[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush (1992-1993, Book II)]
[January 15, 1993]
[Pages 2254-2256]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]



Message to the Senate Transmitting the Russia-United States Treaty on 
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
January 15, 1993

To the Senate of the United States:
    I am transmitting herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate 
to ratification, the Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms (the START II Treaty) signed at Moscow on January 3, 
1993. The Treaty includes the following documents, which are integral 
parts thereof:
    --the Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs 
and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs 
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms (the Elimination and Conver-

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sion Protocol);
    --the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers 
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms (the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol); and
    --the Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy 
Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America 
and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms (the Memorandum on Attribution).
    In addition, I transmit herewith, for the information of the Senate, 
the report of the Department of State and letters exchanged by 
representatives of the Parties. The letters are associated with, but not 
integral parts of, the START II Treaty. Although not submitted for the 
advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, these letters are 
provided because they are relevant to the consideration of the Treaty by 
the Senate.
    The START II Treaty is a milestone in the continuing effort by the 
United States and the Russian Federation to address the threat posed by 
strategic offensive nuclear weapons, especially multiple-warhead ICBMs. 
It builds upon and relies on the Treaty Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the START Treaty) signed at 
Moscow on July 31, 1991. At the same time, the START II Treaty goes even 
further than the START Treaty.
    The START Treaty was the first treaty actually to reduce strategic 
offensive arms of both countries, with overall reductions of 30-40 
percent and reductions of up to 50 percent in the most threatening 
systems. It enhances stability in times of crisis. It not only limits 
strategic arms but also reduces them significantly below current levels. 
In addition, the START Treaty allows equality of forces and is 
effectively verifiable. Finally, commitments associated with the START 
Treaty will result in the elimination of nuclear weapons and deployed 
strategic offensive arms from the territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
and Ukraine within 7 years after entry into force, and accession of 
these three states to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. As a result, after 7 
years, only Russia and the United States will retain any deployed 
strategic offensive arms under the START Treaty.
    The START II Treaty builds upon and surpasses the accomplishments of 
the START Treaty by further reducing strategic offensive arms in such a 
way that further increases the stability of the strategic nuclear 
balance. It bans deployment of the most destabilizing type of nuclear 
weapons system--land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with 
multiple independently targetable nuclear warheads. At the same time, 
the START II Treaty permits the United States to maintain a stabilizing 
sea-based force.
    The central limits of the START II Treaty require reductions by 
January 1, 2003, to 3000-3500 warheads. Within this, there are sublimits 
of between 1700-1750 warheads on deployed SLBMs for each Party, or such 
lower number as each Party shall decide for itself; zero for warheads on 
deployed multiple-warhead ICBMs; and zero for warheads on deployed heavy 
ICBMs. Thus, the Treaty reduces the current overall deployments of 
strategic nuclear weapons on each side by more than two-thirds from 
current levels. These limits will be reached by the end of the year 2000 
if both Parties reach agreement on a program of assistance to the 
Russian Federation with regard to dismantling strategic offensive arms 
within a year after entry into force of the Treaty. Acceptance of these 
reductions serves as a clear indication of the ending of the Cold War.
    In a major accomplishment, START II will result in the complete 
elimination of heavy ICBMs (the SS-18s) and the elimination or 
conversion of their launchers. All heavy ICBMs and launch canisters will 
be destroyed. All but 90 heavy ICBM silos will likewise be destroyed and 
these 90 silos will be modified to be incapable of launching SS-18s. To 
address the Russians' stated concern over the cost of implementing the 
transition to a single-warhead ICBM force, the START II Treaty provides 
for the conversion of up to 90 of the 154 Russian SS-18 heavy ICBM silos 
that will remain after the

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START Treaty reductions. The Russians have unilaterally undertaken to 
use the converted silos only for the smaller, SS-25 type single-warhead 
ICBMs. When implemented, the Treaty's conversion provisions, which 
include extensive on-site inspection rights, will preclude the use of 
these silos to launch heavy ICBMs. Together with the elimination of SS-
18 missiles, these provisions are intended to ensure that the strategic 
capability of the SS-18 system is eliminated.
    START II allows some reductions to be taken by downloading, i.e., 
reducing the number of warheads attributed to existing missiles. This 
will allow the United States to achieve the reductions required by the 
Treaty in a cost-effective way by downloading some or all of our sea-
based Trident SLBMs and land-based Minuteman III ICBMs. The Treaty also 
allows downloading, in Russia, of 105 of the 170 SS-19 multiple-warhead 
missiles in existing silos to a single-warhead missile. All other 
Russian launchers of multiple-warhead ICBMs--including the remaining 65 
SS-19s--must be converted for single-warhead ICBMs or eliminated in 
accordance with START procedures.
    START II can be implemented in a fashion that is fully consistent 
with U.S. national security. To ensure that we have the ability to 
respond to worldwide conventional contingencies, it allows for the 
reorientation, without any conversion procedures, of 100 START-
accountable heavy bombers to a conventional role. These heavy bombers 
will not count against START II warhead limits.
    The START Treaty and the START II Treaty remain in force 
concurrently and have the same duration. Except as explicitly modified 
by the START II Treaty, the provisions of the START Treaty will be used 
to implement START II.
    The START II Treaty provides for inspections in addition to those of 
the START Treaty. These additional inspections will be carried out 
according to the provisions of the START Treaty unless otherwise 
specified in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol or in the 
Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol. As I was convinced that the START 
Treaty is effectively verifiable, I am equally confident that the START 
II Treaty is effectively verifiable.
    The START Treaty was an historic achievement in our long-term effort 
to enhance the stability of the strategic balance through arms control. 
The START II Treaty represents the capstone of that effort. Elimination 
of heavy ICBMs and the effective elimination of all other multiple-
warhead ICBMs will put an end to the most dangerous weapons of the Cold 
War.
    In sum, the START II Treaty is clearly in the interest of the United 
States and represents a watershed in our efforts to stabilize the 
nuclear balance and further reduce strategic offensive arms. I therefore 
urge the Senate to give prompt and favorable consideration to the 
Treaty, including its Protocols and Memorandum on Attribution, and to 
give its advice and consent to ratification.

                                                             George Bush

The White House,
January 15, 1993.