    [Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush (1991, Book I)]
    [March 16, 1991]
    [Pages 274-279]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]

    The President's News Conference With Prime Minister John Major of the
    United Kingdom in Hamilton, Bermuda
    March 16, 1991

        The Prime Minister. We might start now if everyone is content. We
    have very little time, I'm afraid, only about 15 or so minutes. So we'll
    be----

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        Q. I have a question, I have a question. [Laughter]
        The Prime Minister. Well, I'll see if I can flush you later.
        We have about 15 minutes, so we'll be as swift as we can. Can I just
    say by way of introduction, we've had some extremely useful discussions
    this morning covering a very wide area. I think they have come at a very
    appropriate time at the end of the Gulf conflict. There was a great deal
    to discuss, a great deal to learn from the conflict. And it also gave me
    the opportunity of expressing to the President the tremendous admiration
    that is felt in the United Kingdom and elsewhere for the remarkable way
    in which he led this particular enterprise.
        Amongst the matters we were able to discuss this morning were, of
    course, the aftermath of the Gulf, the general position of security in
    the Middle East, the present circumstances in the Soviet Union, the GATT
    rounds, the developing situation in South Africa, arms control, and an
    interim report on Secretary Baker's talks in the Soviet Union.
        So, it was a fairly wide agenda. But I won't elaborate on it now.
    I'll invite the President to say a few words, and then perhaps we can
    take your questions.
        The President. Mr. Prime Minister, all I want to do is thank you for
    the hospitality, thank the Governor General of Bermuda and, of course,
    the Premier, and say we've enjoyed it. And I agree with you that these
    talks are very, very helpful. And I think it's fair to say that we are
    determined now to go forward and each country try to be a catalyst for
    peace, building on our success in the Gulf.
        And so, thank you, sir, and I'm just delighted to be with you once
    again.
        The Prime Minister. Right. Shall we take some questions then? Can I
    take the lady in the second row?

    Situation in Iraq

        Q. Thank you. We just listened, Mr. President, to Saddam Hussein's
    speech, and he said the insurgency in the south had been crushed but
    continued in the north. And he also seemed to be issuing a very strong
    threat once again to the Kurds, saying that if they persisted they would
    be crushed like those who preceded them. Do you have any comment on
    that?
        The President. Crushed like those that preceded them?
        Q. Like those who preceded them. I think it was a reference--I don't
    want to put words in his mouth, but----
        The President. No, I have learned long ago not to comment on
    something that I haven't heard or haven't authoritatively read, but
    there is dissension inside Iraq. That is a matter that we're not
    involved in. And I would simply repeat that Saddam's credibility remains
    at an all-time low ebb as far as the United States is concerned.
        Q. I wonder if I could ask you both if you see any possible role for
    either British or American forces intervening militarily in Iraq?
        The President. I do not. We are not--that would be going beyond our
    mandate. Now, I will say this: that at the tent meeting, certain
    arrangements were made and certain ground rules spelled out--British and
    U.S. commanders agreeing, the Saudis, all the coalition forces, agreeing
    and telling Iraq certain things should not happen. The movement of
    aircraft, for example. And so, they should not violate the conditions
    that they agreed to.
        But having said that, none of us want to move forces into Baghdad or
    to--frankly, we don't want to have any more fighting. But they know what
    the ground rules are, and they ought to play by those rules, live by
    them.
        The Prime Minister. There's no more to be said. I think that's
    precisely it.
        Q. Mr. President, in that speech of Saddam Hussein, he also
    indicated that he was willing to set up some kind of multiparty system,
    even perhaps verging on democracy. What do you make of that kind of talk
    from Saddam Hussein? And also, would that be something that the United
    States could live with? Could Saddam Hussein stay in power in Baghdad
    under that kind of arrangement?
        The President. I find it very difficult to see a situation under
    which we would have normalized relations with Saddam Hussein

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    still in power. His credibility is zilch, zero, zed. And if he wants to
    talk about this, fine. But what people are looking for I think is
    compliance with--fully compliance of United Nations resolutions. It is
    complying with the cease-fire terms. And I don't know what this speech
    is about; I simply can't comment on it. But if he's proclaiming that
    Iraq will be a democratic nation, fine. But that's--I want to see--the
    proof of that pudding is in the eating.

    Soviet-U.S. Relations

        Q. Mr. President and Prime Minister: You mentioned the interim
    report from Secretary Baker on his talks yesterday. What conclusions do
    you draw about future relations with the Soviet Union in view of the
    apparent lack of progress on control, both CFE [conventional forces in
    Europe] and START?
        The Prime Minister. Well, insofar as CFE are concerned, Secretary
    Baker reaffirmed what I said to Mr. Gorbachev 2 days ago about the
    resubordination of a larger amount of Soviet military to the Navy. I
    think Mr. Gorbachev has taken the point. It's a matter he'll clearly
    have to look at. His military are a good deal more hard-line about that
    matter than I think he is, but I think he now understands the absolute
    imperative of sticking with the CFE agreement that he signed.
        On START, I think there's a general wish to proceed with the START
    talks again. We must hope that that proves to be possible. But we must
    make sure, in my judgment, that the CFE agreement itself is actually
    enacted before one can go too far on START.
        The President. I can't add to that because the Baker-Gorbachev
    meeting and Baker-Bessmertnykh meetings have tracked very much what the
    Prime Minister has just said came out of his meeting. So, the Soviet
    position has been--I think the Prime Minister expressed it very well,
    and Jim Baker made clear, as did the Prime Minister in his meetings,
    that the naval infantry question must be resolved and that we've got to
    go forward to CFE agreement as we all--along the lines that we thought
    we were entering into. So, I have no difference at all there.

    Sanctions Against Iraq

        Q. Mr. President and Mr. Prime Minister, what kinds of steps do you
    think Iraq needs to take in order for the economic sanctions to be
    lifted, and is the supervised destruction of their chemical weapons
    stockpile one of those steps that you think has to be taken?
        The Prime Minister. I certainly would like to see the supervised
    destruction of their chemical weapons. I think that is extremely
    important for future security in the Middle East. There are a raft of
    matters, most of which--all of which I think spring out of the Security
    Council resolutions of recent months that will need to be incorporated
    in the cease-fire proposals. There's a considerable amount we need to
    see. I think we do need to see, for example, the destruction of the
    chemical weapons; that's certainly the case.
        I think there's a good deal else we need to see. We need to make it
    absolutely clear, and it needs to be absolutely clear for the Iraqis,
    that they actually recognize the position that now exists in Kuwait and
    that that is going to be a permanent recognition. We need some
    assurances on that.
        I think we have to look at wider issues as well. We'll certainly
    have to look at the question of arms control in the area. That's a
    matter that will need to be developed, I think, very probably amongst
    the Permanent Five, though there are other mechanisms for doing it.
        The President. The only thing I could add to that, some arrangements
    for peacekeeping--perhaps a role for the United Nations, perhaps a role
    for an Arab force. But there's a lot of details that have to follow. But
    the Prime Minister clicked off the major concerns that we have, and I
    would say, sir, that our coalition is united on this.
        The Prime Minister. I think the two things, actually, one might
    actually add to that, of course, are the release of Kuwaiti detainees
    and perhaps some hypothecation of oil revenues in order to meet some of
    the loss and costs that have been incurred in Kuwait.

    European Security

        Q. There seems to be a growing discus-

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    sion in Europe about a defense unit for the security of Europeans. What
    I'm wondering is whether, Mr. Bush, you see this as an exclusion of the
    U.S. and how you feel that may affect NATO? Because that's been its
    traditional role. And Mr. Prime Minister, what's your thoughts on it?
        The President. I'll be glad to start by saying certainly in the
    conversation that we had today there is no differences in terms of where
    the U.K. and the United States stand. I mean, I don't think the United
    Kingdom is foreseeing the pulling out from our responsibilities for
    security by the United States. So, I had discussions of this with
    President Mitterrand, and there have been some nuances of difference,
    perhaps--not necessarily between the French and the United States but
    between some in Europe and the United States--and I think that they're
    manageable differences.
        The United States has a key role. We think that we've performed that
    role adequately in the past, and we have every intention of fulfilling
    what is in our national security interest in the future. And I think the
    presence where we continue to have a strong NATO, for example, is in our
    interest.
        After all, though tensions are lessened, there still are a lot of
    question marks out there. But I can say in terms of my discussions with
    the Prime Minister, I don't think we have differences on this point, but
    I'll leave it to him.
        The Prime Minister. There are absolutely no differences at all. NATO
    has very successfully kept the peace in Europe since the Second World
    War. It has been the cornerstone of the peace, and the American presence
    in NATO and the presence of their troops in Europe has been absolutely
    fundamental to the security of Europe. So, we certainly would wish to
    see absolutely nothing that would damage that.
        I think what some of the Europeans are concerned about--and I think
    they're right to be concerned about that--is the fact that Europe will
    need to make a greater proportionate contribution to the communal
    defense of Europe. But I think that is a contribution that will have to
    be channeled through NATO. And there's no difference whatsoever between
    the United States and Britain on that point.

    Situation in Iraq

        Q. Both of you said you don't want to see any more fighting in Iraq.
    I'm wondering, how do you intend to enforce the terms of the tent
    agreement? Would that be just another thing under the umbrella of
    lifting economic sanctions, or do you have something else in mind?
        The Prime Minister. I don't think we want to go into detail about
    that. We've made it fairly clear to the Iraqis what we expect them to
    do. I think we must wait for them to do it. It's our expectation that
    they both would and should.
        Q. Are you ruling out military action?
        The President. We're not ruling anything in or out. But we're making
    clear--as General Schwarzkopf did, I think, just yesterday--that they
    must abide by agreements made, and there are many agreements in the
    future that we haven't ironed out, many provisions in the future that we
    expect Iraq will comply with--the Prime Minister having set out a very
    good litany right here. So, we're not trying to elevate the chance of
    further military action. When we said cease-fire, we ceased firing, and
    we want to see that formalized. And that's what we're approaching. And I
    won't go into any hypothesis on that.

    British-U.S. Role in the Middle East

        Q. The President spoke about the role for Britain and the United
    States as catalysts for peace. How do you see the two separate roles? Is
    there a specific role for Britain and not a specific role for the United
    States?
        The President. No, I don't look at it that way, but we have separate
    initiatives. For example, the Prime Minister went over and, amongst his
    talks in the Middle East itself, he began exploring avenues for peace.
    Secretary Baker is doing that now on a trip that he took, and ending
    up--now I guess he's on his way to Turkey.
        At each step of the way, each of us will be exploring, and then
    we'll have talks like this. There's going to be probably some United
    Nations role to play. There's going to be bilateral relations between
    ourselves--I'm speaking now for the United

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    States and the State of Israel. We have communications now and contacts
    with Syria. I happen to think that that can be catalytic for peace. So,
    we're not talking about an assignment to the United States to do A, B,
    and C, and for the U.K. to do what follows on--X, Y, and Z--or vice
    versa. And we had talks with Mr. Mitterrand about this.
        So, what we are trying to do is say, look, we now have a renewed
    Western credibility--certainly coalition force credibility. And let's
    use that to try to bring peace to Lebanon, try to bring peace to the
    Israel-Palestine area, the West Bank, et cetera, and try to bring peace
    and security and stability to the Gulf. And there isn't one formula yet,
    and I don't think there will be a single formula until a lot more
    consultation has taken place.
        Some have suggested the instant convening of an international
    conference. The policy of the United States has been, a conference at an
    appropriate time might be useful. That's been our policy for the last 11
    years. But we are not going to urge that at this point until we see that
    it would be productive.
        You don't want to have a conference and some people fail to show up,
    if presence there at the conference is an absolute sine qua non for
    success. So, we're going to just keep talking, keep consulting, but not
    tarry. I do think that we ought to seize the moment. And I know that's
    the goal of the United States, and I gather after these thorough
    consultations this morning that that is the view of the U.K.

    Soviet Role in the Middle East

        Q. Mr. President, you speak of the coalition force credibility. The
    Soviets are not part of that coalition. Secretary Baker met with the
    Soviets in the last couple of days. You two have discussed the Soviet
    role in the new Middle East. What is a valid role for the Soviets now,
    as not being a member of that coalition? Is it just a member of the
    United Nations? How far do we go with it?
        The President. Remember--you appropriately pointed on the United
    Nations. The Soviet Union's state remains solidly with the United
    Kingdom, the United States, and others in the United Nations. Had that
    not been the case, obviously the United Nations would not have had the
    positive role that it had. I gather from just the preliminary report--
    not talking to him but a preliminary report--that Mr. Zoellick passed
    along to me and to the Prime Minister that Jim Baker felt that, after
    talks with Gorbachev and Bessmertnykh, that the Soviets wanted to still
    play a constructive role.
        They have interests in the Middle East. We don't view this as
    something that's against us. And so, true, they were not in the
    coalition in the sense of having forces, but they worked very
    cooperatively with us at the United Nations and inasmuch as there's
    going to be some--there should probably be some U.N. role, perhaps the
    blue helmets along some peacekeeping line, we want to continue to work
    with the Soviets. We want to continue to keep that cooperation.
        So, I don't think their failure to have troops on the ground in the
    Middle East--which we didn't ask them to do, incidentally--is a
    detriment to their playing a useful role for peace. They know a lot of
    the cast of characters there. I'd love to see them improve relations
    with the State of Israel. I think if they did that, that could be a very
    important point in how this peace is brought about.
        So, I see them, after the Baker talks--and again, I'd defer to the
    Prime Minister who did have his own talks with Mr. Gorbachev on that--
    but I see them as still wanting to play a constructive--not obstruction
    but constructive role with whatever follows on.
        The Prime Minister. I can certainly confirm that. In the discussions
    I had with Mr. Gorbachev less than a fortnight ago, he made that
    perfectly clear in perfectly clear terms that he wished to play a
    constructive role in an ongoing settlement in the Middle East. And I see
    no reason to doubt his bona fideness in that respect.

    Withdrawal of British Forces From Iraq

        Q. Prime Minister, if a formal cease-fire cannot be arranged until
    Saddam stops deploying his remaining forces, what does that mean for the
    timetable for the return of British forces back to the U.K.? And if
    American forces do become involved, would British forces become involved
    as

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    well?
        The Prime Minister. There are too many premises there that may not
    come about, to be precise. I don't know precisely when we'll have a
    cease-fire. We're looking at the moment at what a cease-fire resolution
    might contain, and it may be quite a substantial resolution; there's
    quite a lot to get in it. And I don't think we can address those
    secondary questions until we have that resolution. It may be that we'll
    have one broadly ready to begin presenting at the end of next week, but
    I think there can be no certainty about that.
        At the moment, the return of British troops continues. We had
    Security Council resolutions to meet when we sent the troops there.
    Those Security Council resolutions have been met, and the troops are now
    returning home. But I think the other premises you raise can't be
    answered at this stage.
        I think that is the last question we can take, I'm afraid. The
    British element of the press corps may be interested to know that
    England beat France 21-19. [Laughter]
        Thank you very much.

    U.S. Hostages in Lebanon

        Q. Mr. President, can you take a question on Terry Anderson, sir?
    Today starts his 7th year in captivity. What message would you send to
    him?
        The President. We're raising it every chance we get, and will
    continue to.

                        Note: The President's 75th news conference began at
                            12:17 p.m. at Government House. The following
                            persons were referred to in the news conference:
                            Secretary of State James A. Baker III; Gov.
                            Desmond Langley and Premier John W.D. Swan of
                            Bermuda; President Saddam Hussein of Iraq;
                            President Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister
                            Aleksandr Bessmertnykh of the Soviet Union;
                            President Francois Mitterrand of France; Gen. H.
                            Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the U.S. forces
                            in the Persian Gulf; Robert B. Zoellick,
                            Counselor of the Department of State; and
                            hostage Terry Anderson, who was kidnaped in
                            Beirut, Lebanon, on March 16, 1985.