    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1995, Book I)]
    [May 10, 1995]
    [Pages 669-670]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    Joint Statement on Nonproliferation
    May 10, 1995

        The President of the United States of America, William J. Clinton,
    and the President of the Russian Federation, B.N. Yeltsin, at their
    meeting in Moscow May 9-10, 1995, expressed the strong view that the
    Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference underway
    in New York should decide to make the Treaty permanent. The two leaders
    pledged that the United States and Russia will continue to work to
    ensure the full implementation of the Treaty. In particular, they
    reaffirmed the commitments by the United States of America and the
    Russian Federation, under Article VI of the NPT, to pursue negotiations
    in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament,
    which remains their ultimate goal.
        The two Presidents also reaffirmed that the United States and the
    Russian Federation will continue to work together closely to promote
    broad nonproliferation goals. They agreed that, in the newly-established
    bilateral working group on nonproliferation, the two sides would consult
    in a timely manner on issues of mutual concern, including how best to
    fulfill their responsibility to cooperate with other NPT parties in the
    peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while at the same time fulfilling their
    responsibility to avoid risks of proliferation. The leaders recognized
    the importance of a responsible approach to the transfer of nuclear-
    related material, equipment, and technology and to nuclear-related
    training. In this connection, they reaffirmed their commitments to the
    NPT and to the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines, and in particular to
    the principles that nuclear transfers should take place only under full-
    scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and only when
    a supplier is satisfied that such transfers to any non-nuclear weapon
    state would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
        The leaders directed the working group on nonproliferation to
    prepare assessments of proliferation threats in various regions of the
    world, to consider practical means of addressing those threats, to
    assess evidence regarding possible noncompliance with nonproliferation
    commitments, and to report to them periodically on its progress.
        The two Presidents strongly supported the concrete progress recently
    made in their two countries' cooperation in ensuring the security of
    nuclear weapons and nuclear materials that can be used in such weapons.
    They reiterated their call for broad and expanded cooperation on a
    bilateral and multilateral basis, consistent with their international
    obligations, to strengthen national and international regimes of
    control, accounting, and physical protection of nuclear materials, and
    to prevent illegal traffic in nuclear materials. They directed all
    relevant agencies and organizations in their respective countries to
    facilitate in a coordinated manner, effective cooperation to this end.
        They directed that the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission prepare a joint
    report on steps that have been accomplished and additional steps that
    should be taken to ensure the security of nuclear materials.
        The leaders reaffirmed their strong support for the IAEA and
    reiterated their view that its safeguards program plays a fundamental
    role in the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. They stressed the
    importance of enhancing the IAEA's ability to detect diversions of
    nuclear material and to provide increased assurance of the absence of
    undeclared nuclear activities, in

    [[Page 670]]

    particular through the effort currently underway to strengthen the
    effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system.
        The Presidents agreed that the formal participation of the Russian
    Federation in the multilateral nonproliferation export control regimes
    would significantly strengthen those regimes as well as broaden the
    basis for cooperation between the two countries on nonproliferation.
    They agreed to direct officials in their respective governments to
    address expeditiously the issues affecting Russian membership in the
    various regimes, with a view to ensuring active U.S. support for Russian
    admission to each of the regimes at the earliest possible date.

    Note: An original was not available for verification of the content of
    this joint statement.