    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1995, Book II)]
    [August 11, 1995]
    [Pages 1255-1256]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    [[Page 1255]]

    Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Bosnia and
    Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995
    August 11, 1995

    To the Senate of the United States:
        I am returning herewith without my approval S. 21, the ``Bosnia and
    Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995.'' I share the Congress'
    frustration with the situation in Bosnia and am also appalled by the
    human suffering that is occurring there. I am keenly aware that Members
    of Congress are deeply torn about what should be done to try to bring
    this terrible conflict to an end. My Administration will continue to do
    its utmost with our allies to guide developments toward a comprehensive
    political settlement acceptable to all the parties. S. 21, however,
    would hinder rather than support those efforts. It would, quite simply,
    undermine the chances for peace in Bosnia, lead to a wider war, and
    undercut the authority of the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council to
    impose effective measures to deal with threats to the peace. It would
    also attempt to regulate by statute matters for which the President is
    responsible under the Constitution.
        S. 21 is designed to lead to the unilateral lifting by the United
    States of the international arms embargo imposed on the Government of
    Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the United States has supported the
    lifting of the embargo by action of the U.N. Security Council, I
    nonetheless am firmly convinced that a unilateral lifting of the embargo
    would be a serious mistake. It would undermine renewed efforts to
    achieve a negotiated settlement in Bosnia and could lead to an
    escalation of the conflict there, including the almost certain
    Americanization of the conflict.
        The allies of the United States in the U.N. Protection Force for
    Bosnia (UNPROFOR) have made it clear that a unilateral lifting of the
    arms embargo by the United States would result in their rapid withdrawal
    from UNPROFOR, leading to its collapse. The United States, as the leader
    of NATO, would have an obligation under these circumstances to assist in
    that withdrawal, thereby putting thousands of U.S. troops at risk. At
    the least, such unilateral action by the United States would drive our
    allies out of Bosnia and involve the United States more deeply, while
    making the conflict much more dangerous.
        The consequences of UNPROFOR's departure because of a unilateral
    lifting of the arms embargo must be faced squarely. First, the United
    States would immediately be part of a costly NATO operation to withdraw
    UNPROFOR. Second, after that operation is complete, the fighting in
    Bosnia would intensify. It is unlikely the Bosnian Serbs would stand by
    waiting while the Bosnian government received new arms and training.
    Third, under assault, the Bosnian government would look to the United
    States to provide arms and air support, and, if that failed, more active
    military support. Unilateral lift of the embargo would lead to
    unilateral American responsibility. Fourth, intensified fighting would
    risk a wider conflict in the Balkans with far-reaching implications for
    regional peace. UNPROFOR's withdrawal would set back fresh prospects for
    a peaceful, negotiated solution for the foreseeable future. Finally,
    unilateral U.S. action under these circumstances would create serious
    divisions between the United States and its key allies, with potential
    long-lasting damage to these important relationships and to NATO.
        S. 21 would undermine the progress we have made with our allies and
    the United Nations in recent weeks to strengthen the protection of the
    safe areas in Bosnia and improve the provision of humanitarian
    assistance. NATO has agreed to the substantial and decisive use of air
    power to protect Gorazde, Sarajevo, and the other safe areas. The U.N.
    Secretary General has delegated his authority to the military commanders
    on the ground to approve the use of air power. The British and French,
    with our support, are deploying a Rapid Reaction Force to help open land
    routes to Sarajevo for convoys carrying vital supplies, strengthening
    UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its mission. These measures will help
    provide a prompt and effective response to Serb attacks on the safe
    areas. This new protection would disappear if UNPROFOR withdraws in
    response to the unilateral lifting of the embargo.
        Events over the past several weeks have also created some new
    opportunities to seek a nego-

    [[Page 1256]]

    tiated peace. We are actively engaged in discussions with our allies and
    others on these prospects. Unilaterally lifting the arms embargo now
    would jeopardize these ongoing efforts.
        Unilaterally disregarding the U.N. Security Council's decision to
    impose an arms embargo throughout the former Yugoslavia also would have
    a detrimental effect on the ability of the Security Council to act
    effectively in crisis situations, such as the trade and weapons
    embargoes against Iraq or Serbia. If we decide for ourselves to violate
    the arms embargo, other states would cite our action as a pretext to
    ignore other Security Council decisions when it suits their interests.
        S. 21 also would direct that the executive branch take specific
    actions in the Security Council and, if unsuccessful there, in the
    General Assembly. There is no justification for bringing the issue
    before the General Assembly, which has no authority to reconsider and
    reverse decisions of the Security Council, and it could be highly
    damaging to vital U.S. interests to imply otherwise. If the General
    Assembly could exercise such binding authority without the protection of
    the veto right held in the Security Council, any number of issues could
    be resolved against the interests of the United States and our allies.
        Finally, the requirements of S. 21 would impermissibly intrude on
    the core constitutional responsibilities of the President for the
    conduct of foreign affairs, and would compromise the ability of the
    President to protect vital U.S. national security interests abroad. It
    purports, unconstitutionally, to instruct the President on the content
    and timing of U.S. diplomatic positions before international bodies, in
    derogation of the President's exclusive constitutional authority to
    control such foreign policy matters. It also attempts to require the
    President to approve the export of arms to a foreign country where a
    conflict is in progress, even though this may well draw the United
    States more deeply into that conflict. These encroachments on the
    President's constitutional power over, and responsibility for, the
    conduct of foreign affairs, are unacceptable.
        Accordingly, I am disapproving S. 21 and returning it to the Senate.

                                                          William J. Clinton

    The White House,

    August 11, 1995.