[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush (1991, Book I)]
[March 8, 1991]
[Pages 231-241]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]



Interview With Middle Eastern Journalists
March 8, 1991

    The President. I wanted to just say a word of welcome to you all, 
and be glad to thank you for coming all this way. I think the best thing 
is just to go ahead and start, though I might say at the beginning that 
the coalition that was put together to stand up against the aggression 
has been, in my view, historic. There were a lot of predictions early on 
that one or another country would pull away or that it would fracture in 
some--and you come to me on a day when I have great gratitude in my 
heart to the leaders of the coalition countries. Well, I guess all the 
countries from which you've come having had forces there--Morocco, of 
course, in a special role, not a part of the coalition per se but 
nevertheless in the defense of Saudi Arabia, having some soldiers on the 
ground. That's a distinction that I wanted to say to you, sir, we 
understand and respect.
    But in any event, those forces that did end up in the battle did 
very well. There were predictions that some might not want to engage in 
the battle, and they did, and so we are very grateful. And I keep saying 
two things: One, this is not a U.S. effort by itself. And secondly, our 
argument was never with the people of Iraq; it was with Saddam Hussein.
    I make this point because the Iraqis tried to make it them--I mean 
``them'' including all Arabs--against the United States. And I will 
resist that until time immemorial, because there's a feeling of 
gratitude and affection to the Arab world because so many there stood 
with us against this evil.
    But now, look, I came to answer your questions, and I'll try to do 
so. Who wants to go first?

Security in the Persian Gulf

    Q. Sir, my colleagues have elected that I speak first. I would like 
to take the opportunity to thank you personally, the administration and 
this great country and people, for what you have done. I believe this is 
an historical stand. And as our Ambassador has said, you will go into 
history as a great leader and a great man.
    Sir, my first question is, the coalition has won the war, and I 
believe we have a great battle ahead of us, that is, to win the peace. 
What kind of arrangement do you foresee the United States, the 
coalition, and the Gulf States and, of course, the Arabs would have for 
security arrangements within the Gulf States and the Arab States?
    The President. I think this is a time, as Abraham Lincoln once said 
in our history, to think anew. And we are starting to think anew by 
dispatching our Secretary of State to the region. There will not be a 
United States plan to bring peace to Lebanon, to

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the Gulf, or to the Israeli-Palestine question. There will not be a 
single, sole U.S. plan. We want to be an instrumental part of it. We 
think, given what's happened in the Gulf, perhaps we have more 
credibility to be a part of it. When I spoke at our meeting to the joint 
session of Congress the other day, I spoke about our interest in being a 
catalyst for peace. And that's what Baker is out there to do.
    I would love to think that the day would come when the Israeli-Arab 
world hostility could end. And that's going to take compromise on both 
sides. We are very openminded as to how that should be brought about. 
When I talked about territory for peace, that wasn't exactly a new 
statement. We have been proponents of Resolutions 242 and 338 for a long 
time, and so have other countries, many other countries. I'd say most 
every country, but then some have pulled away from them. So, we're going 
to push, after consultation, in trying to get common ground with our 
coalition partners and then with Israel and others, to push on all three 
fronts.
    Obviously, the security in the Gulf is quite different. I will 
repeat--I don't want to lecture here, but I will repeat that we are not 
interested in a longterm ground troop presence. The Iranians, for 
example, are accusing us, or not accusing us but are very much concerned 
about that. So are others. And we would be playing right into the hands 
of our critics if we sent a signal that we wanted to leave a sizable 
U.S. force on the ground out there. We don't. Our families want them 
home.
    But on the other hand, I spelled out the other day some security 
requirements for the Gulf and what we think might be new arrangements 
that will provide for a more stable and more secure Gulf. Lebanon, 
again, and the Israeli question--these will be evolved after the Baker 
consultations.
    Q. Mr. President, President Mubarak has called once again for a 
Middle East, including Israel, free of weapons of mass destruction. Do 
you agree with this initiative and other proposals for the limitation of 
arms shipments to the region, including Israel?
    The President. You heard me speak on proliferation. I don't think 
you're going to disarm Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria--
anybody. I think that's idealistic. I'm not implying that that--what my 
dear friend Hosni Mubarak is saying. But I would like to think that out 
of all this we could have a vastly reduced flow of arms to this troubled 
corner of the world.
    We have been very much concerned about these shipments. In some 
places we've been involved in them, to many of the countries right here 
in which your papers are located and Israel. But when I made this pitch 
for nonproliferation the other day, it is something that again we want 
to talk about within this whole concept of security and stability, not 
of just the Gulf region but of the other parts of the Middle East as 
well.
    So, I'm not certain how we'll come down, what the final arrangements 
will be, but we are very openminded about talking and then doing what we 
say after we talk, in terms of fewer weapons going into the area.
    Q. Mr. President, do you foresee any future role for Iraq and Iran 
in the security arrangement?
    The President. Roles for Iraq and Iran? Well, in the first place, we 
never have felt that it was in the interest of the Gulf or certainly of 
the United States to create a vacuum in Iraq. And we have not wanted an 
unstable Iraq. Iraq has a job to do of reconstruction. And what they 
ought to do is have a government that will signal to the rest of the 
world that they want to live within their own borders, that they are 
renouncing aggression. And indeed, they did renounce the annexation of 
what they used to arrogantly refer to as Province 19.
    So, they've got to send the signal to the world that they want to 
live within what we call the family of peace-loving nations. That is 
difficult, very candidly, for us. And one of the things Baker will talk 
about with our partners is whether it's difficult for them if Saddam 
Hussein remains in power. So, Iraq we want to see stable, living within 
its own borders with respect for its neighbors, renouncing its so-called 
claim to Kuwait, and yes, being an important part of the area.
    Iraq can be a very well-to-do country if they'd spend their money on 
helping their own people and not on arms and bullying

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the neighborhood, which they tried to do until they got into the war 
with Iran. Then the man changed his spots momentarily. Then when that 
war was over, he showed his arrogance and bullying again by going after 
Kuwait.
    So, the best answer, as we see it--and again, with respect for our 
partners, I want to know exactly what they think but--is for Iraq to 
live in its borders, and then it can regain the respect that they 
deserve. They've got a proud history. They've got culture. They've got 
religious traditions and all. So, we're open to that. But it's going to 
be difficult under the status quo.
    On Iran, we've had very strained relations with Iran. I have 
publicly said, and I'll repeat it--this is a unique chance to repeat it 
here--we want better relations with Iran. We have no animosity. There's 
a lot of feeling in our country about our hostages and about the 
Embassy, and there's feelings in Iran about the shooting down, which was 
pure accident, of the airbus and all of this. But sometimes when you 
have deep divisions it takes a little more time. So, we're not pressing 
Iran on bilateral relations.
    But Iran is a big country. I don't think they should be treated 
forever as enemies by all the countries out in the GCC [Gulf Cooperation 
Council] countries or others. And I don't think, as I listen carefully 
to our friends in the Gulf--I think there's an evolution process here 
towards Iran. And as Iran moves to what I hope will be a more moderate 
or a less radical role, I think that the other countries in the area 
will welcome them back.
    But they're an important country and they've got a self-respect. And 
so, we'd like to find ways to recognize that--of self-respect and their 
own sovereignty, of course. But we've got some bilateral problems.
    So, I think both of them, being of their size, of their economic 
potential, of their historic standing, have key roles to play in a 
secure and stable Gulf. But again, it's got to evolve--how that will 
work, I mean, what mechanics are worked out. Will there be an Arab 
peacekeeping force there, and can that be presented to all the countries 
as no threat to them, but as a guarantee of the security of other 
countries?
    So, we want this--remember in the early days of all this, talk about 
``Arab solution''--King Hussein kept talking about, ``We want an Arab 
solution.'' And they had meetings and others saying ``Arab,'' and we 
understood that. We don't want a Yankee solution to the Middle East. 
[Laughter] I mean, that's not what we want.
    So, here's a chance now for our friends in the Arab world--and there 
are many, and I hope there are more than when all this started--to say, 
look, here's where we should carry the ball; here's the place we should 
have the lead. And then we stand there with our, I would say, conviction 
backed up by perhaps a naval presence that I mentioned coming up and 
down the Gulf. It has helped with stability. And I see it as that kind 
of partnership in the future, but with no rancor in my heart about Iran, 
no rancor about the people of Iraq.
    So, when I get up and say that here, I'm not just making it up. 
Because we hurt, we ache when we see a child that doesn't have enough 
food, or water that's contaminated, or something of that nature. And I 
think people in Saudi, Kuwait, Morocco--they feel the same thing when 
they see an Iraqi child.
    So, we've got to approach it in a magnanimous, compassionate way. 
But let our Arab friends stand out there and say: Here's what we 
recommend. Here's what we're prepared to do. And then have us willing to 
put our military and whatever they want behind this effort.
    So, that one is easier, it seems to me, the Gulf security including 
Iran and Iraq, than perhaps Lebanon and the Palestine question as it 
relates to Israel.
    I'm going on too long, but I want to make a point that we've been 
very disappointed in the PLO here. I mean, the PLO was anointed at Rabat 
years ago as the sole spokesmen in all of this, and they've been 
disappointing. They've moved way over too far in support of Saddam 
Hussein. They took a bet--they bet this coalition wouldn't hold, and 
they bet the United States would not do what we did. And the guy bet 
wrong.
    Here was a man that, in spite of the recent terrorist acts, had some 
standing in this country. I don't know how it is in the

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rest of the world, but he's lost that standing here. And that isn't to 
mean that we say to everybody that was sympathetic to the PLO, hey, 
you're bad guys; that's not it. But they've been diminished by this.
    So, their role in the security, at least for now, in my view, has 
been diminished because they bet on the wrong horse for the wrong 
reasons, the wrong motives. I mean, they did not stand up and condemn 
that aggression. And I think it has hurt some of the Palestinians in 
Kuwait who had been treated very well there. And then when the Kuwait 
thing happens, a lot of the Palestinians sided with the Iraqi invaders. 
Well, this didn't help their image around the United States. I can only 
speak for our country.

Palestinians

    Q. What do you mean by political rights to Palestinian people in 
your speech?
    The President. About political rights? Listen, there will not be 
peace until the whole question of where the Palestinians have a right to 
be is taken care of. And some say ``state.'' It's not been our position 
in favor of the state, and there we differ with many of our Arab 
friends. But the question is, get the Palestine question resolved. And 
obviously, the framework has got to be the action taken by the United 
Nations. Or at least, that doesn't have to be the only answer, but 
that's some common ground there. That's something that Israel agreed to, 
that's something that Arab States agreed to, and is subject to a lot of 
interpretation problems. But there is a common place to start from. But 
there's got to be discussions. We can't have state of war forever and 
ever. I mean, we're in kind of a healing mode now. I'd like to heal some 
wounds. I'd like to be a catalyst that can help overcome old enmities.
    Now, maybe that's too idealistic, but even if he can't do that, 
there has got to be a resolution of the Palestine question. And we know 
it, and we feel strongly about it, and we're prepared to play a useful 
role. But as I say, people are going to have to move on all sides of 
this question. The status quo ain't going to get the job done.
    Q. You had a talk with the PLO; are you willing to resume the talks?
    The President. I wouldn't say right now. They're coming at us at the 
wrong time. I don't think they've requested that. They were broken off 
because, as you recall, some terrorists--what we call terrorism. They 
were calling it something else. But I think I would be very--and I'm one 
who wanted to keep those talks going and did as long as we could. But to 
me, they've lost credibility. They've lost credibility with this office 
right here. And the reason they have is because they behaved very badly 
to those of their own fundamental faith.
    That's not all PLO people; I'm sure there are some good people 
there. But their leadership betrayed their friends and got in with the 
wrong side. And it's going to take some time. So, I'm not in any rush to 
do that at all.

Environmental Damage

    Q. Sir, excuse me. I have two points. The first is the immediate 
problems we are facing, and the other one is a medium-term. The first 
one is the environment. Now we have oil spillage and this fire.
    The second one, sir, I am speaking--I think the medium-range sort of 
problems in our region, to my mind, is democracy and development. What's 
your----
    The President. Okay. First, the environment. I have been surprised 
that in this country there has not been more of a highlighted moral 
outrage. I feel a moral outrage here. I feel that what he has done, 
laying waste to the assets of Kuwait, is brutal environmental terrorism. 
There is no excuse for it. There is no rationale for it. It is simply 
what we call the scorched earth policy, as he left. That is 
unacceptable.
    I think world judgment is going to take a while to mature in this 
regard. People here hate it, but there isn't that visceral feeling about 
what this man has done. As time goes by and the shooting has stopped, 
thank God, and people come back into Kuwait as they are, thank heavens, 
I think people are more and more going to be outraged by it.
    One of the reasons that we insisted on accountability and on one of 
the U.N. resolutions that called for compensation was because we felt so 
strongly about the environmental degradation. And Kuwait is entitled to 
compensation for this kind of environ-

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mental terrorism. And so are others who might be affected by that spill.
    So, one, we're very much concerned about it, and I think it's going 
to be a focal point. It hasn't yet been as much as I thought it would 
be--a focal point for indignation against this laying to waste, reckless 
laying to waste, of another country.
    What was your second point?

Democracy and Regional Development

    Q. Democracy and development.
    The President. Of course, the United States, you know, we're for 
democracy. Obviously, the more democratic processes that are put into 
effect in whatever country, we rejoice in that. That's been the history 
of our country. We're not trying to dictate to some country how to do 
its internal affairs. But the more compatible the values, the better it 
is for the future. We urge as much democratic process as possible in the 
area and in all areas.
    So, we just stand as a beacon, we think, for democracy, and we will 
continue to try to do it. As you know, halfway around the world I was 
criticized for not standing stronger for democracy in China. I thought I 
stood very strongly for it. But there's a balance here between 
expressing your own convictions about your own values and having respect 
for problems that others have.
    So, on development, I think the resources are there. And if those 
resources can be turned to peaceful means, so not only a country that 
has valued peace--take Kuwait--but it has had to worry about whether it 
would be aggressed against or whether its neighbors were going to do 
something.
    But if we can get this new order out there, then I think the means 
are there for the development of the entire region. But it isn't going 
to be done with the barrel of the gun. And you can't say to Saudi 
Arabia, to Kuwait, ``Hey, trust me, all is well, throw down your arms,'' 
as long as you have a situation in the Gulf that's unstable.
    Q. Well, Mr. President, one of the main reasons of instability in 
the region, originally in the Mideast, is the big gap between the rich 
and the poor countries. And recently, after the Gulf war, there have 
been many ideas proposed to tackle this problem. And I think Secretary 
Baker--he once mentioned a sort of new international development bank 
for the Middle East or something like that. What are your ideas, Mr. 
President, I mean the U.S. ideas to deal with this problem?
    The President. I don't want to try to preempt the Baker trip. He's 
going out there to discuss economic development. And there are a lot of 
resources in the area. People look at the United States and say, hey, 
there's a lot of resources in the United States, too. And there are. But 
when we tried to assist Egypt with its rather substantial debt to the 
United States, you know I came under great attack here: Hey, wait a 
minute, what the hell are you doing worrying about Egypt's debt? What 
about Iowa and Kansas and Texas and other places in our own country? 
What about our budget deficit of hundreds of billions of dollars?
    So, we are not in a great position to be putting ourselves up as the 
wealthy guy that can solve all the problems in other areas. But there 
are discrepancies in wealth in the area, just as there are in my own 
country. There are a lot of people here in poverty. Some people live 
very well. The same thing is true in the entire Middle East. But I think 
the way to work it out is through consultation and through planning and 
through regional answers to it. We can't dictate. We can't say to a 
wealthy country out there: Hey, you've got to spend x dollars to help 
your guy next door. I don't think that's the way. I mean, that would be 
really resented in that part of the world. Just as I would resent it if 
some wealthy countries in other parts, or Europe, for example, started 
telling me how to take care of poverty in the United States.
    So, again I want to fall back on the Baker consultations, which will 
have this economic ingredient, this development ingredient as part of 
it. Having said that, I think all of us as human beings have to be 
concerned when there's a lot of inequity. And I feel it here. I don't 
get given any credit in this country for feeling it, but I do. I worry 
about it. And I certainly worry about it in other parts.
    But to try to justify aggression on the

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basis of the haves versus the have nots is unacceptable. And I don't 
think we can ever permit that kind of demagogic rationalization to 
justify the takeover of one country by another. And I, to be honest with 
you on that point, I had never considered Iraq a have-not country. I've 
considered them a country that has tremendous resources that they 
splurged on trying to buy support with Mercedes-Benzes and arming 
themselves to the teeth so that they could bully the neighborhood. Well, 
those days are over and I'm damn proud that we had a part, working with 
our partners, in putting an end to it. I say they're over. They better 
be over, or Iraq will not have normalized relations with this country. I 
can speak for the U.S.
    Q. No, what I mean, it's not just to give. To help in development, 
because through development, this will have a solution for these 
problems.
    The President. It would be a fantastic thing to do. No, excuse me, I 
wasn't lecturing you on the fact that we don't need development. I'm 
simply saying it is something that is going to have to be addressed, but 
that we can't use--we can't permit one neighbor to take over another 
because he's doing it in the name of have or versus have not. But I 
think there's a wonderful chance now for economic development where one 
country will want to help another.
    The United States has always been in that mode, and we'll want to 
try to help. All I'm saying is we're going to need--we're not going to 
pull back into some sphere of isolation as a result of all this. But 
once again, it's with respect that I say, hey, we need some regional 
answers out here. We need some Arab solutions. And let us be a part of 
it but not try to dictate it, is all I'm saying on development and on 
how we handle the inequities of wealth versus nonwealth.

Iraq

    Q. Mr. President, you talked about Iraq recently, and you said you 
are not going to pay any penny for rebuilding Iraq. What about if there 
is a new government of Iraq?
    The President. What we're willing to do is immediately help in a 
humanitarian way. If there's a hungry child, if there's a sick family, 
we'll go there today; yesterday we'll be there. We've always done that. 
But as you look at the overall reconstruction of Iraq, what they need to 
do is come up with a plan where they use their wealth for their own 
reconstruction, and then be able to have a good life for their people 
from there on. They can do it. They've got enormous wealth.
    And if they had a new government that had a broad futuristic view, 
that contained the willingness to live at peace with their neighbors, 
throw down these excessive arms--what they've got left, keep what they 
need for their own internal security--guarantee their neighbors they 
have nothing to fear from them, then of course we'd be willing, in a 
broad sense through these international agencies and others, to be 
helpful in terms of reconstruction.
    But it is not the case where we are going to turn around as Uncle 
Sucker, not Uncle Sam but Uncle Sucker, and turn around and start 
sending taxpayers' money that are going to rebuild the arrogance that 
has led to this instability in the first place. And I'll tell you, the 
American people feel strongly about it. And there's 265 million of us, 
and nobody feels more strongly about it than the guy sitting right here.
    We're not inhumane, but let's see the new government develop. Let's 
see them give the assurances to their neighbors they want to live at 
peace. Let's see them show the concern for their own people that they 
should have. And that means not spending it all on rifles from the 
Soviet Union or tanks, but it's on trying to help--turn on those oil 
wells, get those going again, and help their people.
    That's my point. That's what I was trying to say the other night. 
But everything takes time, too. This situation needs time. But the best 
thing that could happen is if the kind of government you asked about 
emerges; then you'd see whole new attitudes emerge in Europe and the 
United States and everyplace else.
    Q. What kind of government do you think that ought to be?
    The President. One that is compassionate and concerned about his own 
people and drops all this arrogance about the neighborhood. That would 
be a good place to start.

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And I have known--before the Iran-Iraq war I used to wrestle with these 
problems when I was at the United Nations. And these guys from other 
Arab countries have come up and told me this man's a bully. He'll walk 
into a room with other Arab leaders and swagger in with his--bullying 
the neighbors. And he had muscle. He had arms, when some of them hadn't 
gone to the arms route. He had an arrogant swagger that tried to 
intimidate his Arab neighbors.
    Then he got into the Iran-Iraq war and that changed, because he 
needed help. So, he turned to those against whom he'd been arrogant and 
showed a different side momentarily. Then that war ended. And what does 
he do? He brutalizes Kuwait. So, he can't have that kind of an attitude 
if he wants reasonable relations with us. And that's what I'm saying. We 
tried with Iraq. We tried just before the end of the Iran-Iraq war to 
have better relations and to see a different side. And what happens? He 
takes over Kuwait, and that was it right there. Bang--that's enough for 
us.
    And again, we're not the ones that are trying to dictate to that 
corner of the world. I've been out there. I have respect for the 
countries and their cultures and their traditions and for their 
sovereignty. And in this office, as long as I'm here, whether we have a 
big country or a small country, we are going to respect that. But I 
don't respect the bullying attitude that resulted now in the aggression 
against Kuwait.

Relations With Persian Gulf Nations

    Q. Sir, while we are on the point, do you envisage more sort of 
cooperation with the GCC themselves on----
    The President. Yes, I think as much as possible. And I think as more 
of a security arrangements as can be arranged for and taken over by the 
GCC, the better it is. It's their neighborhood. We've got a stake in it 
for a lot of reasons--economic reasons and historic reasons--but 
absolutely. And the more vital the GCC is, the more it can say here's 
what's best for the Gulf area, in my view, so much the better. And I'll 
keep using this thing here, the telephone, and talking to these leaders 
out there. And we're going to keep up good bilateral relations with as 
many countries as possible. But the needs are regional; it's crying out 
for a regional answer to it.
    The complex problems that you ask about are a little different. It's 
not strictly regional. It's more global in a sense because it's been so 
intractable.
    Q. Well, Mr. President----
    Mr. Fitzwater. We're going to have to break, gentlemen.
    Q. The last question.
    The President. Let me--and then I'll try not to lecture you so much. 
I get all--I'm very enthusiastic about this. I remember being back as 
Ambassador at the United Nations. And I didn't know as much about 
diplomacy then, but I became very close to the Ambassadors from the Arab 
world. The day I left, they gave a beautiful going-away party, in spite 
of the fact that we had stood against them--or at least they thought, 
against them--on some of the Israel questions. I'll never forget it.
    And Bishara, who is the head of the GCC--he was the Kuwait 
Ambassador at that time. Through not only contact with him but remember 
the guy Baroody--really Lebanese--and they became close friends, and 
they taught me a lot about the individual traditions of the countries. 
Abdel Meguid was my colleague at the U.N. So when I sit down and talk to 
Mubarak, I've been conditioned and sensitized by these friends of mine 
in that area. And I want to reflect my feeling about these countries 
through how we conduct ourselves.
    One of the things that made it easier for us to commit an enormous 
amount of treasure and risk a lot of human life was that we feel this 
area and its importance more than, I think, perhaps some of my 
predecessors. That doesn't mean we're not going to have fights with 
representatives from the various countries represented here. But we 
don't want to do it out of neglect or out of failing to understand the 
intense pride of the region.
    Now, what was the question?
    Q. Sir, I do think that everybody in Kuwait and a lot of people in 
the GCC and their countries look to Mr. George Bush as a great man. And 
this is the first time in his- tory I have 
seen so many articles about the

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United States, about Mr. George Bush being published, not clandestinely 
like you were before, but now everything is open. What kind of relations 
do you envisage between this country and the Gulf GCC?
    The President. Well, again, I think it has to be one of mutual 
respect. I think it has to be one who fiercely recognizes and is willing 
to defend the territorial integrity of the country. I think it has to be 
one where we're forward-leaning on the peace process as it relates to 
Israel and Palestine. Because in these countries, no matter how good our 
bilateral relations, there's this feeling--hey, you ought to be doing 
more about that question.
    I see it as one where we will be tested by whether I am willing to 
do what we've said, be a catalyst for peace not just in the Gulf but up 
into Lebanon and down into the Israeli-Palestine question.
    But what I hope will happen is that because of the commitment we 
made, after great consultation--in your country's case, the Amir; the 
case of the Kingdom [of Saudi Arabia], with King Fahd himself; a close 
relationship with Mubarak--I hope that the United States will--and I 
think it is true in Morocco, although we had a little different standing 
for Morocco in this--I hope that there will be a recognition that we're 
credible friends. And this is an important point, that we have 
credibility. When we say we'll do something, we'll do it; we mean it.
    And that is an important point as to how the U.S. interacts with the 
Middle East from now on, it seems to me. If they say they're going to do 
what they say they'll do, I think that is important. I think a lot of 
lip service was given to that point, but for various reasons, including 
global reasons, Vietnam. People would--``Look, hey, do they really mean 
this? Are they really going to follow through?'' And I think that our 
credibility should be such in the area that we can work closely now as 
credible allies, credible friends.

New World Order

    Q. Mr. President, the Gulf war is the first of its kind to take 
place in the context of the new world order. How did the new world order 
influence the way the world dealt with this crisis? And what is the main 
lesson learned from the Gulf war?
    The President. The new world order said that a lot of countries, 
disparate backgrounds, with differences, can come together standing for 
a common principle. And that principle is: You don't take over another 
country by force. So, the new world order, to the degree it's emerged so 
far, has been enhanced by this single concept that we're going to unite, 
no matter what other differences we may have had, what the bilateral 
problems may have been, and we're going to stand up against aggression.
    It was enhanced by a more viable United Nations, a United Nations 
where the big powers didn't automatically go against each other. In the 
cold war days, we'd say, ``This is black,'' and the Soviets would say, 
``Hey, that's white.'' And you'd have a veto, and nothing would happen. 
And the peacekeeping dreams of the founders of the U.N. were dashed.
    So, part of this new world order has been moved forward by a United 
Nations that functioned. We might have still been able to stand up and 
come to the assistance of Kuwait--the United States. I might have said, 
``To hell with them. It's right and wrong. It's good and evil. He's 
evil; our cause is right,'' and, without the United Nations, sent a 
considerable force to help. But it was an enhanced--it is far better to 
have this collective action where the world, not just the Security 
Council but the whole General Assembly, stood up and condemned it.
    So, part of it is these more viable international organizations. And 
that is where we are now. Then how we build on it is the questions that 
will be coming up, trying to give our share of the answers when Jim 
Baker comes back from these consultations.
    Q. And what is the lesson which we learned from this crisis?
    The President. Well, the one key lesson is: Aggression will not 
stand. You don't bully your neighbor. You don't swagger around the 
neighborhood with an arrogance and back it up by overwhelming force 
without paying a price. Same thing you learned in the school yard when 
you were over there in Egypt. One guy came out and tried to beat the 
hell out of you when you're in the

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third grade, and you'd wait for a while, and then somebody would hit him 
and he'd go back into his shell and he wouldn't do it again. And that is 
what happened in this case. Same thing.
    Q. Mr. President, I am too greedy. I want to make two questions.
    The President. You've got it. [Laughter] They have another way of 
doing it over here, saying ``and a followup,'' you know. They'll ask you 
something unrelated and call it a followup so they can get two.

Syria-U.S. Relations

    Q. You made a step toward Syria and a good--relationship with them. 
How do you see now the relation between the United States and Syria 
regarding Lebanon, especially?
    The President. We've had some differences with Syria that we have 
spoken very frankly about regarding terrorism and other things. I think 
that because we were able to work together with Syria here and we did 
this--there was a lot of advice coming from other coalition partners 
that encouraged me to take additional steps toward Syria. Because of 
that I think we have a much better chance to work with them toward peace 
in Lebanon.
    Syria has interests there. We're not saying they have no interests 
there. But these Taif accords are still valid, and the steps that the 
Arab leaders took there in terms of getting all forces out and 
democratization or better representation in the government inside 
Lebanon, those are good things.
    But I think the key point to your question is, because we worked 
together on this one problem over here, the Gulf, and some doubts about 
each other were kind of laid to rest, we have a chance now to work 
toward the solution of other problems. And you know, they are very--we 
have said very intractable on the Israeli question, and they have said 
we have been overly one-sided. At least we're talking. And at least they 
did what they said they'd do, and we did what we said we'd do.
    And so, I think in terms of Lebanon, we've got a window--we've got a 
big door we can walk in, not a window but a door, where we can openly 
discuss things in a much better way. I know I feel that way about 
relations there. I think our Secretary of State does. And still, I don't 
want to suggest we have no problems with Syria or any other country. But 
we can talk about them more frankly without the door being slammed. And 
that can help Lebanon, that can help it.

Arab-U.S. Relations

    Q. How do you see, Mr. President, your relation with so-called 
Arabic-solution states?
    The President. Good, and better. It depends who you mean. Morocco 
was an Arab-solution state, and I feel very respectful of and friendship 
toward His Majesty the King [Hassan II]. I mean, that wasn't strained by 
this. You've got a problem if you're referring to Jordan.
    Q. The Amman incident.
    The President. Yes, Amman. Let it cool down here, calm, take a 
little time. A little hurt feelings out there, disappointment in the 
United States still there; but a recognition that a stable Jordan is in 
everybody's interests. And I don't want to--I mean, a lot of what 
happened in the Jordan situation was aimed not just against the United 
States but some of the other neighbors in the area.
    And when that happens, I'd like to know how they feel. I'd like to 
know how King Fahd or Hosni Mubarak feels or how the Kuwaitis' Amir 
feels about Jordan--and we can help. I mean, we've had a good 
relationship with the Hashemite King [Hussein I]. But I've expressed my 
public disappointment because I think Jordan has swung way over on this 
question. And I'm not saying it was all his fault because there were 
some people out there in the streets. And they're still out there 
yelling about me, personally, and the whole United States. Obviously I'm 
just this target for that.
    But my view is, hey, we've all got to live together in peace, so 
let's take a little time now and sort this one out. We don't want to see 
a radicalized Jordan, and yet I must confess to a certain disappointment 
in terms of how that Jordanian question will--I'm disappointed with some 
of the Jordan press, frankly, that did nothing but blame everything on 
the United States. They know better than that. And yet they did it.

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    But I've learned in life--maybe it's because I'm 66 now--take a 
little time, let it simmer, and then let's try to put together a more 
peaceful Middle East.
    So, I have no rancor or bitterness. But, again, there is an area--
let the Arabs work their magic out here. You're talking about an Arab 
solution. Let them come to me and say, all of them, including Jordan: 
Here's the way we ought to work together. And not us try to dictate, to 
say to King Fahd, hey, you've got to do this. He wouldn't do it anyway. 
He's a strong-willed person, knows the area.
    So, my answer: disappointment. Determination to think that one day 
we'll have a better relationship with a country with whom we've always 
had a good relationship, try to recognize their problems. But it's going 
to take time. There is some hurt here, some hurt in the neighborhood; 
there is some damage to a bilateral relationship.
    Q. Mr. President, what is your message to the Arab people?
    The President. A positive signal to the Arab people and that our 
argument has never been with the Arab people, per se. And I hope that 
our participation in this coalition and, if I could move one step 
forward, our leadership of the coalition was not aimed against an Arab 
of any kind. It was aimed in favor of a principle. And that principle, 
again: You don't take over your neighbor by force.
    So, I see some demonstrations in various countries against my 
country, and I have a hurt about that. I guess every American loves to 
be loved, you know, around the world. But it doesn't work that way. And 
yet, I think some of the accusations by fundamentalists against us are 
very untrue, and I will stand up against them.
    But I think the message, it shouldn't be one of recrimination: 
``Hey, we remember what you said; we're going to get even.'' It ought to 
be: ``Look, we tried to stand for what we think was decent and right. We 
tried to stand with respect for principles in the Arab world. We tried 
in the targeting of Iraq to be respectful of their culture, 
archeological, religious, whatever.'' And our argument isn't with Islam; 
our argument isn't with Arabs. And I will stand up against any 
discrimination against Arabs in this country publicly, openly--we've had 
groups in here--and say, ``Damn it, we hurt when you hurt.'' But what we 
stood for was something positive. And I want to keep trying in every way 
possible to get that message across. And it was a positive point about 
which many Arabs can rally.
    And I'm not a student of religion, but I don't find anything in what 
the principal teachings of Islam that put us in contradiction at all. In 
fact, the principles are the same as what--we have a diverse religious 
culture. But it's kindness, it's be good to your neighbor, it's love, 
and it's take care of children. It's all these things that--so there's 
no anti-Islam. There is no anti-Arab. Our role is trying to be positive. 
And when it's said to me, ``The Arab world will turn against you,'' I 
never believed it for a minute. And I don't have any rancor when I see 
some. But if they assign motives to my country that are not correct, 
then I'm going to fight, stand up, and say, wait a minute, you're wrong. 
And we've got some healing to do, but we also have some convincing to 
do.
    Q. By the way, Mr. President, one of the relatives of the Egyptian 
soldiers was a Christian, and he arrived in Kuwait.
    The President. Yes.
    Q. And President Mubarak ordered a special flight to get him because 
all the Moslems were buried in Saudi Arabia. But he's a Christian, he 
was buried in Egypt, and President Mubarak sent up a private flight to 
get him back home.

Events Prior to the Conflict

    Q. Mr. President, what's the most difficult moment you've been 
through since the crisis?
    The President. Well, we had some difficult ones internally here. And 
one of them was our press was saying I had not convinced the American 
people that what we were doing as an administration was right. And 
Marlin was in on that, General Scowcroft, Bob Gates--we were all in that 
together.
    Mr. Scowcroft. And the Congress.
    The President. And then I'd say the Congress. It was argued I can't 
go to war without the Congress. And I was saying, I have

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the authority to do this. We had lawyers. But once Congress acted 
affirmatively, it became much clearer to the American people. And so, 
that moment as we were getting down to a congressional vote was a very 
big one.
    I don't think we ever had any real fundamental differences with the 
Arab world once we started--I mean, with the coalition.
    I'm probably forgetting something, but I can't remember exactly.
    Q. How about the Soviets?
    The President. The uncertainty of August. Well, the Soviets stayed 
with us at the U.N. And so, at the end, when they started saying here's 
a peace plan, we knew what we had to do. And I did not assign to them 
the motives that many of our countrymen did, that Gorbachev was playing 
mischief because he was being left out. I really think he wanted to stop 
short of more killing--well, I'm going to feel that way. Others disagree 
with me here. But I don't think it was ever a crisis because we knew 
what we had to do.
    Q. I see.
    The President. Now, if he'd have stood up and said, if you do that 
we're going to blast you, and we're going to lead the Third World in 
opposition--he could have done that.
    Q. Right.
    The President. And he didn't do that. So, it could have been a 
problem, but he conducted himself in that case very well. He tried for 
peace, what he thought was a fair peace, a peace within keeping of the 
U.N. resolution. I was telling him: ``No, it is not, President 
Gorbachev, it is not. Stops short; there are conditions. And we've come 
a long way; we can't accept conditions.''
    But it never got to be--I wouldn't say that one got to be--it had a 
potential of a stumbling block, but it didn't really get there. And then 
I guess the major, not bump in the road but decision on our part was, 
what happens when you commit your young people to war? How many are 
going to be killed? There was a picture in Life magazine, 50,000 graves 
dug. Argument in this country used against me, of us, was body bags. 
That's a horrible image to people across our country. You're going to 
put my son in a body bag to fight for a country halfway around the 
world? So, the actual commitment of force, whether it was first the air, 
then the ground, from the U.S. standpoint was an important decision.
    Again, we knew we had to do this. We've committed to do this. But 
the timing presented a problem and all of that. But on balance, though, 
it went, I think, fairly smoothly.
    Q. It's over.
    The President. It's over, thank God.

                    Note: The interview began at 10:18 a.m. in the Oval 
                        Office at the White House. The following 
                        journalists were participated: Nadir Yata of Al-
                        Bayan, Morocco; Said Sonbol of Al-Akhbar, Egypt; 
                        Mohammed Rumaihi of Sawt Al-Kuwait, Kuwait; and 
                        Othman Al-Omeir of Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Saudi 
                        Arabia.

    In the interview, the following persons were referred to: President 
Saddam Hussein of Iraq; Secretary of State James A. Baker III; President 
Mohammed Hosni Mubarak of Egypt; King Hussein I of Jordan; Yasser 
Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization; Abdullah Yacoub 
Bishara, Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council; Jamil Murad 
Baroody, former Saudi Ambassador to the United Nations; Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Ahmed Esmat Abdel Meguid of Egypt; Amir Jabir al-Ahmad 
al-Jabir al-Sabah of Kuwait; King Fahd bin `Abd al-`Aziz Al Sa`ud of 
Saudi Arabia; King Hassan II of Morocco; Marlin Fitzwater, Press 
Secretary to the President; Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs; and Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the 
President and Deputy for National Security Affairs.
    The interview was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on 
March 10. A tape was not available for verification of the content of 
the interview.