    [Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 108th Congress]
    [108th Congress]
    [House Document 107-284]
    [Rules of the House of Representatives]
    [Pages 813-857]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

                                    Rule XXI

    Reservation of certain points of order
                          restrictions on certain bills

    1035. Reservation of points of order.

      1.  At the time a
    general appropriation bill is reported, all points of order against
    provisions therein shall be considered as reserved.

    [[Page 814]]

    General appropriation bills and amendments
      This clause was added in the 104th Congress (sec. 215(e), H. Res. 6,
    Jan. 4, 1995, p. 468), rendering unnecessary the former practice that a
    Member reserve points of order when a general appropriation bill was
    referred to the calendar of the Committee of the Whole House on the
    state of the Union, in order that provisions in violation of rule XXI
    could be stricken in the Committee of the Whole (see Sec. 1044, infra).
    Before the House recodified its rules in the 106th Congress, this
    provision was found in former clause 8 of rule XXI (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6,
    1999, p. ----).

    1036. Unauthorized appropriations in reported
    general appropriation bills or amendments thereto.

      2. (a)(1)  An appropriation
    may not be reported in a general appropriation bill, and may not be in
    order as an amendment thereto, for an expenditure not previously
    authorized by law, except to continue appropriations for public works
    and objects that are already in progress.

    Sec. 1037. Reappropriations prohibited.

      (2)  A
    reappropriation of unexpended balances of appropriations may not be
    reported in a general appropriation bill, and may not be in order as an
    amendment thereto, except to continue appropriations for public works
    and objects that are already in progress. This subparagraph does not
    apply to transfers of unexpended balances within the department or
    agency for which they were originally appropriated that are reported by
    the Committee on Appropriations.

    [[Page 815]]

    subject matter) and except rescissions of appropriations contained in
    appropriation Acts.

    Sec. 1038. Legislation in reported general appropriation
    bills; exceptions.

      (b)  A provision changing existing law may not be
    reported in a general appropriation bill, including a provision making
    the availability of funds contingent on the receipt or possession of
    information not required by existing law for the period of the
    appropriation, except germane provisions that retrench expenditures by
    the reduction of amounts of money covered by the bill (which may include
    those recommended to the Committee on Appropriations by direction of a
    legislative committee having jurisdiction over the

    Sec. 1039. Legislation or limitations in amendments to
    general appropriation bills.

      (c)  An amendment to a general appropriation
    bill shall not be in order if changing existing law, including an
    amendment making the availability of funds contingent on the receipt or
    possession of information not required by existing law for the period of
    the appropriation. Except as provided in paragraph (d), an amendment
    proposing a limitation not specifically contained or authorized in
    existing law for the period of the limitation shall not be in order
    during consideration of a general appropriation bill.

    Sec. 1040. Motion to rise and report as preferential to
    amendments.

      (d)  After a general appropriation bill has been read for
    amendment, a motion that the Committee of the Whole House on the state
    of the Union rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments
    as may have been adopted shall, if offered by the Majority Leader or a
    designee, have precedence over motions to amend the bill. If such a
    motion to rise and report is rejected or not offered, amendments
    proposing limitations not specifically contained or authorized in
    existing law for the period of the limitation or proposing germane
    amendments that retrench expenditures by reductions of amounts of money
    covered by the bill may be considered.

    [[Page 816]]

    gency Deficit Control Act, a rescission of budget authority, or a
    reduction in direct spending or an amount for a designated emergency may
    not be reported in an appropriation bill or joint resolution containing
    an emergency designation under section 251(b)(2) or section 252(e) of
    such Act and may not be in order as an amendment thereto.

    Sec. 1041. Designated emergencies in reported
    appropriation bills.

      (e)  A provision other than an appropriation
    designated an emergency under section 251(b)(2) or section 252(e) of the
    Balanced Budget and Emer

    Sec. 1042. Offsetting amendments en bloc to appropriation
    bills.

      (f)  During the reading of an appropriation bill for amendment in
    the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, it shall be
    in order to consider en bloc amendments proposing only to transfer
    appropriations among objects in the bill without increasing the levels
    of budget authority or outlays in the bill. When considered en bloc
    under this paragraph, such amendments may amend portions of the bill not
    yet read for amendment (following disposition of any points of order
    against such portions) and is not subject to a demand for division of
    the question in the House or in the Committee of the Whole.

    [[Page 817]]

    of the amounts of money covered by the bill. That form of the
    retrenchment exception remained in place until the 49th Congress in
    1885, when it was dropped until the 52d Congress in 1891, and then
    reinserted through the 53d Congress until 1894. It was again dropped in
    the 54th Congress from 1895 until reinserted in the 62d Congress in 1911
    (IV, 3578; VII, 1125).

    Sec. 1043. Clause 2 of rule XXI, generally.

      The  25th
    Congress in 1837 was the first to adopt a rule prohibiting
    appropriations in a general appropriation bill or amendment thereto not
    previously authorized by law, in order to prevent delay of appropriation
    bills because of contention over propositions of legislation. In 1838
    that Congress added the exception to permit unauthorized appropriations
    for continuation of works in progress and for contingencies for carrying
    on departments of the Government. The rule remained in that form until
    the 44th Congress in 1876, when William S. Holman of Indiana persuaded
    the House to amend the rule to permit germane legislative retrenchments.
    In 1880, the 46th Congress dropped the exception which permitted
    unauthorized appropriations for contingencies of Government departments,
    and modified the ``Holman Rule'' to define retrenchments as the
    reduction of the number and salary of officers of the United States, the
    reduction of compensation of any person paid out of the Treasury of the
    United States, or the reduction

      The clause remained unamended until January 3, 1983, when the 98th
    Congress restructured it in the basic form of paragraphs (a)-(d).
    Clerical and stylistic changes were effected when the House recodified
    its rules in the 106th Congress, including a change to clause 2(a)(2) to
    clarify that the point of order lies against the offending provision in
    the text and not against consideration of the entire bill. At that time
    former clause 6 was transferred to clause 2(a)(2) and former clause 2(a)
    became clause 2(a)(1) (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. ----).

      Paragraph (a)(1) (former paragraph (a)) retained the prohibition
    against unauthorized appropriations in general appropriation bills and
    amendments thereto except in continuation of works in progress.

      Paragraph (a)(2) (former clause 6), from section 139(c) of the
    Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 190f(c)), was made part
    of the standing rules in the 83d Congress (Jan. 3, 1953, p. 24).
    Previously, a reappropriation of an unexpended balance for an object
    authorized by law was in order on a general appropriation bill (IV,
    3591, 3592; VII, 1156, 1158). This provision was amended in the 99th
    Congress by section 228(b) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
    Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177) to permit the Committee on
    Appropriations to report transfers of unexpended balances within the
    department or agency for which originally appropriated.

      Paragraph (b) narrowed the ``Holman Rule'' exception from the
    prohibition against legislation to cover only retrenchments reducing
    amounts of money included in the bill as reported, and permitted
    legislative committees with proper jurisdiction to recommend such
    retrenchments to the Appropriations Committee for discretionary
    inclusion in the reported bill. The last exception in paragraph (b),
    permitting the inclusion of legislation rescinding appropriations in
    appropriation Acts, was added in the 99th Congress by the Balanced
    Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (sec. 228(a), P.L. 99-
    177). The latter feature of the paragraph does not extend to a
    rescission of contract authority provided by a law other than an
    appropriation Act (Sept. 22, 1993, p. 22138; May 15, 1997, p. ----; July
    23, 1997, p. ----). In the 105th Congress paragraph (b) was amended to
    treat as legislation a provision reported in a general appropriation
    bill that makes funding contingent on whether circumstances not made
    determinative by existing law are ``known'' (H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 1997, p.
    121).

    [[Page 818]]

    bill that makes funding contingent on whether circumstances not made
    determinative by existing law are ``known'' (H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 1997, p.
    121). The exception for limitations is strictly
    construed to apply only where existing law requires or permits the
    inclusion of limiting language in an appropriation Act, and not merely
    where the limitation is alleged to be ``consistent with existing law''
    (June 28, 1988, p. 16267). Although the Committee on Appropriations may
    include a limitation in its reported bill, if it is stricken with other
    legislative language on a point of order it may be reinserted during the
    reading only if in compliance with clause 2(c) or in accordance with
    clause 2(d) (June 18, 1991, p. 15199). Where the committee included a
    limitation in its reported bill that precluded funds for assistance to a
    list of countries, an amendment to that paragraph adding a new country
    was held to be a further limitation that must await completion of the
    reading of the bill for amendment (July 23, 2003, p. ----).
      Paragraph (c) retained the prohibition against amendments changing
    existing law but permitted limitation amendments during the reading of
    the bill by paragraph only if specifically authorized by existing law
    for the period of the limitation. In the 105th Congress paragraph (c)
    was amended to treat as legislation an amendment to a general
    appropriation

    [[Page 819]]

    amendment not only reducing an amount in a paragraph of an appropriation
    bill but also limiting expenditure of those funds on a particular
    project (i.e., a limitation not contained in existing law) was held not
    in order during the reading of that paragraph but only at the end of the
    bill under clause 2(d) (July 23, 1986, p. 17431; June 15, 1988, p.
    14719). Where language of limitation was stricken from a general
    appropriation bill on a point of order that it changed existing law, an
    amendment proposing to reinsert the limitation without its former
    legislative content was held not in order before completion of the
    reading for amendment (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22214). A motion that the
    Committee of the Whole rise and report to the House with the
    recommendation that the enacting clause be stricken out takes precedence
    over the motion to amend under clause 9 of rule XVIII (former clause 7
    of rule XXIII) and also over the motion to rise and report
    under clause 2(d) (July 24, 1986, p. 17641).
      Paragraph (d) provided a new procedure for consideration of
    retrenchment and other limitation amendments only when the reading of a
    general appropriation bill has been completed and only if the Committee
    of the Whole does not adopt a motion to rise and report the bill back to
    the House (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1983, p. 34). In the 104th Congress
    paragraph (d) was amended to limit the availability of its preferential
    motion to rise and report to the Majority Leader or his designee (sec.
    215(a), H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 468). In the 105th Congress it was
    further amended to make the motion preferential to any motion to amend
    at that stage (H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. 121). Where the
    reading of a general appropriation bill for amendment has been completed
    (or dispensed with), including the last paragraph of the bill containing
    the citation to the short title (July 30, 1986, p. 18214), the Chair
    (under the former form of the rule, which made the preferential motion
    available to any Member) might first inquire whether any Member sought
    to offer an amendment (formerly, one not prohibited by clauses 2(a) or
    (c)) prior to recognizing Members to offer limitation or retrenchment
    amendments (June 2, 1983, p. 14317; Sept. 22, 1983, p. 25406; Oct. 27,
    1983, p. 29630), including pro forma amendments (Aug. 2, 1989, p.
    18126). Pursuant to clause 2(d), a motion that the Committee rise and
    report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been
    adopted is not debatable (Apr. 23, 1987, p. 9613) and takes precedence
    over any amendment (formerly only over a limitation or retrenchment
    amendment) (July 30, 1985, p. 21534; July 23, 1986, p. 17431; Apr. 23,
    1987, p. 9613), but only after completion of the reading and disposition
    of amendments not otherwise precluded (June 30, 1992, p. 17135). Thus a
    motion that the Committee rise and report the bill to the House with the
    recommendation that it be recommitted, with instructions to report back
    to the House (forthwith or otherwise) with an amendment proposing a
    limitation, does not take precedence over the motion to rise and report
    the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted
    (sustained on appeal, Sept. 19, 1983, p. 24647). An

      Paragraphs (e) and (f) were added in the 104th Congress (sec. 215, H.
    Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 468).

    Sec. 1044. Points of order on general
    appropriation bills.

      As the rule  applies only to general appropriation bills,
    which are not enumerated or defined in the rules (VII, 1116) bills
    appropriating only for one purpose have been held not to be ``general''
    within the meaning of this rule (VII, 1122). Neither a resolution
    providing an appropriation for a single Government agency (Jan. 31,
    1962, p. 1352), nor a joint resolution only containing continuing
    appropriations for diverse agencies to provide funds until regular
    appropriation bills are enacted (Sept. 21, 1967, p. 26370), nor a joint
    resolution providing an appropriation for a single Government agency and
    permitting a transfer of a portion of those funds to another agency
    (Oct. 25, 1979, p. 29627), nor a joint resolution transferring funds
    already appropriated from one specific agency to another (Mar. 26, 1980,
    p. 6716), nor a joint resolution transferring unobligated balances to
    the President to be available for specified purposes but containing no
    new budget authority (Mar. 3, 1988, p. 3239), are ``general
    appropriation bills'' within the purview of this clause.

      A point of order under this rule does not apply to a special order
    reported from the Committee on Rules ``self-executing'' the adoption in
    the House of an amendment changing existing law (July 27, 1993, p.
    17117). By unanimous consent the Committee of the Whole may vacate
    proceedings under specified points of order (June 7, 1991, p. 13973). A
    point of order may be withdrawn as a matter of right (in the Committee
    of the Whole as well as in the House) before action thereon (May 19,
    2000, p. ----).

      Upon the immediate entry by unanimous consent of a 90-minute limit on
    debate on an amendment against which a point of order had been reserved,
    the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole established that the
    reservation would be considered as continued for the duration of debate
    under the time agreement (Nov. 28, 2001, p. ----).

    [[Page 820]]

    must ordinarily occur during consideration in Committee of the Whole,
    where the Chair, in response to a point of order, may rule out any
    portion of the bill in conflict with the rule (IV, 3811; Sept. 8, 1965,
    pp. 23140, 23182). Portions of the bill thus stricken are not reported
    back to the House. Prior to the adoption of clause 1 (former clause 8)
    in the 104th Congress (see Sec. 1035, supra), it was necessary that some
    Member reserve points of order when a general appropriation bill was
    referred to the calendar of the Committee of the Whole House on the
    state of the Union, in order that provisions in violation of the rule
    could be stricken in the Committee (V, 6921-6925; VIII, 3450; Feb. 6,
    1926, p. 3456). Where points of order had been reserved pending a
    unanimous-consent request that the committee be permitted to file its
    report when the House would not be in session, it was not necessary that
    they be reserved again when the report ultimately was presented as
    privileged when the House was in session, as the initial reservation
    carried over to the subsequent filing (Mar. 1, 1983, p. 3241). In an
    instance where points of order were not reserved against an
    appropriation bill when it was reported to the House and referred to the
    Committee of the Whole, points of order in the Committee of the Whole
    against a proposition in violation of this clause were overruled on the
    ground that the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole lacked authority
    to pass upon the question (Apr. 8, 1943, p. 3150, 3153).
      As all bills making or authorizing appropriations require
    consideration in Committee of the Whole, it follows that the enforcement
    of the rule

      The enforcement of the rule also occurs in the House in that a motion
    to recommit a general appropriation bill may not propose an amendment
    containing legislation (Sept. 1, 1976, p. 28883) or a limitation not
    considered in the Committee of the Whole (Speaker Foley, Aug. 1, 1989,
    p. 17159; Aug. 3, 1989, p. 18546); and such amendment is precluded
    whether the Committee of the Whole has risen and reported automatically
    pursuant to a special rule or, instead, by a motion at the end of the
    reading for amendment (June 22, 1995, p. 16844).

    [[Page 821]]

    and appropriation amounts, and points of order against a paragraph must
    be made before an amendment is offered thereto or before the Clerk reads
    the next paragraph heading and amount (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 2.26). A
    point of order against a paragraph under this clause may be made only
    after that paragraph has been read by the Clerk, and not prior to its
    reading pending consideration of an amendment inserting language
    immediately prior thereto (June 6, 1985, pp. 14605, 14609). Where the
    reading of a paragraph of a general appropriation bill has been
    dispensed with by unanimous consent, the Chair inquires whether there
    are points of order against the paragraph before entertaining amendments
    or directing the Clerk to read further, but he does not make such an
    inquiry where the Clerk has actually read the paragraph (May 31, 1984,
    p. 14608). Where a portion of the bill is considered as having been read
    and open to amendment by unanimous consent, points of order against
    provisions in that portion must be made before amendments are offered,
    and may not be reserved (Dec. 1, 1982, p. 28175; May 19, 2000, p. ----
    ; July 26, 2003, p. ----). Where a chapter is considered
    as read by unanimous consent and open to amendment at any point, no
    amendments are offered and the Clerk begins to read the next chapter, it
    is too late to make a point of order against a paragraph in the
    preceding chapter (June 11, 1985, p. 15181). It is too late to rule out
    the entire paragraph after points of order against specific portions
    have been sustained and an amendment to the paragraph has been offered
    (June 27, 1974, pp. 21670-72).
      Points of order against unauthorized appropriations or legislation on
    general appropriation bills may be made as to the whole or only a
    portion of a paragraph (IV, 3652; V, 6881). The fact that a point of
    order is made against a portion of a paragraph does not prevent another
    point of order against the whole paragraph (V, 6882; July 31, 1985, p.
    21895), nor does it prevent another Member from demanding that the
    original point of order be extended to the entire paragraph (July 16,
    1998, p. ----). If a portion of a proposed amendment is out of order, it
    is sufficient for the rejection of the whole amendment (V, 6878-
    6880). If a point of order is sustained against any
    portion of a package of amendments considered en bloc, all the
    amendments are ruled out of order and must be reoffered separately, or
    those which are not subject to a point of order may be considered en
    bloc by unanimous consent (Sept. 16, 1981, pp. 20735-38; June 21, 1984,
    p. 17687; July 26, 2001, p. ----). Where a point of order
    is sustained against the whole of a paragraph the whole must go out, but
    it is otherwise when the point of order is made only against a portion
    (V, 6884, 6885). General appropriation bills are read ``scientifically''
    only by paragraph headings

    [[Page 822]]

    ment is authorized by law is on the proponent of the amendment (May 11,
    1971, p. 14471; Oct. 29, 1991, p. 28791; July 26, 1995, p. 20567; July
    27, 1995, pp. 20808, 20811; July 31, 1995, p. 21207; May 15, 1997, p. --
    --). The burden is on the proponent of an amendment to
    show that language offered under the guise of a limitation
    does not change existing law (July 17, 1975, p. 23239; June 16, 1976, p.
    18666; July 18, 1995, p. 19357; June 24, 2003, p. ----)
    including the burden to show that the duties imposed are
    merely ministerial or already required under existing law (July 26,
    1998, p. ----) and, in the case of an amendment proposing a
    double-negative, the burden to show that the object of the double-
    negative is specifically contemplated by existing law (July 23, 2003, p.
    ----, p. ----). The burden is on the proponent of an amendment to show
    that the amendment does not increase levels of budget authority or
    outlays within the meaning of clause 2(f) (Oct. 11, 2001, p. ----
    ). If the amendment is susceptible to more than one
    interpretation, it is incumbent upon the proponent to show that it is
    not in violation of the rule (Deschler, ch. 26,
    Sec. 22.26). The mere recitation in an amendment that a
    determination is to be made pursuant to existing laws and regulations,
    absent a citation to the law imposing such responsibility, is not
    sufficient proof by the proponent of an amendment to overcome a point of
    order that the amendment constitutes legislation (Sept. 16, 1980, p.
    25606). The authorization must be enacted before the appropriation may
    be included in an appropriation bill; thus delaying the availability of
    an appropriation pending enactment of an authorization does not protect
    the item of appropriation against a point of order under this clause
    (Apr. 26, 1972, p. 14455).
      In the administration of the rule, it is the practice that those
    upholding an item of appropriation should have the burden of showing the
    law authorizing it (IV, 3597; VII, 1179, 1233, 1276; June 23, 2000, p.
    ----). Thus the burden of proving the authorization for appropriations
    carried in a bill, or that the language in the bill constitutes a valid
    limitation which does not change existing law, falls on the proponents
    and managers of the bill (May 28, 1968, p. 15357; Nov. 30, 1982, p.
    28062). Where a provision is susceptible to more than one
    interpretation, that burden may be met by a showing that only the
    requirements of existing law, and not any new requirements, are recited
    in the language (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22206). The Chair may overrule a
    point of order that appropriations for a certain agency are unauthorized
    upon citation to an organic statute creating the agency, absent any
    showing that the organic law has been overtaken by a scheme of periodic
    reauthorization; the Chair may hear further argument and reverse his
    ruling, however, where existing law not previously called to the Chair's
    attention would require the ruling to be reversed (VIII, 3435; June 8,
    1983, p. 14854, where a law amending the statute creating the Bureau of
    the Mint with the express purpose of requiring annual authorizations was
    subsequently called to the Chair's attention). Reported provisions in a
    general appropriation bill described in the accompanying report as
    directly or indirectly changing the application of existing law are
    presumably legislation, absent rebuttal by the committee (May 31, 1984,
    p. 14591). The burden of proof to show that an appropriation contained
    in an amend

      The inclusion of funds in a general appropriation bill in the form of
    a ``not to exceed'' limitation does not obviate a point of order that
    the funds are not authorized by law (June 21, 1988, p. 15440). The fact
    that legislative jurisdiction over the subject matter of an amendment
    may rest with the Committee on Appropriations does not immunize the
    amendment from the application of clause 2(c) of rule XXI (July 17,
    1996, p. 17550; July 24, 1996, p. 18898). The ``works in progress
    exception'' under clause 2(a) of rule XXI is a defense to a point of
    order against an unauthorized appropriation reported in a general
    appropriation bill and is not a defense to a point of order under clause
    2(c) of rule XXI that an amendment to an appropriation bill constitutes
    legislation (July 24, 1996, p. 18898).

      For a discussion of perfecting amendments to unauthorized
    appropriations or legislation permitted to remain in a general
    appropriation bill by failure to raise or by waiver of a point of order,
    see Sec. 1057, infra.

    [[Page 823]]

    elements is insufficient authorization (June 28, 1993, p. 14421). An
    Executive Order does not constitute sufficient authorization in law
    absent proof of its derivation from a statute enacted by Congress
    authorizing the order and expenditure of funds (June 15, 1973, p. 19855;
    June 25, 1974, p. 21036). Thus a Reorganization Plan submitted by the
    President pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 906 has the status of statutory law when
    it becomes effective and is sufficient authorization to support an
    appropriation for an office created by Executive Order issued pursuant
    to the Reorganization Plan (June 21, 1974, p. 20595). A
    constitutional guarantee of just compensation for a governmental taking
    of private property for public use does not itself constitute
    suffficient authorization by law for appropriations in a general
    appropriation bill for compensation of particular private property
    owners (July 18, 2001, p. ----).

    Sec. 1045. Authorization of law for
    appropriations.

      A treaty  may provide the authorization by existing law required
    in the rule to justify appropriations if it has been ratified by the
    contracting parties (IV, 3587); however, where existing law authorizes
    appropriations for the U.S. share of facilities to be recommended in an
    agreement with another country containing specified elements, an
    agreement in principle with that country predating the authorization law
    and lacking the required

      A resolution of the House has been held sufficient
    authorization for an appropriation for the salary of an employee of the
    House (IV, 3656-3658) even though the resolution may have been agreed to
    only by a preceding House (IV, 3660). Previous enactment of items of
    appropriation unauthorized by law does not justify similar
    appropriations in subsequent bills (VII, 1145, 1150, 1151) unless if
    through appropriations previously made, a function of the Government has
    been established which would bring it into the category of continuation
    of works in progress (VII, 1280), or unless legislation in a previous
    appropriation act has become permanent law (May 20, 1964, p. 11422). The
    omission to appropriate during a series of years for an object
    authorized by law does not repeal the law, and consequently an
    appropriation when proposed is not subject to the point of order (IV,
    3595).

    [[Page 824]]

    or the investigation of foods in relation to commerce (IV, 3647, 3648;
    VII, 1298), or the compiling of tests at an exposition (IV, 3653).

      The law authorizing each head of a department to employ such
    numbers of clerks, messengers, copyists, watchmen, laborers, and other
    employees as may be appropriated for by Congress from year to year is
    held to authorize appropriations for those positions not otherwise
    authorized by law (IV, 3669, 3675, 4739); but this law does not apply to
    offices not within departments or not at the seat of Government (IV,
    3670-3674). A permanent law authorizing the President to appoint certain
    staff, together with legislative provisions authorizing additional
    employment contained in an appropriation bill enacted for that fiscal
    year, constituted sufficient authorization for a lump sum supplemental
    appropriation for the White House for the same fiscal year (Nov. 30,
    1973, p. 38854). By a general provision of law,
    appropriations for investigations and the acquisition and diffusion of
    information by the Agriculture Department on subjects related to
    agriculture are generally in order in the agricultural appropriation
    bill (IV, 3649). It has once been held that this law would also
    authorize appropriations for the instrumentalities of such
    investigations (IV, 3615); but these would not include the organization
    of a bureau to conduct the work (IV, 3651). The law does not authorize
    general investigations by the department (IV, 3652), or cooperation with
    State investigations (IV, 3650; VII, 1301, 1302),

      A paragraph of a general appropriation bill both establishing
    and funding a commission was ruled out as constituting legislation and
    carrying unauthorized appropriations (June 29, 1988, p. 16470). A
    paragraph appropriating funds for matching grants to States was held
    unauthorized where the authorizing law did not require State matching
    funds (June 28, 1993, p. 14418). A paragraph funding a project from the
    Highway Trust Fund was held unauthorized where such funding was
    authorized only from the general fund (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22175;
    June 26, 2001, p. ----; Nov. 28, 2001, p. ----). A paragraph
    providing funds for the President to meet ``unanticipated needs'' was
    held unauthorized (July 16, 1998, p. ----).

      The failure of Congress to enact into law separate legislation
    specifically modifying eligibility requirements for grant programs under
    existing law does not necessarily render appropriations for those
    programs subject to a point of order, where more general existing law
    authorizes appropriations for all of the programs proposed to be
    modified by new legislation pending before Congress (June 8, 1978, p.
    16778). However, whether organic statutes or general grants of authority
    in law constitute sufficient authorization to support appropriations
    depends on whether the general laws applicable to the function or
    department in question require specific or annual authorizations (June
    14, 1978, pp. 17616, 17622, 17626, 17630) or on whether a periodic
    authorization scheme has subsequently occupied the field (Sept. 9, 1997,
    p. ----). An authorization of ``such sums as may be necessary'' is
    sufficient to support any dollar amount, but has no tendency to relieve
    other conditions of the authorization law (June 28, 1993, p. 1442).
    Where existing law authorizes certain appropriations from a particular
    trust fund without fiscal year limitation, language that such an
    appropriation remain available until expended does not constitute
    legislation (July 15, 1993, p. 15848). An amendment to a general
    appropriation bill providing that ``not less than'' a certain amount be
    made available to a program requires an authorization (July 12, 2000, p.
    ----; July 13, 2000, p. ----).

      Pursuant to clause 11(i) of rule X (former clause 9 of rule XLVIII),
    no funds may be appropriated to certain agencies carrying out
    intelligence and intelligence-related activities, unless such funds have
    been authorized by law for the fiscal year in question.

    Sec. 1046. Authorization for claims and
    salaries.

      Judgments of  courts certified to Congress in accordance with law or
    authorized by treaty (IV, 3634, 3635, 3644) and audited under authority
    of law have been held to be authorization for appropriations for the
    payment of claims (IV, 3634, 3635). However, unadjudicated claims (IV,
    3628), even though ascertained and transmitted by an executive officer
    (IV, 3625-3640), and findings filed under the Bowman Act do not
    constitute authorization (IV, 3643).

    [[Page 825]]

    year (IV, 3588, 3589; VII, 1128, 1145, 1149, 1191), and the mere
    appropriation for a salary does not create an office so as to justify
    appropriations in succeeding years (IV, 3590, 3672, 3697), it being a
    general rule that propositions to appropriate for salaries not
    established by law or to increase salaries fixed by law are out of order
    (IV, 3664-3667, 3676-3679). An exception to these general principles is
    found in the established practice that in the absence of a general law
    fixing a salary the amount appropriated in the last appropriation bill
    has been held to be the legal salary (IV, 3687-3696). A law having
    established an office and fixed a salary, it is not in order to provide
    for an unauthorized office and salary in lieu of it (IV, 3680).
      An appropriation for an object not otherwise authorized does not
    constitute authorization to justify a continuance of the appropriation
    another

    Sec. 1047. Authorizations for public works.

      An  appropriation
    for a public work in excess of a fixed limit of cost (IV, 3583, 3584;
    VII, 1133), or for extending a service beyond the limits assigned by an
    executive officer exercising a lawful discretion (IV, 3598), or by
    actual law (IV, 3582, 3585), or for purposes prohibited by law are out
    of order (IV, 3580, 3581, 3702), as is an appropriation from the Highway
    Trust Fund where the project is specifically authorized from the general
    fund (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22175). However, the mere appropriation of a
    sum to complete a work does not fix a limit of cost such as would
    exclude future appropriations (IV, 3761). A declaration of policy in an
    act followed by specific provisions conferring authority upon a
    governmental agency to perform certain functions is not construed to
    authorize appropriations for purposes germane to the policy but not
    specifically authorized by the act (VII, 1200). A point of order will
    not lie against an amendment proposing to increase a lump sum for public
    works projects where language in the bill limits use of the lump sum
    appropriation to projects as authorized by law (Deschler, ch. 26,
    Sec. 19.6), but where language in the bill limits use of the lump
    sum both to projects ``authorized by law'' and ``subject, where
    appropriate, to enactment of authorizing legislation,'' that paragraph
    constitutes an appropriation in part for some unauthorized projects and
    is not in order (June 6, 1985, p. 14617).

    [[Page 826]]

    tees, an appropriation for such purposes not authorized by both
    committees is out of order notwithstanding the ``works in progress''
    exemption, since the law specifically precludes the appropriation from
    being made (June 8, 1983, p. 14855). An appropriation from the Highway
    Trust Fund for an ongoing project was held not in order under the
    ``works in progress'' exception where the Internal Revenue Code
    ``occupied the field'' with a comprehensive authorization scheme not
    embracing the specified project (Sept. 22, 1993, p. 22140; Sept. 23,
    1993, p. 22173). Interruption of a work does not necessarily remove it
    from the privileges of the rule (IV, 3705-3708); but the continuation of
    the work must not be so conditioned in relation to place as to become a
    new work (IV, 3704). It has been held that a work has not been begun
    within the meaning of the rule when an appropriation has been made for a
    site for a public building (IV, 3785), or when a commission has been
    created to select a site or when a site has actually been selected for a
    work (IV, 3762-3763), or when a survey has been made (IV, 3782-3784). By
    ``public works and objects already in progress'' are meant tangible
    matters like buildings, roads, etc., and not duties of officials in
    executive departments (IV, 3709-3713), or the continuance of a work
    indefinite as to completion and intangible in nature like the gauging of
    streams (IV, 3714, 3715). A general system of roads on which some work
    has been done, or an extension of an existing road (Sept. 22, 1993, p.
    22140), may not be admitted as a work in progress (VII, 1333).
    Concerning reappropriation for continuation of public works in progress,
    see Sec. 1031, supra.

    Sec. 1048. Continuation of a public work by
    appropriations.

      The provision  excepting public works and objects that are already in
    progress from the requirement that appropriations be authorized by
    existing law (IV, 3578) has historically been applied only in cases of
    general revenue funding (Sept. 22, 1993, p. 22140; Sept. 23, 1993, p.
    22173). An appropriation in violation of existing law or to extend a
    service beyond a fixed limit is not in order as the continuance of a
    public work (IV, 3585, 3702-3724; VII, 1332; Sept. 23, 1993, pp. 22173;
    Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 8.9). The ``works in progress'' exception may not
    be invoked to fund a project governed by a lapsed authorization and may
    not be invoked to fund a project that is not yet under construction
    (July 31, 1995, p. 21207). Where existing law (40 U.S.C. 606)
    specifically prohibits the making of an appropriation to construct or
    alter any public building involving more than $500,000 unless approved
    by the House and Senate Public Works Commit

    [[Page 827]]

    additions to existing buildings in cases where no limits of cost have
    been shown (IV, 3774, 3775). However, the purchase of a separate and
    detached lot of land is not admitted (IV, 3776). The continuation of
    construction at the Kennedy Library, a project owned by the United
    States and funded by a prior year's appropriation, has been admitted
    notwithstanding the absence of any current authorization (June 14, 1988,
    p. 14335). A provision of law authorizing Commissioners of the District
    of Columbia to take over and operate the fish wharves of the city of
    Washington was held insufficient authority to admit an appropriation for
    reconstructing the fish wharf (VII, 1187).

    Sec. 1049. Examples illustrating the continuation of
    a public work.

      Thus the  continuation of the following works has been admitted:
    A topographical survey (IV, 3796, 3797; VII, 1382), a geological map
    (IV, 3795), marking of a boundary line (IV, 3717), marking graves of
    soldiers (IV, 3788), a list of claims (IV, 3717), and recoinage of coins
    in the Treasury (IV, 3807); but the following works have not been
    admitted: Investigation of materials, like coal (IV, 3721), scientific
    investigations (IV, 3719; VII, 1345), duties of a commission (IV, 3720;
    VII, 1344), extension of foreign markets for goods (IV, 3722), printing
    of a series of opinions indefinite in continuance (IV, 3718), free
    evening lectures in the District of Columbia (IV, 3789), certain ongoing
    projects from the Highway Trust Fund (Sept. 22, 1993, pp. 22140; Sept.
    23, 1993, pp. 22173), extension of an existing road (Sept. 22, 1993, p.
    22140), continuation of an extra compensation for ordinary facility for
    carrying the mails (IV, 3808), although the continuation of certain
    special mail facilities has been admitted (IV, 3804-3806). However,
    appropriations for rent and repairs of buildings or Government roads
    (IV, 3793, 3798) and bridges (IV, 3803) have been admitted as in
    continuation of a work (IV, 3777, 3778), although it is not in order as
    such to provide for a new building in place of one destroyed (IV, 3606).
    It is not in order to repair paving adjacent to a public building but in
    a city street, although it may have been laid originally by the
    Government (IV, 3779). The purchase of adjoining land for a work already
    established has been admitted under this principle (IV, 3766-3773) and
    also

    Sec. 1050. New buildings at existing
    institutions as in continuance of a public work.

      Appropriations for  new buildings at
    Government institutions have sometimes been admitted (IV, 3741-3750)
    when intended for the purposes of the institution (IV, 3747); but later
    decisions, in view of the indefinite extent of the practice made
    possible by the early decisions, have ruled out propositions to
    appropriate for new buildings in navy yards (IV, 3755-3759) and other
    establishments (IV, 3751-3754). Appropriations for new schoolhouses in
    the District of Columbia (IV, 3750; VII, 1358), for new Army hospitals
    (IV, 3740), for new lighthouses (IV, 3728), armor-plate factories (IV,
    3737-3739), and for additional playgrounds for children in the District
    of Columbia (IV, 3792) have also been held not to be in continuation of
    a public work.

    Sec. 1051. New vessel for naval and other services
    as in continuation of a public work.

      By a former  broad construction of the rule an
    appropriation of a new and not otherwise authorized vessel of the Navy
    had been held to be a continuance of a public work (IV, 3723, 3724); but
    this line of decisions has been overruled (VII, 1351; Jan. 22, 1926, p.
    2621). While appropriations for new construction and procurement of
    aircraft and equipment for the Navy are not in order, appropriations for
    continuing experiments and development work on all types of aircraft are
    in order (Jan. 22, 1926, p. 2623). This former interpretation was
    confined to naval vessels, and did not apply to vessels in other
    services, like the Coast and Geodetic Survey or Lighthouse Service (IV,
    3725, 3726), or to floating or stationary drydocks (IV, 3729-3736). The
    construction of a submarine cable in extension of one already laid was
    held not to be the continuation of a public work (IV, 3716), but an
    appropriation for the Washington-Alaska military cable has been held in
    order (VII, 1348).

    [[Page 828]]

    Acts but not explicitly beyond the fiscal year in question (July 21,
    1981, p. 16687); or (4) setting a floor on spending that is not
    established by existing law (July 23, 2003, p. ----).

    Sec. 1052. Legislation generally.

      A  provision changing
    existing law is construed to mean the enactment of law where none exists
    (IV, 3812, 3813). For example, the following provisions have been held
    out of order: (1) permitting funds to remain available until expended or
    beyond the fiscal year covered by the bill where existing law does not
    permit such availability (Aug. 1, 1973, p. 27288); (2) permitting funds
    to be available immediately upon enactment prior to the fiscal year
    covered by the bill (July 29, 1986, p. 17981; June 28, 1988, p. 16255);
    (3) permitting funds to be available to the extent provided in advance
    in appropriation

      Although clause 2(b) permits the Committee on Appropriations to report
    rescissions of appropriations, an amendment proposing a rescission
    constitutes legislation under clause 2(c) (May 26, 1993, p. 11319), as
    does a provision proposing a rescission of contract authority (July 29,
    1998, p. ----). A proposal to amend existing law to provide for
    automatic continuation of appropriations in the absence of timely
    enactment of a regular appropriation bill constitutes legislation in
    contravention of clause 2(c) (July 17, 1996, p. 17550; July 24, 1996, p.
    18898). A proposal to designate an appropriation as ``emergency
    spending'' within the meaning of the budget-enforcement laws is
    fundamentally legislative in character (Sept. 8, 1999, pp. ----; June
    19, 2000, p. ---- (sustained on appeal); June 20, 2001, p. ----
    ). Similarly, a provision containing an averment necessary to
    qualify for certain scorekeeping under the Budget Act was conceded to be
    legislation (July 20, 1989, p. 15374), even though the Budget Act
    contemplates that expenditures may be mandated to occur before or
    following a fiscal period if the law making those expenditures specifies
    that the timing is the result of a ``significant'' policy change (July
    20, 1989, p. 15374).

      Although the object to be appropriated for may be described without
    violating the rule (IV, 3864), an amendment proposing an appropriation
    under a heading that indicates an unauthorized purpose as its object has
    been ruled out (Oct. 29, 1991, p. 28814). For example, an amendment
    proposing to make certain funds available for a specified report not
    contemplated by existing law was held to constitute legislation in
    violation of clause 2(c) (June 13, 2000, p. ----). The fact that a
    legislative item has been carried in appropriation bills for many years
    does not exempt it from a point of order (VII, 1445, 1656). The
    reenactment from year to year of a law intended to apply during the year
    of its enactment only is not relieved, however, from the point that it
    is legislation (IV, 3822). Limits of cost for public works may not be
    made or changed (IV, 3761, 3865-3867; VII, 1446), or contracts
    authorized (IV, 3868-3870; May 14, 1937, p. 4595).

      The Chair may examine legislative history established during debate on
    an amendment against which a point of order has been reserved to resolve
    any ambiguity therein when ruling on the eventual point of order (June
    14, 1978, p. 17651), and may inquire after its author's intent when
    attempting to construe an ambiguous amendment (Oct. 29, 1991, p. 28818).

      An amendment to a general appropriation bill stating a legislative
    position constitutes legislation (July 24, 2001, p. ----).

    [[Page 829]]

    for part of the purpose while appropriating for the remainder of it (IV,
    3936; VII, 1595). The language of the limitation provides that some or
    all of the appropriation under consideration may not be used for a
    certain designated purpose (IV, 3917-3926; VII, 1580). This designated
    purpose may reach the question of qualifications, for while it is not in
    order to legislate as to the qualifications of the recipients of an
    appropriation (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. Sec. 53, 57.15), the House may
    specify that no part of the appropriation may go to recipients lacking
    certain qualifications (IV, 3942-3952; VII, 1655; June 4, 1970, p.
    18412; June 27, 1974, p. 21662; Oct. 9, 1974, p. 34712; June 9, 1978, p.
    16990).

    Sec. 1053. Limitations on appropriations
    generally.

      Although the  rule forbids a provision ``changing existing law,'' the
    House, by practice, has established the principle that certain
    ``limitations'' may be admitted. Just as the House may decline to
    appropriate for a purpose authorized by law, so may it by limitation
    prohibit the use of the money

      A limitation amendment prohibiting the use of funds for the
    construction of certain facilities unless such construction were subject
    to a project agreement was held not in order during the reading of the
    bill, even though existing law directed Federal officials to enter into
    such project agreements, on the ground that limitation amendments are in
    order during the reading only where existing law requires or permits the
    inclusion of limiting language in an appropriation Act, and not merely
    where the limitation is alleged to be ``consistent with existing law''
    (June 28, 1988, p. 16267).

      A limitation may place some minimal, incidential duties on Federal
    officials, who must determine the effect of such a limitation on
    appropriated funds. However, a provision may not impose additional
    duties not required by law, either explicitly or implicitly, or make the
    appropriation contingent upon the performance of such duties (VII, 1676;
    June 11, 1968, p. 16712; July 31, 1969, pp. 21631-33; May 28, 1968, p.
    15350; July 26, 1985, p. 20807; see Sec. 1054, infra). The fact that a
    limitation may indirectly interfere with an executive official's
    discretionary authority by denying the use of funds (June 24, 1976, p.
    20408) or may impose certain incidental burdens on executive officials
    (Aug. 25, 1976, p. 27737) does not destroy the character of the
    limitation as long as it does not otherwise amend existing law and is
    descriptive of functions and findings already required to be undertaken
    by existing law. For example, a limitation precluding funds for
    specified Federal departments to file certain motions in specified civil
    actions (all matters of public record in the litigation and therefore
    available to responsible intervening Federal officials) was held to be a
    proper limitation (July 18, 2001, p. ----).

    [[Page 830]]

    year does not justify its inclusion in the pending annual bill (Sept.
    22, 1983, p. 25406, June 26, 2000, p. ----).
      The limitation must apply solely to the money of the appropriation
    under consideration (VII, 1597, 1600, 1720; Feb. 26, 1958, p. 2895), and
    may not be made applicable to money appropriated in other Acts (IV,
    3927, 3928; VII, 1495, 1525; June 28, 1971, p. 22442; June 27, 1974, pp.
    21670-72; May 13, 1981, p. 9663), and may not require funds available to
    an agency in any future fiscal year for a certain purpose to be subject
    to limitations specified in advance in appropriations Acts (May 8, 1986,
    p. 10156). The tendency of a limitation to change existing law is
    measured against the state of existing law ``for the period of the
    limitation,'' such that the presence of the same limitation in the
    annual bill for the previous fiscal

      A restriction on authority to incur obligations is legislative in
    nature and not a limitation on funds (July 13, 1987, p. 19507; Sept. 23,
    1993, p. 22204). For example, a limitation on the authority of the
    Commodity Credit Corporation to purchase sugar is legislative in nature
    and not a limitation on funds (June 29, 2000, p. ----).

      In construing a proposed limitation, the Chair may examine whether the
    purpose of the limitation is legislative. For example, a limitation
    accompanied by language stating a legislative motive or purpose is not
    in order (Aug. 8, 1978, p. 24969; July 22, 1980, p. 19087; Sept. 16,
    1980, p. 25604; Sept. 22, 1981, p. 21577). Similarly, where existing law
    and the Constitution require a census to be taken of all persons, an
    amendment that seeks to preclude the use of funds to exclude another
    class ``known'' to the Secretary is not in order (Aug. 1, 1989, p.
    17156). However, language may, by negatively refusing to include funds
    for all or part of an authorized executive function, thereby affect
    policy and restrict executive discretion to the extent of its denial of
    availability of funds (IV, 3968-3972; VII, 1583, 1653, 1694; Sept. 14,
    1972, p. 30749; June 21, 1974, p. 20601; Oct. 9, 1974, p. 34716). For
    example, an appropriation may be withheld from a designated object by a
    negative limitation on the use of funds, notwithstanding that contracts
    may be left unsatisfied thereby (IV, 3987; July 10, 1975, p. 22005).

      The Chair has stated that a limitation amendment that comprises
    a textual ``double-negative'' (the coupling of a denial of an
    appropriation with a negative restriction on official duties is
    suspect and may result in an affirmative direction or an affirmative
    statement of intent that constitutes legislation and is
    therefore not in order (VII, 1690-1692; Deschler, ch. 26,
    Sec. 51.15 (note); July 23, 2003, p. ----). For example, the following
    have been held out of order for using a double-negative: (1) a provision
    to limit funds to prohibit the obligation of funds up to a
    specified amount for an unauthorized transportation
    project (effectively authorizing an unauthorized project) (Sept. 23,
    1993, p. 22209); (2) an amendment to limit funds to prohibit
    projects that promote the participation of women in international peace
    efforts, such promotion not specifically contemplated by law (July 23,
    2003, p. ----); (3) an amendment to limit funds to prohibit the
    establishment of an independent commission not contemplated by existing
    law (July 23, 2003, p. ----). In order to carry the burden of proof on
    an amendment proposing a double-negative, a Member must be able to show
    that the object of the double-negative is specifically contemplated by
    existing law (July 23, 2003, p. ----, p. ----).

    [[Page 831]]

    tion of certain funds until funds provided by another Act have been
    obligated (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 48.8). The burden is on the proponent
    to show that such a proposal does not change existing law by restricting
    the timing of the expenditure of funds rather than their availability
    for specified objects (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. Sec. 64.23 and 80.5).
      It is not in order, even by language in the form of a limitation, to
    restrict not the use or amount of appropriated funds but the
    discretionary authority conferred by law to administer their
    expenditure, such as by limiting the percentage of funds that may be
    apportioned for expenditure within a certain period of time (Deschler,
    ch. 26, Sec. 51.23), or by precluding the obliga

      As long as a limitation merely restricts the expenditure of Federal
    funds carried in the bill without changing existing law, the limitation
    is in order, even if the Federal funds in question are commingled with
    non-Federal funds that would have to be accounted for separately in
    carrying out the limitation (Aug. 20, 1980, p. 22171).

      The fact that existing law authorizes funds to be available until
    expended or without regard to fiscal year limitation does not prevent
    the Committee on Appropriations from limiting their availability to the
    fiscal year covered by the bill unless existing law mandates
    availability beyond the fiscal year (June 25, 1974, p. 21040; see also
    Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 32). The fact that a provision
    would constitute legislation for only a year does not make it a
    limitation in order under the rule (IV, 3936).

      A proposition to construe a law may not be admitted (IV, 3936-3938,
    see Sec. 1055, infra). Care also should be taken that the language of
    limitation be not such as, when fairly construed, would change existing
    law (IV, 3976-3983) or justify an executive officer in assuming an
    intent to change existing law (IV, 3984; VII, 1706).

      Although the Committee on Appropriations may include in a general
    appropriation bill language not in existing law limiting the use of
    funds in the bill, if such language also constitutes an appropriation it
    must be authorized by law (June 21, 1988, p. 15439). An amendment
    placing a limitation on funds for activities unrelated to the functions
    of departments and agencies addressed by the bill is not germane under
    clause 7 of rule XVI (July 10, 2000, p. ----).

    Sec. 1054. New duties or determinations;
    executive discretion.

      Propositions to  establish affirmative directions for executive
    officers (IV, 3854-3859; VII, 1443; July 31, 1969, p. 21675; June 18,
    1979, p. 15286; July 1, 1987, pp. 18654 and 18655; June 27, 1994, p.
    14572), even in cases where they may have discretion under the law so to
    do (IV, 3853; June 4, 1970, p. 18401; Aug. 8, 1978, p. 24959), or to
    affirmatively take away an authority or discretion conferred by law (IV,
    3862, 3863; VII, 1975; Mar. 30, 1955, p. 4065; June 21, 1974, p. 20600;
    July 31, 1985, p. 21909), are subject to a point of order.

    [[Page 832]]

    held to implicitly require the Office of Management and Budget to make
    determinations not discernibly required by law in evaluating and
    executing its responsibilities).
      Where language implicitly places new duties on officers of the
    Government or implicitly requires them to make investigations, compile
    evidence, or make judgments and determinations not otherwise required of
    them by law, such as to judge intent or motives, then it assumes the
    character of legislation and is subject to a point of order (July 31,
    1969, pp. 21653, 21675, where the words ``in order to overcome racial
    imbalance'' were held to impose additional duties, and Nov. 30, 1982, p.
    28062, where the words ``to interfere with'' the rulemaking authority of
    any regulatory agency were

      An amendment authorizing the President to reduce each appropriation in
    the bill by not more than 10 percent was ruled out as legislation
    conferring new authority on the President (May 31, 1984, p. 14617; June
    6, 1984, p. 15120). The fact that an executive official may have been
    directed by an Executive Order to consult another executive official
    prior to taking an action does not permit inclusion of language
    directing the official being consulted to make determinations not
    specifically required by law (July 22, 1980, p. 19087).

    [[Page 833]]

    mine whether building services are ``usually'' provided through the
    Federal Building Fund to an agency not paying a level of assessment
    specified elsewhere (and not necessarily applicable) (July 16, 1998, p.
    ----); (19) require a determination of ``successor agency'' status
    (Sept. 26, 1997, p. ----); (20) require a determination whether a
    delegate or envoy to the United Nations has ``advocated'' the adoption
    of a certain convention (June 26, 2000, p. ----); (21) require tests or
    reports not required under existing law (May 19, 2000, p. ----); (22)
    impose a new duty to tally violations of law by contractors where
    existing law required information on violations but not on the number
    thereof (June 7, 2000, p. ----); (23) require an investigation of the
    conscription requirements of other nations (July 13, 2000, p. ----);
    (24) require a determination whether ``efforts'' have been made to
    change any nation's laws regarding abortion, family planning, or
    population control (July 13, 2000, p. ----); (25) impose a new
    duty to calculate the ``total amount'' of payments under a Federal
    program paid to a husband and wife (to determine whether an exception to
    an otherwise valid limitation would apply) (July 11, 2001, p. ----);
    (26) require an investigation into the extent to which World Trade
    Organization challenges against foreign laws and policies promote access
    to certain pharmaceuticals (July 18, 2001, p. ----); (27) require an
    investigation into whether an applicant for immigration has been
    involved in the harvesting of organs (July 18, 2001, p. ----); (28)
    require the Inspector General to opine on audited financial statements
    of certain components of the Department of Defense where the issuance of
    such opinion was not shown to be required by existing law (June 27,
    2002, p. ----); (29) require the examination of certain legislative
    reports to determine whether an entity is specifically identified by
    name (July 17, 2002, p. ----); (30) require several agencies to process
    certain information where current law required only one specific agency
    to process that information (June 24, 2003, p. ----); (31) in the case
    of a limitation with respect to certain roads on public land, require a
    determination of the precise nature of those roads including their
    ownership and the types of vehicles allowed to travel on them (July 17,
    2003, p. ----); (32) require a determination that certain trade
    agreements achieved generic undefined policy goals that were not set
    forth in existing law (July 23, 2003, p. ----).
      A limitation may not: (1) be applied directly to the official
    functions of executive officers (IV, 3957-3966; VII, 1673, 1678, 1685),
    (2) directly interfere with discretionary authority in law by
    establishing a level of funding below which expenditures may not be made
    (VII, 1704; July 20, 1978, p. 21856), (3) condition the availability of
    funds or the exercise of contract authority upon an interpretation of
    local law where that interpretation is not required by existing law
    (July 17, 1981, p. 16327); (4) require new determinations of full
    Federal compliance with mandates imposed upon States (July 22, 1981, p.
    16829); (5) require the evaluation of the theoretical basis of a program
    (July 22, 1981, p. 16822); (6) require new determinations of propriety
    or effectiveness (Oct. 6, 1981, p. 23361; May 25, 1988, p. 12275), or
    satisfactory quality (Aug. 1, 1986, p. 18647); (7) incorporate by
    reference determinations already made in administrative processes not
    affecting programs funded by the bill (Oct. 6, 1981, p. 23361); (8)
    require new determinations of rates of interest payable (July 29, 1982,
    p. 18624; Dec. 9, 1982, p. 29691); (9) apply standards of conduct to
    foreign entities where existing law requires such conduct only by
    domestic entities (July 17, 1986, p. 16951); (10) require the
    enforcement of a standard where existing law only requires inspection of
    an area (July 30, 1986, p. 18189); (11) prohibit the availability of
    funds for the purchase of ``nondomestic'' goods and services (Sept. 12,
    1986, p. 23178); (12) mandate contractual provisions (May 18, 1988, p.
    11389); and (13) authorize the adjustment of wages of Government
    employees (June 21, 1988, p. 15451; Apr. 26, 1989, p. 7525) or permit an
    increase in Members' office allowances only ``if requested in writing''
    (Oct. 21, 1990, p. 31708); (14) convert an existing legal prerequisite
    for the issuance of a regulatory permit into a prerequisite for even the
    preliminary processing of such a permit (July 22, 1992, p. 18825); (15)
    mandate reductions in various appropriations by a variable percentage
    calculated in relation to ``overhead'' (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 5.6; June
    24, 1992, p. 16110); (16) require an agency to investigate and determine
    whether private airports are collecting certain fees for each enplaning
    passenger (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22213); (17) require an agency to
    investigate and determine whether a person or entity entering into a
    contract with funds under the pending bill is subject to a legal
    proceeding commenced by the Federal Government and alleging fraud (Sept.
    17, 1997, p. ----); (18) require an agency to deter

    [[Page 834]]

    termining payment levels (June 18, 1980, p. 15355); (4) denying use of
    funds to carry out (or pay the salaries of persons who carry out)
    tobacco crop and insurance programs (July 20, 1995, p. 19798); (5)
    denying the use of funds for any transit project exceeding a specified
    cost-effectiveness index where the Chair was persuaded that the
    limitation applied to projects for which indexes were already required
    by law (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22206); (6) denying the use of funds to
    enforce FAA regulations to require domestic air carriers to surrender
    more than a specified number of ``slots'' at a given airport in
    preference of international air carriers where the Chair was persuaded
    that existing regulations already required the FAA to determine the
    origin of withdrawn slots (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22212); (7) denying the
    use of funds for troops ``except in time of war'' (Deschler, ch. 26,
    Sec. 70.1) or ``except in time of emergency'' (VII, 1657, which was the
    basis for the preceding ruling); (8) denying the use of funds to
    implement any sanction imposed by the United States on private
    commercial sales of agricultural commodities, medicine, or medical
    supplies to Cuba except for a sanction imposed pursuant to agreement
    with one or more other countries (July 20, 2000, p. ----); (9) denying
    the use of funds by the Forest Service to construct roads or prepare
    timber sales in certain roadless areas where the executive was already
    charged by law with ongoing responsibility to maintain a comprehensive
    and detailed inventory of all land and renewable resources of the
    National Forest System (July 18, 1995, p. 19357); (10) denying use of
    funds to eliminate an existing legal requirement for sureties on custom
    bonds (June 27, 1984, p. 19101); (11) denying use of funds by any
    Federal official in any manner that would prevent a provision of
    existing law from being enforced (relating to import restrictions) (June
    27, 1984, p. 19101); (12) denying use of funds for any reduction in the
    number of Customs Service regions or for any consolidation of Customs
    Service offices (June 27, 1984, p. 19102); (13) denying use of
    funds for specified Federal departments to file certain motions in
    specified civil actions (all matters of public record in the litigation
    and therefore available to responsible intervening Federal officials)
    (July 18, 2001, p. ----).
      On the other hand, the following limitations have been held in order
    as not placing new duties on Federal officials: (1) denying the use of
    funds to pay the salaries of Federal officials who perform certain
    functions under existing law if the description of those duties
    precisely follows existing law and does not require them to perform new
    duties (June 24, 1976, p. 20373); (2) denying the use of funds to a
    Federal official not in compliance with an existing law that he is
    charged with enforcing (Sept. 10, 1981, p. 20110); (3) reducing the
    availability of funds for trade adjustment assistance by amounts of
    unemployment insurance entitlements where the law establishing trade
    adjustment assistance already required the disbursing agency to take
    into consideration levels of unemployment insurance in de

    [[Page 835]]

    and thereby broadening the provision to include District of Columbia
    funds as well, was ruled out (Nov. 15, 1989, p. 29004). However, to such
    a provision permitted to remain in a general appropriation bill, an
    amendment ``merely perfecting'' the exemption to address cases where the
    health of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to
    term was held not to constitute further legislation by requiring a
    different or more onerous determinations (June 27, 1984, p. 19113). An
    amendment providing that no Federal funds provided in the District of
    Columbia general appropriation bill be used to perform abortions is not
    legislation, since Federal officials have the responsibility to account
    for all appropriations for the annual Federal payment and for
    disbursement of all taxes collected by the District of Columbia,
    pursuant to the D.C. Code (July 17, 1979, p. 19066).
      A paragraph prohibiting the use of funds to perform abortions except
    where the mother's life would be endangered if the fetus were carried to
    term (or where the pregnancy was a result of rape or incest) is
    legislation, since requiring Federal officials to make new
    determinations and judgments not required of them by law, regardless of
    whether private or State officials administering the funds in question
    routinely make such determinations (June 17, 1977, p. 1969; June 30,
    1993, p. 14871; July 16, 1998, p. ----). The fact that such a provision
    relating to abortion funding may have been included in appropriation
    Acts in prior years applicable to funds in those laws does not permit
    the inclusion of similar language requiring such determinations, not
    required by law, with respect to funds for the fiscal year in question
    (Sept. 22, 1983, p. 25406); and where the provision, applicable to
    Federal funds, was permitted to remain in a bill (no point of order
    having been made), an amendment striking the word ``Federal,''

      An exception to a limitation on funds for the Office of Personnel
    Management to enter contracts for health benefit plans that required
    determinations of ``equivalence'' of benefits was held to impose new
    duties (July 16, 1998, p. ----). However, an exception to a similar
    limitation that merely excepted certain specified coverage and plans was
    held not to impose new duties (July 16, 1998, p. ----). Similarly, a
    limitation denying the use of funds in an appropriation bill for the
    General Services Administration to dispose of Federally owned
    ``agricultural'' land declared surplus was held to impose new duties
    since the determination whether surplus lands are ``agricultural'' was
    not required by law (Aug. 20, 1980, pp. 22156-58). However, a limitation
    denying the use of funds for any transit project exceeding a specified
    cost-effectiveness index was held not to impose new duties where the
    Chair was persuaded that the limitation applied to projects for which
    indexes were already required by law (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22206).

    [[Page 836]]

      Over a period dating from 1908, the House had developed a line of
    precedent to the effect that language restricting the availability of
    funds in a general appropriation bill could be a valid limitation if,
    rather than imposing new duties on a disbursing official or requiring
    new determinations of that official, it and passively addressed the
    state of knowledge of the official (VII, 1695; cf. Aug. 1, 1989, p.
    17156, and June 22, 1995, p. 16844 (limitations in recommittal ruled out
    on basis of form rather than of legislative content)). This reasoning
    culminated in a ruling in the 104th Congress admitting as a valid
    limitation an amendment prohibiting the use of funds in the bill to
    execute certain accounting transactions when specified conditions were
    ``made known'' to the disbursing official (July 17, 1996, p. 17542). In
    the 105th Congress this entire line of precedent was overtaken by
    changes in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this clause that treat as
    legislation a provision that makes funding contingent on whether
    circumstances not determinative under existing law are ``known'' (H.
    Res. 5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. 121; July 15, 1997, p. ----; July
    24, 1997, p. ----).

    Sec. 1055. Contingencies and congressional
    actions.

      An amendment  making an appropriation contingent upon a recommendation
    (June 27, 1979, p. 17054) or action not specifically required by law is
    legislation; such as a provision limiting the use of funds in a bill
    ``unless'' or ``until'' an action contrary to existing law is taken
    (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 47.1; July 24, 1996, p. 18888). Where existing
    law requires an agency to furnish certain information to congressional
    committees upon request, without a subpoena, it is not in order to make
    funding for that agency contingent upon its furnishing information to
    subcommittees upon request (July 29-30, 1980, p. 20475), or contingent
    upon submission of an agreement by a Federal official to Congress and
    congressional review thereof (July 31, 1986, p. 18370). Similarly, it is
    not in order to condition funds on legal determinations to be made by a
    Federal court and an executive department (June 28, 1988, p. 16261; see
    Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 47.2).

      Provisions making the availability of funds contingent upon subsequent
    congressional action have, under the most recent precedents, been ruled
    out as legislation (June 30, 1942, p. 5826; May 15, 1947, p. 5378; June
    27, 1994, p. 14613). However, a limitation on the use of funds to buy
    real estate or establish new offices except where Congress had approved
    and funded such activity (June 18, 1991, p. 15218) was held in order.

      The following provisions have been ruled out as legislation: (1)
    making the availability of certain funds contingent upon subsequent
    congressional action on legislative proposals resolving the policy issue
    (Nov. 18, 1981, p. 28064); (2) making the availability of funds
    contingent upon subsequent enactment of legislation containing specified
    findings (Nov. 2, 1983, p. 30503); and (3) changing a permanent
    appropriation in existing law to restrict its availability until all
    general appropriation bills are presented to the President (June 29,
    1987, p. 18083). A section in a general appropriation bill directly
    contravening existing law to subject the use of local funds to
    congressional approval was held to constitute legislation where it was
    shown that some local (District of Columbia) funds deriving from
    interest accounts were available to the Financial Control Board without
    subsequent congressional approval (Aug. 6, 1998, p. ----).

      Two rulings upholding the admissibility of amendments making the
    availability of funds contingent upon subsequent congressional action
    have been superseded by the precedents cited above (June 11, 1968, p.
    16692; Sept. 6, 1979, p. 23360).

    [[Page 837]]

    the President pursuant to the Impoundment Control Act is not in order if
    included in a general appropriation bill rather than in a separate
    resolution of disapproval under that Act (July 29, 1982, pp. 18625,
    18626). An amendment making the availability of funds contingent upon a
    substantive determination by a State or local government
    official or agency that is not otherwise required by existing law has
    been ruled out as legislation (July 25, 1985, p. 20569).
      The following provisions also have been held to be legislation as they
    required: (1) a congressional committee to promulgate regulations to
    limit the use of an appropriation (June 13, 1979, p. 14670), or
    otherwise to direct the activities of a committee (June 24, 1992, pp.
    16087); (2) the Selective Service Administration to issue regulations to
    bring its classifications into conformance with a Supreme Court decision
    (July 20, 1989, p. 15405); and (3) a change in a rule of the House (IV,
    3819). A provision constituting congressional disapproval of a deferral
    of budget authority proposed by

    Sec. 1056. Construing or amending existing
    law.

      A provision  proposing to construe existing law is itself legislative and
    therefore not in order (IV, 3936-3938; May 2, 1951, p. 4747; July 26,
    1951, p. 8982). However, an official's general responsibility to
    construe the language of a limitation on the use of funds, absent
    imposition of an affirmative direction not required by law, does not
    destroy the validity of a limitation (June 27, 1974, pp. 21687-94).

      Where it is asserted that duties ostensibly occasioned by a limitation
    are already imposed by existing law, the Chair may take cognizance of
    judicial decisions and rule the limitation out on the basis that the
    case law is not uniform, current, or finally dispositive (June 16, 1977,
    pp. 19365-74; June 7, 1978, p. 16676). For example, a limitation
    prohibiting the use of funds for an inspection conducted by a regulatory
    agency without a search warrant has been held out of order as imposing a
    new duty not uniformly required by case law (June 16, 1977, pp. 19365-
    74). Similarly, an amendment denying the use of funds for an agency to
    apply certain provisions of law under court decisions in effect on a
    prior date has been held out of order as requiring the official to apply
    noncurrent case law (June 7, 1978, p. 16655).

      A provision prescribing a rule of construction is legislation
    (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 25.15). For example, a provision prescribing a
    prospective rule of construction for possible (future) tax enactments
    was held to constitute legislation (June 21, 2000, p. ----). Similarly,
    a provision construing a limitation in a bill by affirmatively declaring
    the meaning of the prohibition is legislation (May 17, 1988, p. 11305);
    and a provision prescribing definitions for terms contained in a
    limitation may be legislation (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. Sec. 25.7, 25.11).
    Language excepting certain appropriations from the sweep of a broader
    limitation may be in order (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 25.2). It also has
    been held in order to except from the operation of a specific limitation
    on expenditures certain of those expenditures that are authorized by law
    by prohibiting a construction of the limitation in a way that would
    prevent compliance with that law (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 25.10; June 18,
    1991, p. 15218). Similarly, a limitation on certain payments to persons
    in ``excess of $500,'' but stating that the limitation would not be
    ``construed to deprive any share renter of payments'' to which he might
    otherwise be entitled was held in order (Deschler, ch. 26, Sec. 66.1);

    [[Page 838]]

    an amendment to overcome a point of order that the amendment constitutes
    legislation (Sept. 16, 1980, p. 25606; May 8, 1986, p. 10156). A
    limitation denying the use of funds to apply certain provisions of the
    Internal Revenue Code other than under regulations in effect on a prior
    date is legislation since requiring an official to apply regulations no
    longer current in order to render an appropriation available (June 7,
    1978, p. 16655; Aug. 19, 1980, pp. 21978-80). However, an exception to a
    limitation on the use of funds for designated Federal activities that
    were already authorized by law in more general terms, was held in order
    as not containing legislation (June 27, 1979, pp. 17033-35).
      The mere recitation in an amendment that a determination is to be made
    pursuant to existing laws and regulations, absent a citation to the law
    imposing such responsibility, is not sufficient proof by the proponent
    of

      Language waiving provisions of an existing law that did not
    specifically permit inclusion of such a waiver in an appropriation bill
    has been ruled out (Nov. 13, 1975, p. 36271; June 20, 1996, p. 14847;
    Mar. 29, 2000, p. ----; May 19, 2000, p. ----, p. ----; June 13, 2000,
    p. ----), as has language identical to that contained in an
    authorization bill previously passed by the House but not yet signed
    into law (Aug. 4, 1978, p. 24436), or a proposition for repeal of
    existing law (VII, 1403).

      Existing law may be repeated verbatim without violating the rule (IV,
    3814, 3815), but the slightest change of the text renders it liable to a
    point of order (IV, 3817; VII, 1391, 1394; June 4, 1970, p. 18405). It
    is in order to include language descriptive of authority provided in law
    for the operation of Government agencies and corporations so long as the
    description is precise and does not change that authority in any respect
    (June 15, 1973, p. 19843; Aug. 3, 1978, p. 24249); although language
    merely reciting the applicability of current law to the use of earmarked
    funds is permitted, a provision that elevates existing guidelines to
    mandates for spending has been ruled out (July 12, 1989, p. 14432).

      As it is in order by way of limitation to deny the use of funds for
    implementation of an Executive Order, an amendment precisely describing
    the contents of the Executive Order does not constitute legislation
    solely for that reason (Mar. 16, 1977, p. 7748). The fact that the
    regulation for which funds are denied may have been promulgated pursuant
    to court order and pursuant to constitutional provisions is an argument
    on the merits of the amendment and does not render it legislative in
    nature (Aug. 19, 1980, pp. 21981-84). An amendment prohibiting the use
    of funds to carry out any ruling of the Internal Revenue Service that
    rules that taxpayers are not entitled to certain charitable deductions
    was held in order as a limitation, since merely descriptive of an
    existing ruling already promulgated and not requiring any new
    determinations as to the applicability of the limitation to other
    categories of taxpayers (July 16, 1979, pp. 18808-10).

    [[Page 839]]

      An amendment proposing to increase budget authority and to offset that
    increase by proposing a change in the application of the Internal
    Revenue Code of 1986 was held to constitute legislation (Sept. 8, 1999,
    p. ----; June 24, 2003, p. ---- (sustained on appeal); July 10, 2003, p.
    ----).

    Sec. 1057. Mandating expenditures.

      A provision  that mandates
    a distribution of funds in contravention of an allocation formula in
    existing law is legislation (July 29, 1982, pp. 18637, 18638; Oct. 5,
    1983, p. 27335; Aug. 2, 1989, p. 18123; July 24, 1995, p. 20141), as is
    an amendment that by such a mandate interferes with an executive
    official's discretionary authority (Mar. 12, 1975, p. 6338), as in an
    amendment requiring not less than a certain sum to be used for a
    particular purpose where existing law does not mandate such expenditure
    (June 18, 1976, p. 19297; July 29, 1982, p. 18623), or where an
    amendment earmarks appropriated funds to the arts to require their
    expenditure pursuant to standards otherwise applicable only as
    guidelines (July 12, 1989, p. 14432). Where existing law directed a
    Federal official to provide for sale of certain Government property to a
    private organization in ``necessary'' amounts, an amendment providing
    that no such property be withheld from distribution from qualifying
    purchasers was legislation, since requiring disposal of all property and
    restricting discretionary authority to determine ``necessary'' amounts
    (Aug. 7, 1978, p. 24707). An amendment directing the use of funds to
    assure compliance with an existing law, where existing law does not so
    mandate, also is legislation (June 24, 1976, p. 20370). So-called
    ``hold-harmless'' provisions that mandate a certain level of expenditure
    for certain purposes or recipients, where existing law confers
    discretion or makes ratable reductions in such expenditures, also
    constitute legislation (Apr. 16, 1975, p. 10357; June 25, 1976, p.
    20557). A transfer of available funds from one department to another
    with directions as to the use to which those funds must be put is
    legislation (and also a reappropriation in violation of clause 2(a)(2)
    of this rule) (Dec. 8, 1982, p. 29449). A provision requiring States to
    match funds provided in an appropriation bill was held to constitute
    legislation where existing law contained no such requirement (June 28,
    1993, p. 14418). Where existing law prescribes a formula for the
    allocation of funds among several categories, an amendment merely
    reducing the amount earmarked for one of the categories is not
    legislation, so long as it does not textually change the statutory
    formula (July 24, 1995, p. 20133).

    [[Page 840]]

    4595; Aug. 1, 1973, p. 27291; June 10, 1977, p. 1802; July 30, 1985, p.
    21532; July 23, 1986, p. 17446; June 26, 1987, p. 17655; June 28, 1988,
    pp. 16203, 16213; Aug. 2, 1989, p. 18172; Nov. 15, 1989, p. 29004, June
    23, 1998, p. ----; July 13, 2000, p. ----), proposes a new unauthorized
    purpose (Dec. 8, 1971, p. 45487; Aug. 7, 1978, pp. 24710-12; May 25,
    1988, p. 12256), earmarks for unauthorized purposes (July 17, 1985, p.
    19435; July 17, 1986, p. 16918; July 26, 1995, p. 20528; June 5, 1996,
    p. 13120), earmarks by directing a new use of funds not required by law
    (July 26, 1985, pp. 20811, 20813), or increases an authorized amount
    above the authorized ceiling (Aug. 4, 1999, p. ----).

    Sec. 1058. Waivers; amending legislation permitted
    to remain.

      The House  may, by agreeing to a report from the Committee on Rules or
    by adopting an order under suspension of the rules, allow legislation on
    general appropriation bills (IV, 3260-3263, 3839-3845). Where an
    unauthorized appropriation or legislation is permitted to remain in a
    general appropriation bill by waiver or by failure to raise a point of
    order, an amendment merely changing that amount and not adding
    legislative language or earmarking separate funds for another
    unauthorized purpose is in order (IV, 3823-3835, 3838; VII, 1405, 1413-
    1415; June 9, 1954, p. 5963; July 27, 1954, p. 12287; Oct. 1, 1975, p.
    31058; June 8, 1977, p. 17941; July 17, 1985, p. 19435; Sept. 11, 1985,
    p. 23398; June 14, 1988, p. 14341). However, this does not permit an
    amendment that adds additional legislation (IV, 3836, 3837, 3862; VII,
    1402-1436; Dec. 9, 1971, p.

      An amendment adding a new paragraph indirectly increasing an
    unauthorized amount contained in a prior paragraph permitted to remain
    is subject to a point of order because the new paragraph is adding a
    further unauthorized amount not merely perfecting (July 12, 1995, p.
    18628; July 16, 1997, pp. ----; Sept. 9, 1997, p. ----; Sept. 17, 1998,
    p. ----). However, a new paragraph indirectly reducing an unauthorized
    amount permitted to remain in a prior paragraph passed in the reading is
    not subject to a point of order because it is not adding a further
    unauthorized amount (July 16, 1997, p. ----). Where by unanimous consent
    an amendment is offered en bloc to a paragraph containing an
    unauthorized amount not yet read for amendment, the amendment increasing
    that unauthorized figure is subject to a point of order since at that
    point it is not being offered to a paragraph that has been read and
    permitted to remain (June 21, 1984, p. 17687). As required by clause
    2(f), the Chair will query for points of order against the provisions of
    an appropriation bill not yet reached in the reading but addressed by an
    amendment offered en bloc under that clause as budget authority and
    outlay neutral (July 22, 1997, p. ----).

      The Chair examined an entire legislative provision permitted to remain
    when ruling that an amendment to a portion of the provision was merely
    perfecting (July 15, 1999, p. ----). An amendment to a general
    appropriation bill is not subject to a point of order as adding
    legislation for restating, verbatim, a legislative provision already
    contained in the bill and permitted to remain (Aug. 27, 1980, p. 23519).

    [[Page 841]]

      To a legislative provision permitted to remain conferring assistance
    on a certain class of recipients, an amendment adding another class is
    further legislation and is not merely perfecting (June 22, 1983, p.
    16851). For example, the following amendments to legislative provisions
    permitted to remain have been held to propose additional legislation:
    (1) an amendment striking text that resulted in extending the
    legislative reach of the pending bill (July 17, 1996, p. 17533); (2) an
    amendment extending a legislative provision that placed certain
    restrictions on recipients of a defined set of Federal payments and
    benefits to persons benefiting from a certain tax status determined on
    wholly unrelated criteria (Aug. 3, 1995, p. 21967); (3) an amendment
    adding an additional nation to a legislative provision addressing
    sanctions against one nation (July 13, 2000, p. ----).

      On the other hand, to a legislative provision permitted to remain, an
    amendment particularizing a definition in the language was held not to
    constitute additional legislation where it was shown that the definition
    being amended already contemplated inclusion of the covered class (Aug.
    5, 1998, p. ----). To a legislative provision permitted to remain that
    excepted from a denial of funds for abortions cases where the life of
    the mother would be endangered if a fetus were carried to term, an
    amendment excepting instead cases where the health of the mother would
    be endangered if the fetus were carried to term was held not to
    constitute further legislation, since determinations on the endangerment
    of life necessarily subsume determinations on the endangerment of
    health; and the amendment did not therefore require any different or
    more onerous determinations (June 27, 1984, p. 19113).

      To a paragraph permitted to remain though containing a legislative
    proviso restricting the obligation of funds until a date within the
    fiscal year, an amendment striking the delimiting date, thus applying
    the restriction for the entire year, was held to be perfecting (July 30,
    1990, p. 20442); but striking the date and inserting a new trigger (the
    enactment of other legislation), was held to be additional legislation
    (July 30, 1990, p. 20442).

    Sec. 1059. Senate amendments.

      The principle  seems to be
    generally well accepted that the House proposing legislation on a
    general appropriation bill should recede if the other House persists in
    its objection (IV, 3904-3908), and clause 5 of rule XXII (Sec. 1076,
    infra) prohibits House conferees from agreeing to a Senate amendment
    that proposes legislation on an appropriation bill without specific
    authority from the House. However, where a Senate amendment proposing
    legislation on a general appropriation bill is, pursuant to the edict of
    clause 5 of rule XXII, reported back from conference in disagreement, a
    motion to concur in the Senate amendment with a further amendment is in
    order, even if the proposed amendment adds legislation to that contained
    in the Senate amendment, and the only test is whether the proposed
    amendment is germane to the Senate amendment reported in disagreement
    (IV, 3909; VIII, 3188, 3189; Speaker McCormack, Dec. 15, 1970, p. 41504;
    Aug. 1, 1979, pp. 22007-11; Speaker O'Neill, Dec. 12, 1979, p. 35520;
    June 30, 1987, p. 18308).

                   ``holman rule'' on retrenching expenditures

    [[Page 842]]

    Sec. Sec. 1053-1057, supra). Under the modern practice, the ``Holman
    Rule'' only applies where an obvious reduction is achieved by the
    provision in question and does not apply to limiting language
    unaccompanied by a reduction of funds in the bill (July 16, 1979, pp.
    18808-10). It has no application to an amendment to an appropriation
    bill that does not legislate but is merely a negative limitation citing
    but not changing existing law (June 18, 1980, p. 15355).

    Sec. 1062. Legislation reducing
    expenditures.

      Decisions under  the so-called ``Holman Rule'' in clause 2 of rule XXI
    have been rare in the modern practice of the House. The trend in
    construing language in general appropriation bills or amendments thereto
    has been to minimize the importance of the ``Holman Rule'' in those
    cases where the decision can be made on other grounds. The practice of
    using limitations in appropriation bills has been perfected in recent
    years so that most modern decisions by the Chair deal with distinctions
    between such limitations and matters that are considered to be
    legislation (see

      A paragraph containing legislation reported in an appropriation bill
    to be in order must on its face show a retrenchment of a type that
    conforms to the requirements of the rule (Mar. 17, 1926, p. 5804).

      The reduction of expenditure must appear as a necessary result, in
    order to bring an amendment or provision within the exception to the
    rule. It is not sufficient that such reduction would probably, or would
    in the opinion of the Chair, result therefrom (IV, 3887; VII, 1530-
    1534). Thus, an amendment to a general appropriation bill providing that
    appropriations made in that act are hereby reduced by $7 billion, though
    legislative in form, was held in order under the ``Holman Rule''
    exception (Apr. 5, 1966, p. 7689), but an amendment providing for
    certain reductions of appropriations carried in the bill based on the
    President's budget estimates was held not to show a reduction on its
    face and to provide merely speculative reductions (Deschler, ch. 26,
    Sec. 5.6; June 24, 1992, p. 16110). An amendment authorizing the
    President to reduce each appropriation in the bill by not more than 10
    percent was ruled out as legislation conferring new authority on the
    President (May 31, 1984, p. 14617; June 6, 1984, p. 15120). An amendment
    reducing an unauthorized amount permitted to remain in a general
    appropriation bill is in order as a retrenchment under this clause (Oct.
    1, 1975, p. 31058). An amendment to a general appropriation bill denying
    the availability of funds to certain recipients but which requires
    Federal officials to make additional determinations as to the
    qualifications of recipients is legislation and is not a retrenchment of
    expenditures where it is not apparent that the prohibition will reduce
    the amounts covered by the bill (June 26, 1973, p. 21389).

      The amendment must not only show on its face an attempt to retrench
    but also must be germane to some provision in the bill
    even though offered by direction of the committee having jurisdiction of
    the subject matter of the amendment (VII, 1549; Dec. 16, 1911, p. 442).
    An amendment providing that appropriations ``herein and heretofore
    made'' shall be reduced by $70 million through the reduction of Federal
    employees as the President determines was held to be legislative and not
    germane to the bill, since it went to funds other than those carried
    therein, and was therefore not within the ``Holman Rule'' exception
    (Oct. 18, 1966, p. 27425).

    [[Page 843]]

    trenchment of expenditures even if assumed to be legislative (July 13,
    1979, pp. 18453-55).
      An amendment reducing an amount in an appropriation bill for the
    Postal Service and prohibiting the use of funds therein to implement
    special bulk third-class rates for political committees was held in
    order since not specifically requiring a new determination and since
    constituting a re

      As long as an amendment calls for an obvious reduction at some point
    in time during the fiscal year, the amendment is in order under the
    ``Holman Rule'' even if the reduction takes place in the future in an
    amount actually determined when the reduction takes place (for example,
    by formula) (VII, 1491, 1505; July 30, 1980, pp. 20499-20503). To an
    amendment that is in order under the ``Holman Rule,'' containing
    legislation but retrenching expenditures by formula for every agency
    funded by the bill, an amendment exempting from that reduction several
    specific programs does not add further legislation and is in order (July
    30, 1980, pp. 20499-20503).

      A motion to recommit the District of Columbia appropriation bill with
    instructions to reduce the proportion of the fund appropriated from the
    Public Treasury from one-half, as provided in the bill, to one-fourth of
    the entire appropriation is in order, since the effect of the amendment
    if adopted would reduce the expenditure of public money although not
    reducing the amount of the appropriation (VII, 1518).

      The term ``retrenchment'' means the reduction of the amount of money
    to be taken out of the Federal Treasury by the bill, and therefore a
    reduction of the amount of money to be contributed toward the expenses
    of the District of Columbia is in order as a retrenchment (VII, 1502).

      An amendment proposed to an item for the recoinage of uncurrent
    fractional silver, which amendment struck out the amount appropriated
    and added a provision for the coinage of all the bullion in the Treasury
    into standard silver dollars, the cost of such coinage and recoinage to
    be paid out of the Government's seigniorage, was held not to be in order
    under the rule; first, because not germane to the subject matter of the
    bill (the sundry civil); second, because it did not appear that any
    retrenchment of expenditure would result, the seigniorage being the
    property of the Government as other funds in the Treasury (VII, 1547).

      To an item of appropriation for inland transportation of mails by star
    routes an amendment was offered requiring the Postmaster General to
    provide routes and make contracts in certain cases, with the further
    provision ``and the amount of appropriation herein for star routes is
    hereby reduced to $500.'' A point of order made against the first or
    legislative part of the amendment was sustained, which decision was, on
    appeal, affirmed by the committee (VII, 1555).

      To a clause appropriating for the foreign mail service an amendment
    reducing the appropriation, and in addition repealing the act known as
    the ``subsidy act,'' was held not in order because the repealing of this
    act was not germane to the appropriation bill; and that to be in order
    both branches of the amendment must be germane to the bill (VII, 1548).

    [[Page 844]]

    of Agriculture is out of order, being a provision changing law and not
    retrenching expenditure (IV, 3886).
      A provision in the agricultural appropriation bill transferring the
    supervision of the importation of animals from the Treasury to the
    Department

      Where a paragraph containing new legislation provides in one part for
    a discharge of employees, which means a retrenchment, and in another
    part embodies legislation to bring about the particular retrenchment
    which in turn shows on its face an expenditure the amount of which is
    not apparent, the Chair is unable to hold that the net result will
    retrench expenditures. However, where the additional legislation does
    not show on its face an additional expenditure, the Chair will not
    speculate as to a possible expenditure under the additional legislation
    (VII, 1500).

      As explained in the annotation in Sec. 1043, supra, the amendment of
    clause 2(b) in the 98th Congress narrowed the ``Holman Rule'' exception
    to the general prohibition against legislation to cover only
    retrenchments reducing amounts of money covered by the bill, and not
    retrenchments resulting from reduction of the number and salary of
    officers of the United States or of the compensation of any person paid
    out of the U.S. Treasury. Accordingly, the Chair held out of order an
    amendment mandating the reduction of certain Federal salaries and
    expenses as not confined to a reduction of funds in the bill (June 17,
    1994, p. 13422). Paragraph (b) also eliminated separate authority
    conferred upon legislative committees or commissions with proper
    jurisdiction to report amendments retrenching expenditures, and
    permitted legislative committees to recommend such retrenchments by
    reduction of amounts covered by the bill to the Appropriations Committee
    for discretionary inclusion in the reported bill. Paragraph (d) as added
    in the 98th Congress provides a new procedure for consideration of all
    retrenchment amendments only when reading of the bill has been completed
    and only if the Committee of the Whole does not adopt a motion to rise
    and report the bill back to the House. Other decisions which involved
    interpretation of the ``Holman Rule,'' but which do not reflect the
    current form or interpretation of that rule, are found in IV, 3846,
    3885-3892; VII, 1484, 1486-1492, 1498, 1500, 1515, 1563, 1564, 1569;
    June 1, 1892, p. 4920.

    [[Page 845]]

    Sec. 1063. Reappropriations.

      This  provision from section
    139(c) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 190f(c))
    was made part of the standing rules in the 83d Congress (Jan. 3, 1953,
    p. 24). Previously, a reappropriation of an unexpended balance for an
    object authorized by law was in order on a general appropriation bill
    (IV, 3591, 3592; VII, 1156, 1158). This clause was amended in the 99th
    Congress by section 228(b) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
    Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177) to permit the Committee on
    Appropriations to report certain transfers of unexpended balances.
    Consistent with clause 2 of rule XXI, and as codified in the 106th
    Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. ----), violations of this clause
    are enforced only against specific provisions in general appropriation
    bills containing reappropriations rather than against consideration of
    the bill (see Deschler, ch. 25, Sec. 3).

      A provision in a general appropriation bill, or an amendment thereto,
    providing that funds for a certain purpose are to be derived by
    continuing the availability of funds previously appropriated for a prior
    fiscal year is in violation of clause 2(a)(2) (former clause 6 of rule
    XXI) (Aug. 20, 1951, p. 10393; Mar. 29, 1960, p. 6862; June 17, 1960, p.
    13138; June 20, 1973, p. 20530; July 29, 1982, p. 18625; June 28, 1988,
    p. 16255), and a reappropriation of unexpended prior year balances
    prohibited by this clause is not in order under the guise of a ``Holman
    Rule'' exception to clause 2 of rule XXI (Oct. 18, 1966, p. 27424). An
    amendment to a general appropriation bill making any appropriations
    which are available for the current fiscal year available for certain
    new purposes was held out of order under clause 2(a)(2) since it was not
    confined to the funds in the bill and would permit reappropriation of
    unexpended balances (Oct. 1, 1975, p. 31090). That appropriations may be
    authorized in law for a specified object does not permit an amendment to
    a general appropriation bill to include legislative language mandating
    the reappropriation of funds from other Acts (July 28, 1992, p. 19652).

      This rule, however, is not applicable when the reappropriation
    language is identical to legislative authorization language enacted
    subsequent to the adoption of the rule, since the law is a more recent
    expression of the will of the House (Sept. 5, 1961, p. 18133), nor when
    a measure transferring unobligated balances of previously appropriated
    funds contains legislative provisions and rules changes but no
    appropriation of new budget authority and is neither in the form of an
    appropriation bill nor the subject of a privileged report by the
    Committee on Appropriations under rule XIII (Mar. 3, 1988, p. 3239).

      The return of an unexpended balance to the Treasury is in order (IV,
    3594).

      A provision in a general appropriation bill that authorizes an
    official to transfer funds among appropriation accounts in the bill
    changes existing law in violation of clause 2 of rule XXI by including
    language conferring new authority (Deschler, ch 26 Sec. 29.2). However,
    direct transfers of appropriations within the confines of the same bill
    normally are considered in order (VII, 1468) as a ``within-bill''
    transfer rather than a transfer of unexpended balances of the kind
    addressed by clause 2(a)(2).

    [[Page 846]]

    Transportation obligation limitations

    Sec. 1063a. Offsetting en bloc amendments.

      To  invoke the
    protection of clause 2(f), an amendment must not increase the levels of
    budget authority or outlays carried in the bill (Aug. 4, 1999, p. ----;
    July 12, 2000, p. ----); and the proponent of an amendment
    carries the burden of so proving (Oct. 11, 2001, p. ----). An
    amendment otherwise in order under this paragraph may nevertheless be in
    violation of clause 2(a)(1) if increasing an appropriation above the
    authorized amount contained in the bill (Aug. 4, 1999, p. ----).

    1064. Transportation obligation limitations.

      3.  It shall
    not be in order to consider a bill, joint resolution, amendment, or
    conference report that would cause obligation limitations to be below
    the level for any fiscal year set forth in section 8103 of the
    Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, as adjusted, for the
    highway category or the mass transit category, as applicable.

      The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (sec. 8101(e), P.L.
    105-178; 2 U.S.C. 901 note) added this provision as a new
    clause 9 of rule XXI. In the 106th Congress, this provision was
    transferred to clause 3 (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. ----). The Omnibus
    Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999 (sec.
    108, div. C, P.L. 105-277; 112 Stat. 2681-586), included the following
    provision: ``Sec. 108. For the purpose of any Rule of the House of
    Representatives, notwithstanding any other provision of law, any
    obligation limitation relating to surface transportation projects under
    section 1602 of P.L. 105-178 shall be assumed to be administered on the
    basis of sound program management practices that are consistent with
    past practices of the administering agency permitting States to decide
    High Priority Project funding priorities within state program
    allocations.'' This clause and the cited law are not mutually
    inconsistent, but section 8103 does not address a fiscal year beyond
    2003.

    Sec. 106. Funding for Aviation Programs.

    Sec. 1064a. Funding for aviation programs.

      The  Wendell H.
    Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (sec. 106,
    P.L. 106-181) added the following provision:

      (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--

              (1) Airport and airway trust fund guarantee.--

                      (A) In general.--The total budget resources made

                    available from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund each

                    fiscal year through fiscal year 2003 pursuant to

                    sections 48101, 48102, 48103, and 106(k) of title 49,

                    United States Code, shall be equal to the level of

                    receipts plus interest credited to the Airport and

                    Airway Trust Fund for that fiscal year. Such amounts may

                    be used only for aviation investment programs listed in

                    subsection (b).

                      (B) Guarantee.--No funds may be appropriated or

                    limited for aviation investment programs listed in

                    subsection (b) unless the amount described in

    [[Page 847]]

                    subparagraph (A) has been provided.

              (2) Additional authorizations of appropriations from the

            general fund.--In any fiscal year through fiscal year 2003, if

            the amount described in paragraph (1) is appropriated, there is

            further authorized to be appropriated from the general fund of

            the Treasury such sums as may be necessary for the Federal

            Aviation Administration Operations account.

      (b) Definitions.--In this section, the following definitions apply:

              (1) Total budget resources.--The term ``total budget

            resources'' means the total amount made available from the

            Airport and Airway Trust Fund for the sum of obligation

            limitations and budget authority made available for a fiscal

            year for the following budget accounts that are subject to the

            obligation limitation on contract authority provided in this Act

            and for which appropriations are provided pursuant to

            authorizations contained in this Act:

                      (A) 69-8106-0-7-402 (Grants in Aid for Airports).

                      (B) 69-8107-0-7-402 (Facilities and Equipment).

                      (C) 69-8108-0-7-402 (Research and Development).

                      (D) 69-8104-0-7-402 (Trust Fund Share of Operations).

              (2) Level of receipts plus interest.--The term `level of

            receipts plus interest' means the level of excise taxes and

            interest credited to the Airport and Airway Trust Fund under

            section 9502 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 for a fiscal

            year as set forth in the President's budget baseline projection

            as defined in section 257 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency

            Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-177) (Treasury

            identification code 20-8103-0-7-402) for that fiscal year

            submitted pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States

            Code.

      (c) Enforcement of Guarantees.--

              (1) Total airport and airway trust fund funding.--It shall not

            be in order in the House of Representatives or the Senate to

            consider any bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or

            conference report that would cause total budget resources in a

            fiscal year for aviation investment programs described in

            subsection (b) to be less than the amount required by subsection

            (a)(1)(A) for such fiscal year.

              (2) Capital priority.--It shall not be in order in the House

            of Representatives or the Senate to consider any bill, joint

            resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report that

            provides an appropriation (or any amendment thereto) for any

            fiscal year through fiscal year 2003 for Research and

            Development or Operations if the sum of the obligation

            limitation for Grants-in-Aid for Airports and the appropriation

            for Facilities and Equipment for such fiscal year is below the

            sum of the authorized levels for Grants-in-Aid for Airports and

            for Facilities and Equipment for such fiscal year.

    [[Page 848]]

      The aviation-funding point of order does not address a fiscal
    year beyond 2003.

    Appropriations on legislative bills
      The chairmen of the Committee on Rules and the Committee on
    Transportation and Infrastructure inserted in the Record correspondence
    concerning points of order established in this section (Mar. 15, 2000,
    p. ----).

    1065. Restriction of power to report appropriations.

      4.  A
    bill or joint resolution carrying an appropriation may not be reported
    by a committee not having jurisdiction to report appropriations, and an
    amendment proposing an appropriation shall not be in order during the
    consideration of a bill or joint resolution reported by a committee not
    having that jurisdiction. A point of order against an appropriation in
    such a bill, joint resolution, or amendment thereto may be raised at any
    time during pendency of that measure for amendment.

      This portion of the rule was adopted June 1, 1920 (VII, 2133). When
    the House recodified its rules in the 106th Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6,
    1999, p. ----), this clause was returned to clause 4 where it had been
    until moved to former clause 5(a) of rule XXI in the 93d Congress (H.
    Res. 988, 93d Cong., Oct. 8, 1974, p. 34470).

    [[Page 849]]

    point of order under this rule does not apply to a special order
    reported from the Committee on Rules ``self-executing'' the adoption in
    the House to a reported bill of an amendment containing an
    appropriation, since the amendment is not separately before the House
    during consideration of the special order (Feb. 24, 1993, p. 3542).
      A point of order under this rule cannot be raised against a motion to
    suspend the rules (VIII, 3426), against a motion to discharge a
    nonappropriating committee from consideration of a bill carrying an
    appropriation (VII, 2144), or against a Senate amendment to an
    appropriation bill (VII, 1572). However, it may be directed against an
    item of appropriation in a Senate bill (VII, 2136, 2147; July 30, 1957,
    pp. 13056, 13181). If the House deletes a provision in a Senate bill
    under this rule, the bill is messaged to the Senate with the deletion in
    the form of an amendment. The point of order may be made against an
    appropriation in a Senate bill that, although not reported in the House,
    is considered in lieu of a reported House ``companion bill'' (VII, 2137;
    Mar. 29, 1933, p. 988). This clause applies to an amendment proposed to
    a Senate amendment to a House bill not reported from the Committee on
    Appropriations (Oct. 1, 1980, pp. 28638-42). The rule does not apply to
    private bills since the committees having jurisdiction of bills for the
    payment of private claims may report bills making appropriations within
    the limits of their jurisdiction (VII, 2135; Dec. 12, 1924, p. 538). The
    point of order under this rule does not apply to an appropriation in a
    bill which has been taken away from a nonappropriating committee by a
    motion to discharge (VII, 1019a). The

      The provision in this clause that a point of order against an
    amendment containing an appropriation to a legislative bill may be made
    ``at any time'' has been interpreted to require that the point of order
    be raised during the pendency of the amendment under the five-minute
    rule (Mar. 18, 1946, p. 2365; Apr. 28, 1975, p. 12043), and a point of
    order will lie against an amendment during its pendency, even in its
    amended form, although the point of order is against the amendment as
    amended by a substitute and no point of order was raised against the
    substitute prior to its adoption (Apr. 23, 1975, p. 11512-
    13). However, the point of order must be raised during the
    initial consideration of the bill or amendment under the five-minute
    rule, and a point of order against similar language permitted to remain
    in the House version and included in a conference report on a bill will
    not lie, since the only rule prohibiting such inclusion (clause 5 of
    rule XXII) is limited to language originally contained in a Senate
    amendment where the House conferees have not been specifically
    authorized to agree thereto (May 1, 1975, p. 12752). Where the House has
    adopted a resolution waiving points of order against certain
    appropriations in a legislative bill, a point of order may nevertheless
    be raised against an amendment to the bill containing an identical
    provision, since under this rule a point of order may be raised against
    the amendment ``at any time'' (Apr. 23, 1975, p. 11512). A point of
    order against a direct appropriation in a bill initially reported from a
    legislative committee and then sequentially referred to and reported
    adversely by the Committee on Appropriations was conceded and sustained
    as in violation of this clause (Nov. 10, 1975, p. 35611). The point of
    order should be directed to the item of appropriation in the bill and
    not to the act of reporting the bill (VII, 2143), and cannot be directed
    to the entire bill (VII, 2142; Apr. 28, 1975, p. 12043).

      The term ``appropriation'' in the rule means the payment of funds from
    the Treasury, and the words ``warranted and make available for
    expenditure for payments'' are equivalent to ``is hereby appropriated''
    and therefore not in order (VII, 2150). The words ``available until
    expended,'' making an appropriation already made for one year available
    for ensuing years, are not in order (VII, 2145).

    [[Page 850]]

    where it can be shown that the actual availability of those receipts
    remains contingent upon subsequent enactment of an appropriation act
    (Sept. 10, 1975, p. 28300); (4) increasing the duties of a commission
    (VII, 1578); (5) authorizing payment from an appropriation to be made
    (Jan. 31, 1923, p. 2794).
      The point of order provided for in this clause is not applicable to
    the following provisions: (1) authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury
    to use proceeds from the sale of bonds under the Second Liberty Bond Act
    (public debt transactions) for the purpose of making loans, since such
    loans do not constitute ``appropriations'' within the purview of the
    rule (June 28, 1949, pp. 8536-38; Aug. 2, 1950, p. 11599); (2) exempting
    loan guarantees in a legislative bill from statutory limitations on
    expenditures (July 16, 1974, p. 23344); (3) authorizing the availability
    of certain loan receipts

      Language reappropriating, making available, or diverting an
    appropriation or a portion of an appropriation already made for one
    purpose to another (VII, 2146; Mar. 29, 1933, p. 988; Aug. 10, 1988, p.
    21719), or for one fiscal year to another (Mar. 26, 1992, p. 7223), is
    not in order. For example, the following provisions have been held out
    of order: (1) expanding the definition in existing law of recipients
    under a Federal subsidy program as permitting a new use of funds already
    appropriated (May 11, 1976, pp. 13409-11); (2) authorizing the use,
    without a subsequent appropriation, of funds directly appropriated by a
    previous statute for a new purpose (Oct. 1, 1980, pp. 28637-40).
    However, a modification of such a provision making payments for such new
    purposes ``effective only to the extent and in such amounts as are
    provided in advance in appropriation acts'' does not violate this clause
    (Oct. 1, 1980, pp. 28638-42).

      The following provisions have also been held to be in violation of
    this clause: (1) directing a departmental officer to pay a certain sum
    out of unexpended balances (VII, 2154); (2) authorizing the use of funds
    of the Shipping Board (VII, 2147); (3) directing payments out of Indian
    trust funds (VII, 2149); (4) making excess foreign currencies
    immediately available for a new purpose (Aug. 3, 1971, p. 29109); (5)
    authorizing the collection of fees or user charges by Federal agencies
    and making the revenues collected therefrom available without further
    appropriation (June 17, 1937, pp. 5915-18; Mar. 29, 1972, pp. 10749-51);
    (6) transferring existing Federal funds into a new Treasury trust fund
    to be immediately available for a new purpose (June 20, 1974, pp. 20273-
    75); (7) transferring unexpended balances of appropriations from an
    existing agency to a new agency created therein (Apr. 9, 1979, p. 7774);
    (8) making a direct appropriation to carry out a part of the Energy
    Security Act (Oct. 24, 1985, p. 28812); (9) requiring the diversion of
    previously appropriated funds in lieu of the enactment of new budget
    authority if a maximum deficit amount under the Deficit Control Act of
    1985 is exceeded, though its stated purpose may be to avoid the
    sequestration of funds (Aug. 10, 1988, p. 21719).

    [[Page 851]]

    Tax and tariff measures and amendments
      Section 401(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 317)
    prohibits consideration in the House of any bill or resolution or
    amendment which provides new spending authority (as that term is defined
    in that section) unless that measure also provides that such new
    spending authority is to be available only to the extent provided in
    appropriation act (see Sec. 1127, supra). See also Deschler, ch.
    25, Sec. 4 for a discussion of appropriations on legislative
    bills generally.

    1066. Restriction on bills and
    amendments carrying taxes or tariffs.

      5. (a)(1)  A bill or joint resolution
    carrying a tax or tariff measure may not be reported by a committee not
    having jurisdiction to report tax or tariff measures, and an amendment
    in the House or proposed by the Senate carrying a tax or tariff measure
    shall not be in order during the consideration of a bill or joint
    resolution reported by a committee not having that jurisdiction. A point
    of order against a tax or tariff measure in such a bill, joint
    resolution, or amendment thereto may be raised at any time during
    pendency of that measure for amendment.

      (2) For purposes of paragraph (1), a tax or tariff measure includes an
    amendment proposing a limitation on funds in a general appropriation
    bill for the administration of a tax or tariff.

      Subparagraph (1) was added in the 98th Congress (H. Res.
    5, Jan. 3, 1983, p. 34). Subparagraph (2) was added in the 108th
    Congress (sec. 2(o), H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 2003, p. ----). Before
    the House recodified its rules in the 106th Congress, this provision was
    found in former clause 5(b) of rule XXI (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. --
    --).

      A point of order under this paragraph against a provision in a
    bill is in order at any time during consideration of the bill for
    amendment in Committee of the Whole (Aug. 1, 1986, p. 18649). On October
    4, 1989, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, before ruling on
    several points of order under this paragraph, enunciated several
    guidelines to distinguish taxes and tariffs on the one hand and user or
    regulatory fees and other forms of revenue on the other (p. 23260). On
    the opening day of the 102d Congress, Speaker Foley inserted in the
    Congressional Record the following statement of jurisdictional concepts
    underlying those same distinctions and indicated his intention to
    exercise his referral authority under rule X in a manner consistent with
    this paragraph (Jan. 3, 1991, p. 64; see also Jan. 4, 1995, p. 551; Jan.
    3, 2001, p. ----):

              Clause 5(b) (current clause 5(a)) of rule XXI prohibits the

            reporting of a tax or tariff matter by any committee not having

            that jurisdiction. Most of the questions of order arising under

    [[Page 852]]

            this clause since

            its adoption in 1983 have related to provisions that clearly

            affected the operation of the Internal Revenue Code or the

            customs laws. From time to time, however, such a question has

            related to a provision drafted as a user or regulatory fee

            levied on members of a class that occasions or avails itself of

            a particular governmental activity, typically to generate

            revenue in support of that activity. In order to provide

            guidance concerning the referral of bills, to assist committees

            in staying within their appropriate jurisdictions under rule X,

            to assist committees without jurisdiction over tax or tariff

            measures in complying with clause 5(b) of rule XXI, and to

            protect the constitutional prerogative of the House to originate

            revenue bills, the Speaker will make the following statement:

            Standing committees of the House (other than the Committees on

            Appropriations and Budget) have jurisdiction to consider user,

            regulatory and other fees, charges, and assessments levied on a

            class directly availing itself of, or directly subject to, a

            governmental service, program, or activity, but not on the

            general public, as measures to be utilized solely to support,

            subject to annual appropriations, the service, program, or

            activity (including agency functions associated therewith) for

            which such fees, charges, and assessments are established and

            collected and not to finance the costs of Government generally.

            The fee must be paid by a class benefiting from the service,

            program or activity, or being regulated by the agency; in short,

            there must be a reasonable connection between the payors and the

            agency or function receiving the fee. The fund that receives the

            amounts collected is not itself determinative of the existence

            of a fee or a tax. The Committee on Ways and Means has

            jurisdiction over ``revenue measures generally'' under rule X.

            That committee is entitled to an appropriate referral of broad-

            based fees and could choose to recast such fees as excise taxes.

            A provision only reauthorizing or amending an existing fee

            without fundamental change, or creating a new fee generating

            only a de minimis aggregate amount of revenues, does not

            necessarily require a sequential referral to the Committee on

            Ways and Means. The Chair intends to coordinate these principles

            with the Committee on the Budget and the Congressional Budget

            Office, especially in the reconciliation process, so that budget

            scorekeeping does not determine, and reconciliation directives

            and their implementation will not be inconsistent with,

            committee jurisdiction. Further, it should be emphasized that

            the constitutional prerogative of the House to originate revenue

            measures will continue to be viewed broadly to include any

            meaningful revenue proposal that the Senate may attempt to

            originate.

    [[Page 853]]

    order under this paragraph against a provision in, or an amendment to, a
    general appropriation bill affecting the use of funds therein (otherwise
    traditionally in order if admissible under clause 2 of rule XXI),
    carried the burden of showing a necessary, certain, and inevitable
    change in revenue collections or tax statuses or liabilities (Sept. 12,
    1984, pp. 25108, 25109, 25120; July 26, 1985, p. 20806; Aug. 1, 1986, p.
    18649; July 13, 1990, p. 17473; June 18, 1991, p. 15189). The intent of
    the rules change, as expressed during debate on the change, was ``to
    ease the burden on the maker of a point of order [against an amendment]
    from having to show a necessary, certain and inevitable change in
    revenue collections, tax statuses, or liability as previous precedents
    required, to one of showing a textual relationship between the amendment
    and the administration of the Internal Revenue or tariff laws'' (Jan. 7,
    2003, p. ----).
      The adoption of subparagraph (2) in the 108th Congress
    established a different standard for determining a violation of this
    clause by an amendment to a reported general appropriation bill than for
    a provision in the appropriation bill itself. Before its adoption, a
    Member raising a point of

      The precedents developed under this clause still apply to the Chair's
    determination whether a limitation in a general appropriation bill
    (rather than an amendment thereto) constitutes a tax or tariff measure
    proscribed by this paragraph. Prior precedents addressing amendments are
    still viable for that determination. The Chair will consider
    argument as to whether the limitation effectively and inevitably
    changes revenue collections and tax status or liability (Aug. 1, 1986,
    p. 18649). For example, in determining whether an amendment to a general
    appropriation bill proposing a change in IRS funding priorities
    constituted a tax measure proscribed by this paragraph, the Chair
    considered argument as to whether the change would necessarily or
    inevitably result in a loss or gain in tax liability and in tax
    collection (June 18, 1991, p. 15189).

    [[Page 854]]

    certain articles imported by a designated organization (Sept. 12, 1984,
    p. 25109); and (3) an amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930 to expand the
    authority of the Customs Service to seize and use the proceeds from the
    sale of contraband imports to defray operational expenses, and to offset
    owed customs duties under one section of that law (Sept. 12, 1984, p.
    25120). An amendment to a general appropriation bill proposing to divert
    an increase in funding for the IRS from spot-checks to targeted audits
    was held not to constitute a tax within the meaning of this paragraph
    because it did not necessarily affect revenue collection levels or tax
    liabilities (June 18, 1991, p. 15189).
      A limitation on the use of funds contained in a general appropriation
    bill was held to violate this paragraph by denying the use of funds by
    the Customs Service to enforce duty-free entry laws with respect to
    certain imported commodities, thereby requiring the collection of
    revenues not otherwise provided for by law (Oct. 27, 1983, p. 29611).
    Similar rulings were issued: (1) where it was shown that the imposition
    of the restriction on IRS funding for the fiscal year would effectively
    and inevitably preclude the IRS or the Customs Service from collecting
    revenues otherwise due and owing by law or require collection of revenue
    not legally due or owing (July 26, 1985, p. 20806; Aug. 1, 1986, pp.
    18649, 18650; July 17, 1996, p. 17563); and (2) where a provision in a
    general appropriation bill prohibited the use of funds to impose or
    assess certain taxes due under specified portions of the Internal
    Revenue Code (July 13, 1990, p. 17473). In the 98th Congress, the Chair
    sustained points of order under this paragraph against motions to concur
    in three Senate amendments to a general appropriation bill (not reported
    by the Committee on Ways and Means): (1) an amendment denying the use of
    funds in that or any other Act by the IRS to impose or assess any tax
    due under a designated provision of the Internal Revenue Code, thereby
    rendering the tax uncollectable through the use of any funds available
    to the agency (Sept. 12, 1984, p. 25108); (2) an amendment directing the
    Secretary of the Treasury to admit free of duty

      In the 99th Congress, the following provisions in a reconciliation
    bill reported from the Budget Committee were ruled out as tax measures
    not reported from the Committee on Ways and Means: (1) a recommendation
    from the Committee on Education and Labor (now Education and the
    Workforce) excluding certain interest on obligations from the Student
    Loan Marketing Association from application of the Internal Revenue
    Code, affecting interest deductions against income taxes (Oct. 24, 1985,
    pp. 28776, 28827); and (2) a recommendation from the Committee on
    Merchant Marine and Fisheries expanding tax benefits available to
    shipowners through a capital construction fund (Oct. 24, 1985, pp.
    28802, 28827). In the 101st Congress, the following provisions in an
    omnibus budget reconciliation bill were ruled out: (1) a fee per
    passenger on cruise vessels, with revenues credited as proprietary
    receipts of the Coast Guard to be used for port safety, security,
    navigation, and antiterrorism activities (Oct. 4, 1989, p. 23260); (2) a
    per acre ``ocean protection fee'' on oil and gas leaseholdings in the
    Outer Continental Shelf, with receipts to be used to offset costs of
    various ocean protection programs (Oct. 4, 1989, p. 23261); (3) an
    amendment to the Internal Revenue Code relating to the tax deductibility
    of pension fund contributions (Oct. 4, 1989, p. 23262); (4) a fee
    incident to termination of employee benefit plans, with receipts to be
    applied to enforcement and administration of plans remaining with the
    system (Oct. 4, 1989, p. 23262); and (5) a fee incident to the filing of
    various pension benefit plan reports required by law, with revenues to
    be transferred to the Department of Labor for the enforcement of that
    law (Oct. 5, 1989, p. 23328).

    [[Page 855]]

    a general appropriation bill creating a new tariff classification was
    held to constitute a tariff under this paragraph (June 15, 1994, p.
    13103). A motion to concur in a Senate amendment constituting a tariff
    measure (imposing an import ban on certain dutiable goods) to a bill
    reported by a committee not having tariff jurisdiction was ruled out
    under this paragraph (Sept. 30, 1988, p. 27316). A proposal to increase
    a fee incident to the filing of a securities registration statement,
    with the proceeds to be deposited in the general fund of the Treasury as
    offsetting receipts, was held to constitute a tax within the meaning of
    this paragraph because the amount of revenue derived and the manner of
    its deposit indicated a purpose to defray costs of Government, generally
    (Oct. 23, 1990, p. 32650). To a bill reported by the Committee on
    Transportation and Infrastructure, an amendment increasing a user fee
    was ruled out as a tax measure where the fee overcollected to offset a
    reduction in another fee, thus attenuating the relationship between the
    amount of the fee and the cost of the Government activity for which it
    was assessed (May 9, 1995, p. 12180). To a bill reported by the
    Committee on Science, Space, and Technology (now Science), an amendment
    proposing sundry changes in the Federal income tax by direct amendments
    to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 was ruled out of order as carrying
    a tax measure in violation of this paragraph (Sept. 16, 1992, p. 25205).

    Passage of tax rate increases-
      To a bill reported from the Committee on Education and Labor (now
    Education and the Workforce) authorizing financial assistance to
    unemployed individuals for employment opportunities, an amendment
    providing instead for tax incentives to stimulate employment was held to
    be a tax measure in violation of this paragraph (Sept. 21, 1983, p.
    25145). A provision in a bill reported from the Committee on Foreign
    Affairs (now International Relations) imposing a uniform fee at ports of
    entry to be collected by the Customs Service as a condition of
    importation of a commodity was held to constitute a tariff within the
    meaning of this paragraph (June 4, 1985, p. 14009), as was an amendment
    to a bill reported from that committee amending the tariff schedules to
    deny ``most favored nation'' trade treatment to a certain nation (July
    11, 1985, p. 18590). A provision in

    1067. Threefifths vote to increase income tax rates.

      (b)  A
    bill or joint resolution, amendment, or conference report carrying a
    Federal income tax rate increase may not be considered as passed or
    agreed to unless so determined by a vote of not less than three-fifths
    of the Members voting, a quorum being present. In this paragraph the
    term ``Federal income tax rate increase'' means any amendment to
    subsection (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) of section 1, or to section 11(b)
    or 55(b), of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, that imposes a new
    percentage as a rate of tax and thereby increases the amount of tax
    imposed by any such section.

    [[Page 856]]

    a specific amendment to one of the named subsections (H. Res. 5, Jan. 7,
    1997, p. 121). Before the House recodified its rules in
    the 106th Congress, this provision was found in former clause 5(c) of
    rule XXI (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. ----). On one occasion the Chair
    held that a provision repealing a ceiling on total tax liability
    attributable to a net capital gain was not subject to the original
    version of this paragraph (Apr. 5, 1995, p. 10614). This paragraph does
    not apply to a concurrent resolution (Speaker Gingrich, May 18, 1995, p.
    13499). A resolution reported from the Rules Committee waiving this
    paragraph may be adopted by majority vote (Oct. 26, 1995, p. 29477). The
    Speaker rules on the applicability of this paragraph only pending the
    question of final passage of a measure alleged to carry a Federal income
    tax rate increase, and not in advance upon adoption of a special order
    waiving that provision (Oct. 26, 1995, p. 29477).

    Consideration of retroactive tax rate increases
      This provision was added in the 104th Congress (sec. 106(a), H. Res.
    6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 463), and in the 105th Congress it was amended to
    clarify the definition of ``Federal income tax rate increase'' as
    limited to

    1068. Prohibition against retroactive income tax rate
    increase.

      (c)  It shall not be in order to consider a bill, joint
    resolution, amendment, or conference report carrying a retroactive
    Federal income tax rate increase. In this paragraph--

          (1) the term ``Federal income tax rate increase'' means any
    amendment to subsection (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) of section 1, or to
    section 11(b) or 55(b), of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, that
    imposes a new percentage as a rate of tax and thereby increases the
    amount of tax imposed by any such section; and

          (2) a Federal income tax rate increase is retroactive if it
    applies to a period beginning before the enactment of the provision.

    [[Page 857]]

    Designation of public works
      This paragraph was added in the 104th Congress (sec. 106(b), H. Res.
    6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 463), and it was amended in the 105th Congress to
    clarify the definition of ``Federal income tax rate increase'' (H. Res.
    5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. 121). Before the House recodified its
    rules in the 106th Congress, this provision was found in former clause
    5(d) of rule XXI (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. ----).

    1068a. Restriction on designation of public works.

      6.  It
    shall not be in order to consider a bill, joint resolution, amendment,
    or conference report that provides for the designation or redesignation
    of a public work in honor of an individual then serving as a Member,
    Delegate, Resident Commissioner, or Senator.

      This clause was adopted in the 107th Congress (sec. 2(q), H. Res. 5,
    Jan. 3, 2001, p. ----).