[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush (1991, Book I)]
[March 16, 1991]
[Pages 274-279]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]



The President's News Conference With Prime Minister John Major of the 
United Kingdom in Hamilton, Bermuda
March 16, 1991

    The Prime Minister. We might start now if everyone is content. We 
have very little time, I'm afraid, only about 15 or so minutes. So we'll 
be----

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    Q. I have a question, I have a question. [Laughter]
    The Prime Minister. Well, I'll see if I can flush you later.
    We have about 15 minutes, so we'll be as swift as we can. Can I just 
say by way of introduction, we've had some extremely useful discussions 
this morning covering a very wide area. I think they have come at a very 
appropriate time at the end of the Gulf conflict. There was a great deal 
to discuss, a great deal to learn from the conflict. And it also gave me 
the opportunity of expressing to the President the tremendous admiration 
that is felt in the United Kingdom and elsewhere for the remarkable way 
in which he led this particular enterprise.
    Amongst the matters we were able to discuss this morning were, of 
course, the aftermath of the Gulf, the general position of security in 
the Middle East, the present circumstances in the Soviet Union, the GATT 
rounds, the developing situation in South Africa, arms control, and an 
interim report on Secretary Baker's talks in the Soviet Union.
    So, it was a fairly wide agenda. But I won't elaborate on it now. 
I'll invite the President to say a few words, and then perhaps we can 
take your questions.
    The President. Mr. Prime Minister, all I want to do is thank you for 
the hospitality, thank the Governor General of Bermuda and, of course, 
the Premier, and say we've enjoyed it. And I agree with you that these 
talks are very, very helpful. And I think it's fair to say that we are 
determined now to go forward and each country try to be a catalyst for 
peace, building on our success in the Gulf.
    And so, thank you, sir, and I'm just delighted to be with you once 
again.
    The Prime Minister. Right. Shall we take some questions then? Can I 
take the lady in the second row?

Situation in Iraq

    Q. Thank you. We just listened, Mr. President, to Saddam Hussein's 
speech, and he said the insurgency in the south had been crushed but 
continued in the north. And he also seemed to be issuing a very strong 
threat once again to the Kurds, saying that if they persisted they would 
be crushed like those who preceded them. Do you have any comment on 
that?
    The President. Crushed like those that preceded them?
    Q. Like those who preceded them. I think it was a reference--I don't 
want to put words in his mouth, but----
    The President. No, I have learned long ago not to comment on 
something that I haven't heard or haven't authoritatively read, but 
there is dissension inside Iraq. That is a matter that we're not 
involved in. And I would simply repeat that Saddam's credibility remains 
at an all-time low ebb as far as the United States is concerned.
    Q. I wonder if I could ask you both if you see any possible role for 
either British or American forces intervening militarily in Iraq?
    The President. I do not. We are not--that would be going beyond our 
mandate. Now, I will say this: that at the tent meeting, certain 
arrangements were made and certain ground rules spelled out--British and 
U.S. commanders agreeing, the Saudis, all the coalition forces, agreeing 
and telling Iraq certain things should not happen. The movement of 
aircraft, for example. And so, they should not violate the conditions 
that they agreed to.
    But having said that, none of us want to move forces into Baghdad or 
to--frankly, we don't want to have any more fighting. But they know what 
the ground rules are, and they ought to play by those rules, live by 
them.
    The Prime Minister. There's no more to be said. I think that's 
precisely it.
    Q. Mr. President, in that speech of Saddam Hussein, he also 
indicated that he was willing to set up some kind of multiparty system, 
even perhaps verging on democracy. What do you make of that kind of talk 
from Saddam Hussein? And also, would that be something that the United 
States could live with? Could Saddam Hussein stay in power in Baghdad 
under that kind of arrangement?
    The President. I find it very difficult to see a situation under 
which we would have normalized relations with Saddam Hussein

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still in power. His credibility is zilch, zero, zed. And if he wants to 
talk about this, fine. But what people are looking for I think is 
compliance with--fully compliance of United Nations resolutions. It is 
complying with the cease-fire terms. And I don't know what this speech 
is about; I simply can't comment on it. But if he's proclaiming that 
Iraq will be a democratic nation, fine. But that's--I want to see--the 
proof of that pudding is in the eating.

Soviet-U.S. Relations

    Q. Mr. President and Prime Minister: You mentioned the interim 
report from Secretary Baker on his talks yesterday. What conclusions do 
you draw about future relations with the Soviet Union in view of the 
apparent lack of progress on control, both CFE [conventional forces in 
Europe] and START?
    The Prime Minister. Well, insofar as CFE are concerned, Secretary 
Baker reaffirmed what I said to Mr. Gorbachev 2 days ago about the 
resubordination of a larger amount of Soviet military to the Navy. I 
think Mr. Gorbachev has taken the point. It's a matter he'll clearly 
have to look at. His military are a good deal more hard-line about that 
matter than I think he is, but I think he now understands the absolute 
imperative of sticking with the CFE agreement that he signed.
    On START, I think there's a general wish to proceed with the START 
talks again. We must hope that that proves to be possible. But we must 
make sure, in my judgment, that the CFE agreement itself is actually 
enacted before one can go too far on START.
    The President. I can't add to that because the Baker-Gorbachev 
meeting and Baker-Bessmertnykh meetings have tracked very much what the 
Prime Minister has just said came out of his meeting. So, the Soviet 
position has been--I think the Prime Minister expressed it very well, 
and Jim Baker made clear, as did the Prime Minister in his meetings, 
that the naval infantry question must be resolved and that we've got to 
go forward to CFE agreement as we all--along the lines that we thought 
we were entering into. So, I have no difference at all there.

Sanctions Against Iraq

    Q. Mr. President and Mr. Prime Minister, what kinds of steps do you 
think Iraq needs to take in order for the economic sanctions to be 
lifted, and is the supervised destruction of their chemical weapons 
stockpile one of those steps that you think has to be taken?
    The Prime Minister. I certainly would like to see the supervised 
destruction of their chemical weapons. I think that is extremely 
important for future security in the Middle East. There are a raft of 
matters, most of which--all of which I think spring out of the Security 
Council resolutions of recent months that will need to be incorporated 
in the cease-fire proposals. There's a considerable amount we need to 
see. I think we do need to see, for example, the destruction of the 
chemical weapons; that's certainly the case.
    I think there's a good deal else we need to see. We need to make it 
absolutely clear, and it needs to be absolutely clear for the Iraqis, 
that they actually recognize the position that now exists in Kuwait and 
that that is going to be a permanent recognition. We need some 
assurances on that.
    I think we have to look at wider issues as well. We'll certainly 
have to look at the question of arms control in the area. That's a 
matter that will need to be developed, I think, very probably amongst 
the Permanent Five, though there are other mechanisms for doing it.
    The President. The only thing I could add to that, some arrangements 
for peacekeeping--perhaps a role for the United Nations, perhaps a role 
for an Arab force. But there's a lot of details that have to follow. But 
the Prime Minister clicked off the major concerns that we have, and I 
would say, sir, that our coalition is united on this.
    The Prime Minister. I think the two things, actually, one might 
actually add to that, of course, are the release of Kuwaiti detainees 
and perhaps some hypothecation of oil revenues in order to meet some of 
the loss and costs that have been incurred in Kuwait.

European Security

    Q. There seems to be a growing discus-

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sion in Europe about a defense unit for the security of Europeans. What 
I'm wondering is whether, Mr. Bush, you see this as an exclusion of the 
U.S. and how you feel that may affect NATO? Because that's been its 
traditional role. And Mr. Prime Minister, what's your thoughts on it?
    The President. I'll be glad to start by saying certainly in the 
conversation that we had today there is no differences in terms of where 
the U.K. and the United States stand. I mean, I don't think the United 
Kingdom is foreseeing the pulling out from our responsibilities for 
security by the United States. So, I had discussions of this with 
President Mitterrand, and there have been some nuances of difference, 
perhaps--not necessarily between the French and the United States but 
between some in Europe and the United States--and I think that they're 
manageable differences.
    The United States has a key role. We think that we've performed that 
role adequately in the past, and we have every intention of fulfilling 
what is in our national security interest in the future. And I think the 
presence where we continue to have a strong NATO, for example, is in our 
interest.
    After all, though tensions are lessened, there still are a lot of 
question marks out there. But I can say in terms of my discussions with 
the Prime Minister, I don't think we have differences on this point, but 
I'll leave it to him.
    The Prime Minister. There are absolutely no differences at all. NATO 
has very successfully kept the peace in Europe since the Second World 
War. It has been the cornerstone of the peace, and the American presence 
in NATO and the presence of their troops in Europe has been absolutely 
fundamental to the security of Europe. So, we certainly would wish to 
see absolutely nothing that would damage that.
    I think what some of the Europeans are concerned about--and I think 
they're right to be concerned about that--is the fact that Europe will 
need to make a greater proportionate contribution to the communal 
defense of Europe. But I think that is a contribution that will have to 
be channeled through NATO. And there's no difference whatsoever between 
the United States and Britain on that point.

Situation in Iraq

    Q. Both of you said you don't want to see any more fighting in Iraq. 
I'm wondering, how do you intend to enforce the terms of the tent 
agreement? Would that be just another thing under the umbrella of 
lifting economic sanctions, or do you have something else in mind?
    The Prime Minister. I don't think we want to go into detail about 
that. We've made it fairly clear to the Iraqis what we expect them to 
do. I think we must wait for them to do it. It's our expectation that 
they both would and should.
    Q. Are you ruling out military action?
    The President. We're not ruling anything in or out. But we're making 
clear--as General Schwarzkopf did, I think, just yesterday--that they 
must abide by agreements made, and there are many agreements in the 
future that we haven't ironed out, many provisions in the future that we 
expect Iraq will comply with--the Prime Minister having set out a very 
good litany right here. So, we're not trying to elevate the chance of 
further military action. When we said cease-fire, we ceased firing, and 
we want to see that formalized. And that's what we're approaching. And I 
won't go into any hypothesis on that.

British-U.S. Role in the Middle East

    Q. The President spoke about the role for Britain and the United 
States as catalysts for peace. How do you see the two separate roles? Is 
there a specific role for Britain and not a specific role for the United 
States?
    The President. No, I don't look at it that way, but we have separate 
initiatives. For example, the Prime Minister went over and, amongst his 
talks in the Middle East itself, he began exploring avenues for peace. 
Secretary Baker is doing that now on a trip that he took, and ending 
up--now I guess he's on his way to Turkey.
    At each step of the way, each of us will be exploring, and then 
we'll have talks like this. There's going to be probably some United 
Nations role to play. There's going to be bilateral relations between 
ourselves--I'm speaking now for the United

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States and the State of Israel. We have communications now and contacts 
with Syria. I happen to think that that can be catalytic for peace. So, 
we're not talking about an assignment to the United States to do A, B, 
and C, and for the U.K. to do what follows on--X, Y, and Z--or vice 
versa. And we had talks with Mr. Mitterrand about this.
    So, what we are trying to do is say, look, we now have a renewed 
Western credibility--certainly coalition force credibility. And let's 
use that to try to bring peace to Lebanon, try to bring peace to the 
Israel-Palestine area, the West Bank, et cetera, and try to bring peace 
and security and stability to the Gulf. And there isn't one formula yet, 
and I don't think there will be a single formula until a lot more 
consultation has taken place.
    Some have suggested the instant convening of an international 
conference. The policy of the United States has been, a conference at an 
appropriate time might be useful. That's been our policy for the last 11 
years. But we are not going to urge that at this point until we see that 
it would be productive.
    You don't want to have a conference and some people fail to show up, 
if presence there at the conference is an absolute sine qua non for 
success. So, we're going to just keep talking, keep consulting, but not 
tarry. I do think that we ought to seize the moment. And I know that's 
the goal of the United States, and I gather after these thorough 
consultations this morning that that is the view of the U.K.

Soviet Role in the Middle East

    Q. Mr. President, you speak of the coalition force credibility. The 
Soviets are not part of that coalition. Secretary Baker met with the 
Soviets in the last couple of days. You two have discussed the Soviet 
role in the new Middle East. What is a valid role for the Soviets now, 
as not being a member of that coalition? Is it just a member of the 
United Nations? How far do we go with it?
    The President. Remember--you appropriately pointed on the United 
Nations. The Soviet Union's state remains solidly with the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and others in the United Nations. Had that 
not been the case, obviously the United Nations would not have had the 
positive role that it had. I gather from just the preliminary report--
not talking to him but a preliminary report--that Mr. Zoellick passed 
along to me and to the Prime Minister that Jim Baker felt that, after 
talks with Gorbachev and Bessmertnykh, that the Soviets wanted to still 
play a constructive role.
    They have interests in the Middle East. We don't view this as 
something that's against us. And so, true, they were not in the 
coalition in the sense of having forces, but they worked very 
cooperatively with us at the United Nations and inasmuch as there's 
going to be some--there should probably be some U.N. role, perhaps the 
blue helmets along some peacekeeping line, we want to continue to work 
with the Soviets. We want to continue to keep that cooperation.
    So, I don't think their failure to have troops on the ground in the 
Middle East--which we didn't ask them to do, incidentally--is a 
detriment to their playing a useful role for peace. They know a lot of 
the cast of characters there. I'd love to see them improve relations 
with the State of Israel. I think if they did that, that could be a very 
important point in how this peace is brought about.
    So, I see them, after the Baker talks--and again, I'd defer to the 
Prime Minister who did have his own talks with Mr. Gorbachev on that--
but I see them as still wanting to play a constructive--not obstruction 
but constructive role with whatever follows on.
    The Prime Minister. I can certainly confirm that. In the discussions 
I had with Mr. Gorbachev less than a fortnight ago, he made that 
perfectly clear in perfectly clear terms that he wished to play a 
constructive role in an ongoing settlement in the Middle East. And I see 
no reason to doubt his bona fideness in that respect.

Withdrawal of British Forces From Iraq

    Q. Prime Minister, if a formal cease-fire cannot be arranged until 
Saddam stops deploying his remaining forces, what does that mean for the 
timetable for the return of British forces back to the U.K.? And if 
American forces do become involved, would British forces become involved 
as

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well?
    The Prime Minister. There are too many premises there that may not 
come about, to be precise. I don't know precisely when we'll have a 
cease-fire. We're looking at the moment at what a cease-fire resolution 
might contain, and it may be quite a substantial resolution; there's 
quite a lot to get in it. And I don't think we can address those 
secondary questions until we have that resolution. It may be that we'll 
have one broadly ready to begin presenting at the end of next week, but 
I think there can be no certainty about that.
    At the moment, the return of British troops continues. We had 
Security Council resolutions to meet when we sent the troops there. 
Those Security Council resolutions have been met, and the troops are now 
returning home. But I think the other premises you raise can't be 
answered at this stage.
    I think that is the last question we can take, I'm afraid. The 
British element of the press corps may be interested to know that 
England beat France 21-19. [Laughter]
    Thank you very much.

U.S. Hostages in Lebanon

    Q. Mr. President, can you take a question on Terry Anderson, sir? 
Today starts his 7th year in captivity. What message would you send to 
him?
    The President. We're raising it every chance we get, and will 
continue to.

                    Note: The President's 75th news conference began at 
                        12:17 p.m. at Government House. The following 
                        persons were referred to in the news conference: 
                        Secretary of State James A. Baker III; Gov. 
                        Desmond Langley and Premier John W.D. Swan of 
                        Bermuda; President Saddam Hussein of Iraq; 
                        President Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister 
                        Aleksandr Bessmertnykh of the Soviet Union; 
                        President Francois Mitterrand of France; Gen. H. 
                        Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the U.S. forces 
                        in the Persian Gulf; Robert B. Zoellick, 
                        Counselor of the Department of State; and 
                        hostage Terry Anderson, who was kidnaped in 
                        Beirut, Lebanon, on March 16, 1985.