    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1995, Book II)]
    [November 8, 1995]
    [Pages 1725-1728]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    Message to the Congress on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
    Destruction
    November 8, 1995

    To the Congress of the United States:
        On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation
    of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass
    destruction'') and of the means of delivering such weapons, I issued
    Executive Order No. 12938, and declared a national emergency under the
    International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
    Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
    1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of
    its declaration, unless I publish in the Federal Register and transmit
    to the Congress a notice of its continuation.
        The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to pose
    an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign
    policy, and economy of the United States. Therefore, I am hereby
    advising the Congress that the national emergency declared on November
    14, 1994, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 1995. Accordingly,
    I have extended the national emergency declared in Executive Order No.
    12938 and have sent the attached notice of extension to the Federal
    Register for publication.
        As I described in the report transmitting Executive Order No. 12938,
    the Executive order consolidated the functions of and revoked Executive
    Order No. 12735 of November 16, 1990, which declared a national
    emergency with respect to the proliferation of chemical and biological
    weapons, and Executive Order No. 12930 of September 29, 1994, which
    declared a national emergency with respect to nuclear, biological, and
    chemical weapons, and their means of delivery.
        The following report is made pursuant to section 204 of the
    International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703) and section
    401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), regarding
    activities taken and money spent pursuant to the emergency declaration.
    Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and
    biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation efforts is contained in the
    annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential Components
    of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, provided to the Congress
    pursuant to section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the
    ``Nonproliferation Report,'' and the annual report provided to the
    Congress pursuant to section 308 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons
    Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-182).
        The three export control regulations issued under the Enhanced
    Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) are fully in force and continue
    to be used to control the export of items with potential use in chemical
    or biological weapons or unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass
    destruction.
        In the 12 months since I issued Executive Order No. 12938, 26
    additional countries ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the
    Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
    Their Destruction (CWC) for a total of 42 of the 159 signatories; the
    CWC must be ratified by 65 signatories to enter into force. I must
    report my disappointment that the United States is not yet among those
    who have ratified. The CWC is a critical element of U.S.
    nonproliferation policy and an urgent next step in our effort to end the
    development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical
    weapons. As we have seen this year in Japan, chemical weapons can
    threaten our security and that of our allies, whether as a instrument of
    war or of terrorism. The CWC will make every American safer, and we need
    it now.
        The international community is watching. It is vitally important
    that the United States continue to lead the fight against weapons of
    mass

    [[Page 1726]]

    destruction by being among the first 65 countries to ratify the CWC. The
    Senate recognized the importance of this agreement by adopting a
    bipartisan amendment on September 5, 1995, expressing the sense of the
    Senate that the United States should promptly ratify the CWC. I urge the
    Senate to give its advice and consent as soon as possible.
        In parallel with seeking Senate ratification of the CWC, the United
    States is working hard in the CWC Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) in
    The Hague to draft administrative and implementing procedures for the
    CWC and to create a strong organization for verifying compliance once
    the CWC enters into force.
        The United States also is working vigorously to end the threat of
    biological weapons (BW). We are an active participant in the Convention
    on the Prohibition of the Development and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
    (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction (BWC) Ad Hoc Group,
    which was commissioned September 1994 by the BWC Special Conference to
    draft a legally binding instrument to strengthen the effectiveness and
    improve the implementation of the Convention. The Group convened its
    first meeting in January 1995 and agreed upon a program of work for this
    year. The first substantive meeting took place in July, making important
    progress in outlining the key issues. The next meeting is scheduled for
    November 27 to December 8, 1995. The U.S. objective is to have a draft
    protocol for consideration and adoption at the Fourth BWC Review
    Conference in December 1996.
        The United States continues to be active in the work of the 29-
    member Australia Group (AG) CBW nonproliferation regime, and attended
    the October 16-19 AG consultations. The Group agreed to a United States
    proposal to ensure the AG export controls and information-sharing
    adequately address the threat of CBW terrorism, a threat that became all
    too apparent in the Tokyo subway nerve gas incident. This U.S.
    initiative was the AG's first policy-level action on CBW terrorism.
    Participants also agreed to several amendments to strengthen the AG's
    harmonized export controls on materials and equipment relevant to
    biological weapons, taking into account new developments since the last
    review of the biological weapons lists and, in particular, new insights
    into Iraq's BW activities.
        The Group also reaffirmed the members' collective belief that full
    adherence to the CWC and the BCW will be the only way to achieve a
    permanent global ban on CBW, and that all states adhering to these
    Conventions have an obligation to ensure that their national activities
    support these goals.
        Australia Group participants are taking steps to ensure that all
    relevant national measures promote the object and purposes of the BWC
    and CWC, and will be fully consistent with the CWC upon its entry into
    force. The AG considers that national export licensing policies on
    chemical weapons-related items fulfill the obligation established under
    Article I of the CWC that States Parties never assist, in any way, the
    acquisition of chemical weapons. Moreover, inasmuch as these measures
    are focused solely on preventing activities banned under the CWC, they
    are consistent with the undertaking in Article XI of the CWC to
    facilitate the fullest possible exchange of chemical materials and
    related information for purposes not prohibited by the CWC.
        The AG agreed to continue its active program of briefings for non-AG
    countries, and to promote regional consultations on export controls and
    nonproliferation to further awareness and understanding of national
    policies in these areas.
        The United States Government determined that two foreign companies--
    Mainway Limited and GE Plan--had engaged in chemical weapons
    proliferation activities that required the imposition of sanctions
    against them, effective May 18, 1995. Additional information on this
    determination is contained in a classified report to the Congress,
    provided pursuant to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and
    Warfare Elimination Act of 1991.
        The United States carefully controlled exports which could
    contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction,
    exercising restraint in considering all such proposed transfers
    consistent with the Guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime
    (MTCR). The MTCR Partners continued to share information about
    proliferation problems with each other and with other possible supplier,
    consumer, and transshipment states. Partners also emphasized the need
    for implementing effective export control systems.
        The United States worked unilaterally and in coordination with its
    MTCR partners in multilateral efforts to combat missile proliferation by

    [[Page 1727]]

    nonmembers and to encourage nonmembers to export responsibly and to
    adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. Three new Partners were admitted to the
    MTCR with U.S. support: Russia, South Africa, and Brazil.
        In May 1995, the United States participated in an MTCR team visit to
    Kiev to discuss missile nonproliferation and MTCR membership criteria.
    Under Secretary of State Davis met with Ukraine's Deputy Foreign
    Minister Hryshchenko in May, July, and October to discuss
    nonproliferation issues and MTCR membership. As a result of the July
    meeting, a United States delegation traveled to Kiev in October to
    conduct nonproliferation talks with representatives of Ukraine, brief
    them on the upcoming MTCR Plenary, and discuss U.S. criteria for MTCR
    membership. From August 29-September 1, the U.S. participated in an
    informal seminar with 18 other MTCR Partners in Montreux, Switzerland,
    to explore future approaches to strengthening missile nonproliferation.
        The MTCR held its Tenth Plenary Meeting in Bonn October 10-12. The
    Partners reaffirmed their commitment to controlling exports to prevent
    proliferation of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. They
    also reiterated their readiness for international cooperation in
    peaceful space activities consistent with MTCR policies. The Bonn
    Plenary made minor amendments to the MTCR Equipment and Technology Annex
    in the light of technical developments. Partners also agreed to U.S.
    initiatives to deal more effectively with missile-related aspects of
    regional tensions, coordinate in impeding shipments of missile
    proliferation concern, and deal with the proliferation risks posed by
    transshipment. Finally, MTCR Partners will increase their efforts to
    develop a dialogue with countries outside the Regime to encourage
    voluntary adherence to the MTCR Guidelines and heightened awareness of
    missile proliferation risks.
        The United States has continued to pursue my Administration's
    nuclear nonproliferation goals with success. Parties to the Treaty on
    the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) agreed last May at the
    NPT Review and Extension Conference to extend the NPT indefinitely and
    without conditions. Since the conference, more nations have acceded to
    the Treaty. There now are 180 parties, making the NPT nearly universal.
        The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) continues its efforts to improve
    member states' export policies and controls. Nuclear Suppliers Group
    members have agreed to apply technology controls to all items on the
    nuclear trigger list and to adopt the principle that the intent of the
    NSG Guidelines should not be undermined by the export of parts of
    trigger list and dual-use items without appropriate controls. In 1995,
    the NSG agreed to over 30 changes to update and clarify the list of
    controlled items in the Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Annex. The NSG also
    pursued efforts to enhance information sharing among members by
    establishment of a permanent Joint Information Exchange group and by
    moving toward adoption of a United States Department of Energy-supplied
    computerized automated information exchange system, which is currently
    being tested by most of the members.
        The increasing number of countries capable of exporting nuclear
    commodities and technology is a major challenge for the NSG. The
    ultimate goal of the NSG is to obtain the agreement of all suppliers,
    including nations not members of the regime, to control nuclear exports
    in accordance with the NSG guidelines. Members continued contacts with
    Belarus, Brazil, China, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, the Republic of Korea
    (ROK), and Ukraine regarding NSG activities. Ambassador Patokallio of
    Finland, the current NSG Chair, led a five-member NSG outreach visit to
    Brazil in early November 1995 as part of this effort.
        As a result of such contacts, the ROK has been accepted as a member
    of the NSG. Ukraine is expected to apply for membership in the near
    future. The United States maintains bilateral contacts with emerging
    suppliers, including the New Independent States of the former Soviet
    Union, to encourage early adherence to NSG guidelines.
        Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50
    U.S.C. 1641(c)), I report that there were no expenses directly
    attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred by the declaration
    of the national emergency in Executive Order No. 12938 during the period
    from May 14, 1995, through November 14, 1995.

                                                          William J. Clinton

    The White House,

    November 8, 1995.

    [[Page 1728]]

    Note: This message was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on
    November 9. The notice is listed in Appendix D at the end of this
    volume.