    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1996, Book I)]
    [April 24, 1996]
    [Pages 630-632]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
    of 1996
    April 24, 1996

        I have today signed into law S. 735, the ``Antiterrorism and
    Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.'' This legislation is an important
    step forward in the Federal Government's continuing efforts to combat
    terrorism.
        I first transmitted antiterrorism legislation to the Congress in
    February 1995. Most of the proposals in that legislation, the ``Omnibus
    Counterterrorism Act of 1995,'' were aimed at fighting international
    terrorism. After the tragedy in Oklahoma City, I asked Federal law
    enforcement agencies to reassess their needs and determine which tools
    would help them meet the new challenge of domestic terrorism. They
    produced, and I transmitted to the Congress, the ``Antiterrorism
    Amendments Act of 1995'' in May 1995.
        Together, these two proposals took a comprehensive approach to
    fighting terrorism both at home and abroad. I am pleased that the
    Congress included most of the provisions of these proposals in this
    legislation. As a result, our law enforcement officials will have tough
    new tools to stop terrorists before they strike and to bring them to
    justice if they do. In particular, this legislation will:
        --provide broad new Federal jurisdiction to prosecute anyone who
            commits a terrorist attack in the United States or who uses the
            United States as a planning ground for attacks overseas;
        --ban fundraising in the United States that supports terrorist
            organizations;
        --allow U.S. officials to deport terrorists from American soil
            without being compelled by the terrorists to divulge classified
            information, and to bar terrorists from entering the United
            States in the first place;
        --require plastic explosives to contain chemical markers so that
            criminals who use them--like the ones that blew up Pan Am Flight
            103--can be tracked down and prosecuted;
        --enable the Government to issue regulations requiring that chemical
            taggants be added to some other types of explosives so that
            police can better trace bombs to the criminals who make them;
        --increase our controls over biological and chemical weapons;
        --toughen penalties over a range of terrorist crimes;

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        --ban the sale of defense goods and services to countries that I
            determine are not ``cooperating fully'' with U.S. antiterrorism
            efforts. Such a determination will require a review of a
            country's overall level of cooperation in our efforts to fight
            terrorism, taking into account our counterterrorism objectives
            with that country and a realistic assessment of its
            capabilities.
        By enacting this legislation, the United States remains in the
    forefront of the international effort to fight terrorism through tougher
    laws and resolute enforcement.
        Nevertheless, as strong as this bill is, it should have been
    stronger. For example, I asked the Congress to give U.S. law enforcement
    increased wiretap authority in terrorism cases, including the power to
    seek multi-point wiretaps, enabling police to follow a suspected
    terrorist from phone to phone, and authority for the kind of emergency
    wiretaps available in organized crime cases. But the Congress refused.
        After I proposed that the Secretary of the Treasury consider the
    inclusion of taggants in explosive materials, so that bombs can be
    traced more easily to the bomb makers, the Congress exempted black and
    smokeless powder--two of the most commonly used substances in improvised
    explosive devices.
        I asked that law enforcement be given increased access to hotel,
    phone and other records in terrorism cases. I asked for a mandatory
    penalty for those who knowingly transfer a firearm for use in a violent
    felony. I asked for a longer statute of limitations to allow law
    enforcement more time to prosecute terrorists who use weapons such as
    machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, and explosive devices. But the
    Congress stripped each of these provisions out of the bill. And when I
    asked for a ban on cop-killer bullets, the Congress delivered only a
    study, which will delay real action to protect our Nation's police
    officers.
        I intend to keep urging the Congress to give our law enforcement
    officials all the tools they need and deserve to carry on the fight
    against international and domestic terrorism. This is no time to give
    the criminals a break.
        There are three other portions of this bill that warrant comment.
    First, I have long sought to streamline Federal appeals for convicted
    criminals sentenced to the death penalty. For too long, and in too many
    cases, endless death row appeals have stood in the way of justice being
    served. Some have expressed the concern that two provisions of this
    important bill could be interpreted in a manner that would undercut
    meaningful Federal habeas corpus review. I have signed this bill because
    I am confident that the Federal courts will interpret these provisions
    to preserve independent review of Federal legal claims and the bedrock
    constitutional principle of an independent judiciary.
        Section 104(3) provides that a Federal district court may not issue
    a writ of habeas corpus with respect to any claim adjudicated on the
    merits in State court unless the decision reached was contrary to, or
    involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
    law, as determined by the Supreme Court. Some have suggested that this
    provision will limit the authority of the Federal courts to bring their
    own independent judgment to bear on questions of law and mixed questions
    of law and fact that come before them on habeas corpus.
        In the great 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John
    Marshall explained for the Supreme Court that ``[i]t is emphatically the
    province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.''
    Section 104(3) would be subject to serious constitutional challenge if
    it were read to preclude the Federal courts from making an independent
    determination about ``what the law is'' in cases within their
    jurisdiction. I expect that the courts, following their usual practice
    of construing ambiguous statutes to avoid constitutional problems, will
    read section 104 to permit independent Federal court review of
    constitutional claims based on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
    Constitution and Federal laws.
        Section 104(4) limits evidentiary hearings in Federal habeas corpus
    cases when ``the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a
    claim in State court proceedings.'' If this provision were read to deny
    litigants a meaningful opportunity to prove the facts necessary to
    vindicate Federal rights, it would raise serious constitutional
    questions. I do not read it that way. The provision applies to
    situations in which ``the applicant has failed to develop the factual
    basis'' of his or her claim. Therefore, section 104(4) is not triggered
    when some factor that is not fairly attributable to the applicant
    prevented evidence from being developed in State court.
        Preserving the Federal courts' authority to hear evidence and decide
    questions of law has implications that go far beyond the issue of pris-

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    oners' rights. Our constitutional ideal of a limited government that
    must respect individual freedom has been a practical reality because
    independent Federal courts have the power ``to say what the law is'' and
    to apply the law to the cases before them. I have signed this bill on
    the understanding that the courts can and will interpret these
    provisions of section 104 in accordance with this ideal.
        This bill also makes a number of major, ill-advised changes in our
    immigration laws having nothing to do with fighting terrorism. These
    provisions eliminate most remedial relief for long-term legal residents
    and restrict a key protection for battered spouses and children. The
    provisions will produce extraordinary administrative burdens on the
    Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Administration will urge the
    Congress to correct them in the pending immigration reform legislation.
        I also regret that the Congress included in this legislation a
    commission to study Federal law enforcement that was inspired by special
    interests who are no friends of our Nation's law enforcement officers.
    The Congress has responsibility to oversee the operation of Federal law
    enforcement; to cede this power to an unelected and unaccountable
    commission is a mistake. Our Nation's resources would be better spent
    supporting the men and women in law enforcement, not creating a
    commission that will only get in their way.
        I hope that there will be an opportunity to revisit these and other
    issues, as well as some of the other proposals this Administration has
    made, but upon which the Congress refused to act.
        This legislation is a real step in the right direction. Although it
    does not contain everything we need to combat terrorism, it provides
    valuable tools for stopping and punishing terrorists. It stands as a
    tribute to the victims of terrorism and to the men and women in law
    enforcement who dedicate their lives to protecting all of us from the
    scourge of terrorist activity.

                                                          William J. Clinton

    The White House,

    April 24, 1996.

    Note: S. 735, approved April 24, was assigned Public Law No. 104-132.