[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1995, Book II)]
[August 11, 1995]
[Pages 1255-1256]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]



[[Page 1255]]


Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995
August 11, 1995

To the Senate of the United States:
    I am returning herewith without my approval S. 21, the ``Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995.'' I share the Congress' 
frustration with the situation in Bosnia and am also appalled by the 
human suffering that is occurring there. I am keenly aware that Members 
of Congress are deeply torn about what should be done to try to bring 
this terrible conflict to an end. My Administration will continue to do 
its utmost with our allies to guide developments toward a comprehensive 
political settlement acceptable to all the parties. S. 21, however, 
would hinder rather than support those efforts. It would, quite simply, 
undermine the chances for peace in Bosnia, lead to a wider war, and 
undercut the authority of the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council to 
impose effective measures to deal with threats to the peace. It would 
also attempt to regulate by statute matters for which the President is 
responsible under the Constitution.
    S. 21 is designed to lead to the unilateral lifting by the United 
States of the international arms embargo imposed on the Government of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the United States has supported the 
lifting of the embargo by action of the U.N. Security Council, I 
nonetheless am firmly convinced that a unilateral lifting of the embargo 
would be a serious mistake. It would undermine renewed efforts to 
achieve a negotiated settlement in Bosnia and could lead to an 
escalation of the conflict there, including the almost certain 
Americanization of the conflict.
    The allies of the United States in the U.N. Protection Force for 
Bosnia (UNPROFOR) have made it clear that a unilateral lifting of the 
arms embargo by the United States would result in their rapid withdrawal 
from UNPROFOR, leading to its collapse. The United States, as the leader 
of NATO, would have an obligation under these circumstances to assist in 
that withdrawal, thereby putting thousands of U.S. troops at risk. At 
the least, such unilateral action by the United States would drive our 
allies out of Bosnia and involve the United States more deeply, while 
making the conflict much more dangerous.
    The consequences of UNPROFOR's departure because of a unilateral 
lifting of the arms embargo must be faced squarely. First, the United 
States would immediately be part of a costly NATO operation to withdraw 
UNPROFOR. Second, after that operation is complete, the fighting in 
Bosnia would intensify. It is unlikely the Bosnian Serbs would stand by 
waiting while the Bosnian government received new arms and training. 
Third, under assault, the Bosnian government would look to the United 
States to provide arms and air support, and, if that failed, more active 
military support. Unilateral lift of the embargo would lead to 
unilateral American responsibility. Fourth, intensified fighting would 
risk a wider conflict in the Balkans with far-reaching implications for 
regional peace. UNPROFOR's withdrawal would set back fresh prospects for 
a peaceful, negotiated solution for the foreseeable future. Finally, 
unilateral U.S. action under these circumstances would create serious 
divisions between the United States and its key allies, with potential 
long-lasting damage to these important relationships and to NATO.
    S. 21 would undermine the progress we have made with our allies and 
the United Nations in recent weeks to strengthen the protection of the 
safe areas in Bosnia and improve the provision of humanitarian 
assistance. NATO has agreed to the substantial and decisive use of air 
power to protect Gorazde, Sarajevo, and the other safe areas. The U.N. 
Secretary General has delegated his authority to the military commanders 
on the ground to approve the use of air power. The British and French, 
with our support, are deploying a Rapid Reaction Force to help open land 
routes to Sarajevo for convoys carrying vital supplies, strengthening 
UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its mission. These measures will help 
provide a prompt and effective response to Serb attacks on the safe 
areas. This new protection would disappear if UNPROFOR withdraws in 
response to the unilateral lifting of the embargo.
    Events over the past several weeks have also created some new 
opportunities to seek a nego-


[[Page 1256]]

tiated peace. We are actively engaged in discussions with our allies and 
others on these prospects. Unilaterally lifting the arms embargo now 
would jeopardize these ongoing efforts.
    Unilaterally disregarding the U.N. Security Council's decision to 
impose an arms embargo throughout the former Yugoslavia also would have 
a detrimental effect on the ability of the Security Council to act 
effectively in crisis situations, such as the trade and weapons 
embargoes against Iraq or Serbia. If we decide for ourselves to violate 
the arms embargo, other states would cite our action as a pretext to 
ignore other Security Council decisions when it suits their interests.
    S. 21 also would direct that the executive branch take specific 
actions in the Security Council and, if unsuccessful there, in the 
General Assembly. There is no justification for bringing the issue 
before the General Assembly, which has no authority to reconsider and 
reverse decisions of the Security Council, and it could be highly 
damaging to vital U.S. interests to imply otherwise. If the General 
Assembly could exercise such binding authority without the protection of 
the veto right held in the Security Council, any number of issues could 
be resolved against the interests of the United States and our allies.
    Finally, the requirements of S. 21 would impermissibly intrude on 
the core constitutional responsibilities of the President for the 
conduct of foreign affairs, and would compromise the ability of the 
President to protect vital U.S. national security interests abroad. It 
purports, unconstitutionally, to instruct the President on the content 
and timing of U.S. diplomatic positions before international bodies, in 
derogation of the President's exclusive constitutional authority to 
control such foreign policy matters. It also attempts to require the 
President to approve the export of arms to a foreign country where a 
conflict is in progress, even though this may well draw the United 
States more deeply into that conflict. These encroachments on the 
President's constitutional power over, and responsibility for, the 
conduct of foreign affairs, are unacceptable.
    Accordingly, I am disapproving S. 21 and returning it to the Senate.

                                                      William J. Clinton

The White House,

August 11, 1995.