    [Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 119th Congress]
    [119th Congress]
    [House Document 118-187]
    [Jeffersons Manual of ParliamentaryPractice]
    [Pages 182-208]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

                           sec. xvii--order in debate

    Sec. 353. Decorum of Members as to sitting in their
    places.

        When the Speaker is seated in his chair, every member is to
    sit in his place. Scob., 6; Grey, 403.

      In the House the decorum of Members is regulated by rule XVII; and
    this provision of the parliamentary law is practically obsolete.

    Sec. 354. Procedure of the Member in seeking
    recognition.

      When  any Member means to speak, he is to stand up in his
    place, uncovered, and to address himself, not to the House, or any
    particular Member, but to the Speaker, who calls him by his name, that
    the House may take notice who it is that speaks. Scob., 6; D'Ewes, 487,
    col. 1; 2 Hats., 77; 4 Grey, 66; 8 Grey, 108. But Members who are
    indisposed may be indulged to speak sitting. 2 Hats., 75, 77; 1 Grey,
    143.

      This provision has been superseded by clause 1 of rule XVII, which was
    amended in the 115th Congress to remove a requirement that a Member rise
    to seek recognition (sec. 2(e), H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 2017, p. 37). As long
    ago as 1832, at least, Members were not required to seek recognition
    from their own particular seats (V, 4979, footnote), and seats are no
    longer assigned. In addition, the Speaker calls the Member, not by name,
    but as ``the gentleman or gentlewoman from __,'' (naming the State).

    Sec. 355. Conditions under which a Member's right to the
    floor is subjected to the will of the House.

        When a Member stands up
    to speak, no question is to be put, but he is to be heard unless the
    House overrule him. 4 Grey, 390; 5 Grey, 6, 143.

      Except as provided in clause 4 of rule XVII, no question is put as to
    the right of a Member to the floor.

    [[Page 183]]

    But sometimes the House does not acquiesce in the Speaker's decision, in
    which case the question is put, ``which Member was first up?'' 2 Hats.,
    76; Scob., 7; D'Ewes, 434, col. 1, 2.

    Sec. 356. The parliamentary law as to recognition by the
    Speaker.

      If  two or more rise to speak nearly together, the Speaker
    determines who was first up, and calls him by name, whereupon he
    proceeds, unless he voluntarily sits down and gives way to the other.

      In the Senate of the United States the President's decision is without
    appeal.

      In the House recognition by the Chair is governed by clause 2 of rule
    XVII and the practice thereunder. There has been no appeal from a
    decision by the Speaker on a question of recognition since 1881, on
    which occasion Speaker Randall stated that the power of recognition is
    ``just as absolute in the Chair as the judgment of the Supreme Court of
    the United States is absolute as to the interpretation of the law'' (II,
    1425-1428), and in the later practice no appeal is permitted (VIII,
    2429, 2646, 2762).

    Sec. 357. Right of the Member to be heard a second
    time.

      No  man may speak more than once on the same bill on the same day;
    or even on another day, if the debate be adjourned. But if it be read
    more than once in the same day, he may speak once at every reading. Co.,
    12, 115; Hakew., 148; Scob., 58; 2 Hats., 75. Even a change of opinion
    does not give a right to be heard a second time. Smyth's Comw. L., 2, c.
    3; Arcan, Parl., 17.

      But he may be permitted to speak again to clear a matter of fact, 3
    Grey, 357, 416; or merely to explain himself, 2 Hats., 73, in some
    material part of his speech, Ib., 75; or to the manner or words of the
    question, keeping himself to that only, and not traveling into the
    merits of it, Memorials in Hakew., 29; or to the orders of the House, if
    they be transgressed, keeping within that line, and not falling into the
    matter itself. Mem. Hakew., 30, 31.

    [[Page 184]]

    p. 4497; Oct. 18, 2007, p. 27575). In ordinary practice rule XVII is not
    rigidly enforced, and Members find little difficulty in making such
    explanations as are contemplated by the parliamentary law. See
    Sec. Sec. 959, 981, infra.

      The House has modified the parliamentary law as to a Member's right to
    speak a second time by clause 3 of rule XVII and by permitting a Member
    controlling time in debate to yield to another more than once (Apr. 5,
    2000,

    Sec. 358. Participation of the Speaker in debate.

      But  if the
    Speaker rise to speak, the Member standing up ought to sit down, that he
    may be first heard. Town., col. 205; Hale Parl., 133; Mem. in Hakew.,
    30, 31. Nevertheless, though the Speaker may of right speak to matters
    of order, and be first heard, he is restrained from speaking on any
    other subject, except where the House have occasion for facts within his
    knowledge; then he may, with their leave, state the matter of fact. 3
    Grey, 38.

      This provision is usually observed in the practice of the House only
    with regard to the conduct of the Speaker when in the chair. In several
    instances the Speaker has been permitted by the House to make a
    statement from the chair, as in a case wherein his past conduct had been
    criticized (II, 1369), in a case wherein there had been unusual
    occurrences in the joint session to count the electoral vote (II, 1372;
    Jan. 6, 2021, p. _), and in a matter relating to a contest for the seat
    of the Speaker as a Member (II, 1360). In rare instances the Speaker has
    made brief explanations from the chair without asking the assent of the
    House (II, 1373, 1374). Speakers have called others to the chair and
    participated in debate, usually without asking consent of the House (II,
    1360, 1367, footnote, 1368, 1371; III, 1950), and in one case a Speaker
    on the floor debated a point of order that the Speaker pro tempore was
    to decide (V, 6097). In rare instances Speakers have left the chair to
    make motions on the floor (II, 1367, footnote). Speakers may participate
    in debate in the Committee of the Whole, although the privilege was
    rarely exercised in early practice (II, 1367, footnote).

    Sec. 359. Impertinent, superfluous, or tedious
    speaking.

      No  one is to speak impertinently or beside the question,
    superfluous, or tediously. Scob., 31, 33; 2 Hats., 166, 168; Hale Parl.,
    133.

    [[Page 185]]

      The House, by clause 1 of rule XVII, provides that remarks must be
    confined to the question under debate, but neither by rule nor practice
    has the House suppressed superfluous or tedious speaking, its hour rule
    (clause 2 of rule XVII) being a sufficient safeguard in this respect.

    Sec. 360. Language reflecting on the House.

      No  person is to
    use indecent language against the proceedings of the House; no prior
    determination of which is to be reflected on by any Member, unless he
    means to conclude with a motion to rescind it. 2 Hats., 169, 170;
    Rushw., p. 3, v. 1, fol. 42. But while a proposition under consideration
    is still in fieri, though it has even been reported by a committee,
    reflections on it are no reflections on the House. 9 Grey, 508.

      In the practice of the House it has been held out of order in debate
    to cast reflections on either the House or its membership or its
    decisions, whether present or past (V, 5132-5138). A Member who had used
    offensive words against the character of the House, and who declined to
    explain, was censured (II, 1247). Words impeaching the loyalty of a
    portion of the membership have also been ruled out (V, 5139). Where a
    Member reiterated on the floor certain published charges against the
    House, action was taken, although other business had intervened, the
    question being considered one of privilege (III, 2637). It has been held
    inappropriate and not in order in debate to refer to the proceedings of
    a committee except such as have been formally reported to the House (V,
    5080-5083; VIII, 2269, 2485-2493; June 24, 1958, pp. 12120, 12122), but
    this rule does not apply to the proceedings of a committee of a previous
    Congress (Feb. 2, 1914, p. 2782), and the rationale for this limitation
    on debate is in part obsolete under the modern practice of the House
    insofar as the doctrine is applied to open committee meetings and
    hearings.

    [[Page 186]]

    Sec. 361. Personalities in debate forbidden.

      No  person, in
    speaking, is to mention a Member then present by his name, but to
    describe him by his seat in the House, or who spoke last, or on the
    other side of the question, &c., Mem. in Hakew., 3; Smyth's Comw., L. 2,
    c. 3; nor to digress from the matter to fall upon the person, Scob., 31;
    Hale Parl., 133; 2 Hats., 166, by speaking reviling, nipping, or
    unmannerly words against a particular Member. Smyth's Comw., L. 2, c. 3.
    * * *

      In the practice of the House, a Member is not permitted to refer to
    another Member by name (V, 5144; VIII, 2526, 2529, 2536), or to address
    a Member in the second person (V, 5140-5143; VI, 600; VIII, 2529;
    Speaker Boehner, Jan. 23, 2012, p. 180; Speaker Boehner, Feb. 26, 2013,
    p. 1680; Speaker Boehner, Mar. 25, 2014, p. 4783; Speaker Boehner, Feb.
    25, 2015, p. 2554; Speaker Ryan, June 23, 2017, p. 9794). The proper
    reference to another Member is ``the gentleman or gentlewoman from __,''
    (naming the Member's State) (June 14, 1978, p. 17615; July 21, 1982, p.
    17314). A mere reference to a Member's voting record does not form a
    basis for a point of order against those remarks (June 13, 2002, p.
    10226, p. 10232).

      By rule of the House (clause 1 of rule XVII), as well as by
    parliamentary law, personalities are forbidden (V, 4979, 5145, 5163,
    5169), whether against the Member in the Member's capacity as
    Representative or otherwise (V, 5152, 5153), even if the references may
    be relevant to the pending question (Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25778). The
    House has censured a Member for gross personalities (II, 1251). The
    Chair may intervene to prevent improper references if it is evident that
    a particular Member is being described (Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27077).

      The Chair does not rule on the veracity of a statement made by a
    Member in debate (Apr. 9, 1997, p. 4926; Sept. 26, 2008, p. 22085).
    Although accusing another Member of deceit engages in personality,
    merely accusing another Member of making a mistake does not (V, 5157;
    Oct. 26, 2000, p. 24921).

      Clause 1 of rule XVII has been held to proscribe: (1) referring to an
    identifiable group of sitting Members as having committed a crime (e.g.,
    stealing an election or obstructing justice) (Feb. 27, 1985, p. 3898;
    Speaker Wright, Mar. 21, 1989, p. 5016; May 19, 1998, p. 9738; July 15,
    2004, p. 15859); (2) referring in a personally critical manner to the
    political tactics of the Speaker or other Members (June 25, 1981, p.
    14056); (3) referring to a particular Member of the House in a
    derogatory fashion (Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27077); (4) characterizing a Member
    as ``the most impolite Member'' (June 27, 1996, p. 15915) or ``mean-
    spirited'' (May 13, 1992, p. 11235); (5) questioning the integrity of a
    Member (July 25, 1996, p. 19170); (6) denouncing the spirit in which a
    Member had spoken (V, 6981); (7) using a Member's surname as though an
    adjective for a word of ridicule (June 13, 2002, p. 10232; May 13, 2008,
    p. 8923); (8) questioning the decency of another Member (Mar. 21, 2007,
    p. 7074); (9) labeling the remarks of a Member ``hypocritical and
    dishonest'' (Mar. 7, 2012, p. 3045); (9) referring to a Member as anti-
    Semitic or suggesting affiliation with a terrorist organization (Dec.
    14, 2021, p. _).

    [[Page 187]]

    June 13, 1996, p. 14043; July 16, 2008, p. 15273). For example,
    references to ``down-in-the-dirt gutter politics'' and ``you people are
    going to pay'' were held not to be personal references (Nov. 14, 1995,
    p. 32388). Similarly, characterizing a pending measure as a ``patently
    petty political terrorist tactic'' was held in order as a reference to
    the pending measure rather than to the motive or character of the
    measure's proponent (Nov. 9, 1995, p. 31413). The Chair also has held in
    order a general reference that ``big donors'' receive ``access to
    leadership power and decisions'' because the reference did not identify
    a specific Member as engaging in an improper quid pro quo (Apr. 9, 1997,
    p. 4926). A general statement seeming to invoke racial stereotypes but
    not in a context so inflammatory as to constitute a breach of decorum,
    was held not unparliamentary (Apr. 9, 2003, p. 9005 (sustained by
    tabling of appeal)). Likewise, a general statement linking politics with
    armed conflict in an impersonal way was held not to breach decorum (Oct.
    18, 2007, p. 27578).
      A distinction has been drawn between general language, which
    characterizes a measure or the political motivations behind a measure,
    and personalities (V, 5153, 5163, 5169). Although remarks in debate may
    not include personal attacks against a Member or an identifiable group
    of Members, they may address political motivations for legislative
    positions (Jan. 24, 1995, p. 2214; Mar. 8, 1995, pp. 7307, 7308; Nov.
    17, 1995, p. 33832;

      A Member may not read in debate extraneous material critical of
    another Member that would be improper if spoken in the Member's own
    words (May 25, 1995, pp. 14436, 14437; Sept. 12, 1996, p. 22898). Thus,
    words in a telegram read in debate that repudiated the ``lies and half-
    truths'' of a House committee report were ruled out of order as
    reflecting on the integrity of committee members (June 16, 1947, p.
    7065), and unparliamentary references in debate to newspaper accounts
    used in support of a Member's personal criticism of another Member were
    similarly ruled out of order (Feb. 25, 1985, p. 3346).

      A Member should refrain from references in debate to the official
    conduct of a Member if such conduct is not the subject then pending
    before the House by way of either a report of the Committee on Ethics or
    another question of the privileges of the House (see, e.g., July 24,
    1990, p. 18917; Mar. 19, 1992, p. 6078; May 25, 1995, pp. 14434-37;
    Sept. 19, 1995, pp. 25454, 25455; Apr. 27, 2005, p. 8049); and, although
    such references are ordinarily enforced by the Chair in response to a
    point of order, the Chair may take the initiative in order to maintain
    proper decorum (Apr. 1, 1992, p. 7899; June 17, 2004, p. 12748). This
    stricture also precludes a Member from reciting news articles discussing
    a Member's conduct (Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24318), reciting the content of a
    previously tabled resolution raising a question of the privileges of the
    House (Nov. 17, 1995, p. 33853; Sept. 19, 1996, p. 23855), or even
    referring to a Member's conduct by mere insinuation (Sept. 12, 1996, p.
    22899). Notice of an intention to offer a resolution as a question of
    the privileges of the House under rule IX does not render a resolution
    ``pending'' and thereby permit references to conduct of a Member
    proposed to be addressed therein (Sept. 19, 1996, p. 23811).

    [[Page 188]]

    conduct of a former Member, provided the reference is not made in an
    attempt to compare the conduct of a former Member with the conduct of a
    sitting Member (Sept. 20, 1995, pp. 25825, 25826; Sept. 12, 1996, pp.
    22900, 22901).
      The stricture against references to a Member's conduct not then
    pending before the House applies to the conduct of all sitting Members
    (Apr. 1, 1992, p. 7899), including conduct that has previously been
    resolved by the Committee on Ethics or the House (Sept. 24, 1996, pp.
    24483, 24485; Precedents (Wickham), ch. 6, Sec. 6.7). This stricture
    does not apply to the

      Debate on a pending privileged resolution recommending disciplinary
    action against a Member may necessarily involve personalities. However,
    clause 1 of rule XVII still prohibits the use of language that is
    personally abusive (see, e.g., July 31, 1979, p. 21584; Jan. 21, 1997,
    p. 393) and the Chair may take the initiative to prevent violations of
    the rule (July 24, 2002, p. 14300). Furthermore, during the actual
    pendency of such a resolution, a Member may discuss a prior case
    reported to the House by the Committee on Ethics for the purpose of
    comparing the severity of the sanction recommended in that case with the
    severity of the sanction recommended in the pending case, provided that
    the Member does not identify, or discuss the details of the past conduct
    of, a sitting Member (Dec. 18, 1987, p. 36271).

      In addition to the prohibition against addressing a Member's conduct
    when it is not actually pending before the House, the Speaker has
    advised that Members should refrain from references in debate (1) to the
    motivations of a Member who filed a complaint before the Committee on
    Standards of Official Conduct (now Ethics) (June 15, 1988, p. 14623;
    July 6, 1988, p. 16630; Mar. 22, 1989, p. 5130; May 2, 1989, p. 7735;
    Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27077); (2) to personal criticism of a member of the
    committee (Apr. 1, 1992, p. 7899; Mar. 3, 1995, p. 6715; Sept. 19, 1996,
    p. 23812; Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24317); (3) to an investigation undertaken
    by the committee, including suggestion of a course of action (Mar. 3,
    1995, p. 6715; Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24317; Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25778) or
    advocacy of an interim status report by the committee (Sept. 12, 1996,
    p. 22900; Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25778).

      For precedents applicable to references in debate to the President,
    see Sec. 370, infra, or Members of the Senate, see Sec. 371, infra.

    [[Page 189]]

    to persons who would desecrate the flag (June 20, 1990, p. 14877), to
    refer to him as a ``crybaby'' (Nov. 16, 1995, p. 33394), or to refer to
    official conduct of the Speaker that has previously been resolved by the
    Committee on Standards of Official Conduct (now Ethics) or the House
    (Precedents (Wickham), ch. 6, Sec. 6.7). The Chair may take the
    initiative to admonish Members for references in debate that disparage
    the Speaker (June 25, 1981, p. 14056; Mar. 22, 1996, p. 6077; May 13,
    2008, p. 8923). Debate on a resolution authorizing the Speaker to
    entertain motions to suspend the rules may not engage in personality by
    discussing the official conduct of the Speaker, even if possibly
    relevant to the question of empowerment of the Speaker (Sept. 24, 1996,
    p. 24485).

    Sec. 362. Criticism of the Speaker.

      Complaint  of the conduct
    of the Speaker should be presented directly for the action of the House
    and not by way of debate on other matters (V, 5188). In a case wherein a
    Member used words insulting to the Speaker the House on a subsequent
    day, and after other business had intervened, censured the offender (II,
    1248). In such a case the Speaker would ordinarily leave the chair while
    action should be taken by the House (II, 1366; V, 5188; VI, 565). In the
    104th Congress the Chair reaffirmed that it is not in order to speak
    disrespectfully of the Speaker, and that under the precedents the
    sanctions for such violations transcend the ordinary requirements for
    timeliness of challenges (II, 1248; Jan. 4, 1995, p. 552; Jan. 19, 1995,
    p. 1599). It is not in order to arraign the personal conduct of the
    Speaker (Precedents (Wickham), ch. 6, Sec. 6.6; Jan. 19, 1995, p. 1601).
    For example, it is not in order to charge dishonesty or disregard of the
    rules (July 11, 1985, p. 18550), to reflect on his patriotism by
    accusing him of ``kowtowing''

    Sec. 363. Motives of Members not to be arraigned.

      * * *  The
    consequences of a measure may be reprobated in strong terms; but to
    arraign the motives of those who propose to advocate it is a
    personality, and against order. Qui digreditur a materia ad personam,
    Mr. Speaker ought to suppress. Ord. Com., 1604, Apr. 19.

    [[Page 190]]

      The arraignment of the motives of Members is not permitted (V, 5147-
    51; Dec. 13, 1973, p. 41270), and Speakers have intervened to prevent
    it, in the earlier practice preventing even mildest imputations (V,
    5161, 5162). However, remarks in debate may address political, but not
    personal, motivations for legislative positions (Jan. 24, 1995, p. 2214;
    Mar. 8, 1995, pp. 7307, 7308; Nov. 17, 1995, p. 33832; June 13, 1996, p.
    14043) or for committee membership (July 10, 1995, pp. 18257-59).
    Accusing another Member of hypocrisy has been held not in order (July
    24, 1979, p. 20380; Mar. 29, 1995, p. 9675; Mar. 7, 2012, p. 3045), and
    characterizing the motivation of a Member in offering an amendment as
    deceptive and hypocritical was ruled out of order (June 12, 1979, p.
    14461). A statement in debate that an amendment could only be demagogic
    or racist because only demagoguery or racism impelled such an amendment
    was ruled out of order as impugning the motives of the Member offering
    the amendment (Dec. 13, 1973, pp. 41270, 41271). However, debate
    characterizing a pending measure as a ``patently petty political
    terrorist tactic'' was held in order as directed at the pending measure
    rather than the motive or the character of its proponent (Nov. 9, 1995,
    p. 31913). Although in debate the assertion of one Member may be
    declared untrue by another, in so doing an intentional misrepresentation
    must not be implied (V, 5157-5160), and if stated or implied is
    censurable (II, 1305). A Member in debate having declared the words of
    another ``a base lie,'' censure was inflicted by the House on the
    offender (II, 1249).

    Sec. 364. Disorder and interruptions during debate.

      No  one
    is to disturb another in his speech by hissing, coughing, spitting, 6
    Grey, 322; Scob., 8; D'Ewes, 332, col. 1, 640, col. 2, speaking or
    whispering to another, Scob., 6; D'Ewes, 487, col. 1; nor stand up to
    interrupt him, Town, col. 205; Mem. in Hakew., 31; nor to pass between
    the Speaker and the speaking Member, nor to go across the House, Scob.,
    6, or to walk up and down it, or to take books or papers from the table,
    or write there, 2 Hats., 171, p. 170.

    [[Page 191]]

    dents (Wickham), ch. 6, Sec. 6.1) or may order that the well be cleared
    (Speaker McCormack, Dec. 9, 1963, p. 23831). For further discussion of
    interruptions in debate, see Sec. 946, infra.

      The House has, by clause 5 of rule XVII, prescribed certain rules of
    decorum differing somewhat from this provision of the parliamentary law,
    but supplemental to it rather than antagonistic. In one respect,
    however, the practice of the House differs from the apparent intent of
    the parliamentary law. In the House a Member may interrupt by addressing
    the Chair for permission of the Member speaking (V, 5006; VIII, 2465);
    but it is entirely within the discretion of the Member occupying the
    floor to determine when and by whom to be interrupted (V, 5007, 5008;
    VIII, 2463, 2465). There is no rule of the House requiring a Member
    having the floor to yield to another Member referred to during debate
    (Aug. 2, 1984, p. 22241). A Member may ask another to yield from any
    microphone in the Chamber, including those in the well, so long as not
    crossing between the Member having the floor and the Chair (June 5,
    1998, p. 11170). The Chair may take the initiative in preserving order
    when a Member declining to yield in debate continues to be interrupted
    by another Member, may order that the interrupting Member's remarks not
    appear in the Record (Precedents (Wickham), ch. 5, Sec. 22.24), and may
    admonish Members not to converse with a Member attempting to address the
    House (Feb. 21, 1984, p. 2758), because it is not in order to engage in
    disruption while another is delivering remarks in debate (June 27, 1996,
    p. 15915). On the opening day of the 103d Congress, during the customary
    announcement of policies with respect to particular aspects of the
    legislative process, the Chair elaborated on the rules of order in
    debate with a general statement concerning decorum in the House (Jan. 5,
    1993, p. 105). Under this provision, the Chair may require a line of
    Members waiting to sign a discharge petition to proceed to the rostrum
    from the far right-hand aisle and require the line not to form between
    the Chair and Members engaging in debate (Oct. 24, 1997, p. 23293).
    Hissing and jeering is not proper decorum in the House (May 21, 1998, p.
    10282). In the event of disorder in the well, the Chair may ask Members
    to uphold the dignity and decorum of the House so that business can be
    conducted in an orderly fashion (Speaker Ryan, Prece

    Sec. 365. Parliamentary method of silencing a
    tedious Member.

      Nevertheless,  if a Member finds that it is not the inclination of
    the House to hear him, and that by conversation or any other noise they
    endeavor to drown his voice, it is his most prudent way to submit to the
    pleasure of the House, and sit down; for it scarcely ever happens that
    they are guilty of this piece of ill manners without sufficient reason,
    or inattention to a Member who says anything worth their hearing. 2
    Hats., 77, 78.

      In the House, where the previous question and hour rule of debate have
    been used for many years, the parliamentary method of suppressing a
    tedious Member has never been imported into the practice (V, 5445).

    Sec. 366. The parliamentary law as to naming a disorderly
    Member.

      If  repeated calls do not produce order, the Speaker may call by
    his name any Member obstinately persisting in irregularity; whereupon
    the House may require the Member to withdraw. He is then to be heard in
    exculpation, and to withdraw. Then the Speaker states the offense
    committed; and the House considers the degree of punishment they will
    inflict. 2 Hats., 167, 7, 8, 172.

    [[Page 192]]

      This provision of parliamentary law should be read in conjunction with
    clause 4 of rule XVII, Sec. Sec. 960-961, infra, particularly as this
    provision relates to the ultimate authority of the House to determine
    whether a Member ignoring repeated calls to order should be permitted to
    proceed in order.

    Sec. 367. Proceedings in cases of assaults and
    affrays.

      For  instances of assaults and affrays in the House of Commons,
    and the proceedings thereon, see 1 Pet. Misc., 82; 3 Grey, 128; 4 Grey,
    328; 5 Grey, 382; 6 Grey, 254; 10 Grey, 8. Whenever warm words or an
    assault have passed between Members, the House, for the protection of
    their Members, requires them to declare in their places not to prosecute
    any quarrel, 3 Grey, 128, 293; 5 Grey, 280; or orders them to attend the
    Speaker, who is to accommodate their differences, and report to the
    House, 3 Grey, 419; and they are put under restraint if they refuse, or
    until they do. 9 Grey, 234, 312.

      In several instances assaults and affrays have occurred on the floor
    of the House. Sometimes the House has allowed these affairs to pass
    without notice, the Members concerned making apologies either personally
    or through other Members (II, 1658-1662). In other cases the House has
    exacted apologies (II, 1646-1651, 1657), or required the offending
    Members to pledge themselves before the House to keep the peace (II,
    1643). In case of an aggravated assault by one Member on another on the
    portico of the Capitol for words spoken in debate, the House censured
    the assailant and three other Members who had been present, armed, to
    prevent interference (II, 1655, 1656). Assaults or affrays in the
    Committee of the Whole are dealt with by the House (II, 1648-1651).

    [[Page 193]]

    by the objecting Member. They are then a part of his minutes, and when
    read to the offending Member, he may deny they were his words, and the
    House must then decide by a question whether they are his words or not.
    Then the Member may justify them, or explain the sense in which he used
    them, or apologize. If the House is satisfied, no further proceeding is
    necessary. But if two Members still insist to take the sense of the
    House, the Member must withdraw before that question is stated, and then
    the sense of the House is to be taken. 2 Hats., 199; 4 Grey, 170; 6
    Grey, 59. When any Member has spoken, or other business intervened,
    after offensive words spoken, they can not be taken notice of for
    censure. And this is for the common security of all, and to prevent
    mistakes which must happen if words are not taken down immediately.
    Formerly they might be taken down at any time the same day. 2 Hats.,
    196; Mem. in Hakew., 71; 3 Grey, 48; 9 Grey, 514.

    Sec. 368. Parliamentary law as to taking down
    disorderly words.

      Disorderly  words are not to be noticed till the Member has
    finished his speech. 5 Grey, 356; 6 Grey, 60. Then the person objecting
    to them, and desiring them to be taken down by the Clerk at the table,
    must repeat them. The Speaker then may direct the Clerk to take them
    down in his minutes; but if he thinks them not disorderly, he delays the
    direction. If the call becomes pretty general, he orders the Clerk to
    take them down, as stated

      The House has, by clause 4 of rule XVII, provided a method of
    procedure in cases of disorderly words. The House permits and requires
    them to be noticed as soon as uttered, and has not insisted that the
    offending Member withdraw while the House is deciding as to its course
    of action.

    Sec. 369. Disorderly words taken down and reported
    from Committee of the Whole.

      Disorderly  words spoken in a committee must be
    written down as in the House; but the committee can only report them to
    the House for animadversion. 6 Grey, 46.

    [[Page 194]]

    House has censured a Member for disorderly words spoken in the Committee
    of the Whole and reported therefrom (II, 1259).

      This provision of the parliamentary law has been applied to the
    Committee of the Whole, rather than to select or standing committees,
    which are separately empowered to enforce rules of decorum (clause 1(a)
    of rule XI, which incorporates the provisions of rule XVII where
    applicable). The

    Sec. 370. References in debate to the
    Executive.

      In  Parliament, to speak irreverently or seditiously against
    the King is against order. Smyth's Comw., L. 2, c. 3; 2 Hats., 170.

      This provision of the parliamentary law is manifestly inapplicable to
    the House (V, 5086); and it has been held in order in debate to refer to
    the President of the United States or his opinions, either with approval
    or criticism, provided that such reference be relevant to the subject
    under discussion and otherwise conformable to the Rules of the House (V,
    5087-5091; VIII, 2500). Under this standard the following references are
    in order: (1) a reference to the probable action of the President (V,
    5092); (2) an adjuration to the President to keep his word (although an
    improper form of address) (Dec. 19, 1995, p. 37601); (3) an accusation
    that the President ``frivolously vetoed'' a bill (Nov. 8, 1995, p.
    31785).

      Personal abuse, innuendo, or ridicule of the President is not
    permitted (VIII, 2497; Aug. 12, 1986, p. 21078; Oct. 21, 1987, pp.
    28857, 28858; Sept. 21, 1994, p. 25147; Sept. 7, 2006, pp. 17381, 17382;
    Oct. 24, 2017, p. 16355). The standards applicable to references
    regarding the President apply also to the President-elect (e.g., Nov.
    14, 2016, p. 14092). In the 102d Congress, the Speaker enunciated a
    minimal standard of propriety for all debate concerning nominated
    candidates for the Presidency, based on the traditional proscription
    against personally offensive references to the President even in the
    capacity as a candidate (Speaker Foley, Sept. 24, 1992, p. 27344). This
    policy has been extended to a presumptive major-party nominee for
    President (e.g., Apr. 22, 2004, pp. 7401, 7402) (although references to
    the past statements or views of such nominee are not necessarily
    unparliamentary (May 6, 2004, p. 8554)). The House has adopted a special
    order of business permitting Members to engage in personalities toward
    the President during debate on certain specified measures (sec. 2, H.
    Res. 38, Jan. 12, 2021, p. _).

    [[Page 195]]

    p. 19822); (5) a personal ``dark side'' (Mar. 1, 2017, p. 3243),
    ruthless (May 8, 2019, p. _) or ``sinister'' (Dec. 20, 2018, p. _); (6)
    that such person is deserving of shame (May 24, 2016, p. 6998) or is
    ``shameful'' (e.g., Dec. 8, 2016, p. 16331) (although an accusation of
    ``shameful opposition'' to a legislative proposal is not necessarily out
    of order (Deschler, ch. 29, Sec.  58.7)); (7) not ``a large enough
    person'' to apologize (Mar. 11, 2004, p. 4086); (8) ``arrogant'' (e.g.,
    Jan. 11, 2007, p. 998); (9) ``mean-spirited'' (e.g., July 15, 2008, p.
    15061), ``mean'' (July 28, 2017, p. 12341), or vicious (Sept. 25, 2017,
    p. 14710); vengeful (June 3, 2013, p. 7783), ``cruel'' (e.g., Nov. 15,
    2013, p. 17166), heartless (e.g., July 25, 2017, p. 11493), callous
    (e.g., Sept. 27, 2017, p. _), a ``jerk'' (Nov. 15, 2018, p. _), or
    accusations of demeaning and denigrating others (Oct. 26, 2017, p.
    16692); (10) ill-tempered or lacking temperament (e.g., Sept. 7, 2016,
    p. 11924), ``infantile'' (June 15, 2016, p. 8771) or ``petulant'' (e.g.,
    Jan. 18, 2018, p. _); (11) a ``hissy fit'' (e.g., Oct. 27, 2011, pp.
    16239, 16245) or ``temper tantrum'' (e.g., Mar. 19, 2018, p. _); (12)
    was ``rooting against,'' or was turning one's back on, the American
    people (e.g., Mar. 16, 2016, p. 3317), intentionally hurting the public
    (Oct. 3, 2013, p. 15069), or ``bilking'' the taxpayer (Apr. 22, 2015, p.
    5374); (13) that such person had engaged in insults (e.g., May 13, 2015,
    p. 6583), ``attacks women'' (July 16, 2018, p. _) or protected classes
    (Oct. 26, 2017, p. 16692), or ``says ugly things about women'' (Nov. 21,
    2019, p. _); (14) accusing such person of being ``delusional'' (e.g.,
    Dec. 9, 2015, pp. 19794, 19795), ``paranoid'' (Dec. 14, 2017, p. 19818),
    ``mentally unwell'' (Sept. 29, 2021, p. _), ``erratic and impetuous''
    (Jan. 24, 2019, p. _), of having ``diminished faculties'' (June 4, 2024,
    p. _), or of suffering ``debilitating cognitive decline'' (July 10,
    2024, p. _); (15) commenting derogatorily on physical attributes (May
    24, 2016, p. 6997); (16) accusing such person of engaging in ``character
    assassination'' or a ``smear campaign'' against others (Jan. 10, 2018,
    p. _); (17) alleging that such person mocked disabled individuals (Feb.
    14, 2018, p. _); (18) referring to such person as a ``moron'' (Mar. 22,
    2018, p. _), an ``idiot'' (Dec. 20, 2017, p. 20446), a ``withering,
    blundering, failure'' (Feb. 3, 2022, p. _), or of doing or saying stupid
    things (Oct. 26, 2017, p. 16692); (19) referring to such person as
    ``greedy'' (Apr. 17, 2018, p. _); (20) accusing such person of threats
    against public officials (Apr. 25, 2018, p. _); (21) questioning such
    person's ``reckless'' and ``negligent'' personal conduct (May 24, 2018,
    p. _), doubting such person's faithfulness to a spouse (e.g., June 13,
    2018, p. _), accusing such person of ``using women'' (June 28, 2018, p.
    _), or alleging that such person has a ``sex tape'' (July 18, 2018, p.
    _); (22) ``soulless'' (June 21, 2018, p. _) or ``immoral'' (e.g., Sept.
    25, 2017, p. 14708); (23) a ``drama queen'' (Dec. 20, 2018, p. _); (24)
    insinuating that such person acts according to his ego (Oct. 10, 2017,
    p. 15750), has a fragile ego (Nov. 29, 2017, p. _), or is ``making the
    American people suffer for the sake of his ego'' (Jan. 9, 2019, p. _);
    (25) accusing such person of ``spreading evil'' (Dec. 1, 2017, p.
    19034); (26) accusing such person of vanity (July 11, 2019, p. _); (27)

    [[Page 196]]

    suggesting that such person was ``struggling to stay awake'' (June 24,
    2021, p. _) or is otherwise ``feeble'' (Oct. 2, 2023, p. _).
      Under this standard, the following remarks regarding personal conduct,
    demeanor, or attributes have been held out of order as unparliamentary
    references: (1) discussing personal conduct even as a point of reference
    or comparison (July 16, 1998, p. 15784; Sept. 9, 1998, p. 19735); (2)
    ``cowardly,'' ``cowardice'' (e.g., Oct. 25, 1989, p. 25817), lacking
    personal courage (Mar. 26, 2014, p. 4875), ``dastardly'' (July 25, 2017,
    p. 11493), or lacking a backbone (July 16, 2018, p. _); (3) ``a little
    bugger'' (Nov. 18, 1995, p. 33974); (4) ``disgusting'' and
    ``despicable'' (Mar. 11, 2004, p. 4033; Jan. 15, 2019, p. _),
    ``disgraceful'' (e.g., June 20, 2012, pp. 9462, 9463) or a disgrace
    (e.g., Sept. 25, 2017, p. 14711), ``disgusting and indecent rhetoric''
    (Mar. 27, 2017, p. 4898), ``vile'' (June 15, 2018, p. _), incapable of
    ``basic human decency'' (Sept. 13, 2018, p. _) or a ``loathsome human''
    (Dec. 14, 2017,

      It is not in order to call the President a ``liar'' or accuse such
    person of ``lying'' (e.g., June 26, 1985, p. 17394). Indeed, any
    suggestion of mendacity is out of order, such as: (1) suggesting that
    such person misrepresented the truth, attempted to obstruct justice, and
    encouraged others to perjure themselves (Feb. 25, 1998, p. 2621); (2)
    dishonesty (e.g., July 13, 2004, p. 15275), failing to be honest (Apr.
    14, 2011, p. 6198), making a ``dishonest argument'' (Sept. 12, 2006, p.
    17851), or intent to be intellectually dishonest (May 9, 1990, p. 9828)
    or issue a false statement (Dec. 20, 2017, p. 20438), or stating that
    many were convinced such person had ``not been honest'' (Mar. 5, 1998,
    p. 2620), or stating that such person had ``fallen quite short when it
    comes to fairness or honesty'' (June 12, 2017, p. 9056); (3) ``raping''
    the truth (Apr. 24, 1996, p. 8807), ``contempt for the truth'' (June 24,
    2019, p. _), not telling the truth (e.g., Oct. 29, 2003, p. 26363),
    distorting the truth (Sept. 9, 2003, pp. 21570-73), having only a
    ``nodding acquaintance'' with the truth (Mar. 1, 2017, p. 3291), or
    asserting that such person's ``relationship with the truth is
    complicated at best'' (June 22, 2017, p. 9738); (4) not being ``straight
    with us'' (e.g., Nov. 19, 2003, p. 29811) or ``spoke out of the other
    side of his mouth'' (Jan. 31, 2012, p. 525); (5) attributing
    ``hypocrisy'' (e.g., Sept. 25, 1992, p. 27674); (6) ``deceit'' (Nov. 17,
    2014, p. 15809), ``deception'' (e.g., Sept. 28, 2016, p. 13894), being
    deceptive (e.g., Mar. 29, 2004, pp. 5523, 5524), using ``deceptive
    rhetoric'' (Oct. 17, 2007, pp. 27534, 27538), or engaging in a ``massive
    campaign of deception'' (July 11, 2018, p. _); (7) making promises while
    having ``no intention of living up to his promises'' (Mar. 27, 2017, p.
    4898) or stating that such person went back on (Dec. 20, 2018, p. _) or
    ``personally reneged on'' (Jan. 18, 2018, p. _) his word; (8) acting in
    a ``duplicitous'' manner (June 11, 2015, p. 9358); (9) acting in a
    ``disingenuous'' manner (Mar. 1, 2017, p. 3307); (10) fabricating an
    issue (e.g., July 6, 2004, pp. 14313, 14314), ``gaslighting'' (Dec. 14,
    2022, p. _), engaging in ``scams'' (May 22, 2019, p. _), ``playing the
    American people for fools'' (Oct. 19, 2021, p. _), or intending to
    mislead (e.g., Oct. 6, 2004, p. 21053), such as pushing falsehoods (Aug.
    24, 2021, p. _) or stating ``blatant falsehoods'' (Jan. 30, 2017, p.
    1339); (11) engaging in ``elaborate attempts to conceal information''
    (Dec. 14, 2017, p. 19811); (12) engaging in ``defamation'' (Dec. 14,
    2017, p. 19818); (13) intentional mischaracterization, although
    mischaracterization without intent to deceive is not necessarily out of
    order (July 19, 2005, p. 16525); (14) cheating in an election (Aug. 22,
    2020, p. _); (15) a ``lying, dog-faced pony soldier'' (May 10, 2022, p.
    _).

    [[Page 197]]

    2005, pp. 20238, 20239); (2) using the Presidency for personal benefit
    (e.g., Jan. 11, 2017, p. 583) or ``self-enrichment'' (e.g., Apr. 17,
    2018, p. _), or accusing the President of the ``appearance of
    wrongdoing'' and of ``profiting illegally'' from the office (Mar. 15,
    2018, p. _); (3) questioning whether the President can ``live up to the
    ethical requirements'' of the office (Jan. 24, 2017, p. 1183); (4)
    calling such person ``amoral'' or lacking in morality (June 3, 2013, p.
    7783; Nov. 16, 2016, p. 14390), or accusing such person of having ``no
    conscience'' (May 21, 2018, p. _); (5) referring to such person as
    having financial conflicts of interest (Dec. 11, 2018, p. _); (6) making
    allegations that the President engaged in ``foreign bribery'' (July 18,
    2023, p. _).
      It is not in order to cast aspersions on the ethical behavior of the
    President, including: (1) alluding to unethical behavior or corruption
    (e.g., June 20, 1996, p. 14829), such as implying a cause-and-effect
    relationship between political contributions and his actions as
    President (e.g., May 22, 2001, p. 9028), including an accusation that
    the President had ``lined the pockets'' of his ``political cronies'' and
    filled ``campaign coffers'' (Sept. 14,

    [[Page 198]]

    or a ``rapist'' (May 16, 2024, p. _), or accusing such person of
    bragging about sexual assault (May 16, 2018, p. _); (13) referring to
    such person as a ``grifter'' (Apr. 11, 2018, p. _); (14) alleging that
    such person is holding ``innocent babies'' hostage and referencing their
    placement in cages (June 19, 2018, p. _) or generally referring to such
    person's ``disregard for the well-being of children'' (May 9, 2019, p.
    _); (15) accusing such person of child abuse (July 18, 2018, p. _) or
    encouraging others to commit assault (June 27, 2018, p. _); (16)
    accusing such person of treason (Dec. 14, 2017, p. _) or of potentially
    ``treasonous'' behavior (e.g., July 16, 2018, p. _); (17) referring to
    such person as a ``mobster, con man, gangster'' (June 11, 2019, p. _) or
    a ``mob boss'' (June 11, 2019, p. _), or accusing such person of
    inciting a mob (May 15, 2024, p. _); (18) accusing such person of
    blackmailing a foreign leader (Sept. 24, 2019, p. _); (19) suggesting
    that such person is ``helping'' drug cartels with ``their human
    trafficking business'' (Apr. 16, 2021, p. _) or aiding and abetting drug
    cartels (Oct. 22, 2021, p. _), or calling such person the ``trafficker-
    in-chief'' (e.g., Feb. 2, 2022, p. _); (20) referring to such person as
    a ``kingpin'' overseeing criminal activity (Sept. 14, 2023, p. _); (21)
    accusing such person of engaging in ``money laundering'' (Nov. 1, 2023,
    p. _).
      Accusations that the President has committed a crime, or even that the
    President has done something illegal, are unparliamentary. The following
    allegations are not in order: (1) ``draft-dodger'' (e.g., Apr. 24, 1996,
    pp. 8807, 8808), unexcused absences from military service (May 5, 2004,
    pp. 8417, 8418), such as being ``A.W.O.L.'' (Sept. 22, 2004, p. 18953),
    dereliction of duty as Commander-in-Chief (e.g., Oct. 22, 2015, pp.
    16385, 16389), or of ``abdication of duty'' (Oct. 12, 2017, p. 15859);
    (2) discussing ``charges'' leveled at the President or under
    investigation (e.g., Mar. 19, 1998, p. 4094), including alluding to
    ``fund-raising abuses'' (Mar. 14, 2000, p. 2716), speculating that the
    Vice President might someday pardon the President for certain charges
    (Apr. 12, 2000, p. 5419), or invoking a finding of personal liability by
    a court (May 24, 2016, p. 6998); (3) ``crook'' (e.g., Mar. 1, 2017, p.
    3241), ``come clean'' (Sept. 21, 2016, p. 13243), ``fess up'' (Feb. 6,
    2017, p. 1849), or an allegation that the President has engaged in a
    ``coverup'' (May 22, 2019, p. _); (4) suggesting censure or impeachment
    (e.g., Feb. 2, 2017, p. 1698); (5) discussing alleged criminal conduct
    (e.g., Sept. 10, 1998, p. 19976), including an assertion that the
    President led a vast criminal enterprise for decades (Sept. 5, 2018, p.
    _); (6) obstruction of justice (e.g., May 17, 2017, p. 7911) or
    speculation that a hypothetical action by the President would constitute
    obstruction of justice (Jan. 29, 2018, p. _); (7) accusations of
    ``illegal'' activity or actions taken with the knowledge that they were
    not in accordance with the law (e.g., June 20, 2006, p. 11935); (8)
    ``above the law'' (e.g., June 18, 2012, p. 9191), ``lawless'' (e.g.,
    Aug. 1, 2014, p. 14017), violating the law (e.g., July 29, 2014, p.
    13385), breaking the law (Sept. 9, 2014, p. 14290), abusing the law
    (Feb. 27, 2015, p. 2907), assaulting the rule of law (May 16, 2017, p.
    7831), disrespecting the rule of law (Sept. 27, 2018, p. _), or ``beyond
    justice'' (Apr. 11, 2018, p. _); (9) suggesting collusion with a foreign
    country to violate the integrity of a U.S. election (Mar. 29, 2017, p.
    5048); (10) ``shredding'' (Apr. 19, 2016, p. 4563), having contempt for
    (e.g., July 17, 2013, pp. 11608, 11609), having disrespect for (Feb. 3,
    2014, p. 2389), decimating (Apr. 11, 2018, p. _), trampling upon (e.g.,
    Apr. 26, 2018, p. _), or raping (Feb. 26, 2019, p. _) the Constitution;
    (11) ``con man'' or ``con artist'' (e.g., June 9, 2016, p. 8375); (12)
    alluding to alleged sexual misconduct (e.g., May 10, 1994, p. 9697),
    labeling such person a sexual predator (Nov. 16, 2016, p. 14390)

    [[Page 199]]

      References to racial or other discrimination on the part of the
    President are not in order. As such, remarks may not refer to the
    President as: (1) a racist (e.g., June 9, 2016, p. 8375); (2) having
    made ``racial slurs'' or ``racial epithets'' (e.g., Jan. 9, 2017, p.
    392); (3) telling a ``racist lie'' (e.g., Jan. 9, 2017, p. 392); (4) a
    bigot (e.g., June 9, 2016, p. 8375), including by referring to bigotry
    emanating from the Presidency (e.g., Jan. 16, 2019, p. _); (5) having
    made a bigoted or racist statement (e.g., June 7, 2016, p. 7898); (6)
    having taken a bigoted action (Jan. 30, 2017, p. 1339) or ``putting his
    bigotry into policy'' (June 27, 2018, p. _); (7) not caring about black
    people (Sept. 8, 2005, p. 19797); (8) a misogynist (June 9, 2016, p.
    8363) or a homophobe (Sept. 5, 2018, p. _); (9) having run a prejudiced
    campaign (Jan. 12, 2017, p. 854); (10) having engaged in ``racist
    rhetoric'' (Jan. 17, 2018, p. _), racist stereotyping (Oct. 23, 2017, p.
    16313), or a ``racist rant'' (Feb. 6, 2018, p. _); (11) having ``racist
    intentions'' (Jan. 17, 2018, p. _) or ``inciting racism'' (Nov. 8, 2017,
    p. 17398); (12) normalizing bigotry (Jan. 30, 2018, p. _); (13)
    exhibiting ``hatred for immigrants'' (Feb. 27, 2018, p. _), demonizing
    immigrants (e.g., Feb. 8, 2018, p. _), ``hate peddling'' (June 21, 2018,
    p. _) or having engaged in ``hateful rhetoric'' (Sept. 6, 2018, p. _),
    ``hateful policies'' (Feb. 26, 2019, p. _), condoning hate groups (June
    11, 2019, p. _), ``stoking the flames'' of hate (July 24, 2019, p. _),
    ``inhuman'' behavior (Mar. 7, 2019, p. _) or fearmongering (Jan. 9,
    2019, p. _; Jan. 10, 2019, p. _) with respect to immigrants; (14)
    holding the view that ``crime and the skin color of a person are
    synonymous'' (May 16, 2018, p. _); (15) ``uniting hatred'' (Sept. 25,
    2017, p. _); (16) engaging in ``xenophobic threats'' (June 4, 2019, p.
    _); (17) having a ``white nationalist agenda'' (July 22, 2020, p. _).

      Language impugning the patriotism or loyalty of the President is not
    in order, such as: (1) directly questioning patriotism (Sept. 9, 2016,
    p. 12156); (2) labeling the President as un-American or having an ``un-
    American ideology'' (e.g., June 7, 2016, p. 7898) or ``subverting
    democracy'' (Apr. 17, 2018, p. _); (3) accusing the President of giving
    ``aid and comfort to the enemy'' (e.g., Jan. 25, 1995, p. 2352),
    ``aiding and abetting the enemy'' (Apr. 22, 2004, pp. 7401, 7402),
    ``aiding and abetting a terroristic regime'' (Sept. 10, 2015, p. 13976),
    choosing terrorists over Americans (Mar. 9, 2022, p. _), or ``sucking up
    to dictators'' (June 7, 2018, p. _); (4) accusing the President of
    ``spying'' on Congress (e.g., Jan. 7, 2016, p. 128); (5) equating the
    President's decisions with regard to armed conflict to his having
    ``slaughtered'' thousands (Mar. 8, 2007, p. 5815) or that a soldier's
    death was for his ``amusement'' (Oct. 18, 2007, pp. 27569, 27570); (6)
    accusing the President of having ``hurt'' Americans ``out of spite''
    (July 28, 2017, p. 12341), of torturing the American people (Jan. 23,
    2019, p. _), or of inflicting harm upon Americans (July 9, 2019, p. _);
    (7) alleging that the President ``puts himself above his country'' (July
    17, 2018, p. _); (8) referring to the President's ``voter fraud
    playbook'' (Dec. 11, 2018, p. _); (9) calling the President a ``threat
    to national security'' (Jan. 26, 2023, p. _); (10) accusing the
    President of having ``blood on [his] hands'' (Mar. 7, 2024, p. _); (11)
    accusing the President of stealing food out of soldiers' mouths (June
    12, 2024, p. _); (12) referring to the President as a threat to
    democracy (Sept. 18, 2024, p. _).

    [[Page 200]]

    tarian'' behavior (Feb. 14, 2018, p. _); (10) accusing the President of
    ``boot-licking'' foreign leaders (July 18, 2018, p. _); referring to the
    President as a bully (Jan. 15, 2019, p. _) or a ``billionaire bully''
    (Jan. 9, 2019, p. _); (11) comparing such person's rhetoric to that of
    ``Hitler and other Nazi leaders'' (Apr. 10, 2024, p. _).
      Personally disparaging the manner in which the President carries out
    the duties of the office can constitute a personality, such as when the
    remarks suggest that the President is an undemocratic leader akin to a
    dictator. Remarks that have been held to be unparliamentary include: (1)
    an accusation of ``abuse of power'' or ``abuse of the office'' (e.g.,
    Sept. 9, 2014, p. 14314) or ``abuse of executive privilege'' (Apr. 27,
    2016, p. 5239); (2) an accusation that the President ``disrespected the
    office'' (Mar. 27, 2017, p. 4898) or took an action ``beneath the
    dignity of the office'' (May 3, 2017, p. 6439); (3) an accusation of
    violating the oath of office (e.g., Dec. 3, 2013, p. 18074); (4)
    likening the President to a ``ruler'' (e.g., July 8, 2013, p. 10964),
    ``king'' (e.g., July 17, 2013, p. 11622), ``monarch'' (Jan. 15, 2013, p.
    218), ``emperor'' (Dec. 2, 2014, p. 16380), ``modern-day pharoah'' (Jan.
    23, 2019, p. _), a dictator (e.g., Feb. 6, 2018, p. _), or accusing the
    President of ``quasi-monarchical'' behavior or of ``royal pageantry''
    (July 11, 2019, p. _); (5) an accusation of ``tyranny'' (Mar. 16, 2016,
    p. 3317), of having ``tyrannical impulses'' (Oct. 20, 2021, p. _), or of
    admiring tyrants (Feb. 26, 2019, p. _); (6) an accusation of
    ``demagoguery'' or of being a demagogue (e.g., Jan. 23, 1996, p. 1144);
    (7) referring to the President as a ``Manchurian President'' (July 24,
    2017, p. 11470); (8) an accusation that the President has brought shame
    upon the office (Dec. 1, 2017, p. 19034) or the nation (Dec. 12, 2017,
    p. 19621), ``diminished'' the office by turning it into a ``Theatre of
    the Absurd'' (Jan. 19, 2018, p. _), or is a ``reality-show President''
    (Jan. 17, 2019, p. _); (9) an accusation of ``authori

      The Chair may admonish Members transgressing this stricture even after
    other debate has intervened (Jan. 23, 1996, p. 1144; Apr. 27, 2016, p.
    5239).

      A Member may not read in debate extraneous material personally abusive
    of the President that would be improper if spoken in the Member's own
    words (Mar. 3, 1993, p. 3958; Nov. 15, 1995, p. 32587; May 2, 1996, p.
    10010; Mar. 17, 1998, p. 3799; July 15, 2003, p. 18170; Sept. 16, 2003,
    pp. 22151, 22152; Oct. 17, 2007, p. 27538; Oct. 5, 2013, p. 15297; Sept.
    28, 2015, p. 14945; Apr. 19, 2016, p. 4563; June 29, 2017, p. 10145;
    Jan. 17, 2018, p. _; July 12, 2018, p. _), such as material labeling the
    President's statement a lie (Sept. 10, 2014, p. 14416). This prohibition
    includes the recitation of another Member's criticism of the President
    made off the floor (even if recited as a rebuttal to such criticism)
    (Dec. 17, 1998, p. 27775; Apr. 18, 2016, p. 4499; Oct. 24, 2017, p.
    16397).

      Although wide latitude is permitted in debate on a proposition to
    impeach the President (V, 5093), Members must abstain from language
    personally offensive (V, 5094; Dec. 18, 1998, p. 27829); and Members
    must abstain from comparisons to the personal conduct of sitting Members
    of the House or Senate (Dec. 18, 1998, p. 27829). Furthermore, when
    impeachment is not the pending business on the floor, Members may not
    refer to evidence of alleged impeachable offenses by the President
    contained in a communication from an independent counsel pending before
    a House committee (Sept. 14, 1998, p. 20171; Sept. 17, 1998, p. 20758),
    although they may refer to the communication, itself, within the
    confines of proper decorum in debate (Oct. 6, 1998, p. 23841), and may
    not otherwise suggest that the President has done something worthy of
    censure or impeachment (e.g., Feb. 2, 2017, p. 1698), including by
    reciting the vote totals on an impeachment resolution that had been
    previously laid on the table by the House (Dec. 7, 2017, p. 19441) or by
    urging the Senate to convict the President during a trial following his
    impeachment by the House (Jan. 29, 2020, p. _).

      References in debate to former Presidents are not governed by these
    standards (Nov. 15, 1945, p. 10735; June 27, 2002, pp. 11844, 11845),
    nor are references to members of the President's Cabinet (Mar. 14, 2019,
    p. _).

      The Chair has advised that the protections afforded by Jefferson's
    Manual and the precedents against unparliamentary references to the
    President, personally, do not necessarily extend to members of his
    family (Speaker Foley, July 12, 1990, p. 17206).

    [[Page 201]]

      For discussion of the stricture against addressing remarks in debate
    to the President, as in the second person, see Sec. 945, infra.

      On January 27, 1909 (VIII, 2497), the House adopted a report of a
    committee appointed to investigate the question, which report in part
    stated:

      ``The freedom of speech in debate in the House should never be denied
    or abridged, but freedom of speech in debate does not mean license to
    indulge in personal abuses or ridicule. The right of Members of the two
    Houses of Congress to criticize the official acts of the President and
    other executive officers is beyond question, but this right is subject
    to proper rules requiring decorum in debate. Such right of criticism is
    inherent upon legislative authority. The right to legislate involves the
    right to consider conditions as they are and to contrast present
    conditions with those of the past or those desired in the future. The
    right to correct abuses by legislation carries the right to consider and
    discuss abuses which exist or which are feared.

      ``It is, however, the duty of the House to require its Members in
    speech or debate to preserve that proper restraint which will permit the
    House to conduct its business in an orderly manner and without
    unnecessarily and unduly exciting animosity among its Members or
    antagonism from those other branches of the Government with which the
    House is correlated.''

    Sec. 371. References in debate to the other House and its
    Members.

      It  is a breach of order in debate to notice what has been said
    on the same subject in the other House, or the particular votes or
    majorities on it there; because the opinion of each House should be left
    to its own independency, not to be influenced by the proceedings of the
    other; and the quoting them might beget reflections leading to a
    misunderstanding between the two Houses. 8 Grey, 22.

    [[Page 202]]

    stricture that requires Members to avoid personality (sec. 2(g), H. Res.
    5, Jan. 4, 2005, p. 43). Under the new standard, remarks may urge the
    Senate to take a particular action (Mar. 21, 2010, p. 4105). For a
    recitation of precedents under the former rule, see Sec. 371 of the
    House Rules and Manual for the 108th Congress (H. Doc. 107-284).
      Until former clause 1 of rule XIV (currently clause 1 of rule XVII)
    was amended in the 100th and 101st Congresses (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1987,
    p. 6; H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1989, p. 72), this principle of comity and
    parliamentary law as described by Jefferson governed debate in the House
    to the full extent of its provisions (see generally, V, 5095-5130; VIII,
    2501-21; July 31, 1984, p. 21670; Deschler-Brown, ch. 29, Sec. 44). From
    the 101st Congress through the 108th Congress, clause 1 of rule XVII
    permitted some factual references that were a matter of public record,
    references to the pendency or sponsorship in the Senate of certain
    measures, factual descriptions concerning a measure under debate in the
    House, and quotations from Senate proceedings relevant to the making of
    legislative history on a pending measure. In the 109th Congress clause 1
    was amended to permit debate to include references to the Senate or its
    Members but within the general

      Since the adoption of the new rule, the following references to the
    Senate or its Members have been held unparliamentary: (1) insinuating
    that a Senator or the Majority Leader lied (Dec. 20, 2011, pp. 21444,
    21446; Sept. 28, 2018, p. _); (2) accusing Senate Republicans of
    hypocrisy (May 16, 2005, p. 9757); (3) accusing a Senator of making
    slanderous statements (June 17, 2005, p. 13009; June 21, 2005, p.
    13408); (4) attributing to a Senator a list of offenses under
    investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (Oct. 18, 2005,
    p. 22987); (5) accusing a Senator of corruption (Oct. 13, 2009, p.
    24720), taking bribes (Jan. 19, 2010, p. 209), or being unethical (Aug.
    2, 2012, p. 13256); (6) accusing the Republican leadership of
    ``hijacking justice'' (Feb. 1, 2017, p. 1497); (7) accusing a Senator of
    giving ``aid and comfort'' to the enemy (Dec. 13, 2005, p. 28162); (8)
    referring to a Senator as ``disgraceful'' (Oct. 2, 2013, p. 14985) or a
    Senate action as a ``disgrace'' (Apr. 18, 2013, p. 5539), or
    sarcastically as ``courageous'' (July 22, 2011, p. 11831-33); (9)
    referring to Senate Democrats (May 18, 2005, p. 10136) or liberals in
    the Senate (July 30, 2011, p. 12531) as ``cowardly''; (10) stating a
    ``low opinion'' of the Senate (Apr. 1, 2011, p. 4966); (11) stating that
    the Majority Leader ``has a high opinion of himself'' (Dec. 20, 2011, p.
    21392); (12) accusing a Senator of ``taunting'' (May 22, 2014, p. 8972)
    or of childish behavior (Jan. 24, 2019, p. _); (13) accusing a Senator
    of being prejudiced, racist, or of making a racist comment (Jan. 12,
    2017, p. 854) or referring to Senators as ``white nationalists'' (Jan.
    20, 2022, p. _); (14) accusing several Senators of an abuse of power
    (Nov. 2, 2017, p. 17063); (15) accusing a Senator of criminal conduct or
    harassment (Nov. 16, 2017, p. 18465); (15) referring to a Senator as a
    ``lightweight'' (Dec. 12, 2017, p. 19642) or an ``idiot'' (Dec. 20,
    2017, p. 20443); (16) accusing the Majority Leader and other Senators of
    ``taking a stand against the truth'' (Jan. 12, 2022, p. _).

      It remains the duty of the Chair to call to order a Member who engages
    in personality with respect to a Senator (see Sec. 374, infra), and the
    Chair may admonish a Member for unparliamentary references even after
    intervening recognition (Oct. 12, 1999, p. 24954; Nov. 15, 2001, p.
    22596). Although the Chair is under a duty to caution Members against
    unparliamentary references, the Chair will not advise Members on how to
    construct their remarks to avoid improper references (Feb. 25, 2004, pp.
    2409-15). A Member may not read in debate extraneous material regarding
    a Senator that would be improper if spoken in the Member's own words
    (Nov. 16, 2017, p. 18465; Dec. 12, 2017, p. 19642; Sept. 28, 2018, p.
    _).

    [[Page 203]]

    reading of a paper making criticisms of a Senator (V, 5127); (3) a
    reference to another person's criticism of a Senator (Aug. 4, 1983, p.
    23145). Similarly, the Chair has consistently held that if references to
    the Senate are appropriate, the Member delivering them is not required
    to use the term ``the other body,'' (Oct. 4, 1984, p. 30047) and, by the
    same token, references to ``the other body'' will not cure
    unparliamentary references directed to the Senate (e.g., Oct. 2, 2002,
    p. 18913; Apr. 2, 2004, pp. 6394, 6395).
      The prohibition against improper references to Senators includes (1) a
    reference not explicitly naming the Senator (VIII, 2512; Feb. 23, 1994,
    p. 2658; June 30, 1995, p. 18153; Feb. 27, 1997, pp. 2768, 2769); (2)
    the

      Under the earlier form of the rule, the Chair held that remarks in
    debate during the pendency of an impeachment resolution may not include
    comparisons to the personal conduct of sitting Members of the House or
    Senate (Dec. 18, 1998, p. 27829) and remarks in debate may not criticize
    words spoken in the Senate by one not a Member of that body in the
    course of an impeachment trial (V, 5106). After examination by a
    committee under the earlier form of the rule, a speech reflecting on the
    character of the Senate was ordered to be stricken from the Record on
    the ground that it tended to create ``unfriendly conditions between the
    two bodies * * * obstructive of wise legislation and little short of a
    public calamity'' (V, 5129). Under the earlier form of the rule, where a
    Member had been assailed in the Senate, he was permitted to explain his
    own conduct and motives without bringing the whole controversy into
    discussion or assailing the Senator (V, 5123-5126). Propositions
    relating to breaches of these principles were entertained as a matter of
    privilege (V, 5129, 6980).

      The precise standard in former clause 1 of rule XIV for references to
    ``individual Members of the Senate'' did not apply to references to
    former Senators (Dec. 14, 1995, p. 36968).

      The official policies, actions, and opinions of a Senator who is a
    candidate for President or Vice President (as, in modern practice, with
    one who is not) may be criticized in terms not personally offensive
    (Speaker Wright, Sept. 29, 1988, p. 26683), but references attacking the
    character or integrity of a Senator in that context are not in order
    (Oct. 30, 1979, p. 30150).

    [[Page 204]]

    27070, 27071), including innuendo suggesting policy choices were made on
    the basis of personal pecuniary gain (July 7, 2004, p. 14582; Sept. 13,
    2005, pp. 20238, 20239) or accusations of abuse of power (July 14, 2004,
    p. 15501); to describe him as ``arrogant'' (June 28, 2007, p. 17926;
    Sept. 25, 2008, p. 21781); to accuse her of supporting domestic
    terrorism (May 20, 2021, p. _); to question the patriotism of a major-
    party nominee for the office (Sept. 9, 2016, p. 12156). The rule also
    precludes the insertion in the Record of a paper making improper
    references to the Vice President (Sept. 19, 2000, p. 18580).
      References in debate to the Vice President (as President of the
    Senate) are governed by the standards of reference permitted toward the
    President, as under the earlier form of the rule. As such, a Member may
    criticize in debate the policies, or candidacy, of the Vice President
    but may not engage in personality (Dec. 14, 1995, p. 36968; July 14,
    1998, p. 15314; Sept. 20, 2000, p. 18639). For example, it is not in
    order to allude to ``wrongdoings [including] fund-raising telephone
    calls by the Vice President'' (Mar. 14, 2000, p. 2716); to attribute to
    him a list of offenses under investigation by a special prosecutor (Oct.
    18, 2005, p. 22987); to suggest that the House should investigate him in
    connection with government contracts awarded to his former employer
    (June 15, 2006, p. 11480); to speculate that he might someday pardon the
    President (Apr. 12, 2000, p. 5419); to accuse him of lying (Sept. 20,
    2000, p. 18639; Sept. 21, 2000, p. 18789; Feb. 16, 2006, p. 1960; Mar.
    6, 2007, p. 5412); to suggest ``he has a problem with the truth'' (Oct.
    5, 2000, p. 21014); to allege ``unethical behavior'' or ``corruption''
    (see, e.g., Oct. 29, 2003, pp. 26400-402; Nov. 4, 2003, pp.

       A Member may not read in debate extraneous material regarding the
    Vice President that would be improper if spoken in the Member's own
    words (Feb. 16, 2006, p. 1960).

    Sec. 373. Complaint by one House of conduct of a
    Member of the other.

      Neither  House can exercise any authority over a Member or
    officer of the other, but should complain to the House of which he is,
    and leave the punishment to them.

      In a notable instance, wherein a Member of the House had assaulted a
    Senator in the Senate Chamber for words spoken in debate, the Senate
    examined the breach of privilege and transmitted its report to the
    House, which punished the Member (II, 1622). A Senator having assailed a
    House Member in debate, the House messaged to the Senate a resolution
    declaring the language a breach of privilege and requested the Senate to
    take appropriate action (Sept. 27, 1951, p. 12270). The Senator
    subsequently asked unanimous consent to correct his remarks in the
    permanent Congressional Record, but objection was raised (Sept. 28,
    1951, p. 12383). But where certain Members of the House, in a published
    letter, sought to influence the vote of a Senator in an impeachment
    trial, the House declined to consider the matter as a breach of
    privilege (III, 2657). Although on one occasion it was held that a
    resolution offered in the House requesting the Senate to expunge from
    the Record statements in criticism of a Member of the House did not
    constitute a question of privilege, being in violation of the rule
    prohibiting references to the Senate in debate (VIII, 2519), a properly
    drafted resolution referring to language published in the Record of
    Senate proceedings as constituting a breach of privilege and requesting
    the Senate to take appropriate action concerning the subject has been
    held to present a question of the privileges of the House (VIII, 2516).

    [[Page 205]]

    rules supposed necessary to be observed (as to the immediate noting down
    of words) for the security of Members. Therefore it is the duty of the
    House, and more particularly of the Speaker, to interfere immediately,
    and not to permit expressions to go unnoticed which may give a ground of
    complaint to the other House, and introduce proceedings and mutual
    accusations between the two Houses, which can hardly be terminated
    without difficulty and disorder. 3 Hats., 51.

    Sec. 374. Duty of the Speaker to prevent expressions
    offensive to the other House.

      * * *  Where the complaint is of words
    disrespectfully spoken by a Member of another House, it is difficult to
    obtain punishment, because of the

      A rule of comity prohibiting most references in debate to the Senate
    was first enunciated in Jefferson's Manual and was strictly enforced in
    the House through the 108th Congress (albeit with certain exceptions
    adopted in the 100th and 101st Congresses in the former clause 1(b) of
    rule XVII) (Sec. 371, supra and Sec. 945, infra). In the 109th Congress
    clause 1 was amended to permit references to the Senate or its Members,
    even critical references, so long as avoiding personality (sec. 2(g), H.
    Res. 5, Jan. 4, 2005, p. 43). Nevertheless, it remains the duty of the
    Chair to call to order a Member who violates the rule in debate or
    through an insertion in the Record.

    [[Page 206]]

      The Chair has distinguished between engaging in personality toward
    another Member of the House, as to which the Chair normally awaits a
    point of order from the floor, and improper references to Members of the
    Senate, which violate comity between the Houses, as to which the Chair
    normally takes initiative (Feb. 27, 1997, pp. 2778, 2779). The Chair may
    admonish Members to avoid unparliamentary references to the Senate even
    after intervening recognition (Oct. 12, 1999, p. 24954). Pending
    consideration of a measure relating to the Senate, the Speaker announced
    his intention to strictly enforce this provision of Jefferson's Manual
    prohibiting improper references to the Senate, and to deny recognition
    to Members violating the prohibition, subject to permission of the House
    to proceed in order (Speaker O'Neill, June 16, 1982, p. 13843). Under
    the earlier form of clause 1 of rule XVII, the Chair refused to respond
    to hypothetical questions as to the propriety of possible
    characterizations of Senate actions before their use in debate (Oct. 24,
    1985, p. 28819). For a further discussion of the Speaker's duties
    regarding unparliamentary debate, see Sec. Sec. 960-961, infra.

    Sec. 375. Course of the Member when business concerning
    that Member is under debate.

      No  Member may be present when a bill or any
    business concerning himself is debating; nor is any Member to speak to
    the merits of it till he withdraws. 2 Hats., 219. The rule is that if a
    charge against a Member arise out of a report of a committee, or
    examination of witnesses in the House, as the Member knows from that to
    what points he is to direct his exculpation, he may be heard to those
    points before any question is moved or stated against him. He is then to
    be heard, and withdraw before any question is moved. But if the question
    itself is the charge, as for breach of order or matter arising in the
    debate, then the charge must be stated (that is, the question must be
    moved), himself heard, and then to withdraw. 2 Hats., 121, 122.

      In 1832, during proceedings for the censure of a Member, the Speaker
    informed the Member that he should withdraw (II, 1366); but this seems
    to be an exceptional instance of the enforcement of the law of
    Parliament. In other cases, after the proposition for censure or
    expulsion has been proposed, Members have been heard in debate, either
    as a matter of right (II, 1286), as a matter of course (II, 1246, 1253),
    by express provision (II, 1273), and in writing (II, 1273), or by
    unanimous consent (II, 1275). A Member against whom a resolution of
    censure was pending was asked by the Speaker if he desired to be heard
    (VI, 236). But a Member was not permitted to depute another Member to
    speak in his behalf (II, 1273). In modern practice the Member has been
    permitted to speak in his own behalf, both in censure (June 10, 1980,
    pp. 13802-11) and expulsion proceedings (Oct. 2, 1980, pp. 28953-78;
    July 24, 2002, pp. 14299, 14309; Nov. 1, 2023, p. _; Nov. 30, 2023, p.
    _). A Member-elect has been permitted to participate in debate on a
    resolution relating to his right to take the oath (Jan. 10, 1967, p.
    23).

    [[Page 207]]

    been disallowed, even after a division. In a case so contrary, not only
    to the laws of decency, but to the fundamental principle of the social
    compact, which denies to any man to be a judge in his own cause, it is
    for the honor of the House that this rule of immemorial observance
    should be strictly adhered to. 2 Hats., 119, 121; 6 Grey, 368.

    Sec. 376. Disqualifying personal interest of a
    Member.

      Where  the private interests of a Member are concerned in a bill or
    question he is to withdraw. And where such an interest has appeared, his
    voice has

      In the House it has not been usual for the Member to withdraw from
    debate when the Member's private interests are concerned in a pending
    measure, although clause 1 of rule III addresses voting in such a
    contingency. In one instance the Senate disallowed a vote given by a
    Senator on a question relating to his own right to a seat; but the House
    has never had occasion to proceed so far (V, 5959).

    Sec. 377. Wearing of hats by Members.

      No  Member is to come
    into the House with his head covered, nor to remove from one place to
    another with his hat on, nor is to put on his hat in coming in or
    removing, until he be set down in his place. Scob., 6.

      In 1837 the parliamentary practice of wearing hats during the session
    was abolished by adoption of current clause 5 of rule XVII. In its
    current form, the rule specifies that religious headdress is not
    prohibited. See Sec. 962, infra. In the 116th Congress, the Speaker
    announced that discretion would be applied in enforcing the prohibition
    with respect to hats or other head coverings worn out of medical
    necessity (Jan. 3, 2019, p. _).

    Sec. 378. Adjournment of questions of order.

        A question of
    order may be adjourned to give time to look into precedents. 2 Hats.,
    118.

    [[Page 208]]

    by the House. On occasion, the Chair has reversed as erroneous a
    decision previously made (VI, 639; VII, 849; VIII, 2794, 3435).

      As described in Sec. Sec. 628 and 628a, infra, the Speaker has
    declined, on a difficult question of order, to rule until taking time
    for examination (III, 2725; VI, 432; VII, 2106; VIII, 2174, 2396, 3475),
    and may take a parliamentary inquiry under advisement, especially if not
    related to the pending proceedings (VIII, 2174; Apr. 7, 1992, p. 8274).
    However, it is conceivable that a case might arise wherein this
    privilege of the Chair would require approval of the majority of the
    House to prevent arbitrary obstruction of the pending business by the
    Chair. The law of Parliament evidently contemplates that the adjournment
    of a question of order shall be controlled

    Sec. 379. House's control over question of the Speaker.

        In
    Parliament, all decisions of the Speaker may be controlled by the House.
    3 Grey, 319.

      The Speaker's decision on a question of order is subject to appeal by
    any Member (clause 5 of rule I).