[Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 114th Congress]
[114th Congress]
[House Document 113-181]
[Rules of the House of Representatives]
[Pages 855-913]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


 
                                Rule XXI


Reservation of certain points of order
                      restrictions on certain bills




1035. Reservation of points of order.

  1.  At the time a 
general appropriation bill is reported, all points of order against 
provisions therein shall be considered as reserved.




[[Page 856]]

General appropriation bills and amendments
  This clause was added in the 104th Congress (sec. 215(e), H. Res. 6, 
Jan. 4, 1995, p. 468), rendering unnecessary the former practice that a 
Member reserve points of order when a general appropriation bill was 
referred to the calendar of the Committee of the Whole House on the 
state of the Union, in order that provisions in violation of rule XXI 
could be stricken in the Committee of the Whole (see Sec. 1044, infra). 
Before the House recodified its rules in the 106th Congress, this 
provision was found in former clause 8 of rule XXI (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 
1999, p. 47).



1036. Unauthorized appropriations reported in 
general appropriation bills or amendments thereto.

  2. (a)(1)  An appropriation 
may not be reported in a general appropriation bill, and may not be in 
order as an amendment thereto, for an expenditure not previously 
authorized by law, except to continue appropriations for public works 
and objects that are already in progress.




Sec. 1037. Reappropriations prohibited.

  (2)  A 
reappropriation of unexpended balances of appropriations may not be 
reported in a general appropriation bill, and may not be in order as an 
amendment thereto, except to continue appropriations for public works 
and objects that are already in progress. This subparagraph does not 
apply to transfers of unexpended balances within the department or 
agency for which they were originally appropriated that are reported by 
the Committee on Appropriations.



[[Page 857]]

subject matter) and except rescissions of appropriations contained in 
appropriation Acts.


Sec. 1038. Legislation in reported general appropriation 
bills; exceptions.

  (b)  A provision changing existing law may not be 
reported in a general appropriation bill, including a provision making 
the availability of funds contingent on the receipt or possession of 
information not required by existing law for the period of the 
appropriation, except germane provisions that retrench expenditures by 
the reduction of amounts of money covered by the bill (which may include 
those recommended to the Committee on Appropriations by direction of a 
legislative committee having jurisdiction over the




Sec. 1039. Legislation or limitations in amendments to 
general appropriation bills.

  (c)  An amendment to a general appropriation 
bill shall not be in order if changing existing law, including an 
amendment making the availability of funds contingent on the receipt or 
possession of information not required by existing law for the period of 
the appropriation. Except as provided in paragraph (d), an amendment 
proposing a limitation not specifically contained or authorized in 
existing law for the period of the limitation shall not be in order 
during consideration of a general appropriation bill.




Sec. 1040. Motion to rise and report as preferential to 
amendments.

  (d)  After a general appropriation bill has been read for 
amendment, a motion that the Committee of the Whole House on the state 
of the Union rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments 
as may have been adopted shall, if offered by the Majority Leader or a 
designee, have precedence over motions to amend the bill. If such a 
motion to rise and report is rejected or not offered, amendments 
proposing limitations not specifically contained or authorized in 
existing law for the period of the limitation or proposing germane 
amendments that retrench expenditures by reductions of amounts of money 
covered by the bill may be considered.



[[Page 858]]

gency Deficit Control Act, a rescission of budget authority, or a 
reduction in direct spending or an amount for a designated emergency may 
not be reported in an appropriation bill or joint resolution containing 
an emergency designation under section 251(b)(2) or section 252(e) of 
such Act and may not be in order as an amendment thereto.


Sec. 1041. Designated emergencies reported in 
appropriation bills.

  (e)  A provision other than an appropriation 
designated an emergency under section 251(b)(2) or section 252(e) of the 
Balanced Budget and Emer





Sec. 1042. Offsetting amendments en bloc to appropriation 
bills.

  (f)  During the reading of an appropriation bill for amendment in 
the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, it shall be 
in order to consider en bloc amendments proposing only to transfer 
appropriations among objects in the bill without increasing the levels 
of budget authority or outlays in the bill. When considered en bloc 
under this paragraph, such amendments may amend portions of the bill not 
yet read for amendment (following disposition of any points of order 
against such portions) and are not subject to a demand for division of 
the question in the House or in the Committee of the Whole.



[[Page 859]]

of the amounts of money covered by the bill. That form of the 
retrenchment exception remained in place until the 49th Congress in 
1885, when it was dropped until the 52d Congress in 1891, and then 
reinserted through the 53d Congress until 1894. It was again dropped in 
the 54th Congress from 1895 until reinserted in the 62d Congress in 1911 
(IV, 3578; VII, 1125).


Sec. 1043. History of clause 2 of rule XXI.

  The  25th 
Congress in 1837 was the first to adopt a rule prohibiting 
appropriations in a general appropriation bill or amendment thereto not 
previously authorized by law, in order to prevent delay of appropriation 
bills because of contention over propositions of legislation. In 1838 
that Congress added the exception to permit unauthorized appropriations 
for continuation of works in progress and for contingencies for carrying 
on departments of the Government. The rule remained in that form until 
the 44th Congress in 1876, when William S. Holman of Indiana persuaded 
the House to amend the rule to permit germane legislative retrenchments. 
In 1880, the 46th Congress dropped the exception that permitted 
unauthorized appropriations for contingencies of Government departments, 
and modified the ``Holman Rule'' to define retrenchments as the 
reduction of the number and salary of officers of the United States, the 
reduction of compensation of any person paid out of the Treasury of the 
United States, or the reduction


  The clause remained unamended until January 3, 1983, when the 98th 
Congress restructured it in the basic form of paragraphs (a)-(d). 
Clerical and stylistic changes were effected when the House recodified 
its rules in the 106th Congress, including a change to clause 2(a)(2) to 
clarify that the point of order lies against the offending provision in 
the text and not against consideration of the entire bill. At that time 
former clause 6 was transferred to clause 2(a)(2) and former clause 2(a) 
became clause 2(a)(1) (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. 47).

  Paragraph (a)(1) (formerly paragraph (a)) retained the prohibition 
against unauthorized appropriations in general appropriation bills and 
amendments thereto except in continuation of works in progress.

  Paragraph (a)(2) (formerly clause 6), from section 139(c) of the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 190f(c)), was made part 
of the standing rules in the 83d Congress (Jan. 3, 1953, p. 24). 
Previously, a reappropriation of an unexpended balance for an object 
authorized by law was in order on a general appropriation bill (IV, 
3591, 3592; VII, 1156, 1158). This provision was amended in the 99th 
Congress by section 228(b) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177) to permit the Committee on 
Appropriations to report transfers of unexpended balances within the 
department or agency for which originally appropriated.

  Paragraph (b) narrowed the ``Holman Rule'' exception from the 
prohibition against legislation to cover only retrenchments reducing 
amounts of money included in the bill as reported, and permitted 
legislative committees with proper jurisdiction to recommend such 
retrenchments to the Appropriations Committee for discretionary 
inclusion in the reported bill. The last exception in paragraph (b), 
permitting the inclusion of legislation rescinding appropriations in 
appropriation Acts, was added in the 99th Congress by the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (sec. 228(a), P.L. 99-
177). The latter feature of the paragraph does not extend to a 
rescission of budget authority provided by a law other than an 
appropriation Act (see, Sec. 1052, infra). In the 105th Congress 
paragraph (b) was amended to treat as legislation a provision reported 
in a general appropriation bill that makes funding contingent on whether 
circumstances not made determinative by existing law are ``known'' (H. 
Res. 5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. 121).


[[Page 860]]

bill that makes funding contingent on whether circumstances not made 
determinative by existing law are ``known'' (H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. 
121).
  Paragraph (c) retained the prohibition against amendments changing 
existing law but permitted limitation amendments during the reading of 
the bill by paragraph only if specifically authorized by existing law 
for the period of the limitation. In the 105th Congress paragraph (c) 
was amended to treat as legislation an amendment to a general 
appropriation

  Paragraph (d) provided a new procedure for consideration of 
retrenchment and other limitation amendments only when the reading of a 
general appropriation bill has been completed and only if the Committee 
of the Whole does not adopt a motion to rise and report the bill back to 
the House (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1983, p. 34). In the 104th Congress 
paragraph (d) was amended to limit the availability of the preferential 
motion to rise and report to the Majority Leader or a designee (sec. 
215(a), H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 468). In the 105th Congress it was 
further amended to make the motion preferential to any motion to amend 
at that stage (H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. 121).


  Paragraphs (e) and (f) were added in the 104th Congress (sec. 215, H. 
Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 468). Paragraph (e) was not effective with 
respect to discretionary spending from 2002 to 2011 (from the expiration 
of section 251 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act 
by operation of section 275 of that Act until its revival by the Budget 
Control Act of 2011) (sec. 104, P.L. 112-25). A technical correction to 
paragraph (f) was effected in the 109th Congress (sec. 2(l), H. Res. 5, 
Jan. 4, 2005, p. 44).



Sec. 1044. Points of order on general 
appropriation bills generally.

  As the rule  applies only to general appropriation 
bills, which are not enumerated or defined in the rules (VII, 1116), 
bills appropriating only for one purpose have been held not to be 
``general'' within the meaning of this clause (VII, 1122). The following 
have been held not to be ``general appropriation bills'' within the 
purview of this clause: (1) a joint resolution providing an 
appropriation for a single Government agency (Jan. 31, 1962, p. 1352); 
(2) a joint resolution only containing continuing appropriations for 
diverse agencies to provide funds until regular appropriation bills are 
enacted (Sept. 21, 1967, p. 26370); (3) a joint resolution providing an 
appropriation for a single Government agency and permitting a transfer 
of a portion of those funds to another agency (Oct. 25, 1979, p. 29627); 
(4) a joint resolution transferring funds already appropriated from one 
specific agency to another (Mar. 26, 1980, p. 6716); (5) a joint 
resolution transferring unobligated balances to the President to be 
available for specified purposes but containing no new budget authority 
(Mar. 3, 1988, p. 3239).



[[Page 861]]

  A point of order under this rule does not apply to a special order 
reported from the Committee on Rules ``self-executing'' the adoption in 
the House of an amendment changing existing law (July 27, 1993, p. 
17117). By unanimous consent the Committee of the Whole may vacate 
proceedings under specified points of order (June 7, 1991, p. 13973). A 
point of order may be withdrawn as a matter of right (in the Committee 
of the Whole as well as in the House) before action thereon (May 19, 
2000, p. 8600).

  As all bills making or authorizing appropriations require 
consideration in Committee of the Whole, it follows that the enforcement 
of the rule must ordinarily occur during consideration in Committee of 
the Whole, where the Chair, in response to a point of order, may rule 
out any portion of the bill in conflict with the rule (IV, 3811; Sept. 
8, 1965, pp. 23140, 23182). Portions of the bill thus stricken are not 
reported back to the House. Before the adoption of clause 1 (formerly 
clause 8) in the 104th Congress (see Sec. 1035, supra), it was necessary 
that a Member reserve points of order when a general appropriation bill 
was referred to the Union Calendar, in order that provisions in 
violation of the rule could be stricken in the Committee (V, 6921-6925; 
VIII, 3450; Feb. 6, 1926, p. 3456). Where points of order had been 
reserved pending a unanimous-consent request that the committee be 
permitted to file its report when the House would not be in session, it 
was not necessary that they be reserved again when the report ultimately 
was presented as privileged when the House was in session, because the 
initial reservation carried over to the subsequent filing (Mar. 1, 1983, 
p. 3241). In an instance in which points of order were not reserved 
against an appropriation bill when it was reported, points of order in 
the Committee against a proposition in violation of this clause were 
overruled on the ground that the chair of the Committee lacked authority 
to pass upon the question (Apr. 8, 1943, p. 3150, 3153).

  The enforcement of the rule also occurs in the House in that a motion 
to recommit a general appropriation bill may not propose an amendment 
containing legislation (Sept. 1, 1976, p. 28883; Aug. 1, 2008, pp. 
17890, 17891). Clause 2(c) provides that a limitation not specifically 
contained in existing law or authorized for the period of the limitation 
shall not be in order during consideration of a general appropriation 
bill except as contemplated by clause 2(d), including a requirement that 
it come at the end of the reading (Speaker Foley, Aug. 1, 1989, p. 
17159; Aug. 3, 1989, p. 18546; June 18, 2009, pp. 15655, 15656); and 
such amendment is precluded whether the Committee of the Whole has risen 
and reported automatically pursuant to a special rule or, instead, by a 
motion at the end of the reading for amendment (June 22, 1995, p. 
16844).


[[Page 862]]

a point of order may be considered en bloc by unanimous consent (Sept. 
16, 1981, pp. 20735-38; June 21, 1984, p. 17687; July 26, 2001, pp. 
14716, 14721). Where a point of order is sustained against the whole of 
a paragraph the whole must be stricken, but it is otherwise when the 
point of order is made only against a portion (V, 6884, 6885).
  Points of order against unauthorized appropriations or legislation on 
general appropriation bills may be made as to the whole or only a 
portion of a paragraph (IV, 3652; V, 6881). The fact that a point of 
order is made against a portion of a paragraph does not prevent another 
point of order against the whole paragraph (V, 6882; July 31, 1985, p. 
21895), nor does it prevent another Member from demanding that the 
original point of order be extended to the entire paragraph (e.g., July 
16, 1998, p. 15806; Sept. 4, 2003, pp. 21164, 21167, pp. 21169, 21170; 
Sept. 14, 2004, p. 18384; June 29, 2005, p. 14804). If a portion of a 
proposed amendment is out of order, it is sufficient for the rejection 
of the whole amendment (V, 6878-6880). If a point of order is sustained 
against any portion of a package of amendments considered en bloc, all 
the amendments are ruled out of order and must be reoffered separately, 
or those that are not subject to

  General appropriation bills are read ``scientifically'' only by 
paragraph headings and appropriation amounts, and points of order 
against a paragraph must be made before an amendment is offered thereto 
or before the Clerk reads the next paragraph heading and amount 
(Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 2.26). A point of order against a paragraph 
under this clause may be made only after that paragraph has been read by 
the Clerk, and not before its reading pending consideration of an 
amendment inserting language immediately prior thereto (June 6, 1985, 
pp. 14605, 14609). Where the reading of a paragraph of a general 
appropriation bill has been dispensed with by unanimous consent, the 
Chair inquires whether there are points of order against the paragraph 
before entertaining amendments or directing the Clerk to read further, 
but does not make such an inquiry where the Clerk has actually read the 
paragraph (May 31, 1984, p. 14608). Where a portion of the bill is 
considered as having been read and open to amendment by unanimous 
consent, points of order against provisions in that portion must be made 
before amendments are offered, and may not be reserved (Dec. 1, 1982, p. 
28175; May 19, 2000, p. 8595; July 22, 2003, p. 18984). Where a chapter 
is considered as read by unanimous consent and open to amendment at any 
point, no amendments are offered, and the Clerk begins to read the next 
chapter, it is too late to make a point of order against a paragraph in 
the preceding chapter (June 11, 1985, p. 15181). It is too late to rule 
out the entire paragraph after points of order against specific portions 
have been sustained and an amendment to the paragraph has been offered 
(June 27, 1974, pp. 21670-72).

  The fact that legislative jurisdiction over the subject matter of an 
amendment may rest with the Committee on Appropriations does not 
immunize the amendment from the application of clause 2(c) of rule XXI 
(July 17, 1996, p. 17550; July 24, 1996, p. 18898). The ``works in 
progress'' exception under clause 2(a) of rule XXI is a defense to a 
point of order against an unauthorized appropriation reported in a 
general appropriation bill and is not a defense to a point of order 
under clause 2(c) of rule XXI that an amendment to an appropriation bill 
constitutes legislation (July 24, 1996, p. 18898).



[[Page 863]]


  For a discussion of perfecting amendments to unauthorized 
appropriations or legislation permitted to remain in a general 
appropriation bill by failure to raise or by waiver of a point of order, 
see Sec. 1058, infra. 



Sec. 1044a. Points of order on general appropriation bills, 
deliberation of.

  To  resolve an ambiguity when ruling on a point of order, 
the Chair may: (1) examine legislative history established during debate 
on an amendment against which a point of order has been reserved (June 
14, 1978, p. 17651); (2) inquire after its author's intent (Oct. 29, 
1991, p. 28818); or (3) examine the accompanying report to determine the 
intent of the section (June 25, 2004, p. 14181).


  In the administration of the rule, it is the practice that those 
upholding an item of appropriation should have the burden of showing the 
law authorizing it (IV, 3597; VII, 1179, 1233, 1276; June 23, 2000, p. 
12123). Thus, the burden of proving the authorization for appropriations 
carried in a bill, or that the language in the bill constitutes a valid 
limitation that does not change existing law, falls on the proponents 
and managers of the bill (May 28, 1968, p. 15357; Nov. 30, 1982, p. 
28062; June 25, 2004, p. 14181). By the same token, the proponent of an 
amendment has the burden of proof to show that an appropriation 
contained in an amendment is authorized by law (e.g., May 11, 1971, p. 
14471; Oct. 29, 1991, p. 28791; July 26, 1995, p. 20567; July 27, 1995, 
pp. 20808, 20811; July 31, 1995, p. 21207; May 29, 2014, p. _) or that 
the amendment constitutes a valid limitation (July 17, 1975, p. 23239; 
June 16, 1976, p. 18666; July 18, 1995, p. 19357; June 24, 2003, pp. 
15858, 15859). For example, the proponent of a provision in the bill or 
of an amendment, as the case may be, has the burden to show the 
following: (1) that any duties imposed by a limitation are merely 
ministerial or already required under existing law (July 16, 1998, p. 
15829); (2) in the case of language proposing a double-negative, that 
the object of the double-negative is specifically contemplated by 
existing law (July 23, 2003, pp. 19250-51, pp. 19251-53; see Sec. 1053, 
infra); (3) that the amendment does not increase levels of budget 
authority or outlays within the meaning of clause 2(f) (e.g., Oct. 11, 
2001, pp. 19368, 19369; see also July 13, 2004, pp. 15193, 15194, p. 
15199 and May 25, 2006, p. 9790, where the Chair sustained the point of 
order in part because the manager's averment that the amendment 
increased outlays went unchallenged); (4) if the language is susceptible 
to more than one interpretation, that it merits the construction that it 
does not violate the rule (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 22.26), although that 
burden may be met by a showing that only the requirements of existing 
law, and not any new requirements, are recited in the language (Sept. 
23, 1993, p. 22206).

  The mere recitation in an amendment that a determination is to be made 
pursuant to existing laws and regulations, absent a citation to the law 
imposing such responsibility, is not sufficient proof by the proponent 
of an amendment to overcome a point of order that the amendment 
constitutes legislation (Sept. 16, 1980, p. 25606).


[[Page 864]]

and reverse a ruling, however, where existing law not previously called 
to the Chair's attention would require the ruling to be reversed (VIII, 
3435; June 8, 1983, p. 14854, where a law amending the statute creating 
the Bureau of the Mint with the express purpose of requiring annual 
authorizations was subsequently called to the Chair's attention). 
Reported provisions in a general appropriation bill described in the 
accompanying report as directly or indirectly changing the application 
of existing law are presumably legislation, absent rebuttal by the 
committee (May 31, 1984, p. 14591).
  The Chair may overrule a point of order that appropriations for a 
certain agency are unauthorized upon citation to an organic statute 
creating the agency, absent any showing that the organic law has been 
overtaken by a scheme of periodic reauthorization; the Chair may hear 
further argument


  A point of order under this clause against an amendment must be raised 
(or reserved) before commencement of debate on the measure (e.g., May 
29, 2014, p. _).


[[Page 865]]

also over the motion to rise and report under clause 2(d) (July 24, 
1986, p. 17641).


Sec. 1044b. Motion to rise and report.

  Where  the reading of 
a general appropriation bill for amendment has been completed (or 
dispensed with), including the last paragraph of the bill containing the 
citation to the short title (July 30, 1986, p. 18214), the Chair (under 
the former form of the rule, which made the preferential motion to rise 
and report available to any Member) might first inquire whether any 
Member sought to offer an amendment (formerly, one not prohibited by 
clauses 2(a) or (c)) before recognizing Members to offer limitation or 
retrenchment amendments (June 2, 1983, p. 14317; Sept. 22, 1983, p. 
25406; Oct. 27, 1983, p. 29630), including pro forma amendments (Aug. 2, 
1989, p. 18126). Pursuant to clause 2(d), a motion that the Committee of 
the Whole rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as 
may have been adopted is not debatable (Apr. 23, 1987, p. 9613) and 
takes precedence over any amendment (formerly only over a limitation or 
retrenchment amendment) (July 30, 1985, p. 21534; July 23, 1986, p. 
17431; Apr. 23, 1987, p. 9613), but only after completion of the reading 
and disposition of amendments not otherwise precluded (June 30, 1992, p. 
17135). Thus a motion that the Committee rise and report the bill to the 
House with the recommendation that it be recommitted, with instructions 
to report back to the House with an amendment proposing a limitation, 
does not take precedence over the motion to rise and report the bill to 
the House with such amendments as may have been adopted (Sept. 19, 1983, 
p. 24647 (sustained on appeal)). An amendment not only reducing an 
amount in a paragraph of an appropriation bill but also limiting 
expenditure of those funds on a particular project (i.e., a limitation 
not contained in existing law) was held not in order during the reading 
of that paragraph but only at the end of the bill under clause 2(d) 
(July 23, 1986, p. 17431; June 15, 1988, p. 14719). Where language of 
limitation was stricken from a general appropriation bill on a point of 
order that it changed existing law, an amendment proposing to reinsert 
the limitation without its former legislative content was held not in 
order before completion of the reading for amendment (June 18, 1991, p. 
15214; Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22214). A motion that the Committee rise and 
report to the House with the recommendation that the enacting clause be 
stricken takes precedence over the motion to amend under clause 9 of 
rule XVIII (formerly clause 7 of rule XXIII) and



  The 109th Congress adopted a resolution creating a point of order 
against the motion to rise and report an appropriation bill to the House 
where the bill, as proposed to be amended, exceeded an applicable 
allocation of new budget authority under section 302(b) of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, and setting forth procedures in the 
Committee of the Whole in the event that the point of order was 
sustained (sec. 2, H. Res. 248, Apr. 28, 2005, p. 8309). The 110th 
through 114th Congresses adopted the same procedure (sec. 511(a)(5), H. 
Res. 6, Jan. 4, 2007, p. 19 (adopted Jan. 5, 2007); sec. 3(a)(4), H. 
Res. 5, Jan. 6, 2009, p. 9; sec. 3(a)(4), H. Res. 5, Jan. 5, 2011, p. 
80; sec. 3(b)(4), H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 2013, p. _; sec. 3(e)(2), H. Res. 
5, Jan. 6, 2015, p. _), to wit:

  Sec. 3. (e)(2)(A) During the One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, except 
as provided in subparagraph (C), a motion that the Committee of the 
Whole rise and report a bill to the House shall not be in order if the 
bill, as amended, exceeds an applicable allocation of new budget 
authority under section 302(b) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, 
as estimated by the Committee on the Budget.

  (B) If a point of order under subparagraph (A) is sustained, the Chair 
shall put the question: `Shall the Committee of the Whole rise and 
report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been 
adopted notwithstanding that the bill exceeds its allocation of new 
budget authority under section 302(b) of the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974?'. Such question shall be debatable for 10 minutes equally divided 
and controlled by a proponent of the question and an opponent but shall 
be decided without intervening motion.

  (C) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply--

          (i) to a motion offered under clause 2(d) of rule XXI; or

          (ii) after disposition of a question under subparagraph (B) on 

        a given bill.

  (D) If a question under subparagraph (B) is decided in the negative, 
no further amendment shall be in order except--

          (i) one proper amendment, which shall be debatable for 10 

        minutes equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an 

        opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be 

        subject to a demand for division of the question in the House or 

        in the Committee of the Whole; and

          (ii) pro forma amendments, if offered by the chair or ranking 

        minority member of the Committee on Appropriations or their 


        designees, for the purpose of debate.


[[Page 866]]

another country containing specified elements, an agreement in principle 
with that country predating the authorization law and lacking the 
required elements is insufficient authorization (June 28, 1993, p. 
14421). An Executive Order does not constitute sufficient authorization 
in law absent proof of its derivation from a statute enacted by Congress 
authorizing the order and expenditure of funds (June 15, 1973, p. 19855; 
June 25, 1974, p. 21036). Thus a Reorganization Plan submitted by the 
President pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 906 has the status of statutory law when 
it becomes effective and is sufficient authorization to support an 
appropriation for an office created by Executive Order issued pursuant 
to the Reorganization Plan (June 21, 1974, p. 20595). A constitutional 
guarantee of just compensation for a governmental taking of private 
property for public use does not itself constitute sufficient 
authorization by law for appropriations in a general appropriation bill 
for compensation of particular private property owners (July 18, 2001, 
pp. 13662-65; cf. VII, 1144).


Sec. 1045. Authorization of law for 
appropriations.

  A treaty  may provide the authorization by existing law required 
in the rule to justify appropriations if it has been ratified by the 
contracting parties (IV, 3587); however, where existing law authorizes 
appropriations for the U.S. share of facilities to be recommended in an 
agreement with


  A resolution of the House has been held sufficient authorization for 
an appropriation for the salary of an employee of the House (IV, 3656-
3658) even though the resolution may have been agreed to only by a 
preceding House (IV, 3660). Previous enactment of items of appropriation 
unauthorized by law does not justify similar appropriations in 
subsequent bills (VII, 1145, 1150, 1151) unless, if through 
appropriations previously made, a function of the Government has been 
established that would bring it into the category of continuation of 
works in progress (VII, 1280), or unless legislation in a previous 
appropriation act has become permanent law (May 20, 1964, p. 11422). The 
omission to appropriate during a series of years for an object 
authorized by law does not repeal the law, and consequently an 
appropriation when proposed is not subject to the point of order (IV, 
3595). A lapsed authorization is not ``previously authorized'' within 
the meaning of that phrase in paragraph (a)(1) (June 27, 2012, p. _).


[[Page 867]]

The law does not authorize general investigations by the department (IV, 
3652), cooperation with State investigations (IV, 3650; VII, 1301, 
1302), the investigation of foods in relation to commerce (IV, 3647, 
3648; VII, 1298), or the compiling of tests at an exposition (IV, 3653).
  The law authorizing each head of a department to employ such numbers 
of clerks, messengers, copyists, watchmen, laborers, and other employees 
as may be appropriated for by Congress from year to year is held to 
authorize appropriations for those positions not otherwise authorized by 
law (IV, 3669, 3675, 4739); but this law does not apply to offices not 
within departments or not at the seat of Government (IV, 3670-3674). A 
permanent law authorizing the President to appoint certain staff, 
together with legislative provisions authorizing additional employment 
contained in an appropriation bill enacted for that fiscal year, 
constituted sufficient authorization for a lump sum supplemental 
appropriation for the White House for the same fiscal year (Nov. 30, 
1973, p. 38854). By a general provision of law, appropriations for 
investigations and the acquisition and diffusion of information by the 
Agriculture Department on subjects related to agriculture are generally 
in order in the agricultural appropriation bill (IV, 3649). It has once 
been held that this law would also authorize appropriations for the 
instrumentalities of such investigations (IV, 3615); but these would not 
include the organization of a bureau to conduct the work (IV, 3651).

  A paragraph appropriating funds for matching grants to States was held 
unauthorized where the authorizing law did not require State matching 
funds (June 28, 1993, p. 14418). A paragraph funding a project from the 
Highway Trust Fund (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22175; June 26, 2001, p. 11936; 
Nov. 28, 2001, pp. 23239, 23240) or from the Airport and Airway Trust 
Fund (e.g., Sept. 14, 2004, p. 18384; June 29, 2005, p. 14798) was held 
unauthorized where such funding was authorized only from the general 
fund. A paragraph providing funds for the President to meet 
``unanticipated needs'' was held unauthorized (July 16, 1998, p. 15808). 
The authorization must be enacted before the appropriation may be 
included in an appropriation bill; thus delaying the availability of an 
appropriation pending enactment of an authorization does not protect the 
item of appropriation against a point of order under this clause (Apr. 
26, 1972, p. 14455). Similarly, an amendment limiting funds to the 
extent provided in authorizing legislation on or after the date of 
enactment of the pending appropriation bill is not in order (May 19, 
2005, pp. 10376, 10377).

  The failure of Congress to enact into law separate legislation 
specifically modifying eligibility requirements for grant programs under 
existing law does not necessarily render appropriations for those 
programs subject to a point of order, where more general existing law 
authorizes appropriations for all of the programs proposed to be 
modified by new legislation pending before Congress (June 8, 1978, p. 
16778). However, whether organic statutes or general grants of authority 
in law constitute sufficient authorization to support appropriations 
depends on whether the general laws applicable to the function or 
department in question require specific or annual authorizations (June 
14, 1978, pp. 17616, 17622, 17626, 17630) or on whether a periodic 
authorization scheme has subsequently occupied the field (Sept. 9, 1997, 
p. 18197). An authorization of ``such sums as may be necessary'' is 
sufficient to support any dollar amount, but has no tendency to relieve 
other conditions of the authorization law (June 28, 1993, p. 1442). 
Where existing law authorizes certain appropriations from a particular 
trust fund without fiscal year limitation, language that such an 
appropriation remain available until expended does not constitute 
legislation (July 15, 1993, p. 15848).

  An amendment to a general appropriation bill providing that ``not less 
than'' (or ``not to exceed'') a certain amount be made available to a 
program requires an authorization (June 21, 1988, p. 15440; July 12, 
2000, p. 14070; July 13, 2000, p. 14084; July 25, 2007, pp. 20597, 
20598).



[[Page 868]]


  Pursuant to clause 11(i) of rule X (formerly clause 9 of rule XLVIII), 
no funds may be appropriated to certain agencies carrying out 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities, unless such funds have 
been authorized by law for the fiscal year in question.



Sec. 1046. Authorization for claims and 
salaries.

  Judgments of  courts certified to Congress in accordance with law or 
authorized by treaty (IV, 3634, 3635, 3644) and audited under authority 
of law have been held to be authorizations for appropriations for the 
payment of claims (IV, 3634, 3635). However, unadjudicated claims (IV, 
3628), even though ascertained and transmitted by an executive officer 
(IV, 3625-3640), and findings filed under the Bowman Act do not 
constitute authorization (IV, 3643).


  An appropriation for an object not otherwise authorized does not 
constitute authorization to justify a continuance of the appropriation 
another year (IV, 3588, 3589; VII, 1128, 1145, 1149, 1191), and the mere 
appropriation for a salary does not create an office so as to justify 
appropriations in succeeding years (IV, 3590, 3672, 3697), it being a 
general rule that propositions to appropriate for salaries not 
established by law or to increase salaries fixed by law are out of order 
(IV, 3664-3667, 3676-3679). An exception to these general principles is 
found in the established practice that in the absence of a general law 
fixing a salary the amount appropriated in the last appropriation bill 
has been held to be the legal salary (IV, 3687-3696). A law having 
established an office and fixed a salary, it is not in order to provide 
for an unauthorized office and salary in lieu of it (IV, 3680).



[[Page 869]]




Sec. 1047. Authorizations for public works.

  An  appropriation 
for a public work in excess of a fixed limit of cost (IV, 3583, 3584; 
VII, 1133), or for extending a service beyond the limits assigned by an 
executive officer exercising a lawful discretion (IV, 3598), or by 
actual law (IV, 3582, 3585), or for purposes prohibited by law are out 
of order (IV, 3580, 3581, 3702), as is an appropriation from the Highway 
Trust Fund where the project is specifically authorized from the general 
fund (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22175). However, the mere appropriation of a 
sum to complete a work does not fix a limit of cost such as would 
exclude future appropriations (IV, 3761). A declaration of policy in an 
act followed by specific provisions conferring authority upon a 
governmental agency to perform certain functions was construed not to 
authorize appropriations for purposes germane to the policy but not 
specifically authorized by the act (VII, 1200). A point of order will 
not lie against an amendment proposing to increase a lump sum for public 
works projects where language in the bill limits use of the lump sum 
appropriation to projects as authorized by law (Deschler, ch. 26, 
Sec. 19.6), but where language in the bill limits use of the lump sum 
both to projects ``authorized by law'' and ``subject, where appropriate, 
to enactment of authorizing legislation,'' that paragraph constitutes an 
appropriation in part for some unauthorized projects and is not in order 
(June 6, 1985, p. 14617). Language in an appropriation bill precluding 
funds for projects not authorized by law or beyond the amount authorized 
was held to limit expenditures to authorized projects and was not 
legislation (Deschler, ch. 25, Sec. 2.18).





Sec. 1048. Continuation of a public work by 
appropriations.

  The provision  excepting public works and objects that are already in 
progress from the requirement that appropriations be authorized by 
existing law (IV, 3578) has historically been applied only in cases of 
general revenue funding (Sept. 22, 1993, p. 22140; Sept. 23, 1993, p. 
22173). An appropriation in violation of existing law or to extend a 
service beyond a fixed limit is not in order as the continuance of a 
public work (IV, 3585, 3702-3724; VII, 1332; Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22173; 
Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 8.9). The ``works in progress'' exception may not 
be invoked to fund a project governed by a lapsed authorization (June 
27, 2012, p. _) and may not be invoked to fund a project that is not yet 
under construction (July 31, 1995, p. 21207). Where existing law (40 
U.S.C. 3307) specifically prohibits the making of an appropriation to 
construct or alter any public building involving more than a certain 
amount of money unless approved by the House and Senate Public Works 
Committees, an appropriation for such purposes not authorized by both 
committees is out of order notwithstanding the ``works in progress'' 
exemption, because the law specifically precludes the appropriation from 
being made (June 8, 1983, p. 14855). An appropriation from the Highway 
Trust Fund for an ongoing project was held not in order under the 
``works in progress'' exception where the Internal Revenue Code 
``occupied the field'' with a comprehensive authorization scheme not 
embracing the specified project (Sept. 22, 1993, p. 22140; Sept. 23, 
1993, p. 22173). Interruption of a work does not necessarily remove it 
from the privileges of the rule (IV, 3705-3708); but the continuation of 
the work must not be so conditioned in relation to place as to become a 
new work (IV, 3704). It has been held that a work has not begun within 
the meaning of the rule when an appropriation has been made for a site 
for a public building (IV, 3785), or when a commission has been created 
to select a site or when a site has actually been selected for a work 
(IV, 3762, 3763), or when a survey has been made (IV, 3782-3784). 
``Public works and objects already in progress'' include tangible 
matters like buildings, roads, etc., but not duties of officials in 
executive departments (IV, 3709-3713), or the continuance of a work 
indefinite as to completion and intangible in nature like the gauging of 
streams (IV, 3714, 3715). A general system of roads on which some work 
has been done, or an extension of an existing road (Sept. 22, 1993, p. 
22140), may not be admitted as a work in progress (VII, 1333). 
Concerning reappropriation for continuation of public works in progress, 
see Sec. 1031, supra.



[[Page 870]]

extension of foreign markets for goods (IV, 3722), printing of a series 
of opinions indefinite in continuance (IV, 3718), free evening lectures 
in the District of Columbia (IV, 3789), certain ongoing projects from 
the Highway Trust Fund (Sept. 22, 1993, pp. 22140; Sept. 23, 1993, p. 
22173), extension of an existing road (Sept. 22, 1993, p. 22140), 
continuation of an extra compensation for ordinary facility for carrying 
the mails (IV, 3808), although the continuation of certain special mail 
facilities has been admitted (IV, 3804-3806). However, appropriations 
for rent and repairs of buildings or Government roads (IV, 3793, 3798) 
and bridges (IV, 3803) have been admitted as in continuation of a work 
(IV, 3777, 3778), although it is not in order as such to provide for a 
new building in place of one destroyed (IV, 3606). It is not in order to 
repair paving adjacent to a public building but in a city street, 
although it may have been laid originally by the Government (IV, 3779). 
The purchase of adjoining land for a work already established has been 
admitted under this principle (IV, 3766-3773) as have additions to 
existing buildings in cases in which no limits of cost have been shown 
(IV, 3774, 3775). However, the purchase of a separate and detached lot 
of land is not admitted (IV, 3776). The continuation of construction at 
the Kennedy Library, a project owned by the United States and funded by 
a prior year's appropriation, has been admitted notwithstanding the 
absence of any current authorization (June 14, 1988, p. 14335). A 
provision of law authorizing Commissioners of the District of Columbia 
to take over and operate the fish wharves of the city of Washington was 
held insufficient authority to admit an appropriation for reconstructing 
the fish wharf (VII, 1187).



Sec. 1049. Examples illustrating the continuation of 
a public work.

  Thus the  continuation of the following works has been admitted: 
a topographical survey (IV, 3796, 3797; VII, 1382), a geological map 
(IV, 3795), marking of a boundary line (IV, 3717), marking graves of 
soldiers (IV, 3788), a list of claims (IV, 3717), and recoinage of coins 
in the Treasury (IV, 3807); but the following works have not been 
admitted: investigation of materials, like coal (IV, 3721), scientific 
investigations (IV, 3719; VII, 1345), duties of a commission (IV, 3720; 
VII, 1344),





Sec. 1050. New buildings at existing 
institutions as in continuance of a public work.

  Appropriations for  new buildings at 
Government institutions have sometimes been admitted (IV, 3741-3750) 
when intended for the purposes of the institution (IV, 3747); but later 
decisions, in view of the indefinite extent of the practice made 
possible by the early decisions, have ruled out propositions to 
appropriate for new buildings in navy yards (IV, 3755-3759) and other 
establishments (IV, 3751-3754). Appropriations for new schoolhouses in 
the District of Columbia (IV, 3750; VII, 1358), for new Army hospitals 
(IV, 3740), for new lighthouses (IV, 3728), armor-plate factories (IV, 
3737-3739), and for additional playgrounds for children in the District 
of Columbia (IV, 3792) have also been held not to be in continuation of 
a public work.



[[Page 871]]

vessels, and did not apply to vessels in other services, like the Coast 
and Geodetic Survey or Lighthouse Service (IV, 3725, 3726), or to 
floating or stationary drydocks (IV, 3729-3736). The construction of a 
submarine cable in extension of one already laid was held not to be the 
continuation of a public work (IV, 3716), but an appropriation for the 
Washington-Alaska military cable has been held in order (VII, 1348).



Sec. 1051. New vessel for naval and other services 
as in continuation of a public work.

  By a former  broad construction of the rule an 
appropriation of a new and not otherwise authorized vessel of the Navy 
had been held to be a continuance of a public work (IV, 3723, 3724); but 
this line of decisions has been overruled (VII, 1351; Jan. 22, 1926, p. 
2621). Although appropriations for new construction and procurement of 
aircraft and equipment for the Navy are not in order, appropriations for 
continuing experiments and development work on all types of aircraft are 
in order (Jan. 22, 1926, p. 2623). This former interpretation was 
confined to naval




Sec. 1052. Legislation generally.

  A  provision changing 
existing law is construed to mean the enactment of law where none exists 
(IV, 3812, 3813). For example, the following provisions have been held 
out of order: (1) permitting funds to remain available until expended or 
beyond the fiscal year covered by the bill where existing law does not 
permit such availability (Aug. 1, 1973, p. 27288; June 9, 2006, p. 
10671); (2) permitting funds to be available immediately upon enactment 
before the fiscal year covered by the bill (July 29, 1986, p. 17981; 
June 28, 1988, p. 16255); (3) permitting funds to be available to the 
extent provided in advance in appropriation Acts but not explicitly 
beyond the fiscal year in question (July 21, 1981, p. 16687); (4) 
setting a floor on spending that is not established by existing law 
(July 23, 2003, pp. 19228, 19229); (5) establishing a legislative 
formula for funding (Feb. 18, 2011, pp. 2509, 2510).


  Although clause 2(b) permits the Committee on Appropriations to report 
rescissions of appropriations, an amendment proposing a rescission 
constitutes legislation under clause 2(c) (May 26, 1993, p. 11326; Mar. 
24, 2010, pp. 4779, 4780), as does a provision proposing a rescission of 
budget authority provided in law other than appropriations acts, such as 
contract authority (e.g., Sept. 22, 1993, p. 22138; May 15, 1997, p. 
8510; July 23, 1997, p. 15353; July 29, 1998, p. 17956) or a loan 
guarantee program (July 13, 2004, pp. 15212, 15213). Similarly, a 
provision canceling funds under the Farm Security and Rural Investment 
Act of 2002 was held to be legislation (June 16, 2004, p. 12554). A 
provision constituting congressional disapproval of a deferral of budget 
authority proposed by the President pursuant to the Impoundment Control 
Act of 1974 is not in order if included in a general appropriation bill 
rather than in a separate resolution of disapproval under that Act (July 
29, 1982, pp. 18625, 18626).


[[Page 872]]

templates that expenditures may be mandated to occur before or following 
a fiscal period if the law making those expenditures specifies that the 
timing is the result of a ``significant'' policy change (July 20, 1989, 
p. 15374).
  A proposal to amend existing law to provide for automatic continuation 
of appropriations in the absence of timely enactment of a regular 
appropriation bill constitutes legislation in contravention of clause 
2(c) (July 17, 1996, p. 17550; July 24, 1996, p. 18898). A proposal to 
designate an appropriation as ``emergency spending'' within the meaning 
of the budget-enforcement laws (or so designated under provisions of a 
budget resolution) is fundamentally legislative in character (e.g., 
Sept. 8, 1999, pp. 20900; June 19, 2000, pp. 11294-97 (sustained on 
appeal); June 20, 2001, p. 11224; Oct. 16, 2003, pp. 24962, 24963; Mar. 
15, 2005, pp. 4700-02 (sustained on appeal)). Similarly, a provision 
containing an averment necessary to qualify for certain scorekeeping 
under the Budget Act was conceded to be legislation (July 20, 1989, p. 
15374), even though the Budget Act con

  Language in an appropriation bill precluding funds for projects not 
authorized by law or beyond the amount authorized has been held in order 
as simply limiting expenditures to authorized projects (Deschler, ch. 
25, Sec. 2.18). However, an amendment limiting funds to the extent 
provided for in authorizing legislation on or after the date of 
enactment of the pending appropriation bill is not in order (May 19, 
2005, pp. 10376, 10377).

  Although the object to be appropriated for may be described without 
violating the rule (IV, 3864), an amendment proposing an appropriation 
under a heading that indicates an unauthorized purpose as its object has 
been ruled out (Oct. 29, 1991, p. 28814). For example, an amendment 
proposing to make certain funds available for a specified report not 
contemplated by existing law was held to constitute legislation in 
violation of clause 2(c) (June 13, 2000, p. 10509). The fact that a 
legislative item has been carried in appropriation bills for many years 
does not exempt it from a point of order (VII, 1445, 1656). The 
reenactment from year to year of a law intended to apply during the year 
of its enactment only is not relieved, however, from the point that it 
is legislation (IV, 3822). Limits of cost for public works may not be 
made or changed (IV, 3761, 3865-3867; VII, 1446), nor contracts 
authorized (IV, 3868-3870; May 14, 1937, p. 4595).


  An amendment to a general appropriation bill stating a legislative 
position constitutes legislation (July 24, 2001, pp. 14349, 14351; July 
9, 2009, pp. 17242, 17243 (sustained by tabling of appeal), pp. 17309, 
17310 (sustained by tabling of appeal)) as does one establishing a 
select committee (Mar. 16, 2006, pp. 3793, 3794) or a trust fund in the 
Treasury (June 9, 2006, p. 10680). An amendment proposed in a motion to 
recommit incorporating by reference amendments that changed existing law 
constitutes legislation (July 24, 2009, p. 19225).



Sec. 1053. Limitations on appropriations 
generally.

  Although the  rule forbids a provision ``changing existing law,'' the 
House, by practice, has established the principle that certain 
``limitations'' may be admitted. Just as the House may decline to 
appropriate for a purpose authorized by law, so may it by limitation 
prohibit the use of the money for part of the purpose while 
appropriating for the remainder of it (IV, 3936; VII, 1595). Paragraph 
(c) prohibits consideration of limitation amendments during the reading 
of the bill by paragraph unless specifically authorized by existing law 
for the period of the limitation, even if the amendment is expanding a 
limitation already in the bill (July 23, 2003, p. 19238).



[[Page 873]]

House may specify that no part of the appropriation may go to recipients 
lacking certain qualifications (IV, 3942-3952; VII, 1655; June 4, 1970, 
p. 18412; June 27, 1974, p. 21662; Oct. 9, 1974, p. 34712; June 9, 1978, 
p. 16990).
  A limitation may provide that some or all of the appropriation under 
consideration may not be used for a certain designated purpose (IV, 
3917-3926; VII, 1580). This designated purpose may reach the question of 
qualifications, for although it is not in order to legislate as to the 
qualifications of the recipients of an appropriation (Deschler, ch. 26, 
Sec. Sec. 53, 57.15), the

  A limitation amendment prohibiting the use of funds for the 
construction of certain facilities unless such construction were subject 
to a project agreement was held not in order during the reading of the 
bill, even though existing law directed Federal officials to enter into 
such project agreements, on the ground that limitation amendments are in 
order during the reading only where existing law requires or permits the 
inclusion of limiting language in an appropriation Act, and not merely 
where the limitation is alleged to be ``consistent with existing law'' 
(June 28, 1988, p. 16267).

  A limitation may place some minimal, incidental duties on Federal 
officials, who must determine the effect of such a limitation on 
appropriated funds. However, a provision may not impose additional 
duties not required by law, either explicitly or implicitly, or make the 
appropriation contingent upon the performance of such duties (VII, 1676; 
June 11, 1968, p. 16712; July 31, 1969, pp. 21631-33; May 28, 1968, p. 
15350; July 26, 1985, p. 20807; see Sec. 1054, infra). A duty imposed by 
a provision in the pending bill does not qualify as a duty required by 
law for purposes of a limitation amendment (June 9, 2014, p. _). The 
fact that a limitation may indirectly interfere with an executive 
official's discretionary authority by denying the use of funds (June 24, 
1976, p. 20408) or may impose certain incidental burdens on executive 
officials (Aug. 25, 1976, p. 27737) does not destroy the character of 
the limitation as long as it does not otherwise amend existing law and 
is descriptive of functions and findings already required to be 
undertaken by existing law. For example, a limitation precluding funds 
for specified Federal departments to file certain motions in specified 
civil actions (all matters of public record in the litigation and 
therefore available to responsible intervening Federal officials) was 
held to be a proper limitation (July 18, 2001, pp. 13683, 13684).

  The limitation must apply solely to the money of the appropriation 
under consideration (VII, 1597, 1600, 1720; Feb. 26, 1958, p. 2895). For 
example, a limitation on funds: (1) may not apply to money appropriated 
in other Acts (IV, 3927, 3928; VII, 1495, 1525; June 28, 1971, p. 22442; 
June 27, 1974, pp. 21670-72; May 13, 1981, p. 9663); (2) may not require 
funds available to an agency in any future fiscal year for a certain 
purpose to be subject to limitations specified in advance in 
appropriations Acts (May 8, 1986, p. 10156). The tendency of a 
limitation to change existing law is measured against the state of 
existing law ``for the period of the limitation,'' such that the 
presence of the same limitation in the annual bill for the previous 
fiscal year does not justify its inclusion in the pending annual bill 
(Sept. 22, 1983, p. 25406, June 26, 2000, p. 12355).


[[Page 874]]

the authority of the Commodity Credit Corporation to purchase sugar is 
legislative in nature and not a limitation on funds (June 29, 2000, p. 
13109).
  A restriction on authority to incur obligations is legislative in 
nature and not a limitation on funds (July 13, 1987, p. 19507; Sept. 23, 
1993, p. 22204; July 15, 2004, pp. 15838, 15839). For example, a 
limitation on

  In construing a proposed limitation, the Chair may examine whether the 
purpose of the limitation is legislative. For example, a limitation 
accompanied by language stating a legislative motive or purpose is not 
in order (Aug. 8, 1978, p. 24969; July 22, 1980, p. 19087; Sept. 16, 
1980, p. 25604; Sept. 22, 1981, p. 21577). Similarly, where existing law 
and the Constitution require a census to be taken of all persons, an 
amendment that seeks to preclude the use of funds to exclude another 
class ``known'' to the Secretary is not in order (Aug. 1, 1989, p. 
17156). However, language may, by negatively refusing to include funds 
for all or part of an authorized executive function, thereby affect 
policy and restrict executive discretion to the extent of its denial of 
availability of funds (IV, 3968-3972; VII, 1583, 1653, 1694; Sept. 14, 
1972, p. 30749; June 21, 1974, p. 20601; Oct. 9, 1974, p. 34716). For 
example, an appropriation may be withheld from a designated object by a 
negative limitation on the use of funds, notwithstanding that contracts 
may be left unsatisfied thereby (IV, 3987; July 10, 1975, pp. 22006, 
22007).

  The Chair has stated that a limitation amendment that comprises a 
textual ``double-negative'' (the coupling of a denial of an 
appropriation with a negative restriction on official duties) is suspect 
and may result in an affirmative direction or an affirmative statement 
of intent that constitutes legislation and is therefore not in order 
(VII, 1690-1692; Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 51.15 (note); July 23, 2003, pp. 
19250-53). In order to carry the burden of proof on an amendment 
proposing a double-negative, a Member must be able to show that the 
object of the double-negative is specifically contemplated by existing 
law (July 23, 2003, pp. 19250-51, pp. 19251-53). For example, the 
following have been held out of order for using a double-negative: (1) a 
provision to limit funds to prohibit the obligation of funds up to a 
specified amount for an unauthorized transportation project (effectively 
authorizing an unauthorized project) (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22209); (2) an 
amendment to limit funds to prohibit projects that promote the 
participation of women in international peace efforts, such promotion 
not specifically contemplated by law (July 23, 2003, pp. 19250-51); (3) 
an amendment to limit funds to prohibit the establishment of an 
independent commission not contemplated by existing law (July 23, 2003, 
pp. 19251-53).


[[Page 875]]

  It is not in order, even by language in the form of a limitation, to 
restrict the discretionary authority conferred by law to administer the 
expenditure of appropriated funds, such as by limiting the percentage of 
funds that may be apportioned for expenditure within a certain period of 
time (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 51.23), or by precluding the obligation of 
certain funds until funds provided by another Act have been obligated 
(Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 48.8). The burden is on the proponent to show 
that such a proposal does not change existing law by restricting the 
timing of the expenditure of funds rather than their availability for 
specified objects (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. Sec. 64.23, 80.5).

  As long as a limitation merely restricts the expenditure of Federal 
funds carried in the bill without changing existing law, the limitation 
is in order, even if the Federal funds in question are commingled with 
non-Federal funds that would have to be accounted for separately in 
carrying out the limitation (Aug. 20, 1980, p. 22171).

  The fact that existing law authorizes funds to be available until 
expended or without regard to fiscal year limitation does not prevent 
the Committee on Appropriations from limiting their availability to the 
fiscal year covered by the bill unless existing law mandates 
availability beyond the fiscal year (June 25, 1974, p. 21040; see also 
Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 32). The fact that a provision would constitute 
legislation for only a year does not make it a limitation in order under 
the rule (IV, 3936).

  A proposition to construe a law may not be admitted (IV, 3936-3938, 
see Sec. 1055, infra). Care also should be taken that the language of 
limitation be not such as, when fairly construed, would change existing 
law (IV, 3976-3983) or justify an executive officer in assuming an 
intent to change existing law (IV, 3984; VII, 1706).


  Although the Committee on Appropriations may include in a general 
appropriation bill language not in existing law limiting the use of 
funds in the bill, if such language also constitutes an appropriation it 
must be authorized by law (June 21, 1988, p. 15439). An amendment 
placing a limitation on funds for activities unrelated to the functions 
of departments and agencies addressed by the bill is not germane under 
clause 7 of rule XVI (July 10, 2000, p. 13605).



Sec. 1054. New duties or determinations; 
executive discretion.

  Propositions to  establish affirmative directions for executive 
officers (IV, 3854-3859; VII, 1443; July 31, 1969, p. 21675; June 18, 
1979, p. 15286; July 1, 1987, pp. 18654, 18655; June 27, 1994, p. 
14572), even in cases in which they may have discretion under the law so 
to do (IV, 3853; June 4, 1970, p. 18401; Aug. 8, 1978, p. 24959), or to 
affirmatively take away an authority or discretion conferred by law (IV, 
3862, 3863; VII, 1975; Mar. 30, 1955, p. 4065; June 21, 1974, p. 20600; 
July 31, 1985, p. 21909), are subject to a point of order.



[[Page 876]]

1, 1986, p. 18647); (8) incorporate by reference determinations already 
made in administrative processes not affecting programs funded by the 
bill (Oct. 6, 1981, p. 23361); (9) require new determinations of rates 
of interest payable (July 29, 1982, p. 18624; Dec. 9, 1982, p. 29691); 
(10) require a determination of whether the Office of Management and 
Budget interfered with the rulemaking authority of a regulatory agency 
(Nov. 30, 1982, p. 28062); (11) authorize the President to reduce each 
appropriation in the bill by not more than 10 percent (May 31, 1984, p. 
14617; June 6, 1984, p. 15120); (12) apply standards of conduct to 
foreign entities where existing law requires such conduct only by 
domestic entities (July 17, 1986, p. 16951); (13) require the 
enforcement of a standard where existing law only requires inspection of 
an area (July 30, 1986, p. 18189); (14) prohibit the availability of 
funds for the purchase of goods and services that are ``nondomestic'' 
(Sept. 12, 1986, p. 23178), not ``produced'' domestically (June 1, 2011, 
p. 8517), not ``100 percent domestic in origin'' (June 2, 2011, pp. 
8558, 8559), not ``substantially manufactured'' domestically (July 7, 
2011, pp. 10638, 10639), not manufactured by a ``domestically operated 
entity'' (June 2, 2011, pp. 8557, 8558), not procured in a manner 
consistent with a law not otherwise applicable (the Buy America Act) 
(June 9, 2014, p. _), or that contain components produced in specified 
countries (June 20, 2014, p. _); (15) mandate contractual provisions 
(May 18, 1988, p. 11389); (16) authorize the adjustment of wages of 
Government employees (June 21, 1988, p. 15451; Apr. 26, 1989, p. 7525) 
or permit an increase in Members' office allowances only ``if requested 
in writing'' (Oct. 21, 1990, p. 31708); (17) convert an existing legal 
prerequisite for the issuance of a regulatory permit into a prerequisite 
for even the preliminary processing of such a permit (July 22, 1992, p. 
18825); (18) mandate reductions in various appropriations by a variable 
percentage calculated in relation to ``overhead'' (Deschler, ch. 26, 
Sec. 5.6; June 24, 1992, p. 16110); (19) require an agency to 
investigate and determine whether private airports are collecting 
certain fees for each enplaning passenger (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22213); 
(20) require an agency to investigate and determine whether a person or 
entity entering into a contract with funds under the pending bill is 
subject to a legal proceeding commenced by the Federal Government and 
alleging fraud (Sept. 17, 1997, p. 19045); (21) require an agency to 
determine whether building services are ``usually'' provided through the 
Federal Building Fund to an agency not paying a level of assessment 
specified elsewhere (and not necessarily applicable) (July 16, 1998, p. 
15816); (22) require a determination of ``successor agency'' status 
(Sept. 26, 1997, p. 20347); (23) require a determination whether a 
delegate or envoy to the United Nations has ``advocated'' the adoption 
of a certain convention (June 26, 2000, p. 12355) or whether an activity 
would grant ``de jure or de facto support'' of another country's 
territorial claims (June 20, 2014, p. _); (24) require tests or reports 
not required under existing law (May 19, 2000, p. 8616) or require all 
quarterly and annual reports required by law in accordance with 
standards for reports under a specified law not otherwise applicable

[[Page 877]]

(Sept. 9, 2003, pp. 21548, 21549); (25) impose a new duty to tally 
violations of law by contractors where existing law required information 
on violations but not on the number thereof (June 7, 2000, p. 9849); 
(26) require an investigation of the conscription requirements of other 
nations (July 13, 2000, p. 14121); (27) require a determination whether 
``efforts'' have been made to change any nation's laws regarding 
abortion, family planning, or population control (July 13, 2000, p. 
14130); (28) impose a new duty to calculate the ``total amount'' of 
payments under a Federal program paid to a husband and wife (to 
determine whether an exception to an otherwise valid limitation would 
apply) (July 11, 2001, pp. 13001-03); (29) require an investigation into 
the extent to which World Trade Organization challenges against foreign 
laws and policies promote access to certain pharmaceuticals (July 18, 
2001, pp. 13693, 13694); (30) require an investigation into whether an 
applicant for immigration has been involved in the harvesting of organs 
(July 18, 2001, pp. 13702-05); (31) require the Inspector General to 
opine on audited financial statements of certain components of the 
Department of Defense where the issuance of such opinion was not shown 
to be required by existing law (June 27, 2002, pp. 11788, 11789); (32) 
require the examination of certain legislative reports to determine 
whether an entity is specifically identified by name (July 17, 2002, pp. 
13365, 13366); (33) require several agencies to process certain 
information where current law required only one specific agency to 
process that information (June 24, 2003, pp. 15860, 15861); (34) in the 
case of a limitation with respect to certain roads on public land, 
require a determination of the precise nature of those roads including 
their ownership and the types of vehicles allowed to travel on them 
(July 17, 2003, pp. 18628-31); (35) require a determination that certain 
trade agreements achieved generic undefined policy goals that were not 
set forth in existing law (July 23, 2003, pp. 19156-58); (36) require a 
determination that a drug has been prescribed ``for the purpose of 
relieving or managing pain'' (July 7, 2004, pp. 14679, 14682); (37) 
require a determination as to the date on which various road 
construction projects in a National Forest were commenced within the 
periods in which they were authorized to commence (May 19, 2005, pp. 
10364, 10365); (38) require the Food and Drug Administration to examine 
a registry of clinical trials maintained by the National Institutes of 
Health, a different entity (June 8, 2005, pp. 11945, 11946) or require 
the administrator of the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program to 
determine whether a federal prohibition on certain mineral exploration 
(administered by a different federal entity) remained in effect (Mar. 
15, 2006, p. 3722); (39) require a determination regarding a specific 
type of employment behavior before initiating an employment 
investigation (June 8, 2005, pp. 11948-50); (40) require a determination 
as to whether a local educational agency had obtained parental consent 
before providing military recruiters student information (June 24, 2005, 
pp. 14185, 14186); (41) in the case of a limitation on the enforcement 
of a regulation against a specified class, require a determination as to 
whether a person is a mem

[[Page 878]]

ber of that class (June 30, 2005, pp. 14891-93); (42) prescribe a policy 
for an agency in the distribution of grants (June 6, 2006, pp. 10105, 
10106); (43) require a determination of citizenship based on birth (June 
6, 2006, pp. 10108, 10109); (44) require a determination of what 
activities amount to ``continuation'' of specified litigation (Feb. 18, 
2011, pp. 2520, 2521) or what decision of a court constitutes 
``resolution'' of a case (July 10, 2014, p. _); (45) require a 
determination by the executive branch regarding the composition of the 
legislative branch (June 13, 2011, p. 9014; Apr. 29, 2015, p. _); (46) 
require a determination of the end use of unmanned aircraft authorized 
by the Secretary (June 27, 2012, p. _; June 9, 2014, p. _); (47) require 
a determination of whether education programs qualify students for 
certain occupational exams or licenses (Apr. 30, 2014, p. _); (48) 
require an agency to track the legislative action of whether a contempt 
of Congress had been certified (Apr. 30, 2014, p. _); (49) require a 
determination by all contracting agencies of whether any aspect of a 
project is behind schedule or over budget (June 9, 2014, p. _); (50) 
require a determination of whether an agency action would ``subvert'' or 
``interfere'' with the integrity of a given standard (June 18, 2014, p. 
_); (51) require a determination of whether an entity had commenced a 
bankruptcy action (July 10, 2014, p. _); (52) require a determination of 
the flag status of vessels on pending export applications (July 10, 
2014, p. _); (53) require a determination of whether a rule would 
increase electricity prices or reduce electricity reliability (July 10, 
2014, p. _); (54) require a determination of the reason a financial 
institution provides services to an entity (July 15, 2014, p. _); (55) 
require the District of Columbia to ascertain the state of federal 
firearms law (July 15, 2014, p. _ (sustained on appeal)); (56) require a 
determination of the meaning of ``anytime, anywhere'' inspections of 
civil and military sites in another country (Apr. 30, 2015, p. _).
  A limitation may not: (1) be applied directly to the official 
functions of executive officers (IV, 3957-3966; VII, 1673, 1678, 1685); 
(2) directly interfere with discretionary authority in law by 
establishing a level of funding below which expenditures may not be made 
(VII, 1704; July 20, 1978, p. 21856); (3) require a judgment as to 
whether racial imbalance had been overcome (July 31, 1969, pp. 21653, 
21675); (4) condition the availability of funds or the exercise of 
contract authority upon an interpretation of local law where that 
interpretation is not required by existing law (July 17, 1981, p. 
16327); (5) require new determinations of full Federal compliance with 
mandates imposed upon States (July 22, 1981, p. 16829); (6) require the 
evaluation of the theoretical basis of a program (July 22, 1981, p. 
16822); (7) require new determinations of propriety or effectiveness 
(Oct. 6, 1981, p. 23361; May 25, 1988, p. 12275), or satisfactory 
quality (Aug.

  The fact that an executive official may have been directed by an 
Executive Order to consult another executive official before taking an 
action does not permit inclusion of language directing the official 
being consulted to make determinations not specifically required by law 
(July 22, 1980, p. 19087).


[[Page 879]]

carry out) tobacco crop and insurance programs (July 20, 1995, p. 
19798); (5) denying the use of funds for any transit project exceeding a 
specified cost-effectiveness index where the Chair was persuaded that 
the limitation applied to projects for which indexes were already 
required by law (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22206); (6) denying the use of funds 
to enforce FAA regulations to require domestic air carriers to surrender 
more than a specified number of ``slots'' at a given airport in 
preference of international air carriers where the Chair was persuaded 
that existing regulations already required the FAA to determine the 
origin of withdrawn slots (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22212); (7) denying the 
use of funds for troops ``except in time of war'' (Deschler, ch. 26, 
Sec. 70.1) or ``except in time of emergency'' (VII, 1657, which was the 
basis for the preceding ruling); (8) denying the use of funds to 
implement any sanction imposed by the United States on private 
commercial sales of agricultural commodities, medicine, or medical 
supplies to Cuba except for a sanction imposed pursuant to agreement 
with one or more other countries (July 20, 2000, p. 15751); (9) denying 
the use of funds by the Forest Service to construct roads or prepare 
timber sales in certain roadless areas where the executive was already 
charged by law with ongoing responsibility to maintain a comprehensive 
and detailed inventory of all land and renewable resources of the 
National Forest System (July 18, 1995, p. 19357) or for the plan, 
design, study, or construction of roads in a specified forest for the 
purpose of private timber harvest (June 26, 2007, p. 17521-23) unless 
also requiring a determination of the date a given road project 
commenced (May 19, 2005, pp. 10364, 10365); (10) denying the use of 
funds to eliminate an existing legal requirement for sureties on custom 
bonds (June 27, 1984, p. 19101); (11) denying the use of funds by any 
Federal official in any manner that would prevent a provision of 
existing law (relating to import restrictions) from being enforced (June 
27, 1984, p. 19101); (12) denying the use of funds for any reduction in 
the number of Customs Service regions or for any consolidation of 
Customs Service offices (June 27, 1984, p. 19102); (13) denying the use 
of funds for specified Federal departments to file certain motions in 
specified civil actions (all matters of public record in the litigation 
and therefore available to responsible intervening Federal officials) 
(July 18, 2001, pp. 13683, 13684); (14) denying the use of funds in 
contravention of a cited statute (May 17, 2005, pp. 9993, 9994; June 6, 
2006, pp. 10106, 10107).
  On the other hand, the following limitations have been held in order 
as not placing new duties on Federal officials: (1) denying the use of 
funds to pay the salaries of Federal officials who perform certain 
functions under existing law if the description of those duties 
precisely follows existing law and does not require them to perform new 
duties (June 24, 1976, p. 20373); (2) denying the use of funds to a 
Federal official not in compliance with an existing law that such 
official is charged with enforcing (Sept. 10, 1981, p. 20110); (3) 
reducing the availability of funds for trade adjustment assistance by 
amounts of unemployment insurance entitlements where the law 
establishing trade adjustment assistance already required the disbursing 
agency to take into consideration levels of unemployment insurance in 
determining payment levels (June 18, 1980, p. 15355); (4) denying the 
use of funds to carry out (or pay the salaries of persons who


[[Page 880]]

such determinations, not required by law, with respect to funds for the 
fiscal year in question (Sept. 22, 1983, p. 25406); and where the 
provision, applicable to Federal funds, was permitted to remain in a 
bill (no point of order having been made), an amendment striking the 
word ``Federal,'' and thereby broadening the provision to include 
District of Columbia funds as well, was ruled out (Nov. 15, 1989, p. 
29004; July 16, 2009, pp. 18124, 18125). However, to such a provision 
permitted to remain in a general appropriation bill, an amendment 
``merely perfecting'' the exemption to address cases in which the health 
of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term was 
held not to constitute further legislation by requiring a different or 
more onerous determinations (June 27, 1984, p. 19113). But where the 
exception applies only in the case of rape, adding ``or incest'' 
requires additional determinations and is therefore not ``merely 
perfecting'' (May 29, 2014, p. _). An amendment providing that no 
Federal funds provided in the District of Columbia general appropriation 
bill be used to perform abortions is not legislation, because Federal 
officials have the responsibility to account for all appropriations for 
the annual Federal payment and for disbursement of all taxes collected 
by the District of Columbia, pursuant to the D.C. Code (July 17, 1979, 
p. 19066).
  A paragraph prohibiting the use of funds to perform abortions except 
where the mother's life would be endangered if the fetus were carried to 
term (or where the pregnancy was a result of rape or incest) is 
legislation, because requiring Federal officials to make new 
determinations and judgments not required of them by law, regardless of 
whether private or State officials administering the funds in question 
commonly make such determinations (June 17, 1977, p. 19699; June 30, 
1993, p. 14871; July 16, 1998, p. 15828). The fact that such a provision 
relating to abortion funding may have been included in appropriation 
Acts in prior years applicable to funds in those laws does not permit 
the inclusion of similar language requiring

  An exception to a limitation on funds for the Office of Personnel 
Management to enter contracts for health benefit plans that required 
determinations of ``equivalence'' of benefits was held to impose new 
duties (July 16, 1998, p. 15829). However, an exception to a similar 
limitation that merely excepted certain specified coverage and plans was 
held not to impose new duties (July 16, 1998, p. 15841). Similarly, a 
limitation denying the use of funds in an appropriation bill for the 
General Services Administration to dispose of Federally owned 
``agricultural'' land declared surplus was held to impose new duties 
because the determination whether surplus lands are ``agricultural'' was 
not required by law (Aug. 20, 1980, pp. 22156-58), the same result 
adhering in the case of a limitation on funds for ``semi-professional 
motorsports,'' ``mixed martial arts,'' and ``sporting events'' (July 18, 
2012, p. _), ``marketing activities'' (Apr. 30, 2014, p. _), regulations 
not based on ``hard science'' (June 15, 2011, p. 9342); and ``local law 
enforcement agencies'' (where the program authorized assistance merely 
to states) (June 18, 2014, p. _). However, a limitation denying the use 
of funds for any transit project exceeding a specified cost-
effectiveness index was held not to impose new duties where the Chair 
was persuaded that the limitation applied to projects for which indexes 
were already required by law (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22206).


[[Page 881]]

tions in recommittal ruled out on basis of form rather than of 
legislative content)). This reasoning culminated in a ruling in the 
104th Congress admitting as a valid limitation an amendment prohibiting 
the use of funds in the bill to execute certain accounting transactions 
when specified conditions were ``made known'' to the disbursing official 
(July 17, 1996, p. 17542). In the 105th Congress this entire line of 
precedent was overtaken by changes in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this 
clause that treat as legislation a provision that makes funding 
contingent on whether circumstances not determinative under existing law 
are ``known'' (H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. 121; July 15, 1997, p. 14493; 
July 24, 1997, p. 15758).

  Over a period dating from 1908, the House had developed a line of 
precedent to the effect that language restricting the availability of 
funds in a general appropriation bill could be a valid limitation if, 
rather than imposing new duties on a disbursing official or requiring 
new determinations of that official, it passively addressed the state of 
knowledge of the official (VII, 1695; cf. Aug. 1, 1989, p. 17156, and 
June 22, 1995, p. 16844 (limita



Sec. 1055. Contingencies and congressional 
actions.

  An amendment  making an appropriation contingent upon a recommendation 
(June 27, 1979, p. 17054) or action not specifically required by law is 
legislation; such as a provision limiting the use of funds in a bill 
``unless'' or ``until'' an action contrary to existing law is taken 
(Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 47.1; July 24, 1996, p. 18888). Where existing 
law requires an agency to furnish certain information to congressional 
committees upon request, without a subpoena, it is not in order to make 
funding for that agency contingent upon its furnishing information to 
subcommittees upon request (July 30, 1980, p. 20475), or contingent upon 
submission of an agreement by a Federal official to Congress and 
congressional review thereof (July 31, 1986, p. 18370). Similarly, it is 
not in order to condition funds on legal determinations to be made by a 
Federal court and an executive department (June 28, 1988, p. 16261; see 
Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 47.2).


  Provisions making the availability of funds contingent upon subsequent 
congressional action have, under the most recent precedents, been ruled 
out as legislation (June 30, 1942, p. 5826; May 15, 1947, p. 5378; June 
27, 1994, p. 14613). However, a limitation on the use of funds to buy 
real estate or establish new offices except where Congress had approved 
and funded such activity (June 18, 1991, p. 15218) was held in order.


[[Page 882]]

  The following provisions have been ruled out as legislation: (1) 
making the availability of certain funds contingent upon subsequent 
congressional action on legislative proposals resolving the policy issue 
(Nov. 18, 1981, p. 28064); (2) making the availability of funds 
contingent upon subsequent enactment of legislation containing specified 
findings (Nov. 2, 1983, p. 30503); (3) making the availability of 
funding in the bill contingent on the funding of a separate provision of 
law (Mar. 15, 2006, p. 3713); and (4) changing a permanent appropriation 
in existing law to restrict its availability until all general 
appropriation bills are presented to the President (June 29, 1987, p. 
18083). A section in a general appropriation bill directly contravening 
existing law to subject the use of local funds to congressional approval 
was held to constitute legislation where it was shown that some local 
(District of Columbia) funds deriving from interest accounts were 
available to the Financial Control Board without subsequent 
congressional approval (Aug. 6, 1998, p. 19079).

  Two rulings upholding the admissibility of amendments making the 
availability of funds contingent upon subsequent congressional action 
have been superseded by the precedents cited above (June 11, 1968, p. 
16692; Sept. 6, 1979, p. 23360).


  The following provisions also have been held to be legislation as they 
required: (1) a congressional committee to promulgate regulations to 
limit the use of an appropriation (June 13, 1979, p. 14670), or 
otherwise to direct the activities of a committee (June 24, 1992, p. 
16087); (2) a substantive determination by a State or local government 
official or agency that is not otherwise required by existing law (July 
25, 1985, p. 20569); (3) the Selective Service Administration to issue 
regulations to bring its classifications into conformance with a Supreme 
Court decision (July 20, 1989, p. 15405); (4) a change in a rule of the 
House (IV, 3819); (5) an agency to submit all quarterly and annual 
reports required by law in accordance with standards for reports under a 
specified law not otherwise applicable (Sept. 9, 2003, p. 21548); (6) 
compliance (Sept. 4, 2003, p. 21213; June 9, 2014, p. _) or consistency 
(June 9, 2014, p. _) with a law not otherwise applicable.



Sec. 1056. Construing or amending existing 
law.

  A provision  proposing to construe existing law is itself legislative and 
therefore not in order (IV, 3936-3938; May 2, 1951, p. 4747; July 26, 
1951, p. 8982). However, an official's general responsibility to 
construe the language of a limitation on the use of funds, absent 
imposition of an affirmative direction not required by law, does not 
destroy the validity of a limitation (June 27, 1974, pp. 21687-94).


  Where it is asserted that duties ostensibly occasioned by a limitation 
are already imposed by existing law, the Chair may take cognizance of 
judicial decisions and rule the limitation out on the basis that the 
case law is not uniform, current, or finally dispositive (June 16, 1977, 
pp. 19365-74; June 7, 1978, p. 16676). For example, a limitation 
prohibiting the use of funds for an inspection conducted by a regulatory 
agency without a search warrant has been held out of order as imposing a 
new duty not uniformly required by case law (June 16, 1977, pp. 19365-
74). Similarly, an amendment denying the use of funds for an agency to 
apply certain provisions of law under court decisions in effect on a 
prior date has been held out of order as requiring the official to apply 
noncurrent case law (June 7, 1978, p. 16655).


[[Page 883]]

It also has been held in order to except from the operation of a 
specific limitation on expenditures certain of those expenditures that 
are authorized by law by prohibiting a construction of the limitation in 
a way that would prevent compliance with that law (Deschler, ch. 26, 
Sec. 25.10; June 18, 1991, p. 15218). Similarly, a limitation on certain 
payments to persons in ``excess of $500,'' but stating that the 
limitation would not be ``construed to deprive any share renter of 
payments'' to which the renter might otherwise be entitled was held in 
order (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 66.1).
  A provision prescribing a rule of construction is legislation 
(Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 25.15). For example, a provision prescribing a 
prospective rule of construction for possible (future) tax enactments 
was held to constitute legislation (June 21, 2000, p. 11773). Similarly, 
a provision construing a limitation in a bill by affirmatively declaring 
the meaning of the prohibition is legislation (May 17, 1988, p. 11305); 
and a provision prescribing definitions for terms contained in a 
limitation may be legislation (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. Sec. 25.7, 25.11). 
Language excepting certain appropriations from the sweep of a broader 
limitation may be in order (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 25.2).

  The mere recitation in an amendment that a determination is to be made 
pursuant to existing laws and regulations, absent a citation to the law 
imposing such responsibility, is not sufficient proof by the proponent 
of an amendment to overcome a point of order that the amendment 
constitutes legislation (Sept. 16, 1980, p. 25606; May 8, 1986, p. 
10156). A limitation denying the use of funds to apply certain 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code other than under regulations in 
effect on a prior date is legislation as it would require an official to 
apply regulations no longer current in order to render an appropriation 
available (June 7, 1978, p. 16655; Aug. 19, 1980, pp. 21978-80). 
Similarly, a limitation on funds to implement any ``change'' to a 
requirement in a regulation no longer in effect was held to impose a 
determination not required by current law (June 6, 2012, p. _). However, 
an exception to a limitation on the use of funds for designated Federal 
activities that were already authorized by law in more general terms, 
was held in order as not containing legislation (June 27, 1979, pp. 
17033-35).

  Language waiving provisions of an existing law that did not 
specifically permit inclusion of such a waiver in an appropriation bill 
has been ruled out (e.g., Nov. 13, 1975, p. 36271; June 20, 1996, p. 
14847; May 19, 2000, p. 8600), as has language identical to that 
contained in an authorization bill previously passed by the House but 
not yet signed into law (Aug. 4, 1978, p. 24436), or a proposition for 
repeal of existing law (VII, 1403; Mar. 16, 2006, pp. 3786-88 (sustained 
on appeal)).

  Existing law may be repeated verbatim without violating the rule (IV, 
3814, 3815), but the slightest change of the text renders it liable to a 
point of order (IV, 3817; VII, 1391, 1394; June 4, 1970, p. 18405). It 
is in order to include language descriptive of authority provided in law 
for the operation of Government agencies and corporations so long as the 
description is precise and does not change that authority in any respect 
(June 15, 1973, p. 19843; Aug. 3, 1978, p. 24249); although language 
merely reciting the applicability of current law to the use of earmarked 
funds is permitted, a provision that elevates existing guidelines to 
mandates for spending has been ruled out (July 12, 1989, p. 14432).


[[Page 884]]

ment and not rendering it legislative in nature (Aug. 19, 1980, pp. 
21981-84); (3) a ruling of the Internal Revenue Service that taxpayers 
are not entitled to certain charitable deductions because merely 
descriptive of an existing ruling already promulgated and not requiring 
any new determinations as to the applicability of the limitation to 
other categories of taxpayers (July 16, 1979, pp. 18808-10); (4) changes 
to a set of overtime compensation regulations in existence on a given 
date (with a certain nonlegislative exception) because they did not 
require the Department to administer superseded regulations (Sept. 9, 
2004, pp. 17853, 17854).
  It is in order by way of limitation to deny the use of funds for 
implementation of the following: (1) an Executive Order, which was 
precisely described in the amendment (Mar. 16, 1977, p. 7748); (2) a 
regulation, which was promulgated pursuant to court order and 
constitutional provisions--the authority for the regulation being an 
argument on the merits of the amend


  An amendment proposing to increase budget authority and to offset that 
increase by proposing a change in the application of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 was held to constitute legislation (see, e.g., 
Sept. 8, 1999, pp. 20896-98; June 24, 2003, p. 15831 (sustained on 
appeal); July 10, 2003, p. 17535, p. 17576).


[[Page 885]]

amount earmarked for one of the categories is not legislation, so long 
as it does not textually change the statutory formula (July 24, 1995, p. 
20133).



Sec. 1057. Mandating expenditures.

  A provision  that mandates 
a distribution of funds in contravention of an allocation formula in 
existing law is legislation (July 29, 1982, pp. 18637, 18638; Oct. 5, 
1983, p. 27335; Aug. 2, 1989, p. 18123; July 24, 1995, p. 20141), as is 
an amendment that by such a mandate interferes with an executive 
official's discretionary authority (Mar. 12, 1975, p. 6338), or requires 
not less than a certain sum to be used for a particular purpose where 
existing law does not mandate such expenditure (June 18, 1976, p. 19297; 
July 29, 1982, p. 18623) (including by stating that not less than a 
certain sum ``should be allocated'' (June 9, 2006, p. 10673)), or 
earmarks appropriated funds to the arts and requires their expenditure 
pursuant to standards otherwise applicable only as guidelines (July 12, 
1989, p. 14432). Where existing law directed a Federal official to 
provide for sale of certain Government property to a private 
organization in ``necessary'' amounts, an amendment providing that no 
such property be withheld from distribution from qualifying purchasers 
was legislation, because requiring disposal of all property and 
restricting discretionary authority to determine ``necessary'' amounts 
(Aug. 7, 1978, p. 24707). An amendment directing the use of funds to 
assure compliance with an existing law, where existing law does not so 
mandate, also is legislation (June 24, 1976, p. 20370). So-called 
``hold-harmless'' provisions that mandate a certain level of expenditure 
for certain purposes or recipients, where existing law confers 
discretion or makes ratable reductions in such expenditures, also 
constitute legislation (Apr. 16, 1975, p. 10357; June 25, 1976, p. 
20557). A transfer of available funds from one department to another 
with directions as to the use to which those funds must be put is 
legislation (and also a reappropriation in violation of clause 2(a)(2) 
of this rule) (Dec. 8, 1982, p. 29449). A provision requiring States to 
match funds provided in an appropriation bill was held to constitute 
legislation where existing law contained no such requirement (June 28, 
1993, p. 14418). Where existing law prescribes a formula for the 
allocation of funds among several categories, an amendment merely 
reducing the




Sec. 1058. Waivers; amending legislation permitted 
to remain.

  The House  may, by agreeing to a report from the Committee on Rules or 
by adopting an order under suspension of the rules, allow legislation on 
general appropriation bills (IV, 3260-3263, 3839-3845). Where an 
unauthorized appropriation or legislation is permitted to remain in a 
general appropriation bill by waiver or by failure to raise a point of 
order, an amendment merely changing that amount and not adding 
legislative language or earmarking separate funds for another 
unauthorized purpose is in order (IV, 3823-3835, 3838; VII, 1405, 1413-
1415; June 9, 1954, p. 5963; July 27, 1954, p. 12287; Oct. 1, 1975, p. 
31058; June 8, 1977, p. 17941; July 17, 1985, p. 19435; Sept. 11, 1985, 
p. 23398; June 14, 1988, p. 14341). However, this does not permit an 
amendment that adds additional legislation (IV, 3836, 3837, 3862; VII, 
1402-1436; Dec. 9, 1971, p. 4595; Aug. 1, 1973, p. 27291; June 10, 1977, 
p. 18402; July 30, 1985, p. 21532; July 23, 1986, p. 17446; June 26, 
1987, p. 17655; June 28, 1988, pp. 16203, 16213; Aug. 2, 1989, p. 18172; 
Nov. 15, 1989, p. 29004; June 23, 1998, p. 13475; July 13, 2000, p. 
14093; June 26, 2007, pp. 17485, 17486), proposes a new unauthorized 
purpose (Dec. 8, 1971, p. 45487; Aug. 7, 1978, pp. 24710-12; May 25, 
1988, p. 12256), earmarks for unauthorized purposes (July 17, 1985, p. 
19435; July 17, 1986, p. 16918; July 26, 1995, p. 20528; June 5, 1996, 
p. 13120), earmarks by directing a new use of funds not required by law 
(July 26, 1985, pp. 20811, 20813), or increases an authorized amount 
above the authorized ceiling (Aug. 4, 1999, p. 19513).


  An amendment adding a new paragraph indirectly increasing an 
unauthorized amount contained in a prior paragraph permitted to remain 
is subject to a point of order because the new paragraph is adding a 
further unauthorized amount not merely perfecting (July 12, 1995, p. 
18628; July 16, 1997, p. 14746; Sept. 17, 1998, p. 20818; June 27, 2007, 
pp. 17715, 17716; June 5, 2012, p. _). However, a new paragraph 
indirectly reducing an unauthorized amount permitted to remain in a 
prior paragraph passed in the reading is not subject to a point of order 
because it is not adding a further unauthorized amount (July 16, 1997, 
p. 14747). Where by unanimous consent an amendment is offered en bloc to 
a paragraph containing an unauthorized amount not yet read for 
amendment, the amendment increasing that unauthorized figure is subject 
to a point of order because at that point it is not being offered to a 
paragraph that has been read and permitted to remain (June 21, 1984, p. 
17687). As required by clause 2(f), the Chair will query for points of 
order against the provisions of an appropriation bill not yet reached in 
the reading but addressed by an amendment offered en bloc under that 
clause as budget authority and outlay neutral (July 22, 1997, p. 15250).


[[Page 886]]

appropriation bill is not subject to a point of order as adding 
legislation for restating, verbatim, a legislative provision already 
contained in the bill and permitted to remain (Aug. 27, 1980, p. 23519).
  The Chair examined an entire legislative provision permitted to remain 
when ruling that an amendment to a portion of the provision was merely 
perfecting (July 15, 1999, pp. 16284, 16291). An amendment to a general

  The following amendments to legislative provisions permitted to remain 
have been held to propose additional legislation: (1) adding another 
class to those on which assistance is conferred (June 22, 1983, p. 
16851); (2) adding an additional nation to a legislative provision 
addressing sanctions against one nation (July 13, 2000, p. 14092); (3) 
adding an additional item to a reporting requirement (July 6, 2011, pp. 
10423, 10424; July 9, 2014, p. _); (4) striking text that resulted in 
extending the legislative reach of the pending bill (July 17, 1996, p. 
17533); (5) extending a legislative provision that placed certain 
restrictions on recipients of a defined set of Federal payments and 
benefits to persons benefiting from a certain tax status determined on 
wholly unrelated criteria (Aug. 3, 1995, p. 21967); (6) extending the 
availability of certain housing assistance to certain recipients (June 
13, 2006, pp. 11041, 11042); (7) specifying a different regulation 
required to be reissued by an agency (Feb. 16, 2011, p. 2130); (8) 
adding a rule of construction regarding the implementation of a 
provision of law (as opposed to merely excepting that provision from the 
coverage of a legislative limitation on funds) (Feb. 16, 2011, pp. 2138, 
2140); (9) expanding a requirement for compliance with the Buy America 
Act to include specified domestic content for certain items (June 27, 
2012, p. _).

  On the other hand, to a legislative provision permitted to remain, an 
amendment particularizing a definition in the language was held not to 
constitute additional legislation where it was shown that the definition 
being amended already contemplated inclusion of the covered class (Aug. 
5, 1998, p. 18934). To a legislative provision permitted to remain that 
excepted from a denial of funds for abortions cases in which the life of 
the mother would be endangered if a fetus were carried to term, an 
amendment excepting instead cases in which the health of the mother 
would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term was held not to 
constitute further legislation, because determinations on the 
endangerment of life necessarily subsume determinations on the 
endangerment of health; and the amendment did not therefore require any 
different or more onerous determinations (June 27, 1984, p. 19113).


  To a paragraph permitted to remain despite containing a legislative 
proviso restricting the obligation of funds until a date within the 
fiscal year, an amendment striking the delimiting date, thus applying 
the restriction for the entire year, was held to be perfecting (July 30, 
1990, p. 20442); but striking the date and inserting a new trigger (the 
enactment of other legislation), was held to be additional legislation 
(July 30, 1990, p. 20442).


[[Page 887]]

poses legislation on an appropriation bill without specific authority 
from the House. However, where a Senate amendment proposing legislation 
on a general appropriation bill is, pursuant to the edict of clause 5 of 
rule XXII, reported back from conference in disagreement, a motion to 
concur in the Senate amendment with a further amendment is in order, 
even if the proposed amendment adds legislation to that contained in the 
Senate amendment, and the only test is whether the proposed amendment is 
germane to the Senate amendment reported in disagreement (IV, 3909; 
VIII, 3188, 3189; Speaker McCormack, Dec. 15, 1970, p. 41504; Aug. 1, 
1979, pp. 22007-11; Speaker O'Neill, Dec. 12, 1979, p. 35520; June 30, 
1987, p. 18308).



Sec. 1059. Senate amendments.

  The principle  seems to be 
generally well accepted that the House proposing legislation on a 
general appropriation bill should recede if the other House persists in 
its objection (IV, 3904-3908), and clause 5 of rule XXII (Sec. 1076, 
infra) prohibits House conferees from agreeing to a Senate amendment 
that pro



               ``holman rule'' on retrenching expenditures



Sec. 1062. Legislation reducing 
expenditures.

  Decisions under  the so-called ``Holman Rule'' in clause 2 of rule XXI 
have been rare in the modern practice of the House. The trend in 
construing language in general appropriation bills or amendments thereto 
has been to minimize the importance of the ``Holman Rule'' in those 
cases in which the decision can be made on other grounds. The practice 
of using limitations in appropriation bills has been perfected in recent 
years so that most modern decisions by the Chair deal with distinctions 
between such limitations and matters that are considered to be 
legislation (see Sec. Sec. 1053-1057, supra). Under the modern practice, 
the ``Holman Rule'' only applies where an obvious reduction is achieved 
by the provision in question and does not apply to limiting language 
unaccompanied by a reduction of funds in the bill (July 16, 1979, pp. 
18808-10). It has no application to an amendment to an appropriation 
bill that does not legislate but is merely a negative limitation citing 
but not changing existing law (June 18, 1980, p. 15355).


  A paragraph containing legislation reported in an appropriation bill 
to be in order must on its face show a retrenchment of a type that 
conforms to the requirements of the rule (Mar. 17, 1926, p. 5804).


[[Page 888]]

ment reducing an unauthorized amount permitted to remain in a general 
appropriation bill is in order as a retrenchment under this clause (Oct. 
1, 1975, p. 31058). An amendment to a general appropriation bill denying 
the availability of funds to certain recipients but requiring Federal 
officials to make additional determinations as to the qualifications of 
recipients is legislation and is not a retrenchment of expenditures 
where it is not apparent that the prohibition will reduce the amounts 
covered by the bill (June 26, 1973, p. 21389).
  The reduction of expenditure must appear as a necessary result, in 
order to bring an amendment or provision within the exception to the 
rule. It is not sufficient that such reduction would probably, or would 
in the opinion of the Chair, result therefrom (IV, 3887; VII, 1530-
1534). Thus, an amendment to a general appropriation bill providing that 
appropriations made in that act are hereby reduced by $7 billion, though 
legislative in form, was held in order under the ``Holman Rule'' 
exception (Apr. 5, 1966, p. 7689), but an amendment providing for 
certain reductions of appropriations carried in the bill based on the 
President's budget estimates was held not to show a reduction on its 
face and to provide merely speculative reductions (Deschler, ch. 26, 
Sec. 5.6; June 24, 1992, p. 16110). An amendment authorizing the 
President to reduce each appropriation in the bill by not more than 10 
percent was ruled out as legislation conferring new authority on the 
President (May 31, 1984, p. 14617; June 6, 1984, p. 15120). An amend

  The amendment must not only show on its face an attempt to retrench 
but also must be germane to some provision in the bill even though 
offered by direction of the committee having jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of the amendment (VII, 1549; Dec. 16, 1911, p. 442). An 
amendment providing that appropriations ``herein and heretofore made'' 
shall be reduced by $70 million through the reduction of Federal 
employees as the President determines was held to be legislative and not 
germane to the bill, because it went to funds other than those carried 
therein, and was therefore not within the ``Holman Rule'' exception 
(Oct. 18, 1966, p. 27425).

  An amendment reducing an amount in an appropriation bill for the 
Postal Service and prohibiting the use of funds therein to implement 
special bulk third-class rates for political committees was held in 
order because not specifically requiring a new determination and because 
constituting a retrenchment of expenditures even if assumed to be 
legislative (July 13, 1979, pp. 18453-55).

  As long as an amendment calls for an obvious reduction at some point 
in time during the fiscal year, the amendment is in order under the 
``Holman Rule'' even if the reduction takes place in the future in an 
amount actually determined when the reduction takes place (for example, 
by formula) (VII, 1491, 1505; July 30, 1980, pp. 20499-20503). To an 
amendment that is in order under the ``Holman Rule,'' containing 
legislation but retrenching expenditures by formula for every agency 
funded by the bill, an amendment exempting from that reduction several 
specific programs does not add further legislation and is in order (July 
30, 1980, pp. 20499-20503).

  A motion to recommit the District of Columbia appropriation bill with 
instructions to reduce the proportion of the fund appropriated from the 
Federal Treasury from one-half, as provided in the bill, to one-fourth 
of the entire appropriation is in order, because the effect of the 
amendment if adopted would reduce the expenditure of public money 
although not reducing the amount of the appropriation (VII, 1518).

  The term ``retrenchment'' means the reduction of the amount of money 
to be taken out of the Federal Treasury by the bill, and therefore a 
reduction of the amount of money to be contributed toward the expenses 
of the District of Columbia is in order as a retrenchment (VII, 1502).


[[Page 889]]

standard silver dollars, the cost of such coinage and recoinage to be 
paid out of the Government's seigniorage, was held not to be in order 
under the rule; first, because not germane to the subject matter of the 
bill (the sundry civil); second, because it did not appear that any 
retrenchment of expenditure would result, the seigniorage being the 
property of the Government as other funds in the Treasury (VII, 1547).
  An amendment proposed to an item for the recoinage of uncurrent 
fractional silver, which amendment struck out the amount appropriated 
and added a provision for the coinage of all the bullion in the Treasury 
into

  To an item of appropriation for inland transportation of mails by star 
routes an amendment was offered requiring the Postmaster General to 
provide routes and make contracts in certain cases, with the further 
provision ``and the amount of appropriation herein for star routes is 
hereby reduced to $500.'' A point of order made against the first or 
legislative part of the amendment was sustained, which decision was, on 
appeal, affirmed by the committee (VII, 1555).

  To a clause appropriating for the foreign mail service an amendment 
reducing the appropriation, and in addition repealing the act known as 
the ``subsidy act,'' was held not in order because the repealing of this 
act was not germane to the appropriation bill; and that to be in order 
both branches of the amendment must be germane to the bill (VII, 1548).

  A provision in the agricultural appropriation bill transferring the 
supervision of the importation of animals from the Treasury to the 
Department of Agriculture is out of order, being a provision changing 
law and not retrenching expenditure (IV, 3886).

  Where a paragraph containing new legislation provides in one part for 
a discharge of employees, which means a retrenchment, and in another 
part embodies legislation to bring about the particular retrenchment 
that in turn shows on its face an expenditure the amount of which is not 
apparent, the Chair is unable to hold that the net result will retrench 
expenditures. However, where the additional legislation does not show on 
its face an additional expenditure, the Chair will not speculate as to a 
possible expenditure under the additional legislation (VII, 1500).


[[Page 890]]

completed and only if the Committee of the Whole does not adopt a motion 
to rise and report the bill back to the House. Other decisions that 
involved interpretation of the ``Holman Rule,'' but which do not reflect 
the current form or interpretation of that rule, are found in IV, 3846, 
3885-3892; VII, 1484, 1486-1492, 1498, 1500, 1515, 1563, 1564, 1569; 
June 1, 1892, p. 4920.

  As explained in the annotation in Sec. 1043, supra, the amendment of 
clause 2(b) in the 98th Congress narrowed the ``Holman Rule'' exception 
to the general prohibition against legislation to cover only 
retrenchments reducing amounts of money covered by the bill, and not 
retrenchments resulting from reduction of the number and salary of 
officers of the United States or of the compensation of any person paid 
out of the U.S. Treasury. Accordingly, the Chair held out of order an 
amendment mandating the reduction of certain Federal salaries and 
expenses as not confined to a reduction of funds in the bill (June 17, 
1994, p. 13422). Paragraph (b) also eliminated separate authority 
conferred upon legislative committees or commissions with proper 
jurisdiction to report amendments retrenching expenditures, and 
permitted legislative committees to recommend such retrenchments by 
reduction of amounts covered by the bill to the Appropriations Committee 
for discretionary inclusion in the reported bill. Paragraph (d) as added 
in the 98th Congress provides a new procedure for consideration of all 
retrenchment amendments only when reading of the bill has been



Sec. 1063. Reappropriations.

  This  provision from section 
139(c) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 190f(c)) 
was made part of the standing rules in the 83d Congress (Jan. 3, 1953, 
p. 24). Previously, a reappropriation of an unexpended balance for an 
object authorized by law was in order on a general appropriation bill 
(IV, 3591, 3592; VII, 1156, 1158). This clause was amended in the 99th 
Congress by section 228(b) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177) to permit the Committee on 
Appropriations to report certain transfers of unexpended balances. 
Consistent with clause 2 of rule XXI, and as codified in the 106th 
Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. 47), violations of this clause are 
enforced only against specific provisions in general appropriation bills 
containing reappropriations rather than against consideration of the 
bill (see Deschler, ch. 25, Sec. 3).


  A provision in a general appropriation bill, or an amendment thereto, 
providing that funds for a certain purpose are to be derived by 
continuing the availability of funds previously appropriated for a prior 
fiscal year is in violation of clause 2(a)(2) (formerly clause 6 of rule 
XXI) (Aug. 20, 1951, p. 10393; Mar. 29, 1960, p. 6862; June 17, 1960, p. 
13138; June 20, 1973, p. 20530; July 29, 1982, p. 18625; June 28, 1988, 
p. 16255), and a reappropriation of unexpended prior year balances 
prohibited by this clause is not in order under the guise of a ``Holman 
Rule'' exception to clause 2 of rule XXI (Oct. 18, 1966, p. 27424). An 
amendment to a general appropriation bill making any appropriations that 
are available for the current fiscal year available for certain new 
purposes was held out of order under clause 2(a)(2) because it was not 
confined to the funds in the bill and would permit reappropriation of 
unexpended balances (Oct. 1, 1975, p. 31090). That appropriations may be 
authorized in law for a specified object does not permit an amendment to 
a general appropriation bill to include legislative language mandating 
the reappropriation of funds from other Acts (July 28, 1992, p. 19652).


[[Page 891]]

  This rule, however, is not applicable when the reappropriation 
language is identical to legislative authorization language enacted 
subsequent to the adoption of the rule, because the law is a more recent 
expression of the will of the House (Sept. 5, 1961, p. 18133), nor when 
a measure transferring unobligated balances of previously appropriated 
funds contains legislative provisions and rules changes but no 
appropriation of new budget authority and is neither in the form of an 
appropriation bill nor the subject of a privileged report by the 
Committee on Appropriations under rule XIII (Mar. 3, 1988, p. 3239).

  The return of an unexpended balance to the Treasury is in order (IV, 
3594).


  A provision in a general appropriation bill that authorizes an 
official to transfer funds among appropriation accounts in the bill 
changes existing law in violation of clause 2 of rule XXI by including 
language conferring new authority (Deschler, ch 26, Sec. 29.2; June 9, 
2006, pp. 10681, 10682). However, direct transfers of appropriations 
within the confines of the same bill normally are considered in order 
(VII, 1468) as a ``within-bill'' transfer rather than a transfer of 
unexpended balances of the kind addressed by clause 2(a)(2).




Sec. 1063a. Offsetting en bloc amendments.

  To  invoke the 
protection of clause 2(f), an amendment must not (1) propose a change 
other than a transfer of appropriations among objects in the bill, such 
as increasing the amount of a deferral (June 15, 2000, p. 11064), 
rescission (Feb. 16, 2011, pp. 2136, 2137), or limitation on obligations 
from a trust fund (June 26, 2012, p. _), or striking sections of the 
bill (Apr. 29, 2015, p. _ (sustained on appeal)); (2) reach back in the 
reading (Feb. 15, 2011, pp. 1965, 1966); or (3) increase the levels of 
budget authority or outlays carried in the bill (July 12, 2000, p. 
14071; July 13, 2004, pp. 15193, 15194, pp. 15198, 15199; June 6, 2012, 
p. _), and the proponent of an amendment carries the burden of so 
proving (see Sec. 1044a, supra). An amendment otherwise in order under 
this paragraph may nevertheless be in violation of clause 2(a)(1) if 
increasing an appropriation above the authorized amount contained in the 
bill (Aug. 4, 1999, p. 19513). The Chair will query for points of order 
against provisions of a bill not yet read when they are addressed by an 
offsetting amendment under this paragraph (e.g., May 17, 2005, p. 9975). 
On one occasion, the House adopted an order rendering clause 2(f) 
unavailable during consideration of a bill in the case of an amendment 
transferring appropriations among objects falling within more than one 
suballocation under section 302(b) of the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974 (Feb. 15, 2011, p. 1823), and an amendment to such bill proposing 
such a transfer was ruled out as impermissibly addressing portions of 
the bill not yet read (Feb. 15, 2011, p. 1971).



(d) Spending Reduction Amendments in Appropriations Bills.


Sec. 1063b. Spending reduction account.

  The  112th through 
114th Congresses (sec. 3(j), H. Res. 5, Jan. 5, 2011, p. 80; sec. 3(d), 
H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 2013, p. _; sec. 3(d), H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 2015, p. _) 
established (1) a procedure for reducing an amount in a general 
appropriation bill and displaying that reduction in a spending reduction 
account in the bill, and (2) a point of order against an amendment 
increasing the level of budget authority in a general appropriation 
bill, as follows:


          (1) During the reading of a general appropriation bill for 

        amendment in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of 

        the Union, it shall be in order to consider en bloc amendments 

        proposing only to transfer appropriations from an object or 


[[Page 892]]

        objects in the bill

        to a spending reduction account. When considered en bloc under 

        this clause, such amendments may amend portions of the bill not 

        yet read for amendment (following disposition of any points of 

        order against such portions) and are not subject to a demand for 

        division of the question in the House or in the Committee of the 

        Whole.

          (2) Except as provided in paragraph (1), it shall not be in 

        order to consider an amendment to a spending reduction account 

        in the House or in the Committee of the Whole House on the state 

        of the Union.

          (3) It shall not be in order to consider an amendment to a 

        general appropriation bill proposing a net increase in budget 

        authority in the bill (unless considered en bloc with another 

        amendment or amendments proposing an equal or greater decrease 

        in such budget authority pursuant to clause 2(f) of rule XXI).

          (4) A point of order under clause 2(b) of rule XXI shall not 

        apply to a spending reduction account.

          (5) A general appropriation bill may not be considered in the 

        Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union unless it 

        includes a spending reduction account as the last section of the 

        bill. An order to report a general appropriation bill to the 

        House shall constitute authority for the chair of the Committee 

        on Appropriations to add such a section to the bill or modify 

        the figure contained therein.

          (6) For purposes of this subsection, the term ``spending 

        reduction account'' means an account in a general appropriation 

        bill that bears that caption and contains only a recitation of 

        the amount by which an applicable allocation of new budget 

        authority under section 302(b) of the Congressional Budget Act 

        of 1974 exceeds the amount of new budget authority proposed by 


        the bill.



[[Page 893]]


  The Chair is persuasively guided by an estimate from the chair of the 
Committee on the Budget as to whether an amendment proposes a net 
increase in budget authority in the bill under paragraph (3) (e.g., Feb. 
15, 2011, p. 1987; Apr. 7, 2011, pp. 5337, 5338 (sustained by tabling of 
appeal)). An amendment to a general appropriation bill proposing a 
limitation on funds in the bill for the instant fiscal year was held not 
to propose a net increase in budget authority within the meaning of this 
provision (Feb. 18, 2011, pp. 2490, 2491). An amendment to a general 
appropriation bill that proposed to do more than merely transfer 
appropriations from objects in the bill to a spending reduction account 
(July 6, 2011, pp. 10466, 10467) or proposed to increase the figure in 
the spending reduction account by greater than the amount of reductions 
in earlier accounts (June 1, 2012, p. _) was ineligible to avail itself 
of the protection of paragraph (1) to reach ahead to text not yet read 
for amendment.



Sec. 1064. Highway funding.

  3.  It shall not be in order to 
consider a general appropriation bill or joint resolution, or conference 
report thereon, that--


      (a) provides spending authority derived from receipts deposited in 
the Highway Trust Fund (excluding any transfers from the General Fund of 
the Treasury); or


      (b) reduces or otherwise limits the accruing balances of the 
Highway Trust Fund,
for any purpose other than for those activities authorized for the 
highway or mass transit categories.

  This clause was rewritten entirely in the 112th Congress (sec. 
2(d)(4), H. Res. 5, Jan. 5, 2011, p. 80). For its predecessor, which 
enforced specified minimum levels of surface transportation obligation 
limitations, see Sec. 1064 of the House Rules and Manual for the 111th 
Congress (H. Doc. 110-162).


Sec. 48114. Funding for Aviation Programs.


Sec. 1064a. Funding for aviation programs.

  Section 48114  of 
title 49 (a provision first added by the Wendell H. Ford Aviation 
Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (sec. 106, P.L. 106-181), 
extended to 2007 by its reenactment in title 49 (sec. 104, P.L. 108-
176), and extended to 2015 by the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 
2012 (sec. 104, P.L. 112-95)) provides a point of order to enforce 
guarantees of total budget resources in a fiscal year for certain 
aviation investment programs as follows:


  (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--

          (1) Airport and airway trust fund guarantee.--

                  (A) In general.--The total budget resources made 

                available from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund each 

                fiscal year pursuant to sections 48101, 48102, 48103, 

                and 106(k) shall--

  (i) in fiscal year 2013, be equal to 90 percent of the estimated level 
of receipts plus interest credited to the Airport and Airway Trust Fund 
for that fiscal year; and


[[Page 894]]


  (ii) in fiscal year 2014 and each fiscal year thereafter, be equal to 
the sum of--

                  (B) Guarantee.--No funds may be appropriated or 

                limited for aviation investment programs listed in 

                subsection (b)(1) unless the amount described in 

                subparagraph (A) has been provided.

          (2) Additional authorizations of appropriations from the 

        general fund.--In any fiscal year through fiscal year 2015, if 

        the amount described in paragraph (1) is appropriated, there is 

        further authorized to be appropriated from the general fund of 

        the Treasury such sums as may be necessary for the Federal 

        Aviation Administration Operations account.

  (b) Definitions.--In this section, the following definitions apply:

          (1) Total budget resources.--The term ``total budget 

        resources'' means the total amount made available from the 

        Airport and Airway Trust Fund for the sum of obligation 

        limitations and budget authority made available for a fiscal 

        year for the following budget accounts that are subject to the 

        obligation limitation on contract authority provided in this 

        title and for which appropriations are provided pursuant to 

        authorizations contained in this title:

                  (A) 69-8106-0-7-402 (Grants in Aid for Airports).

                  (B) 69-8107-0-7-402 (Facilities and Equipment).

                  (C) 69-8108-0-7-402 (Research and Development).

                  (D) 69-8104-0-7-402 (Trust Fund Share of Operations).

          (2) Estimated level of receipts plus interest.--The term 

        ``estimated level of receipts plus interest'' means the level of 

        excise taxes and interest credited to the Airport and Airway 

        Trust Fund under section 9502 of the Internal Revenue Code of 

        1986 for a fiscal year as set forth in the President's budget 

        baseline projection as defined in section 257 of the Balanced 

        Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-

        177) (Treasury identification code 20-8103-0-7-402) for that 

        fiscal year submitted pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, 

        United States Code.

  (c) Enforcement of Guarantees.--

          (1) Total airport and airway trust fund funding.--It shall not 

        be in order in the House of Representatives or the Senate to 

        consider any bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or 

        conference report that would cause total budget resources in a 

        fiscal year for aviation investment programs described in 

        subsection (b) to be less than the amount required by subsection 

        (a)(1)(A) for such fiscal year.

          (2) Capital priority.--It shall not be in order in the House 

        of Representatives or the Senate to consider any bill, joint 

        resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report that 

        provides an appropriation (or any amendment thereto) for any 


[[Page 895]]

        fiscal year through fiscal

        year 2015 for Research and Development or Operations if the sum 

        of the obligation limitation for Grants-in-Aid for Airports and 

        the appropriation for Facilities and Equipment for such fiscal 

        year is below the sum of the authorized levels for Grants-in-Aid 

        for Airports and for Facilities and Equipment for such fiscal 


        year.


Appropriations on legislative bills
  The chairs of the Committee on Rules and the Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure inserted in the Record correspondence 
concerning points of order established in this section (Mar. 15, 2000, 
p. 2805).




1065. Restriction of power to report appropriations.

  4.  A 
bill or joint resolution carrying an appropriation may not be reported 
by a committee not having jurisdiction to report appropriations, and an 
amendment proposing an appropriation shall not be in order during the 
consideration of a bill or joint resolution reported by a committee not 
having that jurisdiction. A point of order against an appropriation in 
such a bill, joint resolution, or amendment thereto may be raised at any 
time during pendency of that measure for amendment.


  This portion of the rule was adopted June 1, 1920 (VII, 2133). When 
the House recodified its rules in the 106th Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 
1999, p. 47), this clause was returned to clause 4 where it had been 
until moved to former clause 5(a) of rule XXI in the 93d Congress (H. 
Res. 988, 93d Cong., Oct. 8, 1974, p. 34470).


[[Page 896]]

2137; Mar. 29, 1933, p. 988). The clause does not apply to private bills 
because the committees having jurisdiction over bills for the payment of 
private claims may report bills making appropriations within the limits 
of their jurisdiction (VII, 2135; Dec. 12, 1924, p. 538). The point of 
order under this clause does not apply to an appropriation in a bill 
that has been taken away from a nonappropriating committee by a motion 
to discharge (VII, 1019a). The point of order under this clause does not 
apply to a special order reported from the Committee on Rules ``self-
executing'' the adoption in the House of an amendment containing an 
appropriation, because the amendment is not separately before the House 
during consideration of the special order (Feb. 24, 1993, p. 3542).
  A point of order under this clause cannot be raised against a motion 
to suspend the rules (VIII, 3426), against a motion to discharge a 
nonappropriating committee from consideration of a bill carrying an 
appropriation (VII, 2144), or against a Senate amendment (except as 
applied through clause 5 of rule XXII) (VII, 1572). However, it may be 
directed against an amendment proposed to a Senate amendment to a House 
bill not reported from the Committee on Appropriations (Oct. 1, 1980, 
pp. 28638-42) or against an item of appropriation in a Senate bill (VII, 
2136, 2147; July 30, 1957, pp. 13056, 13181). If the House deletes a 
provision in a Senate bill under this clause, the bill is messaged to 
the Senate with the deletion in the form of an amendment. The point of 
order may be made against an appropriation in a Senate bill that, 
although not reported in the House, is considered in lieu of a reported 
House ``companion bill'' (VII,

  The provision in this clause that a point of order against an 
amendment containing an appropriation to a legislative bill may be made 
``at any time'' has been interpreted to require that the point of order 
be raised during the pendency of the amendment under the five-minute 
rule (Mar. 18, 1946, p. 2365; Apr. 28, 1975, p. 12043), and a point of 
order will lie against an amendment during its pendency, even in its 
amended form, although the point of order is against the amendment as 
amended by a substitute and no point of order was raised against the 
substitute before its adoption (Apr. 23, 1975, pp. 11512-13). However, 
the point of order must be raised during the initial consideration of 
the bill or amendment under the five-minute rule, and a point of order 
against similar language permitted to remain in the House version and 
included in a conference report on a bill will not lie, because the only 
rule prohibiting such inclusion (clause 5 of rule XXII) is limited to 
language originally contained in a Senate amendment where the House 
conferees have not been specifically authorized to agree thereto (May 1, 
1975, p. 12752). Where the House has adopted a resolution waiving points 
of order against certain appropriations in a legislative bill, a point 
of order may nevertheless be raised against an amendment to the bill 
containing an identical provision, because under this rule a point of 
order may be raised against the amendment ``at any time'' (Apr. 23, 
1975, p. 11512). A point of order against a direct appropriation in a 
bill initially reported from a legislative committee and then 
sequentially referred to and reported adversely by the Committee on 
Appropriations was conceded and sustained as in violation of this clause 
(Nov. 10, 1975, p. 35611). The point of order should be directed to the 
item of appropriation in the bill and not to the act of reporting the 
bill (VII, 2143), and cannot be directed to the entire bill (VII, 2142; 
Apr. 28, 1975, p. 12043).

  The term ``appropriation'' in the rule means the payment of funds from 
the Treasury, and the words ``warranted and make available for 
expenditure for payments'' are equivalent to ``is hereby appropriated'' 
and therefore not in order (VII, 2150). The words ``available until 
expended,'' making an appropriation already made for one year available 
for ensuing years, are not in order (VII, 2145).


[[Page 897]]

proceeds from the sale of bonds under the Second Liberty Bond Act 
(public debt transactions) for the purpose of making loans, because such 
loans do not constitute ``appropriations'' within the purview of the 
rule (June 28, 1949, pp. 8536-38; Aug. 2, 1950, p. 11599); (2) exempting 
loan guarantees in a legislative bill from statutory limitations on 
expenditures (July 16, 1974, p. 23344); (3) authorizing the availability 
of certain loan receipts where it can be shown that the actual 
availability of those receipts remains contingent upon subsequent 
enactment of an appropriation act (Sept. 10, 1975, p. 28300); (4) 
increasing the duties of a commission (VII, 1578); (5) authorizing 
payment from an appropriation to be made (Jan. 31, 1923, p. 2794).
  The point of order provided for in this clause is not applicable to 
the following provisions: (1) authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury 
to use

  Language reappropriating, making available, or diverting an 
appropriation or a portion of an appropriation already made for one 
purpose to another (VII, 2146; Mar. 29, 1933, p. 988; Aug. 10, 1988, p. 
21719), or for one fiscal year to another (Mar. 26, 1992, p. 7223), is 
not in order. For example, the following provisions have been held out 
of order: (1) expanding the definition in existing law of recipients 
under a Federal subsidy program as permitting a new use of funds already 
appropriated (May 11, 1976, pp. 13409-11); (2) authorizing the use, 
without a subsequent appropriation, of funds directly appropriated by a 
previous statute for a new purpose (Oct. 1, 1980, pp. 28637-40). 
However, a modification of such a provision making payments for such new 
purposes ``effective only to the extent and in such amounts as are 
provided in advance in appropriation acts'' does not violate this clause 
(Oct. 1, 1980, pp. 28638-42).

  The following provisions have also been held to be in violation of 
this clause: (1) directing a departmental officer to pay a certain sum 
out of unexpended balances (VII, 2154); (2) authorizing the use of funds 
of the Shipping Board (VII, 2147); (3) directing payments out of Indian 
trust funds (VII, 2149); (4) making excess foreign currencies 
immediately available for a new purpose (Aug. 3, 1971, p. 29109); (5) 
authorizing the collection of fees or user charges by Federal agencies 
and making the revenues collected therefrom available without further 
appropriation (June 17, 1937, pp. 5915-18; Mar. 29, 1972, pp. 10749-51); 
(6) transferring existing Federal funds into a new Treasury trust fund 
to be immediately available for a new purpose (June 20, 1974, pp. 20273-
75); (7) transferring unexpended balances of appropriations from an 
existing agency to a new agency created therein (Apr. 9, 1979, p. 7774); 
(8) making a direct appropriation to carry out a part of the Energy 
Security Act (Oct. 24, 1985, p. 28812); (9) requiring the diversion of 
previously appropriated funds in lieu of the enactment of new budget 
authority if a maximum deficit amount under the Deficit Control Act of 
1985 is exceeded, though its stated purpose may be to avoid the 
sequestration of funds (Aug. 10, 1988, p. 21719).


[[Page 898]]

is to be available only to the extent provided in appropriation acts 
(see Sec. 1127, supra). See also Deschler, ch. 25, Sec. 4 for a 
discussion of appropriations on legislative bills generally.

Tax and tariff measures and amendments
  Section 401(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 317) 
prohibits consideration in the House of any bill, resolution, or 
amendment that provides new spending authority (as that term is defined 
in that section) unless that measure also provides that such new 
spending authority



1066. Restriction on bills and amendments carrying 
taxes or tariffs.

  5. (a)(1)  A bill or joint resolution carrying a tax or tariff 
measure may not be reported by a committee not having jurisdiction to 
report tax or tariff measures, and an amendment in the House or proposed 
by the Senate carrying a tax or tariff measure shall not be in order 
during the consideration of a bill or joint resolution reported by a 
committee not having that jurisdiction. A point of order against a tax 
or tariff measure in such a bill, joint resolution, or amendment thereto 
may be raised at any time during pendency of that measure for amendment.



  (2) For purposes of paragraph (1), a tax or tariff measure includes an 
amendment proposing a limitation on funds in a general appropriation 
bill for the administration of a tax or tariff.

  Subparagraph (1) was added in the 98th Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 
1983, p. 34). Subparagraph (2) was added in the 108th Congress (sec. 
2(o), H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 2003, p. 7). Before the House recodified its 
rules in the 106th Congress, this provision was found in former clause 
5(b) of rule XXI (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. 47).


[[Page 899]]

at the beginning of each Congress, e.g., Jan. 4, 1995, p. 551; Jan. 3, 
2001, p. 39)):
  A point of order under this paragraph against a provision in a bill is 
in order at any time during consideration of the bill for amendment in 
Committee of the Whole (Aug. 1, 1986, p. 18649). On October 4, 1989, the 
chair of the Committee of the Whole, before ruling on several points of 
order under this paragraph, enunciated several guidelines to distinguish 
taxes and tariffs on the one hand and user or regulatory fees and other 
forms of revenue on the other (p. 23260). On the opening day of the 102d 
Congress, Speaker Foley inserted in the Congressional Record the 
following statement of jurisdictional concepts underlying those same 
distinctions and indicated his intention to exercise his referral 
authority under rule X in a manner consistent with this paragraph (Jan. 
3, 1991, p. 64 (reiterated

          Clause 5(b) (current clause 5(a)) of rule XXI prohibits the 

        reporting of a tax or tariff matter by any committee not having 

        that jurisdiction. Most of the questions of order arising under 

        this clause since its adoption in 1983 have related to 

        provisions that clearly affected the operation of the Internal 

        Revenue Code or the customs laws. From time to time, however, 

        such a question has related to a provision drafted as a user or 

        regulatory fee levied on members of a class that occasions or 

        avails itself of a particular governmental activity, typically 

        to generate revenue in support of that activity. In order to 

        provide guidance concerning the referral of bills, to assist 

        committees in staying within their appropriate jurisdictions 

        under rule X, to assist committees without jurisdiction over tax 

        or tariff measures in complying with clause 5(b) of rule XXI, 

        and to protect the constitutional prerogative of the House to 

        originate revenue bills, the Speaker will make the following 

        statement: Standing committees of the House (other than the 

        Committees on Appropriations and Budget) have jurisdiction to 

        consider user, regulatory and other fees, charges, and 

        assessments levied on a class directly availing itself of, or 

        directly subject to, a governmental service, program, or 

        activity, but not on the general public, as measures to be 

        utilized solely to support, subject to annual appropriations, 

        the service, program, or activity (including agency functions 

        associated therewith) for which such fees, charges, and 

        assessments are established and collected and not to finance the 

        costs of Government generally. The fee must be paid by a class 

        benefiting from the service, program or activity, or being 

        regulated by the agency; in short, there must be a reasonable 

        connection between the payors and the agency or function 

        receiving the fee. The fund that receives the amounts collected 

        is not itself determinative of the existence of a fee or a tax. 

        The Committee on Ways and Means has jurisdiction over ``revenue 

        measures generally'' under rule X. That committee is entitled to 

        an appropriate referral of broad-based fees and could choose to 

        recast such fees as excise taxes. A provision only reauthorizing 

        or amending an existing fee without fundamental change, or 

        creating a new fee generating only a de minimis  aggregate 

        amount of revenues, does not necessarily require a sequential 

        referral to the Committee on Ways and Means. The Chair intends 

        to coordinate these principles with the Committee on the Budget 

        and the Congressional Budget Office, especially in the 

        reconciliation process, so that budget scorekeeping does not 

        determine, and reconciliation directives and their 

        implementation will not be inconsistent with, committee 

        jurisdiction. Further, it should be emphasized that the 

        constitutional prerogative of the House to originate revenue 


[[Page 900]]

        measures will continue to be viewed broadly to include

        any meaningful revenue proposal that the Senate may attempt to 

        originate.

  The adoption of subparagraph (2) in the 108th Congress established a 
different standard for determining a violation of this clause by an 
amendment to a reported general appropriation bill than for a provision 
in the appropriation bill itself. Before its adoption, a Member raising 
a point of order under this paragraph against a provision in, or an 
amendment to, a general appropriation bill affecting the use of funds 
therein (otherwise traditionally in order if admissible under clause 2 
of rule XXI), carried the burden of showing a necessary, certain, and 
inevitable change in revenue collections or tax statuses or liabilities 
(Sept. 12, 1984, pp. 25108, 25109, 25120; July 26, 1985, p. 20806; Aug. 
1, 1986, p. 18649; July 13, 1990, p. 17473; June 18, 1991, p. 15189). 
The intent of the rules change, as expressed during debate on the 
change, was ``to ease the burden on the maker of a point of order 
[against an amendment] from having to show a necessary, certain and 
inevitable change in revenue collections, tax statuses, or liability as 
previous precedents required, to one of showing a textual relationship 
between the amendment and the administration of the Internal Revenue or 
tariff laws'' (Jan. 7, 2003, p. 12). Under that standard the following 
amendments to a general appropriation bill have been held to impose a 
limitation on funds in violation of this clause: (1) to assess or 
collect any tax liability attributable to the inclusion of certain 
economic assistance in the taxpayer's gross income (Sept. 9, 2003, p. 
21531); (2) to process the importation of any product from Iran (June 
18, 2004, pp. 13041, 13042); (3) for the accession of the Russian 
Federation into the World Trade Organization, thereby effecting changes 
to that country's products under domestic tariff law (June 28, 2006, p. 
12958); (4) to carry out various provisions of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986 (June 1, 2011, pp. 8520, 8521).

  The precedents developed under this clause before its change in the 
108th Congress still apply to the Chair's determination whether a 
limitation in a general appropriation bill (rather than an amendment 
thereto) constitutes a tax or tariff measure proscribed by this 
paragraph. Prior precedents addressing amendments are still viable for 
that determination. The Chair will consider argument as to whether the 
limitation effectively and inevitably changes revenue collections and 
tax status or liability (Aug. 1, 1986, p. 18649). For example, in 
determining whether an amendment to a general appropriation bill 
proposing a change in IRS funding priorities constituted a tax measure 
proscribed by this paragraph, the Chair considered argument as to 
whether the change would necessarily or inevitably result in a loss or 
gain in tax liability and in tax collection (June 18, 1991, p. 15189).


[[Page 901]]

erwise provided for by law (Oct. 27, 1983, p. 29611). Similar rulings 
were issued: (1) where it was shown that the imposition of the 
restriction on IRS funding for the fiscal year would effectively and 
inevitably preclude the IRS or the Customs Service from collecting 
revenues otherwise due and owing by law or require collection of revenue 
not legally due or owing (July 26, 1985, p. 20806; Aug. 1, 1986, pp. 
18649, 18650; July 17, 1996, p. 17563); and (2) where a provision in a 
general appropriation bill prohibited the use of funds to impose or 
assess certain taxes due under specified portions of the Internal 
Revenue Code (July 13, 1990, p. 17473). In the 98th Congress, the Chair 
sustained points of order under this paragraph against motions to concur 
in three Senate amendments to a general appropriation bill (not reported 
by the Committee on Ways and Means): (1) an amendment denying the use of 
funds in that or any other Act by the IRS to impose or assess any tax 
due under a designated provision of the Internal Revenue Code, thereby 
rendering the tax uncollectable through the use of any funds available 
to the agency (Sept. 12, 1984, p. 25108); (2) an amendment directing the 
Secretary of the Treasury to admit free of duty certain articles 
imported by a designated organization (Sept. 12, 1984, p. 25109); and 
(3) an amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930 to expand the authority of 
the Customs Service to seize and use the proceeds from the sale of 
contraband imports to defray operational expenses, and to offset owed 
customs duties under one section of that law (Sept. 12, 1984, p. 25120). 
A limitation on funds (above a specified amount) in any Act for the 
Internal Revenue Service to administer any tax collection contract was 
conceded to inevitably constrain the collection of revenues and was 
stricken from the bill (June 28, 2007, p. 17932). An amendment to a 
general appropriation bill proposing to divert an increase in funding 
for the IRS from spot-checks to targeted audits was held not to 
constitute a tax within the meaning of this paragraph because it did not 
necessarily affect revenue collection levels or tax liabilities (June 
18, 1991, p. 15189).
  A limitation on the use of funds contained in a general appropriation 
bill was held to violate this paragraph by denying the use of funds by 
the Customs Service to enforce duty-free entry laws with respect to 
certain imported commodities, thereby requiring the collection of 
revenues not oth


[[Page 902]]

(Oct. 4, 1989, p. 23261); (3) an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code 
relating to the tax deductibility of pension fund contributions (Oct. 4, 
1989, p. 23262); (4) a fee incident to termination of employee benefit 
plans, with receipts to be applied to enforcement and administration of 
plans remaining with the system (Oct. 4, 1989, p. 23262); and (5) a fee 
incident to the filing of various pension benefit plan reports required 
by law, with revenues to be transferred to the Department of Labor for 
the enforcement of that law (Oct. 5, 1989, p. 23328).
  In the 99th Congress, the following provisions in a reconciliation 
bill reported from the Committee on the Budget were ruled out as tax 
measures not reported from the Committee on Ways and Means: (1) a 
recommendation from the Committee on Education and Labor excluding 
certain interest on obligations from the Student Loan Marketing 
Association from application of the Internal Revenue Code, affecting 
interest deductions against income taxes (Oct. 24, 1985, pp. 28776, 
28827); and (2) a recommendation from the Committee on Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries expanding tax benefits available to shipowners through a 
capital construction fund (Oct. 24, 1985, pp. 28802, 28827). In the 
101st Congress, the following provisions in an omnibus budget 
reconciliation bill were ruled out: (1) a fee per passenger on cruise 
vessels, with revenues credited as proprietary receipts of the Coast 
Guard to be used for port safety, security, navigation, and 
antiterrorism activities (Oct. 4, 1989, p. 23260); (2) a per acre 
``ocean protection fee'' on oil and gas leaseholdings in the Outer 
Continental Shelf, with receipts to be used to offset costs of various 
ocean protection programs



[[Page 903]]


Passage of tax rate increases-
  To a bill reported from the Committee on Education and Labor 
authorizing financial assistance to unemployed individuals for 
employment opportunities, an amendment providing instead for tax 
incentives to stimulate employment was held to be a tax measure in 
violation of this paragraph (Sept. 21, 1983, p. 25145). A provision in a 
bill reported from the Committee on Foreign Affairs imposing a uniform 
fee at ports of entry to be collected by the Customs Service as a 
condition of importation of a commodity was held to constitute a tariff 
within the meaning of this paragraph (June 4, 1985, p. 14009), as was an 
amendment to a bill reported from that committee amending the tariff 
schedules to deny ``most favored nation'' trade treatment to a certain 
nation (July 11, 1985, p. 18590). A provision in a general appropriation 
bill creating a new tariff classification was held to constitute a 
tariff under this paragraph (June 15, 1994, p. 13103). A motion to 
concur in a Senate amendment constituting a tariff measure (imposing an 
import ban on certain dutiable goods) to a bill reported by a committee 
not having tariff jurisdiction was ruled out under this paragraph (Sept. 
30, 1988, p. 27316). A proposal to increase a fee incident to the filing 
of a securities registration statement, with the proceeds to be 
deposited in the general fund of the Treasury as offsetting receipts, 
was held to constitute a tax within the meaning of this paragraph 
because the amount of revenue derived and the manner of its deposit 
indicated a purpose to defray costs of Government, generally (Oct. 23, 
1990, p. 32650). To a bill reported by the Committee on Transportation 
and Infrastructure, an amendment increasing a user fee was ruled out as 
a tax measure where the fee overcollected to offset a reduction in 
another fee, thus attenuating the relationship between the amount of the 
fee and the cost of the Government activity for which it was assessed 
(May 9, 1995, p. 12180). To a bill reported by the Committee on Science, 
Space, and Technology, an amendment proposing sundry changes in the 
Federal income tax by direct amendments to the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 was ruled out of order as carrying a tax measure in violation of 
this paragraph (Sept. 16, 1992, p. 25205), as were amendments to a 
general appropriation bill proposing in part to temper recently enacted 
reductions in rates of tax on income (July 10, 2003, p. 17535, p. 
17576).




1067. Threefifths vote to increase income tax rates.

  (b)  A 
bill or joint resolution, amendment, or conference report carrying a 
Federal income tax rate increase may not be considered as passed or 
agreed to unless so determined by a vote of not less than three-fifths 
of the Members voting, a quorum being present. In this paragraph the 
term ``Federal income tax rate increase'' means any amendment to 
subsection (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) of section 1, or to section 11(b) 
or 55(b), of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, that imposes a new 
percentage as a rate of tax and thereby increases the amount of tax 
imposed by any such section.




[[Page 904]]


Consideration of retroactive tax rate increases
  This provision was added in the 104th Congress (sec. 106(a), H. Res. 
6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 463), and in the 105th Congress it was amended to 
clarify the definition of ``Federal income tax rate increase'' as 
limited to a specific amendment to one of the named subsections (H. Res. 
5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. 121). Before the House recodified its rules in the 
106th Congress, this provision was found in former clause 5(c) of rule 
XXI (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. 47). On one occasion the Chair held 
that a provision repealing a ceiling on total tax liability attributable 
to a net capital gain was not subject to the original version of this 
paragraph (Apr. 5, 1995, p. 10614). The modified version of this 
paragraph comprises three elements (an amendment to a pertinent section 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, the imposition of a new rate of 
tax thereunder, and an increase in the amount of tax thereby imposed) 
and a measure that does not fulfill even the first element does not 
carry a Federal income tax rate increase (Jan. 18, 2007, pp. 1621, 1622 
(sustained by tabling of appeal); Mar. 3, 2011, pp. 3173, 3174). This 
paragraph does not apply to a concurrent resolution (Speaker Gingrich, 
May 18, 1995, p. 13499). A resolution reported from the Committee on 
Rules rendering this paragraph inapplicable may be adopted by majority 
vote (Oct. 26, 1995, p. 29477). The Speaker rules on the applicability 
of this paragraph only pending the question of final passage of a 
measure alleged to carry a Federal income tax rate increase, and not in 
advance upon adoption of a special order rendering this paragraph 
inapplicable (Oct. 26, 1995, p. 29477).



1068. Prohibition against retroactive income tax rate 
increase.

  (c)  It shall not be in order to consider a bill, joint 
resolution, amendment, or conference report carrying a retroactive 
Federal income tax rate increase. In this paragraph--


      (1) the term ``Federal income tax rate increase'' means any 
amendment to subsection (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) of section 1, or to 
section 11(b) or 55(b), of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, that 
imposes a new percentage as a rate of tax and thereby increases the 
amount of tax imposed by any such section; and


      (2) a Federal income tax rate increase is retroactive if it 
applies to a period beginning before the enactment of the provision.


Designation of public works
  This paragraph was added in the 104th Congress (sec. 106(b), H. Res. 
6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 463), and it was amended in the 105th Congress to 
clarify the definition of ``Federal income tax rate increase'' (H. Res. 
5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. 121). Before the House recodified its rules in the 
106th Congress, this provision was found in former clause 5(d) of rule 
XXI (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. 47).




1068a. Restriction on designation of public works.

  6.  It 
shall not be in order to consider a bill, joint resolution, amendment, 
or conference report that provides for the designation or redesignation 
of a public work in honor of an individual then serving as a Member, 
Delegate, Resident Commissioner, or Senator.




 end segment .011  deg.
[[Page 905]]


  This clause was adopted in the 107th Congress (sec. 2(q), H. Res. 5, 
Jan. 3, 2001, p. 25).




Sec. 1068b. Restriction on reconciliation directives.

    7. It 
shall not be in order to consider a concurrent resolution on the budget, 
or an amendment thereto, or a conference report thereon that contains 
reconciliation directives under section 310 of the Congressional Budget 
Act of 1974 that specify changes in law such that the reconciliation 
legislation reported pursuant to such directives would cause an increase 
in net direct spending (as such term is defined in clause 10) for the 
period covered by such concurrent resolution.



  This clause was added in the 110th Congress (sec. 402, H. Res. 6, Jan. 
4, 2007, p. 19 (adopted Jan. 5, 2007)), amended in the 111th Congress to 
reflect a change in the time periods in clause 10(a)(1) (sec. 2(j), H. 
Res. 5, Jan. 6, 2009, p. 7), and rewritten in the 112th Congress to 
focus on an increase in direct spending instead of a reduction in the 
surplus or an increase in the deficit (sec. 2(d)(5), H. Res. 5, Jan. 5, 
2011, p. 80).



Sec. 1068c. Budget Act points of order.

    8. With respect to 
measures considered pursuant to a special order of business, points of 
order under title III of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 shall 
operate without regard to whether the measure concerned has been 
reported from committee. Such points of order shall operate with respect 
to (as the case may be)--


      (a) the form of a measure recommended by the reporting committee 
where the statute uses the term ``as reported'' (in the case of a 
measure that has been so reported);


[[Page 906]]

      (b) the form of the measure made in order as an original bill or 
joint resolution for the purpose of amendment; or


      (c) the form of the measure on which the previous question is 
ordered directly to passage.


  This clause was added in the 110th Congress (sec. 403, H. Res. 6, Jan. 
4, 2007, p. 19 (adopted Jan. 5, 2007)).

  9. (a) It shall not be in order to consider--



Sec. 1068d. Congressional earmarks.

      (1) a  bill or joint 
resolution reported by a committee unless the report includes a list of 
congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, and limited tariff 
benefits in the bill or in the report (and the name of any Member, 
Delegate, or Resident Commissioner who submitted a request to the 
committee for each respective item included in such list) or a statement 
that the proposition contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax 
benefits, or limited tariff benefits;


      (2) a bill or joint resolution not reported by a committee unless 
the chair of each committee of initial referral has caused a list of 
congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, and limited tariff 
benefits in the bill (and the name of any Member, Delegate, or Resident 
Commissioner who submitted a request to the committee for each 
respective item included in such list) or a statement that the 
proposition contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or 
limited tariff benefits to be printed in the Congressional Record prior 
to its consideration;


[[Page 907]]

mittee of initial referral as designated in a report of the Committee on 
Rules to accompany a resolution prescribing a special order of business 
unless the proponent has caused a list of congressional earmarks, 
limited tax benefits, and limited tariff benefits in the amendment (and 
the name of any Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner who submitted 
a request to the proponent for each respective item included in such 
list) or a statement that the proposition contains no congressional 
earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits to be printed 
in the Congressional Record prior to its consideration; or
      (3) an amendment to a bill or joint resolution to be offered at 
the outset of its consideration for amendment by a member of a com

      (4) a conference report to accompany a bill or joint resolution 
unless the joint explanatory statement prepared by the managers on the 
part of the House and the managers on the part of the Senate includes a 
list of congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, and limited tariff 
benefits in the conference report or joint statement (and the name of 
any Member, Delegate, Resident Commissioner, or Senator who submitted a 
request to the House or Senate committees of jurisdiction for each 
respective item included in such list) or a statement that the 
proposition contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or 
limited tariff benefits.


[[Page 908]]

of the House and the managers on the part of the Senate includes--
  (b) It shall not be in order to consider a conference report to 
accompany a regular general appropriation bill unless the joint 
explanatory statement prepared by the managers on the part

      (1) a list of congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, and 
limited tariff benefits in the conference report or joint statement (and 
the name of any Member, Delegate, Resident Commissioner, or Senator who 
submitted a request to the House or Senate committees of jurisdiction 
for each respective item included in such list) that were neither 
committed to the conference committee by either House nor in a report of 
a committee of either House on such bill or on a companion measure; or

      (2) a statement that the proposition contains no such 
congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff 
benefits.

  (c) It shall not be in order to consider a rule or order that waives 
the application of paragraph (a) or (b). As disposition of a point of 
order under this paragraph or paragraph (b), the Chair shall put the 
question of consideration with respect to the rule or order or 
conference report, as applicable. The question of consideration shall be 
debatable for 10 minutes by the Member initiating the point of order and 
for 10 minutes by an opponent, but shall otherwise be decided without 
intervening motion except one that the House adjourn.


[[Page 909]]

paragraph (a) or a statement that the proposition contains no 
congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff 
benefits.
  (d) In order to be cognizable by the Chair, a point of order raised 
under paragraph (a) may be based only on the failure of a report, 
submission to the Congressional Record, or joint explanatory statement 
to include a list required by

  (e) For the purpose of this clause, the term ``congressional earmark'' 
means a provision or report language included primarily at the request 
of a Member, Delegate, Resident Commissioner, or Senator providing, 
authorizing or recommending a specific amount of discretionary budget 
authority, credit authority, or other spending authority for a contract, 
loan, loan guarantee, grant, loan authority, or other expenditure with 
or to an entity, or targeted to a specific State, locality or 
Congressional district, other than through a statutory or administrative 
formula-driven or competitive award process.

  (f) For the purpose of this clause, the term ``limited tax benefit'' 
means--

      (1) any revenue-losing provision that--

          (A) provides a Federal tax deduction, credit, exclusion, or 
preference to 10 or fewer beneficiaries under the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986, and

          (B) contains eligibility criteria that are not uniform in 
application with respect to potential beneficiaries of such provision; 
or

      (2) any Federal tax provision which provides one beneficiary 
temporary or permanent transition relief from a change to the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986.


[[Page 910]]

United States in a manner that benefits 10 or fewer entities.

  (g) For the purpose of this clause, the term ``limited tariff 
benefit'' means a provision modifying the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of 
the

  This clause was added in the 110th Congress (sec. 404, H. Res. 6, Jan. 
4, 2007, p. 19 (adopted Jan. 5, 2007)), a similar point of order having 
operated during part of the 109th Congress (H. Res. 1000, Sept. 14, 
2006, p. 18316). Paragraph (b) was added in the 111th Congress (and 
subsequent paragraphs redesignated) (sec. 2(i), H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 2009, 
p. 7), a similar point of order having operated during part of the 110th 
Congress (H. Res. 491, June 18, 2007, p. 16163). A clarifying change to 
paragraph (b)(2) was made during the 111th Congress (sec. 2, H. Res. 
544, June 16, 2009, p. 15281). A gender-based reference was eliminated 
in the 111th Congress (sec. 2(l), H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 2009, p. 7).

  A point of order under this clause does not lie against an unreported 
measure where the chair of the committee of initial referral has printed 
in the Record a statement that the measure contains no congressional 
earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits (Jan. 31, 
2007, pp. 2737, 2738 (sustained by tabling of appeal)), or against a 
reported measure where the committee report contains such a statement 
(May 10, 2007, pp. 12190, 12191; May 23, 2007, p. 13686). Paragraph (d) 
requires that a point of order under this clause be predicated only on 
the absence of a complying statement, and does not contemplate a 
question of order relating to the content of such statement (May 10, 
2007, p. 12191). A point of order under this clause is untimely after 
consideration has begun (Mar. 23, 2007, pp. 7420, 7423). Because 
paragraph (a) does not apply to a Senate amendment or an amendment 
considered as adopted pursuant to a special order of business, a rule 
waiving all points of order against a motion to dispose of a Senate 
amendment (Sept. 25, 2007, p. 25434 (sustained by tabling of appeal)) or 
a rule effecting a ``self-executing'' amendment (Sept. 27, 2007, p. 
25723) has no tendency to waive the applicability of paragraph (a) 
within the meaning of paragraph (c). After a point of order under 
paragraph (a)(1) is sustained against consideration of a bill, a 
committee may file a supplemental report pursuant to clause 3(a)(2) of 
rule XIII to correct a technical error in the depiction of a bill number 
in the portion of a committee report regarding disclosure under this 
clause (July 30, 2010, p. 14834).


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[[Page 911]]


  Debate on the point of order is on the question of considering the 
measure that is the subject of the point of order (May 14, 2008, p. 
9053). A point of order under both this clause and section 426 of the 
Congressional Budget Act, respectively, may be raised against a special 
order of business (May 14, 2008, pp. 9050, 9052; Jan. 28, 2014, p. _; 
May 21, 2014, p. _). A manager of a measure who controls time for debate 
against the point of order that is to be resolved by a question of 
consideration is entitled to close debate (Mar. 21, 2010, p. 4105).



Sec. 1068f. Cutasyougo point of order.

    10. (a)(1) Except as 
provided in paragraphs (b) and (c), it shall not be in order to consider 
a bill or joint resolution, or an amendment thereto or a conference 
report thereon, if the provisions of such measure have the net effect of 
increasing mandatory spending for the period of either--


      (A) the current year, the budget year, and the four fiscal years 
following that budget year; or

      (B) the current year, the budget year, and the nine fiscal years 
following that budget year.

  (2) For the purpose of this clause, the terms ``budget year'' and 
``current year'' have the meanings specified in section 250 of the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, and the term 
``mandatory spending'' has the meaning of ``direct spending'' specified 
in such section 250 except that such term shall also include provisions 
in appropriation Acts that make outyear modifications to substantive law 
as described in section 3(4)(C) of the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 
2010.


[[Page 912]]

  (b) If a bill or joint resolution, or an amendment thereto, is 
considered pursuant to a special order of the House directing the Clerk 
to add as new matter at the end of such bill or joint resolution the 
entire text of a separate measure or measures as passed by the House, 
the new matter proposed to be added shall be included in the evaluation 
under paragraph (a) of the bill, joint resolution, or amendment.

  (c)(1) Except as provided in subparagraph (2), the evaluation under 
paragraph (a) shall exclude a provision expressly designated as an 
emergency for the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, in the case of a 
point of order under this clause against consideration of--

      (A) a bill or joint resolution;

      (B) an amendment made in order as original text by a special order 
of business;

      (C) a conference report; or

      (D) an amendment between the Houses.


  (2) In the case of an amendment (other than one specified in 
subparagraph (1)) to a bill or joint resolution, the evaluation under 
paragraph (a) shall give no cognizance to any designation of emergency.


-  For the <> 112th 
Congress, the House established a point of order against consideration 
of a measure increasing mandatory spending above a certain threshold 
over four 10-fiscal-year periods (sec. 3(g) of H. Res. 5, Jan. 5, 2011, 
p. 80). A similar provision has been carried in concurrent resolutions 
on the budget (e.g., sec. 3101, S. Con. Res. 11, 114th Cong.).

---
[[Page 913]]


  Clause 10 was added in the 110th Congress (sec. 405, H. Res. 6, Jan. 
4, 2007, p. 19 (adopted Jan. 5, 2007)) and amended in the 111th Congress 
(sec. 2(j), H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 2009, p. 7; sec. 5, H. Res. 1500, July 1, 
2010, p. 12572). In its original form it addressed increases in the 
deficit or surplus caused by changes in revenue and direct spending. It 
was changed to its present form in the 112th Congress (sec. 2(d), H. 
Res. 5, Jan. 5, 2011, p. 80). The Chair is authoritatively guided by 
estimates from the chair of the Committee on the Budget whether the net 
effect of an amendment increases mandatory spending as compared to the 
proposition to which offered (e.g., Jan. 26, 2011, p. 920; Mar. 3, 2011, 
pp. 3171, 3172 (sustained by tabling of appeal); Mar. 10, 2011, p. 3765; 
Mar. 11, 2011, p. 3829). A point of order against a bill under this 
clause is not timely pending the question of engrossment and third 
reading (Mar. 30, 2011, pp. 4715, 4716).




Sec. 1068i. Former payasyougo point of 
order.

  Under the  former clause 10, the Chair was authoritatively guided by 
estimates from the Committee on the Budget as to the net effect of a 
provision on the relevant surplus or deficit (Dec. 12, 2007, p. 34065). 
Spending provided by appropriation acts did not constitute ``direct 
spending'' (May 15, 2008, p. 9229). For a complete recitation of 
precedents under the former clause, see Sec. 1068e of the House Rules 
and Manual for the 111th Congress (H. Doc. 110-162).





Sec. 1068j. Availability of introduced measures.

    11. It 
shall not be in order to consider a bill or joint resolution which has 
not been reported by a committee until the third calendar day (excluding 
Saturdays, Sundays, or legal holidays except when the House is in 
session on such a day) on which such measure has been available to 
Members, Delegates, and the Resident Commissioner.



 segment .012 -- rule XXII  deg.

  This clause was added in the 112th Congress (sec. 2(b), H. Res. 5, 
Jan. 5, 2011, p. 80). It applies to bills and joint resolutions only 
(Jan. 7, 2011, p. 228) and is predicated on a number of days (not hours) 
of availability, including electronic availability in consonance with 
clause 3 of rule XXIX (Mar. 17, 2011, pp. 4373, 4374). A point of order 
under this clause is not ripe until the measure in question is called up 
for consideration (Mar. 17, 2011, p. 4373).