[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush (1991, Book I)]
[June 21, 1991]
[Pages 706-707]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]



Message to the Congress Reporting on the National Emergency With Respect 
to Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation
June 21, 1991

To the Congress of the United States:
    1. On November 16, 1990, in Executive Order No. 12735, I declared a 
national emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(``IEEPA'') (50 U.S.C. 1701, et seq.) to deal with the threat to the 
national security and foreign policy of the United States caused by the 
proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. In that order I 
directed the imposition of export controls on goods, technology, and 
services that can contribute to the proliferation of chemical and 
biological weapons and delivery systems. I also directed the imposition 
of sanctions on foreign persons and foreign countries involved in 
chemical and biological weapons proliferation activities under specified 
circumstances.
    2. I issued Executive Order No. 12735 pursuant to the authority 
vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United 
States, including IEEPA, the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et 
seq.), and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code. At that 
time I also submitted a report to the Congress pursuant to section 
204(b) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(b)). Section 204 of IEEPA requires 
follow-up reports, with respect to actions or changes, to be submitted 
every 6 months. This report is submitted in compliance with that 
requirement.
    3. Since the issuance of Executive Order No. 12735, the United 
States Government has implemented additional export controls under the 
Enhanced Proliferation Controls Initiative (EPCI), announced on December 
13, 1990. Three provisions implementing EPCI and Executive Order No. 
12735 amend the Export Administration Regulations and were published in 
the Federal Register (56 FR 10756-10770, March 13, 1991), copies of 
which are attached. These regulations impose additional controls on 
exports that would assist a country in acquiring the capability to 
develop, produce, stockpile, deliver, or use chemical or biological 
weapons or ballistic missiles. The first two regulations were issued in 
interim form for public comment and implemented immediately. The third 
regulation was issued in proposed form for public comment.
    The three regulations can be described as follows:
    The first regulation expands from 11 to 50 the number of chemical 
weapons precursors whose export is controlled by the United States 
Government to all countries except the 20-member Australia Group of 
countries that cooperate against chemical and biological weapons 
proliferation and the NATO member countries. Prior to this regulation 
the United States had controlled the 39 additional chemical weapons 
precursors only to Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya, and the four embargoed 
countries of Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, and North Korea.
    The second regulation imposes a requirement for individual validated 
licenses for export of certain chemical and biological weapons-related 
dual-use equipment to 28 designated destinations.

[[Page 707]]

    The third regulation will impose a requirement for individual 
validated licenses where an exporter knows or is informed by the United 
States Government that any export is destined for the design, 
development, production, or use of chemical or biological weapons or 
missiles. This regulation also will impose an individual validated 
license requirement for U.S. persons who knowingly provide assistance to 
such a project, as well as for U.S. person participation in the design, 
construction, or export of whole chemical plants that make chemical 
weapons precursors.
    The United States Government, in bilateral contacts, at the 
Australia Group meetings of December 1990 and May 1991, and at the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) partners meeting of March 1991, 
has pursued negotiations with foreign governments to persuade them to 
adopt measures comparable to those the United States has imposed. At the 
May 1991 Australia Group meeting, the members agreed that by the next 
Australia Group meeting in December 1991 they would place controls on 
the export of all 50 chemical weapons precursors identified by the 
Group. They also agreed in principle to control the export of dual-use 
chemical weapons-related equipment. The United States Government is 
seeking greater harmonization of national export control laws, 
particularly in the areas of chemical and biological weapons-related 
equipment, including whole chemical plants, and curbs on citizen 
proliferation activities and end-user controls. At the MTCR partners 
meeting, significant progress was made toward adopting an updated annex 
of controlled missile-related technologies. The MTCR partners also 
agreed to consider further harmonization of controls and implementation 
procedures. We will continue to pursue efforts to obtain foreign 
adoption of comparable measures.
    An interagency chemical and biological weapons sanctions working 
group chaired by the Department of State has been established to 
evaluate intelligence and identify potentially sanctionable chemical or 
biological weapons activity that has taken place since November 16, 
1990. This group has met and vetted information on potentially 
sanctionable activities but has not completed its analysis. The 
Administration has not as yet made any sanctions determinations but is 
reviewing potential sanctions cases.
    On May 13, 1991, I announced a further U.S. initiative aimed at 
completing a comprehensive global chemical weapons ban in the Geneva 
Conference on Disarmament within 12 months. The initiative contains a 
series of concrete, forward-looking proposals that we believe will help 
inspire other governments and make this result possible.
    In addition, on May 29, 1991, I announced a Middle East arms control 
initiative intended to curb the spread of chemical and biological 
weapons as well as conventional arms, missiles, and nuclear weapons. 
With regard to chemical and biological weapons, the initiative calls for 
the establishment of guidelines for restraints on transfers of 
conventional arms, weapons of mass destruction, and associated 
technology. It calls for all states in the Middle East to commit to 
becoming original parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention and for 
confidence-building measures by regional states. The initiative also 
calls for strengthening the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention through 
full implementation of its provisions, an improved mechanism for 
information exchange, and regional confidence-building measures.
    4. The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons continues to 
constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security 
and foreign policy of the United States. I shall continue to exercise 
the powers at my disposal, including export controls and sanctions, and 
will continue to report periodically to the Congress on significant 
developments, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1703(c).

                                                             George Bush

The White House,
June 21, 1991.