    [Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 109th Congress]
    [109th Congress]
    [House Document 108-241]
    [Jeffersons Manual of ParliamentaryPractice]
    [Pages 173-194]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

    <>
    When the Speaker is seated in his chair, every member is to sit in his
    place. Scob., 6; Grey, 403.

                           sec. xvii--order in debate

    [[Page 174]]

      In the House the decorum of Members is regulated by the various
    provisions of rule XVII; and this provision of the parliamentary law is
    practically obsolete.

    Sec. 354. Procedure of the Member in seeking
    recognition.

      When  any Member means to speak, he is to stand up in his
    place, uncovered, and to address himself, not to the House, or any
    particular Member, but to the Speaker, who calls him by his name, that
    the House may take notice who it is that speaks. Scob., 6; D'Ewes, 487,
    col. 1; 2 Hats., 77; 4 Grey, 66; 8 Grey, 108. But Members who are
    indisposed may be indulged to speak sitting. 2 Hats., 75, 77; 1 Grey,
    143.

    <>   When a Member stands up to
    speak, no question is to be put, but he is to be heard unless the House
    overrule him. 4 Grey, 390; 5 Grey, 6, 143.

      In the House a Member seeking recognition is governed by clause 1 of
    rule XVII, which differs materially from this provision of the
    parliamentary law. The Speaker, moreover, calls the Member, not by name,
    but as ``the gentleman (or gentlewoman) from ------,'' naming the State.
    As long ago as 1832, at least, a Member was not required to rise from
    his own particular seat since seats are no longer assigned (V, 4979,
    footnote).

      In the House no question is put as to the right of a Member to the
    floor, unless he be called to order and dealt with by the House under
    clause 4 of rule XVII.

    [[Page 175]]

    Sec. 356. The parliamentary law as to recognition by the
    Speaker.

      If  two or more rise to speak nearly together, the Speaker
    determines who was first up, and calls him by name, whereupon he
    proceeds, unless he voluntarily sits down and gives way to the other.
    But sometimes the House does not acquiesce in the Speaker's decision, in
    which case the question is put, ``which Member was first up?'' 2 Hats.,
    76; Scob., 7; D'Ewes, 434, col. 1, 2.

      In the Senate of the United States the President's decision is without
    appeal.

      In the House recognition by the Chair is governed by clause 2 of rule
    XVII and the practice thereunder. There has been no appeal from a
    decision by the Speaker on a question of recognition since 1881, on
    which occasion Speaker Randall stated that the power of recognition is
    ``just as absolute in the Chair as the judgment of the Supreme Court of
    the United States is absolute as to the interpretation of the law'' (II,
    1425-1428), and in the later practice no appeal is permitted (VIII,
    2429, 2646, 2762).

    Sec. 357. Right of the Member to be heard a second
    time.

      No  man may speak more than once on the same bill on the same day;
    or even on another day, if the debate be adjourned. But if it be read
    more than once in the same day, he may speak once at every reading. Co.,
    12, 115; Hakew., 148; Scob., 58; 2 Hats., 75. Even a change of opinion
    does not give a right to be heard a second time. Smyth's Comw. L., 2, c.
    3; Arcan, Parl., 17.

      But he may be permitted to speak again to clear a matter of fact, 3
    Grey, 357, 416; or merely to explain himself, 2 Hats., 73, in some
    material part of his speech, Ib., 75; or to the manner or words of the
    question, keeping himself to that only, and not traveling into the
    merits of it, Memorials in Hakew., 29; or to the orders of the House, if
    they be transgressed, keeping within that line, and not falling into the
    matter itself. Mem. Hakew., 30, 31.

    [[Page 176]]

      The House has modified the parliamentary law as to a Member's right to
    speak a second time by clause 3 of rule XVII and by permitting a Member
    controlling time in debate to yield to another more than once (Apr. 5,
    2000, p. 4497). In ordinary practice rule XVII is not rigidly enforced,
    and Members find little difficulty in making such explanations as are
    contemplated by the parliamentary law.

    Sec. 358. Participation of the Speaker in debate.

      But  if the
    Speaker rise to speak, the Member standing up ought to sit down, that he
    may be first heard. Town., col. 205; Hale Parl., 133; Mem. in Hakew.,
    30, 31. Nevertheless, though the Speaker may of right speak to matters
    of order, and be first heard, he is restrained from speaking on any
    other subject, except where the House have occasion for facts within his
    knowledge; then he may, with their leave, state the matter of fact. 3
    Grey, 38.

      This provision is usually observed in the practice of the House only
    with regard to the conduct of the Speaker when he is in the chair. In
    several instances the Speaker has been permitted by the House to make a
    statement from the chair, as in a case wherein his past conduct had been
    criticized (II, 1369), and in a case wherein there had been unusual
    occurrences in the joint session to count the electoral vote (II, 1372),
    and in a matter relating to a contest for the seat of the Speaker as a
    Member (II, 1360). In rare instances the Speaker has made brief
    explanations from the chair without asking the assent of the House (II,
    1373, 1374). Speakers have called others to the chair and participated
    in debate, usually without asking consent of the House (II, 1360, 1367,
    footnote, 1368, 1371; III, 1950), and in one case a Speaker on the floor
    debated a point of order which the Speaker pro tempore was to decide (V,
    6097). In rare instances Speakers have left the chair to make motions on
    the floor (II, 1367, footnote). Speakers may participate in debate in
    Committee of the Whole, although the privilege was rarely exercised in
    early practice (II, 1367, footnote).

      During the House's consideration of several measures relating to the
    use of military force in the Persian Gulf, the Speaker took the floor
    not only to debate the pending question but also to commend the House on
    the quality of its recent debates on matters of war and peace and to
    explain his decision to vote on measures relating thereto even though
    not required to do so (Jan. 12, 1991, p. 1085).

    Sec. 359. Impertinent, superfluous, or tedious
    speaking.

      No  one is to speak impertinently or beside the question,
    superfluous, or tediously. Scob., 31, 33; 2 Hats., 166, 168; Hale Parl.,
    133.

    [[Page 177]]

    tice has the House suppressed superfluous or tedious speaking, its hour
    rule (clause 2 of rule XVII) being a sufficient safeguard in this
    respect.

      The House, by clause 1 of rule XVII, provides that the Member shall
    address himself to the question under debate, but neither by rule nor
    prac

    Sec. 360. Language reflecting on the House.

      No  person is to
    use indecent language against the proceedings of the House; no prior
    determination of which is to be reflected on by any Member, unless he
    means to conclude with a motion to rescind it. 2 Hats., 169, 170;
    Rushw., p. 3, v. 1, fol. 42. But while a proposition under consideration
    is still in fieri, though it has even been reported by a committee,
    reflections on it are no reflections on the House. 9 Grey, 508.

      In the practice of the House it has been held out of order in debate
    to cast reflections on either the House or its membership or its
    decisions, whether present or past (V, 5132-5138). A Member who had used
    offensive words against the character of the House, and who declined to
    explain, was censured (II, 1247). Words impeaching the loyalty of a
    portion of the membership have also been ruled out (V, 5139). Where a
    Member reiterated on the floor certain published charges against the
    House, action was taken, although other business had intervened, the
    question being considered one of privilege (III, 2637). It has been held
    inappropriate and not in order in debate to refer to the proceedings of
    a committee except such as have been formally reported to the House (V,
    5080-5083; VIII, 2269, 2485-2493; June 24, 1958, pp. 12120, 12122), but
    this rule does not apply to the proceedings of a committee of a previous
    Congress (Feb. 2, 1914, p. 2782), and the rationale for this limitation
    on debate is in part obsolete under the modern practice of the House
    insofar as the doctrine is applied to open committee meetings and
    hearings.

    [[Page 178]]

    or unmannerly words against a particular Member. Smyth's Comw., L. 2, c.
    3. * * *

    Sec. 361. Personalities in debate forbidden.

      No  person, in
    speaking, is to mention a Member then present by his name, but to
    describe him by his seat in the House, or who spoke last, or on the
    other side of the question, &c., Mem. in Hakew., 3; Smyth's Comw., L. 2,
    c. 3; nor to digress from the matter to fall upon the person, Scob., 31;
    Hale Parl., 133; 2 Hats., 166, by speaking reviling, nipping,

      In the practice of the House, a Member is not permitted to refer to
    another Member by name (V, 5144; VIII, 2526, 2529, 2536), or to address
    him in the second person (V, 5140-5143; VI, 600; VIII, 2529). The proper
    reference to another Member is ``the gentleman (or gentlewoman) from --
    ----,'' naming the Member's State (June 14, 1978, p. 17615; July 21,
    1982, p. 17314). A mere reference to a Member's voting record does not
    form a basis for a point of order against those remarks (June 13, 2002,
    p. ----, p. ----).

      By rule of the House (clause 1 of rule XVII), as well as by
    parliamentary law, personalities are forbidden (V, 4979, 5145, 5163,
    5169), whether against the Member in the Member's capacity as
    Representative or otherwise (V, 5152, 5153), even if the references may
    be relevant to the pending question (Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25778). The
    House has censured a Member for gross personalities (II, 1251). The
    Chair may intervene to prevent improper references where it is evident
    that a particular Member is being described (Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27077).

      The Chair does not rule on the veracity of a statement made by a
    Member in debate (Apr. 9, 1997, p. 4926). Although accusing another
    Member of deceit engages in personality, merely accusing another Member
    of making a mistake does not (Oct. 26, 2000, p. 24921).

      Clause 1 of rule XVII has been held to proscribe: (1) referring to an
    identifiable group of sitting Members as having committed a crime (e.g.,
    stealing an election or obstructing justice) (Feb. 27, 1985, p. 3898;
    Speaker Wright, Mar. 21, 1989, p. 5016; May 19, 1998, p. 9738; July 15,
    2004, p. ----); (2) referring in a personally critical manner to the
    political tactics of the Speaker or other Members (June 25, 1981, p.
    14056); (3) referring to a particular Member of the House in a
    derogatory fashion (Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27077); (4) characterizing a Member
    as ``the most impolite Member'' (June 27, 1996, p. 15915); (5)
    questioning the integrity of a Member (July 25, 1996, p. 19170); (6)
    denunciating the spirit in which a Member had spoken (V, 6981); and (7)
    using a Member's surname as though an adjective for a word of ridicule
    (June 13, 2002, p. ----).

    [[Page 179]]

    acter of the measure's proponent (Nov. 9, 1995, p. 31413). The Chair
    also has held in order a general reference that ``big donors'' receive
    ``access to leadership power and decisions'' because the reference did
    not identify a specific Member as engaging in an improper quid pro quo
    (Apr. 9, 1997, p. 4926). A general statement that seemed to invoke
    racial stereotypes, but not in a context so inflammatory as to
    constitute a breach of decorum, was held not unparliamentary (Apr. 9,
    2003, p. ----).
      A distinction has been drawn between general language, which
    characterizes a measure or the political motivations behind a measure,
    and personalities (V, 5153, 5163, 5169). Although remarks in debate may
    not include personal attacks against a Member or an identifiable group
    of Members, they may address political motivations for legislative
    positions (Jan. 24, 1995, p. 2214; Mar. 8, 1995, pp. 7307, 7308; Nov.
    17, 1995, p. 33832; June 13, 1996, p. 14043). For example, references to
    ``down-in-the-dirt gutter politics'' and ``you people are going to pay''
    were held not to be personal references (Nov. 14, 1995, p. 32388).
    Similarly, characterizing a pending measure as a ``patently petty
    political terrorist tactic'' was held in order as a reference to the
    pending measure rather than to the motive or char

      A Member should refrain from references in debate to the official
    conduct of a Member where such conduct is not the subject then pending
    before the House by way of either a report of the Committee on Standards
    of Official Conduct or another question of the privileges of the House
    (see, e.g., July 24, 1990, p. 18917; Mar. 19, 1992, p. 6078; May 25,
    1995, pp. 14434-37; Sept. 19, 1995, pp. 25454, 25455; Apr. 27, 2005, p.
    ----); and, although such references are ordinarily enforced by the
    Chair in response to a point of order, the Chair may take the initiative
    in order to maintain proper decorum (Apr. 1, 1992; June 17, 2004, p. --
    --). This stricture also precludes a Member from reciting news articles
    discussing a Member's conduct (Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24318), reciting the
    content of a previously tabled resolution raising a question of the
    privileges of the House (Nov. 17, 1995, p. 33853; Sept. 19, 1996, p.
    23855), or even referring to a Member's conduct by mere insinuation
    (Sept. 12, 1996, p. 22899). Notice of an intention to offer a resolution
    as a question of the privileges of the House under rule IX does not
    render a resolution ``pending'' and thereby permit references to conduct
    of a Member proposed to be addressed therein (Sept. 19, 1996, p. 23811).

      The stricture against references to a Member's conduct not then
    pending before the House applies to the conduct of all sitting Members
    (Apr. 1, 1992, p. 7899), including conduct that has previously been
    resolved by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct or the House
    (Sept. 24, 1996, pp. 24483, 24485; Apr. 17, 1997, p. 5831). This
    stricture does not apply to the conduct of a former Member, provided the
    reference is not made in an attempt to compare the conduct of a former
    Member with the conduct of a sitting Member (Sept. 20, 1995, pp. 25825,
    25826; Sept. 12, 1996, pp. 22900, 22901).

    [[Page 180]]

      Debate on a pending privileged resolution recommending disciplinary
    action against a Member may necessarily involve personalities. However,
    clause 1 of rule XVII still prohibits the use of language that is
    personally abusive (see, e.g., July 31, 1979, p. 21584; Jan. 21, 1997,
    p. 393) and the Chair may take the initiative to prevent violations of
    the rule (July 24, 2002, p. ----). Furthermore, during the actual
    pendency of such a resolution, a Member may discuss a prior case
    reported to the House by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct
    for the purpose of comparing the severity of the sanction recommended in
    that case with the severity of the sanction recommended in the pending
    case, provided that the Member does not identify, or discuss the details
    of the past conduct of, a sitting Member (Dec. 18, 1987, p. 36271).

      In addition to the prohibition against addressing a Member's conduct
    when it is not actually pending before the House, the Speaker has
    advised that Members should refrain from references in debate (1) to the
    motivations of a Member who filed a complaint before the Committee on
    Standards of Official Conduct (June 15, 1988, p. 14623; July 6, 1988, p.
    16630; Mar. 22, 1989, p. 5130; May 2, 1989, p. 7735; Nov. 3, 1989, p.
    27077); (2) to personal criticism of a member of the Committee on
    Standards of Official Conduct (Apr. 1, 1992, p. 7899; Mar. 3, 1995, p.
    6715; Sept. 19, 1996, p. 23812; Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24317); and (3) to an
    investigation undertaken by the Committee on Standards of Official
    Conduct, including suggestion of a course of action (Mar. 3, 1995, p.
    6715; Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24317; Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25778) or advocacy of
    an interim status report by the Committee (Sept. 12, 1996, p. 22900;
    Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25778).

      A Member may not read in debate extraneous material critical of
    another Member, which would be improper if spoken in the Member's own
    words (May 25, 1995, pp. 14436, 14437; Sept. 12, 1996, p. 22898). Thus,
    words in a telegram read in debate which repudiated the ``lies and half-
    truths'' of a House committee report were ruled out of order as
    reflecting on the integrity of committee members (June 16, 1947, p.
    7065), and unparliamentary references in debate to newspaper accounts
    used in support of a Member's personal criticism of another Member were
    similarly ruled out of order (Feb. 25, 1985, p. 3346).

      For precedents applicable to references in debate to the President,
    see Sec. 370, infra, or Members of the Senate, see Sec. 371, infra.

    [[Page 181]]

    tions to suspend the rules may not engage in personality by discussing
    the official conduct of the Speaker, even if possibly relevant to the
    question of empowerment of the Speaker (Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24485).

    Sec. 362. Criticism of the Speaker.

      Complaint  of the conduct
    of the Speaker should be presented directly for the action of the House
    and not by way of debate on other matters (V, 5188). In a case wherein a
    Member used words insulting to the Speaker the House on a subsequent
    day, and after other business had intervened, censured the offender (II,
    1248). In such a case the Speaker would ordinarily leave the chair while
    action should be taken by the House (II, 1366; V, 5188; VI, 565). In the
    104th Congress the Chair reaffirmed that it is not in order to speak
    disrespectfully of the Speaker, and that under the precedents the
    sanctions for such violations transcend the ordinary requirements for
    timeliness of challenges (II, 1248; Jan. 4, 1995, p. 552; Jan. 19, 1995,
    p. 1599). It is not in order to arraign the personal conduct of the
    Speaker (Jan. 18, 1995, p. 1441; Jan. 19, 1995, p. 1601). For example,
    it is not in order to charge dishonesty or disregard of the rules (July
    11, 1985, p. 18550), to reflect on his patriotism by accusing him of
    ``kowtowing'' to persons who would desecrate the flag (June 20, 1990, p.
    14877), to refer to him as a ``crybaby'' (Nov. 16, 1995, p. 33394), or
    to refer to official conduct of the Speaker that has previously been
    resolved by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct or the House
    (Apr. 17, 1997, p. 5831). The Chair may take the initiative to admonish
    Members for references in debate that disparage the Speaker (June 25,
    1981, p. 14056; Mar. 22, 1996, p. 6077). Debate on a resolution
    authorizing the Speaker to entertain mo

    Sec. 363. Motives of Members not to be arraigned.

      * * *  The
    consequences of a measure may be reprobated in strong terms; but to
    arraign the motives of those who propose to advocate it is a
    personality, and against order. Qui digreditur a materia ad personam,
    Mr. Speaker ought to suppress. Ord. Com., 1604, Apr. 19.

      The arraignment of the motives of Members is not permitted (V, 5147-
    51; Dec. 13, 1973, p. 41270), and the Speakers have intervened to
    prevent it, in the earlier practice preventing even mildest imputations
    (V, 5161, 5162). However, remarks in debate may address political, but
    not personal, motivations for legislative positions (Jan. 24, 1995, p.
    2214; Mar. 8, 1995, pp. 7307, 7308; Nov. 17, 1995, p. 33832; June 13,
    1996, p. 14043) or for committee membership (July 10, 1995, pp. 18257-
    59). Accusing another Member of hypocrisy has been held not in order
    (July 24, 1979, p. 20380; Mar. 29, 1995, p. 9675), and characterizing
    the motivation of a Member in offering an amendment as deceptive and
    hypocritical was ruled out of order (June 12, 1979, p. 11461). A
    statement in debate that an amendment could only be demagogic or racist
    because only demagoguery or racism impelled such an amendment was ruled
    out of order as impugning the motives of the Member offering the
    amendment (Dec. 3, 1973, pp. 41270, 41271). However, debate
    characterizing a pending measure as a ``patently petty political
    terrorist tactic'' was held in order as directed at the pending measure
    rather than the motive or the character of its proponent (Nov. 9, 1995,
    p. 31413). While in debate the assertion of one Member may be declared
    untrue by another, yet in so doing an intentional misrepresentation must
    not be implied (V, 5157-5160), and if stated or implied is censurable
    (II, 1305) and presents a question of privilege (III, 2717; VI, 607). A
    Member in debate having declared the words of another ``a base lie,''
    censure was inflicted by the House on the offender (II, 1249).

    [[Page 182]]

    in Hakew., 31; nor to pass between the Speaker and the speaking Member,
    nor to go across the House, Scob., 6, or to walk up and down it, or to
    take books or papers from the table, or write there, 2 Hats., 171, p.
    170.

    Sec. 364. Disorder and interruptions during debate.

      No  one
    is to disturb another in his speech by hissing, coughing, spitting, 6
    Grey, 322; Scob., 8; D'Ewes, 332, col. 1, 640, col. 2, speaking or
    whispering to another, Scob., 6; D'Ewes, 487, col. 1; nor stand up to
    interrupt him, Town, col. 205; Mem.

      The House has, by clause 5 of rule XVII, prescribed certain rules of
    decorum differing somewhat from this provision of the parliamentary law,
    but supplemental to it rather than antagonistic. In one respect,
    however, the practice of the House differs from the apparent intent of
    the parliamentary law. In the House a Member may interrupt by addressing
    the Chair for permission of the Member speaking (V, 5006; VIII, 2465);
    but it is entirely within the discretion of the Member occupying the
    floor to determine when and by whom he shall be interrupted (V, 5007,
    5008; VIII, 2463, 2465). There is no rule of the House requiring a
    Member having the floor to yield to another Member to whom he has
    referred during debate (Aug. 2, 1984, p. 22241). A Member may ask
    another to yield from any microphone in the Chamber, including those in
    the well, so long as not crossing between the Member having the floor
    and the Chair (June 5, 1998, p. 11170). The Chair may take the
    initiative in preserving order when a Member declining to yield in
    debate continues to be interrupted by another Member, may order that the
    interrupting Member's remarks not appear in the Record (July 26, 1984,
    p. 21247), and may admonish Members not to converse with a Member
    attempting to address the House (Feb. 21, 1984, p. 2758), as it is not
    in order to engage in disruption while another is delivering remarks in
    debate (June 27, 1996, p. 15915). On the opening day of the 103d
    Congress, during the customary announcement of policies with respect to
    particular aspects of the legislative process, the Chair elaborated on
    the rules of order in debate with a general statement concerning decorum
    in the House (Jan. 5, 1993, p. 105). Under this provision, the Chair may
    require a line of Members waiting to sign a discharge petition to
    proceed to the rostrum from the far right-hand aisle and require the
    line not to stand between the Chair and Members engaging in debate (Oct.
    24, 1997, p. 23293). Hissing and jeering is not proper decorum in the
    House (May 21, 1998, p. 10282). For further discussion of interruptions
    in debate, see Sec. 946, infra.

    [[Page 183]]

    down; for it scarcely ever happens that they are guilty of this piece of
    ill manners without sufficient reason, or inattention to a Member who
    says anything worth their hearing. 2 Hats., 77, 78.

    Sec. 365. Parliamentary method of silencing a
    tedious Member.

      Nevertheless,  if a Member finds that it is not the inclination of
    the House to hear him, and that by conversation or any other noise they
    endeavor to drown his voice, it is his most prudent way to submit to the
    pleasure of the House, and sit

      In the House, where the previous question and hour rule of debate have
    been used for many years, the parliamentary method of suppressing a
    tedious Member has never been imported into the practice (V, 5445).

    Sec. 366. The parliamentary law as to naming a disorderly
    Member.

      If  repeated calls do not produce order, the Speaker may call by
    his name any Member obstinately persisting in irregularity; whereupon
    the House may require the Member to withdraw. He is then to be heard in
    exculpation, and to withdraw. Then the Speaker states the offense
    committed; and the House considers the degree of punishment they will
    inflict. 2 Hats., 167, 7, 8, 172.

      This provision of parliamentary law should be in conjunction with
    clause 4 of rule XVII, Sec. Sec. 960-961, infra, particularly as this
    provision relates to the ultimate authority of the House to determine
    whether a Member ignoring repeated calls to order should be permitted to
    proceed in order.

    [[Page 184]]

    and they are put under restraint if they refuse, or until they do. 9
    Grey, 234, 312.

    Sec. 367. Proceedings in cases of assaults and
    affrays.

      For  instances of assaults and affrays in the House of Commons,
    and the proceedings thereon, see 1 Pet. Misc., 82; 3 Grey, 128; 4 Grey,
    328; 5 Grey, 382; 6 Grey, 254; 10 Grey, 8. Whenever warm words or an
    assault have passed between Members, the House, for the protection of
    their Members, requires them to declare in their places not to prosecute
    any quarrel, 3 Grey, 128, 293; 5 Grey, 280; or orders them to attend the
    Speaker, who is to accommodate their differences, and report to the
    House, 3 Grey, 419;

      In several instances assaults and affrays have occurred on the floor
    of the House. Sometimes the House has allowed these affairs to pass
    without notice, the Members concerned making apologies either personally
    or through other Members (II, 1658-1662). In other cases the House has
    exacted apologies (II, 1646-1651, 1657), or required the offending
    Members to pledge themselves before the House to keep the peace (II,
    1643). In case of an aggravated assault by one Member on another on the
    portico of the Capitol for words spoken in debate, the House censured
    the assailant and three other Members who had been present, armed, to
    prevent interference (II, 1655, 1656). Assaults or affrays in the
    Committee of the Whole are dealt with by the House (II, 1648-1651).

    [[Page 185]]

    4 Grey, 170; 6 Grey, 59. When any Member has spoken, or other business
    intervened, after offensive words spoken, they can not be taken notice
    of for censure. And this is for the common security of all, and to
    prevent mistakes which must happen if words are not taken down
    immediately. Formerly they might be taken down at any time the same day.
    2 Hats., 196; Mem. in Hakew., 71; 3 Grey, 48; 9 Grey, 514.

    Sec. 368. Parliamentary law as to taking down
    disorderly words.

      Disorderly  words are not to be noticed till the Member has
    finished his speech. 5 Grey, 356; 6 Grey, 60. Then the person objecting
    to them, and desiring them to be taken down by the Clerk at the table,
    must repeat them. The Speaker then may direct the Clerk to take them
    down in his minutes; but if he thinks them not disorderly, he delays the
    direction. If the call becomes pretty general, he orders the Clerk to
    take them down, as stated by the objecting Member. They are then a part
    of his minutes, and when read to the offending Member, he may deny they
    were his words, and the House must then decide by a question whether
    they are his words or not. Then the Member may justify them, or explain
    the sense in which he used them, or apologize. If the House is
    satisfied, no further proceeding is necessary. But if two Members still
    insist to take the sense of the House, the Member must withdraw before
    that question is stated, and then the sense of the House is to be taken.
    2 Hats., 199;

      The House has, by clause 4 of rule XVII, provided a method of
    procedure in cases of disorderly words. The House permits and requires
    them to be noticed as soon as uttered, and has not insisted that the
    offending Member withdraw while the House is deciding as to its course
    of action.

    Sec. 369. Disorderly words taken down and reported
    from Committee of the Whole.

      Disorderly  words spoken in a committee must be
    written down as in the House; but the committee can only report them to
    the House for animadversion. 6 Grey, 46.

      This provision of the parliamentary law has been applied to the
    Committee of the Whole, rather than to select or standing committees,
    which are separately empowered to enforce rules of decorum (clause 1(a)
    of rule XI, which incorporates the provisions of rule XVII where
    applicable). The House has censured a Member for disorderly words spoken
    in Committee of the Whole and reported therefrom (II, 1259).

    Sec. 370. References in debate to the
    Executive.

      In  Parliament, to speak irreverently or seditiously against
    the King is against order. Smyth's Comw., L. 2, c. 3; 2 Hats., 170.

    [[Page 186]]

    of address) (Dec. 19, 1995, p. 37601); and (3) an accusation that the
    President ``frivolously vetoed'' a bill (Nov. 8, 1995, p. 31785).
      This provision of the parliamentary law is manifestly inapplicable to
    the House (V, 5086); and it has been held in order in debate to refer to
    the President of the United States or his opinions, either with approval
    or criticism, provided that such reference be relevant to the subject
    under discussion and otherwise conformable to the Rules of the House (V,
    5087-5091; VIII, 2500). Under this standard the following references are
    in order: (1) a reference to the probable action of the President (V,
    5092); (2) an adjuration to the President to keep his word (although an
    improper form

      Although wide latitude is permitted in debate on a proposition to
    impeach the President (V, 5093), Members must abstain from language
    personally offensive (V, 5094; Dec. 18, 1998, p. 27829); and Members
    must abstain from comparisons to the personal conduct of sitting Members
    of the House or Senate (Dec. 18, 1998, p. 27829). Furthermore, Members
    may not refer to evidence of alleged impeachable offenses by the
    President contained in a communication from an independent counsel
    pending before a House committee (Sept. 14, 1998, p. 20171; Sept. 17,
    1998, p. 20758), although they may refer to the communication, itself,
    within the confines of proper decorum in debate (Oct. 6, 1998, p.
    23841).

      Personal abuse, innuendo, or ridicule of the President, is not
    permitted (VIII, 2497; Aug. 12, 1986, p. 21078; Oct. 21, 1987, p. 8857;
    Sept. 21, 1994, p. 25147). Under this standard it is not in order to
    call the President, or a presumptive major-party nominee for President,
    a ``liar'' or accuse him of ``lying'' (June 26, 1985, p. 17394; Sept.
    24, 1992, pp. 27345, 27346; Nov. 15, 1995, p. 32587; June 6, 1996, pp.
    13228, 13229; Mar. 18, 1998, p. 3937; Nov. 14, 2002, p. ----; July 15,
    2003, p. ----; Mar. 24, 2004, p. ----). Indeed, any suggestion of
    mendacity is out of order. For example, the following remarks have been
    held out of order: (1) suggesting that the President misrepresented the
    truth, attempted to obstruct justice, and encouraged others to perjure
    themselves (Feb. 25, 1998, p. 2621); (2) accusing him of dishonesty
    (July 13, 2004, p. ----; June 29, 2005, p. ----), charging him with
    intent to be intellectually dishonest (May 9, 1990, p. 9828), or stating
    that many were convinced he had ``not been honest'' (Mar. 5, 1998, p.
    2620); (3) accusing him of ``raping'' the truth (Apr. 24, 1996, p.
    8807), not telling the truth (Oct. 29, 2003, p. ----), or distorting the
    truth (Sept. 9, 2003, p. ----); (4) stating that he was not being
    ``straight with us'' (Nov. 19, 2003, p. ----); (5) accusing him of being
    deceptive (Mar. 29, 2004, p. ----; Mar. 31, 2004, p. ----), fabricating
    an issue (July 6, 2004, p. ----), or intending to mislead the public
    (Oct. 6, 2004, p. ----; June 9, 2005, p. ----); (6) accusing him of
    intentional mischaracterization, although mischaracterization without
    intent to deceive is not necessarily out of order (July 19, 2005, p. --
    --).

    [[Page 187]]

    (Nov. 18, 1995, p. 33974); (7) alluding to alleged sexual misconduct on
    his part (May 10, 1994, p. 9697; Feb. 25, 1998, p. 1828; Mar. 5, 1998,
    p. 2620; May 18, 1998, p. 9418); (8) alluding to unethical behavior or
    corruption (e.g., June 20, 1996, p. 14829; July 9, 2002, p. ----; Oct.
    29, 2003, p. ----), such as implying a cause-and-effect relationship
    between political contributions and his actions as President (e.g., May
    22, 2001, p. ----; Sept. 29, 2004, p. ----), including an accusation
    that the President had ``lined the pockets'' of his ``political
    cronies'' and filled ``campaign coffers'' (Sept. 14, 2005, p. ----); (9)
    discussing ``charges'' leveled at the President or under investigation
    (Mar. 19, 1998, p. 4094; June 11, 1998, p. 12025), including alluding to
    ``fund-raising abuses'' (Mar. 14, 2000, p. 2716) or speculating that the
    Vice President might someday pardon the President for certain charges
    (Apr. 12, 2000, p. 5419); or discussing alleged criminal conduct (Sept.
    10, 1998, p. 19976); (10) discussing personal conduct even as a point of
    reference or comparison (July 16, 1998, p. 15784; Sept. 9, 1998, p.
    19735); (11) asserting that a major-party nominee had done something
    ``disgusting'' and ``despicable' (Mar. 11, 2004, p. ----); (12)
    asserting that a major-party nominee is not ``a large enough person'' to
    apologize (Mar. 11, 2004, p. ----) or that the President does not care
    about black people (Sept. 8, 2005, p. ----). The Chair may admonish
    Members transgressing this stricture even after other debate has
    intervened (Jan. 23, 1996, p. 1144).
      Furthermore, the following remarks have been held out of order as
    unparliamentary references to the President, or to a presumptive major-
    party nominee for President: (1) attributing to him ``hypocrisy'' (Sept.
    25, 1992, p. 27674); (2) accusing him of giving ``aid and comfort to the
    enemy'' (Jan. 25, 1995, p. 2352; May 6, 2004, p. ----); (3) accusing him
    of ``demagoguery'' (Jan. 23, 1996, p. 1144; Jan. 24, 1996, pp. 1220,
    1221; May 30, 1996, pp. 12646, 12647); (4) calling him a ``draft-
    dodger'' (Apr. 24, 1996, pp. 8807, 8808; Sept. 30, 1996, p. 26603) or
    alleging unexcused absences from military service (May 5, 2004, p. ----
    ), including allegations that the President was ``A.W.O.L.'' (Sept. 22,
    2004, p. ----); (5) describing his action as ``cowardly'' (Oct. 25,
    1989, p. 25817); (6) referring to him as ``a little bugger''

      A Member may not read in debate extraneous material personally abusive
    of the President, which would be improper if spoken in the Member's own
    words (July 12, 1996, pp. 17109, 17110; July 26, 1996, p. 19458; Feb.
    25, 1998, p. 1831; Mar. 3, 1993, p. 3958; Nov. 15, 1995, p. 32587; May
    2, 1996, p. 10010; Mar. 17, 1998, p. 3799; July 15, 2003, p. ----; Sept.
    16, 2003, p. ----). This prohibition includes the recitation of another
    Member's criticism of the President made off the floor (even if recited
    as a rebuttal to such criticism) (Dec. 17, 1998, p. 27775).

      The Chair has advised that the protections afforded by Jefferson's
    Manual and the precedents against unparliamentary references to the
    President, himself, do not necessarily obtain for members of his family
    (July 12, 1990, p. 17206).

      References in debate to former Presidents are not governed by these
    standards (Nov. 15, 1945, p. ----; June 27, 2002, p. ----).

      In the 102d Congress, the Speaker enunciated a minimal standard of
    propriety for all debate concerning nominated candidates for the
    Presidency, based on the traditional proscription against personally
    offensive references to the President even in his capacity as a
    candidate (Speaker Foley, Sept. 24, 1992, p. 27344); and this policy has
    been extended to a presumptive major-party nominee for President (e.g.,
    Apr. 22, 2004, p. ----). However, references to the past statements or
    views of such nominee are not unparliamentary (May 6, 2004, p. ----).

    [[Page 188]]

      For discussion of the stricture against addressing remarks in debate
    to the President, as in the second person, see Sec. 945, infra.

      On January 27, 1909 (VIII, 2497), the House adopted a report of a
    committee appointed to investigate the question, which report in part
    stated:

      ``The freedom of speech in debate in the House should never be denied
    or abridged, but freedom of speech in debate does not mean license to
    indulge in personal abuses or ridicule. The right of Members of the two
    Houses of Congress to criticize the official acts of the President and
    other executive officers is beyond question, but this right is subject
    to proper rules requiring decorum in debate. Such right of criticism is
    inherent upon legislative authority. The right to legislate involves the
    right to consider conditions as they are and to contrast present
    conditions with those of the past or those desired in the future. The
    right to correct abuses by legislation carries the right to consider and
    discuss abuses which exist or which are feared.

      ``It is, however, the duty of the House to require its Members in
    speech or debate to preserve that proper restraint which will permit the
    House to conduct its business in an orderly manner and without
    unnecessarily and unduly exciting animosity among its Members or
    antagonism from those other branches of the Government with which the
    House is correlated.''

    Sec. 371. References in debate to the other House and its
    Members.

      It  is a breach of order in debate to notice what has been said
    on the same subject in the other House, or the particular votes or
    majorities on it there; because the opinion of each House should be left
    to its own independency, not to be influenced by the proceedings of the
    other; and the quoting them might beget reflections leading to a
    misunderstanding between the two Houses. 8 Grey, 22.

    [[Page 189]]

    stricture that requires Members to avoid personality (sec. 2(g), H. Res.
    5, Jan. 4, 2005, p. ----). For a recitation of precedents under the
    former rule, see Sec. 371 of the House Rules and Manual for the 108th
    Congress (H. Doc. 107-284). Since the adoption of the new rule, the
    following references to Members of the Senate have been held
    unparliamentary: (1) accusing Senate Republicans of hypocrisy (May 16,
    2005, p. ----); (2) referring to Senate Democrats as ``cowardly'' (May
    18, 2005, p. ----); (3) accusing a Senator of making slanderous
    statements (June 17, 2005, p. ----; June 21, 2005, p. ----).
      Until former clause 1 of rule XIV (currently clause 1 of rule XVII)
    was amended in the 100th and 101st Congresses (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1987,
    p. 6; H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1989, p. 72), this principle of comity and
    parliamentary law as described by Jefferson governed debate in the House
    to the full extent of its provisions (see generally, V, 5095-5130; VIII,
    2501-21; July 31, 1984, p. 21670; Deschler-Brown, ch. 29, Sec. 44). From
    the 101st Congress through the 108th Congress, clause 1 of rule XVII
    permitted some factual references that were a matter of public record,
    references to the pendency or sponsorship in the Senate of certain
    measures, factual descriptions concerning a measure under debate in the
    House, and quotations from Senate proceedings relevant to the making of
    legislative history on a pending measure. In the 109th Congress clause 1
    was amended to permit debate to include references to the Senate or its
    Members but within the general

      It remains the duty of the Chair to call to order a Member who engages
    in personality with respect to a Senator (see Sec. 374, infra), and the
    Chair may admonish a Member for unparliamentary references even after
    intervening recognition (Oct. 12, 1999, p. 24954; Nov. 15, 2001, p. ----
    ). Although the Chair is under a duty to caution Members against
    unparliamentary references, the Chair will not advise Members on how to
    construct their remarks to avoid improper references (Feb. 25, 2004, p.
    ----).

      Under the earlier form of the rule, the Chair had consistently held
    that the prohibition against improper references to Senators included
    (1) a reference not explicitly naming the Senator (VIII, 2512; Feb. 23,
    1994, p. 2658; June 30, 1995, p. 18153; Feb. 27, 1997, pp. 2768, 2769),
    such as a recitation of a quote by ``a Member of the other body'' (Feb.,
    12, 2003, p. ----); (2) the reading of a paper making criticisms of a
    Senator (V, 5127); and (3) a reference to another person's criticism of
    a Senator (Aug. 4, 1983, p. 23145). Similarly, the Chair has
    consistently held that if references to the Senate are appropriate, the
    Member delivering them is not required to use the term ``the other
    body,'' (Oct. 4, 1984, p. 30047) and, by the same token, references to
    ``the other body'' will not cure unparliamentary references directed to
    the Senate (e.g., Oct. 2, 2002, p. ----; Apr. 2, 2004, p. ----).

      Under the earlier form of the rule, the Chair held that remarks in
    debate during the pendency of an impeachment resolution may not include
    comparisons to the personal conduct of sitting Members of the House or
    Senate (Dec. 18, 1998, p. 27829) and remarks in debate may not criticize
    words spoken in the Senate by one not a Member of that body in the
    course of an impeachment trial (V, 5106). After examination by a
    committee under the earlier form of the rule, a speech reflecting on the
    character of the Senate was ordered to be stricken from the Record on
    the ground that it tended to create ``unfriendly conditions between the
    two bodies * * * obstructive of wise legislation and little short of a
    public calamity'' (V, 5129). Under the earlier form of the rule, where a
    Member had been assailed in the Senate, he was permitted to explain his
    own conduct and motives without bringing the whole controversy into
    discussion or assailing the Senator (V, 5123-5126). Propositions
    relating to breaches of these principles were entertained as a matter of
    privilege (V, 5129, 6980).

    [[Page 190]]

    a Member of that body (V, 5112); and (2) that the precise standard in
    clause 1 of rule XVII (formerly rule XIV) for references to ``individual
    Members of the Senate'' did not apply to references to former Senators
    (Dec. 14, 1995, p. 36968).
      Under the earlier form of the rule, the Chair held (1) that a Member
    of the House may refer to a speech made in the Senate by one no longer

      Under the earlier form of the rule, references in debate to the Vice
    President (as President of the Senate) were governed by the standards of
    reference permitted toward the President. The new form of the rule does
    not change those standards. As such, a Member may criticize in debate
    the policies, or candidacy, of the Vice President but may not engage in
    personality (Dec. 14, 1995, p. 36968; July 14, 1998, p. 15314; Sept. 20,
    2000, p. 18639). For example, it is not in order to allude to
    ``wrongdoings [including] fund-raising telephone calls by the Vice
    President'' (Mar. 14, 2000, p. ----); to speculate that he might someday
    ``pardon'' the President (Apr. 12, 2000, p. 5419); to accuse him of
    lying (Sept. 20, 2000, p. 18639; Sept. 21, 2000, p. 18789); to suggest
    ``he has a problem with the truth'' (Oct. 5, 2000, p. 21014); to allege
    ``unethical behavior'' or ``corruption'' (e.g., Oct. 29, 2003, p. ----;
    Nov. 4, 2003, p. ----), including innuendo suggesting policy choices
    were made on the basis of personal pecuniary gain (July 7, 2004, p. ----
    ; Sept. 13, 2005, p. ----) and accusations of abuse of power (July 14,
    2004, p. ----). The rule also precludes the insertion in the Record of a
    paper making improper references to the Vice President (Sept. 19, 2000,
    p. 18580).

      Under the earlier form of the rule, the Chair held that references to
    Members of the Senate in their capacities as candidates for President or
    Vice President were not prohibited. Where a Senator was a candidate for
    President or Vice President his official policies, actions, and opinions
    as a candidate were permitted to be criticized in terms not personally
    offensive (Speaker Wright, Sept. 29, 1988, p. 26683), but references
    attacking the character or integrity of a Senator even in that context
    were not in order (Oct. 30, 1979, p. 30150). The new form of the rule
    obviates the distinction between a sitting Senator who is a candidate
    for President and a sitting Senator who is not.

      Under the earlier form of the rule, the Chair held the following
    references to the Senate out of order: (1) characterization of Senate
    action as a ``further injustice'' (Oct. 6, 1999, p. 24186), (2)
    accusation that the Senate was governed by ``arcane budget rules'' (Oct.
    2, 2002, p. ----), (3) inference that the Senate had failed to follow
    the law (Oct. 3, 2002, p. ----); (4) questioning of the Senate with
    respect to its courage or resolve to take an action (Aug. 4, 1989, p.
    19315); (5) accusation that the Senate minority held a bill ``hostage''
    (Oct. 5, 1999, p. 23805); (6) speculation as to the intent or motives of
    a Senator (Oct. 11, 1984, pp. 32221-23; Oct. 21, 1997, p. 22328; Nov. 6,
    2001, p. ----; Apr. 11, 2003, p. ----).

    [[Page 191]]

    without referring to or criticizing a named Member of the Senate (July
    29, 1935, p. 12011).

      Under the earlier form of the rule, the Chair held that it was in
    order in debate, while discussing a question involving conference
    committee procedure, to state what actually occurred in a conference
    committee session,

    Sec. 373. Complaint by one House of conduct of a
    Member of the other.

      Neither  House can exercise any authority over a Member or
    officer of the other, but should complain to the House of which he is,
    and leave the punishment to them.

      In a notable instance, wherein a Member of the House had assaulted a
    Senator in the Senate Chamber for words spoken in debate, the Senate
    examined the breach of privilege and transmitted its report to the
    House, which punished the Member (II, 1622). A Senator having assailed a
    House Member in debate, the House messaged to the Senate a resolution
    declaring the language a breach of privilege and requested the Senate to
    take appropriate action (Sept. 27, 1951, p. 12270). The Senator
    subsequently asked unanimous consent to correct his remarks in the
    permanent Congressional Record, but objection was raised (Sept. 28,
    1951, p. 12383). But where certain Members of the House, in a published
    letter, sought to influence the vote of a Senator in an impeachment
    trial, the House declined to consider the matter as a breach of
    privilege (III, 2657). While on one occasion it was held that a
    resolution offered in the House requesting the Senate to expunge from
    the Record statements in criticism of a Member of the House did not
    constitute a question of privilege, being in violation of the rule
    prohibiting references to the Senate in debate (VIII, 2519), a properly
    drafted resolution referring to language published in the record on a
    designated page of Senate proceedings as constituting a breach of
    privilege and requesting the Senate to take appropriate action
    concerning the subject has been held to present a question of the
    privileges of the House (VIII, 2516).

    [[Page 192]]

    troduce proceedings and mutual accusations between the two Houses, which
    can hardly be terminated without difficulty and disorder. 3 Hats., 51.

    Sec. 374. Duty of the Speaker to prevent expressions
    offensive to the other House.

      * * *  Where the complaint is of words
    disrespectfully spoken by a Member of another House, it is difficult to
    obtain punishment, because of the rules supposed necessary to be
    observed (as to the immediate noting down of words) for the security of
    Members. Therefore it is the duty of the House, and more particularly of
    the Speaker, to interfere immediately, and not to permit expressions to
    go unnoticed which may give a ground of complaint to the other House,
    and in

      A rule of comity prohibiting most references in debate to the Senate
    was first enunciated in Jefferson's Manual and was strictly enforced in
    the House through the 108th Congress (albeit with certain exceptions
    adopted in the 100th and 101st Congresses in the former clause 1(b) of
    rule XVII) (Sec. 371, supra and Sec. 945, infra). In the 109th Congress
    clause 1 was amended to permit references to the Senate or its Members,
    even critical references, so long as avoiding personality. (sec. 2(g),
    H. Res. 5, Jan. 4, 2005, p. ----). Nevertheless, it remains the duty of
    the Chair to call to order a Member who violates the rule in debate or
    through an insertion in the Record.

      The Chair has distinguished between engaging in personality toward
    another Member of the House, as to which the Chair normally awaits a
    point of order from the floor, and improper references to Members of the
    Senate, which violate comity between the Houses, as to which the Chair
    normally takes initiative (Feb. 27, 1997, pp. 2778, 2779). The Chair may
    admonish Members to avoid unparliamentary references to the Senate even
    after intervening recognition (Oct. 12, 1999, p. 24954). Pending
    consideration of a measure relating to the Senate, the Speaker announced
    his intention to strictly enforce this provision of Jefferson's Manual
    prohibiting improper references to the Senate, and to deny recognition
    to Members violating the prohibition, subject to permission of the House
    to proceed in order (Speaker O'Neill, June 16, 1982, p. 13843). Under
    the earlier form of clause 1 of rule XVII, the Chair refused to respond
    to hypothetical questions as to the propriety of possible
    characterizations of Senate actions before their use in debate (Oct. 24,
    1985, p. 28819). For a further discussion of the Speaker's duties
    regarding unparliamentary debate, see Sec. Sec. 960-961, infra.

    [[Page 193]]

    heard to those points before any question is moved or stated against
    him. He is then to be heard, and withdraw before any question is moved.
    But if the question itself is the charge, as for breach of order or
    matter arising in the debate, then the charge must be stated (that is,
    the question must be moved), himself heard, and then to withdraw. 2
    Hats., 121, 122.

    Sec. 375. Course of the Member when business concerning
    himself is under debate.

      No  Member may be present when a bill or any
    business concerning himself is debating; nor is any Member to speak to
    the merits of it till he withdraws. 2 Hats., 219. The rule is that if a
    charge against a Member arise out of a report of a committee, or
    examination of witnesses in the House, as the Member knows from that to
    what points he is to direct his exculpation, he may be

      In 1832, during proceedings for the censure of a Member, the Speaker
    informed the Member that he should retire (II, 1366); but this seems to
    be an exceptional instance of the enforcement of the law of Parliament.
    In other cases, after the proposition for censure or expulsion has been
    proposed, Members have been heard in debate, either as a matter of right
    (II, 1286), as a matter of course (II, 1246, 1253), by express provision
    (II, 1273), and in writing (II, 1273), or by unanimous consent (II,
    1275). A Member against whom a resolution of censure was pending was
    asked by the Speaker if he desired to be heard (VI, 236). But a Member
    was not permitted to depute another Member to speak in his behalf (II,
    1273). In modern practice the Member has been permitted to speak in his
    own behalf, both in censure (June 10, 1980, pp. 13802-11) and expulsion
    proceedings (Oct. 2, 1980, pp. 28953-78). A Member-elect has been
    permitted to participate in debate on a resolution relating to his right
    to take the oath (Jan. 10, 1967, p. 23).

    Sec. 376. Disqualifying personal interest of a
    Member.

      Where  the private interests of a Member are concerned in a bill or
    question he is to withdraw. And where such an interest has appeared, his
    voice has been disallowed, even after a division. In a case so contrary,
    not only to the laws of decency, but to the fundamental principle of the
    social compact, which denies to any man to be a judge in his own cause,
    it is for the honor of the House that this rule of immemorial observance
    should be strictly adhered to. 2 Hats., 119, 121; 6 Grey, 368.

    [[Page 194]]

    has provided by clause 1 of rule III that the Member shall not vote in
    such a contingency. In one instance the Senate disallowed a vote given
    by a Senator on a question relating to his own right to a seat; but the
    House has never had occasion to proceed so far (V, 5959).

      In the House it has not been usual for the Member to withdraw when his
    private interests are concerned in a pending measure, but the House

    Sec. 377. Wearing of hats by Members.

      No  Member is to come
    into the House with his head covered, nor to remove from one place to
    another with his hat on, nor is to put on his hat in coming in or
    removing, until he be set down in his place. Scob., 6.

    Sec. 378. Adjournment of questions of order.

      In 1837 the parliamentary practice of wearing hats during the session
    was abolished by adoption of current clause 5 of rule XVII. See
    Sec. 962, infra.
       A question of
    order may be adjourned to give time to look into precedents. 2 Hats.,
    118.

    <>   In
    Parliament, all decisions of the Speaker may be controlled by the House.
    3 Grey, 319.

      As described in Sec. 628, infra, the Speaker has declined, on a
    difficult question of order, to rule until he had taken time for
    examination (III, 2725; VI, 432; VII, 2106; VIII, 2174, 2396, 3475), and
    may take a parliamentary inquiry under advisement, especially where not
    related to the pending proceedings (VIII, 2174; Apr. 7, 1992, p. 8274).
    However, it is conceivable that a case might arise wherein this
    privilege of the Chair would require approval of the majority of the
    House to prevent arbitrary obstruction of the pending business by the
    Chair. The law of Parliament evidently contemplates that the adjournment
    of a question of order shall be controlled by the House. On occasion,
    the Chair has reversed as erroneous a decision previously made (VI, 639;
    VII, 849; VIII, 2794, 3435).

      The Speaker's decision on a decision of order is subject to appeal by
    any Member (clause 5 of rule I).