    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1998, Book I)]
    [June 23, 1998]
    [Pages 1027-1029]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval
    Legislation on Missile Proliferation Sanctions
    June 23, 1998

    To the House of Representatives:
        I am returning herewith without my approval H.R. 2709, the ``Iran
    Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1998.''
        H.R. 2709 would require sanctions to be imposed on foreign
    individuals and companies if there is ``credible information indicating
    that'' they transferred certain items or provided certain types of
    assistance that contributed to Iran's missile program, or attempted more
    than once to transfer such items or provide such assistance. These
    sanctions would last at least 2 years and would prohibit sales of
    defense articles and services; exports of certain dual-use items; and
    United States Government assistance.

    [[Page 1028]]

        My Administration unequivocally supports the critical objectives of
    fighting terrorism and taking steps to halt the transfer of missile
    technology to nations whose foreign policy practices and
    nonproliferation policies violate international norms. This legislation,
    however, is indiscriminate, inflexible, and prejudicial to these
    efforts, and would in fact undermine the national security objectives of
    the United States. Taken together, the flaws in H.R. 2709 risk a
    proliferation of indiscriminate sanctioning worldwide.
        Such indiscriminate sanctioning would undermine the credibility of
    U.S. nonproliferation policy without furthering U.S. nonproliferation
    objectives. Indeed, the sweeping application of sanctions likely would
    cause serious friction with many governments, diminishing vital
    international cooperation across the range of policy areas--military,
    political, and economic--on which U.S. security and global leadership
    depend.
        Specifically, H.R. 2709 would require the imposition of sanctions
    based on an unworkably low standard of evidence: ``credible information
    indicating that'' certain transfers or attempted transfers had occurred.
    Such a low standard of evidence could result in the erroneous imposition
    of sanctions on individuals and business entities worldwide--even in
    certain instances when they did not know the true end user of the items.
    The bill would also hinder U.S. efforts to enlist the support of other
    countries to halt the objectionable activities by imposing an
    unreasonable standard for waiving the bill's sanctions. In addition, the
    sanctions proposed by the legislation are disproportionate. A minor
    violation (e.g., the transfer of a few grams of aluminum powder) would
    carry the same penalty as a transfer of major proliferation
    significance. This, too, undermines U.S. credibility and increases
    foreign opposition to U.S. policy.
        H.R. 2709 does not specifically refer to Russia, but it will affect
    that country. The legislation does not allow flexibility sufficient to
    reflect the progress made by the Russian government in formulating
    policies and processes whose goal is to sever links between Russian
    entities and Iran's ballistic missile program. At the urging of the
    United States, President Yeltsin, the Prime
    Minister, Russian security services Chief
    Kovalev, and Russian Defense Minister
    Sergeyev have all made clear that
    proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction is a serious
    threat to Russia's security. They have called for strict control of
    sensitive technologies and stressed the strict penalties that will be
    imposed for violations of Russian law. On January 22 of this year, the
    Russian government issued a ``catch all'' executive order providing
    authority to stop all transfers of dual-use goods and services for
    missiles and weapons of mass destruction programs, and on May 15
    published detailed regulations to implement that order. They have
    recently developed and circulated a list of end users of concern in
    Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Pakistan. In the course of regular and
    active discussion of this issue with the Russian government, the United
    States has raised problem cases involving cooperation between Russian
    entities and the Iranian missile program. We have seen progress in this
    area, and a number of these cases are no longer active concerns.
        Precisely because Russia needs to take effective enforcement steps
    to control the flow of technology, the United States needs to be able to
    work cooperatively with the Russian government to assure further
    progress. H.R. 2709 would undercut the cooperation we have worked to
    achieve with the Russian government without helping us solve the problem
    of technology transfer. The legislation's unilateral nature could also
    hurt our increasing cooperation with Russian government agencies in
    other vital areas such as law enforcement, counter-narcotics, and
    combating transnational crime. Furthermore, Russia would interpret this
    law as an infringement of its sovereignty, affecting our ability to work
    with Russia on broader U.S. policy goals and on regional and global
    issues.
        Finally, Title I of H.R. 2709 is not needed. Existing law, such as
    the missile technology control provisions of the Arms Export Control
    Act, provides a sufficient basis for imposing sanctions to prevent
    missile proliferation to Iran and elsewhere.
        I also note that it is disappointing that the Congress attached
    Title II, the ``Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of
    1997,'' to this problematic and counterproductive bill. Because Chemical
    Weapons Convention (CWC) implementation legislation has not been
    enacted, the United States has not yet fully carried out its obligations
    under the CWC. The CWC implementing legislation has strong bipartisan
    support, and should be passed by the Congress as a free-standing bill
    without further delay. I note, however, that sections 213(e)(2)(B)(iii),
    213(e)(3)(B)(v), and 213(f)

    [[Page 1029]]

    of Title II could interfere with certain of my exclusive constitutional
    powers, and I urge the Congress to correct these constitutional
    deficiencies.
        For the reasons stated, I am compelled to return H.R. 2709 without
    my approval.

                                                          William J. Clinton

    The White House,

    June 23, 1998.