[Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 110th Congress]
[110th Congress]
[House Document 109-157]
[Jeffersons Manual of ParliamentaryPractice]
[Pages 173-195]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


 

<>   
When the Speaker is seated in his chair, every member is to sit in his 
place. Scob., 6; Grey, 403.

                       sec. xvii--order in debate



[[Page 174]]


  In the House the decorum of Members is regulated by the various 
provisions of rule XVII; and this provision of the parliamentary law is 
practically obsolete.




Sec. 354. Procedure of the Member in seeking 
recognition.

  When  any Member means to speak, he is to stand up in his 
place, uncovered, and to address himself, not to the House, or any 
particular Member, but to the Speaker, who calls him by his name, that 
the House may take notice who it is that speaks. Scob., 6; D'Ewes, 487, 
col. 1; 2 Hats., 77; 4 Grey, 66; 8 Grey, 108. But Members who are 
indisposed may be indulged to speak sitting. 2 Hats., 75, 77; 1 Grey, 
143.



<>   When a Member stands up to 
speak, no question is to be put, but he is to be heard unless the House 
overrule him. 4 Grey, 390; 5 Grey, 6, 143.

  In the House a Member seeking recognition is governed by clause 1 of 
rule XVII, which differs materially from this provision of the 
parliamentary law. The Speaker, moreover, calls the Member, not by name, 
but as ``the gentleman (or gentlewoman) from ------,'' naming the State. 
As long ago as 1832, at least, a Member was not required to rise from 
his own particular seat since seats are no longer assigned (V, 4979, 
footnote).


  In the House no question is put as to the right of a Member to the 
floor, unless he be called to order and dealt with by the House under 
clause 4 of rule XVII.


[[Page 175]]



Sec. 356. The parliamentary law as to recognition by the 
Speaker.

  If  two or more rise to speak nearly together, the Speaker 
determines who was first up, and calls him by name, whereupon he 
proceeds, unless he voluntarily sits down and gives way to the other. 
But sometimes the House does not acquiesce in the Speaker's decision, in 
which case the question is put, ``which Member was first up?'' 2 Hats., 
76; Scob., 7; D'Ewes, 434, col. 1, 2.



  In the Senate of the United States the President's decision is without 
appeal.


  In the House recognition by the Chair is governed by clause 2 of rule 
XVII and the practice thereunder. There has been no appeal from a 
decision by the Speaker on a question of recognition since 1881, on 
which occasion Speaker Randall stated that the power of recognition is 
``just as absolute in the Chair as the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
the United States is absolute as to the interpretation of the law'' (II, 
1425-1428), and in the later practice no appeal is permitted (VIII, 
2429, 2646, 2762).



Sec. 357. Right of the Member to be heard a second 
time.

  No  man may speak more than once on the same bill on the same day; 
or even on another day, if the debate be adjourned. But if it be read 
more than once in the same day, he may speak once at every reading. Co., 
12, 115; Hakew., 148; Scob., 58; 2 Hats., 75. Even a change of opinion 
does not give a right to be heard a second time. Smyth's Comw. L., 2, c. 
3; Arcan, Parl., 17.



  But he may be permitted to speak again to clear a matter of fact, 3 
Grey, 357, 416; or merely to explain himself, 2 Hats., 73, in some 
material part of his speech, Ib., 75; or to the manner or words of the 
question, keeping himself to that only, and not traveling into the 
merits of it, Memorials in Hakew., 29; or to the orders of the House, if 
they be transgressed, keeping within that line, and not falling into the 
matter itself. Mem. Hakew., 30, 31.



[[Page 176]]


  The House has modified the parliamentary law as to a Member's right to 
speak a second time by clause 3 of rule XVII and by permitting a Member 
controlling time in debate to yield to another more than once (Apr. 5, 
2000, p. 4497). In ordinary practice rule XVII is not rigidly enforced, 
and Members find little difficulty in making such explanations as are 
contemplated by the parliamentary law.




Sec. 358. Participation of the Speaker in debate.

  But  if the 
Speaker rise to speak, the Member standing up ought to sit down, that he 
may be first heard. Town., col. 205; Hale Parl., 133; Mem. in Hakew., 
30, 31. Nevertheless, though the Speaker may of right speak to matters 
of order, and be first heard, he is restrained from speaking on any 
other subject, except where the House have occasion for facts within his 
knowledge; then he may, with their leave, state the matter of fact. 3 
Grey, 38.



  This provision is usually observed in the practice of the House only 
with regard to the conduct of the Speaker when he is in the chair. In 
several instances the Speaker has been permitted by the House to make a 
statement from the chair, as in a case wherein his past conduct had been 
criticized (II, 1369), in a case wherein there had been unusual 
occurrences in the joint session to count the electoral vote (II, 1372), 
and in a matter relating to a contest for the seat of the Speaker as a 
Member (II, 1360). In rare instances the Speaker has made brief 
explanations from the chair without asking the assent of the House (II, 
1373, 1374). Speakers have called others to the chair and participated 
in debate, usually without asking consent of the House (II, 1360, 1367, 
footnote, 1368, 1371; III, 1950), and in one case a Speaker on the floor 
debated a point of order that the Speaker pro tempore was to decide (V, 
6097). In rare instances Speakers have left the chair to make motions on 
the floor (II, 1367, footnote). Speakers may participate in debate in 
Committee of the Whole, although the privilege was rarely exercised in 
early practice (II, 1367, footnote).




Sec. 359. Impertinent, superfluous, or tedious 
speaking.

  No  one is to speak impertinently or beside the question, 
superfluous, or tediously. Scob., 31, 33; 2 Hats., 166, 168; Hale Parl., 
133.




[[Page 177]]


  The House, by clause 1 of rule XVII, provides that the Member shall 
address himself to the question under debate, but neither by rule nor 
practice has the House suppressed superfluous or tedious speaking, its 
hour rule (clause 2 of rule XVII) being a sufficient safeguard in this 
respect.




Sec. 360. Language reflecting on the House.

  No  person is to 
use indecent language against the proceedings of the House; no prior 
determination of which is to be reflected on by any Member, unless he 
means to conclude with a motion to rescind it. 2 Hats., 169, 170; 
Rushw., p. 3, v. 1, fol. 42. But while a proposition under consideration 
is still in fieri, though it has even been reported by a committee, 
reflections on it are no reflections on the House. 9 Grey, 508.



  In the practice of the House it has been held out of order in debate 
to cast reflections on either the House or its membership or its 
decisions, whether present or past (V, 5132-5138). A Member who had used 
offensive words against the character of the House, and who declined to 
explain, was censured (II, 1247). Words impeaching the loyalty of a 
portion of the membership have also been ruled out (V, 5139). Where a 
Member reiterated on the floor certain published charges against the 
House, action was taken, although other business had intervened, the 
question being considered one of privilege (III, 2637). It has been held 
inappropriate and not in order in debate to refer to the proceedings of 
a committee except such as have been formally reported to the House (V, 
5080-5083; VIII, 2269, 2485-2493; June 24, 1958, pp. 12120, 12122), but 
this rule does not apply to the proceedings of a committee of a previous 
Congress (Feb. 2, 1914, p. 2782), and the rationale for this limitation 
on debate is in part obsolete under the modern practice of the House 
insofar as the doctrine is applied to open committee meetings and 
hearings.



[[Page 178]]




Sec. 361. Personalities in debate forbidden.

  No  person, in 
speaking, is to mention a Member then present by his name, but to 
describe him by his seat in the House, or who spoke last, or on the 
other side of the question, &c., Mem. in Hakew., 3; Smyth's Comw., L. 2, 
c. 3; nor to digress from the matter to fall upon the person, Scob., 31; 
Hale Parl., 133; 2 Hats., 166, by speaking reviling, nipping, or 
unmannerly words against a particular Member. Smyth's Comw., L. 2, c. 3. 
* * *


  In the practice of the House, a Member is not permitted to refer to 
another Member by name (V, 5144; VIII, 2526, 2529, 2536), or to address 
him in the second person (V, 5140-5143; VI, 600; VIII, 2529). The proper 
reference to another Member is ``the gentleman (or gentlewoman) from --
----,'' naming the Member's State (June 14, 1978, p. 17615; July 21, 
1982, p. 17314). A mere reference to a Member's voting record does not 
form a basis for a point of order against those remarks (June 13, 2002, 
p. 10226, p. 10232).

  By rule of the House (clause 1 of rule XVII), as well as by 
parliamentary law, personalities are forbidden (V, 4979, 5145, 5163, 
5169), whether against the Member in the Member's capacity as 
Representative or otherwise (V, 5152, 5153), even if the references may 
be relevant to the pending question (Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25778). The 
House has censured a Member for gross personalities (II, 1251). The 
Chair may intervene to prevent improper references where it is evident 
that a particular Member is being described (Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27077).

  The Chair does not rule on the veracity of a statement made by a 
Member in debate (Apr. 9, 1997, p. 4926). Although accusing another 
Member of deceit engages in personality, merely accusing another Member 
of making a mistake does not (Oct. 26, 2000, p. 24921).

  Clause 1 of rule XVII has been held to proscribe: (1) referring to an 
identifiable group of sitting Members as having committed a crime (e.g., 
stealing an election or obstructing justice) (Feb. 27, 1985, p. 3898; 
Speaker Wright, Mar. 21, 1989, p. 5016; May 19, 1998, p. 9738; July 15, 
2004, p. ----); (2) referring in a personally critical manner to the 
political tactics of the Speaker or other Members (June 25, 1981, p. 
14056); (3) referring to a particular Member of the House in a 
derogatory fashion (Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27077); (4) characterizing a Member 
as ``the most impolite Member'' (June 27, 1996, p. 15915); (5) 
questioning the integrity of a Member (July 25, 1996, p. 19170); (6) 
denunciating the spirit in which a Member had spoken (V, 6981); (7) 
using a Member's surname as though an adjective for a word of ridicule 
(June 13, 2002, p. 10232); (8) questioning the decency of another Member 
(Mar. 21, 2007, p. ----).


[[Page 179]]

to leadership power and decisions'' because the reference did not 
identify a specific Member as engaging in an improper quid pro quo (Apr. 
9, 1997, p. 4926). A general statement that seemed to invoke racial 
stereotypes, but not in a context so inflammatory as to constitute a 
breach of decorum, was held not unparliamentary (Apr. 9, 2003, p. 9005 
(sustained by tabling of appeal)).
  A distinction has been drawn between general language, which 
characterizes a measure or the political motivations behind a measure, 
and personalities (V, 5153, 5163, 5169). Although remarks in debate may 
not include personal attacks against a Member or an identifiable group 
of Members, they may address political motivations for legislative 
positions (Jan. 24, 1995, p. 2214; Mar. 8, 1995, pp. 7307, 7308; Nov. 
17, 1995, p. 33832; June 13, 1996, p. 14043). For example, references to 
``down-in-the-dirt gutter politics'' and ``you people are going to pay'' 
were held not to be personal references (Nov. 14, 1995, p. 32388). 
Similarly, characterizing a pending measure as a ``patently petty 
political terrorist tactic'' was held in order as a reference to the 
pending measure rather than to the motive or character of the measure's 
proponent (Nov. 9, 1995, p. 31413). The Chair also has held in order a 
general reference that ``big donors'' receive ``access

  A Member should refrain from references in debate to the official 
conduct of a Member where such conduct is not the subject then pending 
before the House by way of either a report of the Committee on Standards 
of Official Conduct or another question of the privileges of the House 
(see, e.g., July 24, 1990, p. 18917; Mar. 19, 1992, p. 6078; May 25, 
1995, pp. 14434-37; Sept. 19, 1995, pp. 25454, 25455; Apr. 27, 2005, p. 
----); and, although such references are ordinarily enforced by the 
Chair in response to a point of order, the Chair may take the initiative 
in order to maintain proper decorum (Apr. 1, 1992, p. 7899; June 17, 
2004, p. ----). This stricture also precludes a Member from reciting 
news articles discussing a Member's conduct (Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24318), 
reciting the content of a previously tabled resolution raising a 
question of the privileges of the House (Nov. 17, 1995, p. 33853; Sept. 
19, 1996, p. 23855), or even referring to a Member's conduct by mere 
insinuation (Sept. 12, 1996, p. 22899). Notice of an intention to offer 
a resolution as a question of the privileges of the House under rule IX 
does not render a resolution ``pending'' and thereby permit references 
to conduct of a Member proposed to be addressed therein (Sept. 19, 1996, 
p. 23811).

  The stricture against references to a Member's conduct not then 
pending before the House applies to the conduct of all sitting Members 
(Apr. 1, 1992, p. 7899), including conduct that has previously been 
resolved by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct or the House 
(Sept. 24, 1996, pp. 24483, 24485; Apr. 17, 1997, p. 5831). This 
stricture does not apply to the conduct of a former Member, provided the 
reference is not made in an attempt to compare the conduct of a former 
Member with the conduct of a sitting Member (Sept. 20, 1995, pp. 25825, 
25826; Sept. 12, 1996, pp. 22900, 22901).


[[Page 180]]

  Debate on a pending privileged resolution recommending disciplinary 
action against a Member may necessarily involve personalities. However, 
clause 1 of rule XVII still prohibits the use of language that is 
personally abusive (see, e.g., July 31, 1979, p. 21584; Jan. 21, 1997, 
p. 393) and the Chair may take the initiative to prevent violations of 
the rule (July 24, 2002, p. 14300). Furthermore, during the actual 
pendency of such a resolution, a Member may discuss a prior case 
reported to the House by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct 
for the purpose of comparing the severity of the sanction recommended in 
that case with the severity of the sanction recommended in the pending 
case, provided that the Member does not identify, or discuss the details 
of the past conduct of, a sitting Member (Dec. 18, 1987, p. 36271).

  In addition to the prohibition against addressing a Member's conduct 
when it is not actually pending before the House, the Speaker has 
advised that Members should refrain from references in debate (1) to the 
motivations of a Member who filed a complaint before the Committee on 
Standards of Official Conduct (June 15, 1988, p. 14623; July 6, 1988, p. 
16630; Mar. 22, 1989, p. 5130; May 2, 1989, p. 7735; Nov. 3, 1989, p. 
27077); (2) to personal criticism of a member of the Committee on 
Standards of Official Conduct (Apr. 1, 1992, p. 7899; Mar. 3, 1995, p. 
6715; Sept. 19, 1996, p. 23812; Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24317); and (3) to an 
investigation undertaken by the Committee on Standards of Official 
Conduct, including suggestion of a course of action (Mar. 3, 1995, p. 
6715; Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24317; Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25778) or advocacy of 
an interim status report by the Committee (Sept. 12, 1996, p. 22900; 
Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25778).

  A Member may not read in debate extraneous material critical of 
another Member that would be improper if spoken in the Member's own 
words (May 25, 1995, pp. 14436, 14437; Sept. 12, 1996, p. 22898). Thus, 
words in a telegram read in debate that repudiated the ``lies and half-
truths'' of a House committee report were ruled out of order as 
reflecting on the integrity of committee members (June 16, 1947, p. 
7065), and unparliamentary references in debate to newspaper accounts 
used in support of a Member's personal criticism of another Member were 
similarly ruled out of order (Feb. 25, 1985, p. 3346).

  For precedents applicable to references in debate to the President, 
see Sec. 370, infra, or Members of the Senate, see Sec. 371, infra.


[[Page 181]]

tions to suspend the rules may not engage in personality by discussing 
the official conduct of the Speaker, even if possibly relevant to the 
question of empowerment of the Speaker (Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24485).



Sec. 362. Criticism of the Speaker.

  Complaint  of the conduct 
of the Speaker should be presented directly for the action of the House 
and not by way of debate on other matters (V, 5188). In a case wherein a 
Member used words insulting to the Speaker the House on a subsequent 
day, and after other business had intervened, censured the offender (II, 
1248). In such a case the Speaker would ordinarily leave the chair while 
action should be taken by the House (II, 1366; V, 5188; VI, 565). In the 
104th Congress the Chair reaffirmed that it is not in order to speak 
disrespectfully of the Speaker, and that under the precedents the 
sanctions for such violations transcend the ordinary requirements for 
timeliness of challenges (II, 1248; Jan. 4, 1995, p. 552; Jan. 19, 1995, 
p. 1599). It is not in order to arraign the personal conduct of the 
Speaker (Jan. 18, 1995, p. 1441; Jan. 19, 1995, p. 1601). For example, 
it is not in order to charge dishonesty or disregard of the rules (July 
11, 1985, p. 18550), to reflect on his patriotism by accusing him of 
``kowtowing'' to persons who would desecrate the flag (June 20, 1990, p. 
14877), to refer to him as a ``crybaby'' (Nov. 16, 1995, p. 33394), or 
to refer to official conduct of the Speaker that has previously been 
resolved by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct or the House 
(Apr. 17, 1997, p. 5831). The Chair may take the initiative to admonish 
Members for references in debate that disparage the Speaker (June 25, 
1981, p. 14056; Mar. 22, 1996, p. 6077). Debate on a resolution 
authorizing the Speaker to entertain mo





Sec. 363. Motives of Members not to be arraigned.

  * * *  The 
consequences of a measure may be reprobated in strong terms; but to 
arraign the motives of those who propose to advocate it is a 
personality, and against order. Qui digreditur a materia ad personam, 
Mr. Speaker ought to suppress. Ord. Com., 1604, Apr. 19.



  The arraignment of the motives of Members is not permitted (V, 5147-
51; Dec. 13, 1973, p. 41270), and the Speakers have intervened to 
prevent it, in the earlier practice preventing even mildest imputations 
(V, 5161, 5162). However, remarks in debate may address political, but 
not personal, motivations for legislative positions (Jan. 24, 1995, p. 
2214; Mar. 8, 1995, pp. 7307, 7308; Nov. 17, 1995, p. 33832; June 13, 
1996, p. 14043) or for committee membership (July 10, 1995, pp. 18257-
59). Accusing another Member of hypocrisy has been held not in order 
(July 24, 1979, p. 20380; Mar. 29, 1995, p. 9675), and characterizing 
the motivation of a Member in offering an amendment as deceptive and 
hypocritical was ruled out of order (June 12, 1979, p. 11461). A 
statement in debate that an amendment could only be demagogic or racist 
because only demagoguery or racism impelled such an amendment was ruled 
out of order as impugning the motives of the Member offering the 
amendment (Dec. 3, 1973, pp. 41270, 41271). However, debate 
characterizing a pending measure as a ``patently petty political 
terrorist tactic'' was held in order as directed at the pending measure 
rather than the motive or the character of its proponent (Nov. 9, 1995, 
p. 31413). While in debate the assertion of one Member may be declared 
untrue by another, yet in so doing an intentional misrepresentation must 
not be implied (V, 5157-5160), and if stated or implied is censurable 
(II, 1305) and presents a question of privilege (III, 2717; VI, 607). A 
Member in debate having declared the words of another ``a base lie,'' 
censure was inflicted by the House on the offender (II, 1249).


[[Page 182]]

in Hakew., 31; nor to pass between the Speaker and the speaking Member, 
nor to go across the House, Scob., 6, or to walk up and down it, or to 
take books or papers from the table, or write there, 2 Hats., 171, p. 
170.



Sec. 364. Disorder and interruptions during debate.

  No  one 
is to disturb another in his speech by hissing, coughing, spitting, 6 
Grey, 322; Scob., 8; D'Ewes, 332, col. 1, 640, col. 2, speaking or 
whispering to another, Scob., 6; D'Ewes, 487, col. 1; nor stand up to 
interrupt him, Town, col. 205; Mem.



  The House has, by clause 5 of rule XVII, prescribed certain rules of 
decorum differing somewhat from this provision of the parliamentary law, 
but supplemental to it rather than antagonistic. In one respect, 
however, the practice of the House differs from the apparent intent of 
the parliamentary law. In the House a Member may interrupt by addressing 
the Chair for permission of the Member speaking (V, 5006; VIII, 2465); 
but it is entirely within the discretion of the Member occupying the 
floor to determine when and by whom he shall be interrupted (V, 5007, 
5008; VIII, 2463, 2465). There is no rule of the House requiring a 
Member having the floor to yield to another Member to whom he has 
referred during debate (Aug. 2, 1984, p. 22241). A Member may ask 
another to yield from any microphone in the Chamber, including those in 
the well, so long as not crossing between the Member having the floor 
and the Chair (June 5, 1998, p. 11170). The Chair may take the 
initiative in preserving order when a Member declining to yield in 
debate continues to be interrupted by another Member, may order that the 
interrupting Member's remarks not appear in the Record (July 26, 1984, 
p. 21247), and may admonish Members not to converse with a Member 
attempting to address the House (Feb. 21, 1984, p. 2758), as it is not 
in order to engage in disruption while another is delivering remarks in 
debate (June 27, 1996, p. 15915). On the opening day of the 103d 
Congress, during the customary announcement of policies with respect to 
particular aspects of the legislative process, the Chair elaborated on 
the rules of order in debate with a general statement concerning decorum 
in the House (Jan. 5, 1993, p. 105). Under this provision, the Chair may 
require a line of Members waiting to sign a discharge petition to 
proceed to the rostrum from the far right-hand aisle and require the 
line not to stand between the Chair and Members engaging in debate (Oct. 
24, 1997, p. 23293). Hissing and jeering is not proper decorum in the 
House (May 21, 1998, p. 10282). For further discussion of interruptions 
in debate, see Sec. 946, infra.


[[Page 183]]

down; for it scarcely ever happens that they are guilty of this piece of 
ill manners without sufficient reason, or inattention to a Member who 
says anything worth their hearing. 2 Hats., 77, 78.



Sec. 365. Parliamentary method of silencing a 
tedious Member.

  Nevertheless,  if a Member finds that it is not the inclination of 
the House to hear him, and that by conversation or any other noise they 
endeavor to drown his voice, it is his most prudent way to submit to the 
pleasure of the House, and sit



  In the House, where the previous question and hour rule of debate have 
been used for many years, the parliamentary method of suppressing a 
tedious Member has never been imported into the practice (V, 5445).




Sec. 366. The parliamentary law as to naming a disorderly 
Member.

  If  repeated calls do not produce order, the Speaker may call by 
his name any Member obstinately persisting in irregularity; whereupon 
the House may require the Member to withdraw. He is then to be heard in 
exculpation, and to withdraw. Then the Speaker states the offense 
committed; and the House considers the degree of punishment they will 
inflict. 2 Hats., 167, 7, 8, 172.



  This provision of parliamentary law should be in conjunction with 
clause 4 of rule XVII, Sec. Sec. 960-961, infra, particularly as this 
provision relates to the ultimate authority of the House to determine 
whether a Member ignoring repeated calls to order should be permitted to 
proceed in order.


[[Page 184]]

and they are put under restraint if they refuse, or until they do. 9 
Grey, 234, 312.



Sec. 367. Proceedings in cases of assaults and 
affrays.

  For  instances of assaults and affrays in the House of Commons, 
and the proceedings thereon, see 1 Pet. Misc., 82; 3 Grey, 128; 4 Grey, 
328; 5 Grey, 382; 6 Grey, 254; 10 Grey, 8. Whenever warm words or an 
assault have passed between Members, the House, for the protection of 
their Members, requires them to declare in their places not to prosecute 
any quarrel, 3 Grey, 128, 293; 5 Grey, 280; or orders them to attend the 
Speaker, who is to accommodate their differences, and report to the 
House, 3 Grey, 419;



  In several instances assaults and affrays have occurred on the floor 
of the House. Sometimes the House has allowed these affairs to pass 
without notice, the Members concerned making apologies either personally 
or through other Members (II, 1658-1662). In other cases the House has 
exacted apologies (II, 1646-1651, 1657), or required the offending 
Members to pledge themselves before the House to keep the peace (II, 
1643). In case of an aggravated assault by one Member on another on the 
portico of the Capitol for words spoken in debate, the House censured 
the assailant and three other Members who had been present, armed, to 
prevent interference (II, 1655, 1656). Assaults or affrays in the 
Committee of the Whole are dealt with by the House (II, 1648-1651).


[[Page 185]]

4 Grey, 170; 6 Grey, 59. When any Member has spoken, or other business 
intervened, after offensive words spoken, they can not be taken notice 
of for censure. And this is for the common security of all, and to 
prevent mistakes which must happen if words are not taken down 
immediately. Formerly they might be taken down at any time the same day. 
2 Hats., 196; Mem. in Hakew., 71; 3 Grey, 48; 9 Grey, 514.



Sec. 368. Parliamentary law as to taking down 
disorderly words.

  Disorderly  words are not to be noticed till the Member has 
finished his speech. 5 Grey, 356; 6 Grey, 60. Then the person objecting 
to them, and desiring them to be taken down by the Clerk at the table, 
must repeat them. The Speaker then may direct the Clerk to take them 
down in his minutes; but if he thinks them not disorderly, he delays the 
direction. If the call becomes pretty general, he orders the Clerk to 
take them down, as stated by the objecting Member. They are then a part 
of his minutes, and when read to the offending Member, he may deny they 
were his words, and the House must then decide by a question whether 
they are his words or not. Then the Member may justify them, or explain 
the sense in which he used them, or apologize. If the House is 
satisfied, no further proceeding is necessary. But if two Members still 
insist to take the sense of the House, the Member must withdraw before 
that question is stated, and then the sense of the House is to be taken. 
2 Hats., 199;



  The House has, by clause 4 of rule XVII, provided a method of 
procedure in cases of disorderly words. The House permits and requires 
them to be noticed as soon as uttered, and has not insisted that the 
offending Member withdraw while the House is deciding as to its course 
of action.




Sec. 369. Disorderly words taken down and reported 
from Committee of the Whole.

  Disorderly  words spoken in a committee must be 
written down as in the House; but the committee can only report them to 
the House for animadversion. 6 Grey, 46.



  This provision of the parliamentary law has been applied to the 
Committee of the Whole, rather than to select or standing committees, 
which are separately empowered to enforce rules of decorum (clause 1(a) 
of rule XI, which incorporates the provisions of rule XVII where 
applicable). The House has censured a Member for disorderly words spoken 
in Committee of the Whole and reported therefrom (II, 1259).




Sec. 370. References in debate to the 
Executive.

  In  Parliament, to speak irreverently or seditiously against 
the King is against order. Smyth's Comw., L. 2, c. 3; 2 Hats., 170.



[[Page 186]]

of address) (Dec. 19, 1995, p. 37601); and (3) an accusation that the 
President ``frivolously vetoed'' a bill (Nov. 8, 1995, p. 31785).
  This provision of the parliamentary law is manifestly inapplicable to 
the House (V, 5086); and it has been held in order in debate to refer to 
the President of the United States or his opinions, either with approval 
or criticism, provided that such reference be relevant to the subject 
under discussion and otherwise conformable to the Rules of the House (V, 
5087-5091; VIII, 2500). Under this standard the following references are 
in order: (1) a reference to the probable action of the President (V, 
5092); (2) an adjuration to the President to keep his word (although an 
improper form

  Although wide latitude is permitted in debate on a proposition to 
impeach the President (V, 5093), Members must abstain from language 
personally offensive (V, 5094; Dec. 18, 1998, p. 27829); and Members 
must abstain from comparisons to the personal conduct of sitting Members 
of the House or Senate (Dec. 18, 1998, p. 27829). Furthermore, Members 
may not refer to evidence of alleged impeachable offenses by the 
President contained in a communication from an independent counsel 
pending before a House committee (Sept. 14, 1998, p. 20171; Sept. 17, 
1998, p. 20758), although they may refer to the communication, itself, 
within the confines of proper decorum in debate (Oct. 6, 1998, p. 
23841).

  Personal abuse, innuendo, or ridicule of the President, is not 
permitted (VIII, 2497; Aug. 12, 1986, p. 21078; Oct. 21, 1987, p. 8857; 
Sept. 21, 1994, p. 25147; Sep. 7, 2006, p. ----). Under this standard it 
is not in order to call the President, or a presumptive major-party 
nominee for President, a ``liar'' or accuse him of ``lying'' (June 26, 
1985, p. 17394; Sept. 24, 1992, pp. 27345, 27346; Nov. 15, 1995, p. 
32587; June 6, 1996, pp. 13228, 13229; Mar. 18, 1998, p. 3937; Nov. 14, 
2002, p. 22370; July 15, 2003, p. ----; Mar. 24, 2004, p. ----). Indeed, 
any suggestion of mendacity is out of order. For example, the following 
remarks have been held out of order: (1) suggesting that the President 
misrepresented the truth, attempted to obstruct justice, and encouraged 
others to perjure themselves (Feb. 25, 1998, p. 2621); (2) accusing him 
of dishonesty (July 13, 2004, p. ----; June 29, 2005, p. ----), accusing 
him of making a ``dishonest argument'' (Sept. 12, 2006, p. ----), 
charging him with intent to be intellectually dishonest (May 9, 1990, p. 
9828), or stating that many were convinced he had ``not been honest'' 
(Mar. 5, 1998, p. 2620); (3) accusing him of ``raping'' the truth (Apr. 
24, 1996, p. 8807), not telling the truth (Oct. 29, 2003, p. ----), or 
distorting the truth (Sept. 9, 2003, p. ----); (4) stating that he was 
not being ``straight with us'' (Nov. 19, 2003, p. ----); (5) accusing 
him of being deceptive (Mar. 29, 2004, p. ----; Mar. 31, 2004, p. ----; 
Feb. 1, 2006, p. ----), fabricating an issue (July 6, 2004, p. ----), or 
intending to mislead the public (Oct. 6, 2004, p. ----; June 9, 2005, p. 
----); (6) accusing him of intentional mischaracterization, although 
mischaracterization without intent to deceive is not necessarily out of 
order (July 19, 2005, p. ----).


[[Page 187]]

describing his action as ``cowardly'' (Oct. 25, 1989, p. 25817); (6) 
referring to him as ``a little bugger'' (Nov. 18, 1995, p. 33974); (7) 
alluding to alleged sexual misconduct on his part (May 10, 1994, p. 
9697; Feb. 25, 1998, p. 1828; Mar. 5, 1998, p. 2620; May 18, 1998, p. 
9418); (8) alluding to unethical behavior or corruption (e.g., June 20, 
1996, p. 14829; July 9, 2002, p. 12286; Oct. 29, 2003, p. ----), such as 
implying a cause-and-effect relationship between political contributions 
and his actions as President (e.g., May 22, 2001, p. 9028; Sept. 29, 
2004, p. ----), including an accusation that the President had ``lined 
the pockets'' of his ``political cronies'' and filled ``campaign 
coffers'' (Sept. 14, 2005, p. ----); (9) discussing ``charges'' leveled 
at the President or under investigation (Mar. 19, 1998, p. 4094; June 
11, 1998, p. 12025), including alluding to ``fund-raising abuses'' (Mar. 
14, 2000, p. 2716) or speculating that the Vice President might someday 
pardon the President for certain charges (Apr. 12, 2000, p. 5419); or 
discussing alleged criminal conduct (Sept. 10, 1998, p. 19976) or 
``illegal surveillance'' (June 20, 2006, p. ----); (10) discussing 
personal conduct even as a point of reference or comparison (July 16, 
1998, p. 15784; Sept. 9, 1998, p. 19735); (11) asserting that a major-
party nominee had done something ``disgusting'' and ``despicable' (Mar. 
11, 2004, p. ----); (12) asserting that a major-party nominee is not ``a 
large enough person'' to apologize (Mar. 11, 2004, p. ----) or that the 
President does not care about black people (Sept. 8, 2005, p. ----); 
(13) describing his action as ``arrogant'' (Jan. 11, 2007, p. ----; Mar. 
22, 2007, p. ----); (14) equating his decisions with regard to armed 
conflict as him having ``slaughtered'' thousands (Mar. 8, 2007, p. ----
). The Chair may admonish Members transgressing this stricture even 
after other debate has intervened (Jan. 23, 1996, p. 1144).
  Furthermore, the following remarks have been held out of order as 
unparliamentary references to the President, or to a presumptive major-
party nominee for President: (1) attributing to him ``hypocrisy'' (Sept. 
25, 1992, p. 27674; Apr. 26, 2006, p. ----); (2) accusing him of giving 
``aid and comfort to the enemy'' (Jan. 25, 1995, p. 2352; May 6, 2004, 
p. ----); (3) accusing him of ``demagoguery'' (Jan. 23, 1996, p. 1144; 
Jan. 24, 1996, pp. 1220, 1221; May 30, 1996, pp. 12646, 12647); (4) 
calling him a ``draft-dodger'' (Apr. 24, 1996, pp. 8807, 8808; Sept. 30, 
1996, p. 26603) or alleging unexcused absences from military service 
(May 5, 2004, p. ----), including allegations that the President was 
``A.W.O.L.'' (Sept. 22, 2004, p. ----); (5)

  A Member may not read in debate extraneous material personally abusive 
of the President that would be improper if spoken in the Member's own 
words (July 12, 1996, pp. 17109, 17110; July 26, 1996, p. 19458; Feb. 
25, 1998, p. 1831; Mar. 3, 1993, p. 3958; Nov. 15, 1995, p. 32587; May 
2, 1996, p. 10010; Mar. 17, 1998, p. 3799; July 15, 2003, p. ----; Sept. 
16, 2003, p. ----). This prohibition includes the recitation of another 
Member's criticism of the President made off the floor (even if recited 
as a rebuttal to such criticism) (Dec. 17, 1998, p. 27775).

  The Chair has advised that the protections afforded by Jefferson's 
Manual and the precedents against unparliamentary references to the 
President, himself, do not necessarily extend to members of his family 
(July 12, 1990, p. 17206).

  References in debate to former Presidents are not governed by these 
standards (Nov. 15, 1945, p. 10735; June 27, 2002, pp. 11844, 11845).


[[Page 188]]

----). However, references to the past statements or views of such 
nominee are not unparliamentary (May 6, 2004, p. ----).
  In the 102d Congress, the Speaker enunciated a minimal standard of 
propriety for all debate concerning nominated candidates for the 
Presidency, based on the traditional proscription against personally 
offensive references to the President even in his capacity as a 
candidate (Speaker Foley, Sept. 24, 1992, p. 27344); and this policy has 
been extended to a presumptive major-party nominee for President (e.g., 
Apr. 22, 2004, p.

  For discussion of the stricture against addressing remarks in debate 
to the President, as in the second person, see Sec. 945, infra.

  On January 27, 1909 (VIII, 2497), the House adopted a report of a 
committee appointed to investigate the question, which report in part 
stated:

  ``The freedom of speech in debate in the House should never be denied 
or abridged, but freedom of speech in debate does not mean license to 
indulge in personal abuses or ridicule. The right of Members of the two 
Houses of Congress to criticize the official acts of the President and 
other executive officers is beyond question, but this right is subject 
to proper rules requiring decorum in debate. Such right of criticism is 
inherent upon legislative authority. The right to legislate involves the 
right to consider conditions as they are and to contrast present 
conditions with those of the past or those desired in the future. The 
right to correct abuses by legislation carries the right to consider and 
discuss abuses which exist or which are feared.


  ``It is, however, the duty of the House to require its Members in 
speech or debate to preserve that proper restraint which will permit the 
House to conduct its business in an orderly manner and without 
unnecessarily and unduly exciting animosity among its Members or 
antagonism from those other branches of the Government with which the 
House is correlated.''




Sec. 371. References in debate to the other House and its 
Members.

  It  is a breach of order in debate to notice what has been said 
on the same subject in the other House, or the particular votes or 
majorities on it there; because the opinion of each House should be left 
to its own independency, not to be influenced by the proceedings of the 
other; and the quoting them might beget reflections leading to a 
misunderstanding between the two Houses. 8 Grey, 22.



[[Page 189]]

cerning a measure under debate in the House, and quotations from Senate 
proceedings relevant to the making of legislative history on a pending 
measure. In the 109th Congress clause 1 was amended to permit debate to 
include references to the Senate or its Members but within the general 
stricture that requires Members to avoid personality (sec. 2(g), H. Res. 
5, Jan. 4, 2005, p. ----). For a recitation of precedents under the 
former rule, see Sec. 371 of the House Rules and Manual for the 108th 
Congress (H. Doc. 107-284).
  Until former clause 1 of rule XIV (currently clause 1 of rule XVII) 
was amended in the 100th and 101st Congresses (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1987, 
p. 6; H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1989, p. 72), this principle of comity and 
parliamentary law as described by Jefferson governed debate in the House 
to the full extent of its provisions (see generally, V, 5095-5130; VIII, 
2501-21; July 31, 1984, p. 21670; Deschler-Brown, ch. 29, Sec. 44). From 
the 101st Congress through the 108th Congress, clause 1 of rule XVII 
permitted some factual references that were a matter of public record, 
references to the pendency or sponsorship in the Senate of certain 
measures, factual descriptions con

  Since the adoption of the new rule, the following references to 
Members of the Senate have been held unparliamentary: (1) accusing 
Senate Republicans of hypocrisy (May 16, 2005, p. ----); (2) referring 
to Senate Democrats as ``cowardly'' (May 18, 2005, p. ----); (3) 
accusing a Senator of making slanderous statements (June 17, 2005, p. --
--; June 21, 2005, p. ----); (4) attributing to a Senator a list of 
offenses under investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(Oct. 18, 2005, p. ----); (5) accusing a Senator of giving ``aid and 
comfort'' to the enemy (Dec. 13, 2005, p. ----).

  It remains the duty of the Chair to call to order a Member who engages 
in personality with respect to a Senator (see Sec. 374, infra), and the 
Chair may admonish a Member for unparliamentary references even after 
intervening recognition (Oct. 12, 1999, p. 24954; Nov. 15, 2001, p. 
22596). Although the Chair is under a duty to caution Members against 
unparliamentary references, the Chair will not advise Members on how to 
construct their remarks to avoid improper references (Feb. 25, 2004, p. 
----).

  Under the earlier form of the rule, the Chair had consistently held 
that the prohibition against improper references to Senators included 
(1) a reference not explicitly naming the Senator (VIII, 2512; Feb. 23, 
1994, p. 2658; June 30, 1995, p. 18153; Feb. 27, 1997, pp. 2768, 2769), 
such as a recitation of a quote by ``a Member of the other body'' (Feb., 
12, 2003, p. ----); (2) the reading of a paper making criticisms of a 
Senator (V, 5127); and (3) a reference to another person's criticism of 
a Senator (Aug. 4, 1983, p. 23145). Similarly, the Chair has 
consistently held that if references to the Senate are appropriate, the 
Member delivering them is not required to use the term ``the other 
body,'' (Oct. 4, 1984, p. 30047) and, by the same token, references to 
``the other body'' will not cure unparliamentary references directed to 
the Senate (e.g., Oct. 2, 2002, p. 18913; Apr. 2, 2004, p. ----).


[[Page 190]]

5129). Under the earlier form of the rule, where a Member had been 
assailed in the Senate, he was permitted to explain his own conduct and 
motives without bringing the whole controversy into discussion or 
assailing the Senator (V, 5123-5126). Propositions relating to breaches 
of these principles were entertained as a matter of privilege (V, 5129, 
6980).
  Under the earlier form of the rule, the Chair held that remarks in 
debate during the pendency of an impeachment resolution may not include 
comparisons to the personal conduct of sitting Members of the House or 
Senate (Dec. 18, 1998, p. 27829) and remarks in debate may not criticize 
words spoken in the Senate by one not a Member of that body in the 
course of an impeachment trial (V, 5106). After examination by a 
committee under the earlier form of the rule, a speech reflecting on the 
character of the Senate was ordered to be stricken from the Record on 
the ground that it tended to create ``unfriendly conditions between the 
two bodies * * * obstructive of wise legislation and little short of a 
public calamity'' (V,

  Under the earlier form of the rule, the Chair held (1) that a Member 
of the House may refer to a speech made in the Senate by one no longer a 
Member of that body (V, 5112); and (2) that the precise standard in 
clause 1 of rule XVII (formerly rule XIV) for references to ``individual 
Members of the Senate'' did not apply to references to former Senators 
(Dec. 14, 1995, p. 36968).

  Under the earlier form of the rule, the Chair held that references to 
Members of the Senate in their capacities as candidates for President or 
Vice President were not prohibited. Where a Senator was a candidate for 
President or Vice President his official policies, actions, and opinions 
as a candidate were permitted to be criticized in terms not personally 
offensive (Speaker Wright, Sept. 29, 1988, p. 26683), but references 
attacking the character or integrity of a Senator even in that context 
were not in order (Oct. 30, 1979, p. 30150). The new form of the rule 
obviates the distinction between a sitting Senator who is a candidate 
for President and a sitting Senator who is not.

  Under the earlier form of the rule, the Chair held the following 
references to the Senate out of order: (1) characterization of Senate 
action as a ``further injustice'' (Oct. 6, 1999, p. 24186), (2) 
accusation that the Senate was governed by ``arcane budget rules'' (Oct. 
2, 2002, p. 18917), (3) inference that the Senate had failed to follow 
the law (Oct. 3, 2002, p. 18994); (4) questioning of the Senate with 
respect to its courage or resolve to take an action (Aug. 4, 1989, p. 
19315); (5) accusation that the Senate minority held a bill ``hostage'' 
(Oct. 5, 1999, p. 23805); (6) speculation as to the intent or motives of 
a Senator (Oct. 11, 1984, pp. 32221-23; Oct. 21, 1997, p. 22328; Nov. 6, 
2001, p. 21725).

  Under the earlier form of the rule, the Chair held that it was in 
order in debate, while discussing a question involving conference 
committee procedure, to state what actually occurred in a conference 
committee session, without referring to or criticizing a named Member of 
the Senate (July 29, 1935, p. 12011).


[[Page 191]]

tracts awarded to his former employer (June 15, 2006, p. ----); to 
speculate that he might someday ``pardon'' the President (Apr. 12, 2000, 
p. 5419); to accuse him of lying (Sept. 20, 2000, p. 18639; Sept. 21, 
2000, p. 18789; Feb. 16, 2006, p. ----; Mar. 6, 2007, p. ----); to 
suggest ``he has a problem with the truth'' (Oct. 5, 2000, p. 21014); to 
allege ``unethical behavior'' or ``corruption'' (see, e.g., Oct. 29, 
2003, p. ----; Nov. 4, 2003, p. ----), including innuendo suggesting 
policy choices were made on the basis of personal pecuniary gain (July 
7, 2004, p. ----; Sept. 13, 2005, p. ----) or accusations of abuse of 
power (July 14, 2004, p. ----). The rule also precludes the insertion in 
the Record of a paper making improper references to the Vice President 
(Sept. 19, 2000, p. 18580).
  References in debate to the Vice President (as President of the 
Senate) are governed by the standards of reference permitted toward the 
President, as under the earlier form of the rule. As such, a Member may 
criticize in debate the policies, or candidacy, of the Vice President 
but may not engage in personality (Dec. 14, 1995, p. 36968; July 14, 
1998, p. 15314; Sept. 20, 2000, p. 18639). For example, it is not in 
order to allude to ``wrongdoings [including] fund-raising telephone 
calls by the Vice President'' (Mar. 14, 2000, p. 2716); to attribute to 
him a list of offenses under investigation by a special prosecutor (Oct. 
18, 2005, p. ----); to suggest that the House should investigate him in 
connection with government con


   A Member may not read in debate extraneous material regarding the 
Vice President that would be improper if spoken in the Member's own 
words (Feb. 16, 2006, p. ----).




Sec. 373. Complaint by one House of conduct of a 
Member of the other.

  Neither  House can exercise any authority over a Member or 
officer of the other, but should complain to the House of which he is, 
and leave the punishment to them.




[[Page 192]]


  In a notable instance, wherein a Member of the House had assaulted a 
Senator in the Senate Chamber for words spoken in debate, the Senate 
examined the breach of privilege and transmitted its report to the 
House, which punished the Member (II, 1622). A Senator having assailed a 
House Member in debate, the House messaged to the Senate a resolution 
declaring the language a breach of privilege and requested the Senate to 
take appropriate action (Sept. 27, 1951, p. 12270). The Senator 
subsequently asked unanimous consent to correct his remarks in the 
permanent Congressional Record, but objection was raised (Sept. 28, 
1951, p. 12383). But where certain Members of the House, in a published 
letter, sought to influence the vote of a Senator in an impeachment 
trial, the House declined to consider the matter as a breach of 
privilege (III, 2657). While on one occasion it was held that a 
resolution offered in the House requesting the Senate to expunge from 
the Record statements in criticism of a Member of the House did not 
constitute a question of privilege, being in violation of the rule 
prohibiting references to the Senate in debate (VIII, 2519), a properly 
drafted resolution referring to language published in the record on a 
designated page of Senate proceedings as constituting a breach of 
privilege and requesting the Senate to take appropriate action 
concerning the subject has been held to present a question of the 
privileges of the House (VIII, 2516).




Sec. 374. Duty of the Speaker to prevent expressions 
offensive to the other House.

  * * *  Where the complaint is of words 
disrespectfully spoken by a Member of another House, it is difficult to 
obtain punishment, because of the rules supposed necessary to be 
observed (as to the immediate noting down of words) for the security of 
Members. Therefore it is the duty of the House, and more particularly of 
the Speaker, to interfere immediately, and not to permit expressions to 
go unnoticed which may give a ground of complaint to the other House, 
and introduce proceedings and mutual accusations between the two Houses, 
which can hardly be terminated without difficulty and disorder. 3 Hats., 
51.


  A rule of comity prohibiting most references in debate to the Senate 
was first enunciated in Jefferson's Manual and was strictly enforced in 
the House through the 108th Congress (albeit with certain exceptions 
adopted in the 100th and 101st Congresses in the former clause 1(b) of 
rule XVII) (Sec. 371, supra and Sec. 945, infra). In the 109th Congress 
clause 1 was amended to permit references to the Senate or its Members, 
even critical references, so long as avoiding personality. (sec. 2(g), 
H. Res. 5, Jan. 4, 2005, p. ----). Nevertheless, it remains the duty of 
the Chair to call to order a Member who violates the rule in debate or 
through an insertion in the Record.


[[Page 193]]

of the Speaker's duties regarding unparliamentary debate, see 
Sec. Sec. 960-961, infra.

  The Chair has distinguished between engaging in personality toward 
another Member of the House, as to which the Chair normally awaits a 
point of order from the floor, and improper references to Members of the 
Senate, which violate comity between the Houses, as to which the Chair 
normally takes initiative (Feb. 27, 1997, pp. 2778, 2779). The Chair may 
admonish Members to avoid unparliamentary references to the Senate even 
after intervening recognition (Oct. 12, 1999, p. 24954). Pending 
consideration of a measure relating to the Senate, the Speaker announced 
his intention to strictly enforce this provision of Jefferson's Manual 
prohibiting improper references to the Senate, and to deny recognition 
to Members violating the prohibition, subject to permission of the House 
to proceed in order (Speaker O'Neill, June 16, 1982, p. 13843). Under 
the earlier form of clause 1 of rule XVII, the Chair refused to respond 
to hypothetical questions as to the propriety of possible 
characterizations of Senate actions before their use in debate (Oct. 24, 
1985, p. 28819). For a further discussion




Sec. 375. Course of the Member when business concerning 
himself is under debate.

  No  Member may be present when a bill or any 
business concerning himself is debating; nor is any Member to speak to 
the merits of it till he withdraws. 2 Hats., 219. The rule is that if a 
charge against a Member arise out of a report of a committee, or 
examination of witnesses in the House, as the Member knows from that to 
what points he is to direct his exculpation, he may be heard to those 
points before any question is moved or stated against him. He is then to 
be heard, and withdraw before any question is moved. But if the question 
itself is the charge, as for breach of order or matter arising in the 
debate, then the charge must be stated (that is, the question must be 
moved), himself heard, and then to withdraw. 2 Hats., 121, 122.




[[Page 194]]


  In 1832, during proceedings for the censure of a Member, the Speaker 
informed the Member that he should retire (II, 1366); but this seems to 
be an exceptional instance of the enforcement of the law of Parliament. 
In other cases, after the proposition for censure or expulsion has been 
proposed, Members have been heard in debate, either as a matter of right 
(II, 1286), as a matter of course (II, 1246, 1253), by express provision 
(II, 1273), and in writing (II, 1273), or by unanimous consent (II, 
1275). A Member against whom a resolution of censure was pending was 
asked by the Speaker if he desired to be heard (VI, 236). But a Member 
was not permitted to depute another Member to speak in his behalf (II, 
1273). In modern practice the Member has been permitted to speak in his 
own behalf, both in censure (June 10, 1980, pp. 13802-11) and expulsion 
proceedings (Oct. 2, 1980, pp. 28953-78). A Member-elect has been 
permitted to participate in debate on a resolution relating to his right 
to take the oath (Jan. 10, 1967, p. 23).




Sec. 376. Disqualifying personal interest of a 
Member.

  Where  the private interests of a Member are concerned in a bill or 
question he is to withdraw. And where such an interest has appeared, his 
voice has been disallowed, even after a division. In a case so contrary, 
not only to the laws of decency, but to the fundamental principle of the 
social compact, which denies to any man to be a judge in his own cause, 
it is for the honor of the House that this rule of immemorial observance 
should be strictly adhered to. 2 Hats., 119, 121; 6 Grey, 368.



  In the House it has not been usual for the Member to withdraw when his 
private interests are concerned in a pending measure, but the House has 
provided by clause 1 of rule III that the Member shall not vote in such 
a contingency. In one instance the Senate disallowed a vote given by a 
Senator on a question relating to his own right to a seat; but the House 
has never had occasion to proceed so far (V, 5959).




Sec. 377. Wearing of hats by Members.

  No  Member is to come 
into the House with his head covered, nor to remove from one place to 
another with his hat on, nor is to put on his hat in coming in or 
removing, until he be set down in his place. Scob., 6.





Sec. 378. Adjournment of questions of order.

  In 1837 the parliamentary practice of wearing hats during the session 
was abolished by adoption of current clause 5 of rule XVII. See 
Sec. 962, infra.
   A question of 
order may be adjourned to give time to look into precedents. 2 Hats., 
118.



[[Page 195]]

the pending business by the Chair. The law of Parliament evidently 
contemplates that the adjournment of a question of order shall be 
controlled by the House. On occasion, the Chair has reversed as 
erroneous a decision previously made (VI, 639; VII, 849; VIII, 2794, 
3435).

<>   In 
Parliament, all decisions of the Speaker may be controlled by the House. 
3 Grey, 319.

  As described in Sec. 628, infra, the Speaker has declined, on a 
difficult question of order, to rule until he had taken time for 
examination (III, 2725; VI, 432; VII, 2106; VIII, 2174, 2396, 3475), and 
may take a parliamentary inquiry under advisement, especially where not 
related to the pending proceedings (VIII, 2174; Apr. 7, 1992, p. 8274). 
However, it is conceivable that a case might arise wherein this 
privilege of the Chair would require approval of the majority of the 
House to prevent arbitrary obstruction of




  The Speaker's decision on a decision of order is subject to appeal by 
any Member (clause 5 of rule I).