    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1995, Book II)]
    [August 11, 1995]
    [Pages 1252-1253]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    Statement on Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Test Ban Negotiations
    August 11, 1995

        One of my administration's highest priorities is to negotiate a
    comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) to reduce the danger posed by
    nuclear weapons proliferation. To advance that goal and secure the
    strongest possible treaty, I am announcing today my decision to seek a
    zero yield CTBT. A zero yield CTBT would ban any nuclear weapon test
    explosion or any other nuclear explosion immediately upon entry into
    force. I hope it will lead to an early consensus among all states at the
    negotiating table.
        Achieving a CTBT was a goal of both Presidents Eisenhower and
    Kennedy. Now, as then, such a treaty would greatly strengthen U.S. and
    global security and create another barrier to nuclear proliferation and
    nuclear weapons development. At the conclusion of the Nuclear Non-
    Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May, all parties to that
    treaty agreed to work to complete a CTBT no later than 1996. Today, I
    want to reaffirm our commitment to do everything possible to conclude
    the CTBT negotiations as soon as possible so that a treaty can be signed
    next year.
        As part of our national security strategy, the United States must
    and will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future
    hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nu-

    [[Page 1253]]

    clear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it
    that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. In this regard, I
    consider the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile to be
    a supreme national interest of the United States.
        I am assured by the Secretary of Energy and the Directors of our
    nuclear weapons labs that we can meet the challenge of maintaining our
    nuclear deterrent under a CTBT through a Science Based Stockpile
    Stewardship program without nuclear testing. I directed the
    implementation of such a program almost 2 years ago, and it is being
    developed with the support of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman
    of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This program will now be tied to a new
    certification procedure. In order for this program to succeed, both the
    administration and the Congress must provide sustained bipartisan
    support for the stockpile stewardship program over the next decade and
    beyond. I am committed to working with the Congress to ensure this
    support.
        While I am optimistic that the stockpile stewardship program will be
    successful, as President I cannot dismiss the possibility, however
    unlikely, that the program will fall short of its objectives. Therefore,
    in addition to the new annual certification procedure for our nuclear
    weapons stockpile, I am also establishing concrete, specific safeguards
    that define the conditions under which the United States can enter into
    a CTBT.
        In the event that I were informed by the Secretary of Defense and
    Secretary of Energy--advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the
    Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories, and the Commander of
    U.S. Strategic Command--that a high level of confidence in the safety or
    reliability of a nuclear weapons type which the two Secretaries consider
    to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, I
    would be prepared, in consultation with Congress, to exercise our
    ``supreme national interests'' rights under the CTBT in order to conduct
    whatever testing might be required. Exercising this right, however, is a
    decision I believe I or any future President will not have to make. The
    nuclear weapons in the United States arsenal are safe and reliable, and
    I am determined our stockpile stewardship program will ensure they
    remain so in the absence of nuclear testing.
        I recognize that our present monitoring systems will not detect with
    high confidence very low yield tests. Therefore, I am committed to
    pursuing a comprehensive research and development program to improve our
    treaty monitoring capabilities and operations.
        Thirty-two years ago, President Kennedy called the completion of the
    Limited Test Ban Treaty in Moscow a ``shaft of light cut into the
    darkness'' of the cold war. With it, he said, the Nation could ``step
    back from the shadows of war and seek out the way of peace.'' We did,
    and the world is a safer place because of it. I believe that we are
    ready to take the next step and lead the world to a comprehensive test
    ban. This would be a fitting tribute to all those, Republicans and
    Democrats, who have worked for a CTBT over the past four decades.

    Note: A fact sheet on arms control and nonproliferation and a fact sheet
    on comprehensive test ban treaty safeguards were attached to the
    statement.