[Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 109th Congress]
[109th Congress]
[House Document 108-241]
[The United States Constitution]
[Pages 3-121]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[[Page 3]]
 
                              The Preamble


                               __________




Sec. 1. The preamble.

  We the People  of the United States, in 
Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic 
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general 
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our 
Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United 
States of America.









[[Page 4]]
 


Sec. 2. Formation of the 
Constitution.

  The First Continental  Congress met in Philadelphia in September of 1774 and 
adopted the Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress, 
embodying rights and principles later to be incorporated into the 
Constitution of the United States. The Second Continental Congress 
adopted in November of 1777 the Articles of Confederation, which the 
States approved in July, 1778. Upon recommendation of the Continental 
Congress, a convention of State representatives met in May, 1787 to 
revise the Articles of Confederation and reported to the Continental 
Congress in September a new Constitution, which the Congress submitted 
to the States for ratification. Nine States, as required by the 
Constitution for its establishment, had ratified by June 21, 1788, and 
eleven States had ratified by July 26, 1788. The Continental Congress 
adopted a resolution on September 13, 1788, putting the new Constitution 
into effect; the First Congress of the United States convened on March 
4, 1789, and George Washington was inaugurated as the first President on 
April 30, 1789.



                               ARTICLE I.




Sec. 3. Legislative powers vested in 
Congress.

  Section 1. All  legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House 
of Representatives.



<>   Section 2. \1\ The House of Representatives shall be composed 
of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, 
* * *.



Sec. 4. Power to 
investigate.

  The power to legislate includes the power to conduct inquiries and 
investigations. See Kilbourn v.   Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 
U.S. 135 (1927); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); 
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). For the power of the 
House to punish for contempt in the course of investigations, see 
Sec. 293, infra.


  This clause requires election by the people and State authority may 
not determine a tie by lot (I, 775).

  The phrase ``by the people of the several States'' means that as 
nearly as practicable one person's vote in a congressional election is 
to be worth as much as another's. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 
(1964); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 385 U.S. 450 (1967). 2 U.S.C. 2a 
mandates apportionment of Representatives based upon population, and 2 
U.S.C. 2c requires the establishment by the States of single-Member 
congressional districts. For elections generally, see Deschler, ch. 8.


[[Page 5]]

resolution fixing the daily hour of meeting at noon or some other hour 
is agreed to at the beginning of each session.


Sec. 6. Term of a Congress.

  The term of a  Congress, before 
the ratification of the 20th amendment to the Constitution, began on the 
4th of March of the odd numbered years and extended through two years. 
This resulted from the action of the Continental Congress on September 
13, 1788, in declaring, on authority conferred by the Federal 
Convention, ``the first Wednesday in March next'' to be ``the time for 
commencing proceedings under the said Constitution.'' This date was the 
4th of March, 1789. Soon after the first Congress assembled a joint 
committee determined that the terms of Representatives and Senators of 
the first class commenced on that day, and must necessarily terminate 
with the 3d of March, 1791 (I, 3). Under the 20th amendment to the 
Constitution the terms of Representatives and Senators begin on the 3d 
of January of the odd-numbered years, regardless of when Congress 
actually convenes. By a practice having the force of common law, the 
House meets at noon when no other hour is fixed (I, 4, 210). In the 
later practice a


  Before adoption of the 20th amendment, the legislative day of March 3 
extended to noon on March 4 (V, 6694-6697) and, unless earlier 
adjourned, the Speaker could at that time declare the House adjourned 
sine die, without motion or vote, even to the point of suspending a roll 
call then in progress (V, 6715-6718).


<> * * * and 
the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for 
Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

  The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (84 Stat. 1140) provides 
that unless Congress otherwise specifies the two Houses shall adjourn 
sine die not later than the last day in July. This requirement is not 
applicable, under the terms of that Act, where a state of war exists 
pursuant to a congressional declaration or where, in an odd-numbered 
(nonelection) year, the Congress has agreed to adjourn for the month 
preceding Labor Day. For more on this provision, see Sec. 1105, infra.

  The House, in the decision of an election case, has rejected votes 
cast by persons not naturalized citizens of the United States, although 
they were entitled to vote under the statutes of a State (I, 811); but 
where an act of Congress had provided that a certain class of persons 
should be deprived of citizenship, a question arose over the proposed 
rejection of their votes in a State wherein citizenship in the United 
States was not a qualification of the elector (I, 451). In an 
exceptional case the House rejected votes cast by persons lately in 
armed resistance to the Government, although by the law of the State 
they were qualified voters (I, 448); but later, the House declined to 
find persons disqualified as voters because they had formerly borne arms 
against the Government (II, 879).



Sec. 8. Decisions of the Court.

  The power  of the States to 
set qualifications for electors is not unlimited, being subject to the 
15th, 19th, 24th, and 26th amendments, and to the equal protection 
clause of the United States Constitution. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 
89 (1965); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).



<>   \2\ No 
Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained
to the Age of twenty five Years, * * *.


[[Page 6]]


  Congress has some power in setting qualifications for electors, as in 
protecting the right to vote and lowering the minimum age for electors 
in congressional elections. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); 
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).


<> * * * 
and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, * * *.

  A Member-elect not being of the required age, was not enrolled by the 
Clerk and he did not take the oath until he had reached the required age 
(I, 418).


<> * * * 
and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which 
he shall be chosen.

  Henry Ellenbogen, Pa., had not been a citizen for seven years when 
elected to the 73d Congress, nor when the term commenced on March 4, 
1933. He was sworn at the beginning of the second session on January 3, 
1934, when a citizen for seven and one-half years (see H. Rept. 1431 and 
H. Res. 370, 73d Cong.). A native of South Carolina who had been abroad 
during the Revolution and on his return had not resided in the country 
seven years, was held to be qualified as a citizen (I, 420). A woman who 
forfeited her citizenship through marriage to a foreign subject and 
later resumed it through naturalization less than seven years before her 
election, was held to fulfill the constitutional requirement as to 
citizenship and entitled to a seat in the House (VI, 184). A Member who 
had long been a resident of the country, but who could not produce 
either the record of the court nor his final naturalization papers, was 
nevertheless retained in his seat by the House (I, 424).


[[Page 7]]

bia for years as a newspaper correspondent and maintenance there of 
church membership were not considered to outweigh payment of poll and 
income taxes, ownership of real estate, and a record for consistent 
voting in the district from which elected (VI, 55), and in the same case 
excuse from jury duty in the District of Columbia on a plea of 
citizenship in the State from which elected and exercise of incidental 
rights of such citizenship, were accepted as evidence of inhabitancy 
(VI, 55).
  The meaning of the word ``inhabitant'' and its relation to citizenship 
has been discussed (I, 366, 434; VI, 174), and the House has held that a 
mere sojourner in a State was not qualified as an inhabitant (I, 369), 
but a contestant was found to be an actual inhabitant of the State 
although for sufficient reason his family resided in another State (II, 
1091). Residence abroad in the service of the Government does not 
destroy inhabitancy as understood under the Constitution (I, 433). One 
holding an office and residing with his family for a series of years in 
the District of Columbia exclusively was held disqualified to sit as a 
Member from the State of his citizenship (I, 434); and one who had his 
business and a residence in the District of Columbia and had no business 
or residence in Virginia was held ineligible to a seat from that State 
(I, 436). One who had a home in the District of Columbia, and had 
inhabited another home in Maryland a brief period before his election, 
but had never been a citizen of any other State, was held to be 
qualified (I, 432). Also a Member who had resided a portion of a year in 
the District of Columbia, but who had a home in the State of his 
citizenship and was actually living there at the time of the election, 
was held to be qualified (I, 435). In the Updike v. Ludlow case, 71st 
Congress, it was decided that residence in the District of Colum



Sec. 12. Qualifications other than those 
specified by the Constitution.

  Whether Congress  may by law establish qualifications 
other than those prescribed by the Constitution has been the subject of 
much discussion (I, 449, 451, 457, 458, 478); but in a case wherein a 
statute declared a Senator convicted of a certain offense ``forever 
thereafter incapable of holding any office of honor, trust, or profit 
under the Government of the United States,'' the Supreme Court expressed 
the opinion that the final judgment of conviction did not operate, ipso 
facto, to vacate the seat or compel the Senate to expel or regard the 
Senator as expelled by force alone of the judgment (II, 1282). Whether 
the House or Senate alone may set up qualifications other than those of 
the Constitution has also been a subject often discussed (I, 414, 415, 
443, 457, 458, 469, 481, 484). The Senate has always declined to act on 
the supposition that it had such a power (I, 443, 483), and during the 
stress of civil war the House of Representatives declined to exercise 
the power, even under circumstances of great provocation (I, 449, 465). 
But later, in one instance, the House excluded a Member-elect on the 
principal argument that it might itself prescribe a qualification not 
specified in the Constitution (I, 477). The matter was extensively 
debated in the 90th Congress in connection with the consideration of 
resolutions relating to the seating of Representative-elect Adam C. 
Powell of New York (H. Res. 1, Jan. 10, 1967, p. 14; H. Res. 278, Mar. 
1, 1967, p. 4997).


  The exclusion of Mr. Powell was the subject of litigation reaching the 
Supreme Court of the United States. In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 
(1969), the Court found that the power of Congress to judge the 
qualifications of its Members was limited to an examination of the 
express qualifications stated in the Constitution.

  It has been decided by the House and Senate that no State may add to 
the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution (I, 414-416, 632); and 
the Supreme Court so ruled in U.S. Term Limits, Inc., v. Thorton, 63 
U.S.L.W. 4413 (1995). There, the Court held that States may not 
``change, add to, or diminish'' constitutional qualifications of 
Members, striking down a State statute prohibiting three-term incumbents 
from appearing on the general election ballot. For qualifications 
generally, see Deschler, ch. 7, Sec. Sec. 9-14.


[[Page 8]]

  For expulsion of seated Members, which requires a two-thirds vote 
rather than a majority vote, see article I, section 5, clause 2 
(Sec. 62, infra).




Sec. 13. Minority candidate not seated when 
returned Member is disqualified.

  Both Houses of  Congress have decided, when a Member-
elect is found to be disqualified, that the person receiving the next 
highest number of votes is not entitled to the seat (I, 323, 326, 450, 
463, 469; VI, 58, 59), even in a case wherein reasonable notice of the 
disqualification was given to the electors (I, 460). In the event of the 
death of a Member-elect, the candidate receiving the next highest number 
of votes is not entitled to the seat (VI, 152).





Sec. 14. The old provision for 
apportionment of Representatives and direct taxes.

  \3\ [Representatives and direct  Taxes shall be 
apportioned among the several States which may be included within this 
Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined 
by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to 
Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three 
fifths of all other Persons.] * * *



* * * The actual <> Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the 
first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every 
subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law 
direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every 
thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; 
and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire 
shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode- Island and 
Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersey 
four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland

[[Page 9]]

six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia 
three.

  The part of this clause relating to the mode of apportionment of 
Representatives was changed after the Civil War by section 2 of the 14th 
amendment and, as to taxes on incomes without apportionment, by the 16th 
amendment.

  The census has been taken decennially since 1790, and, with the 
exception of 1920, was followed each time by reapportionment. In the 
First Congress the House had 65 Members; increased after each census, 
except that of 1840, until 435 was reached in 1913 (VI, 39, 40). The Act 
of June 18, 1929 (46 Stat. 26), as amended by the Act of November 15, 
1941 (55 Stat. 761), provides for reapportionment of the existing number 
(435) among the States following each new census (VI, 41-43; see 2 
U.S.C. 2a). Membership was temporarily increased to 436, then to 437, 
upon admission of Alaska (72 Stat. 345) and Hawaii (73 Stat. 8), but 
returned to 435 on January 3, 1963, the effective date of the 
reapportionment under the 18th Decennial census.

  Under the later but not the earlier practice, bills relating to the 
census and apportionment are not privileged for consideration (I, 305-
308; VI, 48, VII, 889; Apr. 8, 1926, p. 7147).




Sec. 16. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 Howard, 393; 
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall., 533; Scholey v. Rew, 23 Wall., 331; De 
Treville v. Smalls, 98 U.S. 517; Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 
U.S. 404; Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. (Income Tax case), 157 
U.S. 429; Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Rehearing), 158 U.S. 
601; Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 
220 U.S. 107; Corporation Tax cases, 220 U.S. 107; Eisner v. Macomber, 
252 U.S. 189; New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345; Franklin v. 
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992); Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002).





Sec. 17. Writs for elections to vacancies 
in representation.

  \4\ When vacancies  happen in the Representation from any State, the 
Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such 
Vacancies.



[[Page 10]]

  Vacancies are caused by death, resignation, declination, withdrawal, 
or by action of the House in declaring a vacancy as existing or causing 
one by expulsion. When a vacancy occurs, or when a new Member is sworn, 
the Speaker announces the resulting adjustment in the whole number of 
the House pursuant to clause 5(d) of rule XX (see Sec. 1024b, infra). 
Clause 5(c) of rule XX permits the House to operate with a provisional 
number of the House where the House is without a quorum due to 
catastrophic circumstances (see Sec. 1024a, infra). In extraordinary 
circumstances, section 8 of title 2, United States Code, prescribes 
special election rules to expedite the filling of vacancies in 
representation of the House.



Sec. 18. Vacancy from death.

  It was long the  practice to 
notify the executive of the State when a vacancy was caused by the death 
of a Member during a session (II, 1198-1202); but since improvements in 
transportation have made it possible for deceased Members to be buried 
at their homes it has been the practice for State authorities to take 
cognizance of the vacancies without notice. When a Member dies while not 
in attendance on the House or during a recess the House is sufficiently 
informed of the vacancy by the credentials of his successor, when they 
set forth the fact of the death (I, 568). The death of a Member-elect 
creates a vacancy, although no certificate may have been awarded (I, 
323), and in such a case the candidate having the next highest number of 
votes may not receive the credentials (I, 323; VI 152). A Member whose 
seat was contested dying, the House did not admit a claimant with 
credentials until contestant's claim was settled (I, 326); where a 
contestant died after a report in his favor, the House unseated the 
returned Member and declared the seat vacant (II, 965), and in a later 
case the contestant having died, the committee did not recommend to the 
House a resolution it had agreed to declaring he had not been elected 
(VI, 112). In the 93d Congress, when two Members-elect were passengers 
on a missing aircraft and were presumed dead, the Speaker laid before 
the House documentary evidence of the presumptive death of one Member-
elect and the declaration of a vacancy by the Governor, as well as 
evidence that the status of the other Member-elect had not been 
officially determined by State authority. The House then adopted a 
privileged resolution declaring vacant the seat of the latter Member-
elect to enable the Governor of that State to call a special election 
(Jan. 3, 1973, p. 15). For further discussion, see Sec. 23, infra.




Sec. 19. Vacancy from resignation.

  In recent practice  the 
Member frequently informs the House by letter that his resignation has 
been sent to the State executive (II, 1167-1176) and this is 
satisfactory evidence of the resignation (I, 567). However, Members have 
resigned by letter to the House alone, it being presumed that the Member 
would also notify his Governor (VI, 226). Where a Member resigned by 
letter to the House the Speaker was authorized to notify the Governor 
(Nov. 27, 1944, p. 8450; July 12, 1957, p. 11536; Sept. 1, 1976, p. 
28887). Where a Member does not inform the House, the State executive 
may do so (II, 1193, 1194; VI, 232). The House has, on occasion, learned 
of a Member's resignation by means of the credentials of his successor 
(II, 1195, 1356). Where the fact of a Member's resignation has not 
appeared either from the credentials of his successor or otherwise, the 
Clerk has been ordered to make inquiry (II, 1209) or the House has 
ascertained the vacancy from information given by other Members (II, 
1208).



[[Page 11]]

to resign a seat in the House to be effective on a date following the 
anticipated date of a special election that might fill the vacancy 
thereby be created (Deschler, ch. 8, Sec. 9.3). However, the State 
concerned must be willing to treat the prospective resignation as a 
Constitutional predicate for the issuance of a writ of election to fill 
a vacancy. For examples of resignation letters indicating that the 
Executive of the State took cognizance of a prospective resignation, 
see, January 8, 1952, (p. 14) (New York); July 9, 1991, (p. 17301) 
(Virginia); June 5, 2001, (p. ----) (Florida), and Jan. 27, 2003, (p. --
--) (Texas). When the Governor of Oklahoma received a prospective 
resignation from one of its Members, the State provided by statute 
(enrolled Senate Bill Number 7X) for the holding of a special election 
before the effective date of the resignation (Feb. 27, 2002, p. ----).
  It has been established that a Member or Senator may resign, 
appointing a future date for his resignation to take effect, and until 
the arrival of the date may participate in the proceedings (II, 1220-
1225, 1228, 1229; VI, 227, 228; Dec. 15, 1997, p. 26709; June 5, 2001, 
p. ----; Nov. 27, 2001, p. ----; Jan. 27, 2003, p. ----). It has been 
possible even for a Member

  For the State to take cognizance of a prospective resignation, it must 
have assurances that there is no possibility of withdrawal (or 
modification). In one case a Member who had resigned was not permitted 
by the House to withdraw the resignation (II, 1213). However, the House 
has allowed withdrawal in the case of defective resignation; that is, 
where the Member had not actually transmitted the letter of resignation 
(VI, 229), or had transmitted it to an improper state official (Oct. 9, 
1997, p. 22020). A Member may include in a letter of prospective 
resignation a statement of intention that the resignation be 
``irrevocable'' in order to allay any concern about the prospect of 
withdrawal (June 5, 2001, p. ----; Jan. 27, 2003, p. ----).

  Acceptance of the resignation of a Member of the House is unnecessary 
(VI, 65, 226), and the refusal of a Governor to accept a resignation 
cannot operate to continue membership in the House (VI, 65). Only in a 
single exceptional case has the House taken action in the direction of 
accepting a resignation (II, 1214). Sometimes Members who have resigned 
have been reelected to the same House and taken seats (II, 1210, 1212, 
1256; Jan. 28, 1965 and June 16, 1965, pp. 1452, 13774; Jan. 6, 1983 and 
Feb. 22, 1983, pp. 114, 2575). A Member who has not taken his seat 
resigned (II, 1231).


[[Page 12]]

  A letter of resignation is presented as privileged (II, 1167-1176); 
but a resolution to permit a Member to withdraw his resignation was not 
so treated (II, 1213). The Speaker having been elected Vice President 
and a Representative of the succeeding Congress at the same election, 
transmitted to the Governor of his State his resignation as a Member-
elect (VI, 230, 453). A Member of the House having been nominated and 
confirmed as Vice President pursuant to the 25th amendment, submitted a 
letter of resignation as a Representative to the Governor of his State, 
and a copy of his letter of resignation was laid before the House by the 
Speaker following the completion of a joint meeting for his swearing-in 
as Vice President (Dec. 6, 1973, p. 39927). A Member of the House having 
been confirmed as Secretary of Defense, a copy of his letter of 
resignation was laid before the House before his taking the oath of that 
office (Mar. 20, 1989, p. 4976).



Sec. 20. Vacancy from declination.

  A Member who  has been 
elected to a seat may decline to accept it, and in such a case the House 
informed the executive of the State of the vacancy (II, 1234). The House 
has decided an election contest against a returned Member who had not 
appeared to claim the seat (I, 638). In one instance a Member-elect who 
had been convicted in the courts did not appear during the term (IV, 
4484, footnote). On November 7, 1998, less than a week after his re-
election as Representative from the 6th district of Georgia, Speaker 
Gingrich announced that he would not be a candidate for Speaker in the 
106th Congress and that he would resign his seat as a Member of the 
106th Congress. Although the letter of ``withdrawal'' was tendered on 
November 22, the Governor did not attempt to call a special election 
until after the term began on January 3, 1999 (Jan. 6, 1999, p. 42).




Sec. 21. Vacancy by withdrawal.

  At the time  of the secession 
of several States, Members of the House from those States withdrew (II, 
1218). In the Senate, in cases of such withdrawals, the Secretary was 
directed to omit the names of the Senators from the roll (II, 1219), and 
the act of withdrawal was held to create a vacancy which the legislature 
might recognize (I, 383).




Sec. 22. Vacancy by action of the House.

  Where the House,  by 
its action in a question of election or otherwise, creates a vacancy, 
the Speaker is directed to notify the Executive of the State (I, 502, 
709, 824; II, 1203-1205; Mar. 1, 1967, p. 5038; Jan. 3, 1973, p. 15; 
Feb. 24, 1981, pp. 2916-18). A resolution as to such notification is 
presented as a question of privilege (III, 2589), as is a resolution 
declaring a vacancy where a Member-elect was unable to take the oath of 
office or to resign because of an incapacitating illness (Feb. 24, 1981, 
pp. 2916-18).



[[Page 13]]



Sec. 23. Questions as to the existence of a 
vacancy.

  The House declines  to give prima facie effect to credentials, even though they 
be regular in form, until it has ascertained whether or not the seat is 
vacant (I, 322, 518, 565, 569), and a person returned as elected at a 
second election was unseated on ascertainment that another person had 
actually been chosen at the first election (I, 646). Where a Member was 
reelected to the House, although at the time of the election he had been 
unaccounted for for several weeks following the disappearance of the 
plane on which he was a passenger, the Governor of the State from which 
he was elected transmitted his certificate to the House in the regular 
fashion. When the Member-elect was still missing at the time the new 
Congress convened, and circumstances were such that other passengers on 
the missing plane had been presumed dead following judicial inquiries in 
the State where the plane was lost, the House declared the seat vacant 
(H. Res. 1, 93d Cong., Jan. 3, 1973, p. 15). In the 108th Congress the 
House codified in clause 5 of rule XX its practice of accounting for 
vacancies (sec. 2(l), H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 2003, p. ----).



<>   \5\ 
The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other 
Officers; * * *



Sec. 24. Functions of the State executive 
in filling vacancies.

  The term ``vacancy''  as occurring in this paragraph of the 
Constitution has been examined in relation to the functions of the State 
executive (I, 312, 518). A Federal law empowers the States and 
Territories to provide by law the times of elections to fill vacancies 
(I, 516; 2 U.S.C. 8); but an election called by a governor in pursuance 
of constitutional authority was held valid although no State law 
prescribed time, place, or manner of such election (I, 517). Where two 
candidates had an equal number of votes, the governor did not issue 
credentials to either, but ordered a new election after they had waived 
their respective claims (I, 555). A candidate elected for the 104th 
Congress was appointed by the Governor to fill a vacancy for the 
remainder of the 103d Congress pursuant to a State law requiring the 
Governor to appoint the candidate who won the election to the 104th 
Congress. In that case the House authorized the Speaker to administer 
the oath to the Member-elect and referred the question of his final 
right to the seat in the 103d Congress to the Committee on House 
Administration (Nov. 29, 1994, pp. 29585, 29586). For a discussion of a 
State election to fill a prospective vacancy of the House, see Sec. 19.
<>   A 
Member elected to fill a vacancy serves no longer time than the 
remainder of the term of the Member whose place he fills (I, 3). For the 
compensation and allowances of such Members, see Sec. 87, infra.


  The officers of the House are the Speaker, who has always been one of 
its Members and whose term as Speaker must expire with his term as a 
Member; and the Clerk, Sergeant-at-Arms, Chief Administrative Officer, 
and Chaplain (I, 187), no one of whom has ever been chosen from the 
sitting membership of the House and who continue in office until their 
successors are chosen and qualified (I, 187). In one case the officers 
continued through the entire Congress succeeding that in which they were 
elected (I, 244, 263). Former officers include Doorkeeper (abolished by 
the 104th Congress, see Sec. 663a, infra) and Postmaster (abolished 
during the 102d Congress, see Sec. 668, infra). The House formerly 
provided by special rule that the Clerk should continue in office until 
another should be chosen (I, 187, 188, 235, 244). Currently, certain 
statutes impose on the officers duties which contemplate their 
continuance (I, 14, 15; 2 U.S.C. 75a-1, 83).


[[Page 14]]

by what method it shall elect the Speaker (I, 210). On two occasions, by 
special rules, Speakers were chosen by a plurality of votes; but in each 
case the House by majority vote adopted a resolution declaring the 
result (I, 221, 222). The House has declined to choose a Speaker by lot 
(I, 221).


Sec. 27. Election of a Speaker.

  The Speaker, who  was at 
first elected by ballot, has been chosen viva voce by surname in 
response to a call of the roll since 1839 (I, 187). The Speaker is 
elected by a majority of Members-elect voting by surname, a quorum being 
present (I, 216; VI, 24; Jan. 7, 1997, p. 117). The Clerk appoints 
tellers for this election (I, 217). Ultimately, the House, and not the 
Clerk, decides


  The motion to proceed to the election of a Speaker is privileged (I, 
212, 214; VIII, 3883), and debatable unless the previous question is 
ordered (I, 213). Relying on the Act of June 1, 1789 (2 U.S.C. 25), the 
Clerk recognized for nominations for Speaker as being of higher 
constitutional privilege than a resolution to postpone the election of a 
Speaker and instead provide for the election of a Speaker pro tempore 
pending the disposition of certain ethics charges against the nominee of 
the majority party (Jan. 7, 1997, p. 115). On several occasions the 
choice of a Speaker has been delayed for several weeks by contests (I, 
222; V, 5356, 6647, 6649; VI, 24). The contest over the election of a 
Speaker in 1923 was resolved after a procedure for the adoption of rules 
for the 68th Congress had been presented (VI, 24). In 1860 the voting 
for Speaker proceeded slowly, being interspersed with debate (I, 223), 
and in one instance the House asked candidates for Speaker to state 
their views before proceeding to election (I, 218).



Sec. 28. Vacancies in the Office of 
Speaker.

  A proposition  to elect a Speaker is in order at any time a vacancy exists 
and presents a question of the highest privilege (VIII, 3383). Upon a 
vacancy in the Office of Speaker, the House elects a new Speaker either 
viva voce following nominations (in the case where a Speaker has died 
between sessions of Congress or resigned) or by resolution (in the case 
where a Speaker has died during a session of Congress). For example, in 
the case where the Speaker had died between sessions of Congress, the 
Clerk at the next session called the House to order, ascertained the 
presence of a quorum, and then the House proceeded to elect a successor 
viva voce following nominations (I, 234; Jan. 10, 1962, p. 5). In a case 
where the Speaker died during a session of Congress, but not while the 
House was sitting, the Clerk on the following day called the House to 
order and the Speaker's successor was elected by resolution (June 4, 
1936, p. 9016; Sept. 16, 1940, p. 12231). In a case where the Speaker 
resigned ``on the election of my successor'' (May 31, 1989, p. 10440), 
he entertained nominations for Speaker and, following the roll call, 
declared the winner of the election ``duly elected Speaker'' (June 6, 
1989, p. 10801). In one instance a Speaker resigned on the last day of 
the Congress, and the House unanimously adopted a motion to elect a 
successor for the day (I, 225).



[[Page 15]]

floor (I, 225), by tendering the resignation during recognition under a 
question of personal privilege (May 31, 1989, p. 10440), or by sending a 
letter which the Clerk reads to the House at the beginning of a new 
session (I, 232). When the Speaker resigns no action of the House 
excusing him from service is taken (I, 232). Instance wherein the 
Speaker, following a vote upon an essential question indicating a change 
in the party control of the House, announced that under the 
circumstances it was incumbent upon the Speaker to resign or to 
recognize for a motion declaring vacant the Office of Speaker (VI, 35). 
In the 108th Congress the House adopted clause 8(b)(3) of rule I, under 
which the Speaker is required to deliver to the Clerk a list of Members 
in the order in which each shall act as Speaker pro tempore in the case 
of a vacancy in the Office of Speaker (sec. 2(a), H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 
2003, p. ----). The Speaker delivered to the Clerk the first such letter 
on February 10, 2003 (Mar. 13, 2003, p. ----).
<>   The effect of a law to regulate the action of the House in 
choosing its own officers has been discussed (IV, 3819), and such a law 
has been considered of doubtful validity (V, 6765, 6766) in theory and 
practice (I, 241, 242). The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 
U.S.C. 75a-1) authorizes the Speaker to fill temporary vacancies in the 
offices of Clerk, Sergeant-at-Arms, Chief Administrative Officer, and 
Chaplain. For a history of the Speaker's exercise of such authority, see 
Sec. 640, infra;  and, for further information on the elections of 
officers, see Deschler, ch. 6.
  Form of resolution offered on death of a Speaker (Sept. 16, 1940, p. 
12232; Jan. 10, 1962, p. 9) and of a former Speaker (VIII, 3564; Mar. 7, 
1968, p. 5742; H. Res. 328, Jan. 25, 1994, p. 89; H. Res. 418, Feb. 8, 
2000, p. 834). A resolution declaring vacant the Office of Speaker is 
presented as a matter of high constitutional privilege (VI, 35). 
Speakers have resigned by rising in their place and addressing the House 
(I, 231, 233), by calling a Member to the Chair and tendering the 
resignation verbally from the


<> * * * and 
[the House of Representatives] shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.



Sec. 30. Election of Clerk in relation to 
business.

  The Office of  Clerk becoming vacant, it was held that the House would not 
be organized for business until a Clerk should be elected (I, 237); but 
in another instance some business intervened before a Clerk was elected 
(I, 239). At the time of organization, while the Clerk of the preceding 
House was yet officiating, and after the Speaker had been elected, the 
House proceeded to legislation and other business before electing a 
Clerk (I, 242, 244). But in one case it was held that the Act of June 1, 
1789 (2 U.S.C. 25) bound the House to elect the Clerk before proceeding 
to business (I, 241).


  In 1868 the Senate ceased in its rules to describe the House, acting 
in an impeachment, as the ``grand inquest of the nation'' (III, 2126). 
See also art. II, sec. 4 (Sec. 173, infra); Deschler, ch. 14.


[[Page 16]]

  A Federal court having subpoenaed certain evidence gathered by a 
committee of the House in an impeachment inquiry, the House adopted a 
resolution granting such limited access to the evidence as would not 
infringe upon its sole power of impeachment (Aug. 22, 1974, p. 30047).


  Until the law expired on June 30, 1999, an independent counsel was 
required to advise the House of any substantial and credible information 
that may constitute grounds for impeachment of an officer under his 
investigation (28 U.S.C. 595(c)). For a description of impeachment 
proceedings prompted by a communication from an independent counsel, see 
Sec. 176, infra.




Sec. 32. Numbers, terms, and votes 
of Senators.

  Section 3. \1\ [The Senate  of the United States shall be composed of two Senators 
from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and 
each Senator shall have one Vote.]



  This provision has now been changed by the 17th amendment to the 
Constitution.




Sec. 33. Division of the Senate into 
classes.

  \2\ Immediately  after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first 
Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. 
The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the 
Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of 
the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of 
the <> sixth Year, 
so that one-third may be chosen every second Year; [and if Vacancies 
happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the 
Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary 
Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then 
fill such Vacancies.]



  That part of the above paragraph in brackets was changed by the 17th 
amendment.


[[Page 17]]

izen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an 
Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.



Sec. 35. Qualifications of Senators.

  \3\ No Person  shall be 
a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and 
been nine Years a Cit



  In 1794 the Senate decided that Albert Gallatin was disqualified, not 
having been a citizen nine years although he had served in the war of 
Independence and was a resident of the country when the Constitution was 
formed (I, 428); and in 1849 that James Shields was disqualified, not 
having been a citizen for the required time (I, 429). But in 1870 the 
Senate declined to examine as to H. R. Revels, a citizen under the 
recently adopted 14th amendment (I, 430). As to inhabitancy the Senate 
seated one who, being a citizen of the United States, had been an 
inhabitant of the State from which he was appointed for less than a year 
(I, 437). Also one who, while stationed in a State as an army officer 
had declared his intention of making his home in the State, was admitted 
by the Senate (I, 438). A Senator who at the time of his election was 
actually residing in the District of Columbia as an officeholder, but 
who voted in his old home and had no intent of making the District his 
domicile, was held to be qualified (I, 439).




Sec. 36. The Vice President and his 
vote.

  \4\ The Vice  President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, 
but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.



<>   \5\ The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and 
also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or 
when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.

  The right of the Vice President to vote has been construed to extend 
to questions relating to the organization of the Senate (V, 5975), as 
the election of officers of the Senate (V, 5972-5974), or a decision on 
the title of a claimant to a seat (V, 5976, 5977). The Senate has 
declined to make a rule relating to the vote of the Vice President (V, 
5974).


-
[[Page 18]]


  In the 107th Congress the Senate elected two Presidents of the Senate 
pro tempore for different periods when the majority of the Senate 
shifted after inauguration of the Vice President (S. Res. 3, Jan. 3, 
2001, p. 7).




Sec. 38. Senate tries impeachment and convicts 
by twothirds vote.

  \6\ The Senate  shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. 
When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. 
When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice 
shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence 
of two thirds of the Members present.



  For the exclusive power of the Senate to try impeachments under the 
United States Constitution, see Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cls. 293 
(1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 668 (1937). See also Mississippi v. 
Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867) (dictum). For the 
nonjusticiability of a claim that Senate Rule XI violates the 
impeachment trial clause by delegating to a committee of 12 Senators the 
responsibility to receive evidence, hear testimony, and report to the 
Senate thereon, see Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). For a 
discussion of Senate impeachment procedures, see Sec. Sec. 608-20, 
infra.




Sec. 41. Judgment in cases of 
impeachment.

  \7\ Judgment in  Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to 
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office 
of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party 
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, 
Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.




[[Page 19]]


  There has been discussion as to whether or not the Constitution 
requires both removal and disqualification on conviction (III, 2397); 
but in the case of Pickering, the Senate decreed only removal (III, 
2341). In the case of Humphreys, judgment of both removal and 
disqualification was pronounced (III, 2397). In the Ritter case, it was 
first held that upon conviction of the respondent, judgment of removal 
required no vote, following automatically from conviction under article 
II, section 4 (Apr. 17, 1936, p. 5607). In the 99th Congress, having 
tried to conviction the first impeachment case against a Federal 
district judge since 1936, the Senate ordered his removal from office 
(Oct. 9, 1986, p. 29870). In the 101st Congress, two other Federal 
district judges were removed from office following their convictions in 
the Senate (Oct. 20, 1989, p. 25335; Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27101). For a 
further discussion of judgments in cases of impeachment, see Sec. 619, 
infra.




Sec. 42. Times, places, and manner 
of elections of Representatives and Senators.

  Section 4. \1\ The Times,  Places and Manner of 
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed 
in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any 
time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the places of 
chusing Senators.


  The relative powers of the Congress and the States under this graph 
have been the subject of much discussion (I, 311, 313, 507, footnote); 
but Congress has in fact fixed by law the time of elections (I, 508; VI, 
66; 2 U.S.C. 7), and has controlled the manner to the extent of 
prescribing a ballot or voting machine (II, 961; VI, 150; 2 U.S.C. 9). 
When a State delegated to a municipality the power to regulate the 
manner of holding an election, a question arose (II, 975). A question 
has arisen as to whether or not a State, in the absence of action by 
Congress, might make the time of election of Congressmen contingent on 
the time of the State election (I, 522). This paragraph gives Congress 
the power to protect the right to vote in primaries where they are an 
integral part of the election process. United States v. Wurzbach, 280 
U.S. 396 (1930); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). Congress 
may legislate under this paragraph to protect the exercise of the 
franchise in congressional elections. Ex parte Siebolt, 100 U.S. 371 
(1880); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).


[[Page 20]]

cies in representation from the States exceed 100 (P.L. 109-55; 2 U.S.C. 
8).


Sec. 43. Functions of a State legislature in 
fixing time, etc., of elections.

  The meaning of  the word ``legislature'' in this 
clause of the Constitution has been the subject of discussion (II, 856), 
as to whether or not it means a constitutional convention as well as a 
legislature in the commonly accepted meaning of the word (I, 524). The 
House has sworn in Members chosen at an election the time, etc., of 
which was fixed by the schedule of a constitution adopted on that 
election day (I, 519, 520, 522). But the House held that where a 
legislature has been in existence a constitutional convention might not 
exercise the power (I, 363, 367). It has been argued generally that the 
legislature derives the power herein discussed from the Federal and not 
the State Constitution (II, 856, 947), and therefore that the State 
constitution might not in this respect control the State legislature 
(II, 1133). The House has sustained this view by its action (I, 525). 
But where the State constitution fixed a date for an election and the 
legislature had not acted, although it had the opportunity, the House 
held the election valid (II, 846). Title III of the Legislative Branch 
Appropriations Act, 2006, amended Federal election law to require States 
to hold special elections for the House within 49 days after a vacancy 
is announced by the Speaker in the extraordinary circumstance that vacan





Sec. 44. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Ex 
parte Clark, 100 U.S. 399 (1880); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 
(1884); In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888); Ohio v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 
(1916); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); United States  v. 
Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917); Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 
(1921); Smiley v. Holme, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); United States v. Classic, 
313 U.S. 299 (1941); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Roudebush 
v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); U.S. Term Limits, Inc., v. Thorton, 
514 U.S. 779 (1995); and Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997). In Public 
Law 91-285, Congress lowered the minimum age of voters in all Federal, 
State, and local elections from 21 to 18 years. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 
400 U.S. 112 (1970), the Supreme Court upheld the power of Congress 
under article I, section 4 and under section 5 of the 14th amendment to 
the Constitution to fix the age of voters in Federal elections, but held 
that the tenth amendment to the Constitution reserved to the States the 
power to establish voter age qualifications in State and local 
elections. The 26th amendment to the Constitution extended the right of 
persons 18 years of age or older to vote in elections held under State 
authority.





Sec. 45. Annual meeting of Congress.

  \2\ [The Congress  shall 
assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the 
first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different 
Day.]


  This provision of the Constitution has been superseded by the 20th 
amendment.


  In the later but not the earlier practice (I, 5), before the 20th 
amendment, the fact that Congress had met once within the year did not 
make uncertain the constitutional mandate to meet on the first Monday of 
December (I, 6, 9-11). Early Congresses, convened either by proclamation 
or law on a day earlier than the constitutional day, remained in 
continuous session to a time beyond that day (I, 6, 9-11). But in the 
later view an existing session ends with the day appointed by the 
Constitution for the regular annual session (II, 1160); see Sec. 84, 
infra. Congress has frequently appointed by law a day for the meeting 
(I, 4, 5, 10-12, footnote; see also Sec. 243, infra).



[[Page 21]]




Sec. 46. House the judge of elections, 
returns, and qualifications.

  Section 5. \1\ Each  House shall be the Judge of the 
Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, * * *.


  In judging the qualifications of its Members, the House may not add 
qualifications to those expressly stated in the United States 
Constitution. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). This phrase 
allows the House or Senate to deny the right to a seat without 
unlawfully depriving a State of its right to equal representation. Barry 
v. United States ex rel Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929). But a State may 
conduct a recount of votes without interfering with the authority of the 
House under this phrase. Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972). For 
discussion of the power of the House to judge elections, see Deschler, 
ch. 8 (elections) and ch. 9 (election contests); for discussion of the 
power of the House to judge qualifications, see Deschler, ch. 7.

  The House has the same authority to determine the right of a Delegate 
to his seat that it has in the case of a Member (I, 423). The House may 
not delegate the duty of judging its elections to another tribunal (I, 
608), and the courts of a State have nothing to do with it (II, 959). 
The House has once examined the relations of this power to the power to 
expel (I, 469).



Sec. 47. Power of judging as related to State 
laws as to returns.

  As nearly all  the laws governing the elections of 
Representatives in Congress are State laws, questions have often arisen 
as to the relation of this power of judging to those laws (I, 637). The 
House decided very early that the certificate of a State executive 
issued in strict accordance with State law does not prevent examination 
of the votes by the House and a reversal of the return (I, 637). The 
House has also held that it is not confined to the conclusions of 
returns made up in strict conformity to State law, but may examine the 
votes and correct the returns (I, 774); and the fact that a State law 
gives canvassers the right to reject votes for fraud and irregularities 
does not preclude the House from going behind the returns (II, 887). The 
highest court in one State (Colorado) has ruled that it lacked 
jurisdiction to pass upon a candidate's allegations of irregularities in 
a primary election and that the House had exclusive jurisdiction to 
decide such questions and to declare the rightful nominee (Sept. 23, 
1970, p. 33320).



[[Page 22]]



Sec. 48. Power of judging as related to 
State laws as to acts of the voter.

  When the question  concerns not the acts of returning 
officers, but the act of the voter in giving his vote, the House has 
found more difficulty in determining on the proper exercise of its 
constitutional power. While the House has always acted on the principle 
of giving expression to the intent of the voter (I, 575, 639, 641; II, 
1090), yet it has held that a mandatory State law, even though 
arbitrary, may cause the rejection of a ballot on which the intent of 
the voter is plain (II, 1009, 1056, 1077, 1078, 1091). See Deschler, ch. 
8, Sec. 8.11, for discussion of distinction between directory State laws 
governing the conduct of election officials as to ballots, and mandatory 
laws regulating the conduct of voters.




Sec. 49. Power of House as related to 
constitutionality of State laws.

  Where the State  courts have upheld a State election 
law as constitutional the House does not ordinarily question the law 
(II, 856, 1071). But where there has been no such decision the House, in 
determining its election cases, has passed on the validity of State laws 
under State constitutions (II, 1011, 1134), and has acted on its 
decision that they were unconstitutional (II, 1075, 1126), but it is not 
the policy of the House to pass upon the validity of State election laws 
alleged to be in conflict with the State constitution (VI, 151).




Sec. 50. Effect of interpretation of State 
election laws by State courts.

  The courts of  a State have nothing to do directly 
with judging the elections, qualifications, and returns of 
Representatives in Congress (II, 959), but where the highest State court 
has interpreted the State law the House has concluded that it should 
generally be governed by this interpretation (I, 645, 731; II, 1041, 
1048), but does not consider itself bound by such interpretations (VI, 
58). The House is not bound, however, by a decision on an analogous but 
not the identical question in issue (II, 909); and where the alleged 
fraud of election judges was in issue, the acquittal of those judges in 
the courts was held not to be an adjudication binding on the House (II, 
1019). For a recent illustration of a protracted election dispute 
lasting four months see House Report 99-58, culminating in House 
Resolution 146 of the 99th Congress (May 1, 1985, p. 9998).




Sec. 51. Laws of Congress not binding on the 
House in its function of judging its elections.

  The statutes of  the United States 
provide specific methods for institution of a contest as to the title to 
a seat in the House (I, 678, 697-706) (2 U.S.C. 381-396); but the House 
regards this law as not of absolute binding force, but rather a 
wholesome rule not to be departed from except for cause (I, 597, 719, 
825, 833), and it sometimes by resolution modifies the procedure 
prescribed by the law (I, 449, 600).





Sec. 51a. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: In re Loney, 134 U.S. 317 (1890); Reed v. 
County Commissioners, 277 U.S. 376 (1928); Barry v. United States ex 
rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 
(1972).




[[Page 23]]




Sec. 52. The quorum.

  * * * and a  Majority of each [House] 
shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may 
adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance 
of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each 
House may provide.




Sec. 53. Interpretation of the Constitution 
as to number constituting a quorum.

  Out of conditions  arising between 1861 and 1891 the 
rule was established that a majority of the Members chosen and living 
constituted the quorum required by the Constitution (IV, 2885-2888); but 
later examination has resulted in a decision confirming in the House of 
Representatives the construction established in the Senate that a quorum 
consists of a majority of Senators duly chosen and sworn (I, 630; IV, 
2891-2894). So the decision of the House now is that after the House is 
once organized the quorum consists of a majority of those Members 
chosen, sworn, and living whose membership has not been terminated by 
resignation or by the action of the House (IV, 2889, 2890; VI, 638). 
Under clause 5(d) of rule XX, when a vacancy occurs or when a new Member 
is sworn, the Speaker announces the resulting adjustment in the whole 
number of the House (see Sec. 1024b, infra). Under clause 5(c) of rule 
XX, the House may establish a provisional number of the House where, due 
to catastrophic circumstances, a quorum fails to appear (sec. 2(h), H. 
Res. 5, Jan. 4, 2005, p. ----; see Sec. 1024a, infra).



[[Page 24]]

and nays (IV, 2918-2926). For a discussion of the Ballin decision and 
the Chair's count to determine a quorum, see House Practice, ch. 43, 
Sec. 5.


Sec. 54. The theory of the quorum present; and 
the count by the Speaker.

  For many years  a quorum was determined only by noting the 
number of Members voting (IV, 2896, 2897), with the result that Members 
by refusing to vote could often break a quorum and obstruct the public 
business (II, 1034; IV, 2895, footnote; V, 5744). However, in 1890 
Speaker Reed directed the Clerk to enter on the Journal as part of the 
record of a yea-and-nay vote names of Members present but not voting, 
thereby establishing a quorum of record (IV, 2895). This decision, which 
was upheld by the Supreme Court (IV, 2904; United States v. Ballin, 144 
U.S. 1 (1892)), established the principle that a quorum present made 
valid any action by the House, although an actual quorum might not vote 
(I, 216, footnote; IV, 2932). Thenceforth the point of order as to a 
quorum was required to be that no quorum was present and not that no 
quorum had voted (IV, 2917). At the time of the establishment of this 
principle the Speaker revived the count by the Chair as a method of 
determining the presence of a quorum at a time when no record vote was 
ordered (IV, 2909). The Speaker has permitted his count of a quorum to 
be verified by tellers (IV, 2888), but has not conceded it as a right of 
the House to have tellers under the circumstances (IV, 2916; VI, 647-
651; VIII, 2369, 2436), claiming that the Chair might determine the 
presence of a quorum in such manner as he should deem accurate and 
suitable (IV, 2932). The Chair counts all Members in sight, whether in 
the cloak rooms, or within the bar (IV, 2970; VIII, 3120). Later, as the 
complement to the new view of the quorum, the early theory that the 
presence of a quorum was as necessary during debate or other business as 
on a vote was revived (IV, 2935-2949). Also, a line of rulings made 
under the old theory was overruled; and it was established that the 
point of no quorum might be made after the House had declined to verify 
a division by tellers or the yeas




Sec. 55. Relations of the quorum to acts of the 
House.

  The absence of  a quorum having been disclosed, there must be a quorum of 
record before the House may proceed to business (IV, 2952, 2953; VI, 
624, 660, 662), and the point of no quorum may not be withdrawn even by 
unanimous consent after the absence of a quorum has been ascertained and 
announced by the Chair (IV, 2928-2931; VI, 657; Apr. 13, 1978, p. 10119; 
Sept. 25, 1984, p. 26778). But when an action has been completed, it is 
too late to make the point of order that a quorum was not present when 
it was done (IV, 2927; VI, 655). But where action requiring a quorum was 
taken in the ascertained absence of a quorum by ruling of a Speaker pro 
tempore, the Speaker on the next day ruled that the action was null and 
void (IV, 2964; see also VIII, 3161). But such absence of a quorum 
should appear from the Journal if a legislative act is to be vacated for 
such reason (IV, 2962), and where the assumption that a quorum was 
present when the House acted was uncontradicted by the Journal, it was 
held that this assumption might not be overthrown by expressions of 
opinion by Members individually (IV, 2961).


  Major revisions in the House rules concerning the necessity and 
establishment of a quorum occurred in the 94th, 95th, and 96th 
Congresses. Under the practice in the 93d Congress, for example, a point 
of no quorum would prevent the report of the Chairman of a Committee of 
the Whole (VI, 666); but in the 93d Congress clause 7 of rule XX 
(formerly clause 6 of rule XV) was adopted to provide that after the 
presence of a quorum is once ascertained on any day, a point of no 
quorum could not be entertained after the Committee had risen and 
pending the report of the Chairman to the House (see Sec. 1027, infra). 
Clause 7 of rule XX now specifically precludes a point of no quorum 
unless a question has been put to a vote. However, the Speaker retains 
the right to recognize a Member to move a call of the House at any time 
(but may, under clause 7(c) of rule XX recognize for a call of the House 
after the previous question has been ordered only when the Speaker 
determines by actual count that a quorum is not present). A point of 
order of no quorum during debate only in the House does not lie 
independently under this clause of the Constitution because clause 7 of 
rule XX (formerly clause 6 of rule XV) is a proper exercise of the 
House's constitutional rulemaking authority which can be interpreted 
consistently with the requirement that a quorum be present to conduct 
business (as opposed to mere debate) (Sept. 8, 1977, p. 28114; Sept. 12, 
1977, p. 28800).


[[Page 25]]

or approval of the Journal or on the referral or other disposition of 
other papers read to the House. A point of no quorum no longer lies 
during debate in the House. The practice in the Committee of the Whole 
is now governed by clause 6 of rule XVIII. No motion is in order on the 
failure of a quorum but the motions to adjourn and for a call of the 
House (IV, 2950; VI, 680) and the motion to adjourn has precedence over 
the motion for a call of the House (VIII, 2642). A call of the House is 
in order under the Constitution before the adoption of the rules (IV, 
2981). Those present on a call of the House may prescribe a fine as a 
condition on which an arrested Member may be discharged (IV, 3013, 
3014), but this is rarely done. A quorum is not required on motions 
incidental to a call of the House (IV, 2994; VI, 681; Oct. 8, 1940, p. 
13403; and Oct. 8, 1968, p. 30090). The House may adjourn sine die in 
the absence of a quorum where both Houses have already adopted a 
concurrent resolution providing for a sine die adjournment on that day 
(Oct. 18, 1972, p. 37200).
  Before these changes to rule XX (formerly rule XV), a quorum was 
required at all times during the reading of the Journal (IV, 2732, 2733; 
VI, 625, 629) or messages from the President or the Senate (IV, 3522; VI 
6600, 6650; VIII 3339); but the modern practice would require the 
presence of a quorum only when the question is put on a pending motion 
or proposition in the House such as on a motion incident to the reading, 
amendment,



Sec. 56. Relations of the quorum to organization 
of the House.

  At the time  of organization the two Houses inform one another of the 
appearance of the quorum in each, and the two Houses jointly inform the 
President (I, 198-203). A message from one House that its quorum has 
appeared is not delivered in the other until a quorum has appeared there 
also (I, 126). But at the beginning of a second session of a Congress 
the House proceeded to business, although a quorum had not appeared in 
the Senate (I, 126). At the beginning of a second session of a Congress 
unsworn Members-elect were taken into account in ascertaining the 
presence of a quorum (I, 175); however, at the beginning of the second 
session of the 87th Congress, the Clerk called the House to order, 
announced the death of Speaker Rayburn during the sine die adjournment, 
and did not call unsworn Members-elect or Members who had resigned 
during the hiatus to establish a quorum or elect a new Speaker (Jan. 10, 
1962, p. 5). In both Houses the oath has been administered to Members-
elect in the absence of a quorum (I, 174, 181, 182; VI, 22), although in 
one case the Speaker objected to such proceedings (II, 875). Prayer by 
the Chaplain is not business requiring the presence of a quorum and the 
Speaker declines to entertain a point of no quorum before prayer is 
offered (VI, 663; clause 7 of rule XX).



<>   \2\ Each House may 
determine the Rules of its Proceedings, * * *


[[Page 26]]




Sec. 57. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 190 (1881); 
United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Burton v. United States, 202 
U.S. 344 (1906).



[[Page 27]]



Sec. 59. Power to make rules not impaired by 
rules or law.

  The power of  each House of Representatives to make its own rules may 
not be impaired or controlled by the rules of a preceding House (I, 187, 
210; V, 6002, 6743-6747), or by a law passed by a prior Congress (I, 82, 
245; IV, 3298, 3579; V, 6765, 6766). The House in adopting its rules 
may, however, incorporate by reference as a part thereof all applicable 
provisions of law which constituted the Rules of the House at the end of 
the preceding Congress (H. Res. 5, 95th Cong., Jan. 4, 1977, pp. 53-70) 
and has also incorporated provisions of concurrent resolutions which 
were intended to remain applicable under the Budget Act (H. Res. 5, 
107th Cong., Jan. 3, 2001, p. 25). The House twice reaffirmed free-
standing directives to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct 
contained in a simple House resolution (H. Res. 168, 105th Cong., p. 
19317, reaffirmed for the 106th Congress by sec. 2(c), H. Res. 5, Jan. 
6, 1999, p. 47, and reaffirmed for the 107th Congress with an exception 
by sec. 3(a), H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 2001, p. 24; see Sec. 806, infra). In 
the 108th Congress those free-standing directives were codified in 
clause 3 of rule XI (sec. 2(h), H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 2003, p. ----). 
Ordinary rights and functions of the House under the Constitution are 
exercised in accordance with the rules (III, 2567), and under later 
decisions questions of so-called constitutional privilege should also be 
considered in accordance with the rules (VI, 48; VII, 889; Apr. 8, 1926, 
p. 7147). But a law passed by an existing Congress with the concurrence 
of the House has been recognized by that House as of binding force in 
matters of procedure (V, 6767, 6768). In exercising its constitutional 
power to change its rules the House may confine itself within certain 
limitations (V, 6756; VIII, 3376); but the attempt of the House to 
deprive the Speaker of his vote as a Member by a rule was successfully 
resisted (V, 5966, 5967). While the Act of June 1, 1789 (see 2 U.S.C. 
25) requires the election of a Clerk before the House proceeds to 
business yet the House has held that it may adopt rules before electing 
a Clerk (I, 245). Although the Speaker ceases to be an officer of the 
House with the expiration of a Congress, the Clerk, by old usage, 
continues in a new Congress (I, 187, 188, 235, 244; see 2 U.S.C. 26). In 
case of a vacancy in the Office of Clerk, Sergeant-at-Arms, Doorkeeper 
(abolished by the 104th Congress; see Sec. 663a, infra), Postmaster 
(abolished during the 102d Congress; see Sec. 668, infra), Chaplain, or 
Chief Administrative Officer, the Speaker is authorized to make 
temporary appointments (2 U.S.C. 75a-1). The House has adopted a rule 
before election of a Speaker (I, 94, 95); but in 1839 was deterred by 
the Act of June 1, 1789 and the Constitution from adopting rules before 
the administration of the oath to Members-elect (I, 140). The earlier 
theory that an officer might be empowered to administer oaths by a rule 
of either House has been abandoned in later practice and the authority 
has been conferred by law (III, 1823, 1824, 2079, 2303, 2479; 2 U.S.C. 
191).




Sec. 60. Procedure in the House before the 
adoption of rules.

  Before the adoption  of rules the House is governed by general 
parliamentary law, but Speakers have been inclined to give weight to the 
rules and precedents of the House in modifying the usual constructions 
of that law (V, 5604, 6758-6760; VIII, 3384; Jan. 3, 1953, p. 24; Jan. 
10, 1967, p. 14). The general parliamentary law as understood in the 
House is founded on Jefferson's Manual as modified by the practice of 
American legislative assemblies, especially of the House of 
Representatives (V, 6761-6763; Jan. 3, 1953, p. 24), but the provisions 
of the House's accustomed rules are not necessarily followed (V, 5509). 
Before the adoption of rules, the statutory enactments incorporated into 
the rules of the prior Congress as an exercise of the rulemaking power 
do not control the proceedings of the new House until it adopts rules 
incorporating those provisions (Jan. 22, 1971, p. 132).


  Before the adoption of rules, it is in order for any Member who is 
recognized by the Chair to offer a proposition relating to the order of 
business without asking consent of the House (IV, 3060). Relying on the 
Act of June 1, 1789 (2 U.S.C. 25), the Clerk recognized for nominations 
for Speaker as being of higher constitutional privilege than a 
resolution to postpone the election of a Speaker and instead provide for 
the election of a Speaker pro tempore pending the disposition of certain 
ethics charges against the nominee of the majority party (Jan. 7, 1997, 
p. 115). The Speaker may recognize the Majority Leader to offer an 
initial resolution providing for the adoption of the rules as a question 
of privilege in its own right (IV, 3060; Deschler, ch. 1, Sec. 8), even 
before recognizing another Member to offer as a question of privilege 
another resolution calling into question the constitutionality of that 
resolution (Speaker Foley, Jan. 5, 1993, p. 49). The Speaker also may 
recognize a Member to offer for immediate consideration a special order 
providing for the consideration of a resolution adopting the rules (H. 
Res. 5, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 447). The resolution adopting rules for a 
Congress has included a special order of business for consideration of 
specified legislation (sec. 108, H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 463; sec. 
3, H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. 76). The Speaker held as not cognizable a 
point of order that a resolution adopting the Rules of the House 
contained a provision that the House had no constitutional authority to 
adopt, stating that the House decides such issues by way of the question 
of consideration or disposition of the resolution (Speaker Hastert, Jan. 
4, 2005, p. ----).


[[Page 28]]

of rules, the Speaker may maintain decorum by directing a Member who has 
not been recognized in debate beyond an allotted time to be removed from 
the well and by directing the Sergeant-at-Arms to present the mace as 
the traditional symbol of order (Jan. 3, 1991, p. 58).
  During debate on the resolution adopting rules, any Member may make a 
point of order that a quorum is not present based upon general 
parliamentary precedents, since the provisions of clause 7 of rule XX 
(formerly clause 6(e) of rule XV) prohibiting the Chair from 
entertaining such a point of order unless the question has been put on 
the pending proposition are not yet applicable (Jan. 15, 1979, p. 10). 
Before adoption of rules, under general parliamentary law as modified by 
usage and practice of the House, an amendment may be subject to the 
point of order that it is not germane to the proposition to which 
offered (Jan. 3, 1969, p. 23). Before adoption

  The motion to commit is permitted after the previous question has been 
ordered on the resolution adopting the rules (V, 5604; Jan. 3, 1989, p. 
81; Jan. 3, 1991, p. 61) but is not debatable (Jan. 7, 1997, p. 139). It 
is the prerogative of the minority to offer a motion to commit even 
before the adoption of the rules, but at that point the proponent need 
not qualify as opposed to the resolution (Jan. 3, 1991, p. 61; Jan. 4, 
1995, p. 457). Such a motion to commit is not divisible, but if it is 
agreed to and more than one amendment is reported back pursuant thereto, 
then separate votes may be had on the reported amendments (Jan. 5, 1993, 
p. 98). The motion to refer has also been permitted upon the offering of 
a resolution adopting the rules, and before debate thereon, subject to 
the motion to lay on the table (Jan. 5, 1993, p. 52).



Sec. 61. Joint rules.

  The two Houses  of Congress adopted in 
the early years of the Government joint rules to govern their procedure 
in matters requiring concurrent action; but in 1876 these joint rules 
were abrogated (IV, 3430; V, 6782-6787). The most useful of their 
provision continued to be observed in practice, however (IV, 3430; V, 
6592).





Sec. 61a. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6 (1932); 
Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949); United States v. 
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950); Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 
(1963); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).





Sec. 62. Punishment and expulsion of 
Members.

  * * * [Each House may]  punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the 
Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.




Sec. 63. Punishment and expulsion, 
generally.

  Among the  punishments that the House may impose under this provision, 
the rules of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct outline the 
following: (1) expulsion from the House; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; (4) 
fine; (5) denial or limitation of any right, power, privilege, or 
immunity of the Member if not in violation of the Constitution; or (6) 
any other sanction determined by the Committee to be appropriate (rule 
24, Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, 109th Cong.). Under rule 
10 of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, a statement of 
alleged violation must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.



[[Page 29]]

a counsel to appear at its bar (II, 1263), although it declined to grant 
a request for a specific statement of charges or compulsory process for 
witnesses (II, 1264). In one instance, pending consideration of a 
resolution to censure a Member, the Speaker informed him that he should 
retire (II, 1366), but this is not usual. Members or Senators, against 
whom resolutions have been pending, have participated in debate either 
by consent to make a personal explanation (II, 1656) or without question 
as to consent (II, 1246, 1253, 1269, 1286). A Member against whom a 
resolution of censure was pending was asked by the Speaker if he desired 
to be heard (VI, 236). However, after the House had voted censure and 
the Member has been brought to the bar by the Sergeant-at-Arms to be 
censured, it was held that he might not then be heard (II, 1259). In the 
modern practice, the manager of the resolution proposing the punishment 
(who controls the entire hour) yields a portion of his time to the 
accused (Oct. 2, 1980, p. 28966; July 24, 2002, p. ----). In the latter 
case, the House extended debate on the resolution for a specified period 
and yielded that entire time to the Member who was the subject of the 
resolution (July 24, 2002, p. ----). The manager of the resolution has 
the right to close debate, not the Member who is the subject of the 
resolution (July 24, 2002, p. ----). Where the manager of a resolution 
has divided his hour three ways, the Chair announced that the order of 
closing speeches would be as follows: The minority manager of the 
resolution, the subject of the resolution, and the manager of the 
resolution (July 24, 2002, p. ----). Debate on a resolution recommending 
a disciplinary sanction against a Member may not exceed the scope of the 
conduct of the accused Member (Dec. 18, 1987, p. 36271).
  In action for censure or expulsion, the House has discussed whether or 
not the principles of the procedure of the courts should be followed 
(II, 1255, 1264). The House, in a proceeding for expulsion, declined to 
give the Member a trial at the bar (II, 1275); but the Senate has 
permitted

  A resolution recommending reprimand, censure, or expulsion of a Member 
presents a question of privilege (II, 1254; III, 2648-2651; VI, 236; 
Dec. 9, 1913, pp. 584-86; July 26, 1990, p. 19717). If reported by the 
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct (or a derivation thereof), 
the resolution may be called up at any time after the committee has 
filed its report (Jan. 21, 1997, p. 393). Before debate, an expulsion 
resolution is subject to the motion to lay on the table (Oct. 1, 1976, 
p. 35111), to postpone to a date certain (Oct. 2, 1980, p. 28953; July 
24, 2002, p. ----), or to refer to committee (Mar. 1, 1979, p. 3753). A 
proposition to censure is not germane to a proposition to expel (VI, 
236).

  The Senate once expelled several Senators by a single resolution (II, 
1266); however, the House has refused to censure more than one Member by 
a single resolution (II, 1240, 1621).


[[Page 30]]

Service, see H. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 72 Stat. B12.) In the 95th 
Congress following an investigation by the Committee on Standards of 
Official Conduct into whether Members or employees had improperly 
accepted things of value from the Republic of Korea or representatives 
thereof, the House reprimanded three Members, one for falsely answering 
an unsworn questionnaire relative to such gifts and violating the Code 
of Official Conduct, one for failing to report as required by law the 
receipt of a campaign contribution and violating the Code of Official 
Conduct, and one for failing to report a campaign contribution, 
converting a campaign contribution to personal use, testifying falsely 
to the committee under oath, and violating the Code of Official Conduct 
(Oct. 13, 1978, pp. 36984, 37009, 37017). In the 100th Congress the 
House adopted a resolution reprimanding a Member for ``ghost voting,'' 
improperly diverting government resources, and maintaining a ``ghost 
employee'' on his staff (Dec. 18, 1987, p. 36266). In the 101st Congress 
another was reprimanded for seeking dismissal of parking tickets 
received by a person with whom he had a personal relationship and not 
related to official business and for misstatements of fact in a 
memorandum relating to the criminal probation record of that person 
(July 26, 1990, p. 19717). In the 105th Congress the House reprimanded 
the Speaker and ordered him to reimburse a portion of the costs of the 
investigation by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct (Jan. 
21, 1997, p. 393).


Sec. 64. Punishment by reprimand.

  In  the 94th Congress the 
House by adopting a report from the Committee on Standards of Official 
Conduct reprimanded a Member for failing to report certain financial 
holdings in violation of rule XXVI (formerly rule XLIV) and for 
investing in stock in a Navy bank the establishment of which he was 
promoting, in violation of the Code of Ethics for Government Service (H. 
Res. 1421, July 29, 1976, pp. 24379-82). (For the Code of Ethics for 
Government



[[Page 31]]

improper relationship with a House page in a prior Congress (July 20, 
1983, p. 20020 and p. 20030).


Sec. 65. Punishment by censure.

  Censure  is inflicted by the 
Speaker (II, 1259) and the words are entered in the Journal (II, 1251, 
1656; VI 236), but the Speaker may not pronounce censure except by order 
of the House (VI, 237). When Members have resigned pending proceedings 
for censure, the House has nevertheless adopted the resolutions of 
censure (II, 1239, 1273, 1275, 1656). Members have been censured for 
personalities and other disorder in debate (II, 1251, 1253, 1254, 1259), 
assaults on the floor (II, 1665), for presenting a resolution alleged to 
be insulting to the House (II, 1246), and for corrupt acts (II, 1274, 
1286). For abuse of the leave to print, the House censured a Member 
after a motion to expel him had failed (VI, 236). In one instance 
Members were censured for acts before the election of the then existing 
House (II, 1286). In the 96th Congress two Members were censured by the 
House as follows: (1) A Member who during a prior Congress both 
knowingly increased an office employee's salary for repayment of that 
Member's personal expenses and who was unjustly enriched by clerk-hire 
employees' payments of personal expenses later compensated by salary 
increases, was censured and ordered to repay the amount of the unjust 
enrichment with interest (July 31, 1979, p. 21592); (2) a Member was 
censured for receiving over a period of time sums of money from a person 
with a direct interest in legislation in violation of clause 3 of rule 
XXIII (formerly clause 4 of rule XLIII), and for transferring campaign 
funds into office and personal accounts (June 10, 1980, pp. 13801-20)). 
In the 98th Congress the House adopted two resolutions (as amended in 
the House), each censuring a Member for an




Sec. 66. Punishment by expulsion.

  Five  Members have been 
expelled in the history of the House. Among those, three were expelled 
for various offenses related to their service for the Confederacy in the 
Civil War: John B. Clark of Missouri (a Member-elect) (II, 1262, July 
13, 1861); Henry C. Burnett of Kentucky (II, 1261, Dec. 3, 1861); and 
John W. Reid of Missouri (II, 1261, Dec. 6, 1861). Michael J. Myers of 
Pennsylvania was expelled after being convicted in a Federal court of 
bribery and conspiracy in accepting funds to perform official duties 
(Oct. 2, 1980, p. 28978). James A. Traficant of Ohio was expelled after 
being convicted in a Federal court for crimes including (1) trading 
official acts and influence for things of value; (2) demanding and 
accepting salary kickbacks from his congressional employees; (3) 
influencing a congressional employee to destroy evidence and to provide 
false testimony to a Federal grand jury; (4) receiving personal labor 
and the services of his congressional employees while they were being 
paid by the taxpayers to perform public service; and (5) filing false 
income tax returns (July 24, 2002, p. ----). Three Senators were 
expelled for their association with the Confederates during the Civil 
War (II, 1268-1270).



[[Page 32]]

  The power of expulsion has been the subject of much discussion (I, 
469, 476, 481; II, 1264, 1265, 1269; VI, 56, 398; see Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)). In one case a Member-elect who had not 
taken the oath was expelled (II, 1262), and in another case the power to 
do this was discussed (I, 476). In one instance the Senate assumed to 
annul its action of expulsion (II, 1243). The Supreme Court has decided 
that a judgment of conviction under a disqualifying statute does not 
compel the Senate to expel (II, 1282; Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 
344 (1906)). The power of expulsion in its relation to offenses 
committed before the Members' election has been discussed (II, 1264, 
1284, 1285, 1286, 1288, 1289; VI, 56, 238). In one case the Judiciary 
Committee of the House concluded that a Member might not be punished for 
an offense alleged to have been committed against a preceding Congress 
(II, 1283); but the House itself declined to express doubt as to its 
power to expel and proceeded to inflict censure (II, 1286). In addition, 
the 96th Congress punished Members on two occasions for offenses 
committed during a prior Congress (H. Res. 378, July 31, 1979, p. 21592; 
H. Res. 660, June 10, 1980, pp. 13801-20). It has been held that the 
power of the House to expel one of its Members is unlimited; a matter 
purely of discretion to be exercised by a two-thirds vote, from which 
there is no appeal (VI, 78). The resignation of the accused Member has 
always caused a suspension of proceedings for expulsion (II, 1275, 1276, 
1279; VI, 238). Following the expulsion of a Member, the Clerk notifies 
the Governor of the relevant state of the action of the House (July 24, 
2002, p. ----).




Sec. 67. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wh. 204 (1821); Kilbourn 
v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881); United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 
(1892); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897); Burton v. United States, 202 
U.S. 344 (1906); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).





Sec. 68. Each House to keep a journal.

  \3\ Each House  shall 
keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the 
same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; * * 
*




Sec. 69. The Journal the official 
record.

  The Journal and  not the Congressional Record is the official record of the 
proceedings of the House (IV, 2727). Its nature and functions have been 
the subject of extended discussions (IV, 2730, footnote). The House has 
fixed its title (IV, 2728). While it ought to be a correct transcript of 
the proceedings of the House, the House has not insisted on a strict 
chronological order of entries (IV, 2815). The Journal is dated as of 
the legislative and not the calendar day (IV, 2746).




Sec. 70. Journal a record of proceedings 
and not of reasons.

  The Journal records  proceedings but not the reasons therefor (IV, 
2811) or the circumstances attending (IV, 2812), or the statements or 
opinions of Members (IV, 2817-2820). Exceptions to this rule are rare 
(IV, 2808, 2825). Protests have on rare occasions been admitted by the 
action of the House (IV, 2806, 2807), but the entry of a protest on the 
Journal may not be demanded by a Member as a matter of right (IV, 2798) 
and such demand does not present a question of privilege (IV, 2799). A 
motion not entertained is not entered on the Journal (IV, 2813, 2844-
46).



[[Page 33]]

instances has the House nullified proceedings by rescinding the records 
of them in the Journal (IV, 2787), the House and Senate usually 
insisting on the accuracy of its Journal (IV, 2783, 2786). In rare 
instances the House and Senate have rescinded or expunged entries in 
Journals of preceding Congresses (IV, 2730, footnote, 2792, 2793).


Sec. 71. House's absolute control of entries 
in the Journal.

  While the House  controls the Journal and may decide what are 
proceedings, even to the extent of omitting things actually done or 
recording things not done (IV, 2784; VI, 634), and while the Speaker has 
entertained a motion to amend the Journal so as to cause it to state 
what was not the fact, leaving it for the House to decide on the 
propriety of the act (IV, 2785), holding that he could not prevent a 
majority of the House from so amending the Journal as to undo an actual 
transaction (IV, 3091-93), in none of those rulings was an amendment 
permitted to correct the Journal which had the effect of collaterally 
changing the tabling of a motion to reconsider. In fact, under the 
precedents cited in Sec. 902, infra, under clause 1 of rule XVI it has 
been held not in order to amend or strike out a Journal entry setting 
forth a motion exactly as made (IV, 2783, 2789), and thus it was held 
not in order to amend the Journal by striking out a resolution actually 
offered (IV, 2789), but on one occasion the House vacated the Speaker's 
referral of an executive communication by amending the Journal of the 
preceding day (Mar. 19, 1990, p. 4488). Only on rare




Sec. 72. Record of votes in the 
Journal.

  The Journal should  record the result of every vote and state in general terms 
the subject of it (IV, 2804); but the result of a vote is recorded in 
figures only when the yeas and nays are taken (IV, 2827), when the vote 
is recorded by electronic device or by clerks, or when a vote is taken 
by ballot, it having been determined in latest practice that the Journal 
should show not only the result but the state of the ballot or ballots 
(IV, 2832).




Sec. 73. Approval of the Journal.

  It is the  uniform practice 
of the House to approve its Journal for each legislative day (IV, 2731). 
Where Journals of more than one session remain unapproved, they are 
taken up for approval in chronological order (IV, 2771-2773). In 
ordinary practice the Journal is approved by the House without the 
formal putting of the motion to vote (IV, 2774).


  The former rule required the reading of the Journal on each 
legislative day. The reading could be dispensed with only by unanimous 
consent (VI, 625) or suspension of the rules (IV, 2747-2750) and had to 
be in full when demanded by any Member (IV, 2739-2741; VI, 627-628; Feb. 
22, 1950, p. 2152).


[[Page 34]]

  The present form of the rule (clause 1 of rule I; see Sec. 621, infra) 
was drafted from section 127 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 
1970 (84 Stat. 1140), incorporated into the standing rules in the 92d 
Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 22, 1971, p. 144), and was further amended in 
the 96th Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 15, 1979, pp. 7-16). Under the 
current practice, the Speaker is authorized to announce his approval of 
the Journal which is deemed agreed to by the House, subject to the right 
of any Member to demand a vote on agreeing to the Speaker's approval 
(which if decided in the affirmative is not subject to the motion to 
reconsider). In the 98th Congress, the Speaker was given the authority 
to postpone a record vote on agreeing to his approval of the Journal to 
a later time on that legislative day (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1983, p. 34). 
While the transaction of any business is not in order before approval of 
the Journal (IV, 2751; VI, 629, 637; Oct. 8, 1968, p. 30096), approval 
of the Journal yields to the simple motion to adjourn (IV, 2757), 
administration of the oath (I, 171, 172), an arraignment of impeachment 
(VI, 469), and questions of the privileges of the House (II, 1630), and 
the Speaker may in his discretion recognize for a parliamentary inquiry 
before approval of the Journal (VI, 624). Under clause 1 of rule I, as 
amended in the 96th Congress, a point of order of no quorum is not in 
order before the Speaker announces his approval of the Journal. Clause 7 
of rule XX generally prohibits the making of points of order of no 
quorum unless the Speaker has put the question on the pending motion or 
proposition.



Sec. 74. Motions to amend the 
Journal.

  Under the practice  before clause 1 of rule I was adopted in its present form, 
the motion to amend the Journal took precedence over the motion to 
approve it (IV, 2760; VI, 633); but the motion to amend may not be 
admitted after the previous question is demanded on a motion to approve 
(IV, 2770; VI, 633; VIII, 2684). An expression of opinion as to a 
decision of the Chair was held not in order as an amendment to the 
Journal (IV, 2848). A proposed amendment to the Journal being tabled 
does not carry the Journal with it (V, 5435, 5436). While a proposed 
correction of the Journal may be recorded in the Journal, yet it is not 
in order to insert in full in this indirect way what has been denied 
insertion in the first instance (IV, 2782, 2804, 2805). The earlier 
practice was otherwise, however (IV, 2801-2803). The Journal of the last 
day of a session is not approved on the assembling of the next session, 
and is not ordinarily amended (IV, 2743, 2744). For further discussion 
of the composition and approval of the Journal, see Deschler, ch. 5.





Sec. 74a. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United 
States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892).





Sec. 75. Yeas and Nays entered on the 
Journal.

  * * * and the  Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question 
shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the 
Journal.



[[Page 35]]

a quorum fail to vote and the House adjourn, proceedings under the 
automatic call are vacated and the question recurs de novo when the bill 
again comes before the House (Oct. 10, 1940, pp. 13534-35; Oct. 13, 
1962, p. 23474; Oct. 19, 1966, p. 27641). While the Constitution and the 
Rules of the House guarantee that votes taken by the yeas and nays be 
spread upon the Journal, neither requires that a Member's vote be 
announced to the public immediately during the vote (Sept. 19, 1985, p. 
24245).


Sec. 76. Conditions of ordering yeas and 
nays.

  The yeas and  nays may be ordered before the organization of the House (I, 91; 
V, 6012, 6013), but are not taken in Committee of the Whole (IV, 4722, 
4723). They are not necessarily taken on the passage of a resolution 
proposing an amendment to the Constitution (V, 7038, 7039; VIII, 3506), 
but are required to pass a bill over a veto (Sec. 104; VII, 1110). In 
the earlier practice of the House it was held that less than a quorum 
might not order the yeas and nays, but for many years the decisions have 
been uniformly the other way (V, 6016-6028). Neither is a quorum 
necessary on a motion to reconsider the vote whereby the yeas and nays 
are ordered (V, 5693). When a quorum fails on a yea and nay vote it is 
the duty of the Speaker and the House to take notice of that fact (IV, 
2953, 2963, 2988). If the House adjourns, the order for the yeas and 
nays remains effective whenever the bill again comes before the House 
(V, 6014, 6015; VI, 740; VIII, 3108), and it has been held that the 
question of consideration might not intervene on a succeeding day before 
the second calling of the yeas and nays (V, 4949). However, when the 
call of the House is automatic, the Speaker directs the roll to be 
called or the vote to be taken by electronic device without motion from 
the floor (VI, 678, 679, 694, 695); and should


  The yeas and nays may not be demanded until the Speaker has put the 
question in the form prescribed by clause 6 of rule I (formerly clause 
5) (Oct. 2, 1974, p. 33623).



Sec. 77. Demanding the yeas and nays.

  The yeas and  nays may 
be demanded while the Speaker is announcing the result of a division (V, 
6039), while a vote by tellers is being taken (V, 6038), and even after 
the announcement of the vote if the House has not passed to other 
business (V, 6040, 6041; VIII, 3110). But after the Speaker has 
announced the result of a division on a motion and is in the act of 
putting the question on another motion it is too late to demand the yeas 
and nays on the first motion (V, 6042). And it is not in order during 
the various processes of a division to repeat a demand for the yeas and 
nays which has once been refused by the House (V, 6029, 6030, 6031). The 
constitutional right of a Member to demand the yeas and nays may not be 
overruled as dilatory (V, 5737; VIII, 3107); but this constitutional 
right does not exist as to a vote to second a motion when such second is 
required by the rules (V, 6032-6036; VIII, 3109). The right to demand 
yeas and nays is not waived by the fact that the Member demanding them 
has just made the point of no quorum and caused the Chair to count the 
House (V, 6044).-




Sec. 78. Yeas and nays ordered by onefifth.

  In passing on  a 
demand for the yeas and nays the Speaker need determine only whether 
one-fifth of those present sustain the demand (V, 6043; VIII, 3112, 
3115). In ascertaining whether one-fifth of those present support a 
demand for the yeas and nays the Speaker counts the entire number 
present and not merely those who rise to be counted (VIII, 3111, 3120). 
Such count is not subject to verification by appeal (Sept. 12, 1978, p. 
28984), and a request for a rising vote of those opposed to the demand 
is not in order (VIII, 3112-3114). Where the Chair prolongs his count of 
the House in determining whether one-fifth have supported the demand for 
yeas and nays, he counts latecomers in support of the demand as well as 
for the number present (Sept. 24, 1990, p. 25521). After the House, on a 
vote by tellers, has refused to order the yeas and nays it is too late 
to demand the count of the negative on an original vote (V, 6045).



[[Page 36]]

(V, 6037). In one instance it was held that the yeas and nays might be 
demanded on a motion to reconsider the vote whereby the yeas and nays 
were ordered (V, 5689), but evidently there must be a limit to this 
process. The vote whereby the yeas and nays are refused may be 
reconsidered (V, 5692).


Sec. 79. Reconsideration of the vote ordering the 
yeas and nays.

  A motion to  reconsider the vote ordering the yeas and nays is in 
order (V, 6029; VIII, 2790), and the vote may be reconsidered by a 
majority. If the House votes to reconsider the yeas and nays may again 
be ordered by one-fifth (V, 5689-5691). But when the House, having 
reconsidered, again orders the yeas and nays, a second motion to 
reconsider may not be made




Sec. 80. Effect of an order of the yeas and 
nays.

  A motion  to adjourn may be admitted after the yeas and nays are ordered 
and before the roll call has begun (V, 5366); and a motion to suspend 
the rules has been entertained after the yeas and nays have been 
demanded on another matter (V, 6835). Consideration of a conference 
report (V, 6457), and a motion to reconsider the vote by which the yeas 
and nays were ordered (V, 6029; VIII, 2790) may be admitted. A demand 
for tellers or for a division is not precluded or set aside by the fact 
that the yeas and nays are demanded and refused (V, 5998; VIII, 3103).





Sec. 81. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United 
States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 
196 (1897); Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 U.S. 506 (1901); Marshall v. 
Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917).





Sec. 82. Adjournment for more than three 
days or to another place.

  \4\ Neither House,  during the Session of Congress shall, 
without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor 
to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.



[[Page 37]]

President may convene Congress at places outside the seat of Government 
during hazardous circumstances (2 U.S.C. 27; Deschler, ch. 1, Sec. 4).


Sec. 82a. Adjournment to another 
place.

  The word ``Place'' in  the above paragraph was construed to mean the seat of 
Government, and consent of the Senate is not required where the House 
orders its meetings to be held in another structure at the seat of 
Government (Speaker Rayburn, Aug. 17, 1949, pp. 11651, 11683). Under 
clause 12(d) of rule I, the Speaker may convene the House in a place 
within the District of Columbia, other than the Hall of the House, 
whenever, in his opinion, the public interest shall warrant it 
(Sec. 639, infra). In recent practice the two Houses have granted joint 
leadership (or their designees) authority for an entire Congress to 
assemble the Congress at a place outside the District of Columbia 
whenever the public interest shall warrant it (H. Con. Res. 1, Feb. 13, 
2003, p. ----; H. Con. Res. 1, Jan. 4, 2005, p. ----). The Speaker 
executes by letter his designation under such resolution (Mar. 13, 2003, 
p. ----; Jan. 20, 2005, p. ----). After September 11, 2001, recall 
authority carried in adjournment resolutions has allowed reassembly at 
such place as may be designated (see, e.g., S. Con. Res. 160, Nov. 22, 
2002, p. ----; H. Con. Res. 2, Jan. 6, 2005, p. ----; see also Sec. 84, 
infra). The


  On November 22, 1940, p. 13715, the House adopted a resolution 
providing that thereafter until otherwise ordered its meetings be held 
in the Caucus room of the new House Office Building. Likewise the Senate 
on the same day, p. 13709, provided that its meetings be held in the 
Chamber formerly occupied by the Supreme Court in the Capitol. The two 
Houses continued to hold their sessions in these rooms until the opening 
of the 77th Congress. These actions were necessitated by the precarious 
condition of the roofs in the two Chambers. On June 28, 1949, p. 8571, 
and on September 1, 1950, p. 14140, the House provided that until 
otherwise ordered its meetings be held in the Caucus room of the new 
House Office Building, pending the remodeling of its Chamber. On June 
29, 1949, p. 8584, and on Aug. 9, 1950, p. 12106, the Senate provided 
that its meetings be held in the Chamber formerly occupied by the 
Supreme Court in the Capitol, pending remodeling of its Chamber. The 
House returned to its Chamber on January 3, 1950, and again on January 
1, 1951. The Senate returned to its Chamber on January 3, 1950, and 
again on January 3, 1951.

  There has been no occasion for the convening of a session of Congress 
outside the seat of Government. However, the Congress has engaged in 
ceremonial functions outside the seat of Government, which were 
authorized by concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 131, May 28, 1987, p. 
14031; H. Con. Res. 96, Apr. 18, 1989, p. 6834; H. Con. Res. 448, July 
25, 2002, p. ----).-


[[Page 38]]

at-Arms of an imminent impairment of the place of reconvening, then he 
may, in consultation with the Minority Leader, postpone the time for 
reconvening within the three-day limit prescribed by the Constitution. 
In the alternative, the Speaker, under the same conditions, may 
reconvene the House before the time previously appointed solely to 
declare the House in recess within that three-day limit (see Sec. 639, 
infra).


Sec. 83. Adjournment of the House within the 
threeday limit.

  The House of  Representatives in adjourning for not more than three 
days must take into the count either the day of adjourning or the day of 
the meeting, and Sunday is not taken into account in making this 
computation (V, 6673, 6674). By special order, the House may provide for 
a session of the House on a Sunday, traditionally a ``dies non'' under 
the precedents of the House (Dec. 17, 1982, p. 31946; Dec. 18, 1987, p. 
36352; Nov. 17, 1989, p. 30029; Aug. 20, 1994, p. 23367). The House has 
by standing order provided that it should meet on two days only of each 
week instead of daily (V, 6675). Before the election of Speaker, the 
House has adjourned for more than one day (I, 89, 221). The House has by 
unanimous consent agreed to an adjournment for less than three days but 
specified that it would continue in adjournment for 10 days pursuant to 
a concurrent resolution already passed by the House if the Senate 
adopted the concurrent resolution before the third day of the House's 
adjournment (Nov. 20, 1987, p. 33054). The Committee on Rules has 
reported a rule authorizing the Speaker to declare the House in recesses 
subject to calls of the Chair during five discrete periods, each 
consistent with the constitutional constraint that neither House adjourn 
(or recess) for more than three days without consent of the other House 
(Dec. 21, 1995, p. 38141; Jan. 5, 1996, p. 357). Under clause 12(c) of 
rule I, during any recess or adjournment of not more than three days, if 
the Speaker is notified by the Sergeant-




Sec. 84. Resolutions for adjournment of 
the two Houses.

  Congress is adjourned  for more than three days by a concurrent resolution 
(IV, 4031, footnote). When it adjourns in this way, but not to or beyond 
the day fixed by Constitution or law for the next regular session to 
begin, the session is not thereby necessarily terminated (V, 6676, 
6677). At the close of the first session of the 66th Congress, the two 
Houses adjourned sine die under authority granted each House by simple 
resolutions consenting to such adjournment sine die at any time before a 
specified date (Nov. 19, 1919, p. 8810).


  Until the 67th Congress neither House had ever adjourned for more than 
three days by itself with the consent of the other, but resolutions had 
been offered for the accomplishment of that end (V, 6702, 6703). In the 
modern practice it is common for a concurrent resolution to provide for 
a one-House adjournment or to provide for each House to adjourn for 
different time periods. For example: (1) the House adjourned until 
August 15, 1922, with the consent of the Senate (June 29, 1922, p. 
10439); (2) the two Houses provided for an adjournment sine die of the 
House on August 20, 1954, and of the Senate at any time before December 
25, 1954 (H. Con. Res. 266); (3) the two Houses provided for an 
adjournment sine die of the House on December 20 or December 21 pursuant 
to a motion made by the Majority Leader or his designee, and of the 
Senate at any time before January 3, 1983, as determined by the Senate, 
and for adjournments or recesses of the Senate for periods of more than 
three days as determined by the Senate during such period (H. Con. Res. 
438, Dec. 20, 1982, p. 32951); (4) the two Houses provided for an 
adjournment of the Senate to a day certain and of the House for more 
than three days to a day certain, or to any day before that day as 
determined by the House (S. Con. Res. 102, May 27, 1982, pp. 12504, 
12505); (5) the two Houses provided for an adjournment to a day certain, 
with a provision that if there should be no quorum present on that day 
the session should terminate (V, 6686).


[[Page 39]]

of the Senate notified Members of the House to reassemble, the Senate 
already being in session (Mar. 20, 2005, p. ----, pursuant to H. Con. 
Res. 103, 109th Cong., Mar. 17, 2005, p. ----); (2) the Speaker and the 
Majority Leader of the Senate notified Members of both Houses to 
reassemble (Sept. 2, 2005, p. ----, pursuant to H. Con. Res. 225, 109th 
Cong., July 28, 2005, p. ----).
  A concurrent resolution adjourning both Houses for more than three 
days, or sine die, normally includes joint leadership authority to 
reassemble the Members whenever the public interest shall warrant it 
(see, e.g., July 8, 1943, p. 7516; June 23, 1944, p. 6667; Sept. 21, 
1944, p. 8109; July 18, 1945, p. 7733; July 26, 1947, p. 10521; June 20, 
1948, p. 9348; Aug. 7, 1948, p. 10247; Dec. 22, 1973, p. 43327; Dec. 20, 
1974, p. 41815; Nov. 21, 1989, 101st Cong., p. 31156; Oct. 3, 1996, 
104th Cong., p. 12275; Nov. 13, 1997, 105th Cong., p. 26538; Dec. 15, 
2000, 106th Cong., p. 27019). Pursuant to such recall authority: (1) the 
Speaker and the Majority Leader

  After September 11, 2001, such recall authority has allowed reassembly 
at such place as may be designated (see, e.g., S. Con. Res. 160, Nov. 
22, 2002, p. ----; H. Con. Res. 531, Dec. 9, 2004, p. ----). More 
recently, such recall authority permitted recall by designees of the 
Speaker and the Majority Leader of the Senate (see, e.g., S. Con. Res. 
132, July 26, 2002, p. ----). The Speaker executes by letter his 
designation under a concurrent resolution of adjournment, as well as his 
designation under House Concurrent Resolution 1 (Mar. 13, 2003, p. ----; 
Jan. 20, 2005, p. ----). The Speaker also executes by letter his 
designation of another Member to utilize reassembly authority under a 
joint resolution changing the convening date of the next session (H. J. 
Res. 80, 108th Cong., Dec. 15, 2003, p. ----).

  On occasion an adjournment resolution has provided for one-House 
recall (see, e.g., July 20, 1970, 91st Cong., p. 24978). Joint 
leadership and House only recall provisions were included in the sine 
die adjournment resolution for the second session of the 105th Congress 
(H. Con. Res. 353, Oct. 20, 1998, p. 27348), and the Speaker exercised 
his recall authority under that resolution to reassemble the House (Dec. 
17, 1998, p. 27802).

  When the Senate is out of session for not more than three days, the 
Senate Majority and Minority Leaders may modify an order for the time or 
place of convening when, in their opinion, such action is warranted by 
intervening circumstances (S. Res. 296, 108th Cong., Feb. 3, 2003, p. --
--). Pursuant to such authority, during an adjournment of the Senate for 
not more than three days, the Senate convened earlier than previously 
ordered to adopt a House concurrent resolution providing for an 
adjournment of the two Houses (H. Con. Res. 103, Mar. 17, 2005, p. ----
), section 2 of which enabled a recall of the House (Mar. 20, 2005, p. 
----).

  A resolution adopted in the first session of the 106th Congress 
provided for an adjournment to a date certain, unless the House sooner 
received a specified message from the Senate, in which case it would 
stand adjourned sine die (H. Con. Res. 235, Nov. 18, 1999, p. 30734). It 
has become the common practice for the House, by unanimous consent 
adopted after originating an adjournment resolution, to fix a time to 
which it would adjourn within three days unless the House were sooner to 
receive a message from the Senate transmitting its adoption of the 
adjournment resolution, in which case the House would stand adjourned 
pursuant to that resolution (see, e.g., Nov. 3, 2000, p. ----; Mar. 20, 
2002, p. ----).


[[Page 40]]

Res. 232, 96th Cong., Dec. 20, 1979, p. 37317; H. Con. Res. 260, 102d 
Cong., Nov. 26, 1991, p. 35840; H. Con. Res. 235, 106th Cong., Nov. 18, 
1999, p. 30734). That prohibition against the conduct of business was 
considered not to preclude recognition for one-minute speeches and 
special-order speeches by unanimous consent (Jan. 3, 1992, pp. 2, 9) or 
the introduction and numbering of bills and resolutions (which would not 
be noted in the Congressional Record or referred by the Speaker until 
the next legislative day, when executive communications, petitions, and 
memorials also would be numbered and referred) (Jan. 24, 2000, p. ----). 
The House has passed a joint resolution appointing a day for the 
convening of a second session of a Congress and provided for possible 
earlier assembly by joint-leadership recall (see, e.g., H. J. Res. 80, 
107th Cong., Dec. 20, 2001, p. ----; H. J. Res. 80, 108th Cong., Nov. 
21, 2003, p. ----).
  A resolution providing for the sine die adjournment of the first 
session may contain a proviso that when the second session convenes the 
Senate or House may not conduct organizational or legislative business 
but shall adjourn on that day until a date certain, unless sooner 
recalled (H. Con.

  A concurrent resolution to provide for adjournment for more than three 
days or an adjournment sine die is offered in the House as a matter of 
privilege (V, 6701-6706), and is not debatable (VIII, 3372-3374), though 
a Member may be recognized under a reservation of objection to a 
unanimous-consent request that the resolution be agreed to (Oct. 27, 
1990, p. 36850). The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 provides for 
a sine die adjournment, or (in an odd numbered year) an adjournment of 
slightly over a month (from that Friday in August which is at least 30 
days before Labor Day to the Wednesday following Labor Day) unless the 
nation is in a state of war, declared by Congress (sec. 461(b); 84 Stat. 
1140). Congress may, of course, waive this requirement and make other 
determinations regarding its adjournment (see Sec. 1106, infra).


  The requirement that resolutions providing for an adjournment sine die 
of either House may not be considered until Congress has completed 
action on the second concurrent resolution on the budget for the fiscal 
year in question, and on any reconciliation legislation required by such 
a resolution, contained in section 310(f) of the Congressional Budget 
Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344), was repealed by the Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177). That law amended 
sections 309 and 310 of the Congressional Budget Act to prohibit the 
consideration of concurrent resolutions providing adjournments for more 
than three calendar days during the month of July in excess of three 
days until the House has approved annual appropriation bills within the 
jurisdictions of all the subcommittees on Appropriations for the ensuing 
fiscal year, and until the House has completed action on all 
reconciliation legislation for the ensuing fiscal year required to be 
reported by the concurrent resolution on the budget for that year (see 
Sec. 1127, infra).


[[Page 41]]

by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States.



Sec. 85. Compensation of 
Members.

  Section 6. \1\ The Senators  and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their 
Services, to be ascertained


  The 27th amendment to the Constitution addresses laws varying the 
compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives (see 
Sec. 258, infra). The present rate of compensation of Representatives, 
the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico, and Delegates is $162,100 
per annum. The rate of compensation of the Speaker and the Vice 
President is $209,100 per annum (2 U.S.C. 31; 3 U.S.C. 104) with an 
additional $10,000 per annum to assist in defraying expenses (2 U.S.C. 
31b; 3 U.S.C. 111). The Majority and Minority Leaders of the House 
receive $180,100 per annum (2 U.S.C. 31). These rates of compensation 
are all (except for the expense allowances) subject to annual cost of 
living adjustments (2 U.S.C. 31(2)). The present rate of compensation of 
Senators is that fixed by section 1101 of Public Law 101-194, as 
adjusted pursuant to 2 U.S.C. 31(2).



Sec. 86. Salary and deductions.

  Under  the Federal Salary Act 
of 1967 (2 U.S.C. 351-362), the Citizens' Commission on Public Service 
and Compensation (formerly the Commission on Executive, Legislative and 
Judicial Salaries) is authorized and directed to conduct quadrennial 
reviews of the rates of pay of specified government officials, including 
Members of Congress, and to report to the President the results of each 
review and its recommendations for adjustments in such rates. The 
enactment of those recommendations is governed by the Federal Salary Act 
(see Sec. 1130(12), infra).


  The statute also provides for deductions from the pay of Members and 
Delegates who are absent from the sessions of the House for reasons 
other than illness of themselves and families, or who retire before the 
end of the Congress (2 U.S.C. 39; IV, 3011, footnote). The law as to 
deductions has been held to apply only to Members who have taken the 
oath (II, 1154). Members and Delegates are paid monthly on certificate 
of the Speaker (2 U.S.C. 34, 35, 37, 57a). The law also provides that 
the residence of a Member of Congress for purpose of imposing State 
income tax laws shall be the State from which elected and not the State, 
or subdivision thereof, in which the Member maintains an abode for the 
purpose of attending sessions of Congress (4 U.S.C. 113).


[[Page 42]]



Sec. 87. Questions as to 
compensation.

  Questions have arisen  frequently as to compensation of Members especially in 
cases of Members elected to fill vacancies (I, 500; II, 1155) and where 
there have been questions as to incompatible offices (I, 500) or claims 
to a seat (II, 1206). The Supreme Court has held that a Member chosen to 
fill a vacancy is entitled to salary only from the time that the 
compensation of his predecessor has ceased (Page v. United States, 127 
U.S. 67 (1888); see also 2 U.S.C. 37).





Sec. 88. Travel and Members' representational 
allowances.

  In the 92d  Congress, the provisions of H. Res. 457 of that Congress, 
authorizing the Committee on House Administration to adjust allowances 
of Members and committees without further action by the House, were 
enacted into permanent law (2 U.S.C. 57), but the 94th Congress enacted 
into permanent law H. Res. 1372 of that Congress, stripping the 
Committee of that authority and requiring House approval of the 
committee's recommendations, except in cases made necessary by price 
changes in materials and supplies, technological advances in office 
equipment, and cost of living increases (2 U.S.C. 57a). The Committee on 
House Administration retains authority under 2 U.S.C. 57 to 
independently adjust amounts under certain conditions outlined in 2 
U.S.C. 57a (Mar. 21, 1977, p. 8227; Apr. 21, 1983, p. 9339). The text of 
those statutes follow:


    ``Sec. 57. Adjustment of House of Representatives allowances by 


                    Committee on House Administration

  ``(a) In general.--Subject to the provision of law specified in 
subsection (b) of this section, the Committee on House Administration of 
the House of Representatives may, by order of the Committee, fix and 
adjust the amounts, terms, and conditions of, and other matters relating 
to, allowances of the House of Representatives within the following 
categories:

          ``(1) For Members of the House of Representatives, the 

        Members' Representational Allowance, including all aspects of 

        the Official Mail Allowance within the jurisdiction of the 

        Committee under section 59(e) of this title.

          ``(2) For committees, the Speaker, the Majority and Minority 

        Leaders, the Clerk, the Sergeant at Arms, and the Chief 

        Administrative Officer, allowances for official mail (including 

        all aspects of the Official Mail Allowance within the 

        jurisdiction of the Committee under section 59e of this title), 

        stationery, and telephone and telegraph and other 

        communications.

  ``(b) Provision specified.--The provision of law referred to in 
subsection (a) of this section is section 57a of this title.


  ``(c) Member of the House of Representatives defined.--As used in this 
section, the term `Member of the House of Representatives' means a 
Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the 
Congress.''

  ``Sec. 57a. Limitation on allowance authority of Committee on House 


                             Administration.

  ``(a) In general.--An order under the provision of law specified in 
subsection (c) of this section may fix or adjust the allowances of the 
House of Representatives only by reason of--

          ``(1) a change in the price of materials, services, or office 


[[Page 43]]

        space;

          ``(2) a technological change or other improvement in office 

        equipment; or

          ``(3) an increase under section 5303 of title 5 in rates of 

        pay under the General Schedule.

  ``(b) Resolution requirement.--In the case of reasons other than the 
reasons specified in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a) of 
this section, the fixing and adjustment of the allowances of the House 
of Representatives in the categories described in the provision of law 
specified in subsection (c) of this section may be carried out only by 
resolution of the House of Representatives.


  ``(c) Provision specified.--The provision of law referred to in 
subsections (a) and (b) of this section is section 57 of this title.''

  In the 104th Congress the Committee on House Administration 
promulgated an order abolishing separate allowances for Clerk Hire, 
Official Expenses, and Official Mail, in favor of a single ``Members' 
Representational Allowance'' (MRA), which was ultimately enacted into 
law (2 U.S.C. 57b). The MRA is provided for the employment of staff in 
the Member's Washington and district offices, official expenses incurred 
by the Member, and the postage expenses of first, third, and fourth 
class frankable mail.

  Until January 1, 1988, the maximum salary for staff members was the 
rate of basic pay authorized for Level V of the Executive Schedule (by 
order of the Committee on House Administration, Mar. 21, 1977, p. 8227). 
Under section 311 of the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1988, as 
contained in section 101(i) of Public Law 100-202 (2 U.S.C. 60a-2a), the 
maximum salary for staff members is set by pay order of the Speaker. A 
Member may not employ a relative on his MRA (5 U.S.C. 3110). The Code of 
Official Conduct also precludes certain hiring practices of Members (see 
Sec. 1095, inra.).

  Until the 103d Congress, a Member could employ a ``Lyndon Baines 
Johnson Congressional Intern'' for a maximum of two months at not to 
exceed $1,160 per month. Such internships were available for college 
students and secondary or postsecondary school teachers (H. Res. 420, 
93d Cong., Sept. 18, 1973, p. 30186). Any paid internship is now funded 
through the MRA.

  The statutes provide for continuation of the pay of clerical 
assistants to a Member upon his or her death or resignation, until a 
successor is elected to fill the vacancy, and such clerical assistants 
perform their duties under the direction of the Clerk of the House (2 
U.S.C. 92a-92d). Upon the explusion of a Member in the 96th Congress, 
the House by resolution extended those provisions to any termination of 
service by a Member during the term of office (H. Res. 804, Oct. 2, 
1980, p. 28978).


[[Page 44]]

  For current information on the MRA and the method of its accounting 
and disbursement, see current U.S. House of Representatives 
Congressional Handbook, Committee on House Administration.



Sec. 88a. Ban on Legislative Service 
Organizations.

  At its  organization the 104th Congress prohibited the 
establishment or continuation of any legislative service organization 
(as that term had been understood in the 103d Congress) and directed the 
Committee on House Administration to take such steps as were necessary 
to ensure an orderly termination and accounting for funds of any 
legislative service organization in existence on January 3, 1995 (sec. 
222, H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 477).




Sec. 89. Leadership staff allowances.

  Separate from the  MRA 
specified above, the leaders of the House (the Speaker, Majority Leader, 
Minority Leader, Majority Whip, and Minority Whip) are entitled to 
office staffing allowances consisting of certain statutory positions as 
well as lump-sum appropriations authorized by section 473 of the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (84 Stat. 1140). The portion of 
these allowances for leadership office personnel may be adjusted by the 
Clerk of the House in certain situations when the President effects a 
pay adjustment for certain classes of Federal employees under the 
Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-656; 84 Stat. 1946).





Sec. 89a. Speaker's ``pay orders.''

  Under  section 311(d) of 
the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1988 [2 U.S.C. 60a-2a], the 
Speaker may issue ``pay orders'' that adjust pay levels for officers and 
employees of the House to maintain certain relationships with comparable 
levels in the Senate and in the other branches of government. For the 
text of section 311(d), see Sec. 1130, infra.





Sec. 90. Privilege of Members from 
arrest.

  * * * They [the  Senators and Representatives] shall in all Cases, except 
Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest 
during their attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and 
in going to and returning from the same; * * *



[[Page 45]]

of privilege (II, 1645). Where a Member had been arrested and detained 
under mesne process in a civil suit during a recess of Congress, the 
House decided that he was entitled to discharge on the assembling of 
Congress, and liberated him and restored him to his seat by the hands of 
its own officer (III, 2676). Service of process is distinguished from 
arrest in civil cases and related historical data are collected in Long 
v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76 (1934), where the Supreme Court held that the 
clause was applicable only to arrests in civil suits, now largely 
obsolete but common at the time of the adoption of the United States 
Constitution. Rule VIII (formerly rule L, infra, was added in the 97th 
Congress to provide a standing procedure governing subpoenas to Members, 
officers, and employees directing their appearance as witnesses relating 
to the official functions of the House, or for the production of House 
documents.

<>   * * * and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they 
[the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other 
place.



Sec. 91. Assertions of privilege of 
Members by the House.

  The word ``felony''  in this provision has been interpreted not to 
refer to a delinquency in a matter of debt (III, 2676), and ``treason, 
felony, and breach of the peace'' have been construed to mean all 
indictable crimes (III, 2673). The Supreme Court has held that the 
privilege does not apply to arrest in any criminal case. Williamson v. 
United States, 207 U.S. 425 (1908). The courts have discussed and 
sustained the privilege of the Member in going to and returning from the 
session (III, 2674); and where a person assaulted a Member on his way to 
the House, although at a place distant therefrom, the House arrested him 
on warrant of the Speaker, arraigned him at the bar and committed him 
(II, 1626, 1628). Other assaults under these circumstances have been 
treated as breaches



[[Page 46]]

process. Browning v. Clerk, 789 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. den. 
479 U.S. 996 (1986). For a discussion of waivers of the Speech and 
Debate clause, see Sec. 301, infra.


Sec. 93. Scope of the privilege.

  This privilege as  to ``any 
speech or debate'' applies generally to ``things done in a session of 
the House by one of its Members in relation to the business before it.'' 
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881), cited at III, 2675. See also 
II, 1655 and Sec. Sec. 301-302, infra, for provisions in Jefferson's 
Manual on the privilege; and Deschler, ch. 7. The clause precludes 
judicial inquiry into the motivation, preparation, or content of a 
Member's speech on the floor and prevents such a speech from being made 
the basis for a criminal conspiracy charge against the Member. United 
States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966). The Supreme Court held in United 
States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 447 (1979), that under the Speech or 
Debate Clause, neither evidence of nor references to legislative acts of 
a Member of Congress may be introduced by the Government in a 
prosecution under the official bribery statute. But the Supreme Court 
has limited the scope of legislative activity which is protected under 
the clause by upholding grand jury inquiry into the possession and 
nonlegislative use of classified documents by a Member. Gravel v. United 
States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). The Court has also sustained the validity 
of an indictment of a Member for accepting an illegal bribe to perform 
legislative acts where the prosecution established a prima facie case 
without relying on the Member's constitutionally-protected legislative 
speech. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972). Nor does the 
clause protect transmittal of allegedly defamatory material issued in 
press releases and newsletters by a Senator, as neither was essential to 
the deliberative process of the Senate. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 
111 (1979). A complaint against an officer of the House relating to the 
dismissal of an official reporter of debates has been held 
nonjusticiable on the basis that her duties were directly related to the 
due functioning of the legislative


  Legislative employees acting under orders of the House are not 
necessarily protected under the clause from judicial inquiry into the 
constitutionality of their actions. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 165 
(1880); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); Powell v. McCormack, 
395 U.S. 486 (1969). But see Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 
(1972), where the Supreme Court held that the aide of a Senator was 
protected under the clause when performing legislative acts which would 
have been protected under the clause if performed by the Senator 
himself. There is no distinction between the Members of a Senate 
subcommittee and its chief counsel insofar as complete immunity under 
the Speech and Debate Clause is provided for the issuance of a subpoena 
pursuant to legitimate legislative inquiry. Eastland v. U.S. 
Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975). See also Doe v. McMillan, 412 
U.S. 306 (1973) (relating to the dissemination of a congressional 
report) for the immunity under this clause of Members of the House and 
their staffs, and for the common-law immunity of the Public Printer and 
Superintendent of Documents.

  For Federal court decisions on the applicability of the clause to 
unofficial circulation of reprints from the Congressional Record, see 
McGovern v. Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343 (1960); Long v. Ansell, 69 F.2d 386 
(1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 76 (1934); Methodist Federation for Social 
Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp. 729 (1956). For inquiry into a Member's 
use of the franking privilege, see Hoellen v. Annunzio, 468 F.2d 522 
(1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973); Schiaffo v. Helstoski, 350 F. 
Supp. 1076 (1972), rev'd 492 F.2d 413 (1974). For inquiry into the 
printing of committee reports, see Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); 
Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175 (1970).


[[Page 47]]



Sec. 94. Action by the House.

  For assaulting a  Member for 
words spoken in debate, Samuel Houston, not a Member, was arrested, 
tried, and censured by the House (II, 1616-1619). Where Members have 
assaulted other Members for words spoken in debate (II, 1656), or 
proceeded by duel (II, 1644), or demanded explanation in a hostile 
manner (II, 1644), the House has considered the cases as of privilege. A 
communication addressed to the House by an official in an Executive 
Department calling in question words uttered by a Member in debate was 
criticized as a breach of privilege and withdrawn (III, 2684). An 
explanation having been demanded of a Member by a person not a Member 
for a question asked of the latter when a witness before the House, the 
matter was considered but not pressed as a breach of privilege (III, 
2681). A letter from a person supposed to have been assailed by a Member 
in debate, asking properly and without menace if the speech was 
correctly reported, was held to involve no question of privilege (III, 
2682). Unless it be clear that a Member has been questioned for words 
spoken in debate, the House declines to act (II, 1620; III, 2680).


  For assaulting a Member, Charles C. Glover was arrested, arraigned at 
the bar of the House, and censured by the Speaker by direction of the 
House, although the provocation of the assault was words spoken in 
debate in the previous Congress (VI, 333).




Sec. 95. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881); 
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); United States v. Johnson, 383 
U.S. 169 (1966); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 
(1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); United States v. 
Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 
(1979).





Sec. 96. Restriction on appointment of 
Members to office.

  \2\ No Senator or  Representative shall, during the Time for which he 
was elected, be appointed to any Civil Office under the Authority of the 
United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof 
shall have been encreased during such time; *  *  *.



<>   
*  *  * and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall 
be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.

  In a few cases questions have arisen under this paragraph (I, 506, 
footnote; and see 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 36 (1969); see also Deschler, ch. 
7).

  The meaning of the word ``office'' as used in this paragraph has been 
discussed (I, 185, 417, 478, 493; II, 993; VI, 60, 64), as has also the 
general subject of incompatible offices (I, 563).


[[Page 48]]

the Board of Managers of the Soldiers' Home and become local manager of 
one of the Homes, is a matter for the decision of Congress itself (VI, 
63). The House has also distinguished between the performance of paid 
services for the Executive (I, 495), like temporary service as assistant 
United States attorney (II, 993), and the acceptance of an incompatible 
office. The House has declined to hold that a contractor under the 
Government is constitutionally disqualified to serve as a Member (I, 
496). But the House, or its committees, have found disqualified a Member 
who was appointed a militia officer in the District of Columbia (I, 486) 
and in various States (VI, 60), and Members who have accepted 
commissions in the Army (I, 491, 492, 494). But the Judiciary Committee 
has expressed the opinion that persons on the retired list of the Army 
do not hold office under the United States in the constitutional sense 
(I, 494). A Member-elect has continued to act as governor of a State 
after the assembling of the Congress to which he was elected (I, 503), 
but the duties of a Member of the House and the Governor of a State are 
absolutely inconsistent and may not be simultaneously discharged by the 
same Member (VI, 65).-


Sec. 98. As to what are incompatible 
offices.

  The Judiciary Committee  has concluded that members of commissions created by law to 
investigate and report, but having no legislative, executive, or 
judicial powers, and visitors to academies, regents, directors, and 
trustees of public institutions, appointed under the law by the Speaker, 
are not officers within the meaning of the Constitution (I, 493). 
Membership on joint committees created by statute is not an office in 
the contemplation of the constitutional provision prohibiting Members of 
Congress from holding simultaneously other offices under the United 
States (VII, 2164). A Member of either House is eligible to appointment 
to any office not forbidden him by law, the duties of which are not 
incompatible with those of a Member (VI, 63) and the question as to 
whether a Member may be appointed to




Sec. 99. Appointment of Memberselect to 
offices under the United States.

  The House decided  that the status of a Member-elect was 
not affected by the constitutional requirement (I, 499), the theory 
being advanced that the status of the Member-elect is distinguished from 
the status of the Member who has qualified (I, 184). A Member-elect, who 
continued in an office after his election but resigned before taking his 
seat, was held entitled to the seat (I, 497, 498). However, when a 
Member-elect held an incompatible office after the meeting of Congress 
and his taking of the oath, he was held to have disqualified himself (I, 
492). In other words, the Member-elect may defer until the meeting of 
Congress and his taking of the oath, his choice between the seat and an 
incompatible office (I, 492). As early as 1874 the Attorney General 
opined that a Member-elect is not officially a Member of the House, and 
thus may hold any office until sworn (14 Op. Att'y Gen. 408 (1874)).




Sec. 100. Relation of contestants to 
incompatible offices.

  The House has  manifestly leaned to the idea that a contestant 
holding an incompatible office need not make his election until the 
House has declared him entitled to the seat (I, 505). Although a 
contestant had accepted and held a State office in violation of the 
State constitution, if he were really elected a Congressman, the House 
did not treat his contest as abated (II, 1003). Where a Member had been 
appointed to an incompatible office a contestant not found to be elected 
was not admitted to fill the vacancy (I, 807).



[[Page 49]]

case the Member was held to have forfeited his right to a seat (I, 490). 
The House has seated a person bearing regular credentials on 
ascertaining that his predecessor in the same Congress had accepted a 
military office (I, 572). But usually the House by resolution formally 
declares the seat vacant (I, 488, 492). A Member-elect may defer until 
the meeting of Congress and his taking of the oath of office his choice 
between the seat and an incompatible office (I, 492). But when he 
retains the incompatible office and does not qualify, a vacancy has been 
held to exist (I, 500). A resolution excluding a Member who has accepted 
an incompatible office may be agreed to by a majority vote (I, 490). A 
Member charged with acceptance of an incompatible office was heard in 
his own behalf during the debate (I, 486).


Sec. 101. Procedure of the House when 
incompatible offices are accepted.

  Where a Member  has accepted an incompatible 
office, the House has assumed or declared the seat vacant (I, 501, 502; 
VI, 65). In the cases of Baker and Yell, the Elections Committee 
concluded that the acceptance of a commission as an officer of 
volunteers in the national army vacated the seat of a Member (I, 488), 
and in another similar



  Where it was held in Federal court that a Member of Congress may not 
hold a commission in the Armed Forces Reserve under this clause, the 
U.S. Supreme Court reversed on other grounds, the plaintiff's lack of 
standing to maintain the suit. Reservists Committee to Stop the War v. 
Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833 (1971), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1075 (1972), rev'd on 
other grounds, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).




Sec. 102. Bills raising revenue to 
originate in the House.

  Section 7. \1\ All Bills  for raising Revenue shall originate in the 
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with 
Amendments as on other Bills.



[[Page 50]]

1994, p. 16593; July 21, 1994, p. 17280; July 21, 1994, p. 17281; Aug. 
12, 1994, pp. 7642, 7643; Oct. 7, 1994, p. 29136, 29137; Mar. 21, 1996, 
p. 5950; Apr. 16, 1996, pp. 7642, 7643; Sept. 27, 1996, p. 25542; Sept. 
28, 1996, p. 25931; Mar. 5, 1998, p. 2618; Oct. 15, 1998, p. 26483; July 
15, 1999, p. 16317; Nov. 18, 1999, p. 30732; Oct. 24, 2000, p. 24149; 
Sept. 20, 2001, p. ----), or declined to proceed further with it (II, 
1485). Among the measures the House has returned to the Senate: a 
Senate-passed bill providing for the sale of Conrail and containing 
provisions relating to the tax treatment of the sale, notwithstanding 
inclusion in that bill of a disclaimer section requiring all revenue 
provisions therein to be contained in separate legislation originating 
in the House (Sept. 25, 1986, p. 26202); a Senate-passed bill 
prohibiting the importation of commodities subject to tariff (July 30, 
1987, p. 21582); a Senate-passed bill banning all imports from Iran, a 
tariff measure as affecting revenue from dutiable imports (June 16, 
1988, p. 14780); a Senate-passed bill dealing with the tax treatment of 
income derived from the exercise of Indian treaty fishing rights (June 
21, 1988, p. 15425); a Senate-passed bill creating a tax-exempt 
government corporation (June 15, 1989, p. 12167); a Senate-passed bill 
addressing the tax treatment of police-corps scholarships and the 
regulation of firearms under the Internal Revenue Code (Oct. 22, 1991, 
p. 27087); a Senate-passed bill including certain import sanctions in an 
export administration statute (Oct. 31, 1991, p. 29284); a Senate-passed 
bill requiring the President to impose sanctions including import 
restrictions against countries that fail to eliminate largescale 
driftnet fishing (Feb. 25, 1992, p. 3377); a Senate amendment to a 
general appropriation bill prohibiting funds for the Internal Revenue 
Service to enforce a requirement to use undyed diesel fuel for use in 
recreational boats (July 14, 1994, p. 16593); a Senate-passed bill 
proposing to regulate toxic substances by prohibiting the import of 
products containing more than specified level of lead (July 21, 1994, p. 
17280); a Senate amendment to a general appropriation bill proposing a 
user fee raising revenue to finance broader activities of the agency 
imposing the levy, thereby raising general revenue (Aug. 12, 1994, p. 
21656); a Senate-passed bill proposing to repeal a fee on electricity 
generated by nuclear energy that otherwise would raise revenue (Mar. 5, 
1998, p. 2618); a Senate-passed bill proposing new import restrictions 
on products containing any substance derived from rhinoceroses or tigers 
(Oct. 15, 1998, p. 26483); Senate-passed bills proposing an amendment to 
the criminal code that would make it unlawful to import certain assault 
weapons (Oct. 22, 1991, p. 27087) or to import large capacity ammunition 
feeding devices (July 15, 1999, p. 16317); Senate-passed bills 
prescribing the tax treatment of certain benefits to members of the 
Armed Forces (Nov. 18, 1999, p. 30732) or of public-sector retirement 
plans (Nov. 18, 1999, p. 30734); a Senate-passed bill proposing to 
create a new basis for applying import restrictions on bear viscera or 
products derived therefrom (Oct. 24, 2000, p. 24149); a Senate amendment 
proposing to enact by reference a Senate bill providing for a ban on 
(dutiable) imports of diamonds from certain

[[Page 51]]

countries (Sept. 20, 2001, p. ----). The House laid on the table a 
resolution asserting that a conference report (on which the House was 
acting first) accompanying a House bill originated provisions in 
derogation of the constitutional prerogative of the House and resolving 
that such bill be recommitted to conference (July 27, 2000, p. 16565).
  This provision has been the subject of much discussion (II, 1488, 
1494). In the earlier days the practice was not always correct (II, 
1484); but in later years the House has insisted on its prerogative and 
the Senate has often shown reluctance to infringe thereon (II, 1482, 
1483, 1493). In several instances, however, the subject has been matter 
of contention, conference (II, 1487, 1488), and final disagreement (II, 
1485, 1487, 1488). Sometimes, however, when the House has questioned an 
invasion of prerogative, the Senate has receded (II, 1486, 1493). The 
disagreements have been especially vigorous over the right of the Senate 
to concur with amendments (II, 1489), and while the Senate has 
acquiesced in the sole right of the House to originate revenue bills, it 
has at the same time held to a broad power of amendment (II, 1497-1499). 
The House has frequently challenged the Senate on this point (II, 1481, 
1491, 1496; Sept. 14, 1965, p. 23632). When the House has perceived an 
invasion of its prerogative, it has ordered the bill or Senate amendment 
to be returned to the Senate (II, 1480-1499; VI, 315, 317; Mar. 30, 
1937, p. 2930; July 2, 1960, p. 15818; Oct. 10, 1962, p. 23014; May 20, 
1965, p. 11149; June 20, 1968, p. 22127; Nov. 8, 1979, p. 31518; May 17, 
1983, p. 12486; Oct. 1, 1985, p. 25418; Sept. 25, 1986, p. 26202; July 
30, 1987, p. 21582; June 16, 1988, p. 14780; June 21, 1988, p. 15425; 
Sept. 23, 1988, p. 25094; Sept. 28, 1988, p. 26415; Oct. 21, 1988, pp. 
33110-11; June 15, 1989, p. 12167; Nov. 9, 1989, p. 28271; Oct. 22, 
1991, p. 27087; Oct. 31, 1991, p. 29284; Feb. 25, 1992, p. 3377; July 
14,

  A bill raising revenue incidentally was held not to infringe upon the 
constitutional prerogative of the House to originate revenue legislation 
(VI, 315). Discussion of differentiation between bills for the purpose 
of raising revenue and bills which incidentally raise revenue (VI, 315). 
A question relating to the invasion of the constitutional prerogatives 
of the House by a Senate amendment may be raised at any time when the 
House is in possession of the papers, but not otherwise; thus, the 
question has been presented pending the motion to call up a conference 
report on the bill (June 20, 1968, Deschler, ch. 13, Sec. 14.2; Aug. 19, 
1982, p. 22127), but has been held nonprivileged with respect to a bill 
already presented to the President (Apr. 6, 1995, p. 10700). On January 
16, 1924, p. 1027, the Senate decided that a bill proposing a gasoline 
tax in the District of Columbia should not originate in the Senate (VI, 
316).

  Clause 5(a) of rule XXI prohibits consideration of any amendment, 
including any Senate amendment, proposing a tax or tariff measure during 
consideration of a bill or joint resolution reported by a committee not 
having that jurisdiction (Sec. 1066, infra).

  For a discussion of the prerogatives of the House under this clause, 
and discussion of the prerogatives of the House to originate 
appropriation bills, see Deschler, ch. 13. For a discussion of the 
prerogatives of the House with respect to treaties affecting revenue, 
see Sec. 597, infra. For examples of Senate messages requesting the 
return of Senate measures that intruded on the Constitutional 
prerogative of the House to originate revenue measures, see Sec. 565, 
infra.




Sec. 103. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); Twin 
City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 
U.S. 107 (1911); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906); Rainey v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 
U.S. 385 (1990).



[[Page 52]]

their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such 
Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, 
it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by 
which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds 
of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of 
both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the 
Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal 
of each House respectively. * * *.



Sec. 104. Approval and disapproval of bills by 
the President.

  \2\ Every Bill  which shall have passed the House of Representatives 
and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the 
President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if 
not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it 
shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on



[[Page 53]]

of approval a memorandum of his construction of the bill (IV, 3492). But 
where the President has accompanied his message announcing the approval 
with a statement of his reasons there has been no question in the House 
(IV, 3491). The statutes require that bills signed by the President 
shall be received by the Archivist of the United States and deposited in 
his office (1 U.S.C. 106a). Formerly these bills were received by the 
Secretary of State (IV, 3485) and deposited in his office (IV, 3429).


Sec. 105. The act of approval.

  Under the usual  practice, 
bills are considered to have been presented to the President at the time 
they are delivered to the White House. In 1959, bills delivered to the 
White House while the President was abroad were held for presentation to 
the President upon his return to the United States by the White House. 
The United States Court of Claims held, in Eber Bros. Wine and Liquor 
Corp. v. United States, 337 F.2d 624 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 950 
(1965), that where the President had determined, with the informal 
acquiescence of leaders of Congress, that bills from the Congress were 
to be received at the White House only for presentation to him upon his 
return to the United States and the bill delivered to the White House 
was so stamped, the Presidential veto of the bill more than 10 days 
after delivery to the White House but less than 10 days after his return 
to the country was timely. The second session of the 89th Congress 
adjourned sine die while President Johnson was on an Asian tour and 
receipts for bills delivered to the White House during that time were 
marked in like manner. The approval of a bill by the President of the 
United States is valid only with his signature (IV, 3490). Before the 
adoption of the 20th amendment to the Constitution, at the close of a 
Congress, when the two Houses prolonged their sessions into the forenoon 
of March 4, the approvals were dated on the prior legislative day, as 
the legislative portion of March 4 belonged to the term of the new 
Congress. In one instance, however, bills signed on the forenoon of 
March 4 were dated as of that day with the hour and minute of approval 
given with the date (IV, 3489). The 20th amendment to the Constitution 
changed the date of meeting of the Congress to January 3d. The act of 
President Tyler in filing with a bill an exposition of his reasons for 
signing it was examined and severely criticized by a committee of the 
House (IV, 3492); and in 1842 a committee of the House discussed the act 
of President Jackson in writing above his signature




Sec. 106. Notice of approval sent by 
message.

  Notice of the  signature of a bill by the President is sent by message to 
the House in which it originated (VII, 1089) and that House informs the 
other (IV, 3429). But this notice is not necessary to the validity of 
the act (IV, 3495). Sometimes, at the close of a Congress the President 
informs the House of such bills as he has approved and of such as he has 
allowed to fail (IV, 3499-3502). In one instance he communicated his 
omission to sign a bill through the committee appointed to notify him 
that Congress was about to adjourn (IV, 3504). A bill that had not 
actually passed having been signed by the President, he disregarded it 
and a new bill was passed (IV, 3498). Messages of the President giving 
notice of bills approved are entered in the Journal and published in the 
Congressional Record (V, 6593).




Sec. 107. Disapproval (or veto) of 
bills.

  A message withholding  approval of a bill, called a veto message, is sent to the House 
in which the bill originated; but it has been held that such a message 
may not be returned to the President on his request after it has been 
laid before the Senate (IV, 3521). Instance where a veto message which 
had not been laid before the House was returned to the President on his 
request (Aug. 1, 1946, p. 10651). A vetoed bill received in the House by 
way of the Senate is considered as if received directly from the 
President and supersedes the regular order of business (IV, 3537; VII, 
1109). A veto message may not be read in the absence of a quorum, even 
though the House be about to adjourn sine die (IV, 3522; VII, 1094); but 
the message may be read and acted on at the next session of the same 
Congress (IV, 3522). When the President has been prevented by 
adjournment from returning a bill with his objections he has sometimes 
at the next session communicated his reasons for not approving (V, 6618-
6620).


  Although the ordinary form of a return veto is a message under seal 
returning the enrollment with a statement of the President's objections, 
an enrolled House bill returned to the Clerk during the August recess 
with a ``memorandum of disapproval'' setting forth the objections of the 
President was considered as a return veto (Sept. 11, 1991, p. 22643).


[[Page 54]]

proceed to consider'' means that the House shall immediately proceed to 
consider it under the Rules of the House, such that the ordinary motions 
under the Rules of the House (e.g., to refer or to postpone to a day 
certain) are in order (IV, 3542-3550; VII, 1100, 1105, 1113; Speaker 
Wright, Aug. 3, 1988, p. 20280) and (for the stated examples) debatable 
under the hour rule (VIII, 2740). Although under clause 4 of rule XVI, 
and under the precedents the motion for the previous question takes 
precedence over motions to postpone or to refer when a question is under 
debate, where the Speaker has laid before the House a veto message from 
the President but has not yet stated the question to be on overriding 
the veto, that question is not ``under debate'' and the motion for the 
previous question does not take precedence (Speaker Wright, Aug. 3, 
1988; Procedure, ch. 24, Sec. 15.8). A resolution asserting that to 
recognize for a motion to refer a veto message before stating the 
question on overriding the veto would interfere with the constitutional 
prerogative of the House to proceed to that question, and directing the 
Speaker to state the question on overriding the veto as pending before 
recognizing for a motion to refer, did not give rise to a question of 
the privileges of the House (Speaker Wright, Aug. 3, 1988, p. 20281). A 
motion to refer a vetoed bill, either with or without the message, has 
been held allowable within the constitutional mandate that the House 
``shall proceed to reconsider'' (IV, 3550; VII, 1104, 1105, 1108, 1114), 
and in the 101st Congress, a veto pending as unfinished business was 
referred with instructions to consider and report promptly (Jan. 24, 
1990, p. 421). But while the ordinary motion to refer may be applied to 
a vetoed bill, it is not in order to move to recommit it pending the 
demand for the previous question or after it is ordered (IV, 3551; VII, 
1102). When a veto message is before the House for consideration de novo 
or as unfinished business, a motion to refer the message to committee 
takes precedence over the question of passing the bill, the objections 
of the President to the contrary notwithstanding (Procedure, ch. 24, 
Sec. 15.8; Oct. 25, 1983, p. 29188), but the motion to refer may be laid 
on the table (Oct. 25, 1983, p. 29188). A vetoed bill having been 
rejected by the House, the message was referred (IV, 3552; VII, 1103). 
Committees to which vetoed bills have been referred have sometimes 
neglected to report (IV, 3523, 3550, footnotes; VII, 1108, 1114).


Sec. 108. Consideration of a vetoed bill in 
the House.

  It is possible,  although not invariable, that a bill returned with the 
objections of the President shall be voted on at once (IV, 3534-3536) 
and when laid before the House the question on the passage is considered 
as pending and no motion from the floor is required (VII, 1097-1099), 
but it has been held that the constitutional mandate that ``the House 
shall



[[Page 55]]

  A vetoed bill may be laid on the table (IV, 3549; VII, 1105), but it 
is still highly privileged and a motion to take it from the table is in 
order at any time (IV, 3550; V, 5439). Also a motion to discharge a 
committee from the consideration of such a bill is privileged (IV, 3532; 
Aug. 4, 1988, p. 20365; Sept. 19, 1996, p. 23815) and (in the modern 
practice) is debatable (Mar. 7, 1990, p. 3620) but is subject to the 
motion to lay on the table (Sept. 7, 1965, p. 22958; Aug. 4, 1988, p. 
20365). When the motion to discharge is agreed to, the veto message is 
pending as unfinished business (Mar. 7, 1990, p. 3621). While a vetoed 
bill is always privileged, the same is not true of a bill reported in 
lieu of it (IV, 3531; VII, 1103).



Sec. 109. Action on a vetoed bill.

  If two-thirds of  the 
House to which a bill is returned with the President's objections agree 
to pass it, and then two-thirds of the other House also agree, it 
becomes a law (IV, 3520). The yeas and nays are required to pass a bill 
over the President's veto (art. I, sec. 7; IV, 2726, 3520; VII, 1110). 
The two-thirds vote required to pass the bill is two-thirds of the 
Members present and voting and not two-thirds of the total membership of 
the House (IV, 3537, 3538; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 
(1919)). Only Members voting should be considered in determining whether 
two-thirds voted in the affirmative (VII, 1111). The motion to 
reconsider may not be applied to the vote on reconsideration of a bill 
returned with the objections of the President (V, 5644; VIII, 2778).


  It is the practice for one House to inform the other by message of its 
decision that a bill returned with the objections of the President shall 
not pass (IV, 3539-3541). A bill passed notwithstanding the objections 
of the President is sent by the presiding officer of the House which 
last acts on it to the Archivist, who receives it and deposits it in his 
office (1 U.S.C. 106a). Formerly these bills were sent to the Secretary 
of State (IV, 3524) and deposited in his office (IV, 3485).



Sec. 110. Errors in bills sent to the 
President.

  A bill incorrectly  enrolled has been recalled from the President, who erased 
his signature (IV, 3506). Bills sent to the President but not yet signed 
by him are sometimes recalled by concurrent resolution of the two Houses 
(IV, 3507-3509; VII, 1091; Sept. 4, 1962, p. 18405; May 6, 1974, p. 
13076), and amended; but this proceeding is regarded as irregular (IV, 
3510-3518). When the two Houses of Congress request the President by 
concurrent resolution to return an enrolled bill delivered to him and 
the President honors the request, the ten-day period under this clause 
runs anew from the time the bill is re-enrolled and is again presented 
to the President. Thus, in the 93d Congress the President returned on 
May 7, 1974 a bill pursuant to the request of Congress (H. Con. Res. 
485, May 6, 1974, p. 13076). The bill was again enrolled, presented to 
the President on May 7, and marked ``received May 7'' at the White 
House. An error in an enrolled bill that has gone to the President may 
also be corrected by a joint resolution (IV, 3519; VII, 1092). In the 
99th Congress, two enrollments of a continuing appropriation bill for FY 
1987 were presented to and signed by the President, the second 
correcting an omission in the first (see P.L. 99-500 and 99-591). In 
Clinton v.  City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), the Supreme Court 
held that the cancellation procedures of the Line Item Veto Act violated 
the presentment clause of article I, section 7 of the Constitution. For 
a discussion of the operation of the Act during the period of its 
effectiveness, see Sec. 1130, infra.



[[Page 56]]

Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423 (1899); Missouri Pacific Railway Co. 
v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919); Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482 
(1932); Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938); Clinton v. City of 
New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).



Sec. 110a. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Matthews v. Zane, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 164 
(1822); Gardner v. Collector, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 499 (1868); Lapeyre v. 
United States, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 191 (1873); La Abra Silver Mining





Sec. 111. Bills which become laws without the 
President's approval.

  * * * If any  Bill shall not be returned by the President 
within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to 
him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, 
unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which 
Case it shall not be a Law.


  A bill signed by the President within 10 days (Sunday excepted) after 
it has been presented to him becomes a law even though such signing 
takes place when Congress is not in session, whether during the period 
of an adjournment to a day certain or after the final adjournment of a 
session. Presidents currently sign bills after sine die adjournment but 
within 10 days after their receipt. President Truman signed several 
bills passed in the 81st Congress after the convening of the 82d 
Congress but within 10 days (P.L. 910-921; 64 Stat. 1221-1257); and 
President Reagan approved bills passed in the 97th Congress which were 
presented after the convening of the 98th Congress. It was formerly 
contended that the President might not approve bills during a recess 
(IV, 3493, 3494), and in one instance, in 1864, when the President 
signed a bill after final adjournment of Congress but within 10 days 
grave doubts were raised and an adverse report was made by a House 
committee (IV, 3497). Later opinions of the Attorney General have been 
to the effect that the President has the power to approve bills within 
10 days after they have been presented to him during the period of an 
adjournment to a day certain (IV, 3496) and after an adjournment sine 
die (VII, 1088). The Supreme Court has held valid as laws bills signed 
by the President within 10 days during a recess for a specified time (La 
Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 451 (1899); IV, 3495) 
and also those signed after an adjournment sine die (Edwards v. United 
States, 286 U.S. 482 (1932)).


[[Page 57]]

ing three days while the other branch of the Congress remained in 
session, did not prevent a return of the vetoed bill to the House of 
origin (Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938)).


Sec. 112. The pocket veto.

  A bill which  is passed by both 
Houses of Congress during the first regular session of a Congress and 
presented to the President less than 10 days (Sundays excepted) before 
the sine die adjournment of that session, but is neither signed by the 
President, nor returned by him to the House in which it originated, does 
not become a law (``The Pocket Veto Case,'' 279 U.S. 655 (1929); VII, 
1115). President Truman during an adjournment to a day certain pocket 
vetoed several bills passed by the 81st Congress and also, after the 
convening of the 82d Congress, pocket vetoed one bill passed in the 81st 
Congress. The Supreme Court has held that the adjournment of the House 
of origin for not exceed




Sec. 113. Effect of adjournment to a day 
certain.

  Doubt has existed  as to whether a bill which remains with the President 10 days 
without his signature, Congress meanwhile before the tenth day having 
adjourned to a day certain, becomes a law (IV, 3483, 3496; VII, 1115); 
an opinion of the Attorney General in 1943 stated that under such 
circumstances a bill not signed by the President did not become a law 
(40 Op. Att'y Gen. 274 (1943)). However, more recently, where a Member 
of the Senate challenged in Federal court the effectiveness of such a 
pocket veto, a United States Court of Appeals held that a Senate bill 
could not be pocket-vetoed by the President during an ``intrasession'' 
adjournment of Congress to a day certain for more than three days, where 
the Secretary of the Senate had been authorized to receive Presidential 
messages during such adjournment. Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. 
Cir., 1974). See also Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1976). 
Following a consent decree in this case, it was announced that President 
Ford would utilize a ``return'' veto, subject to override, in 
intersession and intrasession adjournments where authority exists for 
the appropriate House to receive such messages notwithstanding the 
adjournment.


  In the 101st Congress, when President Bush returned an enrolled bill 
during the intersession adjournment, not by way of message under seal 
but with a ``memorandum of disapproval'' setting forth his objections, 
the House treated it as a return veto subject to override under article 
I, section 7 (Jan. 23, 1990, p. 4). Similarly, in the 102d Congress, an 
enrolled House bill returned to the Clerk during the August recess, not 
by way of message under seal but with a ``memorandum of disapproval'' 
setting forth the objections of the President, was considered as a 
return veto (Sept. 11, 1991, p. 22643). Also in the 102d Congress, 
President Bush purported on December 20, 1991, to pocket veto a bill (S. 
1176) that was presented to him on December 9, 1991, notwithstanding 
that the Congress was in an intrasession adjournment (from Nov. 27, 
1991, until 11:55 a.m., Jan. 3, 1992) rather than an adjournment sine 
die (see Jan. 23, 1992 [Daily Digest]); and during debate on a 
subsequent bill (S. 2184) purporting to repeal the provisions of S. 1176 
and to enact instead provisions acceding to the objections of the 
President, the Speaker inserted remarks on the pocket veto in light of 
modern congressional practice concerning the receipt of messages and 
communications during recesses and adjournments (Mar. 3, 1992, p. 4081).


[[Page 58]]

within the meaning of article I, section 7 of the Constitution and 
proceeded to reconsider and to pass the bill over the President's veto, 
after postponing consideration to a subsequent day (motion to postpone, 
Nov. 18, 1974, p. 36246; veto override, Nov. 20, 1974, p. 36621). 
Subsequently, on November 21, 1974, the Senate also voted to override 
the veto (p. 36882) and pursuant to 1 U.S.C. 106a the Enrolling Clerk of 
the Senate forwarded the bill to the Archives for publication as a 
public law. The Administrator of General Services at the Archives (now 
Archivist), upon instructions from the Department of Justice, declined 
to promulgate the bill as public law on the day received. The question 
as to the efficacy of the congressional action in passing the bill over 
the President's veto was mooted when the House and Senate passed on 
November 26, 1974 (pp. 37406, 37603), an identical bill which was signed 
into law on December 7, 1974 (P.L. 93-516). On similar occasions, when 
the President has asserted a ``pocket veto,'' the House has regarded the 
President's actual return of the bill without his signature as a veto 
within the meaning of article I, section 7 of the Constitution and 
proceeded to reconsider the bill over the President's objections (Jan. 
23, 1990, p. 3; Sept. 6, 2000, p. 17156; Nov. 13, 2000, p. 26022).
  In the 93d Congress, the President returned a House bill without his 
signature to the Clerk of the House, who had been authorized to receive 
messages from the President during an adjournment to a day certain, and 
the President asserted in his veto message that he had ``pocket vetoed'' 
the bill during the adjournment of the House to a day certain. The House 
regarded the President's return of the bill without his signature as a 
veto

  As part of the concurrent resolution providing for the sine die 
adjournments of the first sessions of the 101st Congress and 105th 
Congress, the Congress reaffirmed its position that an intersession 
adjournment did not prevent the return of a bill where the Clerk and the 
Secretary of the Senate were authorized to receive messages during the 
adjournment (H. Con. Res. 239, Nov. 21, 1989, p. 31156; S. Con. Res. 68, 
Nov. 13, 1997, p. 26538). For the views of the Speaker, the Minority 
Leader, and the Attorney General concerning pocket veto authority during 
an intrasession adjournment, see correspondence inserted in the 
Congressional Record (Jan. 23, 1990, p. 3; Sept. 19, 2000, p. 18594; 
Nov. 13, 2000, p. 26022); and for discussions of the constitutionality 
of intersession or intrasession pocket vetoes see Kennedy, ``Congress, 
The President, and The Pocket Veto,'' 63 Va. L. Rev. 355 (1977), and 
Hearing, Subcommittee on Legislative Process, Committee on Rules, on 
H.R. 849, 101st Congress.




Sec. 114. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 
175 U.S. 423 (1899); Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 U.S. 506 (1901); the 
Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929); Edwards v. United States, 286 
U.S. 482 (1932); Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938); Burke v. 
Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987) (vacating and remanding as moot the decision 
sub nom. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).



[[Page 59]]

dent of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall 
be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by 
two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the 
Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.



Sec. 115. As to presentation of orders and 
resolutions for approval.

  \3\ Every Order,  Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence 
of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a 
question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the Presi


  It has been settled conclusively that a joint resolution proposing an 
amendment to the Constitution should not be presented to the President 
for his approval (V, 7040; Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 
378 (1798)). Such joint resolutions, after passage by both Houses, are 
presented to the Archivist (1 U.S.C. 106b). Although the requirement of 
the Constitution seems specific, the practice of Congress has been to 
present to the President for approval only such concurrent resolutions 
as are legislative in effect (IV, 3483, 3484) which is not within the 
scope of the modern form of concurrent resolutions. See Sec. 192, infra, 
for a discussion of Presidential approval of a joint resolution 
extending the period for State ratification of a constitutional 
amendment already submitted to the States. For discussion of 
``Congressional Disapproval'' provisions contained in public laws, see 
Sec. 1130, infra.




Sec. 116. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United 
States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United 
States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Process 
Gas Consumer's Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America 463 U.S. 1216 
(1983).




Sec. 117. The revenue power.

  Section 8. The Congress  shall 
have Power \1\ To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to 
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of 
the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform 
throughout the United States;
<>   \2\ To borrow Money on the 
credit of the United States:



[[Page 60]]



Sec. 119. Power over commerce.

  \3\ To regulate  Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes;




Sec. 120. Naturalization and bankruptcy.

  \4\ To establish  an 
uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of 
Bankruptcies throughout the United States;
<>   \5\ To coin Money, 
regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of 
Weights and Measures;




Sec. 122. Counterfeiting.

  \6\ To provide  for the Punishment 
of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;-
-
<>   \7\ To establish Post 
Offices and Post Roads;





Sec. 124. Patents and copyrights.

  \8\ To promote  the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries;
<>   \9\ To constitute Tribunals 
inferior to the supreme Court;
<>   \10\ 
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, 
and Offenses against the Law of Nations;
<>   \11\ 
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules 
concerning Captures on Land and Water;



[[Page 61]]

a report is submitted or is required to be submitted, (1) declares war 
or authorizes use of the Armed Forces; (2) extends by law the 60-day 
period; or (3) is physically unable to meet as result of armed attack. 
The Act also provided that Congress could adopt a concurrent resolution 
requiring the removal of Armed Forces engaged in foreign hostilities, a 
provision which should be read in light of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 
(1983). Sections 6 and 7 of the Act provide congressional procedures for 
joint resolutions, bills, and concurrent resolutions introduced pursuant 
to the provisions of the Act (see Sec. 1130, infra). For further 
discussion of that Act, and war powers generally, see Deschler, ch. 13.



Sec. 128. War powers of Congress and the 
President.

  In the 93d  Congress, the Congress passed over the President's veto 
Public Law 93-148, relating to the power of Congress to declare war 
under this clause and the power of the President as Commander in Chief 
under article II, section 2, clause 1 (Sec. 178, infra). The law 
requires that the President report to Congress on the introduction of 
United States Armed Forces in the absence of a declaration of war. The 
President must terminate use of the Armed Forces unless Congress, within 
60 calendar days after




Sec. 129. Raising and support of armies.

  \12\ To raise  and 
support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a 
longer Term than two Years;
<>   \13\ To provide and 
maintain a Navy;
<>   \14\ To make Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;




Sec. 132. Calling out the militia.

  \15\ To provide  for 
calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress 
Insurrections and repel Invasions;




Sec. 133. Power over militia.

  \16\ To provide  for 
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing 
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United 
States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the 
Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the 
discipline prescribed by Congress;



[[Page 62]]

ticular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the 
Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all 
Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which 
the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-
Yards, and other needful Buildings;--And



Sec. 134. Power over territory of the United 
States.

  \17\ To exercise  exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such 
District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of par



-  \18\ To make <> all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in 
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof.


[[Page 63]]




Sec. 135. Congressional authority over 
the District of Columbia.

  Congress has provided  by law that ``all that part of the territory 
of the United States included within the present limits of the District 
of Columbia shall be the permanent seat of government of the United 
States'' (4 U.S.C. 71). Pursuant to its authority under this clause, 
Congress provided in 1970 for the people of the District of Columbia to 
be represented in the House of Representatives by a Delegate and for a 
Commission to report to the Congress on the organization of the 
government of the District of Columbia (P.L. 91-405; 84 Stat. 845). For 
the powers and duties of the Delegate from the District of Columbia, see 
rule III (Sec. 675, infra) and Deschler, ch. 7, Sec. 3. In 1973, 
Congress passed the District of Columbia Self-Government and 
Governmental Reorganization Act, which reorganized the governmental 
structure of the District, provided a charter for local government 
subject to acceptance by a majority of the registered qualified voters 
of the District, delegated certain legislative powers to the District, 
and implemented certain recommendations of the Commission on the 
Organization of the Government of the District of Columbia (P.L. 93-198; 
87 Stat. 774). Section 604 of that Act provides for congressional action 
on certain district matters by providing a procedure for approval and 
disapproval of certain actions by the District of Columbia Council. The 
section, as amended by Public Law 98-473, permits a highly privileged 
motion to discharge a joint resolution of approval or disapproval which 
has not been reported by the committee to which referred within 20 
calendar days after its introduction (see Sec. 1130, infra).




Sec. 137. Migration or importation of 
persons.

  Section 9. \1\ The  Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States 
now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the 
Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a 
Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten 
dollars for each Person.




Sec. 138. Writ of habeas corpus.

  \2\ The Privilege of  the 
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of 
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.
<>   \3\ No 
Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.





Sec. 140. Capitation and direct 
taxes.

  \4\ [No Capitation,  or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the 
Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.]




Sec. 141. Export duties.

  This provision was changed in 1913 by the 16th amendment to the 
Constitution.
   \5\ No Tax or Duty shall be laid on 
Articles exported from any State.




Sec. 142. Freedom of commerce.

  \6\ No Preference  shall be 
given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State 
over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, 
be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.



[[Page 64]]

ceipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time 
to time.


Sec. 143. Appropriations and accounting of public 
money.

  \7\ No Money  shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the 
Re





Sec. 144. Titles of nobility and gifts from 
foreign states.

  \8\ No Title of  Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no 
Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without 
the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, 
or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.




Sec. 145. Foreign gifts and 
decorations.

  Consent has been  granted to officers and employees of the government, 
under enumerated conditions, to accept certain gifts and decorations 
from foreign governments (see 5 U.S.C. 7342). The adoption of this act 
largely has obviated the practice of passing private bills to permit the 
officer or employee to retain the award. However, where the Speaker (who 
was one of the officers empowered by an earlier law to approve retention 
of decorations by Members of the House) was himself tendered an award 
from a foreign government, a private law (Private Law 91-244) was 
enacted to permit him to accept and wear the award so that he would not 
be in the position of reviewing his own application under the provisions 
of the law.


  Public Law 95-105 amended the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act (now 5 
U.S.C. 7342) to designate the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct 
of the House of Representatives as the employing agency for the House 
with respect to foreign gifts and decorations received by Members and 
employees; under that statute the Committee may approve the acceptance 
of foreign decorations and has promulgated regulations to carry out the 
Act with respect to Members and employees (Jan. 23, 1978, p. 452), and 
disposes of foreign gifts which may not be retained by the donee.

  Opinions of Attorneys General:


  Gifts from Foreign Prince, 24 Op. Att'y Gen. 117 (1902); Foreign 
Diplomatic Commission, 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 538 (1871); Marshal of Florida, 
6 Op. Att'y Gen. 409 (1854).


[[Page 65]]

Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of 
Nobility.


Sec. 146. States not to make treaties, coin 
money, pass ex post facto laws, impair contracts, etc.

  Section 10. \1\ No  State shall 
enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of 
Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing 
but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of 
Attainder, ex post facto Law, or




Sec. 147. States not to lay imposts or 
duties.

  \2\ No State  shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or 
Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary 
for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties 
and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the 
Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be 
subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.





 


Sec. 148. States not to lay tonnage taxes, make 
compacts, or go to war.

  \3\ No State  shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay 
any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, 
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a 
foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such 
imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.



                               ARTICLE II.




Sec. 149. Terms of the President and Vice 
President.

  Section 1. \1\ The  executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of 
four years, and together with the Vice President, chosen for the same 
Term, be elected, as follows:



[[Page 66]]

Presidential terms shall end and successor terms shall begin at noon on 
January 20. Thus, Franklin D. Roosevelt's first term began on March 4, 
1933, but ended at noon on January 20, 1937. Formerly, when March 4 fell 
on Sunday, the public inauguration of the President occurred at noon on 
March 5 (III, 1996; VI, 449). Following ratification of the 20th 
amendment, the first time inauguration day fell on Sunday was January 
20, 1957, and Dwight David Eisenhower took the oath for his second term 
in a private ceremony at the White House on that day followed by a 
public inauguration ceremony on the steps of the East Front of the 
Capitol on Monday, January 21, 1957. A similar scenario was followed at 
the beginning of President Reagan's second term, with the oath being 
given at the White House on January 20, 1985, followed by a public 
ceremony on Monday, January 21, in the Rotunda of the Capitol. The 22d 
amendment provides that no person shall be elected President more than 
twice.



Sec. 150. Commencement of President's term of 
office.

  George  Washington took the oath of office, as the first President on 
April 30, 1789 (III, 1986). The two Houses of the First Congress found, 
after examination by a joint committee, that by provisions made in the 
Federal Constitution and by the Continental Congress, the term of the 
President had, notwithstanding, begun on March 4, 1789 (I, 3). The 20th 
amendment, declared to have been ratified on February 6, 1933, provides 
that





Sec. 151. Electors of President and Vice President 
and their qualifications.

  \2\ Each  State shall appoint, in such Manner as the 
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole 
Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be 
entitled in the Congress; but no Senator or Representative, or Person 
holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be 
appointed an Elector.





Sec. 152. Questions as to qualifications of 
electors.

  Questions  of the qualifications of electors have arisen, and in one 
instance certain ones were found disqualified, but as their number was 
not sufficient to affect the result and as there was doubt as to what 
tribunal should pass on the question the votes were counted (III, 1941). 
In other cases there were objections, but the votes were counted (III, 
1972-1974, 1979). In one instance an elector found to be disqualified 
resigned both offices, whereupon he was made eligible to fill the 
vacancy thus caused among electors (III, 1975).



[[Page 67]]

they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of 
Government of the United States, directed to the President of the 
Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate 
and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes 
shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes 
shall be the President, if such Number be a majority of the whole Number 
of Electors appointed: and if there be more than one who have such 
Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of 
Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them for 
President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest 
on the List the said House shall in like manner chuse the President. But 
in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the 
Representation from each State having one Vote; A quorum for this 
purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the 
States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. 
In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the 
greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. 
But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate 
shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice-President.]



Sec. 152a. Original provision for failure of 
electoral college to choose, superseded by 12th amendment.

  \3\ [The  Electors 
shall meet in their respective States and vote by Ballot for two 
Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same 
State with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons 
voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List



<>   \4\ The Congress may determine the Time of chusing 
the Electors, and the Day on which they shall

[[Page 68]]

give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United 
States.

  This third clause of article II, section 1 was superseded by the 12th 
amendment (see Sec. Sec. 219-223, infra).


  The time for choosing electors has been fixed on ``the Tuesday next 
after the first Monday in November, in every fourth year''; and the 
electors in each State ``meet and give in their votes on the first 
Monday after the second Wednesday in December next following their 
appointment, at such place in each State as the legislature of such 
State shall direct'' (III, 1914; VI, 438; 3 U.S.C. 1, 7). The statutes 
also provide for transmitting to the President of the Senate 
certificates of the appointment of the electors and of their votes (III, 
1915-1917; VI, 439; 3 U.S.C. 11).



Sec. 154. Qualifications of President of the United 
States.

  \5\ No  Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the 
United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall 
be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be 
eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty 
five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.





Sec. 155. Succession in case of removal, death, 
resignation, or disability of President and Vice President.

  \6\ In  Case of 
the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, 
or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the 
Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law 
provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both 
of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then 
act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the 
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.



[[Page 69]]

gust 9, 1974, by delivering a signed resignation to the Office of the 
Secretary of State, pursuant to 3 U.S.C. 20. Pursuant to amendment XXV, 
Vice President Gerald R. Ford became President and the House and Senate 
confirmed his nominee, Nelson A. Rockefeller, to become Vice President 
(December 19, 1974, p. 41516).


Sec. 156. Resignation of the President.

  Amendment  XXV 
provides for filling a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President and, 
when the President is unable to perform the duties of his office, for 
the Vice President to assume those powers and duties as Acting 
President. During the 93d Congress, President Richard M. Nixon resigned 
from office on Au



  Congress also has provided for the performance of the duties of the 
President in case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of 
the President and Vice President (3 U.S.C. 19).




Sec. 157. Compensation of President.

  \7\ The  President 
shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which 
shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the Period for which he 
shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any 
other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.



  The compensation of the President, formerly fixed at $200,000 per 
annum (3 U.S.C. 102), was increased to $400,000, effective January 20, 
2001 (P.L. 106-59). In addition the law provides an expense allowance of 
$50,000 (3 U.S.C. 102), and authorizes a travel allowance of not to 
exceed $100,000 (3 U.S.C. 103).




Sec. 158. Oath of the President.

  \8\ Before  he enter on the 
Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or 
Affirmation:--``I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully 
execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the 
best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the 
United States.''



[[Page 70]]

Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had been elected for his fourth term as 
President, took the oath of office on the south portico at the White 
House. On August 9, 1974, Gerald R. Ford, who as Vice President 
succeeded to the Presidency following the resignation of President Nixon 
on that day, was sworn in in the East Room of the White House. The West 
Front of the Capitol was first used for the inaugural ceremony for 
Ronald W. Reagan, Jan. 20, 1981. Because of extreme cold, the public 
administration of the oath was for the first time held in the Rotunda of 
the Capitol, rather than on the West Front, as scheduled, on January 21, 
1985. Permission for such use is authorized by concurrent resolution 
(see, e.g., S. Con. Res. 144, 98th Cong. Oct. 9, 1984, p. 30926).



Sec. 159. Inauguration of the President.

  The  taking of this 
oath, which is termed the inauguration, is made the occasion of certain 
ceremonies which are arranged for by a joint committee of the two Houses 
(III, 1998, 1999; VI, 451). For many years the oath was normally taken 
at the east portico of the Capitol, although in earlier years it was 
taken in the Senate Chamber or Hall of the House (III, 1986-1995). On 
March 4, 1909, owing to inclemency of the weather, the President-elect 
took the oath and delivered his inaugural address in the Senate Chamber 
(VI, 447). And when Vice President Fillmore succeeded to the vacancy in 
the Office of President, Congress being in session, he took the oath in 
the Hall of the House in the presence of the Senate and House (III, 
1997). In 1945





Sec. 160. The President the Commander in 
Chief.

  Section 2. \1\ The  President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of 
the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called 
into the actual Service of the United States; he may require 
the <> Opinion, 
in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive 
Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their 
respective <> Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and 
Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of 
Impeachment.




Sec. 163. War powers of Congress and the President.

  In  the 
93d Congress, the Congress passed over the President's veto Public Law 
93-148, relating to the power of Congress to declare war under article 
I, section 8, clause 11 (Sec. 127, supra) and the power of the President 
as Commander in Chief. For further discussion of the reports to Congress 
required and the procedure for congressional action provided under 
Public Law 93-148, see Sec. 128, supra.




[[Page 71]]




Sec. 164. Pardon of former President.

  In  1974, President 
Ford exercised his power under the last phrase of this clause by 
pardoning former President Nixon for any crimes he might have committed 
during a certain period in office (Proclamation 4311, September 8, 
1974). The former President had resigned on August 9, 1974, following 
the decision of the Committee on the Judiciary to report to the House a 
recommendation of impeachment (H. Rept. 93-1305, Aug. 20, 1974, p. 
29219).





Sec. 165. President makes treaties.

  \2\ He  shall have Power, 
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, 
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall 
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint Ambassadors, <> other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme 
Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments 
are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by 
Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior 
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of 
Law, or in the Heads of Departments.



  The power of the President to appoint diplomatic representatives to 
foreign governments and to determine their rank is derived from the 
Constitution and may not be circumscribed by statutory enactments (VII, 
1248). In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) the Supreme Court held 
that any appointee exercising significant authority (not merely internal 
delegable authorities within the legislative branch) pursuant to the 
laws of the United States is an Officer of the United States and must 
therefore be appointed pursuant to this clause, and that Congress cannot 
by law vest such appointment authority in its own officers or require 
that Presidential appointments be subject to confirmation by both 
Houses. For a discussion of the role of the House with respect to 
treaties affecting revenue, see Sec. 597, infra.




Sec. 167. President's power to fill vacancies during 
recess of the Senate.

  \3\ The  President shall have Power to fill up all 
Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting 
Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.



[[Page 72]]

to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and 
expedient; * * *



Sec. 168. Messages from the President.

  Section 3.  He shall 
from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the 
Union, and recommend


  In the early years of the Government the President made a speech to 
Congress on its assembling (V, 6629), but in 1801 President Jefferson 
discontinued this practice and transmitted a message in writing. This 
precedent was followed until April 8, 1913, when the custom of 
addressing Congress in person was resumed by President Wilson and, with 
the exception of President Hoover (VIII, 3333) has been followed 
generally by subsequent Presidents. Only messages of major importance 
are delivered in person. A message in writing is usually communicated to 
both Houses on the same day, but an original document accompanying can 
of course be sent to but one House (V, 6616, 6617). The President's 
State of the Union message delivered in person to the 95th Congress, 
second Session, together with separate hand-delivered written messages, 
were referred on motion to the Union Calendar and ordered printed (Jan. 
19, 1978, p. 152). In early years confidential messages were often sent 
and considered in secret session of the House (V, 7251, 7252).



Sec. 169. Messages required by law.

  By  law (31 U.S.C. 1105), 
the President is required to transmit the Budget to Congress on or after 
the first Monday in January but not later than the first Monday in 
February each year. In addition, he is required to submit a supplemental 
budget summary by July 16 each year (31 U.S.C. 1106). Submission of the 
Economic Report of the President is required within 10 days after the 
submission of the January budget (15 U.S.C. 1022). The Congressional 
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 601) requires the 
transmittal to Congress by the President of amendments and revisions 
related to the budget on or before April 10 and July 15 of each year. In 
addition, the Act provides for the transmittal of messages proposing 
rescissions and deferrals of budget authority (2 U.S.C. 682).


  When the President has indicated that he will address Congress in 
person a concurrent resolution is adopted by both Houses arranging for a 
joint session to receive the message. At the appointed hour the Members 
of the Senate arrive. The President of the Senate (the Vice President) 
sits to the right of the Speaker, but in the absence of the Vice 
President, the President pro tempore sits to the left of the Speaker 
(Nov. 27, 1963, p. 22838). The Speaker presides.



Sec. 170. Reception of messages from the 
President.

  The  ceremony of receiving a message in writing is simple (V, 
6591), and may occur during consideration of a question of privilege (V, 
6640-6642) or before the organization of the House (V, 6647-6649) and in 
the absence of a quorum (V, 6650; VIII, 3339; clause 7 of rule XX).



[[Page 73]]

not permitted the reading of the accompanying documents to be demanded 
as a matter of right (V, 5267-5271; VII, 1108). A concurrent resolution 
providing for a joint session to receive the President's message was 
held to be of the highest privilege (VIII, 3335).

* * * <> he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both 
Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, 
with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such 
Time as he shall think proper; * * *

  But, with the exception of vetoes, messages are regularly laid before 
the House only at the time prescribed by the rule for the order of 
business (V, 6635-6638) within the discretion of the Speaker (VIII, 
3341). While a message of the President is always read in full the 
latest rulings have


* * * <> he shall receive Ambassadors and other 
public Ministers; he shall take Care That the Laws be faithfully 
executed, and shall Commission all the officers of the United States.

  In certain exigencies the President may convene Congress at a place 
other than the seat of government (I, 2; 2 U.S.C. 27). Congress has on 
occasion been convened by the President (I, 10, 11; Nov. 17, 1947, p. 
10578; July 26, 1948, p. 9362), and in one instance, when Congress had 
provided by law for meeting, the President called it together on an 
earlier day (I, 12). The Congress having adjourned on July 27, 1947, p. 
10521, and on June 20, 1948, p. 9350, to a day certain, the President 
called it together on an earlier date than that to which it adjourned 
(Nov. 17, 1947, p. 10577; July 26, 1948, p. 9362). There has been some 
discussion as to whether or not there is a distinction between a session 
called by the President and other sessions of Congress (I, 12, 
footnote).




Sec. 173. Impeachment of civil officers.

  Section 4.  The 
President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States, 
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, 
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.



[[Page 74]]

not be impeached (III, 2007). But resignation of the office, does not 
prevent impeachment for crime or misdemeanor therein (III, 2007, 2317, 
2444, 2445, 2459, 2509). In Blount's case it was decided that a Senator 
was not a civil officer within the meaning of the impeachment provisions 
of the Constitution (III, 2310, 2316). Questions have also arisen as to 
whether or not the Congressional Printer (III, 1785), or a vice consul-
general (III, 2515), might be impeached. Proceedings for the impeachment 
of territorial judges have been taken in several instances (III, 2486, 
2487, 2488), although various opinions have been given that such an 
officer is not impeachable (III, 2022, 2486, 2493). A committee of the 
House by majority vote held a Commissioner of the District of Columbia 
not to be a civil officer subject to impeachment under the Constitution 
(VI, 548). An independent counsel appointed under 28 U.S.C. 593 (a 
statute currently ineffective under 28 U.S.C. 599) may be impeached 
under 28 U.S.C. 596(a), and a resolution impeaching such an independent 
counsel constitutes a question of the privileges of the House under rule 
IX (Sept. 23, 1998, p. 21560).


Sec. 174. As to the officers who may be impeached.

  In  the 
Blount trial the managers contended that all citizens of the United 
States were liable to impeachment, but this contention was not admitted 
(III, 2315), and in the Belknap trial both managers and counsel for 
respondent agreed that a private citizen, apart from offense in an 
office, might



[[Page 75]]

at length (III, 2014, 2381, 2382, 2518, 2519). The statutes make 
nonresidence of a judge an impeachable offense, and the House has taken 
steps to impeach for this cause (III, 2476, 2512). There has, however, 
been some question as to the power of Congress to make an impeachable 
offense (III, 2014, 2015, 2021, 2512). Usurpation of power has been 
examined several times as a cause for impeachment (III, 2404, 2508, 
2509, 2516, 2517). There also has been discussion as to whether or not 
there is distinction between a misdemeanor and a high misdemeanor (III, 
2270, 2367, 2492). Review of impeachments in Congress showing the nature 
of charges upon which impeachments have been brought and judgments of 
the Senate thereon (VI, 466). The report accompanying a resolution to 
impeach President Clinton, and the debate in the House thereon, included 
discussion of the nature of an impeachable offense (H. Rept. 105-830; 
Dec. 18, 1998, p. 27828). Of the four articles of impeachment of 
President Clinton reported by the Committee on the Judiciary ((1) 
perjury in grand jury, (2) perjury in a civil deposition, (3) 
obstruction of justice, and (4) improper responses to written questions 
from the Committee on the Judiciary), only the first and third were 
adopted by the House (H. Res. 611, Dec. 19, 1998, p. 28110). The 
President was acquitted by the Senate on each article (Feb. 12, 1999, p. 
----).


Sec. 175. Nature of impeachable offenses.

  As  to what are 
impeachable offenses there has been much discussion (III, 2008, 2019, 
2020, 2356, 2362, 2379-2381, 2405, 2406, 2410, 2498, 2510; VI, 455; 
Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, 
Committee on the Judiciary, H. Rept. 93-1305, Aug. 20, 1974, p. 29219; 
Associate Justice William O. Douglas, Final Report by the Special 
Subcommittee on H. Res. 920, Committee on the Judiciary, Sept. 17, 1970; 
Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
States, H. Rept. 105-830, Dec. 16, 1998). For a time the theory that 
indictable offenses only were impeachable was stoutly maintained and as 
stoutly denied (III, 2356, 2360-2362, 2379-2381, 2405, 2406, 2410, 
2416); but on the 10th and 11th articles of the impeachment of President 
Andrew Johnson the House concluded to impeach for other than indictable 
offenses (III, 2418), and in the Swayne trial the theory was definitely 
abandoned (III, 2019). While there has not been definite concurrence in 
the claim of the managers in the trial of the President that an 
impeachable offense is any misbehavior that shows disqualification to 
hold and exercise the office, whether moral, intellectual, or physical 
(III, 2015), yet the House has impeached judges for improper personal 
habits (III, 2328, 2505), and in the impeachment of the President one of 
the articles charged him with ``intemperate, inflammatory, and 
scandalous harangues'' in public addresses, tending to the harm of the 
Government (III, 2420). There was no conviction under these charges 
except in the single case of Judge Pickering, who was charged with 
intoxication on the bench (III, 2328-2341). As to the impeachment of 
judges for other delinquencies, there has been much contention as to 
whether they may be impeached for any breach of good behavior (III, 
2011, 2016, 2497), or only for judicial misconduct occurring in the 
actual administration of justice in connection with the court (III, 
2010, 2013, 2017). The intent of the judge (III, 2014, 2382) as related 
to mistakes of the law, and the relations of intent to conviction have 
been discussed




Sec. 176. Later impeachment inquiries.

  The  articles of 
impeachment adopted by the House in 1936 against Judge Ritter charged a 
variety of judicial misconduct, including violations of criminal law. 
The seventh and general article, upon which Judge Ritter was convicted 
by the Senate, charged general misconduct to bring his court into 
scandal and disrepute and to destroy public confidence in his court and 
in the judicial system (Impeachment by the House, Mar. 2, 1936, p. 3091; 
Conviction by the Senate, Apr. 17, 1936, p. 5606). Following his 
conviction by the Senate, former Judge Ritter brought an action for back 
salary, contending that the Senate had tried and convicted him for 
nonimpeachable offenses. The U.S. Court of Claims held that the Senate's 
power to try impeachments was exclusive and not subject to judicial 
review. Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cls. 293 (1936), cert. denied, 
300 U.S. 668 (1937).


  In 1970 a special subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary 
considered charges of impeachment against Associate Justice Douglas of 
the Supreme Court. The subcommittee recommended against his impeachment 
but concluded that a Federal judge could be impeached (1) for judicial 
conduct which is a serious dereliction from public duty and (2) for 
nonjudicial conduct which is criminal in nature (Associate Justice 
William O. Douglas, Final Report by the Special Subcommittee on H. Res. 
920, Committee on the Judiciary, September 17, 1970).


[[Page 76]]

a resolution of impeachment, and the House accepted the report by 
resolution (H. Res. 1333, Aug. 20, 1974, p. 29361). The report of the 
committee included the text of the three articles of impeachment adopted 
by the committee. The committee had concluded that impeachable offenses 
need not be indictable offenses and recommended impeachment of the 
President (1) for violating his oath of office and his duty under the 
Constitution by preventing, obstructing, and impeding the administration 
of justice; (2) for engaging in a course of conduct violating the 
constitutional rights of citizens, impairing the administration of 
justice, and contravening the laws governing executive agencies; and (3) 
for failing to honor subpoenas issued by the Committee on the Judiciary 
in the course of its impeachment inquiry (Impeachment of Richard M. 
Nixon, President of the United States, Committee on the Judiciary, H. 
Rept. 93-1305, Aug. 20, 1974, printed in full in the Cong. Record, Aug. 
22, 1974, p. 29219).
  In 1974 the Committee on the Judiciary investigated charges of 
impeachment against President Nixon (H. Res. 803, Feb. 6, 1974, p. 
2349), and determined to recommend his impeachment to the House. The 
President having resigned, the committee reported to the House without 
submitting

  In 1986, for the first time since 1936, the House agreed to a 
resolution impeaching a Federal district judge. Judge Harry Claiborne 
had been convicted of falsifying Federal income tax returns. His final 
appeal was denied by the Supreme Court in April, and he began serving 
his prison sentence in May. Because he declined to resign, however, 
Judge Claiborne was still receiving his judicial salary and, absent 
impeachment, would resume the bench on his release from prison. 
Consequently, a resolution of impeachment was introduced on June 3, and 
on July 16, the Committee on the Judiciary reported to the House four 
articles of impeachment against Judge Claiborne. On July 22, the 
resolution was called up as a question of privilege and agreed to by a 
recorded vote of 406 yeas, 0 nays. After trial in the Senate, Judge 
Claiborne was convicted on three of the four articles of impeachment and 
removed from office on October 9, 1986.

  In 1988, the House agreed to a resolution reported from the Committee 
on the Judiciary and called up as a question of the privileges of the 
House impeaching Federal district judge Alcee L. Hastings for high 
crimes and misdemeanors specified in 17 articles of impeachment, some of 
them addressing allegations on which the judge had been acquitted in a 
Federal criminal trial (H. Res. 499, 100th Cong., Aug. 3, 1988, p. 
20206). No trial in the Senate was had before the adjournment of the 
100th Congress. In the 101st Congress, the House reappointed managers to 
conduct this impeachment in the Senate (Jan. 3, 1989, p. 84); the Senate 
began its deliberations on March 15, 1989 (p. 4219); conviction and 
removal from office occurred on October 20, 1989 (p. 25335). Also in the 
101st Congress, the Senate convicted Federal district judge Walter L. 
Nixon on two of the three impeachment charges brought against him (Nov. 
3, 1989, p. 27101). For further discussion of the continuance of 
impeachment proceedings in a succeeding Congress, see Sec. 620, infra.


[[Page 77]]

stricting access to the communication and to meetings and hearings 
thereon (H. Res. 525, Sept. 11, 1998, p. 20020). Later, the House 
adopted a privileged resolution reported from the Committee on the 
Judiciary authorizing an impeachment inquiry by that committee and 
investing it with special investigative authorities to facilitate the 
inquiry (H. Res. 581, Oct. 8, 1998, p. 24679). The Committee on the 
Judiciary filed with the House a privileged report accompanying a 
resolution containing four articles of impeachment against President 
Clinton that alleged: (1) the President gave perjurious, false, and 
misleading testimony to a grand jury; (2) the President gave perjurious, 
false, and misleading testimony in a Federal civil action; (3) the 
President prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration of 
justice relating to a Federal civil action; and (4) the President abused 
his office, impaired the administration of justice, and contravened the 
authority of the legislative branch by his response to 81 written 
questions submitted by the Committee on the Judiciary (H. Res. 611, Dec. 
17, 1998, p. 27819). The chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary 
called up the resolution on December 18, 1998 (p. 27828).
  In 1998 the House agreed to a privileged resolution reported from the 
Committee on Rules, referring to the Committee on the Judiciary a 
communication from an independent counsel transmitting under 28 U.S.C. 
595(c) evidence of possible impeachable offenses by President Clinton, 
and re

  A resolution offered from the floor to permit the Delegate of the 
District of Columbia to vote on the articles of impeachment was held not 
to constitute a question of the privileges of the House under rule IX 
(Dec. 18, 1998, p. 27825). To a privileged resolution of impeachment, an 
amendment proposing instead censure, which is not privileged, was held 
not germane (Dec. 19, 1998, p. 28100).




 
  For further discussion of impeachment proceedings, see Sec. Sec. 601-
620, infra; Sec. 31, supra, and Deschler, ch. 14.


                              ARTICLE III.




Sec. 177. The judges, their terms, and 
compensation.

  Section 1.  The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested 
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme 
and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and 
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, 
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.



[[Page 78]]

Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime 
Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a 
Party;--to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State 
and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different States;--
between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of 
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and 
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.



Sec. 178. Extent of the judicial 
power.

  Section 2. \1\ The  judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the




Sec. 178a. Decisions of the Court on legislative 
standing.

  Decisions  of the Supreme Court involving legislative standing to bring 
cases in Federal court include Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); 
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 
(1984); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990); and, most recently, 
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997), holding that Member plaintiffs must 
have alleged a ``personal stake'' in having an actual injury redressed, 
rather than an ``institutional injury'' that is ``abstract and widely 
dispersed.''




Sec. 179. Original and appellate jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court.

  \2\ In  all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers 
and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme 
Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before 
mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as 
to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the 
Congress shall make.



[[Page 79]]

State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by 
Law have directed.



Sec. 180. Places of trial of crimes by jury.

  \3\ The  Trial 
of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and 
such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have 
been committed; but when not committed within any




Sec. 181. Treason against the United 
States.

  Section 3. \1\ Treason  against the United States, shall consist only in levying War 
against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and 
Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony 
of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.





 


Sec. 182. Punishment for treason.

  \2\ The  Congress shall 
have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of 
Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the 
Life of the Person Attainted.



                               ARTICLE IV.



Sec. 183. Each State to give credit to acts, 
records, etc., of other States.

  Section 1.  Full Faith and Credit shall be given 
in each State to the Public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of 
every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the 
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and 
the Effect thereof.
<>   Section 2. 
\1\ The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and 
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.



[[Page 80]]

he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction 
of the Crime.


Sec. 185. Extradition for treason, felony, or other 
crime.

  \2\ A  Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other 
Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall 
on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which





Sec. 186. Persons held to service or labor.

  \3\ No  Person 
held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping 
into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be 
discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on 
Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.




Sec. 187. Admission and formation of new 
States.

  Section 3. \1\ New  States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no 
new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any 
other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more 
States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of 
the States concerned as well as of the Congress.





Sec. 188. Power of Congress over territory and other 
national property.

  \2\ The  Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make 
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other 
Property belonging to
the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so 
construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any 
particular State.




[[Page 81]]


  The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held 
that the property clause does not prohibit the transfer of United States 
property to foreign nations through self-executing treaties. Edwards v. 
Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (1978), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978).




 


Sec. 189. Republican form of government and 
protection from domestic violence guaranteed to the States.

  Section 4. The  United 
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of 
Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on 
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the 
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence.



                               ARTICLE V.




Sec. 190. Amendments to the Constitution.

  The  Congress, 
whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall 
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the 
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a 
Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be 
valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when 
ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or 
by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of 
Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment 
which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight 
shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth 
Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, 
shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.



[[Page 82]]

under Sec. 115, supra; Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 
(1798)). They are filed with the Archivist who, under the law (1 U.S.C. 
106b; 1 U.S.C. 112), has the responsibility for the certification and 
publication of such amendments, once they are ratified by the States. 
Under the earlier procedure, the two Houses sometimes requested the 
President to transmit to the States certain proposed amendments (V, 
7041, 7043), but a concurrent resolution to that end was without 
privilege (VIII, 3508). The President notified Congress by message of 
the promulgation of the ratification of a constitutional amendment (V, 
7044).-


Sec. 191. Form of and action on amendments to the 
Constitution.

  Amendments  to the Constitution are proposed in the form of joint 
resolutions, which have their several readings and are enrolled and 
signed by the presiding officers of the two Houses (V, 7029, footnote), 
but are not presented to the President for his approval (V, 7040; see 
discussion




Sec. 192. The twothirds vote on proposed 
amendments.

  The  vote required on a joint resolution proposing an amendment 
to the Constitution is two-thirds of those voting, a quorum being 
present, and not two-thirds of the entire membership (V, 7027, 7028; 
VIII, 3503). The majority required to pass a constitutional amendment, 
like the majority required to pass a bill over the President's veto 
(VII, 1111) and the majority required to adopt a motion to suspend the 
rules (Dec. 16, 1981, pp. 31850, 31851, 31855, 31856), is two-thirds of 
those Members voting either in the affirmative or negative, a quorum 
being present, and Members who only indicate that they are ``present'' 
are not counted in this computation (Nov. 15, 1983, p. 32685). The 
requirement of the two-thirds vote applies to the vote on the final 
passage and not to amendments (V, 7031, 7032; VIII, 3504), or prior 
stages (V, 7029, 7030), but is required where the House votes on 
agreeing to Senate amendments (V, 7033, 7034; VIII, 3505), or on 
agreeing to a conference report (V, 7036). One House having, by a two-
thirds vote, passed in amended form a proposed constitutional amendment 
from the other House, and then having by a majority vote receded from 
its amendment, the constitutional amendment was held not to be passed 
(V, 7035).


  In the 95th Congress, both the House and Senate agreed by a majority 
vote to House Joint Resolution 638, extending the time period for 
ratification by the States of the Equal Rights Amendment, where House 
Joint Resolution 208 of the 92d Congress, proposing the amendment, had 
provided for a seven-year ratification period. The House determined, by 
laying on the table by a record vote a privileged resolution asserting 
that a vote of two-thirds of the Members present and voting was required 
to pass a joint resolution extending the ratification period for a 
constitutional amendment already submitted to the States, that only a 
majority vote was required on such a measure (H.J. Res. 638; Speaker 
O'Neill, Aug. 15, 1978, p. 26203).


[[Page 83]]

(D.C.D. Idaho, 1981), judgment stayed sub nom. National Organization of 
Women v. Idaho, 455 U.S. 918 (1982), vacated and remanded to dismiss, 
459 U.S. 809 (1982).
  The joint resolution extending the ratification period for the Equal 
Rights Amendment was delivered to the President, who signed it although 
expressing doubt as to the necessity for his doing so (Presidential 
Documents, Oct. 19, 1978). When sent to the Archivist, the joint 
resolution was not assigned a public law number, but the Archivist 
notified the States of the action of the Congress in extending the 
ratification period. For a judicial decision voiding this extension, see 
Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F.Supp. 1107

  The yeas and nays are not required to pass a joint resolution 
proposing to amend the Constitution (V, 7038-7039; VIII, 3506).

  Question has arisen as to the power of a State to recall, or rescind, 
its assent to a constitutional amendment (V, 7042; footnotes to 
Sec. Sec. 225, 234, infra) but has not been the subject of a final 
judicial determination (see Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F.Supp. 1107 (D.C.D. 
Idaho, 1981), judgment stayed sub nom. National Organization of Women v. 
Idaho, 455 U.S. 918 (1982), vacated and remanded to dismiss, 459 U.S. 
809 (1982)).




 


Sec. 193. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 
(1920); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 
368 (1921); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922); Coleman v. Miller, 
307 U.S. 433 (1939); Chandler v. Wise, 307 U.S. 474 (1939).



                               ARTICLE VI.



Sec. 194. Validity of debts and engagements.

  \1\ All  Debts 
contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this 
Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this 
Constitution, as under the Confederation.




Sec. 195. Constitution, laws, and treaties the 
supreme law of the land.

  \2\ This  Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall 
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.



[[Page 84]]

shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but 
no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any 
Office or public Trust under the United States.



Sec. 196. Oaths of public officers; and prohibition of 
religious tests.

  \3\ The  Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and 
the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and 
judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States,




Sec. 197. Form of oath.

  The  form of the oath is prescribed 
by statute (5 U.S.C. 3331; I, 128): ``I, AB, do solemnly swear (or 
affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United 
States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true 
faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, 
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that I will 
well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am 
about to enter. So help me God.''




Sec. 198. Administration of oath at organization.

  The  Act of 
June 1, 1789 (2 U.S.C. 25), provides that on the organization of the 
House and previous to entering on any other business the oath shall be 
administered by any Member (generally the Member with longest continuous 
service) (I, 131; VI, 6) to the Speaker and by the Speaker to the other 
Members and Clerk (I, 130). The Act has at times been considered in the 
House as directory merely (I, 118, 242, 243, 245; VI, 6); but at other 
times has been observed carefully (I, 118, 140). The Act was cited by 
the Clerk in recognizing for nominations for Speaker as being of higher 
constitutional privilege than a resolution to postpone the election of a 
Speaker and instead provide for the election of a Speaker pro tempore 
pending the disposition of certain ethics charges against the nominee of 
the majority party (Jan. 7, 1997, p. 115).


  Previously it was the custom to administer the oath by State 
delegations, but beginning with the 71st Congress Members-elect have 
been sworn in en masse (VI, 8). The Clerk supplies printed copies of the 
oath to Members and Delegates who have taken the oath in accordance with 
law, which shall be subscribed by the Members and Delegates and 
delivered to the Clerk to be recorded in the Journal and Congressional 
Record as conclusive proof of the fact that the signer duly took the 
oath in accordance with law (2 U.S.C. 25). See Deschler, ch. 2. The 
Speaker has requested that guests in the gallery rise with the Members 
during the administration of the oath of office to a Member-elect (Nov. 
12, 1991, p. 31255).


[[Page 85]]

(I, 396; VI, 11). There has been discussion as to the competency of a 
Speaker pro tempore to administer the oath (I, 170), and in the absence 
of the Speaker a Member-elect waited until the Speaker should be present 
(I, 179), but in 1920 a Speaker pro tempore whose designation by the 
Speaker had been approved by the House, administered the oath to a 
Member (VI, 20). The House may authorize the Speaker to administer the 
oath to a Member away from the House (I, 169), or may, in such a case, 
authorize another than the Speaker to administer the oath (I, 170; VI, 
14). For forms used in this procedure see (VI, 14).


Sec. 199. Functions of the Speaker in administering the 
oath.

  The  Speaker possesses no arbitrary power in the administration of 
the oath (I, 134), and when objection is made the question must be 
decided by the House and not by the Chair (I, 519, 520). An objection 
prevents the Speaker from administering the oath of his own authority, 
even though the credentials be regular in form (I, 135-138). The Speaker 
has frequently declined to administer the oath in cases wherein the 
House has, by its action, indicated that he should not do so (I, 139, 
140). And in case of doubt he has waited the instruction of the House




Sec. 200. Administration of the oath as related 
to the quorum.

  Members-elect  have been sworn at the beginning of a second session 
before the ascertainment of a quorum (I, 176-178), but when the Clerk 
called the second session of the 87th Congress to order, Members-elect 
were not sworn before ascertainment of a quorum and election of Speaker 
McCormack to succeed Speaker Rayburn, who had died during the sine die 
adjournment (Jan. 10, 1962, p. 5). Members-elect have also been sworn 
where a roll call or other ascertainment has shown the absence of a 
quorum (I, 178, 181, 182; VI, 21) but in one instance, however, the 
Speaker declined to administer the oath under such circumstances (II, 
875).




Sec. 201. Privilege of administration of the 
oath.

  A  proposition to administer the oath to a Member is a matter of 
high privilege (VI, 14). It has been administered during a call of the 
roll and during an electronic vote on a motion to agree to rules at the 
time of organization (I, 173; VI, 22; Jan. 5, 2005, p. ----) and during 
an electronic vote taken during House deliberations interlocutory to an 
ongoing joint session to count the electoral votes (Jan. 6, 2005, p. --
--). It also has been administered before the reading of the Journal (I, 
172), in the absence of a quorum (VI, 22), on Calendar Wednesday (VI, 
22), before a pending motion to amend the Journal (I, 171), and after 
the previous question has been ordered on a bill reported back to the 
House from the Committee of the Whole (Oct. 3, 1969, p. 28487). A 
division being demanded on a resolution for seating several claimants, 
the oath may be administered to each as soon as his case is decided (I, 
623). Where a Member-elect whose right to a seat has been determined by 
the House presents himself to take the oath, his right to be sworn is 
complete and cannot be deferred even by a motion to adjourn (I, 622), 
but the Speaker has entertained the motion to adjourn after adoption of 
a seating resolution but before the Member-elect was present in the 
Chamber to take the oath (May 1, 1985, p. 10019).



[[Page 86]]

where an objection was sustained neither by affidavit nor on the 
responsibility of the Member objecting, the House declined to entertain 
it (I, 455).


Sec. 202. Challenge of the right to take the oath.

  The  right 
of a Member-elect to take the oath is sometimes challenged and the 
Speaker requests the Member-elect to stand aside temporarily (VI, 9-11, 
174; VIII, 3386). This usually occurs at the time of organization of the 
House. The challenge proceeds from some Member, but the fact that he has 
not yet taken the oath himself does not debar him from making the 
challenge (I, 141). The Member challenging does so on his responsibility 
as a Member or on the strength of documents (I, 448) or on both (I, 443, 
474). And




Sec. 203. Consideration of an objection to the taking of 
the oath.

  It  has been held, although not uniformly, that in cases where 
the right of a Member-elect to take the oath is challenged, the Speaker 
may direct the Member to stand aside temporarily (I, 143-146, 474; VI, 
9, 174; VIII, 3386). The Member so challenged is not thereby deprived of 
any right (I, 155). Similarly, the seating of a Member-elect does not 
prejudice a pending contest, brought under the Federal Contested 
Elections Act (2 U.S.C. 381-396), over final right to the seat (Jan. 7, 
1997, p. 120). When several are challenged and stand aside the question 
is first taken on the Member-elect first required to stand aside (I, 
147, 148). In 1861 it was held that the House might direct contested 
names to be passed over until the other Members-elect had been sworn in 
(I, 154). Motions and debate are in order on the questions involved in a 
challenge, and in a few cases other business has intervened by unanimous 
consent (I, 149, 150). By unanimous consent the consideration of a 
challenge is sometimes deferred until after the completion of the 
organization (I, 474), and by unanimous consent also the House has 
sometimes proceeded to legislative business pending consideration of the 
right of a Member to be sworn (I, 151-152).



[[Page 87]]



Sec. 204. Relation of credentials to the right to 
take the oath.

  Although  the House has emphasized the impropriety of swearing-in 
a Member without credentials (I, 162-168), yet it has been done in cases 
wherein the credentials are delayed or lost and there is no doubt of the 
election (I, 85, 176-178; VI, 12, 13), or where the governor of a State 
has declined to give credentials to a person whose election was 
undoubted and uncontested (I, 553). A certificate of election in due 
form having been filed, the Clerk placed the name of the Member-elect on 
the roll, although he was subsequently advised that a State Supreme 
Court had issued a writ restraining the Secretary of State from issuing 
such certificate (Jan. 3, 1949, p. 8). Where the prima facie right is 
contested the Speaker declines to administer the oath (I, 550), but the 
House admits on his prima facie showing and without regard to final 
right a Member-elect from a recognized constituency whose credentials 
are in due form and whose qualifications are unquestioned (I, 528-534). 
If the status of the constituency is in doubt, the House usually defers 
the oath (I, 361, 386, 448, 461). In the 99th Congress, the House 
declined to give prima facie effect to a certificate of election, the 
results of the election being in doubt, and referred the issue of 
initial as well as final right to the Committee on House Administration 
(H. Res. 1, Jan. 3, 1985, pp. 380-87). After a recount of the votes was 
conducted by that committee, the House on its recommendation declared 
the candidate without the certificate entitled to the seat (H. Res. 146, 
May 1, 1985, p. 9998). The House also may defer the oath when a question 
of qualifications arises (I, 474), but it may investigate qualifications 
after the oath is taken (I, 156-159, 420, 462, 481), and after 
investigation unseat the Member by majority vote (I, 428).




Sec. 205. Sanity, loyalty, and incapacity as related 
to the oath.

  Questions  of sanity (I, 441) and loyalty (I, 448) seem to pertain 
to competency to take the oath as distinct from a question of 
qualifications, although there has been not a little debate on this 
subject (I, 479). In one case a Member-elect who had not taken the oath 
was excluded from the House because of disloyalty, where the resolution 
of exclusion and the committee report thereon concluded that he was 
ineligible to take a seat as a Representative under the express 
provisions of section 3 of the 14th amendment (VI, 56-59). This action 
by the House was cited in the Supreme Court decision of Powell v. 
McCormack (395 U.S. 486, 545 fn. 83) which denied the power of the House 
to exclude Members-elect by a majority vote for other than failure to 
meet the express qualifications stated in the Constitution. In Bond v. 
Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966), the Supreme Court held that the exclusion by 
a State legislature of a member-elect of that body was unconstitutional, 
where the legislature had asserted the power to judge the sincerity with 
which the Member-elect could take the oath to support the Constitution 
of the United States. In the 97th Congress, the House declared vacant by 
majority vote the seat of a Member-elect unable to take the oath because 
of illness, where the medical prognosis showed no likelihood of 
improvement to permit the Member-elect to take the oath or assume the 
duties of a Representative (H. Res. 80, Feb. 24, 1981, pp. 2916-18).





 


Sec. 206. Decisions of the Court.

  Decisions  of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
316 (1819); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867); Davis v. 
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Mormon Church  v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 
(1890).



                              ARTICLE VII.


Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the 


Sec. 207. Ratification of the Constitution.

  The  Ratification 
of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the 
Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the 
Same.


    Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand 

    seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United 


[[Page 88]]

    States of

    America the Twelfth In Witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed 


    our Names,


                         Go WASHINGTON--Presidt.  


                                               and Deputy from Virginia.


    [Signed also by the deputies of twelve States.]


John Langdon,                        Nicholas Gilman.

                             New Hampshire.


Nathaniel Gorham,                    Rufus King.

                             Massachusetts.


Wm. Saml. Johnson,                   Roger Sherman.

                              Connecticut.


Alexander Hamilton.

                                New York.


Wil: Livingston,                     Wm. Paterson,

David Brearley,                      Jona: Dayton.

                               New Jersey.


B Franklin,                          Thomas Mifflin,

RobT. Morris,             Geo. Clymer,

Thos. FitzSimons,                    Jared Ingersoll,

James Wilson,                        Gouv Morris.

                              Pennsylvania.


Geo. Read,                           Gunning Bedford jun,

John Dickinson,                      Richard Bassett.

Jaco Broom,

                                Delaware.


James McHenry,                       Dan of ST Thos. Jenifer.

Danl Carroll,

                                Maryland.


John Blair,                          James Madison Jr.

[[Page 89]]

                                Virginia.


Wm. Blount,                          Rich'D. Dobbs Spaight.

Hu Williamson,

                             North Carolina.


J. Rutledge,                         Charles Cotesworth Pinckney,

Charles Pinckney,                    Pierce Butler.

                             South Carolina.


William Few,                         Abr Baldwin.

                                Georgia.




[[Page 90]]
 
  Attest:                            William Jackson, Secretary.


                         Amendments ratified

   articles in addition to, and amendment of, the constitution of the 

  united states of america, proposed by congress, and ratified by the 

      several states pursuant to the fifth article of the original 


                       constitution\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------




  \1\ The first 10 amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States were proposed to the legislatures of the several States by 
the First Congress on September 25, 1789 (this date and the date 
succeeding amendments were proposed is the date of final congressional 
action--signature by the presiding officer of the Senate--as is shown in 
the Senate Journals). They were ratified by the following States, on the 
dates shown, and the notifications by the governors thereof of 
ratification were communicated by the President to Congress: New Jersey, 
November 20, 1789; Maryland, December 19, 1789; North Carolina, December 
22, 1789; South Carolina, January 19, 1790; New Hampshire, January 25, 
1790; Delaware, January 28, 1790; New York, February 27, 1790; 
Pennsylvania, March 10, 1790; Rhode Island, June 7, 1790; Vermont, 
November 3, 1791; and Virginia, December 15, 1791. Ratification was 
completed on December 15, 1791. The amendments were subsequently 
ratified by Massachusetts, March 2, 1939; Georgia, March 18, 1939; and 
Connecticut, April 19, 1939.


                              AMENDMENT I.






Sec. 208. Freedom of religion, of speech, and of 
peaceable assembly.

  Congress  shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably 
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.



                              AMENDMENT II.


[[Page 91]]





Sec. 209. The right to bear arms.

  A  well regulated Militia 
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people 
to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.



                             AMENDMENT III.






Sec. 210. Quartering of soldiers in houses.

  No  soldier 
shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent 
of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by 
law.



                              AMENDMENT IV.






Sec. 211. Security from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.

  The  right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.



                              AMENDMENT V.


[[Page 92]]





Sec. 212. Security as to accusations, trials, and 
property.

  No  person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, 
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, 
when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any 
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of 
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be a 
witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.



                              AMENDMENT VI.






Sec. 213. Right to trial by jury and to confront witnesses 
and secure testimony.

  In  all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of 
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.



                             AMENDMENT VII.






Sec. 214. Jury trial in suits at common law.

  In  suits at 
common law, where the value in Controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, 
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a 
jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, 
than according to the rules of the common law.



<>   Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

[[Page 93]]




                             AMENDMENT VIII.


<>   The enumeration in 
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.




                              AMENDMENT IX.


                              AMENDMENT X.







Sec. 217. Powers reserved to the States.

  The  powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.



                       AMENDMENT XI.\2\



Sec. 218. Extent of the judicial power.

  The  Judicial power 
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law 
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 94]]




  \2\ The 11th amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 
Third Congress on March 11, 1794; and was declared in a message from the 
President to Congress dated the 8th of January, 1798, to have been 
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the States. The dates 
of ratification were: New York, March 27, 1794; Rhode Island, March 31, 
1794; Connecticut, May 8, 1794; New Hampshire, June 16, 1794; 
Massachusetts, June 26, 1794; Vermont, October 28, 1794; Virginia, 
November 18, 1794; Georgia, November 29, 1794; Kentucky, December 7, 
1794; Maryland, December 26, 1794; Delaware, January 23, 1795; and North 
Carolina, February 7, 1795. Ratification was completed on February 7, 
1795. The amendment was subsequently ratified by South Carolina on 
December 4, 1797. New Jersey and Pennsylvania did not take action on the 
amendment.


                      AMENDMENT XII.\3\



Sec. 219. Meeting of the electors and transmission and 
count of their votes.

  The  Electors shall meet in their respective states, 
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at 
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; 
they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and 
in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they 
shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of 
all persons voted for as Vice-President, and the number of votes for 
each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to 
the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the 
President of the Senate;--The President of the Senate shall, in presence 
of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates 
and the votes shall then be counted;-- * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------




[[Page 95]]


---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  \3\ See article II, section 1 of the Constitution. The 12th 
amendment to the Constitution was proposed to the legislatures of the 
several States by the Eighth Congress on December 12, 1803, in lieu of 
the original third paragraph of the first section of the second article, 
and was declared in a proclamation of the Secretary of State, dated the 
25th of September, 1804, to have been ratified by the legislatures of 
three-fourths of the States. The dates of ratification were: North 
Carolina, December 21, 1803; Maryland, December 24, 1803; Kentucky, 
December 27, 1803; Ohio, December 30, 1803; Virginia, December 31, 1803; 
Pennsylvania, January 5, 1804; Vermont, January 30, 1804; New York, 
February 10, 1804; New Jersey, February 22, 1804; Rhode Island, March 
12, 1804; South Carolina, May 15, 1804; Georgia, May 19, 1804; New 
Hampshire, June 15, 1804. Ratification was completed on June 15, 1804. 
The amendment was subsequently ratified by Tennessee on July 27, 1804. 
The amendment was rejected by Delaware, January 18, 1804; Massachusetts, 
February 3, 1804; and by Connecticut at its session begun May 10, 1804.



Sec. 220. The electoral count.

  The  electoral count occurs in 
a joint session of the two Houses in the Hall of the House (III, 1819) 
at 1 p.m. on the sixth day of January succeeding every meeting of 
electors (3 U.S.C. 15). The Vice President, as President of the Senate 
(or the President pro tempore in the Vice President's absence), presides 
over the joint session (3 U.S.C. 15). The date of the count has been 
changed by law as follows: (1) the 1957 count was changed to Monday, 
January 7 (P.L. 84-436); (2) the 1985 count was changed to Monday, 
January 7 (P.L. 98-456); (3) the 1989 count was changed to Wednesday, 
January 4 (P.L. 100-646); and (4) the 1997 count was changed to 
Thursday, January 9 (P.L. 104-296).




[[Page 96]]


  Sections 15-18 of title 3, United States Code, prescribe in detail the 
procedure for the count. Nevertheless, the two Houses traditionally 
adopt a concurrent resolution providing for the meeting in joint session 
to count the vote, for the appointment of tellers, and for the 
declaration of the state of the vote (III, 1961; Deschler, ch. 10, 
Sec. 2.1). Under the law governing the proceedings, the two Houses 
divide to consider an objection to the counting of any electoral vote or 
``other question arising in the matter'' (3 U.S.C. 15-18; Jan. 6, 1969, 
pp. 145-47; Jan. 6, 2001, p. 101; Jan. 6, 2005, p. ----), but only when 
in writing and signed by both a Member and a Senator (Jan. 6, 2001, p. 
101; Jan. 6, 2005, p. ----). Examples of an ``other question arising in 
the matter'' include: (1) an objection for lack of a quorum (Jan. 6, 
2001, p. 101); (2) a motion that either House withdraw from the joint 
session (Jan. 6, 2001, p. 101); and (3) an appeal from a ruling by the 
presiding officer (Jan. 6, 2001, p. 101). Such questions are not 
debatable in the joint session (3 U.S.C. 18; Jan. 6, 2001, p. 101). When 
the two Houses have divided, a motion in the House to lay the objection 
on the table is not in order (Jan. 6, 1969; pp. 169-72). A Vice 
President-elect, as Speaker of the House or as a sitting Vice President, 
has participated in the ceremonies (e.g., VI, 446; Jan. 6, 2005, p. ----
). See Deschler, ch. 10 for further discussion. When addressing a 
controversy over the election of President and Vice President in the 
State of Florida, the Supreme Court indicated its view of a section of 
the statute (3 U.S.C. 5) addressing a determination of controversy as to 
the appointment of electors (Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 
(531 U.S. 70 (2000)). Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that the 
Florida Supreme Court violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th 
amendment by ordering certain counties to conduct manual recounts of the 
votes for President and Vice President without establishing standards 
for those recounts (Bush v. Gore (531 U.S. 98 (2000)).


[[Page 97]]

gible to the Office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-
President of the United States.



Sec. 221. Elections of President and Vice President 
by the House and Senate in certain cases.

  * * * The  person having the greatest 
number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be 
a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person 
have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not 
exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House 
of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. 
But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the 
representation from each State having one vote; a quorum for this 
purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the 
states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. 
And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President 
whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth 
day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as 
President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional 
disability of the President. The person having the greatest number of 
votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be 
a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person 
have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the 
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall 
consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of 
the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person 
constitutionally ineli





Sec. 222. History of original provision for failure of 
electoral college to choose.

  The  20th amendment to the Constitution has 
clarified some of the provisions of the 12th amendment. In 1801 (III, 
1983), the House of Representatives chose a President under article II, 
section 1, clause 3 (see Sec. 152a, supra), the constitutional provision 
superseded by the 12th amendment.








Sec. 223. Occasions of election by House and Senate after 
1803.

  In  1825 the House elected a President under the 12th amendment 
(III, 1985); and in 1837 the Senate elected a Vice President (III, 
1941).



                      AMENDMENT XIII.\4\


[[Page 98]]

exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction.
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Sec. 224. Prohibition of slavery and involuntary 
servitude.

  Section 1.  Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, 
shall


  \4\ The 13th amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 
38th Congress, on February 1, 1865, and was declared, in a proclamation 
of the Secretary of State, dated the 18th of December 1865, to have been 
ratified by the legislatures of 27 of the 36 States. The dates of 
ratification were: Illinois, February 1, 1865; Rhode Island, February 2, 
1865; Michigan, February 2, 1865; Maryland, February 3, 1865; New York, 
February 3, 1865; Pennsylvania, February 3, 1865; West Virginia, 
February 3, 1865; Missouri, February 6, 1865; Maine, February 7, 1865; 
Kansas, February 7, 1865; Massachusetts, February 7, 1865; Virginia, 
February 9, 1865; Ohio, February 16, 1865; Indiana, February 13, 1865; 
Nevada, February 16, 1865; Louisiana, February 17, 1865; Minnesota, 
February 23, 1865; Wisconsin, February 24, 1865; Vermont, March 9, 1865; 
Tennessee, April 7, 1865; Arkansas, April 14, 1865; Connecticut, May 4, 
1865; New Hampshire, July 1, 1865; South Carolina, November 13, 1865; 
Alabama, December 2, 1865; North Carolina, December 4, 1865; and 
Georgia, December 6, 1865. Ratification was completed on December 6, 
1865. The amendment was subsequently ratified by Oregon, December 8, 
1865; California, December 19, 1865; Florida, December 28, 1865 (Florida 
again ratified on June 9, 1868, upon its adoption of a new 
constitution); Iowa, January 15, 1866; New Jersey, January 23, 1866 
(after having rejected the amendment on March 16, 1865); Texas, February 
18, 1870; Delaware, February 12, 1901 (after having rejected the 
amendment on February 8, 1865); Kentucky, March 30, 1976 (after hearing 
rejected the amendment on February 24, 1865). The amendment was rejected 
by Mississippi, December 4, 1865.
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  Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation.


                      AMENDMENT XIV.\5\


[[Page 99]]

State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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Sec. 225. Citizenship security and 
equal protection of citizens.

  Section 1. All  persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of 
the United States and of the


  \5\ The 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 
39th Congress, on June 15, 1866. On July 20, 1868, the Secretary of 
State issued a proclamation that the 14th amendment was a part of the 
Constitution if withdrawals of ratification were ineffective. On July 
21, 1868, Congress adopted and transmitted to the Department of State a 
concurrent resolution declaring that ``the legislatures of the States of 
Connecticut, Tennessee, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, New York, Ohio, 
Illinois, West Virginia, Kansas, Maine, Nevada, Missouri, Indiana, 
Minnesota, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Iowa, Arkansas, 
Florida, North Carolina, Alabama, South Carolina, and Louisiana, being 
three-fourths and more of the several States of the Union, have ratified 
the fourteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States, duly proposed by two-thirds of each House of the Thirty-ninth 
Congress: Therefore Resolved, That said fourteenth article is hereby 
declared to be a part of the Constitution of the United States, and it 
shall be duly promulgated as such by the Secretary of State.'' The 
Secretary of State accordingly issued a proclamation, dated July 28, 
1868, declaring that the proposed 14th amendment had been ratified, in 
the manner hereafter mentioned, by the legislatures of 28 States. The 
dates of ratification were: Connecticut, June 30, 1866; New Hampshire, 
July 6, 1866; Tennessee, July 18, 1866; New Jersey, September 11, 1866 
(subsequently, on February 20, 1868, the legislature rescinded its 
ratification, and on March 24, 1868, readopted its resolution of 
rescission over the Governor's veto, and on April 23, 2003, revoked the 
resolution of rescission); Oregon, September 19, 1866; New York, January 
10, 1867; Ohio, January 11, 1867 (subsequently rescinded its 
ratification on January 13, 1868, and ratified on March 12, 2003); 
Illinois, January 15, 1867; West Virginia, January 16, 1867; Michigan, 
January 16, 1867; Minnesota, January 16, 1867; Kansas, January 17, 1867; 
Maine, January 19, 1867; Nevada, January 22, 1867; Indiana, January 23, 
1867; Missouri, January 25, 1867; Pennsylvania, February 6, 1867; Rhode 
Island, February 7, 1867; Wisconsin, February 13, 1867; Massachusetts, 
March 20, 1867; Nebraska, June 15, 1867; Iowa, March 16, 1868; Arkansas, 
April 6, 1868; Florida, June 9, 1868; North Carolina, July 4, 1868 
(after having rejected the amendment December 14, 1866); Louisiana, July 
9, 1868 (after having rejected the amendment February 6, 1867); South 
Carolina, July 9, 1868 (after having rejected the amendment December 20, 
1866). Ratification was completed on July 9, 1868. The amendment was 
subsequently ratified by Alabama, July 13, 1868; Georgia, July 21, 1868 
(after having rejected it on November 9, 1866); Virginia, October 8, 
1869 (after having rejected it on January 9, 1867); Mississippi, January 
17, 1870; Texas, February 18, 1870 (after having rejected it on October 
27, 1866); Delaware, February 12, 1901 (after having rejected it on 
February 8, 1867); Maryland, April 4, 1959 (after having rejected it on 
March 23, 1867); California, May 6, 1959; Kentucky, March 30, 1976 
(after having rejected it on January 10, 1867).
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[[Page 100]]

twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any 
way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the 
basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which 
the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male 
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citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.



Sec. 226. Apportionment of 
representation.

  Section 2.  Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number 
of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the 
right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President 
and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, 
the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the 
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such 
State, being




Sec. 227. Law governing the establishment of 
districts.

  There  has been a readjustment of House representation each 10 
years except during the period 1911 to 1929 (VI, 41, footnote). From 
March 4, 1913, permanent House membership has remained fixed at 435 (VI, 
40, 41; 37 Stat. 13). Upon admission of Alaska and Hawaii to statehood, 
total membership was temporarily increased to 437 until the next 
reapportionment (72 Stat. 339, 345; 73 Stat. 8). Congress has by law 
provided for automatic apportionment of the 435 Representatives among 
the States according to each census including and after that of 1950 (2 
U.S.C. 2a). The Apportionment Act formerly provided that the districts 
in a State were to be composed of contiguous and compact territory 
containing as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants (I, 
303; VI, 44); but subsequent apportionment Acts, those of 1929 (46 Stat. 
26) and 1941 (55 Stat. 761), omitted such provisions (see Wood v. Broom, 
287 U.S. 1 (1932)).


  Congress has by law provided that for the 91st and subsequent 
Congresses each State entitled to more than one Representative shall 
establish a number of districts equal to the number of such 
Representatives, and that Representatives shall be elected only from the 
single-Member districts so established. (Hawaii and New Mexico were 
excepted from the operation of this statute for the elections to the 
91st Congress by Public Law 90-196; see 2 U.S.C. 2c). After any 
apportionment, until a State is redistricted in a manner provided by its 
own law and in compliance with the congressional mandate, the question 
of whether its Representatives shall be elected by districts, at large, 
or by a combination of both, is determined by the Apportionment Act of 
1941 (2 U.S.C. 2a).


[[Page 101]]

od, known as ``imputation,'' was held to be different than ``sampling,'' 
a method prohibited under section 195 of title 13, United States Code 
(Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002)). The method of apportioning the 
seats in the House is vested exclusively in Congress, and neither States 
nor courts may direct greater or lesser representation than that 
allocated by statute (Deschler, ch 8 Sec. 1). See Deschler, ch. 8 for 
apportionment and districting.
  Under the Apportionment Act, a statistical model known as the ``method 
of equal proportions'' is used to determine the number of 
Representatives to which each State is entitled. Although other methods 
for apportioning House seats may be permitted, the equal proportions 
method chosen by Congress has been upheld under the Constitution and was 
plainly intended to reach as close as practicable the goal of ``one 
person, one vote'' (Massachusetts v. Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. 230 (D. 
Mass. 1992), rev'd on other grounds Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 
788 (1992)). The courts also have recently upheld under Federal law and 
the Constitution a counting methodology used by the Census Bureau in a 
decennial census. This meth



Sec. 228. Questions as to elections.

  The  House has always 
seated Members elected at large in the States, although the law required 
election by districts (I, 310, 519). Questions have arisen from time to 
time when a vacancy has occurred soon after a change in districts, with 
the resulting question whether the vacancy should be filled by election 
in the old or new district (I, 311, 312, 327). The House has declined to 
interfere with the act of a State in changing the boundaries of a 
district after the apportionment has been made (I, 313).


  The Attorney General has stated that all Indians are subject to 
taxation. 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 518 (1940).




Sec. 229. Requirement that districts be equally 
populated.

  The Supreme  Court has ruled that congressional districts must be as 
equally populated as practicable. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 
(1964); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 385 U.S. 450 (1967). The Court has made 
clear that variances in population among congressional districts within 
a State may be considered de minimis only if they cannot practicably be 
avoided. If such variances, no matter how mathematically miniscule, 
could have been reduced or eliminated by a good faith effort, then they 
may be justified only on the basis of a consistent, rational State 
policy. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983). The Court also has made 
evident that it will take judicial review of a claims that apportionment 
schemes lack consistent, rational bases. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 
(1986) (holding political gerrymandering complaint justiciable under 
equal protection clause).



[[Page 102]]

or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-
thirds of each House, remove such disability.

-  Congress <> has by law removed generally the 
disabilities arising from the Civil War (30 Stat. L., p. 432). Soon 
after the war various questions arose under this section (I, 386, 393, 
455, 456). For disloyalty to the United States, for giving aid and 
comfort to a public enemy, for publication of expressions hostile to the 
Government a Member-elect was denied a seat in the House (VI, 56, 58). 
As to the meaning of the words ``aid or comfort'' as used in the 14th 
amendment (VI, 57).



Sec. 230. Loyalty as a qualification of Senators 
and Representatives.

  Section 3.  No person shall be a Senator or Representative in 
Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any 
office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, 
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an 
officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, 
or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the 
Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or 
rebellion against the same, or given aid



<>   Section 5. The 
Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article.



Sec. 232. Validity of the national debt, etc.

  Section 4.  The 
validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for 
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be 
questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or 
pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion 
against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of 
any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held 
illegal and void.



[[Page 103]]




  Congress may legislate under this section to protect voting rights by 
preempting State qualifications for electors which are discriminatory 
(Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)), and may lower the voting 
age in Federal (but not State) elections (Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 
112 (1970)).


                       AMENDMENT XV.\6\



Sec. 234. Suffrage not to be abridged for race, 
color, etc.

  Section 1.  The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
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  \6\ The 15th amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 
40th Congress on February 26, 1869, and was declared, in a proclamation 
of the Secretary of State, dated March 30, 1870, to have been ratified 
by the legislatures of 29 of the 37 States. The dates of these 
ratifications were: Nevada, March 1, 1869; West Virginia, March 3, 1869; 
North Carolina, March 5, 1869; Illinois, March 5, 1869; Louisiana, March 
5, 1869; Michigan, March 8, 1869; Wisconsin, March 9, 1869; Maine, March 
11, 1869; Massachusetts, March 12, 1869; Arkansas, March 15, 1869; South 
Carolina, March 15, 1869; Pennsylvania, March 25, 1869; New York, April 
14, 1869 (subsequently withdrew its consent to the ratification on 
January 5, 1870 but rescinded this action on March 30, 1970); Indiana, 
May 14, 1869; Connecticut, May 19, 1869; Florida, June 14, 1869; New 
Hampshire, July 1, 1869; Virginia, October 8, 1869; Vermont, October 20, 
1869; Alabama, November 16, 1869; Missouri, January 7, 1870 (Missouri 
had ratified the first section of the 15th amendment on March 1, 1869, 
but had failed to include in its ratification the second section of the 
amendment); Minnesota, January 13, 1870; Mississippi, January 17, 1870; 
Rhode Island, January 18, 1870; Kansas, January 19, 1870; Ohio, January 
27, 1870 (after having rejected the amendment April 30, 1869); Georgia, 
February 2, 1870; Iowa, February 3, 1870. Ratification was completed on 
February 3, 1870, unless the withdrawal of ratification by New York was 
effective; in which event ratification was completed on February 17, 
1870, when ratified by Nebraska. The amendment was subsequently ratified 
by Texas, February 18, 1870; New Jersey, February 15, 1871 (after having 
rejected it on February 7, 1870); Delaware, February 12, 1901 (after 
having rejected it on March 18, 1869); Oregon, February 24, 1959; 
California, April 3, 1962 (after having rejected it on January 28, 
1870); Maryland, May 7, 1973 (after having rejected it on February 4 and 
February 26, 1870); Kentucky, March 30, 1976 (after having rejected it 
on March 11 and March 12, 1869); and Tennessee, April 2, 1997, (after 
having rejected it on November 16, 1869).
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[[Page 104]]




  Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation.


                      AMENDMENT XVI.\7\



Sec. 235. Taxes on incomes.

  The  Congress shall have power to 
lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without 
apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census 
or enumeration.
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[[Page 105]]




  \7\ The 16th amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 
61st Congress on July 16, 1909, and was declared, in a proclamation of 
the Secretary of State dated February 25, 1913, to have been ratified by 
the legislatures of 36 of the 48 States. The dates of ratification were: 
Alabama, August 10, 1909; Kentucky, February 8, 1910; South Carolina, 
February 19, 1910; Illinois, March 1, 1910; Mississippi, March 7, 1910; 
Oklahoma, March 10, 1910; Maryland, April 8, 1910; Georgia, August 3, 
1910; Texas, August 16, 1910; Ohio, January 19, 1911; Idaho, January 20, 
1911; Oregon, January 23, 1911; Washington, January 26, 1911; Montana, 
January 30, 1911; Indiana, January 30, 1911; California, January 31, 
1911; Nevada, January 31, 1911; South Dakota, February 3, 1911; 
Nebraska, February 9, 1911; North Carolina, February 11, 1911; Colorado, 
February 15, 1911; North Dakota, February 17, 1911; Kansas, February 18, 
1911; Michigan, February 23, 1911; Iowa, February 24, 1911; Missouri, 
March 16, 1911; Maine, March 31, 1911; Tennessee, April 7, 1911; 
Arkansas, April 22, 1911 (after having rejected it at the session begun 
January 9, 1911); Wisconsin, May 26, 1911; New York, July 12, 1911; 
Arizona, April 6, 1912; Minnesota, June 11, 1912; Louisiana, June 28, 
1912; West Virginia, January 31, 1913; Delaware, February 3, 1913; 
Wyoming, February 3, 1913; New Mexico, February 3, 1913. Ratification 
was completed on February 3, 1913. The amendment was subsequently 
ratified by New Jersey, February 4, 1913; Vermont, February 19, 1913 
(after having rejected the amendment January 17, 1911); Massachusetts, 
March 4, 1913; New Hampshire, March 7, 1913 (after having rejected the 
amendment March 2, 1911). The amendment was rejected by Rhode Island, 
April 29, 1910; Utah, March 9, 1911; Connecticut, June 28, 1911; and 
Florida, May 31, 1913. Pennsylvania and Virginia did not complete 
action.


                      AMENDMENT XVII.\8\



Sec. 236. Election of Senators by direct vote.

  The  Senate of 
the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, 
elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall 
have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications 
requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State 
legislatures.
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  \8\ See article I, section 3 of the Constitution. The 17th 
amendment to the Constitution was proposed to the legislatures of the 
several States by the 62d Congress on May 15, 1912, and was declared, in 
a proclamation by the Secretary of State dated May 31, 1913, to have 
been ratified by the legislatures of 36 of the 48 States. The dates of 
ratification were: Massachusetts, May 22, 1912; Arizona, June 3, 1912; 
Minnesota, June 10, 1912; New York, January 15, 1913; Kansas, January 
17, 1913; Oregon, January 23, 1913; North Carolina, January 25, 1913; 
California, January 28, 1913; Michigan, January 28, 1913; Iowa, January 
30, 1913; Montana, January 30, 1913; Idaho, January 31, 1913; West 
Virginia, February 4, 1913; Colorado, February 5, 1913; Nevada, February 
6, 1913; Texas, February 7, 1913; Washington, February 7, 1913; Wyoming, 
February 8, 1913; Arkansas, February 11, 1913; Maine, February 11, 1913; 
Illinois, February 13, 1913; North Dakota, February 14, 1913; Wisconsin, 
February 18, 1913; Indiana, February 19, 1913; New Hampshire, February 
19, 1913; Vermont, February 19, 1913; South Dakota, February 19, 1913; 
Oklahoma, February 24, 1913; Ohio, February 25, 1913; Missouri, March 7, 
1913; New Mexico, March 13, 1913; Nebraska, March 14, 1913; New Jersey, 
March 17, 1913; Tennessee, April 1, 1913; Pennsylvania, April 2, 1913; 
Connecticut, April 8, 1913. Ratification was completed on April 8, 1913. 
The amendment was subsequently ratified by Louisiana, June 11, 1914; 
North Carolina, May 3, 1989; Alabama, April 16, 2002. The amendment was 
rejected by Utah, February 26, 1913; Delaware, March 18, 1913. Florida, 
Georgia, Rhode Island, and South Carolina did not complete action.
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[[Page 106]]

thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the 
vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
  When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the 
Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of 
election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any 
State may empower the executive


  This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or 
term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the 
Constitution.



Sec. 237. Filling vacancies in the Senate.

  Senator  Rebecca 
L. Felton, appointed during the recess of the Senate on October 3, 1922, 
to fill a vacancy, was the first woman to sit in the Senate (VI, 156). 
Senator Walter F. George was elected to fill the vacancy on Novem-
ber 7, 1922. Mrs. Felton took the oath of office on November 21, 1922, 
and Senator George took the oath November 22, 1922 (VI, 156). Discussion 
as to the term of service of a Senator appointed by a State executive to 
fill a vacancy (VI, 156).








Sec. 238. Qualifications of electors.

  The  right of an 
elector to vote for a Senator is fundamentally derived from the United 
States Constitution (United States v. Aczel 219 F.2d 917 (1915)) and may 
not be denied in a discriminatory fashion (Chapman v. King, 154 F.2d 460 
(1946), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 800 (1946); Forssenius v. Harman, 235 F. 
Supp. 66 (1964), affd., 380 U.S. 529 (1965)).



                     AMENDMENT XVIII.\9\


[[Page 107]]

cating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation 
thereof from the United States and all territories subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.
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Sec. 239. Prohibition of intoxicating 
liquors.

  Section 1.  [After one year from the ratification of this article the 
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxi


  \9\ See amendment XXI, repealing this amendment. The 18th 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States was proposed to the 
legislatures of the several States by the 65th Congress on December 18, 
1917, and was declared in a proclamation by the Secretary of State dated 
January 29, 1919, to have been ratified by the legislatures of 36 of the 
48 States. The dates of these ratifications were: Mississippi, January 
8, 1918; Virginia, January 11, 1918; Kentucky, January 14, 1918; North 
Dakota, January 25, 1918; South Carolina, January 29, 1918; Maryland, 
February 13, 1918; Montana, February 19, 1918; Texas, March 4, 1918; 
Delaware, March 18, 1918; South Dakota, March 20, 1918; Massachusetts, 
April 2, 1918; Arizona, May 24, 1918; Georgia, June 26, 1918; Louisiana, 
August 3, 1918; Florida, December 3, 1918; Michigan, January 2, 1919; 
Ohio, January 7, 1919; Oklahoma, January 7, 1919; Idaho, January 8, 
1919; Maine, January 8, 1919; West Virginia, January 9, 1919; 
California, January 13, 1919; Tennessee, January 13, 1919; Washington, 
January 13, 1919; Arkansas, January 14, 1919; Kansas, January 14, 1919; 
Alabama, January 15, 1919; Colorado, January 15, 1919; Iowa, January 15, 
1919; New Hampshire, January 15, 1919; Oregon, January 15, 1919; 
Nebraska, January 16, 1919; North Carolina, January 16, 1919; Utah, 
January 16, 1919; Missouri, January 16, 1919; Wyoming, January 16, 1919. 
Ratification was completed on January 16, 1919. The amendment was 
subsequently ratified by Minnesota, January 17, 1919; Wisconsin, January 
17, 1919; New Mexico, January 20, 1919; Nevada, January 21, 1919; New 
York, January 29, 1919; Vermont, January 29, 1919; Pennsylvania, 
February 25, 1919; Connecticut, May 6, 1919; and New Jersey, March 9, 
1922. Rhode Island rejected the amendment.
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  Section 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent 
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.





  Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been 
ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the 
several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from 
the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.]


                      AMENDMENT XIX.\10\



Sec. 240. Womens suffrage.

  The  right of citizens 
of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or by any State on account of sex.
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[[Page 108]]

  \10\ The 19th amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 
66th Congress on June 5, 1919, and was declared in a proclamation by the 
Secretary of State dated August 26, 1920, to have been ratified by the 
legislatures of 36 of the 48 States. The dates of these ratifications 
were: Illinois, June 10, 1919 (and that State readopted its resolution 
of ratification June 17, 1919); Michigan, June 10, 1919; Wisconsin, June 
10, 1919; Kansas, June 16, 1919; New York, June 16, 1919; Ohio, June 16, 
1919; Pennsylvania, June 24, 1919; Massachusetts, June 25, 1919; Texas, 
June 28, 1919; Iowa, July 2, 1919; Missouri, July 3, 1919; Arkansas, 
July 28, 1919; Montana, August 2, 1919; Nebraska, August 2, 1919; 
Minnesota, September 8, 1919; New Hampshire, September 10, 1919; Utah, 
October 2, 1919; California, November 1, 1919; Maine, November 5, 1919; 
North Dakota, December 1, 1919; South Dakota, December 4, 1919; 
Colorado, December 15, 1919; Kentucky, January 6, 1920; Rhode Island, 
January 6, 1920; Oregon, January 13, 1920; Indiana, January 16, 1920; 
Wyoming, January 27, 1920; Nevada, February 7, 1920; New Jersey, 
February 9, 1920; Idaho, February 11, 1920; Arizona, February 12, 1920; 
New Mexico, February 21, 1920; Oklahoma, February 28, 1920; West 
Virginia, March 10, 1920; Washington, March 22, 1920; Tennessee, August 
28, 1920. Ratification was completed on August 28, 1920. The amendment 
was subsequently ratified by Connecticut, September 14, 1920 (and that 
State reaffirmed on September 21, 1920); Vermont, February 8, 1921; 
Delaware, March 6, 1923 (after having rejected the amendment on June 2, 
1920); Maryland, March 29, 1941 (after having rejected the amendment on 
February 24, 1920; ratification certified February 25, 1958); Virginia, 
February 21, 1952 (after having rejected the amendment February 12, 
1920); Alabama, September 8, 1953 (after having rejected the amendment 
September 22, 1919); Florida, May 13, 1969; South Carolina, July 1, 1969 
(after having rejected the amendment on January 28, 1920); Georgia, 
February 20, 1970 (after having rejected the amendment on July 24, 
1919); Louisiana, June 11, 1970 (after having rejected it on July 1, 
1920); North Carolina, May 6, 1971; Mississippi, March 22, 1984 (after 
having rejected the amendment on March 29, 1920).





  Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation.


                      AMENDMENT XX.\11\


[[Page 109]]

tives at noon on the 3d day of January, of the years in which such terms 
would have ended if this article had not been ratified; and the terms of 
their successors shall then begin.
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Sec. 241. Commencement of terms of Pres., Vice 
Pres., Senators, and Representatives.

  Section 1.  The terms of the President and 
Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the 
terms of Senators and Representa


  \11\ See article I, section 4 of the Constitution. The 20th 
amendment to the Constitution was proposed to the legislatures of the 
several States by the 72d Congress, on March 3, 1932, and was declared 
in a proclamation by the Secretary of State dated February 6, 1933, to 
have been ratified by the legislatures of 36 of the 48 States. The dates 
of these ratifications were: Virginia, March 4, 1932; New York, March 
11, 1932; Mississippi, March 16, 1932; Arkansas, March 17, 1932; 
Kentucky, March 17, 1932; New Jersey, March 21, 1932; South Carolina, 
March 25, 1932; Michigan, March 31, 1932; Maine, April 1, 1932; Rhode 
Island, April 14, 1932; Illinois, April 21, 1932; Louisiana, June 22, 
1932; West Virginia, July 30, 1932; Pennsylvania, August 11, 1932; 
Indiana, August 15, 1932; Texas, September 7, 1932; Alabama, September 
13, 1932; California, January 4, 1933; North Carolina, January 5, 1933; 
North Dakota, January 9, 1933; Minnesota, January 12, 1933; Montana, 
January 13, 1933; Nebraska, January 13, 1933; Oklahoma, January 13, 
1933; Arizona, January 13, 1933; Kansas, January 16, 1933; Oregon, 
January 16, 1933; Wyoming, January 19, 1933; Delaware, January 19, 1933; 
Washington, January 19, 1933; South Dakota, January 20, 1933; Tennessee, 
January 20, 1933; Iowa, January 20, 1933; Idaho, January 21, 1933; New 
Mexico, January 21, 1933; Ohio, January 23, 1933; Utah, January 23, 
1933; Missouri, January 23, 1933; Georgia, January 23, 1933. 
Ratification was completed on January 23, 1933. The amendment was 
subsequently ratified by Massachusetts, January 24, 1933; Wisconsin, 
January 24, 1933; Colorado, January 24, 1933; Nevada, January 26, 1933; 
Connecticut, January 27, 1933; New Hampshire, January 31, 1933; Vermont, 
February 2, 1933; Maryland, March 24, 1933; Florida, April 26, 1933.

  The ratification of this amendment to the Constitution shortened the 
first term of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Vice President John N. 
Garner, and the terms of all Senators and Representatives of the 73d 
Congress.
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Sec. 242. Meeting of Congress.

  Section 2.  The Congress shall 
assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at 
noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a 
different day.



[[Page 110]]

  Before the ratification of the 20th amendment Congress met on the 
first Monday in December as provided in article I, section 4, of the 
Constitution. For discussion of the term of Congress before and pursuant 
to the 20th amendment, see Sec. 6, supra (accompanying art. I, sec. 2, 
cl. 1), and Deschler, ch. 1.

  Pursuant to section 2 of the 20th amendment, a regular session of a 
Congress must begin at noon on January 3 of every year unless Congress 
sets a different date by law, and if the House is in session at that 
time the Speaker declares the House adjourned sine die without a motion 
from the floor, in order that the next regular session of that Congress, 
or the first session of the next Congress (as the case may be) may 
assemble at noon on that day (Jan. 3, 1981, p. 3774; Jan. 3, 1996, pp. 
35, 36).


-  Section 3. <> If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of 
the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President 
elect shall become President. If a President shall not have been chosen 
before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President 
elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall 
act as President until a President

[[Page 111]]

shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the case 
wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have 
qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in 
which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act 
accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.



Sec. 243. Laws appointing different day for 
convening.

  Since  ratification, laws appointing a different day for 
assembling have been enacted as follows: Public Law 74-120, Jan. 5, 
1937; Public Law 77-395, Jan. 5, 1942; Public Law 77-819, Jan. 6, 1943; 
Public Law 78-210, Jan. 10, 1944; Public Law 79-289, Jan. 14, 1946; 
Public Law 80-358, Jan. 6, 1948; Public Law 82-244, Jan. 8, 1952; Public 
Law 83-199, Jan. 6, 1954; Public Law 83-700, Jan. 5, 1955; Public Law 
85-290, Jan. 7, 1958; Public Law 85-819, Jan. 7, 1959; Public Law 86-
305, Jan. 6, 1960; Public Law 87-348, Jan. 10, 1962; Public Law 87-864, 
Jan. 9, 1963; Public Law 88-247, Jan. 7, 1964; Public Law 88-649, Jan. 
4, 1965; Public Law 89-340, Jan. 10, 1966; Public Law 89-704, Jan. 10, 
1967; Public Law 90-230, Jan. 15, 1968; Public Law 91-182, Jan. 19, 
1970; Public Law 91-643, Jan. 21, 1971; Public Law 92-217, Jan. 18, 
1972; Public Law 93-196, Jan. 21, 1974; Public Law 93-553, Jan. 14, 
1975; Public Law 94-186, Jan. 19, 1976; Public Law 94-494, Jan. 4, 1977; 
Public Law 95-594, Jan. 15, 1979; Public Law 96-566, Jan. 5, 1981; 
Public Law 97-133, Jan. 25, 1982; Public Law 98-179, Jan. 23, 1984; 
Public Law 99-379, Jan. 21, 1986; Public Law 99-613, Jan. 6, 1987; 
Public Law 100-229, Jan. 25, 1988; Public Law 101-228, Jan. 23, 1990; 
Public Law 102-475, Jan. 5, 1993; Public Law 103-395, Jan. 4, 1995; 
Public Law 104-296, Jan. 7, 1997; Public Law 105-140, Jan. 27, 1998; 
Public Law 105-350, Jan. 6, 1999; Public Law 106-127, Jan. 24, 2000; 
Public Law 107-328, Jan. 7, 2003; Public Law 108-181, Jan. 20, 2004; 
Public Law 108-433, Jan. 4, 2005. Such laws for the convening of a 
second session of a Congress may provide for possible earlier assembly 
by joint-leadership recall (see, e.g., Public Law 107-98, Jan. 23, 2002; 
Public Law 108-433, Jan. 4, 2005).




Sec. 245. Statutory succession and the 25th 
amendment.

  Congress  provided by law in 1947 for the performance of the duties 
of the President in case of removal, death, resignation or inability, 
both of the President and Vice President (3 U.S.C. 19). Earlier 
succession statutes covering the periods 1792-1886 and 1887-1948 can be 
found in 18 Stat. 21, and 24 Stat. 1, respectively. Also see the 25th 
amendment to the Constitution, relating to vacancies in the Office of 
Vice President and Presidential inability.


  Before the 20th amendment there was no provision in the Constitution 
to take care of a case wherein the President-elect was disqualified or 
had died.




Sec. 246. Congress to provide for case wherein 
death occurs among those from whom House chooses a President.

  Section 4.  The 
Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the 
persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a President 
whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the 
case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may choose 
a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon 
them.



  The above section changes the 12th amendment insofar as it gives 
Congress the power to provide by law the manner in which the House 
should proceed in the event no candidate had a majority and one of the 
three highest on the list of those voted for as President had died.


[[Page 112]]


  Section 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of 
October following the ratification of this article.





  Section 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been 
ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of 
three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of 
its submission.


                      AMENDMENT XXI.\12\



Sec. 247. Repeal of prohibition.

  Section 1.  The eighteenth 
article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby 
repealed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


  \12\ The 21st amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States was proposed to conventions of the several States by the 72d 
Congress on February 20, 1933, and was declared in a proclamation by the 
Acting Secretary of State dated December 5, 1933, to have been ratified 
by conventions in 36 of the 48 States. The dates of these ratifications 
were: Michigan, April 10, 1933; Wisconsin, April 25, 1933; Rhode Island, 
May 8, 1933; Wyoming, May 25, 1933; New Jersey, June 1, 1933; Delaware, 
June 24, 1933; Massachusetts, June 26, 1933; Indiana, June 26, 1933; New 
York, June 27, 1933; Illinois, July 10, 1933; Iowa, July 10, 1933; 
Connecticut, July 11, 1933; New Hampshire, July 11, 1933; California, 
July 24, 1933; West Virginia, July 25, 1933; Arkansas, August 1, 1933; 
Oregon, August 7, 1933; Alabama, August 8, 1933; Tennessee, August 11, 
1933; Missouri, August 29, 1933; Arizona, September 5, 1933; Nevada, 
September 5, 1933; Vermont, September 23, 1933; Colorado, September 26, 
1933; Washington, October 3, 1933; Minnesota, October 10, 1933; Idaho, 
October 17, 1933; Maryland, October 18, 1933; Virginia, October 25, 
1933; New Mexico, November 2, 1933; Florida, November 14, 1933; Texas, 
November 24, 1933; Kentucky, November 27, 1933; Ohio, December 5, 1933; 
Pennsylvania, December 5, 1933; Utah, December 5, 1933. The amendment 
was subsequently ratified by Maine on December 6, 1933; Montana, August 
6, 1934. The convention held in the State of South Carolina on December 
4, 1933, rejected the 21st amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



Sec. 248. Transportation into States 
prohibited.

  Section 2.  The transportation or importation into any State, 
Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use 
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is 
hereby prohibited.



[[Page 113]]

ment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as 
provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the 
submission hereof to the States by the Congress.




  Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been 
ratified as an amend


                     AMENDMENT XXII.\13\


[[Page 114]]

and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office of 
President, or acting as President, during the term within which this 
Article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting 
as President during the remainder of such term.
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Sec. 249. No person shall be elected President more 
than twice.

  Section 1.  No person shall be elected to the office of the President 
more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or 
acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some 
other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the 
President more than once. But this Article shall not apply to any person 
holding the office of President when this Article was proposed by the 
Congress,


  \13\ The 22d amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 
80th Congress on March 24, 1947, and was declared by the Administrator 
of General Services, in a proclamation dated March 1, 1951, to have been 
ratified by the legislatures of 36 of the 48 States. The dates of these 
ratifications were: Maine, March 31, 1947; Michigan, March 31, 1947; 
Iowa, April 1, 1947; Kansas, April 1, 1947; New Hampshire, April 1, 
1947; Delaware, April 2, 1947; Illinois, April 3, 1947; Oregon, April 3, 
1947; Colorado, April 12, 1947; California, April 15, 1947; New Jersey, 
April, 15, 1947; Vermont, April 15, 1947; Ohio, April 16, 1947; 
Wisconsin, April 16, 1947; Pennsylvania, April 29, 1947; Connecticut, 
May 21, 1947; Missouri, May 22, 1947; Nebraska, May 23, 1947; Virginia, 
January 28, 1948; Mississippi, February 12, 1948; New York, March 9, 
1948; South Dakota, January 21, 1949; North Dakota, February 25, 1949; 
Louisiana, May 17, 1950; Montana, January 25, 1951; Indiana, January 29, 
1951; Idaho, January 30, 1951; New Mexico, February 12, 1951; Wyoming, 
February 12, 1951; Arkansas, February 15, 1951; Georgia, February 17, 
1951; Tennessee, February 20, 1951; Texas, February 22, 1951; Nevada, 
February 26, 1951; Utah, February 26, 1951; Minnesota, February 27, 
1951. Ratification was completed February 27, 1951. The amendment was 
subsequently ratified by North Carolina, February 28, 1951; South 
Carolina, March 13, 1951; Maryland, March 14, 1951; Florida, April 16, 
1951; Alabama, May 4, 1951.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------





  Section 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been 
ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of 
three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of 
its submission to the States by the Congress.


                     AMENDMENT XXIII.\14\



Sec. 250. Representation in the Electoral College 
to the District of Columbia.

  Section 1.  The District constituting the seat of 
Government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as the 
Congress may direct:
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[[Page 115]]

  \14\ The 23d amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 
86th Congress on June 17, 1960, and was declared by the Administrator of 
General Services, in a proclamation dated April 3, 1961, to have been 
ratified by the legislatures of 39 of the 50 States. The dates of these 
ratifications were: Hawaii, June 23, 1960; Massachusetts, August 22, 
1960; New Jersey, December 19, 1960; New York, January 17, 1961; 
California, January 19, 1961; Oregon, January 27, 1961; Maryland, 
January 30, 1961; Idaho, January 31, 1961; Maine, January 31, 1961; 
Minnesota, January 31, 1961; New Mexico, February 1, 1961; Nevada, 
February 2, 1961; Montana, February 26, 1961; Colorado, February 8, 
1961; Washington, February 9, 1961; West Virginia, February 9, 1961; 
Alaska, February 10, 1961; Wyoming, February 13, 1961; South Dakota, 
February 14, 1961; Delaware, February 20, 1961; Utah, February 21, 1961; 
Wisconsin, February 21, 1961; Pennsylvania, February 28, 1961; Indiana, 
March 3, 1961; North Dakota, March 3, 1961; Tennessee, March 6, 1961; 
Michigan, March 8, 1961; Connecticut, March 9, 1961; Arizona, March 10, 
1961; Illinois, March 14, 1961; Nebraska, March 15, 1961; Vermont, March 
15, 1961; Iowa, March 16, 1961; Missouri, March 20, 1961; Oklahoma, 
March 21, 1961; Rhode Island, March 22, 1961; Kansas, March 29, 1961; 
and Ohio, March 29, 1961. Ratification was completed March 29, 1961. The 
amendment was subsequently ratified by New Hampshire on March 30, 1961 
(when that State annulled and then repeated its ratification of March 
29, 1961). Arkansas rejected the amendment January 24, 1961.

  A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the 
whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the 
District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than 
the least populous State; they shall be in addition to those appointed 
by the States, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the 
election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a 
State; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as 
provided by the twelfth article of amendment.





  Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation.


                     AMENDMENT XXIV.\15\


[[Page 116]]

or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of 
failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


Sec. 251. Right to vote not denied for failure to 
pay poll tax.

  Section 1.  The right of citizens of the United States to vote in 
any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for 
electors for President



  \15\ The 24th amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 
87th Congress on August 28, 1962, and was declared by the Administrator 
of General Services, in a proclamation dated February 4, 1964, to have 
been ratified by the legislatures of 38 of the 50 States. The dates of 
these ratifications were: Illinois, November 14, 1962; New Jersey, 
December 3, 1962; Oregon, January 25, 1963; Montana, January 28, 1963; 
West Virginia, February 1, 1963; New York, February 4, 1963; Maryland, 
February 6, 1963; California, February 7, 1963; Alaska, February 11, 
1963; Rhode Island, February 14, 1963; Indiana, February 19, 1963; Utah, 
February 20, 1963; Michigan, February 20, 1963; Colorado, February 21, 
1963; Ohio, February 27, 1963; Minnesota, February 27, 1963; New Mexico, 
March 5, 1963; Hawaii, March 6, 1963; North Dakota, March 7, 1963; 
Idaho, March 8, 1963; Washington, March 14, 1963; Vermont, March 15, 
1963; Nevada, March 19, 1963; Connecticut, March 20, 1963; Tennessee, 
March 21, 1963; Pennsylvania, March 25, 1963; Wisconsin, March 26, 1963; 
Kansas, March 28, 1963; Massachusetts, March 28, 1963; Nebraska, April 
4, 1963; Florida, April 18, 1963; Iowa, April 24, 1963; Delaware, May 1, 
1963; Missouri, May 13, 1963; New Hampshire, June 12, 1963; Kentucky, 
June 27, 1963; Maine, January 16, 1964; and South Dakota, January 23, 
1964. Ratification was completed on January 23, 1964. Mississippi 
rejected the amendment on December 20, 1962.


  Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965); Harper v. Virginia State 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).





  Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation.


                      AMENDMENT XXV.\16\



Sec. 252. Presidential succession and 
inability.

  Section 1.  In case of the removal of the President from office or of 
his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 117]]

  \16\ The 25th amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 
89th Congress on July 7, 1965, and was declared by the Administrator of 
General Services, in a proclamation dated February 23, 1967, to have 
been ratified by the legislatures of 39 of the 50 States. The dates of 
these ratifications were: Nebraska, July 12, 1965; Wisconsin, July 13, 
1965; Oklahoma, July 16, 1965; Massachusetts, August 9, 1965; 
Pennsylvania, August 18, 1965; Kentucky, September 15, 1965; Arizona, 
September 22, 1965; Michigan, October 5, 1965; Indiana, October 20, 
1965; California, October 21, 1965; Arkansas, November 4, 1965; New 
Jersey, November 29, 1965; Delaware, December 7, 1965; Utah, January 17, 
1966; West Virginia, January 20, 1966; Maine, January 24, 1966; Rhode 
Island, January 28, 1966; Colorado, February 3, 1966; New Mexico, 
February 3, 1966; Kansas, February 8, 1966; Vermont, February 10, 1966; 
Alaska, February 18, 1966; Idaho, March 2, 1966; Hawaii, March 3, 1966; 
Virginia, March 8, 1966; Mississippi, March 10, 1966; New York, March 
14, 1966; Maryland, March 23, 1966; Missouri, March 30, 1966; New 
Hampshire, June 13, 1966; Louisiana, July 5, 1966; Tennessee, January 
12, 1967; Wyoming, January 25, 1967; Iowa, January 26, 1967; Washington, 
January 26, 1967; Oregon, February 2, 1967; Minnesota, February 10, 
1967; Nevada, February 10, 1967. Ratification was completed February 10, 
1967. The amendment was subsequently ratified by Connecticut, February 
14, 1967; Montana, February 15, 1967; South Dakota, March 6, 1967; Ohio, 
March 7, 1967; Alabama, March 14, 1967; North Carolina, March 22, 1967; 
Illinois, March 22, 1967; Texas, April 25, 1967; Florida, May 25, 1967.



Sec. 253. Confirmation by House and Senate of 
nominee to fill vice presidential vacancy.

  Section 2.  Whenever there is a vacancy 
in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice 
President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of 
both Houses of Congress.




Sec. 254. President's declaration of 
disability.

  Section 3.  Whenever the President transmits to the President pro 
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and 
duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written 
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged 
by the Vice President as Acting President.



[[Page 118]]

to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President 
shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting 
President.


Sec. 255. Determination of Presidential inability 
and Vice President as Acting President.

  Section 4.  Whenever the Vice President 
and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive 
departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, 
transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives their written declaration that the 
President is unable




[[Page 119]]


  Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore 
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his 
written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers 
and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of 
either the principal officers of the executive department or of such 
other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to 
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable 
to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress 
shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that 
purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after 
receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in 
session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, 
determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice 
President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; 
otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his 
office.



Sec. 256. Instances where House and Senate have 
confirmed nominee as Vice President; temporary incapacity of 
President.

  Congress  has twice performed its responsibility under section two of 
the 25th amendment. On October 13, 1973, the Speaker laid before the 
House a message from President Nixon transmitting his nomination of 
Gerald R. Ford, Minority Leader in the House of Representatives, to be 
Vice President of the United States, Vice President Agnew having 
resigned on October 10, 1973. The Speaker referred the nomination to the 
Committee on the Judiciary, which under clause 1(k)(14) of rule X has 
jurisdiction over matters relating to Presidential succession (Oct. 13, 
1973, p. 34032). The nomination of Mr. Ford to be Vice President was 
confirmed by the Senate on November 27, 1973 (p. 38225) and by the House 
on December 6, 1973 (p. 39900), and Vice President Ford was sworn in in 
the Chamber of the House of Representatives on December 6 (p. 39925). 
Subsequently, President Nixon resigned from office by delivering his 
written resignation into the Office of the Secretary of State, pursuant 
to 3 U.S.C. 20, on August 9, 1974. Pursuant to section one of the 25th 
amendment, Vice President Ford became President, and was sworn in in the 
East Room at the White House. He nominated Nelson A. Rockefeller to be 
Vice President which nomination was received in the House of 
Representatives and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary on August 
20, 1974; the nomination was confirmed by the Senate on December 10, 
1974 (p. 38936) and by the House on December 19, 1974 (p. 41516), and 
Vice President Rockefeller was sworn in in the Senate Chamber on 
December 19, 1974 (p. 41181). On both instances, the House received the 
message from the Senate, announcing that body's confirmation of the 
nominee for Vice President, following the vote on confirmation by the 
House.



[[Page 120]]




  The Chair laid before the House communications from the President 
pursuant to section 3 of this amendment as follows: First, before 
undergoing sedation for a medical procedure, declaring his impending 
inability to discharge the constitutional powers and duties of the 
Office of President and advising that the Vice President would discharge 
those responsibilities as Acting President until the President declared 
his ability to resume that role; and second (after recovering from the 
sedation and the medical procedure) declaring his ability to resume the 
discharge the constitutional powers and duties of the Office of 
President, and advising that he was doing so immediately (July 15, 1985, 
p. 18955; July 8, 2002, p. ----).


                     AMENDMENT XXVI.\17\



Sec. 257. Right to vote extended to persons 18 
years of age or older.

  Section 1.  The right of citizens of the United States, who 
are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


  \17\ The 26th amendment to the Constitution was proposed by 
the Congress on March 23, 1971. It was declared, in a certificate of the 
Administrator of General Services, dated July 5, 1971, to have been 
ratified by the legislatures of 39 of the 50 States. The dates of 
ratification were: Connecticut, March 23, 1971; Delaware, March 23, 
1971; Minnesota, March 23, 1971; Tennessee, March 23, 1971; Washington, 
March 23, 1971; Hawaii, March 24, 1971; Massachusetts, March 24, 1971; 
Montana, March 29, 1971; Arkansas, March 30, 1971; Idaho, March 30, 
1971; Iowa, March 30, 1971; Nebraska, April 2, 1971; New Jersey, April 
3, 1971; Kansas, April 7, 1971; Michigan, April 7, 1971; Alaska, April 
8, 1971; Maryland, April 8, 1971; Indiana, April 8, 1971; Maine, April 
9, 1971; Vermont, April 16, 1971; Louisiana, April 17, 1971; California, 
April 19, 1971; Colorado, April 27, 1971; Pennsylvania, April 27, 1971; 
Texas, April 27, 1971; South Carolina, April 28, 1971; West Virginia, 
April 28, 1971; New Hampshire, May 13, 1971; Arizona, May 14, 1971; 
Rhode Island, May 27, 1971; New York, June 2, 1971; Oregon, June 4, 
1971; Missouri, June 14, 1971; Wisconsin, June 22, 1971; Illinois, June 
29, 1971; Alabama, June 30, 1971; Ohio, June 30, 1971; North Carolina, 
July 1, 1971; Oklahoma, July 1, 1971.

  Ratification was completed on July 1, 1971.

  The amendment was subsequently ratified by Virginia, July 8, 1971; 
Wyoming, July 8, 1971; Georgia, October 4, 1971.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------





  Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation.


                     AMENDMENT XXVII.\18\



Sec. 258. Timing of law varying 
congressional compensation.

  No law, varying the  compensation for the services of the 
Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of 
Representatives shall have intervened.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


  \18\ The 27th amendment to the Constitution was proposed on 
September 25, 1789. It was declared to have been ratified by the 
legislatures of 39 of the 50 States in a certificate of the Archivist 
dated May 18, 1992. The dates of ratification were: Maryland, December 
19, 1789; North Carolina, December 22, 1789; South Carolina, January 19, 
1790; Delaware, January 28, 1790; Vermont, November 3, 1791; Virginia, 
December 15, 1791; Ohio, May 6, 1873; Wyoming, March 6, 1978; Maine, 
April 27, 1983; Colorado, April 22, 1984; South Dakota, February 21, 
1985; New Hampshire, March 7, 1985; Arizona, April 3, 1985; Tennessee, 
May 23, 1985; Oklahoma, July 10, 1985; New Mexico, February 14, 1986; 
Indiana, February 24, 1986; Utah, February 25, 1986; Arkansas, March 6, 
1987; Montana, March 17, 1987; Connecticut, May 13, 1987; Wisconsin, 
July 15, 1987; Georgia, February 2, 1988; West Virginia, March 10, 1988; 
Louisiana, July 7, 1988; Iowa, February 9, 1989; Idaho, March 23, 1989; 
Nevada, April 26, 1989; Alaska, May 6, 1989; Oregon, May 19, 1989; 
Minnesota, May 22, 1989; Texas, May 25, 1989; Kansas, April 5, 1990; 
Florida, May 31, 1990; North Dakota, March 25, 1991; Alabama, May 5, 
1992; Missouri, May 5, 1992; Michigan, May 7, 1992; and New Jersey, May 
7, 1992.



[[Page 121]]

  Ratification was completed on May 7, 1992. The amendment was 
subsequently ratified by Illinois, May 12, 1992; and California, June 
26, 1992.

  To quell speculation over the efficacy of a ratification process 
spanning two centuries, the House adopted a concurrent resolution 
declaring the ratification of the amendment (H. Con. Res. 320, 102d 
Cong., May 19, 1992, p. 11779). The Senate adopted both a separate 
concurrent resolution and a simple resolution making similar 
declarations (S. Con. Res. 120 and S. Res. 298, 102d Cong., May 20, 
1992, p. 11869). Neither House considered the concurrent resolution of 
the other. For a concurrent resolution declaring the ratification of the 
14th amendment, see July 21, 1868. For opinions of the Supreme Court 
concerning the duration of the ratification process and the 
contemporaneity of State ratifications, see Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 
368 (1921) and Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).


  For Federal court opinions upholding congressional cost-of-living 
adjustments for Members under in the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 (103 
Stat. 1716), see Boehner v. Anderson, 809 F. Supp. 38 (D.D.C. 1992), 
aff'd, 30 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir 1994); Schaffer v. Clinton, 54 F. Supp.2d 
1014 (D.Colo. 1999).