    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1996, Book II)]
    [November 12, 1996]
    [Pages 2112-2116]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    Letter to Congressional Leaders on Continuation of the National
    Emergency With Respect to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
    Destruction
    November 12, 1996

    Dear Mr. Speaker:  (Dear Mr. President:)
        On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation
    of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass
    destruction''--(WMD)) and of the means of delivering such weapons, I
    issued Executive Order 12938, and declared a national emergency under
    the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et
    seq.). Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
    1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of
    its declaration, unless I publish in the Federal Register and transmit
    to the Congress a notice of its continuation.
        The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to pose
    an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign
    policy, and economy of the United States. Therefore, I am hereby
    advising the Congress that the national emergency declared on November
    14, 1994, and extended on November 14, 1995, must continue in effect
    beyond November 14, 1996. Accordingly, I have extended the national
    emergency declared in Executive Order 12938 and have sent the attached
    notice

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    of extension to the Federal Register for publication.
        The following report is made pursuant to section 204 of the
    International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703) and section
    401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), regarding
    activities taken and money spent pursuant to the emergency declaration.
    Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and
    biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation efforts is contained in the
    most recent annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential
    Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, provided to the
    Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as
    the ``Nonproliferation Report,'' and the most recent annual report
    provided to the Congress pursuant to section 308 of the Chemical and
    Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public
    Law 102-182).
        During the last 6 months, the three export control regulations
    issued under the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI)
    remained fully in force and continue to be applied in order to control
    the export of items with potential use in chemical or biological weapons
    or unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.
        The threat of chemical weapons is one of the most pressing security
    challenges of the post-Cold War era. With bipartisan support from the
    Congress, the United States has long been a leader in the international
    fight against the spread of chemical weapons. Democrats and Republicans
    have worked hard together to strengthen our security by concluding the
    Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
    Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the
    Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC).
        The CWC bans an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. It is
    both an arms control and a nonproliferation treaty that requires total
    elimination of chemical weapons stocks, prohibits chemical weapons-
    related activities, bans assistance for such activities and bars trade
    with non-Parties in certain relevant chemicals. This treaty denies us no
    option we would otherwise wish to exercise and is a critical instrument
    in our global fight against the spread of chemical weapons.
        The CWC provides concrete measures that will raise the costs and
    risks of engaging in chemical weapons-related activities. The CWC's
    declaration and inspection requirements will improve our knowledge of
    possible chemical weapons activities, whether conducted by countries or
    terrorists. The treaty's provisions constitute the most comprehensive
    and intrusive verification regime ever negotiated, covering virtually
    every aspect of a chemical weapons program, from development through
    production and stockpiling. These provisions provide for access to
    declared and undeclared facilities and locations, thus making
    clandestine chemical weapons production and stockpiling more difficult,
    more risky and more expensive.
        Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically isolated
    and banned from trading with States Parties in certain key chemicals.
    Indeed, major chemical industry groups have testified before the Senate
    that our companies stand to lose millions of dollars in international
    sales if the United States is not a State Party when the treaty enters
    into force.
        That could happen if we fail to ratify the CWC promptly. It is
    nearly four years since the Bush Administration signed the Convention
    and three years since this Administration submitted the CWC to the
    Senate for its advice and consent. All our major NATO allies have
    deposited their instruments of ratification, as have all other G-7
    members. The CWC will enter into force 180 days after it has been
    ratified by 65 countries. By mid-October 1996, 64 of the 160 signatory
    countries had done so. It therefore seems likely the CWC will enter into
    force as early as April 1997.
        Further delay in securing U.S. ratification of this vital treaty
    serves only the interests of proliferators and terrorists. Delay may
    well also endanger the international competitiveness of the chemical
    industry, one of our largest exporters. In the interim, pressures are
    increasing in unstable regions to acquire and use chemical weapons. We
    need to ratify this convention urgently to strengthen our own security,
    affirm our leadership in nonproliferation and to protect our chemical
    industry. Ratification must be a top priority of the new Congress in
    early 1997.
        During the reporting period, the United States continued to be
    active in the work of the CWC Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) in The
    Hague. The Prepcom is developing the vital technical and administrative
    procedures for

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    implementation of the CWC through a strong organization to ensure
    compliance when the convention enters into force.
        The United States is working hard with the international community
    to end the threat from another terrible category of weapons of mass
    destruction--biological weapons. We are an active member of the Ad Hoc
    Group striving to create a legally binding instrument to strengthen the
    effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention on the
    Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
    Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction
    (The Biological Weapons Convention or BWC). The Ad Hoc Group was
    mandated by the September 1994 BWC Special Conference. The Group held
    meetings in July and September with the goal of preparing for the late
    November 1996 Fourth BWC Review Conference. Concluding a new BWC
    protocol is high on our list of nonproliferation goals. We should aim to
    complete such a protocol by 1998.
        The United States continues to be a leader in the Australia Group
    (AG) chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation regime. The United
    States supported the entry of the Republic of Korea (South Korea)--a
    country with an important chemical industry--into the AG. The ROK became
    the group's 30th member in late September--a tribute to the continuing
    international recognition of the importance of the Group's effort in
    nonproliferation and to the commitment of the ROK to that goal.
        The United States attended the AG's annual plenary session from
    October 14-17, 1996, during which the Group continued to focus on
    strengthening AG export controls and sharing information to address the
    threat of CBW terrorism. At the behest of the United States, the AG
    first began in-depth discussion of terrorism during the 1995 plenary
    session following the Tokyo subway nerve gas attack earlier that year.
        The Group also reaffirmed the members' collective belief that full
    adherence to the CWC and the BWC will be the best way to achieve
    permanent global elimination of CBW, and that all states adhering to
    these Conventions have an obligation to ensure that their national
    activities support this goal.
        Australia Group participants continue to ensure that all relevant
    national measures promote the object and purposes of the BWC and CWC,
    and will be fully consistent with the CWC upon its entry into force. The
    AG believes that national export licensing policies on chemical weapons-
    related items fulfill the obligation established under Article I of the
    CWC that States Parties never assist, in any way, the acquisition of
    chemical weapons. Inasmuch as these measures are focused solely on
    preventing activities banned under the CWC, they are consistent with the
    undertaking in Article XI of the CWC to facilitate the fullest possible
    exchange of chemical materials and related information for purposes not
    prohibited by the CWC.
        The AG also agreed to continue its active program of briefings for
    non-AG countries, and to promote regional consultations on export
    controls and nonproliferation to further awareness and understanding of
    national policies in these areas.
        During the last year, the United States imposed chemical weapons
    proliferation sanctions on one individual. On November 17, 1995,
    sanctions were imposed under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control
    and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 on Russian citizen Anatoliy
    Kuntsevich for knowingly providing material assistance to a foreign
    chemical weapons program.
        The United States carefully controlled exports that could contribute
    to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, exercising
    restraint in considering all such proposed transfers consistent with the
    Guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In May 1996,
    the United States imposed missile technology proliferation sanctions
    against two entities in Iran and one entity in North Korea for transfers
    involving Category II MTCR Annex items.
        MTCR Partners continued to share information about proliferation
    problems with each other and with other potential supplier, consumer,
    and transshipment states. Partners also emphasized the need for
    implementing effective export control systems. This cooperation has
    resulted in the interdiction of missile-related materials intended for
    use in missile programs of concern.
        The United States worked unilaterally and in coordination with its
    MTCR Partners to combat missile proliferation and to encourage non-
    members to export responsibly and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines.
    Since my last report, we have continued our missile nonproliferation
    dialogue with the Republic of Korea and Ukraine. In the course of normal
    diplomatic relations, we also have pursued such discussions with

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    other countries in Central Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.
        In June 1996, the United States was an active participant in
    discussions at the MTCR's Reinforced Point of Contact Meeting on
    Regional Missile Proliferation Issues. This meeting resulted in an in-
    depth discussion of regional missile proliferation concerns and actions
    the Partners could take, individually and collectively, to address the
    specific concerns raised by missile proliferation in regions of
    tensions.
        In July 1996, the MTCR held a Seminar on Transshipment Issues. The
    Seminar was held in Washington and hosted by the United States on behalf
    of the Regime. It brought together foreign policy makers and experts
    from twelve MTCR Partner countries and seven non-MTCR countries for the
    first joint discussion of ways to address the proliferation threat posed
    by transshipment. The seminar was successful in focusing attention on
    the transshipment problem and fostered a productive exchange of ideas on
    how to impede proliferators' misuse of transshipment. Seminar
    participants also identified several areas for possible follow-up, which
    the United States pursued at the 1996 Edinburgh MTCR Plenary.
        The MTCR held its Eleventh Plenary Meeting at Edinburgh, Scotland,
    October 7-11. At the Plenary, the MTCR Partners reaffirmed their
    commitment to controlling exports to prevent proliferation of delivery
    systems for weapons of mass destruction. They also reiterated their
    readiness for international cooperation in peaceful space activities
    that could not contribute to WMD delivery systems.
        The MTCR Partners also were supportive of U.S. initiatives to follow
    up on the success of the June 1996 Reinforced Point of Contact Meeting
    on the regional aspects of missile proliferation and the July 1996
    Seminar on transshipment issues. The Partners undertook to be proactive
    in encouraging key non-Partner transshippers to adhere to the MTCR
    Guidelines and Annex, and in providing them with practical assistance in
    implementing transshipment controls on missile technology. The Partners
    also agreed on steps they could take to enhance the MTCR's effectiveness
    in impending missile proliferation in South Asia and the Persian Gulf.
    Finally, the MTCR Partners agreed to increase the transparency of Regime
    aims and activities, and to continue their efforts to develop a dialogue
    with countries outside the Regime to encourage voluntary adherence to
    the MTCR Guidelines and heightened awareness of missile proliferation
    risks.
        We also continued vigorous pursuit of our nuclear nonproliferation
    goals. In May 1995, Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
    Nuclear Weapons (NPT) agreed at the NPT Review and Extension Conference
    to extend the NPT indefinitely and without conditions. Since the
    conference, more nations have acceded to the treaty. There now are more
    than 180 parties, making the NPT nearly universal.
        In a truly historic landmark in our efforts to curb the spread of
    nuclear weapons, the 50th UN General Assembly on September 10, 1996,
    adopted and called for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
    Treaty (CTBT) negotiated over the past two and a half years in the
    Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The overwhelming passage of this UN
    resolution (158-3-5) demonstrates the CTBT's strong international
    support and marks a major success for United States foreign policy. On
    September 24, I and other national leaders signed the CTBT in New York.
        The United States played a leading role in promoting the negotiation
    of this agreement by declaring a moratorium on nuclear testing in 1992
    and calling on all the other declared nuclear weapons states to enact
    their own moratoria, and by announcing in August of 1995 our support for
    a complete ban on all tests no matter how small their nuclear yield--a
    so-called ``zero-yield'' CTBT. The United States also insisted on an
    effective verification regime to ensure that the treaty enhances rather
    than reduces the security of its adherents.
        The CTBT will serve several United States national security
    interests in banning all nuclear explosions. It will constrain the
    development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; end the
    development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons; contribute to the
    prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear
    disarmament; and strengthen international peace and security. The CTBT
    marks an historic milestone in our drive to reduce the nuclear threat
    and to build a safer world.
        The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) continues efforts to upgrade
    control lists and export control procedures. By October 1996, NSG
    members confirmed their agreement to clarifications to the nuclear
    trigger list to accord with trigger list changes agreed to by the
    members

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    of the NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee. The NSG also is actively
    pursuing steps to enhance the transparency of the export regime in
    accordance with the call in Principles 16 and 17 of the 1995 NPT Review
    and Extension Conference. The NSG is also continuing efforts to enhance
    information sharing among members regarding the nuclear programs of
    proliferant countries.
        NSG membership increased to 34 with acceptance of Brazil, the
    Republic of Korea and Ukraine at the 1996 Buenos Aires Plenary. Members
    continued contacts with Belarus, China, Kazakstan and Lithuania
    regarding NSG activities and guidelines. The ultimate goal of the NSG is
    to obtain the agreement of all suppliers, including nations not members
    of the regime, to control nuclear and nuclear-related exports in
    accordance with the NSG guidelines.
        Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50
    U.S.C. 1641(c)), I report that there were no expenses directly
    attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred by the declaration
    of the national emergency in Executive Order 12938 during the period
    from May 14, 1996, through November 14, 1996.
            Sincerely,

                                                          William J. Clinton

    Note: Identical letters were sent to Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House
    of Representatives, and Albert Gore, Jr., President of the Senate. The
    notice is listed in Appendix D at the end of this volume.