    [Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 107th Congress]
    [107th Congress]
    [House Document 106-320]
    [The United States Constitution]
    [Pages 4-62]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

    [[Page 4]]

                                   ARTICLE I.

    Sec. 3. Legislative powers vested in
    Congress.

      Section 1. All  legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
    Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House
    of Representatives.

    <>   Section 2. \1\ The House of Representatives shall be composed
    of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States,
    * * *.

    Sec. 4. Power to
    investigate.

      The power to legislate includes the power to conduct inquiries and
    investigations. See Kilbourn v.   Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273
    U.S. 135 (1927); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957);
    Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). For the power of the
    House to punish for contempt in the course of investigations, see
    Sec. 293, infra.

      This clause requires election by the people and State authority may
    not determine a tie by lot (I, 775).

      The phrase ``by the people of the several States'' means that as
    nearly as practicable one person's vote in a congressional election is
    to be worth as much as another's. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
    (1964); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 385 U.S. 450 (1967). 2 U.S.C. 2a
    mandates apportionment of Representatives based upon population, and 2
    U.S.C. 2c requires the establishment by the States of single-Member
    congressional districts. For elections generally, see Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 8.

    [[Page 5]]

    resolution fixing the daily hour of meeting at 12 o'clock meridian or
    some other hour is agreed to at the beginning of each session.

    Sec. 6. Term of a Congress.

      The term of a  Congress, before
    the ratification of the 20th amendment to the Constitution, began on the
    4th of March of the odd numbered years and extended through two years.
    This resulted from the action of the Continental Congress on September
    13, 1788, in declaring, on authority conferred by the Federal
    Convention, ``the first Wednesday in March next'' to be ``the time for
    commencing proceedings under the said Constitution.'' This date was the
    4th of March, 1789. Soon after the first Congress assembled a joint
    committee determined that the terms of Representatives and Senators of
    the first class commenced on that day, and must necessarily terminate
    with the 3d of March, 1791 (I, 3). Under the 20th amendment to the
    Constitution the terms of Representatives and Senators begin on the 3d
    of January of the odd-numbered years, regardless of when Congress
    actually convenes. By a practice having the force of common law, the
    House meets at 12 m. when no other hour is fixed (I. 4, 210). In the
    later practice a

      Prior to adoption of the 20th amendment, the legislative day of March
    3 extended to 12 m. on March 4 (V, 6694-6697) and, unless earlier
    adjourned, the Speaker could at that time declare the House adjourned
    sine die, without motion or vote, even to the point of suspending a roll
    call then in progress (V, 6715-6718).

    <> * * * and
    the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for
    Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

      The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (84 Stat. 1140) provides
    that unless Congress otherwise specifies the two Houses shall adjourn
    sine die not later than the last day in July. This requirement is not
    applicable, under the terms of that Act, where a state of war exists
    pursuant to a congressional declaration or where, in an odd-numbered
    (nonelection) year, the Congress has agreed to adjourn for the month
    preceding Labor Day. For more on this provision, see Sec. 1105, infra.

      The House, in the decision of an election case, has rejected votes
    cast by persons not naturalized citizens of the United States, although
    they were entitled to vote under the statutes of a State (I, 811); but
    where an act of Congress had provided that a certain class of persons
    should be deprived of citizenship, a question arose over the proposed
    rejection of their votes in a State wherein citizenship in the United
    States was not a qualification of the elector (I, 451). In an
    exceptional case the House rejected votes cast by persons lately in
    armed resistance to the Government, although by the law of the State
    they were qualified voters (I, 448); but later, the House declined to
    find persons disqualified as voters because they had formerly borne arms
    against the Government (II, 879).

    Sec. 8. Decisions of the Court.

      The power  of the States to
    set qualifications for electors is not unlimited, being subject to the
    15th, 19th, 24th, and 26th amendments, and to the equal protection
    clause of the United States Constitution. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
    89 (1965); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).

    <>   \2\ No
    Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained
    to the Age of twenty five Years, * * *.

    [[Page 6]]

      Congress has some power in setting qualifications for electors, as in
    protecting the right to vote and lowering the minimum age for electors
    in congressional elections. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966);
    Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).

    <> * * *
    and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, * * *.

      A Member-elect not being of the required age, was not enrolled by the
    Clerk and he did not take the oath until he had reached the required age
    (I, 418).

    <> * * *
    and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which
    he shall be chosen.

      Henry Ellenbogen, Pa., had not been a citizen for seven years when
    elected to the 73d Congress, nor when the term commenced on March 4,
    1933. He was sworn at the beginning of the second session on January 3,
    1934, when a citizen for seven and one-half years (see H. Rept. 1431 and
    H. Res. 370, 73d Cong.). A native of South Carolina who had been abroad
    during the Revolution and on his return had not resided in the country
    seven years, was held to be qualified as a citizen (I, 420). A woman who
    forfeited her citizenship through marriage to a foreign subject and
    later resumed it through naturalization less than seven years prior to
    her election, was held to fulfill the constitutional requirement as to
    citizenship and entitled to a seat in the House (VI, 184). A Member who
    had long been a resident of the country, but who could not produce
    either the record of the court nor his final naturalization papers, was
    nevertheless retained in his seat by the House (I, 424).

    [[Page 7]]

    bia for years as a newspaper correspondent and maintenance there of
    church membership were not considered to outweigh payment of poll and
    income taxes, ownership of real estate, and a record for consistent
    voting in the district from which elected (VI, 55), and in the same case
    excuse from jury duty in the District of Columbia on a plea of
    citizenship in the State from which elected and exercise of incidental
    rights of such citizenship, were accepted as evidence of inhabitancy
    (VI, 55).
      The meaning of the word ``inhabitant'' and its relation to citizenship
    has been discussed (I, 366, 434; VI, 174), and the House has held that a
    mere sojourner in a State was not qualified as an inhabitant (I, 369),
    but a contestant was found to be an actual inhabitant of the State
    although for sufficient reason his family resided in another State (II,
    1091). Residence abroad in the service of the Government does not
    destroy inhabitancy as understood under the Constitution (I, 433). One
    holding an office and residing with his family for a series of years in
    the District of Columbia exclusively was held disqualified to sit as a
    Member from the State of his citizenship (I, 434); and one who had his
    business and a residence in the District of Columbia and had no business
    or residence in Virginia was held ineligible to a seat from that State
    (I, 436). One who had a home in the District of Columbia, and had
    inhabited another home in Maryland a brief period before his election,
    but had never been a citizen of any other State, was held to be
    qualified (I, 432). Also a Member who had resided a portion of a year in
    the District of Columbia, but who had a home in the State of his
    citizenship and was actually living there at the time of the election,
    was held to be qualified (I, 435). In the Updike v. Ludlow case, 71st
    Congress, it was decided that residence in the District of Colum

    Sec. 12. Qualifications other than those
    specified by the Constitution.

      Whether Congress  may by law establish qualifications
    other than those prescribed by the Constitution has been the subject of
    much discussion (I, 449, 451, 457, 458, 478); but in a case wherein a
    statute declared a Senator convicted of a certain offense ``forever
    thereafter incapable of holding any office of honor, trust, or profit
    under the Government of the United States,'' the Supreme Court expressed
    the opinion that the final judgment of conviction did not operate, ipso
    facto, to vacate the seat or compel the Senate to expel or regard the
    Senator as expelled by force alone of the judgment (II, 1282). Whether
    the House or Senate alone may set up qualifications other than those of
    the Constitution has also been a subject often discussed (I, 414, 415,
    443, 457, 458, 469, 481, 484). The Senate has always declined to act on
    the supposition that it had such a power (I, 443, 483), and during the
    stress of civil war the House of Representatives declined to exercise
    the power, even under circumstances of great provocation (I, 449, 465).
    But later, in one instance, the House excluded a Member-elect on the
    principal argument that it might itself prescribe a qualification not
    specified in the Constitution (I, 477). The matter was extensively
    debated in the 90th Congress in connection with the consideration of
    resolutions relating to the seating of Representative-elect Adam C.
    Powell of New York (H. Res. 1, Jan. 10, 1967, p. 14; H. Res. 278, Mar.
    1, 1967, p. 4997).

      The exclusion of Mr. Powell was the subject of litigation reaching the
    Supreme Court of the United States. In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
    (1969), the Court found that the power of Congress to judge the
    qualifications of its Members was limited to an examination of the
    express qualifications stated in the Constitution.

      It has been decided by the House and Senate that no State may add to
    the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution (I, 414-416, 632); and
    the Supreme Court so ruled in U.S. Term Limits, Inc., v. Thorton, 63
    U.S.L.W. 4413 (1995). There, the Court held that States may not
    ``change, add to, or diminish'' constitutional qualifications of
    Members, striking down a State statute prohibiting three-term incumbents
    from appearing on the general election ballot. For qualifications
    generally, see Deschler's Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 7, secs. 9-14.

    [[Page 8]]

      For expulsion of seated Members, which requires a two-thirds vote
    rather than a majority vote, see article I, section 5, clause 2
    (Sec. 62, infra).

    Sec. 13. Minority candidate not seated when
    returned Member is disqualified.

      Both Houses of  Congress have decided, when a Member-
    elect is found to be disqualified, that the person receiving the next
    highest number of votes is not entitled to the seat (I, 323, 326, 450,
    463, 469; VI, 58, 59), even in a case wherein seasonable notice of the
    disqualification was given to the electors (I, 460). In the event of the
    death of a Member-elect, the candidate receiving the next highest number
    of votes is not entitled to the seat (VI, 152).

    Sec. 14. The old provision for
    apportionment of Representatives and direct taxes.

      \3\ [Representatives and direct  Taxes shall be
    apportioned among the several States which may be included within this
    Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined
    by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to
    Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three
    fifths of all other Persons.] * * *

    * * * The actual <> Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the
    first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every
    subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law
    direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every
    thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative;
    and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire
    shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode- Island and
    Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersey
    four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland

    [[Page 9]]

    six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia
    three.

      The part of this clause relating to the mode of apportionment of
    Representatives was changed after the Civil War by section 2 of the 14th
    amendment and as to taxes on incomes without apportionment, by the 16th
    amendment.

      The census has been taken decennially since 1790, and, with the
    exception of 1920, was followed each time by reapportionment. In the
    First Congress the House had 65 Members; increased after each census,
    except that of 1840, until 435 was reached in 1913 (VI, 39, 40). The Act
    of June 18, 1929 (46 Stat. 26), as amended by the Act of November 15,
    1941 (55 Stat. 761), provides for reapportionment of the existing number
    (435) among the States following each new census (VI, 41-43; see 2
    U.S.C. 2a). Membership was temporarily increased to 436, then to 437,
    upon admission of Alaska (72 Stat. 345) and Hawaii (73 Stat. 8), but
    returned to 435 on January 3, 1963, the effective date of the
    reapportionment under the 18th Decennial census.

      Under the later but not the earlier practice, bills relating to the
    census and apportionment are not privileged for consideration (I, 305-
    308; VI, 48, VII, 889; Apr. 8, 1926, p. 7147).

    Sec. 16. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 Howard, 393;
    Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall., 533; Scholey v. Rew, 23 Wall., 331; De
    Treville v. Smalls, 98 U.S. 517; Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116
    U.S. 404; Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. (Income Tax case), 157
    U.S. 429; Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Rehearing), 158 U.S.
    601; Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,
    220 U.S. 107; Corporation Tax cases, 220 U.S. 107; Eisner v. Macomber,
    252 U.S. 189; New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345.

    Sec. 17. Writs for elections to vacancies
    in representation.

      \4\ When vacancies  happen in the Representation from any State, the
    Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such
    Vacancies.

      Vacancies are caused by death, resignation, declination, withdrawal,
    or by action of the House in declaring a vacancy as existing or causing
    one by expulsion.

    [[Page 10]]

    of votes may not receive the credentials (I, 323; VI 152). A Member
    whose seat was contested dying, the House did not admit a claimant with
    credentials until contestant's claim was settled (I, 326); where a
    contestant died after a report in his favor, the House unseated the
    returned Member and declared the seat vacant (II, 965), and in a later
    case the contestant having died, the committee did not recommend to the
    House a resolution it had agreed to declaring he had not been elected
    (VI, 112). In the 93d Congress, when two Members-elect were passengers
    on a missing aircraft and were presumed dead, the Speaker laid before
    the House documentary evidence of the presumptive death of one Member-
    elect and the declaration of a vacancy by the Governor, as well as
    evidence that the status of the other Member-elect had not been
    officially determined by State authority. The House then adopted a
    privileged resolution declaring vacant the seat of the latter Member-
    elect to enable the Governor of that State to call a special election
    (Jan. 3, 1973, p. 15). For further discussion, see Sec. 23, infra.

    Sec. 18. Vacancy from death.

      It was long the  practice to
    notify the executive of the State when a vacancy was caused by the death
    of a Member during a session (II, 1198-1202); but since improvements in
    transportation have made it possible for deceased Members to be buried
    at their homes it has been the practice for State authorities to take
    cognizance of the vacancies without notice. When a Member dies while not
    in attendance on the House or during a recess the House is sufficiently
    informed of the vacancy by the credentials of his successor, when they
    set forth the fact of the death (I, 568). The death of a Member-elect
    creates a vacancy, although no certificate may have been awarded (I,
    323), and in such a case the candidate having the next highest number

    [[Page 11]]

    Vice President and a Representative of the succeeding Congress at the
    same election, transmitted to the Governor of his State his resignation
    as a Member-elect (VI, 230, 453). A Member of the House having been
    nominated and confirmed as Vice President pursuant to the 25th
    amendment, submitted a letter of resignation as a Representative to the
    Governor of his State, and a copy of his letter of resignation was laid
    before the House by the Speaker following the completion of a joint
    meeting for his swearing-in as Vice President (Dec. 6, 1973, p. 39927).
    A sitting Member having been confirmed as Secretary of Defense, his
    letter of resignation was laid before the House prior to his taking the
    oath of that office (Mar. 20, 1989, p. 4976).

    Sec. 19. Vacancy from resignation.

      In recent practice  the
    Member frequently informs the House by letter that his resignation has
    been sent to the State executive (II, 1167-1176) and this is
    satisfactory evidence of the resignation (I, 567) but Members have
    resigned by letter to the House alone, it being presumed that the Member
    would also notify his Governor (VI, 226), and where a Member resigned by
    letter to the House the Speaker was authorized to notify the Governor
    (Nov. 27, 1944, p. 8450; July 12, 1957, p. 11536; Sept. 1, 1976, p.
    28887). Where a Member does not inform the House the State executive may
    do so (II, 1193, 1194; VI, 232). But sometimes the House learns of a
    Member's resignation only by means of the credentials of his successor
    (II, 1195, 1356). Where the fact of a Member's resignation has not
    appeared either from the credentials of his successor or otherwise, the
    Clerk has been ordered to make inquiry (II, 1209), or the House has
    ascertained the vacancy from information given by other Members (II,
    1208). It has been established that a Member or Senator may resign,
    appointing a future date for his resignation to take effect, and until
    the arrival of the date may participate in the proceedings (II, 1220-
    1225, 1228, 1229; VI, 227, 228). In one case a Member who had resigned
    was not permitted by the House to withdraw the resignation (II, 1213),
    but the House permitted it later in another case (VI, 229). Acceptance
    of the resignation of a Member of the House is unnecessary (VI, 65,
    226), and the refusal of a Governor to accept a resignation cannot
    operate to continue membership in the House (VI, 65). Only in a single
    exceptional case has the House taken action in the direction of
    accepting a resignation (II, 1214). Sometimes Members who have resigned
    have been reelected to the same House and taken seats (II, 1210, 1212,
    1256; Jan. 28, 1965 and June 16, 1965, pp. 1452 and 13774; Jan. 6, 1983
    and Feb. 22, 1983, pp. 114 and 2575). A Member who has not taken his
    seat resigned (II, 1231). A letter of resignation is presented as
    privileged (II, 1167-1176); but a resolution to permit a Member to
    withdraw his resignation was not so treated (II, 1213). The Speaker
    having been elected

    Sec. 20. Vacancy from declination.

      A Member who  has been
    elected to a seat may decline to accept it, and in such a case the House
    informed the executive of the State of the vacancy (II, 1234). The House
    has decided an election contest against a returned Member who had not
    appeared to claim the seat (I, 638). In one instance a Member-elect who
    had been convicted in the courts did not appear during the term (IV,
    4484, footnote).

    Sec. 21. Vacancy by withdrawal.

      At the time  of the secession
    of several States, members of the House from those States withdrew (II,
    1218). In the Senate, in cases of such withdrawals, the Secretary was
    directed to omit the names of the Senators from the roll (II, 1219), and
    the act of withdrawal was held to create a vacancy which the legislature
    might recognize (I, 383).

    Sec. 22. Vacancy by action of the House.

      Where the House,  by
    its action in a question of election or otherwise, creates a vacancy,
    the Speaker is directed to notify the Executive of the State (I, 502,
    709, 824; II, 1203-1205; Mar. 1, 1967, p. 5038; Jan. 3, 1973, p. 15;
    Feb. 24, 1981, pp. 2916-18). A resolution as to such notification is
    presented as a question of privilege (III, 2589), as is a resolution
    declaring a vacancy where the Member-elect was unable to take the oath
    of office or to resign because of an incapacitating illness (Feb. 24,
    1981, pp. 2916-18).

    [[Page 12]]

    where the plane was lost, the House declared the seat vacant (H. Res. 1,
    93d Cong., Jan. 3, 1973, p. 15).

    Sec. 23. Questions as to the existence of a
    vacancy.

      The House declines  to give prima facie effect to credentials, even though they
    be regular in form, until it has ascertained whether or not the seat is
    vacant (I, 322, 518, 565, 569), and a person returned as elected at a
    second election was unseated on ascertainment that another person had
    actually been chosen at the first election (I, 646). Where a Member was
    reelected to the House, although at the time of the election he had been
    unaccounted for for several weeks following the disappearance of the
    plane on which he was a passenger, the Governor of the State from which
    he was elected transmitted his certificate to the House in the regular
    fashion. When the Member-elect was still missing at the time the new
    Congress convened, and circumstances were such that other passengers on
    the missing plane had been presumed dead following judicial inquiries in
    the State

    <>   \5\
    The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other
    Officers; * * *

    Sec. 24. Functions of the state executive
    in filling vacancies.

      The term ``vacancy''  as occurring in this paragraph of the
    Constitution has been examined in relation to the functions of the State
    executive (I, 312, 518). A Federal law empowers the States and
    Territories to provide by law the times of elections to fill vacancies
    (I, 516; 2 U.S.C. 8); but an election called by a governor in pursuance
    of constitutional authority was held valid although no state law
    prescribed time, place, or manner of such election (I, 517). Where two
    candidates had an equal number of votes, the governor did not issue
    credentials to either, but ordered a new election after they had waived
    their respective claims (I, 555). A candidate elected for the 104th
    Congress was appointed by the Governor to fill a vacancy for the
    remainder of the 103d Congress pursuant to a State law requiring the
    Governor to appoint the candidate who won the election to the 104th
    Congress. In that case the House authorized the Speaker to administer
    the oath to the Member-elect and referred the question of his final
    right to the seat in the 103d Congress to the Committee on House
    Administration (Nov. 29, 1994, pp. 29585, 29586).
    <>   A
    Member elected to fill a vacancy serves no longer time than the
    remainder of the term of the Member whose place he fills (I, 3). For the
    compensation and allowances of such Members, see Sec. 87, infra.

      The officers of the House are the Speaker, who has always been one of
    its Members and whose term as Speaker must expire with his term as a
    Member; and the Clerk, Sergeant-at-Arms, Chief Administrative Officer,
    and Chaplain (I, 187), no one of whom has ever been chosen from the
    sitting membership of the House and who continue in office until their
    successors are chosen and qualified (I, 187). In one case the officers
    continued through the entire Congress succeeding that in which they were
    elected (I, 244, 263). Former officers include Doorkeeper (abolished by
    the 104th Congress, see Sec. 663a, infra) and Postmaster (abolished
    during the 102d Congress, see Sec. 668, infra). The House formerly
    provided by special rule that the Clerk should continue in office until
    another should be chosen (I, 187, 188, 235, 244). Currently, certain
    statutes impose on the officers duties which contemplate their
    continuance (I, 14, 15; 2 U.S.C. 75a-1, 83).

    [[Page 13]]

    for this election (I, 217). Ultimately, the House, and not the Clerk,
    decides by what method it shall elect the Speaker (I, 210). On two
    occasions, by special rules, Speakers were chosen by a plurality of
    votes; but in each case the House by majority vote adopted a resolution
    declaring the result (I, 221, 222). The House has declined to choose a
    Speaker by lot (I, 221).

    Sec. 27. Election of a Speaker.

      The Speaker, who  was at
    first elected by ballot, has been chosen viva voce by surname in
    response to a call of the roll since 1839 (I, 187). The Speaker is
    elected by a majority of Members-elect voting by surname, a quorum being
    present (I, 216; VI, 24; Jan. 7, 1997, p. ----). The Clerk appoints
    tellers

      The motion to proceed to the election of a Speaker is privileged (I,
    212, 214; VIII, 3883), and debatable unless the previous question is
    ordered (I, 213). Relying on the Act of June 1, 1789 (2 U.S.C. 25), the
    Clerk recognized for nominations for Speaker as being of higher
    constitutional privilege than a resolution to postpone the election of a
    Speaker and instead provide for the election of a Speaker pro tempore
    pending the disposition of certain ethics charges against the nominee of
    the majority party (Jan. 7, 1997, p. ----). On several occasions the
    choice of a Speaker has been delayed for several weeks by contests (I,
    222; V, 5356, 6647, 6649; VI, 24). The contest over the election of a
    Speaker in 1923 was resolved after a procedure for the adoption of rules
    for the 68th Congress had been presented (VI, 24). In 1860 the voting
    for Speaker proceeded slowly, being interspersed with debate (I, 223),
    and in one instance the House asked candidates for Speaker to state
    their views before proceeding to election (I, 218).

    Sec. 28. Vacancies in the office of
    Speaker.

      A proposition  to elect a Speaker is in order at any time a vacancy exists
    and presents a question of the highest privilege (VIII, 3383). Upon a
    vacancy in the office of Speaker, the House elects a new Speaker either
    viva voce following nominations (in the case where a Speaker has died
    between sessions of Congress or resigned) or by resolution (in the case
    where a Speaker has died during a session of Congress). For example, in
    the case where the Speaker had died between sessions of Congress, the
    Clerk at the next session called the House to order, ascertained the
    presence of a quorum, and then the House proceeded to elect a successor
    viva voce following nominations (I, 234; Jan. 10, 1962, p. 5). In a case
    where the Speaker died during a session of Congress, but not while the
    House was sitting, the Clerk on the following day called the House to
    order and the Speaker's successor was elected by resolution (June 4,
    1936, p. 9016; Sept. 16, 1940, p. 12231). In a case where the Speaker
    resigned ``on the election of my successor'' (May 31, 1989, p. 10440),
    he entertained nominations for Speaker and, following the roll call,
    declared the winner of the election ``duly elected Speaker'' (June 6,
    1989, p. 10801). In one instance a Speaker resigned on the last day of
    the Congress, and the House unanimously adopted a motion to elect a
    successor for the day (I, 225).

    [[Page 14]]

    a Member to the Chair and tendering the resignation verbally from the
    floor (I, 225), by tendering the resignation during recognition under a
    question of personal privilege (May 31, 1989, p. 10440), or by sending a
    letter which the Clerk reads to the House at the beginning of a new
    session (I, 232). When the Speaker resigns no action of the House
    excusing him from service is taken (I, 232). Instance wherein the
    Speaker, following a vote upon an essential question indicating a change
    in the party control of the House, announced that under the
    circumstances it was incumbent upon the Speaker to resign or to
    recognize for a motion declaring vacant the office of Speaker (VI, 35).
    <>   The effect of a law to regulate the action of the House in
    choosing its own officers has been discussed (IV, 3819), and such a law
    has been considered of doubtful validity (V, 6765, 6766) in theory and
    practice (I, 241, 242). The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2
    U.S.C. 75a-1) authorizes the Speaker to fill temporary vacancies in the
    offices of Clerk, Sergeant-at-Arms, Chief Administrative Officer, and
    Chaplain. For a history of the Speaker's exercise of such authority, see
    Sec. 640, infra;  and, for further information on the elections of
    officers, see Deschler's Precedents, vol. 1, ch. 6.
      Form of resolution offered on death of a Speaker (Sept. 16, 1940, p.
    12232; Jan. 10, 1962, p. 9) and of a former Speaker (VIII, 3564; Mar. 7,
    1968, p. 5742; H. Res. 328, Jan. 25, 1994, p. ----; H. Res. 418, Feb. 8,
    2000, p. ----). A resolution declaring vacant the office of Speaker is
    presented as a matter of high constitutional privilege (VI, 35).
    Speakers have resigned by rising in their place and addressing the House
    (I, 231, 233), by calling

    <> * * * and
    [the House of Representatives] shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

    Sec. 30. Election of Clerk in relation to
    business.

      The office of  Clerk becoming vacant, it was held that the House would not
    be organized for business until a Clerk should be elected (I, 237); but
    in another instance some business intervened before a Clerk was elected
    (I, 239). At the time of organization, while the Clerk of the preceding
    House was yet officiating, and after the Speaker had been elected, the
    House proceeded to legislation and other business before electing a
    Clerk (I, 242, 244). But in one case it was held that the Act of June 1,
    1789 (2 U.S.C. 25) bound the House to elect the Clerk before proceeding
    to business (I, 241).

      In 1868 the Senate ceased in its rules to describe the House, acting
    in an impeachment, as the ``grand inquest of the nation'' (III, 2126).
    See also art. II, sec. 4 (Sec. 173, infra); Deschler's Precedents, vol.
    3, ch. 14.

      A Federal court having subpoenaed certain evidence gathered by a
    committee of the House in an impeachment inquiry, the House adopted a
    resolution granting such limited access to the evidence as would not
    infringe upon its sole power of impeachment (Aug. 22, 1974, p. 30047).

    [[Page 15]]

    prompted by a communication from an independent counsel, see Sec. 176,
    infra.

      Until the law expired on June 30, 1999, an independent counsel was
    required to advise the House of any substantial and credible information
    that may constitute grounds for impeachment of an officer under his
    investigation (28 U.S.C. 595(c)). For a description of impeachment
    proceedings

    Sec. 32. Numbers, terms, and votes
    of Senators.

      Section 3. \1\ [The Senate  of the United States shall be composed of two Senators
    from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and
    each Senator shall have one Vote.]

      This provision has now been changed by the 17th amendment to the
    Constitution.

    Sec. 33. Division of the Senate into
    classes.

      \2\ Immediately  after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first
    Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes.
    The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the
    Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of
    the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of
    the <> sixth Year,
    so that one-third may be chosen every second Year; [and if Vacancies
    happen by Resignation,
    or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the
    Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting
    of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.]

      That part of the above paragraph in brackets was changed by the 17th
    amendment.

    [[Page 16]]

    Sec. 35. Qualifications of Senators.

      \3\ No Person  shall be
    a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and
    been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when
    elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

      In 1794 the Senate decided that Albert Gallatin was disqualified, not
    having been a citizen nine years although he had served in the war of
    Independence and was a resident of the country when the Constitution was
    formed (I, 428); and in 1849 that James Shields was disqualified, not
    having been a citizen for the required time (I, 429). But in 1870 the
    Senate declined to examine as to H. R. Revels, a citizen under the
    recently adopted 14th amendment (I, 430). As to inhabitancy the Senate
    seated one who, being a citizen of the United States, had been an
    inhabitant of the State from which he was appointed for less than a year
    (I, 437). Also one who, while stationed in a State as an army officer
    had declared his intention of making his home in the State, was admitted
    by the Senate (I, 438). A Senator who at the time of his election was
    actually residing in the District of Columbia as an officeholder, but
    who voted in his old home and had no intent of making the District his
    domicile, was held to be qualified (I, 439).

    Sec. 36. The Vice President and his
    vote.

      \4\ The Vice  President of the United States shall be President of the Senate,
    but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.

    <>   \5\ The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and
    also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or
    when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.

      The right of the Vice President to vote has been construed to extend
    to questions relating to the organization of the Senate (V, 5975), as
    the election of officers of the Senate (V, 5972-5974), or a decision on
    the title of a claimant to a seat (V, 5976, 5977). The Senate has
    declined to make a rule relating to the vote of the Vice President (V,
    5974).

    -  \6\ The Senate <> shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.
    When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation.
    When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice
    shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted

    [[Page 17]]

    without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.

      In the 107th Congress the Senate elected two Presidents of the Senate
    pro tempore for different periods when the majority of the Senate
    shifted after inauguration of the Vice President (S. Res. 3, Jan. 3,
    2001, p. ----).

      For the exclusive power of the Senate to try impeachments under the
    United States Constitution, see Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cls. 293
    (1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 668 (1937). See also Mississippi v.
    Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867) (dictum). For the
    nonjusticiability of a claim that Senate Rule XI violates the
    impeachment trial clause by delegating to a committee of 12 Senators the
    responsibility to receive evidence, hear testimony, and report to the
    Senate thereon, see Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). For a
    discussion of Senate impeachment procedures, see Sec. Sec. 608-20,
    infra.

    Sec. 41. Judgment in cases of
    impeachment.

      \7\ Judgment in  Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to
    removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office
    of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party
    convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial,
    Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.

      There has been discussion as to whether or not the Constitution
    requires both removal and disqualification on conviction (III, 2397);
    but in the case of Pickering, the Senate decreed only removal (III,
    2341). In the case of Humphreys, judgment of both removal and
    disqualification was pronounced (III, 2397). In the Ritter case, it was
    first held that upon conviction of the respondent, judgment of removal
    required no vote, following automatically from conviction under article
    II, section 4 (Apr. 17, 1936, p. 5607). In the 99th Congress, having
    tried to conviction the first impeachment case against a Federal
    district judge since 1936, the Senate ordered his removal from office
    (Oct. 9, 1986, p. 29870). In the 101st Congress, two other Federal
    district judges were removed from office following their convictions in
    the Senate (Oct. 20, 1989, p. 25335; Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27101). For a
    further discussion of judgments in cases of impeachment, see Sec. 619,
    infra.

    [[Page 18]]

    any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the places
    of chusing Senators.

    Sec. 42. Times, places, and manner
    of elections of Representatives and Senators.

      Section 4. \1\ The Times,  Places and Manner of
    holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed
    in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at

      The relative powers of the Congress and the States under this graph
    have been the subject of much discussion (I, 311, 313, 507, footnote);
    but Congress has in fact fixed by law the time of elections (I, 508; VI,
    66; 2 U.S.C. 7), and has controlled the manner to the extent of
    prescribing a ballot or voting machine (II, 961; VI, 150; 2 U.S.C. 9).
    When a State delegated to a municipality the power to regulate the
    manner of holding an election, a question arose (II, 975). A question
    has arisen as to whether or not a State, in the absence of action by
    Congress, might make the time of election of Congressmen contingent on
    the time of the State election (I, 522). This paragraph gives Congress
    the power to protect the right to vote in primaries where they are an
    integral part of the election process. United States v. Wurzbach, 280
    U.S. 396 (1930); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). Congress
    may legislate under this paragraph to protect the exercise of the
    franchise in congressional elections. Ex parte Siebolt, 100 U.S. 371
    (1880); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).

    Sec. 43. Functions of a State legislature in
    fixing time, etc., of elections.

      The meaning of  the word ``legislature'' in this
    clause of the Constitution has been the subject of discussion (II, 856),
    as to whether or not it means a constitutional convention as well as a
    legislature in the commonly accepted meaning of the word (I, 524). The
    House has sworn in Members chosen at an election the time, etc., of
    which was fixed by the schedule of a constitution adopted on that
    election day (I, 519, 520, 522). But the House held that where a
    legislature has been in existence a constitutional convention might not
    exercise the power (I, 363, 367). It has been argued generally that the
    legislature derives the power herein discussed from the Federal and not
    the State Constitution (II, 856, 947), and therefore that the State
    constitution might not in this respect control the State legislature
    (II, 1133). The House has sustained this view by its action (I, 525).
    But where the State constitution fixed a date for an election and the
    legislature had not acted, although it had the opportunity, the House
    held the election valid (II, 846).

    [[Page 19]]

    285, Congress lowered the minimum age of voters in all Federal, state
    and local elections from 21 to 18 years. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
    112 (1970), the Supreme Court upheld the power of Congress under article
    I, section 4 and under section 5 of the 14th amendment to the
    Constitution to fix the age of voters in Federal elections, but held
    that the tenth amendment to the Constitution reserved to the States the
    power to establish voter age qualifications in State and local
    elections. The 26th amendment to the Constitution extended the right of
    persons 18 years of age or older to vote in elections held under State
    authority.

    Sec. 44. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Ex
    parte Clark, 100 U.S. 399 (1880); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651
    (1884); In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888); Ohio v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565
    (1916); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); United States  v.
    Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917); Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232
    (1921); Smiley v. Holme, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); United States v. Classic,
    313 U.S. 299 (1941); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Roudebush
    v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974);
    Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); U.S. Term Limits, Inc., v. Thorton,
    514 U.S. 779 (1995); and Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997). In Public
    Law 91-

    Sec. 45. Annual meeting of Congress.

      \2\ [The Congress  shall
    assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the
    first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different
    Day.]

      This provision of the Constitution has been superseded by the 20th
    amendment.

      In the later but not the earlier practice (I, 5), prior to the 20th
    amendment, the fact that Congress had met once within the year did not
    make uncertain the constitutional mandate to meet on the first Monday of
    December (I, 6, 9-11). Early Congresses, convened either by proclamation
    or law on a day earlier than the constitutional day, remained in
    continuous session to a time beyond that day (I, 6, 9-11). But in the
    later view an existing session ends with the day appointed by the
    Constitution for the regular annual session (II, 1160); see Sec. 84,
    infra. Congress has frequently appointed by law a day for the meeting
    (I, 4, 5, 10-12, footnote; see also Sec. 243, infra).

    Sec. 46. House the judge of elections,
    returns, and qualifications.

      Section 5. \1\ Each  House shall be the Judge of the
    Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, * * *.

    [[Page 20]]

      In judging the qualifications of its Members, the House may not add
    qualifications to those expressly stated in the United States
    Constitution. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). This phrase
    allows the House or Senate to deny the right to a seat without
    unlawfully depriving a State of its right to equal representation. Barry
    v. United States ex rel Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929). But a State may
    conduct a recount of votes without interfering with the authority of the
    House under this phrase. Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972). For
    discussion of the power of the House to judge elections, see Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 8 (elections) and ch. 9 (election contests); for
    discussion of the power of the House to judge qualifications, see
    Deschler's Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 7.

      The House has the same authority to determine the right of a Delegate
    to his seat that it has in the case of a Member (I, 423). The House may
    not delegate the duty of judging its elections to another tribunal (I,
    608), and the courts of a State have nothing to do with it (II, 959).
    The House has once examined the relations of this power to the power to
    expel (I, 469).

    Sec. 47. Power of judging as related to State
    laws as to returns.

      As nearly all  the laws governing the elections of
    Representatives in Congress are State laws, questions have often arisen
    as to the relation of this power of judging to those laws (I, 637). The
    House decided very early that the certificate of a State executive
    issued in strict accordance with State law does not prevent examination
    of the votes by the House and a reversal of the return (I, 637). The
    House has also held that it is not confined to the conclusions of
    returns made up in strict conformity to State law, but may examine the
    votes and correct the returns (I, 774); and the fact that a State law
    gives canvassers the right to reject votes for fraud and irregularities
    does not preclude the House from going behind the returns (II, 887). The
    highest court in one State (Colorado) has ruled that it lacked
    jurisdiction to pass upon a candidate's allegations of irregularities in
    a primary election and that the House had exclusive jurisdiction to
    decide such questions and to declare the rightful nominee (Sept. 23,
    1970, p. 33320).

    Sec. 48. Power of judging as related to
    State laws as to acts of the voter.

      When the question  concerns not the acts of returning
    officers, but the act of the voter in giving his vote, the House has
    found more difficulty in determining on the proper exercise of its
    constitutional power. While the House has always acted on the principle
    of giving expression to the intent of the voter (I, 575, 639, 641; II,
    1090), yet it has held that a mandatory State law, even though
    arbitrary, may cause the rejection of a ballot on which the intent of
    the voter is plain (II, 1009, 1056, 1077, 1078, 1091). See Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 8, sec. 8.11, for discussion of distinction
    between directory state laws governing the conduct of election officials
    as to ballots, and mandatory laws regulating the conduct of voters.

    [[Page 21]]

    Sec. 49. Power of House as related to
    constitutionality of State laws.

      Where the State  courts have upheld a State election
    law as constitutional the House does not ordinarily question the law
    (II, 856, 1071). But where there has been no such decision the House, in
    determining its election cases, has passed on the validity of State laws
    under State constitutions (II, 1011, 1134), and has acted on its
    decision that they were unconstitutional (II, 1075, 1126), but it is not
    the policy of the House to pass upon the validity of State election laws
    alleged to be in conflict with the State constitution (VI, 151).

    Sec. 50. Effect of interpretation of State
    election laws by State courts.

      The courts of  a State have nothing to do directly
    with judging the elections, qualifications, and returns of
    Representatives in Congress (II, 959), but where the highest State court
    has interpreted the State law the House has concluded that it should
    generally be governed by this interpretation (I, 645, 731; II, 1041,
    1048), but does not consider itself bound by such interpretations (VI,
    58). The House is not bound, however, by a decision on an analogous but
    not the identical question in issue (II, 909); and where the alleged
    fraud of election judges was in issue, the acquittal of those judges in
    the courts was held not to be an adjudication binding on the House (II,
    1019). For a recent illustration of a protracted election dispute
    lasting four months see House Report 99-58, culminating in House
    Resolution 146 of the 99th Congress (May 1, 1985, p. 9998).

    Sec. 51. Laws of Congress not binding on the
    House in its function of judging its elections.

      The statutes of  the United States
    provide specific methods for institution of a contest as to the title to
    a seat in the House (I, 678, 697-706) (2 U.S.C. 381); but the House
    regards this law as not of absolute binding force, but rather a
    wholesome rule not to be departed from except for cause (I, 597, 719,
    825, 833), and it sometimes by resolution modifies the procedure
    prescribed by the law (I, 449, 600).

    Sec. 51a. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: In re Loney, 134 U.S. 317 (1890); Reed v.
    County Commissioners, 277 U.S. 376 (1928); Barry v. United States ex
    rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15
    (1972).

    Sec. 52. The quorum.

      * * * and a  Majority of each [House]
    shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may
    adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance
    of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each
    House may provide.

    [[Page 22]]

    Sec. 53. Interpretation of the Constitution
    as to number constituting a quorum.

      Out of conditions  arising between 1861 and 1891 the
    rule was established that a majority of the Members chosen and living
    constituted the quorum required by the Constitution (IV, 2885-2888); but
    later examination has resulted in a decision confirming in the House of
    Representatives the construction established in the Senate that a quorum
    consists of a majority of Senators duly chosen and sworn (I, 630; IV,
    2891-2894). So the decision of the House now is that after the House is
    once organized the quorum consists of a majority of those Members
    chosen, sworn, and living whose membership has not been terminated by
    resignation or by the action of the House (IV, 2889, 2890; VI, 638).

    Sec. 54. The theory of the quorum present; and
    the count by the Speaker.

      For many years  the quorum was determined only by noting the
    numbers of Members voting (IV, 2896, 2897), with the result that Members
    by refusing to vote could often break a quorum and obstruct the public
    business (II, 1034; IV, 2895, footnote; V, 5744). But in 1890 Mr.
    Speaker Reed directed the Clerk to enter on the Journal as part of the
    record of a yea-and-nay vote names of Members present but not voting,
    thereby establishing a quorum of record (IV, 2895). This decision,
    afterwards sustained by the Supreme Court (IV, 2904; United States v.
    Ballin, 144 U.S. (1892)), established the principle that a quorum
    present made valid any action by the House, although an actual quorum
    might not vote (I, 216, footnote; IV, 2932). And thenceforth the point
    of order as to a quorum was required to be that no quorum was present
    and not that no quorum had voted (IV, 2917). At the time of the
    establishment of this principle the Speaker revived the count by the
    Chair as a method of determining the presence of a quorum at a time when
    no record vote was ordered (IV, 2909). The Speaker has permitted his
    count of a quorum to be verified by tellers (IV, 2888), but did not
    concede it as a right of the House to have tellers under the
    circumstances (IV, 2916; VI, 647-651; VIII, 2369, 2436), claiming that
    the Chair might determine the presence of a quorum in such manner as he
    should deem accurate and suitable (IV, 2932). The Chair counts all
    Members in sight, whether in the cloak rooms, or within the bar (IV,
    2970; VIII, 3120). Later, as the complement to the new view of the
    quorum, the early theory that the presence of a quorum was as necessary
    during debate or other business as on a vote was revived (IV, 2935-
    2949); also a line of rulings made under the old theory were overruled,
    and it was established that the point of no quorum might be made after
    the House had declined to verify a division by tellers or the yeas and
    nays (IV, 2918-2926).

    [[Page 23]]

    Sec. 55. Relations of the quorum to acts of the
    House.

      The absence of  a quorum having been disclosed, there must be a quorum of
    record before the House may proceed to business (IV, 2952, 2953; VI,
    624, 660, 662), and the point of no quorum may not be withdrawn even by
    unanimous consent after the absence of a quorum has been ascertained and
    announced by the Chair (IV, 2928-2931; VI, 657; Apr. 13, 1978, p. 10119;
    Sept. 25, 1984, p. 26778). But when an action has been completed, it is
    too late to make the point of order that a quorum was not present when
    it was done (IV, 2927; VI, 655). But where action requiring a quorum was
    taken in the ascertained absence of a quorum by ruling of a Speaker pro
    tempore, the Speaker on the next day ruled that the action was null and
    void (IV, 2964; see also VIII, 3161). But such absence of a quorum
    should appear from the Journal if a legislative act is to be vacated for
    such reason (IV, 2962), and where the assumption that a quorum was
    present when the House acted was uncontradicted by the Journal, it was
    held that this assumption might not be overthrown by expressions of
    opinion by Members individually (IV, 2961).

      Major revisions in the House rules concerning the necessity and
    establishment of a quorum occurred in the 94th, 95th, and 96th
    Congresses. Under the practice in the 93d Congress, for example, a point
    of no quorum would prevent the report of the Chairman of a Committee of
    the Whole (VI, 666); but in the 93d Congress former clause 6 of rule XV
    (current clause 7 of rule XX) was adopted to provide that after the
    presence of a quorum is once ascertained on any day, a point of no
    quorum could not be entertained after the Committee had risen and
    pending the report of the Chairman to the House (see Sec. 1027, infra).
    Clause 7 of rule XX now specifically precludes a point of no quorum
    unless a question has been put to a vote. However, the Speaker retains
    the right to recognize a Member to move a call of the House at any time
    (but may, under clause 7(c) of rule XX recognize for a call of the House
    after the previous question has been ordered only when the Speaker
    determines by actual count that a quorum is not present). A point of
    order of no quorum during debate only in the House does not lie
    independently under this clause of the Constitution since former clause
    6 of rule XV (current clause 7 of rule XX) is a proper exercise of the
    House's constitutional rulemaking authority which can be interpreted
    consistently with the requirement that a quorum be present to conduct
    business (as opposed to mere debate) (Sept. 8, 1977, p. 28114; Sept. 12,
    1977, p. 28800).

    [[Page 24]]

      Before these recent changes to former rule XV (current rule XX), a
    quorum was required at all times during the reading of the Journal (IV,
    2732, 2733; VI, 625, 629) or messages from the President or the Senate
    (IV, 3522; VI 6600, 6650; VIII 3339); but the modern practice would
    require the presence of a quorum only when the question is put on a
    pending motion or proposition in the House such as on a motion incident
    to the reading, amendment, or approval of the Journal or on the referral
    or other disposition of other papers read to the House. A point of no
    quorum no longer lies during debate in the House. The practice in the
    Committee of the Whole is now governed by clause 6 of rule XVIII. No
    motion is in order on the failure of a quorum but the motions to adjourn
    and for a call of the House (IV, 2950; VI, 680) and the motion to
    adjourn has precedence over the motion for a call of the House (VIII,
    2642). A call of the House is in order under the Constitution before the
    adoption of the rules (IV, 2981). Those present on a call of the House
    may prescribe a fine as a condition on which an arrested Member may be
    discharged (IV, 3013, 3014), but this is rarely done. A quorum is not
    required on motions incidental to a call of the House (IV, 2994; VI,
    681; Oct. 8, 1940, p. 13403; and Oct. 8, 1968, p. 30090). The House may
    adjourn sine die in the absence of a quorum where both Houses have
    already adopted a concurrent resolution providing for a sine die
    adjournment on that day (Oct. 18, 1972, p. 37200).

    Sec. 56. Relations of the quorum to organization
    of the House.

      At the time  of organization the two Houses inform one another of the
    appearance of the quorum in each, and the two Houses jointly inform the
    President (I, 198-203). A message from one House that its quorum has
    appeared is not delivered in the other until a quorum has appeared there
    also (I, 126). But at the beginning of a second session of a Congress
    the House proceeded to business, although a quorum had not appeared in
    the Senate (I, 126). At the beginning of a second session of a Congress
    unsworn Members-elect were taken into account in ascertaining the
    presence of a quorum (I, 175); however, at the beginning of the second
    session of the 87th Congress, the Clerk called the House to order,
    announced the death of Speaker Rayburn during the sine die adjournment,
    and did not call unsworn Members-elect or Members who had resigned
    during the hiatus to establish a quorum or elect a new Speaker (Jan. 10,
    1962, p. 5). In both Houses the oath has been administered to Members-
    elect in the absence of a quorum (I, 174, 181, 182; VI, 22), although in
    one case the Speaker objected to such proceedings (II, 875). Prayer by
    the Chaplain is not business requiring the presence of a quorum and the
    Speaker declines to entertain a point of no quorum before prayer is
    offered (VI, 663; clause 7 of rule XX).

    <>   \2\ Each House may
    determine the Rules of its Proceedings, * * *

    Sec. 57. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 190 (1881);
    United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Burton v. United States, 202
    U.S. 344 (1906).

    [[Page 25]]

    VII, 889; Apr. 8, 1926, p. 7147). But a law passed by an existing
    Congress with the concurrence of the House has been recognized by that
    House as of binding force in matters of procedure (V, 6767, 6768). In
    exercising its constitutional power to change its rules the House may
    confine itself within certain limitations (V, 6756; VIII, 3376); but the
    attempt of the House to deprive the Speaker of his vote as a Member by a
    rule was successfully resisted (V, 5966, 5967). While a the Act of June
    1, 1789 (see 2 U.S.C. 25) requires the election of a Clerk before the
    House proceeds to business yet the House has held that it may adopt
    rules before electing a Clerk (I, 245). Although the Speaker ceases to
    be an officer of the House with the expiration of a Congress, the Clerk,
    by old usage, continues in a new Congress (I, 187, 188, 235, 244; see 2
    U.S.C. 26). In case of a vacancy in the office of Clerk, Sergeant-at-
    Arms, Doorkeeper (abolished by the 104th Congress; see Sec. 663a,
    infra), Postmaster (abolished during the 102d Congress; see Sec. 668,
    infra), Chaplain, or Chief Administrative Officer, the Speaker is
    authorized to make temporary appointments (2 U.S.C. 75a-1). The House
    has adopted a rule before election of a Speaker (I, 94, 95); but in 1839
    was deterred by the Act of June 1, 1789 and the Constitution from
    adopting rules before the administration of the oath to Members-elect
    (I, 140). The earlier theory that an officer might be empowered to
    administer oaths by a rule of either House has been abandoned in later
    practice and the authority has been conferred by law (III, 1823, 1824,
    2079, 2303, 2479; 2 U.S.C. 191).

    Sec. 59. Power to make rules not impaired by
    rules or law.

      The power of  each House of Representatives to make its own rules may
    not be impaired or controlled by the rules of a preceding House (I, 187,
    210; V, 6002, 6743-6747), or by a law passed by a prior Congress (I, 82,
    245; IV, 3298, 3579; V, 6765, 6766). The House in adopting its rules
    may, however, incorporate by reference as a part thereof all applicable
    provisions of law which constituted the rules of the House at the end of
    the preceding Congress (H. Res. 5, 95th Cong., Jan. 4, 1977, pp. 53-70)
    and has also incorporated provisions of concurrent resolutions which
    were intended to remain applicable under the Budget Act (H. Res. 5,
    107th Cong., Jan. 3, 2001, p. ----). The House has twice reaffirmed
    free-standing directives to the Committee on Standards of Official
    Conduct contained in a simple House resolution (H. Res. 168, 105th
    Cong., p. ----, reaffirmed for the 106th Congress by sec. 2(c), H. Res.
    5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. ----, and reaffirmed for the 107th Congress with an
    exception by sec. 3(a), H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 2001, p. ----; see Sec. 806,
    infra). The ordinary rights and functions of the House under the
    Constitution are exercised in accordance with the rules (III, 2567), and
    under later decisions questions of so-called constitutional privilege
    should also be considered in accordance with the rules (VI, 48;

    Sec. 60. Procedure in the House before the
    adoption of rules.

      Before the adoption  of rules the House is governed by general
    parliamentary law, but Speakers have been inclined to give weight to the
    rules and precedents of the House in modifying the usual constructions
    of that law (V, 5604, 6758-6760; VIII, 3384; Jan. 3, 1953, p. 24; Jan.
    10, 1967, p. 14). The general parliamentary law as understood in the
    House is founded on Jefferson's Manual as modified by the practice of
    American legislative assemblies, especially of the House of
    Representatives (V, 6761-6763; Jan. 3, 1953, p. 24), but the provisions
    of the House's accustomed rules are not necessarily followed (V, 5509).
    Prior to the adoption of rules, the statutory enactments incorporated
    into the rules of the prior Congress as an exercise of the rulemaking
    power do not control the proceedings of the new House until it adopts
    rules incorporating those provisions (Jan. 22, 1971, p. 132).

    [[Page 26]]

    the adoption of the rules as a question of privilege in its own right
    (IV, 3060; Deschler's Precedents, vol. 1, ch. 1, sec. 8), even prior to
    recognizing another Member to offer as a question of privilege another
    resolution calling into question the constitutionality of that
    resolution (Speaker Foley, Jan. 5, 1993, p. 49). The Speaker also may
    recognize a Member to offer for immediate consideration a special order
    providing for the consideration of a resolution adopting the rules (H.
    Res. 5, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 447). The resolution adopting rules for a
    Congress has included a special order of business for consideration of
    specified legislation (sec. 108, H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 463; sec.
    3, H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. ----).
      Before the adoption of rules, it is in order for any Member who is
    recognized by the Chair to offer a proposition relating to the order of
    business without asking consent of the House (IV, 3060). Relying on the
    Act of June 1, 1789 (2 U.S.C. 25), the Clerk recognized for nominations
    for Speaker as being of higher constitutional privilege than a
    resolution to postpone the election of a Speaker and instead provide for
    the election of a Speaker pro tempore pending the disposition of certain
    ethics charges against the nominee of the majority party (Jan. 7, 1997,
    p. ----). The Speaker may recognize the Majority Leader to offer an
    initial resolution providing for

      During debate on the resolution adopting rules, any Member may make a
    point of order that a quorum is not present based upon general
    parliamentary precedents, since the provisions of former clause 6(e) of
    rule XV (current clause 7 of rule XX) prohibiting the Chair from
    entertaining such a point of order unless the question has been put on
    the pending proposition are not yet applicable (Jan. 15, 1979, p. 10).
    Before adoption of rules, under general parliamentary law as modified by
    usage and practice of the House, an amendment may be subject to the
    point of order that it is not germane to the proposition to which
    offered (Jan. 3, 1969, p. 23). Before adoption of rules, the Speaker may
    maintain decorum by directing a Member who has not been recognized in
    debate beyond an allotted time to be removed from the well and by
    directing the Sergeant-at-Arms to present the mace as the traditional
    symbol of order (Jan. 3, 1991, p. 58).

      The motion to commit is permitted after the previous question has been
    ordered on the resolution adopting the rules (V, 5604; Jan. 3, 1989, p.
    81; Jan. 3, 1991, p. 61) but is not debatable (Jan. 7, 1997, p. ----).
    It is the prerogative of the minority to offer a motion to commit even
    prior to the adoption of the rules, but at that point the proponent need
    not qualify as opposed to the resolution (Jan. 3, 1991, p. 61; Jan. 4,
    1995, p. 457). Such a motion to commit is not divisible, but if it is
    agreed to and more than one amendment is reported back pursuant thereto,
    then separate votes may be had on the reported amendments (Jan. 5, 1993,
    p. 98). The motion to refer has also been permitted upon the offering of
    a resolution adopting the rules, and prior to debate thereon, subject to
    the motion to lay on the table (Jan. 5, 1993, p. 52).

    Sec. 61. Joint rules.

      The two Houses  of Congress adopted in
    the early years of the Government joint rules to govern their procedure
    in matters requiring concurrent action; but in 1876 these joint rules
    were abrogated (IV, 3430; V, 6782-6787). The most useful of their
    provision continued to be observed in practice, however (IV, 3430; V,
    6592).

    [[Page 27]]

    Sec. 61a. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6 (1932);
    Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949); United States v.
    Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950); Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109
    (1963); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).

    Sec. 62. Punishment and expulsion of
    Members.

      * * * [Each House may]  punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the
    Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.

    Sec. 63. Punishment by reprimand or
    censure.

      Among the  punishments that the House may impose under this provision,
    the rules of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct outline the
    following: (1) expulsion from the House; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; (4)
    fine; (5) denial or limitation of any right, power, privilege, or
    immunity of the Member if not in violation of the Constitution; or (6)
    any other sanction determined by the Committee to be appropriate (Rule
    25, Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, 106th Cong.). In action
    for censure the House has discussed whether or not the principles of the
    procedure of the courts should be followed (II, 1255). In one instance,
    pending consideration of a resolution to censure a Member, the Speaker
    informed him that he should retire (II, 1366), but this is not usual,
    and Members, against whom resolutions have been pending have
    participated in debate either by consent (II, 1656) or without question
    as to consent (II, 1246, 1253). A Member against whom a resolution of
    censure was pending was asked by the Speaker if he desired to be heard
    (VI, 236). But after the House had voted censure and the Member has been
    brought to the bar by the Sergeant-at-Arms to be censured, it was held
    that he might not then be heard (II, 1259). A resolution of censure
    should not apply to more than one Member (II, 1240, 1621). Censure is
    inflicted by the Speaker (II, 1259) and the words are entered in the
    Journal (II, 1251, 1656; VI 236), but the Speaker may not pronounce
    censure except by order of the House (VI, 237). When Members have
    resigned pending proceedings for censure, the House has nevertheless
    adopted the resolutions of censure (II, 1239, 1273, 1275, 1656). Members
    have been censured for personalities and other disorder in debate (II,
    1251, 1253, 1254, 1259), assaults on the floor (II, 1665), for
    presenting a resolution alleged to be insulting to the House (II, 1246),
    and for corrupt acts (II, 1274, 1286). For abuse of the leave to print,
    the House censured a Member after a motion to expel him had failed (VI,
    236). In one instance Members were censured for acts before the election
    of the then existing House (II, 1286).

    [[Page 28]]

    ees had improperly accepted things of value from the Republic of Korea
    or representatives thereof, the House reprimanded three Members, one for
    falsely answering an unsworn questionnaire relative to such gifts and
    violating the Code of Official Conduct, one for failing to report as
    required by law the receipt of a campaign contribution and violating the
    Code of Official Conduct, and one for failing to report a campaign
    contribution, converting a campaign contribution to personal use,
    testifying falsely to the committee under oath, and violating the Code
    of Official Conduct (Oct. 13, 1978, pp. 36984, 37009, 37017). In the
    96th Congress two Members were censured by the House: (1) A Member who
    during a prior Congress both knowingly increased an office employee's
    salary for repayment of that Member's personal expenses and who was
    unjustly enriched by clerk-hire employees' payments of personal expenses
    later compensated by salary increases, was censured and ordered to repay
    the amount of the unjust enrichment with interest (July 31, 1979, p.
    21592); (2) a Member was censured for receiving over a period of time
    sums of money from a person with a direct interest in legislation in
    violation of former clause 4 of rule XLIII (current clause 3 of rule
    XXIII, and for transferring campaign funds into office and personal
    accounts (June 10, 1980, pp. 13801-20)). In the 98th Congress the House
    adopted two resolutions (as amended in the House) censuring two Members
    for improper relationships with House pages in prior Congresses (July
    20, 1983, p. 20020 and p. 20030). In the 100th Congress the House
    adopted a resolution reprimanding a Member for ``ghost voting,''
    improperly diverting government resources, and maintaining a ``ghost
    employee'' on his staff (Dec. 18, 1987, p. 36266). In the 101st Congress
    another was reprimanded for seeking dismissal of parking tickets
    received by a person with whom he had a personal relationship and not
    related to official business and for misstatements of fact in a
    memorandum relating to the criminal probation record of that person
    (July 26, 1990, p. 19717). In the 105th Congress the House reprimanded
    the Speaker and ordered him to reimburse a portion of the costs of the
    investigation by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct (Jan.
    21, 1997, p. ----).
      In the 94th Congress the House by adopting a report from the Committee
    on Standards of Official Conduct reprimanded a Member for failing to
    report certain financial holdings in violation of former rule XLIV
    (current rule XXVI) and for investing in stock in a Navy bank the
    establishment of which he was promoting, in violation of the Code of
    Ethics for Government Service (H. Res. 1421, July 29, 1976, pp. 24379-
    82). (For the Code of Ethics for Government Service, see H. Con. Res.
    175, 85th Cong., 72 Stat. B12.) In the 95th Congress following an
    investigation by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct into
    whether Members or employ

      Debate on a resolution recommending a disciplinary sanction against a
    Member may not exceed the scope of the conduct of the accused Member
    (Dec. 18, 1987, p. 36271).

    [[Page 29]]

    that a Member might not be punished for an offense alleged to have been
    committed against a preceding Congress (II, 1283); but the House itself
    declined to express doubt as to its power to expel and proceeded to
    inflict censure (II, 1286). Both Houses have distrusted their power to
    punish in such cases (II, 1264, 1284, 1285, 1288, 1289; VI, 56, 238).
    However, the 96th Congress punished Members on two occasions for
    offenses committed during a prior Congress (H. Res. 378, July 31, 1979,
    p. 21592; H. Res. 660, June 10, 1980, pp. 13801-20). It has been held
    that the power of the House to expel one of its Members is unlimited; a
    matter purely of discretion to be exercised by a two-thirds vote, from
    which there is no appeal (VI, 78). The resignation of the accused Member
    has always caused a suspension of proceedings for expulsion (II, 1275,
    1276, 1279; VI, 238).

    Sec. 64. Punishment by expulsion.

      The power of  expulsion has
    been the subject of much discussion (I, 469, 476, 481; II, 1264, 1265,
    1269; VI, 56, 398; see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)). In one
    case a Member-elect who had not taken the oath was expelled (II, 1262),
    and in another case the power to do this was discussed (I, 476). In one
    instance the Senate assumed to annul its action of expulsion (II, 1243).
    The Supreme Court has decided that a judgment of conviction under a
    disqualifying statute does not compel the Senate to expel (II, 1282;
    Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906)). The power of expulsion in
    its relation to offenses committed before the Members' election has been
    discussed (II, 1286), and in one case the Judiciary Committee of the
    House concluded

    Sec. 65. Procedure for expulsion.

      The House, in  a proceeding
    for expulsion, declined to give the Member a trial at the bar (II,
    1275); but the Senate has permitted a counsel to appear at its bar (II,
    1263), although it declined to grant a request for a specific statement
    of charges or compulsory process for witnesses (II, 1264). Members
    threatened with expulsion have been heard on their own behalf by consent
    (II, 1273, 1275), or as a matter of right (II, 1269, 1286). In general,
    there has been discussion as to whether or not the principles of the
    procedure of the courts should be followed (II, 1264). The Senate once
    expelled several Senators by a single resolution (II, 1266). Members and
    Senators have been expelled for treason (II, 1261), for high misdemeanor
    inconsistent with public duty (II, 1263), for friendship or association
    with enemies of the Government and absence from their seats (II, 1269,
    1270), and for bearing arms against the Government (II, 1267). In the
    96th Congress, the House expelled a Member who had been convicted of
    bribery (a felony) for accepting funds to perform official duties as a
    Member of Congress (H. Res. 794, Oct. 2, 1980, pp. 28953-78).
    <>   A proposition to reprimand, censure, or expel a Member
    presents a question of privilege (II, 1254; III, 2648-2651; VI, 236;
    July 26, 1990, p. 19717); and, if reported by the Committee on Standards
    of Official Conduct (or a derivation thereof), may be called up at any
    time after the Committee has filed its report (Jan. 21, 1997, p. ----).
    An expulsion resolution when offered may be laid on the table (Oct. 1,
    1976, p. 35111) or referred to committee (Mar. 1, 1979, p. 3753) before
    the proponent is recognized to debate it. A proposition to censure is
    not germane to a proposition to expel (VI, 236). On Oct. 2, 1980, the
    House expelled a Member who had been found guilty of accepting money in
    exchange for a promise to perform certain legislative acts (H. Res. 794,
    96th Cong., pp. 28953-78).

    [[Page 30]]

      A resolution providing that the House immediately proceed to consider
    whether a Member should be expelled presents a question of privilege
    (Speaker Clark, Dec. 9, 1913, pp. 584-86).

    Sec. 67. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wh. 204 (1821); Kilbourn
    v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881); United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1
    (1892); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897); Burton v. United States, 202
    U.S. 344 (1906); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).

    Sec. 68. Each House to keep a journal.

      \3\ Each House  shall
    keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the
    same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; * *
    *

    Sec. 69. The Journal the official
    record.

      The Journal and  not the Congressional Record is the official record of the
    proceedings of the House (IV, 2727). Its nature and functions have been
    the subject of extended discussions (IV, 2730, footnote). The House has
    fixed its title (IV, 2728). While it ought to be a correct transcript of
    the proceedings of the House, the House has not insisted on a strict
    chronological order of entries (IV, 2815). The Journal is dated as of
    the legislative and not the calendar day (IV, 2746).

    Sec. 70. Journal a record of proceedings
    and not of reasons.

      The Journal records  proceedings but not the reasons therefor (IV,
    2811) or the circumstances attending (IV, 2812), or the statements or
    opinions of Members (IV, 2817-2820). Exceptions to this rule are rare
    (IV, 2808, 2825). Protests have on rare occasions been admitted by the
    action of the House (IV, 2806, 2807), but the entry of a protest on the
    Journal may not be demanded by a Member as a matter of right (IV, 2798)
    and such demand does not present a question of privilege (IV, 2799). A
    motion not entertained is not entered on the Journal (IV, 2813, 2844-
    46).

    [[Page 31]]

    instances has the House nullified proceedings by rescinding the records
    of them in the Journal (IV, 2787), the House and Senate usually
    insisting on the accuracy of its Journal (IV, 2783, 2786). In rare
    instances the House and Senate have rescinded or expunged entries in
    Journals of preceding Congresses (IV, 2730, footnote, 2792, 2793).

    Sec. 71. House's absolute control of entries
    in the Journal.

      While the House  controls the Journal and may decide what are
    proceedings, even to the extent of omitting things actually done or
    recording things not done (IV, 2784; VI, 634), and while the Speaker has
    entertained a motion to amend the Journal so as to cause it to state
    what was not the fact, leaving it for the House to decide on the
    propriety of the act (IV, 2785), holding that he could not prevent a
    majority of the House from so amending the Journal as to undo an actual
    transaction (IV, 3091-93), in none of those rulings was an amendment
    permitted to correct the Journal which had the effect of collaterally
    changing the tabling of a motion to reconsider. In fact, under the
    precedents cited in Sec. 902, infra, under clause 1 of rule XVI it has
    been held not in order to amend or strike out a Journal entry setting
    forth a motion exactly as made (IV, 2783, 2789), and thus it was held
    not in order to amend the Journal by striking out a resolution actually
    offered (IV, 2789), but on one occasion the House vacated the Speaker's
    referral of an executive communication by amending the Journal of the
    preceding day (Mar. 19, 1990, p. 4488). Only on rare

    Sec. 72. Record of votes in the
    Journal.

      The Journal should  record the result of every vote and state in general terms
    the subject of it (IV, 2804); but the result of a vote is recorded in
    figures only when the yeas and nays are taken (IV, 2827), when the vote
    is recorded by electronic device or by clerks, or when a vote is taken
    by ballot, it having been determined in latest practice that the Journal
    should show not only the result but the state of the ballot or ballots
    (IV, 2832).

    Sec. 73. Approval of the Journal.

      It is the  uniform practice
    of the House to approve its Journal for each legislative day (IV, 2731).
    Where Journals of more than one session remain unapproved, they are
    taken up for approval in chronological order (IV, 2771-2773). In
    ordinary practice the Journal is approved by the House without the
    formal putting of the motion to vote (IV, 2774).

      The former rule required the reading of the Journal on each
    legislative day. The reading could be dispensed with only by unanimous
    consent (VI, 625) or suspension of the rules (IV, 2747-2750) and had to
    be in full when demanded by any Member (IV, 2739-2741; VI, 627-628; Feb.
    22, 1950, p. 2152).

    [[Page 32]]

      The present form of the rule (clause 1 of rule I; see Sec. 621, infra)
    was drafted from section 127 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
    1970 (84 Stat. 1140), incorporated into the standing rules in the 92d
    Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 22, 1971, p. 144), and was further amended in
    the 96th Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 15, 1979, pp. 7-16). Under the
    current practice, the Speaker is authorized to announce his approval of
    the Journal which is deemed agreed to by the House, subject to the right
    of any Member to demand a vote on agreeing to the Speaker's approval
    (which if decided in the affirmative is not subject to the motion to
    reconsider). In the 98th Congress, the Speaker was given the authority
    to postpone a record vote on agreeing to his approval of the Journal to
    a later time on that legislative day (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1983, p. 34).
    While the transaction of any business is not in order before approval of
    the Journal (IV, 2751; VI, 629, 637; Oct. 8, 1968, p. 30096), approval
    of the Journal yields to the simple motion to adjourn (IV, 2757),
    administration of the oath (I, 171, 172), an arraignment of impeachment
    (VI, 469), and questions of the privileges of the House (II, 1630), and
    the Speaker may in his discretion recognize for a parliamentary inquiry
    before approval of the Journal (VI, 624). Under clause 1 of rule I, as
    amended in the 96th Congress, a point of order of no quorum is not in
    order before the Speaker announces his approval of the Journal. Clause 7
    of rule XX generally prohibits the making of points of order of no
    quorum unless the Speaker has put the question on the pending motion or
    proposition.

    Sec. 74. Motions to amend the
    Journal.

      Under the practice  before clause 1 of rule I was adopted in its present form,
    the motion to amend the Journal took precedence over the motion to
    approve it (IV, 2760; VI, 633); but the motion to amend may not be
    admitted after the previous question is demanded on a motion to approve
    (IV, 2770; VI, 633; VIII, 2684). An expression of opinion as to a
    decision of the Chair was held not in order as an amendment to the
    Journal (IV, 2848). A proposed amendment to the Journal being tabled
    does not carry the Journal with it (V, 5435, 5436). While a proposed
    correction of the Journal may be recorded in the Journal, yet it is not
    in order to insert in full in this indirect way what has been denied
    insertion in the first instance (IV, 2782, 2804, 2805). The earlier
    practice was otherwise, however (IV, 2801-2803). The Journal of the last
    day of a session is not approved on the assembling of the next session,
    and is not ordinarily amended (IV, 2743, 2744). For further discussion
    of the composition and approval of the Journal, see Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 1, ch. 5.

    Sec. 74a. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United
    States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892).

    Sec. 75. Yeas and Nays entered on the
    Journal.

      * * * and the  Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question
    shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the
    Journal.

    [[Page 33]]

    a quorum fail to vote and the House adjourn, proceedings under the
    automatic call are vacated and the question recurs de novo when the bill
    again comes before the House (Oct. 10, 1940, pp. 13534-35; Oct. 13,
    1962, p. 23474; Oct. 19, 1966, p. 27641). While the Constitution and the
    Rules of the House guarantee that votes taken by the yeas and nays be
    spread upon the Journal, neither requires that a Member's vote be
    announced to the public immediately during the vote (Sept. 19, 1985, p.
    24245).

    Sec. 76. Conditions of ordering yeas and
    nays.

      The yeas and  nays may be ordered before the organization of the House (I, 91;
    V, 6012, 6013), but are not taken in Committee of the Whole (IV, 4722,
    4723). They are not necessarily taken on the passage of a resolution
    proposing an amendment to the Constitution (V, 7038, 7039; VIII, 3506),
    but are required to pass a bill over a veto (Sec. 104; VII, 1110). In
    the earlier practice of the House it was held that less than a quorum
    might not order the yeas and nays, but for many years the decisions have
    been uniformly the other way (V, 6016-6028). Neither is a quorum
    necessary on a motion to reconsider the vote whereby the yeas and nays
    are ordered (V, 5693). When a quorum fails on a yea and nay vote it is
    the duty of the Speaker and the House to take notice of that fact (IV,
    2953, 2963, 2988). If the House adjourns, the order for the yeas and
    nays remains effective whenever the bill again comes before the House
    (V, 6014, 6015; VI, 740; VIII, 3108), and it has been held that the
    question of consideration might not intervene on a succeeding day before
    the second calling of the yeas and nays (V, 4949). However, when the
    call of the House is automatic, the Speaker directs the roll to be
    called or the vote to be taken by electronic device without motion from
    the floor (VI, 678, 679, 694, 695); and should

      The yeas and nays may not be demanded until the Speaker has put the
    question in the form prescribed by former clause 5 (current clause 6) of
    rule I (Oct. 2, 1974, p. 33623).

    Sec. 77. Demanding the yeas and nays.

      The yeas and  nays may
    be demanded while the Speaker is announcing the result of a division (V,
    6039), while a vote by tellers is being taken (V, 6038), and even after
    the announcement of the vote if the House has not passed to other
    business (V, 6040, 6041; VIII, 3110). But after the Speaker has
    announced the result of a division on a motion and is in the act of
    putting the question on another motion it is too late to demand the yeas
    and nays on the first motion (V, 6042). And it is not in order during
    the various processes of a division to repeat a demand for the yeas and
    nays which has once been refused by the House (V, 6029, 6030, 6031). The
    constitutional right of a Member to demand the yeas and nays may not be
    overruled as dilatory (V, 5737; VIII, 3107); but this constitutional
    right does not exist as to a vote to second a motion when such second is
    required by the rules (V, 6032-6036; VIII, 3109). The right to demand
    yeas and nays is not waived by the fact that the Member demanding them
    has just made the point of no quorum and caused the Chair to count the
    House (V, 6044).-

    Sec. 78. Yeas and nays ordered by onefifth.

      In passing on  a
    demand for the yeas and nays the Speaker need determine only whether
    one-fifth of those present sustain the demand (V, 6043; VIII, 3112,
    3115). In ascertaining whether one-fifth of those present support a
    demand for the yeas and nays the Speaker counts the entire number
    present and not merely those who rise to be counted (VIII, 3111, 3120).
    Such count is not subject to verification by appeal (Sept. 12, 1978, p.
    28984), and a request for a rising vote of those opposed to the demand
    is not in order (VIII, 3112-3114). Where the Chair prolongs his count of
    the House in determining whether one-fifth have supported the demand for
    yeas and nays, he counts latecomers in support of the demand as well as
    for the number present (Sept. 24, 1990, p. 25521). After the House, on a
    vote by tellers, has refused to order the yeas and nays it is too late
    to demand the count of the negative on an original vote (V, 6045).

    [[Page 34]]

    (V, 6037). In one instance it was held that the yeas and nays might be
    demanded on a motion to reconsider the vote whereby the yeas and nays
    were ordered (V, 5689), but evidently there must be a limit to this
    process. The vote whereby the yeas and nays are refused may be
    reconsidered (V, 5692).

    Sec. 79. Reconsideration of the vote ordering the
    yeas and nays.

      A motion to  reconsider the vote ordering the yeas and nays is in
    order (V, 6029; VIII, 2790), and the vote may be reconsidered by a
    majority. If the House votes to reconsider the yeas and nays may again
    be ordered by one-fifth (V, 5689-5691). But when the House, having
    reconsidered, again orders the yeas and nays, a second motion to
    reconsider may not be made

    Sec. 80. Effect of an order of the yeas and
    nays.

      In the general  but not the universal practice debate has not been closed by the
    ordering of the yeas and nays until one Member has responded to the call
    (V, 6101-6105, 6160, 6161). A motion to adjourn may be admitted after
    the yeas and nays are ordered and before the roll call has begun (V,
    5366); and a motion to suspend the rules has been entertained after the
    yeas and nays have been demanded on another matter (V, 6835).
    Consideration of a conference report (V, 6457), and a motion to
    reconsider the vote by which the yeas and nays were ordered (V, 6029;
    VIII, 2790) may be admitted. A demand for tellers or for a division is
    not precluded or set aside by the fact that the yeas and nays are
    demanded and refused (V, 5998; VIII, 3103).

    Sec. 81. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United
    States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S.
    196 (1897); Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 U.S. 506 (1901); Marshall v.
    Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917).

    Sec. 82. Adjournment for more than three
    days.

      \4\ Neither House,  during the Session of Congress shall, without the Consent of the
    other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than
    that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

      The word ``Place'' in the above paragraph was construed to mean the
    seat of Government, and consent of the Senate is not required where the
    House orders its meetings to be held in another structure at the seat of
    Government (Speaker Rayburn, Aug. 17, 1949, pp. 11651, 11683).

    [[Page 35]]

    the Supreme Court in the Capitol, pending remodeling of its Chamber. The
    House returned to its Chamber on January 3, 1950, and again on January
    1, 1951. The Senate returned to its Chamber on January 3, 1950, and
    again on January 3, 1951.-
      On November 22, 1940, p. 13715, the House of Representatives adopted a
    resolution providing that thereafter until otherwise ordered its
    meetings be held in the Caucus room of the new House Office Building.
    Likewise the Senate on the same day, p. 13709, provided that its
    meetings be held in the Chamber formerly occupied by the Supreme Court
    in the Capitol. The two Houses continued to hold their sessions in these
    rooms until the opening of the 77th Congress. These actions were
    necessitated because of the precarious condition of the roofs in the two
    Chambers. On June 28, 1949, p. 8571, and on September 1, 1950, p. 14140,
    the House provided that until otherwise ordered its meetings be held in
    the Caucus room of the new House Office Building, pending the remodeling
    of its Chamber. On June 29, 1949, p. 8584, and on Aug. 9, 1950, p.
    12106, the Senate provided that its meetings be held in the Chamber
    formerly occupied by

    Sec. 83. Adjournment of the House within the
    threeday limit.

      The House of  Representatives in adjourning for not more than three
    days must take into the count either the day of adjourning or the day of
    the meeting, and Sunday is not taken into account in making this
    computation (V, 6673, 6674). By special order, the House may provide for
    a session of the House on a Sunday, traditionally a ``dies non'' under
    the precedents of the House (Dec. 17, 1982, p. 31946; Dec. 18, 1987, p.
    36352; Nov. 17, 1989, p. 30029; Aug. 20, 1994, p. 23367). The House has
    by standing order provided that it should meet on two days only of each
    week instead of daily (V, 6675). Before the election of Speaker, the
    House has adjourned for more than one day (I, 89, 221). The House has by
    unanimous consent agreed to an adjournment for less than three days but
    specified that it would continue in adjournment for 10 days pursuant to
    a concurrent resolution already passed by the House if the Senate
    adopted the concurrent resolution before the third day of the House's
    adjournment (Nov. 20, 1987, p. 33054). The Committee on Rules has
    reported a rule authorizing the Speaker to declare the House in recesses
    subject to calls of the Chair during five discrete periods, each
    consistent with the constitutional constraint that neither House adjourn
    (or recess) for more than three days without consent of the other House
    (Dec. 21, 1995, p. 38141; Jan. 5, 1996, p. 357).

    [[Page 36]]

    of the House to adjournment sine die of the Senate at any time prior to
    January 3, 1983, as determined by the Senate, and the consent of the
    House for adjournments or recesses of the Senate for periods of more
    than three days as determined by the Senate during such period (H. Con.
    Res. 438, Dec. 20, 1982, p. 32951). Another concurrent resolution in the
    97th Congress provided for an adjournment of the Senate to a day certain
    and granted the consent of the Senate to an adjournment of the House for
    more than three days to a day certain, or to any day before that day as
    determined by the House (S. Con. Res. 102, May 27, 1982, pp. 12504,
    12505). On one occasion the two Houses provided for an adjournment to a
    certain day, with a provision that if there should be no quorum present
    on that day the session should terminate (V, 6686). The two Houses have
    adjourned to a certain day, with a provision that they may be
    reassembled by the Leadership if legislative expediency so required such
    reassembling (July 8, 1943, p. 7516; June 23, 1944, p. 6667; Sept. 21,
    1944, p. 8109; July 18, 1945, p. 7733; July 26, 1947, p. 10521; June 20,
    1948, p. 9348; Aug. 7, 1948, p. 10247), and in the 91st Congress, the
    two Houses agreed to a concurrent resolution adjourning both to dates
    certain but which also provided that the House was subject to recall by
    the Speaker if legislative expediency so warranted (July 20, 1970, p.
    24978). In the 93d Congress, first and second sessions, the two Houses
    agreed to concurrent resolutions adjourning the Congress sine die with a
    provision that the two Houses could be reassembled by the Leadership
    (Dec. 22, 1973, p. 43327; Dec. 20, 1974, p. 41815). Recall provisions
    were also included in the sine die adjournment resolutions for the first
    and second sessions of the 101st Congress (Nov. 21, 1989, p. 31156; Oct.
    27, 1990, p. 36850), the second session of the 104th Congress (Oct. 3,
    1996, p. ----), the first session of the 105th Congress (Nov. 13, 1997,
    p. ----), and the second session of the 106th Congress (Dec. 15, 2000,
    p. ----). Joint leadership and House only recall provisions were
    included in the sine die adjournment resolution for the second session
    of the 105th Congress (Oct. 20, 1998, p. ----), and the Speaker
    exercised his recall authority under this resolution to reassemble the
    House (Dec. 17, 1998, p. ----). Resolutions containing recall provisions
    normally permit the motion to adjourn sine die only by the Majority
    Leaders or their designees (Dec. 19, 1985, p. 38358; Oct. 17, 1986, p.
    33096). The sine die adjournment resolution for the first session of the
    102d Congress provided for an adjournment of the House and Senate until
    11:55 a.m. on January 3, 1992, or until recalled by their joint
    leaderships (H. Con. Res. 260, Nov. 26, 1991, p. 35840). A resolution
    adopted in the first session of the 106th Congress provided for an
    adjournment to a date certain, unless the House sooner received a
    specified message from the Senate, in which case it would stand
    adjourned sine die (Nov. 18, 1999, p. ----). A resolution providing for
    the sine die adjournment of the first session may contain a proviso that
    when the second session convenes the Senate and House may not conduct
    organizational or legislative business but shall adjourn on that day
    until a date certain, unless sooner recalled (H. Con.

    [[Page 37]]

    Res. 260, 102d Cong., Nov. 26, 1991, p. 35840; H. Con. Res. 235, 106th
    Cong., Nov. 18, 1999, p. ----). That prohibition against the conduct of
    business was considered not to preclude recognition for one-minute
    speeches and special-order speeches by unanimous consent (Jan. 3, 1992,
    pp. 2, 9) or the introduction and numbering of bills and resolutions
    (which would not be noted in the Congressional Record or referred by the
    Speaker until the next legislative day, when executive communications,
    petitions, and memorials also would be numbered and referred) (Jan. 24,
    2000, p. ----).

    Sec. 84. Resolutions for adjournment of
    the two Houses.

      Congress is adjourned  for more than three days by a concurrent resolution
    (IV, 4031, footnote). When it adjourns in this way, but not to or beyond
    the day fixed by Constitution or law for the next regular session to
    begin, the session is not thereby necessarily terminated (V, 6676,
    6677). Until the 67th Congress neither House had ever adjourned for more
    than three days by itself with the consent of the other, but resolutions
    had been offered for the accomplishment of that end (V, 6702, 6703). At
    the close of the first session of the 66th Congress, the two Houses
    adjourned sine die under authority granted each House by simple
    resolutions consenting to such adjournment sine die at any time prior to
    a specified date (Nov. 19, 1919, p. 8810). On June 30, 1922, the House
    adjourned until August 15, 1922, with the consent of the Senate.
    Pursuant to a concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 266) the Senate
    granted its consent to an adjournment sine die of the House on August
    20, 1954, and the House granted its consent to the Senate to an
    adjournment sine die at any time prior to December 25, 1954. The Senate
    acting under the authority of the aforementioned resolution adjourned
    sine die on December 2, 1954. The adjournment resolution in the second
    session of the 97th Congress provided for adjournment sine die of the
    House on December 20 or December 21 pursuant to a motion made by the
    Majority Leader or his designee, and granted the consent

      A concurrent resolution to provide for adjournment for more than three
    days is offered in the House as a matter of privilege (V, 6701-6706),
    and is not debatable (VIII, 3372-3374). The Legislative Reorganization
    Act of 1970 provides for a sine die adjournment, or (in an odd numbered
    year) an adjournment of slightly over a month (from that Friday in
    August which is at least 30 days before Labor Day to the Wednesday
    following Labor Day) unless the nation is in a state of war, declared by
    Congress (sec. 461(b); 84 Stat. 1140). Congress may, of course, waive,
    this requirement and make other determinations regarding its adjournment
    (see Sec. 1106, infra).

      The requirement that resolutions providing for an adjournment sine die
    of either House may not be considered until Congress has completed
    action on the second concurrent resolution on the budget for the fiscal
    year in question, and on any reconciliation legislation required by such
    a resolution, contained in section 310(f) of the Congressional Budget
    Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344), was repealed by the Balanced Budget and
    Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177). That law amended
    sections 309 and 310 of the Congressional Budget Act to prohibit the
    consideration of concurrent resolutions during the month of July
    providing adjournments in excess of three days until the House has
    approved general annual appropriation bills within the jurisdictions of
    all the subcommittees on Appropriations for the ensuing fiscal year, and
    until the House has completed action on all reconciliation legislation
    for the ensuing fiscal year required to be reported by the concurrent
    resolution on the budget for that year (see Sec. 1127, infra).

     * * *
      A resolution providing for an adjournment sine die is not debatable
    (VIII, 3372-3374), though a Member may be recognized during its
    consideration under a reservation of objection to a unanimous-consent
    request that the resolution be agreed to (Oct. 27, 1990, p. 36850).

    [[Page 38]]

    Sec. 85. Compensation of
    Members.

      Section 6. \1\ The Senators  and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their
    Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the
    United States.

      The 27th amendment to the Constitution addresses laws varying the
    compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives (see
    Sec. 258, infra). The present rate of compensation of Representatives,
    the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico, and Delegates is $145,100
    per annum. The rate of compensation of the Speaker and the Vice
    President is $186,300 per annum (2 U.S.C. 31; 3 U.S.C. 104) with an
    additional $10,000 per annum to assist in defraying expenses (2 U.S.C.
    31b; 3 U.S.C. 111). The Majority and Minority Leaders of the House
    receive $161,200 per annum (2 U.S.C. 31). These rates of compensation
    are all (except for the expense allowances) subject to annual cost of
    living adjustments (2 U.S.C. 31(2)). The present rate of compensation of
    Senators is that fixed by section 1101 of Public Law 101-194, as
    adjusted pursuant to 2 U.S.C. 31(2).

    Sec. 86. Salary and deductions.

      Under  the Federal Salary Act
    of 1967 (2 U.S.C. 351-362), the Citizens' Commission on Public Service
    and Compensation (formerly the Commission on Executive, Legislative and
    Judicial Salaries) is authorized and directed to conduct quadrennial
    reviews of the rates of pay of specified government officials, including
    Members of Congress, and to report to the President the results of each
    review and its recommendations for adjustments in such rates. The
    enactment of those recommendations is governed by the Federal Salary Act
    (see Sec. 1130(12), infra).

      The statute also provides for deductions from the pay of Members and
    Delegates who are absent from the sessions of the House for reasons
    other than illness of themselves and families, or who retire before the
    end of the Congress (2 U.S.C. 39; IV, 3011, footnote). The law as to
    deductions has been held to apply only to Members who have taken the
    oath (II, 1154). Members and Delegates are paid monthly on certificate
    of the Speaker (2 U.S.C. 34, 35, 37, 57a). The law also provides that
    the residence of a Member of Congress for purpose of imposing State
    income tax laws shall be the State from which elected and not the State,
    or subdivision thereof, in which the Member maintains an abode for the
    purpose of attending sessions of Congress (4 U.S.C. 113).

    [[Page 39]]

    Sec. 87. Questions as to
    compensation.

      Questions have arisen  frequently as to compensation of Members especially in
    cases of Members elected to fill vacancies (I, 500; II, 1155) and where
    there have been questions as to incompatible offices (I, 500) or titles
    seat (II, 1206). The Supreme Court has held that a Member chosen to fill
    a vacancy is entitled to salary only from the time that the compensation
    of his predecessor has ceased, Page v. United States, 127 U.S. 67
    (1888). See also 2 U.S.C. 37.

    Sec. 88. Travel and Members' representational
    allowances.

      In the 92d  Congress, the provisions of H. Res. 457 of that Congress,
    authorizing the Committee on House Administration to adjust allowances
    of Members and committees without further action by the House, were
    enacted into permanent law (2 U.S.C. 57), but the 94th Congress enacted
    into permanent law H. Res. 1372 of that Congress, stripping the
    Committee of that authority and requiring House approval of the
    committee's recommendations, except in cases made necessary by price
    changes in materials and supplies, technological advances in office
    equipment, and cost of living increases (2 U.S.C. 57a). The Committee on
    House Administration retains authority under 2 U.S.C. 57 to
    independently adjust amounts under certain conditions outlined in 2
    U.S.C. 57a (Mar. 21, 1977, p. 8227; Apr. 21, 1983, p. 9339). The text of
    those statutes follow:

        ``Sec. 57. Adjustment of House of Representatives allowances by

                        Committee on House Administration

      ``(a) In general.--Subject to the provision of law specified in
    subsection (b) of this section, the Committee on House Administration of
    the House of Representatives may, by order of the Committee, fix and
    adjust the amounts, terms, and conditions of, and other matters relating
    to, allowances of the House of Representatives within the following
    categories:

              ``(1) For Members of the House of Representatives, the

            Members' Representational Allowance, including all aspects of

            the Official Mail Allowance within the jurisdiction of the

            Committee under section 59(e) of this title.

              ``(2) For committees, the Speaker, the Majority and Minority

            Leaders, the Clerk, the Sergeant at Arms, and the Chief

            Administrative Officer, allowances for official mail (including

            all aspects of the Official Mail Allowance within the

            jurisdiction of the Committee under section 59e of this title),

            stationery, and telephone and telegraph and other

            communications.

      ``(b) Provision specified.--The provision of law referred to in
    subsection (a) of this section is section 57a of this title.

      ``(c) Member of the House of Representatives defined.--As used in this
    section, the term `Member of the House of Representatives' means a
    Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the
    Congress.''

      ``Sec. 57a. Limitation on allowance authority of Committee on House

                                 Administration.

      ``(a) In general.--An order under the provision of law specified in
    subsection (c) of this section may fix or adjust the allowances of the
    House of Representatives only by reason of--

              ``(1) a change in the price of materials, services, or office

    [[Page 40]]

            space;

              ``(2) a technological change or other improvement in office

            equipment; or

              ``(3) an increase under section 5303 of title 5 in rates of

            pay under the General Schedule.

      ``(b) Resolution requirement.--In the case of reasons other than the
    reasons specified in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a) of
    this section, the fixing and adjustment of the allowances of the House
    of Representatives in the categories described in the provision of law
    specified in subsection (c) of this section may be carried out only by
    resolution of the House of Representatives.

      ``(c) Provision specified.--The provision of law referred to in
    subsections (a) and (b) of this section is section 57 of this title.''

      In the 104th Congress the Committee on House Administration
    promulgated an order abolishing separate allowances for Clerk Hire,
    Official Expenses, and Official Mail, in favor of a single ``Members'
    Representational Allowance'' (MRA), which was ultimately enacted into
    law (2 U.S.C. 57b). The MRA is provided for the employment of staff in
    the Member's Washington and district offices, official expenses incurred
    by the Member, and the postage expenses of first, third, and fourth
    class frankable mail.

      Until January 1, 1988, the maximum salary for staff members was the
    rate of basic pay authorized for Level V of the Executive Schedule (by
    order of the Committee on House Administration, Mar. 21, 1977, p. 8227).
    Under section 311 of the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1988, as
    contained in section 101(i) of Public Law 100-202 (2 U.S.C. 60a-2a), the
    maximum salary for staff members is set by pay order of the Speaker. A
    Member may not employ a relative on his MRA (5 U.S.C. 3110). The Code of
    Official Conduct also precludes certain hiring practices of Members (see
    Sec. 1095, inra.).

      Until the 103d Congress, a Member could employ a ``Lyndon Baines
    Johnson Congressional Intern'' for a maximum of two months at not to
    exceed $1,160 per month. Such internships were available for college
    students and secondary or postsecondary school teachers (H. Res. 420,
    93d Cong., Sept. 18, 1973, p. 30186). Any paid internship is now funded
    through the MRA.

      The statutes provide for continuation of the pay of clerical
    assistants to a Member upon his or her death or resignation, until a
    successor is elected to fill the vacancy, such clerical assistants to
    perform their duties under the direction of the Clerk of the House (2
    U.S.C. 92a-92d). Upon the explusion of a Member in the 96th Congress,
    the House by resolution extended those provisions to any termination of
    service by a Member during the term of office (H. Res. 804, Oct. 2,
    1980, p. 28978).

    [[Page 41]]

      For current information on the MRA and the method of its accounting
    and disbursement, see current U.S. House of Representatives
    Congressional Handbook, Committee on House Administration.

    Sec. 88a. Ban on Legislative Service
    Organizations.

      At its  organization the 104th Congress prohibited the
    establishment or continuation of any legislative service organization
    (as that term had been understood in the 103d Congress) and directed the
    Committee on House Administration to take such steps as were necessary
    to ensure an orderly termination and accounting for funds of any
    legislative service organization in existence on January 3, 1995 (sec.
    222, H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 477).

    Sec. 89. Leadership staff allowances.

      Separate from the  MRA
    specified above, the leaders of the House (the Speaker, Majority Leader,
    Minority Leader, Majority Whip and Minority Whip) are entitled to office
    staffing allowances consisting of certain statutory positions as well as
    lump-sum appropriations authorized by section 473 (84 Stat. 1140). The
    portion of these allowances for leadership office personnel may be
    adjusted by the Clerk of the House in certain situations when the
    President effects a pay adjustment for certain classes of Federal
    employees under the Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-656;
    84 Stat. 1946).

    Sec. 89a. Speaker's ``pay orders.''

      Under  section 311(d) of
    the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1988 [2 U.S.C. 60a-2a], the
    Speaker may issue ``pay orders'' that adjust pay levels for officers and
    employees of the House to maintain certain relationships with comparable
    levels in the Senate and in the other branches of government. For the
    text of section 311(d), see Sec. 1130, infra.

    Sec. 90. Privilege of Members from
    arrest.

      * * * They [the  Senators and Representatives] shall in all Cases, except
    Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest
    during their attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and
    in going to and returning from the same; * * *

    [[Page 42]]

    under mesne process in a civil suit during a recess of Congress, the
    House decided that he was entitled to discharge on the assembling of
    Congress, and liberated him and restored him to his seat by the hands of
    its own officer (III, 2676). Service of process is distinguished from
    arrest in civil cases and related historical data are collected in Long
    v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76 (1934), where the Supreme Court held that the
    clause was applicable only to arrests in civil suits, now largely
    obsolete but common at the time of the adoption of the United States
    Constitution. Former Rule L (current rule VIII), infra, was added in the
    97th Congress to provide a standing procedure governing subpoenas to
    Members, officers, and employees directing their appearance as witnesses
    relating to the official functions of the House, or for the production
    of House documents.

    <>   * * * and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they
    [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other
    place.

    Sec. 91. Assertions of privilege of
    Members by the House.

      The word ``felony''  in this provision has been interpreted not to
    refer to a delinquency in a matter of debt (III, 2676), and ``treason,
    felony, and breach of the peace'' have been construed to mean all
    indictable crimes (III, 2673). The Supreme Court has held that the
    privilege does not apply to arrest in any criminal case. Williamson v.
    United States, 207 U.S. 425 (1908). The courts have discussed and
    sustained the privilege of the Member in going to and returning from the
    session (III, 2674); and where a person assaulted a Member on his way to
    the House, although at a place distant therefrom, the House arrested him
    on warrant of the Speaker, arraigned him at the bar and committed him
    (II, 1626, 1628). Other assaults under these circumstances have been
    treated as breaches of privilege (II, 1645). Where a Member had been
    arrested and detained

    [[Page 43]]

    923 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. den. 479 U.S. 996 (1986). For a discussion
    of waivers of the Speech and Debate clause, see Sec. 301, infra.

    Sec. 93. Scope of the privilege.

      This privilege as  to ``any
    speech or debate'' applies generally to ``things done in a session of
    the House by one of its Members in relation to the business before it.''
    Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881), cited at III, 2675. See also
    II, 1655 and Sec. Sec. 301-302, infra, for provisions in Jefferson's
    Manual on the privilege; and Deschler's Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 7. The
    clause precludes judicial inquiry into the motivation, preparation, or
    content of a Member's speech on the floor and prevents such a speech
    from being made the basis for a criminal conspiracy charge against the
    Member. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966). The Supreme Court
    held in United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 447 (1979), that under the
    Speech or Debate Clause, neither evidence of nor references to
    legislative acts of a Member of Congress may be introduced by the
    Government in a prosecution under the official bribery statute. But the
    Supreme Court has limited the scope of legislative activity which is
    protected under the clause by upholding grand jury inquiry into the
    possession and nonlegislative use of classified documents by a Member.
    Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). The Court has also
    sustained the validity of an indictment of a Member for accepting an
    illegal bribe to perform legislative acts where the prosecution
    established a prima facie case without relying on the Member's
    constitutionally-protected legislative speech. United States v.
    Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972). Nor does the clause protect transmittal
    of allegedly defamatory material issued in press releases and
    newsletters by a Senator, as neither was essential to the deliberative
    process of the Senate. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). A
    complaint against an officer of the House relating to the dismissal of
    an official reporter of debates has been held nonjusticiable on the
    basis that her duties were directly related to the due functioning of
    the legislative process. Browning v. Clerk, 789 F.2d

      Legislative employees acting under orders of the House are not
    necessarily protected under the clause from judicial inquiry into the
    constitutionality of their actions. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 165
    (1880); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); Powell v. McCormack,
    395 U.S. 486 (1969). But see Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606
    (1972), where the Supreme Court held that the aide of a Senator was
    protected under the clause when performing legislative acts which would
    have been protected under the clause if performed by the Senator
    himself. There is no distinction between the Members of a Senate
    subcommittee and its chief counsel insofar as complete immunity under
    the Speech and Debate Clause is provided for the issuance of a subpoena
    pursuant to legitimate legislative inquiry. Eastland v. U.S.
    Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975). See also Doe v. McMillan, 412
    U.S. 306 (1973) (relating to the dissemination of a congressional
    report) for the immunity under this clause of Members of the House and
    their staffs, and for the common-law immunity of the Public Printer and
    Superintendent of Documents.

      For Federal court decisions on the applicability of the clause to
    unofficial circulation of reprints from the Congressional Record, see
    McGovern v. Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343 (1960); Long v. Ansell, 69 F.2d 386
    (1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 76 (1934); Methodist Federation for Social
    Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp. 729 (1956). For inquiry into a Member's
    use of the franking privilege, see Hoellen v. Annunzio, 468 F.2d 522
    (1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973); Schiaffo v. Helstoski, 350 F.
    Supp. 1076 (1972), rev'd 492 F.2d 413 (1974). For inquiry into the
    printing of committee reports, see Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973);
    Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175 (1970).

    [[Page 44]]

    Sec. 94. Action by the House.

      For assaulting a  Member for
    words spoken in debate, Samuel Houston, not a Member, was arrested,
    tried, and censured by the House (II, 1616-1619). Where Members have
    assaulted other Members for words spoken in debate (II, 1656), or
    proceeded by duel (II, 1644), or demanded explanation in a hostile
    manner (II, 1644), the House has considered the cases as of privilege. A
    communication addressed to the House by an official in an Executive
    Department calling in question words uttered by a Member in debate was
    criticized as a breach of privilege and withdrawn (III, 2684). An
    explanation having been demanded of a Member by a person not a Member
    for a question asked of the latter when a witness before the House, the
    matter was considered but not pressed as a breach of privilege (III,
    2681). A letter from a person supposed to have been assailed by a Member
    in debate, asking properly and without menace if the speech was
    correctly reported, was held to involve no question of privilege (III,
    2682). Unless it be clear that a Member has been questioned for words
    spoken in debate, the House declines to act (II, 1620; III, 2680).

      For assaulting a Member, Charles C. Glover was arrested, arraigned at
    the bar of the House, and censured by the Speaker by direction of the
    House, although the provocation of the assault was words spoken in
    debate in the previous Congress (VI, 333).

    Sec. 95. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881);
    Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); United States v. Johnson, 383
    U.S. 169 (1966); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); Powell v.
    McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606
    (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); United States v.
    Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111
    (1979).

    Sec. 96. Restriction on appointment of
    Members to office.

      \2\ No Senator or  Representative shall, during the Time for which he
    was elected, be appointed to any Civil Office under the Authority of the
    United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof
    shall have been encreased during such time; *  *  *.

    <>
    *  *  * and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall
    be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.

      In a few cases questions have arisen under this paragraph (I, 506,
    footnote; and see 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 36 (1969); see also Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 7).

      The meaning of the word ``office'' as used in this paragraph has been
    discussed (I, 185, 417, 478, 493; II, 993; VI, 60, 64), as has also the
    general subject of incompatible offices (I, 563).

    [[Page 45]]

    (VI, 63) and the question as to whether a Member may be appointed to the
    Board of Managers of the Soldiers' Home and become local manager of one
    of the Homes, is a matter for the decision of Congress itself (VI, 63).
    The House has also distinguished between the performance of paid
    services for the Executive (I, 495), like temporary service as assistant
    United States attorney (II, 993), and the acceptance of an incompatible
    office. The House has declined to hold that a contractor under the
    Government is constitutionally disqualified to serve as a Member (I,
    496). But the House, or its committees, have found disqualified a Member
    who was appointed a militia officer in the District of Columbia (I, 486)
    and in various States (VI, 60), and Members who have accepted
    commissions in the Army (I, 491, 492, 494). But the Judiciary Committee
    has expressed the opinion that persons on the retired list of the Army
    do not hold office under the United States in the constitutional sense
    (I, 494). A Member-elect has continued to act as governor of a State
    after the assembling of the Congress to which he was elected (I, 503),
    but the duties of a Member of the House and the Governor of a State are
    absolutely inconsistent and may not be simultaneously discharged by the
    same Member (VI, 65).-

    Sec. 98. As to what are incompatible
    offices.

      The Judiciary Committee  has concluded that members of commissions created by law to
    investigate and report, but having no legislative, executive, or
    judicial powers, and visitors to academies, regents, directors, and
    trustees of public institutions, appointed under the law by the Speaker,
    are not officers within the meaning of the Constitution (I, 493).
    Membership on joint committees created by the statute is not an office
    in the contemplation of the constitutional provision prohibiting Members
    of Congress from holding simultaneously other offices under the United
    States (VII, 2164). A Member of either House is eligible to appointment
    to any office not forbidden him by law, the duties of which are not
    incompatible with those of a Member

    Sec. 99. Appointment of Memberselect to
    offices under the United States.

      The House decided  that the status of a Member-elect was
    not affected by the constitutional requirement (I, 499), the theory
    being advanced that the status of the Member-elect is distinguished from
    the status of the Member who has qualified (I, 184). A Member-elect, who
    continued in an office after his election but resigned before taking his
    seat, was held entitled to the seat (I, 497, 498). However, when a
    Member-elect held an incompatible office after the meeting of Congress
    and his taking of the oath, he was held to have disqualified himself (I,
    492). In other words, the Member-elect may defer until the meeting of
    Congress and his taking of the oath, his choice between the seat and an
    incompatible office (I, 492). As early as 1874 the Attorney General
    opined that a Member-elect is not officially a Member of the House, and
    thus may hold any office until sworn (14 Op. Att'y Gen. 408 (1874)).

    [[Page 46]]

    Sec. 100. Relation of contestants to
    incompatible offices.

      The House has  manifestly leaned to the idea that a contestant
    holding an incompatible office need not make his election until the
    House has declared him entitled to the seat (I, 505). Although a
    contestant had accepted and held a State office in violation of the
    state constitution, if he were really elected a Congressman, the House
    did not treat his contest as abated (II, 1003). Where a Member had been
    appointed to an incompatible office a contestant not found to be elected
    was not admitted to fill the vacancy (I, 807).

    Sec. 101. Procedure of the House when
    incompatible offices are accepted.

      Where a Member  has accepted an incompatible
    office, the House has assumed or declared the seat vacant (I, 501, 502;
    VI, 65). In the cases of Baker and Yell, the Elections Committee
    concluded that the acceptance of a commission as an officer of
    volunteers in the national army vacated the seat of a Member (I, 488),
    and in another similar case the Member was held to have forfeited his
    right to a seat (I, 490). The House has seated a person bearing regular
    credentials on ascertaining that his predecessor in the same Congress
    had accepted a military office (I, 572). But usually the House by
    resolution formally declares the seat vacant (I, 488, 492). A Member-
    elect may defer until the meeting of Congress and his taking of the oath
    of office his choice between the seat and an incompatible office (I,
    492). But when he retains the incompatible office and does not qualify,
    a vacancy has been held to exist (I, 500). A resolution excluding a
    Member who has accepted an incompatible office may be agreed to by a
    majority vote (I, 490). A Member charged with acceptance of an
    incompatible office was heard in his own behalf during the debate (I,
    486).

      Where it was held in Federal court that a Member of Congress may not
    hold a commission in the Armed Forces Reserve under this clause, the
    U.S. Supreme Court reversed on other grounds, the plaintiff's lack of
    standing to maintain the suit. Reservists Committee to Stop the War v.
    Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833 (1971), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1075 (1972), rev'd on
    other grounds, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).

    Sec. 102. Bills raising revenue to
    originate in the House.

      Section 7. \1\ All Bills  for raising Revenue shall originate in the
    House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with
    Amendments as on other Bills.

    [[Page 47]]

    10, 1962, p. 23014; May 20, 1965, p. 11149; June 20, 1968, p. 22127;
    Nov. 8, 1979, p. 31518; May 17, 1983, p. 12486; Oct. 1, 1985, p. 25418;
    Sept. 25, 1986, p. 26202; July 30, 1987, p. 21582; June 16, 1988, p.
    14780; June 21, 1988, p. 15425; Sept. 23, 1988, p. 25094; Sept. 28,
    1988, p. 26415; Oct. 21, 1988, pp. 33110-11; June 15, 1989, p. 12167;
    Nov. 9, 1989, p. 28271; Oct. 22, 1991, p. 27087; Oct. 31, 1991, p.
    29284; Feb. 25, 1992, p. 3377; July 21, 1994, p. 17280; July 21, 1994,
    p. 17281; Aug. 12, 1994, pp. 7642, 7643; Oct. 7, 1994, p. ----; Mar. 21,
    1996, p. 5950; Apr. 16, 1996, pp. 7642, 7643; Sept. 27, 1996, p. 25542;
    Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25931; Mar. 5, 1998, p. ----; Oct. 15, 1998, p. ----;
    July 15, 1999, p. ----; Nov. 18, 1999, pp. ----; Oct. 24, 2000, p. ----
    ), or declined to proceed further with it (II, 1485). A bill raising
    revenue incidentally was held not to infringe upon the constitutional
    prerogative of the House to originate revenue legislation (VI, 315).
    Discussion of differentiation between bills for the purpose of raising
    revenue and bills which incidentally raise revenue (VI, 315). A question
    relating to the invasion of the constitutional prerogatives of the House
    by a Senate amendment may be raised at any time when the House is in
    possession of the papers, but not otherwise; thus, the question has been
    presented pending the motion to call up a conference report on the bill
    (June 20, 1968, Deschler's Precedents, vol. 3, ch. 13, sec. 14.2; Aug.
    19, 1982, p. 22127), but has been held nonprivileged with respect to a
    bill already presented to the President (Apr. 6, 1995, p. 10700). On
    January 16, 1924, p. 1027, the Senate decided that a bill proposing a
    gasoline tax in the District of Columbia should not originate in the
    Senate (VI, 316). Among the measures the House has returned to the
    Senate: a Senate-passed bill providing for the sale of Conrail and
    containing provisions relating to the tax treatment of the sale,
    notwithstanding inclusion in that bill of a disclaimer section requiring
    all revenue provisions therein to be contained in separate legislation
    originating in the House (Sept. 25, 1986, p. 26202); a Senate-passed
    bill prohibiting the importation of commodities subject to tariff (July
    30, 1987, p. 21582); a Senate-passed bill banning all imports from Iran,
    a tariff measure as affecting revenue from dutiable imports (June 16,
    1988, p. 14780); a Senate-passed bill dealing with the tax treatment of
    income derived from the exercise of Indian treaty fishing rights (June
    21, 1988, p. 15425); a Senate-passed bill creating a tax-exempt
    government corporation (June 15, 1989, p. 12167); a Senate-passed bill
    addressing the tax treatment of police-corps scholarships and the
    regulation of firearms under the Internal Revenue Code (Oct. 22, 1991,
    p. 27087); a Senate-passed bill including certain import sanctions in an
    export administration statute (Oct. 31, 1991, p. 29284); a Senate-passed
    bill requiring the President to impose sanctions including import
    restrictions against countries that fail to eliminate largescale
    driftnet fishing (Feb. 25, 1992, p. 3377); a Senate-passed bill
    proposing to regulate toxic substances by prohibiting the import of
    products containing more than specified level of lead (July 21, 1994, p.
    17280); a Senate amendment to a general appropriation bill proposing a
    user fee raising revenue to finance

    [[Page 48]]

    broader activities of the agency imposing the levy, thereby raising
    general revenue (Aug. 12, 1994, p. 21656); a Senate-passed bill
    proposing to repeal a fee on electricity generated by nuclear energy
    that otherwise would raise revenue (Mar. 5, 1998, p. ----); a Senate-
    passed bill proposing new import restrictions on products containing any
    substance derived from rhinoceroses or tigers (Oct. 15, 1998, p. ----);
    Senate-passed bills proposing an amendment to the criminal code that
    would make it unlawful to import certain assault weapons (Oct. 22, 1991,
    p. 27087) or to import large capacity ammunition feeding devices (July
    15, 1999, p. ----); Senate-passed bills prescribing the tax treatment of
    certain benefits to members of the Armed Forces (Nov. 18, 1999, p. ----)
    or of public-sector retirement plans (Nov. 18, 1999, p. ----); a Senate-
    passed bill proposing to create a new basis for applying import
    restrictions on bear viscera or products derived therefrom (Oct. 24,
    2000, p. ----). The House laid on the table a resolution asserting that
    a conference report accompanying a House bill originated provisions in
    derogation of the constitutional prerogative of the House and resolving
    that such bill be recommitted to conference (July 27, 2000, p. ----).
      This provision has been the subject of much discussion (II, 1488,
    1494). In the earlier days the practice was not always correct (II,
    1484); but in later years the House has insisted on its prerogative and
    the Senate has often shown reluctance to infringe thereon (II, 1482,
    1483, 1493). In several instances, however, the subject has been matter
    of contention, conference (II, 1487, 1488), and final disagreement (II,
    1485, 1487, 1488). Sometimes, however, when the House has questioned an
    invasion of prerogative, the Senate has receded (II, 1486, 1493). The
    disagreements have been especially vigorous over the right of the Senate
    to concur with amendments (II, 1489), and while the Senate has
    acquiesced in the sole right of the House to originate revenue bills, it
    has at the same time held to a broad power of amendment (II, 1497-1499).
    The House has frequently challenged the Senate on this point (II, 1481,
    1491, 1496; Sept. 14, 1965, p. 23632). When the House has perceived an
    invastion of its prerogative, it has ordered the bill or Senate
    amendment to be returned to the Senate (II, 1480-1499; VI, 315, 317;
    Mar. 30, 1937, p. 2930; July 2, 1960, p. 15818; Oct.

      Former clause 5(b) (current clause 5(a)) of rule XXI, added in the
    98th Congress, prohibits consideration of any amendment, including any
    Senate amendment, proposing a tax or tariff measure during consideration
    of a bill or joint resolution reported by a committee not having that
    jurisdiction (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1983, p. 34).

      For discussion as to the prerogatives of the House under this clause,
    and discussion of the prerogatives of the House to originate
    appropriation bills, see Deschler's Precedents, vol. 3, ch. 13.

    Sec. 103. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); Twin
    City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220
    U.S. 107 (1911); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906); Rainey v.
    United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495
    U.S. 385 (1990).

    [[Page 49]]

    House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the
    Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be
    reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall
    become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be
    determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and
    against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House
    respectively. * * *.

    Sec. 104. Approval and disapproval of bills by
    the President.

      \2\ Every Bill  which shall have passed the House of Representatives
    and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the
    President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if
    not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it
    shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their
    Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two
    thirds of that

    [[Page 50]]

    House (IV, 3491). The statutes require that bills signed by the
    President shall be received by the Archivist of the United States and
    deposited in his office (1 U.S.C. 106a). Formerly these bills were
    received by the Secretary of State (IV, 3485) and deposited in his
    office (IV, 3429).

    Sec. 105. The act of approval.

      Under the usual  practice,
    bills are considered to have been presented to the President at the time
    they are delivered to the White House. In 1959, bills delivered to the
    White House while the President was abroad were held for presentation to
    the President upon his return to the United States by the White House.
    The United States Court of Claims held, in Eber Bros. Wine and Liquor
    Corp. v. United States, 337 F.2d 624 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 950
    (1965), that where the President had determined, with the informal
    acquiescence of leaders of Congress, that bills from the Congress were
    to be received at the White House only for presentation to him upon his
    return to the United States and the bill delivered to the White House
    was so stamped, the Presidential veto of the bill more than 10 days
    after delivery to the White House but less than 10 days after his return
    to the country was timely. The second session of the 89th Congress
    adjourned sine die while President Johnson was on an Asian tour and
    receipts for bills delivered to the White House during that time were
    marked in like manner. The approval of a bill by the President of the
    United States is valid only with his signature (IV, 3490). Prior to the
    adoption of the 20th amendment to the Constitution, at the close of a
    Congress, when the two Houses prolonged their sessions into the forenoon
    of March 4, the approvals were dated on the prior legislative day, as
    the legislative portion of March 4 belonged to the term of the new
    Congress. In one instance, however, bills signed on the forenoon of
    March 4 were dated as of that day with the hour and minute of approval
    given with the date (IV, 3489). The 20th amendment to the Constitution
    changed the date of meeting of the Congress to January 3d. The act of
    President Tyler in filing with a bill an exposition of his reasons for
    signing it was examined and severely criticized by a committee of the
    House (IV, 3492); and in 1842 a committee of the House discussed the act
    of President Jackson in writing above his signature of approval a
    memorandum of his construction of the bill (IV, 3492). But where the
    President has accompanied his message announcing the approval with a
    statement of his reasons there has been no question in the

    Sec. 106. Notice of approval sent by
    message.

      Notice of the  signature of a bill by the President is sent by message to
    the House in which it originated (VII, 1089) and that House informs the
    other (IV, 3429). But this notice is not necessary to the validity of
    the act (IV, 3495). Sometimes, at the close of a Congress the President
    informs the House of such bills as he has approved and of such as he has
    allowed to fail (IV, 3499-3502). In one instance he communicated his
    omission to sign a bill through the committee appointed to notify him
    that Congress was about to adjourn (IV, 3504). A bill that had not
    actually passed having been signed by the President, he disregarded it
    and a new bill was passed (IV, 3498). Messages of the President giving
    notice of bills approved are entered in the Journal and published in the
    Congressional Record (V, 6593).

    Sec. 107. Disapproval (or veto) of
    bills.

      A message withholding  approval of a bill, called a veto message, is sent to the House
    in which the bill originated; but it has been held that such a message
    may not be returned to the President on his request after it has been
    laid before the Senate (IV, 3521). Instance where a veto message which
    had not been laid before the House was returned to the President on his
    request (Aug. 1, 1946, p. 10651). A vetoed bill received in the House by
    way of the Senate is considered as if received directly from the
    President and supersedes the regular order of business (IV, 3537; VII,
    1109). A veto message may not be read in the absence of a quorum, even
    though the House be about to adjourn sine die (IV, 3522; VII, 1094); but
    the message may be read and acted on at the next session of the same
    Congress (IV, 3522). When the President has been prevented by
    adjournment from returning a bill with his objections he has sometimes
    at the next session communicated his reasons for not approving (V, 6618-
    6620).

      Although the ordinary form of a return veto is a message under seal
    returning the enrollment with a statement of the President's objections,
    an enrolled House bill returned to the Clerk during the August recess
    with a ``memorandum of disapproval'' setting forth the objections of the
    President was considered as a return veto (Sept. 11, 1991, p. 22643).

    [[Page 51]]

    are in order (IV, 3542-3550; VII, 1100, 1105, 1113; Speaker Wright, Aug.
    3, 1988, p. 20280) and (for the stated examples) debatable under the
    hour rule (VIII, 2740). Although under clause 4 of rule XVI, and under
    the precedents the motion for the previous question takes precedence
    over motions to postpone or to refer when a question is under debate,
    where the Speaker has laid before the House a veto message from the
    President but has not yet stated the question to be on overriding the
    veto, that question is not ``under debate'' and the motion for the
    previous question does not take precedence (Speaker Wright, Aug. 3,
    1988; Procedure, ch. 24, sec. 15.8). A resolution asserting that to
    recognize for a motion to refer a veto message before stating the
    question on overriding the veto would interfere with the constitutional
    prerogative of the House to proceed to that question, and directing the
    Speaker to state the question on overriding the veto as pending before
    recognizing for a motion to refer, did not give rise to a question of
    the privileges of the House (Speaker Wright, Aug. 3, 1988, p. 20281). A
    motion to refer a vetoed bill, either with or without the message, has
    been held allowable within the constitutional mandate that the House
    ``shall proceed to reconsider'' (IV, 3550; VII, 1104, 1105, 1108, 1114),
    and in the 101st Congress, a veto pending as unfinished business was
    referred with instructions to consider and report promptly (Jan. 24,
    1990, p. 421). But while the ordinary motion to refer may be applied to
    a vetoed bill, it is not in order to move to recommit it pending the
    demand for the previous question or after it is ordered (IV, 3551; VII,
    1102). When a veto message is before the House for consideration de novo
    or as unfinished business, a motion to refer the message to committee
    takes precedence over the question of passing the bill, the objections
    of the President to the contrary notwithstanding (Procedure, ch. 24,
    sec. 15.8; Oct. 25, 1983, p. 29188), but the motion to refer may be laid
    on the table (Oct. 25, 1983, p. 29188). A vetoed bill having been
    rejected by the House, the message was referred (IV, 3552; VII, 1103).
    Committees to which vetoed bills have been referred have sometimes
    neglected to report (IV, 3523, 3550, footnotes; VII, 1108, 1114).

    Sec. 108. Consideration of a vetoed bill in the
    House.

      It is the  usual but not invariable rule that a bill returned with the
    objections of the President shall be voted on at once (IV, 3534-3536)
    and when laid before the House the question on the passage is considered
    as pending and no motion from the floor is required (VII, 1097-1099),
    but it has been held that the constitutional mandate that ``the House
    shall proceed to consider'' means that the House shall immediately
    proceed to consider it under the Rules of the House, such that the
    ordinary motions under the Rules of the House (e.g., to refer or to
    postpone to a day certain)

      A vetoed bill may be laid on the table (IV, 3549; VII, 1105), but it
    is still highly privileged and a motion to take it from the table is in
    order at any time (IV, 3550; V, 5439). Also a motion to discharge a
    committee from the consideration of such a bill is privileged (IV, 3532;
    Aug. 4, 1988, p. 20365; Sept. 19, 1996, p. 23815) and (in the modern
    practice) is debatable (Mar. 7, 1990, p. 3620) but is subject to the
    motion to lay on the table (Sept. 7, 1965, p. 22958; Aug. 4, 1988, p.
    20365). When the motion to discharge is agreed to, the veto message is
    pending as unfinished business (Mar. 7, 1990, p. 3621). While a vetoed
    bill is always privileged, the same is not true of a bill reported in
    lieu of it (IV, 3531; VII, 1103).

    [[Page 52]]

    President's veto (art. I, sec. 7; IV, 2726, 3520; VII, 1110). The two-
    thirds vote required to pass the bill is two-thirds of the Members
    present and voting and not two-thirds of the total membership of the
    House (IV, 3537, 3538; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276
    (1919)). Only Members voting should be considered in determining whether
    two-thirds voted in the affirmative (VII, 1111). The motion to
    reconsider may not be applied to the vote on reconsideration of a bill
    returned with the objections of the President (V, 5644; VIII, 2778).

    Sec. 109. Action on a vetoed bill.

      If two-thirds of  the
    House to which a bill is returned with the President's objections agree
    to pass it, and then two-thirds of the other House also agree, it
    becomes a law (IV, 3520). The yeas and nays are required to pass a bill
    over the

      It is the practice for one House to inform the other by message of its
    decision that a bill returned with the objections of the President shall
    not pass (IV, 3539-3541). A bill passed notwithstanding the objections
    of the President is sent by the presiding officer of the House which
    last acts on it to the Archivist, who receives it and deposits it in his
    office (1 U.S.C. 106a). Formerly these bills were sent to the Secretary
    of State (IV, 3524) and deposited in his office (IV, 3485).

    Sec. 110. Errors in bills sent to the
    President.

      A bill incorrectly  enrolled has been recalled from the President, who erased
    his signature (IV, 3506). Bills sent to the President but not yet signed
    by him are sometimes recalled by concurrent resolution of the two Houses
    (IV, 3507-3509; VII, 1091; Sept. 4, 1962, p. 18405; May 6, 1974, p.
    13076), and amended; but this proceeding is regarded as irregular (IV,
    3510-3518). When the two Houses of Congress request the President by
    concurrent resolution to return an enrolled bill delivered to him and
    the President honors the request, the ten-day period under this clause
    runs anew from the time the bill is re-enrolled and is again presented
    to the President. Thus, in the 93d Congress the President returned on
    May 7, 1974 a bill pursuant to the request of Congress (H. Con. Res.
    485, May 6, 1974, p. 13076). The bill was again enrolled, presented to
    the President on May 7, and marked ``received May 7'' at the White
    House. An error in an enrolled bill that has gone to the President may
    also be corrected by a joint resolution (IV, 3519; VII, 1092). In the
    99th Congress, two enrollments of a continuing appropriation bill for FY
    1987 were presented to and signed by the President, the second
    correcting an omission in the first (see P.L. 99-500 and 99-591). In
    Clinton v.  City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), the Supreme Court
    held that the cancellation procedures of the Line Item Veto Act violated
    the presentment clause of article I, section 7 of the Constitution. For
    a discussion of the operation of the Act during the period of its
    effectiveness, see Sec. 1130, infra.

    [[Page 53]]

    Sec. 110a. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Matthews v. Zane, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 164
    (1822); Gardner v. Collector, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 499 (1868); Lapeyre v.
    United States, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 191 (1873); La Abra Silver Mining Co.
    v. United States, 175 U.S. 423 (1899); Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v.
    Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919); Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482
    (1932); Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938); Clinton v. City of
    New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).

    Sec. 111. Bills which become laws without the
    President's approval.

      * * * If any  Bill shall not be returned by the President
    within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to
    him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it,
    unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which
    Case it shall not be a Law.

      A bill signed by the President within 10 days (Sunday excepted) after
    it has been presented to him becomes a law even though such signing
    takes place when Congress is not in session, whether during the period
    of an adjournment to a day certain or after the final adjournment of a
    session. Presidents currently sign bills after sine die adjournment but
    within 10 days after their receipt. President Truman signed several
    bills passed in the 81st Congress after the convening of the 82d
    Congress but within 10 days (P.L. 910-921; 64 Stat. 1221-1257); and
    President Reagan approved bills passed in the 97th Congress which were
    presented after the convening of the 98th Congress. It was formerly
    contended that the President might not approve bills during a recess
    (IV, 3493, 3494), and in one instance, in 1864, when the President
    signed a bill after final adjournment of Congress but within 10 days
    grave doubts were raised and an adverse report was made by a House
    committee (IV, 3497). Later opinions of the Attorney General have been
    to the effect that the President has the power to approve bills within
    10 days after they have been presented to him during the period of an
    adjournment to a day certain (IV, 3496) and after an adjournment sine
    die (VII, 1088). The Supreme Court has held valid as laws bills signed
    by the President within 10 days during a recess for a specified time (La
    Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 451 (1899); IV, 3495)
    and also those signed after an adjournment sine die (Edwards v. United
    States, 286 U.S. 482 (1932)).

    [[Page 54]]

    Sec. 112. The pocket veto.

      A bill which  is passed by both
    Houses of Congress during the first regular session of a Congress and
    presented to the President less than 10 days (Sundays excepted) before
    the sine die adjournment of that session, but is neither signed by the
    President, nor returned by him to the House in which it originated, does
    not become a law (``The Pocket Veto Case,'' 279 U.S. 655 (1929); VII,
    1115). President Truman during an adjournment to a day certain pocket
    vetoed several bills passed by the 81st Congress and also, after the
    convening of the 82d Congress, pocket vetoed one bill passed in the 81st
    Congress. The Supreme Court has held that the adjournment of the House
    of origin for not exceeding three days while the other branch of the
    Congress remained in session, did not prevent a return of the vetoed
    bill to the House of origin (Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583
    (1938)).

    Sec. 113. Effect of adjournment to a day
    certain.

      Doubt has existed  as to whether a bill which remains with the President 10 days
    without his signature, Congress meanwhile before the tenth day having
    adjourned to a day certain, becomes a law (IV, 3483, 3496; VII, 1115);
    an opinion of the Attorney General in 1943 stated that under such
    circumstances a bill not signed by the President did not become a law
    (40 Op. Att'y Gen. 274 (1943)). However, more recently, where a Member
    of the Senate challenged in Federal court the effectiveness of such a
    pocket veto, a United States Court of Appeals held that a Senate bill
    could not be pocket-vetoed by the President during an ``intrasession''
    adjournment of Congress to a day certain for more than three days, where
    the Secretary of the Senate had been authorized to receive Presidential
    messages during such adjournment. Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C.
    Cir., 1974). See also Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1976).
    Following a consent decree in this case, it was announced that President
    Ford would utilize a ``return'' veto, subject to override, in
    intersession and intrasession adjournments where authority exists for
    the appropriate House to receive such messages notwithstanding the
    adjournment.

      In the 101st Congress, when President Bush returned an enrolled bill
    during the intersession adjournment, not by way of message under seal
    but with a ``memorandum of disapproval'' setting forth his objections,
    the House treated it as a return veto subject to override under article
    I, section 7 (Jan. 23, 1990, p. 4). Similarly, in the 102d Congress, an
    enrolled House bill returned to the Clerk during the August recess, not
    by way of message under seal but with a ``memorandum of disapproval''
    setting forth the objections of the President, was considered as a
    return veto (Sept. 11, 1991, p. 22643). Also in the 102d Congress,
    President Bush purported on December 20, 1991, to pocket veto a bill (S.
    1176) that was presented to him on December 9, 1991, notwithstanding
    that the Congress was in an intrasession adjournment (from Nov. 27,
    1991, until 11:55 a.m., Jan. 3, 1992) rather than an adjournment sine
    die (see Jan. 23, 1992 [Daily Digest]); and during debate on a
    subsequent bill (S. 2184) purporting to repeal the provisions of S. 1176
    and to enact instead provisions acceding to the objections of the
    President, the Speaker inserted remarks on the pocket veto in light of
    modern congressional practice concerning the receipt of messages and
    communications during recesses and adjournments (Mar. 3, 1992, p. 4081).

    [[Page 55]]

    36246; veto override, Nov. 20, 1974, p. 36621). Subsequently, on
    November 21, 1974, the Senate also voted to override the veto (p. 36882)
    and pursuant to 1 U.S.C. 106a the Enrolling Clerk of the Senate
    forwarded the bill to the Archives for publication as a public law. The
    Administrator of General Services at the Archives (now Archivist), upon
    instructions from the Department of Justice, declined to promulgate the
    bill as public law on the day received. The question as to the efficacy
    of the congressional action in passing the bill over the President's
    veto was mooted when the House and Senate passed on November 26, 1974
    (pp. 37406, 37603), an identical bill which was signed into law on
    December 7, 1974 (P.L. 93-516). On similar occasions, when the President
    has asserted a ``pocket veto,'' the House has regarded the President's
    actual return of the bill without his signature as a veto within the
    meaning of article I, section 7 of the Constitution and proceeded to
    reconsider the bill over the President's obections (Jan. 23, 1990, p. 3;
    Sept. 6, 2000, p. ----; Nov. 13, 2000, p. ----).
      In the 93d Congress, the President returned a House bill without his
    signature to the Clerk of the House, who had been authorized to receive
    messages from the President during an adjournment to a day certain, and
    the President asserted in his veto message that he had ``pocket vetoed''
    the bill during the adjournment of the House to a day certain. The House
    regarded the President's return of the bill without his signature as a
    veto within the meaning of article I, section 7 of the Constitution and
    proceeded to reconsider and to pass the bill over the President's veto,
    after postponing consideration to a subsequent day (motion to postpone,
    Nov. 18, 1974, p.

      As part of the concurrent resolution providing for the sine die
    adjournments of the first sessions of the 101st Congress and 105th
    Congress, the Congress reaffirmed its position that an intersession
    adjournment did not prevent the return of a bill where the Clerk and the
    Secretary of the Senate were authorized to receive messages during the
    adjournment (H. Con. Res. 239, Nov. 21, 1989, p. 31156; S. Con. Res. 68,
    Nov. 13, 1997, p. ----). For the views of the Speaker, the Minority
    Leader, and the Attorney General concerning pocket veto authority during
    an intrasession adjournment, see correspondence inserted in the
    Congressional Record (Jan. 23, 1990, p. 3; Sept. 19, 2000, p. ----; Nov.
    13, 2000, p. ----); and for discussions of the constitutionality of
    intersession or intrasession pocket vetoes see Kennedy, ``Congress, The
    President, and The Pocket Veto,'' 63 Va. L. Rev. 355 (1977), and
    Hearing, Subcommittee on Legislative Process, Committee on Rules, on
    H.R. 849, 101st Congress.

    Sec. 114. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States,
    175 U.S. 423 (1899); Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 U.S. 506 (1901); the
    Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929); Edwards v. United States, 286
    U.S. 482 (1932); Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938); Burke v.
    Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987) (vacating and remanding as moot the decision
    sub nom. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).

    [[Page 56]]

    being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate
    and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations
    prescribed in the Case of a Bill.

    Sec. 115. As to presentation of orders and
    resolutions for approval.

      \3\ Every Order,  Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence
    of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a
    question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the
    United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved
    by him, or

      It has been settled conclusively that a joint resolution proposing an
    amendment to the Constitution should not be presented to the President
    for his approval (V, 7040; Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
    378 (1798)). Such joint resolutions, after passage by both Houses, are
    presented to the Archivist (1 U.S.C. 106b). Although the requirement of
    the Constitution seems specific, the practice of Congress has been to
    present to the President for approval only such concurrent resolutions
    as are legislative in effect (IV, 3483, 3484) which is not within the
    scope of the modern form of concurrent resolutions. See Sec. 192, infra,
    for a discussion of Presidential approval of a joint resolution
    extending the period for State ratification of a constitutional
    amendment already submitted to the States. For discussion of
    ``Congressional Disapproval'' provisions contained in public laws, see
    Sec. 1130, infra.

    Sec. 116. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United
    States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United
    States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Process
    Gas Consumer's Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America 463 U.S. 1216
    (1983).

    Sec. 117. The revenue power.

      Section 8. The Congress  shall
    have Power \1\ To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to
    pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of
    the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
    throughout the United States;
    <>   \2\ To borrow Money on the
    credit of the United States:

    [[Page 57]]

    Sec. 119. Power over commerce.

      \3\ To regulate  Commerce with
    foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
    Tribes;

    Sec. 120. Naturalization and bankruptcy.

      \4\ To establish  an
    uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of
    Bankruptcies throughout the United States;
    <>   \5\ To coin Money,
    regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of
    Weights and Measures;

    Sec. 122. Counterfeiting.

      \6\ To provide  for the Punishment
    of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;-
    -
    <>   \7\ To establish Post
    Offices and Post Roads;

    Sec. 124. Patents and copyrights.

      \8\ To promote  the
    Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
    Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
    and Discoveries;
    <>   \9\ To constitute Tribunals
    inferior to the supreme Court;
    <>   \10\
    To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,
    and Offenses against the Law of Nations;
    <>   \11\
    To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules
    concerning Captures on Land and Water;

    [[Page 58]]

    a report is submitted or is required to be submitted, (1) declares war
    or authorizes use of the Armed Forces; (2) extends by law the 60-day
    period; or (3) is physically unable to meet as result of armed attack.
    The Act also provided that Congress could adopt a concurrent resolution
    requiring the removal of Armed Forces engaged in foreign hostilities, a
    provision which should be read in light of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
    (1983). Sections 6 and 7 of the Act provide congressional procedures for
    joint resolutions, bills, and concurrent resolutions introduced pursuant
    to the provisions of the Act (see Sec. 1130, infra). For further
    discussion of that Act, and war powers generally, see Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 3, ch. 13.

    Sec. 128. War powers of Congress and the
    President.

      In the 93d  Congress, the Congress passed over the President's veto
    Public Law 93-148, relating to the power of Congress to declare war
    under this clause and the power of the President as Commander in Chief
    under article II, section 2, clause 1 (Sec. 178, infra). The law
    requires that the President report to Congress on the introduction of
    United States Armed Forces in the absence of a declaration of war. The
    President must terminate use of the Armed Forces unless Congress, within
    60 calendar days after

    Sec. 129. Raising and support of armies.

      \12\ To raise  and
    support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a
    longer Term than two Years;
    <>   \13\ To provide and
    maintain a Navy;
    <>   \14\ To make Rules for the
    Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

    Sec. 132. Calling out the militia.

      \15\ To provide  for
    calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
    Insurrections and repel Invasions;

    Sec. 133. Power over militia.

      \16\ To provide  for
    organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing
    such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United
    States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the
    Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the
    discipline prescribed by Congress;

    [[Page 59]]

    ticular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the
    Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all
    Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which
    the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-
    Yards, and other needful Buildings;--And

    Sec. 134. Power over territory of the United
    States.

      \17\ To exercise  exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such
    District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of par

    -  \18\ To make <> all Laws
    which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
    foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
    the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
    thereof.

    [[Page 60]]

    Sec. 135. Congressional authority over
    the District of Columbia.

      Congress has provided  by law that ``all that part of the territory
    of the United States included within the present limits of the District
    of Columbia shall be the permanent seat of government of the United
    States'' (4 U.S.C. 71). Pursuant to its authority under this clause,
    Congress provided in 1970 for the people of the District of Columbia to
    be represented in the House of Representatives by a Delegate and for a
    Commission to report to the Congress on the organization of the
    government of the District of Columbia (P.L. 91-405; 84 Stat. 845). For
    the powers and duties of the Delegate from the District of Columbia, see
    rule III (Sec. 675, infra) and Deschler's Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 7,
    sec. 3. In 1973, Congress passed the District of Columbia Self-
    Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, which reorganized the
    governmental structure of the District, provided a charter for local
    government subject to acceptance by a majority of the registered
    qualified voters of the District, delegated certain legislative powers
    to the District, and implemented certain recommendations of the
    Commission on the Organization of the Government of the District of
    Columbia (P.L. 93-198; 87 Stat. 774). Section 604 of that Act provides
    for congressional action on certain district matters by providing a
    procedure for approval and disapproval of certain actions by the
    District of Columbia Council. The section, as amended by Public Law 98-
    473, permits a highly privileged motion to discharge a joint resolution
    of approval or disapproval which has not been reported by the committee
    to which referred within 20 calendar days after its introduction (see
    Sec. 1130, infra).

    Sec. 137. Migration or importation of
    persons.

      Section 9. \1\ The  Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States
    now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the
    Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a
    Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten
    dollars for each Person.

    Sec. 138. Writ of habeas corpus.

      \2\ The Privilege of  the
    Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
    Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.
    <>   \3\ No
    Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.

    Sec. 140. Capitation and direct
    taxes.

      \4\ [No Capitation,  or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the
    Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.]

    Sec. 141. Export duties.

      This provision was changed in 1913 by the 16th amendment to the
    Constitution.
       \5\ No Tax or Duty shall be laid on
    Articles exported from any State.

    Sec. 142. Freedom of commerce.

      \6\ No Preference  shall be
    given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State
    over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State,
    be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.

    [[Page 61]]

    ceipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time
    to time.

    Sec. 143. Appropriations and accounting of public
    money.

      \7\ No Money  shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
    Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the
    Re

    Sec. 144. Titles of nobility and gifts from
    foreign states.

      \8\ No Title of  Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no
    Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without
    the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office,
    or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.

    Sec. 145. Foreign gifts and
    decorations.

      Consent has been  granted to officers and employees of the government,
    under enumerated conditions, to accept certain gifts and decorations
    from foreign governments (see 5 U.S.C. 7342). The adoption of this act
    largely has obviated the practice of passing private bills to permit the
    officer or employee to retain the award. However, where the Speaker (who
    was one of the officers empowered by an earlier law to approve retention
    of decorations by Members of the House) was himself tendered an award
    from a foreign government, a private law (Private Law 91-244) was
    enacted to permit him to accept and wear the award so that he would not
    be in the position of reviewing his own application under the provisions
    of the law.

      Public Law 95-105 amended the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act (now 5
    U.S.C. 7342) to designate the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct
    of the House of Representatives as the employing agency for the House
    with respect to foreign gifts and decorations received by Members and
    employees; under that statute the Committee may approve the acceptance
    of foreign decorations and has promulgated regulations to carry out the
    Act with respect to Members and employees (Jan. 23, 1978, p. 452), and
    disposes of foreign gifts which may not be retained by the donee.

      Opinions of Attorneys General:

      Gifts from Foreign Prince, 24 Op. Att'y Gen. 117 (1902); Foreign
    Diplomatic Commission, 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 538 (1871); Marshal of Florida,
    6 Op. Att'y Gen. 409 (1854).

    [[Page 62]]

    Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of
    Nobility.

    Sec. 146. States not to make treaties, coin
    money, pass ex post facto laws, impair contracts, etc.

      Section 10. \1\ No  State shall
    enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of
    Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing
    but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of
    Attainder, ex post facto Law, or

    Sec. 147. States not to lay imposts or
    duties.

      \2\ No State  shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or
    Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary
    for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties
    and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the
    Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be
    subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.

    Sec. 148. States not to lay tonnage taxes, make
    compacts, or go to war.

      \3\ No State  shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay
    any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace,
    enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a
    foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such
    imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.