    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1997, Book II)]
    [November 12, 1997]
    [Pages 1542-1546]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    Message to the Congress on Continuation of the National Emergency With
    Respect to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
    November 12, 1997

    To the Congress of the United States:
        On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation
    of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass
    destruction''--(WMD)) and of the means of delivering such weapons, I
    issued Executive Order 12938, and declared a national emergency under
    the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et
    seq.). Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
    1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of
    its declaration, unless I publish in the Federal Register and transmit
    to the Congress a notice of its continuation.
        The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to pose
    an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign
    policy, and economy of the United States. Therefore, I am advising the
    Congress that the national emergency declared on November 14, 1994, and
    extended on November 14, 1995 and November 14, 1996, must continue in
    effect beyond November 14, 1997. Accordingly, I have extended the
    national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938 and have sent the
    attached notice of extension to the Federal Register for publication.
        The following report is made pursuant to section 204(c) of the
    International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)) and
    section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)),
    regarding activities taken and money spent pursuant to the emergency
    declaration. Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical
    and biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation efforts is contained in
    the most recent annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and
    Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons,
    provided to the Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law
    102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation Report,'' and the most
    recent annual report provided to the Congress pursuant to section 308 of
    the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act
    of 1991 (Public Law 102-182), also known as the ``CBW Report.''

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    Chemical and Biological Weapons

        The three export control regulations issued under the Enhanced
    Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) remained fully in force and
    continue to be applied in order to control the export of items with
    potential use in chemical or biological weapons or unmanned delivery
    systems for weapons of mass destruction.
        Chemical weapons continue to pose a very serious threat to our
    security and that of countries friendly to us. On April 29, 1997, the
    Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
    Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the
    ``Chemical Weapons Convention'' or (CWC)) entered into force with 87 of
    the CWC's 165 signatories as original States Parties. The United States
    was among their number, having deposited its instrument of ratification
    on April 25. As of November 5, 104 countries had become States Parties.
        Russia did not complete its legislative approval process in time to
    be among the original CWC States Parties. In our March meeting in
    Helsinki, President Yeltsin did, however, assure me of his understanding
    of the importance of the CWC to Russia's own security. On October 31,
    1997, the Russian Duma (lower house) approved ratification of the CWC.
    On November 5, 1997, the Russian Federation Council unanimously approved
    the CWC and the Russian government deposited its instrument of
    ratification. Russia's ratification makes it possible for Russia to join
    the United States in playing a leadership role in ensuring that all of
    the Convention's benefits are realized.
        Given Russia's financial situation during this difficult period of
    transition to a market economy, serious concerns have been raised about
    the high costs of environmentally sound destruction of the large stocks
    of chemical weapons Russia inherited from the former Soviet Union.
    Through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, we are working with
    Russia to help address these complex problems, and we will continue to
    do so now that Russia has ratified the CWC.
        The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has
    been established to achieve the object and purpose of the CWC, to ensure
    the implementation of its provisions and provide a forum for
    consultation and cooperation among States Parties. The executive organ
    of the OPCW, the Executive Council, has met five times since May to
    oversee decisions related to inter alia data declarations, inspections,
    and organizational issues. The United States plays an active role in
    ensuring effective implementation of the Convention.
        The CWC is an ambitious undertaking by the world community to ban an
    entire class of weapons of mass destruction. Its members have committed
    themselves to totally eliminating chemical weapons stocks and production
    facilities, prohibiting chemical weapons-related activities, banning
    assistance for such activities and restricting trade with non-Parties in
    certain relevant chemicals. Destruction of U.S. chemical weapons stocks
    is moving forward. Other CWC States Parties have now taken on a similar
    task, and we are working hard with the other members of the CWC to make
    membership in this treaty universal.
        The United States is determined to ensure full implementation of the
    concrete measures in the CWC that will raise the costs and the risks for
    any state or terrorist attempting to engage in chemical weapons-related
    activities. The CWC's declaration requirements will improve our
    knowledge of possible chemical weapons activities, whether conducted by
    countries or terrorists. Its inspection provisions provide for access to
    declared and undeclared facilities and locations, thus making
    clandestine chemical weapons production and stockpiling more difficult,
    more risky, and more expensive.
        Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically isolated
    and banned from trading with States Parties in certain key chemicals.
    The relevant Treaty provision is specifically designed to penalize in a
    concrete way countries that refuse to join the rest of the world in
    eliminating the threat of chemical weapons.
        The United States also continues to play a leading role in the
    international effort to reduce the threat from biological weapons. We
    are an active participant in the Ad Hoc Group striving to create a
    legally binding protocol to strengthen and enhance compliance with the
    Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
    Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
    Their Destruction (the ``Biological Weapons Convention'' or (BWC)). This
    Ad Hoc Group was mandated by the September 1994 BWC Special Conference.
    The Fourth BWC Review Conference, held in November 1996, commended the
    work done by the Ad Hoc Group and urged it to complete

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    the protocol as soon as possible but not later than the next Review
    Conference to be held in 2001. A draft rolling text was introduced by
    the Chairman at the July Ad Hoc Group session. Work is progressing on
    insertion of national views and clarification of existing text, largely
    drawn from the consultative phase of Ad Hoc Group work since 1994.
    Three-week sessions are scheduled for January, July, and September of
    1998. Another 2-week session will be scheduled for either March or
    December of 1998. Early completion of an effective BWC protocol is high
    on our list of nonproliferation goals.
        The United States continues to be a leader in the Australia Group
    (AG) chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation regime. Last year,
    the United States supported the entry into the AG of the Republic of
    Korea, which became the group's 30th member in time for the October 1996
    plenary.
        The United States attended this year's annual AG plenary session
    from October 6-9, 1997, during which the Group continued to focus on
    strengthening AG export controls and sharing information to address the
    threat of CBW terrorism. At the behest of the United States, the AG
    first began in-depth political-level discussion of CBW terrorism during
    the 1995 plenary session following the Tokyo subway nerve gas attack
    earlier that year. At the 1996 plenary, the United States urged AG
    members to exchange national points of contact for AG terrorism matters.
    At the 1997 plenary, the AG accepted a U.S. proposal to survey all AG
    members on efforts each has taken to counter this threat.
        The Group also reaffirmed the members' collective belief that full
    adherence to the CWC and the BWC is the best way to achieve permanent
    global elimination of CBW, and that all states adhering to these
    Conventions have an obligation to ensure that their national activities
    support this goal.
        AG participants continue to seek to ensure that all relevant
    national measures promote the object and purposes of the BWC and CWC.
    The AG nations reaffirmed their belief that existing national export
    licensing policies on chemical weapons-related items fulfill the
    obligation established under Article I of the CWC that States Parties
    never assist, in any way, the acquisition of chemical weapons. Given
    this understanding, the AG members also reaffirmed their commitment to
    continuing the Group's activities now that the CWC has entered into
    force.
        The AG also reaffirmed its commitment to continue to provide
    briefings for non-AG countries, and to promote regional consultations on
    export controls and nonproliferation to further awareness and
    understanding of national policies in these areas.
        During the last 6 months, we continue to examine closely
    intelligence and other reports of trade in chemical weapons-related
    material and technology that might require action, including evaluating
    whether sanctions under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and
    Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 were warranted. In May 1997, we imposed
    sanctions on seven Chinese entities and one Hong Kong company for
    knowingly and materially contributing to Iran's CW program through the
    export of dual-use chemical precursors and/or chemical production
    equipment and technology. In September 1997, we imposed sanctions on a
    German citizen and a German company determined to have been involved in
    the export of chemical production equipment to Libya's CW program.
        The United States continues to cooperate with its AG partners in
    stopping shipments of proliferation concern. By sharing information
    through diplomatic and other channels, we and our AG partners have been
    successful in interdicting various shipments destined to CBW programs.

    Missiles for Weapons of Mass Destruction Delivery

        During the reporting period, the United States carefully controlled
    exports that could contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons
    of mass destruction and closely monitored activities of potential
    missile proliferation concern. We also continued to implement U.S.
    missile sanctions law, in cases where sanctionable activity was
    determined to have occurred. In August 1997, we imposed sanctions
    against two North Korean entities determined to have engaged in missile
    proliferation activities. Similar sanctions imposed in May 1996 remain
    in effect against two entities in Iran and one entity in North Korea for
    transfers involving Category II Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
    Annex items.
        During this reporting period, MTCR Partners continued to share
    information about proliferation problems with each other and with other
    potential supplier, consumer, and transshipment states. Partners also
    emphasized the need for

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    implementing effective export control systems. This cooperation has
    resulted in the interdiction of missile-related materials intended for
    use in missile programs of concern.
        The United States was an active participant in the MTCR's June 1997
    Reinforced Point of Contact Meeting (RPOC). At the RPOC, MTCR Partners
    engaged in useful discussions of regional missile proliferation
    concerns, as well as steps the Partners could take to increase
    transparency and outreach to nonmembers.
        In July 1997, the United States also played a leading role at the
    Swiss-hosted MTCR workshop on the licensing and enforcement aspects of
    transshipment. The workshop was successful in focusing attention on the
    enforcement problems raised by proliferators' misuse of transshipment
    and fostered a productive exchange of ideas on how countries can better
    address such activity.
        The United States worked unilaterally and in coordination with its
    MTCR Partners to combat missile proliferation and to encourage
    nonmembers to export responsibly and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines.
    Since the last report, we have continued our missile nonproliferation
    dialogue with China, the Republic of Korea (ROK), North Korea (DPRK),
    and Ukraine. In the course of normal diplomatic relations, we also have
    pursued such discussions with other countries in Central Europe, the
    Middle East, and Asia.
        In June 1997, the United States and the DPRK held a second round of
    missile talks, aimed at freezing the DPRK's indigenous missile
    development program and curtailing its missile-related export
    activities. The DPRK appeared willing to consider limits on its missile-
    related exports, in return for sanctions-easing measures, but did not
    engage in discussion of limits on its missile development program. We
    intend to pursue further missile talks with the DPRK.
        In July 1997, we held another round of nonproliferation talks with
    the ROK. These talks were productive and made progress toward
    facilitating ROK membership in the MTCR.
        In response to reports that Iran had acquired sensitive items from
    Russian entities for use in Iran's missile development program, the
    United States intensified its high-level dialogue with Russia on this
    issue. We held a number of productive discussions with senior Russian
    officials aimed at finding ways the United States and Russia can work
    together to prevent Iran's ballistic missile development program from
    acquiring Russian technology and equipment. This process is continuing.

    Nuclear Weapons

        In a truly historic landmark in our efforts to curb the spread of
    nuclear weapons, the 50th U.N. General Assembly on September 10, 1996,
    adopted and called for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
    Treaty (CTBT), negotiated over the previous 2\1/2\ years in the
    Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The overwhelming passage of this
    U.N. resolution (158-3-5) demonstrates the CTBT's strong international
    support and marks a major success for United States foreign policy. On
    September 24, 1996, I and other international leaders signed the CTBT in
    New York.
        During 1997, CTBT signatories have conducted numerous meetings of
    the Preparatory Commission in Vienna, seeking to promote rapid
    completion of the International Monitoring System established by the
    Treaty. On September 23, I transmitted the CTBT to the Senate,
    requesting prompt advice and consent to ratification.
        The CTBT will serve several United States national security
    interests in banning all nuclear explosions. It will constrain the
    development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; end the
    development of advanced new types; contribute to the prevention of
    nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear disarmament; and
    strengthen international peace and security. The CTBT marks an historic
    milestone in our drive to reduce the nuclear threat and to build a safer
    world.
        Formal preparations for the year 2000 Review Conference for the
    Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) began in 1997
    with the first of three annual Preparatory Committee meetings of the
    Parties to the Treaty. The United States is committed to working to
    ensure that the 2000 NPT review Conference will further strengthen the
    NPT and reinforce global nuclear nonproliferation objectives. Since the
    1995 NPT Conference, eight additional states have joined the NPT,
    leaving only five states worldwide currently outside the NPT regime. The
    NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee added China to its membership in 1997.
        The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) continued its efforts to upgrade
    control lists and export control procedures. NSG members confirmed

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    their agreement to clarifications to the nuclear trigger list to accord
    with trigger list changes agreed to by the members of the NPT Exporters
    (Zangger) Committee, and the International Atomic Energy Agency
    published these understandings on September 16, 1997. The NSG also is
    actively pursuing steps to enhance the transparency of the export regime
    in accordance with the call in Principles 16 and 17 of the 1995 NPT
    Review and Extension Conference.
        The NSG held an export control seminar in Vienna on October 8 and 9,
    1997, which described and explained the role of the NSG (and the Zangger
    Committee) in preventing nuclear proliferation. The NSG also continued
    efforts to enhance information sharing among members regarding the
    nuclear programs of proliferant countries by (1) ``officially'' linking
    the NSG members through a dedicated computer network allowing for real-
    time distribution of license denial information, and by (2) creating a
    separate session for exchange of information on the margins of the NSG
    plenary meeting.
        NSG membership will increase to 35 with the acceptance of Latvia.
    The ultimate goal of the NSG is to obtain the agreement of all
    suppliers, including nations not members of the regime, to control
    nuclear and nuclear-related exports in accordance with the NSG
    guidelines.

    Expenses

        Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50
    U.S.C. 1641(c)), I report that there were no expenses directly
    attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred by the declaration
    of the national emergency in Executive Order 12938 during the semiannual
    reporting period.

                                                          William J. Clinton

    The White House,

    November 12, 1997.

    Note: The notice is listed in Appendix D at the end of this volume.