    [Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 112th Congress]
    [112nd Congress]
    [House Document 111-157]
    [The United States Constitution]
    [Pages 4-66]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

                                   ARTICLE I.

    Sec. 3. Legislative powers vested in
    Congress.

      Section 1. All  legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
    Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House
    of Representatives.

    <>   Section 2. \1\ The House of Representatives shall be composed
    of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States,
    * * *.

    Sec. 4. Power to
    investigate.

      The power to legislate includes the power to conduct inquiries and
    investigations. See Kilbourn v.   Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273
    U.S. 135 (1927); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957);
    Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). For the power of the
    House to punish for contempt in the course of investigations, see
    Sec. 293, infra.

      This clause requires election by the people and State authority may
    not determine a tie by lot (I, 775).

      The phrase ``by the people of the several States'' means that as
    nearly as practicable one person's vote in a congressional election is
    to be worth as much as another's. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
    (1964); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969). 2 U.S.C. 2a
    mandates apportionment of Representatives based upon population, and 2
    U.S.C. 2c requires the establishment by the States of single-Member
    congressional districts. For elections generally, see Deschler, ch. 8.

    [[Page 5]]

    fixing the daily hour of meeting is agreed to at the beginning of
    each session.

    Sec. 6. Term of a Congress.

      The term of a  Congress, before
    the ratification of the 20th amendment to the Constitution, began on the
    4th of March of the odd numbered years and extended through two years.
    This resulted from the action of the Continental Congress on September
    13, 1788, in declaring, on authority conferred by the Federal
    Convention, ``the first Wednesday in March next'' to be ``the time for
    commencing proceedings under the said Constitution.'' This date was
    March 4, 1789. Soon after the first Congress assembled a joint committee
    determined that the terms of Representatives and Senators of the first
    class commenced on that day, and must necessarily terminate with the 3d
    of March, 1791 (I, 3). Under the 20th amendment to the Constitution the
    terms of Representatives and Senators begin on the 3d of January of the
    odd-numbered years, regardless of when Congress actually convenes. By a
    practice having the force of common law, the House meets at noon when no
    other hour is fixed (I, 4, 210). In the later practice a resolution

      Before adoption of the 20th amendment, the legislative day of March 3
    extended to noon on March 4 (V, 6694-6697) and, unless earlier
    adjourned, the Speaker could at that time declare the House adjourned
    sine die, without motion or vote, even to the point of suspending a roll
    call then in progress (V, 6715-6718).

    <> * * * and
    the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for
    Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

      The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (84 Stat. 1140) provides
    that unless Congress otherwise specifies the two Houses shall adjourn
    sine die not later than the last day in July. This requirement is not
    applicable, under the terms of that Act, if a state of war exists
    pursuant to a congressional declaration or if, in an odd-numbered
    (nonelection) year, the Congress has agreed to adjourn for the month
    preceding Labor Day. For more on this provision, see Sec. 1106, infra.

      The House, in the decision of an election case, has rejected votes
    cast by persons not naturalized citizens of the United States, although
    they were entitled to vote under the statutes of a State (I, 811); but
    where an act of Congress had provided that a certain class of persons
    should be deprived of citizenship, a question arose over the proposed
    rejection of their votes in a State wherein citizenship in the United
    States was not a qualification of the elector (I, 451). In an
    exceptional case the House rejected votes cast by persons lately in
    armed resistance to the Government, although by the law of the State
    they were qualified voters (I, 448); but later, the House declined to
    find persons disqualified as voters because they had formerly borne arms
    against the Government (II, 879).

    Sec. 8. Decisions of the Court.

      The power  of the States to
    set qualifications for electors is not unlimited, being subject to the
    15th, 19th, 24th, and 26th amendments, and to the equal protection
    clause of the United States Constitution. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
    89 (1965); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).

    <>   \2\ No
    Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained
    to the Age of twenty five Years, * * *.

    [[Page 6]]

    A Member-elect not being of the required age, was not enrolled by
    the Clerk and he did not take the oath until he had reached the required
    age (I, 418).

    <> * * *
    and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, * * *.

      Congress has some power in setting qualifications for electors, as in
    protecting the right to vote and lowering the minimum age for electors
    in congressional elections. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966);
    Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).

    <> * * *
    and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which
    he shall be chosen.

      Henry Ellenbogen, Pa., had not been a citizen for seven years when
    elected to the 73d Congress, nor when the term commenced on March 4,
    1933. He was sworn at the beginning of the second session on January 3,
    1934, when a citizen for seven and one-half years (see H. Rept. 1431 and
    H. Res. 370, 73d Cong.). A native of South Carolina who had been abroad
    during the Revolution and on his return had not resided in the country
    seven years, was held to be qualified as a citizen (I, 420). A woman who
    forfeited her citizenship through marriage to a foreign subject and
    later resumed it through naturalization less than seven years before her
    election, was held to fulfill the constitutional requirement as to
    citizenship and entitled to a seat in the House (VI, 184). A Member who
    had long been a resident of the country, but who could not produce
    either the record of the court nor his final naturalization papers, was
    nevertheless retained in his seat by the House (I, 424).

    [[Page 7]]

    for years as a newspaper correspondent and maintenance there of church
    membership were not considered to outweigh payment of poll and income
    taxes, ownership of real estate, and a record for consistent voting in
    the district from which elected (VI, 55), and in the same case excuse
    from jury duty in the District of Columbia on a plea of citizenship in
    the State from which elected and exercise of incidental rights of such
    citizenship, were accepted as evidence of inhabitancy (VI, 55).
      The meaning of the word ``inhabitant'' and its relation to citizenship
    has been discussed (I, 366, 434; VI, 174), and the House has held that a
    mere sojourner in a State was not qualified as an inhabitant (I, 369),
    but a contestant was found to be an actual inhabitant of the State
    although for sufficient reason his family resided in another State (II,
    1091). Residence abroad in the service of the Government does not
    destroy inhabitancy as understood under the Constitution (I, 433). One
    holding an office and residing with his family for a series of years in
    the District of Columbia exclusively was held disqualified to sit as a
    Member from the State of his citizenship (I, 434); and one who had his
    business and a residence in the District of Columbia and had no business
    or residence in Virginia was held ineligible to a seat from that State
    (I, 436). One who had a home in the District of Columbia, and had
    inhabited another home in Maryland a brief period before his election,
    but had never been a citizen of any other State, was held to be
    qualified (I, 432). Also a Member who had resided a portion of a year in
    the District of Columbia, but who had a home in the State of his
    citizenship and was actually living there at the time of the election,
    was held to be qualified (I, 435). In the Updike v. Ludlow case, 71st
    Congress, it was decided that residence in the District of Columbia

    Sec. 12. Qualifications other than those
    specified by the Constitution.

      Whether Congress  may by law establish qualifications
    other than those prescribed by the Constitution has been the subject of
    much discussion (I, 449, 451, 457, 458, 478); but in a case wherein a
    statute declared a Senator convicted of a certain offense ``forever
    thereafter incapable of holding any office of honor, trust, or profit
    under the Government of the United States,'' the Supreme Court expressed
    the opinion that the final judgment of conviction did not operate, ipso
    facto, to vacate the seat or compel the Senate to expel or regard the
    Senator as expelled by force alone of the judgment (II, 1282). Whether
    the House or Senate alone may set up qualifications other than those of
    the Constitution has also been a subject often discussed (I, 414, 415,
    443, 457, 458, 469, 481, 484). The Senate has always declined to act on
    the supposition that it had such a power (I, 443, 483), and during the
    stress of civil war the House of Representatives declined to exercise
    the power, even under circumstances of great provocation (I, 449, 465).
    But later, in one instance, the House excluded a Member-elect on the
    principal argument that it might itself prescribe a qualification not
    specified in the Constitution (I, 477). The matter was extensively
    debated in the 90th Congress in connection with the consideration of
    resolutions relating to the seating of Representative-elect Adam C.
    Powell of New York (H. Res. 1, Jan. 10, 1967, p. 14; H. Res. 278, Mar.
    1, 1967, p. 4997). In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), the
    Supreme Court found that the power of Congress to judge the
    qualifications of its Members was limited to an examination of the
    express qualifications stated in the Constitution.

      It has been decided by the House and Senate that no State may add to
    the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution (I, 414-416, 632); and
    the Supreme Court so ruled in U.S. Term Limits, Inc., v. Thornton, 514
    U.S. 779 (1995). There, the Court held that States may not ``change, add
    to, or diminish'' constitutional qualifications of Members, striking
    down a State statute prohibiting three-term incumbents from appearing on
    the general election ballot. For qualifications generally, see Deschler,
    ch. 7, Sec. Sec. 9-14.

    [[Page 8]]

      For expulsion of seated Members, which requires a two-thirds vote
    rather than a majority vote, see article I, section 5, clause 2
    (Sec. 62, infra).

    Sec. 13. Minority candidate not seated when
    returned Member is disqualified.

      Both Houses of
     Congress have decided, when a
    Member-elect is found to be disqualified, that the person receiving the
    next highest number of votes is not entitled to the seat (I, 323, 326,
    450, 463, 469; VI, 58, 59), even in a case wherein reasonable notice of
    the disqualification was given to the electors (I, 460). In the event of
    the death of a Member-elect, the candidate receiving the next highest
    number of votes is not entitled to the seat (VI, 152).

    Sec. 14. The old provision for
    apportionment of Representatives and direct taxes.

      \3\ [Representatives and direct  Taxes shall be
    apportioned among the several States which may be included within this
    Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined
    by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to
    Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three
    fifths of all other Persons.] * * *

    * * * The actual <> Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the
    first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every
    subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law
    direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every
    thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative;
    and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire
    shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode- Island and
    Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersey
    four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland

    [[Page 9]]

    six, Virginia ten,
    North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.

      The part of this clause relating to the mode of apportionment of
    Representatives was changed after the Civil War by section 2 of the 14th
    amendment and, as to taxes on incomes without apportionment, by the 16th
    amendment.

      The census has been taken decennially since 1790, and, with the
    exception of 1920, was followed each time by reapportionment. In the
    First Congress the House had 65 Members; increased after each census,
    except that of 1840, until 435 was reached in 1913 (VI, 39, 40). The Act
    of June 18, 1929 (46 Stat. 26), as amended by the Act of November 15,
    1941 (55 Stat. 761), provides for reapportionment of the existing number
    (435) among the States following each new census (VI, 41-43; see 2
    U.S.C. 2a). Membership was temporarily increased to 436, then to 437,
    upon admission of Alaska (72 Stat. 345) and Hawaii (73 Stat. 8), but
    returned to 435 on January 3, 1963, the effective date of the
    reapportionment under the 18th Decennial census.

      Under the later but not the earlier practice, bills relating to the
    census and apportionment are not privileged for consideration (I, 305-
    308; VI, 48, VII, 889; Apr. 8, 1926, p. 7147).

    Sec. 16. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
    393 (1857); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869); Scholey
    v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331 (1874); De Treville v. Smalls, 98 U.S.
    517 (1878); Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404 (1886);
    Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. (Income Tax case), 157 U.S. 429
    (1895); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Rehearing), 158 U.S. 601
    (1895); Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363 (1904); Flint v. Stone
    Tracy Co. (Corporation Tax cases), 220 U.S. 107 (1911); Eisner v.
    Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S.
    345 (1921); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992); Utah v.
    Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002).

    Sec. 17. Writs for elections to vacancies
    in representation.

      \4\ When vacancies  happen in the Representation from any State, the
    Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such
    Vacancies.

    [[Page 10]]

      Vacancies are caused by death, resignation, declination, withdrawal,
    or by action of the House in declaring a vacancy as existing or causing
    one by expulsion. When a vacancy occurs, or when a new Member is sworn,
    the Speaker announces the resulting adjustment in the whole number of
    the House pursuant to clause 5(d) of rule XX (see Sec. 1024b, infra).
    Clause 5(c) of rule XX permits the House to operate with a provisional
    number of the House if the House is without a quorum due to catastrophic
    circumstances (see Sec. 1024a, infra). In extraordinary circumstances,
    section 8 of title 2, United States Code, prescribes special election
    rules to expedite the filling of vacancies in representation of the
    House.

    Sec. 18. Vacancy from death.

      It was long the
     practice to
    notify the executive of the State when a vacancy was caused by the death
    of a Member during a session (II, 1198-1202); but it is now the practice
    for State authorities to take cognizance of the vacancies without
    notice. When a Member dies while not in attendance in the House or
    during a recess, the House is sufficiently informed of the vacancy by
    the credentials of the successor, when they set forth the fact of the
    death (I, 568). The death of a Member-elect creates a vacancy, although
    no certificate may have been awarded (I, 323), and in such a case the
    candidate having the next highest number of votes may not receive the
    credentials (I, 323; VI 152). A Member whose seat was contested having
    died, the House did not admit a claimant with credentials until
    contestant's claim was settled (I, 326); where a contestant died after a
    report in his favor, the House unseated the returned Member and declared
    the seat vacant (II, 965), and in a later case the contestant having
    died, the committee did not recommend to the House a resolution it had
    agreed to declaring he had not been elected (VI, 112). In the 93d
    Congress, when two Members-elect were passengers on a missing aircraft
    and were presumed dead, the Speaker laid before the House documentary
    evidence of the presumptive death of one Member-elect and the
    declaration of a vacancy by the Governor, as well as evidence that the
    status of the other Member-elect had not been officially determined by
    State authority. The House then adopted a privileged resolution
    declaring vacant the seat of the latter Member-elect to enable the
    Governor of that State to call a special election (Jan. 3, 1973, p. 15).
    For further discussion, see Sec. 23, infra.

    Sec. 19. Vacancy from resignation.

      In recent practice  the
    Member informs the House by letter that a resignation has been sent to
    the State executive (II, 1167-1176) and this is satisfactory evidence of
    the resignation (I, 567). Both a letter to the Speaker and a copy of the
    letter to the State executive are laid before the House. However,
    Members have resigned by letter to the House alone, it being presumed
    that the Member would also notify the Governor (VI, 226). Where a Member
    resigned by letter to the House the Speaker was authorized to notify the
    Governor (Nov. 27, 1944, p. 8450; July 12, 1957, p. 11536; Sept. 1,
    1976, p. 28887). If a Member does not inform the House, the State
    executive may do so (II, 1193, 1194; VI, 232). The House has learned of
    a Member's resignation by means of the credentials of the successor (II,
    1195, 1356). Where the fact of a Member's resignation has not appeared
    either from the credentials of the successor or otherwise, the Clerk has
    been ordered to make inquiry (II, 1209) or the House has ascertained the
    vacancy from information given by other Members (II, 1208).

    [[Page 11]]

    to resign a seat in the House to be effective on a date
    following the anticipated date of a special election that might fill the
    vacancy thereby created (Deschler, ch. 8, Sec. 9.3). However, the State
    concerned must be willing to treat the prospective resignation as a
    constitutional predicate for the issuance of a writ of election to fill
    a vacancy. For examples of resignation letters indicating that the State
    executive took cognizance of a prospective resignation, see January 8,
    1952, (p. 14) (New York); July 9, 1991, (p. 17301) (Virginia); June 5,
    2001, (p. 9882) (Florida), and Jan. 27, 2003, (p. 1751) (Texas). When
    the Governor of Oklahoma received a prospective resignation from one of
    its Members, the State provided by statute (enrolled Senate Bill Number
    7X) for the holding of a special election before the effective date of
    the resignation (Feb. 28, 2002, p. 2245).
      It has been established that a Member or Senator may select a future
    date for a resignation to take effect and, until the arrival of that
    date, participate in the proceedings (II, 1220-1225, 1228, 1229; VI,
    227, 228; Dec. 15, 1997, p. 26709; June 5, 2001, p. 9882; Nov. 27, 2001,
    p. 23006; Jan. 27, 2003, pp. 1750, 1751). It has been possible even for
    a Member

      For the State to take cognizance of a prospective resignation, it must
    have assurances that there is no possibility of withdrawal (or
    modification). In one case a Member who had resigned was not permitted
    by the House to withdraw the resignation (II, 1213). However, the House
    has allowed withdrawal in the case of defective resignation; that is, in
    which the Member had not actually transmitted the letter of resignation
    (VI, 229), or had transmitted it to an improper state official (Oct. 9,
    1997, p. 22020). A Member may include in a letter of prospective
    resignation a statement of intention that the resignation be
    ``irrevocable'' in order to allay any concern about the prospect of
    withdrawal (June 5, 2001, p. 9882).

      Acceptance of the resignation of a Member from the House is
    unnecessary (VI, 65, 226), and the refusal of a Governor to accept a
    resignation cannot operate to continue membership in the House (VI, 65).
    Only in a single exceptional case has the House taken action in the
    direction of accepting a resignation (II, 1214). Sometimes Members who
    have resigned have been reelected to the same House and taken seats (II,
    1210, 1212, 1256; Jan. 28, 1965 and June 16, 1965, pp. 1452, 13774; Jan.
    6, 1983 and Feb. 22, 1983, pp. 114, 2575). A Member who has not taken
    his seat resigned (II, 1231).

    [[Page 12]]

      A letter of resignation is presented as privileged (II, 1167-1176);
    but a resolution to permit a Member to withdraw a resignation was not so
    treated (II, 1213). The Speaker having been elected Vice President and a
    Representative of the succeeding Congress at the same election,
    transmitted to the Governor of his State his resignation as a Member-
    elect (VI, 230, 453). A Member of the House having been nominated and
    confirmed as Vice President pursuant to the 25th amendment, submitted a
    letter of resignation as a Representative to the Governor of his State,
    and a copy of his letter of resignation was laid before the House by the
    Speaker following the completion of a joint meeting for his swearing as
    Vice President (Dec. 6, 1973, p. 39927). A Member of the House having
    been confirmed as Secretary of Defense, a copy of his letter of
    resignation was laid before the House before his taking the oath of that
    office (Mar. 20, 1989, p. 4976).

    Sec. 20. Vacancy from declination.

      A Member who  has been
    elected to a seat may decline to accept it, and in such a case the House
    informed the executive of the State of the vacancy (II, 1234). The House
    has decided an election contest against a returned Member who had not
    appeared to claim the seat (I, 638). In one instance a Member-elect who
    had been convicted in the courts did not appear during the term (IV,
    4484, footnote). On November 7, 1998, less than a week after his re-
    election as Representative from Georgia, Speaker Gingrich announced that
    he would not be a candidate for Speaker in the 106th Congress and that
    he would resign his seat as a Member of the 106th Congress. Although the
    letter of ``withdrawal'' was tendered on November 22, the Governor did
    not attempt to call a special election until after the term began on
    January 3, 1999 (Jan. 6, 1999, p. 42). A Member notified the Speaker and
    the Governor in one Congress that he did not intend to take his seat in
    the next Congress (Jan. 6, 2009, p. _).

    Sec. 21. Vacancy by withdrawal.

      At the time  of the secession
    of several States, Members of the House from those States withdrew (II,
    1218). In the Senate, in cases of such withdrawals, the Secretary was
    directed to omit the names of the Senators from the roll (II, 1219), and
    the act of withdrawal was held to create a vacancy that the legislature
    might recognize (I, 383).

    Sec. 22. Vacancy by action of the House.

      If the House,  by
    its action in a question of election or otherwise, creates a vacancy,
    the Speaker is directed to notify the Executive of the State (I, 502,
    709, 824; II, 1203-1205; Mar. 1, 1967, p. 5038; Jan. 3, 1973, p. 15;
    Feb. 24, 1981, pp. 2916-18). A resolution as to such notification is
    presented as a question of privilege (III, 2589), as is a resolution
    declaring a vacancy in which a Member-elect was unable to take the oath
    of office or to decline the office because of an incapacitating illness
    (Feb. 24, 1981, pp. 2916-18).

    [[Page 13]]

    Sec. 23. Questions as to the existence of a
    vacancy.

      The House declines  to give prima facie effect to credentials, even though they
    be regular in form, until it has ascertained whether or not the seat is
    vacant (I, 322, 518, 565, 569), and a person returned as elected at a
    second election was unseated on ascertainment that another person had
    actually been chosen at the first election (I, 646). Where a Member was
    reelected to the House, although at the time of the election he had been
    unaccounted for for several weeks following the disappearance of the
    plane on which he was a passenger, the Governor of the State from which
    he was elected transmitted his certificate to the House in the regular
    fashion. When the Member-elect was still missing at the time the new
    Congress convened, and circumstances were such that other passengers on
    the missing plane had been presumed dead following judicial inquiries in
    the State where the plane was lost, the House declared the seat vacant
    (H. Res. 1, 93d Cong., Jan. 3, 1973, p. 15). In the 108th Congress the
    House codified in clause 5 of rule XX its practice of accounting for
    vacancies (sec. 2(l), H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 2003, p. 7).

    <>   \5\
    The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other
    Officers; * * *

    Sec. 24. Functions of the State ecutive in filling vacancies.

      The term ``vacancy''  as occurring in this paragraph of
    the Constitution has been examined in relation to the functions of the
    State executive (I, 312, 518). A Federal law empowers the States and
    Territories to provide by law the times of elections to fill vacancies
    (I, 516; 2 U.S.C. 8); but an election called by a governor in pursuance
    of constitutional authority was held valid although no State law
    prescribed the time, place, or manner of such election (I, 517). Where
    two candidates had an equal number of votes, the governor did not issue
    credentials to either, but ordered a new election after they had waived
    their respective claims (I, 555). A candidate elected for the 104th
    Congress was appointed by the Governor to fill a vacancy for the
    remainder of the 103d Congress pursuant to a State law requiring the
    Governor to appoint the candidate who won the election to the 104th
    Congress. In that case the House authorized the Speaker to administer
    the oath to the Member-elect and referred the question of his final
    right to the seat in the 103d Congress to the Committee on House
    Administration (Nov. 29, 1994, pp. 29585, 29586). For a discussion of a
    State election to fill a prospective vacancy of the House, see Sec. 19.
    <>   A
    Member elected to fill a vacancy serves no longer time than the
    remainder of the term of the Member whose place he fills (I, 3). For the
    compensation and allowances of such Members, see Sec. 87, infra.

      The officers of the House are the Speaker, who has always been one of
    its Members and whose term as Speaker must expire with the term as a
    Member; and the Clerk, Sergeant-at-Arms, Chief Administrative Officer,
    and Chaplain (I, 187), no one of whom has ever been chosen from the
    sitting membership of the House and who continue in office until their
    successors are chosen and qualified (I, 187). In one case the officers
    continued through the entire Congress succeeding that in which they were
    elected (I, 244, 263). Former officers include Doorkeeper (abolished by
    the 104th Congress, see Sec. 663a, infra) and Postmaster (abolished
    during the 102d Congress, see Sec. 668, infra). The House formerly
    provided by special rule that the Clerk should continue in office until
    another should be chosen (I, 187, 188, 235, 244). Currently, certain
    statutes impose on the officers duties that contemplate their
    continuance (I, 14, 15; 2 U.S.C. 75a-1, 83).

    [[Page 14]]

    by what method it shall elect the Speaker (I, 210).
    On two occasions, by special rules, Speakers were chosen by a plurality
    of votes; but in each case the House by majority vote adopted a
    resolution declaring the result (I, 221, 222). The House has declined to
    choose a Speaker by lot (I, 221).

    Sec. 27. Election of a Speaker.

      The Speaker, who  was at
    first elected by ballot, has been chosen viva voce by surname in
    response to a call of the roll since 1839 (I, 187). The Speaker is
    elected by a majority of Members-elect voting by surname, a quorum being
    present (I, 216; VI, 24; Jan. 7, 1997, p. 117). The Clerk appoints
    tellers for this election (I, 217). Ultimately, the House, and not the
    Clerk, decides

      The motion to proceed to the election of a Speaker is privileged (I,
    212, 214; VIII, 3883), and debatable unless the previous question is
    ordered (I, 213). Relying on the Act of June 1, 1789 (2 U.S.C. 25), the
    Clerk recognized for nominations for Speaker as being of higher
    constitutional privilege than a resolution to postpone the election of a
    Speaker and instead provide for the election of a Speaker pro tempore
    pending the disposition of certain ethics charges against the nominee of
    the majority party (Jan. 7, 1997, p. 115). On several occasions the
    choice of a Speaker has been delayed for several weeks by contests (I,
    222; V, 5356, 6647, 6649; VI, 24). The contest over the election of a
    Speaker in 1923 was resolved after a procedure for the adoption of rules
    for the 68th Congress had been presented (VI, 24). In 1860 the voting
    for Speaker proceeded slowly, being interspersed with debate (I, 223),
    and in one instance the House asked candidates for Speaker to state
    their views before proceeding to election (I, 218).

    Sec. 28. Vacancies in the Office of
    Speaker.

      A proposition  to elect a Speaker is in order at any time a vacancy exists
    and presents a question of the highest privilege (VIII, 3383). Upon a
    vacancy in the Office of Speaker, the House elects a new Speaker either
    viva voce following nominations (in the case in which a Speaker has died
    between sessions of Congress or resigned) or by resolution (in the case
    in which a Speaker has died during a session of Congress). For example,
    in the case in which the Speaker had died between sessions of Congress,
    the Clerk at the next session called the House to order, ascertained the
    presence of a quorum, and then the House proceeded to elect a successor
    viva voce following nominations (I, 234; Jan. 10, 1962, p. 5). In a case
    in which the Speaker died during a session of Congress, but not while
    the House was sitting, the Clerk on the following day called the House
    to order and the Speaker's successor was elected by resolution (June 4,
    1936, p. 9016; Sept. 16, 1940, p. 12231). In a case in which the Speaker
    resigned ``on the election of my successor'' (May 31, 1989, p. 10440),
    he entertained nominations for Speaker and, following the roll call,
    declared the winner of the election ``duly elected Speaker'' (June 6,
    1989, p. 10801). In one instance a Speaker resigned on the last day of
    the Congress, and the House unanimously adopted a motion to elect a
    successor for the day (I, 225).

    [[Page 15]]

    floor (I, 225), by tendering the
    resignation during recognition under a question of personal privilege
    (May 31, 1989, p. 10440), or by sending a letter that the Clerk reads to
    the House at the beginning of a new session (I, 232). When the Speaker
    resigns no action of the House excusing him from service is taken (I,
    232). Instance wherein the Speaker, following a vote upon an essential
    question indicating a change in the party control of the House,
    announced that under the circumstances it was incumbent upon the Speaker
    to resign or to recognize for a motion declaring vacant the Office of
    Speaker (VI, 35). In the 108th Congress the House adopted clause 8(b)(3)
    of rule I, under which the Speaker is required to deliver to the Clerk a
    list of Members in the order in which each shall act as Speaker pro
    tempore in the case of a vacancy in the Office of Speaker (sec. 2(a), H.
    Res. 5, Jan. 7, 2003, p. 7). The Speaker delivered to the Clerk the
    first such letter on February 10, 2003 (Mar. 13, 2003, p. 6118).
    <>   The effect of a law to regulate the action of the House in
    choosing its own officers has been discussed (IV, 3819), and such a law
    has been considered of doubtful validity (V, 6765, 6766) in theory and
    practice (I, 241, 242). The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2
    U.S.C. 75a-1) authorizes the Speaker to fill temporary vacancies in the
    offices of Clerk, Sergeant-at-Arms, Chief Administrative Officer, and
    Chaplain. For a history of the Speaker's exercise of such authority, see
    Sec. 640, infra;  and, for further information on the elections of
    officers, see Deschler, ch. 6.
      Form of resolution offered on death of a Speaker (Sept. 16, 1940, p.
    12232; Jan. 10, 1962, p. 9) and of a former Speaker (VIII, 3564; Mar. 7,
    1968, p. 5742; H. Res. 328, Jan. 25, 1994, p. 89; H. Res. 418, Feb. 8,
    2000, p. 834). A resolution declaring vacant the Office of Speaker is
    presented as a matter of high constitutional privilege (VI, 35).
    Speakers have resigned by rising in their place and addressing the House
    (I, 231, 233), by calling a Member to the Chair and tendering the
    resignation verbally from the

    * * * <> and
    [the House of Representatives] shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

    Sec. 30. Election of Clerk in relation to business.

        It has
    been held that the Act of June 1, 1789 (2 U.S.C. 25) bound the House to
    elect a Clerk before proceeding to business (I, 237, 241). In some
    instances the House has proceeded to legislation and other business
    before electing a Clerk (I, 242, 244). When a vacancy arises in the
    Office of Clerk during a session, business has intervened before the
    election of a new Clerk (I, 239).

      In 1868 the Senate ceased in its rules to describe the House, acting
    in an impeachment, as the ``grand inquest of the nation'' (III, 2126).
    See also art. II, sec. 4 (Sec. 173, infra); Deschler, ch. 14.

      A Federal court having subpoenaed certain evidence gathered by a
    committee of the House in an impeachment inquiry, the House adopted a
    resolution granting such limited access to the evidence as would not
    infringe upon its sole power of impeachment (Aug. 22, 1974, p. 30047).

    [[Page 16]]

    prompted by a communication from an independent counsel,
    see Sec. 176, infra.

      Until the law expired on June 30, 1999, an independent counsel was
    required to advise the House of any substantial and credible information
    that may constitute grounds for impeachment of an officer under
    investigation (28 U.S.C. 595(c)). For a description of impeachment
    proceedings

    Sec. 32. Numbers, terms, and votes
    of Senators.

      Section 3. \1\ [The Senate  of the United States shall be composed of two Senators
    from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and
    each Senator shall have one Vote.]

      This provision was changed by the 17th amendment.

    Sec. 33. Division of the Senate into
    classes.

      \2\ Immediately  after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first
    Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes.
    The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the
    Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of
    the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of
    the <> sixth Year,
    so that one-third may be chosen every second Year; [and if Vacancies
    happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the
    Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary
    Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then
    fill such Vacancies.]

      That part of the above paragraph in brackets was changed by the 17th
    amendment.

    [[Page 17]]

    Sec. 35. Qualifications of Senators.

      \3\ No Person  shall be
    a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and
    been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when
    elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

      In 1794 the Senate decided that Albert Gallatin was disqualified,
    not having been a citizen nine years although he had served in the war
    of Independence and was a resident of the country when the Constitution
    was formed (I, 428); and in 1849 that James Shields was disqualified,
    not having been a citizen for the required time (I, 429). But in 1870
    the Senate declined to examine as to H. R. Revels, a citizen under the
    recently adopted 14th amendment (I, 430). As to inhabitancy the Senate
    seated one who, being a citizen of the United States, had been an
    inhabitant of the State from which he was appointed for less than a year
    (I, 437). Also one who, while stationed in a State as an army officer
    had declared his intention of making his home in the State, was admitted
    by the Senate (I, 438). A Senator who at the time of his election was
    actually residing in the District of Columbia as an officeholder, but
    who voted in his old home and had no intent of making the District his
    domicile, was held to be qualified (I, 439).

    Sec. 36. The Vice President; voting.

      \4\ The Vice  President
    of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no
    Vote, unless they be equally divided.

    <>   \5\ The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and
    also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or
    when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.

      The right of the Vice President to vote has been construed to extend
    to questions relating to the organization of the Senate (V, 5975), as
    the election of officers of the Senate (V, 5972-5974), or a decision on
    the title of a claimant to a seat (V, 5976, 5977). The Senate has
    declined to make a rule relating to the vote of the Vice President (V,
    5974).

    -  \6\ The Senate <> shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.
    When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation.
    When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice
    shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted

    [[Page 18]]

    without the
    Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.

      In the 107th Congress the Senate elected two Presidents of the Senate
    pro tempore for different periods when the majority of the Senate
    shifted after inauguration of the Vice President (S. Res. 3, Jan. 3,
    2001, p. 7).

      For the exclusive power of the Senate to try impeachments under the
    United States Constitution, see Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 293
    (1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 668 (1937). See also Mississippi v.
    Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867) (dictum). For the
    nonjusticiability of a claim that a Senate impeachment rule (XI)
    violates the impeachment trial clause by delegating to a committee of 12
    Senators the responsibility to receive evidence, hear testimony, and
    report to the Senate thereon, see Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224
    (1993). For a discussion of Senate impeachment procedures, see
    Sec. Sec. 608-20, infra.

    Sec. 41. Judgment in cases of
    impeachment.

      \7\ Judgment in  Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to
    removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office
    of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party
    convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial,
    Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.

      There has been discussion as to whether or not the Constitution
    requires both removal and disqualification on conviction (III, 2397);
    but in the case of Pickering, the Senate decreed only removal (III,
    2341). In the case of Humphreys, judgment of both removal and
    disqualification was pronounced (III, 2397). In the Ritter case, it was
    first held that upon conviction of the respondent, judgment of removal
    required no vote, following automatically from conviction under article
    II, section 4 (Apr. 17, 1936, p. 5607). In the 99th Congress, having
    tried to conviction the first impeachment case against a Federal
    district judge since 1936, the Senate ordered his removal from office
    (Oct. 9, 1986, p. 29870). In the 101st Congress, two other Federal
    district judges were removed from office following their convictions in
    the Senate (Oct. 20, 1989, p. 25335; Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27101). In the
    111th Congress, a Federal district judge was removed from office
    following his conviction in the Senate (Dec. 8, 2010, p. _). For a
    further discussion of judgments in cases of impeachment, see Sec. 619,
    infra.

    [[Page 19]]

    any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the
    places of chusing Senators.

    Sec. 42. Times, places, and manner
    of elections of Representatives and Senators.

      Section 4. \1\ The Times,  Places and Manner of
    holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed
    in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at

      The relative powers of the Congress and the States under this
    paragraph have been the subject of much discussion (I, 311, 313, 507,
    footnote); but Congress has in fact fixed by law the time of elections
    (I, 508; VI, 66; 2 U.S.C. 7), and has controlled the manner to the
    extent of prescribing a ballot or voting machine (II, 961; VI, 150; 2
    U.S.C. 9). When a State delegated to a municipality the power to
    regulate the manner of holding an election, a question arose (II, 975).
    A question has arisen as to whether or not a State, in the absence of
    action by Congress, might make the time of election of Congressmen
    contingent on the time of the State election (I, 522). This paragraph
    gives Congress the power to protect the right to vote in primaries in
    which they are an integral part of the election process. United States
    v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299
    (1941). Congress may legislate under this paragraph to protect the
    exercise of the franchise in congressional elections. Ex parte Siebolt,
    100 U.S. 371 (1880); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).

    Sec. 43. Functions of a State legislature in
    fixing time, etc., of elections.

      The meaning of  the word ``legislature'' in this
    clause of the Constitution has been the subject of discussion (II, 856),
    as to whether or not it means a constitutional convention as well as a
    legislature in the commonly accepted meaning of the word (I, 524). The
    House has sworn in Members chosen at an election the time, etc., of
    which was fixed by the schedule of a constitution adopted on that
    election day (I, 519, 520, 522). But the House held that where a
    legislature has been in existence a constitutional convention might not
    exercise the power (I, 363, 367). It has been argued generally that the
    legislature derives the power herein discussed from the Federal and not
    the State Constitution (II, 856, 947), and therefore that the State
    constitution might not in this respect control the State legislature
    (II, 1133). The House has sustained this view by its action (I, 525).
    But where the State constitution fixed a date for an election and the
    legislature had not acted, although it had the opportunity, the House
    held the election valid (II, 846). Title III of the Legislative Branch
    Appropriations Act, 2006, amended Federal election law to require States
    to hold special elections for the House within 49 days after a vacancy
    is announced by the Speaker in the extraordinary circumstance that
    vacancies in representation from the States exceed 100 (P.L. 109-55; 2
    U.S.C. 8).

    [[Page 20]]

    U.S.
    232 (1921); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); United States v.
    Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
    Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724
    (1974); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); U.S. Term Limits, Inc., v.
    Thorton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995); and Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997). In
    Public Law 91-285, Congress lowered the minimum age of voters in all
    Federal, State, and local elections from 21 to 18 years. In Oregon v.
    Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), the Supreme Court upheld the power of
    Congress under article I, section 4 and under section 5 of the 14th
    amendment to the Constitution to fix the age of voters in Federal
    elections, but held that the 10th amendment to the Constitution reserved
    to the States the power to establish voter age qualifications in State
    and local elections. The 26th amendment to the Constitution extended the
    right of persons 18 years of age or older to vote in elections held
    under State authority.

    Sec. 44. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Ex
    parte Clark, 100 U.S. 399 (1880); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651
    (1884); In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888); Ohio v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565
    (1916); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); United States  v.
    Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917); Newberry v. United States, 256

    Sec. 45. Annual meeting of Congress.

      \2\ [The Congress  shall
    assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the
    first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different
    Day.]

      This provision has been superseded by the 20th amendment.

      In the later but not the earlier practice (I, 5), before the 20th
    amendment, the fact that Congress had met once within the year did not
    make uncertain the constitutional mandate to meet on the first Monday of
    December (I, 6, 9-11). Early Congresses, convened either by proclamation
    or law on a day earlier than the constitutional day, remained in
    continuous session to a time beyond that day (I, 6, 9-11). But in the
    later view an existing session ends with the day appointed by the
    Constitution for the regular annual session (II, 1160); see Sec. 84,
    infra. Congress has frequently appointed by law a day for the meeting
    (I, 4, 5, 10-12, footnote; see also Sec. 243, infra).

    Sec. 46. House the judge of elections,
    returns, and qualifications.

      Section 5. \1\ Each  House shall be the Judge of the
    Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, * * *.

    [[Page 21]]

    ch. 9 (election contests); for discussion of
    the power of the House to judge qualifications, see Deschler, ch. 7.
      In judging the qualifications of its Members, the House may not add
    qualifications to those expressly stated in the United States
    Constitution. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). This phrase
    allows the House or Senate to deny the right to a seat without
    unlawfully depriving a State of its right to equal representation. Barry
    v. United States ex rel Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929). But a State may
    conduct a recount of votes without interfering with the authority of the
    House under this phrase. Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972). For
    discussion of the power of the House to judge elections, see Deschler,
    ch. 8 (elections) and

      The House has the same authority to determine the right of a Delegate
    to a seat that it has in the case of a Member (I, 423). The House may
    not delegate the duty of judging its elections to another tribunal (I,
    608), and the courts of a State have no role in such matters (II, 959).
    The House has once examined the relations of this power to the power to
    expel (I, 469).

    Sec. 47. Power of judging as related to State
    laws as to returns.

      As nearly all  the laws governing the elections of
    Representatives in Congress are State laws, questions have often arisen
    as to the relation of this power of judging to those laws (I, 637). The
    House decided very early that the certificate of a State executive
    issued in strict accordance with State law does not prevent examination
    of the votes by the House and a reversal of the return (I, 637). The
    House has also held that it is not confined to the conclusions of
    returns made up in strict conformity to State law, but may examine the
    votes and correct the returns (I, 774); and the fact that a State law
    gives canvassers the right to reject votes for fraud and irregularities
    does not preclude the House from going behind the returns (II, 887). The
    highest court in one State (Colorado) has ruled that it lacked
    jurisdiction to pass upon a candidate's allegations of irregularities in
    a primary election and that the House had exclusive jurisdiction to
    decide such questions and to declare the rightful nominee (Sept. 23,
    1970, p. 33320).

    Sec. 48. Power of judging as related to
    State laws as to acts of the voter.

      When the question  concerns not the acts of returning
    officers, but the act of the voter in voting, the House has found more
    difficulty in determining the proper exercise of its constitutional
    power. Although the House has always acted on the principle of giving
    expression to the intent of the voter (I, 575, 639, 641; II, 1090), it
    has held that a mandatory State law, even though arbitrary, may cause
    the rejection of a ballot on which the intent of the voter is plain (II,
    1009, 1056, 1077, 1078, 1091). See Deschler, ch. 8, Sec. 8.11, for
    discussion of distinction between directory State laws governing the
    conduct of election officials as to ballots, and mandatory laws
    regulating the conduct of voters.

    [[Page 22]]

    Sec. 49. Power of House as related to
    constitutionality of State laws.

      Where the State  courts have upheld a State election
    law as constitutional the House does not ordinarily question the law
    (II, 856, 1071). But if there has been no such decision the House, in
    determining its election cases, has passed on the validity of State laws
    under State constitutions (II, 1011, 1134), and has acted on its
    decision that they were unconstitutional (II, 1075, 1126), but it is not
    the policy of the House to pass upon the validity of State election laws
    alleged to be in conflict with the State constitution (VI, 151).

    Sec. 50. Effect of interpretation of State
    election laws by State courts.

      The courts of  a State do not have a direct role
    in judging the elections, qualifications, and returns of Representatives
    in Congress (II, 959), but where the highest State court has interpreted
    the State law the House has concluded that it should generally be
    governed by this interpretation (I, 645, 731; II, 1041, 1048), but does
    not consider itself bound by such interpretations (VI, 58). The House is
    not bound, however, by a decision on an analogous but not the identical
    question in issue (II, 909); and where the alleged fraud of election
    judges was in issue, the acquittal of those judges in the courts was
    held not to be an adjudication binding on the House (II, 1019). For a
    recent illustration of a protracted election dispute lasting four months
    see House Report 99-58, culminating in House Resolution 146 of the 99th
    Congress (May 1, 1985, p. 9998).

    Sec. 51. Laws of Congress not binding on the
    House in its function of judging its elections.

      The statutes of  the United States
    provide specific methods for institution of a contest as to the title to
    a seat in the House (I, 678, 697-706) (2 U.S.C. 381-396); but the House
    regards this law as not of absolute binding force, but rather a prudent
    rule not to be departed from except for cause (I, 597, 719, 825, 833),
    and it sometimes by resolution modifies the procedure prescribed by the
    law (I, 449, 600).

    Sec. 51a. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: In re Loney, 134 U.S. 317 (1890); Reed v.
    County Commissioners, 277 U.S. 376 (1928); Barry v. United States ex
    rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15
    (1972).

    Sec. 52. The quorum.

      * * * and a  Majority of each [House]
    shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may
    adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance
    of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each
    House may provide.

    [[Page 23]]

    5(d) of rule XX, when a vacancy occurs or when a new
    Member is sworn, the Speaker announces the resulting adjustment in the
    whole number of the House (see Sec. 1024b, infra). Under clause 5(c) of
    rule XX, the House may establish a provisional number of the House
    where, due to catastrophic circumstances, a quorum fails to appear (sec.
    2(h), H. Res. 5, Jan. 4, 2005, p. 43; see Sec. 1024a, infra).

    Sec. 53. Interpretation of the Constitution
    as to number constituting a quorum.

      Out of conditions  arising between 1861 and 1891 the
    rule was established that a majority of the Members chosen and living
    constituted the quorum required by the Constitution (IV, 2885-2888); but
    later examination has resulted in a decision confirming in the House of
    Representatives the construction established in the Senate that a quorum
    consists of a majority of Senators duly chosen and sworn (I, 630; IV,
    2891-2894). So the decision of the House now is that after the House is
    once organized the quorum consists of a majority of those Members
    chosen, sworn, and living whose membership has not been terminated by
    resignation or by the action of the House (IV, 2889, 2890; VI, 638).
    Under clause

    Sec. 54. The theory of the quorum present; and
    the count by the Speaker.

      For many years  a quorum was determined only by noting the
    number of Members voting (IV, 2896, 2897), with the result that Members
    by refusing to vote could often break a quorum and obstruct the public
    business (II, 1034; IV, 2895, footnote; V, 5744). However, in 1890
    Speaker Reed directed the Clerk to enter on the Journal as part of the
    record of a yea-and-nay vote names of Members present but not voting,
    thereby establishing a quorum of record (IV, 2895). This decision, which
    was upheld by the Supreme Court (IV, 2904; United States v. Ballin, 144
    U.S. 1 (1892)), established the principle that a quorum present made
    valid any action by the House, although an actual quorum might not vote
    (I, 216, footnote; IV, 2932). Thenceforth the point of order as to a
    quorum was required to be that no quorum was present and not that no
    quorum had voted (IV, 2917). At the time of the establishment of this
    principle the Speaker revived the count by the Chair as a method of
    determining the presence of a quorum at a time when no record vote was
    ordered (IV, 2909). The Speaker has permitted his count of a quorum to
    be verified by tellers (IV, 2888), but has not conceded it as a right of
    the House to have tellers under the circumstances (IV, 2916; VI, 647-
    651; VIII, 2369, 2436), claiming that the Chair might determine the
    presence of a quorum in such manner as he should deem accurate and
    suitable (IV, 2932). The Chair counts all Members in sight, whether in
    the cloak rooms, or within the bar (IV, 2970; VIII, 3120). Later, as the
    complement to the new view of the quorum, the early theory that the
    presence of a quorum was as necessary during debate or other business as
    on a vote was revived (IV, 2935-2949). Also, a line of rulings made
    under the old theory was overruled; and it was established that the
    point of no quorum might be made after the House had declined to verify
    a division by tellers or the yeas and nays (IV, 2918-2926). For a
    discussion of the Ballin decision and the Chair's count to determine a
    quorum, see House Practice, ch. 43, Sec. 5.

    [[Page 24]]

    pro tempore, the Speaker on the next day ruled that the action was
    null and void (IV, 2964; see also VIII, 3161). But such absence of a
    quorum should appear from the Journal if a legislative act is to be
    vacated for such reason (IV, 2962), and where the assumption that a
    quorum was present when the House acted was uncontradicted by the
    Journal, it was held that this assumption might not be overthrown by
    expressions of opinion by Members individually (IV, 2961).

    Sec. 55. Relations of the quorum to acts of the
    House.

      The absence of  a quorum having been disclosed, there must be a quorum of
    record before the House may proceed to business (IV, 2952, 2953; VI,
    624, 660, 662), and the point of no quorum may not be withdrawn even by
    unanimous consent after the absence of a quorum has been ascertained and
    announced by the Chair (IV, 2928-2931; VI, 657; Apr. 13, 1978, p. 10119;
    Sept. 25, 1984, p. 26778). But when an action has been completed, it is
    too late to make the point of order that a quorum was not present when
    it was done (IV, 2927; VI, 655). But where action requiring a quorum was
    taken in the ascertained absence of a quorum by ruling of a Speaker

      Major revisions in the House rules concerning the necessity and
    establishment of a quorum occurred in the 94th, 95th, and 96th
    Congresses. Under the practice in the 93d Congress, for example, a point
    of no quorum would prevent the report of the chair of a Committee of the
    Whole (VI, 666); but in the 93d Congress clause 7 of rule XX (formerly
    clause 6 of rule XV) was adopted to provide that after the presence of a
    quorum is once ascertained on any day, a point of no quorum could not be
    entertained after the Committee had risen and pending the report of the
    chair to the House. Clause 7 of rule XX now specifically precludes a
    point of no quorum unless a question has been put to a vote. However,
    the Speaker retains the right to recognize a Member to move a call of
    the House at any time (but may, under clause 7(c) of rule XX recognize
    for a call of the House after the previous question has been ordered
    only when the Speaker determines by actual count that a quorum is not
    present). A point of order of no quorum during debate only in the House
    does not lie independently under this clause of the Constitution because
    clause 7 of rule XX (formerly clause 6 of rule XV) is a proper exercise
    of the House's constitutional rulemaking authority that can be
    interpreted consistently with the requirement that a quorum be present
    to conduct business (as opposed to mere debate) (Sept. 8, 1977, p.
    28114; Sept. 12, 1977, p. 28800).

    [[Page 25]]

    have already adopted a concurrent resolution
    providing for an adjournment sine die on that day (Oct. 18, 1972, p.
    37200).
      Before these changes to rule XX (formerly rule XV), a quorum was
    required at all times during the reading of the Journal (IV, 2732, 2733;
    VI, 625, 629) or messages from the President or the Senate (IV, 3522);
    but the modern practice would require the presence of a quorum only when
    the question is put on a pending motion or proposition in the House such
    as on a motion incident to the reading, amendment, or approval of the
    Journal or on the referral or other disposition of other papers read to
    the House. The practice in the Committee of the Whole is now governed by
    clause 6 of rule XVIII. No motion is in order on the failure of a quorum
    but the motions to adjourn and for a call of the House (IV, 2950; VI,
    680) and the motion to adjourn has precedence over the motion for a call
    of the House (VIII, 2642). A call of the House is in order under the
    Constitution before the adoption of the rules (IV, 2981). Those present
    on a call of the House may prescribe a fine as a condition on which an
    arrested Member may be discharged (IV, 3013, 3014), but this is rarely
    done. A quorum is not required on motions incidental to a call of the
    House (IV, 2994; VI, 681; Oct. 8, 1940, p. 13403; Oct. 8, 1968, p.
    30090). Adjournment sine die is in order notwithstanding the absence of
    a quorum if both Houses

    Sec. 56. Relations of the quorum to organization
    of the House.

      At the time  of organization the two Houses inform one another of the
    appearance of the quorum in each, and the two Houses jointly inform the
    President (I, 198-203). A message from one House that its quorum has
    appeared is not delivered in the other until a quorum has appeared there
    also (I, 126). But at the beginning of a second session of a Congress
    the House proceeded to business, although a quorum had not appeared in
    the Senate (I, 126). At the beginning of a second session of a Congress
    unsworn Members-elect were taken into account in ascertaining the
    presence of a quorum (I, 175); however, at the beginning of the second
    session of the 87th Congress, the Clerk called the House to order,
    announced the death of Speaker Rayburn during the adjournment sine die,
    and did not call unsworn Members-elect or Members who had resigned
    during the hiatus to establish a quorum or elect a new Speaker (Jan. 10,
    1962, p. 5). In both Houses the oath has been administered to Members-
    elect in the absence of a quorum (I, 174, 181, 182; VI, 22), although in
    one case the Speaker objected to such proceedings (II, 875). Prayer by
    the Chaplain is not business requiring the presence of a quorum and the
    Speaker declines to entertain a point of no quorum before prayer is
    offered (VI, 663; clause 7 of rule XX).

    <>   \2\ Each House may
    determine the Rules of its Proceedings, * * *

    Sec. 57. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 190 (1880);
    United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Burton v. United States, 202
    U.S. 344 (1906).

    [[Page 26]]

    5, Jan. 7, 2003, p. 7). Ordinary rights and functions of the House
    under the Constitution are exercised in accordance with the rules (III,
    2567), and under later decisions questions of so-called constitutional
    privilege should also be considered in accordance with the rules (VI,
    48; VII, 889; Apr. 8, 1926, p. 7147). But a law passed by an existing
    Congress with the concurrence of the House has been recognized by that
    House as of binding force in matters of procedure (V, 6767, 6768). In
    exercising its constitutional power to change its rules the House may
    confine itself within certain limitations (V, 6756; VIII, 3376); but the
    attempt of the House to deprive the Speaker of a vote as a Member by a
    rule was successfully resisted (V, 5966, 5967). Although the Act of June
    1, 1789 (see 2 U.S.C. 25) requires the election of a Clerk before the
    House proceeds to business, the House has held that it may adopt rules
    before electing a Clerk (I, 245). Although the Speaker ceases to be an
    officer of the House with the expiration of a Congress, the Clerk, by
    old usage, continues in a new Congress (I, 187, 188, 235, 244; see 2
    U.S.C. 26). The House has adopted a rule before election of a Speaker
    (I, 94, 95); but in 1839 was deterred by the Act of June 1, 1789 and the
    Constitution from adopting rules before the administration of the oath
    to Members-elect (I, 140). The earlier theory that an officer might be
    empowered to administer oaths by a rule of either House has been
    abandoned in later practice and the authority has been conferred by law
    (III, 1823, 1824, 2079, 2303, 2479; 2 U.S.C. 191).

    Sec. 59. Power to make rules not impaired by
    rules or law.

      The power of  each House of Representatives to make its own rules may
    not be impaired or controlled by the rules of a preceding House (I, 187,
    210; V, 6002, 6743-6747), or by a law passed by a prior Congress (I, 82,
    245; IV, 3298, 3579; V, 6765, 6766). The House in adopting its rules
    may, however, incorporate by reference as a part thereof all applicable
    provisions of law that constituted the Rules of the House at the end of
    the preceding Congress (e.g., H. Res. 5, 95th Cong., Jan. 4, 1977, pp.
    53-70) and has also incorporated provisions of concurrent resolutions
    that were intended to remain applicable under the Budget Act (e.g., H.
    Res. 5, 107th Cong., Jan. 3, 2001, p. 25). The House twice reaffirmed
    free-standing directives to the Committee on Standards of Official
    Conduct (now Ethics) contained in a simple House resolution (H. Res.
    168, 105th Cong., p. 19317, reaffirmed for the 106th Congress by sec.
    2(c), H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. 47, and reaffirmed for the 107th
    Congress with an exception by sec. 3(a), H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 2001, p. 24;
    see Sec. 806, infra). In the 108th Congress those free-standing
    directives were codified in clause 3 of rule XI (sec. 2(h), H. Res.

    Sec. 60. Procedure in the House before the
    adoption of rules.

      Before the adoption  of rules the House is governed by general
    parliamentary law, but Speakers have been inclined to give weight to the
    rules and precedents of the House in modifying the usual constructions
    of that law (V, 5604, 6758-6760; VIII, 3384; Jan. 3, 1953, p. 24; Jan.
    10, 1967, p. 14). The general parliamentary law as understood in the
    House is founded on Jefferson's Manual as modified by the practice of
    American legislative assemblies, especially of the House of
    Representatives (V, 6761-6763; Jan. 3, 1953, p. 24), but the provisions
    of the House's accustomed rules are not necessarily followed (V, 5509).
    Before the adoption of rules, the statutory enactments incorporated into
    the rules of the prior Congress as an exercise of the rulemaking power
    do not control the proceedings of the new House until it adopts rules
    incorporating those provisions (Jan. 22, 1971, p. 132).

    [[Page 27]]

    3060; Deschler, ch. 1, Sec. 8),
    even before recognizing another Member to offer as a question of
    privilege another resolution calling into question the constitutionality
    of that resolution (Speaker Foley, Jan. 5, 1993, p. 49). The Speaker
    also may recognize a Member to offer for immediate consideration a
    special order providing for the consideration of a resolution adopting
    the rules (Speaker Gingrich, H. Res. 5, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 447; H. Res. 5,
    Jan. 4, 2007, p. 7). The resolution adopting rules for a Congress has
    included a special order of business for consideration of specified
    legislation (sec. 108, H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 463; sec. 3, H. Res.
    5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. 76; secs. 506-510, H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 2007, p. 30;
    sec. 5, H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 2009, p. _). The Speaker held as not
    cognizable a point of order that a resolution adopting the Rules of the
    House contained a provision that the House had no constitutional
    authority to adopt, stating that the House decides such issues by way of
    the question of consideration or disposition of the resolution (Speaker
    Hastert, Jan. 4, 2005, pp. 44-46).
      Before the adoption of rules, it is in order for any Member who is
    recognized by the Chair to offer a proposition relating to the order of
    business without asking consent of the House (IV, 3060). Relying on the
    Act of June 1, 1789 (2 U.S.C. 25), the Clerk recognized for nominations
    for Speaker as being of higher constitutional privilege than a
    resolution to postpone the election of a Speaker and instead provide for
    the election of a Speaker pro tempore pending the disposition of certain
    ethics charges against the nominee of the majority party (Jan. 7, 1997,
    p. 115). The Speaker may recognize the Majority Leader to offer an
    initial resolution providing for the adoption of the rules as a question
    of privilege in its own right (IV,

      During debate on the resolution adopting rules, any Member may make a
    point of order that a quorum is not present based upon general
    parliamentary precedents, because the provisions of clause 7 of rule XX
    (formerly clause 6(e) of rule XV) prohibiting the Chair from
    entertaining such a point of order unless the question has been put on
    the pending proposition are not yet applicable (Jan. 15, 1979, p. 10).
    Before adoption of rules, under general parliamentary law as modified by
    usage and practice of the House, an amendment may be subject to the
    point of order that it is not germane to the proposition to which
    offered (Jan. 3, 1969, p. 23). Before adoption of rules, the Speaker may
    maintain decorum by directing a Member who has not been recognized in
    debate beyond an allotted time to be removed from the well and by
    directing the Sergeant-at-Arms to present the mace as the traditional
    symbol of order (Jan. 3, 1991, p. 58).

      The motion to commit is permitted after the previous question has been
    ordered on the resolution adopting the rules (V, 5604; Jan. 3, 1989, p.
    81; Jan. 3, 1991, p. 61) but is not debatable (Jan. 7, 1997, p. 139). It
    is the prerogative of the minority to offer a motion to commit even
    before the adoption of the rules, but at that point the proponent need
    not qualify as opposed to the resolution (Jan. 3, 1991, p. 61; Jan. 4,
    1995, p. 457). Such a motion to commit is not divisible, but if it is
    agreed to and more than one amendment is reported back pursuant thereto,
    then separate votes may be had on the reported amendments (Jan. 5, 1993,
    p. 98). The motion to refer has also been permitted upon the offering of
    a resolution adopting the rules, and before debate thereon, subject to
    the motion to lay on the table (Jan. 5, 1993, p. 52; Jan. 5, 2011, _).

    [[Page 28]]

    Sec. 61. Joint rules.

      The two Houses  of Congress adopted in
    the early years of the Government joint rules to govern their procedure
    in matters requiring concurrent action; but in 1876 these joint rules
    were abrogated (IV, 3430; V, 6782-6787). The most useful of their
    provision continued to be observed in practice, however (IV, 3430; V,
    6592).

    Sec. 61a. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the
    Supreme Court of the United States: United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6
    (1932); Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949); United States
    v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950); Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109
    (1963); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).

    Sec. 62. Punishment and expulsion of
    Members.

      * * * [Each House may]  punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the
    Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.

    Sec. 63. Punishment and expulsion,
    generally.

      Among the  punishments that the House may impose under this provision,
    the rules of the Committee on Ethics outline the following: (1)
    expulsion from the House; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; (4) fine; (5)
    denial or limitation of any right, power, privilege, or immunity of the
    Member if not in violation of the Constitution; or (6) any other
    sanction determined by the Committee to be appropriate (rule 24,
    Committee on Ethics, 112th Cong.). Under rule 10 of the rules of that
    committee, a statement of alleged violation must be proven by clear and
    convincing evidence.

    [[Page 29]]

    of the
    resolution, and the manager of the resolution (July 24, 2002, p. 14314).
    Debate on a resolution recommending a disciplinary sanction against a
    Member may not exceed the scope of the conduct of the accused Member
    (Dec. 18, 1987, p. 36271).
      In action for censure or expulsion, the House has discussed whether or
    not the principles of the procedure of the courts should be followed
    (II, 1255, 1264). The House, in a proceeding for expulsion, declined to
    give the Member a trial at the bar (II, 1275); but the Senate has
    permitted a counsel to appear at its bar (II, 1263), although it
    declined to grant a request for a specific statement of charges or
    compulsory process for witnesses (II, 1264). In one instance, pending
    consideration of a resolution to censure a Member, the Speaker informed
    him that he should retire (II, 1366), but this is not usual. Members or
    Senators, against whom resolutions have been pending, have participated
    in debate either by consent to make a personal explanation (II, 1656) or
    without question as to consent (II, 1246, 1253, 1269, 1286). A Member
    against whom a resolution of censure was pending was asked by the
    Speaker if he desired to be heard (VI, 236). However, after the House
    had voted to censure and the Member had been brought to the bar by the
    Sergeant-at-Arms to be censured, it was held that he might not then be
    heard (II, 1259). In the modern practice, the manager of the resolution
    proposing the punishment (who controls the entire hour) yields a portion
    of the time to the accused (Oct. 2, 1980, p. 28966; July 24, 2002, p.
    14309; Dec. 2, 2010, p. _). In the latter case, the House extended
    debate on the resolution for a specified period and yielded that entire
    time to the Member who was the subject of the resolution (July 24, 2002,
    p. 14310). The manager of the resolution has the right to close debate,
    not the Member who is the subject of the resolution (July 24, 2002, p.
    14313). Where the manager of a resolution has divided the hour three
    ways, the Chair announced that the order of closing speeches would be as
    follows: the minority manager of the resolution, the subject

      A resolution recommending reprimand, censure, or expulsion of a Member
    presents a question of privilege (II, 1254; III, 2648-2651; VI, 236;
    Dec. 9, 1913, pp. 584-86; July 26, 1990, p. 19717; May 22, 2007, p.
    13525; Oct. 23, 2007, p. 27966; July 31, 2008, p. _). If reported by the
    Committee on Ethics (or a derivation thereof), the resolution may be
    called up at any time after the committee has filed its report (Jan. 21,
    1997, p. 393; Dec. 2, 2010, p. _). Before debate, an expulsion
    resolution is subject to the motion to lay on the table (Oct. 1, 1976,
    p. 35111), to postpone to a date certain (Oct. 2, 1980, p. 28953; July
    24, 2002, p. 14300), or to refer to committee (Mar. 1, 1979, p. 3753). A
    proposition to censure is not germane to a proposition to expel (VI,
    236).

      The Senate once expelled several Senators by a single resolution (II,
    1266); however, the House has refused to censure more than one Member by
    a single resolution (II, 1240, 1621).

    [[Page 30]]

    burse a portion of
    the costs of the investigation by the Committee on Standards of Official
    Conduct (now Ethics) (Jan. 21, 1997, p. 393).

    Sec. 64. Punishment by reprimand.

      In  the 94th Congress the
    House by adopting a report from the Committee on Standards of Official
    Conduct (now Ethics) reprimanded a Member for failing to report certain
    financial holdings in violation of rule XXVI (formerly rule XLIV) and
    for investing in stock in a Navy bank the establishment of which he was
    promoting, in violation of the Code of Ethics for Government Service (H.
    Res. 1421, July 29, 1976, pp. 24379-82). (For the Code of Ethics for
    Government Service, see H. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 72 Stat. B12.) In
    the 95th Congress following an investigation by the Committee on
    Standards of Official Conduct (now Ethics) into whether Members or
    employees had improperly accepted things of value from the Republic of
    Korea or representatives thereof, the House reprimanded three Members,
    one for falsely answering an unsworn questionnaire relative to such
    gifts and violating the Code of Official Conduct, one for failing to
    report as required by law the receipt of a campaign contribution and
    violating the Code of Official Conduct, and one for failing to report a
    campaign contribution, converting a campaign contribution to personal
    use, testifying falsely to the committee under oath, and violating the
    Code of Official Conduct (Oct. 13, 1978, pp. 36984, 37009, 37017). In
    the 100th Congress the House adopted a resolution reprimanding a Member
    for ``ghost voting,'' improperly diverting government resources, and
    maintaining a ``ghost employee'' on his staff (Dec. 18, 1987, p. 36266).
    In the 101st Congress another was reprimanded for seeking dismissal of
    parking tickets received by a person with whom he had a personal
    relationship and not related to official business and for misstatements
    of fact in a memorandum relating to the criminal probation record of
    that person (July 26, 1990, p. 19717). In the 105th Congress the House
    reprimanded the Speaker and ordered him to reim

    Sec. 65. Punishment by censure.

      Censure  is inflicted by the
    Speaker (II, 1259) and the words are entered in the Journal (II, 1251,
    1656; VI 236), but the Speaker may not pronounce censure except by order
    of the House (VI, 237). When Members have resigned pending proceedings
    for censure, the House has nevertheless adopted the resolutions of
    censure (II, 1239, 1273, 1275, 1656). Members have been censured for
    personalities and other disorder in debate (II, 1251, 1253, 1254, 1259),
    assaults on the floor (II, 1665), for presenting a resolution alleged to
    be insulting to the House (II, 1246), and for corrupt acts (II, 1274,
    1286). For abuse of the leave to print, the House censured a Member
    after a motion to expel him had failed (VI, 236). In one instance
    Members were censured for acts before the election of the then existing
    House (II, 1286). In the 96th Congress two Members were censured by the
    House as follows: (1) A Member who during a prior Congress both
    knowingly increased an office employee's salary for repayment of that
    Member's personal expenses and who was unjustly enriched by clerk-hire
    employees' payments of personal expenses later compensated by salary
    increases, was censured and ordered to repay the amount of the unjust
    enrichment with interest (July 31, 1979, p. 21592); (2) a Member was
    censured for receiving over a period of time sums of money from a person
    with a direct interest in legislation in violation of clause 3 of rule
    XXIII (formerly clause 4 of rule XLIII), and for transferring campaign
    funds into office and personal accounts (June 10, 1980, pp. 13801-20)).
    In the 98th Congress the House adopted two resolutions (as amended in
    the House), each censuring a Member for an improper relationship with a
    House page in a prior Congress (July 20, 1983, p. 20020 and p. 20030).
    In the 111th Congress, after the House defeated an amendment to instead
    punish by reprimand, a Member was censured for using official resources
    to solicit funds for an educational center, failing to file complete
    financial disclosure forms, accepting the benefits of a rent-stabilized
    residence in a manner creating an appearance of impropriety, and failing
    to pay taxes on certain property, and was ordered to pay restitution for
    such unpaid taxes (Dec. 2, 2010, p. _).

    [[Page 31]]

    employee to destroy evidence and to
    provide false testimony to a Federal grand jury; (4) receiving personal
    labor and the services of his congressional employees while they were
    being paid by the taxpayers to perform public service; and (5) filing
    false income tax returns (July 24, 2002, p. 14319). Three Senators were
    expelled for their association with the Confederates during the Civil
    War (II, 1268-1270).

    Sec. 66. Punishment by expulsion.

      Five  Members have been
    expelled in the history of the House. Among those, three were expelled
    for various offenses related to their service for the Confederacy in the
    Civil War: John B. Clark of Missouri (a Member-elect) (II, 1262, July
    13, 1861); Henry C. Burnett of Kentucky (II, 1261, Dec. 3, 1861); and
    John W. Reid of Missouri (II, 1261, Dec. 6, 1861). Michael J. Myers of
    Pennsylvania was expelled after being convicted in a Federal court of
    bribery and conspiracy for accepting funds to perform official duties
    (Oct. 2, 1980, p. 28978). James A. Traficant of Ohio was expelled after
    being convicted in a Federal court for crimes including (1) trading
    official acts and influence for things of value; (2) demanding and
    accepting salary kickbacks from his congressional employees; (3)
    influencing a congressional

      The power of expulsion has been the subject of much discussion (I,
    469, 476, 481; II, 1264, 1265, 1269; VI, 56, 398; see Powell v.
    McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)). In one case a Member-elect who had not
    taken the oath was expelled (II, 1262), and in another case the power to
    do this was discussed (I, 476). In one instance the Senate assumed to
    annul its action of expulsion (II, 1243). The Supreme Court has decided
    that a judgment of conviction under a disqualifying statute does not
    compel the Senate to expel (II, 1282; Burton v. United States, 202 U.S.
    344 (1906)). The power of expulsion in its relation to offenses
    committed before the Members' election has been discussed (II, 1264,
    1284, 1285, 1286, 1288, 1289; VI, 56, 238). In one case the Committee on
    the Judiciary of the House concluded that a Member might not be punished
    for an offense alleged to have been committed against a preceding
    Congress (II, 1283); but the House itself declined to express doubt as
    to its power to expel and proceeded to inflict censure (II, 1286). In
    addition, the 96th Congress punished Members on two occasions for
    offenses committed during a prior Congress (H. Res. 378, July 31, 1979,
    p. 21592; H. Res. 660, June 10, 1980, pp. 13801-20). It has been held
    that the power of the House to expel one of its Members is unlimited; a
    matter purely of discretion to be exercised by a two-thirds vote, from
    which there is no appeal (VI, 78). The resignation of the accused Member
    has always caused a suspension of proceedings for expulsion (II, 1275,
    1276, 1279; VI, 238). Following the expulsion of a Member, the Clerk
    notifies the Governor of the relevant state of the action of the House
    (July 24, 2002, p. 14319).

    Sec. 67. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204
    (1821); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881); United States v.
    Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897); Burton v.
    United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
    (1969).

    [[Page 32]]

    Sec. 68. Each House to keep a journal.

      \3\ Each House  shall
    keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the
    same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; * *
    *

    Sec. 69. The Journal the official
    record.

      The Journal and  not the Congressional Record is the official record of the
    proceedings of the House (IV, 2727). Its nature and functions have been
    the subject of extended discussions (IV, 2730, footnote). The House has
    fixed its title (IV, 2728). Although it ought to be a correct transcript
    of proceedings, the House has not insisted on a strict chronological
    order of entries (IV, 2815). The Journal is dated as of the legislative
    and not the calendar day (IV, 2746).

    Sec. 70. Journal a record of proceedings
    and not of reasons.

      The Journal records  proceedings but not the reasons therefor (IV,
    2811) or the circumstances attending (IV, 2812), or the statements or
    opinions of Members (IV, 2817-2820). Exceptions to this rule are rare
    (IV, 2808, 2825). Protests have on rare occasions been admitted by the
    action of the House (IV, 2806, 2807), but the entry of a protest on the
    Journal may not be demanded by a Member as a matter of right (IV, 2798)
    and such demand does not present a question of privilege (IV, 2799). A
    motion not entertained is not entered on the Journal (IV, 2813, 2844-
    2846).

    Sec. 71. House's absolute control of entries in the
    Journal.

      The House  controls the Journal and may decide what are proceedings,
    even to the extent of omitting things actually done or recording things
    not done (IV, 2784; VI, 634). Although the Speaker has entertained
    motions to amend the Journal so as to cause it to state what was not the
    fact, leaving it for the House to decide on the propriety of such act
    (IV, 2785), and holding that he could not prevent a majority of the
    House from so amending the Journal as to undo an actual transaction (IV,
    3091-3093), in none of those rulings was an amendment permitted to
    correct the Journal that had the effect of collaterally changing the
    tabling of a motion to reconsider. In fact, under the precedents cited
    in Sec. 902, infra, under clause 1 of rule XVI it has been held not in
    order to amend or strike a Journal entry setting forth a motion exactly
    as made (IV, 2783, 2789), and thus it was held not in order to amend the
    Journal by striking a resolution actually offered (IV, 2789), but on one
    occasion the House vacated the Speaker's referral of an executive
    communication by amending the Journal of the preceding day (Mar. 19,
    1990, p. 4488). Only on rare occasions has the House nullified
    proceedings by rescinding the records of them in the Journal (IV, 2787),
    the House and Senate usually insisting on the accuracy of its Journal
    (IV, 2783, 2786). In rare instances the House and Senate have rescinded
    or expunged entries in Journals of preceding Congresses (IV, 2730,
    footnote, 2792, 2793).

    [[Page 33]]

    Sec. 72. Record of votes in the
    Journal.

      The Journal should  record the result of every vote and state in general terms
    the subject of it (IV, 2804); but the result of a vote is recorded in
    figures only when the yeas and nays are taken (IV, 2827), when the vote
    is recorded by electronic device or by clerks, or when a vote is taken
    by ballot, it having been determined in latest practice that the Journal
    should show not only the result but the state of the ballot or ballots
    (IV, 2832).

    Sec. 73. Approval of the Journal.

      It is the  uniform
    practice of the House to approve its Journal for each legislative day
    (IV, 2731). If Journals of more than one session remain unapproved, they
    are taken up for approval in chronological order (IV, 2771-2773; Nov. 3,
    1987, p. 30592).

      The former rule required the reading of the Journal on each
    legislative day. The reading could be dispensed with only by unanimous
    consent (VI, 625) or suspension of the rules (IV, 2747-2750) and had to
    be in full when demanded by any Member (IV, 2739-2741; VI, 627-628; Feb.
    22, 1950, p. 2152).

      The present form of the rule (clause 1 of rule I; see Sec. 621, infra)
    was drafted from section 127 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
    1970 (84 Stat. 1140), incorporated into the standing rules in the 92d
    Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 22, 1971, p. 144), and was further amended in
    the 96th Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 15, 1979, pp. 7-16). Under the
    current practice, the Speaker is authorized to announce approval of the
    Journal, which is deemed agreed to by the House, subject to the right of
    any Member to demand a vote on agreeing to the Speaker's approval
    (which, if decided in the affirmative, is not subject to the motion to
    reconsider). In the 98th Congress, the Speaker was given the authority
    to postpone a record vote on agreeing to the approval of the Journal to
    a later time on that legislative day (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1983, p. 34).
    Although the transaction of any business is not in order before approval
    of the Journal (IV, 2751; VI, 629, 637; Oct. 8, 1968, p. 30096),
    approval of the Journal yields to the simple motion to adjourn (IV,
    2757), administration of the oath (I, 171, 172), an arraignment of
    impeachment (VI, 469), and questions of the privileges of the House (II,
    1630), and the Speaker has discretion to recognize for a parliamentary
    inquiry before approval of the Journal (VI, 624). Under clause 1 of rule
    I, as amended in the 96th Congress, a point of order of no quorum is not
    in order before the Speaker announces approval of the Journal. Clause 7
    of rule XX generally prohibits the making of points of order of no
    quorum unless the Speaker has put the question on the pending matter.

    [[Page 34]]

    further
    discussion of the composition and approval of the Journal, see Deschler,
    ch. 5.

    Sec. 74. Motions to amend the
    Journal.

      Under the practice  before clause 1 of rule I was adopted in its present form,
    the motion to amend the Journal took precedence over the motion to
    approve it (IV, 2760; VI, 633); but the motion to amend may not be
    admitted after the previous question is demanded on a motion to approve
    (IV, 2770; VI, 633; VIII, 2684). An expression of opinion as to a
    decision of the Chair was held not in order as an amendment to the
    Journal (IV, 2848). A proposed amendment to the Journal being tabled
    does not carry the Journal with it (V, 5435, 5436). Although a proposed
    correction of the Journal may be recorded in the Journal, it is not in
    order to insert in full in this indirect way what has been denied
    insertion in the first instance (IV, 2782, 2804, 2805). The earlier
    practice was otherwise, however (IV, 2801-2803). The Journal of the last
    day of a session is not approved on the assembling of the next session,
    and is not ordinarily amended (IV, 2743, 2744). For

    Sec. 74a. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United
    States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892).

    Sec. 75. Yeas and Nays entered on the
    Journal.

      * * * and the  Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question
    shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the
    Journal.

    Sec. 76. Conditions of ordering yeas and
    nays.

      The yeas and  nays may be ordered before the organization of the House (I, 91;
    V, 6012, 6013), but are not taken in Committee of the Whole (IV, 4722,
    4723). They are not necessarily taken on the passage of a resolution
    proposing an amendment to the Constitution (V, 7038, 7039; VIII, 3506),
    but are required to pass a bill over a veto (Sec. 104; VII, 1110). In
    the earlier practice of the House it was held that less than a quorum
    might not order the yeas and nays, but for many years the decisions have
    been uniformly the other way (V, 6016-6028). Neither is a quorum
    necessary on a motion to reconsider the vote whereby the yeas and nays
    are ordered (V, 5693). When a quorum fails on a yea and nay vote it is
    the duty of the Speaker and the House to take notice of that fact (IV,
    2953, 2963, 2988). If the House adjourns, the order for the yeas and
    nays remains effective whenever the bill again comes before the House
    (V, 6014, 6015; VI, 740; VIII, 3108), and it has been held that the
    question of consideration might not intervene on a succeeding day before
    the second calling of the yeas and nays (V, 4949). However, when the
    call of the House is automatic, the Speaker directs the roll to be
    called or the vote to be taken by electronic device without motion from
    the floor (VI, 678, 679, 694, 695); and should a quorum fail to vote and
    the House adjourn, proceedings under the automatic call are vacated and
    the question recurs de novo when the bill again comes before the House
    (Oct. 10, 1940, pp. 13534, 13535; Oct. 13, 1962, p. 23474; Oct. 19,
    1966, p. 27641). Although the Constitution and the Rules of the House
    guarantee that votes taken by the yeas and nays be spread upon the
    Journal, neither requires that a Member's vote be announced to the
    public immediately during the vote (Sept. 19, 1985, p. 24245).

      The yeas and nays may not be demanded until the Speaker has put the
    question in the form prescribed by clause 6 of rule I (formerly clause
    5) (Oct. 2, 1974, p. 33623).

    [[Page 35]]

    business (V, 6040, 6041; VIII, 3110) and if the Member seeking the
    yeas and nays is on his feet and seeking recognition for that purpose
    when the Chair announces the result of the voice vote (Nov. 22, 1991, p.
    34075; Sept. 21, 2005, p. 20856). But after the Speaker has announced
    the result of a division on a motion and is in the act of putting the
    question on another motion it is too late to demand the yeas and nays on
    the first motion (V, 6042). And it is not in order during the various
    processes of a division to repeat a demand for the yeas and nays that
    has once been refused by the House (V, 6029, 6030, 6031). The
    constitutional right of a Member to demand the yeas and nays may not be
    overruled as dilatory (V, 5737; VIII, 3107); but this constitutional
    right does not exist as to a vote to second a motion when such second is
    required by the rules (V, 6032-6036; VIII, 3109). The right to demand
    yeas and nays is not waived by the fact that the Member demanding them
    has just made the point of no quorum and caused the Chair to count the
    House (V, 6044).-

    Sec. 77. Demanding the yeas and nays.

      The yeas and  nays may
    be demanded while the Speaker is announcing the result of a division (V,
    6039), while a vote by tellers is being taken (V, 6038), and even after
    the announcement of the vote if the House has not passed to other

    Sec. 78. Yeas and nays ordered by onefifth.

      In passing on  a
    demand for the yeas and nays the Speaker need determine only whether
    one-fifth of those present sustain the demand (V, 6043; VIII, 3112,
    3115). In ascertaining whether one-fifth of those present support a
    demand for the yeas and nays the Speaker counts the entire number
    present and not merely those who rise to be counted (VIII, 3111, 3120).
    Such count is not subject to verification by appeal (Sept. 12, 1978, p.
    28984; Mar. 8, 2006, p. 2954; Aug. 3, 2007, p. 22745; Mar. 18, 2010, p.
    _), and a request for a rising vote of those opposed to the demand is
    not in order (VIII, 3112-3114), and the Speaker may refuse to entertain
    a parliamentary inquiry regarding the number of Members counted by the
    Chair (Aug. 3, 2007, p. 22745). If the Chair prolongs the count of the
    House in determining whether one-fifth have supported the demand for
    yeas and nays, the Speaker counts latecomers in support of the demand as
    well as for the number present (Sept. 24, 1990, p. 25521). After the
    House, on a vote by tellers, has refused to order the yeas and nays it
    is too late to demand the count of the negative on an original vote (V,
    6045).

    [[Page 36]]

    Sec. 79. Reconsideration of the vote ordering the
    yeas and nays.

      A motion to  reconsider the vote ordering the yeas and nays is in
    order (V, 6029; VIII, 2790), and the vote may be reconsidered by a
    majority. If the House votes to reconsider the yeas and nays may again
    be ordered by one-fifth (V, 5689-5691). But when the House, having
    reconsidered, again orders the yeas and nays, a second motion to
    reconsider may not be made (V, 6037). In one instance it was held that
    the yeas and nays might be demanded on a motion to reconsider the vote
    whereby the yeas and nays were ordered (V, 5689), but evidently there
    must be a limit to this process. The vote whereby the yeas and nays are
    refused may be reconsidered (V, 5692).

    Sec. 80. Effect of an order of the yeas and
    nays.

      A motion  to adjourn may be admitted after the yeas and nays are
    ordered and before the roll call has begun (V, 5366); and a motion to
    suspend the rules has been entertained after the yeas and nays have been
    demanded on another matter (V, 6835). Consideration of a conference
    report (V, 6457), and a motion to reconsider the vote by which the yeas
    and nays were ordered (V, 6029; VIII, 2790) may be admitted. A demand
    for tellers or for a division is not precluded or set aside by the fact
    that the yeas and nays are demanded and refused (V, 5998; VIII, 3103).

    Sec. 81. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United
    States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S.
    196 (1897); Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 U.S. 506 (1901); Marshall v.
    Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917).

    Sec. 82. Adjournment for more than three
    days or to another place.

      \4\ Neither House,  during the Session of Congress shall,
    without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor
    to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

    Sec. 82a. Adjournment to another
    place.

      The word ``Place'' in  the above paragraph was construed to mean the seat of
    Government, and consent of the Senate is not required if the House
    orders its meetings to be held in another structure at the seat of
    Government (Speaker Rayburn, Aug. 17, 1949, pp. 11651, 11683). Under
    clause 12(d) of rule I, the Speaker may convene the House in a place
    within the District of Columbia, other than the Hall of the House,
    whenever, in the opinion of the Speaker, the public interest shall
    warrant it (Sec. 639, infra). In recent practice the two Houses have
    granted joint leadership (or their designees) authority for an entire
    Congress to assemble the Congress at a place outside the District of
    Columbia whenever the public interest shall warrant it (H. Con. Res. 1,
    Feb. 13, 2003, p. 4080; H. Con. Res. 1, Jan. 4, 2005, p. 68 (not adopted
    by the Senate); H. Con. Res. 1, Jan. 4, 2007, p. 42 (not adopted by the
    Senate); H. Con. Res. 1, Jan. 6, 2009, p. _) (not adopted by the
    Senate); H. Con. Res. 1, Jan. 5, 2011, p. _). The Speaker executes by
    letter the designation under such resolution (e.g., Mar. 13, 2003, p.
    6123). After September 11, 2001, recall authority carried in adjournment
    resolutions has allowed reassembly at such place as may be designated
    (see Sec. 84, infra). The President may convene Congress at places
    outside the seat of Government during hazardous circumstances (2 U.S.C.
    27; Deschler, ch. 1, Sec. 4).

    [[Page 37]]

    Caucus room of the new House Office Building. Likewise the
    Senate on the same day (p. 13709), provided that its meetings be held in
    the Chamber formerly occupied by the Supreme Court in the Capitol. The
    two Houses continued to hold their sessions in these rooms until the
    opening of the 77th Congress. These actions were necessitated by the
    precarious condition of the roofs in the two Chambers. On June 28, 1949
    (p. 8571), and on September 1, 1950 (p. 14140), the House provided that
    until otherwise ordered its meetings be held in the Caucus room of the
    new House Office Building, pending the remodeling of its Chamber. On
    June 29, 1949 (p. 8584), and on Aug. 9, 1950 (p. 12106), the Senate
    provided that its meetings be held in the Chamber formerly occupied by
    the Supreme Court in the Capitol, pending remodeling of its Chamber. The
    House returned to its Chamber on January 3, 1950, and again on January
    1, 1951. The Senate returned to its Chamber on January 3, 1950, and
    again on January 3, 1951.
      On November 22, 1940 (p. 13715), the House adopted a resolution
    providing that thereafter until otherwise ordered its meetings be held
    in the

      There has been no occasion for the convening of a session of Congress
    outside the seat of Government. However, the Congress has engaged in
    ceremonial functions outside the seat of Government, which were
    authorized by concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 131, May 28, 1987, p.
    14031; H. Con. Res. 96, Apr. 18, 1989, p. 6834; H. Con. Res. 448, July
    25, 2002, p. 14645).-

    [[Page 38]]

    Sec. 83. Adjournment of the House within the
    threeday limit.

      The House of  Representatives in adjourning for not more than three
    days must take into the count either the day of adjourning or the day of
    the meeting, but not Sundays (V, 6673, 6674). The House may provide for
    a session of the House on a Sunday, traditionally a ``dies non'' under
    the precedents of the House (e.g., Dec. 17, 1982, p. 31946; Nov. 17,
    1989, p. 30029; Aug. 20, 1994, p. 23367). The House has by standing
    order provided that it should meet on two days only of each week instead
    of daily (V, 6675). Before the election of Speaker, the House has
    adjourned for more than one day (I, 89, 221). The House has by unanimous
    consent agreed to an adjournment for less than three days but specified
    that it would continue in adjournment for 10 days pursuant to a
    concurrent resolution already adopted by the House if the Senate adopted
    the concurrent resolution before the third day of the House's
    adjournment (Nov. 20, 1987, p. 33054). The Committee on Rules has
    reported a rule authorizing the Speaker to declare the House in recesses
    subject to calls of the Chair during five discrete periods, each
    consistent with the constitutional constraint that neither House adjourn
    (or recess) for more than three days without consent of the other House
    (Dec. 21, 1995, p. 38141; Jan. 5, 1996, p. 357). Clause 12(c) of rule I
    provides certain authorities for reconvening or postponing the time for
    reconvening during any recess or adjournment of not more than three days
    (see Sec. 639, infra).

    Sec. 84. Resolutions for adjournment of
    the two Houses.

      Congress enables an  adjournment for more than three days by a
    concurrent resolution (IV, 4031, footnote). When it adjourns in this
    way, but not to or beyond the day fixed by Constitution or law for the
    next regular session to begin, the session is not thereby necessarily
    terminated (V, 6676, 6677). At the close of the first session of the
    66th Congress, the two Houses adjourned sine die under authority granted
    each House by simple resolutions consenting to such adjournment sine die
    at any time before a specified date (Nov. 19, 1919, p. 8810).

      Until the 67th Congress neither House had ever adjourned for more than
    three days by itself with the consent of the other, but resolutions had
    been offered for the accomplishment of that end (V, 6702, 6703). In the
    modern practice it is common for a concurrent resolution to provide for
    a one-House adjournment or to provide for each House to adjourn for
    different time periods. For example: (1) the House adjourned until
    August 15, 1922, with the consent of the Senate (June 29, 1922, p.
    10439); (2) the two Houses provided for an adjournment sine die of the
    House on August 20, 1954, and of the Senate at any time before December
    25, 1954 (H. Con. Res. 266; Aug. 20, 1954, p. 15554); (3) the two Houses
    provided for an adjournment sine die of the House on December 20 or
    December 21 pursuant to a motion made by the Majority Leader or a
    designee, and of the Senate at any time before January 3, 1983, as
    determined by the Senate, and for adjournments or recesses of the Senate
    for periods of more than three days as determined by the Senate during
    such period (H. Con. Res. 438, Dec. 20, 1982, p. 32951); (4) the two
    Houses provided for an adjournment of the Senate to a day certain and of
    the House for more than three days to a day certain, or to any day
    before that day as determined by the House (S. Con. Res. 102, May 27,
    1982, pp. 12504, 12505); (5) the two Houses provided for an adjournment
    to a day certain, with a provision that if there should be no quorum
    present on that day the session should terminate (V, 6686).

      A concurrent resolution adjourning both Houses for more than three
    days, or sine die, normally includes joint leadership authority to
    reassemble the Members whenever the public interest shall warrant it
    (see, e.g., July 8, 1943, p. 7516; July 26, 1947, p. 10521; Dec. 20,
    1974, p. 41815; Nov. 21, 1989, p. 31156; Oct. 3, 1996, p. 12275; Dec.
    15, 2000, p. 27019). Pursuant to such recall authority: (1) the Speaker
    and the Majority Leader of the Senate notified Members of the House to
    reassemble, the Senate already being in session (Mar. 20, 2005, p. 5446,
    pursuant to H. Con. Res. 103, Mar. 17, 2005, p. 5143; Nov. 19, 2008, p.
    _ and Dec. 9, 2008, _, pursuant to H. Con. Res. 440, Oct. 2, 2008, p.
    _); (2) the Speaker and the Majority Leader of the Senate notified
    Members of both Houses to reassemble (Sept. 2, 2005, p. 19424, pursuant
    to H. Con. Res. 225, July 28, 2005, p. 18356).

    [[Page 39]]

    such recall authority permitted recall by designees of the
    Speaker and the Majority Leader of the Senate (see, e.g., S. Con. Res.
    132, July 26, 2002, p. 15138). The Speaker executes by letter the
    designation under a concurrent resolution of adjournment (e.g., Mar. 13,
    2003, p. 6123). The Speaker also executes by letter the designation of
    another Member to utilize reassembly authority under a joint resolution
    changing the convening date of the next session (H. J. Res. 80, Dec. 15,
    2003, p. 32411).
      After September 11, 2001, such recall authority has allowed reassembly
    at such place as may be designated (see, e.g., S. Con. Res. 160, Nov.
    22, 2002, p. 23512; H. Con. Res. 531, Dec. 7, 2004, p. 25708). More
    recently,

      On occasion an adjournment resolution has provided for one-House
    recall (see, e.g., July 20, 1970, p. 24978). Joint leadership and House-
    only recall provisions were included in the sine die adjournment
    resolution for the second session of the 105th Congress (H. Con. Res.
    353, Oct. 20, 1998, p. 27348), and the Speaker exercised recall
    authority under that resolution to reassemble the House (Dec. 17, 1998,
    p. 27802). One-House recall authority, with provision to again adjourn
    for more than three days, was included in two complementary one-House
    adjournment resolutions of the 111th Congress (H. Con. Res. 307, H. Con.
    Res. 308, July 29, 2010, p. _) and the Speaker (Aug. 9, 2010, p. _) and
    Majority Leader of the Senate (Aug. 12, 2010, p. _) each exercised
    recall authority under the respective adjournment resolution.

      When the Senate is out of session for not more than three days, the
    Senate Majority and Minority Leaders may modify an order for the time or
    place of convening when, in their opinion, such action is warranted by
    intervening circumstances (S. Res. 296, 108th Cong., Feb. 3, 2004, p.
    731). Pursuant to such authority, during an adjournment of the Senate
    for not more than three days, the Senate convened earlier than
    previously ordered to adopt a House concurrent resolution providing for
    an adjournment of the two Houses (H. Con. Res. 103, Mar. 17, 2005, p.
    5143), section 2 of which enabled a recall of the House (Mar. 20, 2005,
    p. 5446).

    [[Page 40]]

      A resolution adopted in the first session of the 106th Congress
    provided for an adjournment to a date certain, unless the House sooner
    received a specified message from the Senate, in which case it would
    stand adjourned sine die (H. Con. Res. 235, Nov. 18, 1999, p. 30734). A
    simple resolution adopted in the first session of the 111th Congress
    provided for a series of adjournments of not more than three days,
    unless the House sooner received: (1) a specified message from the
    Senate, (2) confirmation that the President had approved a certain bill,
    and (3) a message that the Senate had concurred in an adjournment
    resolution, in which case it would stand adjourned pursuant to such
    adjournment resolution (H. Res. 976, Dec. 16, 2009, p. _). It has become
    the common practice for the House, by unanimous consent adopted after
    originating an adjournment resolution, to fix a time to which it would
    adjourn within three days unless the House were sooner to receive a
    message from the Senate transmitting its adoption of the adjournment
    resolution, in which case the House would stand adjourned pursuant to
    that resolution (see, e.g., Nov. 3, 2000, p. 25993; Mar. 20, 2002, p.
    3726).

      A concurrent resolution providing for adjournment sine die of the
    first session may contain a proviso that when the second session
    convenes the Senate or House may not conduct organizational or
    legislative business but shall adjourn on that day until a date certain,
    unless sooner recalled (H. Con. Res. 232, Dec. 20, 1979, p. 37317; H.
    Con. Res. 260, Nov. 26, 1991, p. 35840; H. Con. Res. 235, Nov. 18, 1999,
    p. 30734). The prohibition on the conduct of such business may be
    applied to the House by simple resolution and may vest the Speaker with
    the authority to dispense with such business over a period of time (H.
    Res. 619, as amended by H. Res. 640, Dec. 16, 2005, p. 29054, Dec. 18,
    2005, p. 30378). Such a prohibition does not preclude recognition for
    one-minute speeches and special-order speeches by unanimous consent
    (Jan. 3, 1992, pp. 2, 9) or the introduction and numbering of bills and
    resolutions (which would not be noted in the Congressional Record or
    referred by the Speaker until the next legislative day, when executive
    communications, petitions, and memorials also would be numbered and
    referred) (Jan. 24, 2000, p. 48). The House has passed a joint
    resolution appointing a day for the convening of a second session of a
    Congress and provided for possible earlier assembly by joint-leadership
    recall (see, e.g., H. J. Res. 80, Dec. 20, 2001, p. 27597; H. J. Res.
    80, Nov. 21, 2003, pp. 30856, 30857).

      A concurrent resolution to provide for adjournment for more than three
    days or an adjournment sine die is offered in the House as a matter of
    privilege (V, 6701-6706), and is not debatable (VIII, 3372-3374), though
    a Member may be recognized under a reservation of objection to a
    unanimous-consent request that the resolution be agreed to (Oct. 27,
    1990, p. 36850). The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 provides for
    an adjournment sine die, or (in an odd numbered year) an adjournment of
    slightly over a month (from that Friday in August which is at least 30
    days before Labor Day to the Wednesday following Labor Day) unless the
    nation is in a state of war, declared by Congress (sec. 461(b); 84 Stat.
    1140). Congress may, of course, waive this requirement and make other
    determinations regarding its adjournment (see Sec. 1106, infra).

    [[Page 41]]

    reported by the concurrent
    resolution on the budget for that year (see Sec. 1127, infra).

      The requirement that resolutions providing for an adjournment sine die
    of either House may not be considered until Congress has completed
    action on the second concurrent resolution on the budget for the fiscal
    year in question, and on any reconciliation legislation required by such
    a resolution, contained in section 310(f) of the Congressional Budget
    Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344), was repealed by the Balanced Budget and
    Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177). That law amended
    sections 309 and 310 of the Congressional Budget Act to prohibit the
    consideration of concurrent resolutions providing adjournments for more
    than three calendar days during the month of July until the House has
    approved annual appropriation bills within the jurisdictions of all the
    subcommittees on Appropriations for the ensuing fiscal year, and until
    the House has completed action on all reconciliation legislation for the
    ensuing fiscal year required to be

    Sec. 85. Compensation of
    Members.

      Section 6. \1\ The Senators  and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their
    Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the
    United States.

      The 27th amendment to the Constitution addresses laws varying the
    compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives (see
    Sec. 258, infra). The present rate of compensation of Representatives,
    the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico, Delegates, the Speaker, the
    Majority and Minority Leaders of the House, and the Vice President is
    established by law (2 U.S.C. 31; 3 U.S.C. 104) with an additional amount
    per annum to assist in defraying expenses (2 U.S.C. 31b; 3 U.S.C. 111).
    These rates of compensation are all (except for the expense allowances)
    subject to annual cost of living adjustments (2 U.S.C. 31(2)). The
    present rate of compensation of Senators is that fixed by section 1101
    of Public Law 101-194, as adjusted pursuant to 2 U.S.C. 31(2).

    Sec. 86. Salary and deductions.

      Under  the Federal Salary Act
    of 1967 (2 U.S.C. 351-362), the Citizens' Commission on Public Service
    and Compensation (formerly the Commission on Executive, Legislative and
    Judicial Salaries) is authorized and directed to conduct quadrennial
    reviews of the rates of pay of specified government officials, including
    Members of Congress, and to report to the President the results of each
    review and its recommendations for adjustments in such rates. The
    enactment of those recommendations is governed by the Federal Salary Act
    (see Sec. 1130(12), infra).

      The statute also provides for deductions from the pay of Members and
    Delegates who are absent from the sessions of the House for reasons
    other than illness of themselves and families, or who retire before the
    end of the Congress (2 U.S.C. 39; IV, 3011, footnote). The law as to
    deductions has been held to apply only to Members who have taken the
    oath (II, 1154). Members and Delegates are paid monthly on certificate
    of the Speaker (2 U.S.C. 34, 35, 37, 57a). The residence of a Member of
    Congress for purpose of imposing State income tax laws shall be the
    State from which elected and not the State, or subdivision thereof, in
    which the Member maintains an abode for the purpose of attending
    sessions of Congress (4 U.S.C. 113). The pension of a Member may be
    forfeited upon conviction involving abuse of the public trust (5 U.S.C.
    8312, 8411).

    [[Page 42]]

    vacancy is entitled to salary only from the time
    that the compensation of the predecessor has ceased. Page v. United
    States, 127 U.S. 67 (1888); see also 2 U.S.C. 37.

    Sec. 87. Questions as to
    compensation.

      Questions have arisen  frequently as to compensation of Members especially in
    cases of Members elected to fill vacancies (I, 500; II, 1155) and in
    which there have been questions as to incompatible offices (I, 500) or
    claims to a seat (II, 1206). The Supreme Court has held that a Member
    chosen to fill a

    Sec. 88. Travel and Members' representational
    allowances.

      In the 92d  Congress, the provisions of H. Res. 457 of that Congress,
    authorizing the Committee on House Administration to adjust allowances
    of Members and committees without further action by the House, were
    enacted into permanent law (2 U.S.C. 57), but the 94th Congress enacted
    into permanent law H. Res. 1372 of that Congress, stripping the
    committee of that authority and requiring House approval of the
    committee's recommendations, except in cases made necessary by price
    changes in materials and supplies, technological advances in office
    equipment, and cost of living increases (2 U.S.C. 57a). The Committee on
    House Administration retains authority under 2 U.S.C. 57 to
    independently adjust amounts under certain conditions outlined in 2
    U.S.C. 57a (Mar. 21, 1977, p. 8227; Apr. 21, 1983, p. 9339). The text of
    those statutes follow:

        ``Sec. 57. Adjustment of House of Representatives allowances by

                        Committee on House Administration

      ``(a) In general.--Subject to the provision of law specified in
    subsection (b) of this section, the Committee on House Administration of
    the House of Representatives may, by order of the Committee, fix and
    adjust the amounts, terms, and conditions of, and other matters relating
    to, allowances of the House of Representatives within the following
    categories:

              ``(1) For Members of the House of Representatives, the

            Members' Representational Allowance, including all aspects of

            the Official Mail Allowance within the jurisdiction of the

            Committee under section 59(e) of this title.

              ``(2) For committees, the Speaker, the Majority and Minority

            Leaders, the Clerk, the Sergeant at Arms, and the Chief

            Administrative Officer, allowances for official mail (including

            all aspects of the Official Mail Allowance within the

            jurisdiction of the Committee under section 59e of this title),

            stationery, and telephone and telegraph and other

            communications.

      ``(b) Provision specified.--The provision of law referred to in
    subsection (a) of this section is section 57a of this title.

    [[Page 43]]

    ``Sec. 57a. Limitation on allowance authority of Committee on House
      ``(c) Member of the House of Representatives defined.--As used in this
    section, the term `Member of the House of Representatives' means a
    Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the
    Congress.''

                                 Administration.

      ``(a) In general.--An order under the provision of law specified in
    subsection (c) of this section may fix or adjust the allowances of the
    House of Representatives only by reason of--

              ``(1) a change in the price of materials, services, or office

            space;

              ``(2) a technological change or other improvement in office

            equipment; or

              ``(3) an increase under section 5303 of title 5 in rates of

            pay under the General Schedule.

      ``(b) Resolution requirement.--In the case of reasons other than the
    reasons specified in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a) of
    this section, the fixing and adjustment of the allowances of the House
    of Representatives in the categories described in the provision of law
    specified in subsection (c) of this section may be carried out only by
    resolution of the House of Representatives.

      ``(c) Provision specified.--The provision of law referred to in
    subsections (a) and (b) of this section is section 57 of this title.''

      In the 104th Congress the Committee on House Administration
    promulgated an order abolishing separate allowances for Clerk Hire,
    Official Expenses, and Official Mail, in favor of a single ``Members'
    Representational Allowance'' (MRA), which was ultimately enacted into
    law (2 U.S.C. 57b). The MRA is provided for the employment of staff in
    the Member's Washington and district offices, official expenses incurred
    by the Member, and the postage expenses of first, third, and fourth
    class frankable mail.

      Until January 1, 1988, the maximum salary for staff members was the
    rate of basic pay authorized for Level V of the Executive Schedule (by
    order of the Committee on House Administration, Mar. 21, 1977, p. 8227).
    Under section 311 of the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1988, as
    contained in section 101(i) of Public Law 100-202 (2 U.S.C. 60a-2a), the
    maximum salary for staff members is set by pay order of the Speaker. A
    Member may not employ a relative on an MRA (5 U.S.C. 3110). The Code of
    Official Conduct also precludes certain hiring practices of Members (see
    Sec. 1095, infra).

      Until the 103d Congress, a Member could employ a ``Lyndon Baines
    Johnson Congressional Intern'' for a maximum of two months at not to
    exceed $1,160 per month. Such internships were available for college
    students and secondary or postsecondary school teachers (H. Res. 420,
    93d Cong., Sept. 18, 1973, p. 30186). Any paid internship is now funded
    through the MRA.

    [[Page 44]]

    those provisions to any termination of service
    by a Member during the term of office (H. Res. 804, Oct. 2, 1980, p.
    28978).
      The statutes provide for continuation of the pay of clerical
    assistants to a Member upon death or resignation, until a successor is
    elected to fill the vacancy, and such clerical assistants perform their
    duties under the direction of the Clerk of the House (2 U.S.C. 92a-92d).
    Upon the expulsion of a Member in the 96th Congress, the House by
    resolution extended

      For current information on the MRA and the method of its accounting
    and disbursement, see current U.S. House of Representatives
    Congressional Handbook, Committee on House Administration.

    Sec. 88a. Ban on Legislative Service
    Organizations.

      At its  organization the 104th Congress prohibited the
    establishment or continuation of any legislative service organization
    (as that term had been understood in the 103d Congress) and directed the
    Committee on House Administration to take such steps as were necessary
    to ensure an orderly termination and accounting for funds of any
    legislative service organization in existence on January 3, 1995 (sec.
    222, H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 477).

    Sec. 89. Leadership staff allowances.

      Separate from the  MRA
    specified above, the leaders of the House (the Speaker, Majority Leader,
    Minority Leader, Majority Whip, and Minority Whip) are entitled to
    office staffing allowances consisting of certain statutory positions as
    well as lump-sum appropriations authorized by section 473 of the
    Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (84 Stat. 1140). The portion of
    these allowances for leadership office personnel may be adjusted by the
    Clerk of the House in certain situations when the President effects a
    pay adjustment for certain classes of Federal employees under the
    Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-656; 84 Stat. 1946).

    Sec. 89a. Speaker's ``pay orders.''

      Under  section 311(d) of
    the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1988 [2 U.S.C. 60a-2a], the
    Speaker may issue ``pay orders'' that adjust pay levels for officers and
    employees of the House to maintain certain relationships with comparable
    levels in the Senate and in the other branches of government. For the
    text of section 311(d), see Sec. 1130(12), infra.

    Sec. 90. Privilege of Members from
    arrest.

      * * * They [the  Senators and Representatives] shall in all Cases, except
    Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest
    during their attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and
    in going to and returning from the same; * * *

    [[Page 45]]

    of the Member in going to and returning from
    the session (III, 2674); and where a person assaulted a Member on his
    way to the House, although at a place distant therefrom, the House
    arrested him on warrant of the Speaker, arraigned him at the bar and had
    him imprisoned (II, 1626, 1628). Other assaults under these
    circumstances have been treated as breaches of privilege (II, 1645).
    Where a Member had been arrested and detained under mesne process in a
    civil suit during a recess of Congress, the House decided that he was
    entitled to discharge on the assembling of Congress, and liberated him
    and restored him to his seat by the hands of its own officer (III,
    2676). Service of process is distinguished from arrest in civil cases
    and related historical data are collected in Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76
    (1934), in which the Supreme Court held that the clause was applicable
    only to arrests in civil suits, now largely obsolete but common at the
    time of the adoption of the United States Constitution. Rule VIII
    (formerly rule L) was added in the 97th Congress to provide a standing
    procedure governing subpoenas to Members, officers, and employees
    directing their appearance as witnesses relating to the official
    functions of the House, or for the production of House documents.

    <>   * * * and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they
    [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other
    place.

    Sec. 91. Assertions of privilege of
    Members by the House.

      The word ``felony''  in this provision has been interpreted not to
    refer to a delinquency in a matter of debt (III, 2676), and ``treason,
    felony, and breach of the peace'' have been construed to mean all
    indictable crimes (III, 2673). The Supreme Court has held that the
    privilege does not apply to arrest in any criminal case. Williamson v.
    United States, 207 U.S. 425 (1908). The courts have discussed and
    sustained the privilege

    [[Page 46]]

    ments by a Member. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S.
    606 (1972). The Court has also sustained the validity of an indictment
    of a Member for accepting an illegal bribe to perform legislative acts
    in which the prosecution established a prima facie case without relying
    on the Member's constitutionally-protected legislative speech. United
    States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972). Nor does the clause protect
    transmittal of allegedly defamatory material issued in press releases
    and newsletters by a Senator, because neither was essential to the
    deliberative process of the Senate. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111
    (1979). For a discussion of waivers of the Speech or Debate clause, see
    Sec. 301, infra.

    Sec. 93. Scope of the privilege.

      This privilege as  to ``any
    speech or debate'' applies generally to ``things done in a session of
    the House by one of its Members in relation to the business before it.''
    Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880), cited at III, 2675. See also
    II, 1655 and Sec. Sec. 301, 302, infra, for provisions in Jefferson's
    Manual on the privilege; and Deschler, ch. 7. Moreover, it applies to
    all acts within the ``legislative sphere,'' which includes matters that
    are ``an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes
    by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with
    respect to the consideration or passage or rejection of proposed
    legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution
    places within the jurisdiction of either House.'' Gravel v. United
    States, 408 U.S. 606, 624, 625 (1972). The clause precludes judicial
    inquiry into the motivation, preparation, or content of a Member's
    speech on the floor and prevents such a speech from being made the basis
    for a criminal conspiracy charge against the Member. United States v.
    Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966). The Supreme Court held in United States v.
    Helstoski, 442 U.S. 447 (1979), that under the Speech or Debate Clause,
    neither evidence of nor references to legislative acts of a Member of
    Congress may be introduced by the Government in a prosecution under the
    official bribery statute. But the Supreme Court has limited the scope of
    legislative activity that is protected under the clause by upholding
    grand jury inquiry into the possession and nonlegislative use of
    classified docu

      Legislative employees acting under orders of the House are not
    necessarily protected under the clause from judicial inquiry into the
    constitutionality of their actions. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 165
    (1880); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); Powell v. McCormack,
    395 U.S. 486 (1969). But see Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606
    (1972), in which the Supreme Court held that the aide of a Senator was
    protected under the clause when performing legislative acts that would
    have been protected under the clause if performed by the Senator
    himself. There is no distinction between the members of a Senate
    subcommittee and its chief counsel insofar as complete immunity under
    the Speech or Debate Clause is provided for the issuance of a subpoena
    pursuant to legitimate legislative inquiry. Eastland v. U.S.
    Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975). See also Doe v. McMillan, 412
    U.S. 306 (1973) (relating to the dissemination of a congressional
    report) for the immunity under this clause of Members of the House and
    their staffs, and for the common-law immunity of the Public Printer and
    Superintendent of Documents.

      For Federal court decisions on the applicability of the clause to
    unofficial circulation of reprints from the Congressional Record, see
    McGovern v. Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343 (1960); Long v. Ansell, 69 F.2d 386
    (1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 76 (1934); Methodist Federation for Social
    Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp. 729 (1956). For inquiry into a Member's
    use of the franking privilege, see Hoellen v. Annunzio, 468 F.2d 522
    (1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973); Schiaffo v. Helstoski, 350 F.
    Supp. 1076 (1972), rev'd 492 F.2d 413 (1974). For inquiry into the
    printing of committee reports, see Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973);
    Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175 (1970).

    [[Page 47]]

    tion asked of the latter when a witness before the House,
    the matter was considered but not pressed as a breach of privilege (III,
    2681). A letter from a person supposed to have been assailed by a Member
    in debate, asking properly and without menace if the speech was
    correctly reported, was held to involve no question of privilege (III,
    2682). Unless it is clear that a Member has been questioned for words
    spoken in debate, the House declines to act (II, 1620; III, 2680).

    Sec. 94. Action by the House.

      For assaulting a  Member for
    words spoken in debate, Samuel Houston, not a Member, was arrested,
    tried, and censured by the House (II, 1616-1619). Where Members have
    assaulted other Members for words spoken in debate (II, 1656), or
    proceeded by duel (II, 1644), or demanded explanation in a hostile
    manner (II, 1644), the House has considered the cases as of privilege. A
    communication addressed to the House by an official in an Executive
    Department calling in question words uttered by a Member in debate was
    criticized as a breach of privilege and withdrawn (III, 2684). An
    explanation having been demanded of a Member by a person not a Member
    for a ques

      For assaulting a Member, Charles C. Glover was arrested, arraigned at
    the bar of the House, and censured by the Speaker by direction of the
    House, although the provocation of the assault was words spoken in
    debate in the previous Congress (VI, 333).

    Sec. 95. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880);
    Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); United States v. Johnson, 383
    U.S. 169 (1966); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); Powell v.
    McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606
    (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); Doe v. McMillan,
    412 U.S. 306 (1973); Eastland v. United States Serviceman's Fund, 421
    U.S. 491 (1975); United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979);
    Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442
    U.S. 500 (1979).

    Sec. 96. Restriction on appointment of
    Members to office.

      \2\ No Senator or  Representative shall, during the Time for which he
    was elected, be appointed to any Civil Office under the Authority of the
    United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof
    shall have been encreased during such time; *  *  *.

    <>
    *  *  * and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall
    be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.

      In a few cases questions have arisen under this paragraph (I, 506,
    footnote; and see 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 36 (1969); see also Deschler, ch. 7;
    P.L. 110-455 (emoluments of Secretary of State); P.L. 111-1 (emoluments
    of Secretary of the Interior).

    [[Page 48]]

      The meaning of the word ``office'' as used in this paragraph has been
    discussed (I, 185, 417, 478, 493; II, 993; VI, 60, 64), as has also the
    general subject of incompatible offices (I, 563).

    Sec. 98. As to what are
    incompatible offices.

      The Committee on the Judiciary  has concluded that members of commissions
    created by law to investigate and report, but having no legislative,
    executive, or judicial powers, and visitors to academies, regents,
    directors, and trustees of public institutions, appointed under the law
    by the Speaker, are not officers within the meaning of the Constitution
    (I, 493). Membership on joint committees created by statute is not an
    office in the contemplation of the constitutional provision prohibiting
    Members of Congress from holding simultaneously other offices under the
    United States (VII, 2164). A Member of either House is eligible to
    appointment to any office not forbidden him by law, the duties of which
    are not incompatible with those of a Member (VI, 63) and the question as
    to whether a Member may be appointed to the Board of Managers of the
    Soldiers' Home and become local manager of one of the homes, is a matter
    for the decision of Congress itself (VI, 63). The House has also
    distinguished between the performance of paid services for the Executive
    (I, 495), like temporary service as assistant United States attorney
    (II, 993), and the acceptance of an incompatible office. The House has
    declined to hold that a contractor under the Government is
    constitutionally disqualified to serve as a Member (I, 496). But the
    House, or its committees, have found disqualified a Member who was
    appointed a militia officer in the District of Columbia (I, 486) and in
    various States (VI, 60), and Members who have accepted commissions in
    the Army (I, 491, 492, 494). But the Committee on the Judiciary has
    expressed the opinion that persons on the retired list of the Army do
    not hold office under the United States in the constitutional sense (I,
    494). A Member-elect has continued to act as governor of a State after
    the assembling of the Congress to which he was elected (I, 503), but the
    duties of a Member of the House and the Governor of a State are
    absolutely inconsistent and may not be simultaneously discharged by the
    same Member (VI, 65).-

    [[Page 49]]

    Sec. 99. Appointment of Memberselect to
    offices under the United States.

      The House decided  that the status of a Member-elect was
    not affected by the constitutional requirement (I, 499), the theory
    being advanced that the status of the Member-elect is distinguished from
    the status of the Member who has qualified (I, 184). A Member-elect, who
    continued in an office after his election but resigned before taking his
    seat, was held entitled to the seat (I, 497, 498). However, when a
    Member-elect held an incompatible office after the meeting of Congress
    and his taking of the oath, he was held to have disqualified himself (I,
    492). In other words, the Member-elect may defer until the meeting of
    Congress and his taking of the oath, his choice between the seat and an
    incompatible office (I, 492). As early as 1874 the Attorney General
    opined that a Member-elect is not officially a Member of the House, and
    thus may hold any office until sworn (14 Op. Att'y Gen. 408 (1874)).

    Sec. 100. Relation of contestants to
    incompatible offices.

      The House has  manifestly subscribed to the idea that a
    contestant holding an incompatible office need not make an election
    until the House has declared the contestant entitled to the seat (I,
    505). Although a contestant had accepted and held a State office in
    violation of the State constitution, if he were really elected a Member,
    the House did not treat his contest as abated (II, 1003). Where a Member
    had been appointed to an incompatible office a contestant not found to
    be elected was not admitted to fill the vacancy (I, 807).

    Sec. 101. Procedure of the House when
    incompatible offices are accepted.

      Where a Member  has accepted an incompatible
    office, the House has assumed or declared the seat vacant (I, 501, 502;
    VI, 65). In the cases of Baker and Yell, the Elections Committee
    concluded that the acceptance of a commission as an officer of
    volunteers in the national army vacated the seat of a Member (I, 488),
    and in another similar case the Member was held to have forfeited his
    right to a seat (I, 490). The House has seated a person bearing regular
    credentials on ascertaining that his predecessor in the same Congress
    had accepted a military office (I, 572). But usually the House by
    resolution formally declares the seat vacant (I, 488, 492). A Member-
    elect may defer until the meeting of Congress and the taking of the oath
    of office the choice between the seat and an incompatible office (I,
    492). But when he retains the incompatible office and does not qualify,
    a vacancy has been held to exist (I, 500). A resolution excluding a
    Member who has accepted an incompatible office may be agreed to by a
    majority vote (I, 490). A Member charged with acceptance of an
    incompatible office was heard in his own behalf during the debate (I,
    486).

      Where it was held in Federal court that a Member of Congress may not
    hold a commission in the Armed Forces Reserve under this clause, the
    U.S. Supreme Court reversed on other grounds, the plaintiff's lack of
    standing to maintain the suit. Reservists Committee to Stop the War v.
    Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833 (1971), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1075 (1972), rev'd on
    other grounds, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).

    Sec. 102. Bills raising revenue to
    originate in the House.

      Section 7. \1\ All Bills  for raising Revenue shall originate in the
    House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with
    Amendments as on other Bills.

    [[Page 50]]

    Senate has receded
    (II, 1486, 1493). The disagreements have been especially vigorous over
    the right of the Senate to concur with amendments (II, 1489), and
    although the Senate has acquiesced in the sole right of the House to
    originate revenue bills, it has at the same time held to a broad power
    of amendment (II, 1497-1499). The House has frequently challenged the
    Senate on this point (II, 1481, 1491, 1496; Sept. 14, 1965, p. 23632).
    When the House has perceived an invasion of its prerogative, it has
    ordered the bill or Senate amendment to be returned to the Senate (II,
    1480-1499; VI, 315, 317; Mar. 30, 1937, p. 2930; July 2, 1960, p. 15818;
    Oct. 10, 1962, p. 23014; May 20, 1965, p. 11149; June 20, 1968, p.
    22127; Nov. 8, 1979, p. 31518; May 17, 1983, p. 12486; Oct. 1, 1985, p.
    25418; Sept. 25, 1986, p. 26202; July 30, 1987, p. 21582; June 16, 1988,
    p. 14780; June 21, 1988, p. 15425; Sept. 23, 1988, p. 25094; Sept. 28,
    1988, p. 26415; Oct. 21, 1988, pp. 33110-11; June 15, 1989, p. 12167;
    Nov. 9, 1989, p. 28271; Oct. 22, 1991, p. 27087; Oct. 31, 1991, p.
    29284; Feb. 25, 1992, p. 3377; July 14, 1994, p. 16593; July 21, 1994,
    p. 17280; July 21, 1994, p. 17281; Aug. 12, 1994, pp. 7642, 7643; Oct.
    7, 1994, p. 29136, 29137; Mar. 21, 1996, p. 5950; Apr. 16, 1996, pp.
    7642, 7643; Sept. 27, 1996, p. 25542; Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25931; Mar. 5,
    1998, p. 2618; Oct. 15, 1998, p. 26483; July 15, 1999, p. 16317; Nov.
    18, 1999, p. 30732; Oct. 24, 2000, p. 24149; Sept. 20, 2001, p. 17454;
    Sept. 23, 2010, p. _), or declined to proceed further with it (II,
    1485). Among the measures the House has returned to the Senate: a
    Senate-passed bill providing for the sale of Conrail and containing
    provisions relating to the tax treatment of the sale, notwithstanding
    inclusion in that bill of a disclaimer section requiring all revenue
    provisions therein to be contained in separate legislation originating
    in the House (Sept. 25, 1986, p. 26202); a Senate-passed bill
    prohibiting the importation of commodities subject to tariff (July 30,
    1987, p. 21582); a Senate-passed bill banning all imports from Iran, a
    tariff measure as affecting revenue from dutiable imports (June 16,
    1988, p. 14780); a Senate-passed bill dealing with the tax treatment of
    income derived from the exercise of Indian treaty fishing rights (June
    21, 1988, p. 15425); a Senate-passed bill creating a tax-exempt
    government corporation (June 15, 1989, p. 12167); a Senate-passed bill
    addressing the tax treatment of police-corps scholarships and the
    regulation of firearms under the Internal Revenue Code (Oct. 22, 1991,
    p. 27087); a Senate-passed bill including certain import sanctions in an
    export administration statute (Oct. 31, 1991, p. 29284); a Senate-passed
    bill requiring the President to impose sanctions including import
    restrictions against countries that fail to eliminate large-scale
    driftnet fishing (Feb. 25, 1992, p. 3377); a Senate amendment to a
    general appropriation bill prohibiting funds for the Internal Revenue
    Service to enforce a requirement to use undyed diesel fuel for use in
    recreational boats (July 14, 1994, p. 16593); a Senate amendment to a
    general appropriation bill proposing a user fee raising revenue to
    finance broader activities of the agency imposing the levy, thereby
    raising general revenue (Aug. 12, 1994, p. 21656); a Senate amendment to
    a general appropriation

    [[Page 51]]

    bill proposing to increase two fees to
    finance general government operations (Sept. 23, 2010, p. _); a Senate-
    passed bill proposing to regulate toxic substances by prohibiting the
    import of products containing more than specified level of lead (July
    21, 1994, p. 17280); a Senate-passed bill proposing to repeal a fee on
    electricity generated by nuclear energy that otherwise would raise
    revenue (Mar. 5, 1998, p. 2618); a Senate-passed bill proposing new
    import restrictions on products containing any substance derived from
    rhinoceroses or tigers (Oct. 15, 1998, p. 26483); Senate-passed bills
    proposing an amendment to the criminal code that would make it unlawful
    to import certain assault weapons (Oct. 22, 1991, p. 27087) or to import
    large capacity ammunition feeding devices (July 15, 1999, p. 16317);
    Senate-passed bills prescribing the tax treatment of certain benefits to
    members of the Armed Forces (Nov. 18, 1999, p. 30732) or of public-
    sector retirement plans (Nov. 18, 1999, p. 30734); a Senate-passed bill
    proposing to create a new basis for applying import restrictions on bear
    viscera or products derived therefrom (Oct. 24, 2000, p. 24149); a
    Senate amendment proposing to enact by reference a Senate bill providing
    for a ban on (dutiable) imports of diamonds from certain countries
    (Sept. 20, 2001, p. 17454). The House laid on the table a resolution
    asserting that a conference report (on which the House was acting first)
    accompanying a House bill originated provisions in derogation of the
    constitutional prerogative of the House and resolving that such bill be
    recommitted to conference (July 27, 2000, p. 16565). The House, by
    adopting one resolution, has returned multiple measures to the Senate
    (Sept. 23, 2010, p. _).
      This provision has been the subject of much discussion (II, 1488,
    1494). In the earlier days the practice was not always correct (II,
    1484); but in later years the House has insisted on its prerogative and
    the Senate has often shown reluctance to infringe thereon (II, 1482,
    1483, 1493). In several instances, however, the subject has been a
    matter of contention, conference (II, 1487, 1488), and final
    disagreement (II, 1485, 1487, 1488). Sometimes, however, when the House
    has questioned an invasion of prerogative, the

      A bill raising revenue incidentally was held not to infringe upon the
    constitutional prerogative of the House to originate revenue legislation
    (VI, 315). A question relating to the invasion of the constitutional
    prerogatives of the House by a Senate amendment may be raised at any
    time when the House is in possession of the papers, but not otherwise;
    thus, the question has been presented pending the motion to call up a
    conference report on the bill (June 20, 1968, Deschler, ch. 13,
    Sec. 14.2; Aug. 19, 1982, p. 22127), but has been held nonprivileged
    with respect to a bill already presented to the President (Apr. 6, 1995,
    p. 10700). The Senate decided that a bill proposing a gasoline tax in
    the District of Columbia should not originate in the Senate (VI, 316).

      Clause 5(a) of rule XXI prohibits consideration of any amendment,
    including any Senate amendment, proposing a tax or tariff during
    consideration of a bill or joint resolution reported by a committee not
    having that jurisdiction (Sec. 1066, infra).

    [[Page 52]]

      For a discussion of the prerogatives of the House under this clause,
    and discussion of the prerogatives of the House to originate
    appropriation bills, see Deschler, ch. 13. For a discussion of the
    prerogatives of the House with respect to treaties affecting revenue,
    see Sec. 597, infra. For examples of Senate messages requesting the
    return of Senate revenue measures, see Sec. 565, infra.

    Sec. 103. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the
    Supreme Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892);
    Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897); Flint v. Stone Tracy
    Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906);
    Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914); United States v. Munoz-
    Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990).

    Sec. 104. Approval and disapproval of bills by
    the President.

      \2\ Every Bill  which shall have passed the House of Representatives
    and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the
    President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if
    not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it
    shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their
    Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two
    thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent,
    together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall
    likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House,
    it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses
    shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons
    voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each
    House respectively. * * *.

    [[Page 53]]

    was so stamped, the Presidential veto of the bill more than 10 days
    after delivery to the White House but less than 10 days after his return
    to the country was timely. The second session of the 89th Congress
    adjourned sine die while President Johnson was on an Asian tour and
    receipts for bills delivered to the White House during that time were
    marked in like manner. The approval of a bill by the President of the
    United States is valid only with his signature (IV, 3490). Before the
    adoption of the 20th amendment to the Constitution (which changed the
    date of meeting of Congress to January 3), at the close of a Congress,
    when the two Houses prolonged their sessions into the forenoon of March
    4, the approvals were dated on the prior legislative day, because the
    legislative portion of March 4 belonged to the term of the new Congress.
    In one instance, however, bills signed on the forenoon of March 4 were
    dated as of that day with the hour and minute of approval given with the
    date (IV, 3489). The act of President Tyler in filing with a bill an
    exposition of his reasons for signing it was examined and severely
    criticized by a committee of the House (IV, 3492); and in 1842 a
    committee of the House discussed the act of President Jackson in writing
    above his signature of approval a memorandum of his construction of the
    bill (IV, 3492). But if the President has accompanied his message
    announcing the approval with a statement of his reasons there has been
    no question in the House (IV, 3491). The statutes require that bills
    signed by the President shall be received by the Archivist of the United
    States and deposited in his office (1 U.S.C. 106a). Formerly these bills
    were received by the Secretary of State (IV, 3485) and deposited in his
    office (IV, 3429).

    Sec. 105. The act of approval.

      Under the usual  practice,
    bills are considered to have been presented to the President at the time
    they are delivered to the White House. In 1959, bills delivered to the
    White House while the President was abroad were held for presentation to
    the President upon his return to the United States by the White House.
    The United States Court of Claims held, in Eber Bros. Wine and Liquor
    Corp. v. United States, 337 F.2d 624 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 950
    (1965), that where the President had determined, with the informal
    acquiescence of leaders of Congress, that bills from the Congress were
    to be received at the White House only for presentation to him upon his
    return to the United States and the bill delivered to the White House

    Sec. 106. Notice of approval sent by
    message.

      Notice of the  signature of a bill by the President is sent by message to
    the House in which it originated (VII, 1089) and that House informs the
    other (IV, 3429). But this notice is not necessary to the validity of
    the act (IV, 3495). Sometimes, at the close of a Congress the President
    informs the House of such bills as have been approved and of such as
    have been allowed to fail (IV, 3499-3502). In one instance he
    communicated his omission to sign a bill through the committee appointed
    to notify him that Congress was about to adjourn (IV, 3504). A bill that
    had not actually passed having been signed by the President, he
    disregarded it and a new bill was passed (IV, 3498). Messages of the
    President giving notice of bills approved are entered in the Journal and
    published in the Congressional Record (V, 6593).

    [[Page 54]]

    supersedes the regular order of business (IV, 3537;
    VII, 1109). A veto message may not be read after the absence of a quorum
    has been ascertained, even though the House be about to adjourn sine die
    (IV, 3522; VII, 1094); but the message may be read and acted on at the
    next session of the same Congress (IV, 3522). When the President has
    been prevented by adjournment from returning a bill with his objections
    he has sometimes at the next session communicated his reasons for not
    approving (V, 6618-6620).

    Sec. 107. Disapproval (or veto) of
    bills.

      A message withholding  approval of a bill, called a veto message, is sent to the House
    in which the bill originated; but it has been held that such a message
    may not be returned to the President on his request after it has been
    laid before the Senate (IV, 3521). In one instance a veto message that
    had not been laid before the House was returned to the President on his
    request (Aug. 1, 1946, p. 10651). A vetoed bill received in the House by
    way of the Senate is considered as if received directly from the
    President and

      For enrollments returned with ``memoranda of disapproval,'' see
    Sec. 113, infra.

    [[Page 55]]

    mittee takes precedence over the question of passing the bill,
    the objections of the President to the contrary notwithstanding
    (Procedure, ch. 24, Sec. 15.8; Oct. 25, 1983, p. 29188), but the motion
    to refer may be laid on the table (Oct. 25, 1983, p. 29188). A vetoed
    bill having been rejected by the House, the message was referred (IV,
    3552; VII, 1103). Committees to which vetoed bills have been referred
    have sometimes neglected to report (IV, 3523, 3550, footnotes; VII,
    1108, 1114).

    Sec. 108. Consideration of a vetoed bill in
    the House.

      It is possible,  although not invariable, that a bill returned with the
    objections of the President shall be voted on at once (IV, 3534-3536)
    and when laid before the House the question on the passage is considered
    as pending and no motion from the floor is required (VII, 1097-1099),
    but it has been held that the constitutional mandate that the House
    shall ``proceed to reconsider'' means that the House shall immediately
    proceed to consider it under the Rules of the House, such that the
    ordinary motions under the Rules of the House (e.g., to refer or to
    postpone to a day certain) are in order (IV, 3542-3550; VII, 1100, 1105,
    1113; Speaker Wright, Aug. 3, 1988, p. 20280) and (for the stated
    examples) debatable under the hour rule (VIII, 2740). When consideration
    of a veto message is postponed to a date certain it has the status of
    unfinished business on that day, such that the House may proceed to its
    consideration without motion from the floor (e.g., May 9, 1996, p. _;
    Nov. 6, 2007, p. _). Although under clause 4 of rule XVI, and under the
    precedents the motion for the previous question takes precedence over
    motions to postpone or to refer when a question is under debate, if the
    Speaker has laid before the House a veto message from the President but
    has not yet stated the question to be on overriding the veto, that
    question is not ``under debate'' and the motion for the previous
    question does not take precedence (Speaker Wright, Aug. 3, 1988;
    Procedure, ch. 24, Sec. 15.8). A resolution asserting that to recognize
    for a motion to refer a veto message before stating the question on
    overriding the veto would interfere with the constitutional prerogative
    of the House to proceed to that question, and directing the Speaker to
    state the question on overriding the veto as pending before recognizing
    for a motion to refer, did not give rise to a question of the privileges
    of the House (Speaker Wright, Aug. 3, 1988, p. 20281). A motion to refer
    a vetoed bill, either with or without the message, has been held
    allowable within the constitutional mandate that the House shall
    ``proceed to reconsider'' (IV, 3550; VII, 1104, 1105, 1108, 1114), and
    in the 101st Congress, a veto pending as unfinished business was
    referred with instructions to consider and report promptly (Jan. 24,
    1990, p. 421). But although the ordinary motion to refer may be applied
    to a vetoed bill, it is not in order to move to recommit it pending the
    demand for the previous question or after it is ordered (IV, 3551; VII,
    1102). When a veto message is before the House for consideration de novo
    or as unfinished business, a motion to refer the message to
    com

      A vetoed bill may be laid on the table (IV, 3549; VII, 1105), but it
    is still highly privileged and a motion to take it from the table is in
    order (IV, 3550; V, 5439). Also a motion to discharge a committee from
    the consideration of such a bill is privileged (IV, 3532; Aug. 4, 1988,
    p. 20365; Sept. 19, 1996, p. 23815) and (in the modern practice) is
    debatable (Mar. 7, 1990, p. 3620) but is subject to the motion to lay on
    the table (Sept. 7, 1965, p. 22958; Aug. 4, 1988, p. 20365). When the
    motion to discharge is agreed to, the veto message is pending as
    unfinished business (Mar. 7, 1990, p. 3621). Although a vetoed bill is
    always privileged, the same is not true of a bill reported in lieu of it
    (IV, 3531; VII, 1103).

    Sec. 109. Action on a vetoed bill.

      If two-thirds of  the
    House to which a bill is returned with the President's objections agree
    to pass it, and then two-thirds of the other House also agree, it
    becomes a law (IV, 3520). The yeas and nays are required to pass a bill
    over the President's veto (art. I, sec. 7; IV, 2726, 3520; VII, 1110).
    The two-thirds vote required to pass the bill is two-thirds of the
    Members present and voting and not two-thirds of the total membership of
    the House (IV, 3537, 3538; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276
    (1919)). Only Members voting should be considered in determining whether
    two-thirds voted in the affirmative (VII, 1111). The motion to
    reconsider may not be applied to the vote on reconsideration of a bill
    returned with the objections of the President (V, 5644; VIII, 2778).

      It is the practice for one House to inform the other by message of its
    decision that a bill returned with the objections of the President shall
    not pass (IV, 3539-3541). A bill passed notwithstanding the objections
    of the President is sent by the presiding officer of the House that last
    acts on it to the Archivist, who receives it and deposits it in his
    office (1 U.S.C. 106a). Formerly these bills were sent to the Secretary
    of State (IV, 3524) and deposited in his office (IV, 3485).

    [[Page 56]]

    President returned on May
    7, 1974 a bill pursuant to the request of Congress (H. Con. Res. 485,
    May 6, 1974, p. 13076). The bill was again enrolled, presented to the
    President on May 7, and marked ``received May 7'' at the White House. An
    error in an enrolled bill that has gone to the President may also be
    corrected by a joint resolution (IV, 3519; VII, 1092). In the 99th
    Congress, two enrollments of a continuing appropriation bill for FY 1987
    were presented to and signed by the President, the second correcting an
    omission in the first (see P.L. 99-500 and 99-591). In Clinton v.  City
    of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), the Supreme Court held that the
    cancellation procedures of the Line Item Veto Act violated the
    presentment clause of article I, section 7 of the Constitution. For a
    discussion of the operation of the Act during the period of its
    effectiveness, see Sec. 1130(6b), infra.

    Sec. 110. Errors in bills sent to the
    President.

      A bill incorrectly  enrolled has been recalled from the President, who erased
    his signature (IV, 3506). Bills sent to the President but not yet signed
    by him are sometimes recalled by concurrent resolution of the two Houses
    (IV, 3507-3509; VII, 1091; Sept. 4, 1962, p. 18405; May 6, 1974, p.
    13076), and amended; but this proceeding is regarded as irregular (IV,
    3510-3518). When the two Houses of Congress request the President by
    concurrent resolution to return an enrolled bill and the President
    honors the request, the ten-day period under this clause runs anew from
    the time the bill is re-enrolled and is again presented to the
    President. Thus, in the 93d Congress the

    Sec. 110a. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Matthews v. Zane, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 164
    (1822); Gardner v. Collector, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 499 (1868); Lapeyre v.
    United States, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 191 (1873); La Abra Silver Mining Co.
    v. United States, 175 U.S. 423 (1899); Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v.
    Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919); Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482
    (1932); Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938); Clinton v. City of
    New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).

    Sec. 111. Bills that become laws without the
    President's approval.

      * * * If any  Bill shall not be returned by the President
    within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to
    him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it,
    unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which
    Case it shall not be a Law.

    [[Page 57]]

    bills
    within 10 days after they have been presented during the period of an
    adjournment to a day certain (IV, 3496) and after an adjournment sine
    die (VII, 1088). The Supreme Court has held valid as laws bills signed
    by the President within 10 days during a recess for a specified time (La
    Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 451 (1899); IV, 3495)
    and also those signed after an adjournment sine die (Edwards v. United
    States, 286 U.S. 482 (1932)).
      A bill signed by the President within 10 days (Sunday excepted) after
    it has been presented becomes a law even though such signing takes place
    when Congress is not in session, whether during the period of an
    adjournment to a day certain or after the final adjournment of a session
    (IV, 3486). Presidents currently sign bills after adjournment sine die
    but within 10 days after their receipt. President Truman signed several
    bills passed in the 81st Congress after the convening of the 82d
    Congress but within 10 days (P.L. 910-921; 64 Stat. 1221-1257); and
    President Reagan, after the convening of the 98th Congress, approved
    bills passed and presented in the 97th Congress. It was formerly
    contended that the President might not approve bills during a recess
    (IV, 3493, 3494), and in one instance, in 1864, when the President
    signed a bill after final adjournment of Congress but within 10 days
    grave doubts were raised and an adverse report was made by a House
    committee (IV, 3497). Later opinions of the Attorney General have been
    to the effect that the President has the power to approve

    Sec. 112. The pocket veto.

      A bill that  is passed by both
    Houses of Congress during the first regular session of a Congress and
    presented to the President less than 10 days (Sundays excepted) before
    the adjournment sine die of that session, but is neither signed by the
    President, nor returned to the House in which it originated, does not
    become a law (``The Pocket Veto Case,'' 279 U.S. 655 (1929); VII, 1115).
    The Supreme Court has held that the adjournment of the House of origin
    for not exceeding three days while the other branch of the Congress
    remained in session, did not prevent a return of the vetoed bill to the
    House of origin. Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938). President
    Truman during an adjournment to a day certain pocket vetoed several
    bills passed by the 81st Congress and also, after the convening of the
    82d Congress, pocket vetoed one bill passed in the 81st Congress.

    Sec. 113. Effect of adjournment to a day
    certain.

      Doubt has existed  as to whether a bill that remains with the President 10 days
    without his signature, Congress meanwhile before the tenth day having
    adjourned to a day certain, becomes a law (IV, 3483, 3496; VII, 1115);
    an opinion of the Attorney General in 1943 stated that under such
    circumstances a bill not signed by the President did not become a law
    (40 Op. Att'y Gen. 274 (1943)). However, more recently, where a Member
    of the Senate challenged in Federal court the effectiveness of such a
    pocket veto, a United States Court of Appeals held that a Senate bill
    could not be pocket-vetoed by the President during an ``intrasession''
    adjournment of Congress to a day certain for more than three days, where
    the Secretary of the Senate had been authorized to receive Presidential
    messages during such adjournment. Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C.
    Cir., 1974). See also Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1976).
    Following a consent decree in this case, it was announced that President
    Ford would utilize a ``return'' veto, subject to override, in
    intersession and intrasession adjournments where authority exists for
    the appropriate House to receive such messages notwithstanding the
    adjournment.

    [[Page 58]]

    the objections of the
    President, was considered as a return veto (Sept. 11, 1991, p. 22643;
    Sept. 6, 2000, p. 17156; Nov. 13, 2000, p. 26022; Nov. 15, 2010, p. _).
    Also in the 102d Congress, President Bush purported on December 20,
    1991, to pocket veto a bill (S. 1176) that was presented to him on
    December 9, 1991, notwithstanding that the Congress was in an
    intrasession adjournment (from Nov. 27, 1991, until 11:55 a.m., Jan. 3,
    1992) rather than an adjournment sine die (see Jan. 23, 1992 [Daily
    Digest]); and during debate on a subsequent bill (S. 2184) purporting to
    repeal the provisions of S. 1176 and to enact instead provisions
    acceding to the objections of the President, the Speaker inserted
    remarks on the pocket veto in light of modern congressional practice
    concerning the receipt of messages and communications during recesses
    and adjournments (Mar. 3, 1992, p. 4081).
      In the 101st, 110th, and 111th Congresses, when the President returned
    an enrolled bill during an intersession adjournment, not by way of
    message under seal but with a ``memorandum of disapproval'' setting
    forth his objections, the House treated it as a return veto subject to
    override under article I, section 7 (Jan. 23, 1990, p. 4; Jan. 15, 2008,
    p. _; Jan. 12, 2010, p. _). Similarly, in the 102d, 106th, and 111th
    Congresses, an enrolled House bill returned to the Clerk during an
    intrasession recess, not by way of message under seal but with a
    ``memorandum of disapproval'' setting forth

      In the 93d Congress, the President returned a House bill without his
    signature to the Clerk of the House, who had been authorized to receive
    messages from the President during an adjournment to a day certain, and
    the President asserted in his veto message that he had ``pocket vetoed''
    the bill during the adjournment of the House to a day certain. The House
    regarded the President's return of the bill without his signature as a
    veto within the meaning of article I, section 7 of the Constitution and
    proceeded to reconsider and to pass the bill over the President's veto,
    after postponing consideration to a subsequent day (motion to postpone,
    Nov. 18, 1974, p. 36246; veto override, Nov. 20, 1974, p. 36621).
    Subsequently, on November 21, 1974, the Senate also voted to override
    the veto (p. 36882) and pursuant to 1 U.S.C. 106a the Enrolling Clerk of
    the Senate forwarded the bill to the Archives for publication as a
    public law. The Administrator of General Services at the Archives (now
    Archivist), upon instructions from the Department of Justice, declined
    to promulgate the bill as public law on the day received. The question
    as to the efficacy of the congressional action in passing the bill over
    the President's veto was mooted when the House and Senate passed on
    November 26, 1974 (pp. 37406, 37603), an identical bill that was signed
    into law on December 7, 1974 (P.L. 93-516).

    [[Page 59]]

    Subcommittee on
    Legislative Process, Committee on Rules, on H.R. 849, 101st Congress.
      As part of the concurrent resolution providing for the adjournments
    sine die of the first sessions of the 101st Congress and 105th Congress,
    the Congress reaffirmed its position that an intersession adjournment
    did not prevent the return of a bill where the Clerk and the Secretary
    of the Senate were authorized to receive messages during the adjournment
    (H. Con. Res. 239, Nov. 21, 1989, p. 31156; S. Con. Res. 68, Nov. 13,
    1997, p. 26538). For the views of the Speaker, the Minority Leader, and
    the Attorney General concerning pocket veto authority during an
    intrasession adjournment, see correspondence inserted in the
    Congressional Record (Jan. 23, 1990, p. 3; Sept. 19, 2000, p. 18594;
    Nov. 13, 2000, p. 26022; Oct. 2, 2008, p. _; May 26, 2010, p. _); and
    for discussions of the constitutionality of intersession or intrasession
    pocket vetoes see Kennedy, ``Congress, The President, and The Pocket
    Veto,'' 63 Va. L. Rev. 355 (1977), and Hearing,

    Sec. 114. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States,
    175 U.S. 423 (1899); Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 U.S. 506 (1901); the
    Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929); Edwards v. United States, 286
    U.S. 482 (1932); Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938); Burke v.
    Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987) (vacating and remanding as moot the decision
    sub nom. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).

    Sec. 115. As to presentation of orders and
    resolutions for approval.

      \3\ Every Order,  Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence
    of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a
    question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the
    United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved
    by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of
    the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and
    Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.

      It has been settled conclusively that a joint resolution proposing an
    amendment to the Constitution should not be presented to the President
    for his approval (V, 7040; Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
    378 (1798)). Such joint resolutions, after passage by both Houses, are
    presented to the Archivist (1 U.S.C. 106b). Although the requirement of
    the Constitution seems specific, the practice of early Congresses was to
    present to the President for approval only such concurrent resolutions
    as were legislative in effect (IV, 3483, 3484).

      For discussion of Presidential approval of a joint resolution
    extending the period for State ratification of a constitutional
    amendment already submitted to the States, see Sec. 192, infra.

    [[Page 60]]

    Sec. 116. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United
    States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United
    States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Process
    Gas Consumer's Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America 463 U.S. 1216
    (1983).

    Sec. 117. The revenue
    power.

      Section 8. The Congress  shall have Power \1\ To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
    Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
    and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and
    Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;
    <>   \2\ To borrow Money on the
    credit of the United States:

    Sec. 119. Power over commerce.

      \3\ To regulate  Commerce with
    foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
    Tribes;

    Sec. 120. Naturalization and bankruptcy.

      \4\ To establish  an
    uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of
    Bankruptcies throughout the United States;
    <>   \5\ To coin Money,
    regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of
    Weights and Measures;

    Sec. 122. Counterfeiting.

      \6\ To provide  for the Punishment
    of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;-
    -
    <>   \7\ To establish Post
    Offices and Post Roads;

    [[Page 61]]

    <>
    \10\ To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high
    Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations;
    <>   \11\
    To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules
    concerning Captures on Land and Water;

    Sec. 124. Patents and copyrights.

      \8\ To promote  the
    Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
    Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
    and Discoveries;
    <>   \9\ To constitute Tribunals
    inferior to the supreme Court;

    Sec. 128. War powers of Congress and the
    President.

      The 93d  Congress passed over the President's veto Public Law 93-
    148, relating to the power of Congress to declare war under this clause
    and the power of the President as Commander in Chief under article II,
    section 2, clause 1. The law requires that the President report to
    Congress on the introduction of United States Armed Forces in the
    absence of a declaration of war. The President must terminate use of the
    Armed Forces unless Congress, within 60 calendar days after a report is
    submitted or is required to be submitted, (1) declares war or authorizes
    use of the Armed Forces; (2) extends by law the 60-day period; or (3) is
    physically unable to meet as result of armed attack. The Act also
    provided that Congress could adopt a concurrent resolution requiring the
    removal of Armed Forces engaged in foreign hostilities, a provision that
    should be read in light of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Sections
    6 and 7 of the Act provide congressional procedures for joint
    resolutions, bills, and concurrent resolutions introduced pursuant to
    the provisions of the Act (see Sec. 1130(2), infra). For further
    discussion of that Act, and war powers generally, see Deschler, ch. 13.

    [[Page 62]]

    Sec. 129. Raising and support of armies.

      \12\ To raise  and
    support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a
    longer Term than two Years;
    <>   \13\ To provide and
    maintain a Navy;
    <>   \14\ To make Rules for the
    Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

    Sec. 132. Calling out the militia.

      \15\ To provide  for
    calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
    Insurrections and repel Invasions;

    Sec. 133. Power over militia.

      \16\ To provide  for
    organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing
    such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United
    States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the
    Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the
    discipline prescribed by Congress;

    Sec. 134. Power over territory of the United
    States.

      \17\ To exercise  exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such
    District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of
    particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of
    the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over
    all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in
    which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals,
    dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;--And

    [[Page 63]]

    governmental
    structure of the District, provided a charter for local government
    subject to acceptance by a majority of the registered qualified voters
    of the District, delegated certain legislative powers to the District,
    and implemented certain recommendations of the Commission on the
    Organization of the Government of the District of Columbia (P.L. 93-198;
    87 Stat. 774). Section 604 of that Act provides for congressional action
    on certain district matters by providing a procedure for approval and
    disapproval of certain actions by the District of Columbia Council. The
    section, as amended by Public Law 98-473, permits a highly privileged
    motion to discharge a joint resolution of approval or disapproval that
    has not been reported by the committee to which referred within 20
    calendar days after its introduction (see Sec. 1130(5), infra).

    Sec. 135. Congressional authority over
    the District of Columbia.

      Congress has provided  by law that ``all that part of the territory
    of the United States included within the present limits of the District
    of Columbia shall be the permanent seat of government of the United
    States'' (4 U.S.C. 71). Pursuant to its authority under this clause,
    Congress provided in 1970 for the people of the District of Columbia to
    be represented in the House of Representatives by a Delegate and for a
    Commission to report to the Congress on the organization of the
    government of the District of Columbia (P.L. 91-405; 84 Stat. 845). For
    the powers and duties of the Delegate from the District of Columbia, see
    rule III (Sec. 675, infra) and Deschler, ch. 7, Sec. 3. In 1973,
    Congress passed the District of Columbia Self-Government and
    Governmental Reorganization Act, which reorganized the

    -  \18\ To make <> all Laws
    which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
    foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
    the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
    thereof.

    Sec. 135a. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. 445 (1805);
    National Mutual Insurance Co. of D.C. v. Tidewater Transfer Co, 337 U.S.
    582 (1945).

    Sec. 137. Migration or importation of
    persons.

      Section 9. \1\ The  Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States
    now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the
    Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a
    Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten
    dollars for each Person.

    [[Page 64]]

    Sec. 138. Writ of habeas corpus.

      \2\ The Privilege of  the
    Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
    Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.
    <>   \3\ No
    Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.

    Sec. 140. Capitation and direct taxes.

      \4\ [No Capitation,  or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to
    the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.]

    Sec. 141. Export duties.

      This provision was changed in 1913 by the 16th amendment.
       \5\ No Tax or Duty shall be laid on
    Articles exported from any State.

    Sec. 142. Freedom of commerce.

      \6\ No Preference  shall be
    given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State
    over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State,
    be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.

    Sec. 143. Appropriations and accounting of public
    money.

      \7\ No Money  shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
    Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the
    Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from
    time to time.

    Sec. 144. Titles of nobility and gifts from
    foreign states.

      \8\ No Title of  Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no
    Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without
    the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office,
    or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.

    [[Page 65]]

    and wear the award so that he would
    not be in the position of reviewing his own application under the
    provisions of the law.

    Sec. 145. Foreign gifts and
    decorations.

      Consent has been  granted to officers and employees of the government,
    under enumerated conditions, to accept certain gifts and decorations
    from foreign governments (see 5 U.S.C. 7342). The adoption of this act
    largely has obviated the practice of passing private bills to permit the
    officer or employee to retain the award. However, where the Speaker (who
    was one of the officers empowered by an earlier law to approve retention
    of decorations by Members of the House) was himself tendered an award
    from a foreign government, a private law (Private Law 91-244) was
    enacted to permit him to accept

      Public Law 95-105 amended the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act (now 5
    U.S.C. 7342) to designate the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct
    (now Ethics) of the House of Representatives as the employing agency for
    the House with respect to foreign gifts and decorations received by
    Members and employees; under that statute the Committee may approve the
    acceptance of foreign decorations and has promulgated regulations to
    carry out the Act with respect to Members and employees (Jan. 23, 1978,
    p. 452), and disposes of foreign gifts that may not be retained by the
    donee.

      Opinions of Attorneys General: Gifts from Foreign Prince, 24 Op. Att'y
    Gen. 117 (1902); Foreign Diplomatic Commission, 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 538
    (1871); Marshal of Florida, 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 409 (1854).

    Sec. 146. States not to make treaties, coin
    money, pass ex post facto laws, impair contracts, etc.

      Section 10. \1\ No  State shall
    enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of
    Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing
    but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of
    Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of
    Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

    Sec. 147. States not to lay imposts or
    duties.

      \2\ No State  shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or
    Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary
    for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties
    and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the
    Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be
    subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.

    [[Page 66]]

    ment or Compact with another State, or with a
    foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such
    imminent Danger as will not admit of delay. end segment .001 segment
    .002 -- Constitution, from article II

    Sec. 148. States not to lay tonnage taxes, make
    compacts, or go to war.

      \3\ No State  shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay
    any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace,
    enter into any Agree