    [Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 106th Congress]
    [106th Congress]
    [House Document 105-358]
    [Rules of the House of Representatives]
    [Pages 782-821]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

    [[Page 782]]

    Reservation of certain points of order
                    Rule XXI.--RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN BILL

    1035. Reservation of points of order.

      1.  At the time a
    general appropriation bill is reported, all points of order against
    provisions therein shall be considered as reserved.

      This clause was added in the 104th Congress (sec. 215(e), H. Res. 6,
    Jan. 4, 1995, p. 468), rendering unnecessary the former practice that a
    Member reserve points of order when a general appropriation bill was
    referred to the calendar of the Committee of the Whole House on the
    state of the Union, in order that provisions in violation of rule XXI
    could be stricken in the Committee of the Whole (see Sec. 1044, infra).
    Before the House recodified its rules in the 106th Congress, this
    provision was found in former clause 8 of rule XXI (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6,
    1999, p. ----).

                                                          Rule XXI, clause 2
    Rule XXI, clause 2
    General appropriation bills and amendments

    1036. Unauthorized appropriations in reported
    general appropriation bills or amendments thereto.

      2. (a)(1)  An appropriation
    may not be reported in a general appropriation bill, and may not be in
    order as an amendment thereto, for an expenditure not previously
    authorized by law, except to continue appropriations for public works
    and objects that are already in progress.

    [[Page 783]]

    originally appropriated that are reported by the Committee on
    Appropriations.

    Sec. 1037. Reappropriations prohibited.

      (2)  A
    reappropriation of unexpended balances of appropriations may not be
    reported in a general appropriation bill, and may not be in order as an
    amendment thereto, except to continue appropriations for public works
    and objects that are already in progress. This subparagraph does not
    apply to transfers of unexpended balances within the department or
    agency for which they were

    Sec. 1038. Legislation in reported general appropriation
    bills; exceptions.

      (b)  A provision changing existing law may not be
    reported in a general appropriation bill, including a provision making
    the availability of funds contingent on the receipt or possession of
    information not required by existing law for the period of the
    appropriation, except germane provisions that retrench expenditures by
    the reduction of amounts of money covered by the bill (which may include
    those recommended to the Committee on Appropriations by direction of a
    legislative committee having jurisdiction over the subject matter) and
    except rescissions of appropriations contained in appropriation Acts.

    [[Page 784]]

    Sec. 1039. Legislation or limitations in amendments to
    general appropriation bills.

      (c)  An amendment to a general appropriation
    bill shall not be in order if changing existing law, including an
    amendment making the availability of funds contingent on the receipt or
    possession of information not required by existing law for the period of
    the appropriation. Except as provided in paragraph (d), an amendment
    proposing a limitation not specifically contained or authorized in
    existing law for the period of the limitation shall not be in order
    during consideration of a general appropriation bill.

    Sec. 1040. Motion to rise and report as preferential to
    limitation or retrenchment amendments.

      (d)  After a general appropriation
    bill has been read for amendment, a motion that the Committee of the
    Whole House on the state of the Union rise and report the bill to the
    House with such amendments as may have been adopted shall, if offered by
    the Majority Leader or a designee, have precedence over motions to amend
    the bill. If such a motion to rise and report is rejected or not
    offered, amendments proposing limitations not specifically contained or
    authorized in existing law for the period of the limitation or proposing
    germane amendments that retrench expenditures by reductions of amounts
    of money covered by the bill may be considered.

    Sec. 1041. Designated emergencies in reported
    appropriation bills.

      (e)  A provision other than an appropriation
    designated an emergency under section 251(b)(2) or section 252(e) of the
    Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, a rescission of
    budget authority, or a reduction in direct spending or an amount for a
    designated emergency may not be reported in an appropriation bill or
    joint resolution containing an emergency designation under section
    251(b)(2) or section 252(e) of such Act and may not be in order as an
    amendment thereto.

    [[Page 785]]

    transfer appropriations among objects in the bill without increasing the
    levels of budget authority or outlays in the bill. When considered en
    bloc under this paragraph, such amendments may amend portions of the
    bill not yet read for amendment (following disposition of any points of
    order against such portions) and is not subject to a demand for division
    of the question in the House or in the Committee of the Whole.

    Sec. 1042. Offsetting amendments en bloc to appropriation
    bills.

      (f)  During the reading of an appropriation bill for amendment in
    the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, it shall be
    in order to consider en bloc amendments proposing only to

    Sec. 1043. Clause 2 of rule XXI, generally.

      The  25th
    Congress in 1837 was the first to adopt a rule prohibiting
    appropriations in a general appropriation bill or amendment thereto not
    previously authorized by law, in order to prevent delay of appropriation
    bills because of contention over propositions of legislation. In 1838
    that Congress added the exception to permit unauthorized appropriations
    for continuation of works in progress and for contingencies for carrying
    on departments of the Government. The rule remained in that form until
    the 44th Congress in 1876, when William S. Holman of Indiana persuaded
    the House to amend the rule to permit germane legislative retrenchments.
    In 1880, the 46th Congress dropped the exception which permitted
    unauthorized appropriations for contingencies of Government departments,
    and modified the ``Holman Rule'' to define retrenchments as the
    reduction of the number and salary of officers of the United States, the
    reduction of compensation of any person paid out of the Treasury of the
    United States, or the reduction of the amounts of money covered by the
    bill. That form of the retrenchment exception remained in place until
    the 49th Congress in 1885, when it was dropped until the 52d Congress in
    1891, and then reinserted through the 53d Congress until 1894. It was
    again dropped in the 54th Congress from 1895 until reinserted in the 62d
    Congress in 1911 (IV, 3578; VII, 1125).

      The clause remained unamended until January 3, 1983, when the 98th
    Congress restructured it in the basic form of paragraphs (a)-(d).
    Clerical and stylistic changes were effected when the House recodified
    its rules in the 106th Congress, including a change to clause 2(a)(2) to
    clarify that the point of order lies against the offending provision in
    the text and not against consideration of the entire bill. At that time
    former clause 6 was transferred to clause 2(a)(2) and former clause 2(a)
    became clause 2(a)(1) (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. ----).

      Paragraph (a)(1) (former paragraph (a)) retained the prohibition
    against unauthorized appropriations in general appropriation bills and
    amendments thereto except in continuation of works in progress.

    [[Page 786]]

    ing rules in the 83d Congress (Jan. 3, 1953, p. 24). Previously, a
    reappropriation of an unexpended balance for an object authorized by law
    was in order on a general appropriation bill (IV, 3591, 3592; VII, 1156,
    1158). This provision was amended in the 99th Congress by section 228(b)
    of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (P.L.
    99-177, Dec. 12, 1985) to permit the Committee on Appropriations to
    report transfers of unexpended balances within the department or agency
    for which originally appropriated.
      Paragraph (a)(2) (former clause 6), from section 139(c) of the
    Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 190f(c)), was made part
    of the stand

      Paragraph (b) narrowed the ``Holman Rule'' exception from the
    prohibition against legislation to cover only retrenchments reducing
    amounts of money included in the bill as reported, and permitted
    legislative committees with proper jurisdiction to recommend such
    retrenchments to the Appropriations Committee for discretionary
    inclusion in the reported bill. The last exception in paragraph (b),
    permitting the inclusion of legislation rescinding appropriations in
    appropriation Acts, was added in the 99th Congress by the Balanced
    Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (sec. 228(a), P.L. 99-
    177). The latter feature of the paragraph does not extend to a
    rescission of contract authority provided by a law other than an
    appropriation Act (Sept. 22, 1993, p. 22138; May 15, 1997, p. ----; July
    23, 1997, p. ----). In the 105th Congress paragraph (b) was amended to
    treat as legislation a provision reported in a general appropriation
    bill that makes funding contingent on whether circumstances not made
    determinative by existing law are ``known'' (H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 1997, p.
    ----).

      Paragraph (c) retained the prohibition against amendments changing
    existing law but permitted limitation amendments during the reading of
    the bill by paragraph only if specifically authorized by existing law
    for the period of the limitation. In the 105th Congress paragraph (c)
    was amended to treat as legislation an amendment to a general
    appropriation bill that makes funding contingent on whether
    circumstances not made determinative by existing law are ``known'' (H.
    Res. 5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. ----). The exception for limitations is
    strictly construed to apply only where existing law requires or permits
    the inclusion of limiting language in an appropriation Act, and not
    merely where the limitation is alleged to be ``consistent with existing
    law'' (June 28, 1988, p. 16267). Although the Committee on
    Appropriations may include a limitation in its reported bill, if it is
    stricken with other legislative language on a point of order it may be
    reinserted during the reading only if in compliance with clause 2(c) or
    in accordance with clause 2(d) (June 18, 1991, p. 15199).

    [[Page 787]]

    the motion preferential to any motion to amend at that stage (H. Res. 5,
    Jan. 7, 1997, p. ----). Where the reading of a general appropriation
    bill for amendment has been completed (or dispensed with), including the
    last paragraph of the bill containing the citation to the short title
    (July 30, 1986, p. 18214), the Chair (under the former form of the rule,
    which made the preferential motion available to any Member) might first
    inquire whether any Member sought to offer an amendment (formerly, one
    not prohibited by clauses 2(a) or (c)) prior to recognizing Members to
    offer limitation or retrenchment amendments (June 2, 1983, p. 14317;
    Sept. 22, 1983, p. 25406; Oct. 27, 1983, p. 29630), including pro forma
    amendments (Aug. 2, 1989, p. 18126). Pursuant to clause 2(d), a motion
    that the Committee rise and report the bill to the House with such
    amendments as may have been adopted is not debatable (Apr. 23, 1987, p.
    9613) and takes precedence over any amendment (formerly only over a
    limitation or retrenchment amendment) (July 30, 1985, p. 21534; July 23,
    1986, p. 17431; Apr. 23, 1987, p. 9613), but only after completion of
    the reading and disposition of amendments not otherwise precluded (June
    30, 1992, p. 17135). Thus a motion that the Committee rise and report
    the bill to the House with the recommendation that it be recommitted,
    with instructions to report back to the House (forthwith or otherwise)
    with an amendment proposing a limitation, does not take precedence over
    the motion to rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments
    as may have been adopted (sustained on appeal, Sept. 19, 1983, p.
    24647). An amendment not only reducing an amount in a paragraph of an
    appropriation bill but also limiting expenditure of those funds on a
    particular project (i.e., a limitation not contained in existing law)
    was held not in order during the reading of that paragraph but only at
    the end of the bill under clause 2(d) (July 23, 1986, p. 17431; June 15,
    1988, p. 14719). Where language of limitation was stricken from a
    general appropriation bill on a point of order that it changed existing
    law, an amendment proposing to reinsert the limitation without its
    former legislative content was held not in order before completion of
    the reading for amendment (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22214). A motion that the
    Committee of the Whole rise and report to the House with the
    recommendation that the enacting clause be stricken out takes precedence
    over the motion to amend under clause 9 of rule XVIII (former clause 7
    of rule XXIII) and thus over the motion to rise and report under clause
    2(d) (July 24, 1986, p. 17641).
      Paragraph (d) provided a new procedure for consideration of
    retrenchment and other limitation amendments only when reading of a
    general appropriation bill has been completed and only if the Committee
    of the Whole does not adopt a motion to rise and report the bill back to
    the House (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1983, p. 34). In the 104th Congress
    paragraph (d) was amended to limit the availability of its preferential
    motion to rise and report to the Majority Leader or his designee (sec.
    215(a), H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 468). In the 105th Congress it was
    further amended to make

      Paragraphs (e) and (f) were added in the 104th Congress (sec. 215, H.
    Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 468).

    [[Page 788]]

    vide funds until regular appropriation bills are enacted (Sept. 21,
    1967, p. 26370), nor a joint resolution providing an appropriation for a
    single Government agency and permitting a transfer of a portion of those
    funds to another agency (Oct. 25, 1979, p. 29627), nor a joint
    resolution transferring funds already appropriated from one specific
    agency to another (Mar. 26, 1980, p. 6716), nor a joint resolution
    transferring unobligated balances to the President to be available for
    specified purposes but containing no new budget authority (Mar. 3, 1988,
    p. 3239), are ``general appropriation bills'' within the purview of this
    clause. A point of order under this rule does not apply to a special
    order reported from the Committee on Rules ``self-executing'' the
    adoption in the House of an amendment changing existing law (July 27,
    1993, p. 17117).

    Sec. 1044. Points of order on general
    appropriation bills.

      As the rule  applies only to general appropriation bills,
    which are not enumerated or defined in the rules (VII, 1116) bills
    appropriating only for one purpose have been held not to be ``general''
    within the meaning of this rule (VII, 1122). Neither a resolution
    providing an appropriation for a single Government agency (Jan. 31,
    1962, p. 1352), nor a joint resolution only containing continuing
    appropriations for diverse agencies to pro

      As all bills making or authorizing appropriations require
    consideration in Committee of the Whole, it follows that the enforcement
    of the rule must ordinarily occur during consideration in Committee of
    the Whole, where the Chair, in response to a point of order, may rule
    out any portion of the bill in conflict with the rule (IV, 3811; Sept.
    8, 1965, pp. 23140, 23182). Portions of the bill thus stricken are not
    reported back to the House.

      Prior to the adoption of clause 1 (former clause 8) in the 104th
    Congress (see Sec. 1035, supra), it was necessary that some Member
    reserve points of order when a general appropriation bill was referred
    to the calendar of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the
    Union, in order that provisions in violation of the rule could be
    stricken in the Committee (V, 6921-6925; VIII, 3450; Feb. 6, 1926, p.
    3456). Where points of order had been reserved pending a unanimous-
    consent request that the committee be permitted to file its report when
    the House would not be in session, it was not necessary that they be
    reserved again when the report ultimately was presented as privileged
    when the House was in session, as the initial reservation carried over
    to the subsequent filing (Mar. 1, 1983, p. 3241). In an instance where
    points of order were not reserved against an appropriation bill when it
    was reported to the House and referred to the Committee of the Whole,
    points of order in the Committee of the Whole against a proposition in
    violation of this clause were overruled on the ground that the Chairman
    of the Committee of the Whole lacked authority to pass upon the question
    (Apr. 8, 1943, p. 3150, 3153). The enforcement of the rule also occurs
    in the House in that a motion to recommit a general appropriation bill
    may not propose an amendment containing legislation (Sept. 1, 1976, p.
    28883) or a limitation not considered in the Committee of the Whole
    (Speaker Foley, Aug. 1, 1989, p. 17159; Aug. 3, 1989, p. 18546); and
    such amendment is precluded whether the Committee of the Whole has risen
    and reported automatically pursuant to a special rule or, instead, by a
    motion at the end of the reading for amendment (June 22, 1995, p.
    16844).

    [[Page 789]]

      By unanimous consent the Committee of the Whole may vacate proceedings
    under specified points of order (June 7, 1991, p. 13973).

      Points of order against unauthorized appropriations or legislation on
    general appropriation bills may be made as to the whole or only a
    portion of a paragraph (IV, 3652; V, 6881). The fact that a point is
    made against a portion of a paragraph does not prevent another point
    against the whole paragraph (V, 6882; July 31, 1985, p. 21895), nor does
    it prevent another Member from demanding that the original point of
    order be extended to the entire paragraph (July 16, 1998, p. ----). If a
    portion of a proposed amendment is out of order, it is sufficient for
    the rejection of the whole amendment (V, 6878-6880); and if a point of
    order is sustained against any portion of a package of amendments
    considered en bloc, all the amendments are ruled out of order and must
    be reoffered separately, or those which are not subject to a point of
    order may be considered en bloc by unanimous consent (Sept. 16, 1981,
    pp. 20735-38; June 21, 1984, p. 17687). Where a point is sustained
    against the whole of a paragraph the whole must go out, but it is
    otherwise when the point is made only against a portion (V, 6884, 6885).
    General appropriation bills are read ``scientifically'' only by
    paragraph headings and appropriation amounts, and points of order
    against a paragraph must be made before an amendment is offered thereto
    or before the Clerk reads the next paragraph heading and amount
    (Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 2.26). A point of order
    against a paragraph under this clause may be made only after that
    paragraph has been read by the Clerk, and not prior to its reading
    pending consideration of an amendment inserting language immediately
    prior thereto (June 6, 1985, pp. 14605, 14609). Where the reading of a
    paragraph of a general appropriation bill has been dispensed with by
    unanimous consent, the Chair inquires whether there are points of order
    against the paragraph before entertaining amendments or directing the
    Clerk to read further, but he does not make such an inquiry where the
    Clerk has actually read the paragraph (May 31, 1984, p. 14608). Where
    the bill is considered as having been read and open to amendment by
    unanimous consent, points of order against provisions in the bill must
    be made before amendments are offered, and cannot be reserved pending
    subsequent action on amendments (Dec. 1, 1982, p. 28175). Where a
    chapter is considered as read by unanimous consent and open to amendment
    at any point, no amendments are offered and the Clerk begins to read the
    next chapter, it is too late to make a point of order against a
    paragraph in the preceding chapter (June 11, 1985, p. 15181). It is too
    late to rule out the entire paragraph after points of order against
    specific portions have been sustained and an amendment to the paragraph
    has been offered (June 27, 1974, pp. 21670-72).

    [[Page 790]]

    1968, p. 15357; Nov. 30, 1982, p. 28062). Where a provision is
    susceptible to more than one interpretation, that burden may be met by a
    showing that only the requirements of existing law, and not any new
    requirements, are recited in the language (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22206).
    The Chair may overrule a point of order that appropriations for a
    certain agency are unauthorized upon citation to an organic statute
    creating the agency, absent any showing that the organic law has been
    overtaken by a scheme of periodic reauthorization; the Chair may hear
    further argument and reverse his ruling, however, where existing law not
    previously called to the Chair's attention would require the ruling to
    be reversed (VIII, 3435; June 8, 1983, p. 14854, where a law amending
    the statute creating the Bureau of the Mint with the express purpose of
    requiring annual authorizations was subsequently called to the Chair's
    attention). Reported provisions in a general appropriation bill
    described in the accompanying report as directly or indirectly changing
    the application of existing law are presumably legislation, absent
    rebuttal by the committee (May 31, 1984, p. 14591). The burden of proof
    to show that an appropriation contained in an amendment is authorized by
    law is on the proponent of the amendment (May 11, 1971, p. 14471; Oct.
    29, 1991, p. 28791; July 26, 1995, p. ----; July 27, 1995, pp. ----, --
    --; July 31, 1995, p. ----; May 15, 1997, p. ----) and the burden is on
    the proponent of an amendment to a general appropriation bill to prove
    that language offered under the guise of a limitation does not change
    existing law (July 17, 1975, p. 23239; June 16, 1976, p. 18666; July 18,
    1995, p. ----) including the burden to prove that the duties imposed are
    merely ministerial or already required under existing law (July 26,
    1998, p. ----). If the amendment is susceptible to more than one
    interpretation, it is incumbent upon the proponent to show that it is
    not in violation of the rule (Procedure, ch. 25, sec. 6.3; July 28,
    1980, p. 19924). The mere recitation in an amendment that a
    determination is to be made pursuant to existing laws and regulations,
    absent a citation to the law imposing such responsibility, is not
    sufficient proof by the proponent of an amendment to overcome a point of
    order that the amendment constitutes legislation (Sept. 16, 1980, p.
    25606). The authorization must be enacted before the appropriation may
    be included in an appropriation bill; thus delaying the availability of
    an appropriation pending enactment of an authorization does not protect
    the item of appropriation against a point of order under this clause
    (Apr. 26, 1972, p. 14455).
      In the administration of the rule, it is the practice that those
    upholding an item of appropriation should have the burden of showing the
    law authorizing it (IV, 3597; VII, 1179, 1233, 1276). Thus the burden of
    proving the authorization for language carried in an appropriation bill,
    or that the language in the bill constitutes a valid limitation which
    does not change existing law, falls on the proponents and managers of
    the bill (May 28,

    [[Page 791]]

    a point of order under clause 2(c) of rule XXI that an amendment to an
    appropriation bill constitutes legislation (July 24, 1996, p. 18898).
      The inclusion of funds in a general appropriation bill in the form of
    a ``not to exceed'' limitation does not obviate a point of order that
    the funds are not authorized by law (June 21, 1988, p. 15440). The fact
    that legislative jurisdiction over the subject matter of an amendment
    may rest with the Committee on Appropriations does not immunize the
    amendment from the application of clause 2(c) of rule XXI (July 17,
    1996, p. 17550; July 24, 1996, p. 18898). The ``works in progress
    exception'' under clause 2(a) of rule XXI is a defense to a point of
    order against an unauthorized appropriation reported in a general
    appropriation bill and is not a defense to

      For a discussion of perfecting amendments to unauthorized
    appropriations or legislation permitted to remain in a general
    appropriation bill by failure to raise or by waiver of a point of order,
    see Sec. 1057, infra.

    [[Page 792]]

    in order in the agricultural appropriation bill (IV, 3649). It has once
    been held that this law would also authorize appropriations for the
    instrumentalities of such investigations (IV, 3615); but these would not
    include the organization of a bureau to conduct the work (IV, 3651). The
    law does not authorize general investigations by the department (IV,
    3652), or cooperation with State investigations (IV, 3650; VII, 1301,
    1302), or the investigation of foods in relation to commerce (IV, 3647,
    3648; VII, 1298), or the compiling of tests at an exposition (IV, 3653).
    A paragraph of a general appropriation bill both establishing and
    funding a commission was ruled out as constituting legislation and
    carrying unauthorized appropriations (June 29, 1988, p. 16470). A
    paragraph appropriating funds for matching grants to States was held
    unauthorized where the authorizing law did not require State matching
    funds (June 28, 1993, p. 14418). A paragraph funding a project from the
    Highway Trust Fund was held unauthorized where such funding was
    authorized only from the general fund (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22175). A
    paragraph providing funds for the President to meet ``unanticipated
    needs'' was held unauthorized (July 16, 1998, p. ----).

    Sec. 1045. Authorization of law for
    appropriations.

      The authorization  by existing law required in the rule to justify
    appropriations may be made also by a treaty if it has been ratified by
    both the contracting parties (IV, 3587); however, where existing law
    authorizes appropriations for the U.S. share of facilities to be
    recommended in an agreement with another country containing specified
    elements, an agreement in principle with that country predating the
    authorization law and lacking the required elements is insufficient
    authorization (June 28, 1993, p. 14421). An Executive order does not
    constitute sufficient authorization in law absent proof of its
    derivation from a statute enacted by Congress authorizing the order and
    expenditure of funds (June 15, 1973, p. 19855; June 25, 1974, p. 21036).
    Thus a Reorganization Plan submitted by the President pursuant to 5
    U.S.C. 906 has the status of statutory law when it becomes effective and
    is sufficient authorization to support an appropriation for an office
    created by Executive order issued pursuant to the Reorganization Plan
    (June 21, 1974, p. 20595). A resolution of the House has been held
    sufficient authorization for an appropriation for the salary of an
    employee of the House (IV, 3656-3658) even though the resolution may
    have been agreed to only by a preceding House (IV, 3660). Previous
    enactment of items of appropriation unauthorized by law does not justify
    similar appropriations in subsequent bills (VII, 1145, 1150, 1151)
    unless if through appropriations previously made, a function of the
    Government has been established which would bring it into the category
    of continuation of works in progress (VII, 1280), or unless legislation
    in a previous appropriation act has become permanent law (May 20, 1964,
    p. 11422). The omission to appropriate during a series of years for an
    object authorized by law does not repeal the law, and consequently an
    appropriation when proposed is not subject to the point of order (IV,
    3595). The law authorizing each head of a department to employ such
    numbers of clerks, messengers, copyists, watchmen, laborers, and other
    employees as may be appropriated for by Congress from year to year is
    held to authorize appropriations for those positions not otherwise
    authorized by law (IV, 3669, 3675, 4739); but this law does not apply to
    offices not within departments or not at the seat of Government (IV,
    3670-3674). A permanent law authorizing the President to appoint certain
    staff, together with legislative provisions authorizing additional
    employment contained in an appropriation bill enacted for that fiscal
    year, constituted sufficient authorization for a lump sum supplemental
    appropriation for the White House for the same fiscal year (Nov. 30,
    1973, p. 38854). By a general provision of law appropriations for
    investigations and the acquisition and diffusion of information by the
    Agriculture Department on subjects related to agriculture are generally

      The failure of Congress to enact into law separate legislation
    specifically modifying eligibility requirements for grant programs under
    existing law does not necessarily render appropriations for those
    programs subject to a point of order, where more general existing law
    authorizes appropriations for all of the programs proposed to be
    modified by new legislation pending before Congress (June 8, 1978, p.
    16778). But whether organic statutes or general grants of authority in
    law constitute sufficient authorization to support appropriations
    depends on whether the general laws applicable to the function or
    department in question require specific or annual authorizations (June
    14, 1978, pp. 17616, 17622, 17626, 17630) or on whether a periodic
    authorization scheme has subsequently occupied the field (Sept. 9, 1997,
    p. ----). An authorization of ``such sums as may be necessary'' is
    sufficient to support any dollar amount, but has no tendency to relieve
    other conditions of the authorization law (June 28, 1993, p. 1442).
    Where existing law authorizes certain appropriations from a particular
    trust fund without fiscal year limitation, language that such an
    appropriation remain available until expended does not constitute
    legislation (July 15, 1993, p. 15848).

      Pursuant to clause 11(i) of rule X (former clause 9 of rule XLVIII),
    no funds may be appropriated to certain agencies carrying out
    intelligence and intelligence-related activities, unless such funds have
    been authorized by law for the fiscal year in question.

    [[Page 793]]

    3640), and findings filed under the Bowman Act do not constitute
    authorization (IV, 3643).

    Sec. 1046. Authorization for claims and
    salaries.

      Judgments of  courts certified to Congress in accordance with law or
    authorized by treaty (IV, 3634, 3635, 3644) and audited under authority
    of law have been held to be authorization for appropriations for the
    payment of claims (IV, 3634, 3635). But unadjudicated claims (IV, 3628),
    even though ascertained and transmitted by an executive officer (IV,
    3625-

      An appropriation for an object not otherwise authorized does not
    constitute authorization to justify a continuance of the appropriation
    another year (IV, 3588, 3589; VII, 1128, 1145, 1149, 1191), and the mere
    appropriation for a salary does not create an office so as to justify
    appropriations in succeeding years (IV, 3590, 3672, 3697), it being a
    general rule that propositions to appropriate for salaries not
    established by law or to increase salaries fixed by law are out of order
    (IV, 3664-3667, 3676-3679). An exception to these general principles is
    found in the established practice that in the absence of a general law
    fixing a salary the amount appropriated in the last appropriation bill
    has been held to be the legal salary (IV, 3687-3696). A law having
    established an office and fixed a salary, it is not in order to provide
    for an unauthorized office and salary in lieu of it (IV, 3680).

    Sec. 1047. Authorizations for public works.

      An  appropriation
    for a public work in excess of a fixed limit of cost (IV, 3583, 3584;
    VII, 1133), or for extending a service beyond the limits assigned by an
    executive officer exercising a lawful discretion (IV, 3598), or by
    actual law (IV, 3582, 3585), or for purposes prohibited by law are out
    of order (IV, 3580, 3581, 3702), as is an appropriation from the Highway
    Trust Fund where the project is specifically authorized from the general
    fund (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22175). But the mere appropriation of a sum to
    complete a work does not fix a limit of cost such as would exclude
    future appropriations (IV, 3761). A declaration of policy in an act
    followed by specific provisions conferring authority upon a governmental
    agency to perform certain functions is not construed to authorize
    appropriations for purposes germane to the policy but not specifically
    authorized by the act (VII, 1200). A point of order will not lie against
    an amendment proposing to increase a lump sum for public works projects
    where language in the bill limits use of the lump sum appropriation to
    projects as authorized by law (Procedure, ch. 25, sec. 5.5), but where
    language in the bill limits use of the lump sum both to projects
    ``authorized by law'' and ``subject, where appropriate, to enactment of
    authorizing legislation,'' that paragraph constitutes an appropriation
    in part for some unauthorized projects and is not in order (June 6,
    1985, p. 14617).

    [[Page 794]]

    a project governed by a lapsed authorization and may not be invoked to
    fund a project that is not yet under construction (July 31, 1995, p. --
    --). Where existing law (40 U.S.C. 606) specifically prohibits the
    making of an appropriation to construct or alter any public building
    involving more than $500,000 unless approved by the House and Senate
    Public Works Committees, an appropriation for such purposes not
    authorized by both committees is out of order notwithstanding the
    ``works in progress'' exemption, since the law specifically precludes
    the appropriation from being made (June 8, 1983, p. 14855). An
    appropriation from the Highway Trust Fund for an ongoing project was
    held not in order under the ``works in progress'' exception where the
    Internal Revenue Code ``occupied the field'' with a comprehensive
    authorization scheme not embracing the specified project (Sept. 22,
    1993, p. 22140; Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22173). Interruption of a work does
    not necessarily remove it from the privileges of the rule (IV, 3705-
    3708); but the continuation of the work must not be so conditioned in
    relation to place as to become a new work (IV, 3704). It has been held
    that a work has not been begun within the meaning of the rule when an
    appropriation has been made for a site for a public building (IV, 3785),
    or when a commission has been created to select a site or when a site
    has actually been selected for a work (IV, 3762-3763), or when a survey
    has been made (IV, 3782-3784). By ``public works and objects already in
    progress'' are meant tangible matters like buildings, roads, etc., and
    not duties of officials in executive departments (IV, 3709-3713), or the
    continuance of a work indefinite as to completion and intangible in
    nature like the gauging of streams (IV, 3714, 3715). A general system of
    roads on which some work has been done cannot be admitted as a work in
    progress (VII, 1333), nor can an extension of an existing road (Sept.
    22, 1993, p. 22140). Concerning reappropriation for continuation of
    public works in progress, see Sec. 1031, supra.

    Sec. 1048. Continuation of a public work by
    appropriations.

      The rule  requiring appropriations to be authorized by existing
    law except those ``in continuance of appropriations for such public
    works and objects as are already in progress'' (IV, 3578); and the
    ``works in progress'' exception has historically been applied only in
    cases of general revenue funding (Sept. 22, 1993, p. 22140; Sept. 23,
    1993, p. 22173). But an appropriation in violation of existing law or to
    extend a service beyond a fixed limit is not in order as the continuance
    of a public work (IV, 3585, 3702-3724; VII, 1332; Sept. 23, 1993, pp.
    22173; Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 8.9). The ``works in
    progress'' exception may not be invoked to fund

    [[Page 795]]

    ted as in continuation of a work (IV, 3777, 3778), although it is not in
    order as such to provide for a new building in place of one destroyed
    (IV, 3606). Nor is it in order to repair paving adjacent to a public
    building but in a city street, although it may have been laid originally
    by the Government (IV, 3779). The purchase of adjoining land for a work
    already established has been admitted under this principle (IV, 3766-
    3773) and also additions to existing buildings in cases where no limits
    of cost have been shown (IV, 3774, 3775). But the purchase of a separate
    and detached lot of land is not admitted (IV, 3776). The continuation of
    construction at the Kennedy Library, a project owned by the United
    States and funded by a prior year's appropriation, has been admitted
    notwithstanding the absence of any current authorization (June 14, 1988,
    p. 14335). A provision of law authorizing Commissioners of the District
    of Columbia to take over and operate the fish wharves of the city of
    Washington was held insufficient authority to admit an appropriation for
    reconstructing the fish wharf (VII, 1187).

    Sec. 1049. Examples illustrating the continuation of
    a public work.

      Thus the  continuation of the following works has been admitted:
    A topographical survey (IV, 3796, 3797; VII, 1382), a geological map
    (IV, 3795), marking of a boundary line (IV, 3717), marking graves of
    soldiers (IV, 3788), a list of claims (IV, 3717), and recoinage of coins
    in the Treasury (IV, 3807); but the following works have not been
    admitted: Investigation of materials, like coal (IV, 3721), scientific
    investigations (IV, 3719; VII, 1345), duties of a commission (IV, 3720;
    VII, 1344), extension of foreign markets for goods (IV, 3722), printing
    of a series of opinions indefinite in continuance (IV, 3718), free
    evening lectures in the District of Columbia (IV, 3789), certain ongoing
    projects from the Highway Trust Fund (Sept. 22, 1993, pp. 22140; Sept.
    23, 1993, pp. 22173), extension of an existing road (Sept. 22, 1993, p.
    22140), continuation of an extra compensation for ordinary facility for
    carrying the mails (IV, 3808), although the continuation of certain
    special mail facilities has been admitted (IV, 3804-3806). But
    appropriations for rent and repairs of buildings or Government roads
    (IV, 3793, 3798) and bridges (IV, 3803) have been admit

    Sec. 1050. New buildings at existing
    institutions as in continuance of a public work.

      Appropriations for  new buildings at
    Government institutions have sometimes been admitted (IV, 3741-3750)
    when intended for the purposes of the institution (IV, 3747); but later
    decisions, in view of the indefinite extent of the practice made
    possible by the early decisions, have ruled out propositions to
    appropriate for new buildings in navy yards (IV, 3755-3759) and other
    establishments (IV, 3751-3754). Appropriations for new schoolhouses in
    the District of Columbia (IV, 3750; VII, 1358), for new Army hospitals
    (IV, 3740), for new lighthouses (IV, 3728), armor-plate factories (IV,
    3737-3739), and for additional playgrounds for children in the District
    of Columbia (IV, 3792) have also been held not to be in continuation of
    a public work.

    [[Page 796]]

    Sec. 1051. New vessel for naval and other services
    as in continuation of a public work.

      By a former  broad construction of the rule an
    appropriation of a new and not otherwise authorized vessel of the Navy
    had been held to be a continuance of a public work (IV, 3723, 3724); but
    this line of decisions has been overruled (VII, 1351; Jan. 22, 1926, p.
    2621). While appropriations for new construction and procurement of
    aircraft and equipment for the Navy are not in order, appropriations for
    continuing experiments and development work on all types of aircraft are
    in order (Jan. 22, 1926, p. 2623). This former interpretation was
    confined to naval vessels, and did not apply to vessels in other
    services, like the Coast and Geodetic Survey or Lighthouse Service (IV,
    3725, 3726), or to floating or stationary drydocks (IV, 3729-3736). The
    construction of a submarine cable in extension of one already laid was
    held not to be the continuation of a public work (IV, 3716), but an
    appropriation for the Washington-Alaska military cable has been held in
    order (VII, 1348).

    Sec. 1052. Legislation on appropriation bills
    generally.

      The provision of  the rule forbidding in any general appropriation bill a
    provision changing existing law is construed to mean the enactment of
    law where none exists (IV, 3812, 3813), such as permitting funds to
    remain available until expended or beyond the fiscal year covered by the
    bill, where existing law permits no such availability (Aug. 1, 1973, p.
    27288), or immediately upon enactment (July 29, 1986, p. 17981; June 28,
    1988, p. 16255) or merely permits availability to the extent provided in
    advance in appropriation Acts but not explicitly beyond the fiscal year
    in question (July 21, 1981, p. 16687). Language waiving the provisions
    of existing law that did not specifically permit inclusion of such a
    waiver in an appropriation bill (Nov. 13, 1975, p. 36271; June 20, 1996,
    p. 14847), has been ruled out, as has language identical to that
    contained in an authorization bill previously passed by the House but
    not yet signed into law (Aug. 4, 1978, p. 24436), or a proposition for
    repeal of existing law (VII, 1403). Although clause 2(b) permits the
    Committee on Appropriations to report rescissions of appropriations, an
    amendment proposing a rescission constitutes legislation under clause
    2(c) (May 26, 1993, p. 11319), as does a provision proposing a
    rescission of contract authority (July 29, 1998, p. ----). A proposal to
    amend existing law to provide for automatic continuation of
    appropriations in the absence of timely enactment of a regular
    appropriation bill constitutes legislation in contravention of clause
    2(c) (July 17, 1996, p. 17550; July 24, 1996, p. 18898). A proposal to
    designate an appropriation as ``emergency spending'' within the meaning
    of the budget-enforcement laws is fundamentally legislative in character
    (Sept. 8, 1999, pp. ----, ----, ----, ----, ----, ----, ----, ----,).

      Existing law may be repeated verbatim in an appropriation bill (IV,
    3814, 3815), but the slightest change of the text causes it to be ruled
    out (IV, 3817; VII, 1391, 1394; June 4, 1970, p. 18405). It is in order
    to include language descriptive of authority provided in law for the
    operation of Government agencies and corporations so long as the
    description is precise and does not change that authority in any respect
    (June 15, 1973, p. 19843; Aug. 3, 1978, p. 24249); and while language
    merely reciting the applicability of current law to the use of earmarked
    funds is permitted, an amendment that elevates existing guidelines to
    mandates for spending has been ruled out (July 12, 1989, p. 14432).

    [[Page 797]]

      Although the object to be appropriated for may be described without
    violating the rule (IV, 3864), an amendment proposing an appropriation
    under a heading that indicates an unauthorized purpose as its object has
    been ruled out (Oct. 29, 1991, p. 28814). The fact that an item has been
    carried in appropriation bills for many years does not exempt it from a
    point of order as being legislation (VII, 1445, 1656). The reenactment
    from year to year of a law intended to apply during the year of its
    enactment only is not relieved, however, from the point that it is
    legislation (IV, 3822).

      Limits of cost for public works may not be made or changed (IV, 3761,
    3865-3867; VII, 1446), or contracts authorized (IV, 3868-3870; May 14,
    1937, p. 4595).

      The Chair may examine legislative history established during debate on
    an amendment against which a point of order has been reserved to resolve
    any ambiguity therein when ruling on the eventual point of order (June
    14, 1978, p. 17651), and may inquire after its author's intent when
    attempting to construe an ambiguous amendment (Oct. 29, 1991, p. 28818).

    Sec. 1053. Contingencies and congressional
    actions.

      An  amendment making an appropriation contingent upon a
    recommendation (June 27, 1979, p. 17054) or action not specifically
    required by law (July 23, 1980, pp. 19295-97; July 29, 1980, pp. 20098-
    20100) is legislation. For example, a provision limiting the use of
    funds in a bill ``unless'' or ``until'' an action contrary to existing
    law is taken constitutes legislation (Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch.
    26, sec. 47.1; July 24, 1996, p. 18888). Where existing law requires an
    agency to furnish certain information to congressional committees upon
    request, without a subpoena, it is not in order on an appropriation bill
    to make funding for that agency contingent upon its furnishing
    information to subcommittees upon request (July 29-30, 1980, p. 20475),
    or contingent upon submission of an agreement by a Federal official to
    Congress and congressional review thereof (July 31, 1986, p. 18370).
    Similarly, it is not in order on a general appropriation bill to
    condition funds on legal determinations to be made by a Federal court
    and an executive department (June 28, 1988, p. 16261; see Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 47.2).

    [[Page 798]]

    law to restrict its availability until all general appropriation bills
    are presented to the President was held to constitute legislation (June
    29, 1987, p. 18083); and an amendment limiting funds in the bill for
    certain peacekeeping operations unless authorized by Congress was held
    to constitute legislation (June 27, 1994, p. 14613). A section in a
    general appropriation bill directly contravening existing law to subject
    the use of local funds to congressional approval was held to constitute
    legislation where it was shown that some local (D.C.) funds deriving
    from interest accounts were available to the Financial Control Board
    without subsequent congressional approval (Aug. 6, 1998, p. ----).
      Amendments making the availability of funds in a general appropriation
    bill contingent upon subsequent congressional action have, under the
    most recent precedents, been ruled out as legislation. An amendment
    prohibiting the availability of funds to enforce certain Executive
    orders, unless those orders were approved by concurrent resolutions of
    the Congress, was held to be legislation imposing new requirements of
    further legislative action (June 30, 1942, p. 5826). An amendment
    providing that a certain appropriation did not grant authority for a
    certain use of funds unless specific approval of Congress was
    subsequently granted was held to be legislation (May 15, 1947, p. 5378).
    Two subsequent rulings upholding the admissibility of amendments making
    the availability of funds in a general appropriation bill contingent
    upon subsequent congressional action (June 11, 1968, p. 16692; Sept. 6,
    1979, p. 23360) have, in turn, been superseded by four more recent
    rulings. A provision making the availability of certain funds contingent
    upon subsequent congressional action on legislative proposals resolving
    the policy issue was held to constitute legislation (Nov. 18, 1981, p.
    28064); an amendment making the availability of funds therein contingent
    upon subsequent enactment of legislation containing specified findings
    was ruled out as legislation requiring new legislative and executive
    branch policy determinations not required by law (Nov. 2, 1983, p.
    30503); an amendment changing a permanent appropriation in existing

      It is not in order on a general appropriation bill to require a
    congressional committee to promulgate regulations to limit the use of an
    appropriation (June 13, 1979, p. 14670), or otherwise to direct the
    activities of a committee (June 24, 1992, pp. 16087); nor is it in order
    to direct the Selective Service Administration to issue regulations to
    bring its classifications into conformance with a Supreme Court decision
    (July 20, 1989, p. 15405). Also a proposition to change a rule of the
    House is subject to the point of order (IV, 3819). A provision
    constituting congressional disapproval of a deferral of budget authority
    proposed by the President pursuant to the Impoundment Control Act is not
    in order if included in a general appropriation bill rather than in a
    separate resolution of disapproval under that Act (July 29, 1982, pp.
    18625, 18626). An amendment making the availability of funds in a
    general appropriation bill contingent upon a substantive determination
    by a state or local government official or agency which is not otherwise
    required by existing law has been ruled out as legislation (July 25,
    1985, p. 20569).

    Sec. 1054. Construing or amending existing
    law.

      A provision  proposing to construe existing law is itself legislative and
    therefore not in order (IV, 3936-3938; May 2, 1951, p. 4747; July 26,
    1951, p. 8982). However, an official's general responsibility to
    construe the language of a limitation on the use of funds, absent
    imposition of an affirmative direction not required by law, does not
    destroy the validity of the limitation (June 27, 1974, pp. 21687-94).

    [[Page 799]]

    ing existing law concerning Federal diversity jurisdiction is
    legislation (July 1, 1987, p. 18638).
      Where it is asserted that duties ostensibly occasioned by a limitation
    are already imposed by existing law, the Chair may take cognizance of
    judicial decisions and rule the limitation out on the basis that the
    case law is not uniform, current, or finally dispositive (June 16, 1977,
    pp. 19365-74; June 7, 1978, p. 16676). For example, a limitation
    prohibiting the use of funds for an inspection conducted by a regulatory
    agency without a search warrant has been held out of order as imposing a
    new duty not uniformly required by case law (June 16, 1977, pp. 19365-
    74). Similarly, an amendment denying the use of funds for an agency to
    apply certain provisions of law under court decisions in effect on a
    prior date has been held out of order as requiring the official to apply
    noncurrent case law (June 7, 1978, p. 16655). A paragraph of a general
    appropriation bill chang

      A provision in an appropriation bill prescribing a rule of
    construction is legislation (Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec.
    25.15), as is a provision construing a limitation in a bill by
    affirmatively declaring the meaning of the prohibition (May 17, 1988, p.
    11305). Similarly, a limitation that prescribes definitions for terms
    contained in the limitation may be legislation (Deschler's Precedents,
    vol. 8, ch. 26, secs. 25.7, 25.11). On the other hand, language
    excepting certain appropriations from the sweep of a broader limitation
    may be in order (Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 25.2). It
    also has been held in order to except from the operation of a specific
    limitation on expenditures certain of those expenditures that are
    authorized by law by prohibiting a construction of the limitation in a
    way that would prevent compliance with that law (Deschler's Precedents,
    vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 25.10; June 18, 1991, p. 15218).

      The mere recitation in an amendment that a determination is to be made
    pursuant to existing laws and regulations, absent a citation to the law
    imposing such responsibility, is not sufficient proof by the proponent
    of an amendment to overcome a point of order that the amendment
    constitutes legislation (Sept. 16, 1980, p. 25606; May 8, 1986, p.
    10156). A limitation denying the use of funds to apply certain
    provisions of the Internal Revenue Code other than under regulations in
    effect on a prior date is legislation since requiring an official to
    apply regulations no longer current in order to render an appropriation
    available (June 7, 1978, p. 16655; Aug. 19, 1980, pp. 21978-80).

    Sec. 1055. Imposing duties or requiring
    determinations.

      Propositions to  establish affirmative directions for executive
    officers (IV, 3854-3859; VII, 1443; July 31, 1969, p. 21675; June 18,
    1979, p. 15286; July 1, 1987, pp. 18654 and 18655; June 27, 1994, p.
    14572), even in cases where they may have discretion under the law so to
    do (IV, 3853; June 4, 1970, p. 18401; Aug. 8, 1978, p. 24959), or to
    affirmatively take away an authority or discretion conferred by law (IV,
    3862, 3863; VII, 1975; Mar. 30, 1955, p. 4065; June 21, 1974, p. 20600;
    July 31, 1985, p. 21909), are subject to the point of order. While any
    limitation in an appropriation bill (see Sec. 483, supra) places some
    minimal duties on Federal officials, who must determine the effect of
    such a limitation on appropriated funds, an amendment or language in an
    appropriation bill may not impose additional duties, not required by
    law, or make the appropriation contingent upon the performance of such
    duties (May 28, 1968, p. 15350). Language in the form of a conditional
    limitation requiring determinations by Federal officials will be held to
    change existing law unless the proponent can show that the new duties
    are merely incidental to functions already required by law and do not
    involve substantive new determinations (July 26, 1985, p. 20807).

    [[Page 800]]

    requires them to make investigations, compile evidence, or make
    judgments and determinations not otherwise required of them by law, such
    as to judge intent or motives, then it assumes the character of
    legislation and is subject to a point of order (July 31, 1969, pp.
    21653, 21675, where the words ``in order to overcome racial imbalance''
    were held to impose additional duties, and Nov. 30, 1982, p. 28062,
    where the words ``to interfere with'' the rulemaking authority of any
    regulatory agency were held to implicitly require the Office of
    Management and Budget to make determinations not discernibly required by
    law in evaluating and executing its responsibilities). An amendment
    limiting funds for an agency or any ``successor agency'' requires a
    determination of ``successor agency'' status (Sept. 26, 1997, p. ----).
      Where an amendment to or language in a general appropriation bill
    implicitly places new duties on officers of the Government or implicitly

    [[Page 801]]

    tion applied to projects for which indexes were already required by law
    (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22206). The fact that an executive official may have
    been directed by an Executive order to consult another executive
    official prior to taking an action does not permit inclusion of language
    directing the official being consulted to make determinations not
    specifically required by law (July 22, 1980, p. 19087). An exception to
    a limitation on funds for the Office of Personnel Management to enter
    contracts for health benefit plans that required determinations of
    ``equivalence'' of benefits was held to impose new duties (July 16,
    1998, p. ----). However, an exception to the same limitation that merely
    excepted certain specified coverage and plans was held not to impose new
    duties (July 16, 1998, p. ----).
      An amendment authorizing the President to reduce each appropriation in
    the bill by not more than 10 percent was ruled out as legislation
    conferring new authority on the President (May 31, 1984, p. 14617; June
    6, 1984, p. 15120). A limitation on the use of funds, or an exception
    therefrom, may not be accompanied by language stating or requiring a
    finding of a motive or purpose in carrying out the limitation (Aug. 8,
    1978, p. 24969; July 22, 1980, p. 19087; Sept. 16, 1980, p. 25604; Sept.
    22, 1981, p. 21577). A paragraph prohibiting the use of funds to perform
    abortions except where the mother's life would be endangered if the
    fetus were carried to term (or where the pregnancy was a result of rape
    or incest) is legislation, since requiring Federal officials to make new
    determinations and judgments not required of them by law, regardless
    whether private or State officials administering the funds in question
    routinely make such determinations (June 17, 1977, p. 1969; June 30,
    1993, p. 14871; July 16, 1998, p. ----). The fact that such a provision
    relating to abortion funding may have been included in appropriation
    Acts in prior years applicable to funds in those laws does not permit
    the inclusion of similar language requiring such determinations, not
    required by law, with respect to funds for the fiscal year in question
    (Sept. 22, 1983, p. 25406); and where the provision, applicable to
    Federal funds, was permitted to remain in a bill (no point of order
    having been made), an amendment striking the word ``Federal,'' and
    thereby broadening the provision to include District of Columbia funds
    as well, was ruled out (Nov. 15, 1989, p. 29004). But to such a
    provision permitted to remain in a general appropriation bill, an
    amendment exempting instead cases where the health of the mother would
    be endangered if the fetus were carried to term was held not to
    constitute further legislation by requiring any different or more
    onerous determinations (June 27, 1984, p. 19113). An amendment
    prohibiting the use of funds in an appropriation bill for the General
    Services Administration to dispose of U.S.-owned ``agricultural'' land
    declared surplus was ruled out as legislation, since the determination
    whether surplus lands are ``agricultural'' was not required by law (Aug.
    20, 1980, pp. 22156-58); but a limitation precluding funds for any
    transit project exceeding a specified cost-effectiveness index was held
    not to impose new duties where the Chair was persuaded that the limita

    [[Page 802]]

    Building Fund to an agency not paying a level of assessment specified
    elsewhere (and not necessarily applicable) (July 16, 1998, p. ----).
      An amendment limiting use of funds in a bill may not condition the
    availability of funds or the exercise of contract authority upon an
    interpretation of local law where that interpretation is not required by
    existing law (July 17, 1981, p. 16327); may not require new
    determinations of full Federal compliance with mandates imposed upon
    States (July 22, 1981, p. 16829); may not require the evaluation of the
    theoretical basis of a program (July 22, 1981, p. 16822); may not
    require new determinations of propriety or effectiveness (Oct. 6, 1981,
    p. 23361; May 25, 1988, p. 12275), or satisfactory quality (Aug. 1,
    1986, p. 18647) or incorporate by reference determinations already made
    in administrative processes not affecting programs funded by the bill
    (Oct. 6, 1981, p. 23361); may not require new determinations of rates of
    interest payable (July 29, 1982, p. 18624; Dec. 9, 1982, p. 29691); may
    not apply standards of conduct to foreign entities where existing law
    requires such conduct only by domestic entities (July 17, 1986, p.
    16951); may not require the enforcement of a standard where existing law
    only requires inspection of an area (July 30, 1986, p. 18189); may not
    prohibit the availability of funds for the purchase of ``nondomestic''
    goods and services (Sept. 12, 1986, p. 23178); may not mandate
    contractual provisions (May 18, 1988, p. 11389); may not authorize the
    adjustment of wages of Government employees (June 21, 1988, p. 15451;
    Apr. 26, 1989, p. 7525) or permit an increase in Members' office
    allowances only ``if requested in writing'' (Oct. 21, 1990, p. 31708);
    may not convert an existing legal prerequisite for the issuance of a
    regulatory permit into a prerequisite for even the preliminary
    processing of such a permit (July 22, 1992, p. 18825); may not mandate
    reductions in various appropriations by a variable percentage calculated
    in relation to ``overhead'' (Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec.
    5.6; June 24, 1992, p. 16110); may not require an agency to investigate
    and determine whether private airports are collecting certain fees for
    each enplaning passenger (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22213); may not require an
    agency to investigate and determine whether a person or entity entering
    into a contract with funds under the pending bill is subject to a legal
    proceeding commenced by the Federal Government and alleging fraud (Sept.
    17, 1997, p. ----); and may not require an agency to determine whether
    building services are ``usually'' provided through the Federal

      Over a period dating from 1908, the House had developed a line of
    precedent to the effect that language restricting the availability of
    funds in a general appropriation bill could be a valid limitation if,
    rather than imposing new duties on a disbursing official or requiring
    new determinations of that official, it simply and passively addressed
    the state of knowledge of the official (VII, 1695; cf. Aug. 1, 1989, p.
    17156, and June 22, 1995, p. 16844 (limitations in recommittal ruled out
    on basis of form rather than of legislative content)). This reasoning
    culminated in a ruling in the 104th Congress admitting as a valid
    limitation an amendment prohibiting the use of funds in the bill to
    execute certain accounting transactions when specified conditions were
    ``made known'' to the disbursing official (July 17, 1996, p. 17542). In
    the 105th Congress this entire line of precedent was overtaken by
    changes in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this clause that treat as
    legislation a provision that makes funding contingent on whether
    circumstances not determinative under existing law are ``known'' (H.
    Res. 5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. ----; July 15, 1997, p. ----; July 24, 1997, p.
    ----).

    [[Page 803]]

    requirement (June 28, 1993, p. 14418). Where existing law prescribes a
    formula for the allocation of funds among several categories, an
    amendment merely reducing the amount earmarked for one of the categories
    is not legislation, so long as it does not textually change the
    statutory formula (July 24, 1995, p. ----).

    Sec. 1056. Mandating expenditures.

      A provision  which
    mandates a distribution of funds in contravention of an allocation
    formula in existing law is legislation (July 29, 1982, pp. 18637, 18638;
    Oct. 5, 1983, p. 27335; Aug. 2, 1989, p. 18123; July 24, 1995, p. ----),
    as is an amendment which by such a mandate interferes with an executive
    official's discretionary authority (Mar. 12, 1975, p. 6338), as in an
    amendment requiring not less than a certain sum to be used for a
    particular purpose where existing law does not mandate such expenditure
    (June 18, 1976, p. 19297; July 29, 1982, p. 18623), or where an
    amendment earmarks appropriated funds to the arts to require their
    expenditure pursuant to standards otherwise applicable only as
    guidelines (July 12, 1989, p. 14432). Where existing law directed a
    Federal official to provide for sale of certain Government property to a
    private organization in ``necessary'' amounts, an amendment providing
    that no such property be withheld from distribution from qualifying
    purchasers is legislation, since requiring disposal of all property and
    restricting discretionary authority to determine ``necessary'' amounts
    (Aug. 7, 1978, p. 24707). An amendment directing the use of funds to
    assure compliance with an existing law, where existing law does not so
    mandate, also is legislation (June 24, 1976, p. 20370). So-called
    ``hold-harmless'' provisions which mandate a certain level of
    expenditure for certain purposes or recipients, where existing law
    confers discretion or makes ratable reductions in such expenditures,
    also constitute legislation (Apr. 16, 1975, p. 10357; June 25, 1976, p.
    20557). A transfer of available funds from one department to another
    with directions as to the use to which those funds must be put is
    legislation (and also a reappropriation in violation of clause 2(a)(2)
    of this rule) (Dec. 8, 1982, p. 29449). A provision requiring states to
    match funds provided in an appropriation bill was held to constitute
    legislation where existing law contained no such

    Sec. 1057. Waivers; amending legislation permitted
    to remain.

      The House  may, by agreeing to a report from the Committee on Rules or
    by adopting an order under suspension of the rules, allow legislation on
    general appropriation bills (IV, 3260-3263, 3839-3845). Where an
    unauthorized appropriation or legislation is permitted to remain in a
    general appropriation bill by failure to raise or by waiver of a point
    of order, an amendment merely changing that amount and not adding
    legislative language or earmarking separate funds for another
    unauthorized purpose is in order (IV, 3823-3835, 3838; VII, 1405, 1413-
    1415; June 9, 1954, p. 5963; July 27, 1954, p. 12287; Oct. 1, 1975, p.
    31058; June 8, 1977, p. 17941; July 17, 1985, p. 19435; Sept. 11, 1985,
    p. 23398; June 14, 1988, p. 14341). However, this does not permit an
    amendment which adds additional legislation (IV, 3836, 3837, 3862; VII,
    1402-1436; Dec. 9, 1971, p. 4595; Aug. 1, 1973, p. 27291; June 10, 1977,
    p. 1802; July 30, 1985, p. 21532; July 23, 1986, p. 17446; June 26,
    1987, p. 17655; June 28, 1988, pp. 16203, 16213; Aug. 2, 1989, p. 18172;
    Nov. 15, 1989, p. 29004, June 23, 1998, p. ----), proposes a new
    unauthorized purpose (Dec. 8, 1971, p. 45487; Aug. 7, 1978, pp. 24710-
    12; May 25, 1988, p. 12256), earmarks for unauthorized purposes (July
    17, 1985, p. 19435; July 17, 1986, p. 16918; July 26, 1995, p. ----;
    June 5, 1996, p. 13120), earmarks by directing a new use of funds not
    required by law (July 26, 1985, pp. 20811, 20813), increases an
    unauthorized amount indirectly by inserting new language at another
    portion of the bill (July 12, 1995, p. ----; Sept. 17, 1998, p. ----),
    or increases an authorized amount above the authorized ceiling (Aug. 4,
    1999, p. ----). An amendment adding a new paragraph indirectly
    increasing an unauthorized amount contained in a prior paragraph passed
    in the reading is subject to a point of order because the new paragraph
    is adding a further unauthorized amount not textually protected by the
    waiver (July 12, 1995, p. ----; July 16, 1997, p. ----, p.----; Sept. 9,
    1997, p. ----). However, a new paragraph indirectly reducing an
    unauthorized amount permitted to remain in a prior paragraph passed in
    the reading is not subject to a point of order because it is not adding
    a further unauthorized amount (July 16, 1997, p. ----).

    [[Page 804]]

    dressed by an amendment offered en bloc under that clause as budget
    authority and outlay neutral (July 22, 1997, p. ----).
      Where by unanimous consent an amendment is offered en bloc to a
    paragraph containing an unauthorized amount not yet read for amendment,
    the amendment increasing that unauthorized figure is subject to a point
    of order since at that point it is not being offered to a paragraph
    which has been read and permitted to remain (June 21, 1984, p. 17687).
    As required by clause 2(f), the Chair will query for points of order
    against the provisions of an appropriation bill not yet reached in the
    reading but ad

      To a legislative provision permitted to remain conferring assistance
    on a certain class of recipients, an amendment adding another class is
    further legislation and is not merely perfecting in nature (June 22,
    1983, p. 16851). On the other hand, to a legislative provision permitted
    to remain, an amendment particularizing a definition in the language was
    held not to constitute additional legislation where it was shown that
    the definition being amended already contemplated inclusion of the
    covered class (Aug. 5, 1998, p. ----). An amendment to a general
    appropriation bill is not subject to a point of order as adding
    legislation if containing, verbatim, a legislative provision already
    contained in the bill and permitted to remain (Aug. 27, 1980, p. 23519).

      To a legislative provision in a general appropriation bill permitted
    to remain, exempting cases where the life of the mother would be
    endangered if a fetus were carried to term from a denial of funds for
    abortions, an amendment exempting instead cases where the health of the
    mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term was held
    not to constitute further legislation, since determinations on the
    endangerment of life necessarily subsume determinations on the
    endangerment of health, and the amendment did not therefore require any
    different or more onerous determinations (June 27, 1984, p. 19113).

      To a paragraph permitted to remain though containing a legislative
    proviso restricting the obligation of funds until a date within the
    fiscal year, an amendment striking the delimiting date, thus applying
    the restriction for the entire year, was held to be perfecting (July 30,
    1990, p. 20442); but striking the date and inserting a new trigger (the
    enactment of other legislation), was held to be additional legislation
    (July 30, 1990, p. 20442). An amendment in the form of a motion to
    strike that would extend the legislative reach of the pending text was
    held to propose additional legislation (July 17, 1996, p. 17533). To a
    legislative title permitted to remain, which placed certain restrictions
    on recipients of a defined set of Federal payments and benefits, an
    amendment extending the restrictions to persons benefiting from a
    certain tax status determined on wholly unrelated criteria was held to
    add further legislation (Aug. 3, 1995, p. ----). The Chair examined an
    entire legislative provision permitted to remain when ruling that an
    amendment to a portion of the provision was merely perfecting (July 15,
    1999, p. ----).

    [[Page 805]]

    reported back from conference in disagreement, a motion to concur in the
    Senate amendment with a further amendment is in order, even if the
    proposed amendment adds legislation to that contained in the Senate
    amendment, and the only test is whether the proposed amendment is
    germane to the Senate amendment reported in disagreement (IV, 3909;
    VIII, 3188, 3189; Speaker McCormack, Dec. 15, 1970, p. 41504; Aug. 1,
    1979, pp. 22007-11; Speaker O'Neill, Dec. 12, 1979, p. 35520; June 30,
    1987, p. 18308).

    Sec. 1058. Senate amendments.

      The principle  seems to be
    generally well accepted that the House proposing legislation on a
    general appropriation bill should recede if the other House persists in
    its objection (IV, 3904-3908), and clause 5 of rule XXII (Sec. 1076,
    infra) prohibits House conferees from agreeing to a Senate amendment
    which proposes legislation on an appropriation bill without specific
    authority from the House. But where a Senate amendment proposing
    legislation on a general appropriation bill is, pursuant to the edict of
    clause 5 of rule XXII,

    Sec. 1059. Limitations on appropriation bills
    generally.

      Although the  rule forbids on any general appropriation bill a provision
    ``changing existing law,'' which is construed to mean legislation
    generally, the practice of the House has established the principle that
    certain ``limitations'' may be admitted. Just as the House may decline
    to appropriate for a purpose authorized by law, so may it by limitation
    prohibit the use of the money for part of the purpose while
    appropriating for the remainder of it (IV, 3936; VII, 1595). The
    language of the limitation provides that no part of the appropriation
    under consideration shall be used for a certain designated purpose (IV,
    3917-3926; VII, 1580). This designated purpose may reach the question of
    qualifications, for while it is not in order to legislate as to the
    qualifications of the recipients of an appropriation (Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, secs. 53, 57.15), the House may specify that
    no part of the appropriation shall go to recipients lacking certain
    qualifications (IV, 3942-3952; VII, 1655; June 4, 1970, p. 18412; June
    27, 1974, p. 21662; Oct. 9, 1974, p. 34712; June 9, 1978, p. 16990). The
    limitation must apply solely to the money of the appropriation under
    consideration (VII, 1597, 1600, 1720; Feb. 26, 1958, p. 2895), and may
    not be made applicable to money appropriated in other acts (IV, 3927,
    3928; VII, 1495, 1525; June 28, 1971, p. 22442; June 27, 1974, pp.
    21670-72; May 13, 1981, p. 9663), and may not require funds available to
    an agency in any future fiscal year for a certain purpose be subject to
    limitations specified in advance in appropriations Acts (May 8, 1986, p.
    10156). A restriction on authority to incur obligations is legislative
    in nature and not a limitation on funds (July 13, 1987, p. 19507; Sept.
    23, 1993, p. 22204).

    [[Page 806]]

    such language also constitutes an appropriation it must be authorized by
    law (June 21, 1988, p. 15439). A provision limiting the use of funds in
    a bill ``unless'' or ``until'' a specified action not required by
    existing law has been taken constitutes legislation (Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 47.1; July 24, 1996, p. 18888).
      The fact that existing law authorizes funds to be available until
    expended or without regard to fiscal year limitation does not prevent
    the Committee on Appropriations from limiting their availability to the
    fiscal year covered by the bill unless existing law mandates
    availability beyond the fiscal year (June 25, 1974, p. 21040; see also
    Procedure, ch. 25, secs. 9-17). The fact that a provision would
    constitute legislation for only a year does not make it a limitation in
    order under the rule (IV, 3936). Nor may a proposition to construe a law
    be admitted (IV, 3936-3938). Care should also be taken that the language
    of limitation be not such as, when fairly construed, would change
    existing law (IV, 3976-3983) or justify an executive officer in assuming
    an intent to change existing law (IV, 3984; VII, 1706). Although the
    Committee on Appropriations may include in a general appropriation bill
    language not in existing law limiting the use of funds in the bill, if

    Sec. 1060. Effect of limitation on executive
    discretion.

      The limitation  may not be applied directly to the official functions of
    executive officers (IV, 3957-3966; VII, 1673, 1678, 1685), but it may
    restrict executive discretion so far as this may be done by a simple
    negative on the use of the appropriation (IV, 3968-3972; VII, 1583,
    1653, 1694; Sept. 14, 1972, p. 30749; June 21, 1974, p. 20601; Oct. 9,
    1974, p. 34716). An appropriation may be withheld from a designated
    object by a negative limitation on the use of funds, although contracts
    may be left unsatisfied thereby (IV, 3987; July 10, 1975, p. 22005); but
    coupling a denial of an appropriation with a negative restriction on
    official duties constitutes by reason of the use of a double negative an
    affirmative direction and is not in order (VII, 1690-1692). Similarly,
    using a double negative to limit the availability of funds to prohibit
    the obligation of funds for an unauthorized project (effectively
    authorizing an unauthorized project) is not in order (Sept. 23, 1993, p.
    22209).

      But such limitations must not give affirmative directions (IV, 3854-
    3859, 3975; VII, 1637), and must not impose new duties upon an executive
    officer (VII, 1676; June 11, 1968, p. 16712; July 31, 1969, pp. 21631-
    33); and may not directly interfere with discretionary authority in law
    by establishing a level of funding below which expenditures may not be
    made (VII, 1704; July 20, 1978, p. 21856).

      In construing a proposed limitation, if the Chair finds the purpose to
    be legislative, in that the intent is to restrict executive discretion
    to a degree that may be fairly termed a change in policy rather than a
    matter of administrative detail, he should sustain the point of order,
    as where a limitation is accompanied by language stating a legislative
    motive or purpose in carrying out the limitation (Aug. 8, 1978, p.
    24969), or where existing law and the Constitution require a census to
    be taken of all persons and an amendment seeks to preclude the use of
    funds to exclude another class ``known'' to the secretary (Aug. 1, 1989,
    p. 17156). However, language in a general appropriation bill may, by
    negatively refusing to include funds for all or part of an authorized
    executive function, thereby affect policy to the extent of its denial of
    availability of funds (VII, 1694; Oct. 9, 1974, p. 34716).

    [[Page 807]]

    sec. 48.8). The burden is on the proponent to show that such a proposal
    does not change existing law by restricting the timing of the
    expenditure of funds rather than their availability for specified
    objects (Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, secs. 64.23 and 80.5).
      It is not in order, even by language in the form of a limitation, to
    restrict not the use or amount of appropriated funds but the
    discretionary authority conferred by law to administer their
    expenditure, such as by limiting the percentage of funds that may be
    apportioned for expenditure within a certain period of time (Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 51.23), or by precluding the obligation
    of certain funds in the bill until funds provided by another Act have
    been obligated (Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26,

      As long as a limitation on the use of funds restricts the expenditure
    of Federal funds carried in the bill without changing existing law, the
    limitation is in order, even if the Federal funds in question are
    commingled with non-Federal funds which would have to be accounted for
    separately in carrying out the limitation (Aug. 20, 1980, p. 22171). An
    amendment providing that no Federal funds provided in the District of
    Columbia general appropriation bill be used to perform abortions is not
    legislation, since Federal officials have the responsibility to account
    for all appropriations for the annual Federal payment and for
    disbursement of all taxes collected by the District of Columbia,
    pursuant to the D.C. Code (July 17, 1979, p. 19066).

    [[Page 808]]

    agency to take into consideration levels of unemployment insurance in
    determining payment levels (June 18, 1980, p. 15355). A limitation
    precluding funds for any transit project exceeding a specified cost-
    effectiveness index was held not to impose new duties where the Chair
    was persuaded that the limitation applied to projects for which indexes
    were already required by law (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22206). A limitation
    precluding the use of funds to enforce FAA regulations to require
    domestic air carriers to surrender more than a specified number of
    ``slots'' at a given airport in preference of international air carriers
    was held not to impose new duties on FAA officials because existing
    regulations already required the FAA to determine the origin of
    withdrawn slots (Sept. 23, 1993, p. 22212). An exception stating that
    the limitation does not prohibit the use of funds for designated Federal
    activities which are already authorized by law in more general terms,
    was held in order as not containing legislation (June 27, 1979, pp.
    17033-35), as was an exception from a valid limitation prohibiting
    construction of that limitation in such a way as to prevent funding of a
    particular authorized activity (Mar. 24, 1944, p. 3095; June 18, 1991,
    p. 15218). An amendment prohibiting the use of funds in the bill by the
    Forest Service to construct roads or prepare timber sales in certain
    roadless areas was held not to impose new duties, where the executive
    was already charged by law with ongoing responsibility to maintain a
    comprehensive and detailed inventory of all land and renewable resources
    of the National Forest System (July 18, 1995, p. ----). The following
    amendments also have been in order as merely constricting the range of
    objects for which funds might be used: denying use of funds to eliminate
    an existing legal requirement for sureties on custom bonds (June 27,
    1984, p. 19101); denying use of funds by any Federal official in any
    manner which would prevent a provision of existing law from being
    enforced (relating to import restrictions) (June 27, 1984, p. 19101);
    denying use of funds for any reduction in Customs Service regions or for
    any consolidation of Customs Service offices (June 27, 1984, p. 19102);
    denying use of funds to carry out (or pay the salaries of persons who
    carry out) tobacco crop and insurance programs (July 20, 1995, p. ----).
    An amendment in the form of a limitation prohibiting the use of funds in
    a general appropriation bill for the construction of certain facilities
    unless such construction were subject to a project agreement was held
    not in order during the reading of the bill, even though existing law
    directed Federal officials to enter into such project agreements, on the
    ground that limitation amendments are in order during the reading only
    where existing law requires or permits the inclusion of limiting
    language in an appropriation Act, and not merely where the limitation is
    alleged to be ``consistent with existing law'' (June 28, 1988, p.
    16267). Similarly, language in a general appropriation bill containing
    an averment necessary to qualify for certain scorekeeping under the
    Budget Act was conceded to be legislation (July 20, 1989, p. 15374),
    even though the Budget Act contemplates that expenditures may be
    mandated to occur before or following a fiscal period if the law making
    those expenditures specifies

    [[Page 809]]

    that the timing is the result of a ``significant'' policy change (July
    20, 1989, p. 15374).

    Sec. 1061. Limitations consistent with existing
    law.

      An amendment  denying the use of funds in the bill to pay the salaries of
    Federal officials who perform certain functions under existing law is a
    proper limitation if the description of those duties precisely follows
    existing law and does not require them to perform new duties (June 24,
    1976, p. 20373), just as an amendment denying such funds to a Federal
    official not in compliance with an existing law which he is charged with
    enforcing is a valid limitation placing no new duties on that Federal
    official (Sept. 10, 1981, p. 20110). The fact that a limitation on the
    use of funds may indirectly interfere with an executive official's
    discretionary authority by denying the use of funds (June 24, 1976, p.
    20408) or may impose certain incidental burdens on executive officials
    (Aug. 25, 1976, p. 27737) does not destroy the character of the
    limitation as long as it does not directly amend existing law and is
    descriptive of functions and findings already required to be undertaken
    by existing law. As it is in order by way of a limitation to deny the
    use of funds for implementation of an Executive order, an amendment
    precisely describing the contents of the Executive order does not
    constitute legislation solely for that reason (Mar. 16, 1977, p. 7748).
    And the fact that the regulation for which funds are denied may have
    been promulgated pursuant to court order and pursuant to constitutional
    provisions is an argument on the merits of the amendment and does not
    render it legislative in nature (Aug. 19, 1980, pp. 21981-84). An
    amendment prohibiting the use of funds to carry out any ruling of the
    Internal Revenue Service which rules that taxpayers are not entitled to
    certain charitable deductions was held in order as a limitation, since
    merely descriptive of an existing ruling already promulgated and not
    requiring any new determinations as to the applicability of the
    limitation to other categories of taxpayers (July 16, 1979, pp. 18808-
    10). An amendment reducing the availability of funds for trade
    adjustment assistance by amounts of unemployment insurance entitlements
    was held in order where the law establishing trade adjustment assistance
    already required the disbursing

                   ``holman rule'' on retrenching expenditures

    Sec. 1062. Legislation reducing
    expenditures.

      Decisions under  the so-called ``Holman Rule'' in clause 2 of rule XXI
    have been rare in the modern practice of the House. The trend in
    construing language in general appropriation bills or amendments thereto
    has been to minimize the importance of the ``Holman Rule'' in those
    cases where the decision can be made on other grounds. The practice of
    using limitations in appropriation bills has been perfected in recent
    years so that most modern decisions by the Chair deal with distinctions
    between such limitations and matters which are considered to be
    legislation (see Sec. Sec. 1059-1961, supra). Under the modern practice,
    the ``Holman Rule'' only applies where an obvious reduction is achieved
    by the provision in question and does not apply to limiting language
    unaccompanied by a reduction of funds in the bill (July 16, 1979, pp.
    18808-10). It has no application to an amendment to an appropriation
    bill which does not legislate but is merely a negative limitation citing
    but not changing existing law (June 18, 1980, p. 15355).

      A paragraph containing legislation reported in an appropriation bill
    to be in order must on its face show a retrenchment of a type which
    conforms to the requirements of the rule (Mar. 17, 1926, p. 5804).

    [[Page 810]]

      The reduction of expenditure must appear as a necessary result, in
    order to bring an amendment or provision within the exception to the
    rule. It is not sufficient that such reduction would probably, or would
    in the opinion of the Chair, result therefrom (IV, 3887; VII, 1530-
    1534). Thus, an amendment to a general appropriation bill providing that
    appropriations made in that act are hereby reduced by $7 billion, though
    legislative in form, was held in order under the ``Holman Rule''
    exception (Apr. 5, 1966, p. 7689), but an amendment providing for
    certain reductions of appropriations carried in the bill based on the
    President's budget estimates was held not to show a reduction on its
    face and to provide merely speculative reductions (Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 5.6; June 24, 1992, p. 16110). An
    amendment authorizing the President to reduce each appropriation in the
    bill by not more than 10 percent was ruled out as legislation conferring
    new authority on the President (May 31, 1984, p. 14617; June 6, 1984, p.
    15120). An amendment reducing an unauthorized amount permitted to remain
    in a general appropriation bill is in order as a retrenchment under this
    clause (Oct. 1, 1975, p. 31058). An amendment to a general appropriation
    bill denying the availability of funds to certain recipients but which
    requires Federal officials to make additional determinations as to the
    qualifications of recipients is legislation and is not a retrenchment of
    expenditures where it is not apparent that the prohibition will reduce
    the amounts covered by the bill (June 26, 1973, p. 21389).

      The amendment must not only show on its face an attempt to retrench
    but must also be germane to some provision in the bill even though
    offered by direction of the committee having jurisdiction of the subject
    matter of the amendment (VII, 1549; Dec. 16, 1911, p. 442). An amendment
    providing that appropriations ``herein and heretofore made'' shall be
    reduced by $70 million through the reduction of Federal employees as the
    President determines was held to be legislative and not germane to the
    bill, since it went to funds other than those carried therein, and was
    therefore not within the ``Holman Rule'' exception (Oct. 18, 1966, p.
    27425).

      An amendment reducing an amount in an appropriation bill for the
    Postal Service and prohibiting the use of funds therein to implement
    special bulk third-class rates for political committees was held in
    order since not specifically requiring new determination and since
    constituting a retrenchment of expenditures even if assumed to be
    legislative (July 13, 1979, pp. 18453-55).

      As long as an amendment calls for an obvious reduction at some point
    in time during the fiscal year, the amendment is in order under the
    ``Holman Rule'' even if the reduction takes place in the future in an
    amount actually determined when the reduction takes place (for example,
    by formula) (VII, 1491, 1505; July 30, 1980, pp. 20499-20503). To an
    amendment that is in order under the ``Holman Rule,'' containing
    legislation but retrenching expenditures by formula for every agency
    funded by the bill, an amendment exempting from that reduction several
    specific programs does not add further legislation and is in order (July
    30, 1980, pp. 20499-20503).

      A motion to recommit the District of Columbia appropriation bill with
    instructions to reduce the proportion of the fund appropriated from the
    Public Treasury from one-half, as provided in the bill, to one-fourth of
    the entire appropriation is in order, since the effect of the amendment
    if adopted would reduce the expenditure of public money although not
    reducing the amount of the appropriation (VII, 1518).

      The term ``retrenchment'' means the reduction of the amount of money
    to be taken out of the Federal Treasury by the bill, and therefore a
    reduction of the amount of money to be contributed toward the expenses
    of the District of Columbia is in order as a retrenchment (VII, 1502).

      An amendment proposed to an item for the recoinage of uncurrent
    fractional silver, which amendment struck out the amount appropriated
    and added a provision for the coinage of all the bullion in the Treasury
    into standard silver dollars, the cost of such coinage and recoinage to
    be paid out of the Government's seigniorage, was held not to be in order
    under the rule; first, because not germane to the subject matter of the
    bill (the sundry civil); second, because it did not appear that any
    retrenchment of expenditure would result, the seigniorage being the
    property of the Government as other funds in the Treasury (VII, 1547).

    [[Page 811]]

    provide routes and make contracts in certain cases, with the further
    provision ``and the amount of appropriation herein for star routes is
    hereby reduced to $500.'' A point of order made against the first or
    legislative part of the amendment was sustained, which decision was, on
    appeal, affirmed by the committee (VII, 1555).
      To an item of appropriation for inland transportation of mails by star
    routes an amendment was offered requiring the Postmaster General to

      To a clause appropriating for the foreign mail service an amendment
    reducing the appropriation, and in addition repealing the act known as
    the ``subsidy act,'' was held not in order because the repealing of this
    act was not germane to the appropriation bill; and that to be in order
    both branches of the amendment must be germane to the bill (VII, 1548).

      A provision in the agricultural appropriation bill transferring the
    supervision of the importation of animals from the Treasury to the
    Department of Agriculture is out of order, being a provision changing
    law and not retrenching expenditure (IV, 3886).

      Where a paragraph containing new legislation provides in one part for
    a discharge of employees, which means a retrenchment, and in another
    part embodies legislation to bring about the particular retrenchment
    which in turn shows on its face an expenditure the amount of which is
    not apparent, the Chair is unable to hold that the net result will
    retrench expenditures. But where the additional legislation does not
    show on its face an additional expenditure, the Chair will not speculate
    as to a possible expenditure under the additional legislation (VII,
    1500).

    [[Page 812]]

      As explained in the annotation in Sec. 1043, supra, the amendment of
    clause 2(b) in the 98th Congress narrowed the ``Holman Rule'' exception
    to the general prohibition against legislation to cover only
    retrenchments reducing amounts of money covered by the bill, and not
    retrenchments resulting from reduction of the number and salary of
    officers of the United States or of the compensation of any person paid
    out of the U.S. Treasury. Accordingly, the Chair held out of order an
    amendment mandating the reduction of certain Federal salaries and
    expenses as not confined to a reduction of funds in the bill (June 17,
    1994, p. 13422). Paragraph (b) also eliminated separate authority
    conferred upon legislative committees or commissions with proper
    jurisdiction to report amendments retrenching expenditures, and
    permitted legislative committees to recommend such retrenchments by
    reduction of amounts covered by the bill to the Appropriations Committee
    for discretionary inclusion in the reported bill. Paragraph (d) as added
    in the 98th Congress provides a new procedure for consideration of all
    retrenchment amendments only when reading of the bill has been completed
    and only if the Committee of the Whole does not adopt a motion to rise
    and report the bill back to the House. Other decisions which involved
    interpretation of the ``Holman Rule,'' but which do not reflect the
    current form or interpretation of that rule, are found in IV, 3846,
    3885-3892; VII, 1484, 1486-1492, 1498, 1500, 1515, 1563, 1564, 1569;
    June 1, 1892, p. 4920.

    Sec. 1063. Reappropriations.

      This  provision from section
    139(c) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 190f(c))
    was made part of the standing rules in the 83d Congress (Jan. 3, 1953,
    p. 24). Previously, a reappropriation of an unexpended balance for an
    object authorized by law was in order on a general appropriation bill
    (IV, 3591, 3592; VII, 1156, 1158). This clause was amended in the 99th
    Congress by section 228(b) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
    Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177, Dec. 12, 1985) to permit the Committee
    on Appropriations to report certain transfers of unexpended balances.
    Consistent with clause 2 of rule XXI, and as codified in the 106th
    Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. ----), violations of this clause
    are enforced only against specific provisions in general appropriation
    bills containing reappropriations rather than against consideration of
    the bill (see, e.g., Procedure, ch. 25, sec. 18).

      A provision in a general appropriation bill, or an amendment thereto,
    providing that funds for a certain purpose are to be derived by
    continuing the availability of funds previously appropriated for a prior
    fiscal year is in violation of clause 2(a)(2) (former clause 6 of rule
    XXI) (Aug. 20, 1951, p. 10393; Mar. 29, 1960, p. 6862; June 17, 1960, p.
    13138; June 20, 1973, p. 20530; July 29, 1982, p. 18625; June 28, 1988,
    p. 16255), and a reappropriation of unexpended prior year balances
    prohibited by this clause is not in order under the guise of a ``Holman
    Rule'' exception to clause 2 of rule XXI (Oct. 18, 1966, p. 27424). An
    amendment to a general appropriation bill making any appropriations
    which are available for the current fiscal year available for certain
    new purposes was held out of order under clause 2(a)(2) since it was not
    confined to the funds in the bill and would permit reappropriation of
    unexpended balances (Oct. 1, 1975, p. 31090). That appropriations may be
    authorized in law for a specified object does not permit an amendment to
    a general appropriation bill to include legislative language mandating
    the reappropriation of funds from other Acts (July 28, 1992, p. 19652).

      This rule, however, is not applicable when the reappropriation
    language is identical to legislative authorization language enacted
    subsequent to the adoption of the rule, since the law is a more recent
    expression of the will of the House (Sept. 5, 1961, p. 18133), nor when
    a measure transferring unobligated balances of previously appropriated
    funds contains legislative provisions and rules changes but no
    appropriation of new budget authority and is neither in the form of an
    appropriation bill nor the subject of a privileged report by the
    Committee on Appropriations under rule XIII (Mar. 3, 1988, p. 3239).

      The return of an unexpended balance to the Treasury is in order (IV,
    3594).

    [[Page 813]]

    p. ----). An amendment otherwise in order under this paragraph may
    nevertheless be in violation of clause 2(a)(1) if increasing an
    appropriation above the authorized amount contained in the bill (Aug. 4,
    1999, p. ----).

    Sec. 1063a. Offsetting en bloc amendments.

      Under  paragraph
    2(f) an amendment en bloc changing amounts in a paragraph not yet read
    for amendment must be outlay neutral. It is not sufficient that the
    offsetting amendment is merely budget authority neutral (Aug. 4, 1999,

                                                          Rule XXI, clause 3
    Rule XXI, clause 3
    Transportation obligation limitations

    1064. Transportation obligation limitations.

      3.  It shall
    not be in order to consider a bill, joint resolution, amendment, or
    conference report that would cause obligation limitations to be below
    the level for any fiscal year set forth in section 8103 of the
    Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, as adjusted, for the
    highway category or the mass transit category, as applicable.

      The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (sec. 8101(e), P.L.
    105-178) added this provision as a new clause 9 of rule XXI. In the
    106th Congress, this provision was transferred to clause 3 (H. Res. 5,
    Jan. 6, 1999, p. ----). The Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
    Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999 (sec. 108, div. C, P.L. 105-277;
    112 Stat. 2681-586), included the following provision: ``Sec. 108. For
    the purpose of any Rule of the House of Representatives, notwithstanding
    any other provision of law, any obligation limitation relating to
    surface transportation projects under section 1602 of P.L. 105-178 shall
    be assumed to be administered on the basis of sound program management
    practices that are consistent with past practices of the administering
    agency permitting States to decide High Priority Project funding
    priorities within state program allocations.'' This clause and the cited
    law should be read together notwithstanding subsequent readoption of
    clause 3 because the two are not mutually inconsistent.

                                                          Rule XXI, clause 4
    Rule XXI, clause 4
    Appropriations on legislative bills

    [[Page 814]]

    appropriation in such a bill, joint resolution, or amendment thereto may
    be raised at any time during pendency of that measure for amendment.

    1065. Restriction of power to report appropriations.

      4.  A
    bill or joint resolution carrying an appropriation may not be reported
    by a committee not having jurisdiction to report appropriations, and an
    amendment proposing an appropriation shall not be in order during the
    consideration of a bill or joint resolution reported by a committee not
    having that jurisdiction. A point of order against an

      This portion of the rule was adopted June 1, 1920 (VII, 2133). When
    the House recodified its rules in the 106th Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6,
    1999, p. ----), this clause was returned to clause 4 where it had been
    until moved to former clause 5(a) of rule XXI in the 93d Congress (H.
    Res. 988, 93d Cong., Oct. 8, 1974, p. 34470).

      A point of order under this rule cannot be raised against a motion to
    suspend the rules (VIII, 3426), against a motion to discharge a
    nonappropriating committee from consideration of a bill carrying an
    appropriation (VII, 2144), or against a Senate amendment to an
    appropriation bill (VII, 1572), but it may be directed against an item
    of appropriation in a Senate bill (VII, 2136, 2147; July 30, 1957, pp.
    13056, 13181), and if the House deletes a provision in a Senate bill
    under this rule, the bill is messaged to the Senate with the deletion in
    the form of an amendment. The point of order may be made against an
    appropriation in a Senate bill that, although not reported in the House,
    is considered in lieu of a reported House ``companion bill'' (VII, 2137;
    Mar. 29, 1933, p. 988). This clause applies to an amendment proposed to
    a Senate amendment to a House bill not reported from the Committee on
    Appropriations (Oct. 1, 1980, pp. 28638-42). The rule does not apply to
    private bills since the committees having jurisdiction of bills for the
    payment of private claims may report bills making appropriations within
    the limits of their jurisdiction (VII, 2135; Dec. 12, 1924, p. 538). The
    point of order under this rule does not apply to an appropriation in a
    bill which has been taken away from a nonappropriating committee by a
    motion to discharge (VII, 1019a). The point of order under this rule
    does not apply to a special order reported from the Committee on Rules
    ``self-executing'' the adoption in the House to a reported bill of an
    amendment containing an appropriation, since the amendment is not
    separately before the House during consideration of the special order
    (Feb. 24, 1993, p. 3542).

    [[Page 815]]

    in the House version and included in a conference report on a bill will
    not lie, since the only rule prohibiting such inclusion (clause 5 of
    rule XXII) is limited to language originally contained in a Senate
    amendment where the House conferees have not been specifically
    authorized to agree thereto (May 1, 1975, p. 12752). Where the House has
    adopted a resolution waiving points of order against certain
    appropriations in a legislative bill, a point of order may nevertheless
    be raised against an amendment to the bill containing an identical
    provision, since under this rule a point of order may be raised against
    the amendment ``at any time'' (Apr. 23, 1975, p. 11512). A point of
    order against a direct appropriation in a bill initially reported from a
    legislative committee and then sequentially referred to and reported
    adversely by the Committee on Appropriations was conceded and sustained
    as in violation of this clause (Nov. 10, 1975, p. 35611).
      The provision in this clause that a point of order against an
    amendment containing an appropriation to a legislative bill may be made
    ``at any time'' has been interpreted to require that the point of order
    be raised during the pendency of the amendment under the five-minute
    rule (Mar. 18, 1946, p. 2365; Apr. 28, 1975, pp. 12043), and a point of
    order will lie against an amendment during its pendency, even in its
    amended form, although the point of order is against the amendment as
    amended by a substitute and no point of order was raised against the
    substitute prior to its adoption (Apr. 23, 1975, p. 12043). But the
    point of order must be raised during the initial consideration of the
    bill or amendment under the five-minute rule, and a point of order
    against similar language permitted to remain

      The point of order should be directed to the item of appropriation in
    the bill and not to the act of reporting the bill (VII, 2143), and
    cannot be directed to the entire bill (VII, 2142; Apr. 28, 1975, p.
    12043).

    [[Page 816]]

    officer to pay a certain sum out of unexpended balances is equivalent to
    an appropriation and not in order (VII, 2154). Language authorizing the
    use of funds of the Shipping Board is not in order (VII, 2147). A
    direction to pay out of Indian trust funds is not in order (VII, 2149).
    A provision in an authorization bill making excess foreign currencies
    immediately available for a new purpose is in violation of this clause
    (Aug. 3, 1971, p. 29109). Provisions authorizing the collection of fees
    or user charges by Federal agencies and making the revenues collected
    therefrom available without further appropriation have been ruled out in
    violation of this clause (June 17, 1937, pp. 5915-18; Mar. 29, 1972, pp.
    10749-51), and the transfer of existing Federal funds into a new
    Treasury trust fund to be immediately available for a new purpose has
    been construed as an appropriation (June 20, 1974, pp. 20273-75), as has
    a provision in a legislative bill transferring unexpended balances of
    appropriations from an existing agency to a new agency created therein
    (Apr. 9, 1979, p. 7774). A provision in an omnibus reconciliation bill
    reported by the Budget Committee (pursuant to section 310(c)(2) of the
    Budget Act upon recommendation from the Energy and Commerce Committee)
    making a direct appropriation to carry out a part of the Energy Security
    Act was ruled out in violation of this clause (Oct. 24, 1985, p. 28812).
    An amendment requiring the diversion of previously appropriated funds in
    lieu of the enactment of new budget authority if a maximum deficit
    amount under the Deficit Control Act of 1985 is exceeded, though its
    stated purpose may be to avoid the sequestration of funds, may
    nevertheless be in violation of this clause as an appropriation on a
    legislative bill (Aug. 10, 1988, p. 21719).
      The point of order provided for in this clause is not applicable to
    propositions authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to use proceeds
    from the sale of bonds under the Second Liberty Bond Act (public debt
    transactions) for the purpose of making loans, since such loans do not
    constitute ``appropriations'' within the purview of the rule (June 28,
    1949, pp. 8536-38; Aug. 2, 1950, p. 11599), and is not applicable to
    language exempting loan guarantees in a legislative bill from statutory
    limitations on expenditures (July 16, 1974, p. 23344). Legislation
    authorizing the availability of certain loan receipts is not an
    appropriation where it can be shown that the actual availability of
    those receipts remains contingent upon subsequent enactment of an
    appropriation act (Sept. 10, 1975, p. 28300). The term ``appropriation''
    in the rule means the payment of funds from the Treasury, and the words
    ``warranted and make available for expenditure for payments'' are
    equivalent to ``is hereby appropriated'' and therefore not in order
    (VII, 2150). The words ``available until expended,'' making an
    appropriation already made for one year available for ensuing years, are
    not in order (VII, 2145). Language reappropriating, making available, or
    diverting an appropriation or a portion of an appropriation already made
    for one purpose to another (VII, 2146; Mar. 29, 1933, p. 988; Aug. 10,
    1988, p. 21719), or for one fiscal year to another (Mar. 26, 1992, p.
    7223), is not in order. An amendment expanding the definition in
    existing law of recipients under a Federal subsidy program was held to
    permit a new use of funds already appropriated in violation of this
    clause (May 11, 1976, pp. 13409-11); and a provision in a legislative
    bill authorizing the use, without a subsequent appropriation, of funds
    directly appropriated by a previous statute for a new purpose
    constitutes an appropriation prohibited by this clause (Oct. 1, 1980,
    pp. 28637-40). But a modification of such a provision making payments
    for such new purposes ``effective only to the extent and in such amounts
    as are provided in advance in appropriation acts'' does not violate this
    clause (Oct. 1, 1980, pp. 28638-42). A direction to a departmental

      An amendment increasing the duties of a commission is not necessarily
    an appropriation (VII, 1578). Language authorizing payment from an
    appropriation to be made or authorizing payment from an appropriation
    that has not yet been made is in order (Jan. 31, 1923, p. 2794). Section
    401(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 317) prohibits
    consideration in the House of any bill or resolution or amendment which
    provides new spending authority (as that term is defined in that
    section) unless that measure also provides that such new spending
    authority is to be available only to the extent provided in
    appropriation act (see Sec. 1127, supra). See also Procedure, ch. 25,
    sec. 3, addressing appropriations on legislative bills generally.

                                                          Rule XXI, clause 5
    Rule XXI, clause 5
    Tax and tariff measures and amendments

    [[Page 817]]

    measure shall not be in order during the consideration of a bill or
    joint resolution reported by a committee not having that jurisdiction. A
    point of order against a tax or tariff measure in such a bill, joint
    resolution, or amendment thereto may be raised at any time during
    pendency of that measure for amendment.

    1066. Restriction on bills and amendments carrying
    taxes or tariffs.

      5. (a)  A bill or joint resolution carrying a tax or tariff
    measure may not be reported by a committee not having jurisdiction to
    report tax or tariff measures, and an amendment in the House or proposed
    by the Senate carrying a tax or tariff

      This provision was added in the 98th Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3,
    1983, p. 34). Before the House recodified its rules in the 106th
    Congress, this provision was found in former clause 5(b) of rule XXI (H.
    Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. ----). A point of order under this paragraph
    against a provision in a bill is in order at any time during
    consideration of the bill for amendment in Committee of the Whole (Aug.
    1, 1986, p. 18649). On October 4, 1989, the Chairman of the Committee of
    the Whole, before ruling on several points of order under this
    paragraph, enunciated several guidelines to distinguish taxes and
    tariffs on the one hand and user or regulatory fees and other forms of
    revenue on the other (p. 23260). On the opening day of the 102d
    Congress, Speaker Foley inserted in the Congressional Record a statement
    of jurisdictional concepts underlying those same distinctions and
    indicated his intention to exercise his referral authority under rule X
    in a manner consistent with this paragraph (Jan. 3, 1991, p. 64; see
    also Jan. 5, 1993, p. 105).

    [[Page 818]]

      Although in the case of most points of order against provisions in
    bills or against amendments the burden is on the proponent of the
    provision to show that it does not violate the cited rule, in the case
    of a point of order under this paragraph against a provision in or an
    amendment to a general appropriation bill affecting the use of funds
    therein (otherwise traditionally in order if admissible under clause 2
    of rule XXI), the burden is on the Member making the point of order to
    show a necessary, certain, and inevitable change in revenue collections
    or tax statuses or liabilities (there being no other funds available
    that fiscal year under existing law) (Sept. 12, 1984, pp. 25108, 25109,
    25120; July 26, 1985, p. 20806; Aug. 1, 1986, p. 18649; July 13, 1990,
    p. 17473; June 18, 1991, p. 15189). Thus, in determining whether a
    limitation in a general appropriation bill constitutes a tax or tariff
    measure proscribed by this paragraph, the Chair will consider argument
    as to whether the limitation effectively and inevitably changes revenue
    collections and tax status or liability (Aug. 1, 1986, p. 18649).
    Similarly, in determining whether an amendment to a general
    appropriation bill proposing a change in IRS funding priorities
    constitutes a tax measure proscribed by this paragraph, the Chair will
    consider argument as to whether the change would necessarily or
    inevitably result in a loss or gain in tax liability and in tax
    collection (June 18, 1991, p. 15189).

      A limitation on the use of funds contained in a general appropriation
    bill was held to violate this paragraph by denying the use of funds by
    the Customs Service to enforce duty-free entry laws with respect to
    certain imported commodities, thereby requiring the collection of
    revenues not otherwise provided for by law (Oct. 27, 1983, p. 29611).
    Similar rulings were issued: (1) where it was shown that the imposition
    of the restriction on IRS funding for the fiscal year would effectively
    and inevitably preclude the IRS or the Customs Service from collecting
    revenues otherwise due and owing by law or require collection of revenue
    not legally due or owing (July 26, 1985, p. 20806; Aug. 1, 1986, pp.
    18649, 18650; July 17, 1996, p. 17563); and (2) where a provision in a
    general appropriation bill prohibited the use of funds to impose or
    assess certain taxes due under specified portions of the Internal
    Revenue Code (July 13, 1990, p. 17473). In the 98th Congress, the Chair
    sustained points of order under this paragraph against motions to concur
    in three Senate amendments to a general appropriation bill (not reported
    by the Committee on Ways and Means): (1) an amendment denying the use of
    funds in that or any other Act by the IRS to impose or assess any tax
    due under a designated provision of the Internal Revenue Code, thereby
    rendering the tax uncollectable through the use of any funds available
    to the agency (Sept. 12, 1984, p. 25108); (2) an amendment directing the
    Secretary of the Treasury to admit free of duty certain articles
    imported by a designated organization (Sept. 12, 1984, p. 25109); and
    (3) an amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930 to expand the authority of
    the Customs Service to seize and use the proceeds from the sale of
    contraband imports to defray operational expenses, and to offset owed
    customs duties under one section of that law (Sept. 12, 1984, p. 25120).
    An amendment to a general appropriation bill proposing to divert an
    increase in funding for the IRS from spot-checks to targeted audits was
    held not to constitute a tax within the meaning of this paragraph
    because it did not necessarily affect revenue collection levels or tax
    liabilities (June 18, 1991, p. 15189).

    [[Page 819]]

    gas leaseholdings in the Outer Continental Shelf, with receipts to be
    used to offset costs of various ocean protection programs (Oct. 4, 1989,
    p. 23261); (3) an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code relating to the
    tax deductibility of pension fund contributions (Oct. 4, 1989, p.
    23262); (4) a fee incident to termination of employee benefit plans,
    with receipts to be applied to enforcement and administration of plans
    remaining with the system (Oct. 4, 1989, p. 23262); and (5) a fee
    incident to the filing of various pension benefit plan reports required
    by law, with revenues to be transferred to the Department of Labor for
    the enforcement of that law (Oct. 5, 1989, p. 23328).
      In the 99th Congress, the following provisions in a reconciliation
    bill reported from the Budget Committee were ruled out as tax measures
    not reported from the Committee on Ways and Means: (1) containing a
    recommendation from the Committee on Education and Labor (now Education
    and the Workforce) excluding certain interest on obligations from the
    Student Loan Marketing Association from application of the Internal
    Revenue Code, affecting interest deductions against income taxes (Oct.
    24, 1985, pp. 28776, 28827); and (2) containing a recommendation from
    the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries expanding tax benefits
    available to shipowners through a capital construction fund (Oct. 24,
    1985, pp. 28802, 28827). In the 101st Congress, the following provisions
    in an omnibus budget reconciliation bill were ruled out: (1) a fee per
    passenger on cruise vessels, with revenues credited as proprietary
    receipts of the Coast Guard to be used for port safety, security,
    navigation, and antiterrorism activities (Oct. 4, 1989, p. 23260); (2) a
    per acre ``ocean protection fee'' on oil and

    [[Page 820]]

    Passage of tax rate increases-
      To a bill reported from the Committee on Education and Labor (now
    Education and the Workforce) authorizing financial assistance to
    unemployed individuals for employment opportunities, an amendment
    providing instead for tax incentives to stimulate employment was held to
    be a tax measure in violation of this paragraph (Sept. 21, 1983, p.
    25145). A provision in a bill reported from the Committee on Foreign
    Affairs (now International Relations) imposing a uniform fee at ports of
    entry to be collected by the Customs Service as a condition of
    importation of a commodity was held to constitute a tariff within the
    meaning of this paragraph (June 4, 1985, p. 14009), as was an amendment
    to a bill reported from that committee amending the tariff schedules to
    deny ``most favored nation'' trade treatment to a certain nation (July
    11, 1985, p. 18590). A provision in a general appropriation bill
    creating a new tariff classification was held to constitute a tariff
    under this paragraph (June 15, 1994, p. 13103). A motion to concur in a
    Senate amendment constituting a tariff measure (imposing an import ban
    on certain dutiable goods) to a bill reported by a committee not having
    tariff jurisdiction was ruled out under this paragraph (Sept. 30, 1988,
    p. 27316). A proposal to increase a fee incident to the filing of a
    securities registration statement, with the proceeds to be deposited in
    the general fund of the Treasury as offsetting receipts, was held to
    constitute a tax within the meaning of this paragraph because the amount
    of revenue derived and the manner of its deposit indicated a purpose to
    defray costs of Government, generally (Oct. 23, 1990, p. 32650). To a
    bill reported by the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, an
    amendment increasing a user fee was ruled out as a tax measure where the
    fee overcollected to offset a reduction in another fee, thus attenuating
    the relationship between the amount of the fee and the cost of the
    Government activity for which it was assessed (May 9, 1995, p. 12180).
    To a bill reported by the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
    (now Science), an amendment proposing sundry changes in the Federal
    income tax by direct amendments to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 was
    ruled out of order as carrying a tax measure in violation of this
    paragraph (Sept. 16, 1992, p. 25205).

    1067. Threefifths vote to increase income tax rates.

      (b)  A
    bill or joint resolution, amendment, or conference report carrying a
    Federal income tax rate increase may not be considered as passed or
    agreed to unless so determined by a vote of not less than three-fifths
    of the Members voting, a quorum being present. In this paragraph the
    term ``Federal income tax rate increase'' means any amendment to
    subsection (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) of section 1, or to section 11(b)
    or 55(b), of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, that imposes a new
    percentage as a rate of tax and thereby increases the amount of tax
    imposed by any such section.

    [[Page 821]]

    Consideration of retroactive tax rate increases
      This provision was added in the 104th Congress (sec. 106(a), H. Res.
    6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 463), and in the 105th Congress it was amended to
    clarify the definition of ``Federal income tax rate increase'' as
    limited to a specific amendment to one of the named subsections (H. Res.
    5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. ----). Before the House recodified its rules in the
    106th Congress, this provision was found in former clause 5(c) of rule
    XXI (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. ----). On one occasion the Chair held
    that a provision repealing a ceiling on total tax liability attributable
    to a net capital gain was not subject to the original version of this
    paragraph (Apr. 5, 1995, p. ----). This paragraph does not apply to a
    concurrent resolution (Speaker Gingrich, May 18, 1995, p. ----). A
    resolution reported from the Rules Committee waiving this paragraph may
    be adopted by majority vote (Oct. 26, 1995, p. ----). The Speaker rules
    on the applicability of this paragraph only pending the question of
    final passage of a measure alleged to carry a Federal income tax rate
    increase, and not in advance upon adoption of a special order waiving
    that provision (Oct. 26, 1995, p. ----).

    1068. Prohibition against retroactive income tax rate
    increase.

      (c)  It shall not be in order to consider a bill, joint
    resolution, amendment, or conference report carrying a retroactive
    Federal income tax rate increase. In this paragraph--

          (1) the term ``Federal income tax rate increase'' means any
    amendment to subsection (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) of section 1, or to
    section 11(b) or 55(b), of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, that
    imposes a new percentage as a rate of tax and thereby increases the
    amount of tax imposed by any such section; and

          (2) a Federal income tax rate increase is retroactive if it
    applies to a period beginning before the enactment of the provision.

      This paragraph was added in the 104th Congress (sec. 106(b), H. Res.
    6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 463), and it was amended in the 105th Congress to
    clarify the definition of ``Federal income tax rate increase'' (H. Res.
    5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. ----). Before the House recodified its rules in the
    106th Congress, this provision was found in former clause 5(d) of rule
    XXI (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. ----).