[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1997, Book II)]
[November 26, 1997]
[Pages 1670-1675]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]



Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq's Compliance With 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions
November 26, 1997

Dear Mr. Speaker:  (Dear Mr. President:)
    Consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against 
Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) and as part of my effort to keep the 
Congress fully informed, I am reporting on the status of efforts to 
obtain Iraq's compliance with the resolutions adopted by the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC). This report covers the period from 
September 23 to the present.
    Since my last report, the Government of Iraq attempted to defy the 
international community by unilaterally imposing unacceptable conditions 
on the operations of the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM). On October 
29, the Iraqi government announced its intention to expel all U.S. 
personnel working in Iraq for UNSCOM. Iraq's aim appears to have been to 
establish an environment under which it could restore its capacity to 
develop weapons of mass destruction without restriction. For 3 weeks, 
the Government of Iraq refused to allow American UNSCOM personnel to 
enter the country or to participate in site inspections, expelled UNSCOM 
personnel who are U.S. citizens, threatened the safety of the U.S. Air 
Force U-2 aircraft that flies missions for UNSCOM, tampered with UNSCOM 
monitoring equipment, removed UNSCOM cameras, moved and concealed 
significant pieces of dual-use equipment, and imposed additional 
unacceptable conditions on continued operations of UNSCOM. Two 
confrontational actions were undertaken in an atmosphere of strident, 
threatening Iraqi rhetoric, the dispersal of Iraqi armed forces as if in 
preparation for a military conflict, and the placement of innocent 
civilian ``human shields'' at military sites and at many of Saddam 
Hussein's palaces in violation of international norms of conduct.
    On November 20, having obtained no agreement from the U.N. or the 
United States to alter UNSCOM or the sanctions regime--indeed, having 
obtained none of its stated objectives--the Iraqi government announced 
that it would allow UNSCOM inspectors who are U.S. citizens to return to 
their duties. This encouraging development, however, will be ultimately 
tested by Saddam Hussein's actions, not his words. It remains to be seen 
whether the Government of Iraq will now live up to its obligations under 
all applicable UNSC resolutions, including its commitment to allow 
UNSCOM to perform its work unhindered.
    As expressed unanimously by the five permanent members (P-5) of the 
Security Council meeting in Geneva November 20, the will of the entire 
international community is for the unconditional decision of Iraq to 
allow the return of UNSCOM inspectors to Iraq in their previous 
composition. I must note that the United States was not briefed on, did 
not endorse, and is not bound by anything other than the terms of the P-
5 statement. Neither the United States nor the U.N. are bound by any 
bilateral agreement between Russia and Iraq. We will carefully monitor 
events and will continue to be prepared for any contingency. Iraq's 
challenge was issued, in part, in response to U.N. Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 1134, of October 23, in which the Security Council 
condemned Iraq's flagrant violations of

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relevant Security Council resolutions and expressed its firm intention 
to impose travel restrictions on the Iraqi leadership if the long-
standing pattern of obstruction and harassment of UNSCOM personnel 
continued. In the debate of UNSCR 1134, not one nation on the Security 
Council questioned the need to continue sanctions. The only serious 
debate was over when and how to impose additional sanctions. UNSCR 1134 
was based on the UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) 6-month reports to the UNSC that indicated that the Government of 
Iraq has not provided the ``substantial compliance'' called for in UNSCR 
1115 of June 21, 1997--especially regarding immediate, unconditional and 
unrestricted access to facilities for inspection and to officials for 
interviews.
    On November 12 the resolve of the international community was 
further demonstrated when the Security Council voted unanimously to 
adopt UNSCR 1137--the first new sanctions against Iraq since the Gulf 
War--condemning Iraq's continued violations of its obligations and 
imposing restrictions on the travel of all Iraqi officials and armed 
forces members responsible for or participating in noncompliance. The 
UNSC in a Presidential Statement condemned Iraq again upon the actual 
expulsion of the American UNSCOM personnel. The UNSC's solidarity was 
reflected as well in the UNSCOM Executive Chairman's and IAEA Director's 
decisions that all UNSCOM and IAEA personnel should depart Iraq rather 
than accede to the Iraqi demand that no American participate in 
inspection activities.
    As a demonstration of our firm resolve to support the U.N., I 
directed the deployment of the USS GEORGE WASHINGTON, escort ships, and 
additional combat aircraft to the region. In this regard we take note of 
and welcome House Resolution 322 expressing the sense of the House that 
the United States should act to resolve the crisis in a manner that 
assures full Iraqi compliance with UNSC resolutions regarding the 
destruction of Iraq's capability to produce and deliver weapons of mass 
destruction. While the addition of these forces gives us a wide range of 
military options, should they be necessary, we remain firmly committed 
to finding a diplomatic solution.
    The ongoing crisis is only one chapter in the long history of 
efforts by the Iraqi regime to flout its obligations under UNSC 
resolutions. Iraq has persistently failed to disclose fully its programs 
for weapons of mass destruction. It admits to moving significant pieces 
of dual-use equipment subject to monitoring. Without full disclosure, 
UNSCOM and the IAEA cannot effectively conduct the ongoing monitoring 
and verification mandated by UNSCR's 687, 707, 715, and other relevant 
resolutions.
    Iraqi biological and chemical weapons are currently the most 
troubling issues for UNSCOM. This is due to the innate dual-use nature 
of the technology--how easily it can be hidden within civilian 
industries such as, for biological agents--the pharmaceutical industry, 
and for chemical agents--the pesticide industry. In both cases, Iraq 
continues to prevent full and immediate access to sites suspected of 
chemical or biological warfare activities. Until 2 months ago, for 
example, major aspects of Iraq's pernicious ``VX'' program (a powerful 
nerve agent) were unknown to UNSCOM due to Iraqi concealment. UNSCOM is 
still unable to verify that all of Iraq's SCUD missile warheads filled 
with biological agents--anthrax and botulinum toxin--have been 
destroyed. When UNSCOM says it is making ``significant progress'' in 
these areas, it is referring to UNSCOM's progress in ferreting out Iraqi 
deception, not Iraqi progress in cooperating with UNSCOM.
    The Iraqi regime contends that UNSCOM and the IAEA should ``close 
the books'' on nuclear and missile inspections. But there are still many 
uncertainties and questions that need to be resolved. Among the many 
problems, Iraq has:
    failed to answer critical questions on nuclear weapons 
            design and fabrication, procurement, and centrifuge 
            enrichment;
    failed to detail how far the theoretical and practical 
            aspects of its clandestine nuclear efforts progressed;
    failed to explain in full the interaction between its 
            nuclear warhead and missile design programs;
    failed to provide a written description of its post-war 
            nuclear weapons procurement program;
    failed to account for major engine components, special 
            warheads, missing propellants, and guidance instruments that 
            could be used to assemble fully operational missiles; and

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    failed to discuss--on the direct orders of Tariq Aziz--its 
            actions to retain missile launchers.
    In accordance with relevant UNSCR's, UNSCOM must continue to 
investigate the Iraqi nuclear and missile programs until it can verify 
with absolute certainty that all the equipment has been destroyed and 
that all the capabilities have been eliminated. Otherwise, Iraq will be 
able to strike at any city in the Middle East, delivering devastating 
biological, chemical, and even nuclear weapons.
    UNSCOM's work must include vigorous efforts to unveil Iraq's 
``Concealment Mechanism.'' Led by elements of its special security 
services, Iraq has for over 6-years engaged in a massive and elaborate 
campaign to keep UNSCOM inspectors from finding proscribed equipment, 
documents, and possibly weapons themselves. Over the years, inspection 
teams have been prevented from doing their jobs and held--often at 
gunpoint--outside suspect facilities, providing enough time for evidence 
to be hidden or destroyed. To rout out Iraq's remaining weapons of mass 
destruction, UNSCOM must be granted full access to all sites, without 
exception.
    The Iraqi regime contends that it has been forced to defy the 
international community in this manner out of concern for the well-being 
of the Iraqi people, claiming that malnutrition and inadequate medical 
care are the direct result of internationally imposed sanctions. To the 
contrary, the deep concern of the United States and the international 
community about the condition of the Iraqi people is evident in the fact 
that the international sanctions against Iraq have been carefully 
structured to help ensure that ordinary Iraqis need not suffer. Since 
their inception, the sanctions against Iraq have had exceptions for the 
importation into Iraq of foods and medicines. In August 1991, when Iraq 
claimed that it was unable to pay for its food needs, the Security 
Council adopted UNSCR 706 (and later 712), authorizing Iraq to sell 
limited amounts of petroleum on the international market, with the 
proceeds to be used to purchase humanitarian supplies, and to fund vital 
U.N. activities regarding Iraq. The Government of Iraq, however, ignored 
the needs of its own people, by refusing to accept UNSCR's 706 and 712.
    In April 1995 the Security Council proposed a new oil-for-food offer 
to Iraq in UNSCR 986, sponsored by the United States and others. UNSCR 
986 authorized the sale of up to $1 billion of oil every 90 days for 
Iraq to purchase food, medicines, and other ``humanitarian items'' for 
its people. The Government of Iraq delayed implementation of UNSCR 986 
for a year and a half, until December 1996.
    Since December 1996, the Iraqi regime has continued to obstruct the 
relief plan. It has reduced the food ration for each person, even as 
more food was flowing into the country. In fact, there are credible 
reports that as food imports under UNSCR 986 increased, the regime 
reduced its regular food purchases, potentially freeing up money for 
other purposes. There are also reports that Iraq may have stockpiled 
food in warehouses for use by the military and regime supporters--even 
though the Iraqi people need the food now. Under UNSCR 1111--the 6-month 
renewal of UNSCR 986 passed in June 1997--the regime delayed oil sales 
for 2 months, even while it claimed its people were starving. In 
Baghdad, the regime staged threatening demonstrations against U.N. 
relief offices. Under both UNSCR's 986 and 1111, the U.N. Sanctions 
Committee has had to carefully consider each and every import contract 
because of the possibility that Iraq may slip orders for dual-use items 
that can be employed to make weapons into long lists of humanitarian 
goods.
    Since 1990--even at the height of the Gulf War--the consistent 
position of the United States has been that this dispute is with Iraq's 
regime, not with its people. We have always been open to suggestions on 
how UNSCR's 986 and 1111 can be improved or expanded to better serve the 
needs of the people. The confrontational tactics of the Iraqi government 
have not altered this position.
    Sanctions against Iraq were imposed as the result of Iraq's invasion 
of Kuwait. It has been necessary to sustain them because of Iraq's 
failure to comply with relevant UNSC resolutions, including those to 
ensure that Saddam Hussein is not allowed to resume the unrestricted 
development and production of weapons of mass destruction. Prior to the 
Gulf War, Saddam had already used chemical weapons on the Iraqi people 
and on Iranian troops, and he threatened to use them on coalition forces 
and innocent civilians in Saudi Arabia and Israel during the Gulf War. 
By restricting the amount of oil he can sell to a level that provides 
for the needs of the Iraqi people but does not allow him to

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pursue other, nonhumanitarian objectives, international sanctions make 
it virtually impossible for Saddam to gear up his weapons programs to 
full strength.
    Saddam could end the suffering of his people tomorrow if he would 
cease his obstruction of the oil-for-food program and allow it to be 
implemented properly. He could end sanctions entirely if he would 
demonstrate peaceful intentions by complying fully with relevant UNSC 
resolutions. The United States has supported and will continue to 
support the sanctions against the Iraqi regime until such time as 
compliance is achieved.
    Saddam Hussein remains a threat to his people, to the region, and to 
the world, and the United States remains determined to contain the 
threat posed by his regime. The United States looks forward to the day 
when Iraq rejoins the family of nations as a responsible and law-abiding 
member but until then, containment must continue.
    Regarding military operations, the United States and its coalition 
partners continue to enforce the no-fly zones over Iraq under Operation 
Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch. We have detected myriad 
intentional Iraqi violations of both no-fly zones. While these incidents 
(Iraqi violations of the no-fly zones) started several hours after an 
Iranian air raid on terrorist bases inside Iraq, it was clear that 
Iraq's purpose was to try and test the coalition to see how far it could 
go in violating the ban on flights in these regions. A maximum effort by 
Operation Southern Watch forces complemented by early arrival in theater 
of the USS NIMITZ battle group, dramatically reduced violations in the 
southern no-fly zone. An increase in the number of support aircraft 
participating in Northern Watch allowed increased operating capacity 
that in turn significantly reduced the number of violations in the 
north. We have repeatedly made clear to the Government of Iraq and to 
all other relevant parties that the United States and its partners will 
continue to enforce both no-fly zones, and that we reserve the right to 
respond appropriately and decisively to any Iraqi provocations.
    United States force levels include land- and carrier-based aircraft, 
surface warships, a Marine amphibious task force, a Patriot missile 
battalion, a mechanized battalion task force, and a mix of special 
operations forces deployed in support of USCINCCENT operations. To 
enhance force protection throughout the region, additional military 
security personnel have been deployed for continuous rotation. 
USCINCCENT continues to monitor closely the security situation in the 
region to ensure adequate force protection is provided for all deployed 
forces.
    United Nations Security Council Resolution 9491 adopted in October 
1994, demands that Iraq not use its military or any other forces to 
threaten its neighbors or U.N. operations in Iraq and that it not 
redeploy troops or enhance its military capacity in southern Iraq. In 
view of Saddam's accumulating record of unreliability, it is prudent to 
retain a significant U.S. force presence in the region in order to deter 
Iraq and maintain the capability to respond rapidly to possible Iraqi 
aggression or threats against its neighbors.
    Implementation of UNSCR 1051 continues. It provides for a mechanism 
to monitor Iraq's efforts to reacquire proscribed weapons capabilities 
by requiring Iraq to notify a joint unit of UNSCOM and the IAEA in 
advance of any imports of dual-use items. Similarly, U.N. members must 
provide timely notification of exports to Iraq of dual-use items.
    The human rights situation throughout Iraq remains unchanged. Iraq's 
repression of its Shi'a population continues, with policies that are 
destroying the Marsh Arabs' way of life in southern Iraq and the ecology 
of the southern marshes. The United Nations, in its most recent reports 
on implementation of Resolution 986, recognized that the Government of 
Iraq continues forcibly to deport Iraqi citizens from Kirkuk and other 
areas of northern Iraq still under the Iraqi government's control. Iraq 
continues to stall and obfuscate rather than work in good faith toward 
accounting for the hundreds of Kuwaitis and third-country nationals who 
disappeared at the hands of Iraqi authorities during the occupation of 
Kuwait. The Government of Iraq shows no signs of complying with UNSC 
Resolution 688, which demands that Iraq cease the repression of its own 
people. The U.N. Human Rights Commission's special rapporteur on Iraq 
reported to the General Assembly of his particular concern that 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and the practice of 
torture continue to occur in Iraq.
    The INDICT campaign continues to gain momentum. Led by various 
independent Iraqi opposition groups and nongovernmental organizations, 
this effort seeks to document crimes

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against humanity and other violations of international humanitarian law 
committed by the Iraqi regime. We applaud the tenacity of the Iraqi 
opposition in the face of one of the most repressive regimes in history. 
We also take note of and welcome H.Con.Res. 137 of November 12, 
expressing the sense of the House of Representatives concerning the need 
for an international criminal tribunal to try members of the Iraqi 
regime for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
    Regarding northern Iraq, our efforts to help resolve the differences 
between Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 
and Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 
have not yet yielded the type of permanent, stable settlement that the 
people of northern Iraq deserve. The Peace Monitoring Force--sponsored 
by the United States, Great Britain, and Turkey under the Ankara Process 
and comprising Iraqi Turkomans and Assyrians--was forced to withdraw 
from the agreed cease-fire line between the two groups, when PUK forces, 
joined by the terrorist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) launched a wide-
scale attack on the KDP on October 13. The KDP, supported by airstrikes 
and ground elements of the Turkish army, launched a counterattack on 
November 8. We have helped to arrange a number of temporary cease-fires 
and to restore humanitarian services in the course of this fighting, but 
the underlying causes for conflict remain. We will continue our efforts 
to reach a permanent settlement through mediation in order to minimize 
opportunities for Baghdad and/or Tehran to insert themselves into the 
conflict and threaten Iraqi citizens in this region.
    The Multinational Interception Force (MIF) continues its important 
mission in the Arabian Gulf. The U.S. Navy provides the bulk of the 
forces involved in the maritime sanctions enforcement authorized under 
Resolution 665, although we receive much-needed help from a number of 
close allies, including during the past year: Belgium, Canada, The 
Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.
    Illegal smuggling of Iraqi gasoil from the Shatt Al Arab waterway in 
violation of Resolution 661 has doubled since May of this year--reaching 
an estimated 180,000 metric tons per month--and continues to increase. 
The smugglers use the territorial waters of Iran with the complicity of 
the Iranian government that profits from charging protection fees for 
these vessels to avoid interception by the MIF in international waters. 
Cash raised from these illegal operations is used to purchase contraband 
goods that are then smuggled back into Iraq by the same route. We 
continue to brief the U.N. Sanctions Committee regarding these 
operations and have pressed the Committee to compel Iran to give a full 
accounting of its involvement. We have also worked closely with our MIF 
partners and Gulf Cooperation Council states to take measures to curb 
sanctions-breaking operations.
    The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), established 
pursuant to UNSCR 687 and 692, continues to resolve claims against Iraq 
arising from Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The UNCC 
has issued almost 1.3 million awards worth approximately $6 billion. 
Thirty percent of the proceeds from the oil sales permitted by UNSCR's 
986 and 1111 have been allocated to the Compensation Fund to pay awards 
and to finance operations of the UNCC, and these proceeds will continue 
to be allocated to the Fund under UNSCR 1111. To the extent that money 
is available in the Compensation Fund, initial payments to each claimant 
are authorized for awards in the order in which the UNCC has approved 
them, in installments of $2,500. To date, 455 U.S. claimants have 
received an initial installment payment, and payment is in process for 
an additional 487 U.S. claimants.
    Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and security. I 
remain determined to see Iraq comply fully with all of its obligations 
under U.N. Security Council resolutions. My Administration will continue 
to sustain and strengthen sanctions until Iraq demonstrates its peaceful 
intentions through such compliance.
    I appreciate the support of the Congress for our efforts and shall 
continue to keep the Congress informed about this important issue.
        Sincerely,

                                                      William J. Clinton

Note: Identical letters were sent to Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House 
of Representatives, and Strom Thurmond, President pro tempore of the 
Senate. In the letter, the President referred to Richard Butler, 
Executive Chairman, United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM); Hans

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Blix, Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency; and Deputy 
Prime Minister Tariq Aziz of Iraq. This letter was released by the 
Office of the Press Secretary on December 1.