    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1997, Book II)]
    [September 22, 1997]
    [Pages 1209-1213]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    Message to the Senate Transmitting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
    Treaty With Documentation
    September 22, 1997

    To the Senate of the United States:
        I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to
    ratification, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (the ``Treaty''
    or ``CTBT''), opened for signature and signed by the United States at
    New York on September 24, 1996. The Treaty includes two Annexes, a
    Protocol, and two Annexes to the Protocol, all of which form integral
    parts of the Treaty. I transmit also, for the information of the Senate,
    the report of the Department of State on the Treaty, including an
    Article-by-Article analysis of the Treaty.
        Also included in the Department of State's report is a document
    relevant to but not part of the Treaty: the Text on the Establishment of
    a Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
    Organization, adopted by the Signatory States to the Treaty on November
    19, 1996. The Text provides the basis for the work of the Preparatory
    Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization in
    preparing detailed procedures for implementing the Treaty and making
    arrangements for the first session of the Conference of the States
    Parties to the

    [[Page 1210]]

    Treaty. In particular, by the terms of the Treaty, the Preparatory
    Commission will be responsible for ensuring that the verification regime
    established by the Treaty will be effectively in operation at such time
    as the Treaty enters into force. My Administration has completed and
    will submit separately to the Senate an analysis of the verifiability of
    the Treaty, consistent with section 37 of the Arms Control and
    Disarmament Act, as amended. Such legislation as may be necessary to
    implement the Treaty also will be submitted separately to the Senate for
    appropriate action.
        The conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is a
    signal event in the history of arms control. The subject of the Treaty
    is one that has been under consideration by the international community
    for nearly 40 years, and the significance of the conclusion of
    negotiations and the signature to date of more than 140 states cannot be
    overestimated. The Treaty creates an absolute prohibition against the
    conduct of nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion
    anywhere. Specifically, each State Party undertakes not to carry out any
    nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion; to
    prohibit and prevent any nuclear explosions at any place under its
    jurisdiction or control; and to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in
    any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test
    explosion or any other nuclear explosion.
        The Treaty establishes a far reaching verification regime, based on
    the provision of seismic, hydroacoustic, radionuclide, and infrasound
    data by a global network (the ``International Monitoring System'')
    consisting of the facilities listed in Annex 1 to the Protocol. Data
    provided by the International Monitoring System will be stored,
    analyzed, and disseminated, in accordance with Treaty-mandated
    operational manuals, by an International Data Center that will be part
    of the Technical Secretariat of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
    Treaty Organization. The verification regime includes rules for the
    conduct of on-site inspections, provisions for consultation and
    clarification, and voluntary confidence-building measures designed to
    contribute to the timely resolution of any compliance concerns arising
    from possible misinterpretation of monitoring data related to chemical
    explosions that a State Party intends to or has carried out. Equally
    important to the U.S. ability to verify the Treaty, the text
    specifically provides for the right of States Parties to use information
    obtained by national technical means in a manner consistent with
    generally recognized principles of international law for purposes of
    verification generally, and in particular, as the basis for an on-site
    inspection request. The verification regime provides each State Party
    the right to protect sensitive installations, activities, or locations
    not related to the Treaty. Determinations of compliance with the Treaty
    rest with each individual State Party to the Treaty.
        Negotiations for a nuclear test-ban treaty date back to the
    Eisenhower Administration. During the period 1978-1980, negotiations
    among the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR (the
    Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
    Weapons (NPT)) made progress, but ended without agreement. Thereafter,
    as the nonnuclear weapon states called for test-ban negotiations, the
    United States urged the Conference on Disarmament (the ``CD'') to devote
    its attention to the difficult aspects of monitoring compliance with
    such a ban and developing elements of an international monitoring
    regime. After the United States, joined by other key states, declared
    its support for comprehensive test-ban negotiations with a view toward
    prompt conclusion of a treaty, negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban
    were initiated in the CD, in January 1994. Increased impetus for the
    conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty by the end of 1996
    resulted from the adoption, by the Parties to the NPT in conjunction
    with the indefinite and unconditional extension of that Treaty, of
    ``Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
    Disarmament'' that listed the conclusion of a CTBT as the highest
    measure of its program of action.
        On August 11, 1995, when I announced U.S. support for a ``zero
    yield'' CTBT, I stated that:
          ``. . . As part of our national security strategy, the United
            States must and will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient
            to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to
            strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests
            and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be
            futile. In this regard, I consider the maintenance of a safe and
            reliable nuclear stockpile to be a supreme national interest of
            the United States.
          ``I am assured by the Secretary of Energy and the Directors of our
            nuclear weapons

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            labs that we can meet the challenge of maintaining our nuclear
            deterrent under a CTBT through a Science Based Stockpile
            Stewardship program without nuclear testing. I directed the
            implementation of such a program almost 2 years ago, and it is
            being developed with the support of the Secretary of Defense and
            the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This program will now
            be tied to a new certification procedure. In order for this
            program to succeed, both the Administration and the Congress
            must provide sustained bipartisan support for the stockpile
            stewardship program over the next decade and beyond. I am
            committed to working with the Congress to ensure this support.
          ``While I am optimistic that the stockpile stewardship program
            will be successful, as President I cannot dismiss the
            possibility, however unlikely, that the program will fall short
            of its objectives. Therefore, in addition to the new annual
            certification procedure for our nuclear weapons stockpile, I am
            also establishing concrete, specific safeguards that define the
            conditions under which the United States can enter into a CTBT .
            . .''
        The safeguards that were established are as follows:
        The conduct of a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program
                to ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and
                reliability of nuclear weapons in the active stockpile,
                including the conduct of a broad range of effective and
                continuing experimental programs.
        The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and
                programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology
                that will attract, retain, and ensure the continued
                application of our human scientific resources to those
                programs on which continued progress in nuclear technology
                depends.
        The maintenance of the basic capability to resume nuclear
                test activities prohibited by the CTBT should the United
                States cease to be bound to adhere to this Treaty.
        The continuation of a comprehensive research and development
                program to improve our treaty monitoring capabilities and
                operations.
        The continuing development of a broad range of intelligence
                gathering and analytical capabilities and operations to
                ensure accurate and comprehensive information on worldwide
                nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapons development programs, and
                related nuclear programs.
        The understanding that if the President of the United States
                is informed by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of
                Energy (DOE)--advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the
                Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories, and the
                Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command--that a high level
                of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear
                weapon type that the two Secretaries consider to be critical
                to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, the
                President, in consultation with the Congress, would be
                prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under the standard
                ``supreme national interests'' clause in order to conduct
                whatever testing might be required.
        With regard to the last safeguard:
        The U.S. regards continued high confidence in the safety and
                reliability of its nuclear weapons stockpile as a matter
                affecting the supreme interests of the country and will
                regard any events calling that confidence into question as
                ``extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the
                treaty.'' It will exercise its rights under the ``supreme
                national interests'' clause if it judges that the safety or
                reliability of its nuclear weapons stockpile cannot be
                assured with the necessary high degree of confidence without
                nuclear testing.
         To implement that commitment, the Secretaries of Defense
                and Energy--advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council or
                ``NWC'' (comprising representatives of DOD, JCS, and DOE),
                the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories and the
                Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command--will report to the
                President annually, whether they can certify that the
                Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and all critical elements
                thereof are, to a high degree of confidence, safe and
                reliable, and, if they cannot do so, whether, in their
                opinion and that of the NWC, testing is necessary to assure,
                with a high degree of

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                confidence, the adequacy of corrective measures to assure
                the safety and reliability of the stockpile, or elements
                thereof. The Secretaries will state the reasons for their
                conclusions, and the views of the NWC, reporting any
                minority views.
         After receiving the Secretaries' certification and
                accompanying report, including NWC and minority views, the
                President will provide them to the appropriate committees of
                the Congress, together with a report on the actions he has
                taken in light of them.
         If the President is advised, by the above procedure, that a
                high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a
                nuclear weapon type critical to the Nation's nuclear
                deterrent could no longer be certified without nuclear
                testing, or that nuclear testing is necessary to assure the
                adequacy of corrective measures, the President will be
                prepared to exercise our ``supreme national interests''
                rights under the Treaty, in order to conduct such testing.
        The procedure for such annual certification by the
                Secretaries, and for advice to them by the NWC, U.S.
                Strategic Command, and the DOE nuclear weapons laboratories
                will be embodied in domestic law.
        As negotiations on a text drew to a close it became apparent that
    one member of the CD, India, would not join in a consensus decision to
    forward the text to the United Nations for its adoption. After
    consultations among countries supporting the text, Australia requested
    the President of the U.N. General Assembly to convene a resumed session
    of the 50th General Assembly to consider and take action on the text.
    The General Assembly was so convened, and by a vote of 158 to 3 the
    Treaty was adopted. On September 24, 1996, the Treaty was opened for
    signature and I had the privilege, on behalf of the United States, of
    being the first to sign the Treaty.
        The Treaty assigns responsibility for overseeing its implementation
    to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (the
    ``Organization''), to be established in Vienna. The Organization, of
    which each State Party will be a member, will have three organs: the
    Conference of the States Parties, a 51-member Executive Council, and the
    Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat will supervise the
    operation of and provide technical support for the International
    Monitoring System, operate the International Data Center, and prepare
    for and support the conduct of on-site inspections. The Treaty also
    requires each State Party to establish a National Authority that will
    serve as the focal point within the State Party for liaison with the
    Organization and with other States Parties.
        The Treaty will enter into force 180 days after the deposit of
    instruments of ratification by all of the 44 states listed in Annex 2 to
    the Treaty, but in no case earlier than 2 years after its being opened
    for signature. If, 3 years from the opening of the Treaty for signature,
    the Treaty has not entered into force, the Secretary-General of the
    United Nations, in his capacity as Depositary of the Treaty, will
    convene a conference of the states that have deposited their instruments
    of ratification if a majority of those states so requests. At this
    conference the participants will consider what measures consistent with
    international law might be undertaken to accelerate the ratification
    process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of the Treaty.
    Their decision on such measures must be taken by consensus.
        Reservations to the Treaty Articles and the Annexes to the Treaty
    are not permitted. Reservations may be taken to the Protocol and its
    Annexes so long as they are not incompatible with the object and purpose
    of the Treaty. Amendment of the Treaty requires the positive vote of a
    majority of the States Parties to the Treaty, voting in a duly convened
    Amendment Conference at which no State Party casts a negative vote. Such
    amendments would enter into force 30 days after ratification by all
    States Parties that cast a positive vote at the Amendment Conference.
        The Treaty is of unlimited duration, but contains a ``supreme
    interests'' clause entitling any State Party that determines that its
    supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related
    to the subject matter of the Treaty to withdraw from the Treaty upon 6-
    month's notice.
        Unless a majority of the Parties decides otherwise, a Review
    Conference will be held 10 years following the Treaty's entry into force
    and may be held at 10-year intervals thereafter if the Conference of the
    States Parties so decides by a majority vote (or more frequently if the
    Conference of the States Parties so decides by a two-thirds vote).

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        The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is of singular
    significance to the continuing efforts to stem nuclear proliferation and
    strengthen regional and global stability. Its conclusion marks the
    achievement of the highest priority item on the international arms
    control and nonproliferation agenda. Its effective implementation will
    provide a foundation on which further efforts to control and limit
    nuclear weapons can be soundly based. By responding to the call for a
    CTBT by the end of 1996, the Signatory States, and most importantly the
    nuclear weapon states, have demonstrated the bona fides of their
    commitment to meaningful arms control measures.
        The monitoring challenges presented by the wide scope of the CTBT
    exceed those imposed by any previous nuclear test-related treaty. Our
    current capability to monitor nuclear explosions will undergo
    significant improvement over the next several years to meet these
    challenges. Even with these enhancements, though, several conceivable
    CTBT evasion scenarios have been identified. Nonetheless, our National
    Intelligence Means (NIM), together with the Treaty's verification regime
    and our diplomatic efforts, provide the United States with the means to
    make the CTBT effectively verifiable. By this, I mean that the United
    States:
         will have a wide range of resources (NIM, the totality of
                information available in public and private channels, and
                the mechanisms established by the Treaty) for addressing
                compliance concerns and imposing sanctions in cases of
                noncompliance; and
         will thereby have the means to: (a) assess whether the
                Treaty is deterring the conduct of nuclear explosions (in
                terms of yields and number of tests) that could damage U.S.
                security interests and constraining the proliferation of
                nuclear weapons, and (b) take prompt and effective
                counteraction.
        My judgment that the CTBT is effectively verifiable also reflects
    the belief that U.S. nuclear deterrence would not be undermined by
    possible nuclear testing that the United States might fail to detect
    under the Treaty, bearing in mind that the United States will derive
    substantial confidence from other factors--the CTBT's ``supreme national
    interests'' clause, the annual certification procedure for the U.S.
    nuclear stockpile, and the U.S. Safeguards program.
        I believe that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is in the
    best interests of the United States. Its provisions will significantly
    further our nuclear nonproliferation and arms control objectives and
    strengthen international security. Therefore, I urge the Senate to give
    early and favorable consideration to the Treaty and its advice and
    consent to ratification as soon as possible.

                                                          William J. Clinton

    The White House,

    September 22, 1997.