[Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 108th Congress]
[108th Congress]
[House Document 107-284]
[Rules of the House of Representatives]
[Pages 813-857]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]


 
                                Rule XXI


Reservation of certain points of order
                      restrictions on certain bills




1035. Reservation of points of order.

  1.  At the time a 
general appropriation bill is reported, all points of order against 
provisions therein shall be considered as reserved.




[[Page 814]]

General appropriation bills and amendments
  This clause was added in the 104th Congress (sec. 215(e), H. Res. 6, 
Jan. 4, 1995, p. 468), rendering unnecessary the former practice that a 
Member reserve points of order when a general appropriation bill was 
referred to the calendar of the Committee of the Whole House on the 
state of the Union, in order that provisions in violation of rule XXI 
could be stricken in the Committee of the Whole (see Sec. 1044, infra). 
Before the House recodified its rules in the 106th Congress, this 
provision was found in former clause 8 of rule XXI (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 
1999, p. ----).



1036. Unauthorized appropriations in reported 
general appropriation bills or amendments thereto.

  2. (a)(1)  An appropriation 
may not be reported in a general appropriation bill, and may not be in 
order as an amendment thereto, for an expenditure not previously 
authorized by law, except to continue appropriations for public works 
and objects that are already in progress.




Sec. 1037. Reappropriations prohibited.

  (2)  A 
reappropriation of unexpended balances of appropriations may not be 
reported in a general appropriation bill, and may not be in order as an 
amendment thereto, except to continue appropriations for public works 
and objects that are already in progress. This subparagraph does not 
apply to transfers of unexpended balances within the department or 
agency for which they were originally appropriated that are reported by 
the Committee on Appropriations.



[[Page 815]]

subject matter) and except rescissions of appropriations contained in 
appropriation Acts.


Sec. 1038. Legislation in reported general appropriation 
bills; exceptions.

  (b)  A provision changing existing law may not be 
reported in a general appropriation bill, including a provision making 
the availability of funds contingent on the receipt or possession of 
information not required by existing law for the period of the 
appropriation, except germane provisions that retrench expenditures by 
the reduction of amounts of money covered by the bill (which may include 
those recommended to the Committee on Appropriations by direction of a 
legislative committee having jurisdiction over the




Sec. 1039. Legislation or limitations in amendments to 
general appropriation bills.

  (c)  An amendment to a general appropriation 
bill shall not be in order if changing existing law, including an 
amendment making the availability of funds contingent on the receipt or 
possession of information not required by existing law for the period of 
the appropriation. Except as provided in paragraph (d), an amendment 
proposing a limitation not specifically contained or authorized in 
existing law for the period of the limitation shall not be in order 
during consideration of a general appropriation bill.




Sec. 1040. Motion to rise and report as preferential to 
amendments.

  (d)  After a general appropriation bill has been read for 
amendment, a motion that the Committee of the Whole House on the state 
of the Union rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments 
as may have been adopted shall, if offered by the Majority Leader or a 
designee, have precedence over motions to amend the bill. If such a 
motion to rise and report is rejected or not offered, amendments 
proposing limitations not specifically contained or authorized in 
existing law for the period of the limitation or proposing germane 
amendments that retrench expenditures by reductions of amounts of money 
covered by the bill may be considered.



[[Page 816]]

gency Deficit Control Act, a rescission of budget authority, or a 
reduction in direct spending or an amount for a designated emergency may 
not be reported in an appropriation bill or joint resolution containing 
an emergency designation under section 251(b)(2) or section 252(e) of 
such Act and may not be in order as an amendment thereto.


Sec. 1041. Designated emergencies in reported 
appropriation bills.

  (e)  A provision other than an appropriation 
designated an emergency under section 251(b)(2) or section 252(e) of the 
Balanced Budget and Emer





Sec. 1042. Offsetting amendments en bloc to appropriation 
bills.

  (f)  During the reading of an appropriation bill for amendment in 
the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, it shall be 
in order to consider en bloc amendments proposing only to transfer 
appropriations among objects in the bill without increasing the levels 
of budget authority or outlays in the bill. When considered en bloc 
under this paragraph, such amendments may amend portions of the bill not 
yet read for amendment (following disposition of any points of order 
against such portions) and is not subject to a demand for division of 
the question in the House or in the Committee of the Whole.



[[Page 817]]

of the amounts of money covered by the bill. That form of the 
retrenchment exception remained in place until the 49th Congress in 
1885, when it was dropped until the 52d Congress in 1891, and then 
reinserted through the 53d Congress until 1894. It was again dropped in 
the 54th Congress from 1895 until reinserted in the 62d Congress in 1911 
(IV, 3578; VII, 1125).


Sec. 1043. Clause 2 of rule XXI, generally.

  The  25th 
Congress in 1837 was the first to adopt a rule prohibiting 
appropriations in a general appropriation bill or amendment thereto not 
previously authorized by law, in order to prevent delay of appropriation 
bills because of contention over propositions of legislation. In 1838 
that Congress added the exception to permit unauthorized appropriations 
for continuation of works in progress and for contingencies for carrying 
on departments of the Government. The rule remained in that form until 
the 44th Congress in 1876, when William S. Holman of Indiana persuaded 
the House to amend the rule to permit germane legislative retrenchments. 
In 1880, the 46th Congress dropped the exception which permitted 
unauthorized appropriations for contingencies of Government departments, 
and modified the ``Holman Rule'' to define retrenchments as the 
reduction of the number and salary of officers of the United States, the 
reduction of compensation of any person paid out of the Treasury of the 
United States, or the reduction


  The clause remained unamended until January 3, 1983, when the 98th 
Congress restructured it in the basic form of paragraphs (a)-(d). 
Clerical and stylistic changes were effected when the House recodified 
its rules in the 106th Congress, including a change to clause 2(a)(2) to 
clarify that the point of order lies against the offending provision in 
the text and not against consideration of the entire bill. At that time 
former clause 6 was transferred to clause 2(a)(2) and former clause 2(a) 
became clause 2(a)(1) (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. ----).

  Paragraph (a)(1) (former paragraph (a)) retained the prohibition 
against unauthorized appropriations in general appropriation bills and 
amendments thereto except in continuation of works in progress.

  Paragraph (a)(2) (former clause 6), from section 139(c) of the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 190f(c)), was made part 
of the standing rules in the 83d Congress (Jan. 3, 1953, p. 24). 
Previously, a reappropriation of an unexpended balance for an object 
authorized by law was in order on a general appropriation bill (IV, 
3591, 3592; VII, 1156, 1158). This provision was amended in the 99th 
Congress by section 228(b) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177) to permit the Committee on 
Appropriations to report transfers of unexpended balances within the 
department or agency for which originally appropriated.

  Paragraph (b) narrowed the ``Holman Rule'' exception from the 
prohibition against legislation to cover only retrenchments reducing 
amounts of money included in the bill as reported, and permitted 
legislative committees with proper jurisdiction to recommend such 
retrenchments to the Appropriations Committee for discretionary 
inclusion in the reported bill. The last exception in paragraph (b), 
permitting the inclusion of legislation rescinding appropriations in 
appropriation Acts, was added in the 99th Congress by the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (sec. 228(a), P.L. 99-
177). The latter feature of the paragraph does not extend to a 
rescission of contract authority provided by a law other than an 
appropriation Act (Sept. 22, 1993, p. 22138; May 15, 1997, p. ----; July 
23, 1997, p. ----). In the 105th Congress paragraph (b) was amended to 
treat as legislation a provision reported in a general appropriation 
bill that makes funding contingent on whether circumstances not made 
determinative by existing law are ``known'' (H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. 
121).


[[Page 818]]

bill that makes funding contingent on whether circumstances not made 
determinative by existing law are ``known'' (H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. 
121). The exception for limitations is strictly 
construed to apply only where existing law requires or permits the 
inclusion of limiting language in an appropriation Act, and not merely 
where the limitation is alleged to be ``consistent with existing law'' 
(June 28, 1988, p. 16267). Although the Committee on Appropriations may 
include a limitation in its reported bill, if it is stricken with other 
legislative language on a point of order it may be reinserted during the 
reading only if in compliance with clause 2(c) or in accordance with 
clause 2(d) (June 18, 1991, p. 15199). Where the committee included a 
limitation in its reported bill that precluded funds for assistance to a 
list of countries, an amendment to that paragraph adding a new country 
was held to be a further limitation that must await completion of the 
reading of the bill for amendment (July 23, 2003, p. ----). 
  Paragraph (c) retained the prohibition against amendments changing 
existing law but permitted limitation amendments during the reading of 
the bill by paragraph only if specifically authorized by existing law 
for the period of the limitation. In the 105th Congress paragraph (c) 
was amended to treat as legislation an amendment to a general 
appropriation


[[Page 819]]

amendment not only reducing an amount in a paragraph of an appropriation 
bill but also limiting expenditure of those funds on a particular 
project (i.e., a limitation not contained in existing law) was held not 
in order during the reading of that paragraph but only at the end of the 
bill under clause 2(d) (July 23, 1986, p. 17431; June 15, 1988, p. 
14719). Where language of limitation was stricken from a general 
appropriation bill on a point of order that it changed existing law, an 
amendment proposing to reinsert the limitation without its former 
legislative content was held not in order before completion of the 
reading for amendment (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22214). A motion that the 
Committee of the Whole rise and report to the House with the 
recommendation that the enacting clause be stricken out takes precedence 
over the motion to amend under clause 9 of rule XVIII (former clause 7 
of rule XXIII) and also over the motion to rise and report 
under clause 2(d) (July 24, 1986, p. 17641).
  Paragraph (d) provided a new procedure for consideration of 
retrenchment and other limitation amendments only when the reading of a 
general appropriation bill has been completed and only if the Committee 
of the Whole does not adopt a motion to rise and report the bill back to 
the House (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1983, p. 34). In the 104th Congress 
paragraph (d) was amended to limit the availability of its preferential 
motion to rise and report to the Majority Leader or his designee (sec. 
215(a), H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 468). In the 105th Congress it was 
further amended to make the motion preferential to any motion to amend 
at that stage (H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. 121). Where the 
reading of a general appropriation bill for amendment has been completed 
(or dispensed with), including the last paragraph of the bill containing 
the citation to the short title (July 30, 1986, p. 18214), the Chair 
(under the former form of the rule, which made the preferential motion 
available to any Member) might first inquire whether any Member sought 
to offer an amendment (formerly, one not prohibited by clauses 2(a) or 
(c)) prior to recognizing Members to offer limitation or retrenchment 
amendments (June 2, 1983, p. 14317; Sept. 22, 1983, p. 25406; Oct. 27, 
1983, p. 29630), including pro forma amendments (Aug. 2, 1989, p. 
18126). Pursuant to clause 2(d), a motion that the Committee rise and 
report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been 
adopted is not debatable (Apr. 23, 1987, p. 9613) and takes precedence 
over any amendment (formerly only over a limitation or retrenchment 
amendment) (July 30, 1985, p. 21534; July 23, 1986, p. 17431; Apr. 23, 
1987, p. 9613), but only after completion of the reading and disposition 
of amendments not otherwise precluded (June 30, 1992, p. 17135). Thus a 
motion that the Committee rise and report the bill to the House with the 
recommendation that it be recommitted, with instructions to report back 
to the House (forthwith or otherwise) with an amendment proposing a 
limitation, does not take precedence over the motion to rise and report 
the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted 
(sustained on appeal, Sept. 19, 1983, p. 24647). An

  Paragraphs (e) and (f) were added in the 104th Congress (sec. 215, H. 
Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 468).



Sec. 1044. Points of order on general 
appropriation bills.

  As the rule  applies only to general appropriation bills, 
which are not enumerated or defined in the rules (VII, 1116) bills 
appropriating only for one purpose have been held not to be ``general'' 
within the meaning of this rule (VII, 1122). Neither a resolution 
providing an appropriation for a single Government agency (Jan. 31, 
1962, p. 1352), nor a joint resolution only containing continuing 
appropriations for diverse agencies to provide funds until regular 
appropriation bills are enacted (Sept. 21, 1967, p. 26370), nor a joint 
resolution providing an appropriation for a single Government agency and 
permitting a transfer of a portion of those funds to another agency 
(Oct. 25, 1979, p. 29627), nor a joint resolution transferring funds 
already appropriated from one specific agency to another (Mar. 26, 1980, 
p. 6716), nor a joint resolution transferring unobligated balances to 
the President to be available for specified purposes but containing no 
new budget authority (Mar. 3, 1988, p. 3239), are ``general 
appropriation bills'' within the purview of this clause.


  A point of order under this rule does not apply to a special order 
reported from the Committee on Rules ``self-executing'' the adoption in 
the House of an amendment changing existing law (July 27, 1993, p. 
17117). By unanimous consent the Committee of the Whole may vacate 
proceedings under specified points of order (June 7, 1991, p. 13973). A 
point of order may be withdrawn as a matter of right (in the Committee 
of the Whole as well as in the House) before action thereon (May 19, 
2000, p. ----).

  Upon the immediate entry by unanimous consent of a 90-minute limit on 
debate on an amendment against which a point of order had been reserved, 
the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole established that the 
reservation would be considered as continued for the duration of debate 
under the time agreement (Nov. 28, 2001, p. ----).


[[Page 820]]

must ordinarily occur during consideration in Committee of the Whole, 
where the Chair, in response to a point of order, may rule out any 
portion of the bill in conflict with the rule (IV, 3811; Sept. 8, 1965, 
pp. 23140, 23182). Portions of the bill thus stricken are not reported 
back to the House. Prior to the adoption of clause 1 (former clause 8) 
in the 104th Congress (see Sec. 1035, supra), it was necessary that some 
Member reserve points of order when a general appropriation bill was 
referred to the calendar of the Committee of the Whole House on the 
state of the Union, in order that provisions in violation of the rule 
could be stricken in the Committee (V, 6921-6925; VIII, 3450; Feb. 6, 
1926, p. 3456). Where points of order had been reserved pending a 
unanimous-consent request that the committee be permitted to file its 
report when the House would not be in session, it was not necessary that 
they be reserved again when the report ultimately was presented as 
privileged when the House was in session, as the initial reservation 
carried over to the subsequent filing (Mar. 1, 1983, p. 3241). In an 
instance where points of order were not reserved against an 
appropriation bill when it was reported to the House and referred to the 
Committee of the Whole, points of order in the Committee of the Whole 
against a proposition in violation of this clause were overruled on the 
ground that the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole lacked authority 
to pass upon the question (Apr. 8, 1943, p. 3150, 3153).
  As all bills making or authorizing appropriations require 
consideration in Committee of the Whole, it follows that the enforcement 
of the rule

  The enforcement of the rule also occurs in the House in that a motion 
to recommit a general appropriation bill may not propose an amendment 
containing legislation (Sept. 1, 1976, p. 28883) or a limitation not 
considered in the Committee of the Whole (Speaker Foley, Aug. 1, 1989, 
p. 17159; Aug. 3, 1989, p. 18546); and such amendment is precluded 
whether the Committee of the Whole has risen and reported automatically 
pursuant to a special rule or, instead, by a motion at the end of the 
reading for amendment (June 22, 1995, p. 16844).


[[Page 821]]

and appropriation amounts, and points of order against a paragraph must 
be made before an amendment is offered thereto or before the Clerk reads 
the next paragraph heading and amount (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 2.26). A 
point of order against a paragraph under this clause may be made only 
after that paragraph has been read by the Clerk, and not prior to its 
reading pending consideration of an amendment inserting language 
immediately prior thereto (June 6, 1985, pp. 14605, 14609). Where the 
reading of a paragraph of a general appropriation bill has been 
dispensed with by unanimous consent, the Chair inquires whether there 
are points of order against the paragraph before entertaining amendments 
or directing the Clerk to read further, but he does not make such an 
inquiry where the Clerk has actually read the paragraph (May 31, 1984, 
p. 14608). Where a portion of the bill is considered as having been read 
and open to amendment by unanimous consent, points of order against 
provisions in that portion must be made before amendments are offered, 
and may not be reserved (Dec. 1, 1982, p. 28175; May 19, 2000, p. ----
; July 26, 2003, p. ----). Where a chapter is considered 
as read by unanimous consent and open to amendment at any point, no 
amendments are offered and the Clerk begins to read the next chapter, it 
is too late to make a point of order against a paragraph in the 
preceding chapter (June 11, 1985, p. 15181). It is too late to rule out 
the entire paragraph after points of order against specific portions 
have been sustained and an amendment to the paragraph has been offered 
(June 27, 1974, pp. 21670-72).
  Points of order against unauthorized appropriations or legislation on 
general appropriation bills may be made as to the whole or only a 
portion of a paragraph (IV, 3652; V, 6881). The fact that a point of 
order is made against a portion of a paragraph does not prevent another 
point of order against the whole paragraph (V, 6882; July 31, 1985, p. 
21895), nor does it prevent another Member from demanding that the 
original point of order be extended to the entire paragraph (July 16, 
1998, p. ----). If a portion of a proposed amendment is out of order, it 
is sufficient for the rejection of the whole amendment (V, 6878-
6880). If a point of order is sustained against any 
portion of a package of amendments considered en bloc, all the 
amendments are ruled out of order and must be reoffered separately, or 
those which are not subject to a point of order may be considered en 
bloc by unanimous consent (Sept. 16, 1981, pp. 20735-38; June 21, 1984, 
p. 17687; July 26, 2001, p. ----). Where a point of order 
is sustained against the whole of a paragraph the whole must go out, but 
it is otherwise when the point of order is made only against a portion 
(V, 6884, 6885). General appropriation bills are read ``scientifically'' 
only by paragraph headings


[[Page 822]]

ment is authorized by law is on the proponent of the amendment (May 11, 
1971, p. 14471; Oct. 29, 1991, p. 28791; July 26, 1995, p. 20567; July 
27, 1995, pp. 20808, 20811; July 31, 1995, p. 21207; May 15, 1997, p. --
--). The burden is on the proponent of an amendment to 
show that language offered under the guise of a limitation 
does not change existing law (July 17, 1975, p. 23239; June 16, 1976, p. 
18666; July 18, 1995, p. 19357; June 24, 2003, p. ----) 
including the burden to show that the duties imposed are 
merely ministerial or already required under existing law (July 26, 
1998, p. ----) and, in the case of an amendment proposing a 
double-negative, the burden to show that the object of the double-
negative is specifically contemplated by existing law (July 23, 2003, p. 
----, p. ----). The burden is on the proponent of an amendment to show 
that the amendment does not increase levels of budget authority or 
outlays within the meaning of clause 2(f) (Oct. 11, 2001, p. ----
). If the amendment is susceptible to more than one 
interpretation, it is incumbent upon the proponent to show that it is 
not in violation of the rule (Deschler, ch. 26, 
Sec. 22.26). The mere recitation in an amendment that a 
determination is to be made pursuant to existing laws and regulations, 
absent a citation to the law imposing such responsibility, is not 
sufficient proof by the proponent of an amendment to overcome a point of 
order that the amendment constitutes legislation (Sept. 16, 1980, p. 
25606). The authorization must be enacted before the appropriation may 
be included in an appropriation bill; thus delaying the availability of 
an appropriation pending enactment of an authorization does not protect 
the item of appropriation against a point of order under this clause 
(Apr. 26, 1972, p. 14455).
  In the administration of the rule, it is the practice that those 
upholding an item of appropriation should have the burden of showing the 
law authorizing it (IV, 3597; VII, 1179, 1233, 1276; June 23, 2000, p. 
----). Thus the burden of proving the authorization for appropriations 
carried in a bill, or that the language in the bill constitutes a valid 
limitation which does not change existing law, falls on the proponents 
and managers of the bill (May 28, 1968, p. 15357; Nov. 30, 1982, p. 
28062). Where a provision is susceptible to more than one 
interpretation, that burden may be met by a showing that only the 
requirements of existing law, and not any new requirements, are recited 
in the language (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22206). The Chair may overrule a 
point of order that appropriations for a certain agency are unauthorized 
upon citation to an organic statute creating the agency, absent any 
showing that the organic law has been overtaken by a scheme of periodic 
reauthorization; the Chair may hear further argument and reverse his 
ruling, however, where existing law not previously called to the Chair's 
attention would require the ruling to be reversed (VIII, 3435; June 8, 
1983, p. 14854, where a law amending the statute creating the Bureau of 
the Mint with the express purpose of requiring annual authorizations was 
subsequently called to the Chair's attention). Reported provisions in a 
general appropriation bill described in the accompanying report as 
directly or indirectly changing the application of existing law are 
presumably legislation, absent rebuttal by the committee (May 31, 1984, 
p. 14591). The burden of proof to show that an appropriation contained 
in an amend

  The inclusion of funds in a general appropriation bill in the form of 
a ``not to exceed'' limitation does not obviate a point of order that 
the funds are not authorized by law (June 21, 1988, p. 15440). The fact 
that legislative jurisdiction over the subject matter of an amendment 
may rest with the Committee on Appropriations does not immunize the 
amendment from the application of clause 2(c) of rule XXI (July 17, 
1996, p. 17550; July 24, 1996, p. 18898). The ``works in progress 
exception'' under clause 2(a) of rule XXI is a defense to a point of 
order against an unauthorized appropriation reported in a general 
appropriation bill and is not a defense to a point of order under clause 
2(c) of rule XXI that an amendment to an appropriation bill constitutes 
legislation (July 24, 1996, p. 18898).

  For a discussion of perfecting amendments to unauthorized 
appropriations or legislation permitted to remain in a general 
appropriation bill by failure to raise or by waiver of a point of order, 
see Sec. 1057, infra. 


[[Page 823]]

elements is insufficient authorization (June 28, 1993, p. 14421). An 
Executive Order does not constitute sufficient authorization in law 
absent proof of its derivation from a statute enacted by Congress 
authorizing the order and expenditure of funds (June 15, 1973, p. 19855; 
June 25, 1974, p. 21036). Thus a Reorganization Plan submitted by the 
President pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 906 has the status of statutory law when 
it becomes effective and is sufficient authorization to support an 
appropriation for an office created by Executive Order issued pursuant 
to the Reorganization Plan (June 21, 1974, p. 20595). A 
constitutional guarantee of just compensation for a governmental taking 
of private property for public use does not itself constitute 
suffficient authorization by law for appropriations in a general 
appropriation bill for compensation of particular private property 
owners (July 18, 2001, p. ----).


Sec. 1045. Authorization of law for 
appropriations.

  A treaty  may provide the authorization by existing law required 
in the rule to justify appropriations if it has been ratified by the 
contracting parties (IV, 3587); however, where existing law authorizes 
appropriations for the U.S. share of facilities to be recommended in an 
agreement with another country containing specified elements, an 
agreement in principle with that country predating the authorization law 
and lacking the required


  A resolution of the House has been held sufficient 
authorization for an appropriation for the salary of an employee of the 
House (IV, 3656-3658) even though the resolution may have been agreed to 
only by a preceding House (IV, 3660). Previous enactment of items of 
appropriation unauthorized by law does not justify similar 
appropriations in subsequent bills (VII, 1145, 1150, 1151) unless if 
through appropriations previously made, a function of the Government has 
been established which would bring it into the category of continuation 
of works in progress (VII, 1280), or unless legislation in a previous 
appropriation act has become permanent law (May 20, 1964, p. 11422). The 
omission to appropriate during a series of years for an object 
authorized by law does not repeal the law, and consequently an 
appropriation when proposed is not subject to the point of order (IV, 
3595). 


[[Page 824]]

or the investigation of foods in relation to commerce (IV, 3647, 3648; 
VII, 1298), or the compiling of tests at an exposition (IV, 3653). 

  The law authorizing each head of a department to employ such 
numbers of clerks, messengers, copyists, watchmen, laborers, and other 
employees as may be appropriated for by Congress from year to year is 
held to authorize appropriations for those positions not otherwise 
authorized by law (IV, 3669, 3675, 4739); but this law does not apply to 
offices not within departments or not at the seat of Government (IV, 
3670-3674). A permanent law authorizing the President to appoint certain 
staff, together with legislative provisions authorizing additional 
employment contained in an appropriation bill enacted for that fiscal 
year, constituted sufficient authorization for a lump sum supplemental 
appropriation for the White House for the same fiscal year (Nov. 30, 
1973, p. 38854). By a general provision of law, 
appropriations for investigations and the acquisition and diffusion of 
information by the Agriculture Department on subjects related to 
agriculture are generally in order in the agricultural appropriation 
bill (IV, 3649). It has once been held that this law would also 
authorize appropriations for the instrumentalities of such 
investigations (IV, 3615); but these would not include the organization 
of a bureau to conduct the work (IV, 3651). The law does not authorize 
general investigations by the department (IV, 3652), or cooperation with 
State investigations (IV, 3650; VII, 1301, 1302),

  A paragraph of a general appropriation bill both establishing 
and funding a commission was ruled out as constituting legislation and 
carrying unauthorized appropriations (June 29, 1988, p. 16470). A 
paragraph appropriating funds for matching grants to States was held 
unauthorized where the authorizing law did not require State matching 
funds (June 28, 1993, p. 14418). A paragraph funding a project from the 
Highway Trust Fund was held unauthorized where such funding was 
authorized only from the general fund (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22175; 
June 26, 2001, p. ----; Nov. 28, 2001, p. ----). A paragraph 
providing funds for the President to meet ``unanticipated needs'' was 
held unauthorized (July 16, 1998, p. ----).

  The failure of Congress to enact into law separate legislation 
specifically modifying eligibility requirements for grant programs under 
existing law does not necessarily render appropriations for those 
programs subject to a point of order, where more general existing law 
authorizes appropriations for all of the programs proposed to be 
modified by new legislation pending before Congress (June 8, 1978, p. 
16778). However, whether organic statutes or general grants of authority 
in law constitute sufficient authorization to support appropriations 
depends on whether the general laws applicable to the function or 
department in question require specific or annual authorizations (June 
14, 1978, pp. 17616, 17622, 17626, 17630) or on whether a periodic 
authorization scheme has subsequently occupied the field (Sept. 9, 1997, 
p. ----). An authorization of ``such sums as may be necessary'' is 
sufficient to support any dollar amount, but has no tendency to relieve 
other conditions of the authorization law (June 28, 1993, p. 1442). 
Where existing law authorizes certain appropriations from a particular 
trust fund without fiscal year limitation, language that such an 
appropriation remain available until expended does not constitute 
legislation (July 15, 1993, p. 15848). An amendment to a general 
appropriation bill providing that ``not less than'' a certain amount be 
made available to a program requires an authorization (July 12, 2000, p. 
----; July 13, 2000, p. ----).

  Pursuant to clause 11(i) of rule X (former clause 9 of rule XLVIII), 
no funds may be appropriated to certain agencies carrying out 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities, unless such funds have 
been authorized by law for the fiscal year in question.



Sec. 1046. Authorization for claims and 
salaries.

  Judgments of  courts certified to Congress in accordance with law or 
authorized by treaty (IV, 3634, 3635, 3644) and audited under authority 
of law have been held to be authorization for appropriations for the 
payment of claims (IV, 3634, 3635). However, unadjudicated claims (IV, 
3628), even though ascertained and transmitted by an executive officer 
(IV, 3625-3640), and findings filed under the Bowman Act do not 
constitute authorization (IV, 3643).



[[Page 825]]

year (IV, 3588, 3589; VII, 1128, 1145, 1149, 1191), and the mere 
appropriation for a salary does not create an office so as to justify 
appropriations in succeeding years (IV, 3590, 3672, 3697), it being a 
general rule that propositions to appropriate for salaries not 
established by law or to increase salaries fixed by law are out of order 
(IV, 3664-3667, 3676-3679). An exception to these general principles is 
found in the established practice that in the absence of a general law 
fixing a salary the amount appropriated in the last appropriation bill 
has been held to be the legal salary (IV, 3687-3696). A law having 
established an office and fixed a salary, it is not in order to provide 
for an unauthorized office and salary in lieu of it (IV, 3680).
  An appropriation for an object not otherwise authorized does not 
constitute authorization to justify a continuance of the appropriation 
another



Sec. 1047. Authorizations for public works.

  An  appropriation 
for a public work in excess of a fixed limit of cost (IV, 3583, 3584; 
VII, 1133), or for extending a service beyond the limits assigned by an 
executive officer exercising a lawful discretion (IV, 3598), or by 
actual law (IV, 3582, 3585), or for purposes prohibited by law are out 
of order (IV, 3580, 3581, 3702), as is an appropriation from the Highway 
Trust Fund where the project is specifically authorized from the general 
fund (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22175). However, the mere appropriation of a 
sum to complete a work does not fix a limit of cost such as would 
exclude future appropriations (IV, 3761). A declaration of policy in an 
act followed by specific provisions conferring authority upon a 
governmental agency to perform certain functions is not construed to 
authorize appropriations for purposes germane to the policy but not 
specifically authorized by the act (VII, 1200). A point of order will 
not lie against an amendment proposing to increase a lump sum for public 
works projects where language in the bill limits use of the lump sum 
appropriation to projects as authorized by law (Deschler, ch. 26, 
Sec. 19.6), but where language in the bill limits use of the lump 
sum both to projects ``authorized by law'' and ``subject, where 
appropriate, to enactment of authorizing legislation,'' that paragraph 
constitutes an appropriation in part for some unauthorized projects and 
is not in order (June 6, 1985, p. 14617).



[[Page 826]]

tees, an appropriation for such purposes not authorized by both 
committees is out of order notwithstanding the ``works in progress'' 
exemption, since the law specifically precludes the appropriation from 
being made (June 8, 1983, p. 14855). An appropriation from the Highway 
Trust Fund for an ongoing project was held not in order under the 
``works in progress'' exception where the Internal Revenue Code 
``occupied the field'' with a comprehensive authorization scheme not 
embracing the specified project (Sept. 22, 1993, p. 22140; Sept. 23, 
1993, p. 22173). Interruption of a work does not necessarily remove it 
from the privileges of the rule (IV, 3705-3708); but the continuation of 
the work must not be so conditioned in relation to place as to become a 
new work (IV, 3704). It has been held that a work has not been begun 
within the meaning of the rule when an appropriation has been made for a 
site for a public building (IV, 3785), or when a commission has been 
created to select a site or when a site has actually been selected for a 
work (IV, 3762-3763), or when a survey has been made (IV, 3782-3784). By 
``public works and objects already in progress'' are meant tangible 
matters like buildings, roads, etc., and not duties of officials in 
executive departments (IV, 3709-3713), or the continuance of a work 
indefinite as to completion and intangible in nature like the gauging of 
streams (IV, 3714, 3715). A general system of roads on which some work 
has been done, or an extension of an existing road (Sept. 22, 1993, p. 
22140), may not be admitted as a work in progress (VII, 1333). 
Concerning reappropriation for continuation of public works in progress, 
see Sec. 1031, supra.


Sec. 1048. Continuation of a public work by 
appropriations.

  The provision  excepting public works and objects that are already in 
progress from the requirement that appropriations be authorized by 
existing law (IV, 3578) has historically been applied only in cases of 
general revenue funding (Sept. 22, 1993, p. 22140; Sept. 23, 1993, p. 
22173). An appropriation in violation of existing law or to extend a 
service beyond a fixed limit is not in order as the continuance of a 
public work (IV, 3585, 3702-3724; VII, 1332; Sept. 23, 1993, pp. 22173; 
Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 8.9). The ``works in progress'' exception may not 
be invoked to fund a project governed by a lapsed authorization and may 
not be invoked to fund a project that is not yet under construction 
(July 31, 1995, p. 21207). Where existing law (40 U.S.C. 606) 
specifically prohibits the making of an appropriation to construct or 
alter any public building involving more than $500,000 unless approved 
by the House and Senate Public Works Commit



[[Page 827]]

additions to existing buildings in cases where no limits of cost have 
been shown (IV, 3774, 3775). However, the purchase of a separate and 
detached lot of land is not admitted (IV, 3776). The continuation of 
construction at the Kennedy Library, a project owned by the United 
States and funded by a prior year's appropriation, has been admitted 
notwithstanding the absence of any current authorization (June 14, 1988, 
p. 14335). A provision of law authorizing Commissioners of the District 
of Columbia to take over and operate the fish wharves of the city of 
Washington was held insufficient authority to admit an appropriation for 
reconstructing the fish wharf (VII, 1187).


Sec. 1049. Examples illustrating the continuation of 
a public work.

  Thus the  continuation of the following works has been admitted: 
A topographical survey (IV, 3796, 3797; VII, 1382), a geological map 
(IV, 3795), marking of a boundary line (IV, 3717), marking graves of 
soldiers (IV, 3788), a list of claims (IV, 3717), and recoinage of coins 
in the Treasury (IV, 3807); but the following works have not been 
admitted: Investigation of materials, like coal (IV, 3721), scientific 
investigations (IV, 3719; VII, 1345), duties of a commission (IV, 3720; 
VII, 1344), extension of foreign markets for goods (IV, 3722), printing 
of a series of opinions indefinite in continuance (IV, 3718), free 
evening lectures in the District of Columbia (IV, 3789), certain ongoing 
projects from the Highway Trust Fund (Sept. 22, 1993, pp. 22140; Sept. 
23, 1993, pp. 22173), extension of an existing road (Sept. 22, 1993, p. 
22140), continuation of an extra compensation for ordinary facility for 
carrying the mails (IV, 3808), although the continuation of certain 
special mail facilities has been admitted (IV, 3804-3806). However, 
appropriations for rent and repairs of buildings or Government roads 
(IV, 3793, 3798) and bridges (IV, 3803) have been admitted as in 
continuation of a work (IV, 3777, 3778), although it is not in order as 
such to provide for a new building in place of one destroyed (IV, 3606). 
It is not in order to repair paving adjacent to a public building but in 
a city street, although it may have been laid originally by the 
Government (IV, 3779). The purchase of adjoining land for a work already 
established has been admitted under this principle (IV, 3766-3773) and 
also




Sec. 1050. New buildings at existing 
institutions as in continuance of a public work.

  Appropriations for  new buildings at 
Government institutions have sometimes been admitted (IV, 3741-3750) 
when intended for the purposes of the institution (IV, 3747); but later 
decisions, in view of the indefinite extent of the practice made 
possible by the early decisions, have ruled out propositions to 
appropriate for new buildings in navy yards (IV, 3755-3759) and other 
establishments (IV, 3751-3754). Appropriations for new schoolhouses in 
the District of Columbia (IV, 3750; VII, 1358), for new Army hospitals 
(IV, 3740), for new lighthouses (IV, 3728), armor-plate factories (IV, 
3737-3739), and for additional playgrounds for children in the District 
of Columbia (IV, 3792) have also been held not to be in continuation of 
a public work.




Sec. 1051. New vessel for naval and other services 
as in continuation of a public work.

  By a former  broad construction of the rule an 
appropriation of a new and not otherwise authorized vessel of the Navy 
had been held to be a continuance of a public work (IV, 3723, 3724); but 
this line of decisions has been overruled (VII, 1351; Jan. 22, 1926, p. 
2621). While appropriations for new construction and procurement of 
aircraft and equipment for the Navy are not in order, appropriations for 
continuing experiments and development work on all types of aircraft are 
in order (Jan. 22, 1926, p. 2623). This former interpretation was 
confined to naval vessels, and did not apply to vessels in other 
services, like the Coast and Geodetic Survey or Lighthouse Service (IV, 
3725, 3726), or to floating or stationary drydocks (IV, 3729-3736). The 
construction of a submarine cable in extension of one already laid was 
held not to be the continuation of a public work (IV, 3716), but an 
appropriation for the Washington-Alaska military cable has been held in 
order (VII, 1348).



[[Page 828]]

Acts but not explicitly beyond the fiscal year in question (July 21, 
1981, p. 16687); or (4) setting a floor on spending that is not 
established by existing law (July 23, 2003, p. ----).


Sec. 1052. Legislation generally.

  A  provision changing 
existing law is construed to mean the enactment of law where none exists 
(IV, 3812, 3813). For example, the following provisions have been held 
out of order: (1) permitting funds to remain available until expended or 
beyond the fiscal year covered by the bill where existing law does not 
permit such availability (Aug. 1, 1973, p. 27288); (2) permitting funds 
to be available immediately upon enactment prior to the fiscal year 
covered by the bill (July 29, 1986, p. 17981; June 28, 1988, p. 16255); 
(3) permitting funds to be available to the extent provided in advance 
in appropriation


  Although clause 2(b) permits the Committee on Appropriations to report 
rescissions of appropriations, an amendment proposing a rescission 
constitutes legislation under clause 2(c) (May 26, 1993, p. 11319), as 
does a provision proposing a rescission of contract authority (July 29, 
1998, p. ----). A proposal to amend existing law to provide for 
automatic continuation of appropriations in the absence of timely 
enactment of a regular appropriation bill constitutes legislation in 
contravention of clause 2(c) (July 17, 1996, p. 17550; July 24, 1996, p. 
18898). A proposal to designate an appropriation as ``emergency 
spending'' within the meaning of the budget-enforcement laws is 
fundamentally legislative in character (Sept. 8, 1999, pp. ----; June 
19, 2000, p. ---- (sustained on appeal); June 20, 2001, p. ----
). Similarly, a provision containing an averment necessary to 
qualify for certain scorekeeping under the Budget Act was conceded to be 
legislation (July 20, 1989, p. 15374), even though the Budget Act 
contemplates that expenditures may be mandated to occur before or 
following a fiscal period if the law making those expenditures specifies 
that the timing is the result of a ``significant'' policy change (July 
20, 1989, p. 15374).

  Although the object to be appropriated for may be described without 
violating the rule (IV, 3864), an amendment proposing an appropriation 
under a heading that indicates an unauthorized purpose as its object has 
been ruled out (Oct. 29, 1991, p. 28814). For example, an amendment 
proposing to make certain funds available for a specified report not 
contemplated by existing law was held to constitute legislation in 
violation of clause 2(c) (June 13, 2000, p. ----). The fact that a 
legislative item has been carried in appropriation bills for many years 
does not exempt it from a point of order (VII, 1445, 1656). The 
reenactment from year to year of a law intended to apply during the year 
of its enactment only is not relieved, however, from the point that it 
is legislation (IV, 3822). Limits of cost for public works may not be 
made or changed (IV, 3761, 3865-3867; VII, 1446), or contracts 
authorized (IV, 3868-3870; May 14, 1937, p. 4595).


  The Chair may examine legislative history established during debate on 
an amendment against which a point of order has been reserved to resolve 
any ambiguity therein when ruling on the eventual point of order (June 
14, 1978, p. 17651), and may inquire after its author's intent when 
attempting to construe an ambiguous amendment (Oct. 29, 1991, p. 28818). 

  An amendment to a general appropriation bill stating a legislative 
position constitutes legislation (July 24, 2001, p. ----).


[[Page 829]]

for part of the purpose while appropriating for the remainder of it (IV, 
3936; VII, 1595). The language of the limitation provides that some or 
all of the appropriation under consideration may not be used for a 
certain designated purpose (IV, 3917-3926; VII, 1580). This designated 
purpose may reach the question of qualifications, for while it is not in 
order to legislate as to the qualifications of the recipients of an 
appropriation (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. Sec. 53, 57.15), the House may 
specify that no part of the appropriation may go to recipients lacking 
certain qualifications (IV, 3942-3952; VII, 1655; June 4, 1970, p. 
18412; June 27, 1974, p. 21662; Oct. 9, 1974, p. 34712; June 9, 1978, p. 
16990).


Sec. 1053. Limitations on appropriations 
generally.

  Although the  rule forbids a provision ``changing existing law,'' the 
House, by practice, has established the principle that certain 
``limitations'' may be admitted. Just as the House may decline to 
appropriate for a purpose authorized by law, so may it by limitation 
prohibit the use of the money


  A limitation amendment prohibiting the use of funds for the 
construction of certain facilities unless such construction were subject 
to a project agreement was held not in order during the reading of the 
bill, even though existing law directed Federal officials to enter into 
such project agreements, on the ground that limitation amendments are in 
order during the reading only where existing law requires or permits the 
inclusion of limiting language in an appropriation Act, and not merely 
where the limitation is alleged to be ``consistent with existing law'' 
(June 28, 1988, p. 16267).

  A limitation may place some minimal, incidential duties on Federal 
officials, who must determine the effect of such a limitation on 
appropriated funds. However, a provision may not impose additional 
duties not required by law, either explicitly or implicitly, or make the 
appropriation contingent upon the performance of such duties (VII, 1676; 
June 11, 1968, p. 16712; July 31, 1969, pp. 21631-33; May 28, 1968, p. 
15350; July 26, 1985, p. 20807; see Sec. 1054, infra). The fact that a 
limitation may indirectly interfere with an executive official's 
discretionary authority by denying the use of funds (June 24, 1976, p. 
20408) or may impose certain incidental burdens on executive officials 
(Aug. 25, 1976, p. 27737) does not destroy the character of the 
limitation as long as it does not otherwise amend existing law and is 
descriptive of functions and findings already required to be undertaken 
by existing law. For example, a limitation precluding funds for 
specified Federal departments to file certain motions in specified civil 
actions (all matters of public record in the litigation and therefore 
available to responsible intervening Federal officials) was held to be a 
proper limitation (July 18, 2001, p. ----).


[[Page 830]]

year does not justify its inclusion in the pending annual bill (Sept. 
22, 1983, p. 25406, June 26, 2000, p. ----).
  The limitation must apply solely to the money of the appropriation 
under consideration (VII, 1597, 1600, 1720; Feb. 26, 1958, p. 2895), and 
may not be made applicable to money appropriated in other Acts (IV, 
3927, 3928; VII, 1495, 1525; June 28, 1971, p. 22442; June 27, 1974, pp. 
21670-72; May 13, 1981, p. 9663), and may not require funds available to 
an agency in any future fiscal year for a certain purpose to be subject 
to limitations specified in advance in appropriations Acts (May 8, 1986, 
p. 10156). The tendency of a limitation to change existing law is 
measured against the state of existing law ``for the period of the 
limitation,'' such that the presence of the same limitation in the 
annual bill for the previous fiscal

  A restriction on authority to incur obligations is legislative in 
nature and not a limitation on funds (July 13, 1987, p. 19507; Sept. 23, 
1993, p. 22204). For example, a limitation on the authority of the 
Commodity Credit Corporation to purchase sugar is legislative in nature 
and not a limitation on funds (June 29, 2000, p. ----).

  In construing a proposed limitation, the Chair may examine whether the 
purpose of the limitation is legislative. For example, a limitation 
accompanied by language stating a legislative motive or purpose is not 
in order (Aug. 8, 1978, p. 24969; July 22, 1980, p. 19087; Sept. 16, 
1980, p. 25604; Sept. 22, 1981, p. 21577). Similarly, where existing law 
and the Constitution require a census to be taken of all persons, an 
amendment that seeks to preclude the use of funds to exclude another 
class ``known'' to the Secretary is not in order (Aug. 1, 1989, p. 
17156). However, language may, by negatively refusing to include funds 
for all or part of an authorized executive function, thereby affect 
policy and restrict executive discretion to the extent of its denial of 
availability of funds (IV, 3968-3972; VII, 1583, 1653, 1694; Sept. 14, 
1972, p. 30749; June 21, 1974, p. 20601; Oct. 9, 1974, p. 34716). For 
example, an appropriation may be withheld from a designated object by a 
negative limitation on the use of funds, notwithstanding that contracts 
may be left unsatisfied thereby (IV, 3987; July 10, 1975, p. 22005).

  The Chair has stated that a limitation amendment that comprises 
a textual ``double-negative'' (the coupling of a denial of an 
appropriation with a negative restriction on official duties is 
suspect and may result in an affirmative direction or an affirmative 
statement of intent that constitutes legislation and is 
therefore not in order (VII, 1690-1692; Deschler, ch. 26, 
Sec. 51.15 (note); July 23, 2003, p. ----). For example, the following 
have been held out of order for using a double-negative: (1) a provision 
to limit funds to prohibit the obligation of funds up to a 
specified amount for an unauthorized transportation 
project (effectively authorizing an unauthorized project) (Sept. 23, 
1993, p. 22209); (2) an amendment to limit funds to prohibit 
projects that promote the participation of women in international peace 
efforts, such promotion not specifically contemplated by law (July 23, 
2003, p. ----); (3) an amendment to limit funds to prohibit the 
establishment of an independent commission not contemplated by existing 
law (July 23, 2003, p. ----). In order to carry the burden of proof on 
an amendment proposing a double-negative, a Member must be able to show 
that the object of the double-negative is specifically contemplated by 
existing law (July 23, 2003, p. ----, p. ----).


[[Page 831]]

tion of certain funds until funds provided by another Act have been 
obligated (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 48.8). The burden is on the proponent 
to show that such a proposal does not change existing law by restricting 
the timing of the expenditure of funds rather than their availability 
for specified objects (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. Sec. 64.23 and 80.5).
  It is not in order, even by language in the form of a limitation, to 
restrict not the use or amount of appropriated funds but the 
discretionary authority conferred by law to administer their 
expenditure, such as by limiting the percentage of funds that may be 
apportioned for expenditure within a certain period of time (Deschler, 
ch. 26, Sec. 51.23), or by precluding the obliga

  As long as a limitation merely restricts the expenditure of Federal 
funds carried in the bill without changing existing law, the limitation 
is in order, even if the Federal funds in question are commingled with 
non-Federal funds that would have to be accounted for separately in 
carrying out the limitation (Aug. 20, 1980, p. 22171).

  The fact that existing law authorizes funds to be available until 
expended or without regard to fiscal year limitation does not prevent 
the Committee on Appropriations from limiting their availability to the 
fiscal year covered by the bill unless existing law mandates 
availability beyond the fiscal year (June 25, 1974, p. 21040; see also 
Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 32). The fact that a provision 
would constitute legislation for only a year does not make it a 
limitation in order under the rule (IV, 3936).

  A proposition to construe a law may not be admitted (IV, 3936-3938, 
see Sec. 1055, infra). Care also should be taken that the language of 
limitation be not such as, when fairly construed, would change existing 
law (IV, 3976-3983) or justify an executive officer in assuming an 
intent to change existing law (IV, 3984; VII, 1706).

  Although the Committee on Appropriations may include in a general 
appropriation bill language not in existing law limiting the use of 
funds in the bill, if such language also constitutes an appropriation it 
must be authorized by law (June 21, 1988, p. 15439). An amendment 
placing a limitation on funds for activities unrelated to the functions 
of departments and agencies addressed by the bill is not germane under 
clause 7 of rule XVI (July 10, 2000, p. ----).



Sec. 1054. New duties or determinations; 
executive discretion.

  Propositions to  establish affirmative directions for executive 
officers (IV, 3854-3859; VII, 1443; July 31, 1969, p. 21675; June 18, 
1979, p. 15286; July 1, 1987, pp. 18654 and 18655; June 27, 1994, p. 
14572), even in cases where they may have discretion under the law so to 
do (IV, 3853; June 4, 1970, p. 18401; Aug. 8, 1978, p. 24959), or to 
affirmatively take away an authority or discretion conferred by law (IV, 
3862, 3863; VII, 1975; Mar. 30, 1955, p. 4065; June 21, 1974, p. 20600; 
July 31, 1985, p. 21909), are subject to a point of order.



[[Page 832]]

held to implicitly require the Office of Management and Budget to make 
determinations not discernibly required by law in evaluating and 
executing its responsibilities).
  Where language implicitly places new duties on officers of the 
Government or implicitly requires them to make investigations, compile 
evidence, or make judgments and determinations not otherwise required of 
them by law, such as to judge intent or motives, then it assumes the 
character of legislation and is subject to a point of order (July 31, 
1969, pp. 21653, 21675, where the words ``in order to overcome racial 
imbalance'' were held to impose additional duties, and Nov. 30, 1982, p. 
28062, where the words ``to interfere with'' the rulemaking authority of 
any regulatory agency were

  An amendment authorizing the President to reduce each appropriation in 
the bill by not more than 10 percent was ruled out as legislation 
conferring new authority on the President (May 31, 1984, p. 14617; June 
6, 1984, p. 15120). The fact that an executive official may have been 
directed by an Executive Order to consult another executive official 
prior to taking an action does not permit inclusion of language 
directing the official being consulted to make determinations not 
specifically required by law (July 22, 1980, p. 19087).


[[Page 833]]

mine whether building services are ``usually'' provided through the 
Federal Building Fund to an agency not paying a level of assessment 
specified elsewhere (and not necessarily applicable) (July 16, 1998, p. 
----); (19) require a determination of ``successor agency'' status 
(Sept. 26, 1997, p. ----); (20) require a determination whether a 
delegate or envoy to the United Nations has ``advocated'' the adoption 
of a certain convention (June 26, 2000, p. ----); (21) require tests or 
reports not required under existing law (May 19, 2000, p. ----); (22) 
impose a new duty to tally violations of law by contractors where 
existing law required information on violations but not on the number 
thereof (June 7, 2000, p. ----); (23) require an investigation of the 
conscription requirements of other nations (July 13, 2000, p. ----); 
(24) require a determination whether ``efforts'' have been made to 
change any nation's laws regarding abortion, family planning, or 
population control (July 13, 2000, p. ----); (25) impose a new 
duty to calculate the ``total amount'' of payments under a Federal 
program paid to a husband and wife (to determine whether an exception to 
an otherwise valid limitation would apply) (July 11, 2001, p. ----); 
(26) require an investigation into the extent to which World Trade 
Organization challenges against foreign laws and policies promote access 
to certain pharmaceuticals (July 18, 2001, p. ----); (27) require an 
investigation into whether an applicant for immigration has been 
involved in the harvesting of organs (July 18, 2001, p. ----); (28) 
require the Inspector General to opine on audited financial statements 
of certain components of the Department of Defense where the issuance of 
such opinion was not shown to be required by existing law (June 27, 
2002, p. ----); (29) require the examination of certain legislative 
reports to determine whether an entity is specifically identified by 
name (July 17, 2002, p. ----); (30) require several agencies to process 
certain information where current law required only one specific agency 
to process that information (June 24, 2003, p. ----); (31) in the case 
of a limitation with respect to certain roads on public land, require a 
determination of the precise nature of those roads including their 
ownership and the types of vehicles allowed to travel on them (July 17, 
2003, p. ----); (32) require a determination that certain trade 
agreements achieved generic undefined policy goals that were not set 
forth in existing law (July 23, 2003, p. ----). 
  A limitation may not: (1) be applied directly to the official 
functions of executive officers (IV, 3957-3966; VII, 1673, 1678, 1685), 
(2) directly interfere with discretionary authority in law by 
establishing a level of funding below which expenditures may not be made 
(VII, 1704; July 20, 1978, p. 21856), (3) condition the availability of 
funds or the exercise of contract authority upon an interpretation of 
local law where that interpretation is not required by existing law 
(July 17, 1981, p. 16327); (4) require new determinations of full 
Federal compliance with mandates imposed upon States (July 22, 1981, p. 
16829); (5) require the evaluation of the theoretical basis of a program 
(July 22, 1981, p. 16822); (6) require new determinations of propriety 
or effectiveness (Oct. 6, 1981, p. 23361; May 25, 1988, p. 12275), or 
satisfactory quality (Aug. 1, 1986, p. 18647); (7) incorporate by 
reference determinations already made in administrative processes not 
affecting programs funded by the bill (Oct. 6, 1981, p. 23361); (8) 
require new determinations of rates of interest payable (July 29, 1982, 
p. 18624; Dec. 9, 1982, p. 29691); (9) apply standards of conduct to 
foreign entities where existing law requires such conduct only by 
domestic entities (July 17, 1986, p. 16951); (10) require the 
enforcement of a standard where existing law only requires inspection of 
an area (July 30, 1986, p. 18189); (11) prohibit the availability of 
funds for the purchase of ``nondomestic'' goods and services (Sept. 12, 
1986, p. 23178); (12) mandate contractual provisions (May 18, 1988, p. 
11389); and (13) authorize the adjustment of wages of Government 
employees (June 21, 1988, p. 15451; Apr. 26, 1989, p. 7525) or permit an 
increase in Members' office allowances only ``if requested in writing'' 
(Oct. 21, 1990, p. 31708); (14) convert an existing legal prerequisite 
for the issuance of a regulatory permit into a prerequisite for even the 
preliminary processing of such a permit (July 22, 1992, p. 18825); (15) 
mandate reductions in various appropriations by a variable percentage 
calculated in relation to ``overhead'' (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 5.6; June 
24, 1992, p. 16110); (16) require an agency to investigate and determine 
whether private airports are collecting certain fees for each enplaning 
passenger (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22213); (17) require an agency to 
investigate and determine whether a person or entity entering into a 
contract with funds under the pending bill is subject to a legal 
proceeding commenced by the Federal Government and alleging fraud (Sept. 
17, 1997, p. ----); (18) require an agency to deter


[[Page 834]]

termining payment levels (June 18, 1980, p. 15355); (4) denying use of 
funds to carry out (or pay the salaries of persons who carry out) 
tobacco crop and insurance programs (July 20, 1995, p. 19798); (5) 
denying the use of funds for any transit project exceeding a specified 
cost-effectiveness index where the Chair was persuaded that the 
limitation applied to projects for which indexes were already required 
by law (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22206); (6) denying the use of funds to 
enforce FAA regulations to require domestic air carriers to surrender 
more than a specified number of ``slots'' at a given airport in 
preference of international air carriers where the Chair was persuaded 
that existing regulations already required the FAA to determine the 
origin of withdrawn slots (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22212); (7) denying the 
use of funds for troops ``except in time of war'' (Deschler, ch. 26, 
Sec. 70.1) or ``except in time of emergency'' (VII, 1657, which was the 
basis for the preceding ruling); (8) denying the use of funds to 
implement any sanction imposed by the United States on private 
commercial sales of agricultural commodities, medicine, or medical 
supplies to Cuba except for a sanction imposed pursuant to agreement 
with one or more other countries (July 20, 2000, p. ----); (9) denying 
the use of funds by the Forest Service to construct roads or prepare 
timber sales in certain roadless areas where the executive was already 
charged by law with ongoing responsibility to maintain a comprehensive 
and detailed inventory of all land and renewable resources of the 
National Forest System (July 18, 1995, p. 19357); (10) denying use of 
funds to eliminate an existing legal requirement for sureties on custom 
bonds (June 27, 1984, p. 19101); (11) denying use of funds by any 
Federal official in any manner that would prevent a provision of 
existing law from being enforced (relating to import restrictions) (June 
27, 1984, p. 19101); (12) denying use of funds for any reduction in the 
number of Customs Service regions or for any consolidation of Customs 
Service offices (June 27, 1984, p. 19102); (13) denying use of 
funds for specified Federal departments to file certain motions in 
specified civil actions (all matters of public record in the litigation 
and therefore available to responsible intervening Federal officials) 
(July 18, 2001, p. ----).
  On the other hand, the following limitations have been held in order 
as not placing new duties on Federal officials: (1) denying the use of 
funds to pay the salaries of Federal officials who perform certain 
functions under existing law if the description of those duties 
precisely follows existing law and does not require them to perform new 
duties (June 24, 1976, p. 20373); (2) denying the use of funds to a 
Federal official not in compliance with an existing law that he is 
charged with enforcing (Sept. 10, 1981, p. 20110); (3) reducing the 
availability of funds for trade adjustment assistance by amounts of 
unemployment insurance entitlements where the law establishing trade 
adjustment assistance already required the disbursing agency to take 
into consideration levels of unemployment insurance in de


[[Page 835]]

and thereby broadening the provision to include District of Columbia 
funds as well, was ruled out (Nov. 15, 1989, p. 29004). However, to such 
a provision permitted to remain in a general appropriation bill, an 
amendment ``merely perfecting'' the exemption to address cases where the 
health of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to 
term was held not to constitute further legislation by requiring a 
different or more onerous determinations (June 27, 1984, p. 19113). An 
amendment providing that no Federal funds provided in the District of 
Columbia general appropriation bill be used to perform abortions is not 
legislation, since Federal officials have the responsibility to account 
for all appropriations for the annual Federal payment and for 
disbursement of all taxes collected by the District of Columbia, 
pursuant to the D.C. Code (July 17, 1979, p. 19066).
  A paragraph prohibiting the use of funds to perform abortions except 
where the mother's life would be endangered if the fetus were carried to 
term (or where the pregnancy was a result of rape or incest) is 
legislation, since requiring Federal officials to make new 
determinations and judgments not required of them by law, regardless of 
whether private or State officials administering the funds in question 
routinely make such determinations (June 17, 1977, p. 1969; June 30, 
1993, p. 14871; July 16, 1998, p. ----). The fact that such a provision 
relating to abortion funding may have been included in appropriation 
Acts in prior years applicable to funds in those laws does not permit 
the inclusion of similar language requiring such determinations, not 
required by law, with respect to funds for the fiscal year in question 
(Sept. 22, 1983, p. 25406); and where the provision, applicable to 
Federal funds, was permitted to remain in a bill (no point of order 
having been made), an amendment striking the word ``Federal,''

  An exception to a limitation on funds for the Office of Personnel 
Management to enter contracts for health benefit plans that required 
determinations of ``equivalence'' of benefits was held to impose new 
duties (July 16, 1998, p. ----). However, an exception to a similar 
limitation that merely excepted certain specified coverage and plans was 
held not to impose new duties (July 16, 1998, p. ----). Similarly, a 
limitation denying the use of funds in an appropriation bill for the 
General Services Administration to dispose of Federally owned 
``agricultural'' land declared surplus was held to impose new duties 
since the determination whether surplus lands are ``agricultural'' was 
not required by law (Aug. 20, 1980, pp. 22156-58). However, a limitation 
denying the use of funds for any transit project exceeding a specified 
cost-effectiveness index was held not to impose new duties where the 
Chair was persuaded that the limitation applied to projects for which 
indexes were already required by law (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22206).


[[Page 836]]

  Over a period dating from 1908, the House had developed a line of 
precedent to the effect that language restricting the availability of 
funds in a general appropriation bill could be a valid limitation if, 
rather than imposing new duties on a disbursing official or requiring 
new determinations of that official, it and passively addressed the 
state of knowledge of the official (VII, 1695; cf. Aug. 1, 1989, p. 
17156, and June 22, 1995, p. 16844 (limitations in recommittal ruled out 
on basis of form rather than of legislative content)). This reasoning 
culminated in a ruling in the 104th Congress admitting as a valid 
limitation an amendment prohibiting the use of funds in the bill to 
execute certain accounting transactions when specified conditions were 
``made known'' to the disbursing official (July 17, 1996, p. 17542). In 
the 105th Congress this entire line of precedent was overtaken by 
changes in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this clause that treat as 
legislation a provision that makes funding contingent on whether 
circumstances not determinative under existing law are ``known'' (H. 
Res. 5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. 121; July 15, 1997, p. ----; July 
24, 1997, p. ----).



Sec. 1055. Contingencies and congressional 
actions.

  An amendment  making an appropriation contingent upon a recommendation 
(June 27, 1979, p. 17054) or action not specifically required by law is 
legislation; such as a provision limiting the use of funds in a bill 
``unless'' or ``until'' an action contrary to existing law is taken 
(Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 47.1; July 24, 1996, p. 18888). Where existing 
law requires an agency to furnish certain information to congressional 
committees upon request, without a subpoena, it is not in order to make 
funding for that agency contingent upon its furnishing information to 
subcommittees upon request (July 29-30, 1980, p. 20475), or contingent 
upon submission of an agreement by a Federal official to Congress and 
congressional review thereof (July 31, 1986, p. 18370). Similarly, it is 
not in order to condition funds on legal determinations to be made by a 
Federal court and an executive department (June 28, 1988, p. 16261; see 
Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 47.2).


  Provisions making the availability of funds contingent upon subsequent 
congressional action have, under the most recent precedents, been ruled 
out as legislation (June 30, 1942, p. 5826; May 15, 1947, p. 5378; June 
27, 1994, p. 14613). However, a limitation on the use of funds to buy 
real estate or establish new offices except where Congress had approved 
and funded such activity (June 18, 1991, p. 15218) was held in order.

  The following provisions have been ruled out as legislation: (1) 
making the availability of certain funds contingent upon subsequent 
congressional action on legislative proposals resolving the policy issue 
(Nov. 18, 1981, p. 28064); (2) making the availability of funds 
contingent upon subsequent enactment of legislation containing specified 
findings (Nov. 2, 1983, p. 30503); and (3) changing a permanent 
appropriation in existing law to restrict its availability until all 
general appropriation bills are presented to the President (June 29, 
1987, p. 18083). A section in a general appropriation bill directly 
contravening existing law to subject the use of local funds to 
congressional approval was held to constitute legislation where it was 
shown that some local (District of Columbia) funds deriving from 
interest accounts were available to the Financial Control Board without 
subsequent congressional approval (Aug. 6, 1998, p. ----).

  Two rulings upholding the admissibility of amendments making the 
availability of funds contingent upon subsequent congressional action 
have been superseded by the precedents cited above (June 11, 1968, p. 
16692; Sept. 6, 1979, p. 23360).


[[Page 837]]

the President pursuant to the Impoundment Control Act is not in order if 
included in a general appropriation bill rather than in a separate 
resolution of disapproval under that Act (July 29, 1982, pp. 18625, 
18626). An amendment making the availability of funds contingent upon a 
substantive determination by a State or local government 
official or agency that is not otherwise required by existing law has 
been ruled out as legislation (July 25, 1985, p. 20569).
  The following provisions also have been held to be legislation as they 
required: (1) a congressional committee to promulgate regulations to 
limit the use of an appropriation (June 13, 1979, p. 14670), or 
otherwise to direct the activities of a committee (June 24, 1992, pp. 
16087); (2) the Selective Service Administration to issue regulations to 
bring its classifications into conformance with a Supreme Court decision 
(July 20, 1989, p. 15405); and (3) a change in a rule of the House (IV, 
3819). A provision constituting congressional disapproval of a deferral 
of budget authority proposed by



Sec. 1056. Construing or amending existing 
law.

  A provision  proposing to construe existing law is itself legislative and 
therefore not in order (IV, 3936-3938; May 2, 1951, p. 4747; July 26, 
1951, p. 8982). However, an official's general responsibility to 
construe the language of a limitation on the use of funds, absent 
imposition of an affirmative direction not required by law, does not 
destroy the validity of a limitation (June 27, 1974, pp. 21687-94).


  Where it is asserted that duties ostensibly occasioned by a limitation 
are already imposed by existing law, the Chair may take cognizance of 
judicial decisions and rule the limitation out on the basis that the 
case law is not uniform, current, or finally dispositive (June 16, 1977, 
pp. 19365-74; June 7, 1978, p. 16676). For example, a limitation 
prohibiting the use of funds for an inspection conducted by a regulatory 
agency without a search warrant has been held out of order as imposing a 
new duty not uniformly required by case law (June 16, 1977, pp. 19365-
74). Similarly, an amendment denying the use of funds for an agency to 
apply certain provisions of law under court decisions in effect on a 
prior date has been held out of order as requiring the official to apply 
noncurrent case law (June 7, 1978, p. 16655).

  A provision prescribing a rule of construction is legislation 
(Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 25.15). For example, a provision prescribing a 
prospective rule of construction for possible (future) tax enactments 
was held to constitute legislation (June 21, 2000, p. ----). Similarly, 
a provision construing a limitation in a bill by affirmatively declaring 
the meaning of the prohibition is legislation (May 17, 1988, p. 11305); 
and a provision prescribing definitions for terms contained in a 
limitation may be legislation (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. Sec. 25.7, 25.11). 
Language excepting certain appropriations from the sweep of a broader 
limitation may be in order (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 25.2). It also has 
been held in order to except from the operation of a specific limitation 
on expenditures certain of those expenditures that are authorized by law 
by prohibiting a construction of the limitation in a way that would 
prevent compliance with that law (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 25.10; June 18, 
1991, p. 15218). Similarly, a limitation on certain payments to persons 
in ``excess of $500,'' but stating that the limitation would not be 
``construed to deprive any share renter of payments'' to which he might 
otherwise be entitled was held in order (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 66.1);


[[Page 838]]

an amendment to overcome a point of order that the amendment constitutes 
legislation (Sept. 16, 1980, p. 25606; May 8, 1986, p. 10156). A 
limitation denying the use of funds to apply certain provisions of the 
Internal Revenue Code other than under regulations in effect on a prior 
date is legislation since requiring an official to apply regulations no 
longer current in order to render an appropriation available (June 7, 
1978, p. 16655; Aug. 19, 1980, pp. 21978-80). However, an exception to a 
limitation on the use of funds for designated Federal activities that 
were already authorized by law in more general terms, was held in order 
as not containing legislation (June 27, 1979, pp. 17033-35).
  The mere recitation in an amendment that a determination is to be made 
pursuant to existing laws and regulations, absent a citation to the law 
imposing such responsibility, is not sufficient proof by the proponent 
of

  Language waiving provisions of an existing law that did not 
specifically permit inclusion of such a waiver in an appropriation bill 
has been ruled out (Nov. 13, 1975, p. 36271; June 20, 1996, p. 14847; 
Mar. 29, 2000, p. ----; May 19, 2000, p. ----, p. ----; June 13, 2000, 
p. ----), as has language identical to that contained in an 
authorization bill previously passed by the House but not yet signed 
into law (Aug. 4, 1978, p. 24436), or a proposition for repeal of 
existing law (VII, 1403).

  Existing law may be repeated verbatim without violating the rule (IV, 
3814, 3815), but the slightest change of the text renders it liable to a 
point of order (IV, 3817; VII, 1391, 1394; June 4, 1970, p. 18405). It 
is in order to include language descriptive of authority provided in law 
for the operation of Government agencies and corporations so long as the 
description is precise and does not change that authority in any respect 
(June 15, 1973, p. 19843; Aug. 3, 1978, p. 24249); although language 
merely reciting the applicability of current law to the use of earmarked 
funds is permitted, a provision that elevates existing guidelines to 
mandates for spending has been ruled out (July 12, 1989, p. 14432).

  As it is in order by way of limitation to deny the use of funds for 
implementation of an Executive Order, an amendment precisely describing 
the contents of the Executive Order does not constitute legislation 
solely for that reason (Mar. 16, 1977, p. 7748). The fact that the 
regulation for which funds are denied may have been promulgated pursuant 
to court order and pursuant to constitutional provisions is an argument 
on the merits of the amendment and does not render it legislative in 
nature (Aug. 19, 1980, pp. 21981-84). An amendment prohibiting the use 
of funds to carry out any ruling of the Internal Revenue Service that 
rules that taxpayers are not entitled to certain charitable deductions 
was held in order as a limitation, since merely descriptive of an 
existing ruling already promulgated and not requiring any new 
determinations as to the applicability of the limitation to other 
categories of taxpayers (July 16, 1979, pp. 18808-10). 


[[Page 839]]

  An amendment proposing to increase budget authority and to offset that 
increase by proposing a change in the application of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 was held to constitute legislation (Sept. 8, 1999, 
p. ----; June 24, 2003, p. ---- (sustained on appeal); July 10, 2003, p. 
----). 



Sec. 1057. Mandating expenditures.

  A provision  that mandates 
a distribution of funds in contravention of an allocation formula in 
existing law is legislation (July 29, 1982, pp. 18637, 18638; Oct. 5, 
1983, p. 27335; Aug. 2, 1989, p. 18123; July 24, 1995, p. 20141), as is 
an amendment that by such a mandate interferes with an executive 
official's discretionary authority (Mar. 12, 1975, p. 6338), as in an 
amendment requiring not less than a certain sum to be used for a 
particular purpose where existing law does not mandate such expenditure 
(June 18, 1976, p. 19297; July 29, 1982, p. 18623), or where an 
amendment earmarks appropriated funds to the arts to require their 
expenditure pursuant to standards otherwise applicable only as 
guidelines (July 12, 1989, p. 14432). Where existing law directed a 
Federal official to provide for sale of certain Government property to a 
private organization in ``necessary'' amounts, an amendment providing 
that no such property be withheld from distribution from qualifying 
purchasers was legislation, since requiring disposal of all property and 
restricting discretionary authority to determine ``necessary'' amounts 
(Aug. 7, 1978, p. 24707). An amendment directing the use of funds to 
assure compliance with an existing law, where existing law does not so 
mandate, also is legislation (June 24, 1976, p. 20370). So-called 
``hold-harmless'' provisions that mandate a certain level of expenditure 
for certain purposes or recipients, where existing law confers 
discretion or makes ratable reductions in such expenditures, also 
constitute legislation (Apr. 16, 1975, p. 10357; June 25, 1976, p. 
20557). A transfer of available funds from one department to another 
with directions as to the use to which those funds must be put is 
legislation (and also a reappropriation in violation of clause 2(a)(2) 
of this rule) (Dec. 8, 1982, p. 29449). A provision requiring States to 
match funds provided in an appropriation bill was held to constitute 
legislation where existing law contained no such requirement (June 28, 
1993, p. 14418). Where existing law prescribes a formula for the 
allocation of funds among several categories, an amendment merely 
reducing the amount earmarked for one of the categories is not 
legislation, so long as it does not textually change the statutory 
formula (July 24, 1995, p. 20133).



[[Page 840]]

4595; Aug. 1, 1973, p. 27291; June 10, 1977, p. 1802; July 30, 1985, p. 
21532; July 23, 1986, p. 17446; June 26, 1987, p. 17655; June 28, 1988, 
pp. 16203, 16213; Aug. 2, 1989, p. 18172; Nov. 15, 1989, p. 29004, June 
23, 1998, p. ----; July 13, 2000, p. ----), proposes a new unauthorized 
purpose (Dec. 8, 1971, p. 45487; Aug. 7, 1978, pp. 24710-12; May 25, 
1988, p. 12256), earmarks for unauthorized purposes (July 17, 1985, p. 
19435; July 17, 1986, p. 16918; July 26, 1995, p. 20528; June 5, 1996, 
p. 13120), earmarks by directing a new use of funds not required by law 
(July 26, 1985, pp. 20811, 20813), or increases an authorized amount 
above the authorized ceiling (Aug. 4, 1999, p. ----).


Sec. 1058. Waivers; amending legislation permitted 
to remain.

  The House  may, by agreeing to a report from the Committee on Rules or 
by adopting an order under suspension of the rules, allow legislation on 
general appropriation bills (IV, 3260-3263, 3839-3845). Where an 
unauthorized appropriation or legislation is permitted to remain in a 
general appropriation bill by waiver or by failure to raise a point of 
order, an amendment merely changing that amount and not adding 
legislative language or earmarking separate funds for another 
unauthorized purpose is in order (IV, 3823-3835, 3838; VII, 1405, 1413-
1415; June 9, 1954, p. 5963; July 27, 1954, p. 12287; Oct. 1, 1975, p. 
31058; June 8, 1977, p. 17941; July 17, 1985, p. 19435; Sept. 11, 1985, 
p. 23398; June 14, 1988, p. 14341). However, this does not permit an 
amendment that adds additional legislation (IV, 3836, 3837, 3862; VII, 
1402-1436; Dec. 9, 1971, p.


  An amendment adding a new paragraph indirectly increasing an 
unauthorized amount contained in a prior paragraph permitted to remain 
is subject to a point of order because the new paragraph is adding a 
further unauthorized amount not merely perfecting (July 12, 1995, p. 
18628; July 16, 1997, pp. ----; Sept. 9, 1997, p. ----; Sept. 17, 1998, 
p. ----). However, a new paragraph indirectly reducing an unauthorized 
amount permitted to remain in a prior paragraph passed in the reading is 
not subject to a point of order because it is not adding a further 
unauthorized amount (July 16, 1997, p. ----). Where by unanimous consent 
an amendment is offered en bloc to a paragraph containing an 
unauthorized amount not yet read for amendment, the amendment increasing 
that unauthorized figure is subject to a point of order since at that 
point it is not being offered to a paragraph that has been read and 
permitted to remain (June 21, 1984, p. 17687). As required by clause 
2(f), the Chair will query for points of order against the provisions of 
an appropriation bill not yet reached in the reading but addressed by an 
amendment offered en bloc under that clause as budget authority and 
outlay neutral (July 22, 1997, p. ----).

  The Chair examined an entire legislative provision permitted to remain 
when ruling that an amendment to a portion of the provision was merely 
perfecting (July 15, 1999, p. ----). An amendment to a general 
appropriation bill is not subject to a point of order as adding 
legislation for restating, verbatim, a legislative provision already 
contained in the bill and permitted to remain (Aug. 27, 1980, p. 23519).


[[Page 841]]

  To a legislative provision permitted to remain conferring assistance 
on a certain class of recipients, an amendment adding another class is 
further legislation and is not merely perfecting (June 22, 1983, p. 
16851). For example, the following amendments to legislative provisions 
permitted to remain have been held to propose additional legislation: 
(1) an amendment striking text that resulted in extending the 
legislative reach of the pending bill (July 17, 1996, p. 17533); (2) an 
amendment extending a legislative provision that placed certain 
restrictions on recipients of a defined set of Federal payments and 
benefits to persons benefiting from a certain tax status determined on 
wholly unrelated criteria (Aug. 3, 1995, p. 21967); (3) an amendment 
adding an additional nation to a legislative provision addressing 
sanctions against one nation (July 13, 2000, p. ----).

  On the other hand, to a legislative provision permitted to remain, an 
amendment particularizing a definition in the language was held not to 
constitute additional legislation where it was shown that the definition 
being amended already contemplated inclusion of the covered class (Aug. 
5, 1998, p. ----). To a legislative provision permitted to remain that 
excepted from a denial of funds for abortions cases where the life of 
the mother would be endangered if a fetus were carried to term, an 
amendment excepting instead cases where the health of the mother would 
be endangered if the fetus were carried to term was held not to 
constitute further legislation, since determinations on the endangerment 
of life necessarily subsume determinations on the endangerment of 
health; and the amendment did not therefore require any different or 
more onerous determinations (June 27, 1984, p. 19113).

  To a paragraph permitted to remain though containing a legislative 
proviso restricting the obligation of funds until a date within the 
fiscal year, an amendment striking the delimiting date, thus applying 
the restriction for the entire year, was held to be perfecting (July 30, 
1990, p. 20442); but striking the date and inserting a new trigger (the 
enactment of other legislation), was held to be additional legislation 
(July 30, 1990, p. 20442).




Sec. 1059. Senate amendments.

  The principle  seems to be 
generally well accepted that the House proposing legislation on a 
general appropriation bill should recede if the other House persists in 
its objection (IV, 3904-3908), and clause 5 of rule XXII (Sec. 1076, 
infra) prohibits House conferees from agreeing to a Senate amendment 
that proposes legislation on an appropriation bill without specific 
authority from the House. However, where a Senate amendment proposing 
legislation on a general appropriation bill is, pursuant to the edict of 
clause 5 of rule XXII, reported back from conference in disagreement, a 
motion to concur in the Senate amendment with a further amendment is in 
order, even if the proposed amendment adds legislation to that contained 
in the Senate amendment, and the only test is whether the proposed 
amendment is germane to the Senate amendment reported in disagreement 
(IV, 3909; VIII, 3188, 3189; Speaker McCormack, Dec. 15, 1970, p. 41504; 
Aug. 1, 1979, pp. 22007-11; Speaker O'Neill, Dec. 12, 1979, p. 35520; 
June 30, 1987, p. 18308).



               ``holman rule'' on retrenching expenditures


[[Page 842]]

Sec. Sec. 1053-1057, supra). Under the modern practice, the ``Holman 
Rule'' only applies where an obvious reduction is achieved by the 
provision in question and does not apply to limiting language 
unaccompanied by a reduction of funds in the bill (July 16, 1979, pp. 
18808-10). It has no application to an amendment to an appropriation 
bill that does not legislate but is merely a negative limitation citing 
but not changing existing law (June 18, 1980, p. 15355).


Sec. 1062. Legislation reducing 
expenditures.

  Decisions under  the so-called ``Holman Rule'' in clause 2 of rule XXI 
have been rare in the modern practice of the House. The trend in 
construing language in general appropriation bills or amendments thereto 
has been to minimize the importance of the ``Holman Rule'' in those 
cases where the decision can be made on other grounds. The practice of 
using limitations in appropriation bills has been perfected in recent 
years so that most modern decisions by the Chair deal with distinctions 
between such limitations and matters that are considered to be 
legislation (see


  A paragraph containing legislation reported in an appropriation bill 
to be in order must on its face show a retrenchment of a type that 
conforms to the requirements of the rule (Mar. 17, 1926, p. 5804).

  The reduction of expenditure must appear as a necessary result, in 
order to bring an amendment or provision within the exception to the 
rule. It is not sufficient that such reduction would probably, or would 
in the opinion of the Chair, result therefrom (IV, 3887; VII, 1530-
1534). Thus, an amendment to a general appropriation bill providing that 
appropriations made in that act are hereby reduced by $7 billion, though 
legislative in form, was held in order under the ``Holman Rule'' 
exception (Apr. 5, 1966, p. 7689), but an amendment providing for 
certain reductions of appropriations carried in the bill based on the 
President's budget estimates was held not to show a reduction on its 
face and to provide merely speculative reductions (Deschler, ch. 26, 
Sec. 5.6; June 24, 1992, p. 16110). An amendment authorizing the 
President to reduce each appropriation in the bill by not more than 10 
percent was ruled out as legislation conferring new authority on the 
President (May 31, 1984, p. 14617; June 6, 1984, p. 15120). An amendment 
reducing an unauthorized amount permitted to remain in a general 
appropriation bill is in order as a retrenchment under this clause (Oct. 
1, 1975, p. 31058). An amendment to a general appropriation bill denying 
the availability of funds to certain recipients but which requires 
Federal officials to make additional determinations as to the 
qualifications of recipients is legislation and is not a retrenchment of 
expenditures where it is not apparent that the prohibition will reduce 
the amounts covered by the bill (June 26, 1973, p. 21389).

  The amendment must not only show on its face an attempt to retrench 
but also must be germane to some provision in the bill 
even though offered by direction of the committee having jurisdiction of 
the subject matter of the amendment (VII, 1549; Dec. 16, 1911, p. 442). 
An amendment providing that appropriations ``herein and heretofore 
made'' shall be reduced by $70 million through the reduction of Federal 
employees as the President determines was held to be legislative and not 
germane to the bill, since it went to funds other than those carried 
therein, and was therefore not within the ``Holman Rule'' exception 
(Oct. 18, 1966, p. 27425).


[[Page 843]]

trenchment of expenditures even if assumed to be legislative (July 13, 
1979, pp. 18453-55).
  An amendment reducing an amount in an appropriation bill for the 
Postal Service and prohibiting the use of funds therein to implement 
special bulk third-class rates for political committees was held in 
order since not specifically requiring a new determination and since 
constituting a re

  As long as an amendment calls for an obvious reduction at some point 
in time during the fiscal year, the amendment is in order under the 
``Holman Rule'' even if the reduction takes place in the future in an 
amount actually determined when the reduction takes place (for example, 
by formula) (VII, 1491, 1505; July 30, 1980, pp. 20499-20503). To an 
amendment that is in order under the ``Holman Rule,'' containing 
legislation but retrenching expenditures by formula for every agency 
funded by the bill, an amendment exempting from that reduction several 
specific programs does not add further legislation and is in order (July 
30, 1980, pp. 20499-20503).

  A motion to recommit the District of Columbia appropriation bill with 
instructions to reduce the proportion of the fund appropriated from the 
Public Treasury from one-half, as provided in the bill, to one-fourth of 
the entire appropriation is in order, since the effect of the amendment 
if adopted would reduce the expenditure of public money although not 
reducing the amount of the appropriation (VII, 1518).

  The term ``retrenchment'' means the reduction of the amount of money 
to be taken out of the Federal Treasury by the bill, and therefore a 
reduction of the amount of money to be contributed toward the expenses 
of the District of Columbia is in order as a retrenchment (VII, 1502).

  An amendment proposed to an item for the recoinage of uncurrent 
fractional silver, which amendment struck out the amount appropriated 
and added a provision for the coinage of all the bullion in the Treasury 
into standard silver dollars, the cost of such coinage and recoinage to 
be paid out of the Government's seigniorage, was held not to be in order 
under the rule; first, because not germane to the subject matter of the 
bill (the sundry civil); second, because it did not appear that any 
retrenchment of expenditure would result, the seigniorage being the 
property of the Government as other funds in the Treasury (VII, 1547).

  To an item of appropriation for inland transportation of mails by star 
routes an amendment was offered requiring the Postmaster General to 
provide routes and make contracts in certain cases, with the further 
provision ``and the amount of appropriation herein for star routes is 
hereby reduced to $500.'' A point of order made against the first or 
legislative part of the amendment was sustained, which decision was, on 
appeal, affirmed by the committee (VII, 1555).

  To a clause appropriating for the foreign mail service an amendment 
reducing the appropriation, and in addition repealing the act known as 
the ``subsidy act,'' was held not in order because the repealing of this 
act was not germane to the appropriation bill; and that to be in order 
both branches of the amendment must be germane to the bill (VII, 1548).


[[Page 844]]

of Agriculture is out of order, being a provision changing law and not 
retrenching expenditure (IV, 3886).
  A provision in the agricultural appropriation bill transferring the 
supervision of the importation of animals from the Treasury to the 
Department

  Where a paragraph containing new legislation provides in one part for 
a discharge of employees, which means a retrenchment, and in another 
part embodies legislation to bring about the particular retrenchment 
which in turn shows on its face an expenditure the amount of which is 
not apparent, the Chair is unable to hold that the net result will 
retrench expenditures. However, where the additional legislation does 
not show on its face an additional expenditure, the Chair will not 
speculate as to a possible expenditure under the additional legislation 
(VII, 1500).


  As explained in the annotation in Sec. 1043, supra, the amendment of 
clause 2(b) in the 98th Congress narrowed the ``Holman Rule'' exception 
to the general prohibition against legislation to cover only 
retrenchments reducing amounts of money covered by the bill, and not 
retrenchments resulting from reduction of the number and salary of 
officers of the United States or of the compensation of any person paid 
out of the U.S. Treasury. Accordingly, the Chair held out of order an 
amendment mandating the reduction of certain Federal salaries and 
expenses as not confined to a reduction of funds in the bill (June 17, 
1994, p. 13422). Paragraph (b) also eliminated separate authority 
conferred upon legislative committees or commissions with proper 
jurisdiction to report amendments retrenching expenditures, and 
permitted legislative committees to recommend such retrenchments by 
reduction of amounts covered by the bill to the Appropriations Committee 
for discretionary inclusion in the reported bill. Paragraph (d) as added 
in the 98th Congress provides a new procedure for consideration of all 
retrenchment amendments only when reading of the bill has been completed 
and only if the Committee of the Whole does not adopt a motion to rise 
and report the bill back to the House. Other decisions which involved 
interpretation of the ``Holman Rule,'' but which do not reflect the 
current form or interpretation of that rule, are found in IV, 3846, 
3885-3892; VII, 1484, 1486-1492, 1498, 1500, 1515, 1563, 1564, 1569; 
June 1, 1892, p. 4920.


[[Page 845]]



Sec. 1063. Reappropriations.

  This  provision from section 
139(c) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 190f(c)) 
was made part of the standing rules in the 83d Congress (Jan. 3, 1953, 
p. 24). Previously, a reappropriation of an unexpended balance for an 
object authorized by law was in order on a general appropriation bill 
(IV, 3591, 3592; VII, 1156, 1158). This clause was amended in the 99th 
Congress by section 228(b) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177) to permit the Committee on 
Appropriations to report certain transfers of unexpended balances. 
Consistent with clause 2 of rule XXI, and as codified in the 106th 
Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. ----), violations of this clause 
are enforced only against specific provisions in general appropriation 
bills containing reappropriations rather than against consideration of 
the bill (see Deschler, ch. 25, Sec. 3).


  A provision in a general appropriation bill, or an amendment thereto, 
providing that funds for a certain purpose are to be derived by 
continuing the availability of funds previously appropriated for a prior 
fiscal year is in violation of clause 2(a)(2) (former clause 6 of rule 
XXI) (Aug. 20, 1951, p. 10393; Mar. 29, 1960, p. 6862; June 17, 1960, p. 
13138; June 20, 1973, p. 20530; July 29, 1982, p. 18625; June 28, 1988, 
p. 16255), and a reappropriation of unexpended prior year balances 
prohibited by this clause is not in order under the guise of a ``Holman 
Rule'' exception to clause 2 of rule XXI (Oct. 18, 1966, p. 27424). An 
amendment to a general appropriation bill making any appropriations 
which are available for the current fiscal year available for certain 
new purposes was held out of order under clause 2(a)(2) since it was not 
confined to the funds in the bill and would permit reappropriation of 
unexpended balances (Oct. 1, 1975, p. 31090). That appropriations may be 
authorized in law for a specified object does not permit an amendment to 
a general appropriation bill to include legislative language mandating 
the reappropriation of funds from other Acts (July 28, 1992, p. 19652).

  This rule, however, is not applicable when the reappropriation 
language is identical to legislative authorization language enacted 
subsequent to the adoption of the rule, since the law is a more recent 
expression of the will of the House (Sept. 5, 1961, p. 18133), nor when 
a measure transferring unobligated balances of previously appropriated 
funds contains legislative provisions and rules changes but no 
appropriation of new budget authority and is neither in the form of an 
appropriation bill nor the subject of a privileged report by the 
Committee on Appropriations under rule XIII (Mar. 3, 1988, p. 3239).

  The return of an unexpended balance to the Treasury is in order (IV, 
3594). 


  A provision in a general appropriation bill that authorizes an 
official to transfer funds among appropriation accounts in the bill 
changes existing law in violation of clause 2 of rule XXI by including 
language conferring new authority (Deschler, ch 26 Sec. 29.2). However, 
direct transfers of appropriations within the confines of the same bill 
normally are considered in order (VII, 1468) as a ``within-bill'' 
transfer rather than a transfer of unexpended balances of the kind 
addressed by clause 2(a)(2).



[[Page 846]]

Transportation obligation limitations


Sec. 1063a. Offsetting en bloc amendments.

  To  invoke the 
protection of clause 2(f), an amendment must not increase the levels of 
budget authority or outlays carried in the bill (Aug. 4, 1999, p. ----; 
July 12, 2000, p. ----); and the proponent of an amendment 
carries the burden of so proving (Oct. 11, 2001, p. ----). An 
amendment otherwise in order under this paragraph may nevertheless be in 
violation of clause 2(a)(1) if increasing an appropriation above the 
authorized amount contained in the bill (Aug. 4, 1999, p. ----).





1064. Transportation obligation limitations.

  3.  It shall 
not be in order to consider a bill, joint resolution, amendment, or 
conference report that would cause obligation limitations to be below 
the level for any fiscal year set forth in section 8103 of the 
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, as adjusted, for the 
highway category or the mass transit category, as applicable.


  The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (sec. 8101(e), P.L. 
105-178; 2 U.S.C. 901 note) added this provision as a new 
clause 9 of rule XXI. In the 106th Congress, this provision was 
transferred to clause 3 (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. ----). The Omnibus 
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999 (sec. 
108, div. C, P.L. 105-277; 112 Stat. 2681-586), included the following 
provision: ``Sec. 108. For the purpose of any Rule of the House of 
Representatives, notwithstanding any other provision of law, any 
obligation limitation relating to surface transportation projects under 
section 1602 of P.L. 105-178 shall be assumed to be administered on the 
basis of sound program management practices that are consistent with 
past practices of the administering agency permitting States to decide 
High Priority Project funding priorities within state program 
allocations.'' This clause and the cited law are not mutually 
inconsistent, but section 8103 does not address a fiscal year beyond 
2003.


Sec. 106. Funding for Aviation Programs.


Sec. 1064a. Funding for aviation programs.

  The  Wendell H. 
Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (sec. 106, 
P.L. 106-181) added the following provision:


  (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--

          (1) Airport and airway trust fund guarantee.--

                  (A) In general.--The total budget resources made 

                available from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund each 

                fiscal year through fiscal year 2003 pursuant to 

                sections 48101, 48102, 48103, and 106(k) of title 49, 

                United States Code, shall be equal to the level of 

                receipts plus interest credited to the Airport and 

                Airway Trust Fund for that fiscal year. Such amounts may 

                be used only for aviation investment programs listed in 

                subsection (b).

                  (B) Guarantee.--No funds may be appropriated or 

                limited for aviation investment programs listed in 

                subsection (b) unless the amount described in 


[[Page 847]]

                subparagraph (A) has been provided.

          (2) Additional authorizations of appropriations from the 

        general fund.--In any fiscal year through fiscal year 2003, if 

        the amount described in paragraph (1) is appropriated, there is 

        further authorized to be appropriated from the general fund of 

        the Treasury such sums as may be necessary for the Federal 

        Aviation Administration Operations account.

  (b) Definitions.--In this section, the following definitions apply:

          (1) Total budget resources.--The term ``total budget 

        resources'' means the total amount made available from the 

        Airport and Airway Trust Fund for the sum of obligation 

        limitations and budget authority made available for a fiscal 

        year for the following budget accounts that are subject to the 

        obligation limitation on contract authority provided in this Act 

        and for which appropriations are provided pursuant to 

        authorizations contained in this Act:

                  (A) 69-8106-0-7-402 (Grants in Aid for Airports).

                  (B) 69-8107-0-7-402 (Facilities and Equipment).

                  (C) 69-8108-0-7-402 (Research and Development).

                  (D) 69-8104-0-7-402 (Trust Fund Share of Operations).

          (2) Level of receipts plus interest.--The term `level of 

        receipts plus interest' means the level of excise taxes and 

        interest credited to the Airport and Airway Trust Fund under 

        section 9502 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 for a fiscal 

        year as set forth in the President's budget baseline projection 

        as defined in section 257 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency 

        Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-177) (Treasury 

        identification code 20-8103-0-7-402) for that fiscal year 

        submitted pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States 

        Code.

  (c) Enforcement of Guarantees.--

          (1) Total airport and airway trust fund funding.--It shall not 

        be in order in the House of Representatives or the Senate to 

        consider any bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or 

        conference report that would cause total budget resources in a 

        fiscal year for aviation investment programs described in 

        subsection (b) to be less than the amount required by subsection 

        (a)(1)(A) for such fiscal year.

          (2) Capital priority.--It shall not be in order in the House 

        of Representatives or the Senate to consider any bill, joint 

        resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report that 

        provides an appropriation (or any amendment thereto) for any 

        fiscal year through fiscal year 2003 for Research and 

        Development or Operations if the sum of the obligation 

        limitation for Grants-in-Aid for Airports and the appropriation 

        for Facilities and Equipment for such fiscal year is below the 

        sum of the authorized levels for Grants-in-Aid for Airports and 


        for Facilities and Equipment for such fiscal year.


[[Page 848]]

  The aviation-funding point of order does not address a fiscal 
year beyond 2003.


Appropriations on legislative bills
  The chairmen of the Committee on Rules and the Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure inserted in the Record correspondence 
concerning points of order established in this section (Mar. 15, 2000, 
p. ----).




1065. Restriction of power to report appropriations.

  4.  A 
bill or joint resolution carrying an appropriation may not be reported 
by a committee not having jurisdiction to report appropriations, and an 
amendment proposing an appropriation shall not be in order during the 
consideration of a bill or joint resolution reported by a committee not 
having that jurisdiction. A point of order against an appropriation in 
such a bill, joint resolution, or amendment thereto may be raised at any 
time during pendency of that measure for amendment.


  This portion of the rule was adopted June 1, 1920 (VII, 2133). When 
the House recodified its rules in the 106th Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 
1999, p. ----), this clause was returned to clause 4 where it had been 
until moved to former clause 5(a) of rule XXI in the 93d Congress (H. 
Res. 988, 93d Cong., Oct. 8, 1974, p. 34470).


[[Page 849]]

point of order under this rule does not apply to a special order 
reported from the Committee on Rules ``self-executing'' the adoption in 
the House to a reported bill of an amendment containing an 
appropriation, since the amendment is not separately before the House 
during consideration of the special order (Feb. 24, 1993, p. 3542).
  A point of order under this rule cannot be raised against a motion to 
suspend the rules (VIII, 3426), against a motion to discharge a 
nonappropriating committee from consideration of a bill carrying an 
appropriation (VII, 2144), or against a Senate amendment to an 
appropriation bill (VII, 1572). However, it may be directed against an 
item of appropriation in a Senate bill (VII, 2136, 2147; July 30, 1957, 
pp. 13056, 13181). If the House deletes a provision in a Senate bill 
under this rule, the bill is messaged to the Senate with the deletion in 
the form of an amendment. The point of order may be made against an 
appropriation in a Senate bill that, although not reported in the House, 
is considered in lieu of a reported House ``companion bill'' (VII, 2137; 
Mar. 29, 1933, p. 988). This clause applies to an amendment proposed to 
a Senate amendment to a House bill not reported from the Committee on 
Appropriations (Oct. 1, 1980, pp. 28638-42). The rule does not apply to 
private bills since the committees having jurisdiction of bills for the 
payment of private claims may report bills making appropriations within 
the limits of their jurisdiction (VII, 2135; Dec. 12, 1924, p. 538). The 
point of order under this rule does not apply to an appropriation in a 
bill which has been taken away from a nonappropriating committee by a 
motion to discharge (VII, 1019a). The

  The provision in this clause that a point of order against an 
amendment containing an appropriation to a legislative bill may be made 
``at any time'' has been interpreted to require that the point of order 
be raised during the pendency of the amendment under the five-minute 
rule (Mar. 18, 1946, p. 2365; Apr. 28, 1975, p. 12043), and a point of 
order will lie against an amendment during its pendency, even in its 
amended form, although the point of order is against the amendment as 
amended by a substitute and no point of order was raised against the 
substitute prior to its adoption (Apr. 23, 1975, p. 11512-
13). However, the point of order must be raised during the 
initial consideration of the bill or amendment under the five-minute 
rule, and a point of order against similar language permitted to remain 
in the House version and included in a conference report on a bill will 
not lie, since the only rule prohibiting such inclusion (clause 5 of 
rule XXII) is limited to language originally contained in a Senate 
amendment where the House conferees have not been specifically 
authorized to agree thereto (May 1, 1975, p. 12752). Where the House has 
adopted a resolution waiving points of order against certain 
appropriations in a legislative bill, a point of order may nevertheless 
be raised against an amendment to the bill containing an identical 
provision, since under this rule a point of order may be raised against 
the amendment ``at any time'' (Apr. 23, 1975, p. 11512). A point of 
order against a direct appropriation in a bill initially reported from a 
legislative committee and then sequentially referred to and reported 
adversely by the Committee on Appropriations was conceded and sustained 
as in violation of this clause (Nov. 10, 1975, p. 35611). The point of 
order should be directed to the item of appropriation in the bill and 
not to the act of reporting the bill (VII, 2143), and cannot be directed 
to the entire bill (VII, 2142; Apr. 28, 1975, p. 12043).

  The term ``appropriation'' in the rule means the payment of funds from 
the Treasury, and the words ``warranted and make available for 
expenditure for payments'' are equivalent to ``is hereby appropriated'' 
and therefore not in order (VII, 2150). The words ``available until 
expended,'' making an appropriation already made for one year available 
for ensuing years, are not in order (VII, 2145).


[[Page 850]]

where it can be shown that the actual availability of those receipts 
remains contingent upon subsequent enactment of an appropriation act 
(Sept. 10, 1975, p. 28300); (4) increasing the duties of a commission 
(VII, 1578); (5) authorizing payment from an appropriation to be made 
(Jan. 31, 1923, p. 2794).
  The point of order provided for in this clause is not applicable to 
the following provisions: (1) authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury 
to use proceeds from the sale of bonds under the Second Liberty Bond Act 
(public debt transactions) for the purpose of making loans, since such 
loans do not constitute ``appropriations'' within the purview of the 
rule (June 28, 1949, pp. 8536-38; Aug. 2, 1950, p. 11599); (2) exempting 
loan guarantees in a legislative bill from statutory limitations on 
expenditures (July 16, 1974, p. 23344); (3) authorizing the availability 
of certain loan receipts

  Language reappropriating, making available, or diverting an 
appropriation or a portion of an appropriation already made for one 
purpose to another (VII, 2146; Mar. 29, 1933, p. 988; Aug. 10, 1988, p. 
21719), or for one fiscal year to another (Mar. 26, 1992, p. 7223), is 
not in order. For example, the following provisions have been held out 
of order: (1) expanding the definition in existing law of recipients 
under a Federal subsidy program as permitting a new use of funds already 
appropriated (May 11, 1976, pp. 13409-11); (2) authorizing the use, 
without a subsequent appropriation, of funds directly appropriated by a 
previous statute for a new purpose (Oct. 1, 1980, pp. 28637-40). 
However, a modification of such a provision making payments for such new 
purposes ``effective only to the extent and in such amounts as are 
provided in advance in appropriation acts'' does not violate this clause 
(Oct. 1, 1980, pp. 28638-42).

  The following provisions have also been held to be in violation of 
this clause: (1) directing a departmental officer to pay a certain sum 
out of unexpended balances (VII, 2154); (2) authorizing the use of funds 
of the Shipping Board (VII, 2147); (3) directing payments out of Indian 
trust funds (VII, 2149); (4) making excess foreign currencies 
immediately available for a new purpose (Aug. 3, 1971, p. 29109); (5) 
authorizing the collection of fees or user charges by Federal agencies 
and making the revenues collected therefrom available without further 
appropriation (June 17, 1937, pp. 5915-18; Mar. 29, 1972, pp. 10749-51); 
(6) transferring existing Federal funds into a new Treasury trust fund 
to be immediately available for a new purpose (June 20, 1974, pp. 20273-
75); (7) transferring unexpended balances of appropriations from an 
existing agency to a new agency created therein (Apr. 9, 1979, p. 7774); 
(8) making a direct appropriation to carry out a part of the Energy 
Security Act (Oct. 24, 1985, p. 28812); (9) requiring the diversion of 
previously appropriated funds in lieu of the enactment of new budget 
authority if a maximum deficit amount under the Deficit Control Act of 
1985 is exceeded, though its stated purpose may be to avoid the 
sequestration of funds (Aug. 10, 1988, p. 21719).



[[Page 851]]

Tax and tariff measures and amendments
  Section 401(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 317) 
prohibits consideration in the House of any bill or resolution or 
amendment which provides new spending authority (as that term is defined 
in that section) unless that measure also provides that such new 
spending authority is to be available only to the extent provided in 
appropriation act (see Sec. 1127, supra). See also Deschler, ch. 
25, Sec. 4 for a discussion of appropriations on legislative 
bills generally.



1066. Restriction on bills and 
amendments carrying taxes or tariffs.

  5. (a)(1)  A bill or joint resolution 
carrying a tax or tariff measure may not be reported by a committee not 
having jurisdiction to report tax or tariff measures, and an amendment 
in the House or proposed by the Senate carrying a tax or tariff measure 
shall not be in order during the consideration of a bill or joint 
resolution reported by a committee not having that jurisdiction. A point 
of order against a tax or tariff measure in such a bill, joint 
resolution, or amendment thereto may be raised at any time during 
pendency of that measure for amendment. 



  (2) For purposes of paragraph (1), a tax or tariff measure includes an 
amendment proposing a limitation on funds in a general appropriation 
bill for the administration of a tax or tariff. 

  Subparagraph (1) was added in the 98th Congress (H. Res. 
5, Jan. 3, 1983, p. 34). Subparagraph (2) was added in the 108th 
Congress (sec. 2(o), H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 2003, p. ----). Before 
the House recodified its rules in the 106th Congress, this provision was 
found in former clause 5(b) of rule XXI (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. --
--).

  A point of order under this paragraph against a provision in a 
bill is in order at any time during consideration of the bill for 
amendment in Committee of the Whole (Aug. 1, 1986, p. 18649). On October 
4, 1989, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, before ruling on 
several points of order under this paragraph, enunciated several 
guidelines to distinguish taxes and tariffs on the one hand and user or 
regulatory fees and other forms of revenue on the other (p. 23260). On 
the opening day of the 102d Congress, Speaker Foley inserted in the 
Congressional Record the following statement of jurisdictional concepts 
underlying those same distinctions and indicated his intention to 
exercise his referral authority under rule X in a manner consistent with 
this paragraph (Jan. 3, 1991, p. 64; see also Jan. 4, 1995, p. 551; Jan. 
3, 2001, p. ----):

          Clause 5(b) (current clause 5(a)) of rule XXI prohibits the 

        reporting of a tax or tariff matter by any committee not having 

        that jurisdiction. Most of the questions of order arising under 


[[Page 852]]

        this clause since

        its adoption in 1983 have related to provisions that clearly 

        affected the operation of the Internal Revenue Code or the 

        customs laws. From time to time, however, such a question has 

        related to a provision drafted as a user or regulatory fee 

        levied on members of a class that occasions or avails itself of 

        a particular governmental activity, typically to generate 

        revenue in support of that activity. In order to provide 

        guidance concerning the referral of bills, to assist committees 

        in staying within their appropriate jurisdictions under rule X, 

        to assist committees without jurisdiction over tax or tariff 

        measures in complying with clause 5(b) of rule XXI, and to 

        protect the constitutional prerogative of the House to originate 

        revenue bills, the Speaker will make the following statement: 

        Standing committees of the House (other than the Committees on 

        Appropriations and Budget) have jurisdiction to consider user, 

        regulatory and other fees, charges, and assessments levied on a 

        class directly availing itself of, or directly subject to, a 

        governmental service, program, or activity, but not on the 

        general public, as measures to be utilized solely to support, 

        subject to annual appropriations, the service, program, or 

        activity (including agency functions associated therewith) for 

        which such fees, charges, and assessments are established and 

        collected and not to finance the costs of Government generally. 

        The fee must be paid by a class benefiting from the service, 

        program or activity, or being regulated by the agency; in short, 

        there must be a reasonable connection between the payors and the 

        agency or function receiving the fee. The fund that receives the 

        amounts collected is not itself determinative of the existence 

        of a fee or a tax. The Committee on Ways and Means has 

        jurisdiction over ``revenue measures generally'' under rule X. 

        That committee is entitled to an appropriate referral of broad-

        based fees and could choose to recast such fees as excise taxes. 

        A provision only reauthorizing or amending an existing fee 

        without fundamental change, or creating a new fee generating 

        only a de minimis aggregate amount of revenues, does not 

        necessarily require a sequential referral to the Committee on 

        Ways and Means. The Chair intends to coordinate these principles 

        with the Committee on the Budget and the Congressional Budget 

        Office, especially in the reconciliation process, so that budget 

        scorekeeping does not determine, and reconciliation directives 

        and their implementation will not be inconsistent with, 

        committee jurisdiction. Further, it should be emphasized that 

        the constitutional prerogative of the House to originate revenue 

        measures will continue to be viewed broadly to include any 

        meaningful revenue proposal that the Senate may attempt to 

        originate.


[[Page 853]]

order under this paragraph against a provision in, or an amendment to, a 
general appropriation bill affecting the use of funds therein (otherwise 
traditionally in order if admissible under clause 2 of rule XXI), 
carried the burden of showing a necessary, certain, and inevitable 
change in revenue collections or tax statuses or liabilities (Sept. 12, 
1984, pp. 25108, 25109, 25120; July 26, 1985, p. 20806; Aug. 1, 1986, p. 
18649; July 13, 1990, p. 17473; June 18, 1991, p. 15189). The intent of 
the rules change, as expressed during debate on the change, was ``to 
ease the burden on the maker of a point of order [against an amendment] 
from having to show a necessary, certain and inevitable change in 
revenue collections, tax statuses, or liability as previous precedents 
required, to one of showing a textual relationship between the amendment 
and the administration of the Internal Revenue or tariff laws'' (Jan. 7, 
2003, p. ----).
  The adoption of subparagraph (2) in the 108th Congress 
established a different standard for determining a violation of this 
clause by an amendment to a reported general appropriation bill than for 
a provision in the appropriation bill itself. Before its adoption, a 
Member raising a point of

  The precedents developed under this clause still apply to the Chair's 
determination whether a limitation in a general appropriation bill 
(rather than an amendment thereto) constitutes a tax or tariff measure 
proscribed by this paragraph. Prior precedents addressing amendments are 
still viable for that determination. The Chair will consider 
argument as to whether the limitation effectively and inevitably 
changes revenue collections and tax status or liability (Aug. 1, 1986, 
p. 18649). For example, in determining whether an amendment to a general 
appropriation bill proposing a change in IRS funding priorities 
constituted a tax measure proscribed by this paragraph, the Chair 
considered argument as to whether the change would necessarily or 
inevitably result in a loss or gain in tax liability and in tax 
collection (June 18, 1991, p. 15189).


[[Page 854]]

certain articles imported by a designated organization (Sept. 12, 1984, 
p. 25109); and (3) an amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930 to expand the 
authority of the Customs Service to seize and use the proceeds from the 
sale of contraband imports to defray operational expenses, and to offset 
owed customs duties under one section of that law (Sept. 12, 1984, p. 
25120). An amendment to a general appropriation bill proposing to divert 
an increase in funding for the IRS from spot-checks to targeted audits 
was held not to constitute a tax within the meaning of this paragraph 
because it did not necessarily affect revenue collection levels or tax 
liabilities (June 18, 1991, p. 15189).
  A limitation on the use of funds contained in a general appropriation 
bill was held to violate this paragraph by denying the use of funds by 
the Customs Service to enforce duty-free entry laws with respect to 
certain imported commodities, thereby requiring the collection of 
revenues not otherwise provided for by law (Oct. 27, 1983, p. 29611). 
Similar rulings were issued: (1) where it was shown that the imposition 
of the restriction on IRS funding for the fiscal year would effectively 
and inevitably preclude the IRS or the Customs Service from collecting 
revenues otherwise due and owing by law or require collection of revenue 
not legally due or owing (July 26, 1985, p. 20806; Aug. 1, 1986, pp. 
18649, 18650; July 17, 1996, p. 17563); and (2) where a provision in a 
general appropriation bill prohibited the use of funds to impose or 
assess certain taxes due under specified portions of the Internal 
Revenue Code (July 13, 1990, p. 17473). In the 98th Congress, the Chair 
sustained points of order under this paragraph against motions to concur 
in three Senate amendments to a general appropriation bill (not reported 
by the Committee on Ways and Means): (1) an amendment denying the use of 
funds in that or any other Act by the IRS to impose or assess any tax 
due under a designated provision of the Internal Revenue Code, thereby 
rendering the tax uncollectable through the use of any funds available 
to the agency (Sept. 12, 1984, p. 25108); (2) an amendment directing the 
Secretary of the Treasury to admit free of duty

  In the 99th Congress, the following provisions in a reconciliation 
bill reported from the Budget Committee were ruled out as tax measures 
not reported from the Committee on Ways and Means: (1) a recommendation 
from the Committee on Education and Labor (now Education and the 
Workforce) excluding certain interest on obligations from the Student 
Loan Marketing Association from application of the Internal Revenue 
Code, affecting interest deductions against income taxes (Oct. 24, 1985, 
pp. 28776, 28827); and (2) a recommendation from the Committee on 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries expanding tax benefits available to 
shipowners through a capital construction fund (Oct. 24, 1985, pp. 
28802, 28827). In the 101st Congress, the following provisions in an 
omnibus budget reconciliation bill were ruled out: (1) a fee per 
passenger on cruise vessels, with revenues credited as proprietary 
receipts of the Coast Guard to be used for port safety, security, 
navigation, and antiterrorism activities (Oct. 4, 1989, p. 23260); (2) a 
per acre ``ocean protection fee'' on oil and gas leaseholdings in the 
Outer Continental Shelf, with receipts to be used to offset costs of 
various ocean protection programs (Oct. 4, 1989, p. 23261); (3) an 
amendment to the Internal Revenue Code relating to the tax deductibility 
of pension fund contributions (Oct. 4, 1989, p. 23262); (4) a fee 
incident to termination of employee benefit plans, with receipts to be 
applied to enforcement and administration of plans remaining with the 
system (Oct. 4, 1989, p. 23262); and (5) a fee incident to the filing of 
various pension benefit plan reports required by law, with revenues to 
be transferred to the Department of Labor for the enforcement of that 
law (Oct. 5, 1989, p. 23328).


[[Page 855]]

a general appropriation bill creating a new tariff classification was 
held to constitute a tariff under this paragraph (June 15, 1994, p. 
13103). A motion to concur in a Senate amendment constituting a tariff 
measure (imposing an import ban on certain dutiable goods) to a bill 
reported by a committee not having tariff jurisdiction was ruled out 
under this paragraph (Sept. 30, 1988, p. 27316). A proposal to increase 
a fee incident to the filing of a securities registration statement, 
with the proceeds to be deposited in the general fund of the Treasury as 
offsetting receipts, was held to constitute a tax within the meaning of 
this paragraph because the amount of revenue derived and the manner of 
its deposit indicated a purpose to defray costs of Government, generally 
(Oct. 23, 1990, p. 32650). To a bill reported by the Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, an amendment increasing a user fee 
was ruled out as a tax measure where the fee overcollected to offset a 
reduction in another fee, thus attenuating the relationship between the 
amount of the fee and the cost of the Government activity for which it 
was assessed (May 9, 1995, p. 12180). To a bill reported by the 
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology (now Science), an amendment 
proposing sundry changes in the Federal income tax by direct amendments 
to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 was ruled out of order as carrying 
a tax measure in violation of this paragraph (Sept. 16, 1992, p. 25205).

Passage of tax rate increases-
  To a bill reported from the Committee on Education and Labor (now 
Education and the Workforce) authorizing financial assistance to 
unemployed individuals for employment opportunities, an amendment 
providing instead for tax incentives to stimulate employment was held to 
be a tax measure in violation of this paragraph (Sept. 21, 1983, p. 
25145). A provision in a bill reported from the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs (now International Relations) imposing a uniform fee at ports of 
entry to be collected by the Customs Service as a condition of 
importation of a commodity was held to constitute a tariff within the 
meaning of this paragraph (June 4, 1985, p. 14009), as was an amendment 
to a bill reported from that committee amending the tariff schedules to 
deny ``most favored nation'' trade treatment to a certain nation (July 
11, 1985, p. 18590). A provision in




1067. Threefifths vote to increase income tax rates.

  (b)  A 
bill or joint resolution, amendment, or conference report carrying a 
Federal income tax rate increase may not be considered as passed or 
agreed to unless so determined by a vote of not less than three-fifths 
of the Members voting, a quorum being present. In this paragraph the 
term ``Federal income tax rate increase'' means any amendment to 
subsection (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) of section 1, or to section 11(b) 
or 55(b), of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, that imposes a new 
percentage as a rate of tax and thereby increases the amount of tax 
imposed by any such section.



[[Page 856]]

a specific amendment to one of the named subsections (H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 
1997, p. 121). Before the House recodified its rules in 
the 106th Congress, this provision was found in former clause 5(c) of 
rule XXI (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. ----). On one occasion the Chair 
held that a provision repealing a ceiling on total tax liability 
attributable to a net capital gain was not subject to the original 
version of this paragraph (Apr. 5, 1995, p. 10614). This paragraph does 
not apply to a concurrent resolution (Speaker Gingrich, May 18, 1995, p. 
13499). A resolution reported from the Rules Committee waiving this 
paragraph may be adopted by majority vote (Oct. 26, 1995, p. 29477). The 
Speaker rules on the applicability of this paragraph only pending the 
question of final passage of a measure alleged to carry a Federal income 
tax rate increase, and not in advance upon adoption of a special order 
waiving that provision (Oct. 26, 1995, p. 29477).

Consideration of retroactive tax rate increases
  This provision was added in the 104th Congress (sec. 106(a), H. Res. 
6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 463), and in the 105th Congress it was amended to 
clarify the definition of ``Federal income tax rate increase'' as 
limited to



1068. Prohibition against retroactive income tax rate 
increase.

  (c)  It shall not be in order to consider a bill, joint 
resolution, amendment, or conference report carrying a retroactive 
Federal income tax rate increase. In this paragraph--


      (1) the term ``Federal income tax rate increase'' means any 
amendment to subsection (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) of section 1, or to 
section 11(b) or 55(b), of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, that 
imposes a new percentage as a rate of tax and thereby increases the 
amount of tax imposed by any such section; and


      (2) a Federal income tax rate increase is retroactive if it 
applies to a period beginning before the enactment of the provision.



[[Page 857]]

Designation of public works
  This paragraph was added in the 104th Congress (sec. 106(b), H. Res. 
6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 463), and it was amended in the 105th Congress to 
clarify the definition of ``Federal income tax rate increase'' (H. Res. 
5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. 121). Before the House recodified its 
rules in the 106th Congress, this provision was found in former clause 
5(d) of rule XXI (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. ----).



1068a. Restriction on designation of public works.

  6.  It 
shall not be in order to consider a bill, joint resolution, amendment, 
or conference report that provides for the designation or redesignation 
of a public work in honor of an individual then serving as a Member, 
Delegate, Resident Commissioner, or Senator.





  This clause was adopted in the 107th Congress (sec. 2(q), H. Res. 5, 
Jan. 3, 2001, p. ----).