    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1998, Book I)]
    [February 3, 1998]
    [Pages 163-167]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    [[Page 163]]

    Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq's Compliance With
    United Nations Security Council Resolutions
    February 3, 1998

    Dear Mr. Speaker:  (Dear Mr. President:)
        Consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
    Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) and as part of my effort to keep the
    Congress fully informed, I am reporting on the status of efforts to
    obtain Iraq's compliance with the resolutions adopted by the United
    Nations Security Council (UNSC). This report covers the period from
    November 26, 1997, to the present.
        My last report included the U.N.-Iraq stand-off which began on
    October 29, 1997, when the Iraqi government announced its intention to
    expel all U.S. personnel working in Iraq for the U.N. Special Commission
    (UNSCOM). Iraq's apparent aim was to force UNSCOM's withdrawal or to
    significantly restrict its ability to function effectively and
    independently, thereby establishing an environment under which Iraq
    could restore its capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
    without restriction. In November, the members of the U.N. Security
    Council thwarted this effort through joint diplomacy and the use of
    Secretary Council resolutions--backed by the deployment of forces in the
    Gulf. This resulted in the Iraqi government's explicit commitment, on
    November 20, 1997, to allow UNSCOM inspectors, including those who are
    U.S. citizens, to return unhindered to their duties.
        In violation of that commitment and of U.N. Security Council
    Resolution (UNSCR) 687 and subsequent resolutions, including 707, 1134,
    and 1137, Iraq has attempted again to dictate the composition of UNSCOM
    inspection teams and the terms of its compliance with Council
    resolutions. In addition, Iraq has persisted in its efforts to defy the
    Council by unilaterally imposing unacceptable conditions on the
    operations of UNSCOM. This report covering the last 60 days reflects the
    failure of the Government of Iraq to live up to its obligations under
    all applicable UNSC resolutions and its continued hindrance of UNSCOM's
    work.
        In December 1997, the Iraqi government reiterated its longstanding
    refusal to allow any access to all so-called ``Presidential'' sites, and
    said it would limit access to so-called ``sensitive'' sites by UNSCOM
    inspectors.
        On January 5, 1998, an inert rocket-propelled grenade struck a
    building in Baghdad that houses various U.N. elements, including UNSCOM
    headquarters, but caused no injuries. The Iraqi government denied
    responsibility but has yet to arrest any suspects.
        On January 12, the Government of Iraq refused to cooperate with an
    UNSCOM inspection team, declaring that the team was dominated by too
    many ``Anglo-Saxons''. The team had been investigating, among other
    things, allegations that Iraq may have used human beings as experimental
    subjects in chemical and biological warfare development.
        On January 17, the Iraqi government declared a Jihad (holy war)
    against U.N. sanctions and called for 1 million Iraqi citizens to
    undergo military training to prepare for any consequences.
        During the last 60 days, UNSCOM launched two special inspection
    teams that once again targeted Iraq's ``Concealment Mechanism'' in order
    to ferret out WMD programs and documents that UNSCOM--and we--believe
    Iraq stubbornly retains. It became clear that the Iraqis had no
    intention of cooperating with these inspections as specifically called
    for in the most recent UNSCRs on the topic--Resolutions 1134 of October
    23 and 1137 of November 12. The teams were stopped en route, denied
    access, and prevented from video-taping equipment movement or document-
    destruction activity at suspect sites.
        Ambassador Butler, UNSCOM's Executive
    Director, traveled to Baghdad on December 12, 1997, and again on January
    19, 1998, to attempt to obtain Iraqi assurance that UNSCOM can resume
    its work unhindered, including unfettered access to ``Presidential'' and
    ``sensitive'' sites. Following the January 19 meetings, the Iraqis
    continued to defy and challenge UNSCOM by refusing to discuss access to
    ``Presidential'' sites until after Technical Meeting talks have
    concluded in April. As Ambassador Butler reported to the Security
    Council on January 22, the talks were characterized by moments

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    ``of abuse and denunciation of UNSCOM and its professional officers; an
    attempt to apportion literally all blame to UNSCOM, past and present,
    for the fact that the disarmament task has not been completed and
    sanctions on Iraq remained in force.'' Throughout, the UNSC has
    expressed its support for UNSCOM and its mission in five unanimous
    Presidential Statements since October 1997.
        This record of intransigence is only the latest chapter in the long
    history of efforts by the Iraqi regime to flout its obligations under
    relevant UNSC resolutions. Without full disclosure and free access to
    all sites UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) wish
    to inspect, the ongoing monitoring and verification mandated by relevant
    UNSC resolutions, including Resolutions 687, 707 and 715, cannot
    effectively be conducted. UNSCOM must be allowed to continue to
    investigate all of Iraq's programs until it can verify with absolute
    certainty that all the equipment has been destroyed and that all the
    capabilities have been eliminated. Otherwise, Iraq eventually will be
    free to develop the capacity to strike at any city in the Middle East,
    delivering biological, chemical and possibly even nuclear weapons.

    Biological/Chemical Weapons

        Iraqi biological and chemical weapons are currently the most
    troubling issues for UNSCOM. This is due to the innate dual-use nature
    of the technology: biological and chemical agents can easily be hidden
    within civilian sectors, such as the pharmaceutical and pesticide
    industries. Iraq continues to prevent full and immediate access to sites
    suspected of chemical or biological warfare activities. UNSCOM is still
    unable to verify that all of Iraq's SCUD missile warheads filled with
    biological agents--anthrax and botulinum toxin--have been destroyed.

    Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Systems

        The Iraqi regime contends that UNSCOM and the IAEA should ``close
    the books'' on nuclear and missile inspections, but there are still many
    uncertainties and questions that need to be resolved. Iraq has failed to
    answer critical questions on nuclear weapons design and fabrication,
    procurement, and centrifuge enrichment; to provide a written description
    of its post-war nuclear weapons procurement program; and to account for
    major engine components, special warheads, missing propellants, and
    guidance instruments that could be used to assemble fully operational
    missiles.

    U.S. Force Levels

        The U.S. has led international efforts to secure UNSCOM the access
    and cooperation it must have to do its job. As a demonstration of our
    resolve, the aircraft carriers USS NIMITZ, USS GEORGE WASHINGTON, their
    accompanying battle group combatant ships, and additional combat
    aircraft have remained in the region. On January 15, the Government of
    the United Kingdom dispatched the aircraft carrier HMS INVINCIBLE and
    escort ships to the Gulf via the Red Sea.
        United States force levels in the region include land- and carrier-
    based aircraft, surface warships, a Marine amphibious task force, a
    Patriot missile battalion, a mechanized battalion task force, and a mix
    of special operations forces deployed in support of USCINCCENT
    operations. To enhance force protection throughout the region,
    additional military security personnel have been deployed for continuous
    rotation. USCINCCENT continues to monitor closely the security situation
    in the region to ensure adequate force protection is provided for all
    deployed forces.
        The U.S. and its coalition partners continue to enforce the no-fly
    zones over Iraq under Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern
    Watch. In response to a series of Iraqi no-fly zone violations in
    October and November 1997, we increased the number of aircraft
    participating in these operations. There have been no observed no-fly
    zone violations during the period covered by this report. We have
    repeatedly made clear to the Government of Iraq and to all other
    relevant parties that the U.S. and its partners will continue to enforce
    both no-fly zones.
        United Nations Security Council Resolution 949, adopted in October
    1994, demands that Iraq not use its military or any other forces to
    threaten its neighbors or U.N. operations in Iraq and that it not
    redeploy troops or enhance its military capacity in southern Iraq. In
    view of Saddam's accumulating record of
    brutality and unreliability, it is prudent to retain a significant U.S.
    force presence in the region to deter Iraq and respond rapidly to
    possible Iraqi aggression or threats against its neighbors.
        We again take note of and welcome H. Res. 322 of November 13, 1997,
    expressing the sense

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    of the House that the U.S. should act to resolve the crisis in a manner
    that assures full Iraqi compliance with UNSC resolutions regarding the
    destruction of Iraq's capability to produce and deliver WMD. While the
    increased forces in the region give us a wide range of military options
    we remain committed to exhausting all diplomatic options before
    resorting to other alternatives.

    Sanctions

        United Nations sanctions against Iraq were imposed as the result of
    Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. It has been necessary to maintain them
    because of Iraq's failure to comply with all relevant UNSC resolutions,
    including those ensuring the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless
    of Iraq's WMD.
        The Iraqi regime continues to insist on the need for rapid lifting
    of the sanctions regime, despite its record of noncompliance with its
    obligations under relevant resolutions, out of alleged concern for the
    well-being of the Iraqi people, claiming that malnutrition and
    inadequate medical care are the direct result of internationally imposed
    sanctions.
        To the contrary, since their inception, the sanctions against Iraq
    have exempted food and medicines--evidence of the concern of the U.S.
    and the international community for the welfare of the Iraqi people. In
    August 1991, when Iraq claimed that it was unable to pay for its food
    needs, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 706 (and later 712),
    authorizing Iraq to sell limited amounts of petroleum on the
    international market, with the proceeds to be used to purchase
    humanitarian supplies and to fund vital U.N. activities regarding Iraq.
    The Government of Iraq, however, ignored the needs of its own people by
    refusing to accept UNSCR's 706 and 712.
        In April 1995 the Security Council proposed a new oil-for-food offer
    to Iraq in UNSCR 986, sponsored by the U.S. and others. UNSCR 986
    authorized the sale of up to $1 billion of oil every 90 days for a total
    of $2 billion during a 180-day period for Iraq to purchase food,
    medicines, and other ``humanitarian items'' for its people, and to fund
    specified U.N. activities regarding Iraq. The Government of Iraq delayed
    implementation of UNSCR 986 for a year and a half, until December 1996.
        Since December 1996, the Iraqi regime has continued to obstruct and
    delay the relief plan. The regime delayed oil sales for two months in
    June and July 1997 under the second phase of the program (UNSCR 1111),
    and again for over one month in December 1997 and January 1998 under the
    third phase (UNSCR 1143).
        The United States has consistently made clear our openness to
    improving the oil-for-food program to better meet the essential needs of
    Iraq's civilian population. The Secretary General
    has just submitted a report to this effect to the Council. We are
    prepared to consider carefully and favorably the Secretary General's
    suggestions to improve and expand the program. Expanding 986 would serve
    our humanitarian and strategic interests. First, the sanctions regime is
    aimed at the threat Saddam poses--not the
    Iraqi people. We should do whatever we can to ease their plight,
    consistent with our interests. Second, expanding 986 will make it more
    difficult for Saddam to use the plight of his people as a propaganda
    card in the Middle East and so help us shore up the anti-Saddam
    coalition. Third, by expanding oil-for-food, we will broaden and
    strengthen the U.N.'s grip on Iraq's revenues and expenditures,
    tightening the leash on Saddam and making it more difficult for him to
    divert funds to the military and WMD.
        Implementation of UNSCR 1051 continues. It provides for a mechanism
    to monitor Iraq's efforts to reacquire proscribed weapons capabilities
    by requiring Iraq to notify a joint UNSCOM/IAEA unit in advance of any
    imports of dual-use items. Similarly, U.N. members must provide timely
    notification of exports to Iraq of dual-use items.
        The Multinational Interception Force (MIF), operating under the
    authority of UNSCR 665, is aggressively enforcing U.N. sanctions in the
    Gulf. The U.S. Navy is the single largest component of this
    international naval force, augmented by ships and aircraft from
    Australia, Canada, Belgium, The Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United
    Kingdom. Member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council support the MIF
    by providing logistical support and shipriders who ensure that merchant
    ships do not deviate from their recorded courses to legal ports and by
    pulling vessels caught violating sanctions into member state ports.
        Since my last report, the MIF has intercepted five sanctions
    violators in the Gulf. Ships involved in smuggling often utilize the
    territorial seas of Iran to avoid MIF inspections. We have

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    given detailed reports of these illegal activities to the U.N. Sanctions
    Committee in New York.
        The volume of illegal smuggling of petroleum products from Iraq
    continues to increase. Iraq is working to improve loading facilities in
    the Shatt Al Arab waterway and the continuing cooperation of the
    smugglers with Iran frustrates the naval forces which are restricted to
    international waters to carry out their duties. We estimate that over
    200,000 metric tons of gasoil and other petroleum cargoes leave Iraq
    illegally each month. Profits from this illegal trade support Saddam at
    the expense of the Iraqi people.
        The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), established
    pursuant to UNSCR 687 and 692, continues to resolve claims against Iraq
    arising from Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The UNCC
    has issued almost 1.3 million awards worth approximately $6 billion.
    Thirty percent of the proceeds from the oil sales permitted by UNSCR's
    986, 1111, and 1143 have been allocated to the Compensation Fund to pay
    awards and to finance operations of the UNCC. To the extent that money
    is available in the Compensation Fund, initial payments to each claimant
    are authorized for awards in the order in which the UNCC has approved
    them, in installments of $2,500. To date, 455 U.S. claimants have
    received an initial installment payment, and payment is in process for
    an additional 323 U.S. claimants.

    Human Rights

        The human rights situation throughout Iraq continues to be cause for
    grave concern. Reports that the Government of Iraq used humans as
    experimental subjects in its chemical and biological weapons programs
    have been noted above. Credible reports from numerous, independent
    sources indicate that the Government of Iraq also may have summarily
    executed anywhere from 800 to 1500 political detainees in November and
    December 1997. Opposition groups have alleged that many of those killed
    were serving sentences of 15-20 years for such crimes as insulting the
    regime or membership in an opposition political party. Max van der
    Stoel, Special Rapporteur for Iraq for the
    U.N. Human Rights Commission and Bacre Ndiaye,
    the Commission's Special Rapporteur for Summary Executions, are
    investigating these reports.
        Iraq's repression of its Shi'a population continues, with policies
    that are destroying the Marsh Arabs' way of life in southern Iraq and
    the ecology of the southern marshes. Iraq continues to stall and
    obfuscate rather than work in good faith toward accounting for more than
    600 Kuwaitis and third-country nationals who disappeared during or after
    the occupation of Kuwait, and nearly 5,000 Iranian prisoners of war
    captured by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. The Government of Iraq shows
    no sign of complying with UNSCR 688, which demands that Iraq cease the
    repression of its own people. The U.N. Human Rights Commission's Special
    Rapporteur on Iraq reported to the General Assembly his particular
    concern that extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary executions and the
    practice of torture continue to occur in Iraq.
        Led by various independent Iraqi opposition groups and
    nongovernmental organizations, the INDICT campaign--which seeks to
    document crimes against humanity and other violations of international
    humanitarian law committed by the Iraqi regime--continues to gain
    momentum.
        Regarding northern Iraq, the cease-fire between the Kurdish parties,
    established November 24, 1997, as the result of U.S. efforts, continues
    to hold. In recent weeks, both Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and
    Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union
    of Kurdistan (PUK) have made positive, forward-looking statements on
    political reconciliation, which may signal a willingness to settle some
    of their differences. We will continue our efforts to reach a permanent
    settlement through mediation in order to help the people of northern
    Iraq find the permanent, stable accommodation which they deserve, and to
    minimize the opportunities for Baghdad and Tehran to insert themselves
    into the conflict and threaten Iraqi citizens in this region. The Peace
    Monitoring Force--sponsored by the U.S., Great Britain and Turkey under
    the Ankara process and comprising Iraqi Turkomans and Assyrians--remains
    in garrison.

    Conclusion

        Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and security.
    As I told the American people in my recent State of the Union address,
    our country is united in its view that Saddam Hussein cannot defy the will of the world. He has used weapons
    of mass destruction before. We are determined to deny him the capacity
    to use them again. I remain determined to see Iraq comply fully with all
    of its obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions.

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        I appreciate the support of the Congress for our efforts and shall
    continue to keep the Congress informed about this important issue.
            Sincerely,

                                                          William J. Clinton

    Note: Identical letters were sent to Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House
    of Representatives, and Albert Gore, Jr., President of the Senate. This
    letter was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on February 4.