    [Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 112th Congress]
    [112nd Congress]
    [House Document 111-157]
    [Jeffersons Manual of ParliamentaryPractice]
    [Pages 174-195]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

    <>
    When the Speaker is seated in his chair, every member is to sit in his
    place. Scob., 6; Grey, 403.

                           sec. xvii--order in debate

      In the House the decorum of Members is regulated by rule XVII; and
    this provision of the parliamentary law is practically obsolete.

    [[Page 175]]

    but to the Speaker, who calls him by his name,
    that the House may take notice who it is that speaks. Scob., 6; D'Ewes,
    487, col. 1; 2 Hats., 77; 4 Grey, 66; 8 Grey, 108. But Members who are
    indisposed may be indulged to speak sitting. 2 Hats., 75, 77; 1 Grey,
    143.

    Sec. 354. Procedure of the Member in seeking
    recognition.

      When  any Member means to speak, he is to stand up in his
    place, uncovered, and to address himself, not to the House, or any
    particular Member,

    <>   When a Member stands up to
    speak, no question is to be put, but he is to be heard unless the House
    overrule him. 4 Grey, 390; 5 Grey, 6, 143.

      This provision has been superseded by clause 1 of rule XVII. The
    Speaker, moreover, calls the Member, not by name, but as ``the gentleman
    or gentlewoman from __,'' (naming the State). As long ago as 1832, at
    least, a Member was not required to rise from his own particular seat
    because seats are no longer assigned (V, 4979, footnote).

      Except as provided in clause 4 of rule XVII, no question is put as to
    the right of a Member to the floor.

    Sec. 356. The parliamentary law as to recognition by the
    Speaker.

      If  two or more rise to speak nearly together, the Speaker
    determines who was first up, and calls him by name, whereupon he
    proceeds, unless he voluntarily sits down and gives way to the other.
    But sometimes the House does not acquiesce in the Speaker's decision, in
    which case the question is put, ``which Member was first up?'' 2 Hats.,
    76; Scob., 7; D'Ewes, 434, col. 1, 2.

      In the Senate of the United States the President's decision is without
    appeal.

    [[Page 176]]

      In the House recognition by the Chair is governed by clause 2 of rule
    XVII and the practice thereunder. There has been no appeal from a
    decision by the Speaker on a question of recognition since 1881, on
    which occasion Speaker Randall stated that the power of recognition is
    ``just as absolute in the Chair as the judgment of the Supreme Court of
    the United States is absolute as to the interpretation of the law'' (II,
    1425-1428), and in the later practice no appeal is permitted (VIII,
    2429, 2646, 2762).

    Sec. 357. Right of the Member to be heard a second
    time.

      No  man may speak more than once on the same bill on the same
    day; or even on another day, if the debate be adjourned. But if it be
    read more than once in the same day, he may speak once at every reading.
    Co., 12, 115; Hakew., 148; Scob., 58; 2 Hats., 75. Even a change of
    opinion does not give a right to be heard a second time. Smyth's Comw.
    L., 2, c. 3; Arcan, Parl., 17.

      But he may be permitted to speak again to clear a matter of fact, 3
    Grey, 357, 416; or merely to explain himself, 2 Hats., 73, in some
    material part of his speech, Ib., 75; or to the manner or words of the
    question, keeping himself to that only, and not traveling into the
    merits of it, Memorials in Hakew., 29; or to the orders of the House, if
    they be transgressed, keeping within that line, and not falling into the
    matter itself. Mem. Hakew., 30, 31.

      The House has modified the parliamentary law as to a Member's right to
    speak a second time by clause 3 of rule XVII and by permitting a Member
    controlling time in debate to yield to another more than once (Apr. 5,
    2000, p. 4497; Oct. 18, 2007, p. 27575). In ordinary practice rule XVII
    is not rigidly enforced, and Members find little difficulty in making
    such explanations as are contemplated by the parliamentary law.

    [[Page 177]]

    within his knowledge; then he may, with their leave, state the
    matter of fact. 3 Grey, 38.

    Sec. 358. Participation of the Speaker in debate.

      But  if the
    Speaker rise to speak, the Member standing up ought to sit down, that he
    may be first heard. Town., col. 205; Hale Parl., 133; Mem. in Hakew.,
    30, 31. Nevertheless, though the Speaker may of right speak to matters
    of order, and be first heard, he is restrained from speaking on any
    other subject, except where the House have occasion for facts

      This provision is usually observed in the practice of the House only
    with regard to the conduct of the Speaker when in the chair. In several
    instances the Speaker has been permitted by the House to make a
    statement from the chair, as in a case wherein his past conduct had been
    criticized (II, 1369), in a case wherein there had been unusual
    occurrences in the joint session to count the electoral vote (II, 1372),
    and in a matter relating to a contest for the seat of the Speaker as a
    Member (II, 1360). In rare instances the Speaker has made brief
    explanations from the chair without asking the assent of the House (II,
    1373, 1374). Speakers have called others to the chair and participated
    in debate, usually without asking consent of the House (II, 1360, 1367,
    footnote, 1368, 1371; III, 1950), and in one case a Speaker on the floor
    debated a point of order that the Speaker pro tempore was to decide (V,
    6097). In rare instances Speakers have left the chair to make motions on
    the floor (II, 1367, footnote). Speakers may participate in debate in
    Committee of the Whole, although the privilege was rarely exercised in
    early practice (II, 1367, footnote).

    Sec. 359. Impertinent, superfluous, or tedious
    speaking.

      No  one is to speak impertinently or beside the question,
    superfluous, or tediously. Scob., 31, 33; 2 Hats., 166, 168; Hale Parl.,
    133.

      The House, by clause 1 of rule XVII, provides that remarks must be
    confined to the question under debate, but neither by rule nor practice
    has the House suppressed superfluous or tedious speaking, its hour rule
    (clause 2 of rule XVII) being a sufficient safeguard in this respect.

    Sec. 360. Language reflecting on the House.

      No  person is to
    use indecent language against the proceedings of the House; no prior
    determination of which is to be reflected on by any Member, unless he
    means to conclude with a motion to rescind it. 2 Hats., 169, 170;
    Rushw., p. 3, v. 1, fol. 42. But while a proposition under consideration
    is still in fieri, though it has even been reported by a committee,
    reflections on it are no reflections on the House. 9 Grey, 508.

    [[Page 178]]

    whether present or past (V, 5132-5138). A Member who had
    used offensive words against the character of the House, and who
    declined to explain, was censured (II, 1247). Words impeaching the
    loyalty of a portion of the membership have also been ruled out (V,
    5139). Where a Member reiterated on the floor certain published charges
    against the House, action was taken, although other business had
    intervened, the question being considered one of privilege (III, 2637).
    It has been held inappropriate and not in order in debate to refer to
    the proceedings of a committee except such as have been formally
    reported to the House (V, 5080-5083; VIII, 2269, 2485-2493; June 24,
    1958, pp. 12120, 12122), but this rule does not apply to the proceedings
    of a committee of a previous Congress (Feb. 2, 1914, p. 2782), and the
    rationale for this limitation on debate is in part obsolete under the
    modern practice of the House insofar as the doctrine is applied to open
    committee meetings and hearings.

      In the practice of the House it has been held out of order in debate
    to cast reflections on either the House or its membership or its
    decisions,

    Sec. 361. Personalities in debate forbidden.

      No  person, in
    speaking, is to mention a Member then present by his name, but to
    describe him by his seat in the House, or who spoke last, or on the
    other side of the question, &c., Mem. in Hakew., 3; Smyth's Comw., L. 2,
    c. 3; nor to digress from the matter to fall upon the person, Scob., 31;
    Hale Parl., 133; 2 Hats., 166, by speaking reviling, nipping, or
    unmannerly words against a particular Member. Smyth's Comw., L. 2, c. 3.
    * * *

      In the practice of the House, a Member is not permitted to refer to
    another Member by name (V, 5144; VIII, 2526, 2529, 2536), or to address
    a Member in the second person (V, 5140-5143; VI, 600; VIII, 2529). The
    proper reference to another Member is ``the gentleman or gentlewoman
    from __,'' (naming the Member's State) (June 14, 1978, p. 17615; July
    21, 1982, p. 17314). A mere reference to a Member's voting record does
    not form a basis for a point of order against those remarks (June 13,
    2002, p. 10226, p. 10232).

      By rule of the House (clause 1 of rule XVII), as well as by
    parliamentary law, personalities are forbidden (V, 4979, 5145, 5163,
    5169), whether against the Member in the Member's capacity as
    Representative or otherwise (V, 5152, 5153), even if the references may
    be relevant to the pending question (Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25778). The
    House has censured a Member for gross personalities (II, 1251). The
    Chair may intervene to prevent improper references if it is evident that
    a particular Member is being described (Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27077).

    [[Page 179]]

    another Member of deceit engages in personality, merely
    accusing another Member of making a mistake does not (Oct. 26, 2000, p.
    24921).
      The Chair does not rule on the veracity of a statement made by a
    Member in debate (Apr. 9, 1997, p. 4926; Sept. 26, 2008, p. _). Although
    accusing

      Clause 1 of rule XVII has been held to proscribe: (1) referring to an
    identifiable group of sitting Members as having committed a crime (e.g.,
    stealing an election or obstructing justice) (Feb. 27, 1985, p. 3898;
    Speaker Wright, Mar. 21, 1989, p. 5016; May 19, 1998, p. 9738; July 15,
    2004, p. 15859); (2) referring in a personally critical manner to the
    political tactics of the Speaker or other Members (June 25, 1981, p.
    14056); (3) referring to a particular Member of the House in a
    derogatory fashion (Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27077); (4) characterizing a Member
    as ``the most impolite Member'' (June 27, 1996, p. 15915) or ``mean-
    spirited'' (May 13, 1992, p. 11235); (5) questioning the integrity of a
    Member (July 25, 1996, p. 19170); (6) denunciating the spirit in which a
    Member had spoken (V, 6981); (7) using a Member's surname as though an
    adjective for a word of ridicule (June 13, 2002, p. 10232; May 13, 2008,
    p. _); (8) questioning the decency of another Member (Mar. 21, 2007, p.
    7074).

      A distinction has been drawn between general language, which
    characterizes a measure or the political motivations behind a measure,
    and personalities (V, 5153, 5163, 5169). Although remarks in debate may
    not include personal attacks against a Member or an identifiable group
    of Members, they may address political motivations for legislative
    positions (Jan. 24, 1995, p. 2214; Mar. 8, 1995, pp. 7307, 7308; Nov.
    17, 1995, p. 33832; June 13, 1996, p. 14043; July 16, 2008, p. _). For
    example, references to ``down-in-the-dirt gutter politics'' and ``you
    people are going to pay'' were held not to be personal references (Nov.
    14, 1995, p. 32388). Similarly, characterizing a pending measure as a
    ``patently petty political terrorist tactic'' was held in order as a
    reference to the pending measure rather than to the motive or character
    of the measure's proponent (Nov. 9, 1995, p. 31413). The Chair also has
    held in order a general reference that ``big donors'' receive ``access
    to leadership power and decisions'' because the reference did not
    identify a specific Member as engaging in an improper quid pro quo (Apr.
    9, 1997, p. 4926). A general statement seeming to invoke racial
    stereotypes but not in a context so inflammatory as to constitute a
    breach of decorum, was held not unparliamentary (Apr. 9, 2003, p. 9005
    (sustained by tabling of appeal)). Likewise, a general statement linking
    politics with armed conflict in an impersonal way was held not to breach
    decorum (Oct. 18, 2007, p. 27578).

    [[Page 180]]

      A Member may not read in debate extraneous material critical of
    another Member that would be improper if spoken in the Member's own
    words (May 25, 1995, pp. 14436, 14437; Sept. 12, 1996, p. 22898). Thus,
    words in a telegram read in debate that repudiated the ``lies and half-
    truths'' of a House committee report were ruled out of order as
    reflecting on the integrity of committee members (June 16, 1947, p.
    7065), and unparliamentary references in debate to newspaper accounts
    used in support of a Member's personal criticism of another Member were
    similarly ruled out of order (Feb. 25, 1985, p. 3346).

      A Member should refrain from references in debate to the official
    conduct of a Member if such conduct is not the subject then pending
    before the House by way of either a report of the Committee on Ethics or
    another question of the privileges of the House (see, e.g., July 24,
    1990, p. 18917; Mar. 19, 1992, p. 6078; May 25, 1995, pp. 14434-37;
    Sept. 19, 1995, pp. 25454, 25455; Apr. 27, 2005, p. 8049); and, although
    such references are ordinarily enforced by the Chair in response to a
    point of order, the Chair may take the initiative in order to maintain
    proper decorum (Apr. 1, 1992, p. 7899; June 17, 2004, p. 12748). This
    stricture also precludes a Member from reciting news articles discussing
    a Member's conduct (Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24318), reciting the content of a
    previously tabled resolution raising a question of the privileges of the
    House (Nov. 17, 1995, p. 33853; Sept. 19, 1996, p. 23855), or even
    referring to a Member's conduct by mere insinuation (Sept. 12, 1996, p.
    22899). Notice of an intention to offer a resolution as a question of
    the privileges of the House under rule IX does not render a resolution
    ``pending'' and thereby permit references to conduct of a Member
    proposed to be addressed therein (Sept. 19, 1996, p. 23811).

      The stricture against references to a Member's conduct not then
    pending before the House applies to the conduct of all sitting Members
    (Apr. 1, 1992, p. 7899), including conduct that has previously been
    resolved by the Committee on Ethics or the House (Sept. 24, 1996, pp.
    24483, 24485; Apr. 17, 1997, p. 5831). This stricture does not apply to
    the conduct of a former Member, provided the reference is not made in an
    attempt to compare the conduct of a former Member with the conduct of a
    sitting Member (Sept. 20, 1995, pp. 25825, 25826; Sept. 12, 1996, pp.
    22900, 22901).

      Debate on a pending privileged resolution recommending disciplinary
    action against a Member may necessarily involve personalities. However,
    clause 1 of rule XVII still prohibits the use of language that is
    personally abusive (see, e.g., July 31, 1979, p. 21584; Jan. 21, 1997,
    p. 393) and the Chair may take the initiative to prevent violations of
    the rule (July 24, 2002, p. 14300). Furthermore, during the actual
    pendency of such a resolution, a Member may discuss a prior case
    reported to the House by the Committee on Ethics for the purpose of
    comparing the severity of the sanction recommended in that case with the
    severity of the sanction recommended in the pending case, provided that
    the Member does not identify, or discuss the details of the past conduct
    of, a sitting Member (Dec. 18, 1987, p. 36271).

    [[Page 181]]

    24, 1996, p. 24317); (3) to an investigation
    undertaken by the committee, including suggestion of a course of action
    (Mar. 3, 1995, p. 6715; Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24317; Sept. 28, 1996, p.
    25778) or advocacy of an interim status report by the committee (Sept.
    12, 1996, p. 22900; Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25778).
      In addition to the prohibition against addressing a Member's conduct
    when it is not actually pending before the House, the Speaker has
    advised that Members should refrain from references in debate (1) to the
    motivations of a Member who filed a complaint before the Committee on
    Standards of Official Conduct (now Ethics) (June 15, 1988, p. 14623;
    July 6, 1988, p. 16630; Mar. 22, 1989, p. 5130; May 2, 1989, p. 7735;
    Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27077); (2) to personal criticism of a member of the
    committee (Apr. 1, 1992, p. 7899; Mar. 3, 1995, p. 6715; Sept. 19, 1996,
    p. 23812; Sept.

      For precedents applicable to references in debate to the President,
    see Sec. 370, infra, or Members of the Senate, see Sec. 371, infra.

    Sec. 362. Criticism of the Speaker.

      Complaint  of the conduct
    of the Speaker should be presented directly for the action of the House
    and not by way of debate on other matters (V, 5188). In a case wherein a
    Member used words insulting to the Speaker the House on a subsequent
    day, and after other business had intervened, censured the offender (II,
    1248). In such a case the Speaker would ordinarily leave the chair while
    action should be taken by the House (II, 1366; V, 5188; VI, 565). In the
    104th Congress the Chair reaffirmed that it is not in order to speak
    disrespectfully of the Speaker, and that under the precedents the
    sanctions for such violations transcend the ordinary requirements for
    timeliness of challenges (II, 1248; Jan. 4, 1995, p. 552; Jan. 19, 1995,
    p. 1599). It is not in order to arraign the personal conduct of the
    Speaker (Jan. 18, 1995, p. 1441; Jan. 19, 1995, p. 1601). For example,
    it is not in order to charge dishonesty or disregard of the rules (July
    11, 1985, p. 18550), to reflect on his patriotism by accusing him of
    ``kowtowing'' to persons who would desecrate the flag (June 20, 1990, p.
    14877), to refer to him as a ``crybaby'' (Nov. 16, 1995, p. 33394), or
    to refer to official conduct of the Speaker that has previously been
    resolved by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct (now Ethics)
    or the House (Apr. 17, 1997, p. 5831). The Chair may take the initiative
    to admonish Members for references in debate that disparage the Speaker
    (June 25, 1981, p. 14056; Mar. 22, 1996, p. 6077; May 13, 2008, p. _).
    Debate on a resolution authorizing the Speaker to entertain motions to
    suspend the rules may not engage in personality by discussing the
    official conduct of the Speaker, even if possibly relevant to the
    question of empowerment of the Speaker (Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24485).

    Sec. 363. Motives of Members not to be arraigned.

      * * *  The
    consequences of a measure may be reprobated in strong terms; but to
    arraign the motives of those who propose to advocate it is a
    personality, and against order. Qui digreditur a materia ad personam,
    Mr. Speaker ought to suppress. Ord. Com., 1604, Apr. 19.

    [[Page 182]]

    5162). However, remarks in debate may address political, but
    not personal, motivations for legislative positions (Jan. 24, 1995, p.
    2214; Mar. 8, 1995, pp. 7307, 7308; Nov. 17, 1995, p. 33832; June 13,
    1996, p. 14043) or for committee membership (July 10, 1995, pp. 18257-
    59). Accusing another Member of hypocrisy has been held not in order
    (July 24, 1979, p. 20380; Mar. 29, 1995, p. 9675), and characterizing
    the motivation of a Member in offering an amendment as deceptive and
    hypocritical was ruled out of order (June 12, 1979, p. 11461). A
    statement in debate that an amendment could only be demagogic or racist
    because only demagoguery or racism impelled such an amendment was ruled
    out of order as impugning the motives of the Member offering the
    amendment (Dec. 3, 1973, pp. 41270, 41271). However, debate
    characterizing a pending measure as a ``patently petty political
    terrorist tactic'' was held in order as directed at the pending measure
    rather than the motive or the character of its proponent (Nov. 9, 1995,
    p. 31413). Although in debate the assertion of one Member may be
    declared untrue by another, in so doing an intentional misrepresentation
    must not be implied (V, 5157-5160), and if stated or implied is
    censurable (II, 1305). A Member in debate having declared the words of
    another ``a base lie,'' censure was inflicted by the House on the
    offender (II, 1249).

      The arraignment of the motives of Members is not permitted (V, 5147-
    51; Dec. 13, 1973, p. 41270), and Speakers have intervened to prevent
    it, in the earlier practice preventing even mildest imputations (V,
    5161,

    Sec. 364. Disorder and interruptions during debate.

      No  one
    is to disturb another in his speech by hissing, coughing, spitting, 6
    Grey, 322; Scob., 8; D'Ewes, 332, col. 1, 640, col. 2, speaking or
    whispering to another, Scob., 6; D'Ewes, 487, col. 1; nor stand up to
    interrupt him, Town, col. 205; Mem. in Hakew., 31; nor to pass between
    the Speaker and the speaking Member, nor to go across the House, Scob.,
    6, or to walk up and down it, or to take books or papers from the table,
    or write there, 2 Hats., 171, p. 170.

    [[Page 183]]

    Chamber, including those in the well, so long as
    not crossing between the Member having the floor and the Chair (June 5,
    1998, p. 11170). The Chair may take the initiative in preserving order
    when a Member declining to yield in debate continues to be interrupted
    by another Member, may order that the interrupting Member's remarks not
    appear in the Record (July 26, 1984, p. 21247), and may admonish Members
    not to converse with a Member attempting to address the House (Feb. 21,
    1984, p. 2758), because it is not in order to engage in disruption while
    another is delivering remarks in debate (June 27, 1996, p. 15915). On
    the opening day of the 103d Congress, during the customary announcement
    of policies with respect to particular aspects of the legislative
    process, the Chair elaborated on the rules of order in debate with a
    general statement concerning decorum in the House (Jan. 5, 1993, p.
    105). Under this provision, the Chair may require a line of Members
    waiting to sign a discharge petition to proceed to the rostrum from the
    far right-hand aisle and require the line not to stand between the Chair
    and Members engaging in debate (Oct. 24, 1997, p. 23293). Hissing and
    jeering is not proper decorum in the House (May 21, 1998, p. 10282). For
    further discussion of interruptions in debate, see Sec. 946, infra.

      The House has, by clause 5 of rule XVII, prescribed certain rules of
    decorum differing somewhat from this provision of the parliamentary law,
    but supplemental to it rather than antagonistic. In one respect,
    however, the practice of the House differs from the apparent intent of
    the parliamentary law. In the House a Member may interrupt by addressing
    the Chair for permission of the Member speaking (V, 5006; VIII, 2465);
    but it is entirely within the discretion of the Member occupying the
    floor to determine when and by whom to be interrupted (V, 5007, 5008;
    VIII, 2463, 2465). There is no rule of the House requiring a Member
    having the floor to yield to another Member referred to during debate
    (Aug. 2, 1984, p. 22241). A Member may ask another to yield from any
    microphone in the

    Sec. 365. Parliamentary method of silencing a
    tedious Member.

      Nevertheless,  if a Member finds that it is not the inclination of
    the House to hear him, and that by conversation or any other noise they
    endeavor to drown his voice, it is his most prudent way to submit to the
    pleasure of the House, and sit down; for it scarcely ever happens that
    they are guilty of this piece of ill manners without sufficient reason,
    or inattention to a Member who says anything worth their hearing. 2
    Hats., 77, 78.

      In the House, where the previous question and hour rule of debate have
    been used for many years, the parliamentary method of suppressing a
    tedious Member has never been imported into the practice (V, 5445).

    [[Page 184]]

    then to be
    heard in exculpation, and to withdraw. Then the Speaker states the
    offense committed; and the House considers the degree of punishment they
    will inflict. 2 Hats., 167, 7, 8, 172.

    Sec. 366. The parliamentary law as to naming a disorderly
    Member.

      If  repeated calls do not produce order, the Speaker may call by
    his name any Member obstinately persisting in irregularity; whereupon
    the House may require the Member to withdraw. He is

      This provision of parliamentary law should be in conjunction with
    clause 4 of rule XVII, Sec. Sec. 960-961, infra, particularly as this
    provision relates to the ultimate authority of the House to determine
    whether a Member ignoring repeated calls to order should be permitted to
    proceed in order.

    Sec. 367. Proceedings in cases of assaults and
    affrays.

      For  instances of assaults and affrays in the House of Commons,
    and the proceedings thereon, see 1 Pet. Misc., 82; 3 Grey, 128; 4 Grey,
    328; 5 Grey, 382; 6 Grey, 254; 10 Grey, 8. Whenever warm words or an
    assault have passed between Members, the House, for the protection of
    their Members, requires them to declare in their places not to prosecute
    any quarrel, 3 Grey, 128, 293; 5 Grey, 280; or orders them to attend the
    Speaker, who is to accommodate their differences, and report to the
    House, 3 Grey, 419; and they are put under restraint if they refuse, or
    until they do. 9 Grey, 234, 312.

    [[Page 185]]

      In several instances assaults and affrays have occurred on the floor
    of the House. Sometimes the House has allowed these affairs to pass
    without notice, the Members concerned making apologies either personally
    or through other Members (II, 1658-1662). In other cases the House has
    exacted apologies (II, 1646-1651, 1657), or required the offending
    Members to pledge themselves before the House to keep the peace (II,
    1643). In case of an aggravated assault by one Member on another on the
    portico of the Capitol for words spoken in debate, the House censured
    the assailant and three other Members who had been present, armed, to
    prevent interference (II, 1655, 1656). Assaults or affrays in the
    Committee of the Whole are dealt with by the House (II, 1648-1651).

    Sec. 368. Parliamentary law as to taking down
    disorderly words.

      Disorderly  words are not to be noticed till the Member has
    finished his speech. 5 Grey, 356; 6 Grey, 60. Then the person objecting
    to them, and desiring them to be taken down by the Clerk at the table,
    must repeat them. The Speaker then may direct the Clerk to take them
    down in his minutes; but if he thinks them not disorderly, he delays the
    direction. If the call becomes pretty general, he orders the Clerk to
    take them down, as stated by the objecting Member. They are then a part
    of his minutes, and when read to the offending Member, he may deny they
    were his words, and the House must then decide by a question whether
    they are his words or not. Then the Member may justify them, or explain
    the sense in which he used them, or apologize. If the House is
    satisfied, no further proceeding is necessary. But if two Members still
    insist to take the sense of the House, the Member must withdraw before
    that question is stated, and then the sense of the House is to be taken.
    2 Hats., 199; 4 Grey, 170; 6 Grey, 59. When any Member has spoken, or
    other business intervened, after offensive words spoken, they can not be
    taken notice of for censure. And this is for the common security of all,
    and to prevent mistakes which must happen if words are not taken down
    immediately. Formerly they might be taken down at any time the same day.
    2 Hats., 196; Mem. in Hakew., 71; 3 Grey, 48; 9 Grey, 514.

    [[Page 186]]

    noticed as soon as uttered, and has not insisted that
    the offending Member withdraw while the House is deciding as to its
    course of action.

      The House has, by clause 4 of rule XVII, provided a method of
    procedure in cases of disorderly words. The House permits and requires
    them to be

    Sec. 369. Disorderly words taken down and reported
    from Committee of the Whole.

      Disorderly  words spoken in a committee must be
    written down as in the House; but the committee can only report them to
    the House for animadversion. 6 Grey, 46.

      This provision of the parliamentary law has been applied to the
    Committee of the Whole, rather than to select or standing committees,
    which are separately empowered to enforce rules of decorum (clause 1(a)
    of rule XI, which incorporates the provisions of rule XVII where
    applicable). The House has censured a Member for disorderly words spoken
    in Committee of the Whole and reported therefrom (II, 1259).

    Sec. 370. References in debate to the
    Executive.

      In  Parliament, to speak irreverently or seditiously against
    the King is against order. Smyth's Comw., L. 2, c. 3; 2 Hats., 170.

      This provision of the parliamentary law is manifestly inapplicable to
    the House (V, 5086); and it has been held in order in debate to refer to
    the President of the United States or his opinions, either with approval
    or criticism, provided that such reference be relevant to the subject
    under discussion and otherwise conformable to the Rules of the House (V,
    5087-5091; VIII, 2500). Under this standard the following references are
    in order: (1) a reference to the probable action of the President (V,
    5092); (2) an adjuration to the President to keep his word (although an
    improper form of address) (Dec. 19, 1995, p. 37601); (3) an accusation
    that the President ``frivolously vetoed'' a bill (Nov. 8, 1995, p.
    31785).

      Although wide latitude is permitted in debate on a proposition to
    impeach the President (V, 5093), Members must abstain from language
    personally offensive (V, 5094; Dec. 18, 1998, p. 27829); and Members
    must abstain from comparisons to the personal conduct of sitting Members
    of the House or Senate (Dec. 18, 1998, p. 27829). Furthermore, when
    impeachment is not the pending business on the floor, Members may not
    refer to evidence of alleged impeachable offenses by the President
    contained in a communication from an independent counsel pending before
    a House committee (Sept. 14, 1998, p. 20171; Sept. 17, 1998, p. 20758),
    although they may refer to the communication, itself, within the
    confines of proper decorum in debate (Oct. 6, 1998, p. 23841).

    [[Page 187]]

    in order to call the President, or a presumptive
    major-party nominee for President, a ``liar'' or accuse such person of
    ``lying'' (June 26, 1985, p. 17394; Sept. 24, 1992, pp. 27345, 27346;
    Nov. 15, 1995, p. 32587; June 6, 1996, pp. 13228, 13229; Mar. 18, 1998,
    p. 3937; Nov. 14, 2002, p. 22370; July 15, 2003, pp. 18172, 18173; Mar.
    24, 2004, pp. 5115, 5116). Indeed, any suggestion of mendacity is out of
    order. For example, the following remarks have been held out of order:
    (1) suggesting that the President misrepresented the truth, attempted to
    obstruct justice, and encouraged others to perjure themselves (Feb. 25,
    1998, p. 2621); (2) accusing him of dishonesty (July 13, 2004, p. 15275;
    June 29, 2005, p. 14770) or of failing to be honest (Apr. 14, 2011, p.
    _), accusing him of making a ``dishonest argument'' (Sept. 12, 2006, p.
    17851), charging him with intent to be intellectually dishonest (May 9,
    1990, p. 9828), or stating that many were convinced he had ``not been
    honest'' (Mar. 5, 1998, p. 2620); (3) accusing him of ``raping'' the
    truth (Apr. 24, 1996, p. 8807), not telling the truth (Oct. 29, 2003, p.
    26363), or distorting the truth (Sept. 9, 2003, pp. 21570-73); (4)
    stating that he was not being ``straight with us'' (Nov. 19, 2003, p.
    29811); (5) accusing him of being deceptive (Mar. 29, 2004, pp. 5523,
    5524; Feb. 1, 2006, p. 647) or using ``deceptive rhetoric'' (Oct. 17,
    2007, pp. 27534, 27538), fabricating an issue (July 6, 2004, pp. 14313,
    14314), or intending to mislead (Oct. 6, 2004, p. 21053; July 12, 2007,
    p. 18827); (6) accusing him of intentional mischaracterization, although
    mischaracterization without intent to deceive is not necessarily out of
    order (July 19, 2005, p. 16525).
      Personal abuse, innuendo, or ridicule of the President is not
    permitted (VIII, 2497; Aug. 12, 1986, p. 21078; Oct. 21, 1987, p. 8857;
    Sept. 21, 1994, p. 25147; Sept. 7, 2006, pp. 17381, 17382). Under this
    standard it is not

    [[Page 188]]

    Vice President might
    someday pardon the President for certain charges (Apr. 12, 2000, p.
    5419); or discussing alleged criminal conduct (Sept. 10, 1998, p. 19976)
    or ``illegal surveillance'' (June 20, 2006, p. 11935); (10) discussing
    personal conduct even as a point of reference or comparison (July 16,
    1998, p. 15784; Sept. 9, 1998, p. 19735); (11) asserting that a major-
    party nominee had done something ``disgusting'' and ``despicable'' (Mar.
    11, 2004, p. 4033); (12) asserting that a major-party nominee is not ``a
    large enough person'' to apologize (Mar. 11, 2004, p. 4086) or that the
    President does not care about black people (Sept. 8, 2005, p. 19797);
    (13) describing his action as ``arrogant'' (Jan. 11, 2007, p. 998; Mar.
    22, 2007, p. 7321) or ``mean-spirited'' (July 15, 2008, p. _); (14)
    equating his decisions with regard to armed conflict as him having
    ``slaughtered'' thousands (Mar. 8, 2007, p. 5815) or that a soldier's
    death was for his ``amusement'' (Oct. 18, 2007, pp. 27569, 27570). The
    Chair may admonish Members transgressing this stricture even after other
    debate has intervened (Jan. 23, 1996, p. 1144).
      Furthermore, the following remarks have been held out of order as
    unparliamentary references to the President, or to a presumptive major-
    party nominee for President: (1) attributing to him ``hypocrisy'' (Sept.
    25, 1992, p. 27674; Apr. 26, 2006, p. 6129); (2) accusing him of giving
    ``aid and comfort to the enemy'' (Jan. 25, 1995, p. 2352; May 6, 2004,
    pp. 8601, 8602); (3) accusing him of ``demagoguery'' (Jan. 23, 1996, p.
    1144; Jan. 24, 1996, pp. 1220, 1221; May 30, 1996, pp. 12646, 12647);
    (4) calling him a ``draft-dodger'' (Apr. 24, 1996, pp. 8807, 8808; Sept.
    30, 1996, p. 26603) or alleging unexcused absences from military service
    (May 5, 2004, pp. 8417, 8418), including allegations that the President
    was ``A.W.O.L.'' (Sept. 22, 2004, p. 18953); (5) describing his action
    as ``cowardly'' (Oct. 25, 1989, p. 25817); (6) referring to him as ``a
    little bugger'' (Nov. 18, 1995, p. 33974); (7) alluding to alleged
    sexual misconduct on his part (May 10, 1994, p. 9697; Feb. 25, 1998, p.
    1828; Mar. 5, 1998, p. 2620; May 18, 1998, p. 9418); (8) alluding to
    unethical behavior or corruption (e.g., June 20, 1996, p. 14829; July 9,
    2002, p. 12286; Oct. 29, 2003, pp. 26400-402), such as implying a cause-
    and-effect relationship between political contributions and his actions
    as President (e.g., May 22, 2001, p. 9028; Sept. 29, 2004, pp. 19976,
    19977), including an accusation that the President had ``lined the
    pockets'' of his ``political cronies'' and filled ``campaign coffers''
    (Sept. 14, 2005, pp. 20238, 20239); (9) discussing ``charges'' leveled
    at the President or under investigation (Mar. 19, 1998, p. 4094; June
    11, 1998, p. 12025), including alluding to ``fund-raising abuses'' (Mar.
    14, 2000, p. 2716) or speculating that the

      A Member may not read in debate extraneous material personally abusive
    of the President that would be improper if spoken in the Member's own
    words (Mar. 3, 1993, p. 3958; Nov. 15, 1995, p. 32587; May 2, 1996, p.
    10010; Mar. 17, 1998, p. 3799; July 15, 2003, p. 18170; Sept. 16, 2003,
    pp. 22151, 22152; Oct. 17, 2007, p. 27538). This prohibition includes
    the recitation of another Member's criticism of the President made off
    the floor (even if recited as a rebuttal to such criticism) (Dec. 17,
    1998, p. 27775).

      The Chair has advised that the protections afforded by Jefferson's
    Manual and the precedents against unparliamentary references to the
    President, personally, do not necessarily extend to members of his
    family (July 12, 1990, p. 17206).

      References in debate to former Presidents are not governed by these
    standards (Nov. 15, 1945, p. 10735; June 27, 2002, pp. 11844, 11845).

      In the 102d Congress, the Speaker enunciated a minimal standard of
    propriety for all debate concerning nominated candidates for the
    Presidency, based on the traditional proscription against personally
    offensive references to the President even in the capacity as a
    candidate (Speaker Foley, Sept. 24, 1992, p. 27344); and this policy has
    been extended to a presumptive major-party nominee for President (e.g.,
    Apr. 22, 2004, pp. 7401, 7402). However, references to the past
    statements or views of such nominee are not unparliamentary (May 6,
    2004, p. 8554).

      For discussion of the stricture against addressing remarks in debate
    to the President, as in the second person, see Sec. 945, infra.

      On January 27, 1909 (VIII, 2497), the House adopted a report of a
    committee appointed to investigate the question, which report in part
    stated:

    [[Page 189]]

    rules requiring decorum in debate. Such right of
    criticism is inherent upon legislative authority. The right to legislate
    involves the right to consider conditions as they are and to contrast
    present conditions with those of the past or those desired in the
    future. The right to correct abuses by legislation carries the right to
    consider and discuss abuses which exist or which are feared.
      ``The freedom of speech in debate in the House should never be denied
    or abridged, but freedom of speech in debate does not mean license to
    indulge in personal abuses or ridicule. The right of Members of the two
    Houses of Congress to criticize the official acts of the President and
    other executive officers is beyond question, but this right is subject
    to proper

      ``It is, however, the duty of the House to require its Members in
    speech or debate to preserve that proper restraint which will permit the
    House to conduct its business in an orderly manner and without
    unnecessarily and unduly exciting animosity among its Members or
    antagonism from those other branches of the Government with which the
    House is correlated.''

    Sec. 371. References in debate to the other House and its
    Members.

      It  is a breach of order in debate to notice what has been said
    on the same subject in the other House, or the particular votes or
    majorities on it there; because the opinion of each House should be left
    to its own independency, not to be influenced by the proceedings of the
    other; and the quoting them might beget reflections leading to a
    misunderstanding between the two Houses. 8 Grey, 22.

      Until former clause 1 of rule XIV (currently clause 1 of rule XVII)
    was amended in the 100th and 101st Congresses (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1987,
    p. 6; H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1989, p. 72), this principle of comity and
    parliamentary law as described by Jefferson governed debate in the House
    to the full extent of its provisions (see generally, V, 5095-5130; VIII,
    2501-21; July 31, 1984, p. 21670; Deschler-Brown, ch. 29, Sec. 44). From
    the 101st Congress through the 108th Congress, clause 1 of rule XVII
    permitted some factual references that were a matter of public record,
    references to the pendency or sponsorship in the Senate of certain
    measures, factual descriptions concerning a measure under debate in the
    House, and quotations from Senate proceedings relevant to the making of
    legislative history on a pending measure. In the 109th Congress clause 1
    was amended to permit debate to include references to the Senate or its
    Members but within the general stricture that requires Members to avoid
    personality (sec. 2(g), H. Res. 5, Jan. 4, 2005, p. 43). Under the new
    standard, remarks may urge the Senate to take a particular action (Mar.
    21, 2010, p. _). For a recitation of precedents under the former rule,
    see Sec. 371 of the House Rules and Manual for the 108th Congress (H.
    Doc. 107-284).

    [[Page 190]]

    licans of hypocrisy (May 16, 2005, p. 9757); (2)
    referring to Senate Democrats as ``cowardly'' (May 18, 2005, p. 10136);
    (3) accusing a Senator of making slanderous statements (June 17, 2005,
    p. 13009; June 21, 2005, p. 13408); (4) attributing to a Senator a list
    of offenses under investigation by the Securities and Exchange
    Commission (Oct. 18, 2005, p. 22987); (5) accusing a Senator of giving
    ``aid and comfort'' to the enemy (Dec. 13, 2005, p. 28162); (6) accusing
    a Senator of corruption (Oct. 13, 2009, p. _) or of taking bribes (Jan.
    19, 2010, p. _); (7) stating a ``low opinion'' of the Senate (Apr. 1,
    2011, p. _).
      Since the adoption of the new rule, the following references to
    Members of the Senate have been held unparliamentary: (1) accusing
    Senate Repub

      It remains the duty of the Chair to call to order a Member who engages
    in personality with respect to a Senator (see Sec. 374, infra), and the
    Chair may admonish a Member for unparliamentary references even after
    intervening recognition (Oct. 12, 1999, p. 24954; Nov. 15, 2001, p.
    22596). Although the Chair is under a duty to caution Members against
    unparliamentary references, the Chair will not advise Members on how to
    construct their remarks to avoid improper references (Feb. 25, 2004, pp.
    2409-15).

      The prohibition against improper references to Senators includes (1) a
    reference not explicitly naming the Senator (VIII, 2512; Feb. 23, 1994,
    p. 2658; June 30, 1995, p. 18153; Feb. 27, 1997, pp. 2768, 2769); (2)
    the reading of a paper making criticisms of a Senator (V, 5127); (3) a
    reference to another person's criticism of a Senator (Aug. 4, 1983, p.
    23145). Similarly, the Chair has consistently held that if references to
    the Senate are appropriate, the Member delivering them is not required
    to use the term ``the other body,'' (Oct. 4, 1984, p. 30047) and, by the
    same token, references to ``the other body'' will not cure
    unparliamentary references directed to the Senate (e.g., Oct. 2, 2002,
    p. 18913; Apr. 2, 2004, pp. 6394, 6395).

      Under the earlier form of the rule, the Chair held that remarks in
    debate during the pendency of an impeachment resolution may not include
    comparisons to the personal conduct of sitting Members of the House or
    Senate (Dec. 18, 1998, p. 27829) and remarks in debate may not criticize
    words spoken in the Senate by one not a Member of that body in the
    course of an impeachment trial (V, 5106). After examination by a
    committee under the earlier form of the rule, a speech reflecting on the
    character of the Senate was ordered to be stricken from the Record on
    the ground that it tended to create ``unfriendly conditions between the
    two bodies * * * obstructive of wise legislation and little short of a
    public calamity'' (V, 5129). Under the earlier form of the rule, where a
    Member had been assailed in the Senate, he was permitted to explain his
    own conduct and motives without bringing the whole controversy into
    discussion or assailing the Senator (V, 5123-5126). Propositions
    relating to breaches of these principles were entertained as a matter of
    privilege (V, 5129, 6980).

      The precise standard in former clause 1 of rule XIV for references to
    ``individual Members of the Senate'' did not apply to references to
    former Senators (Dec. 14, 1995, p. 36968).

    [[Page 191]]

    not) may be criticized in terms not personally offensive
    (Speaker Wright, Sept. 29, 1988, p. 26683), but references attacking the
    character or integrity of a Senator in that context are not in order
    (Oct. 30, 1979, p. 30150).
      The official policies, actions, and opinions of a Senator who is a
    candidate for President or Vice President (as, in modern practice, with
    one who is

      References in debate to the Vice President (as President of the
    Senate) are governed by the standards of reference permitted toward the
    President, as under the earlier form of the rule. As such, a Member may
    criticize in debate the policies, or candidacy, of the Vice President
    but may not engage in personality (Dec. 14, 1995, p. 36968; July 14,
    1998, p. 15314; Sept. 20, 2000, p. 18639). For example, it is not in
    order to allude to ``wrongdoings [including] fund-raising telephone
    calls by the Vice President'' (Mar. 14, 2000, p. 2716); to attribute to
    him a list of offenses under investigation by a special prosecutor (Oct.
    18, 2005, p. 22987); to suggest that the House should investigate him in
    connection with government contracts awarded to his former employer
    (June 15, 2006, p. 11480); to speculate that he might someday pardon the
    President (Apr. 12, 2000, p. 5419); to accuse him of lying (Sept. 20,
    2000, p. 18639; Sept. 21, 2000, p. 18789; Feb. 16, 2006, p. 1960; Mar.
    6, 2007, p. 5412); to suggest ``he has a problem with the truth'' (Oct.
    5, 2000, p. 21014); to allege ``unethical behavior'' or ``corruption''
    (see, e.g., Oct. 29, 2003, pp. 26400-402; Nov. 4, 2003, pp. 27070,
    27071), including innuendo suggesting policy choices were made on the
    basis of personal pecuniary gain (July 7, 2004, p. 14582; Sept. 13,
    2005, pp. 20238, 20239) or accusations of abuse of power (July 14, 2004,
    p. 15501); to describe him as ``arrogant'' (June 28, 2007, p. 17926;
    Sept. 25, 2008, p. _). The rule also precludes the insertion in the
    Record of a paper making improper references to the Vice President
    (Sept. 19, 2000, p. 18580).

       A Member may not read in debate extraneous material regarding the
    Vice President that would be improper if spoken in the Member's own
    words (Feb. 16, 2006, p. 1960).

    Sec. 373. Complaint by one House of conduct of a
    Member of the other.

      Neither  House can exercise any authority over a Member or
    officer of the other, but should complain to the House of which he is,
    and leave the punishment to them.

    [[Page 192]]

    the vote of a Senator in an impeachment
    trial, the House declined to consider the matter as a breach of
    privilege (III, 2657). Although on one occasion it was held that a
    resolution offered in the House requesting the Senate to expunge from
    the Record statements in criticism of a Member of the House did not
    constitute a question of privilege, being in violation of the rule
    prohibiting references to the Senate in debate (VIII, 2519), a properly
    drafted resolution referring to language published in the Record of
    Senate proceedings as constituting a breach of privilege and requesting
    the Senate to take appropriate action concerning the subject has been
    held to present a question of the privileges of the House (VIII, 2516).

      In a notable instance, wherein a Member of the House had assaulted a
    Senator in the Senate Chamber for words spoken in debate, the Senate
    examined the breach of privilege and transmitted its report to the
    House, which punished the Member (II, 1622). A Senator having assailed a
    House Member in debate, the House messaged to the Senate a resolution
    declaring the language a breach of privilege and requested the Senate to
    take appropriate action (Sept. 27, 1951, p. 12270). The Senator
    subsequently asked unanimous consent to correct his remarks in the
    permanent Congressional Record, but objection was raised (Sept. 28,
    1951, p. 12383). But where certain Members of the House, in a published
    letter, sought to influence

    Sec. 374. Duty of the Speaker to prevent expressions
    offensive to the other House.

      * * *  Where the complaint is of words
    disrespectfully spoken by a Member of another House, it is difficult to
    obtain punishment, because of the rules supposed necessary to be
    observed (as to the immediate noting down of words) for the security of
    Members. Therefore it is the duty of the House, and more particularly of
    the Speaker, to interfere immediately, and not to permit expressions to
    go unnoticed which may give a ground of complaint to the other House,
    and introduce proceedings and mutual accusations between the two Houses,
    which can hardly be terminated without difficulty and disorder. 3 Hats.,
    51.

      A rule of comity prohibiting most references in debate to the Senate
    was first enunciated in Jefferson's Manual and was strictly enforced in
    the House through the 108th Congress (albeit with certain exceptions
    adopted in the 100th and 101st Congresses in the former clause 1(b) of
    rule XVII) (Sec. 371, supra and Sec. 945, infra). In the 109th Congress
    clause 1 was amended to permit references to the Senate or its Members,
    even critical references, so long as avoiding personality (sec. 2(g), H.
    Res. 5, Jan. 4, 2005, p. 43). Nevertheless, it remains the duty of the
    Chair to call to order a Member who violates the rule in debate or
    through an insertion in the Record.

    [[Page 193]]

    normally takes initiative (Feb. 27, 1997, pp. 2778, 2779). The
    Chair may admonish Members to avoid unparliamentary references to the
    Senate even after intervening recognition (Oct. 12, 1999, p. 24954).
    Pending consideration of a measure relating to the Senate, the Speaker
    announced his intention to strictly enforce this provision of
    Jefferson's Manual prohibiting improper references to the Senate, and to
    deny recognition to Members violating the prohibition, subject to
    permission of the House to proceed in order (Speaker O'Neill, June 16,
    1982, p. 13843). Under the earlier form of clause 1 of rule XVII, the
    Chair refused to respond to hypothetical questions as to the propriety
    of possible characterizations of Senate actions before their use in
    debate (Oct. 24, 1985, p. 28819). For a further discussion of the
    Speaker's duties regarding unparliamentary debate, see Sec. Sec. 960-
    961, infra.

      The Chair has distinguished between engaging in personality toward
    another Member of the House, as to which the Chair normally awaits a
    point of order from the floor, and improper references to Members of the
    Senate, which violate comity between the Houses, as to which the Chair

    Sec. 375. Course of the Member when business concerning
    that Member is under debate.

      No  Member may be present when a bill or any
    business concerning himself is debating; nor is any Member to speak to
    the merits of it till he withdraws. 2 Hats., 219. The rule is that if a
    charge against a Member arise out of a report of a committee, or
    examination of witnesses in the House, as the Member knows from that to
    what points he is to direct his exculpation, he may be heard to those
    points before any question is moved or stated against him. He is then to
    be heard, and withdraw before any question is moved. But if the question
    itself is the charge, as for breach of order or matter arising in the
    debate, then the charge must be stated (that is, the question must be
    moved), himself heard, and then to withdraw. 2 Hats., 121, 122.

    [[Page 194]]

    not permitted to depute another Member to speak in his behalf
    (II, 1273). In modern practice the Member has been permitted to speak in
    his own behalf, both in censure (June 10, 1980, pp. 13802-11) and
    expulsion proceedings (Oct. 2, 1980, pp. 28953-78; July 24, 2002, pp.
    14299, 14309). A Member-elect has been permitted to participate in
    debate on a resolution relating to his right to take the oath (Jan. 10,
    1967, p. 23).

      In 1832, during proceedings for the censure of a Member, the Speaker
    informed the Member that he should retire (II, 1366); but this seems to
    be an exceptional instance of the enforcement of the law of Parliament.
    In other cases, after the proposition for censure or expulsion has been
    proposed, Members have been heard in debate, either as a matter of right
    (II, 1286), as a matter of course (II, 1246, 1253), by express provision
    (II, 1273), and in writing (II, 1273), or by unanimous consent (II,
    1275). A Member against whom a resolution of censure was pending was
    asked by the Speaker if he desired to be heard (VI, 236). But a Member
    was

    Sec. 376. Disqualifying personal interest of a
    Member.

      Where  the private interests of a Member are concerned in a bill or
    question he is to withdraw. And where such an interest has appeared, his
    voice has been disallowed, even after a division. In a case so contrary,
    not only to the laws of decency, but to the fundamental principle of the
    social compact, which denies to any man to be a judge in his own cause,
    it is for the honor of the House that this rule of immemorial observance
    should be strictly adhered to. 2 Hats., 119, 121; 6 Grey, 368.

      In the House it has not been usual for the Member to withdraw from
    debate when the Member's private interests are concerned in a pending
    measure, although clause 1 of rule III addresses voting in such a
    contingency. In one instance the Senate disallowed a vote given by a
    Senator on a question relating to his own right to a seat; but the House
    has never had occasion to proceed so far (V, 5959).

    Sec. 377. Wearing of hats by Members.

      No  Member is to come
    into the House with his head covered, nor to remove from one place to
    another with his hat on, nor is to put on his hat in coming in or
    removing, until he be set down in his place. Scob., 6.

    [[Page 195]]

    Sec. 378. Adjournment of questions of order.

      In 1837 the parliamentary practice of wearing hats during the session
    was abolished by adoption of current clause 5 of rule XVII. See
    Sec. 962, infra.
       A question of
    order may be adjourned to give time to look into precedents. 2 Hats.,
    118.

    <>   In
    Parliament, all decisions of the Speaker may be controlled by the House.
    3 Grey, 319.

      As described in Sec. Sec. 628 and 628a, infra, the Speaker has
    declined, on a difficult question of order, to rule until taking time
    for examination (III, 2725; VI, 432; VII, 2106; VIII, 2174, 2396, 3475),
    and may take a parliamentary inquiry under advisement, especially if not
    related to the pending proceedings (VIII, 2174; Apr. 7, 1992, p. 8274).
    However, it is conceivable that a case might arise wherein this
    privilege of the Chair would require approval of the majority of the
    House to prevent arbitrary obstruction of the pending business by the
    Chair. The law of Parliament evidently contemplates that the adjournment
    of a question of order shall be controlled by the House. On occasion,
    the Chair has reversed as erroneous a decision previously made (VI, 639;
    VII, 849; VIII, 2794, 3435).

      The Speaker's decision on a question of order is subject to appeal by
    any Member (clause 5 of rule I).