    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1997, Book I)]
    [January 7, 1997]
    [Pages 11-12]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    Message to the Senate Transmitting Conventional Weapons Convention
    Protocols on Mines, Incendiary Weapons, and Blinding Lasers With
    Documentation
    January 7, 1997

    To the Senate of the United States:
        I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to
    ratification, the following Protocols to the 1980 Convention on
    Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
    Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
    Indiscriminate Effects: the amended Protocol on Prohibitions or
    Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices
    (Protocol II or the amended Mines Protocol); the Protocol on
    Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol
    III or the Incendiary Weapons Protocol); and the Protocol on Blinding
    Laser Weapons (Protocol IV). Also transmitted for the information of the
    Senate is the report of the Department of State with respect to these
    Protocols, together with article-by-article analyses.
        The most important of these Protocols is the amended Mines Protocol.
    It is an essential step forward in dealing with the problem of anti-
    personnel landmines (APL) and in minimizing the very severe casualties
    to civilians that have resulted from their use. It is an important
    precursor to the total prohibition of these weapons that the United
    States seeks.
        Among other things, the amended Mines Protocol will do the
    following: (1) expand the scope of the original Protocol to include
    internal armed conflicts, where most civilian mine casualties have
    occurred; (2) require that all remotely delivered anti-personnel mines
    be equipped with self-destruct devices and backup self-deactivation
    features to ensure that they do not pose a long-term threat to
    civilians; (3) require that all nonremotely delivered anti-personnel
    mines that are not equipped with such devices be used only within
    controlled, marked, and monitored minefields to protect the civilian
    population in the area; (4) require that all anti-personnel mines be
    detectable using commonly available technology to make the task of mine
    clearance easier and safer; (5) require that the party laying mines
    assume responsibility for them to ensure against their irresponsible and
    indiscriminate use; and (6) provide more effective means for dealing
    with compliance problems to ensure that these restrictions are actually
    observed. These objectives were all endorsed by the Senate in its
    Resolution of Ratification of the Convention in March 1995.
        The amended Mines Protocol was not as strong as we would have
    preferred. In particular, its provisions on verification and compliance
    are not as rigorous as we had proposed, and the transition periods
    allowed for the conversion or elimination of certain noncompliant mines
    are longer than we thought necessary. We shall pursue these issues in
    the regular meetings that the amended Protocol provides for review of
    its operation.
        Nonetheless, I am convinced that this amended Protocol will, if
    generally adhered to, save many lives and prevent many tragic injuries.
    It will, as well, help to prepare the ground for the total prohibition
    of anti-personnel landmines to which the United States is committed. In
    this regard, I cannot overemphasize how seriously the United States
    takes the goal of eliminating APL entirely. The carnage and devastation
    caused by anti-personnel landmines--the hidden killers that murder and
    maim more than 25,000 people every year--must end.
        On May 16, 1996, I launched an international effort to this end.
    This initiative sets out a concrete path to a global ban on anti-
    personnel landmines and is one of my top arms control priorities. At the
    same time, the policy recognizes that the United States has
    international commitments and responsibilities that must be taken into
    account in any negotiations on a total ban. As our work on this
    initiative progresses, we will continue to consult with the Congress.
        The second of these Protocols--the Protocol on Incendiary Weapons--
    is a part of the original Convention but was not sent to the Senate for
    advice and consent with the other 1980 Protocols in 1994 because of
    concerns about the acceptability of the Protocol from a military point
    of view. Incendiary weapons have significant potential military value,
    particularly with respect to flammable military targets that cannot so

    [[Page 12]]

    readily be destroyed with conventional explosives.
        At the same time, these weapons can be misused in a manner that
    could cause heavy civilian casualties. In particular, the Protocol
    prohibits the use of air-delivered incendiary weapons against targets
    located in a city, town, village, or other concentration of civilians, a
    practice that caused very heavy civilian casualties in past conflicts.
        The executive branch has given very careful study to the
    Incendiaries Protocol and has developed a reservation that would, in our
    view, make it acceptable from a broader national security perspective.
    This proposed reservation, the text of which appears in the report of
    the Department of State, would reserve the right to use incendiaries
    against military objectives located in concentrations of civilians where
    it is judged that such use would cause fewer casualties and less
    collateral damage than alternative weapons.
        The third of these three Protocols--the new Protocol on Blinding
    Lasers--prohibits the use or transfer of laser weapons specifically
    designed to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision (that is, to
    the naked eye or to the eye with corrective devices). The Protocol also
    requires Parties to take all feasible precautions in the employment of
    other laser systems to avoid the incidence of such blindness.
        These blinding lasers are not needed by our military forces. They
    are potential weapons of the future, and the United States is committed
    to preventing their emergence and use. The United States supports the
    adoption of this new Protocol.
        I recommend that the Senate give its early and favorable
    consideration to these Protocols and give its advice and consent to
    ratification, subject to the conditions described in the accompanying
    report of the Department of State. The prompt ratification of the
    amended Mines Protocol is particularly important, so that the United
    States can continue its position of leadership in the effort to deal
    with the humanitarian catastrophe of irresponsible landmine use.

                                                          William J. Clinton

    The White House,

    January 7, 1997.

    Note: This message was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on
    January 8.