

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is of singular significance to the continuing efforts to stem nuclear proliferation and strengthen regional and global stability. Its conclusion marks the achievement of the highest priority item on the international arms control and non-proliferation agenda. Its effective implementation will provide a foundation on which further efforts to control and limit nuclear weapons can be soundly based. By responding to the call for a CTBT by the end of 1996, the Signatory States, and most importantly the nuclear weapon states, have demonstrated the bona fides of their commitment to meaningful arms control measures.

The monitoring challenges presented by the wide scope of the CTBT exceed those imposed by any previous nuclear test-related treaty. Our current capability to monitor nuclear explosions will undergo significant improvement over the next several years to meet these challenges. Even with these enhancements, though, several conceivable CTBT evasion scenarios have been identified. Nonetheless, our National Intelligence Means (NIM), together with the Treaty's verification regime and our diplomatic efforts, provide the United States with the means to make the CTBT effectively verifiable. By this, I mean that the United States:

- will have a wide range of resources (NIM, the totality of information available in public and private channels, and the mechanisms established by the Treaty) for ad-

ressing compliance concerns and imposing sanctions in cases of noncompliance; and

- will thereby have the means to: (a) assess whether the Treaty is deterring the conduct of nuclear explosions (in terms of yields and number of tests) that could damage U.S. security interests and constraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and (b) take prompt and effective counteraction.

My judgment that the CTBT is effectively verifiable also reflects the belief that U.S. nuclear deterrence would not be undermined by possible nuclear testing that the United States might fail to detect under the Treaty, bearing in mind that the United States will derive substantial confidence from other factors—the CTBT's "supreme national interests" clause, the annual certification procedure for the U.S. nuclear stockpile, and the U.S. Safeguards program.

I believe that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is in the best interests of the United States. Its provisions will significantly further our nuclear nonproliferation and arms control objectives and strengthen international security. Therefore, I urge the Senate to give early and favorable consideration to the Treaty and its advice and consent to ratification as soon as possible.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

The White House,
September 22, 1997.

Remarks Prior to Discussions With Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov of Russia and an Exchange With Reporters in New York City *September 22, 1997*

The President. Let me briefly say that it's a pleasure for me to see Foreign Minister Primakov here and to renew our relationship and our dialog. You also know that the Vice President is now in Moscow for his regular meeting with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. And we have a lot of work to do. But I am very encouraged at the progress in our relationships and in our partnership over the last year or so.

I had a great meeting with President Yeltsin in Helsinki. We were together again in Paris and, of course, in Denver. And among other things, Mr. Primakov and I will be discussing our partnership in Bosnia and our partnership for arms control today—places where we look forward to greater progress.

So I'm glad to see him, and I'm delighted to have this chance to visit.

Would you like to say anything?

Foreign Minister Primakov. Thank you very much for receiving me, Mr. President. It is a great honor for me and also a chance to discuss the issues that you have just mentioned. I've brought for you a message from President Yeltsin. This is the reply to your latest message to him. You will see that, for yourself, it mentions our very big interest in having our relations with the United States develop further on many tracks, not just our desire to do so but also our willingness.

Last night we had a very exciting, very productive talk with the Secretary of State. And already, based on that talk, I got a signal coming from Moscow—Madam was asking why I am not being authorized to do certain things. Well, most probably what is at issue is the protocol, because that's something that your Vice President already mentioned. *[Laughter]* This is to indicate the rapid way the United States operates, and we are far removed, as yet, from that. *[Laughter]*

The President. Thank you very much.

1996 Campaign Financing

Q. Mr. President, the Justice Department now says it apparently has memos that indicate you were urged to make another 40 fundraising calls.

Sir, what do you recall of these memos, and were the calls made or were they not?

The President. Well, I've already said I don't know—I haven't read—I don't know what you're talking about on the memos because I haven't seen them, so I can't comment on that. I've already answered about the calls.

Let me just say this. I believe what the Vice President did and what I did was legal, and I am absolutely certain that we believed we were acting within the letter of the law. And I'm going to cooperate however I can to establish the facts, but I think that's important that you and the American people understand that, that I certainly—I believed then and I believe now what we did was legal. But I am absolutely positive that we intended to be firmly within the letter of the law when we were out there campaigning and raising funds as we should have been doing. We had to do that.

NOTE: The President spoke at 12:45 p.m. in the U.S. Mission at the United Nations. In his remarks, he referred to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and President Boris Yeltsin of Russia. A tape was not available for verification of the content of these remarks.

Remarks at a Luncheon Hosted by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan in New York City September 22, 1997

President Udovenko, members of the U.N. Secretariat, my fellow leaders. First let me thank the Secretary-General for his remarks. As some of you may know, after work today I will have the pleasure of attending the opening of the Metropolitan Opera. And I thought I would get into the spirit by singing the praises of our host today. *[Laughter]*

Mr. Secretary-General, it would be hard to find someone more appropriate to lead this great organization at this time. Your work and your life have taken you from your native Ghana to Egypt, Ethiopia, Switzerland, and to Minnesota where you first learned about America. For over three decades, you have given every waking hour to the United Nations. Better than

anyone, you know how this organization works, from its highest office down to the grassroots.

Most importantly, you have earned your reputation as a peacemaker. From Africa to Iraq to Bosnia, your remarkable efforts to turn people from conflict to cooperation have saved thousands of lives.

You have seen revolution, war, and starvation, and you have always risen to fight the suffering they bring. You have witnessed the collapse of the old colonial empires, the end of the cold war, the beginning of this new era of great possibility. I hope future historians will look back and say this was a time when the high principles that led to the founding of the United Nations at last were realized—not simply by avoiding bloodshed and war but also by bringing freedom