[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1997, Book II)]
[November 12, 1997]
[Pages 1542-1546]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]



Message to the Congress on Continuation of the National Emergency With 
Respect to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
November 12, 1997

To the Congress of the United States:
    On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation 
of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass 
destruction''--(WMD)) and of the means of delivering such weapons, I 
issued Executive Order 12938, and declared a national emergency under 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et 
seq.). Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of 
its declaration, unless I publish in the Federal Register and transmit 
to the Congress a notice of its continuation.
    The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to pose 
an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign 
policy, and economy of the United States. Therefore, I am advising the 
Congress that the national emergency declared on November 14, 1994, and 
extended on November 14, 1995 and November 14, 1996, must continue in 
effect beyond November 14, 1997. Accordingly, I have extended the 
national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938 and have sent the 
attached notice of extension to the Federal Register for publication.
    The following report is made pursuant to section 204(c) of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)) and 
section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), 
regarding activities taken and money spent pursuant to the emergency 
declaration. Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical 
and biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation efforts is contained in 
the most recent annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and 
Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, 
provided to the Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 
102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation Report,'' and the most 
recent annual report provided to the Congress pursuant to section 308 of 
the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act 
of 1991 (Public Law 102-182), also known as the ``CBW Report.''

[[Page 1543]]

Chemical and Biological Weapons

    The three export control regulations issued under the Enhanced 
Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) remained fully in force and 
continue to be applied in order to control the export of items with 
potential use in chemical or biological weapons or unmanned delivery 
systems for weapons of mass destruction.
    Chemical weapons continue to pose a very serious threat to our 
security and that of countries friendly to us. On April 29, 1997, the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the 
``Chemical Weapons Convention'' or (CWC)) entered into force with 87 of 
the CWC's 165 signatories as original States Parties. The United States 
was among their number, having deposited its instrument of ratification 
on April 25. As of November 5, 104 countries had become States Parties.
    Russia did not complete its legislative approval process in time to 
be among the original CWC States Parties. In our March meeting in 
Helsinki, President Yeltsin did, however, assure me of his understanding 
of the importance of the CWC to Russia's own security. On October 31, 
1997, the Russian Duma (lower house) approved ratification of the CWC. 
On November 5, 1997, the Russian Federation Council unanimously approved 
the CWC and the Russian government deposited its instrument of 
ratification. Russia's ratification makes it possible for Russia to join 
the United States in playing a leadership role in ensuring that all of 
the Convention's benefits are realized.
    Given Russia's financial situation during this difficult period of 
transition to a market economy, serious concerns have been raised about 
the high costs of environmentally sound destruction of the large stocks 
of chemical weapons Russia inherited from the former Soviet Union. 
Through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, we are working with 
Russia to help address these complex problems, and we will continue to 
do so now that Russia has ratified the CWC.
    The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has 
been established to achieve the object and purpose of the CWC, to ensure 
the implementation of its provisions and provide a forum for 
consultation and cooperation among States Parties. The executive organ 
of the OPCW, the Executive Council, has met five times since May to 
oversee decisions related to inter alia data declarations, inspections, 
and organizational issues. The United States plays an active role in 
ensuring effective implementation of the Convention.
    The CWC is an ambitious undertaking by the world community to ban an 
entire class of weapons of mass destruction. Its members have committed 
themselves to totally eliminating chemical weapons stocks and production 
facilities, prohibiting chemical weapons-related activities, banning 
assistance for such activities and restricting trade with non-Parties in 
certain relevant chemicals. Destruction of U.S. chemical weapons stocks 
is moving forward. Other CWC States Parties have now taken on a similar 
task, and we are working hard with the other members of the CWC to make 
membership in this treaty universal.
    The United States is determined to ensure full implementation of the 
concrete measures in the CWC that will raise the costs and the risks for 
any state or terrorist attempting to engage in chemical weapons-related 
activities. The CWC's declaration requirements will improve our 
knowledge of possible chemical weapons activities, whether conducted by 
countries or terrorists. Its inspection provisions provide for access to 
declared and undeclared facilities and locations, thus making 
clandestine chemical weapons production and stockpiling more difficult, 
more risky, and more expensive.
    Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically isolated 
and banned from trading with States Parties in certain key chemicals. 
The relevant Treaty provision is specifically designed to penalize in a 
concrete way countries that refuse to join the rest of the world in 
eliminating the threat of chemical weapons.
    The United States also continues to play a leading role in the 
international effort to reduce the threat from biological weapons. We 
are an active participant in the Ad Hoc Group striving to create a 
legally binding protocol to strengthen and enhance compliance with the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
Their Destruction (the ``Biological Weapons Convention'' or (BWC)). This 
Ad Hoc Group was mandated by the September 1994 BWC Special Conference. 
The Fourth BWC Review Conference, held in November 1996, commended the 
work done by the Ad Hoc Group and urged it to complete

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the protocol as soon as possible but not later than the next Review 
Conference to be held in 2001. A draft rolling text was introduced by 
the Chairman at the July Ad Hoc Group session. Work is progressing on 
insertion of national views and clarification of existing text, largely 
drawn from the consultative phase of Ad Hoc Group work since 1994. 
Three-week sessions are scheduled for January, July, and September of 
1998. Another 2-week session will be scheduled for either March or 
December of 1998. Early completion of an effective BWC protocol is high 
on our list of nonproliferation goals.
    The United States continues to be a leader in the Australia Group 
(AG) chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation regime. Last year, 
the United States supported the entry into the AG of the Republic of 
Korea, which became the group's 30th member in time for the October 1996 
plenary.
    The United States attended this year's annual AG plenary session 
from October 6-9, 1997, during which the Group continued to focus on 
strengthening AG export controls and sharing information to address the 
threat of CBW terrorism. At the behest of the United States, the AG 
first began in-depth political-level discussion of CBW terrorism during 
the 1995 plenary session following the Tokyo subway nerve gas attack 
earlier that year. At the 1996 plenary, the United States urged AG 
members to exchange national points of contact for AG terrorism matters. 
At the 1997 plenary, the AG accepted a U.S. proposal to survey all AG 
members on efforts each has taken to counter this threat.
    The Group also reaffirmed the members' collective belief that full 
adherence to the CWC and the BWC is the best way to achieve permanent 
global elimination of CBW, and that all states adhering to these 
Conventions have an obligation to ensure that their national activities 
support this goal.
    AG participants continue to seek to ensure that all relevant 
national measures promote the object and purposes of the BWC and CWC. 
The AG nations reaffirmed their belief that existing national export 
licensing policies on chemical weapons-related items fulfill the 
obligation established under Article I of the CWC that States Parties 
never assist, in any way, the acquisition of chemical weapons. Given 
this understanding, the AG members also reaffirmed their commitment to 
continuing the Group's activities now that the CWC has entered into 
force.
    The AG also reaffirmed its commitment to continue to provide 
briefings for non-AG countries, and to promote regional consultations on 
export controls and nonproliferation to further awareness and 
understanding of national policies in these areas.
    During the last 6 months, we continue to examine closely 
intelligence and other reports of trade in chemical weapons-related 
material and technology that might require action, including evaluating 
whether sanctions under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and 
Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 were warranted. In May 1997, we imposed 
sanctions on seven Chinese entities and one Hong Kong company for 
knowingly and materially contributing to Iran's CW program through the 
export of dual-use chemical precursors and/or chemical production 
equipment and technology. In September 1997, we imposed sanctions on a 
German citizen and a German company determined to have been involved in 
the export of chemical production equipment to Libya's CW program.
    The United States continues to cooperate with its AG partners in 
stopping shipments of proliferation concern. By sharing information 
through diplomatic and other channels, we and our AG partners have been 
successful in interdicting various shipments destined to CBW programs.

Missiles for Weapons of Mass Destruction Delivery

    During the reporting period, the United States carefully controlled 
exports that could contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons 
of mass destruction and closely monitored activities of potential 
missile proliferation concern. We also continued to implement U.S. 
missile sanctions law, in cases where sanctionable activity was 
determined to have occurred. In August 1997, we imposed sanctions 
against two North Korean entities determined to have engaged in missile 
proliferation activities. Similar sanctions imposed in May 1996 remain 
in effect against two entities in Iran and one entity in North Korea for 
transfers involving Category II Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
Annex items.
    During this reporting period, MTCR Partners continued to share 
information about proliferation problems with each other and with other 
potential supplier, consumer, and transshipment states. Partners also 
emphasized the need for

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implementing effective export control systems. This cooperation has 
resulted in the interdiction of missile-related materials intended for 
use in missile programs of concern.
    The United States was an active participant in the MTCR's June 1997 
Reinforced Point of Contact Meeting (RPOC). At the RPOC, MTCR Partners 
engaged in useful discussions of regional missile proliferation 
concerns, as well as steps the Partners could take to increase 
transparency and outreach to nonmembers.
    In July 1997, the United States also played a leading role at the 
Swiss-hosted MTCR workshop on the licensing and enforcement aspects of 
transshipment. The workshop was successful in focusing attention on the 
enforcement problems raised by proliferators' misuse of transshipment 
and fostered a productive exchange of ideas on how countries can better 
address such activity.
    The United States worked unilaterally and in coordination with its 
MTCR Partners to combat missile proliferation and to encourage 
nonmembers to export responsibly and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. 
Since the last report, we have continued our missile nonproliferation 
dialogue with China, the Republic of Korea (ROK), North Korea (DPRK), 
and Ukraine. In the course of normal diplomatic relations, we also have 
pursued such discussions with other countries in Central Europe, the 
Middle East, and Asia.
    In June 1997, the United States and the DPRK held a second round of 
missile talks, aimed at freezing the DPRK's indigenous missile 
development program and curtailing its missile-related export 
activities. The DPRK appeared willing to consider limits on its missile-
related exports, in return for sanctions-easing measures, but did not 
engage in discussion of limits on its missile development program. We 
intend to pursue further missile talks with the DPRK.
    In July 1997, we held another round of nonproliferation talks with 
the ROK. These talks were productive and made progress toward 
facilitating ROK membership in the MTCR.
    In response to reports that Iran had acquired sensitive items from 
Russian entities for use in Iran's missile development program, the 
United States intensified its high-level dialogue with Russia on this 
issue. We held a number of productive discussions with senior Russian 
officials aimed at finding ways the United States and Russia can work 
together to prevent Iran's ballistic missile development program from 
acquiring Russian technology and equipment. This process is continuing.

Nuclear Weapons

    In a truly historic landmark in our efforts to curb the spread of 
nuclear weapons, the 50th U.N. General Assembly on September 10, 1996, 
adopted and called for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT), negotiated over the previous 2\1/2\ years in the 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The overwhelming passage of this 
U.N. resolution (158-3-5) demonstrates the CTBT's strong international 
support and marks a major success for United States foreign policy. On 
September 24, 1996, I and other international leaders signed the CTBT in 
New York.
    During 1997, CTBT signatories have conducted numerous meetings of 
the Preparatory Commission in Vienna, seeking to promote rapid 
completion of the International Monitoring System established by the 
Treaty. On September 23, I transmitted the CTBT to the Senate, 
requesting prompt advice and consent to ratification.
    The CTBT will serve several United States national security 
interests in banning all nuclear explosions. It will constrain the 
development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; end the 
development of advanced new types; contribute to the prevention of 
nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear disarmament; and 
strengthen international peace and security. The CTBT marks an historic 
milestone in our drive to reduce the nuclear threat and to build a safer 
world.
    Formal preparations for the year 2000 Review Conference for the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) began in 1997 
with the first of three annual Preparatory Committee meetings of the 
Parties to the Treaty. The United States is committed to working to 
ensure that the 2000 NPT review Conference will further strengthen the 
NPT and reinforce global nuclear nonproliferation objectives. Since the 
1995 NPT Conference, eight additional states have joined the NPT, 
leaving only five states worldwide currently outside the NPT regime. The 
NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee added China to its membership in 1997.
    The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) continued its efforts to upgrade 
control lists and export control procedures. NSG members confirmed

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their agreement to clarifications to the nuclear trigger list to accord 
with trigger list changes agreed to by the members of the NPT Exporters 
(Zangger) Committee, and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
published these understandings on September 16, 1997. The NSG also is 
actively pursuing steps to enhance the transparency of the export regime 
in accordance with the call in Principles 16 and 17 of the 1995 NPT 
Review and Extension Conference.
    The NSG held an export control seminar in Vienna on October 8 and 9, 
1997, which described and explained the role of the NSG (and the Zangger 
Committee) in preventing nuclear proliferation. The NSG also continued 
efforts to enhance information sharing among members regarding the 
nuclear programs of proliferant countries by (1) ``officially'' linking 
the NSG members through a dedicated computer network allowing for real-
time distribution of license denial information, and by (2) creating a 
separate session for exchange of information on the margins of the NSG 
plenary meeting.
    NSG membership will increase to 35 with the acceptance of Latvia. 
The ultimate goal of the NSG is to obtain the agreement of all 
suppliers, including nations not members of the regime, to control 
nuclear and nuclear-related exports in accordance with the NSG 
guidelines.

Expenses

    Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1641(c)), I report that there were no expenses directly 
attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred by the declaration 
of the national emergency in Executive Order 12938 during the semiannual 
reporting period.

                                                      William J. Clinton

The White House,

November 12, 1997.

Note: The notice is listed in Appendix D at the end of this volume.