    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1997, Book II)]
    [December 1, 1997]
    [Pages 1675-1678]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    Remarks on the 1998 Budget and the International Agreement on Greenhouse
    Gas Emissions and an Exchange With Reporters
    December 1, 1997

        The President. Today we are planning for the future, and we're
    working on two issues I wanted to mention briefly.
        First, we are about to start a meeting, as you can see, with the
    economic team, planning for the 1998 budget. This will be the sixth year
    of our economic plan of invest in our people, cut the deficit, expand
    America's ability to sell abroad. And as all of you know, the deficit
    has gone from $290 billion when I took office to $23 billion today. Our
    economy is the strongest in a generation. And what we are going to be
    doing now is looking to continue this strategy within the confines of
    the balanced budget. Keep in mind, we have a balanced budget plan, but
    we don't have a balanced budget yet. We have to keep that uppermost in
    our minds.
        The second thing we're going to be doing is continuing to work on
    the challenge of climate change, with the Kyoto conference in Japan
    opening this week. The conference begins today. I've asked the Vice
    President to go to Kyoto early next week to present our approach, which
    is both environmentally strong and economically sound. All of you know
    that I believe that global warming is one of the great challenges that
    America must face over the next few decades, and we must begin now. The
    challenge is not imminent in the sense that most people can't feel it
    now, but it is clear, and it is very profound. It is a danger that the
    world community would ignore only at its peril.
        There are still significant differences between the parties on key
    issues at the conference. The question before us is whether the nations
    of the world, both the developed and the developing nations, can put
    their rhetoric aside and find common ground in a way that enables us to
    make real progress in reducing the danger of global warming. And this
    can be done, I firmly believe, without undermining the capacity of the
    developing countries to grow or, for that matter, the capacity of the
    developed countries to grow.
        We have set forward a plan that is both aggressive and achievable.
    It represents our commitment to do what we promised to do and to work
    very hard to avoid promising to do something that neither we nor others
    can do.
        The Vice President will lay out the essence of our plan, explain its
    central goals: a strong target, a vigorous domestic program, reliance on
    market mechanisms to reduce the cost of cutting emissions, and
    meaningful participation by the developing countries, because the
    progress that we need to make cannot be made and, indeed, the problem
    cannot be solved unless all countries are involved. This is a global
    problem requiring a global solution.
        I'm pleased the Vice President is going to Kyoto to present our
    position. It shows that we consider this to be a profoundly important
    issue, and we have taken it very seriously. We have worked very hard on
    it. An outstanding negotiating team, led by Under Secretary of State Stu
    Eizenstat, will conduct the negotiations. And I believe that if we all
    work hard, this will be viewed as a landmark meeting on our way to
    making progress on this critical challenge.

    International Agreement on Greenhouse Gas Emissions

        Q. Mr. President, does that mean your position is negotiable, and
    will the Vice President be able to negotiate? Or is he simply stating
    your position?
        The Vice President. Can I answer that, Mr. President? I'm not going
    to be the negotiator. Stu Eizenstat is going to be leading the
    negotiations. And I would like to make it clear that, as others have
    said, we are perfectly prepared to walk away from an agreement that we
    don't think will work. And so it should be crystal clear to all the
    parties there that we're going

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    to present the U.S. position forcefully and clearly. Mr. Eizenstat has
    the President's authority to negotiate, but the principles the President
    laid down earlier will be the ones that have to be met in order for the
    U.S. to participate.
        Q. Sounds hostile.
        The President. No, we're not hostile. We're going there in good
    faith, committed to negotiate within our principles. But I think it's
    very important that we not do something that appears to be politically
    palatable but that won't produce the results.
        We have a good framework here; we've worked very hard. I personally
    have spent a lot of time talking to world leaders about this since I
    announced our position. We spent a lot of time talking about it when I
    was in Canada at the APEC meeting. I spent a lot of time when I was in
    Latin America talking to leaders about it. I spent a lot of time on the
    phone talking to others about it. I talked to President Jiang when he
    was here.
        We're certainly going to negotiate in good faith. But we have to
    negotiate within the framework of our principles, and our principles are
    not inconsistent with what others say they want to achieve. So I'm very
    hopeful.

    Attorney General Reno's Decision

        Q. Mr. President, have you heard from the Attorney General about her
    decision regarding an independent counsel?
        The President. No.
        Q. When do you expect to hear from her?
        The President. I don't know. I have not heard anything.

    International Agreement on Greenhouse Gas Emissions

        Q. Mr. President, returning to Kyoto, the United States is proposing
    one of the more modest proposals of the summit--at the meeting, I should
    say. What factors led the administration to back away from its earlier
    proposal to cut greenhouse gases more dramatically?
        The President. We didn't have an earlier proposal, that I'm aware
    of. The Government of the United States in '92, before I became
    President, signed on to the Rio conference. And we were attempting to
    come up with a proposal that we thought we could actually meet within
    the tools available to us and within the realistic options available to
    me as President and consistent with our desire to maintain our rate of
    growth but to change the energy basis on which we grow our economy. So
    we reached a decision we thought was best not only for the United States
    but that we thought was achievable, and therefore it was responsible,
    for the world.
        I think it's very important--keep in mind, we want to set targets
    that we can hit. At Rio, I think the world did set some targets in good
    faith, but there was no real system, no mechanism set up, country by
    country, to implement that. I'm going to do a much better job of that
    for the United States now. That is, we're going to have a program to
    pursue our course, and we're going to do it whatever happens at Kyoto.
    We're going to really work hard at this now. But I think it's important
    that we have a goal that makes sense. And I've evaluated where the
    Europeans are, in fact, with their efforts, where the Asians are, where
    the Latin Americans are, and what I think we can achieve here.
        Also keep in mind, I think we need to be looking at this in terms of
    not just what happens in 2010 but where are we in 2020, where are we in
    2030? What our objective has to be is to dramatically slow, freeze, and
    then reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the developed countries, and
    then get the developing countries to do the same thing, so that over the
    course of the next few decades we avoid what is otherwise certainly
    going to happen, which is a dramatic warming of the planet.
        This is a problem that needs--it's a hard problem for democracies to
    deal with because we like to deal with things that have quick action and
    quick payoff. This problem has been developing over decades. If you read
    the Vice President's book and you look at his charts, you see how much
    worse it's gotten just in the last few years. But it can't be turned
    around overnight. And so I think we've reached the right decision.
        The Vice President. Mr. President, if I could add just a word on
    this, I think it's important to note that the position outlined and
    presented by the President that will be presented formally in Kyoto
    represents almost a 30 percent cut in emissions that would otherwise
    take place here in the United States by around the year 2010. That would
    represent a huge change.
        The second point, as the President has said, whether there is an
    agreement in Kyoto or not, the United States is prepared, under
    President Clinton's leadership, to unilaterally take the

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    steps that we believe should be taken in order to deal with this
    problem.
        Third point, we see Kyoto as the beginning of the process, not the
    end of the process. And whether the agreement is reached at Kyoto or
    not, we will work to make sure that the world community comes together
    over the next few years and follows a sensible plan to solve this
    problem. And I'm going in order to demonstrate the commitment of the
    administration to solving that problem, regardless of whether or not we
    end up being able to sign on to the agreement at Kyoto.
        The President. Let me make just one other point about that to
    reinforce what the Vice President has said. The goal we have suggested
    for Kyoto would require a much greater effort from the United States
    than from the other developed countries in the next few years because
    we've had so much more growth in the last 5 years than the other
    developed countries. So that if you use 1990 as a base year, let's say,
    instead of 1995, 1997, or some earlier year, it's the year that most
    clearly puts the burden on us since we've had so much more growth than
    our other developed partners have since that period.
        Now, I'm not complaining about that. We have the most to do; we
    intend to do it. But I think that to imply that our goals are more
    modest than others doesn't look at--you ought to look at who has to do
    what work between now and then.
        Q. Your goal is more modest now, though, than it was in 1993, when
    you proposed a goal for the administration. Is it because of the growth?
    Is that the reason why you----
        The President. Yes, we grew a lot more. Frankly, I don't think we
    have--if you want to meet something with market mechanisms and
    technology and you don't favor taxes and regulation, then you have to
    have a more sophisticated system with more, sort of, buy-in, more
    organized, disciplined partnerships than we've had by and large with the
    private sector. I think that I have to do a better job of having a
    disciplined, coordinated effort here, which we intend to do now.
        Q. Why not have the Vice President head the negotiations?
        The President. Because, for one thing, we need him to do other
    things over the next 6 days. Stu Eizenstat is a great negotiator. He's
    the perfect person to do this. The Vice President is going there to
    announce our policy and to be there and show how important it is. No
    other country has got someone at the Vice President's level doing the
    negotiating; that's not how you negotiate these treaties.
        The Vice President. You can be sure that both the President and I
    will remain very active behind the scenes, but all of the negotiating
    will be done, as is traditional and customary, by the head of the
    negotiating team.
        The President. Let me say, they're not going to run away with this;
    we'll get daily reports, maybe several times a day, on what's going on.
    Don't worry about that.

    Assistance to the South Korean Economy

        Q. [Inaudible]--United States and Japan are considering chipping in
    as much as $20 billion to the IMF-led--[inaudible]--for South Korea. Two
    questions. Are those numbers in the ballpark? And secondly, are you at
    all concerned about the moral hazard risk element of this--by
    persistently bailing out countries you end up leading to the possibility
    that they will pursue less prudent national policies rather than more
    prudent ones in the future?
        The President. Well, I would be worried about that if that's what we
    had done, but that's not what we've done. That is, I favor a strong
    agreement with the IMF that would actually restore financial stability
    and confidence in South Korea. And if such an agreement could be made,
    then I would favor the United States participating along with Japan,
    much the same way we did in the recent matter involving Indonesia.
        But if you look at what we did in Indonesia, if you look at what we
    did in Mexico, you see that the moral hazard argument doesn't come into
    play because we didn't agree to provide assistance and backup financial
    support until there was in place a rigorous plan that had a high
    likelihood of success in restoring long-term health and stability to the
    country. If you look at the results that were obtained in Mexico, they
    took a lot of tough medicine, they took a lot of hits to their economy,
    but it rebounded much more quickly than anyone thought it would, and
    they paid the money back to us ahead of time and at a profit. And if the
    plan that was adopted for Indonesia is vigorously implemented in good
    faith, I believe it will have similar results.

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        When our finance ministers met in Manila, we agreed that that was
    the formula that we would try to follow: that the country would reach a
    strong agreement with the IMF, and then if more funds were needed, at
    least in a backup situation, if the IMF fund should not be enough, then
    the United States, Japan, and others, in accordance with their ability,
    would be there to do that. I think we should be prepared to do that in
    the case of Korea if there's a strong agreement that has a high
    likelihood of restoring stability and confidence.

    Internet Antipornography Agreement

        Q. How do you regard the antipornography agreement--[inaudible]--Mr.
    President--[inaudible]----
        The President. I hope it works. I encouraged them to do it, and I'm
    glad they're doing it. I wish them well.

    Note: The President spoke at 11:40 a.m. in the Cabinet Room at the White
    House prior to a meeting with the economic team. In his remarks, he
    referred to President Jiang Zemin of China.