    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1994, Book II)]
    [September 29, 1994]
    [Pages 1659-1661]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    Joint Statement on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Security
    September 29, 1994

    Joint statement on strategic stability and nuclear security by the
    Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation
        Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin underscored that, with the end of the
    Cold War, major progress has been achieved with regard to strengthening
    global strategic stability and nuclear security. Both the United States
    and Russia are significantly reducing their nuclear forces. Important
    steps have been taken to detarget strategic missiles. Multilateral
    negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban have begun. The
    Presidents noted the key role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in
    ensuring global stability.
        President Yeltsin outlined the initiative Russia presented to the UN
    General Assembly for a treaty among the five permanent members of the UN
    Security Council for a halt to the production of fissile materials for
    weapons, a ban on the reuse of fissile materials in weapons, further
    elimination of nuclear warheads, and reduction of strategic delivery
    systems.
        President Clinton outlined the ideas he described at the UN General
    Assembly for cooperation in advancing nuclear non-proliferation,
    particularly to enhance the security of nuclear materials and to prevent
    nuclear smuggling.
        The Presidents discussed these initiatives, of which they had
    informed each other in advance and which reflected shared goals and
    certain common proposals designed to contribute to nuclear non-
    proliferation. In this regard, the Presidents agreed that the permanent
    members of the UN Security Council, given their responsibilities as
    nuclear powers, have a special role to play.
        The United States and Russia will work with the other permanent
    members, as well as other countries, to ensure a successful outcome at
    the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty conference that produces an indefinite
    and unconditional extension of the NPT, to conclude a comprehensive
    nuclear test ban treaty at the earliest possible date, and to achieve a
    global prohibition on the production of fissile materials for nuclear
    weapons. The Presidents also agreed on the desirability of continuing
    their respective moratoria on nuclear weapon tests.
        The Presidents welcomed the ongoing deactivation and dismantlement
    of strategic nuclear systems by the parties to the START I Treaty and
    the implementation of the January 14, 1994 Trilateral Statement. They
    welcomed the real possibility to bring the START I Treaty and the Lisbon
    Protocol into force in the very near future and pledged full cooperation
    to this end. The Presidents agreed that their defense ministers would
    exchange information every three months on strategic systems that have
    been deactivated and eliminated.
        The Presidents confirmed their intention to seek early ratification
    of the START II Treaty, once the START I Treaty enters into force, and
    expressed their desire to exchange START II instruments of ratification
    at the next U.S.-Russia summit meeting.
        In an important new development, the Presidents concurred that, once
    the START II Treaty is ratified, the United States and Russia would
    proceed to deactivate all strategic delivery systems to be reduced under
    START II by remov-

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    ing their nuclear warheads or taking other steps to remove them from
    alert status.
        The Presidents instructed their experts to intensify their dialogue
    to compare conceptual approaches and to develop concrete steps to adapt
    the nuclear forces and practices on both sides to the changed
    international security situation and to the current spirit of U.S.-
    Russian partnership, including the possibility, after ratification of
    START II, of further reductions of, and limitations on, remaining
    nuclear forces. They also discussed the prospect for confidence-building
    and transparency measures in this area. The Presidents consider that, as
    the political partnership develops, there will be new opportunities to
    strengthen stability through openness and transparency.
        President Clinton described to President Yeltsin the unilateral
    adjustments the United States will make in its strategic and non-
    strategic nuclear forces and safety, security and use control practices
    as a result of the recently completed nuclear posture review. President
    Yeltsin noted these U.S. changes as a manifestation of the new
    relationship between the United States and Russia and described the
    comparable review of measures underway in Russia to reduce Russian
    nuclear forces and improve their safety. The Presidents agreed that each
    side would independently consider further unilateral steps, as
    appropriate, with regard to their respective nuclear forces.
        The Presidents discussed the benefits of reduction and enhancements
    to the security of non-strategic nuclear forces.
        The Presidents agreed on the fundamental importance of preserving
    the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty. Noting the recent
    progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and
    multilateralization of the ABM Treaty, the Presidents instructed their
    respective delegations, working with the other participating states, to
    complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time.
        Both sides have an interest in developing and fielding effective
    theater missile defense systems on a cooperative basis. The Presidents
    agreed that the two sides will conduct a joint exercise of theater
    missile defenses and early warning of missile launches. This exercise
    would contribute to providing a basis for U.S. and Russian forces to
    operate together, for example, in peacekeeping operations.
        Proceeding from the principles of partnership and reciprocity, the
    Presidents agreed to work together to develop broad bilateral and
    multilateral cooperation on assuring nuclear security as follows:
        Cooperate on a bilateral and multilateral basis, including through
            the exchange of appropriate information, to prevent illegal
            trade in nuclear materials and undertake measures to strengthen
            the regime of control and physical protection of such materials.
        Exchange detailed information at the next meeting of the Gore-
            Chernomyrdin Commission on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear
            warheads, on stocks of fissile materials and on their safety and
            security. The sides will develop a process for exchanging this
            information on a regular basis.
        Direct their joint working group on nuclear safeguards, transparency
            and irreversibility to pursue by March 1995 further measures to
            improve confidence in and increase the transparency and
            irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons.
        Facilitate broad cooperation among appropriate agencies in both
            countries to ensure effective control, accounting and physical
            protection of nuclear materials.
        Facilitate cooperative programs between U.S. and Russian national
            laboratories in the areas of safety, physical protection,
            control and accounting of nuclear materials.
        Deepen cooperation between the U.S. Department of Defense and the
            Russian Ministry of Defense in the area of ensuring nuclear
            security.
        Implement a joint plan to expedite construction of a new, long-term
            storage facility for fissile materials from dismantled nuclear
            weapons at Mayak.
        Taking a broad view of strategic stability and bearing in mind the
            need to control all types of weapons of mass destruction, the
            Presidents agreed on:
        The importance of continued, full, mutual and reciprocal
            implementation of the September 1992 U.S.-Russian-UK statement
            on Biological Weapons as a means of gaining confidence that
            offensive biological weapons programs have been terminated.
        The need for adherence by all states to the Chemical Weapons
            Convention and for universal application of its provisions, as
            well as the need for adoption without delay of

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            measures that make it possible to bring the CWC into force; and
            the need to resolve without delay the outstanding issues related
            to the Bilateral Destruction Agreement and the Wyoming
            Memorandum of Understanding.

    Note: This joint statement also included a report of September presummit
    meetings on U.S.-Russian security issues.