[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush (1992, Book I)]
[May 9, 1992]
[Pages 736-737]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]



Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Congressional 
Campaign Spending Limit and Election Reform Act of 1992

May 9, 1992
To the Senate of the United States:
    I am returning herewith without my approval S. 3, the 
``Congressional Campaign Spending Limit and Election Reform Act of 
1992.'' The current campaign finance system is seriously flawed. For 3 
years I have called on the Congress to overhaul our campaign finance 
system in order to reduce the influence of special interests, to restore 
the influence of individuals and political parties, and to reduce the 
unfair advantages of incumbency. S. 3 would not accomplish any of these 
objectives. In addition to perpetuating the corrupting influence of 
special interests and the imbalance between challengers and incumbents, 
S. 3 would limit political speech protected by the First Amendment and 
inevitably lead to a raid on the Treasury to pay for the Act's elaborate 
scheme of public subsidies.
    In 1989, I proposed comprehensive campaign finance reform 
legislation to reduce the influence of special interests and the powers 
of incumbency. My proposal would abolish political action committees 
(PACs) subsidized by corporations, unions, and trade associations. It 
would protect statutorily the political rights of American workers, 
implementing the Supreme Court's decision in Communications Workers v. 
Beck. It would curtail leadership PACs. It would virtually prohibit the 
practice of bundling. It would require the full disclosure of all soft 
money expenditures by political parties and by corporations and unions. 
It would restrict the taxpayer-financed franking

[[Page 737]]

privileges enjoyed by incumbents. It would prevent incumbents from 
amassing campaign war chests from excess campaign funds from previous 
elections.
    These are all significant reforms, and I am encouraged that S. 3 
includes a few of them, albeit with some differences. If the Congress is 
serious about enacting campaign finance reform, it should pass 
legislation along the lines I proposed in 1989, and I will sign it 
immediately. However, I cannot accept legislation, like S. 3, that 
contains spending limits or public subsidies, or fails to eliminate 
special interest PACs.
    Further, as I have previously stated, I am opposed to different 
rules for the House and Senate on matters of ethics and election reform. 
In several key respects, S. 3 contains separate rules for House and 
Senate candidates, with no apparent justification other than political 
expediency.
    S. 3 no longer contains the provision that the Senate passed last 
year abolishing all PACs. Although that provision was overbroad in 
banning issue-oriented PACs unconnected to special interests, S. 3 would 
not eliminate any PACs. Instead, the Act provides only a reduced limit 
on individual PAC contributions to Senate candidates and no change in 
the status quo in the House. Moreover, the limit on aggregate PAC 
contributions to House candidates to one-third of the spending limit, 
$200,000, is not likely to diminish the heavy reliance of Members on PAC 
contributions. The average amount a Member of Congress raised from PACs 
in the last election cycle was $209,000.
    The spending limits for both House and Senate candidates will most 
likely hurt challengers more than incumbents, especially because S. 3 
does little to reduce the advantages of incumbency. Inexplicably, there 
is no parallel House provision to the sensible Senate provision 
restricting the use of the frank in an election year. In the last 
election cycle, the amount incumbent House Members spent on franked mail 
was three times the total amount spent by all House challengers. The 
system of public benefits, designed to induce candidates to agree to 
abide by the spending limits, is unlikely in many cases to overcome the 
inherent favors of incumbency.
    S. 3 contains several unconstitutional provisions, although none 
more serious than the aggregate spending limits. In Buckley v. Valeo, 
the Supreme Court ruled that to be constitutional, spending limits must 
be voluntary. There is nothing ``voluntary'' about the spending limits 
in this Act. The penalties in S. 3 for candidates who choose not to 
abide by the spending limits or to accept Treasury funds are punitive--
unlike the Presidential campaign system--as well as costly to the 
taxpayer. For example, if a nonparticipating House candidate spends just 
one dollar over 80 percent of the spending limit, the participating 
candidate may spend without limit and receive unlimited Federal matching 
funds. The subsidies provided for in S. 3 could amount to well over 100 
million dollars every election cycle, yet the Act is silent on how these 
generous Government subsidies would be financed. It seems inevitable 
that they would be paid for by the American taxpayer. I understand why 
Members of Congress would be reluctant to ask taxpayers directly to 
subsidize their reelection campaigns, but given the significant costs of 
S. 3, its failure to address the funding question is irresponsible.
    Our Nation needs campaign finance laws that place the interests of 
individual citizens and political parties above special interests, and 
that provide a level playing field between challengers and incumbents. 
What we do not need is a taxpayer-financed incumbent protection plan. 
For these reasons, I am vetoing S. 3.

                                                             George Bush

The White House,
May 9, 1992.