[Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 118th Congress]
[118th Congress]
[House Document 117-161]
[The United States Constitution]
[Pages 1-126]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


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                              CONSTITUTION


                               __________




Sec. 1. The preamble.

  We the People  of the United States, in 
Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic 
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general 
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our 
Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United 
States of America.




[[Page 4]]



Sec. 2. Formation of the 
Constitution.

  The First Continental  Congress met in Philadelphia in September, 1774 and 
adopted the Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress, 
embodying rights and principles later to be incorporated into the 
Constitution of the United States. The Second Continental Congress 
adopted in November, 1777 the Articles of Confederation, which the 
States approved in July, 1778. Upon recommendation of the Continental 
Congress, a convention of State representatives met in May, 1787 to 
revise the Articles of Confederation and reported to the Continental 
Congress in September a new Constitution, which the Congress submitted 
to the States for ratification. Nine States, as required by the 
Constitution for its establishment, had ratified by June 21, 1788, and 
eleven States had ratified by July 26, 1788. The Continental Congress 
adopted a resolution on September 13, 1788, putting the new Constitution 
into effect; the First Congress of the United States convened on March 
4, 1789, and George Washington was inaugurated as the first President on 
April 30, 1789.



                               ARTICLE I.




Sec. 3. Legislative powers vested in 
Congress.

  Section 1. All  legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House 
of Representatives.



<>   Section 2. \1\The House of Representatives shall be composed 
of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, 
* * *



Sec. 4. Power to 
investigate.

  The power to legislate includes the power to conduct inquiries and 
investigations. See Kilbourn v.   Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 
U.S. 135 (1927); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); 
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). The Chair cannot 
unilaterally grant a request for an investigation (Jan. 12, 2017, p. 
840). For the power of the House to punish for contempt in the course of 
investigations, see Sec. 293, infra.


  This clause requires election by the people and State authority may 
not determine a tie by lot (I, 775).

  The phrase ``by the people of the several States'' means that as 
nearly as practicable one person's vote in a congressional election is 
to be worth as much as another's. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 
(1964); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969). 2 U.S.C. 2a 
mandates apportionment of Representatives based upon population, and 2 
U.S.C. 2c requires the establishment by the States of single-Member 
congressional districts. For elections generally, see Deschler, ch. 8; 
Precedents (Smith), ch. 8.


[[Page 5]]

 when no other hour is fixed (I, 4, 210). In the later practice a resolution 
fixing the daily hour of meeting is agreed to at the beginning of each 
session.


Sec. 6. Term of a Congress.

  The term of a  Congress, before 
ratification of the 20th amendment to the Constitution, began on the 4th 
of March of odd-numbered years and extended through two years. This 
resulted from the action of the Continental Congress on September 13, 
1788, in declaring, on authority conferred by the Federal Convention, 
``the first Wednesday in March next'' to be ``the time for commencing 
proceedings under the said Constitution.'' This date was March 4, 1789. 
Soon after the first Congress assembled a joint committee determined 
that the terms of Representatives and Senators of the first class 
commenced on that day, and must necessarily terminate with the 3d of 
March, 1791 (I, 3). Under the 20th amendment to the Constitution the 
terms of Representatives and Senators begin on the 3d of January of the 
odd-numbered years, regardless of when Congress actually convenes. By a 
practice having the force of common law, the House meets at noon


  Before adoption of the 20th amendment, the legislative day of March 3 
extended to noon on March 4 (V, 6694-6697) and, unless earlier 
adjourned, the Speaker could at that time declare the House adjourned 
sine die, without motion or vote, even to the point of suspending a roll 
call then in progress (V, 6715-6718).


<> * * * and 
the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for 
Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

  The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (84 Stat. 1140) provides 
that unless Congress otherwise specifies the two Houses shall adjourn 
sine die not later than the last day in July. This requirement is not 
applicable, under the terms of that Act, if a state of war exists 
pursuant to a congressional declaration or if, in an odd-numbered 
(nonelection) year, the Congress has agreed to adjourn for the month 
preceding Labor Day. For more on this provision, see Sec. 1106, infra.

  The House, in the decision of an election case, has rejected votes 
cast by persons not naturalized citizens of the United States, although 
they were entitled to vote under the statutes of a State (I, 811); but 
where an act of Congress had provided that a certain class of persons 
should be deprived of citizenship, a question arose over the proposed 
rejection of their votes in a State wherein citizenship in the United 
States was not a qualification of the elector (I, 451). In an 
exceptional case the House rejected votes cast by persons lately in 
armed resistance to the Government, although by the law of the State 
they were qualified voters (I, 448); but later, the House declined to 
find persons disqualified as voters because they had formerly borne arms 
against the Government (II, 879).



Sec. 8. Decisions of the Court.

  The power  of the States to 
set qualifications for electors is not unlimited, being subject to the 
15th, 19th, 24th, and 26th amendments, and to the equal protection 
clause of the United States Constitution. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 
89 (1965); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).



  Congress has some power in setting qualifications for electors, as in 
protecting the right to vote and lowering the minimum age for electors 
in congressional elections. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); 
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).


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Sec. 9. Age as a qualification of the Representative.

    \2\No 
Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained
to the Age of twenty five Years, * * *



<> * * * 
and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, * * *

  A Member-elect not being of the required age, was not enrolled by the 
Clerk and he did not take the oath until he had reached the required age 
(I, 418).


<> * * * 
and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which 
he shall be chosen.

  Henry Ellenbogen, Pa., had not been a citizen for seven years when 
elected to the 73d Congress, nor when the term commenced on March 4, 
1933. He was sworn at the beginning of the second session on January 3, 
1934, when a citizen for seven and one-half years (see H. Rept. 1431 and 
H. Res. 370, 73d Cong.). A native of South Carolina who had been abroad 
during the Revolution and on his return had not resided in the country 
seven years, was held to be qualified as a citizen (I, 420). A woman who 
forfeited her citizenship through marriage to a foreign subject and 
later resumed it through naturalization less than seven years before her 
election, was held to fulfill the constitutional requirement as to 
citizenship and entitled to a seat in the House (VI, 184). A Member who 
had long been a resident of the country, but who could not produce 
either the record of the court nor his final naturalization papers, was 
nevertheless retained in his seat by the House (I, 424).


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bia for years as a newspaper correspondent and maintenance there of church 
membership were not considered to outweigh payment of poll and income 
taxes, ownership of real estate, and a record for consistent voting in 
the district from which elected (VI, 55), and in the same case excuse 
from jury duty in the District of Columbia on a plea of citizenship in 
the State from which elected and exercise of incidental rights of such 
citizenship, were accepted as evidence of inhabitancy (VI, 55).
  The meaning of the word ``inhabitant'' and its relation to citizenship 
has been discussed (I, 366, 434; VI, 174), and the House has held that a 
mere sojourner in a State was not qualified as an inhabitant (I, 369), 
but a contestant was found to be an actual inhabitant of the State 
although for sufficient reason his family resided in another State (II, 
1091). Residence abroad in the service of the Government does not 
destroy inhabitancy as understood under the Constitution (I, 433). One 
holding an office and residing with his family for a series of years in 
the District of Columbia exclusively was held disqualified to sit as a 
Member from the State of his citizenship (I, 434); and one who had his 
business and a residence in the District of Columbia and had no business 
or residence in Virginia was held ineligible to a seat from that State 
(I, 436). One who had a home in the District of Columbia, and had 
inhabited another home in Maryland a brief period before his election, 
but had never been a citizen of any other State, was held to be 
qualified (I, 432). Also a Member who had resided a portion of a year in 
the District of Columbia, but who had a home in the State of his 
citizenship and was actually living there at the time of the election, 
was held to be qualified (I, 435). In the Updike v. Ludlow case, 71st 
Congress, it was decided that residence in the District of Colum



Sec. 12. Qualifications other than those 
specified by the Constitution.

  Whether Congress  may by law establish qualifications 
other than those prescribed by the Constitution has been the subject of 
much discussion (I, 449, 451, 457, 458, 478); but in a case wherein a 
statute declared a Senator convicted of a certain offense ``forever 
thereafter incapable of holding any office of honor, trust, or profit 
under the Government of the United States,'' the Supreme Court expressed 
the opinion that the final judgment of conviction did not operate, ipso 
facto, to vacate the seat or compel the Senate to expel or regard the 
Senator as expelled by force alone of the judgment (II, 1282). Whether 
the House or Senate alone may set up qualifications other than those of 
the Constitution has also been a subject often discussed (I, 414, 415, 
443, 457, 458, 469, 481, 484). The Senate has always declined to act on 
the supposition that it had such a power (I, 443, 483), and during the 
stress of civil war the House of Representatives declined to exercise 
the power, even under circumstances of great provocation (I, 449, 465). 
But later, in one instance, the House excluded a Member-elect on the 
principal argument that it might itself prescribe a qualification not 
specified in the Constitution (I, 477). The matter was extensively 
debated in the 90th Congress in connection with the consideration of 
resolutions relating to the seating of Representative-elect Adam C. 
Powell of New York (H. Res. 1, Jan. 10, 1967, p. 14; H. Res. 278, Mar. 
1, 1967, p. 4997). In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), the 
Supreme Court found that the power of Congress to judge the 
qualifications of its Members was limited to an examination of the 
express qualifications stated in the Constitution.


  It has been decided by the House and Senate that no State may add to 
the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution (I, 414-416, 632); and 
the Supreme Court so ruled in U.S. Term Limits, Inc., v. Thornton, 514 
U.S. 779 (1995). There, the Court held that States may not ``change, add 
to, or diminish'' constitutional qualifications of Members, striking 
down a State statute prohibiting three-term incumbents from appearing on 
the general election ballot. For qualifications generally, see Deschler, 
ch. 7, Sec. Sec. 9-14.


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  For expulsion of seated Members, which requires a two-thirds vote 
rather than a majority vote, see article I, section 5, clause 2 
(Sec. 62, infra).




Sec. 13. Minority candidate not seated when 
returned Member is disqualified.

  Both Houses of  Congress have decided, when a Member-
elect is found to be disqualified, that the person receiving the next 
highest number of votes is not entitled to the seat (I, 323, 326, 450, 
463, 469; VI, 58, 59), even in a case wherein reasonable notice of the 
disqualification was given to the electors (I, 460). In the event of the 
death of a Member-elect, the candidate receiving the next highest number 
of votes is not entitled to the seat (VI, 152).





Sec. 14. The old provision for 
apportionment of Representatives and direct taxes.

  \3\[Representatives and direct  Taxes shall be 
apportioned among the several States which may be included within this 
Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined 
by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to 
Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three 
fifths of all other Persons.] * * *



* * * The actual <> Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the 
first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every 
subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law 
direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every 
thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; 
and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire 
shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode- Island and 
Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersey 
four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland 

[[Page 9]]

six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia
three.

  The part of this clause relating to the mode of apportionment of 
Representatives was changed after the Civil War by section 2 of the 14th 
amendment and, as to taxes on incomes without apportionment, by the 16th 
amendment.

  The census has been taken decennially since 1790, and, with the 
exception of 1920, was followed each time by reapportionment. In the 
First Congress the House had 65 Members; increased after each census, 
except that of 1840, until 435 was reached in 1913 (VI, 39, 40). The Act 
of June 18, 1929 (46 Stat. 26), as amended by the Act of November 15, 
1941 (55 Stat. 761), provides for reapportionment of the existing number 
(435) among the States following each new census (VI, 41-43; see 2 
U.S.C. 2a). Membership was temporarily increased to 436, then to 437, 
upon admission of Alaska (72 Stat. 345) and Hawaii (73 Stat. 8), but 
returned to 435 on January 3, 1963, the effective date of the 
reapportionment under the 18th Decennial census.

  Under the later but not the earlier practice, bills relating to the 
census and apportionment are not privileged for consideration (I, 305-
308; VI, 48, VII, 889; Apr. 8, 1926, p. 7147).




Sec. 16. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 
393 (1857); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869); Scholey 
v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331 (1874); De Treville v. Smalls, 98 U.S. 
517 (1878); Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404 (1886); 
Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. (Income Tax case), 157 U.S. 429 
(1895); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Rehearing), 158 U.S. 601 
(1895); Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363 (1904); Flint v. Stone 
Tracy Co. (Corporation Tax cases), 220 U.S. 107 (1911); Eisner v. 
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 
345 (1921); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992); Utah v. 
Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002).





Sec. 17. Writs for elections to vacancies in 
representation.

  \4\When vacancies  happen in the Representation from any State, the 
Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such 
Vacancies.



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  Vacancies are caused by death, resignation, declination, withdrawal, 
or by action of the House in declaring a vacancy as existing or causing 
one by expulsion. When a vacancy occurs, or when a new Member is sworn, 
the Speaker announces the resulting adjustment in the whole number of 
the House pursuant to clause 5(d) of rule XX (see Sec. 1024b, infra). 
Clause 5(c) of rule XX permits the House to operate with a provisional 
number of the House if the House is without a quorum due to catastrophic 
circumstances (see Sec. 1024a, infra). In extraordinary circumstances, 
section 8 of title 2, United States Code, prescribes special election 
rules to expedite the filling of vacancies in representation of the 
House.



Sec. 18. Vacancy from death.

  It was long the  practice to 
notify the executive of the State when a vacancy was caused by the death 
of a Member during a session (II, 1198-1202); but it is now the practice 
for State authorities to take cognizance of the vacancies without 
notice. When a Member dies while not in attendance in the House or 
during a recess, the House is sufficiently informed of the vacancy by 
the credentials of the successor, when they set forth the fact of the 
death (I, 568). The death of a Member-elect creates a vacancy, although 
no certificate may have been awarded (I, 323), and in such a case the 
candidate having the next highest number of votes may not receive the 
credentials (I, 323; VI 152). The Clerk announces any vacancy created by 
the death of a Member-elect following the call of the roll at the 
beginning of a Congress (Jan. 3, 2021, p. _; Jan. 3, 2023, p. _). A 
Member whose seat was contested having died, the House did not admit a 
claimant with credentials until contestant's claim was settled (I, 326); 
where a contestant died after a report in his favor, the House unseated 
the returned Member and declared the seat vacant (II, 965), and in a 
later case the contestant having died, the committee did not recommend 
to the House a resolution it had agreed to declaring he had not been 
elected (VI, 112). In the 93d Congress, when two Members-elect were 
passengers on a missing aircraft and were presumed dead, the Speaker 
laid before the House documentary evidence of the presumptive death of 
one Member-elect and the declaration of a vacancy by the Governor, as 
well as evidence that the status of the other Member-elect had not been 
officially determined by State authority. The House then adopted a 
privileged resolution declaring vacant the seat of the latter Member-
elect to enable the Governor of that State to call a special election 
(Jan. 3, 1973, p. 15). For further discussion, see Sec. 23, infra.




Sec. 19. Vacancy from resignation.

  In recent practice  the 
Member informs the House by letter that a resignation has been sent to 
the State executive (II, 1167-1176) and this is satisfactory evidence of 
the resignation (I, 567). Both a letter to the Speaker and a copy of the 
letter to the State executive are laid before the House. However, 
Members have resigned by letter to the House alone, it being presumed 
that the Member would also notify the Governor (VI, 226). Where a Member 
resigned by letter to the House the Speaker was authorized to notify the 
Governor (Nov. 27, 1944, p. 8450; July 12, 1957, p. 11536; Sept. 1, 
1976, p. 28887). If a Member does not inform the House, the State 
executive may do so (II, 1193, 1194; VI, 232). The House has learned of 
a Member's resignation by means of the credentials of the successor (II, 
1195, 1356). Where the fact of a Member's resignation has not appeared 
either from the credentials of the successor or otherwise, the Clerk has 
been ordered to make inquiry (II, 1209) or the House has ascertained the 
vacancy from information given by other Members (II, 1208).



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Dec. 15, 1997, p. 26709; June 5, 2001, p. 9882; Nov. 27, 2001, 
p. 23006; Jan. 27, 2003, pp. 1750, 1751). It has been possible even for 
a Member to resign a seat in the House to be effective on a date 
following the anticipated date of a special election that might fill the 
vacancy thereby created (Deschler, ch. 8, Sec. 9.3). However, the State 
concerned must be willing to treat the prospective resignation as a 
constitutional predicate for the issuance of a writ of election to fill 
a vacancy. For examples of resignation letters indicating that the State 
executive took cognizance of a prospective resignation, see January 8, 
1952 (p. 14) (New York); July 9, 1991 (p. 17301) (Virginia); June 5, 
2001 (p. 9882) (Florida), and January 27, 2003 (p. 1751) (Texas). When 
the Governor of Oklahoma received a prospective resignation from one of 
its Members, the State provided by statute (enrolled Senate Bill Number 
7X) for the holding of a special election before the effective date of 
the resignation (Feb. 28, 2002, p. 2245).
  It has been established that a Member or Senator may select a future 
date for a resignation to take effect and, until the arrival of that 
date, participate in the proceedings (II, 1220-1225, 1228, 1229; VI, 
227, 228; 

  For the State to take cognizance of a prospective resignation, it must 
have assurances that there is no possibility of withdrawal (or 
modification). In one case a Member who had resigned was not permitted 
by the House to withdraw the resignation (II, 1213). However, the House 
has allowed withdrawal in the case of defective resignation; that is, in 
which the Member had not actually transmitted the letter of resignation 
(VI, 229), or had transmitted it to an improper state official (Oct. 9, 
1997, p. 22020). A Member may include in a letter of prospective 
resignation a statement of intention that the resignation be 
``irrevocable'' in order to allay any concern about the prospect of 
withdrawal (June 5, 2001, p. 9882).

  Acceptance of the resignation of a Member from the House is 
unnecessary (VI, 65, 226), and the refusal of a Governor to accept a 
resignation cannot operate to continue membership in the House (VI, 65). 
Only in a single exceptional case has the House taken action in the 
direction of accepting a resignation (II, 1214). Sometimes Members who 
have resigned have been reelected to the same House and taken seats (II, 
1210, 1212, 1256; Jan. 28, 1965 and June 16, 1965, pp. 1452, 13774; Jan. 
6, 1983 and Feb. 22, 1983, pp. 114, 2575). A Member-elect may resign 
before taking the oath (II, 1230-1232).


[[Page]]

  A letter of resignation is presented as privileged (II, 1167-1176); 
but a resolution to permit a Member to withdraw a resignation was not so 
treated (II, 1213). The Speaker, having been elected Vice President and 
a Representative of the succeeding Congress at the same election, 
transmitted to the Governor of his State his resignation as a Member-
elect (VI, 230, 453). A Member of the House, having been nominated and 
confirmed as Vice President pursuant to the 25th amendment, submitted a 
letter of resignation as a Representative to the Governor of his State, 
and a copy of his letter of resignation was laid before the House by the 
Speaker following the completion of a joint meeting for his swearing as 
Vice President (Dec. 6, 1973, p. 39927).



Sec. 20. Vacancy from declination.

  A Member who  has been 
elected to a seat may decline to accept it, and in such a case the House 
informed the executive of the State of the vacancy (II, 1234). The House 
has decided an election contest against a returned Member who had not 
appeared to claim the seat (I, 638). In one instance a Member-elect who 
had been convicted in the courts did not appear during the term (IV, 
4484, footnote). On November 7, 1998, less than a week after his re-
election as Representative from Georgia, Speaker Gingrich announced that 
he would not be a candidate for Speaker in the 106th Congress and that 
he would resign his seat as a Member of the 106th Congress. Although the 
letter of ``withdrawal'' was tendered on November 22, the Governor did 
not attempt to call a special election until after the term began on 
January 3, 1999 (Jan. 6, 1999, p. 42). A Member has notified the Speaker 
and the Governor in one Congress of an intention not to take a seat in 
the next Congress (Jan. 6, 2009, pp. 2, 3; Jan. 3, 2013, p. 21; Jan. 3, 
2013, p. 21; Jan. 6, 2015, p. 29).




Sec. 21. Vacancy by withdrawal.

  At the time  of the secession 
of several States, Members of the House from those States withdrew (II, 
1218). In the Senate, in cases of such withdrawals, the Secretary was 
directed to omit the names of the Senators from the roll (II, 1219), and 
the act of withdrawal was held to create a vacancy that the legislature 
might recognize (I, 383).




Sec. 22. Vacancy by action of the House.

  If the House,  by 
its action in a question of election or otherwise, creates a vacancy, 
the Speaker is directed to notify the Executive of the State (I, 502, 
709, 824; II, 1203-1205; Mar. 1, 1967, p. 5038; Jan. 3, 1973, p. 15; 
Feb. 24, 1981, pp. 2916-18). A resolution as to such notification is 
presented as a question of privilege (III, 2589), as is a resolution 
declaring a vacancy in which a Member-elect was unable to take the oath 
of office or to decline the office because of an incapacitating illness 
(Precedents (Smith), ch. 7, Sec. 6.8).



[[Page 13]]

Congressional District and therefore only 434 certificates of election 
had been received (Jan. 3, 2021, p. _). Soon thereafter, the state of 
New York certified the election results for its Twenty-Second 
Congressional District and the Member-elect appeared in the Chamber to 
take the oath of office (Feb. 11, 2021, p. _).


Sec. 22a. Vacancy by lack of election 
results.

  A vacancy exists  where the Clerk does not receive a certificate of election 
from a State and there is no election contest or any person seeking to 
be sworn as a Member, and the Clerk announces such lack of certification 
when announcing the official roll of Members immediately prior to the 
call of the roll at the beginning of a Congress (Jan. 3, 2019, p. _; 
Jan. 3, 2021, p. _). On opening day of the 116th Congress the Clerk 
announced that no certificate of election had been received from the 
state of North Carolina with respect to its Ninth Congressional District 
and therefore only 434 certificates of election had been received (Jan. 
3, 2019, p. _). No election contest was filed and no person sought to 
take the oath of office. Soon thereafter, the state ordered a special 
election for the district and a letter from the state board of elections 
informing the Clerk of the dates of such election was laid before the 
House (Mar. 14, 2019, p. _). On the opening day of the 117th Congress 
the Clerk announced that no certificate of election had been received 
from the state of New York with respect to its Twenty-Second




Sec. 23. Questions as to the existence of a 
vacancy.

  The House declines  to give prima facie effect to credentials, even though they 
be regular in form, until it has ascertained whether or not the seat is 
vacant (I, 322, 518, 565, 569), and a person returned as elected at a 
second election was unseated on ascertainment that another person had 
actually been chosen at the first election (I, 646). Where a Member was 
reelected to the House, although at the time of the election he had been 
unaccounted for for several weeks following the disappearance of the 
plane on which he was a passenger, the Governor of the State from which 
he was elected transmitted his certificate to the House in the regular 
fashion. When the Member-elect was still missing at the time the new 
Congress convened, and circumstances were such that other passengers on 
the missing plane had been presumed dead following judicial inquiries in 
the State where the plane was lost, the House declared the seat vacant 
(H. Res. 1, 93d Cong., Jan. 3, 1973, p. 15). In the 108th Congress the 
House codified in clause 5 of rule XX its practice of accounting for 
vacancies (sec. 2(l), H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 2003, p. 7).




Sec. 24. Functions of the State executive 
in filling vacancies.

  The term ``vacancy''  as occurring in this paragraph of the 
Constitution has been examined in relation to the functions of the State 
executive (I, 312, 518). A Federal law empowers the States and 
Territories to provide by law the times of elections to fill vacancies 
(I, 516; 2 U.S.C. 8); but an election called by a governor in pursuance 
of constitutional authority was held valid although no State law 
prescribed the time, place, or manner of such election (I, 517). Where 
two candidates had an equal number of votes, the governor did not issue 
credentials to either, but ordered a new election after they had waived 
their respective claims (I, 555). A candidate elected for the 104th 
Congress was appointed by the Governor to fill a vacancy for the 
remainder of the 103d Congress pursuant to a State law requiring the 
Governor to appoint the candidate who won the election to the 104th 
Congress. In that case the House authorized the Speaker to administer 
the oath to the Member-elect and referred the question of his final 
right to the seat in the 103d Congress to the Committee on House 
Administration (Precedents (Wickham), ch. 2, Sec. 3.9). For a discussion 
of a State election to fill a prospective vacancy of the House, see 
Sec. 19, supra.



[[Page 14]]



Sec. 25. Term of a Member elected to fill a vacancy.

    A 
Member elected to fill a vacancy serves no longer time than the 
remainder of the term of the Member whose place he fills (I, 3). For the 
compensation and allowances of such Members, see Sec. 87, infra.





Sec. 26. House chooses the Speaker and other 
officers.

    \5\The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker 
and other Officers; * * *


  The officers of the House are the Speaker, who has always been one of 
its Members and whose term as Speaker must expire with the term as a 
Member; and the Clerk, Sergeant-at-Arms, Chief Administrative Officer, 
and Chaplain (I, 187), no one of whom has ever been chosen from the 
sitting membership of the House and who continue in office until their 
successors are chosen and qualified (I, 187). In one case the officers 
continued through the entire Congress succeeding that in which they were 
elected (I, 244, 263). Former officers include Doorkeeper (abolished by 
the 104th Congress, see Sec. 663b, infra) and Postmaster (abolished 
during the 102d Congress, see Sec. 668, infra). The House formerly 
provided by special rule that the Clerk should continue in office until 
another should be chosen (I, 187, 188, 235, 244). Currently, certain 
statutes impose on the officers duties that contemplate their 
continuance (I, 14, 15; 2 U.S.C. 5602).



Sec. 27. Election of a Speaker.

  The Speaker, who  was at 
first elected by ballot, has been chosen viva voce by surname in 
response to a call of the roll since 1839 (I, 187). The Speaker is 
elected by a majority of Members-elect voting by surname, a quorum being 
present (I, 216; VI, 24; Jan. 7, 1997, p. 117; Jan. 6, 2023, p. _). 
Because the House is composed of Members elected by the people of the 
several States, and because the House elects its Speaker, the Delegates-
elect and the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico are not 
constitutionally qualified to vote in the House for Speaker (Precedents 
(Wickham), ch. 1, Sec. 4.2; Jan. 3, 2017, p. 33). The Clerk appoints 
tellers for this election (I, 217). Ultimately, the House, and not the 
Clerk, decides by what method it shall elect the Speaker (I, 210). On 
two occasions, by special rules, Speakers were chosen by a plurality of 
votes; but in each case the House by majority vote adopted a resolution 
declaring the result (I, 221, 222). The House has declined to choose a 
Speaker by lot (I, 221).


  The motion to proceed to the election of a Speaker is privileged (I, 
212, 214; VIII, 3383), and debatable unless the previous question is 
ordered (I, 213). Relying on the Act of June 1, 1789 (2 U.S.C. 25), the 
Clerk recognized for nominations for Speaker as being of higher 
constitutional privilege than a resolution to postpone the election of a 
Speaker and instead provide for the election of a Speaker pro tempore 
pending the disposition of certain ethics charges against the nominee of 
the majority party (Jan. 7, 1997, p. 115). The Clerk has recognized for 
nominations for Speaker of a previously nominated Member-elect after the 
House failed to choose a Speaker pursuant to a call of the roll (Jan. 3, 
2023, p. _). On several occasions the choice of a Speaker has been 
delayed for several weeks by contests (I, 222; V, 5356, 6647, 6649; VI, 
24). The contest over the election of a Speaker in 1923 was resolved 
after a procedure for the adoption of rules for the 68th Congress had 
been presented (VI, 24). In 2023 the election of a Speaker for the 118th 
Congress was resolved after 15 ballots (Jan. 6, 2023, p. _). In 1860 the 
voting for Speaker proceeded slowly, being interspersed with debate (I, 
223), and in one instance the House asked candidates for Speaker to 
state their views before proceeding to election (I, 218).



Sec. 28. Vacancies in the Office of 
Speaker.

  A proposition  to elect a Speaker is in order at any time a vacancy exists 
and presents a question of the highest privilege (VIII, 3383). In the 
108th Congress the House adopted clause 8(b)(3) of rule I, under which 
the Speaker is required to deliver to the Clerk a list of Members in the 
order in which each shall act as Speaker pro tempore in the case of a 
vacancy in the Office of Speaker (sec. 2(a), H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 2003, p. 
7). The Speaker delivered to the Clerk the first such letter on February 
10, 2003 (Mar. 13, 2003, p. 6118). A resolution declaring vacant the 
Office of Speaker is presented as a matter of high constitutional 
privilege (VI, 35). In the 116th and 117th Congresses, the House had in 
place a rule restricting the privilege, but such provision was repealed 
in the 118th Congress. Upon a vacancy in the Office of Speaker, the 
House elects a new Speaker either viva voce following nominations (in 
the case in which a Speaker has died between sessions of Congress or 
resigned) or by resolution (in the case in which a Speaker has died 
during a session of Congress). For example, in the case in which the 
Speaker had died between sessions of Congress, the Clerk at the next 
session called the House to order, ascertained the presence of a quorum, 
and then the House proceeded to elect a successor viva voce following 
nominations (I, 234; Jan. 10, 1962, p. 5). In a case in which the 
Speaker died during a session of Congress, but not while the House was 
sitting, the Clerk on the following day called the House to order and 
the Speaker's successor was elected by resolution (June 4, 1936, p. 
9016; Sept. 16, 1940, p. 12231). Form of resolution offered on death of 
a Speaker (Sept. 16, 1940, p. 12232; Jan. 10, 1962, p. 9) and of a 
former Speaker (VIII, 3564; Mar. 7, 1968, p. 5742; H. Res. 328, Jan. 25, 
1994, p. 89; H. Res. 418, Feb. 8, 2000, p. 834; H. Res. 383, Oct. 22, 
2013, p. 16056; H. Res. 254, May 12, 2015, pp. 6455, 6492).


  Speakers have resigned by addressing the House (I, 231, 233; 
Precedents (Wickham), ch. 6, Sec. 1.2), by calling a Member to the Chair 
and tendering the resignation verbally from the floor (I, 225), by 
tendering the resignation during recognition under a question of 
personal privilege (Precedents (Wickham), ch. 6, Sec. 7.4), or by 
sending a letter that the Clerk reads to the House at the beginning of a 
new session (I, 232). In cases in which a Speaker resigned ``on the 
election of my successor'' (May 31, 1989, p. 10440; Precedents 
(Wickham), ch. 6, Sec. 1.2), he entertained nominations for Speaker and, 
following the roll call, declared the winner of the election ``duly 
elected Speaker'' (Precedents (Wickham), ch. 1, Sec. 4.6; Precedents 
(Wickham), ch. 6, Sec. 1.2). In one instance a Speaker resigned on the 
last day of the Congress, and the House unanimously adopted a motion to 
elect a successor for the day (I, 225). When the Speaker resigns no 
action of the House excusing him from service is taken (I, 232). 
Instance wherein the Speaker, following a vote upon an essential 
question indicating a change in the party control of the House, 
announced that under the circumstances it was incumbent upon the Speaker 
to resign or to recognize for a motion declaring vacant the Office of 
Speaker (VI, 35).

  In the 108th Congress the House adopted clause 8(b)(3) of rule I, 
under which the Speaker is required to deliver to the Clerk a list of 
Members in the order in which each shall act as Speaker pro tempore in 
the case of a vacancy in the Office of Speaker (sec. 2(a), H. Res. 5, 
Jan. 7, 2003, p. 7). The Speaker delivered to the Clerk the first such 
letter on February 10, 2003 (Mar. 13, 2003, p. 6118).



Sec. 29. Power of House to elect its officers as related to 
law.

    The effect of a law to regulate the action of the House in 
choosing its own officers has been discussed (IV, 3819), and such a law 
has been considered of doubtful validity (V, 6765, 6766) in theory and 
practice (I, 241, 242). The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 
U.S.C. 5501) authorizes the Speaker to fill temporary vacancies in the 
offices of Clerk, Sergeant-at-Arms, Chief Administrative Officer, and 
Chaplain. For a history of the Speaker's exercise of such authority, see 
Sec. 640, infra;  and, for further information on the elections of 
officers, see Deschler, ch. 6.



* * * <> and 
[the House of Representatives] shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.



Sec. 30. Election of Clerk in relation to business.

    It has 
been held that the Act of June 1, 1789 (2 U.S.C. 25) binds the House to 
elect a Clerk before proceeding to business (I, 237, 241; contrast, I, 
242, 244). When a vacancy arises in the Office of Clerk during a 
session, business has intervened before the election of a new Clerk (I, 
239).


  In 1868 the Senate ceased in its rules to describe the House, acting 
in an impeachment, as the ``grand inquest of the nation'' (III, 2126). 
See also art. II, sec. 4 (Sec. 173, infra); Deschler, ch. 14.

  A Federal court having subpoenaed certain evidence gathered by a 
committee of the House in an impeachment inquiry, the House adopted a 
resolution granting such limited access to the evidence as would not 
infringe upon its sole power of impeachment (Aug. 22, 1974, p. 30047).


  Until the law expired on June 30, 1999, an independent counsel was 
required to advise the House of any substantial and credible information 
that may constitute grounds for impeachment of an officer under 
investigation (28 U.S.C. 595(c)). For a description of impeachment 
proceedings prompted by a communication from an independent counsel, see 
Sec. 176, infra.




Sec. 32. Numbers, terms, and votes 
of Senators.

  Section 3. \1\[The Senate  of the United States shall be composed of two Senators 
from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and 
each Senator shall have one Vote.]



  This provision was changed by the 17th amendment.




Sec. 33. Division of the Senate into 
classes.

  \2\Immediately  after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first 
Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. 
The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the 
Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of 
the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of 
the <> sixth Year, 
so that one-third may be chosen every second Year; [and if Vacancies 
happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the 
Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary 
Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then 
fill such Vacancies.]



  That part of the above paragraph in brackets was changed by the 17th 
amendment.




Sec. 35. Qualifications of Senators.

  \3\No Person  shall be a 
Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been 
nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when 
elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.



  In 1794 the Senate decided that Albert Gallatin was disqualified, not 
having been a citizen nine years although he had served in the war of 
Independence and was a resident of the country when the Constitution was 
formed (I, 428); and in 1849 that James Shields was disqualified, not 
having been a citizen for the required time (I, 429). But in 1870 the 
Senate declined to examine as to H. R. Revels, a citizen under the 
recently adopted 14th amendment (I, 430). As to inhabitancy the Senate 
seated one who, being a citizen of the United States, had been an 
inhabitant of the State from which he was appointed for less than a year 
(I, 437). Also one who, while stationed in a State as an army officer 
had declared his intention of making his home in the State, was admitted 
by the Senate (I, 438). A Senator who at the time of his election was 
actually residing in the District of Columbia as an officeholder, but 
who voted in his old home and had no intent of making the District his 
domicile, was held to be qualified (I, 439).




Sec. 36. The Vice President; voting.

  \4\The Vice  President 
of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no 
Vote, unless they be equally divided.



  The right of the Vice President to vote has been construed to extend 
to questions relating to the organization of the Senate (V, 5975), the 
election of officers of the Senate (V, 5972-5974), the title of a 
claimant to a seat (V, 5976, 5977), or the confirmation of a Cabinet 
nominee (Feb. 6, 2017, p. 2010). The Senate has declined to make a rule 
relating to the vote of the Vice President (V, 5974).




Sec. 37. Choice of President pro tempore and other officers 
of the Senate.

    \5\The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and 
also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or 
when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.



-  \6\The Senate <> shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. 
When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. 
When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice 
shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence 
of two thirds of the Members present.

  In the 107th Congress the Senate elected two Presidents of the Senate 
pro tempore for different periods when the majority of the Senate 
shifted after inauguration of the Vice President (S. Res. 3, Jan. 3, 
2001, p. 7).


  For the exclusive power of the Senate to try impeachment under the 
United States Constitution, see Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 293 
(1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 668 (1937). See also Mississippi v. 
Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867) (dictum). For the 
nonjusticiability of a claim that a Senate impeachment rule (XI) 
violates the impeachment trial clause by delegating to a committee of 12 
Senators the responsibility to receive evidence, hear testimony, and 
report to the Senate thereon, see Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 
(1993). For a discussion of Senate impeachment procedures, see 
Sec. Sec. 608-20, infra.




Sec. 41. Judgment in cases of 
impeachment.

  \7\Judgment in  Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to 
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office 
of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party 
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, 
Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.



  There has been discussion as to whether or not the Constitution 
requires both removal and disqualification on conviction (III, 2397); 
but in the case of Pickering, the Senate decreed only removal (III, 
2341). In the case of Humphreys, judgment of both removal and 
disqualification was pronounced (III, 2397). In the Ritter case, it was 
first held that upon conviction of the respondent, judgment of removal 
required no vote, following automatically from conviction under article 
II, section 4 (Apr. 17, 1936, p. 5607). In the 99th Congress, having 
tried to conviction the first impeachment case against a Federal 
district judge since 1936, the Senate ordered his removal from office 
(Oct. 9, 1986, p. 29870). In the 101st Congress, two other Federal 
district judges were removed from office following their convictions in 
the Senate (Oct. 20, 1989, p. 25335; Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27101). In the 
111th Congress, a Federal district judge was removed from office 
following his conviction in the Senate (Dec. 8, 2010, p. 19349). For a 
further discussion of judgments in cases of impeachment, see Sec. 619, 
infra.




Sec. 42. Times, places, and manner of 
elections of Representatives and Senators.

  Section 4. \1\The Times,  Places and Manner of 
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed 
in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any 
time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the places of 
chusing Senators.


  The relative powers of the Congress and the States under this 
paragraph have been the subject of much discussion (I, 311, 313, 507, 
footnote); but Congress has in fact fixed by law the time of elections 
(I, 508; VI, 66; 2 U.S.C. 7), and has controlled the manner to the 
extent of prescribing a ballot or voting machine (II, 961; VI, 150; 2 
U.S.C. 9). When a State delegated to a municipality the power to 
regulate the manner of holding an election, a question arose (II, 975). 
A question has arisen as to whether or not a State, in the absence of 
action by Congress, might make the time of election of Members of 
Congress contingent on the time of the State election (I, 522). This 
paragraph gives Congress the power to protect the right to vote in 
primaries in which they are an integral part of the election process. 
United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930); United States v. 
Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). Congress may legislate under this 
paragraph to protect the exercise of the franchise in congressional 
elections. Ex parte Siebolt, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Ex parte Yarbrough, 
110 U.S. 651 (1884).



Sec. 43. Functions of a State legislature in 
fixing time, etc., of elections.

  The meaning of  the word ``legislature'' in this 
clause of the Constitution has been the subject of discussion (II, 856), 
as to whether or not it means a constitutional convention as well as a 
legislature in the commonly accepted meaning of the word (I, 524). The 
House has sworn in Members chosen at an election the time, etc., of 
which was fixed by the schedule of a constitution adopted on that 
election day (I, 519, 520, 522). But the House held that where a 
legislature has been in existence a constitutional convention might not 
exercise the power (I, 363, 367). It has been argued generally that the 
legislature derives the power herein discussed from the Federal and not 
the State Constitution (II, 856, 947), and therefore that the State 
constitution might not in this respect control the State legislature 
(II, 1133). The House has sustained this view by its action (I, 525). 
But where the State constitution fixed a date for an election and the 
legislature had not acted, although it had the opportunity, the House 
held the election valid (II, 846). Title III of the Legislative Branch 
Appropriations Act, 2006, amended Federal election law to require States 
to hold special elections for the House within 49 days after a vacancy 
is announced by the Speaker in the extraordinary circumstance that 
vacancies in representation from the States exceed 100 (P.L. 109-55; 2 
U.S.C. 8).





Sec. 44. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Ex 
parte Clark, 100 U.S. 399 (1880); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 
(1884); In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888); Ohio v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 
(1916); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); United States  v. 
Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917); Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 
(1921); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); United States v. Classic, 
313 U.S. 299 (1941); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Roudebush 
v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); U.S. Term Limits, Inc., v. Thorton, 
514 U.S. 779 (1995); and Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997). In Public 
Law 91-285, Congress lowered the minimum age of voters in all Federal, 
State, and local elections from 21 to 18 years. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 
400 U.S. 112 (1970), the Supreme Court upheld the power of Congress 
under article I, section 4 and under section 5 of the 14th amendment to 
the Constitution to fix the age of voters in Federal elections, but held 
that the 10th amendment to the Constitution reserved to the States the 
power to establish voter age qualifications in State and local 
elections. The 26th amendment to the Constitution extended the right of 
persons 18 years of age or older to vote in elections held under State 
authority.





Sec. 45. Annual meeting of Congress.

  \2\[The Congress  shall 
assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the 
first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different 
Day.]


  This provision has been superseded by the 20th amendment.


  In the later but not the earlier practice (I, 5), before the 20th 
amendment, the fact that Congress had met once within the year did not 
make uncertain the constitutional mandate to meet on the first Monday of 
December (I, 6, 9-11). Early Congresses, convened either by proclamation 
or law on a day earlier than the constitutional day, remained in 
continuous session to a time beyond that day (I, 6, 9-11). But in the 
later view an existing session ends with the day appointed by the 
Constitution for the regular annual session (II, 1160); see Sec. 84, 
infra. Congress has frequently appointed by law a day for the meeting 
(I, 4, 5, 10-12, footnote; see also Sec. 243, infra).




Sec. 46. House the judge of elections, 
returns, and qualifications.

  Section 5. \1\Each  House shall be the Judge of the 
Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, * * *


  In judging the qualifications of its Members, the House may not add 
qualifications to those expressly stated in the United States 
Constitution. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). This phrase 
allows the House or Senate to deny the right to a seat without 
unlawfully depriving a State of its right to equal representation. Barry 
v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929). But a State 
may conduct a recount of votes without interfering with the authority of 
the House under this phrase. Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972). 
For discussion of the power of the House to judge elections, see 
Deschler, ch. 8, and Precedents (Smith), ch. 8 (elections), as well as 
Deschler, ch. 9 and Precedents (Smith), ch. 9 (election contests); for 
discussion of the power of the House to judge qualifications, see 
Deschler, ch. 7 and Precedents (Smith), ch. 7.

  The House has the same authority to determine the right of a Delegate 
to a seat that it has in the case of a Member (I, 423). The House may 
not delegate the duty of judging its elections to another tribunal (I, 
608), and the courts of a State have no role in such matters (II, 959). 
The House has once examined the relations of this power to the power to 
expel (I, 469).



Sec. 47. Power of judging as related to State 
laws as to returns.

  As nearly all  the laws governing the elections of 
Representatives in Congress are State laws, questions have often arisen 
as to the relation of this power of judging to those laws (I, 637). The 
House decided very early that the certificate of a State executive 
issued in strict accordance with State law does not prevent examination 
of the votes by the House and a reversal of the return (I, 637). The 
House has also held that it is not confined to the conclusions of 
returns made up in strict conformity to State law, but may examine the 
votes and correct the returns (I, 774); and the fact that a State law 
gives canvassers the right to reject votes for fraud and irregularities 
does not preclude the House from going behind the returns (II, 887). The 
highest court in one State (Colorado) has ruled that it lacked 
jurisdiction to pass upon a candidate's allegations of irregularities in 
a primary election and that the House had exclusive jurisdiction to 
decide such questions and to declare the rightful nominee (Sept. 23, 
1970, p. 33320).




Sec. 48. Power of judging as related to 
State laws as to acts of the voter.

  When the question  concerns not the acts of returning 
officers, but the act of the voter in voting, the House has found more 
difficulty in determining the proper exercise of its constitutional 
power. Although the House has always acted on the principle of giving 
expression to the intent of the voter (I, 575, 639, 641; II, 1090), it 
has held that a mandatory State law, even though arbitrary, may cause 
the rejection of a ballot on which the intent of the voter is plain (II, 
1009, 1056, 1077, 1078, 1091). See Deschler, ch. 8, Sec. 8.11, for 
discussion of distinction between directory State laws governing the 
conduct of election officials as to ballots, and mandatory laws 
regulating the conduct of voters.




Sec. 49. Power of House as related to 
constitutionality of State laws.

  Where the State  courts have upheld a State election 
law as constitutional the House does not ordinarily question the law 
(II, 856, 1071). But if there has been no such decision the House, in 
determining its election cases, has passed on the validity of State laws 
under State constitutions (II, 1011, 1134), and has acted on its 
decision that they were unconstitutional (II, 1075, 1126), but it is not 
the policy of the House to pass upon the validity of State election laws 
alleged to be in conflict with the State constitution (VI, 151).




Sec. 50. Effect of interpretation of State 
election laws by State courts.

  The courts of  a State do not have a direct role in 
judging the elections, qualifications, and returns of Representatives in 
Congress (II, 959), but where the highest State court has interpreted 
the State law the House has concluded that it should generally be 
governed by this interpretation (I, 645, 731; II, 1041, 1048), but does 
not consider itself bound by such interpretations (VI, 58), especially 
by a decision on an analogous but not the identical question in issue 
(II, 909); and where the alleged fraud of election judges was in issue, 
the acquittal of those judges in the courts was held not to be an 
adjudication binding on the House (II, 1019). For an illustration of a 
protracted election dispute lasting four months see House Report 99-58, 
culminating in House Resolution 146 of the 99th Congress (Precedents 
(Wickham), ch. 2, Sec. 3.8).




Sec. 51. Laws of Congress not binding on the 
House in its function of judging its elections.

  The statutes of  the United States 
provide specific methods for institution of a contest as to the title to 
a seat in the House (I, 678, 697-706) (2 U.S.C. 381-396), which the 
House regards as not of absolute binding force, but rather a prudent 
rule not to be departed from except for cause (I, 597, 719, 825, 833). 
It sometimes by resolution modifies the procedure prescribed by the law 
(I, 449, 600).





Sec. 51a. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: In re Loney, 134 U.S. 317 (1890); Reed v. 
County Commissioners, 277 U.S. 376 (1928); Barry v. United States ex 
rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 
(1972).





Sec. 52. The quorum.

  * * * and a  Majority of each [House] 
shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may 
adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance 
of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each 
House may provide.




Sec. 53. Interpretation of the Constitution 
as to number constituting a quorum.

  Out of conditions  arising between 1861 and 1891 the 
rule was established that a majority of the Members chosen and living 
constituted the quorum required by the Constitution (IV, 2885-2888); but 
later examination has resulted in a decision confirming in the House of 
Representatives the construction established in the Senate that a quorum 
consists of a majority of Senators duly chosen and sworn (I, 630; IV, 
2891-2894). So the decision of the House now is that after the House is 
once organized the quorum consists of a majority of those Members 
chosen, sworn, and living whose membership has not been terminated by 
resignation or by the action of the House (IV, 2889, 2890; VI, 638). 
Under clause 5(d) of rule XX, when a vacancy occurs or when a new Member 
is sworn, the Speaker announces the resulting adjustment in the whole 
number of the House (see Sec. 1024b, infra). Under clause 5(c) of rule 
XX, the House may establish a provisional number of the House where, due 
to catastrophic circumstances, a quorum fails to appear (sec. 2(h), H. 
Res. 5, Jan. 4, 2005, p. 43; see Sec. 1024a, infra).




Sec. 54. The theory of the quorum present; and 
the count by the Speaker.

  For many years  a quorum was determined only by noting the 
number of Members voting (IV, 2896, 2897), with the result that Members 
by refusing to vote could often break a quorum and obstruct the public 
business (II, 1034; IV, 2895, footnote; V, 5744). However, in 1890 
Speaker Reed directed the Clerk to enter on the Journal as part of the 
record of a yea-and-nay vote names of Members present but not voting, 
thereby establishing a quorum of record (IV, 2895). This decision, which 
was upheld by the Supreme Court (IV, 2904; United States v. Ballin, 144 
U.S. 1 (1892)), established the principle that a quorum present made 
valid any action by the House, although an actual quorum might not vote 
(I, 216, footnote; IV, 2932). Thenceforth the point of order as to a 
quorum was required to be that no quorum was present and not that no 
quorum had voted (IV, 2917). At the time of the establishment of this 
principle the Speaker revived the count by the Chair as a method of 
determining the presence of a quorum at a time when no record vote was 
ordered (IV, 2909). The Speaker has permitted his count of a quorum to 
be verified by tellers (IV, 2888), but has not conceded it as a right of 
the House to have tellers under the circumstances (IV, 2916; VI, 647-
651; VIII, 2369, 2436), claiming that the Chair might determine the 
presence of a quorum in such manner as he should deem accurate and 
suitable (IV, 2932). The Chair counts all Members in sight, whether in 
the cloak rooms, or within the bar (IV, 2970; VIII, 3120). Later, as the 
complement to the new view of the quorum, the early theory that the 
presence of a quorum was as necessary during debate or other business as 
on a vote was revived (IV, 2935-2949). Also, a line of rulings made 
under the old theory was overruled; and it was established that the 
point of no quorum might be made after the House had declined to verify 
a division by tellers or the yeas and nays (IV, 2918-2926). For a 
discussion of the Ballin decision and the Chair's count to determine a 
quorum, see House Practice, ch. 43, Sec. 5. In the 116th and 117th 
Congresses the House adopted a provision, effective during a designated 
public health emergency, to count for the purpose of establishing a 
quorum all Members voting or recording their presence by proxy (sec. 
3(b), H. Res. 965, May 15, 2020, p. _; sec. 3(s), H. Res. 8, Jan. 4, 
2021, p. _).




Sec. 55. Relations of the quorum to acts of the 
House.

  The absence of  a quorum having been disclosed, there must be a quorum of 
record before the House may proceed to business (IV, 2952, 2953; VI, 
624, 660, 662), and the point of no quorum may not be withdrawn even by 
unanimous consent after the absence of a quorum has been ascertained and 
announced by the Chair (IV, 2928-2931; VI, 657; Apr. 13, 1978, p. 10119; 
Sept. 25, 1984, p. 26778). But when an action has been completed, it is 
too late to make the point of order that a quorum was not present when 
it was done (IV, 2927; VI, 655). But where action requiring a quorum was 
taken in the ascertained absence of a quorum by ruling of a Speaker pro 
tempore, the Speaker on the next day ruled that the action was null and 
void (IV, 2964; see also VIII, 3161). But such absence of a quorum 
should appear from the Journal if a legislative act is to be vacated for 
such reason (IV, 2962), and where the assumption that a quorum was 
present when the House acted was uncontradicted by the Journal, it was 
held that this assumption might not be overthrown by expressions of 
opinion by Members individually (IV, 2961).


  Major revisions in the House rules concerning the necessity and 
establishment of a quorum occurred in the 94th, 95th, and 96th 
Congresses. Under the practice in the 93d Congress, for example, a point 
of no quorum would prevent the report of the chair of a Committee of the 
Whole (VI, 666); but in the 93d Congress clause 7 of rule XX (formerly 
clause 6 of rule XV) was adopted to provide that after the presence of a 
quorum is once ascertained on any day, a point of no quorum could not be 
entertained after the Committee had risen and pending the report of the 
chair to the House. Clause 7 of rule XX now specifically precludes a 
point of no quorum unless a question has been put to a vote. However, 
the Speaker retains the right to recognize a Member to move a call of 
the House at any time (but may, under clause 7(c) of rule XX, recognize 
for a call of the House after the previous question has been ordered 
only when the Speaker determines by actual count that a quorum is not 
present). A point of order of no quorum during debate only in the House 
does not lie independently under this clause of the Constitution because 
clause 7 of rule XX (formerly clause 6 of rule XV) is a proper exercise 
of the House's constitutional rulemaking authority that can be 
interpreted consistently with the requirement that a quorum be present 
to conduct business (as opposed to mere debate) (Sept. 8, 1977, pp. 
28123, 28124; Precedents (Wickham), ch. 5, Sec. 3.1).

  Before these changes to rule XX (formerly rule XV), a quorum was 
required at all times during the reading of the Journal (IV, 2732, 2733; 
VI, 625, 629) or messages from the President or the Senate (IV, 3522); 
but the modern practice would require the presence of a quorum only when 
the question is put on a pending motion or proposition in the House such 
as on a motion incident to the reading, amendment, or approval of the 
Journal or on the referral or other disposition of other papers read to 
the House. The practice in the Committee of the Whole is now governed by 
clause 6 of rule XVIII. No motion is in order on the failure of a quorum 
but the motions to adjourn and for a call of the House (IV, 2950; VI, 
680) and the motion to adjourn has precedence over the motion for a call 
of the House (VIII, 2642). A call of the House is in order under the 
Constitution before the adoption of the rules (IV, 2981). Those present 
on a call of the House may prescribe a fine as a condition on which an 
arrested Member may be discharged (IV, 3013, 3014), but this is rarely 
done. A quorum is not required on motions incidental to a call of the 
House (IV, 2994; VI, 681; Oct. 8, 1940, p. 13403; Oct. 8, 1968, p. 
30090). Adjournment sine die is in order notwithstanding the absence of 
a quorum if both Houses have already adopted a concurrent resolution 
providing for an adjournment sine die on that day (Oct. 18, 1972, p. 
37200).



Sec. 56. Relations of the quorum to organization 
of the House.

  At the time  of organization the two Houses inform one another of the 
appearance of the quorum in each, and the two Houses jointly inform the 
President (I, 198-203). A message from one House that its quorum has 
appeared is not delivered in the other until a quorum has appeared there 
also (I, 126). But at the beginning of a second session of a Congress 
the House proceeded to business, although a quorum had not appeared in 
the Senate (I, 126). At the beginning of a second session of a Congress 
unsworn Members-elect were taken into account in ascertaining the 
presence of a quorum (I, 175); however, at the beginning of the second 
session of the 87th Congress, the Clerk called the House to order, 
announced the death of Speaker Rayburn during the adjournment sine die, 
and did not call unsworn Members-elect or Members who had resigned 
during the hiatus to establish a quorum or elect a new Speaker (Jan. 10, 
1962, p. 5). In both Houses the oath has been administered to Members-
elect in the absence of a quorum (I, 174, 181, 182; VI, 22), although in 
one case the Speaker objected to such proceedings (II, 875). Prayer by 
the Chaplain is not business requiring the presence of a quorum and the 
Speaker declines to entertain a point of no quorum before prayer is 
offered (VI, 663; clause 7 of rule XX).





Sec. 57. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 190 (1880); 
United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Burton v. United States, 202 
U.S. 344 (1906).





Sec. 58. The House determines its rules.

    \2\Each House may 
determine the Rules of its Proceedings, * * *




Sec. 59. Power to make rules not impaired by 
rules or law.

  The power of  each House of Representatives to make its own rules may 
not be impaired or controlled by the rules of a preceding House (I, 187, 
210; V, 6002, 6743-6747), or by a law passed by a prior Congress (I, 82, 
245; IV, 3298, 3579; V, 6765, 6766). The House in adopting its rules 
may, however, incorporate by reference as a part thereof all applicable 
provisions of law that constituted the Rules of the House at the end of 
the preceding Congress (e.g., H. Res. 5, 95th Cong., Jan. 4, 1977, p. 
53) and has also incorporated provisions of concurrent resolutions that 
were intended to remain applicable under the Budget Act (e.g., H. Res. 
5, 107th Cong., Jan. 3, 2001, p. 25). Ordinary rights and functions of 
the House under the Constitution are exercised in accordance with the 
rules (III, 2567), and under later decisions questions of so-called 
constitutional privilege should also be considered in accordance with 
the rules (VI, 48; VII, 889; Apr. 8, 1926, p. 7147). But a law passed by 
an existing Congress with the concurrence of the House has been 
recognized by that House as of binding force in matters of procedure (V, 
6767, 6768). In exercising its constitutional power to change its rules 
the House may confine itself within certain limitations (V, 6756; VIII, 
3376); but the attempt of the House to deprive the Speaker of a vote as 
a Member by a rule was successfully resisted (V, 5966, 5967). Although 
the Act of June 1, 1789 (see 2 U.S.C. 25) requires the election of a 
Clerk before the House proceeds to business, the House has held that it 
may adopt rules before electing a Clerk (I, 245). Although the Speaker 
ceases to be an officer of the House with the expiration of a Congress, 
the Clerk, by old usage, continues in a new Congress (I, 187, 188, 235, 
244; see 2 U.S.C. 26). The House has adopted a rule before election of a 
Speaker (I, 94, 95); but in 1839 was deterred by the Act of June 1, 1789 
and the Constitution from adopting rules before the administration of 
the oath to Members-elect (I, 140). The earlier theory that an officer 
might be empowered to administer oaths by a rule of either House has 
been abandoned in later practice and the authority has been conferred by 
law (III, 1823, 1824, 2079, 2303, 2479; 2 U.S.C. 191).




Sec. 60. Procedure in the House before the 
adoption of rules.

  Before the adoption  of rules the House is governed by general 
parliamentary law, but Speakers have been inclined to give weight to the 
rules and precedents of the House in modifying the usual constructions 
of that law (V, 5604, 6758-6760; VIII, 3384; Jan. 3, 1953, p. 24; Jan. 
10, 1967, p. 14). The general parliamentary law as understood in the 
House is founded on Jefferson's Manual as modified by the practice of 
American legislative assemblies, especially of the House of 
Representatives (V, 6761-6763; Jan. 3, 1953, p. 24), but the provisions 
of the House's accustomed rules are not necessarily followed (V, 5509). 
Before the adoption of rules, the statutory enactments incorporated into 
the rules of the prior Congress as an exercise of the rulemaking power 
do not control the proceedings of the new House until it adopts rules 
incorporating those provisions (Jan. 22, 1971, p. 132).


  Before the adoption of rules, it is in order for any Member who is 
recognized by the Chair to offer a proposition relating to the order of 
business without asking consent of the House (IV, 3060). Relying on the 
Act of June 1, 1789 (2 U.S.C. 25), the Clerk recognized for nominations 
for Speaker as being of higher constitutional privilege than a 
resolution to postpone the election of a Speaker and instead provide for 
the election of a Speaker pro tempore pending the disposition of certain 
ethics charges against the nominee of the majority party (Jan. 7, 1997, 
p. 115). The Speaker may recognize the Majority Leader to offer an 
initial resolution providing for the adoption of the rules as a question 
of privilege in its own right (IV, 3060; Deschler, ch. 1, Sec. 8), even 
before recognizing another Member to offer as a question of privilege 
another resolution calling into question the constitutionality of that 
resolution (Speaker Foley, Precedents (Wickham), ch. 1, Sec. 6.9). The 
Speaker also may recognize a Member to offer for immediate consideration 
a special order providing for the consideration of a resolution adopting 
the rules (Precedents (Wickham), ch. 1, Sec. 6.10; Precedents (Wickham), 
ch. 5, Sec. 5.2). The resolution adopting rules for a Congress has 
included a special order of business for consideration of specified 
legislation (sec. 108, H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 463; sec. 3, H. Res. 
5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. 76; secs. 506-510, H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 2007, p. 30; 
sec. 5, H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 2009, p. 10; sec. 5(b), H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 
2017, p. 40; sec. 5, H. Res. 5, Jan. 9, 2023, p. _), as has a special 
order providing for the consideration of the resolution adopting the 
rules (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 2019, p. _). The Speaker held as not 
cognizable a point of order that a resolution adopting the rules of the 
House contained a provision that the House had no constitutional 
authority to adopt, stating that the House decides such issues by way of 
the question of consideration or disposition of the resolution (Speaker 
Hastert, Precedents (Wickham), ch. 1, Sec. 6.8).

  During debate on the resolution adopting rules, any Member may make a 
point of order that a quorum is not present based upon general 
parliamentary precedents, because the provisions of clause 7 of rule XX 
(formerly clause 6(e) of rule XV) prohibiting the Chair from 
entertaining such a point of order unless the question has been put on 
the pending proposition are not yet applicable (Precedents (Wickham), 
ch. 5, Sec. 5.3). Before adoption of rules, under general parliamentary 
law as modified by usage and practice of the House, an amendment may be 
subject to the point of order that it is not germane to the proposition 
to which offered (Jan. 3, 1969, p. 23). Before adoption of rules, the 
Speaker may maintain decorum by directing a Member who has not been 
recognized in debate beyond an allotted time to be removed from the well 
and by directing the Sergeant-at-Arms to present the mace as the 
traditional symbol of order (Precedents (Wickham), ch. 1, Sec. 6.5).

  The motion to commit is permitted after the previous question has been 
ordered on the resolution adopting the rules (V, 5604; Precedents 
(Wickham), ch. 5, Sec. 5.5; Jan. 3, 1991, p. 61; Precedents (Wickham), 
ch. 1, Sec. 6.4) but is not debatable (Jan. 7, 1997, p. 139). It is the 
prerogative of the minority to offer a motion to commit even before the 
adoption of the rules, but at that point the proponent need not qualify 
as opposed to the resolution (Jan. 3, 1991, p. 61; Jan. 4, 1995, p. 
457). Such a motion to commit is not divisible, but if it is agreed to 
and more than one amendment is reported back pursuant thereto, then 
separate votes may be had on the reported amendments (Jan. 5, 1993, p. 
98). The motions to refer and postpone have also been permitted upon the 
offering of a resolution adopting the rules, and before debate thereon, 
subject to the motion to lay on the table (e.g., Precedents (Wickham), 
ch. 5, Sec. 5.9; Jan. 4, 2021, p. _).



Sec. 61. Joint rules.

  The two Houses  of Congress adopted in 
the early years of the Government joint rules to govern their procedure 
in matters requiring concurrent action; but in 1876 these joint rules 
were abrogated (IV, 3430; V, 6782-6787). The most useful of their 
provision continued to be observed in practice, however (IV, 3430; V, 
6592).





Sec. 61a. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6 (1932); 
Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949); United States v. 
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950); Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 
(1963); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).





Sec. 62. Punishment and expulsion of 
Members.

  * * * [Each House may]  punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the 
Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.




Sec. 63. Punishment and expulsion, 
generally.

  Among the  punishments that the House may impose under this provision, 
the rules of the Committee on Ethics outline the following: (1) 
expulsion from the House; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; (4) fine; (5) 
denial or limitation of any right, power, privilege, or immunity of the 
Member if under the Constitution the House of Representatives may impose 
such denial or limitation; or (6) any other sanction determined by the 
Committee to be appropriate (rule 24, Committee on Ethics, 115th Cong.). 
Under rule 10 of the rules of that committee, a statement of alleged 
violation must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.


  In action for censure or expulsion, the House has discussed whether or 
not the principles of the procedure of the courts should be followed 
(II, 1255, 1264). The House, in a proceeding for expulsion, declined to 
give the Member a trial at the bar (II, 1275); but the Senate has 
permitted a counsel to appear at its bar (II, 1263), although it 
declined to grant a request for a specific statement of charges or 
compulsory process for witnesses (II, 1264). In one instance, pending 
consideration of a resolution to censure a Member, the Speaker informed 
him that he should retire (II, 1366), but this is not usual. Members or 
Senators, against whom resolutions have been pending, have participated 
in debate either by consent to make a personal explanation (II, 1656) or 
without question as to consent (II, 1246, 1253, 1269, 1286). A Member 
against whom a resolution of censure was pending was asked by the 
Speaker if he desired to be heard (VI, 236). However, after the House 
had voted to censure and the Member had been brought to the bar by the 
Sergeant-at-Arms to be censured, it was held that he might not then be 
heard (II, 1259). In the modern practice, the manager of the resolution 
proposing the punishment (who controls the entire hour) yields a portion 
of the time to the accused (Oct. 2, 1980, p. 28966; July 24, 2002, p. 
14309; Dec. 2, 2010, p. 18721).

  A resolution recommending reprimand, censure, or expulsion of a Member 
presents a question of privilege (II, 1254; III, 2648-2651; VI, 236; 
Dec. 9, 1913, pp. 584-86; July 26, 1990, p. 19717; May 22, 2007, p. 
13525; Oct. 23, 2007, p. 27966; July 31, 2008, pp. 17463, 17464; Jan. 
16, 2019, p. _; Apr. 20, 2021, p. _), as does one disapproving of the 
behavior of a Member inside (Sept. 15, 2009, p. 21662; Mar. 18, 2010, 
pp. 3847, 3848) or outside (Dec. 20, 2011, p. 21435; Sept. 25, 2019, p. 
_; Sept. 27, 2019, p. _; Oct. 21, 2019, p. _) the Chamber. If reported 
by the Committee on Ethics (or a derivation thereof), the resolution may 
be called up at any time after the committee has filed its report (Jan. 
21, 1997, p. 393; Dec. 2, 2010, p. 18721). A proposition to censure is 
not germane to a proposition to expel (VI, 236).

  The Senate once expelled several Senators by a single resolution (II, 
1266); however, the House has refused to censure more than one Member by 
a single resolution (II, 1240, 1621).



Sec. 64. Punishment by reprimand.

  In  the 94th Congress the 
House by adopting a report from the Committee on Standards of Official 
Conduct (now Ethics) reprimanded a Member for failing to report certain 
financial holdings in violation of rule XXVI (formerly rule XLIV) and 
for investing in stock in a Navy bank the establishment of which he was 
promoting, in violation of the Code of Ethics for Government Service (H. 
Res. 1421, July 29, 1976, pp. 24379-82). (For the Code of Ethics for 
Government Service, see H. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 72 Stat. B12.) In 
the 95th Congress following an investigation by the Committee on 
Standards of Official Conduct (now Ethics) into whether Members or 
employees had improperly accepted things of value from the Republic of 
Korea or representatives thereof, the House reprimanded three Members, 
one for falsely answering an unsworn questionnaire relative to such 
gifts and violating the Code of Official Conduct, one for failing to 
report as required by law the receipt of a campaign contribution and 
violating the Code of Official Conduct, and one for failing to report a 
campaign contribution, converting a campaign contribution to personal 
use, testifying falsely to the committee under oath, and violating the 
Code of Official Conduct (Precedents (Smith), ch. 8, Sec. 7.3). In the 
100th Congress the House adopted a resolution reprimanding a Member for 
``ghost voting,'' improperly diverting government resources, and 
maintaining a ``ghost employee'' on his staff (Dec. 18, 1987, p. 36266). 
In the 101st Congress another was reprimanded for seeking dismissal of 
parking tickets received by a person with whom he had a personal 
relationship and not related to official business and for misstatements 
of fact in a memorandum relating to the criminal probation record of 
that person (July 26, 1990, p. 19717). In the 105th Congress the House 
reprimanded the Speaker and ordered him to reimburse a portion of the 
costs of the investigation by the Committee on Standards of Official 
Conduct (now Ethics) (Jan. 21, 1997, p. 393). In the 112th Congress the 
House by adopting a report from the Committee on Ethics reprimanded a 
Member for using official resources of the House for unofficial purposes 
and compelling staff to perform campaign work, and imposed a fine 
(Precedents (Smith), ch. 8, Sec. 7.2). In the 116th Congress the House 
by adopting a report from the Committee on Ethics reprimanded a Member 
for the misuse of campaign funds for personal purposes, and imposed a 
fine (Precedents (Smith), ch. 8, Sec. 7.1).




Sec. 65. Punishment by censure.

  Censure  is inflicted by the 
Speaker (II, 1259) and the words are entered in the Journal (II, 1251, 
1656; VI 236), but the Speaker may not pronounce censure except by order 
of the House (VI, 237). When Members have resigned pending proceedings 
for censure, the House has nevertheless adopted the resolutions of 
censure (II, 1239, 1273, 1275, 1656). Members have been censured for 
personalities and other disorder in debate (II, 1251, 1253, 1254, 1259), 
assaults on the floor (II, 1665), for presenting a resolution alleged to 
be insulting to the House (II, 1246), and for corrupt acts (II, 1274, 
1286). For abuse of the leave to print, the House censured a Member 
after a motion to expel him had failed (VI, 236). In one instance 
Members were censured for acts before the election of the then existing 
House (II, 1286). In the 96th Congress two Members were censured by the 
House as follows: (1) A Member who during a prior Congress both 
knowingly increased an office employee's salary for repayment of that 
Member's personal expenses and who was unjustly enriched by clerk-hire 
employees' payments of personal expenses later compensated by salary 
increases, was censured and ordered to repay the amount of the unjust 
enrichment with interest (July 31, 1979, p. 21592); (2) a Member was 
censured for receiving over a period of time sums of money from a person 
with a direct interest in legislation in violation of clause 3 of rule 
XXIII (formerly clause 4 of rule XLIII), and for transferring campaign 
funds into office and personal accounts (Precedents (Smith), ch. 8, 
Sec. 7.4)). In the 98th Congress the House adopted two resolutions (as 
amended in the House), each censuring a Member for an improper 
relationship with a House Page in a prior Congress (July 20, 1983, p. 
20020 and p. 20030). In the 111th Congress, after the House defeated an 
amendment to instead punish by reprimand, a Member was censured for 
using official resources to solicit funds for an educational center, 
failing to file complete financial disclosure forms, accepting the 
benefits of a rent-stabilized residence in a manner creating an 
appearance of impropriety, and failing to pay taxes on certain property, 
and was ordered to pay restitution for such unpaid taxes (Dec. 2, 2010, 
pp. 18729-30). In the 117th Congress, a Member was censured (and removed 
from his committees) for displaying on his social media accounts an 
animated depiction of himself engaging in violence toward another Member 
and the President (Nov. 17, 2021, p. _).




Sec. 66. Punishment by expulsion.

  Five  Members have been 
expelled in the history of the House. Among those, three were expelled 
for various offenses related to their service for the Confederacy in the 
Civil War: John B. Clark of Missouri (a Member-elect) (II, 1262, July 
13, 1861); Henry C. Burnett of Kentucky (II, 1261, Dec. 3, 1861); and 
John W. Reid of Missouri (II, 1261, Dec. 6, 1861). Michael J. Myers of 
Pennsylvania was expelled after being convicted in a Federal court of 
bribery and conspiracy for accepting funds to perform official duties 
(Oct. 2, 1980, p. 28978). James A. Traficant of Ohio was expelled after 
being convicted in a Federal court for crimes including (1) trading 
official acts and influence for things of value; (2) demanding and 
accepting salary kickbacks from his congressional employees; (3) 
influencing a congressional employee to destroy evidence and to provide 
false testimony to a Federal grand jury; (4) receiving personal labor 
and the services of his congressional employees while they were being 
paid by the taxpayers to perform public service; and (5) filing false 
income tax returns (July 24, 2002, p. 14319). Three Senators were 
expelled for their association with the Confederates during the Civil 
War (II, 1268-1270).


  The power of expulsion has been the subject of much discussion (I, 
469, 476, 481; II, 1264, 1265, 1269; VI, 56, 398; see Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)). In one case a Member-elect who had not 
taken the oath was expelled (II, 1262), and in another case the power to 
do this was discussed (I, 476). In one instance the Senate assumed to 
annul its action of expulsion (II, 1243). The Supreme Court has decided 
that a judgment of conviction under a disqualifying statute does not 
compel the Senate to expel (II, 1282; Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 
344 (1906)). The power of expulsion in its relation to offenses 
committed before the Members' election has been discussed (II, 1264, 
1284, 1285, 1286, 1288, 1289; VI, 56, 238). In one case the Committee on 
the Judiciary of the House concluded that a Member might not be punished 
for an offense alleged to have been committed against a preceding 
Congress (II, 1283); but the House itself declined to express doubt as 
to its power to expel and proceeded to inflict censure (II, 1286). In 
addition, the 96th Congress punished Members on two occasions for 
offenses committed during a prior Congress (H. Res. 378, July 31, 1979, 
p. 21592; H. Res. 660, Precedents (Smith), ch. 8, Sec. 7.4). It has been 
held that the power of the House to expel one of its Members is 
unlimited; a matter purely of discretion to be exercised by a two-thirds 
vote, from which there is no appeal (VI, 78). The resignation of the 
accused Member has always caused a suspension of proceedings for 
expulsion (II, 1275, 1276, 1279; VI, 238). Following the expulsion of a 
Member, the Clerk notifies the Governor of the relevant state of the 
action of the House (July 24, 2002, p. 14319).



Sec. 66a. Punishment by removal from 
committee.

  In the 117th and 118th  Congresses the House adopted unreported resolutions 
(referred to the Committee on Ethics and considered pursuant to a 
special order of business reported by the Committee on Rules) removing a 
Member from committee assignments based on such Member's conduct (H. 
Res. 72, Feb. 4, 2021, p. _; H. Res. 789, Nov. 17, 2021, p. _; H. Res. 
76, Feb. 2, 2023, p. _).





Sec. 67. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 
(1821); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881); United States v. 
Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897); Burton v. 
United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 
(1969).





Sec. 68. Each House to keep a journal.

  \3\Each House  shall 
keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the 
same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; * * 
*




Sec. 69. The Journal the official 
record.

  The Journal and  not the Congressional Record is the official record of the 
proceedings of the House (IV, 2727). Its nature and functions have been 
the subject of extended discussions (IV, 2730, footnote). The House has 
fixed its title (IV, 2728). Although it ought to be a correct transcript 
of proceedings, the House has not insisted on a strict chronological 
order of entries (IV, 2815). The Journal is dated as of the legislative 
and not the calendar day (IV, 2746).




Sec. 70. Journal a record of proceedings 
and not of reasons.

  The Journal records  proceedings but not the reasons therefor (IV, 
2811) or the circumstances attending (IV, 2812), or the statements or 
opinions of Members (IV, 2817-2820). Exceptions to this rule are rare 
(IV, 2808, 2825). Protests have on rare occasions been admitted by the 
action of the House (IV, 2806, 2807), but the entry of a protest on the 
Journal may not be demanded by a Member as a matter of right (IV, 2798) 
and such demand does not present a question of privilege (IV, 2799). A 
motion not entertained is not entered on the Journal (IV, 2813, 2844-
2846).




Sec. 71. House's absolute control of entries in the 
Journal.

  The House  controls the Journal and may decide what are proceedings, 
even to the extent of omitting things actually done or recording things 
not done (IV, 2784; VI, 634). Although the Speaker has entertained 
motions to amend the Journal so as to cause it to state what was not the 
fact, leaving it for the House to decide on the propriety of such act 
(IV, 2785), and holding that he could not prevent a majority of the 
House from so amending the Journal as to undo an actual transaction (IV, 
3091-3093), in none of those rulings was an amendment permitted to 
correct the Journal that had the effect of collaterally changing the 
tabling of a motion to reconsider. In fact, under the precedents cited 
in Sec. 902, infra, under clause 1 of rule XVI it has been held not in 
order to amend or strike a Journal entry setting forth a motion exactly 
as made (IV, 2783, 2789), and thus it was held not in order to amend the 
Journal by striking a resolution actually offered (IV, 2789), but on one 
occasion the House vacated the Speaker's referral of an executive 
communication by amending the Journal of the preceding day (Precedents 
(Wickham), ch. 5, Sec. 14.1). Only on rare occasions has the House 
nullified proceedings by rescinding the records of them in the Journal 
(IV, 2787), the House and Senate usually insisting on the accuracy of 
its Journal (IV, 2783, 2786). In rare instances the House and Senate 
have rescinded or expunged entries in Journals of preceding Congresses 
(IV, 2730, footnote, 2792, 2793).




Sec. 72. Record of votes in the 
Journal.

  The Journal should  record the result of every vote and state in general terms 
the subject of it (IV, 2804); but the result of a vote is recorded in 
figures only when the yeas and nays are taken (IV, 2827), when the vote 
is recorded by electronic device or by clerks, or when a vote is taken 
by ballot, it having been determined in latest practice that the Journal 
should show not only the result but the state of the ballot or ballots 
(IV, 2832).




Sec. 73. Approval of the Journal.

  It is the  uniform practice 
of the House to approve its Journal for each legislative day (IV, 2731). 
If Journals of more than one session remain unapproved, they are taken 
up for approval in chronological order (IV, 2771-2773; Precedents 
(Wickham), ch. 5, Sec. 12.6).


  The former rule required the reading of the Journal on each 
legislative day. The reading could be dispensed with only by unanimous 
consent (VI, 625) or suspension of the rules (IV, 2747-2750) and had to 
be in full when demanded by any Member (IV, 2739-2741; VI, 627-628; Feb. 
22, 1950, p. 2152).

  The present form of the rule (clause 1 of rule I; see Sec. 621, infra) 
was drafted from section 127 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 
1970 (84 Stat. 1140), incorporated into the standing rules in the 92d 
Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 22, 1971, p. 144), and was further amended in 
the 96th Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 15, 1979, pp. 7-16). Under the 
current practice, the Speaker is authorized to announce approval of the 
Journal, which is deemed agreed to by the House, subject to the right of 
any Member to demand a vote on agreeing to the Speaker's approval 
(which, if decided in the affirmative, is not subject to the motion to 
reconsider). In the 98th Congress, the Speaker was given the authority 
to postpone a record vote on agreeing to the approval of the Journal to 
a later time on that legislative day (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1983, p. 34). 
Although the transaction of any business is not in order before approval 
of the Journal (IV, 2751; VI, 629, 637; Oct. 8, 1968, p. 30096), 
approval of the Journal yields to the simple motion to adjourn (IV, 
2757), administration of the oath (I, 171, 172), an arraignment of 
impeachment (VI, 469), and questions of the privileges of the House (II, 
1630), and the Speaker has discretion to recognize for a parliamentary 
inquiry before approval of the Journal (VI, 624). Under clause 1 of rule 
I, as amended in the 96th Congress, a point of order of no quorum is not 
in order before the Speaker announces approval of the Journal. Clause 7 
of rule XX generally prohibits the making of points of order of no 
quorum unless the Speaker has put the question on the pending matter.



Sec. 74. Motions to amend the 
Journal.

  Under the practice  before clause 1 of rule I was adopted in its present form, 
the motion to amend the Journal took precedence over the motion to 
approve it (IV, 2760; VI, 633); but the motion to amend may not be 
admitted after the previous question is demanded on a motion to approve 
(IV, 2770; VI, 633; VIII, 2684). An expression of opinion as to a 
decision of the Chair was held not in order as an amendment to the 
Journal (IV, 2848). A proposed amendment to the Journal being tabled 
does not carry the Journal with it (V, 5435, 5436). Although a proposed 
correction of the Journal may be recorded in the Journal, it is not in 
order to insert in full in this indirect way what has been denied 
insertion in the first instance (IV, 2782, 2804, 2805). The earlier 
practice was otherwise, however (IV, 2801-2803). The Journal of the last 
day of a session is not approved on the assembling of the next session, 
and is not ordinarily amended (IV, 2743, 2744). For further discussion 
of the composition and approval of the Journal, see Deschler, ch. 5.





Sec. 74a. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United 
States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892).





Sec. 75. Yeas and Nays entered on the 
Journal.

  * * * and the  Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question 
shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the 
Journal.




Sec. 76. Conditions of ordering yeas and 
nays.

  The yeas and  nays may be ordered before the organization of the House (I, 91; 
V, 6012, 6013), but are not taken in the Committee of the Whole (IV, 
4722, 4723). They are not necessarily taken on the passage of a 
resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution (V, 7038, 7039; 
VIII, 3506), but are required to pass a bill over a veto (Sec. 104; VII, 
1110). In the earlier practice of the House it was held that less than a 
quorum might not order the yeas and nays, but for many years the 
decisions have been uniformly the other way (V, 6016-6028). Neither is a 
quorum necessary on a motion to reconsider the vote whereby the yeas and 
nays are ordered (V, 5693). When a quorum fails on a yea and nay vote it 
is the duty of the Speaker and the House to take notice of that fact 
(IV, 2953, 2963, 2988). If the House adjourns, the order for the yeas 
and nays remains effective whenever the bill again comes before the 
House (V, 6014, 6015; VI, 740; VIII, 3108), and it has been held that 
the question of consideration might not intervene on a succeeding day 
before the second calling of the yeas and nays (V, 4949). However, when 
the call of the House is automatic, the Speaker directs the roll to be 
called or the vote to be taken by electronic device without motion from 
the floor (VI, 678, 679, 694, 695); and should a quorum fail to vote and 
the House adjourn, proceedings under the automatic call are vacated and 
the question recurs de novo when the bill again comes before the House 
(Oct. 10, 1940, pp. 13534, 13535; Oct. 13, 1962, p. 23474; Oct. 19, 
1966, p. 27641). Although the Constitution and the Rules of the House 
guarantee that votes taken by the yeas and nays be spread upon the 
Journal, neither requires that a Member's vote be announced to the 
public immediately during the vote (Precedents (Wickham), ch. 5, 
Sec. 10.3).


  The yeas and nays may not be demanded until the Speaker has put the 
question in the form prescribed by clause 6 of rule I (formerly clause 
5) (Oct. 2, 1974, p. 33623).



Sec. 77. Demanding the yeas and nays.

  The yeas and  nays may 
be demanded while the Speaker is announcing the result of a division (V, 
6039), while a vote by tellers is being taken (V, 6038), and even after 
the announcement of the vote if the House has not passed to other 
business (V, 6040, 6041; VIII, 3110) and if the Member seeking the yeas 
and nays is actively seeking recognition for that purpose when the Chair 
announces the result of the voice vote (Nov. 22, 1991, p. 34075; Sept. 
21, 2005, p. 20856). But after the Speaker has announced the result of a 
division on a motion and is in the act of putting the question on 
another motion it is too late to demand the yeas and nays on the first 
motion (V, 6042). And it is not in order during the various processes of 
a division to repeat a demand for the yeas and nays that has once been 
refused by the House (V, 6029, 6030, 6031). The constitutional right of 
a Member to demand the yeas and nays may not be overruled as dilatory 
(V, 5737; VIII, 3107); but this constitutional right does not exist as 
to a vote to second a motion when such second is required by the rules 
(V, 6032-6036; VIII, 3109). The right to demand yeas and nays is not 
waived by the fact that the Member demanding them has just made the 
point of no quorum and caused the Chair to count the House (V, 6044). A 
demand for the yeas and nays is not timely when further proceedings have 
been postponed on a measure pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX (Dec. 19, 
2018, p. _).-




Sec. 78. Yeas and nays ordered by onefifth.

  In passing on  a 
demand for the yeas and nays the Speaker need determine only whether 
one-fifth of those present sustain the demand (V, 6043; VIII, 3112, 
3115). In ascertaining whether one-fifth of those present support a 
demand for the yeas and nays the Speaker counts the entire number 
present and not merely those who wish to be counted (VIII, 3111, 3120). 
Such count is not subject to verification by appeal (Sept. 12, 1978, p. 
28984; Mar. 8, 2006, p. 2954; Aug. 3, 2007, p. 22745; Mar. 18, 2010, p. 
3842), a request for a count of those opposed to the demand is not in 
order (VIII, 3112-3114), and the Speaker may refuse to entertain a 
parliamentary inquiry regarding the number of Members counted by the 
Chair (Aug. 3, 2007, p. 22745). If the Chair prolongs the count of the 
House in determining whether one-fifth have supported the demand for 
yeas and nays, the Speaker counts latecomers in support of the demand as 
well as for the number present (Sept. 24, 1990, p. 25521). After the 
House, on a vote by tellers, has refused to order the yeas and nays it 
is too late to demand the count of the negative on an original vote (V, 
6045).




Sec. 79. Reconsideration of the vote ordering the 
yeas and nays.

  A motion to  reconsider the vote ordering the yeas and nays is in 
order (V, 6029; VIII, 2790), and the vote may be reconsidered by a 
majority. If the House votes to reconsider the yeas and nays may again 
be ordered by one-fifth (V, 5689-5691). But when the House, having 
reconsidered, again orders the yeas and nays, a second motion to 
reconsider may not be made (V, 6037). In one instance it was held that 
the yeas and nays might be demanded on a motion to reconsider the vote 
whereby the yeas and nays were ordered (V, 5689), but evidently there 
must be a limit to this process. The vote whereby the yeas and nays are 
refused may be reconsidered (V, 5692).




Sec. 80. Effect of an order of the yeas and 
nays.

  A motion  to adjourn may be admitted after the yeas and nays are ordered 
and before the roll call has begun (V, 5366); and a motion to suspend 
the rules has been entertained after the yeas and nays have been 
demanded on another matter (V, 6835). Consideration of a conference 
report (V, 6457), and a motion to reconsider the vote by which the yeas 
and nays were ordered (V, 6029; VIII, 2790) may be admitted. A demand 
for tellers or for a division is not precluded or set aside by the fact 
that the yeas and nays are demanded and refused (V, 5998; VIII, 3103).





Sec. 81. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United 
States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 
196 (1897); Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 U.S. 506 (1901); Marshall v. 
Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917).





Sec. 82. Adjournment for more than three 
days or to another place.

  \4\Neither House,  during the Session of Congress shall, 
without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor 
to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.




Sec. 82a. Adjournment to another 
place.

  The word ``Place'' in  the above paragraph was construed to mean the seat of 
Government, and consent of the Senate is not required if the House 
orders its meetings to be held in another structure at the seat of 
Government (Speaker Rayburn, Aug. 17, 1949, pp. 11651, 11683). Under 
clause 12(d) of rule I, the Speaker may convene the House in a place 
within the District of Columbia, other than the Hall of the House, if, 
in the opinion of the Speaker, the public interest shall warrant it 
(Sec. 639, infra). The two Houses once granted joint leadership (or 
their designees) authority for an entire Congress to assemble the 
Congress at a place outside the District of Columbia whenever the public 
interest warranted it (H. Con. Res. 1, Feb. 13, 2003, p. 4080). The 
Speaker executed by letter his designation under that authority (Mar. 
13, 2003, p. 6123). The House, but not the Senate, re-adopted similar 
concurrent resolutions in succeeding Congresses (e.g., H. Con. Res. 1, 
Jan. 4, 2005, p. 68; H. Con. Res. 1, Jan. 4, 2007, p. 42; H. Con. Res. 
1, Jan. 6, 2009, p. 22; H. Con. Res. 1, Jan. 5, 2011, p. 103). After 
September 11, 2001, recall authority carried in adjournment resolutions 
has allowed reassembly at such place as may be designated (see Sec. 84, 
infra). The President may convene Congress at places outside the seat of 
Government during hazardous circumstances (2 U.S.C. 27; Deschler, ch. 1, 
Sec. 4).


  On November 22, 1940 (p. 13715), the House adopted a resolution 
providing that thereafter until otherwise ordered its meetings be held 
in the Caucus room of the new House Office Building. Likewise the Senate 
on the same day (p. 13709) provided that its meetings be held in the 
Chamber formerly occupied by the Supreme Court in the Capitol. The two 
Houses continued to hold their sessions in these rooms until the opening 
of the 77th Congress. These actions were necessitated by the precarious 
condition of the roofs in the two Chambers. On June 28, 1949 (p. 8571), 
and on September 1, 1950 (p. 14140), the House provided that until 
otherwise ordered its meetings be held in the Caucus room of the new 
House Office Building, pending the remodeling of its Chamber. On June 
29, 1949 (p. 8584), and on Aug. 9, 1950 (p. 12106), the Senate provided 
that its meetings be held in the Chamber formerly occupied by the 
Supreme Court in the Capitol, pending remodeling of its Chamber. The 
House returned to its Chamber on January 3, 1950, and again on January 
1, 1951. The Senate returned to its Chamber on January 3, 1950, and 
again on January 3, 1951.

  There has been no occasion for the convening of a session of Congress 
outside the seat of Government. However, the Congress has engaged in 
commemorative or ceremonial functions outside the seat of Government, 
which were authorized by concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 131, May 
28, 1987, p. 14031; H. Con. Res. 96, Apr. 18, 1989, p. 6834; H. Con. 
Res. 448, July 25, 2002, p. 14645).-



Sec. 83. Adjournment of the House within the 
threeday limit.

  The House of  Representatives in adjourning for not more than three 
days must take into the count either the day of adjourning or the day of 
the meeting, but not Sundays (V, 6673, 6674). The House may provide for 
a session of the House on a Sunday, traditionally a ``dies non'' under 
the precedents of the House (e.g., Dec. 17, 1982, p. 31946; Nov. 17, 
1989, p. 30029; Aug. 20, 1994, p. 23367). The House has by standing 
order provided that it should meet on two days only of each week instead 
of daily (V, 6675). Before the election of Speaker, the House has 
adjourned for more than one day (I, 89, 221). The House has by unanimous 
consent agreed to an adjournment for not more than three days but 
specified that it would continue in adjournment pursuant to a concurrent 
resolution adopted by the House if it received a message of the Senate's 
adoption of the concurrent resolution before the time of the House's 
reconvening (e.g., Nov. 20, 1987, p. 33054). The Committee on Rules has 
reported a rule authorizing the Speaker to declare the House in recesses 
subject to calls of the Chair during multiple discrete periods, each 
consistent with the constitutional constraint that neither House adjourn 
(or recess) for more than three days without consent of the other House 
(Precedents (Wickham), ch. 1, Sec. 2.9; Jan. 5, 1996, p. 357).




Sec. 83a. Reconvening from adjournment of not 
more than three days.

  Clause 12(e) of  rule I provides certain authorities for 
reconvening or postponing the time for reconvening during any recess or 
adjournment of not more than three days when warranted by the public 
interest (see Sec. 639, infra), and the Speaker has reconvened the House 
before the time previously appointed pursuant to such authority (Dec. 3, 
2018, p. _). The House had previously provided such authority by 
standing order (H. Res. 479, 112th Cong., Dec. 6, 2011, p. 18998; H. 
Res. 66, Feb. 14, 2013, p. 1405) and on one occasion convened earlier 
than previously ordered (Precedents (Wickham), ch. 1, Sec. 11.12). The 
Senate has adopted similar authority, applicable also to the place of 
convening, which may be exercised by the Senate Majority and Minority 
Leaders when warranted by intervening circumstances (S. Res. 296, 108th 
Cong., Feb. 3, 2004, p. 731). Pursuant to such authority, during an 
adjournment of the Senate for not more than three days, the Senate 
convened earlier than previously ordered to adopt a House concurrent 
resolution providing for an adjournment of the two Houses (H. Con. Res. 
103, Mar. 17, 2005, p. 5143), section 2 of which enabled a recall of the 
House (Mar. 20, 2005, p. 5446).




Sec. 84. Resolutions for adjournment of 
the two Houses.

  Congress enables an  adjournment for more than three days by a concurrent 
resolution (IV, 4031, footnote). When it adjourns in this way, but not 
to or beyond the day fixed by Constitution or law for the next regular 
session to begin, the session is not thereby necessarily terminated (V, 
6676, 6677). At the close of the first session of the 66th Congress, the 
two Houses adjourned sine die under authority granted each House by 
simple resolutions consenting to such adjournment sine die at any time 
before a specified date (Nov. 19, 1919, p. 8810).


  Until the 67th Congress neither House had adjourned for more than 
three days by itself with the consent of the other, but resolutions had 
been offered for the accomplishment of that end (V, 6702, 6703). In the 
modern practice it is common for a concurrent resolution to provide for 
a one-House adjournment or to provide for each House to adjourn for 
different time periods. For example: (1) the House adjourned until 
August 15, 1922, with the consent of the Senate (June 29, 1922, p. 
10439); (2) the two Houses provided for an adjournment sine die of the 
House on August 20, 1954, and of the Senate at any time before December 
25, 1954 (H. Con. Res. 266; Aug. 20, 1954, p. 15554); (3) the two Houses 
provided for an adjournment sine die of the House on December 20 or 
December 21, 1982, pursuant to a motion made by the Majority Leader or a 
designee, and of the Senate at any time before January 3, 1983, as 
determined by the Senate, and for adjournments or recesses of the Senate 
for periods of more than three days as determined by the Senate during 
such period (H. Con. Res. 438, Dec. 20, 1982, p. 32951); (4) the two 
Houses provided for an adjournment of the Senate to a day certain and of 
the House for more than three days to a day certain, or to any day 
before that day as determined by the House (S. Con. Res. 102, May 27, 
1982, pp. 12504, 12505); (5) the two Houses provided for an adjournment 
to a day certain, with a provision that if there should be no quorum 
present on that day the session should terminate (V, 6686).

  A concurrent resolution adjourning both Houses for more than three 
days, or sine die, normally includes authority to reassemble the Members 
whenever the public interest shall warrant it, either separately (see, 
e.g., Dec. 26, 2013, p. 19517) or jointly (see, e.g., July 8, 1943, p. 
7516; July 26, 1947, p. 10521; Dec. 20, 1974, p. 41815; Nov. 21, 1989, 
p. 31156; Oct. 3, 1996, p. 12275; Dec. 15, 2000, p. 27019). Similarly, a 
concurrent resolution adjourning one House typically provides for recall 
of that House (see, e.g., Sept. 28, 2016, p. 13985).

  Pursuant to such recall authority: (1) the Speaker and the Majority 
Leader of the Senate notified Members of the House to reassemble, the 
Senate already being in session (Mar. 20, 2005, p. 5446, pursuant to H. 
Con. Res. 103, Mar. 17, 2005, p. 5143; Precedents (Wickham), ch. 1, 
Sec. 11.10); (2) the Speaker and the Majority Leader of the Senate 
notified Members of both Houses to reassemble (Sept. 2, 2005, p. 19424, 
pursuant to H. Con. Res. 225, July 28, 2005, p. 18356; Precedents 
(Wickham), ch. 1, Sec. 11.13).

  Joint leadership and House-only recall provisions were included in the 
sine die adjournment resolution for the second session of the 105th 
Congress (H. Con. Res. 353, Oct. 20, 1998, p. 27348), and the Speaker 
exercised recall authority under that resolution to reassemble the House 
(Dec. 17, 1998, p. 27802). One-House recall authority, with provision to 
again adjourn for more than three days, was included in two 
complementary one-House adjournment resolutions of the 111th Congress 
(H. Con. Res. 307, H. Con. Res. 308, July 29, 2010, p. 14604) and the 
Speaker (Precedents (Wickham), ch. 1, Sec. 11.11) and Majority Leader of 
the Senate (Aug. 12, 2010, p. 15504) each exercised recall authority 
under the respective adjournment resolution.

  After September 11, 2001, such recall authority has allowed reassembly 
at such place as may be designated (see, e.g., S. Con. Res. 160, Nov. 
22, 2002, p. 23512; H. Con. Res. 531, Dec. 7, 2004, p. 25708). More 
recently, such recall authority permitted recall by designees of the 
Speaker and the Majority Leader of the Senate (see, e.g., S. Con. Res. 
132, July 26, 2002, p. 15138). The Speaker executes by letter the 
designation under a concurrent resolution of adjournment (e.g., Mar. 13, 
2003, p. 6123). Such letter was expanded in the 114th Congress to 
account for the increased use of separate recall authority and for new 
designation authority in clause 12(f) of rule I (Precedents (Wickham), 
ch. 1, Sec. 11.8). The Speaker also executes by letter the designation 
of another Member to utilize reassembly authority under a joint 
resolution changing the convening date of the next session (H. J. Res. 
80, Dec. 15, 2003, p. 32411).

  A resolution adopted in the first session of the 106th Congress 
provided for an adjournment to a date certain, unless the House sooner 
received a specified message from the Senate, in which case it would 
stand adjourned sine die (H. Con. Res. 235, Nov. 18, 1999, p. 30734). A 
simple resolution adopted in the first session of the 111th Congress 
provided for a series of adjournments of not more than three days, 
unless the House sooner received: (1) a specified message from the 
Senate, (2) confirmation that the President had approved a certain bill, 
and (3) a message that the Senate had concurred in an adjournment 
resolution, in which case it would stand adjourned pursuant to such 
adjournment resolution (H. Res. 976, Dec. 16, 2009, p. 32039). It has 
become the common practice for the House, by unanimous consent adopted 
after originating an adjournment resolution, to fix a time to which it 
would adjourn within three days unless the House were sooner to receive 
a message from the Senate transmitting its adoption of the adjournment 
resolution, in which case the House would stand adjourned pursuant to 
that resolution (see, e.g., Nov. 3, 2000, p. 25993; Mar. 20, 2002, p. 
3726).

  A concurrent resolution providing for adjournment sine die of the 
first session may contain a proviso that when the second session 
convenes the Senate or House may not conduct organizational or 
legislative business but shall adjourn on that day until a date certain, 
unless sooner recalled (H. Con. Res. 232, Dec. 20, 1979, p. 37317; H. 
Con. Res. 260, Nov. 26, 1991, p. 35840; H. Con. Res. 235, Nov. 18, 1999, 
p. 30734). The prohibition on the conduct of such business may be 
applied to the House by simple resolution and may vest the Speaker with 
the authority to dispense with such business over a period of time 
(e.g., Precedents (Wickham), ch. 1, Sec. 2.10). Such a prohibition does 
not preclude recognition for one-minute speeches and special-order 
speeches by unanimous consent (Precedents (Wickham), ch. 1, Sec. 2.8) or 
the introduction and numbering of bills and resolutions (which would not 
be noted in the Congressional Record or referred by the Speaker until 
the next legislative day, when executive communications, petitions, and 
memorials also would be numbered and referred) (Jan. 24, 2000, p. 48). 
The House has passed a joint resolution appointing a day for the 
convening of a second session of a Congress and provided for possible 
earlier assembly by joint-leadership recall (see, e.g., Precedents 
(Wickham), ch. 1, Sec. 2.3; H. J. Res. 80, Nov. 21, 2003, pp. 30856, 
30857).

  A concurrent resolution to provide for adjournment for more than three 
days or an adjournment sine die is offered in the House as a matter of 
privilege (V, 6701-6706), and is not debatable (VIII, 3372-3374), though 
a Member may be recognized under a reservation of objection to a 
unanimous-consent request that the resolution be agreed to (Oct. 27, 
1990, p. 36850). The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 provides for 
an adjournment sine die, or (in an odd-numbered year) an adjournment of 
slightly over a month (from that Friday in August which is at least 30 
days before Labor Day to the Wednesday following Labor Day) unless the 
nation is in a state of war, declared by Congress (sec. 461(b); 84 Stat. 
1140). Congress may, of course, waive this requirement and make other 
determinations regarding its adjournment (see Sec. 1106, infra).

  The requirement that resolutions providing for an adjournment sine die 
of either House may not be considered until Congress has completed 
action on the second concurrent resolution on the budget for the fiscal 
year in question, and on any reconciliation legislation required by such 
a resolution, contained in section 310(f) of the Congressional Budget 
Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344), was repealed by the Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177). That law amended 
sections 309 and 310 of the Congressional Budget Act to prohibit the 
consideration of concurrent resolutions providing adjournments for more 
than three calendar days during the month of July until the House has 
approved annual appropriation bills within the jurisdictions of all the 
subcommittees on Appropriations for the ensuing fiscal year, and until 
the House has completed action on all reconciliation legislation for the 
ensuing fiscal year required to be reported by the concurrent resolution 
on the budget for that year (see Sec. 1127, infra).


  In the 118th Congress, the House established the following set of 
procedures to apply, in the absence of an adjournment resolution, during 
any district work period designated by the Speaker: (1) automatic 
approval of the Journal of the proceedings of the previous day; (2) 
authority for the Chair to declare the House adjourned to meet at any 
time within the three-day limit required by this clause; (3) authority 
for the Speaker to appoint Members to perform the duties of the Chair as 
though under clause 8(a) of rule I; and (4) the tolling of specified 
periods of time under the War Powers Resolution, clause 7 of rule XIII 
(resolutions of inquiry), clause 7(c)(1) of rule XXII (motions to 
instruct), and clause 7 of rule XV (Consensus Calendar) (sec. 3(z), H. 
Res. 5, Jan. 9, 2023, p. _). Such designation is achieved through a 
letter from the Speaker, which is laid before the House (e.g., Jan. 12, 
2023, p. _).




Sec. 85. Compensation of 
Members.

  Section 6. \1\The Senators  and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their 
Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the 
United States.


  The 27th amendment to the Constitution addresses laws varying the 
compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives (see 
Sec. 258, infra). The present rate of compensation of Representatives, 
the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico, Delegates, the Speaker, the 
Majority and Minority Leaders of the House, and the Vice President is 
established by law (2 U.S.C. 4501; 3 U.S.C. 104) with an additional 
amount per annum to assist in defraying expenses for the Speaker and 
Vice President (2 U.S.C. 5121; 3 U.S.C. 111). These rates of 
compensation are all (except for the expense allowances) subject to 
annual cost of living adjustments (2 U.S.C. 4501(2)). The present rate 
of compensation of Senators is that fixed by section 1101 of Public Law 
101-194, as adjusted pursuant to 2 U.S.C. 4501(2).



Sec. 86. Salary and deductions.

  Under  the Federal Salary Act 
of 1967 (2 U.S.C. 351-362), the Citizens' Commission on Public Service 
and Compensation (formerly the Commission on Executive, Legislative and 
Judicial Salaries) is authorized and directed to conduct quadrennial 
reviews of the rates of pay of specified government officials, including 
Members of Congress, and to report to the President the results of each 
review and its recommendations for adjustments in such rates. The 
enactment of those recommendations is governed by the Federal Salary Act 
(see Sec. 1130(12), infra).


  The statute also provides for deductions from the pay of Members and 
Delegates who are absent from the sessions of the House for reasons 
other than illness of themselves and families, or who retire before the 
end of the Congress (2 U.S.C. 5306; IV, 3011, footnote). The law as to 
deductions has been held to apply only to Members who have taken the 
oath (II, 1154). Members and Delegates are paid monthly on certificate 
of the Speaker (2 U.S.C. 5301, 5302, 5304). The residence of a Member of 
Congress for purpose of imposing State income tax laws shall be the 
State from which elected and not the State, or subdivision thereof, in 
which the Member maintains an abode for the purpose of attending 
sessions of Congress (4 U.S.C. 113). The pension of a Member may be 
forfeited upon conviction involving abuse of the public trust (5 U.S.C. 
8312, 8411).



Sec. 87. Questions as to 
compensation.

  Questions have arisen  frequently as to compensation of Members especially in 
cases of Members elected to fill vacancies (I, 500; II, 1155) and in 
which there have been questions as to incompatible offices (I, 500) or 
claims to a seat (II, 1206). The Supreme Court has held that a Member 
chosen to fill a vacancy is entitled to salary only from the time that 
the compensation of the predecessor has ceased. Page v. United States, 
127 U.S. 67 (1888); see also 2 U.S.C. 5304.





Sec. 88. Travel and Members' representational 
allowances.

  In the 92d  Congress, the provisions of H. Res. 457 of that Congress, 
authorizing the Committee on House Administration to adjust allowances 
of Members and committees without further action by the House, were 
enacted into permanent law (2 U.S.C. 4313), but the 94th Congress 
enacted into permanent law H. Res. 1372 of that Congress, stripping the 
committee of that authority and requiring House approval of the 
committee's recommendations, except in cases made necessary by price 
changes in materials and supplies, technological advances in office 
equipment, and cost of living increases (2 U.S.C. 4314). The Committee 
on House Administration retains authority under 2 U.S.C. 4313 to 
independently adjust amounts under certain conditions outlined in 2 
U.S.C. 4314 (Precedents (Smith), ch. 7, Sec. Sec. 6.5-6.6). The text of 
those statutes follow:


   ``Sec. 4313. Adjustment of House of Representatives allowances by 


                    Committee on House Administration

  ``(a) In general.--Subject to the provision of law specified in 
subsection (b) of this section, the Committee on House Administration of 
the House of Representatives may, by order of the Committee, fix and 
adjust the amounts, terms, and conditions of, and other matters relating 
to, allowances of the House of Representatives within the following 
categories:

          ``(1) For Members of the House of Representatives, the 

        Members' Representational Allowance, including all aspects of 

        official mail within the jurisdiction of the Committee under 

        section 503 of this title.

          ``(2) For committees, the Speaker, the Majority and Minority 

        Leaders, the Clerk, the Sergeant at Arms, and the Chief 

        Administrative Officer, allowances for official mail (including 

        all aspects of official mail within the jurisdiction of the 

        Committee under section 503 of this title), stationery, and 

        telephone and telegraph and other communications.

  ``(b) Provision specified.--The provision of law referred to in 
subsection (a) of this section is section 503 of this title.


  ``(c) Member of the House of Representatives defined.--As used in this 
section, the term `Member of the House of Representatives' means a 
Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the 
Congress.''

  ``Sec. 4314. Limitation on allowance authority of Committee on House 


                             Administration.

  ``(a) In general.--An order under the provision of law specified in 
subsection (c) of this section may fix or adjust the allowances of the 
House of Representatives only by reason of--

          ``(1) a change in the price of materials, services, or office 

        space;

          ``(2) a technological change or other improvement in office 

        equipment; or

          ``(3) an increase under section 5303 of title 5 in rates of 

        pay under the General Schedule.

  ``(b) Resolution requirement.--In the case of reasons other than the 
reasons specified in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a) of 
this section, the fixing and adjustment of the allowances of the House 
of Representatives in the categories described in the provision of law 
specified in subsection (c) of this section may be carried out only by 
resolution of the House of Representatives.


  ``(c) Provision specified.--The provision of law referred to in 
subsections (a) and (b) of this section is section 4313 of this title.''

  In the 104th Congress the Committee on House Administration 
promulgated an order abolishing separate allowances for Clerk Hire, 
Official Expenses, and Official Mail, in favor of a single ``Members' 
Representational Allowance'' (MRA), which was ultimately enacted into 
law (2 U.S.C. 5341). The MRA is provided for the employment of staff in 
the Member's Washington and district offices, official expenses incurred 
by the Member, and the postage expenses of first, third, and fourth 
class frankable mail.

  Until January 1, 1988, the maximum salary for staff members was the 
rate of basic pay authorized for Level V of the Executive Schedule (by 
order of the Committee on House Administration, Precedents (Smith), ch. 
7, Sec. 6.5). Under section 311 of the Legislative Branch Appropriations 
Act, 1988, as contained in section 101(i) of Public Law 100-202 (2 
U.S.C. 4532), the maximum salary for staff members is set by pay order 
of the Speaker. A Member may not employ a relative on an MRA (5 U.S.C. 
3110). The Code of Official Conduct also precludes certain hiring 
practices of Members (see Sec. 1095, infra).

  Until the 103d Congress, a Member could employ a ``Lyndon Baines 
Johnson Congressional Intern'' for a maximum of two months at not to 
exceed $1,160 per month. Such internships were available for college 
students and secondary or postsecondary school teachers (H. Res. 420, 
Sept. 18, 1973, p. 30186; 2 U.S.C. 5322). In the 115th Congress there 
was established a separate allowance available to Members for the 
compensation of interns (2 U.S.C. 5322a).

  The statutes provide for continuation of the pay of clerical 
assistants to a Member upon death or resignation, until a successor is 
elected to fill the vacancy, and such clerical assistants perform their 
duties under the direction of the Clerk of the House (2 U.S.C. 5323-
5329). Upon the expulsion of a Member in the 96th Congress, the House by 
resolution extended those provisions to any termination of service by a 
Member during the term of office (Precedents (Smith), ch. 7, Sec. 6.11).

  For current information on the MRA and the method of its accounting 
and disbursement, see current U.S. House of Representatives Members' 
Congressional Handbook, Committee on House Administration.



Sec. 88a. Ban on Legislative Service 
Organizations.

  At its  organization the 104th Congress prohibited the 
establishment or continuation of any legislative service organization 
(as that term had been understood in the 103d Congress) and directed the 
Committee on House Administration to take such steps as were necessary 
to ensure an orderly termination and accounting for funds of any 
legislative service organization in existence on January 3, 1995 (sec. 
222, H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 477). The 114th through 118th 
Congresses authorized the payment of salaries and expenses by certain 
Congressional Member Organizations that had registered with the 
Committee on House Administration during the previous Congress (sec. 
3(p), H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 2015, p. 37; (sec. 3(n), H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 
2017, p. 39; sec. 103(p), H. Res. 6, Jan. 3, 2019, p. _; sec. 3(o), H. 
Res. 8, Jan. 4, 2021, p. _; sec. 3(w), H. Res. 5, Jan. 9, 2023, p. _).




Sec. 89. Leadership staff allowances.

  Separate from the  MRA 
specified above, the leaders of the House (the Speaker, Majority Leader, 
Minority Leader, Majority Whip, and Minority Whip) are entitled to 
office staffing allowances consisting of certain statutory positions as 
well as lump-sum appropriations authorized by section 473 of the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (84 Stat. 1140). The portion of 
these allowances for leadership office personnel may be adjusted by the 
Clerk of the House in certain situations when the President effects a 
pay adjustment for certain classes of Federal employees under the 
Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-656; 84 Stat. 1946).





Sec. 89a. Speaker's ``pay orders.''

  Under  section 311(d) of 
the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1988 (2 U.S.C. 4532), the 
Speaker may issue ``pay orders'' that adjust pay levels for officers and 
employees of the House to maintain certain relationships with comparable 
levels in the Senate and in the other branches of government. For the 
text of section 311(d), see Sec. 1130(12), infra.





Sec. 90. Privilege of Members from 
arrest.

  * * * They [the  Senators and Representatives] shall in all Cases, except 
Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest 
during their attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and 
in going to and returning from the same; * * *





Sec. 91. Assertions of privilege of 
Members by the House.

  The word ``felony''  in this provision has been interpreted not to 
refer to a delinquency in a matter of debt (III, 2676), and ``treason, 
felony, and breach of the peace'' have been construed to mean all 
indictable crimes (III, 2673). The Supreme Court has held that the 
privilege does not apply to arrest in any criminal case. Williamson v. 
United States, 207 U.S. 425 (1908). The courts have discussed and 
sustained the privilege of the Member in going to and returning from the 
session (III, 2674); and where a person assaulted a Member on his way to 
the House, although at a place distant therefrom, the House arrested him 
on warrant of the Speaker, arraigned him at the bar and had him 
imprisoned (II, 1626, 1628). Other assaults under these circumstances 
have been treated as breaches of privilege (II, 1645). Where a Member 
had been arrested and detained under mesne process in a civil suit 
during a recess of Congress, the House decided that he was entitled to 
discharge on the assembling of Congress, and liberated him and restored 
him to his seat by the hands of its own officer (III, 2676). Service of 
process is distinguished from arrest in civil cases and related 
historical data are collected in Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76 (1934), in 
which the Supreme Court held that the clause was applicable only to 
arrests in civil suits, now largely obsolete but common at the time of 
the adoption of the United States Constitution. Rule VIII (formerly rule 
L) was added in the 97th Congress to provide a standing procedure 
governing subpoenas to Members, officers, and employees directing their 
appearance as witnesses relating to the official functions of the House, 
or for the production of House documents.





Sec. 92. Members privileged from being questioned for speech 
or debate.

    * * * and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they 
[the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other 
place.




Sec. 93. Scope of the privilege.

  This privilege as  to ``any 
speech or debate'' applies generally to ``things done in a session of 
the House by one of its Members in relation to the business before it.'' 
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880), cited at III, 2675. See also 
II, 1655 and Sec. Sec. 301, 302, infra, for provisions in Jefferson's 
Manual on the privilege; Deschler, ch. 7; and Precedents (Smith), ch. 7, 
Sec. 8. Moreover, it applies to all acts within the ``legislative 
sphere,'' which includes matters that are ``an integral part of the 
deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in 
committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration or 
passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other 
matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either 
House.'' Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 624, 625 (1972). The 
clause precludes judicial inquiry into the motivation, preparation, or 
content of a Member's speech on the floor and prevents such a speech 
from being made the basis for a criminal conspiracy charge against the 
Member. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966). The Supreme Court 
held in United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 447 (1979), that under the 
Speech or Debate Clause, neither evidence of nor references to 
legislative acts of a Member of Congress may be introduced by the 
Government in a prosecution under the official bribery statute. But the 
Supreme Court has limited the scope of legislative activity that is 
protected under the clause by upholding grand jury inquiry into the 
possession and nonlegislative use of classified documents by a Member. 
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). The Court has also 
sustained the validity of an indictment of a Member for accepting an 
illegal bribe to perform legislative acts in which the prosecution 
established a prima facie case without relying on the Member's 
constitutionally-protected legislative speech. United States v. 
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972). Nor does the clause protect transmittal 
of allegedly defamatory material issued in press releases and 
newsletters by a Senator, because neither was essential to the 
deliberative process of the Senate. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 
(1979). For a discussion of waivers of the Speech or Debate clause, see 
Sec. 301, infra.


  Legislative employees acting under orders of the House are not 
necessarily protected under the clause from judicial inquiry into the 
constitutionality of their actions. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 165 
(1880); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); Powell v. McCormack, 
395 U.S. 486 (1969). But see Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 
(1972), in which the Supreme Court held that the aide of a Senator was 
protected under the clause when performing legislative acts that would 
have been protected under the clause if performed by the Senator 
himself. There is no distinction between the members of a Senate 
subcommittee and its chief counsel insofar as complete immunity under 
the Speech or Debate Clause is provided for the issuance of a subpoena 
pursuant to legitimate legislative inquiry. Eastland v. U.S. 
Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975). See also Doe v. McMillan, 412 
U.S. 306 (1973) (relating to the dissemination of a congressional 
report) for the immunity under this clause of Members of the House and 
their staffs, and for the common-law immunity of the Public Printer (now 
the Director of the Government Publishing Office) and Superintendent of 
Documents.

  For Federal court decisions on the applicability of the clause to 
unofficial circulation of reprints from the Congressional Record, see 
McGovern v. Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343 (1960); Long v. Ansell, 69 F.2d 386 
(1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 76 (1934); Methodist Federation for Social 
Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp. 729 (1956). For inquiry into a Member's 
use of the franking privilege, see Hoellen v. Annunzio, 468 F.2d 522 
(1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973); Schiaffo v. Helstoski, 350 F. 
Supp. 1076 (1972), rev'd 492 F.2d 413 (1974). For inquiry into the 
printing of committee reports, see Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); 
Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175 (1970).



Sec. 94. Action by the House.

  For assaulting a  Member for 
words spoken in debate, Samuel Houston, not a Member, was arrested, 
tried, and censured by the House (II, 1616-1619). Where Members have 
assaulted other Members for words spoken in debate (II, 1656), or 
proceeded by duel (II, 1644), or demanded explanation in a hostile 
manner (II, 1644), the House has considered the cases as of privilege. A 
communication addressed to the House by an official in an Executive 
Department calling in question words uttered by a Member in debate was 
criticized as a breach of privilege and withdrawn (III, 2684). An 
explanation having been demanded of a Member by a person not a Member 
for a question asked of the latter when a witness before the House, the 
matter was considered but not pressed as a breach of privilege (III, 
2681). A letter from a person supposed to have been assailed by a Member 
in debate, asking properly and without menace if the speech was 
correctly reported, was held to involve no question of privilege (III, 
2682). Unless it is clear that a Member has been questioned for words 
spoken in debate, the House declines to act (II, 1620; III, 2680).


  For assaulting a Member, Charles C. Glover was arrested, arraigned at 
the bar of the House, and censured by the Speaker by direction of the 
House, although the provocation of the assault was words spoken in 
debate in the previous Congress (VI, 333).




Sec. 95. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880); 
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); United States v. Johnson, 383 
U.S. 169 (1966); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 
(1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); Doe v. McMillan, 
412 U.S. 306 (1973); Eastland v. United States Serviceman's Fund, 421 
U.S. 491 (1975); United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979); 
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 
U.S. 500 (1979).





Sec. 96. Restriction on appointment of 
Members to office.

  \2\No Senator or  Representative shall, during the Time for which he 
was elected, be appointed to any Civil Office under the Authority of the 
United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof 
shall have been encreased during such time; *  *  *



  In a few cases questions have arisen under this paragraph (I, 506, 
footnote; and see 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 36 (1969); see also Deschler, ch. 7; 
P.L. 110-455 (emoluments of Secretary of State); P.L. 111-1 (emoluments 
of Secretary of the Interior).




Sec. 97. Members not to hold office under the United 
States.

    *  *  * and no Person holding any Office under the United 
States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in 
Office.


  The meaning of the word ``office'' as used in this paragraph has been 
discussed (I, 185, 417, 478, 493; II, 993; VI, 60, 64), as has also the 
general subject of incompatible offices (I, 563).



Sec. 98. As to what are 
incompatible offices.

  The Committee on the Judiciary  has concluded that members of commissions 
created by law to investigate and report, but having no legislative, 
executive, or judicial powers, and visitors to academies, regents, 
directors, and trustees of public institutions, appointed under the law 
by the Speaker, are not officers within the meaning of the Constitution 
(I, 493). Membership on joint committees created by statute is not an 
office in the contemplation of the constitutional provision prohibiting 
Members of Congress from holding simultaneously other offices under the 
United States (VII, 2164). A Member of either House is eligible to 
appointment to any office not otherwise forbidden by law, the duties of 
which are not incompatible with those of a Member (VI, 63) and the 
question as to whether a Member may be appointed to the Board of 
Managers of the Soldiers' Home and become local manager of one of the 
homes, is a matter for the decision of Congress itself (VI, 63). The 
House has also distinguished between the performance of paid services 
for the Executive (I, 495), like temporary service as assistant United 
States attorney (II, 993), and the acceptance of an incompatible office. 
The House has declined to hold that a contractor under the Government is 
constitutionally disqualified to serve as a Member (I, 496). But the 
House, or its committees, have found disqualified a Member who was 
appointed a militia officer in the District of Columbia (I, 486) and in 
various States (VI, 60), and Members who have accepted commissions in 
the Army (I, 491, 492, 494). But the Committee on the Judiciary has 
expressed the opinion that persons on the retired list of the Army do 
not hold office under the United States in the constitutional sense (I, 
494). A Member-elect has continued to act as governor of a State after 
the assembling of the Congress to which he was elected (I, 503), but the 
duties of a Member of the House and the Governor of a State are 
absolutely inconsistent and may not be simultaneously discharged by the 
same Member (VI, 65). The House adopted a privileged resolution 
authorizing and directing the Speaker to administer the oath of office 
to a Member-elect then serving as president of a city council 
(Precedents (Smith), ch. 7, Sec. 4.3). For an insertion by the Speaker, 
in concurrence with the Minority Leader, on this case and relevant 
precedents, see Precedents (Smith), ch. 7, Sec. 4.3.-




Sec. 99. Appointment of Memberselect to 
offices under the United States.

  The House decided  that the status of a Member-elect was 
not affected by the constitutional requirement (I, 499), the theory 
being advanced that the status of the Member-elect is distinguished from 
the status of the Member who has qualified (I, 184). A Member-elect, who 
continued in an office after his election but resigned before taking his 
seat, was held entitled to the seat (I, 497, 498). However, when a 
Member-elect held an incompatible office after the meeting of Congress 
and his taking of the oath, he was held to have disqualified himself (I, 
492). In other words, the Member-elect may defer until the meeting of 
Congress and his taking of the oath, his choice between the seat and an 
incompatible office (I, 492). As early as 1874 the Attorney General 
opined that a Member-elect is not officially a Member of the House, and 
thus may hold any office until sworn (14 Op. Att'y Gen. 408 (1874)).




Sec. 100. Relation of contestants to 
incompatible offices.

  The House has  manifestly subscribed to the idea that a 
contestant holding an incompatible office need not make an election 
until the House has declared the contestant entitled to the seat (I, 
505). Although a contestant had accepted and held a State office in 
violation of the State constitution, if he were really elected a Member, 
the House did not treat his contest as abated (II, 1003). Where a Member 
had been appointed to an incompatible office a contestant not found to 
be elected was not admitted to fill the vacancy (I, 807).




Sec. 101. Procedure of the House when 
incompatible offices are accepted.

  Where a Member  has accepted an incompatible 
office, the House has assumed or declared the seat vacant (I, 501, 502; 
VI, 65). In the cases of Baker and Yell, the Elections Committee 
concluded that the acceptance of a commission as an officer of 
volunteers in the national army vacated the seat of a Member (I, 488), 
and in another similar case the Member was held to have forfeited his 
right to a seat (I, 490). The House has seated a person bearing regular 
credentials on ascertaining that his predecessor in the same Congress 
had accepted a military office (I, 572). But usually the House by 
resolution formally declares the seat vacant (I, 488, 492). A Member-
elect may defer until the meeting of Congress and the taking of the oath 
of office the choice between the seat and an incompatible office (I, 
492). But when he retains the incompatible office and does not qualify, 
a vacancy has been held to exist (I, 500). A resolution excluding a 
Member who has accepted an incompatible office may be agreed to by a 
majority vote (I, 490). A Member charged with acceptance of an 
incompatible office was heard in his own behalf during the debate (I, 
486).



  Where it was held in Federal court that a Member of Congress may not 
hold a commission in the Armed Forces Reserve under this clause, the 
U.S. Supreme Court reversed on other grounds, the plaintiff's lack of 
standing to maintain the suit. Reservists Committee to Stop the War v. 
Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833 (1971), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1075 (1972), rev'd on 
other grounds, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).




Sec. 102. Bills raising revenue to 
originate in the House.

  Section 7. \1\All Bills  for raising Revenue shall originate in the 
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with 
Amendments as on other Bills.


  This provision has been the subject of much discussion (II, 1488, 
1494). In the earlier days the practice was not always correct (II, 
1484); but in later years the House has insisted on its prerogative and 
the Senate has often shown reluctance to infringe thereon (II, 1482, 
1483, 1493). In several instances, however, the subject has been a 
matter of contention, conference (II, 1487, 1488), and final 
disagreement (II, 1485, 1487, 1488). Sometimes, however, when the House 
has questioned an invasion of prerogative, the Senate has receded (II, 
1486, 1493). The disagreements have been especially vigorous over the 
right of the Senate to concur with amendments (II, 1489), and although 
the Senate has acquiesced in the sole right of the House to originate 
revenue bills, it has at the same time held to a broad power of 
amendment (II, 1497-1499). The House has frequently challenged the 
Senate on this point (II, 1481, 1491, 1496; Sept. 14, 1965, p. 23632). 
When the House has perceived an invasion of its prerogative, it has 
ordered the bill or Senate amendment to be returned to the Senate (II, 
1480-1499; VI, 315, 317; Mar. 30, 1937, p. 2930; July 2, 1960, p. 15818; 
Oct. 10, 1962, p. 23014; May 20, 1965, p. 11149; June 20, 1968, p. 
22127; Nov. 8, 1979, p. 31518; May 17, 1983, p. 12486; Oct. 1, 1985, p. 
25418; Sept. 25, 1986, p. 26202; July 30, 1987, p. 21582; June 16, 1988, 
p. 14780; June 21, 1988, p. 15425; Sept. 23, 1988, p. 25094; Sept. 28, 
1988, p. 26415; Oct. 21, 1988, pp. 33110-11; June 15, 1989, p. 12167; 
Nov. 9, 1989, p. 28271; Oct. 22, 1991, p. 27087; Oct. 31, 1991, p. 
29284; Feb. 25, 1992, p. 3377; July 14, 1994, p. 16593; July 21, 1994, 
p. 17280; July 21, 1994, p. 17281; Aug. 12, 1994, pp. 7642, 7643; Oct. 
7, 1994, p. 29136, 29137; Mar. 21, 1996, p. 5950; Apr. 16, 1996, pp. 
7642, 7643; Sept. 27, 1996, p. 25542; Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25931; Mar. 5, 
1998, p. 2618; Oct. 15, 1998, p. 26483; July 15, 1999, p. 16317; Nov. 
18, 1999, p. 30732; Oct. 24, 2000, p. 24149; Sept. 20, 2001, p. 17454; 
Sept. 23, 2010, pp. 16379, 16380; Dec. 12, 2012, p. 16984); June 25, 
2015 (p. 10498), or declined to proceed further with it (II, 1485).

  Among the measures the House has returned to the Senate: a Senate-
passed bill providing for the sale of Conrail and containing provisions 
relating to the tax treatment of the sale, notwithstanding inclusion in 
that bill of a disclaimer section requiring all revenue provisions 
therein to be contained in separate legislation originating in the House 
(Sept. 25, 1986, p. 26202); a Senate-passed bill dealing with the tax 
treatment of income derived from the exercise of Indian treaty fishing 
rights (June 21, 1988, p. 15425); a Senate-passed bill creating a tax-
exempt government corporation (June 15, 1989, p. 12167); a Senate-passed 
bill addressing the tax treatment of police-corps scholarships and the 
regulation of firearms under the Internal Revenue Code (Oct. 22, 1991, 
p. 27087); a Senate amendment to a general appropriation bill 
prohibiting funds for the Internal Revenue Service to enforce a 
requirement to use undyed diesel fuel for use in recreational boats 
(July 14, 1994, p. 16593); Senate-passed bills prescribing the tax 
treatment of certain benefits to members of the Armed Forces (Nov. 18, 
1999, p. 30732), of public-sector retirement plans (Nov. 18, 1999, p. 
30734), or of a military retirement fund (June 25, 2015, p. 10498); a 
Senate-passed bill prohibiting the importation of commodities subject to 
tariff (July 30, 1987, p. 21582); a Senate-passed bill banning all 
imports from Iran, a tariff measure as affecting revenue from dutiable 
imports (June 16, 1988, p. 14780); a Senate-passed bill including 
certain import sanctions in an export administration statute (Oct. 31, 
1991, p. 29284); a Senate-passed bill requiring the President to impose 
sanctions including import restrictions against countries that fail to 
eliminate large-scale driftnet fishing (Feb. 25, 1992, p. 3377); a 
Senate-passed bill proposing to regulate toxic substances by prohibiting 
the import of products containing more than specified level of lead 
(July 21, 1994, p. 17280); a Senate-passed bill proposing new import 
restrictions on products containing any substance derived from 
rhinoceroses or tigers (Oct. 15, 1998, p. 26483); Senate-passed bills 
proposing an amendment to the criminal code that would make it unlawful 
to import certain assault weapons (Oct. 22, 1991, p. 27087) or to import 
large capacity ammunition feeding devices (July 15, 1999, p. 16317); a 
Senate-passed bill proposing to create a new basis for applying import 
restrictions on bear viscera or products derived therefrom (Oct. 24, 
2000, p. 24149); a Senate amendment proposing to enact by reference a 
Senate bill providing for a ban on (dutiable) imports of diamonds from 
certain countries (Sept. 20, 2001, p. 17454); a Senate amendment to a 
general appropriation bill proposing a user fee raising revenue to 
finance broader activities of the agency imposing the levy, thereby 
raising general revenue (Aug. 12, 1994, p. 21656); a Senate amendment to 
a general appropriation bill proposing to increase two fees to finance 
general government operations (Sept. 23, 2010, pp. 16379, 16380); a 
Senate-passed bill proposing to repeal a fee on electricity generated by 
nuclear energy that otherwise would raise revenue (Mar. 5, 1998, p. 
2618).

  The House has adopted a resolution recommitting a House bill to 
conference upon determining that a conference report (on which the House 
was acting first) accompanying such bill originated provisions in 
derogation of the constitutional prerogative of the House (July 24, 
2018, p. _), but has laid on the table a similar resolution (July 27, 
2000, p. 16565). The House has also laid on the table a resolution that 
Senate amendments, including those subsequently agreed to in a 
conference report (on which the House was acting first), originated 
provisions in derogation of the constitutional prerogative of the House 
and resolving that such bill and Senate amendments be returned to the 
Senate (July 28, 1982, p. 18375; Aug. 19, 1982, p. 22127).

  The House, by adopting one resolution, has returned multiple measures 
to the Senate (Sept. 23, 2010, pp. 16379, 16380; Dec. 12, 2012, p. 
16984).

  A bill raising revenue incidentally was held not to infringe upon the 
constitutional prerogative of the House to originate revenue legislation 
(VI, 315). A question relating to the invasion of the constitutional 
prerogatives of the House by a Senate amendment may be raised at any 
time when the House is in possession of the papers, but not otherwise; 
thus, the question has been presented pending the motion to call up a 
conference report on the bill (June 20, 1968, Deschler, ch. 13, 
Sec. 14.2; Aug. 19, 1982, p. 22127), but has been held nonprivileged 
with respect to a bill already presented to the President (Apr. 6, 1995, 
p. 10700). The Senate decided that a bill proposing a gasoline tax in 
the District of Columbia should not originate in the Senate (VI, 316).

  Clause 5(a) of rule XXI prohibits consideration of any amendment, 
including any Senate amendment, proposing a tax or tariff during 
consideration of a bill or joint resolution reported by a committee not 
having that jurisdiction (Sec. 1066, infra).

  For a discussion of the prerogatives of the House under this clause, 
and discussion of the prerogatives of the House to originate 
appropriation bills, see Deschler, ch. 13. For a discussion of the 
prerogatives of the House with respect to treaties affecting revenue, 
see Sec. 597, infra. For a discussion of how the House exercises its 
origination clause responsibilities by a former chair of the Committee 
on Ways and Means, see Dec. 12, 2014, p. 18729. For examples of Senate 
messages requesting the return of Senate revenue measures, see Sec. 565, 
infra.




Sec. 103. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); Twin 
City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 
U.S. 107 (1911); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906); Rainey v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 
U.S. 385 (1990).





Sec. 104. Approval and disapproval of bills by 
the President.

  \2\Every Bill  which shall have passed the House of Representatives 
and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the 
President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if 
not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it 
shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their 
Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two 
thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, 
together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall 
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, 
it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses 
shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons 
voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each 
House respectively. * * *




Sec. 105. The act of approval.

  Under the usual  practice, 
bills are considered to have been presented to the President at the time 
they are delivered to the White House. In 1959, bills delivered to the 
White House while the President was abroad were held for presentation to 
the President upon his return to the United States by the White House. 
The United States Court of Claims held, in Eber Bros. Wine and Liquor 
Corp. v. United States, 337 F.2d 624 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 950 
(1965), that where the President had determined, with the informal 
acquiescence of leaders of Congress, that bills from the Congress were 
to be received at the White House only for presentation to him upon his 
return to the United States and the bill delivered to the White House 
was so stamped, the Presidential veto of the bill more than 10 days 
after delivery to the White House but less than 10 days after his return 
to the country was timely. The second session of the 89th Congress 
adjourned sine die while President Johnson was on an Asian tour and 
receipts for bills delivered to the White House during that time were 
marked in like manner. The approval of a bill by the President of the 
United States is valid only with his signature (IV, 3490). Before the 
adoption of the 20th amendment to the Constitution (which changed the 
date of meeting of Congress to January 3), at the close of a Congress, 
when the two Houses prolonged their sessions into the forenoon of March 
4, the approvals were dated on the prior legislative day, because the 
legislative portion of March 4 belonged to the term of the new Congress. 
In one instance, however, bills signed on the forenoon of March 4 were 
dated as of that day with the hour and minute of approval given with the 
date (IV, 3489). The act of President Tyler in filing with a bill an 
exposition of his reasons for signing it was examined and severely 
criticized by a committee of the House (IV, 3492); and in 1842 a 
committee of the House discussed the act of President Jackson in writing 
above his signature of approval a memorandum of his construction of the 
bill (IV, 3492). But if the President has accompanied his message 
announcing the approval with a statement of his reasons there has been 
no question in the House (IV, 3491). The statutes require that bills 
signed by the President shall be received by the Archivist of the United 
States and deposited in his office (1 U.S.C. 106a). Formerly these bills 
were received by the Secretary of State (IV, 3485) and deposited in his 
office (IV, 3429).




Sec. 106. Notice of approval sent by 
message.

  Notice of the  signature of a bill by the President is sent by message to 
the House in which it originated (VII, 1089) and that House informs the 
other (IV, 3429). But this notice is not necessary to the validity of 
the act (IV, 3495). Sometimes, at the close of a Congress the President 
informs the House of such bills as have been approved and of such as 
have been allowed to fail (IV, 3499-3502). In one instance he 
communicated his omission to sign a bill through the committee appointed 
to notify him that Congress was about to adjourn (IV, 3504). A bill that 
had not actually passed having been signed by the President, he 
disregarded it and a new bill was passed (IV, 3498). Messages of the 
President giving notice of bills approved are entered in the Journal and 
published in the Congressional Record (V, 6593).




Sec. 107. Disapproval (or veto) of 
bills.

  A message withholding  approval of a bill, called a veto message, is sent to the House 
in which the bill originated; but it has been held that such a message 
may not be returned to the President on his request after it has been 
laid before the Senate (IV, 3521). In one instance a veto message that 
had not been laid before the House was returned to the President on his 
request (Aug. 1, 1946, p. 10651). A vetoed bill received in the House by 
way of the Senate is considered as if received directly from the 
President and supersedes the regular order of business (IV, 3537; VII, 
1109). A veto message may not be read after the absence of a quorum has 
been ascertained, even though the House be about to adjourn sine die 
(IV, 3522; VII, 1094); but the message may be read and acted on at the 
next session of the same Congress (IV, 3522). When the President has 
been prevented by adjournment from returning a bill with his objections 
he has sometimes at the next session communicated his reasons for not 
approving (V, 6618-6620).


  For enrollments returned with ``memoranda of disapproval,'' see 
Sec. 113, infra.



Sec. 108. Consideration of a vetoed bill in 
the House.

  It is possible,  although not invariable, that a bill returned with the 
objections of the President shall be voted on at once (IV, 3534-3536) 
and when laid before the House the question on passage is considered as 
pending and no motion from the floor is required (VII, 1097-1099), but 
it has been held that the constitutional mandate that the House shall 
``proceed to reconsider'' means that the House shall immediately proceed 
to consider it under the Rules of the House, such that the ordinary 
motions under the Rules of the House (e.g., to refer or to postpone to a 
day certain) are in order (IV, 3542-3550; VII, 1100, 1105, 1113; Speaker 
Wright, Aug. 3, 1988, p. 20280) and (for the stated examples) debatable 
under the hour rule (VIII, 2740). The House may by unanimous consent 
(e.g., August 17, 1978, pp. 26802, 26803) or special order of business 
(Jan. 7, 2016, p. 133; Dec. 21, 2020, p. _) postpone consideration of a 
vetoed bill, or any motion related to its disposition, in advance of its 
receipt by the House, and such a special order of business may supersede 
an earlier unanimous-consent request in order to further postpone 
consideration (May 27, 2020, p. _). When consideration of a veto message 
is postponed to a date certain it has the status of unfinished business 
on that day, such that the House may proceed to its consideration 
without motion from the floor (e.g., May 9, 1996, p. 10807; Nov. 6, 
2007, pp. 29822, 29823). Although under clause 4 of rule XVI, and under 
the precedents the motion for the previous question takes precedence 
over motions to postpone or to refer when a question is under debate, if 
the Speaker has laid before the House a veto message from the President 
but has not yet stated the question to be on overriding the veto, that 
question is not ``under debate'' and the motion for the previous 
question does not take precedence (Speaker Wright, Aug. 3, 1988; 
Procedure, ch. 24, Sec. 15.8). A resolution asserting that to recognize 
for a motion to refer a veto message before stating the question on 
overriding the veto would interfere with the constitutional prerogative 
of the House to proceed to that question, and directing the Speaker to 
state the question on overriding the veto as pending before recognizing 
for a motion to refer, did not give rise to a question of the privileges 
of the House (Speaker Wright, Aug. 3, 1988, p. 20281). A motion to refer 
a vetoed bill, either with or without the message, has been held 
allowable within the constitutional mandate that the House shall 
``proceed to reconsider'' (IV, 3550; VII, 1104, 1105, 1108, 1114), and 
in the 101st Congress, a veto pending as unfinished business was 
referred with instructions to consider and report promptly (Jan. 24, 
1990, p. 421). But although the ordinary motion to refer may be applied 
to a vetoed bill, it is not in order to move to recommit it pending the 
demand for the previous question or after it is ordered (IV, 3551; VII, 
1102). When a veto message is before the House for consideration de novo 
or as unfinished business, a motion to refer the message to committee 
takes precedence over the question of passing the bill, the objections 
of the President to the contrary notwithstanding (Procedure, ch. 24, 
Sec. 15.8; Oct. 25, 1983, p. 29188), but the motion to refer may be laid 
on the table (Oct. 25, 1983, p. 29188). A vetoed bill having been 
rejected by the House, the message was referred (IV, 3552; VII, 1103). 
Committees to which vetoed bills have been referred have sometimes 
neglected to report (IV, 3523, 3550, footnotes; VII, 1108, 1114).


  A vetoed bill may be laid on the table (IV, 3549; VII, 1105), but it 
is still highly privileged and a motion to take it from the table is in 
order (IV, 3550; V, 5439). Also a motion to discharge a committee from 
the consideration of such a bill is privileged (IV, 3532; Aug. 4, 1988, 
p. 20365; Sept. 19, 1996, p. 23815) and (in the modern practice) is 
debatable (Mar. 7, 1990, p. 3620) but is subject to the motion to lay on 
the table (Sept. 7, 1965, p. 22958; Aug. 4, 1988, p. 20365). When the 
motion to discharge is agreed to, the veto message is pending as 
unfinished business (Mar. 7, 1990, p. 3621). Although a vetoed bill is 
always privileged, the same is not true of a bill reported in lieu of it 
(IV, 3531; VII, 1103).



Sec. 109. Action on a vetoed bill.

  If two-thirds of  the 
House to which a bill is returned with the President's objections agree 
to pass it, and then two-thirds of the other House also agree, it 
becomes a law (IV, 3520). The yeas and nays are required to pass a bill 
over the President's veto (art. I, sec. 7; IV, 2726, 3520; VII, 1110). 
The two-thirds vote required to pass the bill is two-thirds of the 
Members present and voting and not two-thirds of the total membership of 
the House (IV, 3537, 3538; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 
(1919)). Only Members voting should be considered in determining whether 
two-thirds voted in the affirmative (VII, 1111). The motion to 
reconsider may not be applied to the vote on reconsideration of a bill 
returned with the objections of the President (V, 5644; VIII, 2778).


  It is the practice for one House to inform the other by message of its 
decision that a bill returned with the objections of the President shall 
not pass (IV, 3539-3541). A bill passed notwithstanding the objections 
of the President is sent by the presiding officer of the House that last 
acts on it to the Archivist, who receives it and deposits it in his 
office (1 U.S.C. 106a). Formerly these bills were sent to the Secretary 
of State (IV, 3524) and deposited in that office (IV, 3485).



Sec. 110. Errors in bills sent to the 
President.

  A bill incorrectly  enrolled has been recalled from the President, who erased 
his signature (IV, 3506). Bills sent to the President but not yet signed 
by him are sometimes recalled by concurrent resolution of the two Houses 
(IV, 3507-3509; VII, 1091; Sept. 4, 1962, p. 18405; May 6, 1974, p. 
13076), and amended; but this proceeding is regarded as irregular (IV, 
3510-3518). When the two Houses of Congress request the President by 
concurrent resolution to return an enrolled bill and the President 
honors the request, the ten-day period under this clause runs anew from 
the time the bill is re-enrolled and is again presented to the 
President. Thus, in the 93d Congress the President returned on May 7, 
1974 a bill pursuant to the request of Congress (H. Con. Res. 485, May 
6, 1974, p. 13076). The bill was again enrolled, presented to the 
President on May 7, and marked ``received May 7'' at the White House. An 
error in an enrolled bill that has gone to the President may also be 
corrected by a joint resolution (IV, 3519; VII, 1092). In the 99th 
Congress, two enrollments of a continuing appropriation bill for FY 1987 
were presented to and signed by the President, the second correcting an 
omission in the first (see P.L. 99-500 and 99-591). In Clinton v.  City 
of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), the Supreme Court held that the 
cancellation procedures of the Line Item Veto Act violated the 
presentment clause of article I, section 7 of the Constitution. For a 
discussion of the operation of the Act during the period of its 
effectiveness, see Sec. 1130(6b), infra.





Sec. 110a. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Matthews v. Zane, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 164 
(1822); Gardner v. Collector, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 499 (1868); Lapeyre v. 
United States, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 191 (1873); La Abra Silver Mining Co. 
v. United States, 175 U.S. 423 (1899); Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. 
Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919); Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482 
(1932); Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938); Clinton v. City of 
New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).





Sec. 111. Bills that become laws without the 
President's approval.

  * * * If any  Bill shall not be returned by the President 
within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to 
him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, 
unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which 
Case it shall not be a Law.


  A bill signed by the President within 10 days (Sunday excepted) after 
it has been presented becomes a law even though such signing takes place 
when Congress is not in session, whether during the period of an 
adjournment to a day certain or after the final adjournment of a session 
(IV, 3486). A President may sign a bill after adjournment sine die but 
within 10 days after its receipt. For example, President Truman, after 
the convening of the 82d Congress, approved bills passed and presented 
in the 81st Congress (e.g., P.L. 81-910); President Reagan, after the 
convening of the 98th Congress, approved bills passed and presented in 
the 97th Congress (e.g., P.L. 97-414); and President Obama, after the 
convening of the 113th Congress, approved bills passed and presented in 
the 112th Congress (e.g., P.L. 112-241). It was formerly contended that 
the President might not approve bills during a recess (IV, 3493, 3494), 
and in one instance, in 1864, when the President signed a bill after 
final adjournment of Congress but within 10 days grave doubts were 
raised and an adverse report was made by a House committee (IV, 3497). 
Later opinions of the Attorney General have been to the effect that the 
President has the power to approve bills within 10 days after they have 
been presented during the period of an adjournment to a day certain (IV, 
3496) and after an adjournment sine die (VII, 1088). The Supreme Court 
has held valid as laws bills signed by the President within 10 days 
during a recess for a specified time (La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. 
United States, 175 U.S. 451 (1899); IV, 3495) and also those signed 
after an adjournment sine die (Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482 
(1932)).



Sec. 112. The pocket veto.

  A bill that  is passed by both 
Houses of Congress during the first regular session of a Congress and 
presented to the President less than 10 days (Sundays excepted) before 
the adjournment sine die of that session, but is neither signed by the 
President, nor returned to the House in which it originated, does not 
become a law (``The Pocket Veto Case,'' 279 U.S. 655 (1929); VII, 1115). 
The Supreme Court has held that the adjournment of the House of origin 
for not exceeding three days while the other branch of the Congress 
remained in session did not prevent a return of the vetoed bill to the 
House of origin. Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938). President 
Truman during an adjournment to a day certain pocket vetoed several 
bills passed by the 81st Congress and also, after the convening of the 
82d Congress, pocket vetoed one bill passed in the 81st Congress.




Sec. 113. Effect of adjournment to a day 
certain.

  Doubt has existed  as to whether a bill that remains with the President 10 days 
without his signature, Congress meanwhile before the tenth day having 
adjourned to a day certain, becomes a law (IV, 3483, 3496; VII, 1115); 
an opinion of the Attorney General in 1943 stated that under such 
circumstances a bill not signed by the President did not become a law 
(40 Op. Att'y Gen. 274 (1943)). However, more recently, where a Member 
of the Senate challenged in Federal court the effectiveness of such a 
pocket veto, a United States Court of Appeals held that a Senate bill 
could not be pocket-vetoed by the President during an ``intrasession'' 
adjournment of Congress to a day certain for more than three days, where 
the Secretary of the Senate had been authorized to receive Presidential 
messages during such adjournment. Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. 
Cir., 1974). See also Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1976). 
Following a consent decree in this case, it was announced that President 
Ford would utilize a ``return'' veto, subject to override, in 
intersession and intrasession adjournments where authority exists for 
the appropriate House to receive such messages notwithstanding the 
adjournment.


  In the 101st, 110th, and 111th Congresses, when the President returned 
an enrolled bill during an intersession adjournment, not by way of 
message under seal but with a ``memorandum of disapproval'' setting 
forth his objections, the House treated it as a return veto subject to 
override under article I, section 7 (Jan. 23, 1990, p. 4; Jan. 15, 2008, 
pp. 11, 12; Jan. 12, 2010, p. 7). For similar treatment by the Senate in 
the 114th Congress, including holding the veto message at the desk, see 
January 11, 2016, pp. 253, 254. Similarly, in the 102d, 106th, and 111th 
Congresses, an enrolled House bill returned to the Clerk during an 
intrasession recess, not by way of message under seal but with a 
``memorandum of disapproval'' setting forth the objections of the 
President, was considered as a return veto (Sept. 11, 1991, p. 22643; 
Sept. 6, 2000, p. 17156; Nov. 13, 2000, p. 26022; Nov. 15, 2010, p. 
17521). Also in the 102d Congress, President Bush purported on December 
20, 1991, to pocket veto a bill (S. 1176) that was presented to him on 
December 9, 1991, notwithstanding that the Congress was in an 
intrasession adjournment (from Nov. 27, 1991, until 11:55 a.m., Jan. 3, 
1992) rather than an adjournment sine die (see Jan. 23, 1992 [Daily 
Digest]); and during debate on a subsequent bill (S. 2184) purporting to 
repeal the provisions of S. 1176 and to enact instead provisions 
acceding to the objections of the President, the Speaker inserted 
remarks on the pocket veto in light of modern congressional practice 
concerning the receipt of messages and communications during recesses 
and adjournments (Mar. 3, 1992, p. 4081).

  In the 93d Congress, the President returned a House bill without his 
signature to the Clerk of the House, who had been authorized to receive 
messages from the President during an adjournment to a day certain, and 
the President asserted in his veto message that he had ``pocket vetoed'' 
the bill during the adjournment of the House to a day certain. The House 
regarded the President's return of the bill without his signature as a 
veto within the meaning of article I, section 7 of the Constitution and 
proceeded to reconsider and to pass the bill over the President's veto, 
after postponing consideration to a subsequent day (motion to postpone, 
Nov. 18, 1974, p. 36246; veto override, Nov. 20, 1974, p. 36621). 
Subsequently, on November 21, 1974, the Senate also voted to override 
the veto (p. 36882) and pursuant to 1 U.S.C. 106a the Enrolling Clerk of 
the Senate forwarded the bill to the Archives for publication as a 
public law. The Administrator of General Services at the Archives (now 
Archivist), upon instructions from the Department of Justice, declined 
to promulgate the bill as public law on the day received. The question 
as to the efficacy of the congressional action in passing the bill over 
the President's veto was mooted when the House and Senate passed on 
November 26, 1974 (pp. 37406, 37603), an identical bill that was signed 
into law on December 7, 1974 (P.L. 93-516).

  As part of the concurrent resolution providing for the adjournments 
sine die of the first sessions of the 101st Congress and 105th Congress, 
the Congress reaffirmed its position that an intersession adjournment 
did not prevent the return of a bill where the Clerk and the Secretary 
of the Senate were authorized to receive messages during the adjournment 
(H. Con. Res. 239, Nov. 21, 1989, p. 31156; S. Con. Res. 68, Nov. 13, 
1997, p. 26538). For the views of the Speaker, the Minority Leader, and 
the Attorney General concerning pocket veto authority during an 
intrasession adjournment, see correspondence inserted in the 
Congressional Record (Jan. 23, 1990, p. 3; Sept. 19, 2000, p. 18594; 
Nov. 13, 2000, p. 26022; Oct. 2, 2008, pp. 23874, 23875; May 26, 2010, 
pp. 9473, 9474); and for discussions of the constitutionality of 
intersession or intrasession pocket vetoes see Kennedy, ``Congress, The 
President, and The Pocket Veto,'' 63 Va. L. Rev. 355 (1977), and 
Hearing, Subcommittee on Legislative Process, Committee on Rules, on 
H.R. 849, 101st Congress.




Sec. 114. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 
175 U.S. 423 (1899); Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 U.S. 506 (1901); the 
Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929); Edwards v. United States, 286 
U.S. 482 (1932); Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938); Burke v. 
Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987) (vacating and remanding as moot the decision 
sub nom. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).





Sec. 115. As to presentation of orders and 
resolutions for approval.

  \3\Every Order,  Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence 
of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a 
question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the 
United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved 
by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of 
the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and 
Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.


  It has been settled conclusively that a joint resolution proposing an 
amendment to the Constitution should not be presented to the President 
for his approval (V, 7040; Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 
378 (1798)). Such joint resolutions, after passage by both Houses, are 
presented to the Archivist (1 U.S.C. 106b). Although the requirement of 
the Constitution seems specific, the practice of early Congresses was to 
present to the President for approval only such concurrent resolutions 
as were legislative in effect (IV, 3483, 3484).

  For discussion of Presidential approval of a joint resolution 
extending the period for State ratification of a constitutional 
amendment already submitted to the States, see Sec. 192, infra.




Sec. 116. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United 
States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United 
States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Process 
Gas Consumer's Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America 463 U.S. 1216 
(1983).




Sec. 117. The revenue power.

  Section 8. The Congress  shall 
have Power\1\ To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to 
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of 
the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform 
throughout the United States;




Sec. 118. The borrowing power.

    \2\To borrow Money on the 
credit of the United States:




Sec. 119. Power over commerce.

  \3\To regulate  Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes;




Sec. 120. Naturalization and bankruptcy.

  \4\To establish  an 
uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of 
Bankruptcies throughout the United States;




Sec. 121. Coinage, weight, and measures.

    \5\To coin Money, 
regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of 
Weights and Measures;




Sec. 122. Counterfeiting.

  \6\To provide  for the Punishment 
of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;-
-




Sec. 123. Postoffices and postroads.

    \7\To establish Post 
Offices and Post Roads;




Sec. 124. Patents and copyrights.

  \8\To promote  the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries;




Sec. 125. Inferior courts.

    \9\To constitute Tribunals 
inferior to the supreme Court;




Sec. 126. Piracies and offenses against law of 
nations.

    \10\To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on 
the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations;





Sec. 127. Declarations of war and maritime 
operations.

    \11\To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, 
and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;





Sec. 128. War powers of Congress and the 
President.

  The 93d  Congress passed over the President's veto Public Law 93-
148, relating to the power of Congress to declare war under this clause 
and the power of the President as Commander in Chief under article II, 
section 2, clause 1. The law requires that the President report to 
Congress on the introduction of United States Armed Forces in the 
absence of a declaration of war. The President must terminate use of the 
Armed Forces unless Congress, within 60 calendar days after a report is 
submitted or is required to be submitted, (1) declares war or authorizes 
use of the Armed Forces; (2) extends by law the 60-day period; or (3) is 
physically unable to meet as result of armed attack. The Act also 
provided that Congress could adopt a concurrent resolution requiring the 
removal of Armed Forces engaged in foreign hostilities, a provision that 
should be read in light of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Sections 
6 and 7 of the Act provide congressional procedures for joint 
resolutions, bills, and concurrent resolutions introduced pursuant to 
the provisions of the Act (see Sec. 1130(2), infra). For further 
discussion of that Act, and war powers generally, see Deschler, ch. 13.




Sec. 129. Raising and support of armies.

  \12\To raise  and 
support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a 
longer Term than two Years;




Sec. 130. Provisions for a navy.

    \13\To provide and 
maintain a Navy;




Sec. 131. Land and naval forces.

    \14\To make Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;




Sec. 132. Calling out the militia.

  \15\To provide  for 
calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress 
Insurrections and repel Invasions;




Sec. 133. Power over militia.

  \16\To provide  for organizing, 
arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of 
them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving 
to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the 
Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed 
by Congress;





Sec. 134. Power over territory of the United 
States.

  \17\To exercise  exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such 
District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of 
particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of 
the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over 
all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in 
which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, 
dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;--And




Sec. 135. Congressional authority over 
the District of Columbia.

  Congress has provided  by law that ``all that part of the territory 
of the United States included within the present limits of the District 
of Columbia shall be the permanent seat of government of the United 
States'' (4 U.S.C. 71). Pursuant to its authority under this clause, 
Congress provided in 1970 for the people of the District of Columbia to 
be represented in the House of Representatives by a Delegate and for a 
Commission to report to the Congress on the organization of the 
government of the District of Columbia (P.L. 91-405; 84 Stat. 845). For 
the powers and duties of the Delegate from the District of Columbia, see 
rule III (Sec. 675, infra) and Deschler, ch. 7, Sec. 3. In 1973, 
Congress passed the District of Columbia Self-Government and 
Governmental Reorganization Act, which reorganized the governmental 
structure of the District, provided a charter for local government 
subject to acceptance by a majority of the registered qualified voters 
of the District, delegated certain legislative powers to the District, 
and implemented certain recommendations of the Commission on the 
Organization of the Government of the District of Columbia (P.L. 93-198; 
87 Stat. 774). Section 604 of that Act provides for congressional action 
on certain district matters by providing a procedure for approval and 
disapproval of certain actions by the District of Columbia Council. The 
section, as amended by Public Law 98-473, permits a highly privileged 
motion to discharge a joint resolution of approval or disapproval that 
has not been reported by the committee to which referred within 20 
calendar days after its introduction (see Sec. 1130(5), infra).



-  \18\To make <> all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in 
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof.



Sec. 135a. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. 445 (1805); 
National Mutual Insurance Co. of D.C. v. Tidewater Transfer Co, 337 U.S. 
582 (1945).




Sec. 137. Migration or importation of 
persons.

  Section 9. \1\The  Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States 
now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the 
Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a 
Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten 
dollars for each Person.




Sec. 138. Writ of habeas corpus.

  \2\The Privilege of  the 
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of 
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.




Sec. 139. Bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.

    \3\No 
Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.





Sec. 140. Capitation and direct taxes.

  \4\[No Capitation,  or 
other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or 
Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.]


  This provision was changed in 1913 by the 16th amendment.



Sec. 141. Export duties.

    \5\No Tax or Duty shall be laid on 
Articles exported from any State.




Sec. 142. Freedom of commerce.

  \6\No Preference  shall be 
given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State 
over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, 
be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.




Sec. 143. Appropriations and accounting of public 
money.

  \7\No Money  shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the 
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from 
time to time.





Sec. 144. Titles of nobility and gifts from 
foreign states.

  \8\No Title of  Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no 
Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without 
the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, 
or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.




Sec. 145. Foreign gifts and 
decorations.

  Consent has been  granted to officers and employees of the government, 
under enumerated conditions, to accept certain gifts and decorations 
from foreign governments (see 5 U.S.C. 7342). The adoption of this act 
largely has obviated the practice of passing private bills to permit the 
officer or employee to retain the award. However, where the Speaker (who 
was one of the officers empowered by an earlier law to approve retention 
of decorations by Members of the House) was himself tendered an award 
from a foreign government, a private law (Private Law 91-244) was 
enacted to permit him to accept and wear the award so that he would not 
be in the position of reviewing his own application under the provisions 
of the law.


  Public Law 95-105 amended the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act (now 5 
U.S.C. 7342) to designate the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct 
(now Ethics) of the House of Representatives as the employing agency for 
the House with respect to foreign gifts and decorations received by 
Members and employees; under that statute the Committee may approve the 
acceptance of foreign decorations and has promulgated regulations to 
carry out the Act with respect to Members and employees (Jan. 23, 1978, 
p. 452), and disposes of foreign gifts that may not be retained by the 
donee.


  Opinions of Attorneys General: Gifts from Foreign Prince, 24 Op. Att'y 
Gen. 117 (1902); Foreign Diplomatic Commission, 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 538 
(1871); Marshal of Florida, 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 409 (1854).



Sec. 146. States not to make treaties, coin 
money, pass ex post facto laws, impair contracts, etc.

  Section 10. \1\No  State shall 
enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of 
Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing 
but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of 
Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.




Sec. 147. States not to lay imposts or 
duties.

  \2\No State  shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or 
Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary 
for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties 
and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the 
Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be 
subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.




[[Page 68]]



Sec. 148. States not to lay tonnage taxes, make 
compacts, or go to war.

  \3\No State  shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay 
any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, 
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a 
foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such 
imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.



                               ARTICLE II.




Sec. 149. Terms of the President and Vice 
President.

  Section 1. \1\The  executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of 
four years, and together with the Vice President, chosen for the same 
Term, be elected, as follows:





Sec. 150. Commencement of President's term of 
office.

  George  Washington took the oath of office as the first President on 
April 30, 1789 (III, 1986). The two Houses of the First Congress found, 
after examination by a joint committee, that by provisions made in the 
Federal Constitution and by the Continental Congress, the term of the 
President had, notwithstanding, begun on March 4, 1789 (I, 3). The 20th 
amendment, declared to have been ratified on February 6, 1933, provides 
that Presidential terms shall end and successor terms shall begin at 
noon on January 20. Thus, Franklin D. Roosevelt's first term began on 
March 4, 1933, but ended at noon on January 20, 1937. Formerly, when 
March 4 fell on Sunday, the public inauguration of the President 
occurred at noon on March 5 (III, 1996; VI, 449). Following ratification 
of the 20th amendment, the first time inauguration day fell on Sunday 
was January 20, 1957, and President Eisenhower took the oath for his 
second term in a private ceremony at the White House on that day 
followed by a public inauguration ceremony on the steps of the East 
Front of the Capitol on Monday, January 21, 1957. A similar scenario was 
followed at the beginning of the second terms of President Reagan and 
President Obama, with the oath being given at the White House on Sunday 
(1985 and 2013), followed by a public ceremony on Monday in the Rotunda 
(1985) or the East Front of the Capitol (2013). The 22d amendment 
provides that no person shall be elected President more than twice.





Sec. 151. Electors of President and Vice President and 
their qualifications.

  \2\Each  State shall appoint, in such Manner as the 
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole 
Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be 
entitled in the Congress; but no Senator or Representative, or Person 
holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be 
appointed an Elector.





Sec. 152. Questions as to qualifications of 
electors.

  Questions  of the qualifications of electors have arisen, and in one 
instance certain ones were found disqualified, but because their number 
was not sufficient to affect the result and there was doubt as to what 
tribunal should pass on the question the votes were counted (III, 1941). 
In other cases there were objections, but the votes were counted (III, 
1972-1974, 1979). In one instance an elector found to be disqualified 
resigned both offices, whereupon he was made eligible to fill the 
vacancy thus caused among electors (III, 1975).





Sec. 152a. Original provision for failure of electoral 
college to choose.

  \3\[The  Electors shall meet in their respective States and 
vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an 
Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List 
of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which 
List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of 
Government of the United States, directed to the President of the 
Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate 
and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes 
shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes 
shall be the President, if such Number be a majority of the whole Number 
of Electors appointed: and if there be more than one who have such 
Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of 
Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them for 
President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest 
on the List the said House shall in like manner chuse the President. But 
in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the 
Representation from each State having one Vote; A quorum for this 
purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the 
States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. 
In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the 
greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. 
But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate 
shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice-President.]



  This third clause of article II, section 1 was superseded by the 12th 
amendment (see Sec. Sec. 219-223, infra).




Sec. 153. Time of choosing electors and time at which their 
votes are given.

    \4\The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the 
Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day 
shall be the same throughout the United States.



  The time for choosing electors has been fixed on ``election day'', 
which is ``the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November, in every 
fourth year . . . .''; and the electors in each State ``meet and give in 
their votes on the first Tuesday after the second Wednesday in December 
next following their appointment, at such place in each State in 
accordance with the laws of the State enacted prior to election day'' 
(III, 1914; VI, 438; 3 U.S.C. 1, 7, 21). The statute also provides for 
transmitting to the President of the Senate certificates of the 
appointment of the electors and of their votes (III, 1915-1917; VI, 439; 
3 U.S.C. 11).



Sec. 154. Qualifications of President of the United 
States.

  \5\No  Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the 
United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall 
be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be 
eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty 
five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.





Sec. 155. Succession in case of removal, death, 
resignation, or disability of President and Vice President.

  \6\In  Case of 
the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, 
or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the 
Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law 
provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both 
of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then 
act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the 
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.




Sec. 156. Resignation of the President.

  The  25th amendment 
provides for filling a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President and, 
when the President is unable to perform the duties of his office, for 
the Vice President to assume those powers and duties as Acting 
President. During the 93d Congress, President Richard M. Nixon resigned 
from office on August 9, 1974, by delivering a signed resignation to the 
Office of the Secretary of State, pursuant to 3 U.S.C. 20. Pursuant to 
the 25th amendment, Vice President Gerald R. Ford became President and 
the House and Senate confirmed his nominee, Nelson A. Rockefeller, to 
become Vice President (December 19, 1974, p. 41516).



  Congress also has provided for the performance of the duties of the 
President in case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of 
the President and Vice President (3 U.S.C. 19).




Sec. 157. Compensation of President.

  \7\The  President shall, 
at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall 
neither be encreased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall 
have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other 
Emolument from the United States, or any of them.



  The compensation of the President is established by law (3 U.S.C. 
102). In addition, the law provides an expense allowance (3 U.S.C. 102) 
and a travel allowance (3 U.S.C. 103).




Sec. 158. Oath of the President.

  \8\Before  he enter on the 
Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or 
Affirmation:--``I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully 
execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the 
best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the 
United States.''





Sec. 159. Inauguration of the President.

  The  taking of this 
oath, which is termed the inauguration, is made the occasion of certain 
ceremonies that are arranged for by a joint committee of the two Houses 
(III, 1998, 1999; VI, 451). For many years the oath was normally taken 
at the east portico of the Capitol, although in earlier years it was 
taken in the Senate Chamber or Hall of the House (III, 1986-1995). On 
March 4, 1909, owing to inclement weather, the President-elect took the 
oath and delivered his inaugural address in the Senate Chamber (VI, 
447). And when Vice President Fillmore succeeded to the vacancy in the 
Office of President, Congress being in session, he took the oath in the 
Hall of the House in the presence of the Senate and House (III, 1997). 
In 1945 Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had been elected for his fourth term 
as President, took the oath of office on the south portico at the White 
House. On August 9, 1974, Gerald R. Ford, who as Vice President 
succeeded to the Presidency following the resignation of President Nixon 
on that day, was sworn in in the East Room of the White House. The West 
Front of the Capitol was first used for the inaugural ceremony for 
Ronald W. Reagan, Jan. 20, 1981. Because of extreme cold, the public 
administration of the oath was for the first time held in the Rotunda of 
the Capitol, rather than on the West Front, as scheduled, on January 21, 
1985. Permission for such use is authorized by concurrent resolution 
(see, e.g., Oct. 9, 1984, p. 30926).





Sec. 160. The President the Commander in 
Chief.

  Section 2. \1\The  President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of 
the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called 
into the actual Service of the United States; he may require 
the <> Opinion, 
in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive 
Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their 
respective <> Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and 
Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of 
Impeachment.




Sec. 163. War powers of Congress and the President.

  The   93d 
Congress passed over the President's veto Public Law 93-148, relating to 
the power of Congress to declare war under article I, section 8, clause 
11 (Sec. 127, supra) and the power of the President as Commander in 
Chief under this clause. For further discussion of the reports to 
Congress required and the procedure for congressional action provided 
under Public Law 93-148, see Sec. 128, supra.





Sec. 164. Pardon of former President.

  In  1974, President 
Ford exercised his power under the last phrase of this clause by 
pardoning former President Nixon for any crimes he might have committed 
during a certain period in office (Proclamation 4311, September 8, 
1974). President Nixon had resigned on August 9, 1974, following the 
decision of the Committee on the Judiciary to report to the House a 
recommendation of impeachment (H. Rept. 93-1305, Aug. 20, 1974, p. 
29219).





Sec. 165. President makes treaties.

  \2\He  shall have Power, 
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, 
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall 
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint Ambassadors, <> other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme 
Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments 
are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by 
Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior 
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of 
Law, or in the Heads of Departments.



  The power of the President to appoint diplomatic representatives to 
foreign governments and to determine their rank is derived from the 
Constitution and may not be circumscribed by statutory enactments (VII, 
1248). In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Supreme Court held 
that any appointee exercising significant authority (not merely internal 
delegable authorities within the legislative branch) pursuant to the 
laws of the United States is an Officer of the United States and must 
therefore be appointed pursuant to this clause, and that Congress cannot 
by law vest such appointment authority in its own officers or require 
that Presidential appointments be subject to confirmation by both 
Houses. For a discussion of the role of the House with respect to 
treaties affecting revenue, see Sec. 597, infra.




Sec. 167. President's power to fill vacancies during 
recess of the Senate.

  \3\The  President shall have Power to fill up all 
Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting 
Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.





Sec. 167a. Decision of the Court.

  Decision  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: National Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel 
Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014).





Sec. 168. Messages from the President.

  Section 3.  He shall 
from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the 
Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall 
judge necessary and expedient; * * *


  In the early years of the Government the President made a speech to 
Congress on its assembling (V, 6629), but in 1801 President Jefferson 
discontinued this practice and transmitted a message in writing. This 
protocol was followed until April 8, 1913, when the custom of addressing 
Congress in person was resumed by President Wilson and, with the 
exception of President Hoover (VIII, 3333) has been followed generally 
by subsequent Presidents. A message in writing is usually communicated 
to both Houses on the same day, but an accompanying document can be sent 
to but one House (V, 6616, 6617). The President's State of the Union 
message is referred on motion to the Union Calendar and ordered printed 
(e.g., Jan. 15, 1975, p. 177). This motion may also refer a separate 
hand-delivered written message from the President (e.g., Jan. 19, 1978, 
p. 152). In response to a series of inquiries regarding the potential 
destruction of such written message, the Chair affirmed that such 
message is part of the proceedings of the House and is used by the House 
for archival and printing purposes (Feb. 5, 2020, p. _). A resolution 
disapproving of the Speaker's conduct relating to the handling of such 
message constitutes a question of the privileges of the House (Feb. 6, 
2020, p. _). In early years confidential messages were often sent and 
considered in secret session of the House (V, 7251, 7252).



Sec. 169. Messages required by law.

  By  law (31 U.S.C. 1105), 
the President is required to transmit the budget to Congress on or after 
the first Monday in January but not later than the first Monday in 
February each year. In addition, the President is required to submit a 
supplemental budget summary by July 16 each year (31 U.S.C. 1106). 
Submission of the Economic Report of the President is required within 10 
days after the submission of the budget (15 U.S.C. 1022). The 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 601) 
requires the transmittal to Congress by the President of amendments and 
revisions related to the budget on or before April 10 and July 15 of 
each year. In addition, the Act provides for the transmittal of messages 
proposing rescissions and deferrals of budget authority (2 U.S.C. 683, 
684).


  When the President has expressed desire to address Congress in person 
a concurrent resolution is adopted by both Houses arranging for a joint 
session to receive the message. The Speaker presides and the President 
of the Senate (the Vice President) sits to the right of the Speaker, but 
in the absence of the Vice President, the President pro tempore sits to 
the left of the Speaker (Nov. 27, 1963, p. 22838).



Sec. 170. Reception of messages from the 
President.

  The  ceremony of receiving a message in writing is simple (V, 
6591), and may occur during consideration of a question of privilege (V, 
6640-6642) or before the organization of the House (V, 6647-6649) and in 
the absence of a quorum (V, 6650; VIII, 3339; clause 7 of rule XX).



* * * <> he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both 
Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, 
with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such 
Time as he shall think proper; * * *

  But, with the exception of vetoes, messages are regularly laid before 
the House only at the time prescribed by the rule for the order of 
business (V, 6635-6638) within the discretion of the Speaker (VIII, 
3341). Although a message of the President is always read, the latest 
rulings have not permitted the reading of the accompanying documents to 
be demanded as a matter of right (V, 5267-5271; VII, 1108). A concurrent 
resolution providing for a joint session to receive the President's 
message was held to be of the highest privilege (VIII, 3335).


* * * <> he shall receive Ambassadors and other 
public Ministers; he shall take Care That the Laws be faithfully 
executed, and shall Commission all the officers of the United States.

  In certain exigencies the President may convene Congress at a place 
other than the seat of government (I, 2; 2 U.S.C. 27). Congress has on 
occasion been convened by the President (I, 10, 11; Nov. 17, 1947, p. 
10578; July 26, 1948, p. 9362), and in one instance, when Congress had 
provided by law for meeting, the President called it together on an 
earlier day (I, 12). The Congress having adjourned on July 27, 1947, p. 
10521, and on June 20, 1948, p. 9350, to a day certain, the President 
called it together on an earlier date than that to which it adjourned 
(Nov. 17, 1947, p. 10577; July 26, 1948, p. 9362). There has been some 
discussion as to whether or not there is a distinction between a session 
called by the President and other sessions of Congress (I, 12, 
footnote).




Sec. 173. Impeachment of civil officers.

  Section 4.  The 
President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States, 
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, 
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.




Sec. 174. As to the officers who may be impeached.

  In  the 
Blount trial the managers contended that all citizens of the United 
States were liable to impeachment, but this contention was not admitted 
(III, 2315), and in the Belknap trial both managers and counsel for 
respondent agreed that a private citizen, apart from offense in an 
office, might not be impeached (III, 2007). But resignation of the 
office does not prevent impeachment for crime or misdemeanor therein 
(III, 2007, 2317, 2444, 2445, 2459, 2509). In Blount's case it was 
decided that a Senator was not a civil officer within the meaning of the 
impeachment provisions of the Constitution (III, 2310, 2316). Questions 
have also arisen as to whether or not the Congressional Printer (III, 
1785), or a vice consul-general (III, 2515), might be impeached. 
Proceedings for the impeachment of territorial judges have been taken in 
several instances (III, 2486, 2487, 2488), although various opinions 
have been given that such an officer is not impeachable (III, 2022, 
2486, 2493). A committee of the House by majority vote held a 
Commissioner of the District of Columbia not to be a civil officer 
subject to impeachment under the Constitution (VI, 548). An independent 
counsel appointed under 28 U.S.C. 593 (a statute currently ineffective 
under 28 U.S.C. 599) may be impeached under 28 U.S.C. 596(a), and a 
resolution impeaching such an independent counsel constitutes a question 
of the privileges of the House under rule IX (Sept. 23, 1998, p. 21560). 
A resolution impeaching the United States Ambassador to the United 
Nations (July 13, 1978, p. 20606) or the Commissioner of the Internal 
Revenue Service (Dec. 6, 2016, p. 15982) constitutes a question of the 
privileges of the House under rule IX.




Sec. 175. Nature of impeachable offenses.

  As  to what are 
impeachable offenses there has been much discussion (III, 2008, 2019, 
2020, 2356, 2362, 2379-2381, 2405, 2406, 2410, 2498, 2510; VI, 455; 
Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, 
Committee on the Judiciary, H. Rept. 93-1305, Aug. 20, 1974, p. 29219; 
Associate Justice William O. Douglas, Final Report by the Special 
Subcommittee on H. Res. 920, Committee on the Judiciary, Sept. 17, 1970; 
Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
States, H. Rept. 105-830, Dec. 16, 1998; Impeachment of Donald J. Trump, 
President of the United States, H. Rept. 116-346, Dec. 15, 2019). For a 
time the theory that indictable offenses only were impeachable was 
stoutly maintained and as stoutly denied (III, 2356, 2360-2362, 2379-
2381, 2405, 2406, 2410, 2416); but on the 10th and 11th articles of the 
impeachment of President Andrew Johnson the House concluded to impeach 
for other than indictable offenses (III, 2418), and in the Swayne trial 
the theory was definitely abandoned (III, 2019). Although there has not 
been definite concurrence in the claim of the managers in the trial of 
the President that an impeachable offense is any misbehavior that shows 
disqualification to hold and exercise the office, whether moral, 
intellectual, or physical (III, 2015), the House has impeached judges 
for improper personal habits (III, 2328, 2505), and in the impeachment 
of President Johnson one of the articles charged him with ``intemperate, 
inflammatory, and scandalous harangues'' in public addresses, tending to 
harm the Government (III, 2420). There was no conviction under these 
charges except in the single case of Judge Pickering, who was charged 
with intoxication on the bench (III, 2328-2341). As to the impeachment 
of judges for other delinquencies, there has been much contention as to 
whether they may be impeached for any breach of good behavior (III, 
2011, 2016, 2497), or only for judicial misconduct occurring in the 
actual administration of justice in connection with the court (III, 
2010, 2013, 2017). The intent of the judge (III, 2014, 2382) as related 
to mistakes of the law, and the relations of intent to conviction have 
been discussed at length (III, 2014, 2381, 2382, 2518, 2519). The 
statutes make nonresidence of a judge an impeachable offense, and the 
House has taken steps to impeach for this cause (III, 2476, 2512). There 
has, however, been some question as to the power of Congress to make an 
impeachable offense (III, 2014, 2015, 2021, 2512). Usurpation of power 
has been examined several times as a cause for impeachment (III, 2404, 
2508, 2509, 2516, 2517). There also has been discussion as to whether or 
not there is distinction between a misdemeanor and a high misdemeanor 
(III, 2270, 2367, 2492). Review of impeachments in Congress showing the 
nature of charges upon which impeachments have been brought and 
judgments of the Senate thereon (VI, 466). Reports accompanying 
resolutions to impeach Presidents Clinton and Trump, and the debate in 
the House thereon, as well as debate in the House during the second 
impeachment of President Trump, included discussion of the nature of an 
impeachable offense (H. Rept. 105-830; Dec. 18, 1998, p. 27828; H. Rept. 
116-346, Dec. 15, 2019, p. _; Jan. 13, 2021, p. _). Of the four articles 
of impeachment of President Clinton reported by the Committee on the 
Judiciary ((1) perjury in grand jury, (2) perjury in a civil deposition, 
(3) obstruction of justice, and (4) improper responses to written 
questions from the Committee on the Judiciary), only the first and third 
were adopted by the House (Dec. 19, 1998, p. 28110).




Sec. 176. Other impeachment inquiries.

  The  articles of 
impeachment adopted by the House in 1936 against Judge Ritter charged a 
variety of judicial misconduct, including violations of criminal law. 
The seventh and general article, upon which Judge Ritter was convicted 
by the Senate, charged general misconduct to bring his court into 
scandal and disrepute and to destroy public confidence in his court and 
in the judicial system (Impeachment by the House, Mar. 2, 1936, p. 3091; 
Conviction by the Senate, Apr. 17, 1936, p. 5606). Following his 
conviction by the Senate, former Judge Ritter brought an action for back 
salary, contending that the Senate had tried and convicted him for 
nonimpeachable offenses. The U.S. Court of Claims held that the Senate's 
power to try impeachments was exclusive and not subject to judicial 
review. Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cls. 293 (1936), cert. denied, 
300 U.S. 668 (1937).


  In 1970 a special subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary 
considered charges of impeachment against Associate Justice Douglas of 
the Supreme Court. The subcommittee recommended against his impeachment 
but concluded that a Federal judge could be impeached (1) for judicial 
conduct that is a serious dereliction from public duty and (2) for 
nonjudicial conduct that is criminal in nature (Associate Justice 
William O. Douglas, Final Report by the Special Subcommittee on H. Res. 
920, Committee on the Judiciary, September 17, 1970).

  In 1974 the Committee on the Judiciary investigated charges of 
impeachment against President Nixon (Feb. 6, 1974, p. 2349), and 
determined to recommend his impeachment to the House. The President 
having resigned, the committee reported to the House without submitting 
a resolution of impeachment, and the House accepted the report by 
resolution (Aug. 20, 1974, p. 29361). The report of the committee 
included the text of the three articles of impeachment adopted by the 
committee. The committee had concluded that impeachable offenses need 
not be indictable offenses and recommended impeachment of the President: 
(1) for violating his oath of office and his duty under the Constitution 
by preventing, obstructing, and impeding the administration of justice; 
(2) for engaging in a course of conduct violating the constitutional 
rights of citizens, impairing the administration of justice, and 
contravening the laws governing executive agencies; and (3) for failing 
to honor subpoenas issued by the Committee on the Judiciary in the 
course of its impeachment inquiry (Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, 
President of the United States, Committee on the Judiciary, H. Rept. 93-
1305, Aug. 20, 1974, printed in full in the Cong. Record, Aug. 22, 1974, 
p. 29219).

  In 1986, for the first time since 1936, the House agreed to a 
resolution impeaching a Federal district judge. Judge Harry Claiborne 
had been convicted of falsifying Federal income tax returns. His final 
appeal was denied by the Supreme Court in April, and he began serving 
his prison sentence in May. Because he declined to resign, however, 
Judge Claiborne was still receiving his judicial salary and, absent 
impeachment, would resume the bench on his release from prison. 
Consequently, a resolution of impeachment was introduced on June 3, and 
on July 16, the Committee on the Judiciary reported to the House four 
articles of impeachment against Judge Claiborne. On July 22, the 
resolution was called up as a question of privilege and agreed to by a 
recorded vote of 406 yeas, 0 nays. After trial in the Senate, Judge 
Claiborne was convicted on three of the four articles of impeachment and 
removed from office on October 9, 1986.

  In 1988, the House agreed to a resolution reported from the Committee 
on the Judiciary and called up as a question of the privileges of the 
House impeaching Federal district judge Alcee L. Hastings for high 
crimes and misdemeanors specified in 17 articles of impeachment, some of 
them addressing allegations on which the judge had been acquitted in a 
Federal criminal trial (Aug. 3, 1988, p. 20206). No trial in the Senate 
was had before the adjournment of the 100th Congress. In the 101st 
Congress, the House reappointed managers to conduct this impeachment in 
the Senate (Jan. 3, 1989, p. 84); the Senate began its deliberations on 
March 15, 1989 (p. 4219); conviction and removal from office occurred on 
October 20, 1989 (p. 25335). Also in the 101st Congress, the Senate 
convicted Federal district judge Walter L. Nixon on two of the three 
impeachment charges brought against him (Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27101). For 
further discussion of the continuance of impeachment proceedings in a 
succeeding Congress, see Sec. 620, infra.

  In 1998 the House agreed to a privileged resolution reported from the 
Committee on Rules, referring to the Committee on the Judiciary a 
communication from an independent counsel transmitting under 28 U.S.C. 
595(c) evidence of possible impeachable offenses by President Clinton, 
and restricting access to the communication and to meetings and hearings 
thereon (Sept. 11, 1998, p. 20020). Later, the House adopted a 
privileged resolution reported from the Committee on the Judiciary 
authorizing an impeachment inquiry by that committee and investing it 
with special investigative authorities to facilitate the inquiry (Oct. 
8, 1998, p. 24679). The Committee on the Judiciary filed with the House 
a privileged report accompanying a resolution containing four articles 
of impeachment against President Clinton that alleged: (1) the President 
gave perjurious, false, and misleading testimony to a grand jury; (2) 
the President gave perjurious, false, and misleading testimony in a 
Federal civil action; (3) the President prevented, obstructed, and 
impeded the administration of justice relating to a Federal civil 
action; and (4) the President abused his office, impaired the 
administration of justice, and contravened the authority of the 
legislative branch by his response to 81 written questions submitted by 
the Committee on the Judiciary (Dec. 17, 1998, p. 27819). The chair of 
the Committee on the Judiciary called up the resolution on December 18, 
1998 (p. 27828).

  In 2008, the House agreed to an unreported resolution authorizing an 
impeachment inquiry of Federal district Judge G. Thomas Porteous by the 
Committee on the Judiciary and investing it with special investigative 
authorities to facilitate the inquiry (Sept. 17, 2008, p. 19517), which 
was continued in the next Congress (Precedents (Wickham), ch. 1, 
Sec. 8.1). In 2010, the House adopted a resolution reported from the 
committee and called up as a question of the privileges of the House 
impeaching the judge for high crimes and misdemeanors specified in 4 
articles of impeachment (Mar. 11, 2010, p. 3147).

  In 2009, the House agreed to a resolution reported from the Committee 
on the Judiciary and called up as a question of the privileges of the 
House impeaching Federal district judge Samuel B. Kent for high crimes 
and misdemeanors specified in 4 articles of impeachment, some of them 
addressing allegations on which the judge had been convicted in a 
Federal criminal trial (June 19, 2009, p. 15747).

  In 2019, the House agreed to a privileged resolution reported from the 
Committee on Rules directing the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence and the Committees on Financial Services, Foreign Affairs, 
the Judiciary, Oversight and Reform, and Ways and Means to ``continue 
their ongoing investigations as part of the existing . . . inquiry into 
whether sufficient grounds exist for the House of Representatives to 
exercise its Constitutional power to impeach Donald J. Trump'' (H. Res. 
660, Oct. 31, 2019, p. _). The resolution directed further ongoing 
investigation by all listed committees and established a two-phase 
public committee procedure, beginning with the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence and concluding in the Committee on the 
Judiciary. The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence adopted a 
report detailing its findings and transmitted such report to the 
Committee on the Judiciary and to the House (H. Rept. 116-335, Dec. 9, 
2019, p. _). The Committee on the Judiciary subsequently filed with the 
House a privileged report accompanying a resolution containing two 
articles of impeachment against President Trump that alleged: (1) the 
President used the powers of his office to solicit and pressure a 
foreign government, Ukraine, to investigate his domestic political rival 
and interfere in the upcoming United State Presidential election; and 
(2) the President categorically obstructed the Congressional impeachment 
inquiry into his conduct (H. Rept. 116-346, Dec. 15, 2019, p. _). Upon 
the adoption of a special order of business, the House proceeded to the 
immediate consideration of the impeachment resolution (Dec. 18, 2019, p. 
_).

  A resolution offered from the floor to permit the Delegate of the 
District of Columbia to vote on the articles of impeachment was held not 
to constitute a question of the privileges of the House under rule IX 
(Precedents (Smith), ch. 7, Sec. 2.6). To a privileged resolution of 
impeachment, an amendment proposing instead censure, which is not 
privileged, was held not germane (Dec. 19, 1998, p. 28100).



[[Page 81]]

  For further discussion of impeachment proceedings, see Sec. Sec. 601-
620, infra; Sec. 31, supra, and Deschler, ch. 14.


                              ARTICLE III.




Sec. 177. The judges, their terms, and 
compensation.

  Section 1.  The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested 
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme 
and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and 
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, 
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.





Sec. 178. Extent of the judicial 
power.

  Section 2. \1\The  judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all 
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all 
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which 
the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or 
more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between 
Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State 
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or 
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.




Sec. 178a. Decisions of the Court on legislative 
standing.

  Decisions  of the Supreme Court involving legislative standing to bring 
cases in Federal court include Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); 
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 
(1984); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990); and, most recently, 
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997), holding that Member plaintiffs must 
have alleged a ``personal stake'' in having an actual injury redressed, 
rather than an ``institutional injury'' that is ``abstract and widely 
dispersed.'' See also the 11th amendment (Sec. 218, infra).




Sec. 179. Original and appellate jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court.

  \2\In  all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers 
and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme 
Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before 
mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as 
to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the 
Congress shall make.





Sec. 180. Places of trial of crimes by jury.

  \3\The  Trial of 
all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such 
Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been 
committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be 
at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.




Sec. 181. Treason against the United 
States.

  Section 3. \1\Treason  against the United States, shall consist only in levying War 
against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and 
Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony 
of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.




[[Page 83]]




Sec. 182. Punishment for treason.

  \2\The  Congress shall have 
Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason 
shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of 
the Person Attainted.



                               ARTICLE IV.



Sec. 183. Each State to give credit to acts, 
records, etc., of other States.

  Section 1.  Full Faith and Credit shall be given 
in each State to the Public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of 
every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the 
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and 
the Effect thereof.




Sec. 184. Privileges and immunities of citizens.

    Section 2. 
\1\The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and 
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.




Sec. 185. Extradition for treason, felony, or other 
crime.

  \2\A  Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other 
Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall 
on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be 
delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the 
Crime.





Sec. 186. Persons held to service or labor.

  \3\No  Person 
held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping 
into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be 
discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on 
Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.




Sec. 187. Admission and formation of new 
States.

  Section 3. \1\New  States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no 
new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any 
other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more 
States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of 
the States concerned as well as of the Congress.





Sec. 188. Power of Congress over territory and other 
national property.

  \2\The  Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make 
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other 
Property belonging to
the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so 
construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any 
particular State.



  The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held 
that the property clause does not prohibit the transfer of United States 
property to foreign nations through self-executing treaties. Edwards v. 
Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (1978), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978).



[[Page 85]]




Sec. 189. Republican form of government and 
protection from domestic violence guaranteed to the States.

  Section 4. The  United 
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of 
Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on 
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the 
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence.



                               ARTICLE V.




Sec. 190. Amendments to the Constitution.

  The  Congress, 
whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall 
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the 
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a 
Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be 
valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when 
ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or 
by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of 
Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment 
which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight 
shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth 
Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, 
shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.




Sec. 191. Form of and action on amendments to the 
Constitution.

  Amendments  to the Constitution are proposed in the form of joint 
resolutions, which have their several readings and are enrolled and 
signed by the presiding officers of the two Houses (V, 7029, footnote), 
but are not presented to the President for his approval (V, 7040; see 
discussion under Sec. 115, supra; Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) 378 (1798)). They are filed with the Archivist who, under the law 
(1 U.S.C. 106b; 1 U.S.C. 112), has the responsibility for the 
certification and publication of such amendments, once they are ratified 
by the States. Under the earlier procedure, the two Houses sometimes 
requested the President to transmit to the States certain proposed 
amendments (V, 7041, 7043), but a concurrent resolution to that end was 
without privilege (VIII, 3508). The President notified Congress by 
message of the promulgation of the ratification of a constitutional 
amendment (V, 7044). The House in the 114th through 118th Congresses 
required that petitions from state legislatures purporting to call for 
constitutional conventions or to rescind such calls be made publicly 
available (sec. 3(c), H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 2015, p. 35; sec. 3(d), H. Res. 
5, Jan. 3, 2017, p. 38; sec. 103(b), H. Res. 6, Jan. 3, 2019, p. _; sec. 
3(m), H. Res. 8, Jan. 4, 2021, p. _; sec. 3(n), H. Res. 5, Jan. 9, 2023, 
p. _).-




Sec. 192. The twothirds vote on proposed 
amendments.

  The  vote required on a joint resolution proposing an amendment 
to the Constitution is two-thirds of those voting, a quorum being 
present, and not two-thirds of the entire membership (V, 7027, 7028; 
VIII, 3503). The majority required to pass a constitutional amendment, 
like the majority required to pass a bill over the President's veto 
(VII, 1111) and the majority required to adopt a motion to suspend the 
rules (Dec. 16, 1981, pp. 31850, 31851, 31855, 31856), is two-thirds of 
those Members voting either in the affirmative or negative, a quorum 
being present, and Members who only indicate that they are ``present'' 
are not counted in this computation (Nov. 15, 1983, p. 32685). The 
requirement of the two-thirds vote applies to the vote on final passage 
and not to amendments (V, 7031, 7032; VIII, 3504), or prior stages (V, 
7029, 7030), but is required if the House votes on agreeing to Senate 
amendments (V, 7033, 7034; VIII, 3505), or on agreeing to a conference 
report (V, 7036). One House having, by a two-thirds vote, passed in 
amended form a proposed constitutional amendment from the other House, 
and then having by a majority vote receded from its amendment, the 
constitutional amendment was held not to be passed (V, 7035).


  In the 95th Congress, both the House and Senate passed by a majority 
vote House Joint Resolution 638, extending the time period for 
ratification by the States of the Equal Rights Amendment, where House 
Joint Resolution 208 of the 92d Congress, proposing the amendment, had 
provided for a seven-year ratification period. The House determined, by 
laying on the table by a record vote a privileged resolution asserting 
that a vote of two-thirds of the Members present and voting was required 
to pass a joint resolution extending the ratification period for a 
constitutional amendment already submitted to the States, that only a 
majority vote was required on such a measure (H.J. Res. 638; Speaker 
O'Neill, Aug. 15, 1978, p. 26203).

  The joint resolution extending the ratification period for the Equal 
Rights Amendment was delivered to the President, who signed it although 
expressing doubt as to the necessity for his doing so (Presidential 
Documents, Oct. 19, 1978). When sent to the Archivist, the joint 
resolution was not assigned a public law number, but the Archivist 
notified the States of the action of the Congress in extending the 
ratification period. For a judicial decision voiding this extension, see 
Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F.Supp. 1107 (D.C.D. Idaho, 1981), judgment stayed 
sub nom. National Organization of Women v. Idaho, 455 U.S. 918 (1982), 
vacated and remanded to dismiss, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).

  In the 116th Congress, the House passed by a majority vote House Joint 
Resolution 79, eliminating the deadline for ratification by the States 
of the Equal Rights Amendment (Feb. 13, 2020, p. _), following adoption 
of a resolution (by special order of business) affirming that the proper 
threshold to adopt such joint resolution was a majority vote (H. Res. 
842, Feb. 11, 2020, p. _). In response to a point of order regarding the 
proper vote threshold prior to the question on final passage of the 
joint resolution, the Chair ruled that a majority vote threshold was 
required pursuant to the terms of House Resolution 842 and declined to 
entertain an appeal from such ruling because the terms of that 
resolution were unambiguous (Feb. 13, 2020, p. _). The House adopted a 
similar resolution (by special order of business) setting a majority 
threshold for the vote on final passage of House Joint Resolution 17 in 
the 117th Congress (H. Res. 232, Mar. 16, 2021, p. _)

  The yeas and nays are not required to pass a joint resolution 
proposing to amend the Constitution (V, 7038-7039; VIII, 3506).

  Question has arisen as to the power of a State to recall, or rescind, 
its assent to a constitutional amendment (V, 7042; footnotes to 
Sec. Sec. 225, 234, infra) but has not been the subject of a final 
judicial determination (see Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F.Supp. 1107 (D. 
Idaho, 1981), judgment stayed sub nom. National Organization of Women v. 
Idaho, 455 U.S. 918 (1982), vacated and remanded to dismiss, 459 U.S. 
809 (1982)).


[[Page 87]]


[[Page 88]]


Sec. 193. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 
(1920); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 
368 (1921); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922); Coleman v. Miller, 
307 U.S. 433 (1939); Chandler v. Wise, 307 U.S. 474 (1939).



                               ARTICLE VI.



Sec. 194. Validity of debts and engagements.

  \1\All  Debts 
contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this 
Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this 
Constitution, as under the Confederation.




Sec. 195. Constitution, laws, and treaties the supreme 
law of the land.

  \2\This  Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.





Sec. 196. Oaths of public officers; and prohibition of 
religious tests.

  \3\The  Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and 
the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and 
judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, 
shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but 
no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any 
Office or public Trust under the United States.




Sec. 197. Form of oath.

  The  form of the oath is prescribed 
by statute (5 U.S.C. 3331; I, 128): ``I, AB, do solemnly swear (or 
affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United 
States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true 
faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, 
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that I will 
well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am 
about to enter. So help me God.''




Sec. 198. Administration of oath at organization.

  The  Act of 
June 1, 1789 (2 U.S.C. 25), provides that on the organization of the 
House and previous to entering on any other business the oath shall be 
administered by any Member (generally the Member with longest continuous 
service) (I, 131; VI, 6) to the Speaker and by the Speaker to the other 
Members and the Clerk (I, 130). The Act has at times been considered in 
the House as directory merely (I, 118, 242, 243, 245; VI, 6); but at 
other times has been observed carefully (I, 118, 140). The Act was cited 
by the Clerk in recognizing for nominations for Speaker as being of 
higher constitutional privilege than a resolution to postpone the 
election of a Speaker and instead provide for the election of a Speaker 
pro tempore pending the disposition of certain ethics charges against 
the nominee of the majority party (Precedents (Wickham), ch. 1, 
Sec. 4.1).


  Previously it was the custom to administer the oath by State 
delegations, but beginning with the 71st Congress Members-elect have 
been sworn in en masse (VI, 8). The Clerk supplies printed copies of the 
oath to Members and Delegates who have taken the oath in accordance with 
law, which shall be subscribed by the Members and Delegates and 
delivered to the Clerk to be recorded in the Journal and Congressional 
Record as conclusive proof of the fact that the signer duly took the 
oath in accordance with law (2 U.S.C. 25). See Deschler, ch. 2. Where 
two Members-elect participated in various House and committee business 
before taking the oath of office, the House adopted a resolution (1) 
correcting the results of record votes to remove mention of them, and 
(2) ratifying the following activities involving one or both of them: 
election to and participation in standing committee; introduction and 
numbering of measures; submission of items to the Congressional Record; 
co-sponsorship of measures; and non-voting participation in floor 
proceedings (Precedents (Wickham), ch. 5, Sec. 18.21). During an ongoing 
public health emergency the Speaker announced that the oath would be 
administered to Members-elect in small, pre-arranged groups in order to 
adhere to restrictions on the number of persons permitted in the House 
chamber consistent with guidance from the Office of Attending Physician 
(Jan. 3, 2021, p. _).



Sec. 199. Functions of the Speaker in administering the 
oath.

  The  Speaker possesses no arbitrary power in the administration of 
the oath (I, 134), and when objection is made the question must be 
decided by the House and not by the Chair (I, 519, 520). An objection 
prevents the Speaker from administering the oath of his own authority, 
even though the credentials be regular in form (I, 135-138). The Speaker 
has frequently declined to administer the oath in cases wherein the 
House has, by its action, indicated that the Speaker should not do so 
(I, 139, 140). And in case of doubt the Speaker has waited the 
instruction of the House (I, 396; VI, 11). There has been discussion as 
to the competency of a Speaker pro tempore to administer the oath (I, 
170), and in the absence of the Speaker a Member-elect waited until the 
Speaker could be present (I, 179), but in 1920 a Speaker pro tempore 
whose designation by the Speaker had been approved by the House, 
administered the oath (VI, 20). The House may authorize the Speaker to 
administer the oath away from the House (I, 169), or may, in such a 
case, authorize another than the Speaker to administer the oath (I, 170; 
VI, 14). For forms used in this procedure, see VI, 14. On one occasion, 
the Speaker requested that guests in the gallery rise with the Members 
during the administration of the oath of office to a Member-elect 
(Precedents (Wickham), ch. 4, Sec. 4.9).




Sec. 200. Administration of the oath as related 
to the quorum.

  Members-elect  have been sworn at the beginning of a second session 
before the ascertainment of a quorum (I, 176-178), but when the Clerk 
called the second session of the 87th Congress to order, Members-elect 
were not sworn before ascertainment of a quorum and election of Speaker 
McCormack to succeed Speaker Rayburn, who had died during the 
adjournment sine die (Jan. 10, 1962, p. 5). Members-elect have also been 
sworn where a roll call or other ascertainment has shown the absence of 
a quorum (I, 178, 181, 182; VI, 21) but in one instance, however, the 
Speaker declined to administer the oath under such circumstances (II, 
875).




Sec. 201. Privilege of administration of the 
oath.

  A  proposition to administer the oath is a matter of high privilege 
(VI, 14). It has been administered during a call of the roll and during 
an electronic vote on a motion to agree to rules at the time of 
organization (I, 173; VI, 22; Precedents (Wickham), ch. 2, Sec. 3.20) 
and during an electronic vote taken during House deliberations 
interlocutory to an ongoing joint session to count the electoral votes 
(Precedents (Wickham), ch. 2, Sec. 3.21). It also has been administered 
before the reading of the Journal (I, 172), in the absence of a quorum 
(VI, 22), on Calendar Wednesday (VI, 22), before a pending motion to 
amend the Journal (I, 171), and after the previous question has been 
ordered on a bill reported back to the House from the Committee of the 
Whole (Oct. 3, 1969, p. 28487) or pending engrossment and third reading 
(Precedents (Wickham), ch. 2, Sec. 3.19). A division being demanded on a 
resolution seating several claimants, the oath may be administered to 
each as soon as his case is decided (I, 623). If a Member-elect whose 
right to a seat has been determined by the House is present to take the 
oath, the right to be sworn is complete and cannot be deferred even by a 
motion to adjourn (I, 622), but the Speaker has entertained the motion 
to adjourn after adoption of a seating resolution but before the Member-
elect was present in the Chamber to take the oath (Precedents (Wickham), 
ch. 2, Sec. 3.17).




Sec. 202. Challenge of the right to take the oath.

  The  right 
of a Member-elect to take the oath is sometimes challenged, usually at 
the time of organization of the House. The challenge may be made by a 
Member-elect who has not yet taken the oath (I, 141). The Member 
challenging does so on his responsibility as a Member or on the strength 
of documents (I, 448) or on both (I, 443, 474). And where an objection 
was sustained neither by affidavit nor on the responsibility of the 
Member objecting, the House declined to entertain it (I, 455).




Sec. 203. Consideration of an objection to the taking of 
the oath.

  It  has been held, although not uniformly, that in cases in 
which the right of a Member-elect to take the oath is challenged, the 
Speaker may direct the Member to abstain temporarily (I, 143-146, 474; 
VI, 9, 174; VIII, 3386). The Member so challenged is not thereby 
deprived of any right (I, 155). Similarly, the seating of a Member-elect 
does not prejudice a pending contest, brought under the Federal 
Contested Elections Act (2 U.S.C. 381-396), over final right to the seat 
(Jan. 7, 1997, p. 120; Precedents (Wickham), ch. 2, Sec. 2.3). When 
several are challenged and abstain, the question is first taken on the 
Member-elect first required to abstain (I, 147, 148), but when a Member-
elect challenged the right of all Members-elect from six states to take 
the oath, the House adopted a privileged resolution authorizing and 
directing the Speaker to administer the oath to all Members-elect prior 
to the administration of the oath to Members-elect en masse (Jan. 3, 
2021, p. _). In 1861 it was held that the House might direct contested 
names to be passed over until the other Members-elect had been sworn in 
(I, 154). Motions and debate are in order on the questions involved in a 
challenge, and in a few cases other business has intervened by unanimous 
consent (I, 149, 150). By unanimous consent the consideration of a 
challenge is sometimes deferred until after the completion of the 
organization (I, 474), and by unanimous consent also the House has 
sometimes proceeded to legislative business pending consideration of the 
right of a Member to be sworn (I, 151, 152).




Sec. 204. Relation of credentials to the right to 
take the oath.

  Although  the House has emphasized the impropriety of swearing a 
Member without credentials (I, 162-168), yet it has been done in cases 
in which the credentials are delayed or lost and there is no doubt of 
the election (I, 85, 176-178; VI, 12, 13), or in which the governor of a 
State has declined to give credentials to a person whose election was 
undoubted and uncontested (I, 553). A certificate of election in due 
form having been filed, the Clerk placed the name of the Member-elect on 
the roll, although he was subsequently advised that a State Supreme 
Court had issued a writ restraining the Secretary of State from issuing 
such certificate (Jan. 3, 1949, p. 8). If the prima facie right is 
contested the Speaker declines to administer the oath (I, 550), but the 
House admits on a prima facie showing, and without regard to final 
right, a Member-elect from a recognized constituency whose credentials 
are in due form and whose qualifications are unquestioned (I, 528-534). 
If the status of the constituency is in doubt, the House usually defers 
the oath (I, 361, 386, 448, 461). In the 99th Congress, the House 
declined to give prima facie effect to a certificate of election, the 
results of the election being in doubt, and referred the issue of 
initial as well as final right to the Committee on House Administration 
(Precedents (Wickham), ch. 2, Sec. 4.1). After a recount of the votes 
was conducted by that committee, the House on its recommendation 
declared the candidate without the certificate entitled to the seat 
(Precedents (Wickham), ch. 2, Sec. 3.8). The House also may defer the 
oath when a question of qualifications arises (I, 474), but it may 
investigate qualifications after the oath is taken (I, 156-159, 420, 
462, 481), and after investigation unseat the Member by majority vote 
(I, 428). On one occasion when a Member-elect's credentials were in due 
form but there was a question as to whether the Member-elect held an 
incompatible office, the House resolved the matter by adopting a 
privileged resolution authorizing and directing the Speaker to 
administer the oath to the Member-elect (Precedents (Smith), ch. 7, 
Sec. 4.3; see Sec. 98, supra). For an insertion by the Speaker, in 
concurrence with the Minority Leader, on this matter and relevant 
precedents, see Precedents (Smith), ch. 7, Sec. 4,3.




Sec. 205. Sanity, loyalty, and incapacity as related 
to the oath.

  Questions  of sanity (I, 441) and loyalty (I, 448) seem to pertain 
to competency to take the oath as a question of qualifications, although 
there has been not a little debate on this subject (I, 479). In one case 
a Member-elect who had not taken the oath was excluded from the House 
because of disloyalty, in which the resolution of exclusion and the 
committee report thereon concluded that he was ineligible to take a seat 
as a Representative under the express provisions of section 3 of the 
14th amendment (VI, 56-59). This action by the House was cited in the 
Supreme Court decision of Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 545 fn. 83 
(1969), which denied the power of the House to exclude Members-elect by 
a majority vote for other than failure to meet the express 
qualifications stated in the Constitution. In Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 
116 (1966), the Supreme Court held that the exclusion by a State 
legislature of a member-elect of that body was unconstitutional, where 
the legislature had asserted the power to judge the sincerity with which 
the Member-elect could take the oath to support the Constitution of the 
United States. In the 97th Congress, the House declared vacant by 
majority vote the seat of a Member-elect unable to take the oath because 
of illness, in which the medical prognosis showed no likelihood of 
improvement to permit the Member-elect to take the oath or assume the 
duties of a Representative (Precedents (Smith), ch. 7, Sec. 6.8).



[[Page 92]]




Sec. 206. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
316 (1819); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867); Davis v. 
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Mormon Church  v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 
(1890).



                              ARTICLE VII.


Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the 


Sec. 207. Ratification of the Constitution.

  The  Ratification 
of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the 
Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the 
Same.


    Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand 

    seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United 

    States of America the Twelfth In Witness whereof We have hereunto 


    subscribed our Names,


                         Go WASHINGTON--Presidt.  


                                               and Deputy from Virginia.


    [Signed also by the deputies of twelve States.]


John Langdon,                        Nicholas Gilman.

                             New Hampshire.


Nathaniel Gorham,                    Rufus King.

                             Massachusetts.


Wm. Saml. Johnson,                   Roger Sherman.

                              Connecticut.


Alexander Hamilton.

                                New York.


Wil: Livingston,                     Wm. Paterson,

David Brearley,                      Jona: Dayton.

                               New Jersey.


B Franklin,                          Thomas Mifflin,

RobT. Morris,             Geo. Clymer,

Thos. FitzSimons,                    Jared Ingersoll,

James Wilson,                        Gouv Morris.

                              Pennsylvania.


Geo. Read,                           Gunning Bedford jun,

John Dickinson,                      Richard Bassett.

Jaco Broom,
[[Page 94]]
                                Delaware.


James McHenry,                       Dan of ST Thos. Jenifer.

Danl Carroll,

                                Maryland.


John Blair,                          James Madison Jr.

                                Virginia.


Wm. Blount,                          Rich'D. Dobbs Spaight.

Hu Williamson,

                             North Carolina.


J. Rutledge,                         Charles Cotesworth Pinckney,

Charles Pinckney,                    Pierce Butler.

                             South Carolina.


William Few,                         Abr Baldwin.

                                Georgia.





[[Page 95]]

  Attest:                            William Jackson, Secretary.

   articles in addition to, and amendment of, the constitution of the 

  united states of america, proposed by congress, and ratified by the 

      several states pursuant to the fifth article of the original 


                       constitution\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------





  \1\The first 10 amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States were proposed to the legislatures of the several States by 
the First Congress on September 25, 1789 (this date and the date 
succeeding amendments were proposed is the date of final congressional 
action--signature by the presiding officer of the Senate--as is shown in 
the Senate Journals). They were ratified by the following States, on the 
dates shown, and the notifications by the governors thereof of 
ratification were communicated by the President to Congress: New Jersey, 
November 20, 1789; Maryland, December 19, 1789; North Carolina, December 
22, 1789; South Carolina, January 19, 1790; New Hampshire, January 25, 
1790; Delaware, January 28, 1790; New York, February 27, 1790; 
Pennsylvania, March 10, 1790; Rhode Island, June 7, 1790; Vermont, 
November 3, 1791; Virginia, December 15, 1791. Ratification was 
completed on December 15, 1791. The amendments were subsequently 
ratified by Massachusetts, March 2, 1939; Georgia, March 18, 1939; 
Connecticut, April 19, 1939.


                              AMENDMENT I.







Sec. 208. Freedom of religion, of speech, and of 
peaceable assembly.

  Congress  shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably 
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.



                              AMENDMENT II.




[[Page 96]]


Sec. 209. The right to bear arms.

  A  well regulated Militia 
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people 
to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.



                             AMENDMENT III.







Sec. 210. Quartering of soldiers in houses.

  No  soldier 
shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent 
of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by 
law.



                              AMENDMENT IV.







Sec. 211. Security from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.

  The  right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.



                              AMENDMENT V.

[[Page 96]]


[[Page 97]]


Sec. 212. Security as to accusations, trials, and 
property.

  No  person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, 
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, 
when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any 
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of 
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be a 
witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.



                              AMENDMENT VI.







Sec. 213. Right to trial by jury and to confront witnesses 
and secure testimony.

  In  all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of 
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.



                             AMENDMENT VII.







Sec. 214. Jury trial in suits at common law.

  In  suits at 
common law, where the value in Controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, 
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a 
jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, 
than according to the rules of the common law.



                             AMENDMENT VIII.





[[Page 98]]


Sec. 215. Excessive bail or fines and cruel punishments 
prohibited.

    Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.



                              AMENDMENT IX.







Sec. 216. Rights reserved to the people.

    The enumeration in 
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.



                              AMENDMENT X.







Sec. 217. Powers reserved to the States.

  The  powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.



                       AMENDMENT XI.\2\



Sec. 218. Extent of the judicial power.

  The  Judicial power 
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law 
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------





[[Page 99]]
  \2\The 11th amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 
Third Congress on March 11, 1794; and was declared in a message from the 
President to Congress dated the 8th of January, 1798, to have been 
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the States. The dates 
of ratification were: New York, March 27, 1794; Rhode Island, March 31, 
1794; Connecticut, May 8, 1794; New Hampshire, June 16, 1794; 
Massachusetts, June 26, 1794; Vermont, October 28, 1794; Virginia, 
November 18, 1794; Georgia, November 29, 1794; Kentucky, December 7, 
1794; Maryland, December 26, 1794; Delaware, January 23, 1795; North 
Carolina, February 7, 1795. Ratification was completed on February 7, 
1795. The amendment was subsequently ratified by South Carolina, 
December 4, 1797. New Jersey and Pennsylvania did not take action on the 
amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


                      AMENDMENT XII.\3\



Sec. 219. Meeting of the electors and transmission and 
count of their votes.

  The  Electors shall meet in their respective states, 
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at 
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; 
they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and 
in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they 
shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of 
all persons voted for as Vice-President, and the number of votes for 
each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to 
the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the 
President of the Senate;--The President of the Senate shall, in presence 
of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates 
and the votes shall then be counted;-- * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



  \3\See article II, section 1 of the Constitution. The 12th 
amendment to the Constitution was proposed to the legislatures of the 
several States by the Eighth Congress on December 12, 1803, in lieu of 
the original third paragraph of the first section of the second article, 
and was declared in a proclamation of the Secretary of State, dated the 
25th of September, 1804, to have been ratified by the legislatures of 
three-fourths of the States. The dates of ratification were: North 
Carolina, December 21, 1803; Maryland, December 24, 1803; Kentucky, 
December 27, 1803; Ohio, December 30, 1803; Virginia, December 31, 1803; 
Pennsylvania, January 5, 1804; Vermont, January 30, 1804; New York, 
February 10, 1804; New Jersey, February 22, 1804; Rhode Island, March 
12, 1804; South Carolina, May 15, 1804; Georgia, May 19, 1804; New 
Hampshire, June 15, 1804. Ratification was completed on June 15, 1804. 
The amendment was subsequently ratified by Tennessee, July 27, 1804. The 
amendment was rejected by Delaware, January 18, 1804; Massachusetts, 
February 3, 1804; and by Connecticut at its session begun May 10, 1804.



Sec. 220. The electoral count.

  The  electoral count occurs in 
a joint session of the two Houses in the Hall of the House (III, 1819) 
at 1 p.m. on the sixth day of January succeeding every meeting of 
electors (3 U.S.C. 15). The Vice President, as President of the Senate 
(or the President pro tempore in the Vice President's absence), presides 
over the joint session (3 U.S.C. 15). The date of the count has been 
changed by law as follows: Monday, January 7, 1957 (P.L. 84-436); 
Monday, January 7, 1985 (P.L. 98-456); Wednesday, January 4, 1989 (P.L. 
100-646); Thursday, January 9, 1997 (P.L. 104-296); Thursday, January 8, 
2009 (P.L. 110-430); Friday, January 4, 2013 (P.L. 112-228).



  Sections 15-18 of title 3, United States Code, as comprehensively 
amended in the 117th Congress by the Electoral Count Reform Act of 2022 
(Division P, P.L. 117-328), prescribe in detail the procedure for the 
count. Nevertheless, the two Houses traditionally adopt a concurrent 
resolution providing for the meeting in joint session to count the vote, 
for the appointment of tellers, and for the declaration of the state of 
the vote (III, 1961; Deschler, ch. 10, Sec. 2.1). Under the law 
governing the proceedings, the two Houses divide to consider an 
objection to the counting of any electoral vote or ``other question 
arising in the matter'' (3 U.S.C. 15-18; Jan. 6, 1969, pp. 145-47; Jan. 
6, 2001, p. 101; Jan. 6, 2005, pp. 198, 199; Jan. 6, 2017, p. 344; Jan. 
6, 2021, p. _), but only when in writing and signed by ``at least one-
fifth of the Senators duly chosen and sworn and one-fifth of the Members 
of the House of Representatives duly chosen and sworn'' (3 U.S.C. 15). 
Under a prior form of the statute, the signature of one Senator and one 
Member was required (Jan. 6, 2001, p. 101; Jan. 6, 2005, p. 198; Jan. 6, 
2017, p. 344; Jan. 6, 2021, p. _). Examples of an ``other question 
arising in the matter'' include: (1) an objection for lack of a quorum 
(Jan. 6, 2001, p. 101); (2) a motion that either House withdraw from the 
joint session (Jan. 6, 2001, p. 101); and (3) an appeal from a ruling by 
the presiding officer (Jan. 6, 2001, p. 101). Such questions and 
objections are not debatable in the joint session (3 U.S.C. 18; Jan. 6, 
2001, p. 101; Jan. 6, 2017, p. 345; Jan. 6, 2021, p. _). When the two 
Houses have divided, a motion in the House to lay the objection on the 
table is not in order (Jan. 6, 1969; pp. 169-72), but the Chair may 
declare the House in an emergency recess pursuant to clause 12(b) of 
rule I (Jan. 6, 2021, p. _). A Vice President-elect, as Speaker of the 
House or as a sitting Vice President, has participated in the ceremonies 
(e.g., VI, 446; Jan. 6, 2005, p. 197). See Deschler, ch. 10 for further 
discussion. When addressing a controversy over the election of President 
and Vice President in the State of Florida, the Supreme Court indicated 
its view of a section of the statute in its prior form (3 U.S.C. 5) 
addressing a determination of controversy as to the appointment of 
electors. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. (531 U.S. 70 (2000)). 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that the Florida Supreme Court 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th amendment by ordering 
certain counties to conduct manual recounts of the votes for President 
and Vice President without establishing standards for those recounts. 
Bush v. Gore (531 U.S. 98 (2000)).


[[Page 102]]

to a choice. But no person 
constitutionally ineligible to the Office of President shall be eligible 
to that of Vice-President of the United States.



Sec. 221. Elections of President and Vice President 
by the House and Senate in certain cases.

  * * * The  person having the greatest 
number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be 
a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person 
have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not 
exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House 
of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. 
But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the 
representation from each State having one vote; a quorum for this 
purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the 
states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. 
And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President 
whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth 
day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as 
President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional 
disability of the President. The person having the greatest number of 
votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be 
a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person 
have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the 
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall 
consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of 
the whole number shall be necessary 





Sec. 222. History of original provision for failure of 
electoral college to choose.

  The  20th amendment to the Constitution has 
clarified some of the provisions of the 12th amendment. In 1801 (III, 
1983), the House of Representatives chose a President under article II, 
section 1, clause 3 (see Sec. 152a, supra), the constitutional provision 
superseded by the 12th amendment.








Sec. 223. Occasions of election by House and Senate after 
1803.

  In  1825 the House elected a President under the 12th amendment 
(III, 1985); and in 1837 the Senate elected a Vice President (III, 
1941).



                      AMENDMENT XIII.\4\



Sec. 224. Prohibition of slavery and involuntary 
servitude.

  Section 1.  Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, 
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



[[Page 103]]

  \4\The 13th amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 
38th Congress, on February 1, 1865, and was declared, in a proclamation 
of the Secretary of State, dated December 18, 1865, to have been 
ratified by the legislatures of 27 of the 36 States. The dates of 
ratification were: Illinois, February 1, 1865; Rhode Island, February 2, 
1865; Michigan, February 2, 1865; Maryland, February 3, 1865; New York, 
February 3, 1865; Pennsylvania, February 3, 1865; West Virginia, 
February 3, 1865; Missouri, February 6, 1865; Maine, February 7, 1865; 
Kansas, February 7, 1865; Massachusetts, February 7, 1865; Virginia, 
February 9, 1865; Ohio, February 16, 1865; Indiana, February 13, 1865; 
Nevada, February 16, 1865; Louisiana, February 17, 1865; Minnesota, 
February 23, 1865; Wisconsin, February 24, 1865; Vermont, March 9, 1865; 
Tennessee, April 7, 1865; Arkansas, April 14, 1865; Connecticut, May 4, 
1865; New Hampshire, July 1, 1865; South Carolina, November 13, 1865; 
Alabama, December 2, 1865; North Carolina, December 4, 1865; Georgia, 
December 6, 1865. Ratification was completed on December 6, 1865. The 
amendment was subsequently ratified by Oregon, December 8, 1865; 
California, December 19, 1865; Florida, December 28, 1865 (Florida again 
ratified on June 9, 1868, upon its adoption of a new constitution); 
Iowa, January 15, 1866; New Jersey, January 23, 1866 (after having 
rejected the amendment on March 16, 1865); Texas, February 18, 1870; 
Delaware, February 12, 1901 (after having rejected the amendment on 
February 8, 1865); Kentucky, March 30, 1976 (after having rejected the 
amendment on February 24, 1865). The amendment was rejected by 
Mississippi, December 4, 1865, but subsequently ratified on March 16, 
1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------




  Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation.


                      AMENDMENT XIV.\5\



Sec. 225. Citizenship security and 
equal protection of citizens.

  Section 1. All  persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of 
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


  \5\The 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 
39th Congress, on June 15, 1866. On July 20, 1868, the Secretary of 
State issued a proclamation that the 14th amendment was a part of the 
Constitution if withdrawals of ratification were ineffective. On July 
21, 1868, Congress adopted and transmitted to the Department of State a 
concurrent resolution declaring that ``the legislatures of the States of 
Connecticut, Tennessee, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, New York, Ohio, 
Illinois, West Virginia, Kansas, Maine, Nevada, Missouri, Indiana, 
Minnesota, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Iowa, Arkansas, 
Florida, North Carolina, Alabama, South Carolina, and Louisiana, being 
three-fourths and more of the several States of the Union, have ratified 
the fourteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States, duly proposed by two-thirds of each House of the Thirty-ninth 
Congress: Therefore Resolved, That said fourteenth article is hereby 
declared to be a part of the Constitution of the United States, and it 
shall be duly promulgated as such by the Secretary of State.'' The 
Secretary of State accordingly issued a proclamation, dated July 28, 
1868, declaring that the proposed 14th amendment had been ratified, in 
the manner hereafter mentioned, by the legislatures of 28 States. The 
dates of ratification were: Connecticut, June 30, 1866; New Hampshire, 
July 6, 1866; Tennessee, July 18, 1866; New Jersey, September 11, 1866 
(subsequently, on February 20, 1868, the legislature rescinded its 
ratification, and on March 24, 1868, readopted its resolution of 
rescission over the Governor's veto, and on April 23, 2003, revoked the 
resolution of rescission); Oregon, September 19, 1866 (subsequently 
rescinded its ratification on October 16, 1868, and ratified on April 
25, 1973); New York, January 10, 1867; Ohio, January 11, 1867 
(subsequently rescinded its ratification on January 13, 1868, and 
ratified on March 12, 2003); Illinois, January 15, 1867; West Virginia, 
January 16, 1867; Michigan, January 16, 1867; Minnesota, January 16, 
1867; Kansas, January 17, 1867; Maine, January 19, 1867; Nevada, January 
22, 1867; Indiana, January 23, 1867; Missouri, January 25, 1867; 
Pennsylvania, February 6, 1867; Rhode Island, February 7, 1867; 
Wisconsin, February 13, 1867; Massachusetts, March 20, 1867; Nebraska, 
June 15, 1867; Iowa, March 16, 1868; Arkansas, April 6, 1868; Florida, 
June 9, 1868; North Carolina, July 4, 1868 (after having rejected the 
amendment December 14, 1866); Louisiana, July 9, 1868 (after having 
rejected the amendment February 6, 1867); South Carolina, July 9, 1868 
(after having rejected the amendment December 20, 1866). Ratification 
was completed on July 9, 1868. The amendment was subsequently ratified 
by Alabama, July 13, 1868; Georgia, July 21, 1868 (after having rejected 
it on November 9, 1866); Virginia, October 8, 1869 (after having 
rejected it on January 9, 1867); Mississippi, January 17, 1870; Texas, 
February 18, 1870 (after having rejected it on October 27, 1866); 
Delaware, February 12, 1901 (after having rejected it on February 8, 
1867); Maryland, April 4, 1959 (after having rejected it on March 23, 
1867); California, May 6, 1959; Kentucky, March 30, 1976 (after having 
rejected it on January 10, 1867).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------




Sec. 226. Apportionment of 
representation.

  Section 2.  Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number 
of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the 
right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President 
and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, 
the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the 
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such 
State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, 
or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the 
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the 
whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.




Sec. 227. Law governing the establishment of 
districts.

  There  has been a readjustment of House representation each 10 
years except during the period 1911 to 1929 (VI, 41, footnote). From 
March 4, 1913, permanent House membership has remained fixed at 435 (VI, 
40, 41; 37 Stat. 13). Upon admission of Alaska and Hawaii to statehood, 
total membership was temporarily increased to 437 until the next 
reapportionment (72 Stat. 339, 345; 73 Stat. 8). Congress has by law 
provided for automatic apportionment of the 435 Representatives among 
the States according to each census including and after that of 1950 (2 
U.S.C. 2a). The Apportionment Act formerly provided that the districts 
in a State were to be composed of contiguous and compact territory 
containing as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants (I, 
303; VI, 44); but subsequent apportionment Acts, those of 1929 (46 Stat. 
26) and 1941 (55 Stat. 761), omitted such provisions. See Wood v. Broom, 
287 U.S. 1 (1932).


  Congress has by law provided that for the 91st and subsequent 
Congresses each State entitled to more than one Representative shall 
establish a number of districts equal to the number of such 
Representatives, and that Representatives shall be elected only from the 
single-Member districts so established. (Hawaii and New Mexico were 
excepted from the operation of this statute for the elections to the 
91st Congress by Public Law 90-196; see 2 U.S.C. 2c.) After any 
apportionment, until a State is redistricted in a manner provided by its 
own law and in compliance with the congressional mandate, the question 
of whether its Representatives shall be elected by districts, at large, 
or by a combination of both, is determined by the Apportionment Act of 
1941 (2 U.S.C. 2a).

  Under the Apportionment Act, a statistical model known as the ``method 
of equal proportions'' is used to determine the number of 
Representatives to which each State is entitled. Although other methods 
for apportioning House seats may be permitted, the equal proportions 
method chosen by Congress has been upheld under the Constitution and was 
plainly intended to reach as close as practicable the goal of ``one 
person, one vote.'' Massachusetts v. Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. 230 (D. 
Mass. 1992), rev'd on other grounds Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 
788 (1992). The courts also have recently upheld under Federal law and 
the Constitution a counting methodology used by the Census Bureau in a 
decennial census. This method, known as ``imputation,'' was held to be 
different than ``sampling,'' a method prohibited under section 195 of 
title 13, United States Code. Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002). The 
method of apportioning the seats in the House is vested exclusively in 
Congress, and neither States nor courts may direct greater or lesser 
representation than that allocated by statute (Deschler, ch 8 Sec. 1). 
See Deschler, ch. 8 for apportionment and districting.



Sec. 228. Questions as to elections.

  The  House has always 
seated Members elected at large in the States, although the law required 
election by districts (I, 310, 519). Questions have arisen from time to 
time when a vacancy has occurred soon after a change in districts, with 
the resulting question whether the vacancy should be filled by election 
in the old or new district (I, 311, 312, 327). The House has declined to 
interfere with the act of a State in changing the boundaries of a 
district after the apportionment has been made (I, 313).





Sec. 229. Requirement that districts be equally 
populated.

  The Supreme  Court has ruled that congressional districts must be as 
equally populated as practicable. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 
(1964); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 385 U.S. 450 (1967). The Court has made 
clear that variances in population among congressional districts within 
a State may be considered de minimis only if they cannot practicably be 
avoided. If such variances, no matter how mathematically miniscule, 
could have been reduced or eliminated by a good faith effort, then they 
may be justified only on the basis of a consistent, rational State 
policy. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983). The Court also has made 
evident that it will take judicial review of a claim that apportionment 
schemes lack consistent, rational bases. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 
(1986) (holding political gerrymandering complaint justiciable under 
equal protection clause).



[[Page 107]]

or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds
 of each House, remove such disability.

-  Congress <> has by law removed generally the 
disabilities arising from the Civil War (30 Stat. 432). Soon after the 
war various questions arose under this section (I, 386, 393, 455, 456). 
For disloyalty to the United States, for giving aid and comfort to a 
public enemy, for publication of expressions hostile to the Government a 
Member-elect was denied a seat in the House (VI, 56, 58). As to the 
meaning of the words ``aid or comfort'' as used in the 14th amendment 
(VI, 57).



Sec. 230. Loyalty as a qualification of Senators 
and Representatives.

  Section 3.  No person shall be a Senator or Representative in 
Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any 
office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, 
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an 
officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, 
or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the 
Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or 
rebellion against the same, or given aid 





Sec. 232. Validity of the national debt, etc.

  Section 4.  The 
validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for 
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be 
questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or 
pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion 
against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of 
any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held 
illegal and void.





Sec. 233. Enforcement of the 14th amendment.

    Section 5. The 
Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article.






[[Page 108]]
  Congress may legislate under this section to protect voting rights by 
preempting discriminatory State qualifications for electors (Katzenbach 
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)), and may lower the voting age in Federal 
(but not State) elections (Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)).


                       AMENDMENT XV.\6\



Sec. 234. Suffrage not to be abridged for race, 
color, etc.

  Section 1.  The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


  \6\The 15th amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 
40th Congress on February 26, 1869, and was declared, in a proclamation 
of the Secretary of State, dated March 30, 1870, to have been ratified 
by the legislatures of 29 of the 37 States. The dates of these 
ratifications were: Nevada, March 1, 1869; West Virginia, March 3, 1869; 
North Carolina, March 5, 1869; Illinois, March 5, 1869; Louisiana, March 
5, 1869; Michigan, March 8, 1869; Wisconsin, March 9, 1869; Maine, March 
11, 1869; Massachusetts, March 12, 1869; Arkansas, March 15, 1869; South 
Carolina, March 15, 1869; Pennsylvania, March 25, 1869; New York, April 
14, 1869 (subsequently withdrew its consent to the ratification on 
January 5, 1870 but rescinded this action on March 30, 1970); Indiana, 
May 14, 1869; Connecticut, May 19, 1869; Florida, June 14, 1869; New 
Hampshire, July 1, 1869; Virginia, October 8, 1869; Vermont, October 20, 
1869; Alabama, November 16, 1869; Missouri, January 7, 1870 (Missouri 
had ratified the first section of the 15th amendment on March 1, 1869, 
but had failed to include in its ratification the second section of the 
amendment); Minnesota, January 13, 1870; Mississippi, January 17, 1870; 
Rhode Island, January 18, 1870; Kansas, January 19, 1870; Ohio, January 
27, 1870 (after having rejected the amendment April 30, 1869); Georgia, 
February 2, 1870; Iowa, February 3, 1870. Ratification was completed on 
February 3, 1870, unless the withdrawal of ratification by New York was 
effective; in which event ratification was completed on February 17, 
1870, when ratified by Nebraska. The amendment was subsequently ratified 
by Texas, February 18, 1870; New Jersey, February 15, 1871 (after having 
rejected it on February 7, 1870); Delaware, February 12, 1901 (after 
having rejected it on March 18, 1869); Oregon, February 24, 1959; 
California, April 3, 1962 (after having rejected it on January 28, 
1870); Maryland, May 7, 1973 (after having rejected it on February 4 and 
February 26, 1870); Kentucky, March 30, 1976 (after having rejected it 
on March 11 and March 12, 1869); Tennessee, April 2, 1997, (after having 
rejected it on November 16, 1869).
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[[Page 109]]
  Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation.


                      AMENDMENT XVI.\7\



Sec. 235. Taxes on incomes.

  The  Congress shall have power to 
lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without 
apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census 
or enumeration.
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[[Page 110]]
  \7\The 16th amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 
61st Congress on July 16, 1909, and was declared, in a proclamation of 
the Secretary of State dated February 25, 1913, to have been ratified by 
the legislatures of 36 of the 48 States. The dates of ratification were: 
Alabama, August 10, 1909; Kentucky, February 8, 1910; South Carolina, 
February 19, 1910; Illinois, March 1, 1910; Mississippi, March 7, 1910; 
Oklahoma, March 10, 1910; Maryland, April 8, 1910; Georgia, August 3, 
1910; Texas, August 16, 1910; Ohio, January 19, 1911; Idaho, January 20, 
1911; Oregon, January 23, 1911; Washington, January 26, 1911; Montana, 
January 30, 1911; Indiana, January 30, 1911; California, January 31, 
1911; Nevada, January 31, 1911; South Dakota, February 3, 1911; 
Nebraska, February 9, 1911; North Carolina, February 11, 1911; Colorado, 
February 15, 1911; North Dakota, February 17, 1911; Kansas, February 18, 
1911; Michigan, February 23, 1911; Iowa, February 24, 1911; Missouri, 
March 16, 1911; Maine, March 31, 1911; Tennessee, April 7, 1911; 
Arkansas, April 22, 1911 (after having rejected it at the session begun 
January 9, 1911); Wisconsin, May 26, 1911; New York, July 12, 1911; 
Arizona, April 6, 1912; Minnesota, June 11, 1912; Louisiana, June 28, 
1912; West Virginia, January 31, 1913; Delaware, February 3, 1913; 
Wyoming, February 3, 1913; New Mexico, February 3, 1913. Ratification 
was completed on February 3, 1913. The amendment was subsequently 
ratified by New Jersey, February 4, 1913; Vermont, February 19, 1913 
(after having rejected the amendment January 17, 1911); Massachusetts, 
March 4, 1913; New Hampshire, March 7, 1913 (after having rejected the 
amendment March 2, 1911). The amendment was rejected by Rhode Island, 
April 29, 1910; Utah, March 9, 1911; Connecticut, June 28, 1911; and 
Florida, May 31, 1913. Pennsylvania and Virginia did not complete 
action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


                      AMENDMENT XVII.\8\



Sec. 236. Election of Senators by direct vote.

  The  Senate of 
the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, 
elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall 
have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications 
requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State 
legislatures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


  \8\See article I, section 3 of the Constitution. The 17th 
amendment to the Constitution was proposed to the legislatures of the 
several States by the 62d Congress on May 15, 1912, and was declared, in 
a proclamation by the Secretary of State dated May 31, 1913, to have 
been ratified by the legislatures of 36 of the 48 States. The dates of 
ratification were: Massachusetts, May 22, 1912; Arizona, June 3, 1912; 
Minnesota, June 10, 1912; New York, January 15, 1913; Kansas, January 
17, 1913; Oregon, January 23, 1913; North Carolina, January 25, 1913; 
California, January 28, 1913; Michigan, January 28, 1913; Iowa, January 
30, 1913; Montana, January 30, 1913; Idaho, January 31, 1913; West 
Virginia, February 4, 1913; Colorado, February 5, 1913; Nevada, February 
6, 1913; Texas, February 7, 1913; Washington, February 7, 1913; Wyoming, 
February 8, 1913; Arkansas, February 11, 1913; Maine, February 11, 1913; 
Illinois, February 13, 1913; North Dakota, February 14, 1913; Wisconsin, 
February 18, 1913; Indiana, February 19, 1913; New Hampshire, February 
19, 1913; Vermont, February 19, 1913; South Dakota, February 19, 1913; 
Oklahoma, February 24, 1913; Ohio, February 25, 1913; Missouri, March 7, 
1913; New Mexico, March 13, 1913; Nebraska, March 14, 1913; New Jersey, 
March 17, 1913; Tennessee, April 1, 1913; Pennsylvania, April 2, 1913; 
Connecticut, April 8, 1913. Ratification was completed on April 8, 1913. 
The amendment was subsequently ratified by Louisiana, June 11, 1914; 
Alabama, April 16, 2002. The amendment was rejected by Utah, February 
26, 1913; Delaware, March 18, 1913. Florida, Georgia, Rhode Island, and 
South Carolina did not complete action.
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[[Page 111]]

the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may 
direct.
  When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the 
Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of 
election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any 
State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments 
until 


  This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or 
term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the 
Constitution.



Sec. 237. Filling vacancies in the Senate.

  Senator  Rebecca 
L. Felton, appointed during the recess of the Senate on October 3, 1922, 
to fill a vacancy, was the first woman to sit in the Senate (VI, 156). 
Senator Walter F. George was elected to fill the vacancy on Novem-
ber 7, 1922. Mrs. Felton took the oath of office on November 21, 1922, 
and Senator George took the oath November 22, 1922 (VI, 156). Discussion 
as to the term of service of a Senator appointed by a State executive to 
fill a vacancy (VI, 156).






Sec. 238. Qualifications of electors.

  The  right of an 
elector to vote for a Senator is fundamentally derived from the United 
States Constitution (United States v. Aczel 219 F.2d 917 (1915)) and may 
not be denied in a discriminatory fashion (Chapman v. King, 154 F.2d 460 
(1946), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 800 (1946); Forssenius v. Harman, 235 F. 
Supp. 66 (1964), aff'd., 380 U.S. 529 (1965)).



                     AMENDMENT XVIII.\9\


[[Page 112]]

cating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation 
thereof from the United States and all territories subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


Sec. 239. Prohibition of intoxicating 
liquors.

  Section 1.  [After one year from the ratification of this article the 
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxi


  \9\See amendment XXI, repealing this amendment. The 18th 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States was proposed to the 
legislatures of the several States by the 65th Congress on December 18, 
1917, and was declared in a proclamation by the Secretary of State dated 
January 29, 1919, to have been ratified by the legislatures of 36 of the 
48 States. The dates of these ratifications were: Mississippi, January 
8, 1918; Virginia, January 11, 1918; Kentucky, January 14, 1918; North 
Dakota, January 25, 1918; South Carolina, January 29, 1918; Maryland, 
February 13, 1918; Montana, February 19, 1918; Texas, March 4, 1918; 
Delaware, March 18, 1918; South Dakota, March 20, 1918; Massachusetts, 
April 2, 1918; Arizona, May 24, 1918; Georgia, June 26, 1918; Louisiana, 
August 3, 1918; Florida, December 3, 1918; Michigan, January 2, 1919; 
Ohio, January 7, 1919; Oklahoma, January 7, 1919; Idaho, January 8, 
1919; Maine, January 8, 1919; West Virginia, January 9, 1919; 
California, January 13, 1919; Tennessee, January 13, 1919; Washington, 
January 13, 1919; Arkansas, January 14, 1919; Kansas, January 14, 1919; 
Alabama, January 15, 1919; Colorado, January 15, 1919; Iowa, January 15, 
1919; New Hampshire, January 15, 1919; Oregon, January 15, 1919; 
Nebraska, January 16, 1919; North Carolina, January 16, 1919; Utah, 
January 16, 1919; Missouri, January 16, 1919; Wyoming, January 16, 1919. 
Ratification was completed on January 16, 1919. The amendment was 
subsequently ratified by Minnesota, January 17, 1919; Wisconsin, January 
17, 1919; New Mexico, January 20, 1919; Nevada, January 21, 1919; New 
York, January 29, 1919; Vermont, January 29, 1919; Pennsylvania, 
February 25, 1919; Connecticut, May 6, 1919; New Jersey, March 9, 1922. 
Connecticut and Rhode Island rejected the amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

  Section 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent 
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.





  Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been 
ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the 
several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from 
the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.]


                      AMENDMENT XIX.\10\



Sec. 240. Womens suffrage.

  The  right of citizens 
of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or by any State on account of sex.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 113]]
  \10\The 19th amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 
66th Congress on June 5, 1919, and was declared in a proclamation by the 
Secretary of State dated August 26, 1920, to have been ratified by the 
legislatures of 36 of the 48 States. The dates of these ratifications 
were: Illinois, June 10, 1919 (and that State readopted its resolution 
of ratification June 17, 1919); Michigan, June 10, 1919; Wisconsin, June 
10, 1919; Kansas, June 16, 1919; New York, June 16, 1919; Ohio, June 16, 
1919; Pennsylvania, June 24, 1919; Massachusetts, June 25, 1919; Texas, 
June 28, 1919; Iowa, July 2, 1919; Missouri, July 3, 1919; Arkansas, 
July 28, 1919; Montana, August 2, 1919; Nebraska, August 2, 1919; 
Minnesota, September 8, 1919; New Hampshire, September 10, 1919; Utah, 
October 2, 1919; California, November 1, 1919; Maine, November 5, 1919; 
North Dakota, December 1, 1919; South Dakota, December 4, 1919; 
Colorado, December 15, 1919; Kentucky, January 6, 1920; Rhode Island, 
January 6, 1920; Oregon, January 13, 1920; Indiana, January 16, 1920; 
Wyoming, January 27, 1920; Nevada, February 7, 1920; New Jersey, 
February 9, 1920; Idaho, February 11, 1920; Arizona, February 12, 1920; 
New Mexico, February 21, 1920; Oklahoma, February 28, 1920; West 
Virginia, March 10, 1920; Washington, March 22, 1920; Tennessee, August 
28, 1920. Ratification was completed on August 28, 1920. The amendment 
was subsequently ratified by Connecticut, September 14, 1920 (and that 
State reaffirmed on September 21, 1920); Vermont, February 8, 1921; 
Delaware, March 6, 1923 (after having rejected the amendment on June 2, 
1920); Maryland, March 29, 1941 (after having rejected the amendment on 
February 24, 1920; ratification certified February 25, 1958); Virginia, 
February 21, 1952 (after having rejected the amendment February 12, 
1920); Alabama, September 8, 1953 (after having rejected the amendment 
September 22, 1919); Florida, May 13, 1969; South Carolina, July 1, 1969 
(after having rejected the amendment on January 28, 1920); Georgia, 
February 20, 1970 (after having rejected the amendment on July 24, 
1919); Louisiana, June 11, 1970 (after having rejected it on July 1, 
1920); North Carolina, May 6, 1971; Mississippi, March 22, 1984 (after 
having rejected the amendment on March 29, 1920).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------




  Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation.


                      AMENDMENT XX.\11\



Sec. 241. Commencement of terms of Pres., Vice 
Pres., Senators, and Representatives.

  Section 1.  The terms of the President and 
Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the 
terms of Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January, 
of the years in which such terms would have ended if this article had 
not been ratified; and the terms of their successors shall then begin.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


  \11\See article I, section 4 of the Constitution. The 20th 
amendment to the Constitution was proposed to the legislatures of the 
several States by the 72d Congress, on March 3, 1932, and was declared 
in a proclamation by the Secretary of State dated February 6, 1933, to 
have been ratified by the legislatures of 36 of the 48 States. The dates 
of these ratifications were: Virginia, March 4, 1932; New York, March 
11, 1932; Mississippi, March 16, 1932; Arkansas, March 17, 1932; 
Kentucky, March 17, 1932; New Jersey, March 21, 1932; South Carolina, 
March 25, 1932; Michigan, March 31, 1932; Maine, April 1, 1932; Rhode 
Island, April 14, 1932; Illinois, April 21, 1932; Louisiana, June 22, 
1932; West Virginia, July 30, 1932; Pennsylvania, August 11, 1932; 
Indiana, August 15, 1932; Texas, September 7, 1932; Alabama, September 
13, 1932; California, January 4, 1933; North Carolina, January 5, 1933; 
North Dakota, January 9, 1933; Minnesota, January 12, 1933; Montana, 
January 13, 1933; Nebraska, January 13, 1933; Oklahoma, January 13, 
1933; Arizona, January 13, 1933; Kansas, January 16, 1933; Oregon, 
January 16, 1933; Wyoming, January 19, 1933; Delaware, January 19, 1933; 
Washington, January 19, 1933; South Dakota, January 20, 1933; Tennessee, 
January 20, 1933; Iowa, January 20, 1933; Idaho, January 21, 1933; New 
Mexico, January 21, 1933; Ohio, January 23, 1933; Utah, January 23, 
1933; Missouri, January 23, 1933; Georgia, January 23, 1933. 
Ratification was completed on January 23, 1933. The amendment was 
subsequently ratified by Massachusetts, January 24, 1933; Wisconsin, 
January 24, 1933; Colorado, January 24, 1933; Nevada, January 26, 1933; 
Connecticut, January 27, 1933; New Hampshire, January 31, 1933; Vermont, 
February 2, 1933; Maryland, March 24, 1933; Florida, April 26, 1933.

  The ratification of this amendment to the Constitution shortened the 
first term of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Vice President John N. 
Garner, and the terms of all Senators and Representatives of the 73d 
Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------




Sec. 242. Meeting of Congress.

  Section 2.  The Congress shall 
assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at 
noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a 
different day.


  Before the ratification of the 20th amendment Congress met on the 
first Monday in December as provided in article I, section 4, of the 
Constitution. For discussion of the term of Congress before and pursuant 
to the 20th amendment, see Sec. 6, supra (accompanying art. I, sec. 2, 
cl. 1), and Deschler, ch. 1.

  Pursuant to section 2 of the 20th amendment, a regular session of a 
Congress must begin at noon on January 3 of every year unless Congress 
sets a different date by law, and if the House is in session at that 
time the Speaker declares the House adjourned sine die without a motion 
from the floor, in order that the next regular session of that Congress, 
or the first session of the next Congress (as the case may be) may 
assemble at noon on that day (Jan. 3, 1980, pp. 37773, 37774; Jan. 3, 
1996, pp. 35, 36; Jan. 3, 2012, p. 21498; Precedents (Wickham), ch. 1, 
Sec. 2.6; Precedents (Wickham), ch. 1, Sec. 2.5; Jan. 3, 2017, p. 16863; 
Jan. 3, 2018, p. _; Jan. 3, 2019, p. _; Jan. 3, 2020, p. _; Jan. 3, 
2021, p. _; Jan. 3, 2022, p. _; Jan. 3, 2023, p. _). The House has 
adjourned the second session of a Congress without motion at its 
expiration and convened the first session of the new Congress on a 
different date as prescribed by law (Jan. 3, 2009, p. 24812).


-  Section 3. <> If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of 
the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President 
elect shall become President. If a President shall not have been chosen 
before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President 
elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall 
act as President until a President shall have qualified; and the 
Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President 
elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who 
shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act 
shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a 
President or Vice President shall have qualified.



Sec. 243. Laws appointing different day for 
convening.

  Since  ratification, the following days for assembling have been 
established: Public Law 74-120, Jan. 5, 1937; Public Law 77-395, Jan. 5, 
1942; Public Law 77-819, Jan. 6, 1943; Public Law 78-210, Jan. 10, 1944; 
Public Law 79-289, Jan. 14, 1946; Public Law 80-358, Jan. 6, 1948; 
Public Law 82-244, Jan. 8, 1952; Public Law 83-199, Jan. 6, 1954; Public 
Law 83-700, Jan. 5, 1955; Public Law 85-290, Jan. 7, 1958; Public Law 
85-819, Jan. 7, 1959; Public Law 86-305, Jan. 6, 1960; Public Law 87-
348, Jan. 10, 1962; Public Law 87-864, Jan. 9, 1963; Public Law 88-247, 
Jan. 7, 1964; Public Law 88-649, Jan. 4, 1965; Public Law 89-340, Jan. 
10, 1966; Public Law 89-704, Jan. 10, 1967; Public Law 90-230, Jan. 15, 
1968; Public Law 91-182, Jan. 19, 1970; Public Law 91-643, Jan. 21, 
1971; Public Law 92-217, Jan. 18, 1972; Public Law 93-196, Jan. 21, 
1974; Public Law 93-553, Jan. 14, 1975; Public Law 94-186, Jan. 19, 
1976; Public Law 94-494, Jan. 4, 1977; Public Law 95-594, Jan. 15, 1979; 
Public Law 96-566, Jan. 5, 1981; Public Law 97-133, Jan. 25, 1982; 
Public Law 98-179, Jan. 23, 1984; Public Law 99-379, Jan. 21, 1986; 
Public Law 99-613, Jan. 6, 1987; Public Law 100-229, Jan. 25, 1988; 
Public Law 101-228, Jan. 23, 1990; Public Law 102-475, Jan. 5, 1993; 
Public Law 103-395, Jan. 4, 1995; Public Law 104-296, Jan. 7, 1997; 
Public Law 105-140, Jan. 27, 1998; Public Law 105-350, Jan. 6, 1999; 
Public Law 106-127, Jan. 24, 2000; Public Law 107-328, Jan. 7, 2003; 
Public Law 108-181, Jan. 20, 2004; Public Law 108-433, Jan. 4, 2005; 
Public Law 109-447, Jan. 4, 2007; Public Law 110-430, Jan. 6, 2009; 
Public Law 111-121, Jan. 5, 2010; Public Law 111-289, Jan. 5, 2011; 
Public Law 113-201, Jan. 6, 2015; Public Law 114-108, Jan. 4, 2016. Such 
laws for the convening of a second session of a Congress may provide for 
possible earlier assembly by joint-leadership recall (see, e.g., Public 
Law 107-98, Jan. 23, 2002).




Sec. 245. Statutory succession and the 25th 
amendment.

  Congress  provided by law in 1947 for the performance of the duties 
of the President in case of removal, death, resignation or inability, 
both of the President and Vice President (3 U.S.C. 19). Earlier 
succession statutes covering the periods 1792-1886 and 1887-1948 can be 
found in 18 Stat. 21, and 24 Stat. 1, respectively. Also see the 25th 
amendment to the Constitution, relating to vacancies in the Office of 
Vice President and Presidential inability.


  Before the 20th amendment there was no provision in the Constitution 
for a case wherein the President-elect was disqualified or had died.


[[Page 117]]

 Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon 
them.



Sec. 246. Congress to provide for case wherein 
death occurs among those from whom House chooses a President.

  Section 4.  The 
Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the 
persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a President 
whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the 
case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may choose 
a



  The above section changes the 12th amendment insofar as it gives 
Congress the power to provide by law the manner in which the House 
should proceed in the event no candidate had a majority and one of the 
three highest on the list of those voted for as President had died.

  Section 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of 
October following the ratification of this article.



  Section 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been 
ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of 
three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of 
its submission.


                      AMENDMENT XXI.\12\



Sec. 247. Repeal of prohibition.

  Section 1.  The eighteenth 
article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby 
repealed.
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[[Page 118]]

  \12\The 21st amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States was proposed to conventions of the several States by the 72d 
Congress on February 20, 1933, and was declared in a proclamation by the 
Acting Secretary of State dated December 5, 1933, to have been ratified 
by conventions in 36 of the 48 States. The dates of these ratifications 
were: Michigan, April 10, 1933; Wisconsin, April 25, 1933; Rhode Island, 
May 8, 1933; Wyoming, May 25, 1933; New Jersey, June 1, 1933; Delaware, 
June 24, 1933; Massachusetts, June 26, 1933; Indiana, June 26, 1933; New 
York, June 27, 1933; Illinois, July 10, 1933; Iowa, July 10, 1933; 
Connecticut, July 11, 1933; New Hampshire, July 11, 1933; California, 
July 24, 1933; West Virginia, July 25, 1933; Arkansas, August 1, 1933; 
Oregon, August 7, 1933; Alabama, August 8, 1933; Tennessee, August 11, 
1933; Missouri, August 29, 1933; Arizona, September 5, 1933; Nevada, 
September 5, 1933; Vermont, September 23, 1933; Colorado, September 26, 
1933; Washington, October 3, 1933; Minnesota, October 10, 1933; Idaho, 
October 17, 1933; Maryland, October 18, 1933; Virginia, October 25, 
1933; New Mexico, November 2, 1933; Florida, November 14, 1933; Texas, 
November 24, 1933; Kentucky, November 27, 1933; Ohio, December 5, 1933; 
Pennsylvania, December 5, 1933; Utah, December 5, 1933. The amendment 
was subsequently ratified by Maine on December 6, 1933; Montana, August 
6, 1934. The convention held in the State of South Carolina on December 
4, 1933, rejected the 21st amendment.
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Sec. 248. Transportation into States 
prohibited.

  Section 2.  The transportation or importation into any State, 
Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use 
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is 
hereby prohibited.






  Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been 
ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the 
several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from 
the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.


                     AMENDMENT XXII.\13\


[[Page 119]]

President, for more than two years of a term to which some 
other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the 
President more than once. But this Article shall not apply to any person 
holding the office of President when this Article was proposed by the 
Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office 
of President, or acting as President, during the term within which this 
Article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting 
as President during the remainder of such term.
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Sec. 249. No person shall be elected President more 
than twice.

  Section 1.  No person shall be elected to the office of the President 
more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or 
acted as 


  \13\The 22d amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 
80th Congress on March 24, 1947, and was declared by the Administrator 
of General Services, in a proclamation dated March 1, 1951, to have been 
ratified by the legislatures of 36 of the 48 States. The dates of these 
ratifications were: Maine, March 31, 1947; Michigan, March 31, 1947; 
Iowa, April 1, 1947; Kansas, April 1, 1947; New Hampshire, April 1, 
1947; Delaware, April 2, 1947; Illinois, April 3, 1947; Oregon, April 3, 
1947; Colorado, April 12, 1947; California, April 15, 1947; New Jersey, 
April, 15, 1947; Vermont, April 15, 1947; Ohio, April 16, 1947; 
Wisconsin, April 16, 1947; Pennsylvania, April 29, 1947; Connecticut, 
May 21, 1947; Missouri, May 22, 1947; Nebraska, May 23, 1947; Virginia, 
January 28, 1948; Mississippi, February 12, 1948; New York, March 9, 
1948; South Dakota, January 21, 1949; North Dakota, February 25, 1949; 
Louisiana, May 17, 1950; Montana, January 25, 1951; Indiana, January 29, 
1951; Idaho, January 30, 1951; New Mexico, February 12, 1951; Wyoming, 
February 12, 1951; Arkansas, February 15, 1951; Georgia, February 17, 
1951; Tennessee, February 20, 1951; Texas, February 22, 1951; Nevada, 
February 26, 1951; Utah, February 26, 1951; Minnesota, February 27, 
1951. Ratification was completed February 27, 1951. The amendment was 
subsequently ratified by North Carolina, February 28, 1951; South 
Carolina, March 13, 1951; Maryland, March 14, 1951; Florida, April 16, 
1951; Alabama, May 4, 1951. Massachusetts and Oklahoma rejected the 
amendment.
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  Section 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been 
ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of 
three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of 
its submission to the States by the Congress.


                     AMENDMENT XXIII.\14\



Sec. 250. Representation in the Electoral College 
to the District of Columbia.

  Section 1.  The District constituting the seat of 
Government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as the 
Congress may direct:
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[[Page 120]]

  \14\The 23d amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 
86th Congress on June 17, 1960, and was declared by the Administrator of 
General Services, in a proclamation dated April 3, 1961, to have been 
ratified by the legislatures of 39 of the 50 States. The dates of these 
ratifications were: Hawaii, June 23, 1960; Massachusetts, August 22, 
1960; New Jersey, December 19, 1960; New York, January 17, 1961; 
California, January 19, 1961; Oregon, January 27, 1961; Maryland, 
January 30, 1961; Idaho, January 31, 1961; Maine, January 31, 1961; 
Minnesota, January 31, 1961; New Mexico, February 1, 1961; Nevada, 
February 2, 1961; Montana, February 26, 1961; Colorado, February 8, 
1961; Washington, February 9, 1961; West Virginia, February 9, 1961; 
Alaska, February 10, 1961; Wyoming, February 13, 1961; South Dakota, 
February 14, 1961; Delaware, February 20, 1961; Utah, February 21, 1961; 
Wisconsin, February 21, 1961; Pennsylvania, February 28, 1961; Indiana, 
March 3, 1961; North Dakota, March 3, 1961; Tennessee, March 6, 1961; 
Michigan, March 8, 1961; Connecticut, March 9, 1961; Arizona, March 10, 
1961; Illinois, March 14, 1961; Nebraska, March 15, 1961; Vermont, March 
15, 1961; Iowa, March 16, 1961; Missouri, March 20, 1961; Oklahoma, 
March 21, 1961; Rhode Island, March 22, 1961; Kansas, March 29, 1961; 
and Ohio, March 29, 1961. Ratification was completed March 29, 1961. The 
amendment was subsequently ratified by New Hampshire on March 30, 1961 
(when that State annulled and then repeated its ratification of March 
29, 1961). Arkansas rejected the amendment January 24, 1961.
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  A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the 
whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the 
District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than 
the least populous State; they shall be in addition to those appointed 
by the States, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the 
election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a 
State; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as 
provided by the twelfth article of amendment.




[[Page 121]]
  Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation.


                     AMENDMENT XXIV.\15\



Sec. 251. Right to vote not denied for failure to 
pay poll tax.

  Section 1.  The right of citizens of the United States to vote in 
any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for 
electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or 
Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or 
other tax.
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  \15\The 24th amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 
87th Congress on August 28, 1962, and was declared by the Administrator 
of General Services, in a proclamation dated February 4, 1964, to have 
been ratified by the legislatures of 38 of the 50 States. The dates of 
these ratifications were: Illinois, November 14, 1962; New Jersey, 
December 3, 1962; Oregon, January 25, 1963; Montana, January 28, 1963; 
West Virginia, February 1, 1963; New York, February 4, 1963; Maryland, 
February 6, 1963; California, February 7, 1963; Alaska, February 11, 
1963; Rhode Island, February 14, 1963; Indiana, February 19, 1963; Utah, 
February 20, 1963; Michigan, February 20, 1963; Colorado, February 21, 
1963; Ohio, February 27, 1963; Minnesota, February 27, 1963; New Mexico, 
March 5, 1963; Hawaii, March 6, 1963; North Dakota, March 7, 1963; 
Idaho, March 8, 1963; Washington, March 14, 1963; Vermont, March 15, 
1963; Nevada, March 19, 1963; Connecticut, March 20, 1963; Tennessee, 
March 21, 1963; Pennsylvania, March 25, 1963; Wisconsin, March 26, 1963; 
Kansas, March 28, 1963; Massachusetts, March 28, 1963; Nebraska, April 
4, 1963; Florida, April 18, 1963; Iowa, April 24, 1963; Delaware, May 1, 
1963; Missouri, May 13, 1963; New Hampshire, June 12, 1963; Kentucky, 
June 27, 1963; Maine, January 16, 1964; and South Dakota, January 23, 
1964. Ratification was completed on January 23, 1964. Mississippi 
rejected the amendment on December 20, 1962. The amendment was 
subsequently ratified by Virginia, February 25, 1977; North Carolina, 
May 3, 1989; Alabama, Sept. 26, 2002; Texas, May 22, 2009.


  Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965); Harper v. Virginia State 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).




[[Page 122]]
  Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation.


                      AMENDMENT XXV.\16\



Sec. 252. Presidential succession and 
inability.

  Section 1.  In case of the removal of the President from office or of 
his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
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  \16\The 25th amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 
89th Congress on July 7, 1965, and was declared by the Administrator of 
General Services, in a proclamation dated February 23, 1967, to have 
been ratified by the legislatures of 39 of the 50 States. The dates of 
these ratifications were: Nebraska, July 12, 1965; Wisconsin, July 13, 
1965; Oklahoma, July 16, 1965; Massachusetts, August 9, 1965; 
Pennsylvania, August 18, 1965; Kentucky, September 15, 1965; Arizona, 
September 22, 1965; Michigan, October 5, 1965; Indiana, October 20, 
1965; California, October 21, 1965; Arkansas, November 4, 1965; New 
Jersey, November 29, 1965; Delaware, December 7, 1965; Utah, January 17, 
1966; West Virginia, January 20, 1966; Maine, January 24, 1966; Rhode 
Island, January 28, 1966; Colorado, February 3, 1966; New Mexico, 
February 3, 1966; Kansas, February 8, 1966; Vermont, February 10, 1966; 
Alaska, February 18, 1966; Idaho, March 2, 1966; Hawaii, March 3, 1966; 
Virginia, March 8, 1966; Mississippi, March 10, 1966; New York, March 
14, 1966; Maryland, March 23, 1966; Missouri, March 30, 1966; New 
Hampshire, June 13, 1966; Louisiana, July 5, 1966; Tennessee, January 
12, 1967; Wyoming, January 25, 1967; Iowa, January 26, 1967; Washington, 
January 26, 1967; Oregon, February 2, 1967; Minnesota, February 10, 
1967; Nevada, February 10, 1967. Ratification was completed February 10, 
1967. The amendment was subsequently ratified by Connecticut, February 
14, 1967; Montana, February 15, 1967; South Dakota, March 6, 1967; Ohio, 
March 7, 1967; Alabama, March 14, 1967; North Carolina, March 22, 1967; 
Illinois, March 22, 1967; Texas, April 25, 1967; Florida, May 25, 1967.
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Sec. 253. Confirmation by House and Senate of 
nominee to fill vice presidential vacancy.

  Section 2.  Whenever there is a vacancy 
in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice 
President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of 
both Houses of Congress.




Sec. 254. President's declaration of 
disability.

  Section 3.  Whenever the President transmits to the President pro 
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and 
duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written 
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged 
by the Vice President as Acting President.




Sec. 255. Determination of Presidential inability 
and Vice President as Acting President.

  Section 4.  Whenever the Vice President 
and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive 
departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, 
transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives their written declaration that the 
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, 
the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the 
office as Acting President.



  Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore 
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his 
written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers 
and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of 
either the principal officers of the executive department or of such 
other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to 
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable 
to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress 
shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that 
purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after 
receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in 
session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, 
determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice 
President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; 
otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his 
office.


[[Page 125]]

confirmation of the nominee for Vice President, following the vote on 
confirmation by the House.


Sec. 256. Instances in which House and Senate have 
confirmed nominee as Vice President; temporary incapacity of 
President.

  Congress  has twice performed its responsibility under section two of 
the 25th amendment. On October 13, 1973, the Speaker laid before the 
House a message from President Nixon transmitting his nomination of 
Gerald R. Ford, Minority Leader in the House of Representatives, to be 
Vice President of the United States, Vice President Agnew having 
resigned on October 10, 1973. The Speaker referred the nomination to the 
Committee on the Judiciary, which under rule X has jurisdiction over 
matters relating to Presidential succession (Precedents (Wickham), ch. 
3, Sec. 6.6). The nomination of Mr. Ford to be Vice President was 
confirmed by the Senate on November 27, 1973 (p. 38225) and by the House 
on December 6, 1973 (p. 39900), and Vice President Ford was sworn in in 
the Chamber of the House of Representatives on December 6 (p. 39925). 
Subsequently, President Nixon resigned from office by delivering his 
written resignation to the Office of the Secretary of State, pursuant to 
3 U.S.C. 20, on August 9, 1974. Pursuant to section one of the 25th 
amendment, Vice President Ford became President, and was sworn in in the 
East Room at the White House. He nominated Nelson A. Rockefeller to be 
Vice President, which nomination was received in the House of 
Representatives and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary on August 
20, 1974; the nomination was confirmed by the Senate on December 10, 
1974 (p. 38936) and by the House on December 19, 1974 (p. 41516), and 
Vice President Rockefeller was sworn in in the Senate Chamber on 
December 19, 1974 (p. 41181). On both instances, the House received the 
message from the Senate, announcing that body's 





  The Chair laid before the House communications from the President 
pursuant to section three of this amendment as follows: First, before 
undergoing sedation for a medical procedure, declaring his impending 
inability to discharge the constitutional powers and duties of the 
Office of President and advising that the Vice President would discharge 
those responsibilities as Acting President until the President declared 
his ability to resume that role; and second (after recovering from the 
sedation and the medical procedure) declaring his ability to resume the 
discharge of the constitutional powers and duties of the Office of 
President, and advising that he was doing so immediately (July 15, 1985, 
p. 18955; July 8, 2002, pp. 12089, 12090; July 23, 2007, p. 20036).


                     AMENDMENT XXVI.\17\



Sec. 257. Right to vote extended to persons 18 
years of age or older.

  Section 1.  The right of citizens of the United States, who 
are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.
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  \17\The 26th amendment to the Constitution was proposed by 
the Congress on March 23, 1971. It was declared, in a certificate of the 
Administrator of General Services, dated July 5, 1971, to have been 
ratified by the legislatures of 39 of the 50 States. The dates of 
ratification were: Connecticut, March 23, 1971; Delaware, March 23, 
1971; Minnesota, March 23, 1971; Tennessee, March 23, 1971; Washington, 
March 23, 1971; Hawaii, March 24, 1971; Massachusetts, March 24, 1971; 
Montana, March 29, 1971; Arkansas, March 30, 1971; Idaho, March 30, 
1971; Iowa, March 30, 1971; Nebraska, April 2, 1971; New Jersey, April 
3, 1971; Kansas, April 7, 1971; Michigan, April 7, 1971; Alaska, April 
8, 1971; Maryland, April 8, 1971; Indiana, April 8, 1971; Maine, April 
9, 1971; Vermont, April 16, 1971; Louisiana, April 17, 1971; California, 
April 19, 1971; Colorado, April 27, 1971; Pennsylvania, April 27, 1971; 
Texas, April 27, 1971; South Carolina, April 28, 1971; West Virginia, 
April 28, 1971; New Hampshire, May 13, 1971; Arizona, May 14, 1971; 
Rhode Island, May 27, 1971; New York, June 2, 1971; Oregon, June 4, 
1971; Missouri, June 14, 1971; Wisconsin, June 22, 1971; Illinois, June 
29, 1971; Alabama, June 30, 1971; Ohio, June 30, 1971; North Carolina, 
July 1, 1971; Oklahoma, July 1, 1971.

  Ratification was completed on July 1, 1971.


[[Page 126]]

  The amendment was subsequently ratified by Virginia, July 8, 1971; 
Wyoming, July 8, 1971; Georgia, October 4, 1971.
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  Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation.


                     AMENDMENT XXVII.\18\



Sec. 258. Timing of law varying 
congressional compensation.

  No law, varying the  compensation for the services of the 
Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of 
Representatives shall have intervened.
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  \18\The 27th amendment to the Constitution was proposed on 
September 25, 1789. It was declared to have been ratified by the 
legislatures of 39 of the 50 States in a certificate of the Archivist 
dated May 18, 1992. The dates of ratification were: Maryland, December 
19, 1789; North Carolina, December 22, 1789; South Carolina, January 19, 
1790; Delaware, January 28, 1790; Vermont, November 3, 1791; Virginia, 
December 15, 1791; Ohio, May 6, 1873; Wyoming, March 6, 1978; Maine, 
April 27, 1983; Colorado, April 22, 1984; South Dakota, February 21, 
1985; New Hampshire, March 7, 1985; Arizona, April 3, 1985; Tennessee, 
May 23, 1985; Oklahoma, July 10, 1985; New Mexico, February 14, 1986; 
Indiana, February 24, 1986; Utah, February 25, 1986; Arkansas, March 6, 
1987; Montana, March 17, 1987; Connecticut, May 13, 1987; Wisconsin, 
July 15, 1987; Georgia, February 2, 1988; West Virginia, March 10, 1988; 
Louisiana, July 7, 1988; Iowa, February 9, 1989; Idaho, March 23, 1989; 
Nevada, April 26, 1989; Alaska, May 6, 1989; Oregon, May 19, 1989; 
Minnesota, May 22, 1989; Texas, May 25, 1989; Kansas, April 5, 1990; 
Florida, May 31, 1990; North Dakota, March 25, 1991; Alabama, May 5, 
1992; Missouri, May 5, 1992; Michigan, May 7, 1992; New Jersey, May 7, 
1992.


  Ratification was completed on May 7, 1992. The amendment was 
subsequently ratified by Illinois, May 12, 1992; California, June 26, 
1992; Rhode Island, June 10, 1993; Hawaii, April 26, 1994; Washington, 
August 12, 1995; Kentucky, March 21, 1996; Nebraska, April 1, 2016.

  To quell speculation over the efficacy of a ratification process 
spanning two centuries, the House adopted a concurrent resolution 
declaring the ratification of the amendment (H. Con. Res. 320, May 19, 
1992, p. 11779 (adopted May 20, 1992, p. 12051)). The Senate adopted 
both a separate concurrent resolution and a simple resolution making 
similar declarations (S. Con. Res. 120 and S. Res. 298, May 20, 1992, p. 
11869). Neither House considered the concurrent resolution of the other. 
For a concurrent resolution declaring the ratification of the 14th 
amendment, see July 21, 1868. For opinions of the Supreme Court 
concerning the duration of the ratification process and the 
contemporaneity of State ratifications, see Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 
368 (1921) and Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). A law enacted in 
the 113th Congress directed the payroll administrators of each House to 
withhold the pay of Members or Senators until either (1) a concurrent 
resolution on the budget was adopted in their respective body or (2) in 
order to ensure compliance with the 27th amendment, the final day of the 
113th Congress (P.L. 113-3).


  For Federal court opinions upholding congressional cost-of-living 
adjustments for Members under the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 (103 Stat. 
1716), see Boehner v. Anderson, 809 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1992), aff'd, 
30 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir 1994); Schaffer v. Clinton, 54 F. Supp.2d 1014 
(D.Colo. 1999).