    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1995, Book II)]
    [December 22, 1995]
    [Pages 1919-1923]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    Interview With the Armed Forces Media
    December 22, 1995

    Bosnia

        The President. First let me say that I have just come from a
    briefing here at the Pentagon with our senior military officials who are
    working on the mission in Bosnia. We've also had a teleconference with
    General Joulwan, getting the latest up-to-date briefing on the
    conditions of the deployment. And I would say--I should emphasize to you
    two things.
        One is that, notwithstanding some weather problems and a few delays
    occasioned by Christmas traffic on the rails in Germany, we're pretty
    much on schedule. And secondly, and even more important, the attitude
    toward compliance thus far in Bosnia by all parties has been quite good.
    Now, it's early in the mission, but so far the attitude toward
    compliance has been very good, and we're encouraged by that. And we
    think we can stay on schedule for the separation of the forces and the
    other elements of it.
        And also in this Christmas season, I'd like to remind the people who
    serve our country that we are doing this essentially for three reasons.
    First of all, because we can do it, and when we can do something like
    this, it's consistent with our values to stop suffering and slaughter on
    the scale we've seen it in Bosnia.
        Second, because it's very much in our interest to contain and end
    this war, to prevent it from spreading in a way that can involve our
    NATO allies on opposite sides and many other countries that are critical
    to the stability of Europe. It's also important for us to do what we can
    to promote a stable and democratic and free Europe. We, after all, have
    fought two World Wars because we did not have such a Europe; we had a
    long cold war because we did not have such a Europe. So it's in our
    interest.
        And finally, it is critical to our ability to lead the world for the
    next 10 or 20 years as we sort out what the security arrangements of the
    post-cold-war era will be. I can tell you that our leadership of NATO
    specifically, and in general our ability to lead in the world toward
    peace and democracy, is very much tied to our willingness to assume a
    leadership role in this Bosnia mission.
        I could see it on my recent trip to Europe, whether it was talking
    to Prime Ministers in Great Britain or Ireland or Germany or Spain or
    just to people on the street. It means a lot to them to know that the
    United States is still there working and leading and being a good
    partner.
        So for all these reasons, I think this is a very, very important
    mission to our country.
        Q. Thank you, sir. Mr. President, I'm Austin Camacho from the AFRTS
    News Center. After Operation Joint Endeavor, what do you see as the U.S.
    role in that area formerly known as Yugoslavia? What will be our role
    there?
        The President. Well, I think, first of all, we'll still be there
    through NATO and whatever role that NATO assumes in the general area
    beyond our NATO member nations. But more importantly, I would expect,
    after this mission is over, we will continue to have American citizens,
    both people who work for and represent our Government and people in the
    private sector, going in and out of there helping in the reconstruction

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    effort, contributing to that, supporting the political process in
    whatever way we can.
        But I think it is quite important that the NATO force not become an
    occupying army. We're not dealing with Berlin here. We're not--all we're
    trying to do is to give this peace agreement a chance to take hold. And
    we have a very clear and limited mission. In fact, I want to make sure
    that all of our folks know that, as far as I know, this peace agreement
    is the first one ever where the military annex to the agreement was
    actually written by the military commanders who were going to be
    expected to implement it. That is, the parties actually asked our
    military people to fashion the military annex to the agreement that was
    initialed in Dayton so that there would be a limited, defined, strictly
    military mission.
        Q. Mr. President, do you agree with the premise that Bosnia is
    really the first test of post-cold-war policy?
        The President. Well, I think it's been tested in other ways, but
    it's certainly the most significant military test of our post-cold-war
    policy. If you accept the premise that what happened in the Gulf at the
    Gulf war could have occurred during the cold war as well as afterward,
    that this is literally a post-cold-war problem, then it is the biggest
    military test.
        Q. Does that mean that--what does the success or failure of this
    then mean to American foreign policy 10, 15 years down the line?
        The President. Well, let me just say I think the most important
    thing here is that the United States was prepared to lead and to work
    with our NATO allies. If you remember, in the beginning when the Bosnian
    war broke out, a lot of our European allies said, ``Well, we ought to
    take the leadership role here. We'll do this. We'll do it through the
    United Nations.'' And we've played a very strong supporting role through
    NATO. After all, it's important that the United States never forget that
    during these last 4 tough years, we led in the conduct of the largest
    humanitarian airlift in history; we led in enforcing the no-fly zone,
    keeping the war out of the air, and a lot of other things that were
    done, including NATO's willingness to use air strikes to, first of all,
    bring about a relatively peaceful 1994 and then to bring about the
    conditions in which a peace agreement could be made in 1995.
        But what I believe this means, if we make this effort and if we
    succeed in our military mission, even if, God forbid, after we're all
    gone the thing should come apart, at least we will be united in doing
    what we can do to promote stability in Europe and to take a stand for
    peace in the post-cold-war era.
        If you remember when I sent our troops into Haiti with a U.N.-led
    mission, and then when I left a smaller number there when the United
    Nations took over on schedule, I always said that we could not guarantee
    the people of Haiti a future; they would have to do that for themselves.
    The same is true for the Bosnians. We cannot guarantee for them a future
    without war. What we can guarantee for them is a year without war,
    during which they can implement their own agreement and in which time
    they can have elections, they can begin the economic reconstruction,
    they can begin to see the benefits of peace, and then some equilibrium
    within the country can be established from a security point of view.
        But I think it would be a mistake for the United States or for NATO
    to believe that we should be going around anywhere guaranteeing the
    results of peace agreements which have to be guaranteed in the minds and
    hearts of the people who are making them.
        So this will be a success for our alliance, for our leadership, just
    by doing the mission. Obviously, it will be a much, much greater success
    if the humanitarian relief, the refugee relocation, the economic
    reconstruction all are completely successful and Bosnia has a permanent
    peace. That is the real measure of success. But the main thing is we
    have to define together where we must try and where we must stand
    against chaos. And I think we've done a good job of that here.
        Q. Mr. President, Cindy Killion from the European Stars and Stripes.
    Under what circumstances would you order the U.S. forces to withdraw
    from Bosnia within the next year, before the one-year mark?
        The President. The only circumstance that I can imagine doing that
    is if the mission no longer existed. That is, keep in mind, we are there
    not to fight a war. We are there not to stop a war. We are there to
    implement a peace agreement. We anticipate that there will be violations
    of this agreement but that the leaders will not abandon it and that the
    vast bulk of the people will not abandon it. So we have to be prepared
    for some violations. We even have to be prepared for some casualties,
    al-

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    though I think our people have trained and planned as hard against
    problems for this mission as they ever have for any.
        But that would not cause me to withdraw. I believe that NATO would
    determine, if all the factions decided they wanted to go fight again,
    that there was no longer a mission to perform.

    Defense Authorization Bill

        Q. Hi, Bill Matthews with Army Times. Switching a little bit to the
    defense authorization bill, you have said you are going to veto it. The
    bill includes a pay raise and a housing allowance increase for military
    people. Since some of them are headed off to Bosnia, are you concerned
    that not getting the pay raise, not getting the housing allowance
    increase would be detrimental to morale? And is there some alternative?
        The President. Very much. Yes, there is an alternative. The Congress
    could send me a separate bill with the pay raise and the allowances in
    it, and I would sign it in a heartbeat. I think, indeed I hope, that
    they will do one of two things: I hope they will either do that, or when
    I veto this bill, assuming my veto would be sustained, which I believe
    it would because there are some unconstitutional restrictions on the
    President's authority as Commander in Chief in this bill which compels
    me to veto it--so they can either send me the pay raise and the
    allowance increase in a separate bill, or they could delete the
    offending portions of the defense authorization bill and send it right
    back to me. They can do either one of those things. And I would hope the
    Congress would promptly act to do that.
        I do not want any erosion of morale and spirit among not only our
    people in uniform but their family members. I believe that we are
    completely united in supporting the full pay raise and the allowance
    increase. And I have done my best to budget for these things over a
    period of several years.
        I have visited a large number of our military facilities, both in
    the United States and beyond our borders. I have talked to a lot of
    people in uniform about this. And I think it is a very important issue.
    If we want to keep the very best people in our military, we're going to
    have to see to the quality-of-life issues. We've allocated a lot of
    money for it over the next budget cycle, and I want to release it,
    starting with these two issues.

    Defense Spending

        Q. Mr. President, Jim Wolffe, also from the Army Times. On a
    slightly longer term budget issue, the Republican 7-year budget plan,
    while it has more money for defense in the first couple of years,
    actually targets less money towards defense spending in the out-years
    2000 and beyond. Secretary Perry said earlier this week that that would
    force him into the difficult decision of actually cutting force
    structure to pay for modernization.
        You've talked a lot about social spending in the budget debate, but
    I haven't heard you talk much about defending defense spending. Is that
    something you're willing to give away to get a deal?
        The President. Well, let me say that I still hope that I can work
    with Congress in a way that that choice won't be necessary. It is true
    that they front-loaded more defense spending than we did, which made it
    very attractive to all the people who wanted it in these years. But what
    we tried to do was to have a balanced commitment.
        I think the worst thing that can happen to the military is to be
    jerked around with these up and down budgets and unpredictability. What
    we tried to do is to get our folks together here and to say, ``Okay,
    what do we need over the next 5 years? What do we need over the next 7
    years?'' The only thing I can say to you, and I would say with some
    sense of assurance, is that our political system has shown a willingness
    now to respond if there's a problem created for our forces in uniform
    and for our national defense.
        I mean, I think--one of the things you see that in the last 3 years
    is we've had a remarkable bipartisan ability to maintain a strong
    defense as a part of our continuing engagement in the post-cold-war
    world. And I think that everyone knows that the military went through a
    significant downsizing with a remarkable maintenance of excellence and
    morale and that now we have to sustain the system that we have created.
        And so I would say to our forces in uniform, I'm going to get the
    very best budget agreement I can. I hope we can get an agreement. But if
    there is an alarming tailoff in years 6 and 7, I think it can be
    corrected in the future. And I believe if we balance the budget, get

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    interest rates down, the economy will grow more quickly. And one of the
    big differences between me and the Republicans in Congress is that they
    have now given me an economic plan which says if we do everything they
    want, at the end of 6 or 7 years interest rates and unemployment will be
    higher than they are now. I find that very hard to believe. I think that
    we're going to be better off, not worse off, if we do this, and we'll
    have more money, therefore, to invest in defense.
        So I would not worry too much about the out-years. Whatever happens
    in this budget agreement, at least as long as I am here--and I can't
    conceive of anyone else coming into this job or anyone coming into
    control of the Congress that would not try to sustain a long-term plan
    for the military, because that's what we've learned--that if the
    military has a plan they can do nearly anything, but we can't jack
    around the plan. And we don't want to play games with people's lives or
    with the national security.

    Bosnia and Politics

        Q. Mr. President, I'm Dave Gollust from Voice of America. Can I jump
    back to Bosnia for a second and politics? How important do you consider
    the success of the Bosnia operation to your own political prospects? Is
    it a defining moment for you? And secondly, from a tactical point of
    view, would you mind if Senator Dole was the first senior political
    presence in Bosnia on Christmas?
        The President. Well, let me answer the first question. If you look
    at recent American history, the evidence is that the success of the
    Bosnia operation may not have much to do with the election in 1996, but
    the failure of the Bosnia operation or the sustaining of significant
    casualties could have a great deal to do with it in a negative way. And
    that's all. The conventional political wisdom is, ``Why would the
    President do this? There's no upside and tons of downside.''
        But I have to say, when you take a job, you have to do what you--you
    have to do the job. And to be President at the edge of the 21st century,
    in a time of dramatic, dramatic change in the way we work and live and
    relate to each other, means that you can't predict the future and you
    just have to do what you think is right. So for me, this was not--once I
    became convinced we could train for this mission, that we could define
    the mission in the peace agreement, that we could minimize the risks to
    our troops, then the decision to me was not so difficult, no matter what
    the political downside, because I believe, in a time like this, you have
    to ask yourself which decision would you rather defend 10 years from now
    when you're not in office, if it goes wrong?
        I would much rather explain to my child and my grandchildren why the
    United States tried to stop slaughter, prevent the spread of the war,
    maintain NATO instead of destroy it, maintain the leadership of the
    United States in the world for peace and freedom. I would much rather
    explain why we tried to do that than why, because of the short-term
    political problems, we permitted the war to resume, it expanded, NATO's
    alliance was destroyed, and the influence of the United States was
    compromised for 10 years.
        I think it's obvious if you look at it that way--what do you want to
    tell your grandchildren 10 years from now--that the United States is
    doing the right thing. And the political risk is part of the price you
    pay for being President. Anybody who doesn't want to take any political
    risk at a time like this should not run for the job.
        Now, in terms of who goes to Bosnia when, I don't think we should
    politicize it. Senator Dole and I worked together to get the support
    that the Senate gave to this mission. He expressed his reservations
    about it, but he supported my decision as Commander in Chief. I
    appreciated that. And obviously, at the appropriate time, I have no
    objection to either Senator Dole or anyone else for that matter going to
    Bosnia.
        The question is, when is the appropriate time? If I had my way, I
    would be spending Christmas Eve and Christmas morning there. That's what
    I wanted to do. But our commanders made it clear that when a President
    comes into Bosnia, if I fly into that airport at Tuzla, and then I go
    down to Sarajevo when they're in the middle of this deployment, it would
    be exceedingly disruptive. So even though I wanted to go there to say to
    the American people I believe this mission is on the right track and,
    most importantly, to support the troops and to reassure their families,
    I'm taking the advice of the military commanders. I do not want to
    interrupt this mission.
        The mission's success is the most important thing. And that's what I
    believe should guide

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    everyone. I think everyone--there are different levels of disruption
    that different trips would cause, and I think we ought to try to just
    keep it nonpolitical. I hope anybody that wants to go there that has a
    reason to go, including Senator Dole, will be able to go at the
    appropriate time. And that's the determination that needs to be made.
        Q. Mr. President, you mentioned the safety of the troops as being
    part of your decision a couple times in that last answer. We're sending
    quite a large force involved in the Bosnia mission. Some might say,
    awfully large for a peaceful mission. How extensive do you think the
    danger is to our troops there?
        The President. Well, I think there is--let's look at what the
    sources are. No one can--the extent of the danger depends on factors
    that we can't fully predict. But I believe that we have minimized the
    risks. What are the possible problems? First of all, if you look at what
    the United Nations went through over the last 4 years, I think something
    over 200 people lost their lives in Bosnia. But more than half of them
    lost their lives in accidents. So we have really worked hard to train
    against accidents, to prepare--to look at the roadways, to look at the
    railways, to look at the airfields. We've worked hard to minimize the
    loss of life or serious injury due to accidents.
        Then we know there are a lot of landmines there. I got a very
    encouraging report today that the parties themselves in many places are
    assisting us in removing the mines. But there are a lot of places where
    there are a lot of mines laid where the land was first in one hand and
    then another, where we don't have records of the mines, where people
    don't have memories of them. So we have trained very hard to deal with
    landmines. I think that's the next biggest danger after accidents.
        Then the third problem is people that fought in that war who are
    either from the country or who came in from without the country who may
    have either a specific grudge against the United States or, more likely,
    will just be frustrated because they don't agree with the peace
    agreement that the leaders made and, therefore, some--and then,
    fourthly, there is just the possibility of encounters that go wrong. The
    only casualty we sustained in Haiti had nothing to do with opposition to
    our being there. It was a man who was literally a common criminal who
    ran through a barrier, and there was an incident, and he shot one of our
    soldiers dead.
        So I would say that those are the dangers in order.
        Q. Mr. President, I think that's all the time we have.
        The President. Thank you, and Merry Christmas. I appreciate what you
    do.

    Note: The interview began at 10:35 a.m. in the Visual Recording Facility
    at the National Military Command Center, the Pentagon. The following
    journalists participated in the interview: Sgt. Austin Camacho, American
    Forces Radio and Television Service; Jim Garamone, American Forces
    Information Service; Cindy Killion, Stars and Stripes; Bill Matthews and
    Jim Wolffe, Army Times; and David Gollust, Voice of America. In his
    remarks, the President referred to Gen. George A. Joulwan, USA, Supreme
    Allied Commander, Europe.