

The President. I don't know. I'm not imputing motives to them. I'm just saying it's very interesting to me that there has been almost no analysis of anything. This whole thing immediately became—well, this is a big political story about California. This is an economic story, and it's a national security story. And there has been no analysis of what got put back and why, and what got taken off and why.

And I have been doing my best to deal with what is in the national interest. There are two considerations here. We have to reduce our base capacity. That's the most important thing. We have twice as much base capacity as we need, more or less, for the size of the military force we have. That is a national security interest. And that is my first and most important duty. But secondly, under the law, economic impact was supposed to be taken into account. And as nearly as I can determine, it wasn't anywhere—never in these determinations, with the possible exception of the Red River Depot, based on my reading of the report.

Now, the question is, is there a way to accept these recommendations, because even though I think they're far—they're not as good as what the Pentagon recommended and they do a lot more economic harm for very little extra security gain—is there a way to accept them and minimize the economic loss in the areas where I think it is plainly excessive. And that is what

we have been working on. That is what I've been working hard on. But I just want you to know that I deeply resent the suggestion that this is somehow a political deal.

I have not seen anything written anywhere that the State of California lost 52 percent of the jobs in the first three base closings and that this commission took them back up to nearly 50 percent in this one, even though they only have 15 percent of the soldiers and their unemployment rate is 50 percent above the national average. I haven't seen anywhere what this was likely to do to the Hispanic middle class and to the people of San Antonio, Texas, unless we can save a lot of those jobs there so that a lot of other things could be put back in 10 or 11 places around the country.

And I think that you folks need to look at the real impact of this. I am trying to do my job to reduce the capacity of the bases in the country consistent with the national interest and still be faithful to the statute requiring us to deal with the economic impact on these communities.

Thank you.

NOTE: The President spoke at 10:08 a.m. in the Rose Garden at the White House. In his remarks, he referred to Gov. Tom Carper of Delaware and Mayor Dennis Archer of Detroit, MI.

Statement on the Appointment of the Chairman of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community *July 13, 1995*

I am announcing today my intention to appoint Harold Brown to chair the congressionally mandated Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community. This appointment fills the post held by Les Aspin. Like Les, Harold Brown brings a rich combination of experience, creativity, and vision to this crucial job.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank former Senator Warren Rudman, who so ably served as Acting Chairman in the interim and who will again assume the position of Vice Chairman. He and Tony Harrington, as Acting

Vice Chairman, have done an excellent job keeping up the momentum of the Commission's work. They and the rest of the Commission are conducting a thorough assessment of the kind of intelligence community we will need to address the security challenges of the future.

Harold Brown is a counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Prior to this post, he has served as Secretary of Defense from 1977 to 1981. He also served as Director of Defense Research and Engineering from 1961 to 1965, and Secretary of the Air Force from 1965 to 1969. In addition, he was president

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of the California Institute of Technology from 1969 to 1977, and he was chairman of the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute from 1984 to 1992.

Letter to Congressional Leaders Transmitting the Report of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

July 13, 1995

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. Chairman:)

I am pleased to transmit the 1994 Annual Report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

The ACDA was established in 1961 in part because Dean Rusk, Secretary of State at that time, believed the President needed access to unfiltered arms control analysis.

After a comprehensive review in 1993 and a second review in early 1995, it is clear to me that Secretary Rusk was correct: sound arms control and nonproliferation policy requires an independent, specialized, and technically competent arms control and nonproliferation agency.

In the absence of such an agency, neither I nor any future President could count on receiving independent arms control advice, unfiltered by other policy considerations. A President would thus at times have to make the most consequential national security decisions without the benefit of vigorous advocacy of the arms control point of view.

Moreover, I have found that ACDA's unique combination of single-mission technical expertise with its painstakingly developed capability for multilateral negotiation and implementation of the most intricate arms control and nonproliferation agreements could not be sustained with

equal effectiveness outside of a dedicated arms control agency.

The ACDA's first major success was the establishment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Twenty-five years later, its most recent major success is its long-term effort culminating in permanent and unconditional extension of that same Treaty. On both counts, America and the world are far more secure because of the ability and dedication of ACDA's leadership and professional staff.

I have therefore decided that ACDA will remain independent and continue its central role in U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy.

Whether the issue is nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear missile reduction, chemical weapons elimination, or any of the other growing arms control and nonproliferation challenges America faces, ACDA is an essential national security asset.

In that spirit, I commend this report to you.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

NOTE: Identical letters were sent to Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Jesse Helms, chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Message to the Congress Transmitting the Report of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

July 13, 1995

To the Congress of the United States:

I transmit herewith the report containing the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) pursuant to section 2903 of Public Law 101-510, 104 Stat. 1810, as amended.

I hereby certify that I approve all the recommendations contained in the Commission's report.

In a July 8, 1995, letter to Deputy Secretary of Defense White (attached), Chairman Dixon confirmed that the Commission's recommenda-