[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1997, Book II)]
[December 18, 1997]
[Pages 1793-1797]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]


[[Page 1793]]


Remarks on the Peace Process in Bosnia and an Exchange With Reporters
December 18, 1997

    The President. Good morning. I want to speak with you today about 
the progress we have made toward a lasting peace in Bosnia and the 
challenges that still must be faced in order to finish the job.
    For nearly 4 years, Bosnia was the battleground for the bloodiest 
war in Europe since World War II. The conflict killed or wounded one out 
of every 10 Bosnians. It drove half the country's people from their 
homes, left 9 out of 10 of them unemployed. We will never be able to 
forget the mass graves, the women and young girls victimized by 
systematic campaigns of rape, skeletal prisoners locked behind barbed-
wire fences, endless lines of refugees marching toward a future of 
despair.
    The war in Bosnia was abhorrent to our values. It also threatened 
our national interests. We've learned the hard way in this century that 
Europe's stability and America's security are joined. The war threatened 
to explode into a broader conflict in the Balkans, endangering the vital 
interests of allies like Greece and Turkey and undermining our efforts 
to build a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe.
    Then, 2 years ago in Dayton, Ohio, American leadership helped to end 
the war in Bosnia. With our allies in NATO and others, we launched an 
extraordinary military and political effort to implement the peace 
agreement. Twenty-four months later, by almost any measure, the lives of 
Bosnia's people are better, and their hopes for the future are brighter.
    Consider what we have achieved together. We ended the fighting and 
the bloodshed, separating rival armies, demobilizing more than 350,000 
troops, destroying almost 6,600 heavy weapons. We helped Bosnians to put 
in place national democratic institutions, including a Presidency, a 
Parliament, a Supreme Court, and hold peaceful and free elections for 
all levels of government, with turnouts exceeding 70 percent. We've 
begun to restore normal life, repairing roads and schools, electricity 
and water, heat and sewage, doubling economic output, quadrupling wages. 
Unemployment in the Bosnian-Croat Federation has been cut from 90 
percent to 50 percent.
    We're helping the Bosnians to provide for their own security, 
training ethnically integrated police forces in the Federation, taking 
the first steps toward a professional democratic police force in the 
Serb Republic. We've helped to turn the media from an instrument of war 
into a force for peace, stifling the inflammatory radio and television 
broadcasts that helped to fuel the conflict. And we've provided a secure 
environment for 350,000 displaced persons to return to their homes, 
while bringing 22 war criminals to justice. Just a few hours ago, SFOR 
captured and transported to The Hague two more war crimes suspects.
    The progress is unmistakable, but it is not yet irreversible. Bosnia 
has been at peace only half as long as it was at war. It remains poised 
on a tightrope, moving toward a better future but not at the point yet 
of a self-sustaining peace. To get there, the people of Bosnia still 
need a safety net and a helping hand that only the international 
community, including the United States, can provide.
    Our assistance must be twofold. First we must intensify our civilian 
and economic engagement. As a result of the progress we've achieved in 
recent months, we know where to focus our efforts. Civilian and 
voluntary agencies working with Bosnian authorities must help to do the 
following things: first, deepen and spread economic opportunity while 
rooting out corruption; second, reform, retrain, and re-equip the 
police; third, restructure the state-run media to meet international 
standards of objectivity and access and establish alternative 
independent media; fourth, help more refugees return home; and fifth, 
make indicted war criminals answer for their crimes, both as a matter of 
justice and because they are stumbling blocks to lasting stability.
    The second thing we must do is to continue to provide an 
international military presence that will enable these efforts to 
proceed in an atmosphere of confidence. Our progress in Bosnia to date 
would not have been possible without the secure environment created 
first by IFOR, now by SFOR. They've allowed dozens of civilian agencies 
and literally hundreds of voluntary

[[Page 1794]]

agencies to do their job in security, laying the foundation for a self-
sustaining peace.
    In authorizing American troops to take part in the SFOR mission, I 
said the mission would end in 18 months, in June of 1998. It was my 
expectation that by that time we would have rebuilt enough of Bosnia's 
economic and political life to continue the work without continuing 
outside military support. But following intensive consultations with my 
national security and military advisers, with our NATO allies, and with 
leaders from both parties in Congress, it has become clear that the 
progress we've seen in Bosnia, in order for it to continue, a follow-on 
military force led by NATO will be necessary after SFOR ends. America is 
a leader of NATO, and America should participate in that force.
    Therefore, I have instructed our representatives in NATO to inform 
our allies that, in principle, the United States will take part in a 
security presence in Bosnia when SFOR withdraws this summer. The 
agreement in principle will become a commitment only when I have 
approved the action plan NATO's military authorities will develop and 
present early next year after careful study of all the options. The 
details of that plan, including the mission's specific objectives, its 
size, and its duration, must be agreed to by all NATO allies.
    Without prejudging the details, let me make clear the key criteria 
the plan must meet for me to approve United States participation:
    First, the mission must be achievable and tied to concrete 
benchmarks, not a deadline. We should have clear objectives that when 
set--when met will create a self-sustaining, secure environment and 
allow us to remove our troops.
    Second, the force must be able to protect itself. Over 2 years we 
have steadily decreased the number of our troops in Bosnia from about 
27,000 Americans in IFOR in 1996 to 8,500 in SFOR today. I hope the 
follow-on force will be smaller, but I will insist it be sufficient in 
number and in equipment to achieve its mission and to protect itself in 
safety.
    Third, the United States must retain command. Time and again, events 
have proven that American leadership is crucial to decisive collective 
action.
    Fourth, our European allies must assume their share of 
responsibility. Now, Europe and our other partners are already doing a 
great deal, providing 3 times as many troops as we are, 5 times as much 
economic assistance, 9 times as many international police, 10 times as 
many refugees have been received by them. And while Bosnia is a 
challenge to American interests and values, the longer term and 
fundamental challenge is to make Bosnia a genuine part of Europe, and we 
hope the Europeans will do more.
    Fifth, the cost must be manageable.
    And sixth and finally, the plan must have substantial support from 
Congress and the American people. I have been pleased by the spirit and 
the substance of our consultations with leading members of both parties. 
As we develop the details of the new NATO mission, these consultations 
must and will continue. I am pleased that Members of both parties in 
both Houses of Congress have accepted my invitation to go to Bosnia with 
me when I leave in a couple of days. All of us have a duty to explain 
the stakes in Bosnia to the American people, and I will do my very best 
to shoulder my responsibility for that.
    Now, some say a lasting peace in Bosnia is impossible and, 
therefore, we should end our efforts now, in June, and/or allow the 
country to be partitioned along ethnic lines. I believe they're 
profoundly wrong. A full and fair reading of Bosnia's history and an 
honest assessment of the progress of the last 23 months simply refutes 
the proposition that the Dayton peace agreement cannot work. But if we 
pull out before the job is done, Bosnia almost certainly will fall back 
into violence, chaos, and ultimately, a war every bit as bloody as the 
one that was stopped.
    And partition is not a good alternative. It would sanction the 
horrors of ethnic cleansing and send the wrong signal to extremists 
everywhere. At best, partition would require a peacekeeping force to 
patrol a volatile border for years to come. More likely it would set the 
stage also for renewed conflict.
    A lasting peace is possible, along the lines of the Dayton peace 
agreement. For decades, Muslims, Croats, and Serbs lived together, 
worked together, raised their families together. Thanks to the 
investments of America and others in Bosnia over the past 2 years, they 
have begun again to lead more normal lives.
    Ultimately, Bosnia's future is in the hands of its own people. But 
we can help them make it a future of peace. We should finish the job we 
began for the sake of that future and in the service of our own 
interests and values.

[[Page 1795]]

    Go ahead. We'll take--yeah.

Benchmarks for Troop Withdrawal

    Q. Mr. President, a number of Americans are understandably going to 
be concerned about an open-ended U.S. military commitment to Bosnia. Can 
you at least assure the American people that by the time you leave 
office, a little more than 3 years from now, those American troops will 
be out of Bosnia?
    The President. In order to answer that, let's go back and see what 
our experience has been. First of all, the big military mission, IFOR, 
really was completed within a year. In fact, it was completed in less 
than a year; that is the robust, large military presence we needed 
there--I think we had over 60,000 total allied troops there--to end the 
war, separate the forces, establish the separation zone between the 
parties. It was achieved quickly and with remarkable peace and 
remarkably low loss of life for all of our allied forces who were there.
    But then we went to the smaller force to try to support the civilian 
implementation of the Dayton agreement. Now, what has happened? An 
enormous amount of progress has been made; we don't believe the peace is 
self-sustaining. I think the responsible thing for me to do, since I do 
not believe we can meet the 18-month deadline, and no one I know now 
believes that, is to say to the American people what the benchmarks are.
    What are the benchmarks? Let's talk about that. Can they be achieved 
in the near-term? I believe they can. Do I think we should have a 
permanent presence in Bosnia? No. I don't believe this is like Germany 
after World War II or in the cold war or Korea after the Korean war. 
This is not what I'm suggesting here. But what are the benchmarks? 
First, let me say the final set of benchmarks must be developed by our 
NATO allies working with us. But let me give you just some of the things 
that I think we ought to be asking ourselves. Number one, are the joint 
institutions strong enough to be self-sustaining after the military 
operation? Number two, have the political parties really given up the 
so-called state-run media that have been instruments of hate and venom? 
Number three, is the civilian police large enough, well-trained enough, 
well-managed enough to do the job it has to do? Number four, do we have 
confidence that the military is under democratic rule?
    Those are just some of the benchmarks. I think, when we go through 
this, I want a full public discussion of it. But I will say again, I 
understand your job is try to get a deadline nailed down, but we tried 
it in this SFOR period, and it turned out we were wrong. I am not 
suggesting a permanent presence in Bosnia. I am suggesting that it's a 
more honest thing to do to say what our objectives are and that these 
objectives should be pursued, and they can be pursued at an affordable 
cost with fair burden-sharing with the Europeans. If that can be done, 
we should pursue them.
    Go ahead.

Prosecution of War Crimes

    Q. Mr. President, the lead prosecutor in the War Crimes Tribunal 
says that Mladic and Karadzic can rest easy because the French won't try 
to capture them. What is the United States willing to do to bring these 
men to justice?
    The President. Well, I don't want to comment on what the prosecutor 
has said about the French. I can tell you this, that we were involved 
this morning with the Dutch, and it was in their sector, and they took 
the lead. They asked us for support just like we were involved with the 
British not very long ago when they made their arrests. And we believe 
that provision of the Dayton agreement is important, as I said again 
today, and we think that all of us who are there should be prepared to 
do what is appropriate to implement it. And I think that, having said 
that, the less I say from then on in, the better.
    We believe the war crimes process is an important part of Dayton. 
The United States, indeed, is supporting an international permanent war 
crimes tribunal even as we speak. We've got countries working on trying 
to establish that.
    Yes.

Benchmarks for Troop Withdrawal

    Q. Mr. President, sir, one of the benchmarks you listed was the 
willingness of the political parties there really to work toward 
progress. Does that not make us hostages of those political figures 
there, particularly those who don't want progress? They can simply 
undermine the attempt to reach that benchmark and keep U.S. troops there 
forever.
    The President. Well, let me--I don't think I was clear about that. 
What I mean is the willingness of the political parties or, whether

[[Page 1796]]

they're willing or not, our capacity to stop them from, in effect, 
perverting the state-run media and using them as an instrument of 
violence and suppression. I don't think it's necessary for us to stay 
until everybody wants to go have tea together at 4 o'clock in the 
afternoon in a civil environment. I think it's--I do think that there 
are--and again let me say, we will make public a final set of benchmarks 
before we go forward with this, and our allies have to work on this. I'm 
just telling you what my thoughts are.
    But if you look at where we've really had problems--or let's flip 
the question; why do we think we still need some military presence there 
after June? I think because we believe there is more venom still in the 
political system than there otherwise would have been if there had been 
no perversion of the so-called state-run media by the political parties 
that control them. We believe that if the joint institutions were 
working a little more effectively they would--the people would see the 
benefits of the joint institutions more than they will by June.
    We're grateful that there are 2,000 civilian police working there. 
And I might say, while the United States has put up 90 percent of the 
money, as I said, the Europeans have put up 90 percent of the personnel 
for the training and the preparation of the civilian police. But there 
should be more.
    So I think that's what we have to do. I do not want to hold us 
hostage to the feelings of the people of Bosnia, although I believe the 
feelings will change as the facts of life change. But I do think we 
should stay there until we believe we've got the job done.
    Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press International].

Prosecution of War Crimes

    Q. Mr. President, how did you get Secretary Cohen on board on this? 
And you know, the whole public perception--unless you go after the 
highest profile alleged war criminals, it doesn't have much of an 
impact. Why the restraint?
    The President. Well, first of all, there are--the circumstances 
under which the SFOR troops will apprehend war criminals have been 
fairly well defined. We did not send SFOR there to mount major military 
campaigns.
    Secondly, I don't want to discuss the circumstances in detail under 
which we might or might not go after anyone. But let me go to the point 
underlying your question--I think it is--which is, can this peace be 
made to work unless Mr. Karadzic is arrested? I mean, let's just sort of 
get to the bottom line here.
    I think the answer to that is, under the right circumstances--that 
is, if he flees the country, if he is deep enough underground, if he 
can't have any impact on it--we might make the peace work anyway. After 
all, a great deal of progress has been made. I would point out that more 
progress has been made in the Bosnian-Croat--the Muslim-Croat Federation 
part of Bosnia economically than in the Serbian part, in part because 
reactionary elements there have resisted doing the right thing across 
the board in many areas.
    Q. Are you considering aid for Serbia in that respect?
    The President. I'm considering--what I'm going to do is to work with 
the allies to implement the Dayton accords. And our position is going to 
be we're going to support the people that are trying to implement the 
Dayton framework; we're going to oppose those who are opposing it, in 
all specifics. If you use that benchwork, I think it will get you there.
    One last question. Go ahead, Wolf [Wolf Blitzer, Cable News 
Network].

Timelines and the Peace Process

    Q. Just to wrap up this by asking you the question that a lot of 
Republican critics of yours are suggesting that your credibility was 
undermined on Bosnia by imposing these two deadlines which you failed to 
meet, and knowing that some of your own advisers at the time were 
saying, ``Don't give these deadlines because they're unrealistic; the 
job can't be done within a year or within 18 months.'' So how do you 
answer your critics now, like Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison or Arlen 
Specter or Newt Gingrich, who say that you have to prove your 
credibility because you failed to honor these two earlier imposed 
deadlines?
    The President. Well, first of all, let me say, I have a 
fundamentally different view of the first deadline. I mean, we did--the 
mission I defined for IFOR was achieved, and it was achieved before a 
year was out. And I was--it's not worth going through and rewriting 
history there about who said what at the time.
    I did think that in 18 months--I honestly believed in 18 months we 
could get this done

[[Page 1797]]

at the time I said it. And it wasn't--I wasn't right, which is why I 
don't want to make that error again. Now, having acknowledged the error 
I made, let's look at what we were right about. Let's flip this around 
before we get too much into who was right about what happened after 18 
months.
    What has happened? With the leadership of the United States, NATO 
and its allies, including Russia, working side by side, ended, almost 
overnight and with virtually no bloodshed, the worst war in Europe since 
World War II. We have seen democratic elections with 70 percent 
participation take place; hundreds of thousands of people have been able 
to go home under circumstances that were difficult, to say the least; 
economic growth has resumed; infrastructure has been rebuilt; the 
conditions of normal life have come back for tens of thousands, hundreds 
of thousands of people.
    So if I take the hit for being wrong about the timetable, I would 
like some acknowledgement that in the larger issue here, the United 
States and its allies were right to undertake this mission and that the 
results of the mission have been very, very good. They have justified 
the effort. And the cost of the mission in lives and treasure to the 
United States and to its allies has been much lower than even the most 
ardent supporters of the mission thought that it would be.
    So I think--I don't mind taking a hit for being wrong about the 
timetable. But after the hit is dished out, I would like the larger 
truth looked at. That is, did we do the right thing? Was it in our 
interests? Did it further our values? Are the American people less 
likely to be drawn into some other conflict in Europe 10, 20, 30 years 
from now where the costs could be far greater if we make this work? I 
think they are.
    And I'd like to close basically with a conversation I had from my 
opponent in the last election, Senator Dole. I want to give him--he said 
something that I thought was very good and pithier than anything I've 
said about this. We had a talk about it the other day on the phone, and 
he said, ``Look,'' he said, ``you know, I didn't necessarily agree with 
all the details about how you got to where you were. But,'' he said, 
``what's happened in Bosnia? It's like we're in a football game. We're 
in the fourth quarter, and we're winning, and some people suggest we 
should walk off the field and forfeit the game. I don't think we should. 
I think we ought to stay here, finish the game, and collect the win.''
    And that's a pretty good analogy. And with due credit to the 
Senator, I appreciate it. I wish I'd have thought of it myself.
    Thank you very much.
    Merry Christmas.

President's New Dog, Buddy

    Q. How is Buddy?
    The President. Good.

Note: The President spoke at 10:15 a.m. in the Briefing Room at the 
White House. In his remarks, he referred to Judge Richard Goldstone, 
Chief Prosecutor, United Nations International War Crimes Tribunal; 
Bosnian-Croat war crimes suspects Vlatko Kupreskic and Anto Furundzija; 
and Bosnian-Serb war crimes suspect Radovan Karadzic, former President 
of the Bosnian-Serb Republic. The President also referred to the NATO-
led Stabilization Force in Bosnia (SFOR) and the NATO-led Implementation 
Force in Bosnia (IFOR). A reporter referred to Bosnian-Serb war crimes 
suspect Ratko Mladic.