    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1997, Book II)]
    [November 26, 1997]
    [Pages 1670-1675]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq's Compliance With
    United Nations Security Council Resolutions
    November 26, 1997

    Dear Mr. Speaker:  (Dear Mr. President:)
        Consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
    Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) and as part of my effort to keep the
    Congress fully informed, I am reporting on the status of efforts to
    obtain Iraq's compliance with the resolutions adopted by the United
    Nations Security Council (UNSC). This report covers the period from
    September 23 to the present.
        Since my last report, the Government of Iraq attempted to defy the
    international community by unilaterally imposing unacceptable conditions
    on the operations of the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM). On October
    29, the Iraqi government announced its intention to expel all U.S.
    personnel working in Iraq for UNSCOM. Iraq's aim appears to have been to
    establish an environment under which it could restore its capacity to
    develop weapons of mass destruction without restriction. For 3 weeks,
    the Government of Iraq refused to allow American UNSCOM personnel to
    enter the country or to participate in site inspections, expelled UNSCOM
    personnel who are U.S. citizens, threatened the safety of the U.S. Air
    Force U-2 aircraft that flies missions for UNSCOM, tampered with UNSCOM
    monitoring equipment, removed UNSCOM cameras, moved and concealed
    significant pieces of dual-use equipment, and imposed additional
    unacceptable conditions on continued operations of UNSCOM. Two
    confrontational actions were undertaken in an atmosphere of strident,
    threatening Iraqi rhetoric, the dispersal of Iraqi armed forces as if in
    preparation for a military conflict, and the placement of innocent
    civilian ``human shields'' at military sites and at many of Saddam
    Hussein's palaces in violation of international norms of conduct.
        On November 20, having obtained no agreement from the U.N. or the
    United States to alter UNSCOM or the sanctions regime--indeed, having
    obtained none of its stated objectives--the Iraqi government announced
    that it would allow UNSCOM inspectors who are U.S. citizens to return to
    their duties. This encouraging development, however, will be ultimately
    tested by Saddam Hussein's actions, not his words. It remains to be seen
    whether the Government of Iraq will now live up to its obligations under
    all applicable UNSC resolutions, including its commitment to allow
    UNSCOM to perform its work unhindered.
        As expressed unanimously by the five permanent members (P-5) of the
    Security Council meeting in Geneva November 20, the will of the entire
    international community is for the unconditional decision of Iraq to
    allow the return of UNSCOM inspectors to Iraq in their previous
    composition. I must note that the United States was not briefed on, did
    not endorse, and is not bound by anything other than the terms of the P-
    5 statement. Neither the United States nor the U.N. are bound by any
    bilateral agreement between Russia and Iraq. We will carefully monitor
    events and will continue to be prepared for any contingency. Iraq's
    challenge was issued, in part, in response to U.N. Security Council
    Resolution (UNSCR) 1134, of October 23, in which the Security Council
    condemned Iraq's flagrant violations of

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    relevant Security Council resolutions and expressed its firm intention
    to impose travel restrictions on the Iraqi leadership if the long-
    standing pattern of obstruction and harassment of UNSCOM personnel
    continued. In the debate of UNSCR 1134, not one nation on the Security
    Council questioned the need to continue sanctions. The only serious
    debate was over when and how to impose additional sanctions. UNSCR 1134
    was based on the UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency
    (IAEA) 6-month reports to the UNSC that indicated that the Government of
    Iraq has not provided the ``substantial compliance'' called for in UNSCR
    1115 of June 21, 1997--especially regarding immediate, unconditional and
    unrestricted access to facilities for inspection and to officials for
    interviews.
        On November 12 the resolve of the international community was
    further demonstrated when the Security Council voted unanimously to
    adopt UNSCR 1137--the first new sanctions against Iraq since the Gulf
    War--condemning Iraq's continued violations of its obligations and
    imposing restrictions on the travel of all Iraqi officials and armed
    forces members responsible for or participating in noncompliance. The
    UNSC in a Presidential Statement condemned Iraq again upon the actual
    expulsion of the American UNSCOM personnel. The UNSC's solidarity was
    reflected as well in the UNSCOM Executive Chairman's and IAEA Director's
    decisions that all UNSCOM and IAEA personnel should depart Iraq rather
    than accede to the Iraqi demand that no American participate in
    inspection activities.
        As a demonstration of our firm resolve to support the U.N., I
    directed the deployment of the USS GEORGE WASHINGTON, escort ships, and
    additional combat aircraft to the region. In this regard we take note of
    and welcome House Resolution 322 expressing the sense of the House that
    the United States should act to resolve the crisis in a manner that
    assures full Iraqi compliance with UNSC resolutions regarding the
    destruction of Iraq's capability to produce and deliver weapons of mass
    destruction. While the addition of these forces gives us a wide range of
    military options, should they be necessary, we remain firmly committed
    to finding a diplomatic solution.
        The ongoing crisis is only one chapter in the long history of
    efforts by the Iraqi regime to flout its obligations under UNSC
    resolutions. Iraq has persistently failed to disclose fully its programs
    for weapons of mass destruction. It admits to moving significant pieces
    of dual-use equipment subject to monitoring. Without full disclosure,
    UNSCOM and the IAEA cannot effectively conduct the ongoing monitoring
    and verification mandated by UNSCR's 687, 707, 715, and other relevant
    resolutions.
        Iraqi biological and chemical weapons are currently the most
    troubling issues for UNSCOM. This is due to the innate dual-use nature
    of the technology--how easily it can be hidden within civilian
    industries such as, for biological agents--the pharmaceutical industry,
    and for chemical agents--the pesticide industry. In both cases, Iraq
    continues to prevent full and immediate access to sites suspected of
    chemical or biological warfare activities. Until 2 months ago, for
    example, major aspects of Iraq's pernicious ``VX'' program (a powerful
    nerve agent) were unknown to UNSCOM due to Iraqi concealment. UNSCOM is
    still unable to verify that all of Iraq's SCUD missile warheads filled
    with biological agents--anthrax and botulinum toxin--have been
    destroyed. When UNSCOM says it is making ``significant progress'' in
    these areas, it is referring to UNSCOM's progress in ferreting out Iraqi
    deception, not Iraqi progress in cooperating with UNSCOM.
        The Iraqi regime contends that UNSCOM and the IAEA should ``close
    the books'' on nuclear and missile inspections. But there are still many
    uncertainties and questions that need to be resolved. Among the many
    problems, Iraq has:
        failed to answer critical questions on nuclear weapons
                design and fabrication, procurement, and centrifuge
                enrichment;
        failed to detail how far the theoretical and practical
                aspects of its clandestine nuclear efforts progressed;
        failed to explain in full the interaction between its
                nuclear warhead and missile design programs;
        failed to provide a written description of its post-war
                nuclear weapons procurement program;
        failed to account for major engine components, special
                warheads, missing propellants, and guidance instruments that
                could be used to assemble fully operational missiles; and

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        failed to discuss--on the direct orders of Tariq Aziz--its
                actions to retain missile launchers.
        In accordance with relevant UNSCR's, UNSCOM must continue to
    investigate the Iraqi nuclear and missile programs until it can verify
    with absolute certainty that all the equipment has been destroyed and
    that all the capabilities have been eliminated. Otherwise, Iraq will be
    able to strike at any city in the Middle East, delivering devastating
    biological, chemical, and even nuclear weapons.
        UNSCOM's work must include vigorous efforts to unveil Iraq's
    ``Concealment Mechanism.'' Led by elements of its special security
    services, Iraq has for over 6-years engaged in a massive and elaborate
    campaign to keep UNSCOM inspectors from finding proscribed equipment,
    documents, and possibly weapons themselves. Over the years, inspection
    teams have been prevented from doing their jobs and held--often at
    gunpoint--outside suspect facilities, providing enough time for evidence
    to be hidden or destroyed. To rout out Iraq's remaining weapons of mass
    destruction, UNSCOM must be granted full access to all sites, without
    exception.
        The Iraqi regime contends that it has been forced to defy the
    international community in this manner out of concern for the well-being
    of the Iraqi people, claiming that malnutrition and inadequate medical
    care are the direct result of internationally imposed sanctions. To the
    contrary, the deep concern of the United States and the international
    community about the condition of the Iraqi people is evident in the fact
    that the international sanctions against Iraq have been carefully
    structured to help ensure that ordinary Iraqis need not suffer. Since
    their inception, the sanctions against Iraq have had exceptions for the
    importation into Iraq of foods and medicines. In August 1991, when Iraq
    claimed that it was unable to pay for its food needs, the Security
    Council adopted UNSCR 706 (and later 712), authorizing Iraq to sell
    limited amounts of petroleum on the international market, with the
    proceeds to be used to purchase humanitarian supplies, and to fund vital
    U.N. activities regarding Iraq. The Government of Iraq, however, ignored
    the needs of its own people, by refusing to accept UNSCR's 706 and 712.
        In April 1995 the Security Council proposed a new oil-for-food offer
    to Iraq in UNSCR 986, sponsored by the United States and others. UNSCR
    986 authorized the sale of up to $1 billion of oil every 90 days for
    Iraq to purchase food, medicines, and other ``humanitarian items'' for
    its people. The Government of Iraq delayed implementation of UNSCR 986
    for a year and a half, until December 1996.
        Since December 1996, the Iraqi regime has continued to obstruct the
    relief plan. It has reduced the food ration for each person, even as
    more food was flowing into the country. In fact, there are credible
    reports that as food imports under UNSCR 986 increased, the regime
    reduced its regular food purchases, potentially freeing up money for
    other purposes. There are also reports that Iraq may have stockpiled
    food in warehouses for use by the military and regime supporters--even
    though the Iraqi people need the food now. Under UNSCR 1111--the 6-month
    renewal of UNSCR 986 passed in June 1997--the regime delayed oil sales
    for 2 months, even while it claimed its people were starving. In
    Baghdad, the regime staged threatening demonstrations against U.N.
    relief offices. Under both UNSCR's 986 and 1111, the U.N. Sanctions
    Committee has had to carefully consider each and every import contract
    because of the possibility that Iraq may slip orders for dual-use items
    that can be employed to make weapons into long lists of humanitarian
    goods.
        Since 1990--even at the height of the Gulf War--the consistent
    position of the United States has been that this dispute is with Iraq's
    regime, not with its people. We have always been open to suggestions on
    how UNSCR's 986 and 1111 can be improved or expanded to better serve the
    needs of the people. The confrontational tactics of the Iraqi government
    have not altered this position.
        Sanctions against Iraq were imposed as the result of Iraq's invasion
    of Kuwait. It has been necessary to sustain them because of Iraq's
    failure to comply with relevant UNSC resolutions, including those to
    ensure that Saddam Hussein is not allowed to resume the unrestricted
    development and production of weapons of mass destruction. Prior to the
    Gulf War, Saddam had already used chemical weapons on the Iraqi people
    and on Iranian troops, and he threatened to use them on coalition forces
    and innocent civilians in Saudi Arabia and Israel during the Gulf War.
    By restricting the amount of oil he can sell to a level that provides
    for the needs of the Iraqi people but does not allow him to

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    pursue other, nonhumanitarian objectives, international sanctions make
    it virtually impossible for Saddam to gear up his weapons programs to
    full strength.
        Saddam could end the suffering of his people tomorrow if he would
    cease his obstruction of the oil-for-food program and allow it to be
    implemented properly. He could end sanctions entirely if he would
    demonstrate peaceful intentions by complying fully with relevant UNSC
    resolutions. The United States has supported and will continue to
    support the sanctions against the Iraqi regime until such time as
    compliance is achieved.
        Saddam Hussein remains a threat to his people, to the region, and to
    the world, and the United States remains determined to contain the
    threat posed by his regime. The United States looks forward to the day
    when Iraq rejoins the family of nations as a responsible and law-abiding
    member but until then, containment must continue.
        Regarding military operations, the United States and its coalition
    partners continue to enforce the no-fly zones over Iraq under Operation
    Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch. We have detected myriad
    intentional Iraqi violations of both no-fly zones. While these incidents
    (Iraqi violations of the no-fly zones) started several hours after an
    Iranian air raid on terrorist bases inside Iraq, it was clear that
    Iraq's purpose was to try and test the coalition to see how far it could
    go in violating the ban on flights in these regions. A maximum effort by
    Operation Southern Watch forces complemented by early arrival in theater
    of the USS NIMITZ battle group, dramatically reduced violations in the
    southern no-fly zone. An increase in the number of support aircraft
    participating in Northern Watch allowed increased operating capacity
    that in turn significantly reduced the number of violations in the
    north. We have repeatedly made clear to the Government of Iraq and to
    all other relevant parties that the United States and its partners will
    continue to enforce both no-fly zones, and that we reserve the right to
    respond appropriately and decisively to any Iraqi provocations.
        United States force levels include land- and carrier-based aircraft,
    surface warships, a Marine amphibious task force, a Patriot missile
    battalion, a mechanized battalion task force, and a mix of special
    operations forces deployed in support of USCINCCENT operations. To
    enhance force protection throughout the region, additional military
    security personnel have been deployed for continuous rotation.
    USCINCCENT continues to monitor closely the security situation in the
    region to ensure adequate force protection is provided for all deployed
    forces.
        United Nations Security Council Resolution 9491 adopted in October
    1994, demands that Iraq not use its military or any other forces to
    threaten its neighbors or U.N. operations in Iraq and that it not
    redeploy troops or enhance its military capacity in southern Iraq. In
    view of Saddam's accumulating record of unreliability, it is prudent to
    retain a significant U.S. force presence in the region in order to deter
    Iraq and maintain the capability to respond rapidly to possible Iraqi
    aggression or threats against its neighbors.
        Implementation of UNSCR 1051 continues. It provides for a mechanism
    to monitor Iraq's efforts to reacquire proscribed weapons capabilities
    by requiring Iraq to notify a joint unit of UNSCOM and the IAEA in
    advance of any imports of dual-use items. Similarly, U.N. members must
    provide timely notification of exports to Iraq of dual-use items.
        The human rights situation throughout Iraq remains unchanged. Iraq's
    repression of its Shi'a population continues, with policies that are
    destroying the Marsh Arabs' way of life in southern Iraq and the ecology
    of the southern marshes. The United Nations, in its most recent reports
    on implementation of Resolution 986, recognized that the Government of
    Iraq continues forcibly to deport Iraqi citizens from Kirkuk and other
    areas of northern Iraq still under the Iraqi government's control. Iraq
    continues to stall and obfuscate rather than work in good faith toward
    accounting for the hundreds of Kuwaitis and third-country nationals who
    disappeared at the hands of Iraqi authorities during the occupation of
    Kuwait. The Government of Iraq shows no signs of complying with UNSC
    Resolution 688, which demands that Iraq cease the repression of its own
    people. The U.N. Human Rights Commission's special rapporteur on Iraq
    reported to the General Assembly of his particular concern that
    extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and the practice of
    torture continue to occur in Iraq.
        The INDICT campaign continues to gain momentum. Led by various
    independent Iraqi opposition groups and nongovernmental organizations,
    this effort seeks to document crimes

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    against humanity and other violations of international humanitarian law
    committed by the Iraqi regime. We applaud the tenacity of the Iraqi
    opposition in the face of one of the most repressive regimes in history.
    We also take note of and welcome H.Con.Res. 137 of November 12,
    expressing the sense of the House of Representatives concerning the need
    for an international criminal tribunal to try members of the Iraqi
    regime for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
        Regarding northern Iraq, our efforts to help resolve the differences
    between Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
    and Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
    have not yet yielded the type of permanent, stable settlement that the
    people of northern Iraq deserve. The Peace Monitoring Force--sponsored
    by the United States, Great Britain, and Turkey under the Ankara Process
    and comprising Iraqi Turkomans and Assyrians--was forced to withdraw
    from the agreed cease-fire line between the two groups, when PUK forces,
    joined by the terrorist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) launched a wide-
    scale attack on the KDP on October 13. The KDP, supported by airstrikes
    and ground elements of the Turkish army, launched a counterattack on
    November 8. We have helped to arrange a number of temporary cease-fires
    and to restore humanitarian services in the course of this fighting, but
    the underlying causes for conflict remain. We will continue our efforts
    to reach a permanent settlement through mediation in order to minimize
    opportunities for Baghdad and/or Tehran to insert themselves into the
    conflict and threaten Iraqi citizens in this region.
        The Multinational Interception Force (MIF) continues its important
    mission in the Arabian Gulf. The U.S. Navy provides the bulk of the
    forces involved in the maritime sanctions enforcement authorized under
    Resolution 665, although we receive much-needed help from a number of
    close allies, including during the past year: Belgium, Canada, The
    Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.
        Illegal smuggling of Iraqi gasoil from the Shatt Al Arab waterway in
    violation of Resolution 661 has doubled since May of this year--reaching
    an estimated 180,000 metric tons per month--and continues to increase.
    The smugglers use the territorial waters of Iran with the complicity of
    the Iranian government that profits from charging protection fees for
    these vessels to avoid interception by the MIF in international waters.
    Cash raised from these illegal operations is used to purchase contraband
    goods that are then smuggled back into Iraq by the same route. We
    continue to brief the U.N. Sanctions Committee regarding these
    operations and have pressed the Committee to compel Iran to give a full
    accounting of its involvement. We have also worked closely with our MIF
    partners and Gulf Cooperation Council states to take measures to curb
    sanctions-breaking operations.
        The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), established
    pursuant to UNSCR 687 and 692, continues to resolve claims against Iraq
    arising from Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The UNCC
    has issued almost 1.3 million awards worth approximately $6 billion.
    Thirty percent of the proceeds from the oil sales permitted by UNSCR's
    986 and 1111 have been allocated to the Compensation Fund to pay awards
    and to finance operations of the UNCC, and these proceeds will continue
    to be allocated to the Fund under UNSCR 1111. To the extent that money
    is available in the Compensation Fund, initial payments to each claimant
    are authorized for awards in the order in which the UNCC has approved
    them, in installments of $2,500. To date, 455 U.S. claimants have
    received an initial installment payment, and payment is in process for
    an additional 487 U.S. claimants.
        Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and security. I
    remain determined to see Iraq comply fully with all of its obligations
    under U.N. Security Council resolutions. My Administration will continue
    to sustain and strengthen sanctions until Iraq demonstrates its peaceful
    intentions through such compliance.
        I appreciate the support of the Congress for our efforts and shall
    continue to keep the Congress informed about this important issue.
            Sincerely,

                                                          William J. Clinton

    Note: Identical letters were sent to Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House
    of Representatives, and Strom Thurmond, President pro tempore of the
    Senate. In the letter, the President referred to Richard Butler,
    Executive Chairman, United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM); Hans

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    Blix, Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency; and Deputy
    Prime Minister Tariq Aziz of Iraq. This letter was released by the
    Office of the Press Secretary on December 1.