    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1997, Book II)]
    [December 18, 1997]
    [Pages 1793-1797]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    [[Page 1793]]

    Remarks on the Peace Process in Bosnia and an Exchange With Reporters
    December 18, 1997

        The President. Good morning. I want to speak with you today about
    the progress we have made toward a lasting peace in Bosnia and the
    challenges that still must be faced in order to finish the job.
        For nearly 4 years, Bosnia was the battleground for the bloodiest
    war in Europe since World War II. The conflict killed or wounded one out
    of every 10 Bosnians. It drove half the country's people from their
    homes, left 9 out of 10 of them unemployed. We will never be able to
    forget the mass graves, the women and young girls victimized by
    systematic campaigns of rape, skeletal prisoners locked behind barbed-
    wire fences, endless lines of refugees marching toward a future of
    despair.
        The war in Bosnia was abhorrent to our values. It also threatened
    our national interests. We've learned the hard way in this century that
    Europe's stability and America's security are joined. The war threatened
    to explode into a broader conflict in the Balkans, endangering the vital
    interests of allies like Greece and Turkey and undermining our efforts
    to build a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe.
        Then, 2 years ago in Dayton, Ohio, American leadership helped to end
    the war in Bosnia. With our allies in NATO and others, we launched an
    extraordinary military and political effort to implement the peace
    agreement. Twenty-four months later, by almost any measure, the lives of
    Bosnia's people are better, and their hopes for the future are brighter.
        Consider what we have achieved together. We ended the fighting and
    the bloodshed, separating rival armies, demobilizing more than 350,000
    troops, destroying almost 6,600 heavy weapons. We helped Bosnians to put
    in place national democratic institutions, including a Presidency, a
    Parliament, a Supreme Court, and hold peaceful and free elections for
    all levels of government, with turnouts exceeding 70 percent. We've
    begun to restore normal life, repairing roads and schools, electricity
    and water, heat and sewage, doubling economic output, quadrupling wages.
    Unemployment in the Bosnian-Croat Federation has been cut from 90
    percent to 50 percent.
        We're helping the Bosnians to provide for their own security,
    training ethnically integrated police forces in the Federation, taking
    the first steps toward a professional democratic police force in the
    Serb Republic. We've helped to turn the media from an instrument of war
    into a force for peace, stifling the inflammatory radio and television
    broadcasts that helped to fuel the conflict. And we've provided a secure
    environment for 350,000 displaced persons to return to their homes,
    while bringing 22 war criminals to justice. Just a few hours ago, SFOR
    captured and transported to The Hague two more war crimes suspects.
        The progress is unmistakable, but it is not yet irreversible. Bosnia
    has been at peace only half as long as it was at war. It remains poised
    on a tightrope, moving toward a better future but not at the point yet
    of a self-sustaining peace. To get there, the people of Bosnia still
    need a safety net and a helping hand that only the international
    community, including the United States, can provide.
        Our assistance must be twofold. First we must intensify our civilian
    and economic engagement. As a result of the progress we've achieved in
    recent months, we know where to focus our efforts. Civilian and
    voluntary agencies working with Bosnian authorities must help to do the
    following things: first, deepen and spread economic opportunity while
    rooting out corruption; second, reform, retrain, and re-equip the
    police; third, restructure the state-run media to meet international
    standards of objectivity and access and establish alternative
    independent media; fourth, help more refugees return home; and fifth,
    make indicted war criminals answer for their crimes, both as a matter of
    justice and because they are stumbling blocks to lasting stability.
        The second thing we must do is to continue to provide an
    international military presence that will enable these efforts to
    proceed in an atmosphere of confidence. Our progress in Bosnia to date
    would not have been possible without the secure environment created
    first by IFOR, now by SFOR. They've allowed dozens of civilian agencies
    and literally hundreds of voluntary

    [[Page 1794]]

    agencies to do their job in security, laying the foundation for a self-
    sustaining peace.
        In authorizing American troops to take part in the SFOR mission, I
    said the mission would end in 18 months, in June of 1998. It was my
    expectation that by that time we would have rebuilt enough of Bosnia's
    economic and political life to continue the work without continuing
    outside military support. But following intensive consultations with my
    national security and military advisers, with our NATO allies, and with
    leaders from both parties in Congress, it has become clear that the
    progress we've seen in Bosnia, in order for it to continue, a follow-on
    military force led by NATO will be necessary after SFOR ends. America is
    a leader of NATO, and America should participate in that force.
        Therefore, I have instructed our representatives in NATO to inform
    our allies that, in principle, the United States will take part in a
    security presence in Bosnia when SFOR withdraws this summer. The
    agreement in principle will become a commitment only when I have
    approved the action plan NATO's military authorities will develop and
    present early next year after careful study of all the options. The
    details of that plan, including the mission's specific objectives, its
    size, and its duration, must be agreed to by all NATO allies.
        Without prejudging the details, let me make clear the key criteria
    the plan must meet for me to approve United States participation:
        First, the mission must be achievable and tied to concrete
    benchmarks, not a deadline. We should have clear objectives that when
    set--when met will create a self-sustaining, secure environment and
    allow us to remove our troops.
        Second, the force must be able to protect itself. Over 2 years we
    have steadily decreased the number of our troops in Bosnia from about
    27,000 Americans in IFOR in 1996 to 8,500 in SFOR today. I hope the
    follow-on force will be smaller, but I will insist it be sufficient in
    number and in equipment to achieve its mission and to protect itself in
    safety.
        Third, the United States must retain command. Time and again, events
    have proven that American leadership is crucial to decisive collective
    action.
        Fourth, our European allies must assume their share of
    responsibility. Now, Europe and our other partners are already doing a
    great deal, providing 3 times as many troops as we are, 5 times as much
    economic assistance, 9 times as many international police, 10 times as
    many refugees have been received by them. And while Bosnia is a
    challenge to American interests and values, the longer term and
    fundamental challenge is to make Bosnia a genuine part of Europe, and we
    hope the Europeans will do more.
        Fifth, the cost must be manageable.
        And sixth and finally, the plan must have substantial support from
    Congress and the American people. I have been pleased by the spirit and
    the substance of our consultations with leading members of both parties.
    As we develop the details of the new NATO mission, these consultations
    must and will continue. I am pleased that Members of both parties in
    both Houses of Congress have accepted my invitation to go to Bosnia with
    me when I leave in a couple of days. All of us have a duty to explain
    the stakes in Bosnia to the American people, and I will do my very best
    to shoulder my responsibility for that.
        Now, some say a lasting peace in Bosnia is impossible and,
    therefore, we should end our efforts now, in June, and/or allow the
    country to be partitioned along ethnic lines. I believe they're
    profoundly wrong. A full and fair reading of Bosnia's history and an
    honest assessment of the progress of the last 23 months simply refutes
    the proposition that the Dayton peace agreement cannot work. But if we
    pull out before the job is done, Bosnia almost certainly will fall back
    into violence, chaos, and ultimately, a war every bit as bloody as the
    one that was stopped.
        And partition is not a good alternative. It would sanction the
    horrors of ethnic cleansing and send the wrong signal to extremists
    everywhere. At best, partition would require a peacekeeping force to
    patrol a volatile border for years to come. More likely it would set the
    stage also for renewed conflict.
        A lasting peace is possible, along the lines of the Dayton peace
    agreement. For decades, Muslims, Croats, and Serbs lived together,
    worked together, raised their families together. Thanks to the
    investments of America and others in Bosnia over the past 2 years, they
    have begun again to lead more normal lives.
        Ultimately, Bosnia's future is in the hands of its own people. But
    we can help them make it a future of peace. We should finish the job we
    began for the sake of that future and in the service of our own
    interests and values.

    [[Page 1795]]

        Go ahead. We'll take--yeah.

    Benchmarks for Troop Withdrawal

        Q. Mr. President, a number of Americans are understandably going to
    be concerned about an open-ended U.S. military commitment to Bosnia. Can
    you at least assure the American people that by the time you leave
    office, a little more than 3 years from now, those American troops will
    be out of Bosnia?
        The President. In order to answer that, let's go back and see what
    our experience has been. First of all, the big military mission, IFOR,
    really was completed within a year. In fact, it was completed in less
    than a year; that is the robust, large military presence we needed
    there--I think we had over 60,000 total allied troops there--to end the
    war, separate the forces, establish the separation zone between the
    parties. It was achieved quickly and with remarkable peace and
    remarkably low loss of life for all of our allied forces who were there.
        But then we went to the smaller force to try to support the civilian
    implementation of the Dayton agreement. Now, what has happened? An
    enormous amount of progress has been made; we don't believe the peace is
    self-sustaining. I think the responsible thing for me to do, since I do
    not believe we can meet the 18-month deadline, and no one I know now
    believes that, is to say to the American people what the benchmarks are.
        What are the benchmarks? Let's talk about that. Can they be achieved
    in the near-term? I believe they can. Do I think we should have a
    permanent presence in Bosnia? No. I don't believe this is like Germany
    after World War II or in the cold war or Korea after the Korean war.
    This is not what I'm suggesting here. But what are the benchmarks?
    First, let me say the final set of benchmarks must be developed by our
    NATO allies working with us. But let me give you just some of the things
    that I think we ought to be asking ourselves. Number one, are the joint
    institutions strong enough to be self-sustaining after the military
    operation? Number two, have the political parties really given up the
    so-called state-run media that have been instruments of hate and venom?
    Number three, is the civilian police large enough, well-trained enough,
    well-managed enough to do the job it has to do? Number four, do we have
    confidence that the military is under democratic rule?
        Those are just some of the benchmarks. I think, when we go through
    this, I want a full public discussion of it. But I will say again, I
    understand your job is try to get a deadline nailed down, but we tried
    it in this SFOR period, and it turned out we were wrong. I am not
    suggesting a permanent presence in Bosnia. I am suggesting that it's a
    more honest thing to do to say what our objectives are and that these
    objectives should be pursued, and they can be pursued at an affordable
    cost with fair burden-sharing with the Europeans. If that can be done,
    we should pursue them.
        Go ahead.

    Prosecution of War Crimes

        Q. Mr. President, the lead prosecutor in the War Crimes Tribunal
    says that Mladic and Karadzic can rest easy because the French won't try
    to capture them. What is the United States willing to do to bring these
    men to justice?
        The President. Well, I don't want to comment on what the prosecutor
    has said about the French. I can tell you this, that we were involved
    this morning with the Dutch, and it was in their sector, and they took
    the lead. They asked us for support just like we were involved with the
    British not very long ago when they made their arrests. And we believe
    that provision of the Dayton agreement is important, as I said again
    today, and we think that all of us who are there should be prepared to
    do what is appropriate to implement it. And I think that, having said
    that, the less I say from then on in, the better.
        We believe the war crimes process is an important part of Dayton.
    The United States, indeed, is supporting an international permanent war
    crimes tribunal even as we speak. We've got countries working on trying
    to establish that.
        Yes.

    Benchmarks for Troop Withdrawal

        Q. Mr. President, sir, one of the benchmarks you listed was the
    willingness of the political parties there really to work toward
    progress. Does that not make us hostages of those political figures
    there, particularly those who don't want progress? They can simply
    undermine the attempt to reach that benchmark and keep U.S. troops there
    forever.
        The President. Well, let me--I don't think I was clear about that.
    What I mean is the willingness of the political parties or, whether

    [[Page 1796]]

    they're willing or not, our capacity to stop them from, in effect,
    perverting the state-run media and using them as an instrument of
    violence and suppression. I don't think it's necessary for us to stay
    until everybody wants to go have tea together at 4 o'clock in the
    afternoon in a civil environment. I think it's--I do think that there
    are--and again let me say, we will make public a final set of benchmarks
    before we go forward with this, and our allies have to work on this. I'm
    just telling you what my thoughts are.
        But if you look at where we've really had problems--or let's flip
    the question; why do we think we still need some military presence there
    after June? I think because we believe there is more venom still in the
    political system than there otherwise would have been if there had been
    no perversion of the so-called state-run media by the political parties
    that control them. We believe that if the joint institutions were
    working a little more effectively they would--the people would see the
    benefits of the joint institutions more than they will by June.
        We're grateful that there are 2,000 civilian police working there.
    And I might say, while the United States has put up 90 percent of the
    money, as I said, the Europeans have put up 90 percent of the personnel
    for the training and the preparation of the civilian police. But there
    should be more.
        So I think that's what we have to do. I do not want to hold us
    hostage to the feelings of the people of Bosnia, although I believe the
    feelings will change as the facts of life change. But I do think we
    should stay there until we believe we've got the job done.
        Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press International].

    Prosecution of War Crimes

        Q. Mr. President, how did you get Secretary Cohen on board on this?
    And you know, the whole public perception--unless you go after the
    highest profile alleged war criminals, it doesn't have much of an
    impact. Why the restraint?
        The President. Well, first of all, there are--the circumstances
    under which the SFOR troops will apprehend war criminals have been
    fairly well defined. We did not send SFOR there to mount major military
    campaigns.
        Secondly, I don't want to discuss the circumstances in detail under
    which we might or might not go after anyone. But let me go to the point
    underlying your question--I think it is--which is, can this peace be
    made to work unless Mr. Karadzic is arrested? I mean, let's just sort of
    get to the bottom line here.
        I think the answer to that is, under the right circumstances--that
    is, if he flees the country, if he is deep enough underground, if he
    can't have any impact on it--we might make the peace work anyway. After
    all, a great deal of progress has been made. I would point out that more
    progress has been made in the Bosnian-Croat--the Muslim-Croat Federation
    part of Bosnia economically than in the Serbian part, in part because
    reactionary elements there have resisted doing the right thing across
    the board in many areas.
        Q. Are you considering aid for Serbia in that respect?
        The President. I'm considering--what I'm going to do is to work with
    the allies to implement the Dayton accords. And our position is going to
    be we're going to support the people that are trying to implement the
    Dayton framework; we're going to oppose those who are opposing it, in
    all specifics. If you use that benchwork, I think it will get you there.
        One last question. Go ahead, Wolf [Wolf Blitzer, Cable News
    Network].

    Timelines and the Peace Process

        Q. Just to wrap up this by asking you the question that a lot of
    Republican critics of yours are suggesting that your credibility was
    undermined on Bosnia by imposing these two deadlines which you failed to
    meet, and knowing that some of your own advisers at the time were
    saying, ``Don't give these deadlines because they're unrealistic; the
    job can't be done within a year or within 18 months.'' So how do you
    answer your critics now, like Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison or Arlen
    Specter or Newt Gingrich, who say that you have to prove your
    credibility because you failed to honor these two earlier imposed
    deadlines?
        The President. Well, first of all, let me say, I have a
    fundamentally different view of the first deadline. I mean, we did--the
    mission I defined for IFOR was achieved, and it was achieved before a
    year was out. And I was--it's not worth going through and rewriting
    history there about who said what at the time.
        I did think that in 18 months--I honestly believed in 18 months we
    could get this done

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    at the time I said it. And it wasn't--I wasn't right, which is why I
    don't want to make that error again. Now, having acknowledged the error
    I made, let's look at what we were right about. Let's flip this around
    before we get too much into who was right about what happened after 18
    months.
        What has happened? With the leadership of the United States, NATO
    and its allies, including Russia, working side by side, ended, almost
    overnight and with virtually no bloodshed, the worst war in Europe since
    World War II. We have seen democratic elections with 70 percent
    participation take place; hundreds of thousands of people have been able
    to go home under circumstances that were difficult, to say the least;
    economic growth has resumed; infrastructure has been rebuilt; the
    conditions of normal life have come back for tens of thousands, hundreds
    of thousands of people.
        So if I take the hit for being wrong about the timetable, I would
    like some acknowledgement that in the larger issue here, the United
    States and its allies were right to undertake this mission and that the
    results of the mission have been very, very good. They have justified
    the effort. And the cost of the mission in lives and treasure to the
    United States and to its allies has been much lower than even the most
    ardent supporters of the mission thought that it would be.
        So I think--I don't mind taking a hit for being wrong about the
    timetable. But after the hit is dished out, I would like the larger
    truth looked at. That is, did we do the right thing? Was it in our
    interests? Did it further our values? Are the American people less
    likely to be drawn into some other conflict in Europe 10, 20, 30 years
    from now where the costs could be far greater if we make this work? I
    think they are.
        And I'd like to close basically with a conversation I had from my
    opponent in the last election, Senator Dole. I want to give him--he said
    something that I thought was very good and pithier than anything I've
    said about this. We had a talk about it the other day on the phone, and
    he said, ``Look,'' he said, ``you know, I didn't necessarily agree with
    all the details about how you got to where you were. But,'' he said,
    ``what's happened in Bosnia? It's like we're in a football game. We're
    in the fourth quarter, and we're winning, and some people suggest we
    should walk off the field and forfeit the game. I don't think we should.
    I think we ought to stay here, finish the game, and collect the win.''
        And that's a pretty good analogy. And with due credit to the
    Senator, I appreciate it. I wish I'd have thought of it myself.
        Thank you very much.
        Merry Christmas.

    President's New Dog, Buddy

        Q. How is Buddy?
        The President. Good.

    Note: The President spoke at 10:15 a.m. in the Briefing Room at the
    White House. In his remarks, he referred to Judge Richard Goldstone,
    Chief Prosecutor, United Nations International War Crimes Tribunal;
    Bosnian-Croat war crimes suspects Vlatko Kupreskic and Anto Furundzija;
    and Bosnian-Serb war crimes suspect Radovan Karadzic, former President
    of the Bosnian-Serb Republic. The President also referred to the NATO-
    led Stabilization Force in Bosnia (SFOR) and the NATO-led Implementation
    Force in Bosnia (IFOR). A reporter referred to Bosnian-Serb war crimes
    suspect Ratko Mladic.