[Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 108th Congress]
[108th Congress]
[House Document 107-284]
[Jeffersons Manual of ParliamentaryPractice]
[Pages 172-194]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]


 

<>   
When the Speaker is seated in his chair, every member is to sit in his 
place. Scob., 6; Grey, 403.

                       sec. xvii--order in debate



[[Page 173]]


  In the House the decorum of Members is regulated by the various 
provisions of rule XVII; and this provision of the parliamentary law is 
practically obsolete.




Sec. 354. Procedure of the Member in seeking 
recognition.

  When  any Member means to speak, he is to stand up in his 
place, uncovered, and to address himself, not to the House, or any 
particular Member, but to the Speaker, who calls him by his name, that 
the House may take notice who it is that speaks. Scob., 6; D'Ewes, 487, 
col. 1; 2 Hats., 77; 4 Grey, 66; 8 Grey, 108. But Members who are 
indisposed may be indulged to speak sitting. 2 Hats., 75, 77; 1 Grey, 
143.



<>   When a Member stands up to 
speak, no question is to be put, but he is to be heard unless the House 
overrule him. 4 Grey, 390; 5 Grey, 6, 143.

  In the House a Member seeking recognition is governed by clause 1 of 
rule XVII, which differs materially from this provision of the 
parliamentary law. The Speaker, moreover, calls the Member, not by name, 
but as ``the gentleman (or gentlewoman) from ------,'' naming the State. 
As long ago as 1832, at least, a Member was not required to rise from 
his own particular seat since seats are no longer assigned (V, 4979, 
footnote).


  In the House no question is put as to the right of a Member to the 
floor, unless he be called to order and dealt with by the House under 
clause 4 of rule XVII.


[[Page 174]]



Sec. 356. The parliamentary law as to recognition by the 
Speaker.

  If  two or more rise to speak nearly together, the Speaker 
determines who was first up, and calls him by name, whereupon he 
proceeds, unless he voluntarily sits down and gives way to the other. 
But sometimes the House does not acquiesce in the Speaker's decision, in 
which case the question is put, ``which Member was first up?'' 2 Hats., 
76; Scob., 7; D'Ewes, 434, col. 1, 2.



  In the Senate of the United States the President's decision is without 
appeal.


  In the House recognition by the Chair is governed by clause 2 of rule 
XVII and the practice thereunder. There has been no appeal from a 
decision by the Speaker on a question of recognition since 1881, on 
which occasion Speaker Randall stated that the power of recognition is 
``just as absolute in the Chair as the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
the United States is absolute as to the interpretation of the law'' (II, 
1425-1428), and in the later practice no appeal is permitted (VIII, 
2429, 2646, 2762).



Sec. 357. Right of the Member to be heard a second 
time.

  No  man may speak more than once on the same bill on the same day; 
or even on another day, if the debate be adjourned. But if it be read 
more than once in the same day, he may speak once at every reading. Co., 
12, 115; Hakew., 148; Scob., 58; 2 Hats., 75. Even a change of opinion 
does not give a right to be heard a second time. Smyth's Comw. L., 2, c. 
3; Arcan, Parl., 17.



  But he may be permitted to speak again to clear a matter of fact, 3 
Grey, 357, 416; or merely to explain himself, 2 Hats., 73, in some 
material part of his speech, Ib., 75; or to the manner or words of the 
question, keeping himself to that only, and not traveling into the 
merits of it, Memorials in Hakew., 29; or to the orders of the House, if 
they be transgressed, keeping within that line, and not falling into the 
matter itself. Mem. Hakew., 30, 31.



[[Page 175]]


  The House has modified the parliamentary law as to a Member's right to 
speak a second time by clause 3 of rule XVII and by permitting a Member 
controlling time in debate to yield to another more than once (Apr. 5, 
2000, p. ----). In ordinary practice rule XVII is not rigidly enforced, 
and Members find little difficulty in making such explanations as are 
contemplated by the parliamentary law.




Sec. 358. Participation of the Speaker in debate.

  But  if the 
Speaker rise to speak, the Member standing up ought to sit down, that he 
may be first heard. Town., col. 205; Hale Parl., 133; Mem. in Hakew., 
30, 31. Nevertheless, though the Speaker may of right speak to matters 
of order, and be first heard, he is restrained from speaking on any 
other subject, except where the House have occasion for facts within his 
knowledge; then he may, with their leave, state the matter of fact. 3 
Grey, 38.


  This provision is usually observed in the practice of the House only 
with regard to the conduct of the Speaker when he is in the chair. In 
several instances the Speaker has been permitted by the House to make a 
statement from the chair, as in a case wherein his past conduct had been 
criticized (II, 1369), and in a case wherein there had been unusual 
occurrences in the joint session to count the electoral vote (II, 1372), 
and in a matter relating to a contest for the seat of the Speaker as a 
Member (II, 1360). In rare instances the Speaker has made brief 
explanations from the chair without asking the assent of the House (II, 
1373, 1374). Speakers have called others to the chair and participated 
in debate, usually without asking consent of the House (II, 1360, 1367, 
footnote, 1368, 1371; III, 1950), and in one case a Speaker on the floor 
debated a point of order which the Speaker pro tempore was to decide (V, 
6097). In rare instances Speakers have left the chair to make motions on 
the floor (II, 1367, footnote). Speakers may participate in debate in 
Committee of the Whole, although the privilege was rarely exercised in 
early practice (II, 1367, footnote).


  During the House's consideration of several measures relating to the 
use of military force in the Persian Gulf, the Speaker took the floor 
not only to debate the pending question but also to commend the House on 
the quality of its recent debates on matters of war and peace and to 
explain his decision to vote on measures relating thereto even though 
not required to do so (Jan. 12, 1991, p. 1085).




Sec. 359. Impertinent, superfluous, or tedious 
speaking.

  No  one is to speak impertinently or beside the question, 
superfluous, or tediously. Scob., 31, 33; 2 Hats., 166, 168; Hale Parl., 
133.



[[Page 176]]

tice has the House suppressed superfluous or tedious speaking, its hour 
rule (clause 2 of rule XVII) being a sufficient safeguard in this 
respect.

  The House, by clause 1 of rule XVII, provides that the Member shall 
address himself to the question under debate, but neither by rule nor 
prac




Sec. 360. Language reflecting on the House.

  No  person is to 
use indecent language against the proceedings of the House; no prior 
determination of which is to be reflected on by any Member, unless he 
means to conclude with a motion to rescind it. 2 Hats., 169, 170; 
Rushw., p. 3, v. 1, fol. 42. But while a proposition under consideration 
is still in fieri, though it has even been reported by a committee, 
reflections on it are no reflections on the House. 9 Grey, 508.



  In the practice of the House it has been held out of order in debate 
to cast reflections on either the House or its membership or its 
decisions, whether present or past (V, 5132-5138). A Member who had used 
offensive words against the character of the House, and who declined to 
explain, was censured (II, 1247). Words impeaching the loyalty of a 
portion of the membership have also been ruled out (V, 5139). Where a 
Member reiterated on the floor certain published charges against the 
House, action was taken, although other business had intervened, the 
question being considered one of privilege (III, 2637). It has been held 
inappropriate and not in order in debate to refer to the proceedings of 
a committee except such as have been formally reported to the House (V, 
5080-5083; VIII, 2269, 2485-2493; June 24, 1958, pp. 12120, 12122), but 
this rule does not apply to the proceedings of a committee of a previous 
Congress (Feb. 2, 1914, p. 2782), and the rationale for this limitation 
on debate is in part obsolete under the modern practice of the House 
insofar as the doctrine is applied to open committee meetings and 
hearings.


[[Page 177]]

or unmannerly words against a particular Member. Smyth's Comw., L. 2, c. 
3. * * *



Sec. 361. Personalities in debate forbidden.

  No  person, in 
speaking, is to mention a Member then present by his name, but to 
describe him by his seat in the House, or who spoke last, or on the 
other side of the question, &c., Mem. in Hakew., 3; Smyth's Comw., L. 2, 
c. 3; nor to digress from the matter to fall upon the person, Scob., 31; 
Hale Parl., 133; 2 Hats., 166, by speaking reviling, nipping,


  In the practice of the House, a Member is not permitted to refer to 
another Member by name (V, 5144; VIII, 2526, 2529, 2536), or to address 
him in the second person (V, 5140-5143; VI, 600; VIII, 2529). The proper 
reference to another Member is ``the gentleman (or gentlewoman) from --
----,'' naming the Member's State (June 14, 1978, p. 17615; July 21, 
1982, p. 17314). A mere reference to a Member's voting record 
does not form a basis for a point of order against those remarks (June 
13, 2002, p. ----, p. ----).

  By rule of the House (clause 1 of rule XVII), as well as by 
parliamentary law, personalities are forbidden (V, 4979, 5145, 5163, 
5169), whether against the Member in the Member's capacity as 
Representative or otherwise (V, 5152, 5153), even if the references may 
be relevant to the pending question (Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25778). The 
House has censured a Member for gross personalities (II, 1251). The 
Chair may intervene to prevent improper references where it is evident 
that a particular Member is being described (Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27077).

  The Chair does not rule on the veracity of a statement made by a 
Member in debate (Apr. 9, 1997, p. ----). Although
accusing another Member of deceit engages in personality, merely 
accusing another Member of making a mistake does not (Oct. 26, 2000, p. 
----).

  Clause 1 of rule XVII has been held to proscribe: (1) referring to an 
identifiable group of sitting Members as having committed a crime (e.g., 
``stealing'' an election or obstructing justice) (Feb. 27, 1985, p. 
3898; Speaker Wright, Mar. 21, 1989, p. 5016; May 19, 1998, p. ----); 
(2) referring in a personally critical manner to the political tactics 
of the Speaker or other Members (June 25, 1981, p. 14056); (3) referring 
to a particular Member of the House in a derogatory fashion (Nov. 3, 
1989, p. 27077); (4) characterizing a Member as ``the most impolite 
Member'' (June 27, 1996, p. 15915); (5) questioning the integrity of a 
Member (July 25, 1996, p. 19170); (6) denunciating the spirit in which a 
Member had spoken (V, 6981); and (7) using a Member's surname as 
though an adjective for a word of ridicule (June 13, 2002, p. ----
).


[[Page 178]]

acter of the measure's proponent (Nov. 9, 1995, p. 31413). The Chair has 
also held in order a general reference that ``big donors'' receive 
``access to leadership power and decisions'' because the reference did 
not identify a specific Member as engaging in an improper quid pro quo 
(Apr. 9, 1997, p. ----). A general statement that seemed to 
invoke racial stereotypes, but not in a context so inflammatory as to 
constitute a breach of decorum, was held not unparliamentary (Apr. 9, 
2003, p. ----).
  A distinction has been drawn between general language, which 
characterizes a measure or the political motivations behind a measure, 
and personalities (V, 5153, 5163, 5169). Although remarks in debate may 
not include personal attacks against a Member or an identifiable group 
of Members, they may address political motivations for legislative 
positions (Jan. 24, 1995, p. 2214; Mar. 8, 1995, pp. 7307, 7308; Nov. 
17, 1995, p. 33832; June 13, 1996, p. 14043). For example, references to 
``down-in-the-dirt gutter politics'' and ``you people are going to pay'' 
were held not to be personal references (Nov. 14, 1995, p. 32388). 
Similarly, characterizing a pending measure as a ``patently petty 
political terrorist tactic'' was held in order as a reference to the 
pending measure rather than to the motive or char

  A Member should refrain from references in debate to the official 
conduct of a Member where such conduct is not the subject then pending 
before the House by way of either a report of the Committee on Standards 
of Official Conduct or another question of the privileges of the House 
(see, e.g., July 24, 1990, p. 18917; Mar. 19, 1992, p. 6078; May 25, 
1995, pp. 14434-37; Sept. 19, 1995, pp. 25454, 25455). This stricture 
also precludes a Member from reciting news articles discussing a 
Member's conduct (Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24318), reciting the content of a 
previously tabled resolution raising a question of the privileges of the 
House (Nov. 17, 1995, p. 33853; Sept. 19, 1996, p. 23855), or even 
referring to a Member's conduct by mere insinuation (Sept. 12, 1996, p. 
22899). Notice of an intention to offer a resolution as a question of 
the privileges of the House under rule IX does not render a resolution 
``pending'' and thereby permit references to conduct of a Member 
proposed to be addressed therein (Sept. 19, 1996, p. 23811).

  The stricture against references to a Member's conduct not then 
pending before the House applies to the conduct of all sitting Members 
(Apr. 1, 1992, p. 7899), including conduct that has previously been 
resolved by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct or the House 
(Sept. 20, 1995, pp. 25825, 25826; Sept. 24, 1996, pp. 24483, 24485; 
Apr. 17, 1997, p. ----). This stricture does not apply to the conduct of 
a former Member, provided the reference is not made in an attempt to 
compare the conduct of a former Member with the conduct of a sitting 
Member (Sept. 12, 1996, pp. 22900, 22901).

  Debate on a pending privileged resolution recommending disciplinary 
action against a Member may necessarily involve personalities. However, 
clause 1 of rule XVII still prohibits the use of language that is 
personally abusive (see, e.g., July 31, 1979, p. 21584; Jan. 
21, 1997, p. 393) and the Chair may 
take the initiative to prevent violations of the rule (July 24, 2002, p. 
----). Furthermore, during the actual pendency of such a 
resolution, a Member may discuss a prior case reported to the House by 
the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct for the purpose of 
comparing the severity of the sanction recommended in that case with the 
severity of the sanction recommended in the pending case, provided that 
the Member does not identify, or discuss the details of the past conduct 
of, a sitting Member (Dec. 18, 1987, p. 36271).


[[Page 179]]

ards of Official Conduct (June 15, 1988, p. 14623; July 6, 1988, p. 
16630; Mar. 22, 1989, p. 5130; May 2, 1989, p. 7735; Nov. 3, 1989, p. 
27077); (2) to personal criticism of a member of the Committee on 
Standards of Official Conduct (Apr. 1, 1992, p. 7899; Mar. 3, 1995, p. 
6715; Sept. 19, 1996, p. 23812; Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24317); and (3) to an 
investigation undertaken by the Committee on Standards of Official 
Conduct, including suggestion of a course of action (Mar. 3, 1995, p. 
6715; Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24317; Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25778) or advocacy of 
an interim status report by the Committee (Sept. 12, 1996, p. 22900; 
Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25778).
  In addition to the prohibition against addressing a Member's conduct 
when it is not actually pending before the House, the Speaker has 
advised that Members should refrain from references in debate (1) to the 
motivations of a Member who filed a complaint before the Committee on 
Stand

  A Member may not read in debate extraneous material critical of 
another Member, which would be improper if spoken in the Member's own 
words (May 25, 1995, pp. 14436, 14437; Sept. 12, 1996, p. 22898). Thus, 
words in a telegram read in debate which repudiated the ``lies and half-
truths'' of a House committee report were ruled out of order as 
reflecting on the integrity of committee members (June 16, 1947, p. 
7065), and unparliamentary references in debate to newspaper accounts 
used in support of a Member's personal criticism of another Member were 
similarly ruled out of order (Feb. 25, 1985, p. 3346).



[[Page 180]]




Sec. 362. Criticism of the Speaker.

  Complaint  of the conduct 
of the Speaker should be presented directly for the action of the House 
and not by way of debate on other matters (V, 5188). In a case wherein a 
Member used words insulting to the Speaker the House on a subsequent 
day, and after other business had intervened, censured the offender (II, 
1248). In such a case the Speaker would ordinarily leave the chair while 
action should be taken by the House (II, 1366; V, 5188; VI, 565). In the 
104th Congress the Chair reaffirmed that it is not in order to speak 
disrespectfully of the Speaker, and that under the precedents the 
sanctions for such violations transcend the ordinary requirements for 
timeliness of challenges (II, 1248; Jan. 4, 1995, p. 552; Jan. 19, 1995, 
p. 1599). It is not in order to arraign the personal conduct of the 
Speaker (Jan. 18, 1995, p. 1441; Jan. 19, 1995, p. 1601). For example, 
it is not in order to charge dishonesty or disregard of the rules (July 
11, 1985, p. 18550), to reflect on his patriotism by accusing him of 
``kowtowing'' to persons who would desecrate the flag (June 20, 1990, p. 
14877), to refer to him as a ``crybaby'' (Nov. 16, 1995, p. 33394), or 
to refer to official conduct of the Speaker that has previously been 
resolved by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct or the House 
(Apr. 17, 1997, p. ----). The Chair may take the initiative to admonish 
Members for references in debate that disparage the Speaker (June 25, 
1981, p. 14056; Mar. 22, 1996, p. 6077). Debate on a resolution 
authorizing the Speaker to entertain motions to suspend the rules may 
not engage in personality by discussing the official conduct of the 
Speaker, even if possibly relevant to the question of empowerment of the 
Speaker (Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24485).





Sec. 363. Motives of Members not to be arraigned.

  * * *  The 
consequences of a measure may be reprobated in strong terms; but to 
arraign the motives of those who propose to advocate it is a 
personality, and against order. Qui digreditur a materia ad personam, 
Mr. Speaker ought to suppress. Ord. Com., 1604, Apr. 19.



  The arraignment of the motives of Members is not permitted (V, 5147-
51; Dec. 13, 1973, p. 41270), and the Speakers have intervened to 
prevent it, in the earlier practice preventing even mildest imputations 
(V, 5161, 5162). However, remarks in debate may address political, but 
not personal, motivations for legislative positions (Jan. 24, 1995, p. 
2214; Mar. 8, 1995, pp. 7307, 7308; Nov. 17, 1995, p. 33832; June 13, 
1996, p. 14043) or for committee membership (July 10, 1995, pp. 18257-
59). Accusing another Member of hypocrisy has been held not in order 
(July 24, 1979, p. 20380; Mar. 29, 1995, p. 9675), and characterizing 
the motivation of a Member in offering an amendment as deceptive and 
hypocritical was ruled out of order (June 12, 1979, p. 11461). A 
statement in debate that an amendment could only be demagogic or racist 
because only demagoguery or racism impelled such an amendment was ruled 
out of order as impugning the motives of the Member offering the 
amendment (Dec. 3, 1973, pp. 41270, 41271). However, debate 
characterizing a pending measure as a ``patently petty political 
terrorist tactic'' was held in order as directed at the pending measure 
rather than the motive or the character of its proponent (Nov. 9, 1995, 
p. 31413). While in debate the assertion of one Member may be declared 
untrue by another, yet in so doing an intentional misrepresentation must 
not be implied (V, 5157-5160), and if stated or implied is censurable 
(II, 1305) and presents a question of privilege (III, 2717; VI, 607). A 
Member in debate having declared the words of another ``a base lie,'' 
censure was inflicted by the House on the offender (II, 1249).


[[Page 181]]

to take books or papers from the table, or write there, 2 Hats., 171, p. 
170.



Sec. 364. Disorder and interruptions during debate.

  No  one 
is to disturb another in his speech by hissing, coughing, spitting, 6 
Grey, 322; Scob., 8; D'Ewes, 332, col. 1, 640, col. 2, speaking or 
whispering to another, Scob., 6; D'Ewes, 487, col. 1; nor stand up to 
interrupt him, Town, col. 205; Mem. in Hakew., 31; nor to pass between 
the Speaker and the speaking Member, nor to go across the House, Scob., 
6, or to walk up and down it, or



  The House has, by clause 5 of rule XVII, prescribed certain rules of 
decorum differing somewhat from this provision of the parliamentary law, 
but supplemental to it rather than antagonistic. In one respect, 
however, the practice of the House differs from the apparent intent of 
the parliamentary law. In the House a Member may interrupt by addressing 
the Chair for permission of the Member speaking (V, 5006; VIII, 2465); 
but it is entirely within the discretion of the Member occupying the 
floor to determine when and by whom he shall be interrupted (V, 5007, 
5008; VIII, 2463, 2465). There is no rule of the House requiring a 
Member having the floor to yield to another Member to whom he has 
referred during debate (Aug. 2, 1984, p. 22241). A Member may ask 
another to yield from any microphone in the Chamber, including those in 
the well, so long as not crossing between the Member having the floor 
and the Chair (June 5, 1998, p. ----). The Chair may take the initiative 
in preserving order when a Member declining to yield in debate continues 
to be interrupted by another Member, may order that the interrupting 
Member's remarks not appear in the Record (July 26, 1984, p. 21247), and 
may admonish Members not to converse with a Member attempting to address 
the House (Feb. 21, 1984, p. 2758), as it is not in order to engage in 
disruption while another is delivering remarks in debate (June 27, 1996, 
p. 15915). On the opening day of the 103d Congress, during the customary 
announcement of policies with respect to particular aspects of the 
legislative process, the Chair elaborated on the rules of order in 
debate with a general statement concerning decorum in the House (Jan. 5, 
1993, p. 105). Under this provision, the Chair may require a line of 
Members waiting to sign a discharge petition to proceed to the rostrum 
from the far right-hand aisle and require the line not to stand between 
the Chair and Members engaging in debate (Oct. 24, 1997, p. ----). 
Hissing and jeering is not proper decorum in the House (May 21, 1998, p. 
----). For further discussion of interruptions in debate, see Sec. 946, 
infra.


[[Page 182]]

says anything worth their hearing. 2 Hats., 77, 78.



Sec. 365. Parliamentary method of silencing a 
tedious Member.

  Nevertheless,  if a Member finds that it is not the inclination of 
the House to hear him, and that by conversation or any other noise they 
endeavor to drown his voice, it is his most prudent way to submit to the 
pleasure of the House, and sit down; for it scarcely ever happens that 
they are guilty of this piece of ill manners without sufficient reason, 
or inattention to a Member who



  In the House, where the previous question and hour rule of debate have 
been used for many years, the parliamentary method of suppressing a 
tedious Member has never been imported into the practice (V, 5445).




Sec. 366. The parliamentary law as to naming a disorderly 
Member.

  If  repeated calls do not produce order, the Speaker may call by 
his name any Member obstinately persisting in irregularity; whereupon 
the House may require the Member to withdraw. He is then to be heard in 
exculpation, and to withdraw. Then the Speaker states the offense 
committed; and the House considers the degree of punishment they will 
inflict. 2 Hats., 167, 7, 8, 172.



  This provision of parliamentary law should be in conjunction with 
clause 4 of rule XVII, Sec. Sec. 960-961, infra, particularly as this 
provision relates to the ultimate authority of the House to determine 
whether a Member ignoring repeated calls to order should be permitted to 
proceed in order.



[[Page 183]]




Sec. 367. Proceedings in cases of assaults and 
affrays.

  For  instances of assaults and affrays in the House of Commons, 
and the proceedings thereon, see 1 Pet. Misc., 82; 3 Grey, 128; 4 Grey, 
328; 5 Grey, 382; 6 Grey, 254; 10 Grey, 8. Whenever warm words or an 
assault have passed between Members, the House, for the protection of 
their Members, requires them to declare in their places not to prosecute 
any quarrel, 3 Grey, 128, 293; 5 Grey, 280; or orders them to attend the 
Speaker, who is to accommodate their differences, and report to the 
House, 3 Grey, 419; and they are put under restraint if they refuse, or 
until they do. 9 Grey, 234, 312.



  In several instances assaults and affrays have occurred on the floor 
of the House. Sometimes the House has allowed these affairs to pass 
without notice, the Members concerned making apologies either personally 
or through other Members (II, 1658-1662). In other cases the House has 
exacted apologies (II, 1646-1651, 1657), or required the offending 
Members to pledge themselves before the House to keep the peace (II, 
1643). In case of an aggravated assault by one Member on another on the 
portico of the Capitol for words spoken in debate, the House censured 
the assailant and three other Members who had been present, armed, to 
prevent interference (II, 1655, 1656). Assaults or affrays in the 
Committee of the Whole are dealt with by the House (II, 1648-1651).


[[Page 184]]

of for censure. And this is for the common security of all, and to 
prevent mistakes which must happen if words are not taken down 
immediately. Formerly they might be taken down at any time the same day. 
2 Hats., 196; Mem. in Hakew., 71; 3 Grey, 48; 9 Grey, 514.



Sec. 368. Parliamentary law as to taking down 
disorderly words.

  Disorderly  words are not to be noticed till the Member has 
finished his speech. 5 Grey, 356; 6 Grey, 60. Then the person objecting 
to them, and desiring them to be taken down by the Clerk at the table, 
must repeat them. The Speaker then may direct the Clerk to take them 
down in his minutes; but if he thinks them not disorderly, he delays the 
direction. If the call becomes pretty general, he orders the Clerk to 
take them down, as stated by the objecting Member. They are then a part 
of his minutes, and when read to the offending Member, he may deny they 
were his words, and the House must then decide by a question whether 
they are his words or not. Then the Member may justify them, or explain 
the sense in which he used them, or apologize. If the House is 
satisfied, no further proceeding is necessary. But if two Members still 
insist to take the sense of the House, the Member must withdraw before 
that question is stated, and then the sense of the House is to be taken. 
2 Hats., 199; 4 Grey, 170; 6 Grey, 59. When any Member has spoken, or 
other business intervened, after offensive words spoken, they can not be 
taken notice



  The House has, by clause 4 of rule XVII, provided a method of 
procedure in cases of disorderly words. The House permits and requires 
them to be noticed as soon as uttered, and has not insisted that the 
offending Member withdraw while the House is deciding as to its course 
of action.




Sec. 369. Disorderly words taken down and reported 
from Committee of the Whole.

  Disorderly  words spoken in a committee must be 
written down as in the House; but the committee can only report them to 
the House for animadversion. 6 Grey, 46.



  This provision of the parliamentary law has been applied to the 
Committee of the Whole, rather than to select or standing committees, 
which are separately empowered to enforce rules of decorum (clause 1(a) 
of rule XI, which incorporates the provisions of rule XVII where 
applicable). The House has censured a Member for disorderly words spoken 
in Committee of the Whole and reported therefrom (II, 1259).




Sec. 370. References in debate to the 
Executive.

  In  Parliament, to speak irreverently or seditiously against 
the King is against order. Smyth's Comw., L. 2, c. 3; 2 Hats., 170.


  This provision of the parliamentary law is manifestly inapplicable to 
the House (V, 5086); and it has been held in order in debate to refer to 
the President of the United States or his opinions, either with approval 
or criticism, provided that such reference be relevant to the subject 
under discussion and otherwise conformable to the Rules of the House (V, 
5087-5091; VIII, 2500). Under this standard the following references are 
in order: (1) a reference to the probable action of the President (V, 
5092); (2) an adjuration to the President to keep his word (although an 
improper form of address) (Dec. 19, 1995, p. 37601); and (3) an 
accusation that the President ``frivolously vetoed'' a bill (Nov. 8, 
1995, p. 31785). 


[[Page 185]]

stain from comparisons to the personal conduct of sitting Members of the 
House or Senate (Dec. 18, 1998, p. ----). Furthermore, 
Members may not refer to evidence of alleged impeachable offenses by the 
President contained in a communication from an independent counsel 
pending before a House committee (Sept. 14, 1998, p. ----; Sept. 17, 
1998, p. ----), although they may refer to the communication, itself, 
within the confines of proper decorum in debate (Oct. 6, 1998, p. ----). 

  Although wide latitude is permitted in debate on a proposition 
to impeach the President (V, 5093), Members must abstain from language 
personally offensive (V, 5094; Dec. 18, 1998, p. ----); and Members must 
ab

  Personal abuse, innuendo, or ridicule of the President is not 
permitted (VIII, 2497; Aug. 12, 1986, p. 21078; Oct. 21, 1987, p. 8857; 
Sept. 21, 1994, p. 25147). Under this standard the following references 
are not in order: (1) calling the President a ``liar'' or accusing him 
of ``lying'' (June 26, 1985, p. 17394; Sept. 24, 1992, pp. 27345, 27346; 
Nov. 15, 1995, p. 32587; June 6, 1996, pp. 13228, 13229; Mar. 18, 1998, 
p. ----; Nov. 14, 2002, p. ----; July 15, 2003, p. ----), 
or suggesting mendacity (such as suggesting the President misrepresented 
the truth, attempted to obstruct justice, and encouraged others to 
perjure themselves (Feb. 25, 1998, p. ----), charging him with intent to 
be intellectually dishonest (May 9, 1990, p. 9828), stating that many 
were convinced he had ``not been honest'' (Mar. 5, 1998, p. ----); (2) 
attributing to him ``hypocrisy'' (Sept. 25, 1992, p. 27674); (3) 
accusing him of giving ``aid and comfort to the enemy'' (Jan. 25, 1995, 
p. 2352); (4) accusing him of ``demagoguery'' (Jan. 23, 1996, p. 1144; 
Jan. 24, 1996, pp. 1220, 1221; May 30, 1996, pp. 12646, 12647); (5) 
calling him a ``draft-dodger'' or accusing him of ``raping the truth'' 
(Apr. 24, 1996, pp. 8807, 8808; Sept. 30, 1996, p. 26603); 
(6) describing his action as ``cowardly'' (Oct. 25, 1989, p. 25817); (7) 
referring to him as ``a little bugger'' (Nov. 18, 1995, p. 33974); (8) 
alluding to alleged sexual misconduct on his part (May 10, 1994, p. 
9697; Feb. 25, 1998, p. ----; Mar. 5, 1998, p. ----; May 18, 1998, p. --
--); (9) alluding to unethical behavior on his part (June 20, 1996, p. 
14829; July 9, 2002, p. ----); (10) discussing ``charges'' 
leveled at the President or under investigation (Mar. 19, 1998, p. ----; 
June 11, 1998, p. ----), including alluding to ``fund-raising abuses'' 
(Mar. 14, 2000, p. ----) or speculating that the Vice President might 
someday pardon the President for certain charges (Apr. 12, 2000, p. ----
); or discussing alleged criminal conduct (Sept. 10, 1998, p. ----); 
(11) discussing personal conduct even as a point of reference or 
comparison (July 16, 1998, p. ----; Sept. 9, 1998, p. ----); and 
(12) implying a cause-and-effect relationship between political 
contributions and his actions as President (May 22, 2001, p. ----
). The Chair may admonish Members transgressing this stricture 
even after other debate has intervened (Jan. 23, 1996, p. 1144).


[[Page 186]]

President made off the floor (even if recited as a rebuttal to such 
criticism) (Dec. 17, 1998, p. ----).
  A Member may not read in debate extraneous material personally abusive 
of the President, which would be improper if spoken in the Member's own 
words (July 12, 1996, pp. 17109, 17110; July 26, 1996, p. 19458; Feb. 
26, 1998, p. ----; Mar. 3, 1993, p. 3958; Nov. 15, 1995, p. 32587; May 
2, 1996, p. 10010; Mar. 17, 1998, p. ----; July 15, 2003, p. ----
). This prohibition includes the recitation of another Member's 
criticism of the

  The Chair has advised that the protections afforded by Jefferson's 
Manual and the precedents against unparliamentary references to the 
President, himself, do not necessarily obtain for members of his family 
(July 12, 1990, p. 17206). In the 102d Congress, the Speaker enunciated 
a minimal standard of propriety for all debate concerning nominated 
candidates for the Presidency, based on the traditional proscription 
against personally offensive references to the President even in his 
capacity as a candidate (Speaker Foley, Sept. 24, 1992, p. 27344).

  For discussion of the stricture against addressing remarks in debate 
to the President, as in the second person, see Sec. 945, infra.

  On January 27, 1909 (VIII, 2497), the House adopted a report of a 
committee appointed to investigate the question, which report in part 
stated:

  ``The freedom of speech in debate in the House should never be denied 
or abridged, but freedom of speech in debate does not mean license to 
indulge in personal abuses or ridicule. The right of Members of the two 
Houses of Congress to criticize the official acts of the President and 
other executive officers is beyond question, but this right is subject 
to proper rules requiring decorum in debate. Such right of criticism is 
inherent upon legislative authority. The right to legislate involves the 
right to consider conditions as they are and to contrast present 
conditions with those of the past or those desired in the future. The 
right to correct abuses by legislation carries the right to consider and 
discuss abuses which exist or which are feared.


  ``It is, however, the duty of the House to require its Members in 
speech or debate to preserve that proper restraint which will permit the 
House to conduct its business in an orderly manner and without 
unnecessarily and unduly exciting animosity among its Members or 
antagonism from those other branches of the Government with which the 
House is correlated.''



[[Page 187]]




Sec. 371. The other House and its Members not to be 
criticized in debate.

  It  is a breach of order in debate to notice what 
has been said on the same subject in the other House, or the particular 
votes or majorities on it there; because the opinion of each House 
should be left to its own independency, not to be influenced by the 
proceedings of the other; and the quoting them might beget reflections 
leading to a misunderstanding between the two Houses. 8 Grey, 22.


  Until former clause 1 of rule XIV (current clause 1 of rule XVII) was 
amended by adoption of the rules in the 100th Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 
6, 1987, p. 6) and again in the 101st Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1989, 
p. 72), this principle of comity and the parliamentary law as described 
by Jefferson governed debate in the House to the full extent of its 
provisions (see generally, V, 5095-5130; VIII, 2501-21; July 31, 1984, 
p. 21670; Deschler-Brown, ch. 29, Sec. 44). Clause 1 of rule XVII 
governs debate concerning the Senate and permits some factual references 
that are a matter of public record and that are relevant to the making 
of legislative history on the pending measure. It is the duty of the 
Speaker to call to order a Member who criticizes the actions of the 
Senate (see Sec. 374, infra), and the Speaker may admonish a Member even 
after intervening recognition (Oct. 12, 1999, p. ----; Nov. 15, 
2001, p. ----). The House has, by unanimous consent, permitted 
tributes to a retiring Senator (Sept. 18, 2000, p. ----).

  It is not in order in debate to mention the name of a Senator (except 
as the sponsor of a measure or in quotations from Senate proceedings for 
the purpose of making legislative history). This rule has been applied 
when a Member in debate: (1) either criticizes (V, 5121, 5122; VIII, 
2518, 2521; July 10, 1990, p. 17205) or compliments (VIII, 2509; Apr. 
21, 1993, p. 8013; Nov. 18, 1999, p. ----), including extending 
thanks to named Senators (June 12, 2001, p.----); (2) refers to a 
Senator's vote on a proposition (Deschler-Brown, ch. 29, 
Sec. Sec. 44.38-44.44; (3) characterizes the position of a Senator on a 
legislative issue (Deschler-Brown, ch. 29, Sec. Sec. 44.17, 44.19; Oct. 
11, 1984, p. 32153; July 12, 1990, p. 17205); (4) publicizes the 
telephone number of a Senator in an attempt to influence his future vote 
(Oct. 25, 1990, p. 34083); or (5) speculates as to the intent or motives 
of a Senator (Oct. 11, 1984, pp. 32221-23; Oct. 21, 1997, p. ----
; Nov. 6, 2001, p. ----; Apr. 11, 2003, p. ----). The 
prohibition against such references to Senators includes a reference not 
explicitly naming the Senator (VIII, 2512; Feb. 23, 1994, p. 2658; June 
30, 1995, p. 18153; Feb. 27, 1997, pp. 2768, 2769), including a 
recitation of a quote by ``a Member of the other body'' (Feb., 12, 2003, 
p. ----). References to statements or actions of Senators 
occurring outside the Senate Chamber also are not in order 
(VIII, 2515; Deschler-Brown, ch. 29, Sec. Sec. 44.31-44.37; Apr. 
11, 2000, p. ----). The prohibition also extends to the reading of a 
paper making criticisms of a Senator (V, 5127) and references to another 
person's criticism of a Senator (Aug. 4, 1983, p. 23145). Remarks in 
debate during the pendency of an impeachment resolution may not include 
comparisons to the personal conduct of sitting Members of the House or 
Senate (Dec. 18, 1998, p. ----). /It also is not in order in 
debate to refer to the presence of a Senator on the House floor (Apr. 
17, 2002, p. ----; Apr. 30, 2002, p. ----).


[[Page 188]]

accounts of Senate debates printed elsewhere, such as in reprints or in 
the press (VIII, 2053). After examination by a committee, a speech 
reflecting on the character of the Senate was ordered to be stricken 
from the Record, on the ground that it tended to create ``unfriendly 
conditions between the two bodies * * * obstructive of wise legislation 
and little short of a public calamity'' (V, 5129). 
  A Member may not read or quote from the record of speeches or 
proceedings in the Senate, or insert such material in the Record (V, 
5107-5111; VIII, 2501-2506; June 25, 1986, p. 15576; Deschler-Brown, ch. 
29, Sec. Sec. 44.23-44.25; Apr. 11, 2000, p. ----) except to make 
legislative history on a measure then under debate, and the prohibition 
extends to quoting

  On one occasion before the rule was changed in the 101st Congress to 
permit certain quotations from Senate proceedings for the purpose of 
making legislative history, the Speaker entertained a unanimous-consent 
request that a Member be permitted to refer in debate to Senate 
proceedings (to quote a statement by the Senate Majority Leader as to 
probable Senate action on the measure then pending in the House), but 
the Speaker first ascertained in what manner the reference would be 
made, in order to assure that remarks critical of the Senate, its 
Members, or its proceedings would not be made (Speaker O'Neill, June 4, 
1980, p. 13212). However, the Chair will not entertain 
such a request where the references would necessarily imply criticism of 
the Senate, such as to respond to remarks in the Senate which were 
critical of Members of the House (VIII, 2519).

  With respect to references to Members of the Senate acting in another 
capacity, references to former Members of the House who are presently 
Senators are only permissible if they merely address prior House service 
and are not implicitly critical of Senate service (May 8, 1984, p. 
11428). A Member of the House has been permitted to refer to a speech 
made in the Senate by one no longer a Member of that body (V, 5112), 
although references to Senate proceedings on legislation in the current 
Congress other than those expressly permitted to establish legislative 
history should be avoided. In the 104th Congress the Chair held that the 
precise standard in clause 1 of former rule XIV (current rule XVII) for 
references to ``individual Members of the Senate'' does not apply to 
references to former Senators or to the Vice President in his former 
capacity as a Senator (Dec. 14, 1995, p. 36968). It has even been held 
out of order to criticize words spoken in the Senate by one not a Member 
of that body in the course of an impeachment trial (V, 5106).


[[Page 189]]

President contained in extraneous material read in debate are held to 
the same standard as words spoken in debate (Sept. 19, 2000, p. ----).
  References in debate to the Vice President (as President of the 
Senate) are governed by the standards of reference permitted toward the 
President rather than the more stringent prohibitions under clause 1 of 
former rule XIV (current rule XVII) against references to sitting 
Senators. Therefore, a Member may criticize in debate the policies, or 
candidacy, of the Vice President but may not engage in personality (Dec. 
14, 1995, p. 36968; July 14, 1998, p. ----; Sept. 20, 2000, p. ----). As 
such, it is not in order to allude to ``wrongdoings [including] fund-
raising telephone calls by the Vice President'' (Mar. 14, 2000, p. ----
); to speculate that he might someday ``pardon'' the President (Apr. 12, 
2000, p. ----); to accuse him of lying (Sept. 20, 2000, p. ----; Sept. 
21, 2000, p. ----); or to suggest ``he has a problem with the truth'' 
(Oct. 5, 2000, p. ----). References to the Vice

  References to Members of the Senate in their capacities as candidates 
for the Presidency or other office are not prohibited; where a Senator 
is a candidate for President or Vice President his official policies, 
actions, and opinions as a candidate may be criticized in terms not 
personally offensive (Speaker Wright, Sept. 29, 1988, p. 26683), but 
references attacking the character or integrity of a Senator even in 
that context are not in order (Oct. 30, 1979, p. 30150).

  Although it is not in order to characterize the position 
of the Senate (Oct. 5, 1984, p. 30326) or speculate as to the intent of 
the Senate on legislation (Oct. 11, 1984, pp. 32221-23), it is 
permissible under clause 1 of rule XVII to discuss the content of a 
Senate-passed counterpart to a pending House bill (Nov. 1, 2001, p. ----
), to affirm that the Senate has or has not taken an action (Dec. 
19, 2001, p. --; Mar. 5, 2003, p. ------), or to discuss Senate 
procedures on a factual basis (Feb. 13, 2003, p. ----). For example, 
although a Member may say that the Senate has, as a matter of fact, 
``not acted'' on a specified measure, the Member may not say that the 
Senate ``cannot act'' (Dec. 19, 2001, p. ----) or cite the Senate for 
``failure to act'' (Sept. 26, 2002, p. ----) or to suggest Senate 
inaction was the result of a ``filibuster'' (Mar. 5, 2003, p. ----
).


[[Page 190]]

  Even prior to the 100th Congress, it has been 
permissible to refer to proceedings in the other House, provided the 
reference does not contravene the principles stated by Jefferson. A 
Member must be permitted to refer to the existence of the Senate and its 
functions in a general and neutral way. For example, a Member may oppose 
a sine die adjournment resolution on the grounds that Congress should 
stay in session to complete action on specified legislation then pending 
in the Senate (V, 5115), or a Member may discuss the 
constitutional prerogatives of the Senate on a factual basis, but may 
not characterize Senate procedures with regard to a particular 
confirmation proceeding (Feb. 13, 2003, p. ----). It is 
appropriate to state whether or not the Senate has acted on House-passed 
legislation as long as criticism is neither stated nor implied (Oct. 4, 
1984, p. 30047; Mar. 5, 2003, p. ----). If references to the Senate are 
appropriate, the Member delivering them is not required to use the term 
``the other body,'' and the use of the term ``Senate'' is not a per se 
violation of the rule of comity (Oct. 4, 1984, p. 30047). 
Similarly, references to ``the other body'' will not cure 
unparliamentary references directed to the Senate (Oct. 2, 2002, p. ----
). It is in order in debate, while discussing a question 
involving conference committee procedure, to state what actually 
occurred in a conference committee session, without referring to or 
criticizing a named Member of the Senate (July 29, 1935, p. 12011). 
Where a Member has been assailed in the Senate, he has been permitted to 
explain his own conduct and motives, without bringing the whole 
controversy into discussion or assailing the Senator (V, 5123-5126). 
Propositions relating to breaches of these principles have been 
entertained as of privilege (V, 5129, 6980).


  Although the rule permits a factual statement about the Senate, 
it prohibits any characterization of Senate action or 
inaction (Apr. 29, 1986, p. 8856; July 31, 1986, p. 18253; Aug. 4, 1987, 
p. 22288; Oct. 28, 1993, p. 26538; Jan. 3, 1996, p. 61). For example, 
the rule prohibits: (1) characterization of the action of a 
Senate committee on a Presidential nominee (July 9, 1992, p. 18342), 
including advocating that it take a certain action with respect thereto 
(Feb. 7, 1984, p. 1979; Oct. 8, 1991, p. 25754; May 24, 1995, p. 14304; 
Oct. 30, 1997, p. ----; Feb. 12, 2003, p. ----); (2) any 
criticism of Senate action (V, 5114-5120; Dec. 10, 1980, p. 33205; Apr. 
27, 1993, p. 8271), including a characterization of Senate action as a 
``further injustice'' (Oct. 6, 1999, p. ----), an allegation that 
``the Senate has not passed legislation in a constructive way'' (Sept. 
25, 2002, p. ----), an accusation that the Senate is governed by 
``arcane budget rules'' (Oct. 2, 2002, p. ----), or an inference that 
the Senate has failed to follow the law (Oct. 3, 2002, p. ----); (3) any 
praise of Senate action, such as characterizing Senate action as 
``responsible'' or ``bipartisan'' (Sept. 19, 2002, p. ----); (4)
questions with respect to the courage or resolve of its Members to take 
an action (Aug. 4, 1989, p. 19315); (5) an accusation that 
the Senate majority leadership failed to schedule a bill (Oct. 5, 1998, 
p. ----) or that the Senate minority held a bill ``hostage'' (Oct. 5, 
1999, p. ----); or (6) characterization of a Senate bill as 
``hastily drafted'' (Nov. 1, 2001, p. ----). Furthermore, it is 
not in order in debate to specifically urge that the Senate take certain 
action, such as suggesting that the President urge Senate conferees to 
meet with House conferees on specific legislation (Aug. 2, 1984, p. 
22270), or urge Members of the House to ``lobby'' Senators on an issue 
(Apr. 4, 2000, p. ----; Dec. 5, 2001, p. ----; Oct. 3, 2002, p. 
----).




Sec. 373. Complaint by one House of conduct of a 
Member of the other.

  Neither  House can exercise any authority over a Member or 
officer of the other, but should complain to the House of which he is, 
and leave the punishment to them.



[[Page 191]]

to expunge from the Record statements in criticism of a Member of the 
House did not constitute a question of privilege, being in violation of 
the rule prohibiting references to the Senate in debate (VIII, 2519), a 
properly drafted resolution referring to language published in the 
record on a designated page of Senate proceedings as constituting a 
breach of privilege and requesting the Senate to take appropriate action 
concerning the subject has been held to present a question of the 
privileges of the House (VIII, 2516).

  In a notable instance, wherein a Member of the House had assaulted a 
Senator in the Senate Chamber for words spoken in debate, the Senate 
examined the breach of privilege and transmitted its report to the 
House, which punished the Member (II, 1622). A Senator having assailed a 
House Member in debate, the House messaged to the Senate a resolution 
declaring the language a breach of privilege and requested the Senate to 
take appropriate action (Sept. 27, 1951, p. 12270). The Senator 
subsequently asked unanimous consent to correct his remarks in the 
permanent Congressional Record, but objection was raised (Sept. 28, 
1951, p. 12383). But where certain Members of the House, in a published 
letter, sought to influence the vote of a Senator in an impeachment 
trial, the House declined to consider the matter as a breach of 
privilege (III, 2657). While on one occasion it was held that a 
resolution offered in the House requesting the Senate




Sec. 374. Duty of the Speaker to prevent expressions 
offensive to the other House.

  * * *  Where the complaint is of words 
disrespectfully spoken by a Member of another House, it is difficult to 
obtain punishment, because of the rules supposed necessary to be 
observed (as to the immediate noting down of words) for the security of 
Members. Therefore it is the duty of the House, and more particularly of 
the Speaker, to interfere immediately, and not to permit expressions to 
go unnoticed which may give a ground of complaint to the other House, 
and introduce proceedings and mutual accusations between the two Houses, 
which can hardly be terminated without difficulty and disorder. 3 Hats., 
51.



[[Page 192]]

House to proceed in order (Speaker O'Neill, June 16, 1982, p. 13843). 
While the Chair should take the initiative to prevent improper 
references to the Senate in debate, the Chair will not respond to 
hypothetical questions as to the propriety of possible characterizations 
of Senate actions prior to their use in debate (Oct. 24, 1985, p. 
28819). For a further discussion of the Speaker's duties regarding 
unparliamentary debate, see Sec. Sec. 960-961, infra.

  In the House this rule of parliamentary law is considered as binding 
on the Chair (V, 5130; VIII, 2465), and it is the duty of the Speaker to 
call to order a Member who criticizes the actions of the Senate, its 
Members or committees in debate or through an insertion in the Record 
(Speaker Albert, Apr. 17, 1975, p. 10458; Oct. 7, 1975, p. 32055). The 
Chair has distinguished between engaging in personality toward another 
Member of the House, as to which the Chair normally awaits a point of 
order from the floor, and improper references to Members of the Senate, 
which violate comity between the Houses whether or not engaging in 
personality, as to which the Chair normally takes initiative (Feb. 27, 
1997, pp. 2778, 2779). The Chair may admonish Members to 
avoid unparliamentary references to the Senate even after intervening 
recognition (Oct. 12, 1999, p. ----). Pending consideration of a measure 
relating to the Senate, the Speaker announced his intention to strictly 
enforce this provision of Jefferson's Manual prohibiting improper 
references to the Senate, and to deny recognition to Members violating 
the prohibition, subject to permission of the




Sec. 375. Course of the Member when business concerning 
himself is debating.

  No  Member may be present when a bill or any business 
concerning himself is debating; nor is any Member to speak to the merits 
of it till he withdraws. 2 Hats., 219. The rule is that if a charge 
against a Member arise out of a report of a committee, or examination of 
witnesses in the House, as the Member knows from that to what points he 
is to direct his exculpation, he may be heard to those points before any 
question is moved or stated against him. He is then to be heard, and 
withdraw before any question is moved. But if the question itself is the 
charge, as for breach of order or matter arising in the debate, then the 
charge must be stated (that is, the question must be moved), himself 
heard, and then to withdraw. 2 Hats., 121, 122.




[[Page 193]]


  In 1832, during proceedings for the censure of a Member, the Speaker 
informed the Member that he should retire (II, 1366); but this seems to 
be an exceptional instance of the enforcement of the law of Parliament. 
In other cases, after the proposition for censure or expulsion has been 
proposed, Members have been heard in debate, either as a matter of right 
(II, 1286), as a matter of course (II, 1246, 1253), by express provision 
(II, 1273), and in writing (II, 1273), or by unanimous consent (II, 
1275). A Member against whom a resolution of censure was pending was 
asked by the Speaker if he desired to be heard (VI, 236). But a Member 
was not permitted to depute another Member to speak in his behalf (II, 
1273). In modern practice the Member has been permitted to speak in his 
own behalf, both in censure (June 10, 1980, pp. 13802-11) and expulsion 
proceedings (Oct. 2, 1980, pp. 28953-78). A Member-elect has been 
permitted to participate in debate on a resolution relating to his right 
to take the oath (Jan. 10, 1967, p. 23).




Sec. 376. Disqualifying personal interest of a 
Member.

  Where  the private interests of a Member are concerned in a bill or 
question he is to withdraw. And where such an interest has appeared, his 
voice has been disallowed, even after a division. In a case so contrary, 
not only to the laws of decency, but to the fundamental principle of the 
social compact, which denies to any man to be a judge in his own cause, 
it is for the honor of the House that this rule of immemorial observance 
should be strictly adhered to. 2 Hats., 119, 121; 6 Grey, 368.



  In the House it has not been usual for the Member to withdraw when his 
private interests are concerned in a pending measure, but the House has 
provided by clause 1 of rule III that the Member shall not vote in such 
a contingency. In one instance the Senate disallowed a vote given by a 
Senator on a question relating to his own right to a seat; but the House 
has never had occasion to proceed so far (V, 5959).




Sec. 377. Wearing of hats by Members.

  No  Member is to come 
into the House with his head covered, nor to remove from one place to 
another with his hat on, nor is to put on his hat in coming in or 
removing, until he be set down in his place. Scob., 6.





Sec. 378. Adjournment of questions of order.

  In 1837 the parliamentary practice of wearing hats during the session 
was abolished by adoption of current clause 5 of rule XVII. See 
Sec. 962, infra.
   A question of 
order may be adjourned to give time to look into precedents. 2 Hats., 
118.



[[Page 194]]

Chair. On occasion, the Chair has reversed as erroneous a decision 
previously made (VI, 639; VII, 849; VIII, 2794, 3435). The law of 
Parliament evidently contemplates that the adjournment of a question of 
order shall be controlled by the House.

<>   In 
Parliament, all decisions of the Speaker may be controlled by the House. 
3 Grey, 319.

  The Speaker has declined, on a difficult question of order, to rule 
until he had taken time for examination (III, 2725; VI, 432; VII, 2106; 
VIII, 2174, 2396, 3475), and may take a parliamentary inquiry under 
advisement, especially where not related to the pending proceedings 
(VIII, 2174; Apr. 7, 1992, p. 8274), but it is conceivable that a case 
might arise wherein this privilege of the Chair would require approval 
of the majority of the House, to prevent arbitrary obstruction of the 
pending business by the




  The Speaker's decision on a decision of order is subject to appeal by 
any Member (clause 5 of rule I).