

Bosnian government not to use force to defend itself?

The President. Well, first of all, my sympathies are with them. I agreed to the statement that we all signed off on last night because the French and the British are doing their best to get more troops there through the rapid reaction force, which would permit the U.N. to fulfill its mandate which includes opening Sarajevo, and because I believe that has the best chance of opening Sarajevo without other adverse consequences to the Bosnians.

In other words, I tried to make sure that resolution was carefully worded to say, right now don't increase hostilities, because I don't believe this is a good time to do that when we are trying to strengthen the rapid reaction force and when, if we are successful, they will be better able to guarantee the openness of Sarajevo.

My sympathies with them are complete. They have a right to want their city to be open. And the Serbs have been shelling it on and off for 4 years whenever they could get away with it. So I don't agree with what's going on. But if the rapid reaction force works and the U.N. mission can work again and Sarajevo can be protected again, then I believe we're better off, and I believe, more importantly, they're better off if it can be done that way. I think there will be fewer casualties, and I think their polit-

ical position will be stronger. That's why I agreed to support the settlement.

Q. [Inaudible]—lift the siege?

The President. I'm saying, no, that's not their job. Their job is to back up and protect the U.N. mission. But I think it will show that the U.N. mission will have a greater capacity to do what the U.N. has authorized it to do, which is to be able to get in and out of Sarajevo.

Now, that is not the same thing as saying they will take a unilateral military action to lift the siege, but then the Serbs and everybody else, for that matter, will have to think about the Blue Helmets in a little different way before they just say, "I'm sorry, you can't cross this road; I'm sorry, we're going to take you a prisoner; I'm sorry, we're going to treat you like dirt; I'm sorry, we're going to ignore the U.N."

That is what President Chirac and Prime Minister Major want to avoid having happen to their troops again. And if it is seen in that light, then I think at least we have to give them a chance to try to make the U.N. mandate work again.

Thank you very much.

NOTE: The President's 99th news conference began at 4:20 p.m. at Dalhousie University. In his remarks, he referred to President Jacques Chirac of France and U.S. Representative to the United Nations Madeleine K. Albright.

Memorandum on Supporting the Role of Fathers in Families June 16, 1995

*Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies*

Subject: Supporting the Role of Fathers in
Families

I am firm in my belief that the future of our Republic depends on strong families and that committed fathers are essential to those families. I am also aware that strengthening fathers' involvement with their children cannot be accomplished by the Federal Government alone; the solutions lie in the hearts and consciences of individual fathers and the support of the families and communities in which they live. However, there are ways for a flexible, responsive

Government to help support men in their roles as fathers.

Therefore, today I am asking the Federal agencies to assist me in this effort. I direct all executive departments and agencies to review every program, policy, and initiative (hereinafter referred to collectively as "programs") that pertains to families to:

- ensure, where appropriate, and consistent with program objectives, that they seek to engage and meaningfully include fathers;
- proactively modify those programs that were designed to serve primarily mothers and children, where appropriate and consistent with program objectives, to explicitly

include fathers and strengthen their involvement with their children;

- include evidence of father involvement and participation, where appropriate, in measuring the success of the programs; and
- incorporate fathers, where appropriate, in government-initiated research regarding children and their families.

I ask the departments and agencies to provide an initial report on the results of the review to the Vice President through the National Per-

formance Review within 90 days of the date of this memorandum.

The information gained from this review will be combined with information gathered through the Vice President's "Father to Father" initiative and other father involvement programs to determine the direction of those programs for the future. The National Performance Review, together with the Domestic Policy Council, will recommend further action based on the results of this review.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on a Bipartisan Commission on Political Reform

June 16, 1995

Dear Mr. Speaker:

I was delighted when you and I agreed to the suggestion of a citizen in New Hampshire that we create a bipartisan commission to address the issues of political reform. As you stated at the time, this proposal offers the best chance in a generation to break through the stalemate between the parties that has blocked progress for reform. As you know, the citizen stated that this commission should be modeled after the base closing commission; I agree. This is an idea with wide appeal: in addition to our agreement, this proposal has previously been endorsed by Senate Majority Leader Dole, and a similar proposal has been introduced by Representatives Maloney, Meehan, Johnson, and others. I am writing to set forth my views on the best way to write into legislation the agreement we reached in New Hampshire.

As you know, to succeed, such a panel must be distinguished and truly bipartisan; it must have a firm deadline for action; and it must have a mechanism for presenting its proposals to the President and the Congress in such a way that we will be forced to act on them in a timely and comprehensive manner. Several times in recent years, particularly thorny issues, including base closings and congressional and judicial pay, have been addressed in this fashion.

First, the commission should be bipartisan in nature. Under this model, it would be comprised of eight members, appointed by the President in consultation with the leaders of the Congress.

The President would make two appointments; two would be made in consultation with the Speaker of the House; two would be made in consultation with the Majority Leader of the Senate; one each would be made in consultation with the minority leaders of the House and Senate. No more than four commissioners could be members of any one political party. To ensure that the commissioners are independent, receive the trust of the people, and can take a fresh look at these issues, they should not be current Federal officials or Members of Congress, or officers of or counsel to the political parties. In this fashion, we have an opportunity to achieve consensus and balance that will produce a national consensus on reform.

Second, the commission should be given a firm deadline in which to act—by February 1, 1996. These issues, while difficult, are not new, and can be fruitfully addressed in that time. The American people want to know that we will act during this Congress, and I believe the best chance of that is before the electoral season begins in the summer of 1996. The commission would be charged with considering all the issues of political reform, including campaign finance reform and lobby reform. Let me be clear: I do not believe that this proposal for establishing a commission should deter or detract from the previously scheduled Senate action on political reform (S. 101), a measure I strongly support. That would be contrary to the purpose of the entire enterprise—making progress on reforms