    [Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 106th Congress]
    [106th Congress]
    [House Document 105-358]
    [Jeffersons Manual of ParliamentaryPractice]
    [Pages 166-186]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

    <>
    When the Speaker is seated in his chair, every member is to sit in his
    place. Scob., 6; Grey, 403.

                           sec. xvii--order in debate

      In the House the decorum of Members is regulated by the various
    provisions of rule XVII; and this provision of the parliamentary law is
    practically obsolete.

    Sec. 354. Procedure of the Member in seeking
    recognition.

      When  any Member means to speak, he is to stand up in his
    place, uncovered, and to address himself, not to the House, or any
    particular Member, but to the Speaker, who calls him by his name, that
    the House may take notice who it is that speaks. Scob., 6; D'Ewes, 487,
    col. 1; 2 Hats., 77; 4 Grey, 66; 8 Grey, 108. But Members who are
    indisposed may be indulged to speak sitting. 2 Hats., 75, 77; 1 Grey,
    143.

    [[Page 167]]

    <>   When a Member stands up to
    speak, no question is to be put, but he is to be heard unless the House
    overrule him. 4 Grey, 390; 5 Grey, 6, 143.

      In the House a Member seeking recognition is governed by clause 1 of
    rule XVII, which differs materially from this provision of the
    parliamentary law. The Speaker, moreover, calls the Member, not by name,
    but as ``the gentleman (or gentlewoman) from ------,'' naming the State.
    As long ago as 1832, at least, a Member was not required to rise from
    his own particular seat since seats are no longer assigned (V, 4979,
    footnote).

      In the House no question is put as to the right of a Member to the
    floor, unless he be called to order and dealt with by the House under
    clause 4 of rule XVII.

    Sec. 356. The parliamentary law as to recognition by the
    Speaker.

      If  two or more rise to speak nearly together, the Speaker
    determines who was first up, and calls him by name, whereupon he
    proceeds, unless he voluntarily sits down and gives way to the other.
    But sometimes the House does not acquiesce in the Speaker's decision, in
    which case the question is put, ``which Member was first up?'' 2 Hats.,
    76; Scob., 7; D'Ewes, 434, col. 1, 2.

      In the Senate of the United States the President's decision is without
    appeal.

      In the House recognition by the Chair is governed by clause 2 of rule
    XVII and the practice thereunder. There has been no appeal from a
    decision by the Speaker on a question of recognition since 1881, on
    which occasion Speaker Randall stated that the power of recognition is
    ``just as absolute in the Chair as the judgment of the Supreme Court of
    the United States is absolute as to the interpretation of the law'' (II,
    1425-1428), and in the later practice no appeal is permitted (VIII,
    2429, 2646, 2762).

    [[Page 168]]

    Sec. 357. Right of the Member to be heard a second
    time.

      No  man may speak more than once on the same bill on the same day;
    or even on another day, if the debate be adjourned. But if it be read
    more than once in the same day, he may speak once at every reading. Co.,
    12, 115; Hakew., 148; Scob., 58; 2 Hats., 75. Even a change of opinion
    does not give a right to be heard a second time. Smyth's Comw. L., 2, c.
    3; Arcan, Parl., 17.

      But he may be permitted to speak again to clear a matter of fact, 3
    Grey, 357, 416; or merely to explain himself, 2 Hats., 73, in some
    material part of his speech, Ib., 75; or to the manner or words of the
    question, keeping himself to that only, and not traveling into the
    merits of it, Memorials in Hakew., 29; or to the orders of the House, if
    they be transgressed, keeping within that line, and not falling into the
    matter itself. Mem. Hakew., 30, 31.

      The House has modified the parliamentary law as to a Member's right to
    speak a second time by clause 3 of rule XVII and by permitting a Member
    controlling time in debate to yield to another more than once. In
    ordinary practice rule XVII is not rigidly enforced, and Members find
    little difficulty in making such explanations as are contemplated by the
    parliamentary law.

    Sec. 358. Participation of the Speaker in debate.

      But  if the
    Speaker rise to speak, the Member standing up ought to sit down, that he
    may be first heard. Town., col. 205; Hale Parl., 133; Mem. in Hakew.,
    30, 31. Nevertheless, though the Speaker may of right speak to matters
    of order, and be first heard, he is restrained from speaking on any
    other subject, except where the House have occasion for facts within his
    knowledge; then he may, with their leave, state the matter of fact. 3
    Grey, 38.

    [[Page 169]]

    case a Speaker on the floor debated a point of order which the Speaker
    pro tempore was to decide (V, 6097). In rare instances Speakers have
    left the chair to make motions on the floor (II, 1367, footnote).
    Speakers may participate in debate in Committee of the Whole, although
    at certain periods in the history of the House the privilege was rarely
    exercised (II, 1367, footnote).
      This provision is usually observed in the practice of the House, so
    far as the conduct of the Speaker in the chair is concerned. In several
    instances the Speaker has been permitted by the House to make a
    statement from the chair, as in a case wherein his past conduct had been
    criticized (II, 1369), and in a case wherein there had been unusual
    occurrences in the joint meeting to count the electoral vote (II, 1372),
    and in a matter relating to a contest for the seat of the Speaker as a
    Member (II, 1360). In rare instances the Speaker has made brief
    explanations from the chair without asking the assent of the House (II,
    1373, 1374). Speakers have called others to the chair and participated
    in debate, usually without asking consent of the House (II, 1360, 1367,
    footnote, 1368, 1371; III, 1950), and in one

      During the House's consideration of several measures relating to the
    use of military force in the Persian Gulf, the Speaker took the floor
    not only to debate the pending question but also to commend the House on
    the quality of its recent debates on matters of war and peace and to
    explain his decision to vote on measures relating thereto even though
    not required to do so (Jan. 12, 1991, p. 1085).

    Sec. 359. Impertinent, superfluous, or tedious
    speaking.

      No  one is to speak impertinently or beside the question,
    superfluous, or tediously. Scob., 31, 33; 2 Hats., 166, 168; Hale Parl.,
    133.

      The House, by clause 1 of rule XVII, provides that the Member shall
    address himself to the question under debate, but neither by rule nor
    practice has the House ever suppressed superfluous or tedious speaking,
    its hour rule (clause 2 of rule XVII) being a sufficient safeguard in
    this respect.

    Sec. 360. Language reflecting on the House.

      No  person is to
    use indecent language against the proceedings of the House; no prior
    determination of which is to be reflected on by any Member, unless he
    means to conclude with a motion to rescind it. 2 Hats., 169, 170;
    Rushw., p. 3, v. 1, fol. 42. But while a proposition under consideration
    is still in fieri, though it has even been reported by a committee,
    reflections on it are no reflections on the House. 9 Grey, 508.

    [[Page 170]]

    in order in debate to refer to the proceedings of a committee except
    such as have been formally reported to the House (V, 5080-5083; VIII,
    2269, 2485-2493; June 24, 1958, pp. 12120, 12122), but this rule does
    not apply to the proceedings of a committee of a previous Congress (Feb.
    2, 1914, p. 2782), and the rationale for this limitation on debate is in
    part obsolete under the modern practice of the House insofar as the
    doctrine is applied to open committee meetings and hearings.

      In the practice of the House it has been held out of order in debate
    to cast reflections on either the House or its membership or its
    decisions, whether present or past (V, 5132-5138). A Member who had used
    offensive words against the character of the House, and who declined to
    explain, was censured (II, 1247). Words impeaching the loyalty of a
    portion of the membership have also been ruled out (V, 5139). Where a
    Member reiterated on the floor certain published charges against the
    House, action was taken, although other business had intervened, the
    question being considered one of privilege (III, 2637). It has been held
    inappropriate and not

    Sec. 361. Personalities in debate forbidden.

      No  person, in
    speaking, is to mention a Member then present by his name, but to
    describe him by his seat in the House, or who spoke last, or on the
    other side of the question, &c., Mem. in Hakew., 3; Smyth's Comw., L. 2,
    c. 3; nor to digress from the matter to fall upon the person, Scob., 31;
    Hale Parl., 133; 2 Hats., 166, by speaking reviling, nipping, or
    unmannerly words against a particular Member. Smyth's Comw., L. 2, c. 3.
    * * *

      In the practice of the House, a Member is not permitted to refer to
    another Member by name (V, 5144; VIII, 2526, 2529, 2536), or to address
    him in the second person (V, 5140-5143; VI, 600; VIII, 2529). The proper
    reference to another Member is ``the gentleman (or gentlewoman) from --
    ----,'' naming the Member's State (June 14, 1978, p. 17615; July 21,
    1982, p. 17314).

      By rule of the House (clause 1 of rule XVII), as well as by
    parliamentary law, personalities are forbidden (V, 4979, 5145, 5163,
    5169), whether against the Member in the Member's capacity as
    Representative or otherwise (V, 5152, 5153), even if the references may
    be relevant to the pending question (Sept. 28, 1996, p. ----). The House
    has censured a Member for gross personalities (II, 1251). The Chair may
    intervene to prevent improper references where it is evident that a
    particular Member is being described (Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27077). The Chair
    does not rule on the veracity of a statement made by a Member in debate
    (Apr. 9, 1997, p. ----).

    [[Page 171]]

      Clause 1 of rule XVII has been held to proscribe: (1) referring to an
    identifiable group of sitting Members as having committed a crime (e.g.,
    ``stealing'' an election or obstructing justice) (Feb. 27, 1985, p.
    3898; Speaker Wright, Mar. 21, 1989, p. 5016; May 19, 1998, p. ----);
    (2) referring in a personally critical manner to the political tactics
    of the Speaker or other Members (June 25, 1981, p. 14056); (3) referring
    to a particular Member of the House in a derogatory fashion (Nov. 3,
    1989, p. 27077); (4) characterizing a Member as ``the most impolite
    Member'' (June 27, 1996, p. 15915); (5) questioning the integrity of a
    Member (July 25, 1996, p. 19170); and (6) denunciating the spirit in
    which a Member had spoken (V, 6981).

      A distinction has been drawn between general language, which
    characterizes a measure or the political motivations behind a measure,
    and personalities (V, 5153, 5163, 5169). Although remarks in debate may
    not include personal attacks against a Member or an identifiable group
    of Members, they may address political motivations for legislative
    positions (Jan. 24, 1995, p. 2214; Mar. 8, 1995, pp. 7307, 7308; Nov.
    17, 1995, p. ----; June 13, 1996, p. 14043). For example, references to
    ``down-in-the-dirt gutter politics'' and ``you people are going to pay''
    were held not to be personal references (Nov. 14, 1995, p. ----).
    Similarly, characterizing a pending measure as a ``patently petty
    political terrorist tactic'' was held in order as a reference to the
    pending measure rather than to the motive or character of the measure's
    proponent (Nov. 9, 1995, p. ----). The Chair has also held in order a
    general reference that ``big donors'' receive ``access to leadership
    power and decisions'' because the reference did not identify a specific
    Member as engaging in an improper quid pro quo (Apr. 9, 1997, p. ----).

      A Member should refrain from references in debate to the official
    conduct of a Member where such conduct is not the subject then pending
    before the House by way of either a report of the Committee on Standards
    of Official Conduct or another question of the privileges of the House
    (see, e.g., July 24, 1990, p. 18917; Mar. 19, 1992, p. 6078; May 25,
    1995, pp. 14434-37; Sept. 19, 1995, pp. 25454, 25455). This stricture
    also precludes a Member from reciting news articles discussing a
    Member's conduct (Sept. 24, 1996, p. ----), reciting the content of a
    previously tabled resolution raising a question of the privileges of the
    House (Nov. 17, 1995, p. ----; Sept. 19, 1996, p. ----), or even
    referring to a Member's conduct by mere insinuation (Sept. 12, 1996, p.
    ----). Notice of an intention to offer a resolution as a question of the
    privileges of the House under rule IX does not render a resolution
    ``pending'' and thereby permit references to conduct of a Member
    proposed to be addressed therein (Sept. 19, 1996, p. ----).

      The stricture against references to a Member's conduct not then
    pending before the House applies to the conduct of all sitting Members
    (Apr. 1, 1992, p. 7899), including conduct that has previously been
    resolved by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct or the House
    (Sept. 20, 1995, pp. 25825, 25826; Sept. 24, 1996, pp. ----, ----; Apr.
    17, 1997, p. ----). This stricture does not apply to the conduct of a
    former Member, provided the reference is not made in an attempt to
    compare the conduct of a former Member with the conduct of a sitting
    Member (Sept. 12, 1996, pp. ----, ----).

    [[Page 172]]

    recommended in that case with the severity of the sanction recommended
    in the pending case, provided that the Member does not identify, or
    discuss the details of the past conduct of, a sitting Member (Dec. 18,
    1987, p. 36271).
      Debate on a pending privileged resolution recommending disciplinary
    action against a Member may necessarily involve personalities. However,
    clause 1 of rule XVII still prohibits the use of language that is
    personally abusive (see, e.g., July 31, 1979, p. 21584; Jan. 7, 1997, p.
    ----). Furthermore, during the actual pendency of such a resolution, a
    Member may discuss a prior case reported to the House by the Committee
    on Standards of Official Conduct for the purpose of comparing the
    severity of the sanction

      In addition to the prohibition against addressing a Member's conduct
    when it is not actually pending before the House, the Speaker has
    advised that Members should refrain from references in debate (1) to the
    motivations of a Member who filed a complaint before the Committee on
    Standards of Official Conduct (June 15, 1988, p. 14623; July 6, 1988, p.
    16630; Mar. 22, 1989, p. 5130; May 2, 1989, p. 7735; Nov. 3, 1989, p.
    27077); (2) to personal criticism of a member of the Committee on
    Standards of Official Conduct (Apr. 1, 1992, p. 7899; Mar. 3, 1995, p.
    6715; Sept. 19, 1996, p. ----; Sept. 24, 1996, p. ----); and (3) to an
    investigation undertaken by the Committee on Standards of Official
    Conduct, including suggestion of a course of action (Mar. 3, 1995, p.
    6715; Sept. 24, 1996, p. ----; Sept. 28, 1996, p. ----) or advocacy of
    an interim status report by the Committee (Sept. 12, 1996, p. ----;
    Sept. 28, 1996, p. ----).

      A Member may not read in debate extraneous material critical of
    another Member, which would be improper if spoken in the Member's own
    words (May 25, 1995, pp. 14436, 14437; Sept. 12, 1996, p. ----). Thus,
    words in a telegram read in debate which repudiated the ``lies and half-
    truths'' of a House committee report were ruled out of order as
    reflecting on the integrity of committee members (June 16, 1947, p.
    7065), and unparliamentary references in debate to newspaper accounts
    used in support of a Member's personal criticism of another Member were
    similarly ruled out of order (Feb. 25, 1985, p. 3346).

    [[Page 173]]

    bate that disparage the Speaker (June 25, 1981, p. 14056; Mar. 22, 1996,
    p. 6077). Debate on a resolution authorizing the Speaker to entertain
    motions to suspend the rules may not engage in personality by discussing
    the official conduct of the Speaker, even if possibly relevant to the
    question of empowerment of the Speaker (Sept. 24, 1996, p. ----).

    Sec. 362. Criticism of the Speaker.

      Complaint  of the conduct
    of the Speaker should be presented directly for the action of the House
    and not by way of debate on other matters (V, 5188). In a case wherein a
    Member used words insulting to the Speaker the House on a subsequent
    day, and after other business had intervened, censured the offender (II,
    1248). In such a case the Speaker would ordinarily leave the chair while
    action should be taken by the House (II, 1366; V, 5188; VI, 565). In the
    104th Congress the Chair reaffirmed that it is not in order to speak
    disrespectfully of the Speaker, and that under the precedents the
    sanctions for such violations transcend the ordinary requirements for
    timeliness of challenges (II, 1248; Jan. 4, 1995, p. 552; Jan. 19, 1995,
    p. 1599). It is not in order to arraign the personal conduct of the
    Speaker (Jan. 18, 1995, p. 1441; Jan. 19, 1995, p. 1601). For example,
    it is not in order to charge dishonesty or disregard of the rules (July
    11, 1985, p. 18550), to reflect on his patriotism by accusing him of
    ``kowtowing'' to persons who would desecrate the flag (June 20, 1990, p.
    14877), to refer to him as a ``crybaby'' (Nov. 16, 1995, p. ----), or to
    refer to official conduct of the Speaker that has previously been
    resolved by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct or the House
    (Apr. 17, 1997, p. ----). The Chair may take the initiative to admonish
    Members for references in de

    Sec. 363. Motives of Members not to be arraigned.

      * * *  The
    consequences of a measure may be reprobated in strong terms; but to
    arraign the motives of those who propose to advocate it is a
    personality, and against order. Qui digreditur a materia ad personam,
    Mr. Speaker ought to suppress. Ord. Com., 1604, Apr. 19.

      The arraignment of the motives of Members is not permitted (V, 5147-
    51; Dec. 13, 1973, p. 41270), and the Speakers have intervened to
    prevent it, in the earlier practice preventing even mildest imputations
    (V, 5161, 5162). However, remarks in debate may address political, but
    not personal, motivations for legislative positions (Jan. 24, 1995, p.
    2214; Mar. 8, 1995, pp. 7307, 7308; Nov. 17, 1995, p. ----; June 13,
    1996, p. 14043) or for committee membership (July 10, 1995, pp. 18257-
    59). Accusing another Member of hypocrisy has been held not in order
    (July 24, 1979, p. 20380; Mar. 29, 1995, p. 9675), and characterizing
    the motivation of a Member in offering an amendment as deceptive and
    hypocritical was ruled out of order (June 12, 1979, p. 11461). A
    statement in debate that an amendment could only be demagogic or racist
    because only demagoguery or racism impelled such an amendment was ruled
    out of order as impugning the motives of the Member offering the
    amendment (Dec. 3, 1973, pp. 41270, 41271). However, debate
    characterizing a pending measure as a ``patently petty political
    terrorist tactic'' was held in order as directed at the pending measure
    rather than the motive or the character of its proponent (Nov. 9, 1995,
    p. ----). While in debate the assertion of one Member may be declared
    untrue by another, yet in so doing an intentional misrepresentation must
    not be implied (V, 5157-5160), and if stated or implied is censurable
    (II, 1305) and presents a question of privilege (III, 2717; VI, 607). A
    Member in debate having declared the words of another ``a base lie,''
    censure was inflicted by the House on the offender (II, 1249).

    [[Page 174]]

    stand up to interrupt him, Town, col. 205; Mem. in Hakew., 31; nor to
    pass between the Speaker and the speaking Member, nor to go across the
    House, Scob., 6, or to walk up and down it, or to take books or papers
    from the table, or write there, 2 Hats., 171, p. 170.

    Sec. 364. Disorder and interruptions during debate.

      No  one
    is to disturb another in his speech by hissing, coughing, spitting, 6
    Grey, 322; Scob., 8; D'Ewes, 332, col. 1, 640, col. 2, speaking or
    whispering to another, Scob., 6; D'Ewes, 487, col. 1; nor

      The House has by clause 5 of rule XVII prescribed certain rules of
    decorum differing somewhat from this provision of the parliamentary law,
    but supplemental to it rather than antagonistic. In one respect,
    however, the practice of the House differs from the apparent intent of
    the parliamentary law. In the House a Member may interrupt by addressing
    the Chair for permission of the Member speaking (V, 5006; VIII, 2465);
    but it is entirely within the discretion of the Member occupying the
    floor to determine when and by whom he shall be interrupted (V, 5007,
    5008; VIII, 2463, 2465). There is no rule of the House requiring a
    Member having the floor to yield to another Member to whom he has
    referred during debate (Aug. 2, 1984, p. 22241). A Member may ask
    another to yield from any microphone in the Chamber, including those in
    the well, so long as not crossing between the Member having the floor
    and the Chair (June 5, 1998, p. ----). The Chair may take the initiative
    in preserving order when a Member declining to yield in debate continues
    to be interrupted by another Member, may order that the interrupting
    Member's remarks not appear in the Record (July 26, 1984, p. 21247), and
    may admonish Members not to converse with a Member attempting to address
    the House (Feb. 21, 1984, p. 2758), as it is not in order to engage in
    disruption while another is delivering remarks in debate (June 27, 1996,
    p. 15915). On the opening day of the 103d Congress, during the customary
    announcement of policies with respect to particular aspects of the
    legislative process, the Chair elaborated on the rules of order in
    debate with a general statement concerning decorum in the House (Jan. 5,
    1993, p. 105). Under this provision, the Chair may require a line of
    Members waiting to sign a discharge petition to proceed to the rostrum
    from the far right-hand aisle and require the line not to stand between
    the Chair and Members engaging in debate (Oct. 24, 1997, p. ----).
    Hissing and jeering is not proper decorum in the House (May 21, 1998, p.
    ----). For further discussion of interruptions in debate, see Sec. 946,
    infra.

    [[Page 175]]

    submit to the pleasure of the House, and sit down; for it scarcely ever
    happens that they are guilty of this piece of ill manners without
    sufficient reason, or inattention to a Member who says anything worth
    their hearing. 2 Hats., 77, 78.

    Sec. 365. Parliamentary method of silencing a
    tedious Member.

      Nevertheless,  if a Member finds that it is not the inclination of
    the House to hear him, and that by conversation or any other noise they
    endeavor to drown his voice, it is his most prudent way to

      In the House, where the previous question and hour rule of debate have
    been used for many years, the parliamentary method of suppressing a
    tedious Member has never been imported into the practice (V, 5445).

    Sec. 366. The parliamentary law as to naming a disorderly
    Member.

      If  repeated calls do not produce order, the Speaker may call by
    his name any Member obstinately persisting in irregularity; whereupon
    the House may require the Member to withdraw. He is then to be heard in
    exculpation, and to withdraw. Then the Speaker states the offense
    committed; and the House considers the degree of punishment they will
    inflict. 2 Hats., 167, 7, 8, 172.

      This provision of parliamentary law should be in conjunction with
    clause 4 of rule XVII, Sec. Sec. 960-961, infra, particularly as this
    provision relates to the ultimate authority of the House to determine
    whether a Member ignoring repeated calls to order should be permitted to
    proceed in order.

    [[Page 176]]

    ferences, and report to the House, 3 Grey, 419; and they are put under
    restraint if they refuse, or until they do. 9 Grey, 234, 312.

    Sec. 367. Proceedings in cases of assaults and
    affrays.

      For  instances of assaults and affrays in the House of Commons,
    and the proceedings thereon, see 1 Pet. Misc., 82; 3 Grey, 128; 4 Grey,
    328; 5 Grey, 382; 6 Grey, 254; 10 Grey, 8. Whenever warm words or an
    assault have passed between Members, the House, for the protection of
    their Members, requires them to declare in their places not to prosecute
    any quarrel, 3 Grey, 128, 293; 5 Grey, 280; or orders them to attend the
    Speaker, who is to accommodate their dif

      In several instances assaults and affrays have occurred on the floor
    of the House. Sometimes the House has allowed these affairs to pass
    without notice, the Members concerned making apologies either personally
    or through other Members (II, 1658-1662). In other cases the House has
    exacted apologies (II, 1646-1651, 1657), or required the offending
    Members to pledge themselves before the House to keep the peace (II,
    1643). In case of an aggravated assault by one Member on another on the
    portico of the Capitol for words spoken in debate, the House censured
    the assailant and three other Members who had been present, armed, to
    prevent interference (II, 1655, 1656). Assaults or affrays in the
    Committee of the Whole are dealt with by the House (II, 1648-1651).

    [[Page 177]]

    sense of the House is to be taken. 2 Hats., 199; 4 Grey, 170; 6 Grey,
    59. When any Member has spoken, or other business intervened, after
    offensive words spoken, they can not be taken notice of for censure. And
    this is for the common security of all, and to prevent mistakes which
    must happen if words are not taken down immediately. Formerly they might
    be taken down at any time the same day. 2 Hats., 196; Mem. in Hakew.,
    71; 3 Grey, 48; 9 Grey, 514.

    Sec. 368. Parliamentary law as to taking down
    disorderly words.

      Disorderly  words are not to be noticed till the Member has
    finished his speech. 5 Grey, 356; 6 Grey, 60. Then the person objecting
    to them, and desiring them to be taken down by the Clerk at the table,
    must repeat them. The Speaker then may direct the Clerk to take them
    down in his minutes; but if he thinks them not disorderly, he delays the
    direction. If the call becomes pretty general, he orders the Clerk to
    take them down, as stated by the objecting Member. They are then a part
    of his minutes, and when read to the offending Member, he may deny they
    were his words, and the House must then decide by a question whether
    they are his words or not. Then the Member may justify them, or explain
    the sense in which he used them, or apologize. If the House is
    satisfied, no further proceeding is necessary. But if two Members still
    insist to take the sense of the House, the Member must withdraw before
    that question is stated, and then the

      The House has, by clause 4 of rule XVII, provided a method of
    procedure in cases of disorderly words. The House permits and requires
    them to be noticed as soon as uttered, and has not insisted that the
    offending Member withdraw while the House is deciding as to its course
    of action.

    Sec. 369. Disorderly words taken down and reported
    from Committee of the Whole.

      Disorderly  words spoken in a committee must be
    written down as in the House; but the committee can only report them to
    the House for animadversion. 6 Grey, 46.

      This provision of the parliamentary law has been applied to the
    Committee of the Whole, rather than to select or standing committees,
    which are separately empowered to enforce rules of decorum (clause 1(a)
    of rule XI, which incorporates the provisions of rule XVII where
    applicable). The House has censured a Member for disorderly words spoken
    in Committee of the Whole and reported therefrom (II, 1259).

    Sec. 370. References in debate to the
    Executive.

      In  Parliament, to speak irreverently or seditiously against
    the King is against order. Smyth's Comw., L. 2, c. 3; 2 Hats., 170.

    [[Page 178]]

    of address) (Dec. 19, 1995, p. ----); and (3) an accusation that the
    President ``frivolously vetoed'' a bill (Nov. 8, 1995, p. ----).
    Although wide latitude is permitted in debate on a proposition to
    impeach the President (V, 5093), Members must abstain from language
    personally offensive (V, 5094; Dec. 18, 1998, p. ----); and Members must
    abstain from comparisons to the personal conduct of sitting Members of
    the House or Senate (Dec. 18, 1998, p ----). Furthermore, Members may
    not refer to evidence of alleged impeachable offenses by the President
    contained in a communication from an independent counsel pending before
    a House committee (Sept. 14, 1998, p. ----; Sept. 17, 1998, p. ----),
    although they may refer to the communication, itself, within the
    confines of proper decorum in debate (Oct. 6, 1998, p. ----). Personal
    abuse, innuendo, or ridicule of the President is not permitted (VIII,
    2497; Aug. 12, 1986, p. 21078; Oct. 21, 1987, p. 8857; Sept. 21, 1994,
    p. 25147). Under this standard the following references are not in
    order: (1) calling the President a ``liar'' or accusing him of ``lying''
    (June 26, 1985, p. 17394; Sept. 24, 1992, pp. 27345, 27346; Nov. 15,
    1995, p. ----; June 6, 1996, pp. 13228, 13229; Mar. 18, 1998, p. ----),
    or suggesting mendacity (such as suggesting the President misrepresented
    the truth, attempted to obstruct justice, and encouraged others to
    perjure themselves (Feb. 25, 1998, p. ----), questioning his credibility
    (Feb. 25, 1998, p. ----), charging him with intent to be intellectually
    dishonest (May 9, 1990, p. 9828), or stating that many were convinced he
    had ``not been honest'' (Mar. 5, 1998, p. ----); (2) attributing to him
    ``hypocrisy'' (Sept. 25, 1992, p. 27674); (3) accusing him of giving
    ``aid and comfort to the enemy'' (Jan. 25, 1995, p. 2352); (4) accusing
    him of ``demagoguery'' (Jan. 23, 1996, p. 1144; Jan. 24, 1996, pp. 1220,
    1221; May 30, 1996, pp. 12646, 12647); (5) calling him a ``draft-
    dodger'' or accusing him of ``raping the truth'' (Apr. 24, 1996, pp.
    8807, 8808; Sept. 30, 1996, p. ----); (6) describing his action as
    ``cowardly'' (Oct. 25, 1989, p. 25817); (7) referring to him as ``a
    little bugger'' (Nov. 18, 1995, p. ----); (8) alluding to alleged sexual
    misconduct on his part (May 10, 1994, p. 9697; Feb. 25, 1998, p. ----;
    Mar. 5, 1998, p. ----; May 18, 1998, p. ----); (9) alluding to a
    propensity for unethical behavior on his part (June 20, 1996, p. 14829);
    (10) discussing ``charges'' leveled at the President or under
    investigation (Mar. 19, 1998, p. ----; June 11, 1998, p. ----), or
    discussing alleged criminal conduct (Sept. 10, 1998, p. ----); and (11)
    discussing personal conduct even as a point of reference or comparison
    (July 16, 1998, p.----; Sept. 9, 1998, p. ----). The Chair may admonish
    Members transgressing this stricture even after other debate has
    intervened (Jan. 23, 1996, p. 1144).
      This provision of the parliamentary law is manifestly inapplicable to
    the House (V, 5086); and it has been held in order in debate to refer to
    the President of the United States or his opinions, either with approval
    or criticism, provided that such reference be relevant to the subject
    under discussion and otherwise conformable to the Rules of the House (V,
    5087-5091; VIII, 2500). Under this standard the following references are
    in order: (1) a reference to the probable action of the President (V,
    5092); (2) an adjuration to the President to keep his word (although an
    improper form

    [[Page 179]]

    himself, do not necessarily obtain for members of his family (July 12,
    1990, p. 17206). In the 102d Congress, the Speaker enunciated a minimal
    standard of propriety for all debate concerning nominated candidates for
    the Presidency, based on the traditional proscription against personally
    offensive references to the President even in his capacity as a
    candidate (Speaker Foley, Sept. 24, 1992, p. 27344).
      A Member may not read in debate extraneous material personally abusive
    of the President, which would be improper if spoken in the Member's own
    words (July 12, 1996, pp. 17109, 17110; July 26, 1996, p. 19458; Feb.
    26, 1998, p. ----; Mar. 17, 1998, p. ----), such as calling the
    President a liar (Mar. 3, 1993, p. 3958; Nov. 15, 1995, p. ----; May 2,
    1996, p. 10010). The Chair has advised that the protections afforded by
    Jefferson's Manual and the precedents against unparliamentary references
    to the President,

      For discussion of the stricture against addressing remarks in debate
    to the President, as in the second person, see Sec. 945, infra.

      On January 27, 1909 (VIII, 2497), the House adopted a report of a
    committee appointed to investigate the question, which report in part
    stated:

      ``The freedom of speech in debate in the House should never be denied
    or abridged, but freedom of speech in debate does not mean license to
    indulge in personal abuses or ridicule. The right of Members of the two
    Houses of Congress to criticize the official acts of the President and
    other executive officers is beyond question, but this right is subject
    to proper rules requiring decorum in debate. Such right of criticism is
    inherent upon legislative authority. The right to legislate involves the
    right to consider conditions as they are and to contrast present
    conditions with those of the past or those desired in the future. The
    right to correct abuses by legislation carries the right to consider and
    discuss abuses which exist or which are feared.

      ``It is, however, the duty of the House to require its Members in
    speech or debate to preserve that proper restraint which will permit the
    House to conduct its business in an orderly manner and without
    unnecessarily and unduly exciting animosity among its Members or
    antagonism from those other branches of the Government with which the
    House is correlated.''

    Sec. 371. The other House and its Members not to be
    criticized in debate.

      It  is a breach of order in debate to notice what
    has been said on the same subject in the other House, or the particular
    votes or majorities on it there; because the opinion of each House
    should be left to its own independency, not to be influenced by the
    proceedings of the other; and the quoting them might beget reflections
    leading to a misunderstanding between the two Houses. 8 Grey, 22.

    [[Page 180]]

    (see generally, V, 5095-5130; VIII, 2501-21; July 31, 1984, p. 21670;
    Procedure, ch. 29, sec. 14). Clause 1 of rule XVII governs debate
    concerning the Senate and permits some factual references that are a
    matter of public record and that are relevant to the making of
    legislative history on the pending measure.
      Until former clause 1 of rule XIV (current clause 1 of rule XVII) was
    amended by adoption of the rules in the 100th Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan.
    6, 1987, p. 6) and again in the 101st Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1989,
    p. 72), this principle of comity and the parliamentary law as described
    by Jefferson governed debate in the House to the full extent of its
    provisions

      It is not in order in debate to mention the name of a Senator (except
    as the sponsor of a measure or in quotations from Senate proceedings for
    the purpose of making legislative history), to refer to a Senator or his
    vote on a proposition (Procedure, ch. 29, sec. 14.2; Sept. 29, 1983, p.
    26515), or to publish the telephone number of a Senator in an attempt to
    influence his future vote (Oct. 25, 1990, p. 34083). The prohibition
    against such references to Senators includes a reference not explicitly
    naming the Senator (VIII, 2512; Feb. 23, 1994, p. 2658; June 30, 1995,
    p. 18153; Feb. 27, 1997, p. ----). In one case, the personal views of a
    Senator, not uttered in the Senate, were allowed to be quoted in the
    House (V, 5112), but the weight of recent precedent and the purposes of
    the rule prohibit references to speeches or statements of Senators
    occurring outside the Senate Chamber (VIII, 2515; June 26, 1935, p.
    10189; May 2, 1941, p. 3566; Procedure, ch. 29, sec. 14.3; May 21, 1984,
    p. 13024). Remarks in debate during the pendency of an impeachment
    resolution may not include comparisons to the personal conduct of
    sitting Members of the House or Senate (Dec. 18, 1998, p. ----).

    [[Page 181]]

      With respect to references to Members of the Senate acting in another
    capacity, references to former Members of the House who are presently
    Senators are only permissible if they merely address prior House service
    and are not implicitly critical of Senate service (May 8, 1984, p.
    11428). A Member of the House has been permitted to refer to a speech
    made in the Senate by one no longer a Member of that body (V, 5112),
    although references to Senate proceedings on legislation in the current
    Congress other than those expressly permitted to establish legislative
    history should be avoided. In the 104th Congress the Chair held that the
    precise standard in clause 1 of former rule XIV (current rule XVII) for
    references to ``individual Members of the Senate'' does not apply to
    references to former Senators or to the Vice President in his former
    capacity as a Senator (Dec. 14, 1995, p. ----). References in debate to
    the Vice President (as President of the Senate) are governed by the
    standards of reference permitted toward the President rather than the
    more stringent prohibitions under clause 1 of former rule XIV (current
    rule XVII) against references to sitting Senators (Dec. 14, 1995, p. --
    --; July 14, 1998, p. ----). References to Members of the Senate in
    their capacities as candidates for the Presidency or other office are
    not prohibited; where a Senator is a candidate for President or Vice
    President his official policies, actions, and opinions as a candidate
    may be criticized in terms not personally offensive (Speaker Wright,
    Sept. 29, 1988, p. 26683), but references attacking the character or
    integrity of a Senator even in that context are not in order (Oct. 30,
    1979, p. 30150).

      A Member may not read or quote from the record of speeches or
    proceedings in the Senate, or insert such material in the Record (V,
    5107-5111; VIII, 2501-2506; June 25, 1986, p. 15576; Procedure, ch. 29,
    sec. 14.3) except to make legislative history on a measure then under
    debate, and the prohibition extends to quoting accounts of Senate
    debates printed elsewhere, such as in reprints or in the press (VIII,
    2053).

      Except as permitted in clause 1 of rule XVII, it is not in order to
    characterize the position of the Senate, or of Senators designated by
    name or position, on legislative issues (Oct. 5, 1984, p. 30326; Oct.
    11, 1984, p. 32153; Nov. 2, 1989, p. 26918; July 12, 1990, p. 17205), or
    to speculate as to the intent of Senators or of the Senate on
    legislation (Oct. 11, 1984, pp. 32221-23; Oct. 21, 1997, p. ----), or to
    characterize Senate action or inaction (see, e.g., Apr. 29, 1986, p.
    8856; July 31, 1986, p. 18253; Aug. 4, 1987, p. 22288; Oct. 28, 1993, p.
    26538; Jan. 3, 1996, p. 61); or to question the courage or resolve of
    its Members (Aug. 4, 1989, p. 19315). Nor is it in order in debate to
    specifically urge that the Senate take certain action; thus a Member may
    not refer to confirmation proceedings in the Senate by advocating that
    it take a certain action with respect to a Presidential nominee (Feb. 7,
    1984, p. 1979; Oct. 8, 1991, p. 25754; May 24, 1995, p. 14304; Oct. 30,
    1997, p. ----), or by characterizing the action of a Senate committee on
    a judicial nominee (July 9, 1992, p. 18342), suggest that the President
    urge Senate conferees to meet with House conferees on specific
    legislation (Aug. 2, 1984, p. 22270); or by accusing the Senate majority
    leadership of failing to schedule a bill (Oct. 5, 1998, p. ----).

      Even prior to the 100th Congress (as indicated in Procedure, ch. 29,
    sec. 14.1) it was permissible to refer to proceedings in the other
    House, provided the reference does not contravene the principles stated
    by Jefferson. A Member must be permitted to refer to the existence of
    the Senate and its functions in a general and neutral way. For example,
    a Member may oppose a sine die adjournment resolution on the grounds
    that Congress should stay in session to complete action on specified
    legislation then pending in the Senate (V, 5115). It is appropriate to
    state whether or not the Senate has acted on House-passed legislation as
    long as criticism is neither stated nor implied (Oct. 4, 1984, p.
    30047). If references to the Senate are appropriate, the Member
    delivering them is not required to use the term ``the other body,'' and
    the use of the term ``Senate'' is not a per se violation of the rule of
    comity (Oct. 4, 1984, p. 30047). It is in order in debate, while
    discussing a question involving conference committee procedure, to state
    what actually occurred in a conference committee session, without
    referring to or criticizing a named Member of the Senate (July 29, 1935,
    p. 12011).

    [[Page 182]]

    ---- ); for purpose of complimenting (VIII, 2509; Apr. 21, 1993, pp.
    8013, 8014), or read a paper making such criticism (V, 5127); and the
    inhibition extends to references to the remarks or actions of a Senator
    outside the Senate (VIII, 2515; Speaker Albert, Oct. 7, 1975, p. 32055).
    The prohibition extends to references to another person's criticism of a
    Member of the Senate (Aug. 4, 1983, p. 23145). It has even been held out
    of order to criticize words spoken in the Senate by one not a Member of
    that body in the course of an impeachment trial (V, 5106). After
    examination by a committee a speech reflecting on the character of the
    Senate was ordered to be stricken from the Record, on the ground that it
    tended to create ``unfriendly conditions between the two bodies * * *
    obstructive of wise legislation and little short of a public calamity''
    (V, 5129). But where a Member has been assailed in the Senate, he has
    been permitted to explain his own conduct and motives, without bringing
    the whole controversy into discussion or assailing the Senator (V, 5123-
    5126). Propositions relating to breaches of these principles have been
    entertained as of privilege (V, 5129, 6980).
      While the Senate may be referred to properly in debate, it is not in
    order to criticize its acts (V, 5114-5120; Dec. 10, 1980, p. 33205; Apr.
    27, 1993, p. 8271); refer to a Senator in terms of personal criticism
    (V, 5121, 5122; VIII, 2518, 2521; July 10, 1990, p. 17205); even
    anonymously (VIII, 2512; Feb. 23, 1994, p. 2658; June 30, 1995, p. 1853;
    Feb. 27, 1997, p.

      On one occasion before the rule was changed in the 101st Congress to
    permit certain quotations from Senate proceedings for the purpose of
    making legislative history, the Speaker entertained a unanimous-consent
    request that a Member be permitted to refer in debate to Senate
    proceedings (to quote a statement by the Senate Majority Leader as to
    probable Senate action on the measure then pending in the House), but
    the Speaker first ascertained in what manner the reference would be
    made, in order to assure that remarks critical of the Senate, its
    Members or proceedings would not be made (Speaker O'Neill, June 4, 1980,
    p. 13212). But the Chair will not entertain such a request where the
    references would necessarily imply criticism of the Senate, such as to
    respond to remarks in the Senate which were critical of Members of the
    House (VIII, 2519).

    Sec. 373. Complaint by one House of conduct of a
    Member of the other.

      Neither  House can exercise any authority over a Member or
    officer of the other, but should complain to the House of which he is,
    and leave the punishment to them.

    [[Page 183]]

    sider the matter as a breach of privilege (III, 2657). While on one
    occasion it was held that a resolution offered in the House requesting
    the Senate to expunge from the Record statements in criticism of a
    Member of the House did not constitute a question of privilege, being in
    violation of the rule prohibiting references to the Senate in debate
    (VIII, 2519), a properly drafted resolution referring to language
    published in the record on a designated page of Senate proceedings as
    constituting a breach of privilege and requesting the Senate to take
    appropriate action concerning the subject has been held to present a
    question of the privileges of the House (VIII, 2516).

      In a notable instance, wherein a Member of the House had assaulted a
    Senator in the Senate Chamber for words spoken in debate, the Senate
    examined the breach of privilege and transmitted its report to the
    House, which punished the Member (II, 1622). A Senator having assailed a
    House Member in debate, the House messaged to the Senate a resolution
    declaring the language a breach of privilege and requested the Senate to
    take appropriate action (Sept. 27, 1951, p. 12270). The Senator
    subsequently asked unanimous consent to correct his remarks in the
    permanent Congressional Record, but objection was raised (Sept. 28,
    1951, p. 12383). But where certain Members of the House, in a published
    letter, sought to influence the vote of a Senator in an impeachment
    trial, the House declined to con

    Sec. 374. Duty of the Speaker to prevent expressions
    offensive to the other House.

      * * *  Where the complaint is of words
    disrespectfully spoken by a Member of another House, it is difficult to
    obtain punishment, because of the rules supposed necessary to be
    observed (as to the immediate noting down of words) for the security of
    Members. Therefore it is the duty of the House, and more particularly of
    the Speaker, to interfere immediately, and not to permit expressions to
    go unnoticed which may give a ground of complaint to the other House,
    and introduce proceedings and mutual accusations between the two Houses,
    which can hardly be terminated without difficulty and disorder. 3 Hats.,
    51.

    [[Page 184]]

    to proceed in order (Speaker O'Neill, June 16, 1982, p. 13843). While
    the Chair should take the initiative to prevent improper references to
    the Senate in debate, the Chair will not respond to hypothetical
    questions as to the propriety of possible characterizations of Senate
    actions prior to their use in debate (Oct. 24, 1985, p. 28819). For a
    further discussion of the Speaker's duties regarding unparliamentary
    debate, see Sec. Sec. 960-961, infra.

      In the House this rule of the parliamentary law is considered as
    binding on the Chair (V, 5130; VIII, 2465), and it is the duty of the
    Speaker to call to order a Member who criticizes the actions of the
    Senate, its Members or committees in debate or through an insertion in
    the Record (Speaker Albert, Apr. 17, 1975, p. 10458; Oct. 7, 1975, p.
    32055). The Chair has distinguished between engaging in personality
    toward another Member of the House, as to which the Chair normally
    awaits a point of order from the floor, and improper references to
    Members of the Senate, which violate comity between the Houses whether
    or not engaging in personality, as to which the Chair normally takes
    initiative (Feb. 27, 1997, p. ----). Pending consideration of a measure
    relating to the Senate, the Speaker announced his intention to strictly
    enforce this provision of Jefferson's Manual prohibiting improper
    references to the Senate, and to deny recognition to Members violating
    the prohibition, subject to permission of the House

    Sec. 375. Course of the Member when business concerning
    himself is debating.

      No  Member may be present when a bill or any business
    concerning himself is debating; nor is any Member to speak to the merits
    of it till he withdraws. 2 Hats., 219. The rule is that if a charge
    against a Member arise out of a report of a committee, or examination of
    witnesses in the House, as the Member knows from that to what points he
    is to direct his exculpation, he may be heard to those points before any
    question is moved or stated against him. He is then to be heard, and
    withdraw before any question is moved. But if the question itself is the
    charge, as for breach of order or matter arising in the debate, then the
    charge must be stated (that is, the question must be moved), himself
    heard, and then to withdraw. 2 Hats., 121, 122.

    [[Page 185]]

      In 1832, during proceedings for the censure of a Member, the Speaker
    informed the Member that he should retire (II, 1366); but this seems to
    be an exceptional instance of the enforcement of the law of Parliament.
    In other cases, after the proposition for censure or expulsion has been
    proposed, Members have been heard in debate, either as a matter of right
    (II, 1286), as a matter of course (II, 1246, 1253), by express provision
    (II, 1273), and in writing (II, 1273), or by unanimous consent (II,
    1275). A Member against whom a resolution of censure was pending was
    asked by the Speaker if he desired to be heard (VI, 236). But a Member
    was not permitted to depute another Member to speak in his behalf (II,
    1273). In modern practice the Member has been permitted to speak in his
    own behalf, both in censure (June 10, 1980, pp. 13802-11) and expulsion
    proceedings (Oct. 2, 1980, pp. 28953-78). A Member-elect has been
    permitted to participate in debate on a resolution relating to his right
    to take the oath (Jan. 10, 1967, p. 23).

    Sec. 376. Disqualifying personal interest of a
    Member.

      Where  the private interests of a Member are concerned in a bill or
    question he is to withdraw. And where such an interest has appeared, his
    voice has been disallowed, even after a division. In a case so contrary,
    not only to the laws of decency, but to the fundamental principle of the
    social compact, which denies to any man to be a judge in his own cause,
    it is for the honor of the House that this rule of immemorial observance
    should be strictly adhered to. 2 Hats., 119, 121; 6 Grey, 368.

      In the House it has not been usual for the Member to withdraw when his
    private interests are concerned in a pending measure, but the House has
    provided by clause 1 of rule III that the Member shall not vote in such
    a contingency. In one instance the Senate disallowed a vote given by a
    Senator on a question relating to his own right to a seat; but the House
    has never had occasion to proceed so far (V, 5959).

    Sec. 377. Wearing of hats by Members.

      No  Member is to come
    into the House with his head covered, nor to remove from one place to
    another with his hat on, nor is to put on his hat in coming in or
    removing, until he be set down in his place. Scob., 6.

    Sec. 378. Adjournment of questions of order.

      Until 1837 the parliamentary practice of wearing hats during the
    session continued in the House; but in that year it was abolished by
    current clause 5 of rule XVII.
       A question of
    order may be adjourned to give time to look into precedents. 2 Hats.,
    118.

    [[Page 186]]

    House, to prevent arbitrary obstruction of the pending business by the
    Chair. On occasion, the Chair has reversed as erroneous a decision
    previously made (VI, 639; VII, 849; VIII, 2794, 3435). The law of
    Parliament evidently contemplates that the adjournment of a question of
    order shall be controlled by the House.

    <>   In
    Parliament, all decisions of the Speaker may be controlled by the House.
    3 Grey, 319.

      The Speaker has declined, on a difficult question of order, to rule
    until he had taken time for examination (III, 2725; VI, 432; VII, 2106;
    VIII, 2174, 2396, 3475), and may take a parliamentary inquiry under
    advisement, especially where not related to the pending proceedings
    (VIII, 2174; Apr. 7, 1992, p. 8274), but it is conceivable that a case
    might arise wherein this privilege of the Chair would require approval
    of the majority of the

      The Speaker's decision on a decision of order is subject to appeal by
    any Member (clause 5 of rule I).