    [Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 115th Congress]
    [115th Congress]
    [House Document 114-192]
    [Jeffersons Manual of ParliamentaryPractice]
    [Pages 175-199]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

                           sec. xvii--order in debate

    Sec. 353. Decorum of Members as to sitting in their
    places.

        When the Speaker is seated in his chair, every member is to
    sit in his place. Scob., 6; Grey, 403.

      In the House the decorum of Members is regulated by rule XVII; and
    this provision of the parliamentary law is practically obsolete.

    Sec. 354. Procedure of the Member in seeking
    recognition.

      When  any Member means to speak, he is to stand up in his
    place, uncovered, and to address himself, not to the House, or any
    particular Member, but to the Speaker, who calls him by his name, that
    the House may take notice who it is that speaks. Scob., 6; D'Ewes, 487,
    col. 1; 2 Hats., 77; 4 Grey, 66; 8 Grey, 108. But Members who are
    indisposed may be indulged to speak sitting. 2 Hats., 75, 77; 1 Grey,
    143.

    [[Page 176]]

    ago as 1832, at least, Members were not required to seek recognition
    from their own particular seats (V, 4979, footnote), and seats are no
    longer assigned. In addition, the Speaker calls the Member, not by name,
    but as ``the gentleman or gentlewoman from __,'' (naming the State).

      This provision has been superseded by clause 1 of rule XVII, which was
    amended in the 115th Congress to remove a requirement that a Member rise
    to seek recognition (sec. 2(e), H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 2017, p. _). As long

    Sec. 355. Conditions under which a Member's right to the
    floor is subjected to the will of the House.

        When a Member stands up
    to speak, no question is to be put, but he is to be heard unless the
    House overrule him. 4 Grey, 390; 5 Grey, 6, 143.

      Except as provided in clause 4 of rule XVII, no question is put as to
    the right of a Member to the floor.

    Sec. 356. The parliamentary law as to recognition by the
    Speaker.

      If  two or more rise to speak nearly together, the Speaker
    determines who was first up, and calls him by name, whereupon he
    proceeds, unless he voluntarily sits down and gives way to the other.
    But sometimes the House does not acquiesce in the Speaker's decision, in
    which case the question is put, ``which Member was first up?'' 2 Hats.,
    76; Scob., 7; D'Ewes, 434, col. 1, 2.

      In the Senate of the United States the President's decision is without
    appeal.

      In the House recognition by the Chair is governed by clause 2 of rule
    XVII and the practice thereunder. There has been no appeal from a
    decision by the Speaker on a question of recognition since 1881, on
    which occasion Speaker Randall stated that the power of recognition is
    ``just as absolute in the Chair as the judgment of the Supreme Court of
    the United States is absolute as to the interpretation of the law'' (II,
    1425-1428), and in the later practice no appeal is permitted (VIII,
    2429, 2646, 2762).

    [[Page 177]]

    not give a right to be heard a second time. Smyth's Comw. L., 2, c. 3;
    Arcan, Parl., 17.

    Sec. 357. Right of the Member to be heard a second
    time.

      No  man may speak more than once on the same bill on the same day;
    or even on another day, if the debate be adjourned. But if it be read
    more than once in the same day, he may speak once at every reading. Co.,
    12, 115; Hakew., 148; Scob., 58; 2 Hats., 75. Even a change of opinion
    does

      But he may be permitted to speak again to clear a matter of fact, 3
    Grey, 357, 416; or merely to explain himself, 2 Hats., 73, in some
    material part of his speech, Ib., 75; or to the manner or words of the
    question, keeping himself to that only, and not traveling into the
    merits of it, Memorials in Hakew., 29; or to the orders of the House, if
    they be transgressed, keeping within that line, and not falling into the
    matter itself. Mem. Hakew., 30, 31.

      The House has modified the parliamentary law as to a Member's right to
    speak a second time by clause 3 of rule XVII and by permitting a Member
    controlling time in debate to yield to another more than once (Apr. 5,
    2000, p. 4497; Oct. 18, 2007, p. 27575). In ordinary practice rule XVII
    is not rigidly enforced, and Members find little difficulty in making
    such explanations as are contemplated by the parliamentary law. See
    Sec. Sec. 959, 981, infra.

    Sec. 358. Participation of the Speaker in debate.

      But  if the
    Speaker rise to speak, the Member standing up ought to sit down, that he
    may be first heard. Town., col. 205; Hale Parl., 133; Mem. in Hakew.,
    30, 31. Nevertheless, though the Speaker may of right speak to matters
    of order, and be first heard, he is restrained from speaking on any
    other subject, except where the House have occasion for facts within his
    knowledge; then he may, with their leave, state the matter of fact. 3
    Grey, 38.

    [[Page 178]]

    stances the Speaker has made brief explanations from the chair without
    asking the assent of the House (II, 1373, 1374). Speakers have called
    others to the chair and participated in debate, usually without asking
    consent of the House (II, 1360, 1367, footnote, 1368, 1371; III, 1950),
    and in one case a Speaker on the floor debated a point of order that the
    Speaker pro tempore was to decide (V, 6097). In rare instances Speakers
    have left the chair to make motions on the floor (II, 1367, footnote).
    Speakers may participate in debate in the Committee of the Whole,
    although the privilege was rarely exercised in early practice (II, 1367,
    footnote).

      This provision is usually observed in the practice of the House only
    with regard to the conduct of the Speaker when in the chair. In several
    instances the Speaker has been permitted by the House to make a
    statement from the chair, as in a case wherein his past conduct had been
    criticized (II, 1369), in a case wherein there had been unusual
    occurrences in the joint session to count the electoral vote (II, 1372),
    and in a matter relating to a contest for the seat of the Speaker as a
    Member (II, 1360). In rare in

    Sec. 359. Impertinent, superfluous, or tedious
    speaking.

      No  one is to speak impertinently or beside the question,
    superfluous, or tediously. Scob., 31, 33; 2 Hats., 166, 168; Hale Parl.,
    133.

      The House, by clause 1 of rule XVII, provides that remarks must be
    confined to the question under debate, but neither by rule nor practice
    has the House suppressed superfluous or tedious speaking, its hour rule
    (clause 2 of rule XVII) being a sufficient safeguard in this respect.

    Sec. 360. Language reflecting on the House.

      No  person is to
    use indecent language against the proceedings of the House; no prior
    determination of which is to be reflected on by any Member, unless he
    means to conclude with a motion to rescind it. 2 Hats., 169, 170;
    Rushw., p. 3, v. 1, fol. 42. But while a proposition under consideration
    is still in fieri, though it has even been reported by a committee,
    reflections on it are no reflections on the House. 9 Grey, 508.

    [[Page 179]]

    to the proceedings of a committee of a previous Congress (Feb. 2, 1914,
    p. 2782), and the rationale for this limitation on debate is in part
    obsolete under the modern practice of the House insofar as the doctrine
    is applied to open committee meetings and hearings.

      In the practice of the House it has been held out of order in debate
    to cast reflections on either the House or its membership or its
    decisions, whether present or past (V, 5132-5138). A Member who had used
    offensive words against the character of the House, and who declined to
    explain, was censured (II, 1247). Words impeaching the loyalty of a
    portion of the membership have also been ruled out (V, 5139). Where a
    Member reiterated on the floor certain published charges against the
    House, action was taken, although other business had intervened, the
    question being considered one of privilege (III, 2637). It has been held
    inappropriate and not in order in debate to refer to the proceedings of
    a committee except such as have been formally reported to the House (V,
    5080-5083; VIII, 2269, 2485-2493; June 24, 1958, pp. 12120, 12122), but
    this rule does not apply

    Sec. 361. Personalities in debate forbidden.

      No  person, in
    speaking, is to mention a Member then present by his name, but to
    describe him by his seat in the House, or who spoke last, or on the
    other side of the question, &c., Mem. in Hakew., 3; Smyth's Comw., L. 2,
    c. 3; nor to digress from the matter to fall upon the person, Scob., 31;
    Hale Parl., 133; 2 Hats., 166, by speaking reviling, nipping, or
    unmannerly words against a particular Member. Smyth's Comw., L. 2, c. 3.
    * * *

      In the practice of the House, a Member is not permitted to refer to
    another Member by name (V, 5144; VIII, 2526, 2529, 2536), or to address
    a Member in the second person (V, 5140-5143; VI, 600; VIII, 2529;
    Speaker Boehner, Jan. 23, 2012, p. _; Speaker Boehner, Feb. 26, 2013, p.
    _; Speaker Boehner, Mar. 25, 2014, p. _; Speaker Boehner, Feb. 25, 2015,
    p. _). The proper reference to another Member is ``the gentleman or
    gentlewoman from __,'' (naming the Member's State) (June 14, 1978, p.
    17615; July 21, 1982, p. 17314). A mere reference to a Member's voting
    record does not form a basis for a point of order against those remarks
    (June 13, 2002, p. 10226, p. 10232).

      By rule of the House (clause 1 of rule XVII), as well as by
    parliamentary law, personalities are forbidden (V, 4979, 5145, 5163,
    5169), whether against the Member in the Member's capacity as
    Representative or otherwise (V, 5152, 5153), even if the references may
    be relevant to the pending question (Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25778). The
    House has censured a Member for gross personalities (II, 1251). The
    Chair may intervene to prevent improper references if it is evident that
    a particular Member is being described (Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27077).

      The Chair does not rule on the veracity of a statement made by a
    Member in debate (Apr. 9, 1997, p. 4926; Sept. 26, 2008, p. 22085).
    Although accusing another Member of deceit engages in personality,
    merely accusing another Member of making a mistake does not (V, 5157;
    Oct. 26, 2000, p. 24921).

    [[Page 180]]

    of the Speaker or other Members (June 25, 1981, p. 14056); (3) referring
    to a particular Member of the House in a derogatory fashion (Nov. 3,
    1989, p. 27077); (4) characterizing a Member as ``the most impolite
    Member'' (June 27, 1996, p. 15915) or ``mean-spirited'' (May 13, 1992,
    p. 11235); (5) questioning the integrity of a Member (July 25, 1996, p.
    19170); (6) denouncing the spirit in which a Member had spoken (V,
    6981); (7) using a Member's surname as though an adjective for a word of
    ridicule (June 13, 2002, p. 10232; May 13, 2008, p. 8923); (8)
    questioning the decency of another Member (Mar. 21, 2007, p. 7074); (9)
    labeling the remarks of a Member ``hypocritical and dishonest'' (Mar. 7,
    2012, p. _).
      Clause 1 of rule XVII has been held to proscribe: (1) referring to an
    identifiable group of sitting Members as having committed a crime (e.g.,
    stealing an election or obstructing justice) (Feb. 27, 1985, p. 3898;
    Speaker Wright, Mar. 21, 1989, p. 5016; May 19, 1998, p. 9738; July 15,
    2004, p. 15859); (2) referring in a personally critical manner to the
    political tactics

      A distinction has been drawn between general language, which
    characterizes a measure or the political motivations behind a measure,
    and personalities (V, 5153, 5163, 5169). Although remarks in debate may
    not include personal attacks against a Member or an identifiable group
    of Members, they may address political motivations for legislative
    positions (Jan. 24, 1995, p. 2214; Mar. 8, 1995, pp. 7307, 7308; Nov.
    17, 1995, p. 33832; June 13, 1996, p. 14043; July 16, 2008, p. 15273).
    For example, references to ``down-in-the-dirt gutter politics'' and
    ``you people are going to pay'' were held not to be personal references
    (Nov. 14, 1995, p. 32388). Similarly, characterizing a pending measure
    as a ``patently petty political terrorist tactic'' was held in order as
    a reference to the pending measure rather than to the motive or
    character of the measure's proponent (Nov. 9, 1995, p. 31413). The Chair
    also has held in order a general reference that ``big donors'' receive
    ``access to leadership power and decisions'' because the reference did
    not identify a specific Member as engaging in an improper quid pro quo
    (Apr. 9, 1997, p. 4926). A general statement seeming to invoke racial
    stereotypes but not in a context so inflammatory as to constitute a
    breach of decorum, was held not unparliamentary (Apr. 9, 2003, p. 9005
    (sustained by tabling of appeal)). Likewise, a general statement linking
    politics with armed conflict in an impersonal way was held not to breach
    decorum (Oct. 18, 2007, p. 27578).

      A Member may not read in debate extraneous material critical of
    another Member that would be improper if spoken in the Member's own
    words (May 25, 1995, pp. 14436, 14437; Sept. 12, 1996, p. 22898). Thus,
    words in a telegram read in debate that repudiated the ``lies and half-
    truths'' of a House committee report were ruled out of order as
    reflecting on the integrity of committee members (June 16, 1947, p.
    7065), and unparliamentary references in debate to newspaper accounts
    used in support of a Member's personal criticism of another Member were
    similarly ruled out of order (Feb. 25, 1985, p. 3346).

    [[Page 181]]

    ordinarily enforced by the Chair in response to a point of order, the
    Chair may take the initiative in order to maintain proper decorum (Apr.
    1, 1992, p. 7899; June 17, 2004, p. 12748). This stricture also
    precludes a Member from reciting news articles discussing a Member's
    conduct (Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24318), reciting the content of a previously
    tabled resolution raising a question of the privileges of the House
    (Nov. 17, 1995, p. 33853; Sept. 19, 1996, p. 23855), or even referring
    to a Member's conduct by mere insinuation (Sept. 12, 1996, p. 22899).
    Notice of an intention to offer a resolution as a question of the
    privileges of the House under rule IX does not render a resolution
    ``pending'' and thereby permit references to conduct of a Member
    proposed to be addressed therein (Sept. 19, 1996, p. 23811).
      A Member should refrain from references in debate to the official
    conduct of a Member if such conduct is not the subject then pending
    before the House by way of either a report of the Committee on Ethics or
    another question of the privileges of the House (see, e.g., July 24,
    1990, p. 18917; Mar. 19, 1992, p. 6078; May 25, 1995, pp. 14434-37;
    Sept. 19, 1995, pp. 25454, 25455; Apr. 27, 2005, p. 8049); and, although
    such references are

      The stricture against references to a Member's conduct not then
    pending before the House applies to the conduct of all sitting Members
    (Apr. 1, 1992, p. 7899), including conduct that has previously been
    resolved by the Committee on Ethics or the House (Sept. 24, 1996, pp.
    24483, 24485; Apr. 17, 1997, p. 5831). This stricture does not apply to
    the conduct of a former Member, provided the reference is not made in an
    attempt to compare the conduct of a former Member with the conduct of a
    sitting Member (Sept. 20, 1995, pp. 25825, 25826; Sept. 12, 1996, pp.
    22900, 22901).

      Debate on a pending privileged resolution recommending disciplinary
    action against a Member may necessarily involve personalities. However,
    clause 1 of rule XVII still prohibits the use of language that is
    personally abusive (see, e.g., July 31, 1979, p. 21584; Jan. 21, 1997,
    p. 393) and the Chair may take the initiative to prevent violations of
    the rule (July 24, 2002, p. 14300). Furthermore, during the actual
    pendency of such a resolution, a Member may discuss a prior case
    reported to the House by the Committee on Ethics for the purpose of
    comparing the severity of the sanction recommended in that case with the
    severity of the sanction recommended in the pending case, provided that
    the Member does not identify, or discuss the details of the past conduct
    of, a sitting Member (Dec. 18, 1987, p. 36271).

    [[Page 182]]

      In addition to the prohibition against addressing a Member's conduct
    when it is not actually pending before the House, the Speaker has
    advised that Members should refrain from references in debate (1) to the
    motivations of a Member who filed a complaint before the Committee on
    Standards of Official Conduct (now Ethics) (June 15, 1988, p. 14623;
    July 6, 1988, p. 16630; Mar. 22, 1989, p. 5130; May 2, 1989, p. 7735;
    Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27077); (2) to personal criticism of a member of the
    committee (Apr. 1, 1992, p. 7899; Mar. 3, 1995, p. 6715; Sept. 19, 1996,
    p. 23812; Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24317); (3) to an investigation undertaken
    by the committee, including suggestion of a course of action (Mar. 3,
    1995, p. 6715; Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24317; Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25778) or
    advocacy of an interim status report by the committee (Sept. 12, 1996,
    p. 22900; Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25778).

      For precedents applicable to references in debate to the President,
    see Sec. 370, infra, or Members of the Senate, see Sec. 371, infra.

    Sec. 362. Criticism of the Speaker.

      Complaint  of the conduct
    of the Speaker should be presented directly for the action of the House
    and not by way of debate on other matters (V, 5188). In a case wherein a
    Member used words insulting to the Speaker the House on a subsequent
    day, and after other business had intervened, censured the offender (II,
    1248). In such a case the Speaker would ordinarily leave the chair while
    action should be taken by the House (II, 1366; V, 5188; VI, 565). In the
    104th Congress the Chair reaffirmed that it is not in order to speak
    disrespectfully of the Speaker, and that under the precedents the
    sanctions for such violations transcend the ordinary requirements for
    timeliness of challenges (II, 1248; Jan. 4, 1995, p. 552; Jan. 19, 1995,
    p. 1599). It is not in order to arraign the personal conduct of the
    Speaker (Jan. 18, 1995, p. 1441; Jan. 19, 1995, p. 1601). For example,
    it is not in order to charge dishonesty or disregard of the rules (July
    11, 1985, p. 18550), to reflect on his patriotism by accusing him of
    ``kowtowing'' to persons who would desecrate the flag (June 20, 1990, p.
    14877), to refer to him as a ``crybaby'' (Nov. 16, 1995, p. 33394), or
    to refer to official conduct of the Speaker that has previously been
    resolved by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct (now Ethics)
    or the House (Apr. 17, 1997, p. 5831). The Chair may take the initiative
    to admonish Members for references in debate that disparage the Speaker
    (June 25, 1981, p. 14056; Mar. 22, 1996, p. 6077; May 13, 2008, p.
    8923). Debate on a resolution authorizing the Speaker to entertain
    motions to suspend the rules may not engage in personality by discussing
    the official conduct of the Speaker, even if possibly relevant to the
    question of empowerment of the Speaker (Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24485).

    Sec. 363. Motives of Members not to be arraigned.

      * * *  The
    consequences of a measure may be reprobated in strong terms; but to
    arraign the motives of those who propose to advocate it is a
    personality, and against order. Qui digreditur a materia ad personam,
    Mr. Speaker ought to suppress. Ord. Com., 1604, Apr. 19.

    [[Page 183]]

    Mar. 29, 1995, p. 9675; Mar. 7, 2012, p. _), and characterizing the
    motivation of a Member in offering an amendment as deceptive and
    hypocritical was ruled out of order (June 12, 1979, p. 14461). A
    statement in debate that an amendment could only be demagogic or racist
    because only demagoguery or racism impelled such an amendment was ruled
    out of order as impugning the motives of the Member offering the
    amendment (Dec. 13, 1973, pp. 41270, 41271). However, debate
    characterizing a pending measure as a ``patently petty political
    terrorist tactic'' was held in order as directed at the pending measure
    rather than the motive or the character of its proponent (Nov. 9, 1995,
    p. 31913). Although in debate the assertion of one Member may be
    declared untrue by another, in so doing an intentional misrepresentation
    must not be implied (V, 5157-5160), and if stated or implied is
    censurable (II, 1305). A Member in debate having declared the words of
    another ``a base lie,'' censure was inflicted by the House on the
    offender (II, 1249).

      The arraignment of the motives of Members is not permitted (V, 5147-
    51; Dec. 13, 1973, p. 41270), and Speakers have intervened to prevent
    it, in the earlier practice preventing even mildest imputations (V,
    5161, 5162). However, remarks in debate may address political, but not
    personal, motivations for legislative positions (Jan. 24, 1995, p. 2214;
    Mar. 8, 1995, pp. 7307, 7308; Nov. 17, 1995, p. 33832; June 13, 1996, p.
    14043) or for committee membership (July 10, 1995, pp. 18257-59).
    Accusing another Member of hypocrisy has been held not in order (July
    24, 1979, p. 20380;

    Sec. 364. Disorder and interruptions during debate.

      No  one
    is to disturb another in his speech by hissing, coughing, spitting, 6
    Grey, 322; Scob., 8; D'Ewes, 332, col. 1, 640, col. 2, speaking or
    whispering to another, Scob., 6; D'Ewes, 487, col. 1; nor stand up to
    interrupt him, Town, col. 205; Mem. in Hakew., 31; nor to pass between
    the Speaker and the speaking Member, nor to go across the House, Scob.,
    6, or to walk up and down it, or to take books or papers from the table,
    or write there, 2 Hats., 171, p. 170.

    [[Page 184]]

    that the interrupting Member's remarks not appear in the Record (July
    26, 1984, p. 21247), and may admonish Members not to converse with a
    Member attempting to address the House (Feb. 21, 1984, p. 2758), because
    it is not in order to engage in disruption while another is delivering
    remarks in debate (June 27, 1996, p. 15915). On the opening day of the
    103d Congress, during the customary announcement of policies with
    respect to particular aspects of the legislative process, the Chair
    elaborated on the rules of order in debate with a general statement
    concerning decorum in the House (Jan. 5, 1993, p. 105). Under this
    provision, the Chair may require a line of Members waiting to sign a
    discharge petition to proceed to the rostrum from the far right-hand
    aisle and require the line not to form between the Chair and Members
    engaging in debate (Oct. 24, 1997, p. 23293). Hissing and jeering is not
    proper decorum in the House (May 21, 1998, p. 10282). In the event of
    disorder in the well, the Chair may ask Members to uphold the dignity
    and decorum of the House so that business can be conducted in an orderly
    fashion (Speaker Ryan, June 22, 2016, p. _) or may order that the well
    be cleared (Speaker McCormack, Dec. 9, 1963, p. 23831). For further
    discussion of interruptions in debate, see Sec. 946, infra.

      The House has, by clause 5 of rule XVII, prescribed certain rules of
    decorum differing somewhat from this provision of the parliamentary law,
    but supplemental to it rather than antagonistic. In one respect,
    however, the practice of the House differs from the apparent intent of
    the parliamentary law. In the House a Member may interrupt by addressing
    the Chair for permission of the Member speaking (V, 5006; VIII, 2465);
    but it is entirely within the discretion of the Member occupying the
    floor to determine when and by whom to be interrupted (V, 5007, 5008;
    VIII, 2463, 2465). There is no rule of the House requiring a Member
    having the floor to yield to another Member referred to during debate
    (Aug. 2, 1984, p. 22241). A Member may ask another to yield from any
    microphone in the Chamber, including those in the well, so long as not
    crossing between the Member having the floor and the Chair (June 5,
    1998, p. 11170). The Chair may take the initiative in preserving order
    when a Member declining to yield in debate continues to be interrupted
    by another Member, may order

    Sec. 365. Parliamentary method of silencing a
    tedious Member.

      Nevertheless,  if a Member finds that it is not the inclination of
    the House to hear him, and that by conversation or any other noise they
    endeavor to drown his voice, it is his most prudent way to submit to the
    pleasure of the House, and sit down; for it scarcely ever happens that
    they are guilty of this piece of ill manners without sufficient reason,
    or inattention to a Member who says anything worth their hearing. 2
    Hats., 77, 78.

      In the House, where the previous question and hour rule of debate have
    been used for many years, the parliamentary method of suppressing a
    tedious Member has never been imported into the practice (V, 5445).

    [[Page 185]]

    then to be heard in exculpation, and to withdraw. Then the Speaker
    states the offense committed; and the House considers the degree of
    punishment they will inflict. 2 Hats., 167, 7, 8, 172.

    Sec. 366. The parliamentary law as to naming a disorderly
    Member.

      If  repeated calls do not produce order, the Speaker may call by
    his name any Member obstinately persisting in irregularity; whereupon
    the House may require the Member to withdraw. He is

      This provision of parliamentary law should be read in conjunction with
    clause 4 of rule XVII, Sec. Sec. 960-961, infra, particularly as this
    provision relates to the ultimate authority of the House to determine
    whether a Member ignoring repeated calls to order should be permitted to
    proceed in order.

    Sec. 367. Proceedings in cases of assaults and
    affrays.

      For  instances of assaults and affrays in the House of Commons,
    and the proceedings thereon, see 1 Pet. Misc., 82; 3 Grey, 128; 4 Grey,
    328; 5 Grey, 382; 6 Grey, 254; 10 Grey, 8. Whenever warm words or an
    assault have passed between Members, the House, for the protection of
    their Members, requires them to declare in their places not to prosecute
    any quarrel, 3 Grey, 128, 293; 5 Grey, 280; or orders them to attend the
    Speaker, who is to accommodate their differences, and report to the
    House, 3 Grey, 419; and they are put under restraint if they refuse, or
    until they do. 9 Grey, 234, 312.

    [[Page 186]]

      In several instances assaults and affrays have occurred on the floor
    of the House. Sometimes the House has allowed these affairs to pass
    without notice, the Members concerned making apologies either personally
    or through other Members (II, 1658-1662). In other cases the House has
    exacted apologies (II, 1646-1651, 1657), or required the offending
    Members to pledge themselves before the House to keep the peace (II,
    1643). In case of an aggravated assault by one Member on another on the
    portico of the Capitol for words spoken in debate, the House censured
    the assailant and three other Members who had been present, armed, to
    prevent interference (II, 1655, 1656). Assaults or affrays in the
    Committee of the Whole are dealt with by the House (II, 1648-1651).

    Sec. 368. Parliamentary law as to taking down
    disorderly words.

      Disorderly  words are not to be noticed till the Member has
    finished his speech. 5 Grey, 356; 6 Grey, 60. Then the person objecting
    to them, and desiring them to be taken down by the Clerk at the table,
    must repeat them. The Speaker then may direct the Clerk to take them
    down in his minutes; but if he thinks them not disorderly, he delays the
    direction. If the call becomes pretty general, he orders the Clerk to
    take them down, as stated by the objecting Member. They are then a part
    of his minutes, and when read to the offending Member, he may deny they
    were his words, and the House must then decide by a question whether
    they are his words or not. Then the Member may justify them, or explain
    the sense in which he used them, or apologize. If the House is
    satisfied, no further proceeding is necessary. But if two Members still
    insist to take the sense of the House, the Member must withdraw before
    that question is stated, and then the sense of the House is to be taken.
    2 Hats., 199; 4 Grey, 170; 6 Grey, 59. When any Member has spoken, or
    other business intervened, after offensive words spoken, they can not be
    taken notice of for censure. And this is for the common security of all,
    and to prevent mistakes which must happen if words are not taken down
    immediately. Formerly they might be taken down at any time the same day.
    2 Hats., 196; Mem. in Hakew., 71; 3 Grey, 48; 9 Grey, 514.

    [[Page 187]]

    noticed as soon as uttered, and has not insisted that the offending
    Member withdraw while the House is deciding as to its course of action.

      The House has, by clause 4 of rule XVII, provided a method of
    procedure in cases of disorderly words. The House permits and requires
    them to be

    Sec. 369. Disorderly words taken down and reported
    from Committee of the Whole.

      Disorderly  words spoken in a committee must be
    written down as in the House; but the committee can only report them to
    the House for animadversion. 6 Grey, 46.

      This provision of the parliamentary law has been applied to the
    Committee of the Whole, rather than to select or standing committees,
    which are separately empowered to enforce rules of decorum (clause 1(a)
    of rule XI, which incorporates the provisions of rule XVII where
    applicable). The House has censured a Member for disorderly words spoken
    in the Committee of the Whole and reported therefrom (II, 1259).

    Sec. 370. References in debate to the
    Executive.

      In  Parliament, to speak irreverently or seditiously against
    the King is against order. Smyth's Comw., L. 2, c. 3; 2 Hats., 170.

      This provision of the parliamentary law is manifestly inapplicable to
    the House (V, 5086); and it has been held in order in debate to refer to
    the President of the United States or his opinions, either with approval
    or criticism, provided that such reference be relevant to the subject
    under discussion and otherwise conformable to the Rules of the House (V,
    5087-5091; VIII, 2500). Under this standard the following references are
    in order: (1) a reference to the probable action of the President (V,
    5092); (2) an adjuration to the President to keep his word (although an
    improper form of address) (Dec. 19, 1995, p. 37601); (3) an accusation
    that the President ``frivolously vetoed'' a bill (Nov. 8, 1995, p.
    31785).

    [[Page 188]]

      Personal abuse, innuendo, or ridicule of the President is not
    permitted (VIII, 2497; Aug. 12, 1986, p. 21078; Oct. 21, 1987, pp.
    28857, 28858; Sept. 21, 1994, p. 25147; Sept. 7, 2006, pp. 17381,
    17382). The standards applicable to references regarding the President
    applies also to the President-elect (e.g., Nov. 14, 2016, p. _). In the
    102d Congress, the Speaker enunciated a minimal standard of propriety
    for all debate concerning nominated candidates for the Presidency, based
    on the traditional proscription against personally offensive references
    to the President even in the capacity as a candidate (Speaker Foley,
    Sept. 24, 1992, p. 27344). This policy has been extended to a
    presumptive major-party nominee for President (e.g., Apr. 22, 2004, pp.
    7401, 7402) (although references to the past statements or views of such
    nominee are not necessarily unparliamentary (May 6, 2004, p. 8554)).

      Under this standard, the following remarks regarding personal conduct,
    demeanor, or attributes have been held out of order as unparliamentary
    references: (1) discussing personal conduct even as a point of reference
    or comparison (July 16, 1998, p. 15784; Sept. 9, 1998, p. 19735); (2)
    ``cowardly,'' ``cowardice'' (Oct. 25, 1989, p. 25817; Sept. 28, 2015, p.
    _; Jan. 11, 2017, p. _), or lacking personal courage (Mar. 26, 2014, p.
    _); (3) ``a little bugger'' (Nov. 18, 1995, p. 33974); (4)
    ``disgusting'' and ``despicable'' (Mar. 11, 2004, p. 4033),
    ``disgraceful'' (June 20, 2012, p. _), ``disgusting and indecent
    rhetoric'' (Mar. 27, 2017, p. _); (5) a personal ``dark side'' (Mar. 1,
    2017, p. _); (6) that such person is deserving of shame (May 24, 2016,
    p. _) or is ``shameful'' (Dec. 8, 2016, p. _) (although an accusation of
    ``shameful opposition'' to a legislative proposal is not necessarily out
    of order (Deschler, ch. 29, Sec.  58.7); (7) not ``a large enough
    person'' to apologize (Mar. 11, 2004, p. 4086); (8) ``arrogant'' (Jan.
    11, 2007, p. 998; Mar. 22, 2007, p. 7321; Nov. 17, 2011, p. 17759; Feb.
    16, 2012, p. _; July 18, 2012, p. _; Oct. 29, 2013, p. _; Nov. 17, 2014,
    p. _); (9) ``mean-spirited'' (July 15, 2008, p. 15061), vengeful (June
    3, 2013, p. _), or ``cruel'' (Nov. 15, 2013, p. _; Feb. 16, 2017, p. _);
    (10) ill-tempered or lacking temperament (Sept. 7, 2016, p. _; Mar. 1,
    2017, p. _) or ``infantile'' (June 15, 2016, p. _); (11) a ``hissy fit''
    (Oct. 27, 2011, pp. 16239, 16245; Dec. 1, 2014, p. _); (12) was
    ``rooting against,'' or was turning one's back on, the American people
    (May 24, 2015, p. _; Mar. 16, 2016, p. _), intentionally hurting the
    public (Oct. 3, 2013, p. _), or ``bilking'' the taxpayer (Apr. 22, 2015,
    p. _); (13) that such person had engaged in insults (May 13, 2015, p.
    _); (14) accusing such person of being ``delusional'' (Dec. 9, 2015, p.
    _); (15) commenting derogatorily on physical attributes (May 24, 2016,
    p. _).

    [[Page 189]]

    July 10, 2012, p. _) or ``spoke out of the other side of his mouth''
    (Jan. 31, 2012, p. _); (5) attributing ``hypocrisy'' (Sept. 25, 1992, p.
    27674; Apr. 26, 2006, p. 6129; Oct. 13, 2011, p. 15513; Mar. 5, 2013, p.
    _; May 17, 2016, p. _); (6) ``deceit'' (Nov. 17, 2014, p. _),
    ``deception'' (Sept. 28, 2016, p. _; Nov. 18, 2013, p. _), being
    deceptive (Mar. 29, 2004, pp. 5523, 5524; Feb. 1, 2006, p. 647), or
    using ``deceptive rhetoric'' (Oct. 17, 2007, pp. 27534, 27538); (7)
    making promises while having ``no intention of living up to his
    promises'' (Mar. 27, 2017, p. _); (8) acting in a ``duplicitous'' manner
    (June 11, 2015, p. _); (9) acting in a ``disingenuous'' manner (Mar. 1,
    2017, p. _); (10) fabricating an issue (July 6, 2004, pp. 14313, 14314;
    Jan. 30, 2017, p. _; Feb. 14, 2017, p. _), or intending to mislead (Oct.
    6, 2004, p. 21053; July 12, 2007, p. 18827; Mar. 22, 2012, p. _; Nov.
    14, 2013, p. _), such as stating ``blatant falsehoods'' (Jan. 30, 2017,
    p. _); (11) intentional mischaracterization, although
    mischaracterization without intent to deceive is not necessarily out of
    order (July 19, 2005, p. 16525).
      It is not in order to call the President a ``liar'' or accuse such
    person of ``lying'' (June 26, 1985, p. 17394; Sept. 24, 1992, pp. 27345,
    27346; Nov. 15, 1995, p. 32587; June 6, 1996, pp. 13228, 13229; Mar. 18,
    1998, p. 3937; Nov. 14, 2002, p. 22370; July 15, 2003, pp. 18172, 18173;
    Mar. 24, 2004, pp. 5115, 5116; Oct. 3, 2013, p. _; Oct. 5, 2013, p. _;
    June 9, 2016, p. _; July 13, 2016, p. _; Nov. 16, 2016, p. _; Jan. 9,
    2017, p. _; Mar. 1, 2017, p. _; Mar. 9, 2017, p. _; Mar. 17, 2017, p. _;
    Mar. 29, 2017, p. _; May 4, 2017, p. _). Indeed, any suggestion of
    mendacity is out of order, such as: (1) suggesting that such person
    misrepresented the truth, attempted to obstruct justice, and encouraged
    others to perjure themselves (Feb. 25, 1998, p. 2621); (2) dishonesty
    (July 13, 2004, p. 15275; June 29, 2005, p. 14770; June 3, 2013, p. _),
    failing to be honest (Apr. 14, 2011, p. 6198), making a ``dishonest
    argument'' (Sept. 12, 2006, p. 17851), or intent to be intellectually
    dishonest (May 9, 1990, p. 9828), or stating that many were convinced
    such person had ``not been honest'' (Mar. 5, 1998, p. 2620); (3)
    ``raping'' the truth (Apr. 24, 1996, p. 8807), not telling the truth
    (Oct. 29, 2003, p. 26363), distorting the truth (Sept. 9, 2003, pp.
    21570-73), or having only a ``nodding acquaintance'' with the truth
    (Mar. 1, 2017, p. _); (4) not being ``straight with us'' (Nov. 19, 2003,
    p. 29811;

      It is not in order to cast aspersions on the ethical behavior of the
    President, including: (1) alluding to unethical behavior or corruption
    (June 20, 1996, p. 14829; July 9, 2002, p. 12286; Oct. 29, 2003, pp.
    26400-402; Sept. 21, 2016, p. _), such as implying a cause-and-effect
    relationship between political contributions and his actions as
    President (May 22, 2001, p. 9028; Sept. 29, 2004, pp. 19976, 19977),
    including an accusation that the President had ``lined the pockets'' of
    his ``political cronies'' and filled ``campaign coffers'' (Sept. 14,
    2005, pp. 20238, 20239); (2) using the Presidency for personal benefit
    (Jan. 11, 2017, p. _; Feb. 6, 2017, p. _; Mar. 2, 2017, p. _; Apr. 4,
    2017, p. _; Apr. 26, 2017, p. _; Apr. 27, 2017, p. _); (3) questioning
    whether the President can ``live up to the ethical requirements'' of the
    office (Jan. 24, 2017, p. _); (4) calling such person ``amoral'' or
    lacking in morality (June 3, 2013, p. _; Nov. 16, 2016, p. _).

    [[Page 190]]

    or actions taken with the knowledge that they were not in accordance
    with the law (June 20, 2006, p. 11935; Jan. 31, 2012, p. _; Nov. 20,
    2014, p. _; Dec. 1, 2014, p. _; Jan. 13, 2015, p. _, p. _; Jan. 14,
    2015, p. _; Feb. 11, 2015, p. _; Feb. 27, 2015, p. _; Mar. 24, 2015, p.
    _; Feb. 24, 2016, p. _; Mar. 17, 2016, p. _; Apr. 18, 2016, p. _; Apr.
    19, 2016, p. _); (8) ``above the law'' (June 18, 2012, p. _; Jan. 15,
    2013, p. _; Jan. 13, 2015, p. _; Feb. 14, 2017, p. _), ``lawless'' (Aug.
    1, 2014, p. _; Nov. 20, 2014, p. _; Dec. 4, 2014, p. _; May 14, 2015, p.
    _; Jan. 7, 2016, p. _; Apr. 18, 2016, p. _; Apr. 27, 2016, p. _),
    violating the law (July 29, 2014, p. _; Apr. 27, 2016, p. _), breaking
    the law (Sept. 9, 2014, p. _, p. _), abusing the law (Feb. 27, 2015, p.
    _), or assaulting the rule of law (May 16, 2017, p. _); (9) suggesting
    collusion with a foreign country to violate the integrity of a U.S.
    election (Mar. 29, 2017, p. _); (10) ``shredding'' (Apr. 19, 2016, p.
    _), having contempt for (July 17, 2013, p. _; Jan. 11, 2017, p. _), or
    having disrespect for (Feb. 3, 2014, p. _) the Constitution; (11) ``con
    man'' or ``con artist'' (June 9, 2016, p. _; Nov. 16, 2016, p. _, p. _;
    Mar. 17, 2017, p. _); (12) alluding to alleged sexual misconduct (May
    10, 1994, p. 9697; Feb. 25, 1998, p. 1828; Mar. 5, 1998, p. 2620; May
    18, 1998, p. 9418; Jan. 9, 2017, p. _) or labeling such person a sexual
    predator (Nov. 16, 2016, p. _).
      Accusations that the President has committed a crime, or even that the
    President has done something illegal, are unparliamentary. The following
    allegations are not in order: (1) ``draft-dodger'' (Apr. 24, 1996, pp.
    8807, 8808; Sept. 30, 1996, p. 26603), unexcused absences from military
    service (May 5, 2004, pp. 8417, 8418), such as being ``A.W.O.L.'' (Sept.
    22, 2004, p. 18953) or of dereliction of duty as Commander-in-Chief
    (Oct. 22, 2015, p. _); (2) discussing ``charges'' leveled at the
    President or under investigation (Mar. 19, 1998, p. 4094; June 11, 1998,
    p. 12025; Sept. 21, 2016, p. _), including alluding to ``fund-raising
    abuses'' (Mar. 14, 2000, p. 2716), speculating that the Vice President
    might someday pardon the President for certain charges (Apr. 12, 2000,
    p. 5419), or invoking a finding of personal liability by a court (May
    24, 2016, p. _); (3) ``crook'' (Mar. 1, 2017, p. _), ``come clean''
    (Sept. 21, 2016, p. _), or ``fess up'' (Feb. 6, 2017, p. _); (4)
    suggesting censure or impeachment (Feb. 2, 2017, p. _; Feb. 7, 2017, p.
    _; Mar. 29, 2017, p. _; May 17, 2017, p. _, p. _; May 25, 2017, p. _);
    (5) discussing alleged criminal conduct (Sept. 10, 1998, p. 19976; Feb.
    15, 2017, p. _; Mar. 29, 2017, p. _); (6) obstruction of justice (May
    17, 2017, p. _, p. _; May 18, 2017, p. _); (7) accusations of
    ``illegal'' activity

      References to racial or other discrimination on the part of the
    President are not in order. As such, remarks may not refer to the
    President as: (1) a racist (June 9, 2016, p. _; Nov. 16, 2016, p. _;
    Mar. 9, 2017, p. _); (2) having made ``racial slurs'' or ``racial
    epithets'' (Jan. 9, 2017, p. _; Mar. 16, 2017, p. _); (3) telling a
    ``racist lie'' (Jan. 9, 2017, p. _; Feb. 13, 2017, p. _; Mar. 21, 2017,
    p. _); (4) a bigot (June 9, 2016, p. _); (5) having made a bigoted or
    racist statement (June 7, 2016, p. _; June 9, 2016, p. _; Nov. 16, 2016,
    p. _); (6) having taken a bigoted action (Jan. 30, 2017, p. _); (7) not
    caring about black people (Sept. 8, 2005, p. 19797); (8) a misogynist
    (June 9, 2016, p. _); (9) having run a prejudiced campaign (Jan. 12,
    2017, p. _).

      Language impugning the patriotism or loyalty of the President is not
    in order, such as: (1) directly questioning patriotism (Sept. 9, 2016,
    p. _); (2) labeling the President as un-American or having an ``un-
    American ideology'' (June 7, 2016, p. _; Nov. 14, 2016, p. _; Jan. 30,
    2017, p. _; Mar. 1, 2017, p. _); (3) accusing the President of giving
    ``aid and comfort to the enemy'' (Jan. 25, 1995, p. 2352; May 6, 2004,
    pp. 8601, 8602), ``aiding and abetting the enemy'' (Apr. 22, 2004, pp.
    7401, 7402), or ``aiding and abetting a terroristic regime'' (Sept. 10,
    2015, p. _); (4) accusing the President of ``spying'' on Congress (Jan.
    7, 2016, p. _; Jan. 8, 2016, p. _); (5) equating the President's
    decisions with regard to armed conflict to his having ``slaughtered''
    thousands (Mar. 8, 2007, p. 5815) or that a soldier's death was for his
    ``amusement'' (Oct. 18, 2007, pp. 27569, 27570).

    [[Page 191]]

    tator. Remarks that have been held to be unparliamentary include: (1) an
    accusation of ``abuse of power'' or ``abuse of the office'' (Sept. 9,
    2014, p. _; Dec. 4, 2014, p. _; Jan. 8, 2016, p. _; May 25, 2016, p. _;
    May 17, 2017, p. _; May 22, 2017, p. _) or ``abuse of executive
    privilege'' (Apr. 27, 2016, p. _); (2) an accusation that the President
    ``disrespected the office'' (Mar. 27, 2017, p. _) or took an action
    ``beneath the dignity of the office'' (May 3, 2017, p. _); (3) an
    accusation of violating the oath of office (Dec. 3, 2013, p. _; Feb. 3,
    2014, p. _; Feb. 10, 2014, p. _; Nov. 20, 2014, p. _; Feb. 11, 2015, p.
    _); (4) likening the President to a ``ruler'' (July 8, 2013, p. _; July
    16, 2013, p. _), ``king'' (July 17, 2013, p. _; May 22, 2014, p. _; Nov.
    20, 2014, p. _), ``monarch'' (Jan. 15, 2013, p. _), or ``emperor'' (Dec.
    2, 2014, p. _); (5) an accusation of ``tyranny'' (Mar. 16, 2016, p. _);
    (6) an accusation of ``demagoguery'' or of being a demagogue (Jan. 23,
    1996, p. 1144; Jan. 24, 1996, pp. 1220, 1221; May 30, 1996, pp. 12646,
    12647; Nov. 16, 2016, p. _).
      Personally disparaging the manner in which the President carries out
    the duties of the office can constitute a personality, such as when the
    remarks suggest that the President is an undemocratic leader akin to a
    dic

      The Chair may admonish Members transgressing this stricture even after
    other debate has intervened (Jan. 23, 1996, p. 1144; Apr. 27, 2016, p.
    _).

      A Member may not read in debate extraneous material personally abusive
    of the President that would be improper if spoken in the Member's own
    words (Mar. 3, 1993, p. 3958; Nov. 15, 1995, p. 32587; May 2, 1996, p.
    10010; Mar. 17, 1998, p. 3799; July 15, 2003, p. 18170; Sept. 16, 2003,
    pp. 22151, 22152; Oct. 17, 2007, p. 27538; Oct. 5, 2013, p. _; Sept. 28,
    2015, p. _; Apr. 19, 2016, p. _), such as material labeling the
    President's statement a lie (Sept. 10, 2014, p. _). This prohibition
    includes the recitation of another Member's criticism of the President
    made off the floor (even if recited as a rebuttal to such criticism)
    (Dec. 17, 1998, p. 27775; Apr. 18, 2016, p. _).

      Although wide latitude is permitted in debate on a proposition to
    impeach the President (V, 5093), Members must abstain from language
    personally offensive (V, 5094; Dec. 18, 1998, p. 27829); and Members
    must abstain from comparisons to the personal conduct of sitting Members
    of the House or Senate (Dec. 18, 1998, p. 27829). Furthermore, when
    impeachment is not the pending business on the floor, Members may not
    refer to evidence of alleged impeachable offenses by the President
    contained in a communication from an independent counsel pending before
    a House committee (Sept. 14, 1998, p. 20171; Sept. 17, 1998, p. 20758),
    although they may refer to the communication, itself, within the
    confines of proper decorum in debate (Oct. 6, 1998, p. 23841), and may
    not otherwise suggest that the President has done something worthy of
    censure or impeachment (Feb. 2, 2017, p. _; Feb. 7, 2017, p. _; Mar. 29,
    2017, p. _; May 17, 2017, p. _, p. _; May 25, 2017, p. _).

      References in debate to former Presidents are not governed by these
    standards (Nov. 15, 1945, p. 10735; June 27, 2002, pp. 11844, 11845).

    [[Page 192]]

    dent, personally, do not necessarily extend to members of his family
    (Speaker Foley, July 12, 1990, p. 17206).
      The Chair has advised that the protections afforded by Jefferson's
    Manual and the precedents against unparliamentary references to the
    Presi

      For discussion of the stricture against addressing remarks in debate
    to the President, as in the second person, see Sec. 945, infra.

      On January 27, 1909 (VIII, 2497), the House adopted a report of a
    committee appointed to investigate the question, which report in part
    stated:

      ``The freedom of speech in debate in the House should never be denied
    or abridged, but freedom of speech in debate does not mean license to
    indulge in personal abuses or ridicule. The right of Members of the two
    Houses of Congress to criticize the official acts of the President and
    other executive officers is beyond question, but this right is subject
    to proper rules requiring decorum in debate. Such right of criticism is
    inherent upon legislative authority. The right to legislate involves the
    right to consider conditions as they are and to contrast present
    conditions with those of the past or those desired in the future. The
    right to correct abuses by legislation carries the right to consider and
    discuss abuses which exist or which are feared.

      ``It is, however, the duty of the House to require its Members in
    speech or debate to preserve that proper restraint which will permit the
    House to conduct its business in an orderly manner and without
    unnecessarily and unduly exciting animosity among its Members or
    antagonism from those other branches of the Government with which the
    House is correlated.''

    Sec. 371. References in debate to the other House and its
    Members.

      It  is a breach of order in debate to notice what has been said
    on the same subject in the other House, or the particular votes or
    majorities on it there; because the opinion of each House should be left
    to its own independency, not to be influenced by the proceedings of the
    other; and the quoting them might beget reflections leading to a
    misunderstanding between the two Houses. 8 Grey, 22.

    [[Page 193]]

    cerning a measure under debate in the House, and quotations from Senate
    proceedings relevant to the making of legislative history on a pending
    measure. In the 109th Congress clause 1 was amended to permit debate to
    include references to the Senate or its Members but within the general
    stricture that requires Members to avoid personality (sec. 2(g), H. Res.
    5, Jan. 4, 2005, p. 43). Under the new standard, remarks may urge the
    Senate to take a particular action (Mar. 21, 2010, p. 4105). For a
    recitation of precedents under the former rule, see Sec. 371 of the
    House Rules and Manual for the 108th Congress (H. Doc. 107-284).
      Until former clause 1 of rule XIV (currently clause 1 of rule XVII)
    was amended in the 100th and 101st Congresses (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1987,
    p. 6; H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1989, p. 72), this principle of comity and
    parliamentary law as described by Jefferson governed debate in the House
    to the full extent of its provisions (see generally, V, 5095-5130; VIII,
    2501-21; July 31, 1984, p. 21670; Deschler-Brown, ch. 29, Sec. 44). From
    the 101st Congress through the 108th Congress, clause 1 of rule XVII
    permitted some factual references that were a matter of public record,
    references to the pendency or sponsorship in the Senate of certain
    measures, factual descriptions con

      Since the adoption of the new rule, the following references to the
    Senate or its Members have been held unparliamentary: (1) insinuating
    that the Majority Leader lied (Dec. 20, 2011, pp. 21444, 21446); (2)
    accusing Senate Republicans of hypocrisy (May 16, 2005, p. 9757); (3)
    accusing a Senator of making slanderous statements (June 17, 2005, p.
    13009; June 21, 2005, p. 13408); (4) attributing to a Senator a list of
    offenses under investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission
    (Oct. 18, 2005, p. 22987); (5) accusing a Senator of corruption (Oct.
    13, 2009, p. 24720), taking bribes (Jan. 19, 2010, p. 209), or being
    unethical (Aug. 2, 2012, p. _); (6) accusing the Republican leadership
    of ``hijacking justice'' (Feb. 1, 2017, p. _); (7) accusing a Senator of
    giving ``aid and comfort'' to the enemy (Dec. 13, 2005, p. 28162); (8)
    referring to a Senator as ``disgraceful'' (Oct. 2, 2013, p. _) or a
    Senate action as a ``disgrace'' (Apr. 18, 2013, p. _) or sarcastically
    as ``courageous'' (July 22, 2011, p. 11831-33); (9) referring to Senate
    Democrats (May 18, 2005, p. 10136) or liberals in the Senate (July 30,
    2011, p. 12531) as ``cowardly''; (10) stating a ``low opinion'' of the
    Senate (Apr. 1, 2011, p. 4966); (11) stating that the Majority Leader
    ``has a high opinion of himself'' (Dec. 20, 2011, p. 21392); (12)
    accusing a Senator of ``taunting'' (May 22, 2014, p. _); (13) accusing a
    Senator of being prejudiced, racist, or of making a racist comment (Jan.
    12, 2017, p. _).

      It remains the duty of the Chair to call to order a Member who engages
    in personality with respect to a Senator (see Sec. 374, infra), and the
    Chair may admonish a Member for unparliamentary references even after
    intervening recognition (Oct. 12, 1999, p. 24954; Nov. 15, 2001, p.
    22596). Although the Chair is under a duty to caution Members against
    unparliamentary references, the Chair will not advise Members on how to
    construct their remarks to avoid improper references (Feb. 25, 2004, pp.
    2409-15).

    [[Page 194]]

      The prohibition against improper references to Senators includes (1) a
    reference not explicitly naming the Senator (VIII, 2512; Feb. 23, 1994,
    p. 2658; June 30, 1995, p. 18153; Feb. 27, 1997, pp. 2768, 2769); (2)
    the reading of a paper making criticisms of a Senator (V, 5127); (3) a
    reference to another person's criticism of a Senator (Aug. 4, 1983, p.
    23145). Similarly, the Chair has consistently held that if references to
    the Senate are appropriate, the Member delivering them is not required
    to use the term ``the other body,'' (Oct. 4, 1984, p. 30047) and, by the
    same token, references to ``the other body'' will not cure
    unparliamentary references directed to the Senate (e.g., Oct. 2, 2002,
    p. 18913; Apr. 2, 2004, pp. 6394, 6395).

      Under the earlier form of the rule, the Chair held that remarks in
    debate during the pendency of an impeachment resolution may not include
    comparisons to the personal conduct of sitting Members of the House or
    Senate (Dec. 18, 1998, p. 27829) and remarks in debate may not criticize
    words spoken in the Senate by one not a Member of that body in the
    course of an impeachment trial (V, 5106). After examination by a
    committee under the earlier form of the rule, a speech reflecting on the
    character of the Senate was ordered to be stricken from the Record on
    the ground that it tended to create ``unfriendly conditions between the
    two bodies * * * obstructive of wise legislation and little short of a
    public calamity'' (V, 5129). Under the earlier form of the rule, where a
    Member had been assailed in the Senate, he was permitted to explain his
    own conduct and motives without bringing the whole controversy into
    discussion or assailing the Senator (V, 5123-5126). Propositions
    relating to breaches of these principles were entertained as a matter of
    privilege (V, 5129, 6980).

      The precise standard in former clause 1 of rule XIV for references to
    ``individual Members of the Senate'' did not apply to references to
    former Senators (Dec. 14, 1995, p. 36968).

      The official policies, actions, and opinions of a Senator who is a
    candidate for President or Vice President (as, in modern practice, with
    one who is not) may be criticized in terms not personally offensive
    (Speaker Wright, Sept. 29, 1988, p. 26683), but references attacking the
    character or integrity of a Senator in that context are not in order
    (Oct. 30, 1979, p. 30150).

    [[Page 195]]

    in the Record of a paper making improper references to the Vice
    President (Sept. 19, 2000, p. 18580).
      References in debate to the Vice President (as President of the
    Senate) are governed by the standards of reference permitted toward the
    President, as under the earlier form of the rule. As such, a Member may
    criticize in debate the policies, or candidacy, of the Vice President
    but may not engage in personality (Dec. 14, 1995, p. 36968; July 14,
    1998, p. 15314; Sept. 20, 2000, p. 18639). For example, it is not in
    order to allude to ``wrongdoings [including] fund-raising telephone
    calls by the Vice President'' (Mar. 14, 2000, p. 2716); to attribute to
    him a list of offenses under investigation by a special prosecutor (Oct.
    18, 2005, p. 22987); to suggest that the House should investigate him in
    connection with government contracts awarded to his former employer
    (June 15, 2006, p. 11480); to speculate that he might someday pardon the
    President (Apr. 12, 2000, p. 5419); to accuse him of lying (Sept. 20,
    2000, p. 18639; Sept. 21, 2000, p. 18789; Feb. 16, 2006, p. 1960; Mar.
    6, 2007, p. 5412); to suggest ``he has a problem with the truth'' (Oct.
    5, 2000, p. 21014); to allege ``unethical behavior'' or ``corruption''
    (see, e.g., Oct. 29, 2003, pp. 26400-402; Nov. 4, 2003, pp. 27070,
    27071), including innuendo suggesting policy choices were made on the
    basis of personal pecuniary gain (July 7, 2004, p. 14582; Sept. 13,
    2005, pp. 20238, 20239) or accusations of abuse of power (July 14, 2004,
    p. 15501); to describe him as ``arrogant'' (June 28, 2007, p. 17926;
    Sept. 25, 2008, p. 21781); to question the patriotism of a major-party
    nominee for the office (Sept. 9, 2016, p. _). The rule also precludes
    the insertion

       A Member may not read in debate extraneous material regarding the
    Vice President that would be improper if spoken in the Member's own
    words (Feb. 16, 2006, p. 1960).

    Sec. 373. Complaint by one House of conduct of a
    Member of the other.

      Neither  House can exercise any authority over a Member or
    officer of the other, but should complain to the House of which he is,
    and leave the punishment to them.

      In a notable instance, wherein a Member of the House had assaulted a
    Senator in the Senate Chamber for words spoken in debate, the Senate
    examined the breach of privilege and transmitted its report to the
    House, which punished the Member (II, 1622). A Senator having assailed a
    House Member in debate, the House messaged to the Senate a resolution
    declaring the language a breach of privilege and requested the Senate to
    take appropriate action (Sept. 27, 1951, p. 12270). The Senator
    subsequently asked unanimous consent to correct his remarks in the
    permanent Congressional Record, but objection was raised (Sept. 28,
    1951, p. 12383). But where certain Members of the House, in a published
    letter, sought to influence the vote of a Senator in an impeachment
    trial, the House declined to consider the matter as a breach of
    privilege (III, 2657). Although on one occasion it was held that a
    resolution offered in the House requesting the Senate to expunge from
    the Record statements in criticism of a Member of the House did not
    constitute a question of privilege, being in violation of the rule
    prohibiting references to the Senate in debate (VIII, 2519), a properly
    drafted resolution referring to language published in the Record of
    Senate proceedings as constituting a breach of privilege and requesting
    the Senate to take appropriate action concerning the subject has been
    held to present a question of the privileges of the House (VIII, 2516).

    [[Page 196]]

    pressions to go unnoticed which may give a ground of complaint to the
    other House, and introduce proceedings and mutual accusations between
    the two Houses, which can hardly be terminated without difficulty and
    disorder. 3 Hats., 51.

    Sec. 374. Duty of the Speaker to prevent expressions
    offensive to the other House.

      * * *  Where the complaint is of words
    disrespectfully spoken by a Member of another House, it is difficult to
    obtain punishment, because of the rules supposed necessary to be
    observed (as to the immediate noting down of words) for the security of
    Members. Therefore it is the duty of the House, and more particularly of
    the Speaker, to interfere immediately, and not to permit ex

      A rule of comity prohibiting most references in debate to the Senate
    was first enunciated in Jefferson's Manual and was strictly enforced in
    the House through the 108th Congress (albeit with certain exceptions
    adopted in the 100th and 101st Congresses in the former clause 1(b) of
    rule XVII) (Sec. 371, supra and Sec. 945, infra). In the 109th Congress
    clause 1 was amended to permit references to the Senate or its Members,
    even critical references, so long as avoiding personality (sec. 2(g), H.
    Res. 5, Jan. 4, 2005, p. 43). Nevertheless, it remains the duty of the
    Chair to call to order a Member who violates the rule in debate or
    through an insertion in the Record.

      The Chair has distinguished between engaging in personality toward
    another Member of the House, as to which the Chair normally awaits a
    point of order from the floor, and improper references to Members of the
    Senate, which violate comity between the Houses, as to which the Chair
    normally takes initiative (Feb. 27, 1997, pp. 2778, 2779). The Chair may
    admonish Members to avoid unparliamentary references to the Senate even
    after intervening recognition (Oct. 12, 1999, p. 24954). Pending
    consideration of a measure relating to the Senate, the Speaker announced
    his intention to strictly enforce this provision of Jefferson's Manual
    prohibiting improper references to the Senate, and to deny recognition
    to Members violating the prohibition, subject to permission of the House
    to proceed in order (Speaker O'Neill, June 16, 1982, p. 13843). Under
    the earlier form of clause 1 of rule XVII, the Chair refused to respond
    to hypothetical questions as to the propriety of possible
    characterizations of Senate actions before their use in debate (Oct. 24,
    1985, p. 28819). For a further discussion of the Speaker's duties
    regarding unparliamentary debate, see Sec. Sec. 960-961, infra.

    [[Page 197]]

    House, as the Member knows from that to what points he is to direct his
    exculpation, he may be heard to those points before any question is
    moved or stated against him. He is then to be heard, and withdraw before
    any question is moved. But if the question itself is the charge, as for
    breach of order or matter arising in the debate, then the charge must be
    stated (that is, the question must be moved), himself heard, and then to
    withdraw. 2 Hats., 121, 122.

    Sec. 375. Course of the Member when business concerning
    that Member is under debate.

      No  Member may be present when a bill or any
    business concerning himself is debating; nor is any Member to speak to
    the merits of it till he withdraws. 2 Hats., 219. The rule is that if a
    charge against a Member arise out of a report of a committee, or
    examination of witnesses in the

      In 1832, during proceedings for the censure of a Member, the Speaker
    informed the Member that he should withdraw (II, 1366); but this seems
    to be an exceptional instance of the enforcement of the law of
    Parliament. In other cases, after the proposition for censure or
    expulsion has been proposed, Members have been heard in debate, either
    as a matter of right (II, 1286), as a matter of course (II, 1246, 1253),
    by express provision (II, 1273), and in writing (II, 1273), or by
    unanimous consent (II, 1275). A Member against whom a resolution of
    censure was pending was asked by the Speaker if he desired to be heard
    (VI, 236). But a Member was not permitted to depute another Member to
    speak in his behalf (II, 1273). In modern practice the Member has been
    permitted to speak in his own behalf, both in censure (June 10, 1980,
    pp. 13802-11) and expulsion proceedings (Oct. 2, 1980, pp. 28953-78;
    July 24, 2002, pp. 14299, 14309). A Member-elect has been permitted to
    participate in debate on a resolution relating to his right to take the
    oath (Jan. 10, 1967, p. 23).

    [[Page 198]]

    Sec. 376. Disqualifying personal interest of a
    Member.

      Where  the private interests of a Member are concerned in a bill or
    question he is to withdraw. And where such an interest has appeared, his
    voice has been disallowed, even after a division. In a case so contrary,
    not only to the laws of decency, but to the fundamental principle of the
    social compact, which denies to any man to be a judge in his own cause,
    it is for the honor of the House that this rule of immemorial observance
    should be strictly adhered to. 2 Hats., 119, 121; 6 Grey, 368.

      In the House it has not been usual for the Member to withdraw from
    debate when the Member's private interests are concerned in a pending
    measure, although clause 1 of rule III addresses voting in such a
    contingency. In one instance the Senate disallowed a vote given by a
    Senator on a question relating to his own right to a seat; but the House
    has never had occasion to proceed so far (V, 5959).

    Sec. 377. Wearing of hats by Members.

      No  Member is to come
    into the House with his head covered, nor to remove from one place to
    another with his hat on, nor is to put on his hat in coming in or
    removing, until he be set down in his place. Scob., 6.

      In 1837 the parliamentary practice of wearing hats during the session
    was abolished by adoption of current clause 5 of rule XVII. See
    Sec. 962, infra.

    Sec. 378. Adjournment of questions of order.

        A question of
    order may be adjourned to give time to look into precedents. 2 Hats.,
    118.

      As described in Sec. Sec. 628 and 628a, infra, the Speaker has
    declined, on a difficult question of order, to rule until taking time
    for examination (III, 2725; VI, 432; VII, 2106; VIII, 2174, 2396, 3475),
    and may take a parliamentary inquiry under advisement, especially if not
    related to the pending proceedings (VIII, 2174; Apr. 7, 1992, p. 8274).
    However, it is conceivable that a case might arise wherein this
    privilege of the Chair would require approval of the majority of the
    House to prevent arbitrary obstruction of the pending business by the
    Chair. The law of Parliament evidently contemplates that the adjournment
    of a question of order shall be controlled by the House. On occasion,
    the Chair has reversed as erroneous a decision previously made (VI, 639;
    VII, 849; VIII, 2794, 3435).

    Sec. 379. House's control over question of the Speaker.

        In
    Parliament, all decisions of the Speaker may be controlled by the House.
    3 Grey, 319.

    [[Page 199]]

      The Speaker's decision on a question of order is subject to appeal by
    any Member (clause 5 of rule I).