    [Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 115th Congress]
    [115th Congress]
    [House Document 114-192]
    [The United States Constitution]
    [Pages 1-123]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

    [[Page 1]]

    ========================================================================

    ========================================================================

    [[Page 3]]

                                  CONSTITUTION

                                   __________

    Sec. 1. The preamble.

      We the People  of the United States, in
    Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
    Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general
    Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
    Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United
    States of America.

    [[Page 4]]

    Sec. 2. Formation of the
    Constitution.

      The First Continental  Congress met in Philadelphia in September, 1774 and
    adopted the Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress,
    embodying rights and principles later to be incorporated into the
    Constitution of the United States. The Second Continental Congress
    adopted in November, 1777 the Articles of Confederation, which the
    States approved in July, 1778. Upon recommendation of the Continental
    Congress, a convention of State representatives met in May, 1787 to
    revise the Articles of Confederation and reported to the Continental
    Congress in September a new Constitution, which the Congress submitted
    to the States for ratification. Nine States, as required by the
    Constitution for its establishment, had ratified by June 21, 1788, and
    eleven States had ratified by July 26, 1788. The Continental Congress
    adopted a resolution on September 13, 1788, putting the new Constitution
    into effect; the First Congress of the United States convened on March
    4, 1789, and George Washington was inaugurated as the first President on
    April 30, 1789.

                                   ARTICLE I.

    Sec. 3. Legislative powers vested in
    Congress.

      Section 1. All  legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
    Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House
    of Representatives.

    <>   Section 2. \1\The House of Representatives shall be composed
    of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States,
    * * *

    Sec. 4. Power to
    investigate.

      The power to legislate includes the power to conduct inquiries and
    investigations. See Kilbourn v.   Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273
    U.S. 135 (1927); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957);
    Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). The Chair cannot
    unilaterally grant a request for an investigation (Jan. 12, 2017, p. _).
    For the power of the House to punish for contempt in the course of
    investigations, see Sec. 293, infra.

      This clause requires election by the people and State authority may
    not determine a tie by lot (I, 775).

      The phrase ``by the people of the several States'' means that as
    nearly as practicable one person's vote in a congressional election is
    to be worth as much as another's. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
    (1964); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969). 2 U.S.C. 2a
    mandates apportionment of Representatives based upon population, and 2
    U.S.C. 2c requires the establishment by the States of single-Member
    congressional districts. For elections generally, see Deschler, ch. 8.

    [[Page 5]]

    no other hour is fixed (I, 4, 210). In the later practice a resolution
    fixing the daily hour of meeting is agreed to at the beginning of each
    session.

    Sec. 6. Term of a Congress.

      The term of a  Congress, before
    ratification of the 20th amendment to the Constitution, began on the 4th
    of March of odd-numbered years and extended through two years. This
    resulted from the action of the Continental Congress on September 13,
    1788, in declaring, on authority conferred by the Federal Convention,
    ``the first Wednesday in March next'' to be ``the time for commencing
    proceedings under the said Constitution.'' This date was March 4, 1789.
    Soon after the first Congress assembled a joint committee determined
    that the terms of Representatives and Senators of the first class
    commenced on that day, and must necessarily terminate with the 3d of
    March, 1791 (I, 3). Under the 20th amendment to the Constitution the
    terms of Representatives and Senators begin on the 3d of January of the
    odd-numbered years, regardless of when Congress actually convenes. By a
    practice having the force of common law, the House meets at noon when

      Before adoption of the 20th amendment, the legislative day of March 3
    extended to noon on March 4 (V, 6694-6697) and, unless earlier
    adjourned, the Speaker could at that time declare the House adjourned
    sine die, without motion or vote, even to the point of suspending a roll
    call then in progress (V, 6715-6718).

    <> * * * and
    the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for
    Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

      The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (84 Stat. 1140) provides
    that unless Congress otherwise specifies the two Houses shall adjourn
    sine die not later than the last day in July. This requirement is not
    applicable, under the terms of that Act, if a state of war exists
    pursuant to a congressional declaration or if, in an odd-numbered
    (nonelection) year, the Congress has agreed to adjourn for the month
    preceding Labor Day. For more on this provision, see Sec. 1106, infra.

      The House, in the decision of an election case, has rejected votes
    cast by persons not naturalized citizens of the United States, although
    they were entitled to vote under the statutes of a State (I, 811); but
    where an act of Congress had provided that a certain class of persons
    should be deprived of citizenship, a question arose over the proposed
    rejection of their votes in a State wherein citizenship in the United
    States was not a qualification of the elector (I, 451). In an
    exceptional case the House rejected votes cast by persons lately in
    armed resistance to the Government, although by the law of the State
    they were qualified voters (I, 448); but later, the House declined to
    find persons disqualified as voters because they had formerly borne arms
    against the Government (II, 879).

    Sec. 8. Decisions of the Court.

      The power  of the States to
    set qualifications for electors is not unlimited, being subject to the
    15th, 19th, 24th, and 26th amendments, and to the equal protection
    clause of the United States Constitution. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
    89 (1965); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).

      Congress has some power in setting qualifications for electors, as in
    protecting the right to vote and lowering the minimum age for electors
    in congressional elections. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966);
    Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).

    [[Page 6]]

    Sec. 9. Age as a qualification of the Representative.

        \2\No
    Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained
    to the Age of twenty five Years, * * *

    <> * * *
    and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, * * *

      A Member-elect not being of the required age, was not enrolled by the
    Clerk and he did not take the oath until he had reached the required age
    (I, 418).

    <> * * *
    and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which
    he shall be chosen.

      Henry Ellenbogen, Pa., had not been a citizen for seven years when
    elected to the 73d Congress, nor when the term commenced on March 4,
    1933. He was sworn at the beginning of the second session on January 3,
    1934, when a citizen for seven and one-half years (see H. Rept. 1431 and
    H. Res. 370, 73d Cong.). A native of South Carolina who had been abroad
    during the Revolution and on his return had not resided in the country
    seven years, was held to be qualified as a citizen (I, 420). A woman who
    forfeited her citizenship through marriage to a foreign subject and
    later resumed it through naturalization less than seven years before her
    election, was held to fulfill the constitutional requirement as to
    citizenship and entitled to a seat in the House (VI, 184). A Member who
    had long been a resident of the country, but who could not produce
    either the record of the court nor his final naturalization papers, was
    nevertheless retained in his seat by the House (I, 424).

    [[Page 7]]

    bia for years as a newspaper correspondent and maintenance there of
    church membership were not considered to outweigh payment of poll and
    income taxes, ownership of real estate, and a record for consistent
    voting in the district from which elected (VI, 55), and in the same case
    excuse from jury duty in the District of Columbia on a plea of
    citizenship in the State from which elected and exercise of incidental
    rights of such citizenship, were accepted as evidence of inhabitancy
    (VI, 55).
      The meaning of the word ``inhabitant'' and its relation to citizenship
    has been discussed (I, 366, 434; VI, 174), and the House has held that a
    mere sojourner in a State was not qualified as an inhabitant (I, 369),
    but a contestant was found to be an actual inhabitant of the State
    although for sufficient reason his family resided in another State (II,
    1091). Residence abroad in the service of the Government does not
    destroy inhabitancy as understood under the Constitution (I, 433). One
    holding an office and residing with his family for a series of years in
    the District of Columbia exclusively was held disqualified to sit as a
    Member from the State of his citizenship (I, 434); and one who had his
    business and a residence in the District of Columbia and had no business
    or residence in Virginia was held ineligible to a seat from that State
    (I, 436). One who had a home in the District of Columbia, and had
    inhabited another home in Maryland a brief period before his election,
    but had never been a citizen of any other State, was held to be
    qualified (I, 432). Also a Member who had resided a portion of a year in
    the District of Columbia, but who had a home in the State of his
    citizenship and was actually living there at the time of the election,
    was held to be qualified (I, 435). In the Updike v. Ludlow case, 71st
    Congress, it was decided that residence in the District of Colum

    Sec. 12. Qualifications other than those
    specified by the Constitution.

      Whether Congress  may by law establish qualifications
    other than those prescribed by the Constitution has been the subject of
    much discussion (I, 449, 451, 457, 458, 478); but in a case wherein a
    statute declared a Senator convicted of a certain offense ``forever
    thereafter incapable of holding any office of honor, trust, or profit
    under the Government of the United States,'' the Supreme Court expressed
    the opinion that the final judgment of conviction did not operate, ipso
    facto, to vacate the seat or compel the Senate to expel or regard the
    Senator as expelled by force alone of the judgment (II, 1282). Whether
    the House or Senate alone may set up qualifications other than those of
    the Constitution has also been a subject often discussed (I, 414, 415,
    443, 457, 458, 469, 481, 484). The Senate has always declined to act on
    the supposition that it had such a power (I, 443, 483), and during the
    stress of civil war the House of Representatives declined to exercise
    the power, even under circumstances of great provocation (I, 449, 465).
    But later, in one instance, the House excluded a Member-elect on the
    principal argument that it might itself prescribe a qualification not
    specified in the Constitution (I, 477). The matter was extensively
    debated in the 90th Congress in connection with the consideration of
    resolutions relating to the seating of Representative-elect Adam C.
    Powell of New York (H. Res. 1, Jan. 10, 1967, p. 14; H. Res. 278, Mar.
    1, 1967, p. 4997). In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), the
    Supreme Court found that the power of Congress to judge the
    qualifications of its Members was limited to an examination of the
    express qualifications stated in the Constitution.

      It has been decided by the House and Senate that no State may add to
    the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution (I, 414-416, 632); and
    the Supreme Court so ruled in U.S. Term Limits, Inc., v. Thornton, 514
    U.S. 779 (1995). There, the Court held that States may not ``change, add
    to, or diminish'' constitutional qualifications of Members, striking
    down a State statute prohibiting three-term incumbents from appearing on
    the general election ballot. For qualifications generally, see Deschler,
    ch. 7, Sec. Sec. 9-14.

    [[Page 8]]

      For expulsion of seated Members, which requires a two-thirds vote
    rather than a majority vote, see article I, section 5, clause 2
    (Sec. 62, infra).

    Sec. 13. Minority candidate not seated when
    returned Member is disqualified.

      Both Houses of  Congress have decided, when a Member-
    elect is found to be disqualified, that the person receiving the next
    highest number of votes is not entitled to the seat (I, 323, 326, 450,
    463, 469; VI, 58, 59), even in a case wherein reasonable notice of the
    disqualification was given to the electors (I, 460). In the event of the
    death of a Member-elect, the candidate receiving the next highest number
    of votes is not entitled to the seat (VI, 152).

    Sec. 14. The old provision for
    apportionment of Representatives and direct taxes.

      \3\[Representatives and direct  Taxes shall be
    apportioned among the several States which may be included within this
    Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined
    by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to
    Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three
    fifths of all other Persons.] * * *

    * * * The actual <> Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the
    first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every
    subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law
    direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every
    thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative;
    and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire
    shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode- Island and
    Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersey
    four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland

    [[Page 9]]

    six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia
    three.

      The part of this clause relating to the mode of apportionment of
    Representatives was changed after the Civil War by section 2 of the 14th
    amendment and, as to taxes on incomes without apportionment, by the 16th
    amendment.

      The census has been taken decennially since 1790, and, with the
    exception of 1920, was followed each time by reapportionment. In the
    First Congress the House had 65 Members; increased after each census,
    except that of 1840, until 435 was reached in 1913 (VI, 39, 40). The Act
    of June 18, 1929 (46 Stat. 26), as amended by the Act of November 15,
    1941 (55 Stat. 761), provides for reapportionment of the existing number
    (435) among the States following each new census (VI, 41-43; see 2
    U.S.C. 2a). Membership was temporarily increased to 436, then to 437,
    upon admission of Alaska (72 Stat. 345) and Hawaii (73 Stat. 8), but
    returned to 435 on January 3, 1963, the effective date of the
    reapportionment under the 18th Decennial census.

      Under the later but not the earlier practice, bills relating to the
    census and apportionment are not privileged for consideration (I, 305-
    308; VI, 48, VII, 889; Apr. 8, 1926, p. 7147).

    Sec. 16. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
    393 (1857); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869); Scholey
    v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331 (1874); De Treville v. Smalls, 98 U.S.
    517 (1878); Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404 (1886);
    Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. (Income Tax case), 157 U.S. 429
    (1895); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Rehearing), 158 U.S. 601
    (1895); Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363 (1904); Flint v. Stone
    Tracy Co. (Corporation Tax cases), 220 U.S. 107 (1911); Eisner v.
    Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S.
    345 (1921); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992); Utah v.
    Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002).

    Sec. 17. Writs for elections to vacancies in
    representation.

      \4\When vacancies  happen in the Representation from any State, the
    Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such
    Vacancies.

    [[Page 10]]

      Vacancies are caused by death, resignation, declination, withdrawal,
    or by action of the House in declaring a vacancy as existing or causing
    one by expulsion. When a vacancy occurs, or when a new Member is sworn,
    the Speaker announces the resulting adjustment in the whole number of
    the House pursuant to clause 5(d) of rule XX (see Sec. 1024b, infra).
    Clause 5(c) of rule XX permits the House to operate with a provisional
    number of the House if the House is without a quorum due to catastrophic
    circumstances (see Sec. 1024a, infra). In extraordinary circumstances,
    section 8 of title 2, United States Code, prescribes special election
    rules to expedite the filling of vacancies in representation of the
    House.

    Sec. 18. Vacancy from death.

      It was long the  practice to
    notify the executive of the State when a vacancy was caused by the death
    of a Member during a session (II, 1198-1202); but it is now the practice
    for State authorities to take cognizance of the vacancies without
    notice. When a Member dies while not in attendance in the House or
    during a recess, the House is sufficiently informed of the vacancy by
    the credentials of the successor, when they set forth the fact of the
    death (I, 568). The death of a Member-elect creates a vacancy, although
    no certificate may have been awarded (I, 323), and in such a case the
    candidate having the next highest number of votes may not receive the
    credentials (I, 323; VI 152). A Member whose seat was contested having
    died, the House did not admit a claimant with credentials until
    contestant's claim was settled (I, 326); where a contestant died after a
    report in his favor, the House unseated the returned Member and declared
    the seat vacant (II, 965), and in a later case the contestant having
    died, the committee did not recommend to the House a resolution it had
    agreed to declaring he had not been elected (VI, 112). In the 93d
    Congress, when two Members-elect were passengers on a missing aircraft
    and were presumed dead, the Speaker laid before the House documentary
    evidence of the presumptive death of one Member-elect and the
    declaration of a vacancy by the Governor, as well as evidence that the
    status of the other Member-elect had not been officially determined by
    State authority. The House then adopted a privileged resolution
    declaring vacant the seat of the latter Member-elect to enable the
    Governor of that State to call a special election (Jan. 3, 1973, p. 15).
    For further discussion, see Sec. 23, infra.

    Sec. 19. Vacancy from resignation.

      In recent practice  the
    Member informs the House by letter that a resignation has been sent to
    the State executive (II, 1167-1176) and this is satisfactory evidence of
    the resignation (I, 567). Both a letter to the Speaker and a copy of the
    letter to the State executive are laid before the House. However,
    Members have resigned by letter to the House alone, it being presumed
    that the Member would also notify the Governor (VI, 226). Where a Member
    resigned by letter to the House the Speaker was authorized to notify the
    Governor (Nov. 27, 1944, p. 8450; July 12, 1957, p. 11536; Sept. 1,
    1976, p. 28887). If a Member does not inform the House, the State
    executive may do so (II, 1193, 1194; VI, 232). The House has learned of
    a Member's resignation by means of the credentials of the successor (II,
    1195, 1356). Where the fact of a Member's resignation has not appeared
    either from the credentials of the successor or otherwise, the Clerk has
    been ordered to make inquiry (II, 1209) or the House has ascertained the
    vacancy from information given by other Members (II, 1208).

    [[Page 11]]

    to resign a seat in the House to be effective on a date following the
    anticipated date of a special election that might fill the vacancy
    thereby created (Deschler, ch. 8, Sec. 9.3). However, the State
    concerned must be willing to treat the prospective resignation as a
    constitutional predicate for the issuance of a writ of election to fill
    a vacancy. For examples of resignation letters indicating that the State
    executive took cognizance of a prospective resignation, see January 8,
    1952, (p. 14) (New York); July 9, 1991, (p. 17301) (Virginia); June 5,
    2001, (p. 9882) (Florida), and January 27, 2003, (p. 1751) (Texas). When
    the Governor of Oklahoma received a prospective resignation from one of
    its Members, the State provided by statute (enrolled Senate Bill Number
    7X) for the holding of a special election before the effective date of
    the resignation (Feb. 28, 2002, p. 2245).
      It has been established that a Member or Senator may select a future
    date for a resignation to take effect and, until the arrival of that
    date, participate in the proceedings (II, 1220-1225, 1228, 1229; VI,
    227, 228; Dec. 15, 1997, p. 26709; June 5, 2001, p. 9882; Nov. 27, 2001,
    p. 23006; Jan. 27, 2003, pp. 1750, 1751). It has been possible even for
    a Member

      For the State to take cognizance of a prospective resignation, it must
    have assurances that there is no possibility of withdrawal (or
    modification). In one case a Member who had resigned was not permitted
    by the House to withdraw the resignation (II, 1213). However, the House
    has allowed withdrawal in the case of defective resignation; that is, in
    which the Member had not actually transmitted the letter of resignation
    (VI, 229), or had transmitted it to an improper state official (Oct. 9,
    1997, p. 22020). A Member may include in a letter of prospective
    resignation a statement of intention that the resignation be
    ``irrevocable'' in order to allay any concern about the prospect of
    withdrawal (June 5, 2001, p. 9882).

      Acceptance of the resignation of a Member from the House is
    unnecessary (VI, 65, 226), and the refusal of a Governor to accept a
    resignation cannot operate to continue membership in the House (VI, 65).
    Only in a single exceptional case has the House taken action in the
    direction of accepting a resignation (II, 1214). Sometimes Members who
    have resigned have been reelected to the same House and taken seats (II,
    1210, 1212, 1256; Jan. 28, 1965 and June 16, 1965, pp. 1452, 13774; Jan.
    6, 1983 and Feb. 22, 1983, pp. 114, 2575). A Member-elect may resign
    before taking the oath (II, 1230-1232).

      A letter of resignation is presented as privileged (II, 1167-1176);
    but a resolution to permit a Member to withdraw a resignation was not so
    treated (II, 1213). The Speaker, having been elected Vice President and
    a Representative of the succeeding Congress at the same election,
    transmitted to the Governor of his State his resignation as a Member-
    elect (VI, 230, 453). A Member of the House, having been nominated and
    confirmed as Vice President pursuant to the 25th amendment, submitted a
    letter of resignation as a Representative to the Governor of his State,
    and a copy of his letter of resignation was laid before the House by the
    Speaker following the completion of a joint meeting for his swearing as
    Vice President (Dec. 6, 1973, p. 39927).

    [[Page 12]]

    not appeared to claim the seat (I, 638). In one instance a Member-elect
    who had been convicted in the courts did not appear during the term (IV,
    4484, footnote). On November 7, 1998, less than a week after his re-
    election as Representative from Georgia, Speaker Gingrich announced that
    he would not be a candidate for Speaker in the 106th Congress and that
    he would resign his seat as a Member of the 106th Congress. Although the
    letter of ``withdrawal'' was tendered on November 22, the Governor did
    not attempt to call a special election until after the term began on
    January 3, 1999 (Jan. 6, 1999, p. 42). A Member has notified the Speaker
    and the Governor in one Congress of an intention not to take a seat in
    the next Congress (Jan. 6, 2009, pp. 2, 3; Jan. 3, 2013, p. _; Jan. 3,
    2013, p. _; Jan. 6, 2015, p. _).

    Sec. 20. Vacancy from declination.

      A Member who  has been
    elected to a seat may decline to accept it, and in such a case the House
    informed the executive of the State of the vacancy (II, 1234). The House
    has decided an election contest against a returned Member who had

    Sec. 21. Vacancy by withdrawal.

      At the time  of the secession
    of several States, Members of the House from those States withdrew (II,
    1218). In the Senate, in cases of such withdrawals, the Secretary was
    directed to omit the names of the Senators from the roll (II, 1219), and
    the act of withdrawal was held to create a vacancy that the legislature
    might recognize (I, 383).

    Sec. 22. Vacancy by action of the House.

      If the House,  by
    its action in a question of election or otherwise, creates a vacancy,
    the Speaker is directed to notify the Executive of the State (I, 502,
    709, 824; II, 1203-1205; Mar. 1, 1967, p. 5038; Jan. 3, 1973, p. 15;
    Feb. 24, 1981, pp. 2916-18). A resolution as to such notification is
    presented as a question of privilege (III, 2589), as is a resolution
    declaring a vacancy in which a Member-elect was unable to take the oath
    of office or to decline the office because of an incapacitating illness
    (Feb. 24, 1981, pp. 2916-18).

    [[Page 13]]

    Sec. 23. Questions as to the existence of a
    vacancy.

      The House declines  to give prima facie effect to credentials, even though they
    be regular in form, until it has ascertained whether or not the seat is
    vacant (I, 322, 518, 565, 569), and a person returned as elected at a
    second election was unseated on ascertainment that another person had
    actually been chosen at the first election (I, 646). Where a Member was
    reelected to the House, although at the time of the election he had been
    unaccounted for for several weeks following the disappearance of the
    plane on which he was a passenger, the Governor of the State from which
    he was elected transmitted his certificate to the House in the regular
    fashion. When the Member-elect was still missing at the time the new
    Congress convened, and circumstances were such that other passengers on
    the missing plane had been presumed dead following judicial inquiries in
    the State where the plane was lost, the House declared the seat vacant
    (H. Res. 1, 93d Cong., Jan. 3, 1973, p. 15). In the 108th Congress the
    House codified in clause 5 of rule XX its practice of accounting for
    vacancies (sec. 2(l), H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 2003, p. 7).

    Sec. 24. Functions of the State executive
    in filling vacancies.

      The term ``vacancy''  as occurring in this paragraph of the
    Constitution has been examined in relation to the functions of the State
    executive (I, 312, 518). A Federal law empowers the States and
    Territories to provide by law the times of elections to fill vacancies
    (I, 516; 2 U.S.C. 8); but an election called by a governor in pursuance
    of constitutional authority was held valid although no State law
    prescribed the time, place, or manner of such election (I, 517). Where
    two candidates had an equal number of votes, the governor did not issue
    credentials to either, but ordered a new election after they had waived
    their respective claims (I, 555). A candidate elected for the 104th
    Congress was appointed by the Governor to fill a vacancy for the
    remainder of the 103d Congress pursuant to a State law requiring the
    Governor to appoint the candidate who won the election to the 104th
    Congress. In that case the House authorized the Speaker to administer
    the oath to the Member-elect and referred the question of his final
    right to the seat in the 103d Congress to the Committee on House
    Administration (Nov. 29, 1994, pp. 29585, 29586). For a discussion of a
    State election to fill a prospective vacancy of the House, see Sec. 19,
    supra.

    Sec. 25. Term of a Member elected to fill a vacancy.

        A
    Member elected to fill a vacancy serves no longer time than the
    remainder of the term of the Member whose place he fills (I, 3). For the
    compensation and allowances of such Members, see Sec. 87, infra.

    Sec. 26. House chooses the Speaker and other
    officers.

        \5\The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker
    and other Officers; * * *

      The officers of the House are the Speaker, who has always been one of
    its Members and whose term as Speaker must expire with the term as a
    Member; and the Clerk, Sergeant-at-Arms, Chief Administrative Officer,
    and Chaplain (I, 187), no one of whom has ever been chosen from the
    sitting membership of the House and who continue in office until their
    successors are chosen and qualified (I, 187). In one case the officers
    continued through the entire Congress succeeding that in which they were
    elected (I, 244, 263). Former officers include Doorkeeper (abolished by
    the 104th Congress, see Sec. 663b, infra) and Postmaster (abolished
    during the 102d Congress, see Sec. 668, infra). The House formerly
    provided by special rule that the Clerk should continue in office until
    another should be chosen (I, 187, 188, 235, 244). Currently, certain
    statutes impose on the officers duties that contemplate their
    continuance (I, 14, 15; 2 U.S.C. 5602).

    [[Page 14]]

    House elects its Speaker, the Delegates-elect and the Resident
    Commissioner from Puerto Rico are not constitutionally qualified to vote
    in the House for Speaker (Jan. 6, 1999, p. 43; Jan. 3, 2017, p. _). The
    Clerk appoints tellers for this election (I, 217). Ultimately, the
    House, and not the Clerk, decides by what method it shall elect the
    Speaker (I, 210). On two occasions, by special rules, Speakers were
    chosen by a plurality of votes; but in each case the House by majority
    vote adopted a resolution declaring the result (I, 221, 222). The House
    has declined to choose a Speaker by lot (I, 221).

    Sec. 27. Election of a Speaker.

      The Speaker, who  was at
    first elected by ballot, has been chosen viva voce by surname in
    response to a call of the roll since 1839 (I, 187). The Speaker is
    elected by a majority of Members-elect voting by surname, a quorum being
    present (I, 216; VI, 24; Jan. 7, 1997, p. 117). Because the House is
    composed of Members elected by the people of the several States, and
    because the

      The motion to proceed to the election of a Speaker is privileged (I,
    212, 214; VIII, 3383), and debatable unless the previous question is
    ordered (I, 213). Relying on the Act of June 1, 1789 (2 U.S.C. 25), the
    Clerk recognized for nominations for Speaker as being of higher
    constitutional privilege than a resolution to postpone the election of a
    Speaker and instead provide for the election of a Speaker pro tempore
    pending the disposition of certain ethics charges against the nominee of
    the majority party (Jan. 7, 1997, p. 115). On several occasions the
    choice of a Speaker has been delayed for several weeks by contests (I,
    222; V, 5356, 6647, 6649; VI, 24). The contest over the election of a
    Speaker in 1923 was resolved after a procedure for the adoption of rules
    for the 68th Congress had been presented (VI, 24). In 1860 the voting
    for Speaker proceeded slowly, being interspersed with debate (I, 223),
    and in one instance the House asked candidates for Speaker to state
    their views before proceeding to election (I, 218).

    Sec. 28. Vacancies in the Office of
    Speaker.

      A proposition  to elect a Speaker is in order at any time a vacancy exists
    and presents a question of the highest privilege (VIII, 3383). A
    resolution declaring vacant the Office of Speaker is presented as a
    matter of high constitutional privilege (VI, 35). Upon a vacancy in the
    Office of Speaker, the House elects a new Speaker either viva voce
    following nominations (in the case in which a Speaker has died between
    sessions of Congress or resigned) or by resolution (in the case in which
    a Speaker has died during a session of Congress). For example, in the
    case in which the Speaker had died between sessions of Congress, the
    Clerk at the next session called the House to order, ascertained the
    presence of a quorum, and then the House proceeded to elect a successor
    viva voce following nominations (I, 234; Jan. 10, 1962, p. 5). In a case
    in which the Speaker died during a session of Congress, but not while
    the House was sitting, the Clerk on the following day called the House
    to order and the Speaker's successor was elected by resolution (June 4,
    1936, p. 9016; Sept. 16, 1940, p. 12231). Form of resolution offered on
    death of a Speaker (Sept. 16, 1940, p. 12232; Jan. 10, 1962, p. 9) and
    of a former Speaker (VIII, 3564; Mar. 7, 1968, p. 5742; H. Res. 328,
    Jan. 25, 1994, p. 89; H. Res. 418, Feb. 8, 2000, p. 834; H. Res. 383,
    Oct. 22, 2013, p. _; H. Res. 254, May 12, 2015, p. _).

    [[Page 15]]

    verbally from the floor (I, 225), by tendering the resignation during
    recognition under a question of personal privilege (May 31, 1989, p.
    10440), or by sending a letter that the Clerk reads to the House at the
    beginning of a new session (I, 232). In cases in which a Speaker
    resigned ``on the election of my successor'' (May 31, 1989, p. 10440;
    Oct. 29, 2015, p. _), he entertained nominations for Speaker and,
    following the roll call, declared the winner of the election ``duly
    elected Speaker'' (June 6, 1989, p. 10801; Oct. 29, 2015, p. _). In one
    instance a Speaker resigned on the last day of the Congress, and the
    House unanimously adopted a motion to elect a successor for the day (I,
    225). When the Speaker resigns no action of the House excusing him from
    service is taken (I, 232). Instance wherein the Speaker, following a
    vote upon an essential question indicating a change in the party control
    of the House, announced that under the circumstances it was incumbent
    upon the Speaker to resign or to recognize for a motion declaring vacant
    the Office of Speaker (VI, 35).
      Speakers have resigned by addressing the House (I, 231, 233; Oct. 29,
    2015, p. _), by calling a Member to the Chair and tendering the
    resignation

      In the 108th Congress the House adopted clause 8(b)(3) of rule I,
    under which the Speaker is required to deliver to the Clerk a list of
    Members in the order in which each shall act as Speaker pro tempore in
    the case of a vacancy in the Office of Speaker (sec. 2(a), H. Res. 5,
    Jan. 7, 2003, p. 7). The Speaker delivered to the Clerk the first such
    letter on February 10, 2003 (Mar. 13, 2003, p. 6118).

    Sec. 29. Power of House to elect its officers as related to
    law.

        The effect of a law to regulate the action of the House in
    choosing its own officers has been discussed (IV, 3819), and such a law
    has been considered of doubtful validity (V, 6765, 6766) in theory and
    practice (I, 241, 242). The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2
    U.S.C. 5501) authorizes the Speaker to fill temporary vacancies in the
    offices of Clerk, Sergeant-at-Arms, Chief Administrative Officer, and
    Chaplain. For a history of the Speaker's exercise of such authority, see
    Sec. 640, infra;  and, for further information on the elections of
    officers, see Deschler, ch. 6.

    * * * <> and
    [the House of Representatives] shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

    Sec. 30. Election of Clerk in relation to business.

        It has
    been held that the Act of June 1, 1789 (2 U.S.C. 25) binds the House to
    elect a Clerk before proceeding to business (I, 237, 241; contrast, I,
    242, 244). When a vacancy arises in the Office of Clerk during a
    session, business has intervened before the election of a new Clerk (I,
    239).

      In 1868 the Senate ceased in its rules to describe the House, acting
    in an impeachment, as the ``grand inquest of the nation'' (III, 2126).
    See also art. II, sec. 4 (Sec. 173, infra); Deschler, ch. 14.

    [[Page 16]]

    lution granting such limited access to the evidence as would not
    infringe upon its sole power of impeachment (Aug. 22, 1974, p. 30047).
      A Federal court having subpoenaed certain evidence gathered by a
    committee of the House in an impeachment inquiry, the House adopted a
    reso

      Until the law expired on June 30, 1999, an independent counsel was
    required to advise the House of any substantial and credible information
    that may constitute grounds for impeachment of an officer under
    investigation (28 U.S.C. 595(c)). For a description of impeachment
    proceedings prompted by a communication from an independent counsel, see
    Sec. 176, infra.

    Sec. 32. Numbers, terms, and votes
    of Senators.

      Section 3. \1\[The Senate  of the United States shall be composed of two Senators
    from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and
    each Senator shall have one Vote.]

      This provision was changed by the 17th amendment.

    Sec. 33. Division of the Senate into
    classes.

      \2\Immediately  after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first
    Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes.
    The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the
    Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of
    the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of
    the <> sixth Year,
    so that one-third may be chosen every second Year; [and if Vacancies
    happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the
    Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary
    Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then
    fill such Vacancies.]

      That part of the above paragraph in brackets was changed by the 17th
    amendment.

    [[Page 17]]

    izen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an
    Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

    Sec. 35. Qualifications of Senators.

      \3\No Person  shall be a
    Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been
    nine Years a Cit

      In 1794 the Senate decided that Albert Gallatin was disqualified, not
    having been a citizen nine years although he had served in the war of
    Independence and was a resident of the country when the Constitution was
    formed (I, 428); and in 1849 that James Shields was disqualified, not
    having been a citizen for the required time (I, 429). But in 1870 the
    Senate declined to examine as to H. R. Revels, a citizen under the
    recently adopted 14th amendment (I, 430). As to inhabitancy the Senate
    seated one who, being a citizen of the United States, had been an
    inhabitant of the State from which he was appointed for less than a year
    (I, 437). Also one who, while stationed in a State as an army officer
    had declared his intention of making his home in the State, was admitted
    by the Senate (I, 438). A Senator who at the time of his election was
    actually residing in the District of Columbia as an officeholder, but
    who voted in his old home and had no intent of making the District his
    domicile, was held to be qualified (I, 439).

    Sec. 36. The Vice President; voting.

      \4\The Vice  President
    of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no
    Vote, unless they be equally divided.

      The right of the Vice President to vote has been construed to extend
    to questions relating to the organization of the Senate (V, 5975), the
    election of officers of the Senate (V, 5972-5974), the title of a
    claimant to a seat (V, 5976, 5977), or the confirmation of a Cabinet
    nominee (Feb. 6, 2017, p. _). The Senate has declined to make a rule
    relating to the vote of the Vice President (V, 5974).

    Sec. 37. Choice of President pro tempore and other officers
    of the Senate.

        \5\The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and
    also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or
    when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.

    -
    [[Page 18]]

      In the 107th Congress the Senate elected two Presidents of the Senate
    pro tempore for different periods when the majority of the Senate
    shifted after inauguration of the Vice President (S. Res. 3, Jan. 3,
    2001, p. 7).

    Sec. 38. Senate tries impeachment and convicts
    by twothirds vote.

      \6\The Senate  shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.
    When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation.
    When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice
    shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence
    of two thirds of the Members present.

      For the exclusive power of the Senate to try impeachment under the
    United States Constitution, see Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 293
    (1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 668 (1937). See also Mississippi v.
    Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867) (dictum). For the
    nonjusticiability of a claim that a Senate impeachment rule (XI)
    violates the impeachment trial clause by delegating to a committee of 12
    Senators the responsibility to receive evidence, hear testimony, and
    report to the Senate thereon, see Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224
    (1993). For a discussion of Senate impeachment procedures, see
    Sec. Sec. 608-20, infra.

    Sec. 41. Judgment in cases of
    impeachment.

      \7\Judgment in  Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to
    removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office
    of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party
    convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial,
    Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.

    [[Page 19]]

    following his conviction in the Senate (Dec. 8, 2010, p. 19349). For a
    further discussion of judgments in cases of impeachment, see Sec. 619,
    infra.

      There has been discussion as to whether or not the Constitution
    requires both removal and disqualification on conviction (III, 2397);
    but in the case of Pickering, the Senate decreed only removal (III,
    2341). In the case of Humphreys, judgment of both removal and
    disqualification was pronounced (III, 2397). In the Ritter case, it was
    first held that upon conviction of the respondent, judgment of removal
    required no vote, following automatically from conviction under article
    II, section 4 (Apr. 17, 1936, p. 5607). In the 99th Congress, having
    tried to conviction the first impeachment case against a Federal
    district judge since 1936, the Senate ordered his removal from office
    (Oct. 9, 1986, p. 29870). In the 101st Congress, two other Federal
    district judges were removed from office following their convictions in
    the Senate (Oct. 20, 1989, p. 25335; Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27101). In the
    111th Congress, a Federal district judge was removed from office

    Sec. 42. Times, places, and manner of
    elections of Representatives and Senators.

      Section 4. \1\The Times,  Places and Manner of
    holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed
    in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any
    time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the places of
    chusing Senators.

      The relative powers of the Congress and the States under this
    paragraph have been the subject of much discussion (I, 311, 313, 507,
    footnote); but Congress has in fact fixed by law the time of elections
    (I, 508; VI, 66; 2 U.S.C. 7), and has controlled the manner to the
    extent of prescribing a ballot or voting machine (II, 961; VI, 150; 2
    U.S.C. 9). When a State delegated to a municipality the power to
    regulate the manner of holding an election, a question arose (II, 975).
    A question has arisen as to whether or not a State, in the absence of
    action by Congress, might make the time of election of Members of
    Congress contingent on the time of the State election (I, 522). This
    paragraph gives Congress the power to protect the right to vote in
    primaries in which they are an integral part of the election process.
    United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930); United States v.
    Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). Congress may legislate under this
    paragraph to protect the exercise of the franchise in congressional
    elections. Ex parte Siebolt, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Ex parte Yarbrough,
    110 U.S. 651 (1884).

    [[Page 20]]

    Appropriations Act, 2006, amended Federal election law to require States
    to hold special elections for the House within 49 days after a vacancy
    is announced by the Speaker in the extraordinary circumstance that
    vacancies in representation from the States exceed 100 (P.L. 109-55; 2
    U.S.C. 8).

    Sec. 43. Functions of a State legislature in
    fixing time, etc., of elections.

      The meaning of  the word ``legislature'' in this
    clause of the Constitution has been the subject of discussion (II, 856),
    as to whether or not it means a constitutional convention as well as a
    legislature in the commonly accepted meaning of the word (I, 524). The
    House has sworn in Members chosen at an election the time, etc., of
    which was fixed by the schedule of a constitution adopted on that
    election day (I, 519, 520, 522). But the House held that where a
    legislature has been in existence a constitutional convention might not
    exercise the power (I, 363, 367). It has been argued generally that the
    legislature derives the power herein discussed from the Federal and not
    the State Constitution (II, 856, 947), and therefore that the State
    constitution might not in this respect control the State legislature
    (II, 1133). The House has sustained this view by its action (I, 525).
    But where the State constitution fixed a date for an election and the
    legislature had not acted, although it had the opportunity, the House
    held the election valid (II, 846). Title III of the Legislative Branch

    Sec. 44. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Ex
    parte Clark, 100 U.S. 399 (1880); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651
    (1884); In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888); Ohio v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565
    (1916); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); United States  v.
    Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917); Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232
    (1921); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); United States v. Classic,
    313 U.S. 299 (1941); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Roudebush
    v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974);
    Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); U.S. Term Limits, Inc., v. Thorton,
    514 U.S. 779 (1995); and Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997). In Public
    Law 91-285, Congress lowered the minimum age of voters in all Federal,
    State, and local elections from 21 to 18 years. In Oregon v. Mitchell,
    400 U.S. 112 (1970), the Supreme Court upheld the power of Congress
    under article I, section 4 and under section 5 of the 14th amendment to
    the Constitution to fix the age of voters in Federal elections, but held
    that the 10th amendment to the Constitution reserved to the States the
    power to establish voter age qualifications in State and local
    elections. The 26th amendment to the Constitution extended the right of
    persons 18 years of age or older to vote in elections held under State
    authority.

    Sec. 45. Annual meeting of Congress.

      \2\[The Congress  shall
    assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the
    first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different
    Day.]

      This provision has been superseded by the 20th amendment.

    [[Page 21]]

      In the later but not the earlier practice (I, 5), before the 20th
    amendment, the fact that Congress had met once within the year did not
    make uncertain the constitutional mandate to meet on the first Monday of
    December (I, 6, 9-11). Early Congresses, convened either by proclamation
    or law on a day earlier than the constitutional day, remained in
    continuous session to a time beyond that day (I, 6, 9-11). But in the
    later view an existing session ends with the day appointed by the
    Constitution for the regular annual session (II, 1160); see Sec. 84,
    infra. Congress has frequently appointed by law a day for the meeting
    (I, 4, 5, 10-12, footnote; see also Sec. 243, infra).

    Sec. 46. House the judge of elections,
    returns, and qualifications.

      Section 5. \1\Each  House shall be the Judge of the
    Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, * * *

      In judging the qualifications of its Members, the House may not add
    qualifications to those expressly stated in the United States
    Constitution. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). This phrase
    allows the House or Senate to deny the right to a seat without
    unlawfully depriving a State of its right to equal representation. Barry
    v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929). But a State
    may conduct a recount of votes without interfering with the authority of
    the House under this phrase. Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972).
    For discussion of the power of the House to judge elections, see
    Deschler, ch. 8 (elections) and ch. 9 (election contests); for
    discussion of the power of the House to judge qualifications, see
    Deschler, ch. 7.

      The House has the same authority to determine the right of a Delegate
    to a seat that it has in the case of a Member (I, 423). The House may
    not delegate the duty of judging its elections to another tribunal (I,
    608), and the courts of a State have no role in such matters (II, 959).
    The House has once examined the relations of this power to the power to
    expel (I, 469).

    Sec. 47. Power of judging as related to State
    laws as to returns.

      As nearly all  the laws governing the elections of
    Representatives in Congress are State laws, questions have often arisen
    as to the relation of this power of judging to those laws (I, 637). The
    House decided very early that the certificate of a State executive
    issued in strict accordance with State law does not prevent examination
    of the votes by the House and a reversal of the return (I, 637). The
    House has also held that it is not confined to the conclusions of
    returns made up in strict conformity to State law, but may examine the
    votes and correct the returns (I, 774); and the fact that a State law
    gives canvassers the right to reject votes for fraud and irregularities
    does not preclude the House from going behind the returns (II, 887). The
    highest court in one State (Colorado) has ruled that it lacked
    jurisdiction to pass upon a candidate's allegations of irregularities in
    a primary election and that the House had exclusive jurisdiction to
    decide such questions and to declare the rightful nominee (Sept. 23,
    1970, p. 33320).

    [[Page 22]]

    directory State laws governing the conduct of election officials as to
    ballots, and mandatory laws regulating the conduct of voters.

    Sec. 48. Power of judging as related to
    State laws as to acts of the voter.

      When the question  concerns not the acts of returning
    officers, but the act of the voter in voting, the House has found more
    difficulty in determining the proper exercise of its constitutional
    power. Although the House has always acted on the principle of giving
    expression to the intent of the voter (I, 575, 639, 641; II, 1090), it
    has held that a mandatory State law, even though arbitrary, may cause
    the rejection of a ballot on which the intent of the voter is plain (II,
    1009, 1056, 1077, 1078, 1091). See Deschler, ch. 8, Sec. 8.11, for
    discussion of distinction between

    Sec. 49. Power of House as related to
    constitutionality of State laws.

      Where the State  courts have upheld a State election
    law as constitutional the House does not ordinarily question the law
    (II, 856, 1071). But if there has been no such decision the House, in
    determining its election cases, has passed on the validity of State laws
    under State constitutions (II, 1011, 1134), and has acted on its
    decision that they were unconstitutional (II, 1075, 1126), but it is not
    the policy of the House to pass upon the validity of State election laws
    alleged to be in conflict with the State constitution (VI, 151).

    Sec. 50. Effect of interpretation of State
    election laws by State courts.

      The courts of  a State do not have a direct role in
    judging the elections, qualifications, and returns of Representatives in
    Congress (II, 959), but where the highest State court has interpreted
    the State law the House has concluded that it should generally be
    governed by this interpretation (I, 645, 731; II, 1041, 1048), but does
    not consider itself bound by such interpretations (VI, 58), especially
    by a decision on an analogous but not the identical question in issue
    (II, 909); and where the alleged fraud of election judges was in issue,
    the acquittal of those judges in the courts was held not to be an
    adjudication binding on the House (II, 1019). For an illustration of a
    protracted election dispute lasting four months see House Report 99-58,
    culminating in House Resolution 146 of the 99th Congress (May 1, 1985,
    p. 9998).

    Sec. 51. Laws of Congress not binding on the
    House in its function of judging its elections.

      The statutes of  the United States
    provide specific methods for institution of a contest as to the title to
    a seat in the House (I, 678, 697-706) (2 U.S.C. 381-396), which the
    House regards as not of absolute binding force, but rather a prudent
    rule not to be departed from except for cause (I, 597, 719, 825, 833).
    It sometimes by resolution modifies the procedure prescribed by the law
    (I, 449, 600).

    Sec. 51a. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: In re Loney, 134 U.S. 317 (1890); Reed v.
    County Commissioners, 277 U.S. 376 (1928); Barry v. United States ex
    rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15
    (1972).

    [[Page 23]]

    Sec. 52. The quorum.

      * * * and a  Majority of each [House]
    shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may
    adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance
    of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each
    House may provide.

    Sec. 53. Interpretation of the Constitution
    as to number constituting a quorum.

      Out of conditions  arising between 1861 and 1891 the
    rule was established that a majority of the Members chosen and living
    constituted the quorum required by the Constitution (IV, 2885-2888); but
    later examination has resulted in a decision confirming in the House of
    Representatives the construction established in the Senate that a quorum
    consists of a majority of Senators duly chosen and sworn (I, 630; IV,
    2891-2894). So the decision of the House now is that after the House is
    once organized the quorum consists of a majority of those Members
    chosen, sworn, and living whose membership has not been terminated by
    resignation or by the action of the House (IV, 2889, 2890; VI, 638).
    Under clause 5(d) of rule XX, when a vacancy occurs or when a new Member
    is sworn, the Speaker announces the resulting adjustment in the whole
    number of the House (see Sec. 1024b, infra). Under clause 5(c) of rule
    XX, the House may establish a provisional number of the House where, due
    to catastrophic circumstances, a quorum fails to appear (sec. 2(h), H.
    Res. 5, Jan. 4, 2005, p. 43; see Sec. 1024a, infra).

    [[Page 24]]

    and nays (IV, 2918-2926). For a discussion of the Ballin decision and
    the Chair's count to determine a quorum, see House Practice, ch. 43,
    Sec. 5.

    Sec. 54. The theory of the quorum present; and
    the count by the Speaker.

      For many years  a quorum was determined only by noting the
    number of Members voting (IV, 2896, 2897), with the result that Members
    by refusing to vote could often break a quorum and obstruct the public
    business (II, 1034; IV, 2895, footnote; V, 5744). However, in 1890
    Speaker Reed directed the Clerk to enter on the Journal as part of the
    record of a yea-and-nay vote names of Members present but not voting,
    thereby establishing a quorum of record (IV, 2895). This decision, which
    was upheld by the Supreme Court (IV, 2904; United States v. Ballin, 144
    U.S. 1 (1892)), established the principle that a quorum present made
    valid any action by the House, although an actual quorum might not vote
    (I, 216, footnote; IV, 2932). Thenceforth the point of order as to a
    quorum was required to be that no quorum was present and not that no
    quorum had voted (IV, 2917). At the time of the establishment of this
    principle the Speaker revived the count by the Chair as a method of
    determining the presence of a quorum at a time when no record vote was
    ordered (IV, 2909). The Speaker has permitted his count of a quorum to
    be verified by tellers (IV, 2888), but has not conceded it as a right of
    the House to have tellers under the circumstances (IV, 2916; VI, 647-
    651; VIII, 2369, 2436), claiming that the Chair might determine the
    presence of a quorum in such manner as he should deem accurate and
    suitable (IV, 2932). The Chair counts all Members in sight, whether in
    the cloak rooms, or within the bar (IV, 2970; VIII, 3120). Later, as the
    complement to the new view of the quorum, the early theory that the
    presence of a quorum was as necessary during debate or other business as
    on a vote was revived (IV, 2935-2949). Also, a line of rulings made
    under the old theory was overruled; and it was established that the
    point of no quorum might be made after the House had declined to verify
    a division by tellers or the yeas

    Sec. 55. Relations of the quorum to acts of the
    House.

      The absence of  a quorum having been disclosed, there must be a quorum of
    record before the House may proceed to business (IV, 2952, 2953; VI,
    624, 660, 662), and the point of no quorum may not be withdrawn even by
    unanimous consent after the absence of a quorum has been ascertained and
    announced by the Chair (IV, 2928-2931; VI, 657; Apr. 13, 1978, p. 10119;
    Sept. 25, 1984, p. 26778). But when an action has been completed, it is
    too late to make the point of order that a quorum was not present when
    it was done (IV, 2927; VI, 655). But where action requiring a quorum was
    taken in the ascertained absence of a quorum by ruling of a Speaker pro
    tempore, the Speaker on the next day ruled that the action was null and
    void (IV, 2964; see also VIII, 3161). But such absence of a quorum
    should appear from the Journal if a legislative act is to be vacated for
    such reason (IV, 2962), and where the assumption that a quorum was
    present when the House acted was uncontradicted by the Journal, it was
    held that this assumption might not be overthrown by expressions of
    opinion by Members individually (IV, 2961).

      Major revisions in the House rules concerning the necessity and
    establishment of a quorum occurred in the 94th, 95th, and 96th
    Congresses. Under the practice in the 93d Congress, for example, a point
    of no quorum would prevent the report of the chair of a Committee of the
    Whole (VI, 666); but in the 93d Congress clause 7 of rule XX (formerly
    clause 6 of rule XV) was adopted to provide that after the presence of a
    quorum is once ascertained on any day, a point of no quorum could not be
    entertained after the Committee had risen and pending the report of the
    chair to the House. Clause 7 of rule XX now specifically precludes a
    point of no quorum unless a question has been put to a vote. However,
    the Speaker retains the right to recognize a Member to move a call of
    the House at any time (but may, under clause 7(c) of rule XX, recognize
    for a call of the House after the previous question has been ordered
    only when the Speaker determines by actual count that a quorum is not
    present). A point of order of no quorum during debate only in the House
    does not lie independently under this clause of the Constitution because
    clause 7 of rule XX (formerly clause 6 of rule XV) is a proper exercise
    of the House's constitutional rulemaking authority that can be
    interpreted consistently with the requirement that a quorum be present
    to conduct business (as opposed to mere debate) (Sept. 8, 1977, pp.
    28123, 28124; Sept. 12, 1977, p. 28800).

    [[Page 25]]

    House. The practice in the Committee of the Whole is now governed by
    clause 6 of rule XVIII. No motion is in order on the failure of a quorum
    but the motions to adjourn and for a call of the House (IV, 2950; VI,
    680) and the motion to adjourn has precedence over the motion for a call
    of the House (VIII, 2642). A call of the House is in order under the
    Constitution before the adoption of the rules (IV, 2981). Those present
    on a call of the House may prescribe a fine as a condition on which an
    arrested Member may be discharged (IV, 3013, 3014), but this is rarely
    done. A quorum is not required on motions incidental to a call of the
    House (IV, 2994; VI, 681; Oct. 8, 1940, p. 13403; Oct. 8, 1968, p.
    30090). Adjournment sine die is in order notwithstanding the absence of
    a quorum if both Houses have already adopted a concurrent resolution
    providing for an adjournment sine die on that day (Oct. 18, 1972, p.
    37200).
      Before these changes to rule XX (formerly rule XV), a quorum was
    required at all times during the reading of the Journal (IV, 2732, 2733;
    VI, 625, 629) or messages from the President or the Senate (IV, 3522);
    but the modern practice would require the presence of a quorum only when
    the question is put on a pending motion or proposition in the House such
    as on a motion incident to the reading, amendment, or approval of the
    Journal or on the referral or other disposition of other papers read to
    the

    Sec. 56. Relations of the quorum to organization
    of the House.

      At the time  of organization the two Houses inform one another of the
    appearance of the quorum in each, and the two Houses jointly inform the
    President (I, 198-203). A message from one House that its quorum has
    appeared is not delivered in the other until a quorum has appeared there
    also (I, 126). But at the beginning of a second session of a Congress
    the House proceeded to business, although a quorum had not appeared in
    the Senate (I, 126). At the beginning of a second session of a Congress
    unsworn Members-elect were taken into account in ascertaining the
    presence of a quorum (I, 175); however, at the beginning of the second
    session of the 87th Congress, the Clerk called the House to order,
    announced the death of Speaker Rayburn during the adjournment sine die,
    and did not call unsworn Members-elect or Members who had resigned
    during the hiatus to establish a quorum or elect a new Speaker (Jan. 10,
    1962, p. 5). In both Houses the oath has been administered to Members-
    elect in the absence of a quorum (I, 174, 181, 182; VI, 22), although in
    one case the Speaker objected to such proceedings (II, 875). Prayer by
    the Chaplain is not business requiring the presence of a quorum and the
    Speaker declines to entertain a point of no quorum before prayer is
    offered (VI, 663; clause 7 of rule XX).

    Sec. 57. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 190 (1880);
    United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Burton v. United States, 202
    U.S. 344 (1906).

    Sec. 58. The House determines its rules.

        \2\Each House may
    determine the Rules of its Proceedings, * * *

    [[Page 26]]

    however, incorporate by reference as a part thereof all applicable
    provisions of law that constituted the Rules of the House at the end of
    the preceding Congress (e.g., H. Res. 5, 95th Cong., Jan. 4, 1977, p.
    53) and has also incorporated provisions of concurrent resolutions that
    were intended to remain applicable under the Budget Act (e.g., H. Res.
    5, 107th Cong., Jan. 3, 2001, p. 25). Ordinary rights and functions of
    the House under the Constitution are exercised in accordance with the
    rules (III, 2567), and under later decisions questions of so-called
    constitutional privilege should also be considered in accordance with
    the rules (VI, 48; VII, 889; Apr. 8, 1926, p. 7147). But a law passed by
    an existing Congress with the concurrence of the House has been
    recognized by that House as of binding force in matters of procedure (V,
    6767, 6768). In exercising its constitutional power to change its rules
    the House may confine itself within certain limitations (V, 6756; VIII,
    3376); but the attempt of the House to deprive the Speaker of a vote as
    a Member by a rule was successfully resisted (V, 5966, 5967). Although
    the Act of June 1, 1789 (see 2 U.S.C. 25) requires the election of a
    Clerk before the House proceeds to business, the House has held that it
    may adopt rules before electing a Clerk (I, 245). Although the Speaker
    ceases to be an officer of the House with the expiration of a Congress,
    the Clerk, by old usage, continues in a new Congress (I, 187, 188, 235,
    244; see 2 U.S.C. 26). The House has adopted a rule before election of a
    Speaker (I, 94, 95); but in 1839 was deterred by the Act of June 1, 1789
    and the Constitution from adopting rules before the administration of
    the oath to Members-elect (I, 140). The earlier theory that an officer
    might be empowered to administer oaths by a rule of either House has
    been abandoned in later practice and the authority has been conferred by
    law (III, 1823, 1824, 2079, 2303, 2479; 2 U.S.C. 191).

    Sec. 59. Power to make rules not impaired by
    rules or law.

      The power of  each House of Representatives to make its own rules may
    not be impaired or controlled by the rules of a preceding House (I, 187,
    210; V, 6002, 6743-6747), or by a law passed by a prior Congress (I, 82,
    245; IV, 3298, 3579; V, 6765, 6766). The House in adopting its rules
    may,

    Sec. 60. Procedure in the House before the
    adoption of rules.

      Before the adoption  of rules the House is governed by general
    parliamentary law, but Speakers have been inclined to give weight to the
    rules and precedents of the House in modifying the usual constructions
    of that law (V, 5604, 6758-6760; VIII, 3384; Jan. 3, 1953, p. 24; Jan.
    10, 1967, p. 14). The general parliamentary law as understood in the
    House is founded on Jefferson's Manual as modified by the practice of
    American legislative assemblies, especially of the House of
    Representatives (V, 6761-6763; Jan. 3, 1953, p. 24), but the provisions
    of the House's accustomed rules are not necessarily followed (V, 5509).
    Before the adoption of rules, the statutory enactments incorporated into
    the rules of the prior Congress as an exercise of the rulemaking power
    do not control the proceedings of the new House until it adopts rules
    incorporating those provisions (Jan. 22, 1971, p. 132).

    [[Page 27]]

    the election of a Speaker and instead provide for the election of a
    Speaker pro tempore pending the disposition of certain ethics charges
    against the nominee of the majority party (Jan. 7, 1997, p. 115). The
    Speaker may recognize the Majority Leader to offer an initial resolution
    providing for the adoption of the rules as a question of privilege in
    its own right (IV, 3060; Deschler, ch. 1, Sec. 8), even before
    recognizing another Member to offer as a question of privilege another
    resolution calling into question the constitutionality of that
    resolution (Speaker Foley, Jan. 5, 1993, p. 49). The Speaker also may
    recognize a Member to offer for immediate consideration a special order
    providing for the consideration of a resolution adopting the rules
    (Speaker Gingrich, H. Res. 5, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 447; H. Res. 5, Jan. 4,
    2007, p. 7). The resolution adopting rules for a Congress has included a
    special order of business for consideration of specified legislation
    (sec. 108, H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 463; sec. 3, H. Res. 5, Jan. 6,
    1999, p. 76; secs. 506-510, H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 2007, p. 30; sec. 5, H.
    Res. 5, Jan. 6, 2009, p. 10; sec. 5(b), H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 2017, p. _).
    The Speaker held as not cognizable a point of order that a resolution
    adopting the Rules of the House contained a provision that the House had
    no constitutional authority to adopt, stating that the House decides
    such issues by way of the question of consideration or disposition of
    the resolution (Speaker Hastert, Jan. 4, 2005, pp. 44-46).
      Before the adoption of rules, it is in order for any Member who is
    recognized by the Chair to offer a proposition relating to the order of
    business without asking consent of the House (IV, 3060). Relying on the
    Act of June 1, 1789 (2 U.S.C. 25), the Clerk recognized for nominations
    for Speaker as being of higher constitutional privilege than a
    resolution to postpone

      During debate on the resolution adopting rules, any Member may make a
    point of order that a quorum is not present based upon general
    parliamentary precedents, because the provisions of clause 7 of rule XX
    (formerly clause 6(e) of rule XV) prohibiting the Chair from
    entertaining such a point of order unless the question has been put on
    the pending proposition are not yet applicable (Jan. 15, 1979, p. 10).
    Before adoption of rules, under general parliamentary law as modified by
    usage and practice of the House, an amendment may be subject to the
    point of order that it is not germane to the proposition to which
    offered (Jan. 3, 1969, p. 23). Before adoption of rules, the Speaker may
    maintain decorum by directing a Member who has not been recognized in
    debate beyond an allotted time to be removed from the well and by
    directing the Sergeant-at-Arms to present the mace as the traditional
    symbol of order (Jan. 3, 1991, p. 58).

    [[Page 28]]

    lay on the table (e.g., Jan. 5, 1993, p. 52; Jan. 5, 2011, p. 83; Jan.
    3, 2013, p. _).
      The motion to commit is permitted after the previous question has been
    ordered on the resolution adopting the rules (V, 5604; Jan. 3, 1989, p.
    81; Jan. 3, 1991, p. 61) but is not debatable (Jan. 7, 1997, p. 139). It
    is the prerogative of the minority to offer a motion to commit even
    before the adoption of the rules, but at that point the proponent need
    not qualify as opposed to the resolution (Jan. 3, 1991, p. 61; Jan. 4,
    1995, p. 457). Such a motion to commit is not divisible, but if it is
    agreed to and more than one amendment is reported back pursuant thereto,
    then separate votes may be had on the reported amendments (Jan. 5, 1993,
    p. 98). The motion to refer has also been permitted upon the offering of
    a resolution adopting the rules, and before debate thereon, subject to
    the motion to

    Sec. 61. Joint rules.

      The two Houses  of Congress adopted in
    the early years of the Government joint rules to govern their procedure
    in matters requiring concurrent action; but in 1876 these joint rules
    were abrogated (IV, 3430; V, 6782-6787). The most useful of their
    provision continued to be observed in practice, however (IV, 3430; V,
    6592).

    Sec. 61a. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6 (1932);
    Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949); United States v.
    Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950); Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109
    (1963); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).

    Sec. 62. Punishment and expulsion of
    Members.

      * * * [Each House may]  punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the
    Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.

    Sec. 63. Punishment and expulsion,
    generally.

      Among the  punishments that the House may impose under this provision,
    the rules of the Committee on Ethics outline the following: (1)
    expulsion from the House; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; (4) fine; (5)
    denial or limitation of any right, power, privilege, or immunity of the
    Member if under the Constitution the House of Representatives may impose
    such denial or limitation; or (6) any other sanction determined by the
    Committee to be appropriate (rule 24, Committee on Ethics, 115th Cong.).
    Under rule 10 of the rules of that committee, a statement of alleged
    violation must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.

    [[Page 29]]

    the entire hour) yields a portion of the time to the accused (Oct. 2,
    1980, p. 28966; July 24, 2002, p. 14309; Dec. 2, 2010, p. 18721).
      In action for censure or expulsion, the House has discussed whether or
    not the principles of the procedure of the courts should be followed
    (II, 1255, 1264). The House, in a proceeding for expulsion, declined to
    give the Member a trial at the bar (II, 1275); but the Senate has
    permitted a counsel to appear at its bar (II, 1263), although it
    declined to grant a request for a specific statement of charges or
    compulsory process for witnesses (II, 1264). In one instance, pending
    consideration of a resolution to censure a Member, the Speaker informed
    him that he should retire (II, 1366), but this is not usual. Members or
    Senators, against whom resolutions have been pending, have participated
    in debate either by consent to make a personal explanation (II, 1656) or
    without question as to consent (II, 1246, 1253, 1269, 1286). A Member
    against whom a resolution of censure was pending was asked by the
    Speaker if he desired to be heard (VI, 236). However, after the House
    had voted to censure and the Member had been brought to the bar by the
    Sergeant-at-Arms to be censured, it was held that he might not then be
    heard (II, 1259). In the modern practice, the manager of the resolution
    proposing the punishment (who controls

      A resolution recommending reprimand, censure, or expulsion of a Member
    presents a question of privilege (II, 1254; III, 2648-2651; VI, 236;
    Dec. 9, 1913, pp. 584-86; July 26, 1990, p. 19717; May 22, 2007, p.
    13525; Oct. 23, 2007, p. 27966; July 31, 2008, pp. 17463, 17464), as
    does one disapproving of the behavior of a Member inside (Sept. 15,
    2009, p. 21662; Mar. 18, 2010, pp. 3847, 3848) or outside (Dec. 20,
    2011, p. 21435) the Chamber. If reported by the Committee on Ethics (or
    a derivation thereof), the resolution may be called up at any time after
    the committee has filed its report (Jan. 21, 1997, p. 393; Dec. 2, 2010,
    p. 18721). A proposition to censure is not germane to a proposition to
    expel (VI, 236).

      The Senate once expelled several Senators by a single resolution (II,
    1266); however, the House has refused to censure more than one Member by
    a single resolution (II, 1240, 1621).

    [[Page 30]]

    cial purposes and compelling staff to perform campaign work, and imposed
    a fine (Aug. 2, 2012, p. _).

    Sec. 64. Punishment by reprimand.

      In  the 94th Congress the
    House by adopting a report from the Committee on Standards of Official
    Conduct (now Ethics) reprimanded a Member for failing to report certain
    financial holdings in violation of rule XXVI (formerly rule XLIV) and
    for investing in stock in a Navy bank the establishment of which he was
    promoting, in violation of the Code of Ethics for Government Service (H.
    Res. 1421, July 29, 1976, pp. 24379-82). (For the Code of Ethics for
    Government Service, see H. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 72 Stat. B12.) In
    the 95th Congress following an investigation by the Committee on
    Standards of Official Conduct (now Ethics) into whether Members or
    employees had improperly accepted things of value from the Republic of
    Korea or representatives thereof, the House reprimanded three Members,
    one for falsely answering an unsworn questionnaire relative to such
    gifts and violating the Code of Official Conduct, one for failing to
    report as required by law the receipt of a campaign contribution and
    violating the Code of Official Conduct, and one for failing to report a
    campaign contribution, converting a campaign contribution to personal
    use, testifying falsely to the committee under oath, and violating the
    Code of Official Conduct (Oct. 13, 1978, pp. 36984, 37009, 37017). In
    the 100th Congress the House adopted a resolution reprimanding a Member
    for ``ghost voting,'' improperly diverting government resources, and
    maintaining a ``ghost employee'' on his staff (Dec. 18, 1987, p. 36266).
    In the 101st Congress another was reprimanded for seeking dismissal of
    parking tickets received by a person with whom he had a personal
    relationship and not related to official business and for misstatements
    of fact in a memorandum relating to the criminal probation record of
    that person (July 26, 1990, p. 19717). In the 105th Congress the House
    reprimanded the Speaker and ordered him to reimburse a portion of the
    costs of the investigation by the Committee on Standards of Official
    Conduct (now Ethics) (Jan. 21, 1997, p. 393). In the 112th Congress the
    House by adopting a report from the Committee on Ethics reprimanded a
    Member for using official resources of the House for unoffi

    Sec. 65. Punishment by censure.

      Censure  is inflicted by the
    Speaker (II, 1259) and the words are entered in the Journal (II, 1251,
    1656; VI 236), but the Speaker may not pronounce censure except by order
    of the House (VI, 237). When Members have resigned pending proceedings
    for censure, the House has nevertheless adopted the resolutions of
    censure (II, 1239, 1273, 1275, 1656). Members have been censured for
    personalities and other disorder in debate (II, 1251, 1253, 1254, 1259),
    assaults on the floor (II, 1665), for presenting a resolution alleged to
    be insulting to the House (II, 1246), and for corrupt acts (II, 1274,
    1286). For abuse of the leave to print, the House censured a Member
    after a motion to expel him had failed (VI, 236). In one instance
    Members were censured for acts before the election of the then existing
    House (II, 1286). In the 96th Congress two Members were censured by the
    House as follows: (1) A Member who during a prior Congress both
    knowingly increased an office employee's salary for repayment of that
    Member's personal expenses and who was unjustly enriched by clerk-hire
    employees' payments of personal expenses later compensated by salary
    increases, was censured and ordered to repay the amount of the unjust
    enrichment with interest (July 31, 1979, p. 21592); (2) a Member was
    censured for receiving over a period of time sums of money from a person
    with a direct interest in legislation in violation of clause 3 of rule
    XXIII (formerly clause 4 of rule XLIII), and for transferring campaign
    funds into office and personal accounts (June 10, 1980, pp. 13801-20)).
    In the 98th Congress the House adopted two resolutions (as amended in
    the House), each censuring a Member for an improper relationship with a
    House Page in a prior Congress (July 20, 1983, p. 20020 and p. 20030).
    In the 111th Congress, after the House defeated an amendment to instead
    punish by reprimand, a Member was censured for using official resources
    to solicit funds for an educational center, failing to file complete
    financial disclosure forms, accepting the benefits of a rent-stabilized
    residence in a manner creating an appearance of impropriety, and failing
    to pay taxes on certain property, and was ordered to pay restitution for
    such unpaid taxes (Dec. 2, 2010, pp. 18729-30).

    [[Page 31]]

    employee to destroy evidence and to provide false testimony to a Federal
    grand jury; (4) receiving personal labor and the services of his
    congressional employees while they were being paid by the taxpayers to
    perform public service; and (5) filing false income tax returns (July
    24, 2002, p. 14319). Three Senators were expelled for their association
    with the Confederates during the Civil War (II, 1268-1270).

    Sec. 66. Punishment by expulsion.

      Five  Members have been
    expelled in the history of the House. Among those, three were expelled
    for various offenses related to their service for the Confederacy in the
    Civil War: John B. Clark of Missouri (a Member-elect) (II, 1262, July
    13, 1861); Henry C. Burnett of Kentucky (II, 1261, Dec. 3, 1861); and
    John W. Reid of Missouri (II, 1261, Dec. 6, 1861). Michael J. Myers of
    Pennsylvania was expelled after being convicted in a Federal court of
    bribery and conspiracy for accepting funds to perform official duties
    (Oct. 2, 1980, p. 28978). James A. Traficant of Ohio was expelled after
    being convicted in a Federal court for crimes including (1) trading
    official acts and influence for things of value; (2) demanding and
    accepting salary kickbacks from his congressional employees; (3)
    influencing a congressional

      The power of expulsion has been the subject of much discussion (I,
    469, 476, 481; II, 1264, 1265, 1269; VI, 56, 398; see Powell v.
    McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)). In one case a Member-elect who had not
    taken the oath was expelled (II, 1262), and in another case the power to
    do this was discussed (I, 476). In one instance the Senate assumed to
    annul its action of expulsion (II, 1243). The Supreme Court has decided
    that a judgment of conviction under a disqualifying statute does not
    compel the Senate to expel (II, 1282; Burton v. United States, 202 U.S.
    344 (1906)). The power of expulsion in its relation to offenses
    committed before the Members' election has been discussed (II, 1264,
    1284, 1285, 1286, 1288, 1289; VI, 56, 238). In one case the Committee on
    the Judiciary of the House concluded that a Member might not be punished
    for an offense alleged to have been committed against a preceding
    Congress (II, 1283); but the House itself declined to express doubt as
    to its power to expel and proceeded to inflict censure (II, 1286). In
    addition, the 96th Congress punished Members on two occasions for
    offenses committed during a prior Congress (H. Res. 378, July 31, 1979,
    p. 21592; H. Res. 660, June 10, 1980, pp. 13801-20). It has been held
    that the power of the House to expel one of its Members is unlimited; a
    matter purely of discretion to be exercised by a two-thirds vote, from
    which there is no appeal (VI, 78). The resignation of the accused Member
    has always caused a suspension of proceedings for expulsion (II, 1275,
    1276, 1279; VI, 238). Following the expulsion of a Member, the Clerk
    notifies the Governor of the relevant state of the action of the House
    (July 24, 2002, p. 14319).

    Sec. 67. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204
    (1821); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881); United States v.
    Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897); Burton v.
    United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
    (1969).

    [[Page 32]]

    Sec. 68. Each House to keep a journal.

      \3\Each House  shall
    keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the
    same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; * *
    *

    Sec. 69. The Journal the official
    record.

      The Journal and  not the Congressional Record is the official record of the
    proceedings of the House (IV, 2727). Its nature and functions have been
    the subject of extended discussions (IV, 2730, footnote). The House has
    fixed its title (IV, 2728). Although it ought to be a correct transcript
    of proceedings, the House has not insisted on a strict chronological
    order of entries (IV, 2815). The Journal is dated as of the legislative
    and not the calendar day (IV, 2746).

    Sec. 70. Journal a record of proceedings
    and not of reasons.

      The Journal records  proceedings but not the reasons therefor (IV,
    2811) or the circumstances attending (IV, 2812), or the statements or
    opinions of Members (IV, 2817-2820). Exceptions to this rule are rare
    (IV, 2808, 2825). Protests have on rare occasions been admitted by the
    action of the House (IV, 2806, 2807), but the entry of a protest on the
    Journal may not be demanded by a Member as a matter of right (IV, 2798)
    and such demand does not present a question of privilege (IV, 2799). A
    motion not entertained is not entered on the Journal (IV, 2813, 2844-
    2846).

    Sec. 71. House's absolute control of entries in the
    Journal.

      The House  controls the Journal and may decide what are proceedings,
    even to the extent of omitting things actually done or recording things
    not done (IV, 2784; VI, 634). Although the Speaker has entertained
    motions to amend the Journal so as to cause it to state what was not the
    fact, leaving it for the House to decide on the propriety of such act
    (IV, 2785), and holding that he could not prevent a majority of the
    House from so amending the Journal as to undo an actual transaction (IV,
    3091-3093), in none of those rulings was an amendment permitted to
    correct the Journal that had the effect of collaterally changing the
    tabling of a motion to reconsider. In fact, under the precedents cited
    in Sec. 902, infra, under clause 1 of rule XVI it has been held not in
    order to amend or strike a Journal entry setting forth a motion exactly
    as made (IV, 2783, 2789), and thus it was held not in order to amend the
    Journal by striking a resolution actually offered (IV, 2789), but on one
    occasion the House vacated the Speaker's referral of an executive
    communication by amending the Journal of the preceding day (Mar. 19,
    1990, p. 4488). Only on rare occasions has the House nullified
    proceedings by rescinding the records of them in the Journal (IV, 2787),
    the House and Senate usually insisting on the accuracy of its Journal
    (IV, 2783, 2786). In rare instances the House and Senate have rescinded
    or expunged entries in Journals of preceding Congresses (IV, 2730,
    footnote, 2792, 2793).

    [[Page 33]]

    Sec. 72. Record of votes in the
    Journal.

      The Journal should  record the result of every vote and state in general terms
    the subject of it (IV, 2804); but the result of a vote is recorded in
    figures only when the yeas and nays are taken (IV, 2827), when the vote
    is recorded by electronic device or by clerks, or when a vote is taken
    by ballot, it having been determined in latest practice that the Journal
    should show not only the result but the state of the ballot or ballots
    (IV, 2832).

    Sec. 73. Approval of the Journal.

      It is the  uniform practice
    of the House to approve its Journal for each legislative day (IV, 2731).
    If Journals of more than one session remain unapproved, they are taken
    up for approval in chronological order (IV, 2771-2773; Nov. 3, 1987, p.
    30592).

      The former rule required the reading of the Journal on each
    legislative day. The reading could be dispensed with only by unanimous
    consent (VI, 625) or suspension of the rules (IV, 2747-2750) and had to
    be in full when demanded by any Member (IV, 2739-2741; VI, 627-628; Feb.
    22, 1950, p. 2152).

      The present form of the rule (clause 1 of rule I; see Sec. 621, infra)
    was drafted from section 127 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
    1970 (84 Stat. 1140), incorporated into the standing rules in the 92d
    Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 22, 1971, p. 144), and was further amended in
    the 96th Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 15, 1979, pp. 7-16). Under the
    current practice, the Speaker is authorized to announce approval of the
    Journal, which is deemed agreed to by the House, subject to the right of
    any Member to demand a vote on agreeing to the Speaker's approval
    (which, if decided in the affirmative, is not subject to the motion to
    reconsider). In the 98th Congress, the Speaker was given the authority
    to postpone a record vote on agreeing to the approval of the Journal to
    a later time on that legislative day (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1983, p. 34).
    Although the transaction of any business is not in order before approval
    of the Journal (IV, 2751; VI, 629, 637; Oct. 8, 1968, p. 30096),
    approval of the Journal yields to the simple motion to adjourn (IV,
    2757), administration of the oath (I, 171, 172), an arraignment of
    impeachment (VI, 469), and questions of the privileges of the House (II,
    1630), and the Speaker has discretion to recognize for a parliamentary
    inquiry before approval of the Journal (VI, 624). Under clause 1 of rule
    I, as amended in the 96th Congress, a point of order of no quorum is not
    in order before the Speaker announces approval of the Journal. Clause 7
    of rule XX generally prohibits the making of points of order of no
    quorum unless the Speaker has put the question on the pending matter.

    [[Page 34]]

    further discussion of the composition and approval of the Journal, see
    Deschler, ch. 5.

    Sec. 74. Motions to amend the
    Journal.

      Under the practice  before clause 1 of rule I was adopted in its present form,
    the motion to amend the Journal took precedence over the motion to
    approve it (IV, 2760; VI, 633); but the motion to amend may not be
    admitted after the previous question is demanded on a motion to approve
    (IV, 2770; VI, 633; VIII, 2684). An expression of opinion as to a
    decision of the Chair was held not in order as an amendment to the
    Journal (IV, 2848). A proposed amendment to the Journal being tabled
    does not carry the Journal with it (V, 5435, 5436). Although a proposed
    correction of the Journal may be recorded in the Journal, it is not in
    order to insert in full in this indirect way what has been denied
    insertion in the first instance (IV, 2782, 2804, 2805). The earlier
    practice was otherwise, however (IV, 2801-2803). The Journal of the last
    day of a session is not approved on the assembling of the next session,
    and is not ordinarily amended (IV, 2743, 2744). For

    Sec. 74a. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United
    States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892).

    Sec. 75. Yeas and Nays entered on the
    Journal.

      * * * and the  Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question
    shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the
    Journal.

    Sec. 76. Conditions of ordering yeas and
    nays.

      The yeas and  nays may be ordered before the organization of the House (I, 91;
    V, 6012, 6013), but are not taken in the Committee of the Whole (IV,
    4722, 4723). They are not necessarily taken on the passage of a
    resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution (V, 7038, 7039;
    VIII, 3506), but are required to pass a bill over a veto (Sec. 104; VII,
    1110). In the earlier practice of the House it was held that less than a
    quorum might not order the yeas and nays, but for many years the
    decisions have been uniformly the other way (V, 6016-6028). Neither is a
    quorum necessary on a motion to reconsider the vote whereby the yeas and
    nays are ordered (V, 5693). When a quorum fails on a yea and nay vote it
    is the duty of the Speaker and the House to take notice of that fact
    (IV, 2953, 2963, 2988). If the House adjourns, the order for the yeas
    and nays remains effective whenever the bill again comes before the
    House (V, 6014, 6015; VI, 740; VIII, 3108), and it has been held that
    the question of consideration might not intervene on a succeeding day
    before the second calling of the yeas and nays (V, 4949). However, when
    the call of the House is automatic, the Speaker directs the roll to be
    called or the vote to be taken by electronic device without motion from
    the floor (VI, 678, 679, 694, 695); and should a quorum fail to vote and
    the House adjourn, proceedings under the automatic call are vacated and
    the question recurs de novo when the bill again comes before the House
    (Oct. 10, 1940, pp. 13534, 13535; Oct. 13, 1962, p. 23474; Oct. 19,
    1966, p. 27641). Although the Constitution and the Rules of the House
    guarantee that votes taken by the yeas and nays be spread upon the
    Journal, neither requires that a Member's vote be announced to the
    public immediately during the vote (Sept. 19, 1985, p. 24245).

      The yeas and nays may not be demanded until the Speaker has put the
    question in the form prescribed by clause 6 of rule I (formerly clause
    5) (Oct. 2, 1974, p. 33623).

    [[Page 35]]

    business (V, 6040, 6041; VIII, 3110) and if the Member seeking the yeas
    and nays is actively seeking recognition for that purpose when the Chair
    announces the result of the voice vote (Nov. 22, 1991, p. 34075; Sept.
    21, 2005, p. 20856). But after the Speaker has announced the result of a
    division on a motion and is in the act of putting the question on
    another motion it is too late to demand the yeas and nays on the first
    motion (V, 6042). And it is not in order during the various processes of
    a division to repeat a demand for the yeas and nays that has once been
    refused by the House (V, 6029, 6030, 6031). The constitutional right of
    a Member to demand the yeas and nays may not be overruled as dilatory
    (V, 5737; VIII, 3107); but this constitutional right does not exist as
    to a vote to second a motion when such second is required by the rules
    (V, 6032-6036; VIII, 3109). The right to demand yeas and nays is not
    waived by the fact that the Member demanding them has just made the
    point of no quorum and caused the Chair to count the House (V, 6044).-

    Sec. 77. Demanding the yeas and nays.

      The yeas and  nays may
    be demanded while the Speaker is announcing the result of a division (V,
    6039), while a vote by tellers is being taken (V, 6038), and even after
    the announcement of the vote if the House has not passed to other

    Sec. 78. Yeas and nays ordered by onefifth.

      In passing on  a
    demand for the yeas and nays the Speaker need determine only whether
    one-fifth of those present sustain the demand (V, 6043; VIII, 3112,
    3115). In ascertaining whether one-fifth of those present support a
    demand for the yeas and nays the Speaker counts the entire number
    present and not merely those who wish to be counted (VIII, 3111, 3120).
    Such count is not subject to verification by appeal (Sept. 12, 1978, p.
    28984; Mar. 8, 2006, p. 2954; Aug. 3, 2007, p. 22745; Mar. 18, 2010, p.
    3842), a request for a count of those opposed to the demand is not in
    order (VIII, 3112-3114), and the Speaker may refuse to entertain a
    parliamentary inquiry regarding the number of Members counted by the
    Chair (Aug. 3, 2007, p. 22745). If the Chair prolongs the count of the
    House in determining whether one-fifth have supported the demand for
    yeas and nays, the Speaker counts latecomers in support of the demand as
    well as for the number present (Sept. 24, 1990, p. 25521). After the
    House, on a vote by tellers, has refused to order the yeas and nays it
    is too late to demand the count of the negative on an original vote (V,
    6045).

    [[Page 36]]

    Sec. 79. Reconsideration of the vote ordering the
    yeas and nays.

      A motion to  reconsider the vote ordering the yeas and nays is in
    order (V, 6029; VIII, 2790), and the vote may be reconsidered by a
    majority. If the House votes to reconsider the yeas and nays may again
    be ordered by one-fifth (V, 5689-5691). But when the House, having
    reconsidered, again orders the yeas and nays, a second motion to
    reconsider may not be made (V, 6037). In one instance it was held that
    the yeas and nays might be demanded on a motion to reconsider the vote
    whereby the yeas and nays were ordered (V, 5689), but evidently there
    must be a limit to this process. The vote whereby the yeas and nays are
    refused may be reconsidered (V, 5692).

    Sec. 80. Effect of an order of the yeas and
    nays.

      A motion  to adjourn may be admitted after the yeas and nays are ordered
    and before the roll call has begun (V, 5366); and a motion to suspend
    the rules has been entertained after the yeas and nays have been
    demanded on another matter (V, 6835). Consideration of a conference
    report (V, 6457), and a motion to reconsider the vote by which the yeas
    and nays were ordered (V, 6029; VIII, 2790) may be admitted. A demand
    for tellers or for a division is not precluded or set aside by the fact
    that the yeas and nays are demanded and refused (V, 5998; VIII, 3103).

    Sec. 81. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United
    States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S.
    196 (1897); Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 U.S. 506 (1901); Marshall v.
    Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917).

    Sec. 82. Adjournment for more than three
    days or to another place.

      \4\Neither House,  during the Session of Congress shall,
    without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor
    to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

    Sec. 82a. Adjournment to another
    place.

      The word ``Place'' in  the above paragraph was construed to mean the seat of
    Government, and consent of the Senate is not required if the House
    orders its meetings to be held in another structure at the seat of
    Government (Speaker Rayburn, Aug. 17, 1949, pp. 11651, 11683). Under
    clause 12(d) of rule I, the Speaker may convene the House in a place
    within the District of Columbia, other than the Hall of the House, if,
    in the opinion of the Speaker, the public interest shall warrant it
    (Sec. 639, infra). The two Houses once granted joint leadership (or
    their designees) authority for an entire Congress to assemble the
    Congress at a place outside the District of Columbia whenever the public
    interest warranted it (H. Con. Res. 1, Feb. 13, 2003, p. 4080). The
    Speaker executed by letter his designation under that authority (Mar.
    13, 2003, p. 6123). The House, but not the Senate, re-adopted similar
    concurrent resolutions in succeeding Congresses (e.g., H. Con. Res. 1,
    Jan. 4, 2005, p. 68; H. Con. Res. 1, Jan. 4, 2007, p. 42; H. Con. Res.
    1, Jan. 6, 2009, p. 22; H. Con. Res. 1, Jan. 5, 2011, p. 103). After
    September 11, 2001, recall authority carried in adjournment resolutions
    has allowed reassembly at such place as may be designated (see Sec. 84,
    infra). The President may convene Congress at places outside the seat of
    Government during hazardous circumstances (2 U.S.C. 27; Deschler, ch. 1,
    Sec. 4).

    [[Page 37]]

    the same day (p. 13709) provided that its meetings be held in the
    Chamber formerly occupied by the Supreme Court in the Capitol. The two
    Houses continued to hold their sessions in these rooms until the opening
    of the 77th Congress. These actions were necessitated by the precarious
    condition of the roofs in the two Chambers. On June 28, 1949 (p. 8571),
    and on September 1, 1950 (p. 14140), the House provided that until
    otherwise ordered its meetings be held in the Caucus room of the new
    House Office Building, pending the remodeling of its Chamber. On June
    29, 1949 (p. 8584), and on Aug. 9, 1950 (p. 12106), the Senate provided
    that its meetings be held in the Chamber formerly occupied by the
    Supreme Court in the Capitol, pending remodeling of its Chamber. The
    House returned to its Chamber on January 3, 1950, and again on January
    1, 1951. The Senate returned to its Chamber on January 3, 1950, and
    again on January 3, 1951.
      On November 22, 1940 (p. 13715), the House adopted a resolution
    providing that thereafter until otherwise ordered its meetings be held
    in the Caucus room of the new House Office Building. Likewise the Senate
    on

      There has been no occasion for the convening of a session of Congress
    outside the seat of Government. However, the Congress has engaged in
    commemorative or ceremonial functions outside the seat of Government,
    which were authorized by concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 131, May
    28, 1987, p. 14031; H. Con. Res. 96, Apr. 18, 1989, p. 6834; H. Con.
    Res. 448, July 25, 2002, p. 14645).-

    Sec. 83. Adjournment of the House within the
    threeday limit.

      The House of  Representatives in adjourning for not more than three
    days must take into the count either the day of adjourning or the day of
    the meeting, but not Sundays (V, 6673, 6674). The House may provide for
    a session of the House on a Sunday, traditionally a ``dies non'' under
    the precedents of the House (e.g., Dec. 17, 1982, p. 31946; Nov. 17,
    1989, p. 30029; Aug. 20, 1994, p. 23367). The House has by standing
    order provided that it should meet on two days only of each week instead
    of daily (V, 6675). Before the election of Speaker, the House has
    adjourned for more than one day (I, 89, 221). The House has by unanimous
    consent agreed to an adjournment for not more than three days but
    specified that it would continue in adjournment pursuant to a concurrent
    resolution adopted by the House if it received a message of the Senate's
    adoption of the concurrent resolution before the time of the House's
    reconvening (e.g., Nov. 20, 1987, p. 33054). The Committee on Rules has
    reported a rule authorizing the Speaker to declare the House in recesses
    subject to calls of the Chair during five discrete periods, each
    consistent with the constitutional constraint that neither House adjourn
    (or recess) for more than three days without consent of the other House
    (Dec. 21, 1995, p. 38141; Jan. 5, 1996, p. 357).

    [[Page 38]]

    18998; H. Res. 66, Feb. 14, 2013, p. _) and on one occasion convened
    earlier than previously ordered (Dec. 30, 2012, p. _). The Senate has
    adopted similar authority, applicable also to the place of convening,
    which may be exercised by the Senate Majority and Minority Leaders when
    warranted by intervening circumstances (S. Res. 296, 108th Cong., Feb.
    3, 2004, p. 731). Pursuant to such authority, during an adjournment of
    the Senate for not more than three days, the Senate convened earlier
    than previously ordered to adopt a House concurrent resolution providing
    for an adjournment of the two Houses (H. Con. Res. 103, Mar. 17, 2005,
    p. 5143), section 2 of which enabled a recall of the House (Mar. 20,
    2005, p. 5446).

    Sec. 83a. Reconvening from adjournment of not
    more than three days.

      Clause 12(e) of  rule I provides certain authorities for
    reconvening or postponing the time for reconvening during any recess or
    adjournment of not more than three days when warranted by the public
    interest (see Sec. 639, infra). The House had previously provided such
    authority by standing order (H. Res. 479, 112th Cong., Dec. 6, 2011, p.

    Sec. 84. Resolutions for adjournment of
    the two Houses.

      Congress enables an  adjournment for more than three days by a concurrent
    resolution (IV, 4031, footnote). When it adjourns in this way, but not
    to or beyond the day fixed by Constitution or law for the next regular
    session to begin, the session is not thereby necessarily terminated (V,
    6676, 6677). At the close of the first session of the 66th Congress, the
    two Houses adjourned sine die under authority granted each House by
    simple resolutions consenting to such adjournment sine die at any time
    before a specified date (Nov. 19, 1919, p. 8810).

      Until the 67th Congress neither House had adjourned for more than
    three days by itself with the consent of the other, but resolutions had
    been offered for the accomplishment of that end (V, 6702, 6703). In the
    modern practice it is common for a concurrent resolution to provide for
    a one-House adjournment or to provide for each House to adjourn for
    different time periods. For example: (1) the House adjourned until
    August 15, 1922, with the consent of the Senate (June 29, 1922, p.
    10439); (2) the two Houses provided for an adjournment sine die of the
    House on August 20, 1954, and of the Senate at any time before December
    25, 1954 (H. Con. Res. 266; Aug. 20, 1954, p. 15554); (3) the two Houses
    provided for an adjournment sine die of the House on December 20 or
    December 21, 1982, pursuant to a motion made by the Majority Leader or a
    designee, and of the Senate at any time before January 3, 1983, as
    determined by the Senate, and for adjournments or recesses of the Senate
    for periods of more than three days as determined by the Senate during
    such period (H. Con. Res. 438, Dec. 20, 1982, p. 32951); (4) the two
    Houses provided for an adjournment of the Senate to a day certain and of
    the House for more than three days to a day certain, or to any day
    before that day as determined by the House (S. Con. Res. 102, May 27,
    1982, pp. 12504, 12505); (5) the two Houses provided for an adjournment
    to a day certain, with a provision that if there should be no quorum
    present on that day the session should terminate (V, 6686).

    [[Page 39]]

    1996, p. 12275; Dec. 15, 2000, p. 27019). Similarly, a concurrent
    resolution adjourning one House typically provides for recall of that
    House (see, e.g., Sept. 28, 2016, p. _).
      A concurrent resolution adjourning both Houses for more than three
    days, or sine die, normally includes authority to reassemble the Members
    whenever the public interest shall warrant it, either separately (see,
    e.g., Dec. 26, 2013, p. _) or jointly (see, e.g., July 8, 1943, p. 7516;
    July 26, 1947, p. 10521; Dec. 20, 1974, p. 41815; Nov. 21, 1989, p.
    31156; Oct. 3,

      Pursuant to such recall authority: (1) the Speaker and the Majority
    Leader of the Senate notified Members of the House to reassemble, the
    Senate already being in session (Mar. 20, 2005, p. 5446, pursuant to H.
    Con. Res. 103, Mar. 17, 2005, p. 5143; Nov. 19, 2008, p. 24146 and Dec.
    9, 2008, p. 24496, pursuant to H. Con. Res. 440, Oct. 2, 2008, p.
    23766); (2) the Speaker and the Majority Leader of the Senate notified
    Members of both Houses to reassemble (Sept. 2, 2005, p. 19424, pursuant
    to H. Con. Res. 225, July 28, 2005, p. 18356; Sept. 6, 2013, p. _,
    pursuant to S. Con. Res. 22, Aug. 2, 2013, p. _).

      Joint leadership and House-only recall provisions were included in the
    sine die adjournment resolution for the second session of the 105th
    Congress (H. Con. Res. 353, Oct. 20, 1998, p. 27348), and the Speaker
    exercised recall authority under that resolution to reassemble the House
    (Dec. 17, 1998, p. 27802). One-House recall authority, with provision to
    again adjourn for more than three days, was included in two
    complementary one-House adjournment resolutions of the 111th Congress
    (H. Con. Res. 307, H. Con. Res. 308, July 29, 2010, p. 14604) and the
    Speaker (Aug. 9, 2010, p. 15413) and Majority Leader of the Senate (Aug.
    12, 2010, p. 15504) each exercised recall authority under the respective
    adjournment resolution.

      After September 11, 2001, such recall authority has allowed reassembly
    at such place as may be designated (see, e.g., S. Con. Res. 160, Nov.
    22, 2002, p. 23512; H. Con. Res. 531, Dec. 7, 2004, p. 25708). More
    recently, such recall authority permitted recall by designees of the
    Speaker and the Majority Leader of the Senate (see, e.g., S. Con. Res.
    132, July 26, 2002, p. 15138). The Speaker executes by letter the
    designation under a concurrent resolution of adjournment (e.g., Mar. 13,
    2003, p. 6123). Such letter was expanded in the 114th Congress to
    account for the increased use of separate recall authority and for new
    designation authority in clause 12(f) of rule I (Jan. 6, 2015, p. _).
    The Speaker also executes by letter the designation of another Member to
    utilize reassembly authority under a joint resolution changing the
    convening date of the next session (H. J. Res. 80, Dec. 15, 2003, p.
    32411).

    [[Page 40]]

    Res. 976, Dec. 16, 2009, p. 32039). It has become the common practice
    for the House, by unanimous consent adopted after originating an
    adjournment resolution, to fix a time to which it would adjourn within
    three days unless the House were sooner to receive a message from the
    Senate transmitting its adoption of the adjournment resolution, in which
    case the House would stand adjourned pursuant to that resolution (see,
    e.g., Nov. 3, 2000, p. 25993; Mar. 20, 2002, p. 3726).
      A resolution adopted in the first session of the 106th Congress
    provided for an adjournment to a date certain, unless the House sooner
    received a specified message from the Senate, in which case it would
    stand adjourned sine die (H. Con. Res. 235, Nov. 18, 1999, p. 30734). A
    simple resolution adopted in the first session of the 111th Congress
    provided for a series of adjournments of not more than three days,
    unless the House sooner received: (1) a specified message from the
    Senate, (2) confirmation that the President had approved a certain bill,
    and (3) a message that the Senate had concurred in an adjournment
    resolution, in which case it would stand adjourned pursuant to such
    adjournment resolution (H.

      A concurrent resolution providing for adjournment sine die of the
    first session may contain a proviso that when the second session
    convenes the Senate or House may not conduct organizational or
    legislative business but shall adjourn on that day until a date certain,
    unless sooner recalled (H. Con. Res. 232, Dec. 20, 1979, p. 37317; H.
    Con. Res. 260, Nov. 26, 1991, p. 35840; H. Con. Res. 235, Nov. 18, 1999,
    p. 30734). The prohibition on the conduct of such business may be
    applied to the House by simple resolution and may vest the Speaker with
    the authority to dispense with such business over a period of time
    (e.g., H. Res. 619, as amended by H. Res. 640, Dec. 16, 2005, p. 29054,
    Dec. 18, 2005, p. 30378). Such a prohibition does not preclude
    recognition for one-minute speeches and special-order speeches by
    unanimous consent (Jan. 3, 1992, pp. 2, 9) or the introduction and
    numbering of bills and resolutions (which would not be noted in the
    Congressional Record or referred by the Speaker until the next
    legislative day, when executive communications, petitions, and memorials
    also would be numbered and referred) (Jan. 24, 2000, p. 48). The House
    has passed a joint resolution appointing a day for the convening of a
    second session of a Congress and provided for possible earlier assembly
    by joint-leadership recall (see, e.g., H. J. Res. 80, Dec. 20, 2001, p.
    27597; H. J. Res. 80, Nov. 21, 2003, pp. 30856, 30857).

      A concurrent resolution to provide for adjournment for more than three
    days or an adjournment sine die is offered in the House as a matter of
    privilege (V, 6701-6706), and is not debatable (VIII, 3372-3374), though
    a Member may be recognized under a reservation of objection to a
    unanimous-consent request that the resolution be agreed to (Oct. 27,
    1990, p. 36850). The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 provides for
    an adjournment sine die, or (in an odd-numbered year) an adjournment of
    slightly over a month (from that Friday in August which is at least 30
    days before Labor Day to the Wednesday following Labor Day) unless the
    nation is in a state of war, declared by Congress (sec. 461(b); 84 Stat.
    1140). Congress may, of course, waive this requirement and make other
    determinations regarding its adjournment (see Sec. 1106, infra).

    [[Page 41]]

    310 of the Congressional Budget Act to prohibit the consideration of
    concurrent resolutions providing adjournments for more than three
    calendar days during the month of July until the House has approved
    annual appropriation bills within the jurisdictions of all the
    subcommittees on Appropriations for the ensuing fiscal year, and until
    the House has completed action on all reconciliation legislation for the
    ensuing fiscal year required to be reported by the concurrent resolution
    on the budget for that year (see Sec. 1127, infra).

      The requirement that resolutions providing for an adjournment sine die
    of either House may not be considered until Congress has completed
    action on the second concurrent resolution on the budget for the fiscal
    year in question, and on any reconciliation legislation required by such
    a resolution, contained in section 310(f) of the Congressional Budget
    Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344), was repealed by the Balanced Budget and
    Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177). That law amended
    sections 309 and

    Sec. 85. Compensation of
    Members.

      Section 6. \1\The Senators  and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their
    Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the
    United States.

      The 27th amendment to the Constitution addresses laws varying the
    compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives (see
    Sec. 258, infra). The present rate of compensation of Representatives,
    the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico, Delegates, the Speaker, the
    Majority and Minority Leaders of the House, and the Vice President is
    established by law (2 U.S.C. 4501; 3 U.S.C. 104) with an additional
    amount per annum to assist in defraying expenses for the Speaker and
    Vice President (2 U.S.C. 5121; 3 U.S.C. 111). These rates of
    compensation are all (except for the expense allowances) subject to
    annual cost of living adjustments (2 U.S.C. 4501(2)). The present rate
    of compensation of Senators is that fixed by section 1101 of Public Law
    101-194, as adjusted pursuant to 2 U.S.C. 4501(2).

    Sec. 86. Salary and deductions.

      Under  the Federal Salary Act
    of 1967 (2 U.S.C. 351-362), the Citizens' Commission on Public Service
    and Compensation (formerly the Commission on Executive, Legislative and
    Judicial Salaries) is authorized and directed to conduct quadrennial
    reviews of the rates of pay of specified government officials, including
    Members of Congress, and to report to the President the results of each
    review and its recommendations for adjustments in such rates. The
    enactment of those recommendations is governed by the Federal Salary Act
    (see Sec. 1130(12), infra).

    [[Page 42]]

    (4 U.S.C. 113). The pension of a Member may be forfeited upon conviction
    involving abuse of the public trust (5 U.S.C. 8312, 8411).
      The statute also provides for deductions from the pay of Members and
    Delegates who are absent from the sessions of the House for reasons
    other than illness of themselves and families, or who retire before the
    end of the Congress (2 U.S.C. 5306; IV, 3011, footnote). The law as to
    deductions has been held to apply only to Members who have taken the
    oath (II, 1154). Members and Delegates are paid monthly on certificate
    of the Speaker (2 U.S.C. 5301, 5302, 5304). The residence of a Member of
    Congress for purpose of imposing State income tax laws shall be the
    State from which elected and not the State, or subdivision thereof, in
    which the Member maintains an abode for the purpose of attending
    sessions of Congress

    Sec. 87. Questions as to
    compensation.

      Questions have arisen  frequently as to compensation of Members especially in
    cases of Members elected to fill vacancies (I, 500; II, 1155) and in
    which there have been questions as to incompatible offices (I, 500) or
    claims to a seat (II, 1206). The Supreme Court has held that a Member
    chosen to fill a vacancy is entitled to salary only from the time that
    the compensation of the predecessor has ceased. Page v. United States,
    127 U.S. 67 (1888); see also 2 U.S.C. 5304.

    Sec. 88. Travel and Members' representational
    allowances.

      In the 92d  Congress, the provisions of H. Res. 457 of that Congress,
    authorizing the Committee on House Administration to adjust allowances
    of Members and committees without further action by the House, were
    enacted into permanent law (2 U.S.C. 4313), but the 94th Congress
    enacted into permanent law H. Res. 1372 of that Congress, stripping the
    committee of that authority and requiring House approval of the
    committee's recommendations, except in cases made necessary by price
    changes in materials and supplies, technological advances in office
    equipment, and cost of living increases (2 U.S.C. 4314). The Committee
    on House Administration retains authority under 2 U.S.C. 4313 to
    independently adjust amounts under certain conditions outlined in 2
    U.S.C. 4314 (Mar. 21, 1977, p. 8227; Apr. 21, 1983, p. 9339). The text
    of those statutes follow:

       ``Sec. 4313. Adjustment of House of Representatives allowances by

                        Committee on House Administration

      ``(a) In general.--Subject to the provision of law specified in
    subsection (b) of this section, the Committee on House Administration of
    the House of Representatives may, by order of the Committee, fix and
    adjust the amounts, terms, and conditions of, and other matters relating
    to, allowances of the House of Representatives within the following
    categories:

              ``(1) For Members of the House of Representatives, the

            Members' Representational Allowance, including all aspects of

            official mail within the jurisdiction of the Committee under

            section 503 of this title.

              ``(2) For committees, the Speaker, the Majority and Minority

            Leaders, the Clerk, the Sergeant at Arms, and the Chief

            Administrative Officer, allowances for official mail (including

            all aspects of official mail within the jurisdiction of the

            Committee under section 503 of this title), stationery, and

            telephone and telegraph and other communications.

      ``(b) Provision specified.--The provision of law referred to in
    subsection (a) of this section is section 503 of this title.

    [[Page 43]]

    a Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the
    Congress.''

      ``(c) Member of the House of Representatives defined.--As used in this
    section, the term `Member of the House of Representatives' means

      ``Sec. 4314. Limitation on allowance authority of Committee on House

                                 Administration.

      ``(a) In general.--An order under the provision of law specified in
    subsection (c) of this section may fix or adjust the allowances of the
    House of Representatives only by reason of--

              ``(1) a change in the price of materials, services, or office

            space;

              ``(2) a technological change or other improvement in office

            equipment; or

              ``(3) an increase under section 5303 of title 5 in rates of

            pay under the General Schedule.

      ``(b) Resolution requirement.--In the case of reasons other than the
    reasons specified in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a) of
    this section, the fixing and adjustment of the allowances of the House
    of Representatives in the categories described in the provision of law
    specified in subsection (c) of this section may be carried out only by
    resolution of the House of Representatives.

      ``(c) Provision specified.--The provision of law referred to in
    subsections (a) and (b) of this section is section 4313 of this title.''

      In the 104th Congress the Committee on House Administration
    promulgated an order abolishing separate allowances for Clerk Hire,
    Official Expenses, and Official Mail, in favor of a single ``Members'
    Representational Allowance'' (MRA), which was ultimately enacted into
    law (2 U.S.C. 5341). The MRA is provided for the employment of staff in
    the Member's Washington and district offices, official expenses incurred
    by the Member, and the postage expenses of first, third, and fourth
    class frankable mail.

      Until January 1, 1988, the maximum salary for staff members was the
    rate of basic pay authorized for Level V of the Executive Schedule (by
    order of the Committee on House Administration, Mar. 21, 1977, p. 8227).
    Under section 311 of the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1988, as
    contained in section 101(i) of Public Law 100-202 (2 U.S.C. 4532), the
    maximum salary for staff members is set by pay order of the Speaker. A
    Member may not employ a relative on an MRA (5 U.S.C. 3110). The Code of
    Official Conduct also precludes certain hiring practices of Members (see
    Sec. 1095, infra).

      Until the 103d Congress, a Member could employ a ``Lyndon Baines
    Johnson Congressional Intern'' for a maximum of two months at not to
    exceed $1,160 per month. Such internships were available for college
    students and secondary or postsecondary school teachers (H. Res. 420,
    Sept. 18, 1973, p. 30186; 2 U.S.C. 5322). Any paid internship is now
    funded through the MRA.

    [[Page 44]]

    the direction of the Clerk of the House (2 U.S.C. 5323-5329). Upon the
    expulsion of a Member in the 96th Congress, the House by resolution
    extended those provisions to any termination of service by a Member
    during the term of office (H. Res. 804, Oct. 2, 1980, p. 28978).
      The statutes provide for continuation of the pay of clerical
    assistants to a Member upon death or resignation, until a successor is
    elected to fill the vacancy, and such clerical assistants perform their
    duties under

      For current information on the MRA and the method of its accounting
    and disbursement, see current U.S. House of Representatives Members'
    Congressional Handbook, Committee on House Administration.

    Sec. 88a. Ban on Legislative Service
    Organizations.

      At its  organization the 104th Congress prohibited the
    establishment or continuation of any legislative service organization
    (as that term had been understood in the 103d Congress) and directed the
    Committee on House Administration to take such steps as were necessary
    to ensure an orderly termination and accounting for funds of any
    legislative service organization in existence on January 3, 1995 (sec.
    222, H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 477). The 114th and 115th Congresses
    authorized the payment of salaries and expenses by certain Congressional
    Member Organizations that had registered with the Committee on House
    Administration during the previous Congress (sec. 3(p), H. Res. 5, Jan.
    6, 2015, p. _; (sec. 3(n), H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 2017, p. _).

    Sec. 89. Leadership staff allowances.

      Separate from the  MRA
    specified above, the leaders of the House (the Speaker, Majority Leader,
    Minority Leader, Majority Whip, and Minority Whip) are entitled to
    office staffing allowances consisting of certain statutory positions as
    well as lump-sum appropriations authorized by section 473 of the
    Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (84 Stat. 1140). The portion of
    these allowances for leadership office personnel may be adjusted by the
    Clerk of the House in certain situations when the President effects a
    pay adjustment for certain classes of Federal employees under the
    Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-656; 84 Stat. 1946).

    Sec. 89a. Speaker's ``pay orders.''

      Under  section 311(d) of
    the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1988 (2 U.S.C. 4532), the
    Speaker may issue ``pay orders'' that adjust pay levels for officers and
    employees of the House to maintain certain relationships with comparable
    levels in the Senate and in the other branches of government. For the
    text of section 311(d), see Sec. 1130(12), infra.

    [[Page 45]]

    Sec. 90. Privilege of Members from
    arrest.

      * * * They [the  Senators and Representatives] shall in all Cases, except
    Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest
    during their attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and
    in going to and returning from the same; * * *

    Sec. 91. Assertions of privilege of
    Members by the House.

      The word ``felony''  in this provision has been interpreted not to
    refer to a delinquency in a matter of debt (III, 2676), and ``treason,
    felony, and breach of the peace'' have been construed to mean all
    indictable crimes (III, 2673). The Supreme Court has held that the
    privilege does not apply to arrest in any criminal case. Williamson v.
    United States, 207 U.S. 425 (1908). The courts have discussed and
    sustained the privilege of the Member in going to and returning from the
    session (III, 2674); and where a person assaulted a Member on his way to
    the House, although at a place distant therefrom, the House arrested him
    on warrant of the Speaker, arraigned him at the bar and had him
    imprisoned (II, 1626, 1628). Other assaults under these circumstances
    have been treated as breaches of privilege (II, 1645). Where a Member
    had been arrested and detained under mesne process in a civil suit
    during a recess of Congress, the House decided that he was entitled to
    discharge on the assembling of Congress, and liberated him and restored
    him to his seat by the hands of its own officer (III, 2676). Service of
    process is distinguished from arrest in civil cases and related
    historical data are collected in Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76 (1934), in
    which the Supreme Court held that the clause was applicable only to
    arrests in civil suits, now largely obsolete but common at the time of
    the adoption of the United States Constitution. Rule VIII (formerly rule
    L) was added in the 97th Congress to provide a standing procedure
    governing subpoenas to Members, officers, and employees directing their
    appearance as witnesses relating to the official functions of the House,
    or for the production of House documents.

    Sec. 92. Members privileged from being questioned for speech
    or debate.

        * * * and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they
    [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other
    place.

    [[Page 46]]

    Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966). The Supreme Court held in United States v.
    Helstoski, 442 U.S. 447 (1979), that under the Speech or Debate Clause,
    neither evidence of nor references to legislative acts of a Member of
    Congress may be introduced by the Government in a prosecution under the
    official bribery statute. But the Supreme Court has limited the scope of
    legislative activity that is protected under the clause by upholding
    grand jury inquiry into the possession and nonlegislative use of
    classified documents by a Member. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606
    (1972). The Court has also sustained the validity of an indictment of a
    Member for accepting an illegal bribe to perform legislative acts in
    which the prosecution established a prima facie case without relying on
    the Member's constitutionally-protected legislative speech. United
    States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972). Nor does the clause protect
    transmittal of allegedly defamatory material issued in press releases
    and newsletters by a Senator, because neither was essential to the
    deliberative process of the Senate. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111
    (1979). For a discussion of waivers of the Speech or Debate clause, see
    Sec. 301, infra.

    Sec. 93. Scope of the privilege.

      This privilege as  to ``any
    speech or debate'' applies generally to ``things done in a session of
    the House by one of its Members in relation to the business before it.''
    Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880), cited at III, 2675. See also
    II, 1655 and Sec. Sec. 301, 302, infra, for provisions in Jefferson's
    Manual on the privilege; and Deschler, ch. 7. Moreover, it applies to
    all acts within the ``legislative sphere,'' which includes matters that
    are ``an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes
    by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with
    respect to the consideration or passage or rejection of proposed
    legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution
    places within the jurisdiction of either House.'' Gravel v. United
    States, 408 U.S. 606, 624, 625 (1972). The clause precludes judicial
    inquiry into the motivation, preparation, or content of a Member's
    speech on the floor and prevents such a speech from being made the basis
    for a criminal conspiracy charge against the Member. United States v.

      Legislative employees acting under orders of the House are not
    necessarily protected under the clause from judicial inquiry into the
    constitutionality of their actions. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 165
    (1880); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); Powell v. McCormack,
    395 U.S. 486 (1969). But see Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606
    (1972), in which the Supreme Court held that the aide of a Senator was
    protected under the clause when performing legislative acts that would
    have been protected under the clause if performed by the Senator
    himself. There is no distinction between the members of a Senate
    subcommittee and its chief counsel insofar as complete immunity under
    the Speech or Debate Clause is provided for the issuance of a subpoena
    pursuant to legitimate legislative inquiry. Eastland v. U.S.
    Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975). See also Doe v. McMillan, 412
    U.S. 306 (1973) (relating to the dissemination of a congressional
    report) for the immunity under this clause of Members of the House and
    their staffs, and for the common-law immunity of the Public Printer (now
    the Director of the Government Publishing Office) and Superintendent of
    Documents.

    [[Page 47]]

      For Federal court decisions on the applicability of the clause to
    unofficial circulation of reprints from the Congressional Record, see
    McGovern v. Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343 (1960); Long v. Ansell, 69 F.2d 386
    (1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 76 (1934); Methodist Federation for Social
    Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp. 729 (1956). For inquiry into a Member's
    use of the franking privilege, see Hoellen v. Annunzio, 468 F.2d 522
    (1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973); Schiaffo v. Helstoski, 350 F.
    Supp. 1076 (1972), rev'd 492 F.2d 413 (1974). For inquiry into the
    printing of committee reports, see Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973);
    Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175 (1970).

    Sec. 94. Action by the House.

      For assaulting a  Member for
    words spoken in debate, Samuel Houston, not a Member, was arrested,
    tried, and censured by the House (II, 1616-1619). Where Members have
    assaulted other Members for words spoken in debate (II, 1656), or
    proceeded by duel (II, 1644), or demanded explanation in a hostile
    manner (II, 1644), the House has considered the cases as of privilege. A
    communication addressed to the House by an official in an Executive
    Department calling in question words uttered by a Member in debate was
    criticized as a breach of privilege and withdrawn (III, 2684). An
    explanation having been demanded of a Member by a person not a Member
    for a question asked of the latter when a witness before the House, the
    matter was considered but not pressed as a breach of privilege (III,
    2681). A letter from a person supposed to have been assailed by a Member
    in debate, asking properly and without menace if the speech was
    correctly reported, was held to involve no question of privilege (III,
    2682). Unless it is clear that a Member has been questioned for words
    spoken in debate, the House declines to act (II, 1620; III, 2680).

      For assaulting a Member, Charles C. Glover was arrested, arraigned at
    the bar of the House, and censured by the Speaker by direction of the
    House, although the provocation of the assault was words spoken in
    debate in the previous Congress (VI, 333).

    Sec. 95. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880);
    Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); United States v. Johnson, 383
    U.S. 169 (1966); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); Powell v.
    McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606
    (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); Doe v. McMillan,
    412 U.S. 306 (1973); Eastland v. United States Serviceman's Fund, 421
    U.S. 491 (1975); United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979);
    Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442
    U.S. 500 (1979).

    Sec. 96. Restriction on appointment of
    Members to office.

      \2\No Senator or  Representative shall, during the Time for which he
    was elected, be appointed to any Civil Office under the Authority of the
    United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof
    shall have been encreased during such time; *  *  *

    [[Page 48]]

      In a few cases questions have arisen under this paragraph (I, 506,
    footnote; and see 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 36 (1969); see also Deschler, ch. 7;
    P.L. 110-455 (emoluments of Secretary of State); P.L. 111-1 (emoluments
    of Secretary of the Interior).

    Sec. 97. Members not to hold office under the United
    States.

        *  *  * and no Person holding any Office under the United
    States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in
    Office.

      The meaning of the word ``office'' as used in this paragraph has been
    discussed (I, 185, 417, 478, 493; II, 993; VI, 60, 64), as has also the
    general subject of incompatible offices (I, 563).

    Sec. 98. As to what are
    incompatible offices.

      The Committee on the Judiciary  has concluded that members of commissions
    created by law to investigate and report, but having no legislative,
    executive, or judicial powers, and visitors to academies, regents,
    directors, and trustees of public institutions, appointed under the law
    by the Speaker, are not officers within the meaning of the Constitution
    (I, 493). Membership on joint committees created by statute is not an
    office in the contemplation of the constitutional provision prohibiting
    Members of Congress from holding simultaneously other offices under the
    United States (VII, 2164). A Member of either House is eligible to
    appointment to any office not forbidden him by law, the duties of which
    are not incompatible with those of a Member (VI, 63) and the question as
    to whether a Member may be appointed to the Board of Managers of the
    Soldiers' Home and become local manager of one of the homes, is a matter
    for the decision of Congress itself (VI, 63). The House has also
    distinguished between the performance of paid services for the Executive
    (I, 495), like temporary service as assistant United States attorney
    (II, 993), and the acceptance of an incompatible office. The House has
    declined to hold that a contractor under the Government is
    constitutionally disqualified to serve as a Member (I, 496). But the
    House, or its committees, have found disqualified a Member who was
    appointed a militia officer in the District of Columbia (I, 486) and in
    various States (VI, 60), and Members who have accepted commissions in
    the Army (I, 491, 492, 494). But the Committee on the Judiciary has
    expressed the opinion that persons on the retired list of the Army do
    not hold office under the United States in the constitutional sense (I,
    494). A Member-elect has continued to act as governor of a State after
    the assembling of the Congress to which he was elected (I, 503), but the
    duties of a Member of the House and the Governor of a State are
    absolutely inconsistent and may not be simultaneously discharged by the
    same Member (VI, 65).-

    [[Page 49]]

    his taking of the oath, he was held to have disqualified himself (I,
    492). In other words, the Member-elect may defer until the meeting of
    Congress and his taking of the oath, his choice between the seat and an
    incompatible office (I, 492). As early as 1874 the Attorney General
    opined that a Member-elect is not officially a Member of the House, and
    thus may hold any office until sworn (14 Op. Att'y Gen. 408 (1874)).

    Sec. 99. Appointment of Memberselect to
    offices under the United States.

      The House decided  that the status of a Member-elect was
    not affected by the constitutional requirement (I, 499), the theory
    being advanced that the status of the Member-elect is distinguished from
    the status of the Member who has qualified (I, 184). A Member-elect, who
    continued in an office after his election but resigned before taking his
    seat, was held entitled to the seat (I, 497, 498). However, when a
    Member-elect held an incompatible office after the meeting of Congress
    and

    Sec. 100. Relation of contestants to
    incompatible offices.

      The House has  manifestly subscribed to the idea that a
    contestant holding an incompatible office need not make an election
    until the House has declared the contestant entitled to the seat (I,
    505). Although a contestant had accepted and held a State office in
    violation of the State constitution, if he were really elected a Member,
    the House did not treat his contest as abated (II, 1003). Where a Member
    had been appointed to an incompatible office a contestant not found to
    be elected was not admitted to fill the vacancy (I, 807).

    Sec. 101. Procedure of the House when
    incompatible offices are accepted.

      Where a Member  has accepted an incompatible
    office, the House has assumed or declared the seat vacant (I, 501, 502;
    VI, 65). In the cases of Baker and Yell, the Elections Committee
    concluded that the acceptance of a commission as an officer of
    volunteers in the national army vacated the seat of a Member (I, 488),
    and in another similar case the Member was held to have forfeited his
    right to a seat (I, 490). The House has seated a person bearing regular
    credentials on ascertaining that his predecessor in the same Congress
    had accepted a military office (I, 572). But usually the House by
    resolution formally declares the seat vacant (I, 488, 492). A Member-
    elect may defer until the meeting of Congress and the taking of the oath
    of office the choice between the seat and an incompatible office (I,
    492). But when he retains the incompatible office and does not qualify,
    a vacancy has been held to exist (I, 500). A resolution excluding a
    Member who has accepted an incompatible office may be agreed to by a
    majority vote (I, 490). A Member charged with acceptance of an
    incompatible office was heard in his own behalf during the debate (I,
    486).

      Where it was held in Federal court that a Member of Congress may not
    hold a commission in the Armed Forces Reserve under this clause, the
    U.S. Supreme Court reversed on other grounds, the plaintiff's lack of
    standing to maintain the suit. Reservists Committee to Stop the War v.
    Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833 (1971), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1075 (1972), rev'd on
    other grounds, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).

    [[Page 50]]

    Sec. 102. Bills raising revenue to
    originate in the House.

      Section 7. \1\All Bills  for raising Revenue shall originate in the
    House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with
    Amendments as on other Bills.

      This provision has been the subject of much discussion (II, 1488,
    1494). In the earlier days the practice was not always correct (II,
    1484); but in later years the House has insisted on its prerogative and
    the Senate has often shown reluctance to infringe thereon (II, 1482,
    1483, 1493). In several instances, however, the subject has been a
    matter of contention, conference (II, 1487, 1488), and final
    disagreement (II, 1485, 1487, 1488). Sometimes, however, when the House
    has questioned an invasion of prerogative, the Senate has receded (II,
    1486, 1493). The disagreements have been especially vigorous over the
    right of the Senate to concur with amendments (II, 1489), and although
    the Senate has acquiesced in the sole right of the House to originate
    revenue bills, it has at the same time held to a broad power of
    amendment (II, 1497-1499). The House has frequently challenged the
    Senate on this point (II, 1481, 1491, 1496; Sept. 14, 1965, p. 23632).
    When the House has perceived an invasion of its prerogative, it has
    ordered the bill or Senate amendment to be returned to the Senate (II,
    1480-1499; VI, 315, 317; Mar. 30, 1937, p. 2930; July 2, 1960, p. 15818;
    Oct. 10, 1962, p. 23014; May 20, 1965, p. 11149; June 20, 1968, p.
    22127; Nov. 8, 1979, p. 31518; May 17, 1983, p. 12486; Oct. 1, 1985, p.
    25418; Sept. 25, 1986, p. 26202; July 30, 1987, p. 21582; June 16, 1988,
    p. 14780; June 21, 1988, p. 15425; Sept. 23, 1988, p. 25094; Sept. 28,
    1988, p. 26415; Oct. 21, 1988, pp. 33110-11; June 15, 1989, p. 12167;
    Nov. 9, 1989, p. 28271; Oct. 22, 1991, p. 27087; Oct. 31, 1991, p.
    29284; Feb. 25, 1992, p. 3377; July 14, 1994, p. 16593; July 21, 1994,
    p. 17280; July 21, 1994, p. 17281; Aug. 12, 1994, pp. 7642, 7643; Oct.
    7, 1994, p. 29136, 29137; Mar. 21, 1996, p. 5950; Apr. 16, 1996, pp.
    7642, 7643; Sept. 27, 1996, p. 25542; Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25931; Mar. 5,
    1998, p. 2618; Oct. 15, 1998, p. 26483; July 15, 1999, p. 16317; Nov.
    18, 1999, p. 30732; Oct. 24, 2000, p. 24149; Sept. 20, 2001, p. 17454;
    Sept. 23, 2010, pp. 16379, 16380; Dec. 12, 2012, p. _), or declined to
    proceed further with it (II, 1485).

    [[Page 51]]

    passed bill prohibiting the importation of commodities subject to tariff
    (July 30, 1987, p. 21582); a Senate-passed bill banning all imports from
    Iran, a tariff measure as affecting revenue from dutiable imports (June
    16, 1988, p. 14780); a Senate-passed bill including certain import
    sanctions in an export administration statute (Oct. 31, 1991, p. 29284);
    a Senate-passed bill requiring the President to impose sanctions
    including import restrictions against countries that fail to eliminate
    large-scale driftnet fishing (Feb. 25, 1992, p. 3377); a Senate-passed
    bill proposing to regulate toxic substances by prohibiting the import of
    products containing more than specified level of lead (July 21, 1994, p.
    17280); a Senate-passed bill proposing new import restrictions on
    products containing any substance derived from rhinoceroses or tigers
    (Oct. 15, 1998, p. 26483); Senate-passed bills proposing an amendment to
    the criminal code that would make it unlawful to import certain assault
    weapons (Oct. 22, 1991, p. 27087) or to import large capacity ammunition
    feeding devices (July 15, 1999, p. 16317); a Senate-passed bill
    proposing to create a new basis for applying import restrictions on bear
    viscera or products derived therefrom (Oct. 24, 2000, p. 24149); a
    Senate amendment proposing to enact by reference a Senate bill providing
    for a ban on (dutiable) imports of diamonds from certain countries
    (Sept. 20, 2001, p. 17454); a Senate amendment to a general
    appropriation bill proposing a user fee raising revenue to finance
    broader activities of the agency imposing the levy, thereby raising
    general revenue (Aug. 12, 1994, p. 21656); a Senate amendment to a
    general appropriation bill proposing to increase two fees to finance
    general government operations (Sept. 23, 2010, pp. 16379, 16380); a
    Senate-passed bill proposing to repeal a fee on electricity generated by
    nuclear energy that otherwise would raise revenue (Mar. 5, 1998, p.
    2618).
      Among the measures the House has returned to the Senate: a Senate-
    passed bill providing for the sale of Conrail and containing provisions
    relating to the tax treatment of the sale, notwithstanding inclusion in
    that bill of a disclaimer section requiring all revenue provisions
    therein to be contained in separate legislation originating in the House
    (Sept. 25, 1986, p. 26202); a Senate-passed bill dealing with the tax
    treatment of income derived from the exercise of Indian treaty fishing
    rights (June 21, 1988, p. 15425); a Senate-passed bill creating a tax-
    exempt government corporation (June 15, 1989, p. 12167); a Senate-passed
    bill addressing the tax treatment of police-corps scholarships and the
    regulation of firearms under the Internal Revenue Code (Oct. 22, 1991,
    p. 27087); a Senate amendment to a general appropriation bill
    prohibiting funds for the Internal Revenue Service to enforce a
    requirement to use undyed diesel fuel for use in recreational boats
    (July 14, 1994, p. 16593); Senate-passed bills prescribing the tax
    treatment of certain benefits to members of the Armed Forces (Nov. 18,
    1999, p. 30732), of public-sector retirement plans (Nov. 18, 1999, p.
    30734), or of a military retirement fund (June 25, 2015, p. _); a
    Senate-

      The House laid on the table a resolution asserting that: (1) a
    conference report (on which the House was acting first) accompanying a
    House bill originated provisions in derogation of the constitutional
    prerogative of the House and resolving that such bill be recommitted to
    conference (July 27, 2000, p. 16565); or (2) that Senate amendments,
    including those subsequently agreed to in a conference report (on which
    the House was acting first), originated provisions in derogation of the
    constitutional prerogative of the House and resolving that such bill and
    Senate amendments be returned to the Senate (July 28, 1982, p. 18375;
    Aug. 19, 1982, p. 22127).

      The House, by adopting one resolution, has returned multiple measures
    to the Senate (Sept. 23, 2010, pp. 16379, 16380; Dec. 12, 2012, p. _).

    [[Page 52]]

    to the President (Apr. 6, 1995, p. 10700). The Senate decided that a
    bill proposing a gasoline tax in the District of Columbia should not
    originate in the Senate (VI, 316).
      A bill raising revenue incidentally was held not to infringe upon the
    constitutional prerogative of the House to originate revenue legislation
    (VI, 315). A question relating to the invasion of the constitutional
    prerogatives of the House by a Senate amendment may be raised at any
    time when the House is in possession of the papers, but not otherwise;
    thus, the question has been presented pending the motion to call up a
    conference report on the bill (June 20, 1968, Deschler, ch. 13,
    Sec. 14.2; Aug. 19, 1982, p. 22127), but has been held nonprivileged
    with respect to a bill already presented

      Clause 5(a) of rule XXI prohibits consideration of any amendment,
    including any Senate amendment, proposing a tax or tariff during
    consideration of a bill or joint resolution reported by a committee not
    having that jurisdiction (Sec. 1066, infra).

      For a discussion of the prerogatives of the House under this clause,
    and discussion of the prerogatives of the House to originate
    appropriation bills, see Deschler, ch. 13. For a discussion of the
    prerogatives of the House with respect to treaties affecting revenue,
    see Sec. 597, infra. For a discussion of how the House exercises its
    origination clause responsibilities by a former chair of the Committee
    on Ways and Means, see Dec. 12, 2014, p. _. For examples of Senate
    messages requesting the return of Senate revenue measures, see Sec. 565,
    infra.

    Sec. 103. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); Twin
    City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220
    U.S. 107 (1911); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906); Rainey v.
    United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495
    U.S. 385 (1990).

    [[Page 53]]

    entered on the Journal of each House respectively. * * *

    Sec. 104. Approval and disapproval of bills by
    the President.

      \2\Every Bill  which shall have passed the House of Representatives
    and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the
    President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if
    not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it
    shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their
    Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two
    thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent,
    together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall
    likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House,
    it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses
    shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons
    voting for and against the Bill shall be

    Sec. 105. The act of approval.

      Under the usual  practice,
    bills are considered to have been presented to the President at the time
    they are delivered to the White House. In 1959, bills delivered to the
    White House while the President was abroad were held for presentation to
    the President upon his return to the United States by the White House.
    The United States Court of Claims held, in Eber Bros. Wine and Liquor
    Corp. v. United States, 337 F.2d 624 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 950
    (1965), that where the President had determined, with the informal
    acquiescence of leaders of Congress, that bills from the Congress were
    to be received at the White House only for presentation to him upon his
    return to the United States and the bill delivered to the White House
    was so stamped, the Presidential veto of the bill more than 10 days
    after delivery to the White House but less than 10 days after his return
    to the country was timely. The second session of the 89th Congress
    adjourned sine die while President Johnson was on an Asian tour and
    receipts for bills delivered to the White House during that time were
    marked in like manner. The approval of a bill by the President of the
    United States is valid only with his signature (IV, 3490). Before the
    adoption of the 20th amendment to the Constitution (which changed the
    date of meeting of Congress to January 3), at the close of a Congress,
    when the two Houses prolonged their sessions into the forenoon of March
    4, the approvals were dated on the prior legislative day, because the
    legislative portion of March 4 belonged to the term of the new Congress.
    In one instance, however, bills signed on the forenoon of March 4 were
    dated as of that day with the hour and minute of approval given with the
    date (IV, 3489). The act of President Tyler in filing with a bill an
    exposition of his reasons for signing it was examined and severely
    criticized by a committee of the House (IV, 3492); and in 1842 a
    committee of the House discussed the act of President Jackson in writing
    above his signature of approval a memorandum of his construction of the
    bill (IV, 3492). But if the President has accompanied his message
    announcing the approval with a statement of his reasons there has been
    no question in the House (IV, 3491). The statutes require that bills
    signed by the President shall be received by the Archivist of the United
    States and deposited in his office (1 U.S.C. 106a). Formerly these bills
    were received by the Secretary of State (IV, 3485) and deposited in his
    office (IV, 3429).

    [[Page 54]]

    sion to sign a bill through the committee appointed to notify him that
    Congress was about to adjourn (IV, 3504). A bill that had not actually
    passed having been signed by the President, he disregarded it and a new
    bill was passed (IV, 3498). Messages of the President giving notice of
    bills approved are entered in the Journal and published in the
    Congressional Record (V, 6593).

    Sec. 106. Notice of approval sent by
    message.

      Notice of the  signature of a bill by the President is sent by message to
    the House in which it originated (VII, 1089) and that House informs the
    other (IV, 3429). But this notice is not necessary to the validity of
    the act (IV, 3495). Sometimes, at the close of a Congress the President
    informs the House of such bills as have been approved and of such as
    have been allowed to fail (IV, 3499-3502). In one instance he
    communicated his omis

    Sec. 107. Disapproval (or veto) of
    bills.

      A message withholding  approval of a bill, called a veto message, is sent to the House
    in which the bill originated; but it has been held that such a message
    may not be returned to the President on his request after it has been
    laid before the Senate (IV, 3521). In one instance a veto message that
    had not been laid before the House was returned to the President on his
    request (Aug. 1, 1946, p. 10651). A vetoed bill received in the House by
    way of the Senate is considered as if received directly from the
    President and supersedes the regular order of business (IV, 3537; VII,
    1109). A veto message may not be read after the absence of a quorum has
    been ascertained, even though the House be about to adjourn sine die
    (IV, 3522; VII, 1094); but the message may be read and acted on at the
    next session of the same Congress (IV, 3522). When the President has
    been prevented by adjournment from returning a bill with his objections
    he has sometimes at the next session communicated his reasons for not
    approving (V, 6618-6620).

      For enrollments returned with ``memoranda of disapproval,'' see
    Sec. 113, infra.

    [[Page 55]]

    ``under debate'' and the motion for the previous question does not take
    precedence (Speaker Wright, Aug. 3, 1988; Procedure, ch. 24, Sec. 15.8).
    A resolution asserting that to recognize for a motion to refer a veto
    message before stating the question on overriding the veto would
    interfere with the constitutional prerogative of the House to proceed to
    that question, and directing the Speaker to state the question on
    overriding the veto as pending before recognizing for a motion to refer,
    did not give rise to a question of the privileges of the House (Speaker
    Wright, Aug. 3, 1988, p. 20281). A motion to refer a vetoed bill, either
    with or without the message, has been held allowable within the
    constitutional mandate that the House shall ``proceed to reconsider''
    (IV, 3550; VII, 1104, 1105, 1108, 1114), and in the 101st Congress, a
    veto pending as unfinished business was referred with instructions to
    consider and report promptly (Jan. 24, 1990, p. 421). But although the
    ordinary motion to refer may be applied to a vetoed bill, it is not in
    order to move to recommit it pending the demand for the previous
    question or after it is ordered (IV, 3551; VII, 1102). When a veto
    message is before the House for consideration de novo or as unfinished
    business, a motion to refer the message to committee takes precedence
    over the question of passing the bill, the objections of the President
    to the contrary notwithstanding (Procedure, ch. 24, Sec. 15.8; Oct. 25,
    1983, p. 29188), but the motion to refer may be laid on the table (Oct.
    25, 1983, p. 29188). A vetoed bill having been rejected by the House,
    the message was referred (IV, 3552; VII, 1103). Committees to which
    vetoed bills have been referred have sometimes neglected to report (IV,
    3523, 3550, footnotes; VII, 1108, 1114).

    Sec. 108. Consideration of a vetoed bill in
    the House.

      It is possible,  although not invariable, that a bill returned with the
    objections of the President shall be voted on at once (IV, 3534-3536)
    and when laid before the House the question on the passage is considered
    as pending and no motion from the floor is required (VII, 1097-1099),
    but it has been held that the constitutional mandate that the House
    shall ``proceed to reconsider'' means that the House shall immediately
    proceed to consider it under the Rules of the House, such that the
    ordinary motions under the Rules of the House (e.g., to refer or to
    postpone to a day certain) are in order (IV, 3542-3550; VII, 1100, 1105,
    1113; Speaker Wright, Aug. 3, 1988, p. 20280) and (for the stated
    examples) debatable under the hour rule (VIII, 2740). The House may by
    unanimous consent (e.g., August 17, 1978, pp. 26802, 26803) or special
    order of business (Jan. 7, 2016, p. _) postpone consideration of a
    vetoed bill, or any motion related to its disposition, in advance of its
    receipt by the House. When consideration of a veto message is postponed
    to a date certain it has the status of unfinished business on that day,
    such that the House may proceed to its consideration without motion from
    the floor (e.g., May 9, 1996, p. 10807; Nov. 6, 2007, pp. 29822, 29823).
    Although under clause 4 of rule XVI, and under the precedents the motion
    for the previous question takes precedence over motions to postpone or
    to refer when a question is under debate, if the Speaker has laid before
    the House a veto message from the President but has not yet stated the
    question to be on overriding the veto, that question is not

      A vetoed bill may be laid on the table (IV, 3549; VII, 1105), but it
    is still highly privileged and a motion to take it from the table is in
    order (IV, 3550; V, 5439). Also a motion to discharge a committee from
    the consideration of such a bill is privileged (IV, 3532; Aug. 4, 1988,
    p. 20365; Sept. 19, 1996, p. 23815) and (in the modern practice) is
    debatable (Mar. 7, 1990, p. 3620) but is subject to the motion to lay on
    the table (Sept. 7, 1965, p. 22958; Aug. 4, 1988, p. 20365). When the
    motion to discharge is agreed to, the veto message is pending as
    unfinished business (Mar. 7, 1990, p. 3621). Although a vetoed bill is
    always privileged, the same is not true of a bill reported in lieu of it
    (IV, 3531; VII, 1103).

    [[Page 56]]

    to the vote on reconsideration of a bill returned with the objections of
    the President (V, 5644; VIII, 2778).

    Sec. 109. Action on a vetoed bill.

      If two-thirds of  the
    House to which a bill is returned with the President's objections agree
    to pass it, and then two-thirds of the other House also agree, it
    becomes a law (IV, 3520). The yeas and nays are required to pass a bill
    over the President's veto (art. I, sec. 7; IV, 2726, 3520; VII, 1110).
    The two-thirds vote required to pass the bill is two-thirds of the
    Members present and voting and not two-thirds of the total membership of
    the House (IV, 3537, 3538; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276
    (1919)). Only Members voting should be considered in determining whether
    two-thirds voted in the affirmative (VII, 1111). The motion to
    reconsider may not be applied

      It is the practice for one House to inform the other by message of its
    decision that a bill returned with the objections of the President shall
    not pass (IV, 3539-3541). A bill passed notwithstanding the objections
    of the President is sent by the presiding officer of the House that last
    acts on it to the Archivist, who receives it and deposits it in his
    office (1 U.S.C. 106a). Formerly these bills were sent to the Secretary
    of State (IV, 3524) and deposited in his office (IV, 3485).

    Sec. 110. Errors in bills sent to the
    President.

      A bill incorrectly  enrolled has been recalled from the President, who erased
    his signature (IV, 3506). Bills sent to the President but not yet signed
    by him are sometimes recalled by concurrent resolution of the two Houses
    (IV, 3507-3509; VII, 1091; Sept. 4, 1962, p. 18405; May 6, 1974, p.
    13076), and amended; but this proceeding is regarded as irregular (IV,
    3510-3518). When the two Houses of Congress request the President by
    concurrent resolution to return an enrolled bill and the President
    honors the request, the ten-day period under this clause runs anew from
    the time the bill is re-enrolled and is again presented to the
    President. Thus, in the 93d Congress the President returned on May 7,
    1974 a bill pursuant to the request of Congress (H. Con. Res. 485, May
    6, 1974, p. 13076). The bill was again enrolled, presented to the
    President on May 7, and marked ``received May 7'' at the White House. An
    error in an enrolled bill that has gone to the President may also be
    corrected by a joint resolution (IV, 3519; VII, 1092). In the 99th
    Congress, two enrollments of a continuing appropriation bill for FY 1987
    were presented to and signed by the President, the second correcting an
    omission in the first (see P.L. 99-500 and 99-591). In Clinton v.  City
    of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), the Supreme Court held that the
    cancellation procedures of the Line Item Veto Act violated the
    presentment clause of article I, section 7 of the Constitution. For a
    discussion of the operation of the Act during the period of its
    effectiveness, see Sec. 1130(6b), infra.

    Sec. 110a. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Matthews v. Zane, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 164
    (1822); Gardner v. Collector, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 499 (1868); Lapeyre v.
    United States, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 191 (1873); La Abra Silver Mining Co.
    v. United States, 175 U.S. 423 (1899); Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v.
    Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919); Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482
    (1932); Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938); Clinton v. City of
    New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).

    [[Page 57]]

    a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by
    their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a
    Law.

    Sec. 111. Bills that become laws without the
    President's approval.

      * * * If any  Bill shall not be returned by the President
    within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to
    him, the Same shall be

      A bill signed by the President within 10 days (Sunday excepted) after
    it has been presented becomes a law even though such signing takes place
    when Congress is not in session, whether during the period of an
    adjournment to a day certain or after the final adjournment of a session
    (IV, 3486). A President may sign a bill after adjournment sine die but
    within 10 days after its receipt. For example, President Truman, after
    the convening of the 82d Congress, approved bills passed and presented
    in the 81st Congress (e.g., P.L. 81-910); President Reagan, after the
    convening of the 98th Congress, approved bills passed and presented in
    the 97th Congress (e.g., P.L. 97-414); and President Obama, after the
    convening of the 113th Congress, approved bills passed and presented in
    the 112th Congress (e.g., P.L. 112-241). It was formerly contended that
    the President might not approve bills during a recess (IV, 3493, 3494),
    and in one instance, in 1864, when the President signed a bill after
    final adjournment of Congress but within 10 days grave doubts were
    raised and an adverse report was made by a House committee (IV, 3497).
    Later opinions of the Attorney General have been to the effect that the
    President has the power to approve bills within 10 days after they have
    been presented during the period of an adjournment to a day certain (IV,
    3496) and after an adjournment sine die (VII, 1088). The Supreme Court
    has held valid as laws bills signed by the President within 10 days
    during a recess for a specified time (La Abra Silver Mining Co. v.
    United States, 175 U.S. 451 (1899); IV, 3495) and also those signed
    after an adjournment sine die (Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482
    (1932)).

    Sec. 112. The pocket veto.

      A bill that  is passed by both
    Houses of Congress during the first regular session of a Congress and
    presented to the President less than 10 days (Sundays excepted) before
    the adjournment sine die of that session, but is neither signed by the
    President, nor returned to the House in which it originated, does not
    become a law (``The Pocket Veto Case,'' 279 U.S. 655 (1929); VII, 1115).
    The Supreme Court has held that the adjournment of the House of origin
    for not exceeding three days while the other branch of the Congress
    remained in session did not prevent a return of the vetoed bill to the
    House of origin. Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938). President
    Truman during an adjournment to a day certain pocket vetoed several
    bills passed by the 81st Congress and also, after the convening of the
    82d Congress, pocket vetoed one bill passed in the 81st Congress.

    [[Page 58]]

    circumstances a bill not signed by the President did not become a law
    (40 Op. Att'y Gen. 274 (1943)). However, more recently, where a Member
    of the Senate challenged in Federal court the effectiveness of such a
    pocket veto, a United States Court of Appeals held that a Senate bill
    could not be pocket-vetoed by the President during an ``intrasession''
    adjournment of Congress to a day certain for more than three days, where
    the Secretary of the Senate had been authorized to receive Presidential
    messages during such adjournment. Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C.
    Cir., 1974). See also Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1976).
    Following a consent decree in this case, it was announced that President
    Ford would utilize a ``return'' veto, subject to override, in
    intersession and intrasession adjournments where authority exists for
    the appropriate House to receive such messages notwithstanding the
    adjournment.

    Sec. 113. Effect of adjournment to a day
    certain.

      Doubt has existed  as to whether a bill that remains with the President 10 days
    without his signature, Congress meanwhile before the tenth day having
    adjourned to a day certain, becomes a law (IV, 3483, 3496; VII, 1115);
    an opinion of the Attorney General in 1943 stated that under such

      In the 101st, 110th, and 111th Congresses, when the President returned
    an enrolled bill during an intersession adjournment, not by way of
    message under seal but with a ``memorandum of disapproval'' setting
    forth his objections, the House treated it as a return veto subject to
    override under article I, section 7 (Jan. 23, 1990, p. 4; Jan. 15, 2008,
    pp. 11, 12; Jan. 12, 2010, p. 7). For similar treatment by the Senate in
    the 114th Congress, including holding the veto message at the desk, see
    January 11, 2016, p. _. Similarly, in the 102d, 106th, and 111th
    Congresses, an enrolled House bill returned to the Clerk during an
    intrasession recess, not by way of message under seal but with a
    ``memorandum of disapproval'' setting forth the objections of the
    President, was considered as a return veto (Sept. 11, 1991, p. 22643;
    Sept. 6, 2000, p. 17156; Nov. 13, 2000, p. 26022; Nov. 15, 2010, p.
    17521). Also in the 102d Congress, President Bush purported on December
    20, 1991, to pocket veto a bill (S. 1176) that was presented to him on
    December 9, 1991, notwithstanding that the Congress was in an
    intrasession adjournment (from Nov. 27, 1991, until 11:55 a.m., Jan. 3,
    1992) rather than an adjournment sine die (see Jan. 23, 1992 [Daily
    Digest]); and during debate on a subsequent bill (S. 2184) purporting to
    repeal the provisions of S. 1176 and to enact instead provisions
    acceding to the objections of the President, the Speaker inserted
    remarks on the pocket veto in light of modern congressional practice
    concerning the receipt of messages and communications during recesses
    and adjournments (Mar. 3, 1992, p. 4081).

    [[Page 59]]

    to 1 U.S.C. 106a the Enrolling Clerk of the Senate forwarded the bill to
    the Archives for publication as a public law. The Administrator of
    General Services at the Archives (now Archivist), upon instructions from
    the Department of Justice, declined to promulgate the bill as public law
    on the day received. The question as to the efficacy of the
    congressional action in passing the bill over the President's veto was
    mooted when the House and Senate passed on November 26, 1974 (pp. 37406,
    37603), an identical bill that was signed into law on December 7, 1974
    (P.L. 93-516).
      In the 93d Congress, the President returned a House bill without his
    signature to the Clerk of the House, who had been authorized to receive
    messages from the President during an adjournment to a day certain, and
    the President asserted in his veto message that he had ``pocket vetoed''
    the bill during the adjournment of the House to a day certain. The House
    regarded the President's return of the bill without his signature as a
    veto within the meaning of article I, section 7 of the Constitution and
    proceeded to reconsider and to pass the bill over the President's veto,
    after postponing consideration to a subsequent day (motion to postpone,
    Nov. 18, 1974, p. 36246; veto override, Nov. 20, 1974, p. 36621).
    Subsequently, on November 21, 1974, the Senate also voted to override
    the veto (p. 36882) and pursuant

      As part of the concurrent resolution providing for the adjournments
    sine die of the first sessions of the 101st Congress and 105th Congress,
    the Congress reaffirmed its position that an intersession adjournment
    did not prevent the return of a bill where the Clerk and the Secretary
    of the Senate were authorized to receive messages during the adjournment
    (H. Con. Res. 239, Nov. 21, 1989, p. 31156; S. Con. Res. 68, Nov. 13,
    1997, p. 26538). For the views of the Speaker, the Minority Leader, and
    the Attorney General concerning pocket veto authority during an
    intrasession adjournment, see correspondence inserted in the
    Congressional Record (Jan. 23, 1990, p. 3; Sept. 19, 2000, p. 18594;
    Nov. 13, 2000, p. 26022; Oct. 2, 2008, pp. 23874, 23875; May 26, 2010,
    pp. 9473, 9474); and for discussions of the constitutionality of
    intersession or intrasession pocket vetoes see Kennedy, ``Congress, The
    President, and The Pocket Veto,'' 63 Va. L. Rev. 355 (1977), and
    Hearing, Subcommittee on Legislative Process, Committee on Rules, on
    H.R. 849, 101st Congress.

    Sec. 114. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States,
    175 U.S. 423 (1899); Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 U.S. 506 (1901); the
    Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929); Edwards v. United States, 286
    U.S. 482 (1932); Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938); Burke v.
    Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987) (vacating and remanding as moot the decision
    sub nom. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).

    [[Page 60]]

    Sec. 115. As to presentation of orders and
    resolutions for approval.

      \3\Every Order,  Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence
    of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a
    question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the
    United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved
    by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of
    the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and
    Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.

      It has been settled conclusively that a joint resolution proposing an
    amendment to the Constitution should not be presented to the President
    for his approval (V, 7040; Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
    378 (1798)). Such joint resolutions, after passage by both Houses, are
    presented to the Archivist (1 U.S.C. 106b). Although the requirement of
    the Constitution seems specific, the practice of early Congresses was to
    present to the President for approval only such concurrent resolutions
    as were legislative in effect (IV, 3483, 3484).

      For discussion of Presidential approval of a joint resolution
    extending the period for State ratification of a constitutional
    amendment already submitted to the States, see Sec. 192, infra.

    Sec. 116. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United
    States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United
    States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Process
    Gas Consumer's Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America 463 U.S. 1216
    (1983).

    Sec. 117. The revenue power.

      Section 8. The Congress  shall
    have Power\1\ To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to
    pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of
    the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
    throughout the United States;

    Sec. 118. The borrowing power.

        \2\To borrow Money on the
    credit of the United States:

    Sec. 119. Power over commerce.

      \3\To regulate  Commerce with
    foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
    Tribes;

    Sec. 120. Naturalization and bankruptcy.

      \4\To establish  an
    uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of
    Bankruptcies throughout the United States;

    [[Page 61]]

    Sec. 121. Coinage, weight, and measures.

        \5\To coin Money,
    regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of
    Weights and Measures;

    Sec. 122. Counterfeiting.

      \6\To provide  for the Punishment
    of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;-
    -

    Sec. 123. Postoffices and postroads.

        \7\To establish Post
    Offices and Post Roads;

    Sec. 124. Patents and copyrights.

      \8\To promote  the Progress
    of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
    Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
    Discoveries;

    Sec. 125. Inferior courts.

        \9\To constitute Tribunals
    inferior to the supreme Court;

    Sec. 126. Piracies and offenses against law of
    nations.

        \10\To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on
    the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations;

    Sec. 127. Declarations of war and maritime
    operations.

        \11\To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,
    and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

    [[Page 62]]

    For further discussion of that Act, and war powers generally, see
    Deschler, ch. 13.

    Sec. 128. War powers of Congress and the
    President.

      The 93d  Congress passed over the President's veto Public Law 93-
    148, relating to the power of Congress to declare war under this clause
    and the power of the President as Commander in Chief under article II,
    section 2, clause 1. The law requires that the President report to
    Congress on the introduction of United States Armed Forces in the
    absence of a declaration of war. The President must terminate use of the
    Armed Forces unless Congress, within 60 calendar days after a report is
    submitted or is required to be submitted, (1) declares war or authorizes
    use of the Armed Forces; (2) extends by law the 60-day period; or (3) is
    physically unable to meet as result of armed attack. The Act also
    provided that Congress could adopt a concurrent resolution requiring the
    removal of Armed Forces engaged in foreign hostilities, a provision that
    should be read in light of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Sections
    6 and 7 of the Act provide congressional procedures for joint
    resolutions, bills, and concurrent resolutions introduced pursuant to
    the provisions of the Act (see Sec. 1130(2), infra).

    Sec. 129. Raising and support of armies.

      \12\To raise  and
    support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a
    longer Term than two Years;

    Sec. 130. Provisions for a navy.

        \13\To provide and
    maintain a Navy;

    Sec. 131. Land and naval forces.

        \14\To make Rules for the
    Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

    Sec. 132. Calling out the militia.

      \15\To provide  for
    calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
    Insurrections and repel Invasions;

    Sec. 133. Power over militia.

      \16\To provide  for organizing,
    arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of
    them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving
    to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the
    Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed
    by Congress;

    [[Page 63]]

    nals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;--And

    Sec. 134. Power over territory of the United
    States.

      \17\To exercise  exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such
    District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of
    particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of
    the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over
    all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in
    which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arse

    Sec. 135. Congressional authority over
    the District of Columbia.

      Congress has provided  by law that ``all that part of the territory
    of the United States included within the present limits of the District
    of Columbia shall be the permanent seat of government of the United
    States'' (4 U.S.C. 71). Pursuant to its authority under this clause,
    Congress provided in 1970 for the people of the District of Columbia to
    be represented in the House of Representatives by a Delegate and for a
    Commission to report to the Congress on the organization of the
    government of the District of Columbia (P.L. 91-405; 84 Stat. 845). For
    the powers and duties of the Delegate from the District of Columbia, see
    rule III (Sec. 675, infra) and Deschler, ch. 7, Sec. 3. In 1973,
    Congress passed the District of Columbia Self-Government and
    Governmental Reorganization Act, which reorganized the governmental
    structure of the District, provided a charter for local government
    subject to acceptance by a majority of the registered qualified voters
    of the District, delegated certain legislative powers to the District,
    and implemented certain recommendations of the Commission on the
    Organization of the Government of the District of Columbia (P.L. 93-198;
    87 Stat. 774). Section 604 of that Act provides for congressional action
    on certain district matters by providing a procedure for approval and
    disapproval of certain actions by the District of Columbia Council. The
    section, as amended by Public Law 98-473, permits a highly privileged
    motion to discharge a joint resolution of approval or disapproval that
    has not been reported by the committee to which referred within 20
    calendar days after its introduction (see Sec. 1130(5), infra).

    -  \18\To make <> all Laws
    which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
    foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
    the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
    thereof.

    Sec. 135a. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. 445 (1805);
    National Mutual Insurance Co. of D.C. v. Tidewater Transfer Co, 337 U.S.
    582 (1945).

    [[Page 64]]

    eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such
    Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.

    Sec. 137. Migration or importation of
    persons.

      Section 9. \1\The  Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States
    now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the
    Congress prior to the Year one thousand

    Sec. 138. Writ of habeas corpus.

      \2\The Privilege of  the
    Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
    Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.

    Sec. 139. Bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.

        \3\No
    Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.

    Sec. 140. Capitation and direct taxes.

      \4\[No Capitation,  or
    other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or
    Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.]

      This provision was changed in 1913 by the 16th amendment.

    Sec. 141. Export duties.

        \5\No Tax or Duty shall be laid on
    Articles exported from any State.

    Sec. 142. Freedom of commerce.

      \6\No Preference  shall be
    given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State
    over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State,
    be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.

    Sec. 143. Appropriations and accounting of public
    money.

      \7\No Money  shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
    Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the
    Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from
    time to time.

    [[Page 65]]

    sent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or
    Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.

    Sec. 144. Titles of nobility and gifts from
    foreign states.

      \8\No Title of  Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no
    Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without
    the Con

    Sec. 145. Foreign gifts and
    decorations.

      Consent has been  granted to officers and employees of the government,
    under enumerated conditions, to accept certain gifts and decorations
    from foreign governments (see 5 U.S.C. 7342). The adoption of this act
    largely has obviated the practice of passing private bills to permit the
    officer or employee to retain the award. However, where the Speaker (who
    was one of the officers empowered by an earlier law to approve retention
    of decorations by Members of the House) was himself tendered an award
    from a foreign government, a private law (Private Law 91-244) was
    enacted to permit him to accept and wear the award so that he would not
    be in the position of reviewing his own application under the provisions
    of the law.

      Public Law 95-105 amended the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act (now 5
    U.S.C. 7342) to designate the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct
    (now Ethics) of the House of Representatives as the employing agency for
    the House with respect to foreign gifts and decorations received by
    Members and employees; under that statute the Committee may approve the
    acceptance of foreign decorations and has promulgated regulations to
    carry out the Act with respect to Members and employees (Jan. 23, 1978,
    p. 452), and disposes of foreign gifts that may not be retained by the
    donee.

      Opinions of Attorneys General: Gifts from Foreign Prince, 24 Op. Att'y
    Gen. 117 (1902); Foreign Diplomatic Commission, 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 538
    (1871); Marshal of Florida, 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 409 (1854).

    Sec. 146. States not to make treaties, coin
    money, pass ex post facto laws, impair contracts, etc.

      Section 10. \1\No  State shall
    enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of
    Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing
    but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of
    Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of
    Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

    [[Page 66]]

    and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the
    Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be
    subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.

    Sec. 147. States not to lay imposts or
    duties.

      \2\No State  shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or
    Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary
    for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties

    Sec. 148. States not to lay tonnage taxes, make
    compacts, or go to war.

      \3\No State  shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay
    any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace,
    enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a
    foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such
    imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

                                   ARTICLE II.

    Sec. 149. Terms of the President and Vice
    President.

      Section 1. \1\The  executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
    United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of
    four years, and together with the Vice President, chosen for the same
    Term, be elected, as follows:

    [[Page 67]]

    ning of the second terms of President Reagan and President Obama, with
    the oath being given at the White House on Sunday (1985 and 2013),
    followed by a public ceremony on Monday in the Rotunda (1985) or the
    East Front of the Capitol (2013). The 22d amendment provides that no
    person shall be elected President more than twice.

    Sec. 150. Commencement of President's term of
    office.

      George  Washington took the oath of office as the first President on
    April 30, 1789 (III, 1986). The two Houses of the First Congress found,
    after examination by a joint committee, that by provisions made in the
    Federal Constitution and by the Continental Congress, the term of the
    President had, notwithstanding, begun on March 4, 1789 (I, 3). The 20th
    amendment, declared to have been ratified on February 6, 1933, provides
    that Presidential terms shall end and successor terms shall begin at
    noon on January 20. Thus, Franklin D. Roosevelt's first term began on
    March 4, 1933, but ended at noon on January 20, 1937. Formerly, when
    March 4 fell on Sunday, the public inauguration of the President
    occurred at noon on March 5 (III, 1996; VI, 449). Following ratification
    of the 20th amendment, the first time inauguration day fell on Sunday
    was January 20, 1957, and President Eisenhower took the oath for his
    second term in a private ceremony at the White House on that day
    followed by a public inauguration ceremony on the steps of the East
    Front of the Capitol on Monday, January 21, 1957. A similar scenario was
    followed at the begin

    Sec. 151. Electors of President and Vice President and
    their qualifications.

      \2\Each  State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
    Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole
    Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be
    entitled in the Congress; but no Senator or Representative, or Person
    holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be
    appointed an Elector.

    Sec. 152. Questions as to qualifications of
    electors.

      Questions  of the qualifications of electors have arisen, and in one
    instance certain ones were found disqualified, but because their number
    was not sufficient to affect the result and there was doubt as to what
    tribunal should pass on the question the votes were counted (III, 1941).
    In other cases there were objections, but the votes were counted (III,
    1972-1974, 1979). In one instance an elector found to be disqualified
    resigned both offices, whereupon he was made eligible to fill the
    vacancy thus caused among electors (III, 1975).

    [[Page 68]]

    Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if
    such Number be a majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed: and
    if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal
    Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately
    chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a
    Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall in
    like manner chuse the President. But in chusing the President, the Votes
    shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one
    Vote; A quorum for this purpose shall consist of a Member or Members
    from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be
    necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President,
    the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be
    the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have
    equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice-
    President.]

    Sec. 152a. Original provision for failure of electoral
    college to choose.

      \3\[The  Electors shall meet in their respective States and
    vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an
    Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List
    of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which
    List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of
    Government of the United States, directed to the President of the
    Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate
    and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes
    shall then be counted. The

      This third clause of article II, section 1 was superseded by the 12th
    amendment (see Sec. Sec. 219-223, infra).

    Sec. 153. Time of choosing electors and time at which their
    votes are given.

        \4\The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the
    Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day
    shall be the same throughout the United States.

    [[Page 69]]

    VI, 438; 3 U.S.C. 1, 7). The statute also provides for transmitting to
    the President of the Senate certificates of the appointment of the
    electors and of their votes (III, 1915-1917; VI, 439; 3 U.S.C. 11).

      The time for choosing electors has been fixed on ``the Tuesday next
    after the first Monday in November, in every fourth year''; and the
    electors in each State ``meet and give in their votes on the first
    Monday after the second Wednesday in December next following their
    appointment, at such place in each State as the legislature of such
    State shall direct'' (III, 1914;

    Sec. 154. Qualifications of President of the United
    States.

      \5\No  Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the
    United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall
    be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be
    eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty
    five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.

    Sec. 155. Succession in case of removal, death,
    resignation, or disability of President and Vice President.

      \6\In  Case of
    the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation,
    or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the
    Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law
    provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both
    of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then
    act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the
    Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

    Sec. 156. Resignation of the President.

      The  25th amendment
    provides for filling a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President and,
    when the President is unable to perform the duties of his office, for
    the Vice President to assume those powers and duties as Acting
    President. During the 93d Congress, President Richard M. Nixon resigned
    from office on August 9, 1974, by delivering a signed resignation to the
    Office of the Secretary of State, pursuant to 3 U.S.C. 20. Pursuant to
    the 25th amendment, Vice President Gerald R. Ford became President and
    the House and Senate confirmed his nominee, Nelson A. Rockefeller, to
    become Vice President (December 19, 1974, p. 41516).

    [[Page 70]]

      Congress also has provided for the performance of the duties of the
    President in case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of
    the President and Vice President (3 U.S.C. 19).

    Sec. 157. Compensation of President.

      \7\The  President shall,
    at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall
    neither be encreased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall
    have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other
    Emolument from the United States, or any of them.

      The compensation of the President is established by law (3 U.S.C.
    102). In addition, the law provides an expense allowance (3 U.S.C. 102)
    and a travel allowance (3 U.S.C. 103).

    Sec. 158. Oath of the President.

      \8\Before  he enter on the
    Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or
    Affirmation:--``I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully
    execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the
    best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
    United States.''

    [[Page 71]]

    Sec. 159. Inauguration of the President.

      The  taking of this
    oath, which is termed the inauguration, is made the occasion of certain
    ceremonies that are arranged for by a joint committee of the two Houses
    (III, 1998, 1999; VI, 451). For many years the oath was normally taken
    at the east portico of the Capitol, although in earlier years it was
    taken in the Senate Chamber or Hall of the House (III, 1986-1995). On
    March 4, 1909, owing to inclement weather, the President-elect took the
    oath and delivered his inaugural address in the Senate Chamber (VI,
    447). And when Vice President Fillmore succeeded to the vacancy in the
    Office of President, Congress being in session, he took the oath in the
    Hall of the House in the presence of the Senate and House (III, 1997).
    In 1945 Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had been elected for his fourth term
    as President, took the oath of office on the south portico at the White
    House. On August 9, 1974, Gerald R. Ford, who as Vice President
    succeeded to the Presidency following the resignation of President Nixon
    on that day, was sworn in in the East Room of the White House. The West
    Front of the Capitol was first used for the inaugural ceremony for
    Ronald W. Reagan, Jan. 20, 1981. Because of extreme cold, the public
    administration of the oath was for the first time held in the Rotunda of
    the Capitol, rather than on the West Front, as scheduled, on January 21,
    1985. Permission for such use is authorized by concurrent resolution
    (see, e.g., Oct. 9, 1984, p. 30926).

    Sec. 160. The President the Commander in
    Chief.

      Section 2. \1\The  President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of
    the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called
    into the actual Service of the United States; he may require
    the <> Opinion,
    in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive
    Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their
    respective <> Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and
    Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of
    Impeachment.

    Sec. 163. War powers of Congress and the President.

      The   93d
    Congress passed over the President's veto Public Law 93-148, relating to
    the power of Congress to declare war under article I, section 8, clause
    11 (Sec. 127, supra) and the power of the President as Commander in
    Chief under this clause. For further discussion of the reports to
    Congress required and the procedure for congressional action provided
    under Public Law 93-148, see Sec. 128, supra.

    Sec. 164. Pardon of former President.

      In  1974, President
    Ford exercised his power under the last phrase of this clause by
    pardoning former President Nixon for any crimes he might have committed
    during a certain period in office (Proclamation 4311, September 8,
    1974). President Nixon had resigned on August 9, 1974, following the
    decision of the Committee on the Judiciary to report to the House a
    recommendation of impeachment (H. Rept. 93-1305, Aug. 20, 1974, p.
    29219).

    [[Page 72]]

    Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
    established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
    such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in
    the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

    Sec. 165. President makes treaties.

      \2\He  shall have Power,
    by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
    provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall
    nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
    appoint Ambassadors, <> other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme
    Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose

      The power of the President to appoint diplomatic representatives to
    foreign governments and to determine their rank is derived from the
    Constitution and may not be circumscribed by statutory enactments (VII,
    1248). In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Supreme Court held
    that any appointee exercising significant authority (not merely internal
    delegable authorities within the legislative branch) pursuant to the
    laws of the United States is an Officer of the United States and must
    therefore be appointed pursuant to this clause, and that Congress cannot
    by law vest such appointment authority in its own officers or require
    that Presidential appointments be subject to confirmation by both
    Houses. For a discussion of the role of the House with respect to
    treaties affecting revenue, see Sec. 597, infra.

    Sec. 167. President's power to fill vacancies during
    recess of the Senate.

      \3\The  President shall have Power to fill up all
    Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting
    Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.

    Sec. 167a. Decision of the Court.

      Decision  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: National Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel
    Canning, 573 U.S. _ (2014).

    Sec. 168. Messages from the President.

      Section 3.  He shall
    from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the
    Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall
    judge necessary and expedient; * * *

    [[Page 73]]

    on the same day, but an accompanying document can be sent to but one
    House (V, 6616, 6617). The President's State of the Union message is
    referred on motion to the Union Calendar and ordered printed (e.g., Jan.
    15, 1975, p. 177). This motion may also refer a separate hand-delivered
    written message from the President (e.g., Jan. 19, 1978, p. 152). In
    early years confidential messages were often sent and considered in
    secret session of the House (V, 7251, 7252).
      In the early years of the Government the President made a speech to
    Congress on its assembling (V, 6629), but in 1801 President Jefferson
    discontinued this practice and transmitted a message in writing. This
    protocol was followed until April 8, 1913, when the custom of addressing
    Congress in person was resumed by President Wilson and, with the
    exception of President Hoover (VIII, 3333) has been followed generally
    by subsequent Presidents. A message in writing is usually communicated
    to both Houses

    Sec. 169. Messages required by law.

      By  law (31 U.S.C. 1105),
    the President is required to transmit the budget to Congress on or after
    the first Monday in January but not later than the first Monday in
    February each year. In addition, the President is required to submit a
    supplemental budget summary by July 16 each year (31 U.S.C. 1106).
    Submission of the Economic Report of the President is required within 10
    days after the submission of the budget (15 U.S.C. 1022). The
    Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 601)
    requires the transmittal to Congress by the President of amendments and
    revisions related to the budget on or before April 10 and July 15 of
    each year. In addition, the Act provides for the transmittal of messages
    proposing rescissions and deferrals of budget authority (2 U.S.C. 683,
    684).

      When the President has expressed desire to address Congress in person
    a concurrent resolution is adopted by both Houses arranging for a joint
    session to receive the message. The Speaker presides and the President
    of the Senate (the Vice President) sits to the right of the Speaker, but
    in the absence of the Vice President, the President pro tempore sits to
    the left of the Speaker (Nov. 27, 1963, p. 22838).

    Sec. 170. Reception of messages from the
    President.

      The  ceremony of receiving a message in writing is simple (V,
    6591), and may occur during consideration of a question of privilege (V,
    6640-6642) or before the organization of the House (V, 6647-6649) and in
    the absence of a quorum (V, 6650; VIII, 3339; clause 7 of rule XX).

    * * * <> he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both
    Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them,
    with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such
    Time as he shall think proper; * * *

    [[Page 74]]

      But, with the exception of vetoes, messages are regularly laid before
    the House only at the time prescribed by the rule for the order of
    business (V, 6635-6638) within the discretion of the Speaker (VIII,
    3341). Although a message of the President is always read, the latest
    rulings have not permitted the reading of the accompanying documents to
    be demanded as a matter of right (V, 5267-5271; VII, 1108). A concurrent
    resolution providing for a joint session to receive the President's
    message was held to be of the highest privilege (VIII, 3335).

    * * * <> he shall receive Ambassadors and other
    public Ministers; he shall take Care That the Laws be faithfully
    executed, and shall Commission all the officers of the United States.

      In certain exigencies the President may convene Congress at a place
    other than the seat of government (I, 2; 2 U.S.C. 27). Congress has on
    occasion been convened by the President (I, 10, 11; Nov. 17, 1947, p.
    10578; July 26, 1948, p. 9362), and in one instance, when Congress had
    provided by law for meeting, the President called it together on an
    earlier day (I, 12). The Congress having adjourned on July 27, 1947, p.
    10521, and on June 20, 1948, p. 9350, to a day certain, the President
    called it together on an earlier date than that to which it adjourned
    (Nov. 17, 1947, p. 10577; July 26, 1948, p. 9362). There has been some
    discussion as to whether or not there is a distinction between a session
    called by the President and other sessions of Congress (I, 12,
    footnote).

    Sec. 173. Impeachment of civil officers.

      Section 4.  The
    President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States,
    shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
    Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

    [[Page 75]]

    a resolution impeaching such an independent counsel constitutes a
    question of the privileges of the House under rule IX (Sept. 23, 1998,
    p. 21560). A resolution impeaching the United States Ambassador to the
    United Nations (July 13, 1978, p. 20606) or the Commissioner of the
    Internal Revenue Service (Dec. 6, 2016, p. _) constitutes a question of
    the privileges of the House under rule IX.

    Sec. 174. As to the officers who may be impeached.

      In  the
    Blount trial the managers contended that all citizens of the United
    States were liable to impeachment, but this contention was not admitted
    (III, 2315), and in the Belknap trial both managers and counsel for
    respondent agreed that a private citizen, apart from offense in an
    office, might not be impeached (III, 2007). But resignation of the
    office does not prevent impeachment for crime or misdemeanor therein
    (III, 2007, 2317, 2444, 2445, 2459, 2509). In Blount's case it was
    decided that a Senator was not a civil officer within the meaning of the
    impeachment provisions of the Constitution (III, 2310, 2316). Questions
    have also arisen as to whether or not the Congressional Printer (III,
    1785), or a vice consul-general (III, 2515), might be impeached.
    Proceedings for the impeachment of territorial judges have been taken in
    several instances (III, 2486, 2487, 2488), although various opinions
    have been given that such an officer is not impeachable (III, 2022,
    2486, 2493). A committee of the House by majority vote held a
    Commissioner of the District of Columbia not to be a civil officer
    subject to impeachment under the Constitution (VI, 548). An independent
    counsel appointed under 28 U.S.C. 593 (a statute currently ineffective
    under 28 U.S.C. 599) may be impeached under 28 U.S.C. 596(a), and

    [[Page 76]]

    (VI, 466). The report accompanying a resolution to impeach President
    Clinton, and the debate in the House thereon, included discussion of the
    nature of an impeachable offense (H. Rept. 105-830; Dec. 18, 1998, p.
    27828). Of the four articles of impeachment of President Clinton
    reported by the Committee on the Judiciary ((1) perjury in grand jury,
    (2) perjury in a civil deposition, (3) obstruction of justice, and (4)
    improper responses to written questions from the Committee on the
    Judiciary), only the first and third were adopted by the House (Dec. 19,
    1998, p. 28110). The President was acquitted by the Senate on each
    article (Feb. 12, 1999, p. 2376).

    Sec. 175. Nature of impeachable offenses.

      As  to what are
    impeachable offenses there has been much discussion (III, 2008, 2019,
    2020, 2356, 2362, 2379-2381, 2405, 2406, 2410, 2498, 2510; VI, 455;
    Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States,
    Committee on the Judiciary, H. Rept. 93-1305, Aug. 20, 1974, p. 29219;
    Associate Justice William O. Douglas, Final Report by the Special
    Subcommittee on H. Res. 920, Committee on the Judiciary, Sept. 17, 1970;
    Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United
    States, H. Rept. 105-830, Dec. 16, 1998). For a time the theory that
    indictable offenses only were impeachable was stoutly maintained and as
    stoutly denied (III, 2356, 2360-2362, 2379-2381, 2405, 2406, 2410,
    2416); but on the 10th and 11th articles of the impeachment of President
    Andrew Johnson the House concluded to impeach for other than indictable
    offenses (III, 2418), and in the Swayne trial the theory was definitely
    abandoned (III, 2019). Although there has not been definite concurrence
    in the claim of the managers in the trial of the President that an
    impeachable offense is any misbehavior that shows disqualification to
    hold and exercise the office, whether moral, intellectual, or physical
    (III, 2015), the House has impeached judges for improper personal habits
    (III, 2328, 2505), and in the impeachment of President Johnson one of
    the articles charged him with ``intemperate, inflammatory, and
    scandalous harangues'' in public addresses, tending to harm the
    Government (III, 2420). There was no conviction under these charges
    except in the single case of Judge Pickering, who was charged with
    intoxication on the bench (III, 2328-2341). As to the impeachment of
    judges for other delinquencies, there has been much contention as to
    whether they may be impeached for any breach of good behavior (III,
    2011, 2016, 2497), or only for judicial misconduct occurring in the
    actual administration of justice in connection with the court (III,
    2010, 2013, 2017). The intent of the judge (III, 2014, 2382) as related
    to mistakes of the law, and the relations of intent to conviction have
    been discussed at length (III, 2014, 2381, 2382, 2518, 2519). The
    statutes make nonresidence of a judge an impeachable offense, and the
    House has taken steps to impeach for this cause (III, 2476, 2512). There
    has, however, been some question as to the power of Congress to make an
    impeachable offense (III, 2014, 2015, 2021, 2512). Usurpation of power
    has been examined several times as a cause for impeachment (III, 2404,
    2508, 2509, 2516, 2517). There also has been discussion as to whether or
    not there is distinction between a misdemeanor and a high misdemeanor
    (III, 2270, 2367, 2492). Review of impeachments in Congress showing the
    nature of charges upon which impeachments have been brought and
    judgments of the Senate thereon

    Sec. 176. Other impeachment inquiries.

      The  articles of
    impeachment adopted by the House in 1936 against Judge Ritter charged a
    variety of judicial misconduct, including violations of criminal law.
    The seventh and general article, upon which Judge Ritter was convicted
    by the Senate, charged general misconduct to bring his court into
    scandal and disrepute and to destroy public confidence in his court and
    in the judicial system (Impeachment by the House, Mar. 2, 1936, p. 3091;
    Conviction by the Senate, Apr. 17, 1936, p. 5606). Following his
    conviction by the Senate, former Judge Ritter brought an action for back
    salary, contending that the Senate had tried and convicted him for
    nonimpeachable offenses. The U.S. Court of Claims held that the Senate's
    power to try impeachments was exclusive and not subject to judicial
    review. Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cls. 293 (1936), cert. denied,
    300 U.S. 668 (1937).

      In 1970 a special subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary
    considered charges of impeachment against Associate Justice Douglas of
    the Supreme Court. The subcommittee recommended against his impeachment
    but concluded that a Federal judge could be impeached (1) for judicial
    conduct that is a serious dereliction from public duty and (2) for
    nonjudicial conduct that is criminal in nature (Associate Justice
    William O. Douglas, Final Report by the Special Subcommittee on H. Res.
    920, Committee on the Judiciary, September 17, 1970).

    [[Page 77]]

    ard M. Nixon, President of the United States, Committee on the
    Judiciary, H. Rept. 93-1305, Aug. 20, 1974, printed in full in the Cong.
    Record, Aug. 22, 1974, p. 29219).
      In 1974 the Committee on the Judiciary investigated charges of
    impeachment against President Nixon (Feb. 6, 1974, p. 2349), and
    determined to recommend his impeachment to the House. The President
    having resigned, the committee reported to the House without submitting
    a resolution of impeachment, and the House accepted the report by
    resolution (Aug. 20, 1974, p. 29361). The report of the committee
    included the text of the three articles of impeachment adopted by the
    committee. The committee had concluded that impeachable offenses need
    not be indictable offenses and recommended impeachment of the President:
    (1) for violating his oath of office and his duty under the Constitution
    by preventing, obstructing, and impeding the administration of justice;
    (2) for engaging in a course of conduct violating the constitutional
    rights of citizens, impairing the administration of justice, and
    contravening the laws governing executive agencies; and (3) for failing
    to honor subpoenas issued by the Committee on the Judiciary in the
    course of its impeachment inquiry (Impeachment of Rich

      In 1986, for the first time since 1936, the House agreed to a
    resolution impeaching a Federal district judge. Judge Harry Claiborne
    had been convicted of falsifying Federal income tax returns. His final
    appeal was denied by the Supreme Court in April, and he began serving
    his prison sentence in May. Because he declined to resign, however,
    Judge Claiborne was still receiving his judicial salary and, absent
    impeachment, would resume the bench on his release from prison.
    Consequently, a resolution of impeachment was introduced on June 3, and
    on July 16, the Committee on the Judiciary reported to the House four
    articles of impeachment against Judge Claiborne. On July 22, the
    resolution was called up as a question of privilege and agreed to by a
    recorded vote of 406 yeas, 0 nays. After trial in the Senate, Judge
    Claiborne was convicted on three of the four articles of impeachment and
    removed from office on October 9, 1986.

      In 1988, the House agreed to a resolution reported from the Committee
    on the Judiciary and called up as a question of the privileges of the
    House impeaching Federal district judge Alcee L. Hastings for high
    crimes and misdemeanors specified in 17 articles of impeachment, some of
    them addressing allegations on which the judge had been acquitted in a
    Federal criminal trial (Aug. 3, 1988, p. 20206). No trial in the Senate
    was had before the adjournment of the 100th Congress. In the 101st
    Congress, the House reappointed managers to conduct this impeachment in
    the Senate (Jan. 3, 1989, p. 84); the Senate began its deliberations on
    March 15, 1989 (p. 4219); conviction and removal from office occurred on
    October 20, 1989 (p. 25335). Also in the 101st Congress, the Senate
    convicted Federal district judge Walter L. Nixon on two of the three
    impeachment charges brought against him (Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27101). For
    further discussion of the continuance of impeachment proceedings in a
    succeeding Congress, see Sec. 620, infra.

    [[Page 78]]

    a Federal civil action; and (4) the President abused his office,
    impaired the administration of justice, and contravened the authority of
    the legislative branch by his response to 81 written questions submitted
    by the Committee on the Judiciary (Dec. 17, 1998, p. 27819). The chair
    of the Committee on the Judiciary called up the resolution on December
    18, 1998 (p. 27828).
      In 1998 the House agreed to a privileged resolution reported from the
    Committee on Rules, referring to the Committee on the Judiciary a
    communication from an independent counsel transmitting under 28 U.S.C.
    595(c) evidence of possible impeachable offenses by President Clinton,
    and restricting access to the communication and to meetings and hearings
    thereon (Sept. 11, 1998, p. 20020). Later, the House adopted a
    privileged resolution reported from the Committee on the Judiciary
    authorizing an impeachment inquiry by that committee and investing it
    with special investigative authorities to facilitate the inquiry (Oct.
    8, 1998, p. 24679). The Committee on the Judiciary filed with the House
    a privileged report accompanying a resolution containing four articles
    of impeachment against President Clinton that alleged: (1) the President
    gave perjurious, false, and misleading testimony to a grand jury; (2)
    the President gave perjurious, false, and misleading testimony in a
    Federal civil action; (3) the President prevented, obstructed, and
    impeded the administration of justice relating to

      In 2008, the House agreed to an unreported resolution authorizing an
    impeachment inquiry of Federal district judge G. Thomas Porteous by the
    Committee on the Judiciary and investing it with special investigative
    authorities to facilitate the inquiry (Sept. 17, 2008, p. 19517), which
    was continued in the next Congress (Jan. 13, 2009, p. 568). In 2010, the
    House adopted a resolution reported from the committee and called up as
    a question of the privileges of the House impeaching the judge for high
    crimes and misdemeanors specified in 4 articles of impeachment (Mar. 11,
    2010, p. 3147).

      In 2009, the House agreed to a resolution reported from the Committee
    on the Judiciary and called up as a question of the privileges of the
    House impeaching Federal district judge Samuel B. Kent for high crimes
    and misdemeanors specified in 4 articles of impeachment, some of them
    addressing allegations on which the judge had been convicted in a
    Federal criminal trial (June 19, 2009, p. 15747).

      A resolution offered from the floor to permit the Delegate of the
    District of Columbia to vote on the articles of impeachment was held not
    to constitute a question of the privileges of the House under rule IX
    (Dec. 18, 1998, p. 27825). To a privileged resolution of impeachment, an
    amendment proposing instead censure, which is not privileged, was held
    not germane (Dec. 19, 1998, p. 28100).

      For further discussion of impeachment proceedings, see Sec. Sec. 601-
    620, infra; Sec. 31, supra, and Deschler, ch. 14.

                                  ARTICLE III.

    [[Page 79]]

    Sec. 177. The judges, their terms, and
    compensation.

      Section 1.  The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
    in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
    from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme
    and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and
    shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation,
    which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

    Sec. 178. Extent of the judicial
    power.

      Section 2. \1\The  judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
    arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
    Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all
    Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all
    Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which
    the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or
    more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between
    Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State
    claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or
    the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

    Sec. 178a. Decisions of the Court on legislative
    standing.

      Decisions  of the Supreme Court involving legislative standing to bring
    cases in Federal court include Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939);
    Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737
    (1984); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990); and, most recently,
    Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997), holding that Member plaintiffs must
    have alleged a ``personal stake'' in having an actual injury redressed,
    rather than an ``institutional injury'' that is ``abstract and widely
    dispersed.'' See also the 11th amendment (Sec. 218, infra).

    [[Page 80]]

    Sec. 179. Original and appellate jurisdiction of the
    Supreme Court.

      \2\In  all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
    and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme
    Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before
    mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as
    to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
    Congress shall make.

    Sec. 180. Places of trial of crimes by jury.

      \3\The  Trial of
    all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such
    Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
    committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be
    at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.

    Sec. 181. Treason against the United
    States.

      Section 3. \1\Treason  against the United States, shall consist only in levying War
    against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and
    Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony
    of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.

    Sec. 182. Punishment for treason.

      \2\The  Congress shall have
    Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason
    shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of
    the Person Attainted.

                                   ARTICLE IV.

    Sec. 183. Each State to give credit to acts,
    records, etc., of other States.

      Section 1.  Full Faith and Credit shall be given
    in each State to the Public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of
    every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the
    Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and
    the Effect thereof.

    [[Page 81]]

    Sec. 184. Privileges and immunities of citizens.

        Section 2.
    \1\The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
    Immunities of Citizens in the several States.

    Sec. 185. Extradition for treason, felony, or other
    crime.

      \2\A  Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other
    Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall
    on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be
    delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the
    Crime.

    Sec. 186. Persons held to service or labor.

      \3\No  Person
    held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping
    into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be
    discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on
    Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.

    Sec. 187. Admission and formation of new
    States.

      Section 3. \1\New  States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no
    new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any
    other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more
    States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of
    the States concerned as well as of the Congress.

    Sec. 188. Power of Congress over territory and other
    national property.

      \2\The  Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make
    all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
    Property belonging to
    the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so
    construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any
    particular State.

    [[Page 82]]

    to foreign nations through self-executing treaties. Edwards v. Carter,
    580 F.2d 1055 (1978), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978).

      The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held
    that the property clause does not prohibit the transfer of United States
    property

    Sec. 189. Republican form of government and
    protection from domestic violence guaranteed to the States.

      Section 4. The  United
    States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
    Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on
    Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the
    Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence.

                                   ARTICLE V.

    [[Page 83]]

    Sec. 190. Amendments to the Constitution.

      The  Congress,
    whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
    propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the
    Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a
    Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be
    valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when
    ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or
    by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of
    Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment
    which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight
    shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth
    Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent,
    shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

    Sec. 191. Form of and action on amendments to the
    Constitution.

      Amendments  to the Constitution are proposed in the form of joint
    resolutions, which have their several readings and are enrolled and
    signed by the presiding officers of the two Houses (V, 7029, footnote),
    but are not presented to the President for his approval (V, 7040; see
    discussion under Sec. 115, supra; Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3
    Dall.) 378 (1798)). They are filed with the Archivist who, under the law
    (1 U.S.C. 106b; 1 U.S.C. 112), has the responsibility for the
    certification and publication of such amendments, once they are ratified
    by the States. Under the earlier procedure, the two Houses sometimes
    requested the President to transmit to the States certain proposed
    amendments (V, 7041, 7043), but a concurrent resolution to that end was
    without privilege (VIII, 3508). The President notified Congress by
    message of the promulgation of the ratification of a constitutional
    amendment (V, 7044). The House in the 114th and 115th Congresses
    required that petitions from state legislatures purporting to call for
    constitutional conventions or to rescind such calls be made publicly
    available (sec. 3(c), H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 2015, p. _; sec. 3(d), H. Res.
    5, Jan. 3, 2017, p. _).-

    Sec. 192. The twothirds vote on proposed
    amendments.

      The  vote required on a joint resolution proposing an amendment
    to the Constitution is two-thirds of those voting, a quorum being
    present, and not two-thirds of the entire membership (V, 7027, 7028;
    VIII, 3503). The majority required to pass a constitutional amendment,
    like the majority required to pass a bill over the President's veto
    (VII, 1111) and the majority required to adopt a motion to suspend the
    rules (Dec. 16, 1981, pp. 31850, 31851, 31855, 31856), is two-thirds of
    those Members voting either in the affirmative or negative, a quorum
    being present, and Members who only indicate that they are ``present''
    are not counted in this computation (Nov. 15, 1983, p. 32685). The
    requirement of the two-thirds vote applies to the vote on final passage
    and not to amendments (V, 7031, 7032; VIII, 3504), or prior stages (V,
    7029, 7030), but is required if the House votes on agreeing to Senate
    amendments (V, 7033, 7034; VIII, 3505), or on agreeing to a conference
    report (V, 7036). One House having, by a two-thirds vote, passed in
    amended form a proposed constitutional amendment from the other House,
    and then having by a majority vote receded from its amendment, the
    constitutional amendment was held not to be passed (V, 7035).

    [[Page 84]]

    was required on such a measure (H.J. Res. 638; Speaker O'Neill, Aug. 15,
    1978, p. 26203).
      In the 95th Congress, both the House and Senate agreed by a majority
    vote to House Joint Resolution 638, extending the time period for
    ratification by the States of the Equal Rights Amendment, where House
    Joint Resolution 208 of the 92d Congress, proposing the amendment, had
    provided for a seven-year ratification period. The House determined, by
    laying on the table by a record vote a privileged resolution asserting
    that a vote of two-thirds of the Members present and voting was required
    to pass a joint resolution extending the ratification period for a
    constitutional amendment already submitted to the States, that only a
    majority vote

      The joint resolution extending the ratification period for the Equal
    Rights Amendment was delivered to the President, who signed it although
    expressing doubt as to the necessity for his doing so (Presidential
    Documents, Oct. 19, 1978). When sent to the Archivist, the joint
    resolution was not assigned a public law number, but the Archivist
    notified the States of the action of the Congress in extending the
    ratification period. For a judicial decision voiding this extension, see
    Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F.Supp. 1107 (D.C.D. Idaho, 1981), judgment stayed
    sub nom. National Organization of Women v. Idaho, 455 U.S. 918 (1982),
    vacated and remanded to dismiss, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).

      The yeas and nays are not required to pass a joint resolution
    proposing to amend the Constitution (V, 7038-7039; VIII, 3506).

      Question has arisen as to the power of a State to recall, or rescind,
    its assent to a constitutional amendment (V, 7042; footnotes to
    Sec. Sec. 225, 234, infra) but has not been the subject of a final
    judicial determination (see Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F.Supp. 1107 (D.
    Idaho, 1981), judgment stayed sub nom. National Organization of Women v.
    Idaho, 455 U.S. 918 (1982), vacated and remanded to dismiss, 459 U.S.
    809 (1982)).

    Sec. 193. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350
    (1920); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S.
    368 (1921); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922); Coleman v. Miller,
    307 U.S. 433 (1939); Chandler v. Wise, 307 U.S. 474 (1939).

                                   ARTICLE VI.

    Sec. 194. Validity of debts and engagements.

      \1\All  Debts
    contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this
    Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this
    Constitution, as under the Confederation.

    [[Page 85]]

    any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
    notwithstanding.

    Sec. 195. Constitution, laws, and treaties the supreme
    law of the land.

      \2\This  Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
    shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
    shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
    supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
    thereby,

    Sec. 196. Oaths of public officers; and prohibition of
    religious tests.

      \3\The  Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and
    the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and
    judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States,
    shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but
    no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any
    Office or public Trust under the United States.

    Sec. 197. Form of oath.

      The  form of the oath is prescribed
    by statute (5 U.S.C. 3331; I, 128): ``I, AB, do solemnly swear (or
    affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United
    States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true
    faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely,
    without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that I will
    well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am
    about to enter. So help me God.''

    Sec. 198. Administration of oath at organization.

      The  Act of
    June 1, 1789 (2 U.S.C. 25), provides that on the organization of the
    House and previous to entering on any other business the oath shall be
    administered by any Member (generally the Member with longest continuous
    service) (I, 131; VI, 6) to the Speaker and by the Speaker to the other
    Members and Clerk (I, 130). The Act has at times been considered in the
    House as directory merely (I, 118, 242, 243, 245; VI, 6); but at other
    times has been observed carefully (I, 118, 140). The Act was cited by
    the Clerk in recognizing for nominations for Speaker as being of higher
    constitutional privilege than a resolution to postpone the election of a
    Speaker and instead provide for the election of a Speaker pro tempore
    pending the disposition of certain ethics charges against the nominee of
    the majority party (Jan. 7, 1997, p. 115).

    [[Page 86]]

    votes to remove mention of them, and (2) ratifying the following
    activities involving one or both of them: election to and participation
    in standing committee; introduction and numbering of measures;
    submission of items to the Congressional Record; co-sponsorship of
    measures; and non-voting participation in floor proceedings (Jan. 7,
    2011, p. 227).
      Previously it was the custom to administer the oath by State
    delegations, but beginning with the 71st Congress Members-elect have
    been sworn in en masse (VI, 8). The Clerk supplies printed copies of the
    oath to Members and Delegates who have taken the oath in accordance with
    law, which shall be subscribed by the Members and Delegates and
    delivered to the Clerk to be recorded in the Journal and Congressional
    Record as conclusive proof of the fact that the signer duly took the
    oath in accordance with law (2 U.S.C. 25). See Deschler, ch. 2. Where
    two Members-elect participated in various House and committee business
    before taking the oath of office, the House adopted a resolution (1)
    correcting the results of record

    Sec. 199. Functions of the Speaker in administering the
    oath.

      The  Speaker possesses no arbitrary power in the administration of
    the oath (I, 134), and when objection is made the question must be
    decided by the House and not by the Chair (I, 519, 520). An objection
    prevents the Speaker from administering the oath of his own authority,
    even though the credentials be regular in form (I, 135-138). The Speaker
    has frequently declined to administer the oath in cases wherein the
    House has, by its action, indicated that the Speaker should not do so
    (I, 139, 140). And in case of doubt the Speaker has waited the
    instruction of the House (I, 396; VI, 11). There has been discussion as
    to the competency of a Speaker pro tempore to administer the oath (I,
    170), and in the absence of the Speaker a Member-elect waited until the
    Speaker could be present (I, 179), but in 1920 a Speaker pro tempore
    whose designation by the Speaker had been approved by the House,
    administered the oath (VI, 20). The House may authorize the Speaker to
    administer the oath away from the House (I, 169), or may, in such a
    case, authorize another than the Speaker to administer the oath (I, 170;
    VI, 14). For forms used in this procedure, see VI, 14. On one occasion,
    the Speaker requested that guests in the gallery rise with the Members
    during the administration of the oath of office to a Member-elect (Nov.
    12, 1991, p. 31255).

    Sec. 200. Administration of the oath as related
    to the quorum.

      Members-elect  have been sworn at the beginning of a second session
    before the ascertainment of a quorum (I, 176-178), but when the Clerk
    called the second session of the 87th Congress to order, Members-elect
    were not sworn before ascertainment of a quorum and election of Speaker
    McCormack to succeed Speaker Rayburn, who had died during the
    adjournment sine die (Jan. 10, 1962, p. 5). Members-elect have also been
    sworn where a roll call or other ascertainment has shown the absence of
    a quorum (I, 178, 181, 182; VI, 21) but in one instance, however, the
    Speaker declined to administer the oath under such circumstances (II,
    875).

    [[Page 87]]

    Whole (Oct. 3, 1969, p. 28487) or pending engrossment and third reading
    (June 19, 2008, pp. 13047-49). A division being demanded on a resolution
    seating several claimants, the oath may be administered to each as soon
    as his case is decided (I, 623). If a Member-elect whose right to a seat
    has been determined by the House is present to take the oath, the right
    to be sworn is complete and cannot be deferred even by a motion to
    adjourn (I, 622), but the Speaker has entertained the motion to adjourn
    after adoption of a seating resolution but before the Member-elect was
    present in the Chamber to take the oath (May 1, 1985, p. 10019).

    Sec. 201. Privilege of administration of the
    oath.

      A  proposition to administer the oath is a matter of high privilege
    (VI, 14). It has been administered during a call of the roll and during
    an electronic vote on a motion to agree to rules at the time of
    organization (I, 173; VI, 22; Jan. 4, 2005, p. 46) and during an
    electronic vote taken during House deliberations interlocutory to an
    ongoing joint session to count the electoral votes (Jan. 6, 2005, p.
    242). It also has been administered before the reading of the Journal
    (I, 172), in the absence of a quorum (VI, 22), on Calendar Wednesday
    (VI, 22), before a pending motion to amend the Journal (I, 171), and
    after the previous question has been ordered on a bill reported back to
    the House from the Committee of the

    Sec. 202. Challenge of the right to take the oath.

      The  right
    of a Member-elect to take the oath is sometimes challenged, usually at
    the time of organization of the House. The challenge may be made by a
    Member-elect who has not yet taken the oath (I, 141). The Member
    challenging does so on his responsibility as a Member or on the strength
    of documents (I, 448) or on both (I, 443, 474). And where an objection
    was sustained neither by affidavit nor on the responsibility of the
    Member objecting, the House declined to entertain it (I, 455).

    Sec. 203. Consideration of an objection to the taking of
    the oath.

      It  has been held, although not uniformly, that in cases in
    which the right of a Member-elect to take the oath is challenged, the
    Speaker may direct the Member to abstain temporarily (I, 143-146, 474;
    VI, 9, 174; VIII, 3386). The Member so challenged is not thereby
    deprived of any right (I, 155). Similarly, the seating of a Member-elect
    does not prejudice a pending contest, brought under the Federal
    Contested Elections Act (2 U.S.C. 381-396), over final right to the seat
    (Jan. 7, 1997, p. 120; Jan. 4, 2007, p. 5). When several are challenged
    and abstain, the question is first taken on the Member-elect first
    required to abstain (I, 147, 148). In 1861 it was held that the House
    might direct contested names to be passed over until the other Members-
    elect had been sworn in (I, 154). Motions and debate are in order on the
    questions involved in a challenge, and in a few cases other business has
    intervened by unanimous consent (I, 149, 150). By unanimous consent the
    consideration of a challenge is sometimes deferred until after the
    completion of the organization (I, 474), and by unanimous consent also
    the House has sometimes proceeded to legislative business pending
    consideration of the right of a Member to be sworn (I, 151, 152).

    [[Page 88]]

    3, 1949, p. 8). If the prima facie right is contested the Speaker
    declines to administer the oath (I, 550), but the House admits on a
    prima facie showing, and without regard to final right, a Member-elect
    from a recognized constituency whose credentials are in due form and
    whose qualifications are unquestioned (I, 528-534). If the status of the
    constituency is in doubt, the House usually defers the oath (I, 361,
    386, 448, 461). In the 99th Congress, the House declined to give prima
    facie effect to a certificate of election, the results of the election
    being in doubt, and referred the issue of initial as well as final right
    to the Committee on House Administration (H. Res. 1, Jan. 3, 1985, pp.
    380-87). After a recount of the votes was conducted by that committee,
    the House on its recommendation declared the candidate without the
    certificate entitled to the seat (H. Res. 146, May 1, 1985, p. 9998).
    The House also may defer the oath when a question of qualifications
    arises (I, 474), but it may investigate qualifications after the oath is
    taken (I, 156-159, 420, 462, 481), and after investigation unseat the
    Member by majority vote (I, 428).

    Sec. 204. Relation of credentials to the right to
    take the oath.

      Although  the House has emphasized the impropriety of swearing a
    Member without credentials (I, 162-168), yet it has been done in cases
    in which the credentials are delayed or lost and there is no doubt of
    the election (I, 85, 176-178; VI, 12, 13), or in which the governor of a
    State has declined to give credentials to a person whose election was
    undoubted and uncontested (I, 553). A certificate of election in due
    form having been filed, the Clerk placed the name of the Member-elect on
    the roll, although he was subsequently advised that a State Supreme
    Court had issued a writ restraining the Secretary of State from issuing
    such certificate (Jan.

    Sec. 205. Sanity, loyalty, and incapacity as related
    to the oath.

      Questions  of sanity (I, 441) and loyalty (I, 448) seem to pertain
    to competency to take the oath as a question of qualifications, although
    there has been not a little debate on this subject (I, 479). In one case
    a Member-elect who had not taken the oath was excluded from the House
    because of disloyalty, in which the resolution of exclusion and the
    committee report thereon concluded that he was ineligible to take a seat
    as a Representative under the express provisions of section 3 of the
    14th amendment (VI, 56-59). This action by the House was cited in the
    Supreme Court decision of Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 545 fn. 83
    (1969), which denied the power of the House to exclude Members-elect by
    a majority vote for other than failure to meet the express
    qualifications stated in the Constitution. In Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S.
    116 (1966), the Supreme Court held that the exclusion by a State
    legislature of a member-elect of that body was unconstitutional, where
    the legislature had asserted the power to judge the sincerity with which
    the Member-elect could take the oath to support the Constitution of the
    United States. In the 97th Congress, the House declared vacant by
    majority vote the seat of a Member-elect unable to take the oath because
    of illness, in which the medical prognosis showed no likelihood of
    improvement to permit the Member-elect to take the oath or assume the
    duties of a Representative (H. Res. 80, Feb. 24, 1981, pp. 2916-18).

    [[Page 89]]

    Sec. 206. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
    316 (1819); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867); Davis v.
    Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Mormon Church  v. United States, 136 U.S. 1
    (1890).

                                  ARTICLE VII.

    Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the

    Sec. 207. Ratification of the Constitution.

      The  Ratification
    of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the
    Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the
    Same.

        Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand

        seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United

        States of America the Twelfth In Witness whereof We have hereunto

        subscribed our Names,

                             Go WASHINGTON--Presidt.

                                                   and Deputy from Virginia.

        [Signed also by the deputies of twelve States.]

    John Langdon,                        Nicholas Gilman.

                                 New Hampshire.

    Nathaniel Gorham,                    Rufus King.

                                 Massachusetts.

    Wm. Saml. Johnson,                   Roger Sherman.

                                  Connecticut.

    Alexander Hamilton.

                                    New York.

    Wil: Livingston,                     Wm. Paterson,

    David Brearley,                      Jona: Dayton.

                                   New Jersey.

    B Franklin,                          Thomas Mifflin,

    RobT. Morris,             Geo. Clymer,

    [[Page 90]]

    Thos. FitzSimons,                    Jared Ingersoll,

    James Wilson,                        Gouv Morris.

                                  Pennsylvania.

    Geo. Read,                           Gunning Bedford jun,

    John Dickinson,                      Richard Bassett.

    Jaco Broom,

                                    Delaware.

    James McHenry,                       Dan of ST Thos. Jenifer.

    Danl Carroll,

                                    Maryland.

    John Blair,                          James Madison Jr.

                                    Virginia.

    Wm. Blount,                          Rich'D. Dobbs Spaight.

    Hu Williamson,

                                 North Carolina.

    J. Rutledge,                         Charles Cotesworth Pinckney,

    Charles Pinckney,                    Pierce Butler.

                                 South Carolina.

    William Few,                         Abr Baldwin.

                                    Georgia.

    [[Page 91]]

      Attest:                            William Jackson, Secretary.

       articles in addition to, and amendment of, the constitution of the

      united states of america, proposed by congress, and ratified by the

          several states pursuant to the fifth article of the original

                           constitution\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      \1\The first 10 amendments to the Constitution of the
    United States were proposed to the legislatures of the several States by
    the First Congress on September 25, 1789 (this date and the date
    succeeding amendments were proposed is the date of final congressional
    action--signature by the presiding officer of the Senate--as is shown in
    the Senate Journals). They were ratified by the following States, on the
    dates shown, and the notifications by the governors thereof of
    ratification were communicated by the President to Congress: New Jersey,
    November 20, 1789; Maryland, December 19, 1789; North Carolina, December
    22, 1789; South Carolina, January 19, 1790; New Hampshire, January 25,
    1790; Delaware, January 28, 1790; New York, February 27, 1790;
    Pennsylvania, March 10, 1790; Rhode Island, June 7, 1790; Vermont,
    November 3, 1791; Virginia, December 15, 1791. Ratification was
    completed on December 15, 1791. The amendments were subsequently
    ratified by Massachusetts, March 2, 1939; Georgia, March 18, 1939;
    Connecticut, April 19, 1939.

                                  AMENDMENT I.

    Sec. 208. Freedom of religion, of speech, and of
    peaceable assembly.

      Congress  shall make no law respecting an establishment of
    religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
    freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
    to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

                                  AMENDMENT II.

    [[Page 92]]

    Sec. 209. The right to bear arms.

      A  well regulated Militia
    being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people
    to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.

                                 AMENDMENT III.

    Sec. 210. Quartering of soldiers in houses.

      No  soldier
    shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent
    of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by
    law.

                                  AMENDMENT IV.

    Sec. 211. Security from unreasonable searches and
    seizures.

      The  right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
    papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
    not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
    supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
    to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

                                  AMENDMENT V.

    [[Page 93]]

    Sec. 212. Security as to accusations, trials, and
    property.

      No  person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
    infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
    except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,
    when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any
    person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
    life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be a
    witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
    without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
    public use, without just compensation.

                                  AMENDMENT VI.

    Sec. 213. Right to trial by jury and to confront witnesses
    and secure testimony.

      In  all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
    enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
    the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
    which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
    informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
    with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
    witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
    defence.

                                 AMENDMENT VII.

    Sec. 214. Jury trial in suits at common law.

      In  suits at
    common law, where the value in Controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
    the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
    jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,
    than according to the rules of the common law.

                                 AMENDMENT VIII.

    [[Page 94]]

    Sec. 215. Excessive bail or fines and cruel punishments
    prohibited.

        Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
    imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

                                  AMENDMENT IX.

    Sec. 216. Rights reserved to the people.

        The enumeration in
    the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
    construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

                                  AMENDMENT X.

    Sec. 217. Powers reserved to the States.

      The  powers not
    delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
    to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
    people.

                           AMENDMENT XI.\2\

    Sec. 218. Extent of the judicial power.

      The  Judicial power
    of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
    or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
    Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
    State.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [[Page 95]]

      \2\The 11th amendment to the Constitution of the United
    States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the
    Third Congress on March 11, 1794; and was declared in a message from the
    President to Congress dated the 8th of January, 1798, to have been
    ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the States. The dates
    of ratification were: New York, March 27, 1794; Rhode Island, March 31,
    1794; Connecticut, May 8, 1794; New Hampshire, June 16, 1794;
    Massachusetts, June 26, 1794; Vermont, October 28, 1794; Virginia,
    November 18, 1794; Georgia, November 29, 1794; Kentucky, December 7,
    1794; Maryland, December 26, 1794; Delaware, January 23, 1795; North
    Carolina, February 7, 1795. Ratification was completed on February 7,
    1795. The amendment was subsequently ratified by South Carolina,
    December 4, 1797. New Jersey and Pennsylvania did not take action on the
    amendment.

                          AMENDMENT XII.\3\

    Sec. 219. Meeting of the electors and transmission and
    count of their votes.

      The  Electors shall meet in their respective states,
    and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at
    least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves;
    they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and
    in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they
    shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of
    all persons voted for as Vice-President, and the number of votes for
    each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to
    the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the
    President of the Senate;--The President of the Senate shall, in presence
    of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates
    and the votes shall then be counted;-- * * *
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [[Page 96]]

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      \3\See article II, section 1 of the Constitution. The 12th
    amendment to the Constitution was proposed to the legislatures of the
    several States by the Eighth Congress on December 12, 1803, in lieu of
    the original third paragraph of the first section of the second article,
    and was declared in a proclamation of the Secretary of State, dated the
    25th of September, 1804, to have been ratified by the legislatures of
    three-fourths of the States. The dates of ratification were: North
    Carolina, December 21, 1803; Maryland, December 24, 1803; Kentucky,
    December 27, 1803; Ohio, December 30, 1803; Virginia, December 31, 1803;
    Pennsylvania, January 5, 1804; Vermont, January 30, 1804; New York,
    February 10, 1804; New Jersey, February 22, 1804; Rhode Island, March
    12, 1804; South Carolina, May 15, 1804; Georgia, May 19, 1804; New
    Hampshire, June 15, 1804. Ratification was completed on June 15, 1804.
    The amendment was subsequently ratified by Tennessee, July 27, 1804. The
    amendment was rejected by Delaware, January 18, 1804; Massachusetts,
    February 3, 1804; and by Connecticut at its session begun May 10, 1804.

    Sec. 220. The electoral count.

      The  electoral count occurs in
    a joint session of the two Houses in the Hall of the House (III, 1819)
    at 1 p.m. on the sixth day of January succeeding every meeting of
    electors (3 U.S.C. 15). The Vice President, as President of the Senate
    (or the President pro tempore in the Vice President's absence), presides
    over the joint session (3 U.S.C. 15). The date of the count has been
    changed by law as follows: Monday, January 7, 1957 (P.L. 84-436);
    Monday, January 7, 1985 (P.L. 98-456); Wednesday, January 4, 1989 (P.L.
    100-646); Thursday, January 9, 1997 (P.L. 104-296); Thursday, January 8,
    2009 (P.L. 110-430); Friday, January 4, 2013 (P.L. 112-228).

    [[Page 97]]

      Sections 15-18 of title 3, United States Code, prescribe in detail the
    procedure for the count. Nevertheless, the two Houses traditionally
    adopt a concurrent resolution providing for the meeting in joint session
    to count the vote, for the appointment of tellers, and for the
    declaration of the state of the vote (III, 1961; Deschler, ch. 10,
    Sec. 2.1). Under the law governing the proceedings, the two Houses
    divide to consider an objection to the counting of any electoral vote or
    ``other question arising in the matter'' (3 U.S.C. 15-18; Jan. 6, 1969,
    pp. 145-47; Jan. 6, 2001, p. 101; Jan. 6, 2005, pp. 198, 199; Jan. 6,
    2017, p. _), but only when in writing and signed by both a Member and a
    Senator (Jan. 6, 2001, p. 101; Jan. 6, 2005, p. 198; Jan. 6, 2017, p.
    _). Examples of an ``other question arising in the matter'' include: (1)
    an objection for lack of a quorum (Jan. 6, 2001, p. 101); (2) a motion
    that either House withdraw from the joint session (Jan. 6, 2001, p.
    101); and (3) an appeal from a ruling by the presiding officer (Jan. 6,
    2001, p. 101). Such questions and objections are not debatable in the
    joint session (3 U.S.C. 18; Jan. 6, 2001, p. 101; Jan. 6, 2017, p. _).
    When the two Houses have divided, a motion in the House to lay the
    objection on the table is not in order (Jan. 6, 1969; pp. 169-72). A
    Vice President-elect, as Speaker of the House or as a sitting Vice
    President, has participated in the ceremonies (e.g., VI, 446; Jan. 6,
    2005, p. 197). See Deschler, ch. 10 for further discussion. When
    addressing a controversy over the election of President and Vice
    President in the State of Florida, the Supreme Court indicated its view
    of a section of the statute (3 U.S.C. 5) addressing a determination of
    controversy as to the appointment of electors. Bush v. Palm Beach County
    Canvassing Bd. (531 U.S. 70 (2000)). Ultimately, the Supreme Court found
    that the Florida Supreme Court violated the Equal Protection Clause of
    the 14th amendment by ordering certain counties to conduct manual
    recounts of the votes for President and Vice President without
    establishing standards for those recounts. Bush v. Gore (531 U.S. 98
    (2000)).

    [[Page 98]]

    gible to the Office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-
    President of the United States.

    Sec. 221. Elections of President and Vice President
    by the House and Senate in certain cases.

      * * * The  person having the greatest
    number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be
    a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person
    have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not
    exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House
    of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President.
    But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the
    representation from each State having one vote; a quorum for this
    purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the
    states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice.
    And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President
    whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth
    day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as
    President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional
    disability of the President. The person having the greatest number of
    votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be
    a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person
    have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the
    Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall
    consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of
    the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person
    constitutionally ineli

    Sec. 222. History of original provision for failure of
    electoral college to choose.

      The  20th amendment to the Constitution has
    clarified some of the provisions of the 12th amendment. In 1801 (III,
    1983), the House of Representatives chose a President under article II,
    section 1, clause 3 (see Sec. 152a, supra), the constitutional provision
    superseded by the 12th amendment.

    Sec. 223. Occasions of election by House and Senate after
    1803.

      In  1825 the House elected a President under the 12th amendment
    (III, 1985); and in 1837 the Senate elected a Vice President (III,
    1941).

                          AMENDMENT XIII.\4\

    [[Page 99]]

    exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
    jurisdiction.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sec. 224. Prohibition of slavery and involuntary
    servitude.

      Section 1.  Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
    punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
    shall

      \4\The 13th amendment to the Constitution of the United
    States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the
    38th Congress, on February 1, 1865, and was declared, in a proclamation
    of the Secretary of State, dated December 18, 1865, to have been
    ratified by the legislatures of 27 of the 36 States. The dates of
    ratification were: Illinois, February 1, 1865; Rhode Island, February 2,
    1865; Michigan, February 2, 1865; Maryland, February 3, 1865; New York,
    February 3, 1865; Pennsylvania, February 3, 1865; West Virginia,
    February 3, 1865; Missouri, February 6, 1865; Maine, February 7, 1865;
    Kansas, February 7, 1865; Massachusetts, February 7, 1865; Virginia,
    February 9, 1865; Ohio, February 16, 1865; Indiana, February 13, 1865;
    Nevada, February 16, 1865; Louisiana, February 17, 1865; Minnesota,
    February 23, 1865; Wisconsin, February 24, 1865; Vermont, March 9, 1865;
    Tennessee, April 7, 1865; Arkansas, April 14, 1865; Connecticut, May 4,
    1865; New Hampshire, July 1, 1865; South Carolina, November 13, 1865;
    Alabama, December 2, 1865; North Carolina, December 4, 1865; Georgia,
    December 6, 1865. Ratification was completed on December 6, 1865. The
    amendment was subsequently ratified by Oregon, December 8, 1865;
    California, December 19, 1865; Florida, December 28, 1865 (Florida again
    ratified on June 9, 1868, upon its adoption of a new constitution);
    Iowa, January 15, 1866; New Jersey, January 23, 1866 (after having
    rejected the amendment on March 16, 1865); Texas, February 18, 1870;
    Delaware, February 12, 1901 (after having rejected the amendment on
    February 8, 1865); Kentucky, March 30, 1976 (after having rejected the
    amendment on February 24, 1865). The amendment was rejected by
    Mississippi, December 4, 1865, but subsequently ratified on March 16,
    1995.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
    appropriate legislation.

                          AMENDMENT XIV.\5\

    [[Page 100]]

    State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
    shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
    States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
    property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
    jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sec. 225. Citizenship security and
    equal protection of citizens.

      Section 1. All  persons born or naturalized in the
    United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
    the United States and of the

      \5\The 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United
    States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the
    39th Congress, on June 15, 1866. On July 20, 1868, the Secretary of
    State issued a proclamation that the 14th amendment was a part of the
    Constitution if withdrawals of ratification were ineffective. On July
    21, 1868, Congress adopted and transmitted to the Department of State a
    concurrent resolution declaring that ``the legislatures of the States of
    Connecticut, Tennessee, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, New York, Ohio,
    Illinois, West Virginia, Kansas, Maine, Nevada, Missouri, Indiana,
    Minnesota, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Iowa, Arkansas,
    Florida, North Carolina, Alabama, South Carolina, and Louisiana, being
    three-fourths and more of the several States of the Union, have ratified
    the fourteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United
    States, duly proposed by two-thirds of each House of the Thirty-ninth
    Congress: Therefore Resolved, That said fourteenth article is hereby
    declared to be a part of the Constitution of the United States, and it
    shall be duly promulgated as such by the Secretary of State.'' The
    Secretary of State accordingly issued a proclamation, dated July 28,
    1868, declaring that the proposed 14th amendment had been ratified, in
    the manner hereafter mentioned, by the legislatures of 28 States. The
    dates of ratification were: Connecticut, June 30, 1866; New Hampshire,
    July 6, 1866; Tennessee, July 18, 1866; New Jersey, September 11, 1866
    (subsequently, on February 20, 1868, the legislature rescinded its
    ratification, and on March 24, 1868, readopted its resolution of
    rescission over the Governor's veto, and on April 23, 2003, revoked the
    resolution of rescission); Oregon, September 19, 1866 (subsequently
    rescinded its ratification on October 16, 1868, and ratified on April
    25, 1973); New York, January 10, 1867; Ohio, January 11, 1867
    (subsequently rescinded its ratification on January 13, 1868, and
    ratified on March 12, 2003); Illinois, January 15, 1867; West Virginia,
    January 16, 1867; Michigan, January 16, 1867; Minnesota, January 16,
    1867; Kansas, January 17, 1867; Maine, January 19, 1867; Nevada, January
    22, 1867; Indiana, January 23, 1867; Missouri, January 25, 1867;
    Pennsylvania, February 6, 1867; Rhode Island, February 7, 1867;
    Wisconsin, February 13, 1867; Massachusetts, March 20, 1867; Nebraska,
    June 15, 1867; Iowa, March 16, 1868; Arkansas, April 6, 1868; Florida,
    June 9, 1868; North Carolina, July 4, 1868 (after having rejected the
    amendment December 14, 1866); Louisiana, July 9, 1868 (after having
    rejected the amendment February 6, 1867); South Carolina, July 9, 1868
    (after having rejected the amendment December 20, 1866). Ratification
    was completed on July 9, 1868. The amendment was subsequently ratified
    by Alabama, July 13, 1868; Georgia, July 21, 1868 (after having rejected
    it on November 9, 1866); Virginia, October 8, 1869 (after having
    rejected it on January 9, 1867); Mississippi, January 17, 1870; Texas,
    February 18, 1870 (after having rejected it on October 27, 1866);
    Delaware, February 12, 1901 (after having rejected it on February 8,
    1867); Maryland, April 4, 1959 (after having rejected it on March 23,
    1867); California, May 6, 1959; Kentucky, March 30, 1976 (after having
    rejected it on January 10, 1867).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [[Page 101]]

    any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of
    age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except
    for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
    representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the
    number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

    Sec. 226. Apportionment of
    representation.

      Section 2.  Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
    States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number
    of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the
    right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President
    and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress,
    the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the
    Legislature thereof, is denied to

    Sec. 227. Law governing the establishment of
    districts.

      There  has been a readjustment of House representation each 10
    years except during the period 1911 to 1929 (VI, 41, footnote). From
    March 4, 1913, permanent House membership has remained fixed at 435 (VI,
    40, 41; 37 Stat. 13). Upon admission of Alaska and Hawaii to statehood,
    total membership was temporarily increased to 437 until the next
    reapportionment (72 Stat. 339, 345; 73 Stat. 8). Congress has by law
    provided for automatic apportionment of the 435 Representatives among
    the States according to each census including and after that of 1950 (2
    U.S.C. 2a). The Apportionment Act formerly provided that the districts
    in a State were to be composed of contiguous and compact territory
    containing as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants (I,
    303; VI, 44); but subsequent apportionment Acts, those of 1929 (46 Stat.
    26) and 1941 (55 Stat. 761), omitted such provisions. See Wood v. Broom,
    287 U.S. 1 (1932).

      Congress has by law provided that for the 91st and subsequent
    Congresses each State entitled to more than one Representative shall
    establish a number of districts equal to the number of such
    Representatives, and that Representatives shall be elected only from the
    single-Member districts so established. (Hawaii and New Mexico were
    excepted from the operation of this statute for the elections to the
    91st Congress by Public Law 90-196; see 2 U.S.C. 2c). After any
    apportionment, until a State is redistricted in a manner provided by its
    own law and in compliance with the congressional mandate, the question
    of whether its Representatives shall be elected by districts, at large,
    or by a combination of both, is determined by the Apportionment Act of
    1941 (2 U.S.C. 2a).

    [[Page 102]]

    have recently upheld under Federal law and the Constitution a counting
    methodology used by the Census Bureau in a decennial census. This
    method, known as ``imputation,'' was held to be different than
    ``sampling,'' a method prohibited under section 195 of title 13, United
    States Code. Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002). The method of
    apportioning the seats in the House is vested exclusively in Congress,
    and neither States nor courts may direct greater or lesser
    representation than that allocated by statute (Deschler, ch 8 Sec. 1).
    See Deschler, ch. 8 for apportionment and districting.
      Under the Apportionment Act, a statistical model known as the ``method
    of equal proportions'' is used to determine the number of
    Representatives to which each State is entitled. Although other methods
    for apportioning House seats may be permitted, the equal proportions
    method chosen by Congress has been upheld under the Constitution and was
    plainly intended to reach as close as practicable the goal of ``one
    person, one vote.'' Massachusetts v. Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. 230 (D.
    Mass. 1992), rev'd on other grounds Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S.
    788 (1992). The courts also

    Sec. 228. Questions as to elections.

      The  House has always
    seated Members elected at large in the States, although the law required
    election by districts (I, 310, 519). Questions have arisen from time to
    time when a vacancy has occurred soon after a change in districts, with
    the resulting question whether the vacancy should be filled by election
    in the old or new district (I, 311, 312, 327). The House has declined to
    interfere with the act of a State in changing the boundaries of a
    district after the apportionment has been made (I, 313).

    Sec. 229. Requirement that districts be equally
    populated.

      The Supreme  Court has ruled that congressional districts must be as
    equally populated as practicable. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
    (1964); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 385 U.S. 450 (1967). The Court has made
    clear that variances in population among congressional districts within
    a State may be considered de minimis only if they cannot practicably be
    avoided. If such variances, no matter how mathematically miniscule,
    could have been reduced or eliminated by a good faith effort, then they
    may be justified only on the basis of a consistent, rational State
    policy. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983). The Court also has made
    evident that it will take judicial review of a claim that apportionment
    schemes lack consistent, rational bases. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109
    (1986) (holding political gerrymandering complaint justiciable under
    equal protection clause).

    [[Page 103]]

    or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-
    thirds of each House, remove such disability.

    -  Congress <> has by law removed generally the
    disabilities arising from the Civil War (30 Stat. 432). Soon after the
    war various questions arose under this section (I, 386, 393, 455, 456).
    For disloyalty to the United States, for giving aid and comfort to a
    public enemy, for publication of expressions hostile to the Government a
    Member-elect was denied a seat in the House (VI, 56, 58). As to the
    meaning of the words ``aid or comfort'' as used in the 14th amendment
    (VI, 57).

    Sec. 230. Loyalty as a qualification of Senators
    and Representatives.

      Section 3.  No person shall be a Senator or Representative in
    Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any
    office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State,
    who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an
    officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature,
    or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the
    Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or
    rebellion against the same, or given aid

    Sec. 232. Validity of the national debt, etc.

      Section 4.  The
    validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
    including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for
    services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be
    questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or
    pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion
    against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of
    any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held
    illegal and void.

    Sec. 233. Enforcement of the 14th amendment.

        Section 5. The
    Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
    provisions of this article.

    [[Page 104]]

      Congress may legislate under this section to protect voting rights by
    preempting discriminatory State qualifications for electors (Katzenbach
    v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)), and may lower the voting age in Federal
    (but not State) elections (Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)).

                           AMENDMENT XV.\6\

    Sec. 234. Suffrage not to be abridged for race,
    color, etc.

      Section 1.  The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
    not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
    account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      \6\The 15th amendment to the Constitution of the United
    States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the
    40th Congress on February 26, 1869, and was declared, in a proclamation
    of the Secretary of State, dated March 30, 1870, to have been ratified
    by the legislatures of 29 of the 37 States. The dates of these
    ratifications were: Nevada, March 1, 1869; West Virginia, March 3, 1869;
    North Carolina, March 5, 1869; Illinois, March 5, 1869; Louisiana, March
    5, 1869; Michigan, March 8, 1869; Wisconsin, March 9, 1869; Maine, March
    11, 1869; Massachusetts, March 12, 1869; Arkansas, March 15, 1869; South
    Carolina, March 15, 1869; Pennsylvania, March 25, 1869; New York, April
    14, 1869 (subsequently withdrew its consent to the ratification on
    January 5, 1870 but rescinded this action on March 30, 1970); Indiana,
    May 14, 1869; Connecticut, May 19, 1869; Florida, June 14, 1869; New
    Hampshire, July 1, 1869; Virginia, October 8, 1869; Vermont, October 20,
    1869; Alabama, November 16, 1869; Missouri, January 7, 1870 (Missouri
    had ratified the first section of the 15th amendment on March 1, 1869,
    but had failed to include in its ratification the second section of the
    amendment); Minnesota, January 13, 1870; Mississippi, January 17, 1870;
    Rhode Island, January 18, 1870; Kansas, January 19, 1870; Ohio, January
    27, 1870 (after having rejected the amendment April 30, 1869); Georgia,
    February 2, 1870; Iowa, February 3, 1870. Ratification was completed on
    February 3, 1870, unless the withdrawal of ratification by New York was
    effective; in which event ratification was completed on February 17,
    1870, when ratified by Nebraska. The amendment was subsequently ratified
    by Texas, February 18, 1870; New Jersey, February 15, 1871 (after having
    rejected it on February 7, 1870); Delaware, February 12, 1901 (after
    having rejected it on March 18, 1869); Oregon, February 24, 1959;
    California, April 3, 1962 (after having rejected it on January 28,
    1870); Maryland, May 7, 1973 (after having rejected it on February 4 and
    February 26, 1870); Kentucky, March 30, 1976 (after having rejected it
    on March 11 and March 12, 1869); Tennessee, April 2, 1997, (after having
    rejected it on November 16, 1869).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [[Page 105]]

      Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
    appropriate legislation.

                          AMENDMENT XVI.\7\

    Sec. 235. Taxes on incomes.

      The  Congress shall have power to
    lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without
    apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census
    or enumeration.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [[Page 106]]

      \7\The 16th amendment to the Constitution of the United
    States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the
    61st Congress on July 16, 1909, and was declared, in a proclamation of
    the Secretary of State dated February 25, 1913, to have been ratified by
    the legislatures of 36 of the 48 States. The dates of ratification were:
    Alabama, August 10, 1909; Kentucky, February 8, 1910; South Carolina,
    February 19, 1910; Illinois, March 1, 1910; Mississippi, March 7, 1910;
    Oklahoma, March 10, 1910; Maryland, April 8, 1910; Georgia, August 3,
    1910; Texas, August 16, 1910; Ohio, January 19, 1911; Idaho, January 20,
    1911; Oregon, January 23, 1911; Washington, January 26, 1911; Montana,
    January 30, 1911; Indiana, January 30, 1911; California, January 31,
    1911; Nevada, January 31, 1911; South Dakota, February 3, 1911;
    Nebraska, February 9, 1911; North Carolina, February 11, 1911; Colorado,
    February 15, 1911; North Dakota, February 17, 1911; Kansas, February 18,
    1911; Michigan, February 23, 1911; Iowa, February 24, 1911; Missouri,
    March 16, 1911; Maine, March 31, 1911; Tennessee, April 7, 1911;
    Arkansas, April 22, 1911 (after having rejected it at the session begun
    January 9, 1911); Wisconsin, May 26, 1911; New York, July 12, 1911;
    Arizona, April 6, 1912; Minnesota, June 11, 1912; Louisiana, June 28,
    1912; West Virginia, January 31, 1913; Delaware, February 3, 1913;
    Wyoming, February 3, 1913; New Mexico, February 3, 1913. Ratification
    was completed on February 3, 1913. The amendment was subsequently
    ratified by New Jersey, February 4, 1913; Vermont, February 19, 1913
    (after having rejected the amendment January 17, 1911); Massachusetts,
    March 4, 1913; New Hampshire, March 7, 1913 (after having rejected the
    amendment March 2, 1911). The amendment was rejected by Rhode Island,
    April 29, 1910; Utah, March 9, 1911; Connecticut, June 28, 1911; and
    Florida, May 31, 1913. Pennsylvania and Virginia did not complete
    action.

                          AMENDMENT XVII.\8\

    Sec. 236. Election of Senators by direct vote.

      The  Senate of
    the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State,
    elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall
    have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications
    requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State
    legislatures.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      \8\See article I, section 3 of the Constitution. The 17th
    amendment to the Constitution was proposed to the legislatures of the
    several States by the 62d Congress on May 15, 1912, and was declared, in
    a proclamation by the Secretary of State dated May 31, 1913, to have
    been ratified by the legislatures of 36 of the 48 States. The dates of
    ratification were: Massachusetts, May 22, 1912; Arizona, June 3, 1912;
    Minnesota, June 10, 1912; New York, January 15, 1913; Kansas, January
    17, 1913; Oregon, January 23, 1913; North Carolina, January 25, 1913;
    California, January 28, 1913; Michigan, January 28, 1913; Iowa, January
    30, 1913; Montana, January 30, 1913; Idaho, January 31, 1913; West
    Virginia, February 4, 1913; Colorado, February 5, 1913; Nevada, February
    6, 1913; Texas, February 7, 1913; Washington, February 7, 1913; Wyoming,
    February 8, 1913; Arkansas, February 11, 1913; Maine, February 11, 1913;
    Illinois, February 13, 1913; North Dakota, February 14, 1913; Wisconsin,
    February 18, 1913; Indiana, February 19, 1913; New Hampshire, February
    19, 1913; Vermont, February 19, 1913; South Dakota, February 19, 1913;
    Oklahoma, February 24, 1913; Ohio, February 25, 1913; Missouri, March 7,
    1913; New Mexico, March 13, 1913; Nebraska, March 14, 1913; New Jersey,
    March 17, 1913; Tennessee, April 1, 1913; Pennsylvania, April 2, 1913;
    Connecticut, April 8, 1913. Ratification was completed on April 8, 1913.
    The amendment was subsequently ratified by Louisiana, June 11, 1914;
    Alabama, April 16, 2002. The amendment was rejected by Utah, February
    26, 1913; Delaware, March 18, 1913. Florida, Georgia, Rhode Island, and
    South Carolina did not complete action.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [[Page 107]]

    the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
      When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the
    Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of
    election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any
    State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments
    until

      This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or
    term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the
    Constitution.

    Sec. 237. Filling vacancies in the Senate.

      Senator  Rebecca
    L. Felton, appointed during the recess of the Senate on October 3, 1922,
    to fill a vacancy, was the first woman to sit in the Senate (VI, 156).
    Senator Walter F. George was elected to fill the vacancy on Novem-
    ber 7, 1922. Mrs. Felton took the oath of office on November 21, 1922,
    and Senator George took the oath November 22, 1922 (VI, 156). Discussion
    as to the term of service of a Senator appointed by a State executive to
    fill a vacancy (VI, 156).

    Sec. 238. Qualifications of electors.

      The  right of an
    elector to vote for a Senator is fundamentally derived from the United
    States Constitution (United States v. Aczel 219 F.2d 917 (1915)) and may
    not be denied in a discriminatory fashion (Chapman v. King, 154 F.2d 460
    (1946), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 800 (1946); Forssenius v. Harman, 235 F.
    Supp. 66 (1964), aff'd., 380 U.S. 529 (1965)).

                         AMENDMENT XVIII.\9\

    [[Page 108]]

    cating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation
    thereof from the United States and all territories subject to the
    jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sec. 239. Prohibition of intoxicating
    liquors.

      Section 1.  [After one year from the ratification of this article the
    manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxi

      \9\See amendment XXI, repealing this amendment. The 18th
    amendment to the Constitution of the United States was proposed to the
    legislatures of the several States by the 65th Congress on December 18,
    1917, and was declared in a proclamation by the Secretary of State dated
    January 29, 1919, to have been ratified by the legislatures of 36 of the
    48 States. The dates of these ratifications were: Mississippi, January
    8, 1918; Virginia, January 11, 1918; Kentucky, January 14, 1918; North
    Dakota, January 25, 1918; South Carolina, January 29, 1918; Maryland,
    February 13, 1918; Montana, February 19, 1918; Texas, March 4, 1918;
    Delaware, March 18, 1918; South Dakota, March 20, 1918; Massachusetts,
    April 2, 1918; Arizona, May 24, 1918; Georgia, June 26, 1918; Louisiana,
    August 3, 1918; Florida, December 3, 1918; Michigan, January 2, 1919;
    Ohio, January 7, 1919; Oklahoma, January 7, 1919; Idaho, January 8,
    1919; Maine, January 8, 1919; West Virginia, January 9, 1919;
    California, January 13, 1919; Tennessee, January 13, 1919; Washington,
    January 13, 1919; Arkansas, January 14, 1919; Kansas, January 14, 1919;
    Alabama, January 15, 1919; Colorado, January 15, 1919; Iowa, January 15,
    1919; New Hampshire, January 15, 1919; Oregon, January 15, 1919;
    Nebraska, January 16, 1919; North Carolina, January 16, 1919; Utah,
    January 16, 1919; Missouri, January 16, 1919; Wyoming, January 16, 1919.
    Ratification was completed on January 16, 1919. The amendment was
    subsequently ratified by Minnesota, January 17, 1919; Wisconsin, January
    17, 1919; New Mexico, January 20, 1919; Nevada, January 21, 1919; New
    York, January 29, 1919; Vermont, January 29, 1919; Pennsylvania,
    February 25, 1919; Connecticut, May 6, 1919; New Jersey, March 9, 1922.
    Connecticut and Rhode Island rejected the amendment.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      Section 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent
    power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

      Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
    ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the
    several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from
    the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.]

                          AMENDMENT XIX.\10\

    Sec. 240. Womens suffrage.

      The  right of citizens
    of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
    United States or by any State on account of sex.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [[Page 109]]

      \10\The 19th amendment to the Constitution of the United
    States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the
    66th Congress on June 5, 1919, and was declared in a proclamation by the
    Secretary of State dated August 26, 1920, to have been ratified by the
    legislatures of 36 of the 48 States. The dates of these ratifications
    were: Illinois, June 10, 1919 (and that State readopted its resolution
    of ratification June 17, 1919); Michigan, June 10, 1919; Wisconsin, June
    10, 1919; Kansas, June 16, 1919; New York, June 16, 1919; Ohio, June 16,
    1919; Pennsylvania, June 24, 1919; Massachusetts, June 25, 1919; Texas,
    June 28, 1919; Iowa, July 2, 1919; Missouri, July 3, 1919; Arkansas,
    July 28, 1919; Montana, August 2, 1919; Nebraska, August 2, 1919;
    Minnesota, September 8, 1919; New Hampshire, September 10, 1919; Utah,
    October 2, 1919; California, November 1, 1919; Maine, November 5, 1919;
    North Dakota, December 1, 1919; South Dakota, December 4, 1919;
    Colorado, December 15, 1919; Kentucky, January 6, 1920; Rhode Island,
    January 6, 1920; Oregon, January 13, 1920; Indiana, January 16, 1920;
    Wyoming, January 27, 1920; Nevada, February 7, 1920; New Jersey,
    February 9, 1920; Idaho, February 11, 1920; Arizona, February 12, 1920;
    New Mexico, February 21, 1920; Oklahoma, February 28, 1920; West
    Virginia, March 10, 1920; Washington, March 22, 1920; Tennessee, August
    28, 1920. Ratification was completed on August 28, 1920. The amendment
    was subsequently ratified by Connecticut, September 14, 1920 (and that
    State reaffirmed on September 21, 1920); Vermont, February 8, 1921;
    Delaware, March 6, 1923 (after having rejected the amendment on June 2,
    1920); Maryland, March 29, 1941 (after having rejected the amendment on
    February 24, 1920; ratification certified February 25, 1958); Virginia,
    February 21, 1952 (after having rejected the amendment February 12,
    1920); Alabama, September 8, 1953 (after having rejected the amendment
    September 22, 1919); Florida, May 13, 1969; South Carolina, July 1, 1969
    (after having rejected the amendment on January 28, 1920); Georgia,
    February 20, 1970 (after having rejected the amendment on July 24,
    1919); Louisiana, June 11, 1970 (after having rejected it on July 1,
    1920); North Carolina, May 6, 1971; Mississippi, March 22, 1984 (after
    having rejected the amendment on March 29, 1920).

      Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
    legislation.

                          AMENDMENT XX.\11\

    [[Page 110]]

    tives at noon on the 3d day of January, of the years in which such terms
    would have ended if this article had not been ratified; and the terms of
    their successors shall then begin.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sec. 241. Commencement of terms of Pres., Vice
    Pres., Senators, and Representatives.

      Section 1.  The terms of the President and
    Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the
    terms of Senators and Representa

      \11\See article I, section 4 of the Constitution. The 20th
    amendment to the Constitution was proposed to the legislatures of the
    several States by the 72d Congress, on March 3, 1932, and was declared
    in a proclamation by the Secretary of State dated February 6, 1933, to
    have been ratified by the legislatures of 36 of the 48 States. The dates
    of these ratifications were: Virginia, March 4, 1932; New York, March
    11, 1932; Mississippi, March 16, 1932; Arkansas, March 17, 1932;
    Kentucky, March 17, 1932; New Jersey, March 21, 1932; South Carolina,
    March 25, 1932; Michigan, March 31, 1932; Maine, April 1, 1932; Rhode
    Island, April 14, 1932; Illinois, April 21, 1932; Louisiana, June 22,
    1932; West Virginia, July 30, 1932; Pennsylvania, August 11, 1932;
    Indiana, August 15, 1932; Texas, September 7, 1932; Alabama, September
    13, 1932; California, January 4, 1933; North Carolina, January 5, 1933;
    North Dakota, January 9, 1933; Minnesota, January 12, 1933; Montana,
    January 13, 1933; Nebraska, January 13, 1933; Oklahoma, January 13,
    1933; Arizona, January 13, 1933; Kansas, January 16, 1933; Oregon,
    January 16, 1933; Wyoming, January 19, 1933; Delaware, January 19, 1933;
    Washington, January 19, 1933; South Dakota, January 20, 1933; Tennessee,
    January 20, 1933; Iowa, January 20, 1933; Idaho, January 21, 1933; New
    Mexico, January 21, 1933; Ohio, January 23, 1933; Utah, January 23,
    1933; Missouri, January 23, 1933; Georgia, January 23, 1933.
    Ratification was completed on January 23, 1933. The amendment was
    subsequently ratified by Massachusetts, January 24, 1933; Wisconsin,
    January 24, 1933; Colorado, January 24, 1933; Nevada, January 26, 1933;
    Connecticut, January 27, 1933; New Hampshire, January 31, 1933; Vermont,
    February 2, 1933; Maryland, March 24, 1933; Florida, April 26, 1933.

      The ratification of this amendment to the Constitution shortened the
    first term of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Vice President John N.
    Garner, and the terms of all Senators and Representatives of the 73d
    Congress.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sec. 242. Meeting of Congress.

      Section 2.  The Congress shall
    assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at
    noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a
    different day.

    [[Page 111]]

      Before the ratification of the 20th amendment Congress met on the
    first Monday in December as provided in article I, section 4, of the
    Constitution. For discussion of the term of Congress before and pursuant
    to the 20th amendment, see Sec. 6, supra (accompanying art. I, sec. 2,
    cl. 1), and Deschler, ch. 1.

      Pursuant to section 2 of the 20th amendment, a regular session of a
    Congress must begin at noon on January 3 of every year unless Congress
    sets a different date by law, and if the House is in session at that
    time the Speaker declares the House adjourned sine die without a motion
    from the floor, in order that the next regular session of that Congress,
    or the first session of the next Congress (as the case may be) may
    assemble at noon on that day (Jan. 3, 1980, pp. 37773, 37774; Jan. 3,
    1996, pp. 35, 36; Jan. 3, 2012, p. _; Jan. 3, 2013, p. _; Jan. 3, 2014,
    p. _; Jan. 3, 2017, p. _). The House has adjourned the second session of
    a Congress without motion at its expiration and convened the first
    session of the new Congress on a different date as prescribed by law
    (Jan. 3, 2009, p. 24812).

    -  Section 3. <> If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of
    the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President
    elect shall become President. If a President shall not have

    [[Page 112]]

    been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if
    the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice
    President elect shall act as President until a President shall have
    qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein
    neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have
    qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in
    which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act
    accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.

    Sec. 243. Laws appointing different day for
    convening.

      Since  ratification, the following days for assembling have been
    established: Public Law 74-120, Jan. 5, 1937; Public Law 77-395, Jan. 5,
    1942; Public Law 77-819, Jan. 6, 1943; Public Law 78-210, Jan. 10, 1944;
    Public Law 79-289, Jan. 14, 1946; Public Law 80-358, Jan. 6, 1948;
    Public Law 82-244, Jan. 8, 1952; Public Law 83-199, Jan. 6, 1954; Public
    Law 83-700, Jan. 5, 1955; Public Law 85-290, Jan. 7, 1958; Public Law
    85-819, Jan. 7, 1959; Public Law 86-305, Jan. 6, 1960; Public Law 87-
    348, Jan. 10, 1962; Public Law 87-864, Jan. 9, 1963; Public Law 88-247,
    Jan. 7, 1964; Public Law 88-649, Jan. 4, 1965; Public Law 89-340, Jan.
    10, 1966; Public Law 89-704, Jan. 10, 1967; Public Law 90-230, Jan. 15,
    1968; Public Law 91-182, Jan. 19, 1970; Public Law 91-643, Jan. 21,
    1971; Public Law 92-217, Jan. 18, 1972; Public Law 93-196, Jan. 21,
    1974; Public Law 93-553, Jan. 14, 1975; Public Law 94-186, Jan. 19,
    1976; Public Law 94-494, Jan. 4, 1977; Public Law 95-594, Jan. 15, 1979;
    Public Law 96-566, Jan. 5, 1981; Public Law 97-133, Jan. 25, 1982;
    Public Law 98-179, Jan. 23, 1984; Public Law 99-379, Jan. 21, 1986;
    Public Law 99-613, Jan. 6, 1987; Public Law 100-229, Jan. 25, 1988;
    Public Law 101-228, Jan. 23, 1990; Public Law 102-475, Jan. 5, 1993;
    Public Law 103-395, Jan. 4, 1995; Public Law 104-296, Jan. 7, 1997;
    Public Law 105-140, Jan. 27, 1998; Public Law 105-350, Jan. 6, 1999;
    Public Law 106-127, Jan. 24, 2000; Public Law 107-328, Jan. 7, 2003;
    Public Law 108-181, Jan. 20, 2004; Public Law 108-433, Jan. 4, 2005;
    Public Law 109-447, Jan. 4, 2007; Public Law 110-430, Jan. 6, 2009;
    Public Law 111-121, Jan. 5, 2010; Public Law 111-289, Jan. 5, 2011;
    Public Law 113-201, Jan. 6, 2015; Public Law 114-108, Jan. 4, 2016. Such
    laws for the convening of a second session of a Congress may provide for
    possible earlier assembly by joint-leadership recall (see, e.g., Public
    Law 107-98, Jan. 23, 2002).

    Sec. 245. Statutory succession and the 25th
    amendment.

      Congress  provided by law in 1947 for the performance of the duties
    of the President in case of removal, death, resignation or inability,
    both of the President and Vice President (3 U.S.C. 19). Earlier
    succession statutes covering the periods 1792-1886 and 1887-1948 can be
    found in 18 Stat. 21, and 24 Stat. 1, respectively. Also see the 25th
    amendment to the Constitution, relating to vacancies in the Office of
    Vice President and Presidential inability.

      Before the 20th amendment there was no provision in the Constitution
    for a case wherein the President-elect was disqualified or had died.

    Sec. 246. Congress to provide for case wherein
    death occurs among those from whom House chooses a President.

      Section 4.  The
    Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the
    persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a President
    whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the
    case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may choose
    a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon
    them.

    [[Page 113]]

      The above section changes the 12th amendment insofar as it gives
    Congress the power to provide by law the manner in which the House
    should proceed in the event no candidate had a majority and one of the
    three highest on the list of those voted for as President had died.

      Section 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of
    October following the ratification of this article.

      Section 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
    ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of
    three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of
    its submission.

                          AMENDMENT XXI.\12\

    Sec. 247. Repeal of prohibition.

      Section 1.  The eighteenth
    article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby
    repealed.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      \12\The 21st amendment to the Constitution of the United
    States was proposed to conventions of the several States by the 72d
    Congress on February 20, 1933, and was declared in a proclamation by the
    Acting Secretary of State dated December 5, 1933, to have been ratified
    by conventions in 36 of the 48 States. The dates of these ratifications
    were: Michigan, April 10, 1933; Wisconsin, April 25, 1933; Rhode Island,
    May 8, 1933; Wyoming, May 25, 1933; New Jersey, June 1, 1933; Delaware,
    June 24, 1933; Massachusetts, June 26, 1933; Indiana, June 26, 1933; New
    York, June 27, 1933; Illinois, July 10, 1933; Iowa, July 10, 1933;
    Connecticut, July 11, 1933; New Hampshire, July 11, 1933; California,
    July 24, 1933; West Virginia, July 25, 1933; Arkansas, August 1, 1933;
    Oregon, August 7, 1933; Alabama, August 8, 1933; Tennessee, August 11,
    1933; Missouri, August 29, 1933; Arizona, September 5, 1933; Nevada,
    September 5, 1933; Vermont, September 23, 1933; Colorado, September 26,
    1933; Washington, October 3, 1933; Minnesota, October 10, 1933; Idaho,
    October 17, 1933; Maryland, October 18, 1933; Virginia, October 25,
    1933; New Mexico, November 2, 1933; Florida, November 14, 1933; Texas,
    November 24, 1933; Kentucky, November 27, 1933; Ohio, December 5, 1933;
    Pennsylvania, December 5, 1933; Utah, December 5, 1933. The amendment
    was subsequently ratified by Maine on December 6, 1933; Montana, August
    6, 1934. The convention held in the State of South Carolina on December
    4, 1933, rejected the 21st amendment.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [[Page 114]]

    ery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws
    thereof, is hereby prohibited.

    Sec. 248. Transportation into States
    prohibited.

      Section 2.  The transportation or importation into any State,
    Territory, or possession of the United States for deliv

      Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
    ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the
    several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from
    the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.

                         AMENDMENT XXII.\13\

    [[Page 115]]

    which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the
    office of the President more than once. But this Article shall not apply
    to any person holding the office of President when this Article was
    proposed by the Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be
    holding the office of President, or acting as President, during the term
    within which this Article becomes operative from holding the office of
    President or acting as President during the remainder of such term.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sec. 249. No person shall be elected President more
    than twice.

      Section 1.  No person shall be elected to the office of the President
    more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or
    acted as President, for more than two years of a term to

      \13\The 22d amendment to the Constitution of the United
    States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the
    80th Congress on March 24, 1947, and was declared by the Administrator
    of General Services, in a proclamation dated March 1, 1951, to have been
    ratified by the legislatures of 36 of the 48 States. The dates of these
    ratifications were: Maine, March 31, 1947; Michigan, March 31, 1947;
    Iowa, April 1, 1947; Kansas, April 1, 1947; New Hampshire, April 1,
    1947; Delaware, April 2, 1947; Illinois, April 3, 1947; Oregon, April 3,
    1947; Colorado, April 12, 1947; California, April 15, 1947; New Jersey,
    April, 15, 1947; Vermont, April 15, 1947; Ohio, April 16, 1947;
    Wisconsin, April 16, 1947; Pennsylvania, April 29, 1947; Connecticut,
    May 21, 1947; Missouri, May 22, 1947; Nebraska, May 23, 1947; Virginia,
    January 28, 1948; Mississippi, February 12, 1948; New York, March 9,
    1948; South Dakota, January 21, 1949; North Dakota, February 25, 1949;
    Louisiana, May 17, 1950; Montana, January 25, 1951; Indiana, January 29,
    1951; Idaho, January 30, 1951; New Mexico, February 12, 1951; Wyoming,
    February 12, 1951; Arkansas, February 15, 1951; Georgia, February 17,
    1951; Tennessee, February 20, 1951; Texas, February 22, 1951; Nevada,
    February 26, 1951; Utah, February 26, 1951; Minnesota, February 27,
    1951. Ratification was completed February 27, 1951. The amendment was
    subsequently ratified by North Carolina, February 28, 1951; South
    Carolina, March 13, 1951; Maryland, March 14, 1951; Florida, April 16,
    1951; Alabama, May 4, 1951. Massachusetts and Oklahoma rejected the
    amendment.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      Section 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
    ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of
    three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of
    its submission to the States by the Congress.

                         AMENDMENT XXIII.\14\

    Sec. 250. Representation in the Electoral College
    to the District of Columbia.

      Section 1.  The District constituting the seat of
    Government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as the
    Congress may direct:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [[Page 116]]

      \14\The 23d amendment to the Constitution of the United
    States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the
    86th Congress on June 17, 1960, and was declared by the Administrator of
    General Services, in a proclamation dated April 3, 1961, to have been
    ratified by the legislatures of 39 of the 50 States. The dates of these
    ratifications were: Hawaii, June 23, 1960; Massachusetts, August 22,
    1960; New Jersey, December 19, 1960; New York, January 17, 1961;
    California, January 19, 1961; Oregon, January 27, 1961; Maryland,
    January 30, 1961; Idaho, January 31, 1961; Maine, January 31, 1961;
    Minnesota, January 31, 1961; New Mexico, February 1, 1961; Nevada,
    February 2, 1961; Montana, February 26, 1961; Colorado, February 8,
    1961; Washington, February 9, 1961; West Virginia, February 9, 1961;
    Alaska, February 10, 1961; Wyoming, February 13, 1961; South Dakota,
    February 14, 1961; Delaware, February 20, 1961; Utah, February 21, 1961;
    Wisconsin, February 21, 1961; Pennsylvania, February 28, 1961; Indiana,
    March 3, 1961; North Dakota, March 3, 1961; Tennessee, March 6, 1961;
    Michigan, March 8, 1961; Connecticut, March 9, 1961; Arizona, March 10,
    1961; Illinois, March 14, 1961; Nebraska, March 15, 1961; Vermont, March
    15, 1961; Iowa, March 16, 1961; Missouri, March 20, 1961; Oklahoma,
    March 21, 1961; Rhode Island, March 22, 1961; Kansas, March 29, 1961;
    and Ohio, March 29, 1961. Ratification was completed March 29, 1961. The
    amendment was subsequently ratified by New Hampshire on March 30, 1961
    (when that State annulled and then repeated its ratification of March
    29, 1961). Arkansas rejected the amendment January 24, 1961.

      A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the
    whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the
    District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than
    the least populous State; they shall be in addition to those appointed
    by the States, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the
    election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a
    State; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as
    provided by the twelfth article of amendment.

      Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
    appropriate legislation.

                         AMENDMENT XXIV.\15\

    [[Page 117]]

    or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall
    not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of
    failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sec. 251. Right to vote not denied for failure to
    pay poll tax.

      Section 1.  The right of citizens of the United States to vote in
    any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for
    electors for President

      \15\The 24th amendment to the Constitution of the United
    States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the
    87th Congress on August 28, 1962, and was declared by the Administrator
    of General Services, in a proclamation dated February 4, 1964, to have
    been ratified by the legislatures of 38 of the 50 States. The dates of
    these ratifications were: Illinois, November 14, 1962; New Jersey,
    December 3, 1962; Oregon, January 25, 1963; Montana, January 28, 1963;
    West Virginia, February 1, 1963; New York, February 4, 1963; Maryland,
    February 6, 1963; California, February 7, 1963; Alaska, February 11,
    1963; Rhode Island, February 14, 1963; Indiana, February 19, 1963; Utah,
    February 20, 1963; Michigan, February 20, 1963; Colorado, February 21,
    1963; Ohio, February 27, 1963; Minnesota, February 27, 1963; New Mexico,
    March 5, 1963; Hawaii, March 6, 1963; North Dakota, March 7, 1963;
    Idaho, March 8, 1963; Washington, March 14, 1963; Vermont, March 15,
    1963; Nevada, March 19, 1963; Connecticut, March 20, 1963; Tennessee,
    March 21, 1963; Pennsylvania, March 25, 1963; Wisconsin, March 26, 1963;
    Kansas, March 28, 1963; Massachusetts, March 28, 1963; Nebraska, April
    4, 1963; Florida, April 18, 1963; Iowa, April 24, 1963; Delaware, May 1,
    1963; Missouri, May 13, 1963; New Hampshire, June 12, 1963; Kentucky,
    June 27, 1963; Maine, January 16, 1964; and South Dakota, January 23,
    1964. Ratification was completed on January 23, 1964. Mississippi
    rejected the amendment on December 20, 1962. The amendment was
    subsequently ratified by Virginia, February 25, 1977; North Carolina,
    May 3, 1989; Alabama, Sept. 26, 2002; Texas, May 22, 2009.

      Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965); Harper v. Virginia State
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).

      Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
    appropriate legislation.

                          AMENDMENT XXV.\16\

    Sec. 252. Presidential succession and
    inability.

      Section 1.  In case of the removal of the President from office or of
    his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [[Page 118]]

      \16\The 25th amendment to the Constitution of the United
    States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the
    89th Congress on July 7, 1965, and was declared by the Administrator of
    General Services, in a proclamation dated February 23, 1967, to have
    been ratified by the legislatures of 39 of the 50 States. The dates of
    these ratifications were: Nebraska, July 12, 1965; Wisconsin, July 13,
    1965; Oklahoma, July 16, 1965; Massachusetts, August 9, 1965;
    Pennsylvania, August 18, 1965; Kentucky, September 15, 1965; Arizona,
    September 22, 1965; Michigan, October 5, 1965; Indiana, October 20,
    1965; California, October 21, 1965; Arkansas, November 4, 1965; New
    Jersey, November 29, 1965; Delaware, December 7, 1965; Utah, January 17,
    1966; West Virginia, January 20, 1966; Maine, January 24, 1966; Rhode
    Island, January 28, 1966; Colorado, February 3, 1966; New Mexico,
    February 3, 1966; Kansas, February 8, 1966; Vermont, February 10, 1966;
    Alaska, February 18, 1966; Idaho, March 2, 1966; Hawaii, March 3, 1966;
    Virginia, March 8, 1966; Mississippi, March 10, 1966; New York, March
    14, 1966; Maryland, March 23, 1966; Missouri, March 30, 1966; New
    Hampshire, June 13, 1966; Louisiana, July 5, 1966; Tennessee, January
    12, 1967; Wyoming, January 25, 1967; Iowa, January 26, 1967; Washington,
    January 26, 1967; Oregon, February 2, 1967; Minnesota, February 10,
    1967; Nevada, February 10, 1967. Ratification was completed February 10,
    1967. The amendment was subsequently ratified by Connecticut, February
    14, 1967; Montana, February 15, 1967; South Dakota, March 6, 1967; Ohio,
    March 7, 1967; Alabama, March 14, 1967; North Carolina, March 22, 1967;
    Illinois, March 22, 1967; Texas, April 25, 1967; Florida, May 25, 1967.

    Sec. 253. Confirmation by House and Senate of
    nominee to fill vice presidential vacancy.

      Section 2.  Whenever there is a vacancy
    in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice
    President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of
    both Houses of Congress.

    [[Page 119]]

    Sec. 254. President's declaration of
    disability.

      Section 3.  Whenever the President transmits to the President pro
    tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
    his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and
    duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
    declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged
    by the Vice President as Acting President.

    Sec. 255. Determination of Presidential inability
    and Vice President as Acting President.

      Section 4.  Whenever the Vice President
    and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive
    departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide,
    transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of
    the House of Representatives their written declaration that the
    President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
    the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the
    office as Acting President.

    [[Page 120]]

    to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President
    shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the
    President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.

      Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore
    of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
    written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers
    and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of
    either the principal officers of the executive department or of such
    other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to
    the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
    Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable
    to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress
    shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that
    purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after
    receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in
    session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble,
    determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is
    unable

    Sec. 256. Instances in which House and Senate have
    confirmed nominee as Vice President; temporary incapacity of
    President.

      Congress  has twice performed its responsibility under section two of
    the 25th amendment. On October 13, 1973, the Speaker laid before the
    House a message from President Nixon transmitting his nomination of
    Gerald R. Ford, Minority Leader in the House of Representatives, to be
    Vice President of the United States, Vice President Agnew having
    resigned on October 10, 1973. The Speaker referred the nomination to the
    Committee on the Judiciary, which under rule X has jurisdiction over
    matters relating to Presidential succession (Oct. 13, 1973, p. 34032).
    The nomination of Mr. Ford to be Vice President was confirmed by the
    Senate on November 27, 1973 (p. 38225) and by the House on December 6,
    1973 (p. 39900), and Vice President Ford was sworn in in the Chamber of
    the House of Representatives on December 6 (p. 39925). Subsequently,
    President Nixon resigned from office by delivering his written
    resignation to the Office of the Secretary of State, pursuant to 3
    U.S.C. 20, on August 9, 1974. Pursuant to section one of the 25th
    amendment, Vice President Ford became President, and was sworn in in the
    East Room at the White House. He nominated Nelson A. Rockefeller to be
    Vice President, which nomination was received in the House of
    Representatives and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary on August
    20, 1974; the nomination was confirmed by the Senate on December 10,
    1974 (p. 38936) and by the House on December 19, 1974 (p. 41516), and
    Vice President Rockefeller was sworn in in the Senate Chamber on
    December 19, 1974 (p. 41181). On both instances, the House received the
    message from the Senate, announcing that body's confirmation of the
    nominee for Vice President, following the vote on confirmation by the
    House.

    [[Page 121]]

      The Chair laid before the House communications from the President
    pursuant to section three of this amendment as follows: First, before
    undergoing sedation for a medical procedure, declaring his impending
    inability to discharge the constitutional powers and duties of the
    Office of President and advising that the Vice President would discharge
    those responsibilities as Acting President until the President declared
    his ability to resume that role; and second (after recovering from the
    sedation and the medical procedure) declaring his ability to resume the
    discharge of the constitutional powers and duties of the Office of
    President, and advising that he was doing so immediately (July 15, 1985,
    p. 18955; July 8, 2002, pp. 12089, 12090; July 23, 2007, p. 20036).

                         AMENDMENT XXVI.\17\

    Sec. 257. Right to vote extended to persons 18
    years of age or older.

      Section 1.  The right of citizens of the United States, who
    are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or
    abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      \17\The 26th amendment to the Constitution was proposed by
    the Congress on March 23, 1971. It was declared, in a certificate of the
    Administrator of General Services, dated July 5, 1971, to have been
    ratified by the legislatures of 39 of the 50 States. The dates of
    ratification were: Connecticut, March 23, 1971; Delaware, March 23,
    1971; Minnesota, March 23, 1971; Tennessee, March 23, 1971; Washington,
    March 23, 1971; Hawaii, March 24, 1971; Massachusetts, March 24, 1971;
    Montana, March 29, 1971; Arkansas, March 30, 1971; Idaho, March 30,
    1971; Iowa, March 30, 1971; Nebraska, April 2, 1971; New Jersey, April
    3, 1971; Kansas, April 7, 1971; Michigan, April 7, 1971; Alaska, April
    8, 1971; Maryland, April 8, 1971; Indiana, April 8, 1971; Maine, April
    9, 1971; Vermont, April 16, 1971; Louisiana, April 17, 1971; California,
    April 19, 1971; Colorado, April 27, 1971; Pennsylvania, April 27, 1971;
    Texas, April 27, 1971; South Carolina, April 28, 1971; West Virginia,
    April 28, 1971; New Hampshire, May 13, 1971; Arizona, May 14, 1971;
    Rhode Island, May 27, 1971; New York, June 2, 1971; Oregon, June 4,
    1971; Missouri, June 14, 1971; Wisconsin, June 22, 1971; Illinois, June
    29, 1971; Alabama, June 30, 1971; Ohio, June 30, 1971; North Carolina,
    July 1, 1971; Oklahoma, July 1, 1971.

      Ratification was completed on July 1, 1971.

      The amendment was subsequently ratified by Virginia, July 8, 1971;
    Wyoming, July 8, 1971; Georgia, October 4, 1971.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [[Page 122]]

      Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
    appropriate legislation.

                         AMENDMENT XXVII.\18\

    Sec. 258. Timing of law varying
    congressional compensation.

      No law, varying the  compensation for the services of the
    Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of
    Representatives shall have intervened.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      \18\The 27th amendment to the Constitution was proposed on
    September 25, 1789. It was declared to have been ratified by the
    legislatures of 39 of the 50 States in a certificate of the Archivist
    dated May 18, 1992. The dates of ratification were: Maryland, December
    19, 1789; North Carolina, December 22, 1789; South Carolina, January 19,
    1790; Delaware, January 28, 1790; Vermont, November 3, 1791; Virginia,
    December 15, 1791; Ohio, May 6, 1873; Wyoming, March 6, 1978; Maine,
    April 27, 1983; Colorado, April 22, 1984; South Dakota, February 21,
    1985; New Hampshire, March 7, 1985; Arizona, April 3, 1985; Tennessee,
    May 23, 1985; Oklahoma, July 10, 1985; New Mexico, February 14, 1986;
    Indiana, February 24, 1986; Utah, February 25, 1986; Arkansas, March 6,
    1987; Montana, March 17, 1987; Connecticut, May 13, 1987; Wisconsin,
    July 15, 1987; Georgia, February 2, 1988; West Virginia, March 10, 1988;
    Louisiana, July 7, 1988; Iowa, February 9, 1989; Idaho, March 23, 1989;
    Nevada, April 26, 1989; Alaska, May 6, 1989; Oregon, May 19, 1989;
    Minnesota, May 22, 1989; Texas, May 25, 1989; Kansas, April 5, 1990;
    Florida, May 31, 1990; North Dakota, March 25, 1991; Alabama, May 5,
    1992; Missouri, May 5, 1992; Michigan, May 7, 1992; New Jersey, May 7,
    1992.

      Ratification was completed on May 7, 1992. The amendment was
    subsequently ratified by Illinois, May 12, 1992; California, June 26,
    1992; Rhode Island, June 10, 1993; Hawaii, April 26, 1994; Washington,
    August 12, 1995; Kentucky, March 21, 1996; Nebraska, April 1, 2016.

    [[Page 123]]

    (1) a concurrent resolution on the budget was adopted in their
    respective body or (2) in order to ensure compliance with the 27th
    amendment, the final day of the 113th Congress (P.L. 113-3).
      To quell speculation over the efficacy of a ratification process
    spanning two centuries, the House adopted a concurrent resolution
    declaring the ratification of the amendment (H. Con. Res. 320, May 19,
    1992, p. 11779 (adopted May 20, 1992, p. 12051)). The Senate adopted
    both a separate concurrent resolution and a simple resolution making
    similar declarations (S. Con. Res. 120 and S. Res. 298, May 20, 1992, p.
    11869). Neither House considered the concurrent resolution of the other.
    For a concurrent resolution declaring the ratification of the 14th
    amendment, see July 21, 1868. For opinions of the Supreme Court
    concerning the duration of the ratification process and the
    contemporaneity of State ratifications, see Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S.
    368 (1921) and Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). A law enacted in
    the 113th Congress directed the payroll administrators of each House to
    withhold the pay of Members or Senators until either

      For Federal court opinions upholding congressional cost-of-living
    adjustments for Members under the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 (103 Stat.
    1716), see Boehner v. Anderson, 809 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1992), aff'd,
    30 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir 1994); Schaffer v. Clinton, 54 F. Supp.2d 1014
    (D.Colo. 1999).