[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1994, Book I)]
[January 14, 1994]
[Pages 71-73]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]



[[Page 71]]


Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and 
the Means of Their Delivery
January 14, 1994

    President Clinton and President Yeltsin, during their meeting in 
Moscow on January 14, 1994, agreed that the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and their missile delivery systems represents an acute 
threat to international security in the period following the end of the 
Cold War. They declared the resolve of their countries to cooperate 
actively and closely with each other, and also with other interested 
states, for the purpose of preventing and reducing this threat.
    The Presidents noted that the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
creates a serious threat to the security of all states, and expressed 
their intention to take energetic measures aimed at prevention of such 
proliferation.
    --Considering the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
        as the basis for efforts to ensure the nonproliferation of 
        nuclear weapons, they called for its indefinite and 
        unconditional extension at conference of its participants in 
        1995, and they urged that all states that have not yet done so 
        accede to this treaty.
    --They expressed their resolve to implement effective measures to 
        limit and reduce nuclear weapons. In this connection, they 
        advocated the most rapid possible entry into force of the START 
        I and START II treaties.
    --They agreed to review jointly appropriate ways to strengthen 
        security assurances for the states which have renounced the 
        possession of nuclear weapons and that comply strictly with 
        their nonproliferation obligations.
    --They expressed their support for the International Atomic Energy 
        Agency in its efforts to carry out its safeguards 
        responsibilities. They also expressed their intention to provide 
        assistance to the Agency in the safeguards field, including 
        through joint efforts of their relevant laboratories to improve 
        safeguards.
    --They supported the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and agreed with the 
        need for effective implementation of the principle of full-scope 
        IAEA safeguards as a condition for nuclear exports with the need 
        for export controls on dual-use materials and technology in the 
        nuclear field.
    --They reaffirmed their countries' commitment to the conclusion as 
        soon as possible of an international treaty to achieve a 
        comprehensive ban on nuclear test explosions and welcomed the 
        decision to begin negotiations at the conference on disarmament. 
        They declared their firm intention to provide political support 
        for the negotiating process, and appealed to other states to 
        refrain from carrying out nuclear explosions while these talks 
        are being held.
    --They noted that an important contribution to the goal of 
        nonproliferation of nuclear weapons would be made by a 
        verifiable ban on the production of fissile materials for 
        nuclear weapons and by the most rapid conclusion of an 
        international convention to this effect with the widest possible 
        participation of states and on a non-discriminatory basis.
    --They agreed to cooperate with each other and also with other 
        states to elaborate measures designed to prevent the 
        accumulation of excessive stocks of fissile materials and over 
        time to reduce such stocks.
    --They agreed to establish a joint working group to consider:
      --including in their voluntary IAEA safeguards offers all source 
        and special fissionable materials, excluding only those 
        facilities associated with activities having direct national 
        security significance;
      --steps to ensure the transparency and irreversibility of the 
        process of reduction of nuclear weapons, including the 
        possibility of putting a portion of fissionable material under 
        IAEA safeguards. Particular attention would be given to 
        materials released in the process of nuclear disarmament and 
        steps to ensure that these materials would not be used again for 
        nuclear weapons.
    --The Presidents also tasked their experts to study options for the 
        long-term disposition of fissile materials, particularly of 
        plutonium, taking into account the issues of non-


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      proliferation, environmental protection, safety, and technical and 
        economic factors.
    --They reaffirmed the intention of interested organizations of the 
        two countries to complete within a short time a joint study of 
        the possibilities of terminating the production of weapon-grade 
        plutonium.
    --The Presidents agreed that reduction of the risk of theft or 
        diversion of nuclear materials is a high priority, and in this 
        context they noted the usefulness of the September 1993 
        Agreement to cooperate in improving the system of controls, 
        accounting, and physical protection for nuclear materials. They 
        attached great significance to further joint work on the 
        separate but mutually connected problems of accounting for 
        nuclear materials used in the civilian and military fields.
    Both Presidents favored a further increase in the efforts to prevent 
the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.
    --As the heads of the countries that have the world's largest 
        stockpiles of chemical weapons, they acknowledged particular 
        responsibility for eliminating the threat posed by these 
        weapons. In this context, they declare their resolute support 
        for the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and 
        their intention to promote ratification as rapidly as possible 
        and entry into force of the Convention not later than 1995.
    --To promote implementation of a comprehensive ban on chemical 
        weapons, they welcomed the conclusion of the implementing 
        documents for the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding and agreed 
        to conclude work in as short a time as possible on the 
        implementing documents for the Bilateral Agreement on the 
        Destruction of Chemical Weapons.
    --The Presidents reaffirmed their desire to facilitate the safe, 
        secure, timely, and ecologically sound destruction of chemical 
        weapons in the Russian Federation and the United States. They 
        applauded the joint Chemical Weapons Destruction Work Plan 
        recently concluded between the two countries which leads the way 
        for the United States to provide an additional $30 million in 
        assistance to support an analytical chemical laboratory in 
        Russia to facilitate chemical weapons destruction. The United 
        States also agreed to consider appropriate additional measures 
        to support Russia's chemical weapons destruction program.
    --They reiterated the importance of strict compliance with the 
        Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons 
        and of continued implementation of measures in accordance with 
        the Russia-America-British Statement of September 1992, which 
        provided inter alia for the reciprocal visits of facilities and 
        meetings between experts in order to ensure confidence in the 
        compliance with the Convention.
    --They supported convening a special conference of the states' 
        parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and 
        Toxin Weapons in order to consider measures that would 
        contribute to transparency and thereby confidence in compliance 
        with the Convention and its effectiveness.
    The Presidents expressed the determination of their countries to 
cooperate with each other in preventing the proliferation of missiles 
capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction.
    --They welcomed the conclusion of the Bilateral Memorandum of 
        Understanding between the Government of the Russian Federation 
        and the Government of the United States of America Concerning 
        the Export of Missile Equipment and Technologies, signed in 
        September 1993, noted the importance of this Agreement for 
        ensuring mutually beneficial cooperation between the U.S. and 
        Russia in the field of space exploration, and agreed to 
        collaborate closely in order to ensure its full and timely 
        implementation.
    --The U.S. welcomed Russia's intention to join the Missile 
        Technology Control Regime and undertook to cooperate with Russia 
        in facilitation its membership at an early date. The Russian 
        Federation and the United States of America are certain that 
        further improving the MTCR, including the prudent expansion of 
        membership, will help reduce the threat of proliferation of 
        missiles and missile technologies in the regional context as 
        well.
    The Presidents of the two countries agreed that, in addition to 
strengthening global norms of nonproliferation and working out 
agreements to this effect, close cooperation is essential in order to 
develop policies on nonproliferation applicable to specific regions 
posing the greatest

[[Page 73]]

risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of 
delivery.
    --They agreed that nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula would 
        represent a grave threat to regional and international security, 
        and decided that their countries would consult with each other 
        on ways to eliminate this danger. They called upon the DPRK to 
        honor fully its obligation under the Treaty on the Non-
        proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its safeguards agreement 
        with the IAEA in connection with the Treaty, and to resolve the 
        problems of safeguards implementation, inter alia, through 
        dialogue between IAEA and DPRK. They also urged full and speedy 
        implementation of the Joint Declaration of the ROK and the DPRK 
        on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
    --They support efforts to reach agreement on the establishment of a 
        multilateral forum to consider measures in the filed of arms 
        control in nonproliferation that could strengthen security in 
        South Asia. They call on India and Pakistan to join in the 
        negotiation of and become original signatories to the Treaty 
        Banning Nuclear Weapons Test Explosions and the proposed 
        Convention to Ban Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear 
        Explosives and to refrain from deploying ballistic missiles 
        capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction to each 
        other's territories.
    --They agreed that the U.S. and Russia, as co-chairs in the Middle 
        East peace process, would actively promote progress in the 
        activity of the working group for Arms Control and Regional 
        Security in the Middle East, striving for speedy implementation 
        of confidence-building measures and working toward turning the 
        Middle East into a region free of weapons of mass destruction, 
        where conventional forces would not exceed reasonable defense 
        needs.
    --They firmly supported the efforts of the UN Special Commission and 
        the IAEA to put into operation a long-term monitoring system of 
        the military potential of Iraq, and called upon Iraq to comply 
        with all UN Security Council resolutions.

Note: An original was not available for verification of the content of 
this communique.