    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1998, Book I)]
    [June 24, 1998]
    [Pages 1044-1048]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    [[Page 1044]]

    Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq's Compliance With
    United Nations Security Council Resolutions
    June 24, 1998

    Dear Mr. Speaker:    (Dear Mr. President:)
        Consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
    Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) and as part of my effort to keep the
    Congress fully informed, I am reporting on the status of efforts to
    obtain Iraq's compliance with the resolutions adopted by the United
    Nations Security Council (UNSC). This report covers the period from
    April 3 to the present.

    Introduction

        During the 60-day period covered by this report, Iraq continued to
    provide access to U.N. weapons inspectors as required under the terms of
    the February 23 Annan-Aziz MOU and UNSC Resolution 1154. Travel
    restrictions on Iraq imposed under UNSC Resolution 1137 of November 12,
    1997 expired by their terms after UNSCOM Executive Chairman
    Butler reported that Iraq was complying with
    access requirements. In accordance with UNSC Resolution 1134, regular
    sanctions reviews have resumed. However, Iraq's continued failure to
    meet its obligations under UNSC Resolution 687 and other relevant
    resolutions led the Security Council to conclude on April 27 that Iraq
    still had not met the conditions necessary to enable the Council to lift
    sanctions. Ongoing UNSCOM and IAEA inspections continue to test Iraq's
    long-term intentions with regard to providing full access and full
    disclosure to U.N. weapons inspectors.
        We continue to support the international community's efforts to
    provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people through the
    ``oil-for-food'' program and other humanitarian efforts. Resolution
    1153, which was adopted by the UNSC on February 20, expands the ``oil-
    for-food'' program considerably by raising the ceiling of permitted
    Iraqi oil exports to $5.2 billion every 180 days and by authorizing
    repairs to Iraq's degraded petroleum, health, education, and sanitation
    infrastructure under strict U.N. supervision in accordance with a
    prioritized distribution plan.
        During the period covered by this report, the humanitarian needs of
    the Iraqi people were addressed through Phase Three of the original
    ``oil-for-food'' plan in accordance with UNSCRs 986 and 1143. The Iraqi
    government only recently produced an acceptable distribution plan to
    implement UNSCR 1153.
        On May 1, I signed into law the 1998 Supplemental Appropriations and
    Rescissions Act. This legislation provides funding for Radio Free
    Europe/Radio Liberty to initiate a surrogate broadcast service for the
    Iraqi people. It also provides funding for efforts to support the
    democratic Iraqi opposition in presenting a credible alternative to the
    present Iraqi regime and compiling information to support the indictment
    of Iraqi officials for war crimes. These new programs will enable us to
    redouble our work with the Iraqi opposition to support their efforts to
    build a pluralistic, peaceful Iraq that observes the international rule
    of law and respects basic human rights. Such an Iraq would have little
    trouble regaining its rightful place in the region and in the
    international community.
        The United States will keep a significant military presence in the
    region to provide the full range of military options necessary to deter
    Iraqi aggression, to ensure that UNSC resolutions are enforced, and to
    deal with other contingencies that may arise.

    U.S. and Coalition Force Levels in the Gulf Region

        In view of Saddam's record of brutality
    and unreliability, it is prudent to retain a significant force presence
    in the region to deter Iraq. United States and allied forces now in the
    region are prepared to deal with contingencies. This gives us the
    capability to respond rapidly to possible Iraqi aggression or threats
    against its neighbors. As we make the force adjustments mentioned below,
    we are strengthening a rapid redeployment capability to supplement our
    forces in the Gulf. Our cruise missile force will be twice the pre-
    crisis level. In addition, we will be able to double again our cruise
    missile force in days. Once these moves are completed, this capability
    will allow for a swift, powerful strike.
        The aircraft carrier USS JOHN C. STENNIS and her accompanying battle
    group combatant

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    ships and combat aircraft remain in the region as United States force
    levels are being reduced. The aircraft carriers USS INDEPENDENCE and USS
    GEORGE WASHINGTON and their accompanying battle group combatant ships
    left the region, as scheduled. Once force level adjustments are
    completed, U.S. forces will include land and carrier-based aircraft,
    surface warships, a Marine amphibious task force, Patriot missile
    battalions, a mechanized battalion task force and a mix of special
    operations forces deployed in support of USCINCCENT operations. To
    enhance force protection throughout the region, additional military
    security personnel are also deployed. During the crisis, U.S. forces
    were augmented by HMS ILLUSTRIOUS and accompanying ships from the United
    Kingdom.
        During our successful effort to compel Iraq's compliance with
    relevant UNSC resolutions earlier this year, the United Kingdom and a
    number of other nations pledged forces. Although all of the members of
    this international effort sought a peaceful diplomatic resolution of the
    crisis, all showed their resolve to achieve our common objective by
    military force if that becomes necessary.
        Twenty nations deployed forces to the region or readied their forces
    for contingency deployment. Another 12 nations offered important access,
    basing, overflight, and other assistance essential for the multinational
    effort. Still others identified force contributions that were held in
    reserve for deployment should the need arise. For those nations with
    forces deployed during the crisis, most of these governments redeployed
    their forces back home after the crisis in keeping with our own force
    adjustments. These nations have made clear their willingness to repeat
    this deployment should Iraq again challenge the international community.

    Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch

        The United States and coalition partners continue to enforce the no-
    fly zones over Iraq under Operation Northern Watch and Operation
    Southern Watch. In response to a series of Iraqi no-fly zone violations
    in October and November 1997, we increased the number of aircraft
    participating in these operations. Since then, there have been no
    observed no-fly zone violations. In early April, we restored the
    preexisting level of aircraft deployed to Northern Watch. We have made
    clear to the Government of Iraq and to all other relevant parties that
    the United States and coalition partners will continue to enforce both
    no-fly zones.

    The Maritime Interception Force

        The Maritime Interception Force (MIF), operating under the authority
    of UNSCR 665, vigorously enforces U.N. sanctions in the Gulf. The U.S.
    Navy is the single largest component of this multinational force, but it
    is frequently augmented by ships and aircraft from Australia, Canada,
    Belgium, The Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Today in
    the Gulf, ships from Canada, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
    have joined with us in maritime patrols. Member states of the Gulf
    Cooperation Council support the MIF by providing logistical support and
    shipriders and by accepting vessels diverted for violating U.N.
    sanctions against Iraq.
        Since my last report, the MIF has intercepted several vessels
    involved in illegal smuggling from Iraq. Although petroleum products
    comprise most of the prohibited traffic, the MIF has recently diverted
    vessels engaged in date smuggling as well. Ships involved in smuggling
    have often utilized the territorial seas of Iran to avoid MIF
    inspections. We have provided detailed reports of these illegal
    activities to the U.N. Sanctions Committee in New York.
        The level of petroleum smuggling from Iraq appears to be in a state
    of flux. For several weeks, Iran ceased allowing gasoil smugglers to use
    its territorial seas to avoid the MIF inspections, causing a dramatic
    decrease in the level of gasoil smuggling. In recent weeks, however, we
    have noted ships once again using Iranian waters with the apparent aid
    of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard forces that operate in small boats
    near the mouth of the Shatt Al Arab waterway. It is too early to tell
    what the long-term policy of Iran will be in this matter, although we
    are hopeful that it will take the necessary steps to curb U.N. sanctions
    violations occurring within its territorial seas.
        Our forces continue to benefit from recent actions by the United
    Arab Emirates that make it difficult for sanctions violators to operate
    in UAE territory. We will continue to work with the Emirates to find
    ways to thwart the significant sanctions-busting trade which has
    historically been bound for UAE ports. As noted in my last report, the
    UAE has significantly increased its level of cooperation with the MIF.

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    These efforts have resulted in an increase in the number of ships caught
    with illegal cargoes. In addition, the UAE has prohibited the use of
    tankers, barges, and other vessel types to transport petroleum products
    to UAE ports and through its waters or to store such products there.
    While it is still too early to determine the full effect of these
    measures, we are hopeful that these actions will deal a significant blow
    to sanctions-busting activity in the region.

    Biological and Chemical Weapons

        Iraqi biological and chemical weapons remain the most troubling
    issues for UNSCOM. This is due to the innate dual-use nature of the
    technology; it can easily be hidden within civilian industries, such as
    the pharmaceutical industry for biological agents and the pesticide
    industry for chemical agents. Iraq continues to resist making a full and
    complete declaration of its biological weapons programs, as required by
    UNSCR 707.
        Following its March technical evaluation meetings, UNSCOM concluded
    that Iraq has not provided a clear statement of the current status of
    the programs. Iraq's declaration still contains major mistakes,
    inconsistencies, and gaps. It may substantially understate Iraq's
    production of bulk biological weapons agents. UNSCOM is still unable to
    verify that all of Iraq's SCUD missile warheads filled with biological
    agents--anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin--have been destroyed.
    UNSCOM also suspects Iraq may be concealing additional, as-yet
    undisclosed, biological weapons research or development programs.

    Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Systems

        On May 14, the UNSC adopted a Presidential Statement on the most
    recent UNSCOM and IAEA reports about Iraq's nuclear program. The
    Statement notes that the IAEA's investigations over the past several
    years have yielded a technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine
    nuclear program, but that all outstanding unanswered technical and
    substantive questions must be answered before the UNSC will authorize
    the IAEA to move from inspections to ongoing monitoring and verification
    in the nuclear field. While the bulk of its resources are now devoted to
    monitoring, the IAEA will continue to exercise its right to investigate
    any aspect of Iraq's nuclear program. The IAEA, in a recent report,
    points out that Iraq still has not provided information requested about
    certain sites, that concerns remain as to the completeness, accuracy,
    and internal consistency of Iraq's nuclear declaration and that Iraq has
    failed to enact laws prohibiting certain activities.

    Iraq's Concealment Mechanisms

        From March 26 to April 2 UNSCOM conducted inspections of the so-
    called ``Presidential Sites.'' The inspectors reported that the sites
    appeared to have been ``sanitized'' prior to their visits, and, as
    anticipated, they discovered no materials related to Iraq's WMD programs
    during these inspections. In accordance with relevant UNSC resolutions,
    UNSCOM and the IAEA must be allowed to continue to investigate all
    aspects of Iraq's prohibited programs until they can verify that all
    relevant components have been destroyed under international supervision,
    and that all remaining capabilities have been eliminated. Without such
    verification, Iraq could develop the ability to strike at any city in
    the region--and beyond the region--with devastating biological,
    chemical, and possibly even nuclear weapons.

    Dual-Use Imports

        Resolution 1051 established a joint UNSCOM/IAEA unit to monitor
    Iraq's imports of allowed dual-use items. Iraq must notify the unit
    before it imports specific items which can be used in both weapons of
    mass destruction and civilian applications. Similarly, U.N. members must
    provide timely notification of exports to Iraq of such dual-use items.
        We continue to be concerned that Iraq's land borders are extremely
    porous. Iraq continues substantial trade with its neighbors. There is
    significant potential for evasion of sanctions by land routes, giving
    additional weight to our position that UNSCOM must have full and
    unconditional access to all locations, and be allowed to inspect and
    monitor Iraqi compliance over time.

    The U.N.'s ``Oil-for-Food'' Program

        On February 20, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1153, which
    raises from $2.0 billion to $5.2 billion the amount of oil Iraq is
    authorized to sell every 180 days. Resolution 1153 provides that the
    nutritional and health requirements of the Iraqi people are the top
    priority. My Administration's support for Resolution 1153 is fully
    consistent with long-standing U.S. policy.

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    Since 1990, at the height of the Gulf War, the United States has held
    that the international community's dispute is with Iraq's leadership,
    not its people. The Security Council proposed an ``oil-for-food''
    program in 1991 (UNSCR 706/712), which Iraq rejected. A similar program
    (UNSCR 986) was eventually accepted by Iraq in 1996. We supported the
    expansion of the ``oil-for-food'' program under UNSCR 1153 because it
    will provide additional humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people,
    under strict U.N. supervision, without benefiting the regime.
        Since the beginning of the ``oil-for-food'' program, we have
    consistently worked with the U.N. and other U.N. member states to find
    ways to improve the program's effectiveness to better meet the
    humanitarian needs of Iraq's civilian population. Iraq, however, has
    frequently failed to provide the full cooperation necessary to ensure
    that the program functions smoothly. For example, during calendar year
    1997, the Government of Iraq refused to pump oil under UNSCR 986 for
    more than three months, all the while blaming the U.N. and the United
    States for disruptions in the flow of food and medicine which it had
    caused. The Iraqi government, after much prodding by the U.N. Secretary
    General's office, finally submitted a satisfactory distribution plan to
    the U.N. as called for by UNSCR 1153.
        Resolution 1153 calls for an independent assessment of Iraq's oil
    infrastructure to determine whether it can export $5.2 billion in oil in
    a 180-day period, as provided for in the resolution. This report, which
    was submitted to the UNSC on April 15, recommended that the Sanctions
    Committee approve up to $300 million worth of repairs to Iraq's oil
    infrastructure during the period covered by UNSCR 1153. The United
    States has expressed its intention to support those oil infrastructure
    repairs needed to fund the expanded humanitarian program, provided these
    repairs can be carried out in a manner fully consistent with the
    humanitarian objectives of UNSCR 1153, and that the U.N. is able to
    properly monitor all aspects of the repair process. We are continuing to
    work with members of the Security Council to resolve these concerns.
        Resolution 1153 also maintains the separate program for northern
    Iraq, administered directly by the U.N. in consultation with the local
    population. This program receives 13 to 15 percent of the funds
    generated under the ``oil-for-food'' program. The United States strongly
    supports this provision. The separate northern program was established
    because of the Baghdad regime's proven disregard for the humanitarian
    condition of the Kurdish, Assyrian, and Turkomen minorities of northern
    Iraq and its readiness to apply the most brutal forms of repression
    against them. The well-documented series of chemical weapons attacks a
    decade ago by the government against civilians in the north is only one
    example of this brutality. In northern Iraq, where Baghdad does not
    exercise control, the ``oil-for-food'' program has been able to operate
    unhindered. The Kurdish factions are seeking to set aside their
    differences to work together so that UNSCR 1153 is implemented as
    efficiently as possible. As a result, the contrast between the north and
    the rest of the country is striking.
        The U.N. must carefully monitor implementation of Resolution 1153.
    The Iraqi government continues to insist on the need for rapid lifting
    of the sanctions regime, despite its clear record of noncompliance with
    its obligations under relevant U.N. resolutions--a record which was
    unanimously acknowledged during the Security Council's 38th sanctions
    review on April 27. We will continue to work with the U.N. Secretariat,
    the Security Council, and others in the international community to
    ensure that the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people are met while
    denying any political or economic benefits to the Baghdad regime.

    The Human Rights Situation in Iraq

        The human rights situation throughout Iraq continues to be a cause
    for grave concern. Summary, arbitrary, and extrajudicial executions
    remain a primary concern. On March 10, U.N. Special Rapporteur for Iraq,
    Max Van der Stoel, reported that his
    ongoing investigation had revealed that ``there is strong evidence that
    hundreds of prisoners have been executed in Abu Gharaib and Radwaniyah
    prisons since August 1997.'' According to credible reports, many of
    those killed were serving sentences of 15-20 years for such crimes as
    insulting the regime or being members of an opposition political party.
    Families in Iraq reportedly received the bodies of the executed which
    bore, in some cases, clear signs of torture. In April, the U.N. Human
    Rights Commission issued a strong condemnatory resolution describing
    these and other

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    ongoing Iraqi human rights violations. The resolution extended the
    Special Rapporteur's mandate and condemned the ``all-pervasive
    repression and oppression'' perpetrated by the Government of Iraq.
        In southern Iraq, the government continues to repress the Shi'a
    population, destroying the Marsh Arabs' way of life and the unique
    ecology of the southern marshes. In the north, outside the Kurdish-
    controlled areas, the government continues the forced expulsion of tens
    of thousands of ethnic Kurds and Turkomans from Kirkuk and other cities.
    The government continues to stall and obfuscate attempts to account for
    more than 600 Kuwaitis and third-country nationals who disappeared at
    the hands of Iraqi authorities during or after the occupation of Kuwait.
    In the course of recent prisoner exchanges brokered by the ICRC, Iraq
    has released more than 300 Iranian prisoners of war taken during the
    Iran-Iraq war in exchange for 5,600 Iraqi POWs. Yet the Government of
    Iraq shows no sign of complying with UNSCR 688, which demands that Iraq
    cease the repression of its own people.

    Northern Iraq: PUK-KDP Relations

        In northern Iraq, the cease-fire between the Kurdish parties,
    established in November 1997 as the result of U.S. efforts, continues to
    hold. Both Massoud Barzani, leader of the
    Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have
    made positive, forward-looking statements on political reconciliation,
    and talks between the two groups are now entering their sixth round. We
    will continue our efforts to reach a permanent reconciliation through
    mediation in order to help the people of northern Iraq find the
    permanent, stable settlement which they deserve, and to minimize the
    opportunities for Baghdad and Tehran to insert themselves into the
    conflict and threaten Iraqi citizens in this region. Baghdad continues
    to pressure the two groups to enter into negotiations.

    The United Nations Compensation Commission

        The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), established
    pursuant to UNSCRs 687 and 692, continues to resolve claims against Iraq
    arising from Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The UNCC
    has issued almost 1.3 million awards worth $6 billion. Thirty percent of
    the proceeds from the oil sales permitted by UNSCRs 986, 1111, and 1143
    have been allocated to the Compensation Fund to pay awards and to
    finance operations of the UNCC. To the extent that money is available in
    the Compensation Fund, initial payments to each claimant are authorized
    for awards in the order in which the UNCC has approved them, in
    installments of $2,500. To date, 757 U.S. claimants have received an
    initial installment payment, and payment is still in process for
    approximately another 58 U.S. claimants.

    Conclusion

        Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and security. I
    remain determined to see Iraq comply fully with all of its obligations
    under UNSC resolutions. The United States looks forward to the day when
    Iraq rejoins the family of nations as a responsible and law-abiding
    member.
        I appreciate the support of the Congress for our efforts and shall
    continue to keep the Congress informed about this important issue.
            Sincerely,

                                                          William J. Clinton

    Note: Identical letters were sent to Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House
    of Representatives, and Strom Thurmond, President pro tempore of the
    Senate.