[Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 105th Congress]
[105th Congress]
[House Document 104-272]
[Rules of the House of Representatives]
[Pages 654-694]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



[[Page 654]]
 

                                Rule XXI.


                                on bills.




Sec. 830. Reading, engrossment, and passage of 
bills.

  1. Bills and  joint resolutions on their passage shall be read the first time 
by title and the second time in full, when, if the previous question is 
ordered, the Speaker shall state the question to be: Shall the bill be 
engrossed and read a third time? and, if decided in the affirmative, it 
shall be read the third time by title, and the question shall then be 
put upon its passage.


  This rule was adopted in 1789, amended in 1794, 1880 (IV, 3391), and 
on Jan. 4, 1965 (H. Res. 8, 89th Cong.). This latest amendment 
eliminated the provision which permitted a Member to demand the reading 
in full of the engrossed copy of a House bill.



Sec. 831. First and second readings.

  Formerly a  bill was 
read for the first time by title at the time of its introduction, but 
since 1890 all bills have been introduced by filing them with the Clerk, 
thus rendering a reading by title impossible at that time (IV, 3391). 
But the titles of all bills introduced are printed in the Journal and 
Record, thus carrying out the real purposes of the rule.



[[Page 655]]

  The second reading of a bill is in full and occurs when the bill is 
considered in the House (IV, 3391) or in the Committee of the Whole 
(Apr. 28, 1977, p. 12635). The initial step of consideration in the 
Committee of the Whole is sometimes referred to as the ``first reading'' 
and is customarily dispensed with by unanimous consent or special rule. 
Thus, the second reading of a bill comprises its reading for amendment 
in the Committee of the Whole (Apr. 28, 1977, p. 12635). Any Member may 
demand a full reading of a bill before general debate begins in the 
Committee of the Whole or, if considered in the House, when first taken 
up for action (IV, 3391, 4738). However, the second reading is normally 
affected by unanimous consent, suspension of the rules, or a special 
rule providing for the consideration of the bill. A motion to dispense 
with the reading of a bill in full is not in order (VIII, 2335, 2436). 
The Speaker may object to a request for unanimous consent that a bill 
may be acted on without being read (IV, 3390; VII, 1054).



Sec. 832. The third reading after 
engrossment.

  The right to  demand the reading in full of the engrossed copy of a 
bill formerly guaranteed by the rule, existed only immediately after it 
had passed to be engrossed and before it had been read a third time by 
title (IV, 3400, 3403, 3404; VII, 1061); or before the yeas and nays had 
been ordered on passage (IV, 3402). The right to demand the reading in 
full caused the bill to be laid aside until engrossed even though the 
previous question had been ordered (IV, 3395-3399; VII, 1062). A 
privileged motion may not intervene before the third reading (IV, 3405), 
and the question on engrossment and third reading is not subject to a 
demand for division of the question (Aug. 3, 1989, p. 18544). A vote on 
passage must first be reconsidered to remedy the omission to read a bill 
a third time (IV, 3406). Senate bills are not engrossed in the House; 
but are ordered to a third reading. The demand for the reading of the 
engrossed copy of a Senate bill cannot be made in the House (VIII, 
2426).





Sec. 833. Voting on bills.

  A bill in  the House (as 
distinguished from the Committee of the Whole) is amended pending the 
engrossment and third reading (V, 5781; VI, 1051, 1052). The question on 
engrossment and third reading being decided in the negative the bill is 
rejected (IV, 3420, 3421). A bill must be considered and voted on by 
itself (IV, 3408). Where the two Houses pass similar but distinct bills 
on the same subject it is necessary that one or the other House act 
again on the subject (IV, 3386). The requirement of a two-thirds vote 
for proposed constitutional amendments has been construed in the later 
practice to apply only to the vote on the final passage (V, 7029, 7030; 
VIII, 3504). A bill having been rejected by the House, a similar but not 
identical bill on the same subject was afterwards held to be in order 
(IV, 3384).




Sec. 834a. Unauthorized appropriations in reported 
general appropriation bills or amendments thereto.

  2. (a)  No appropriation 
shall be reported in a general appropriation bill, or shall be in order 
as an amendment thereto, for any expenditure not previously authorized 
by law, except to continue appropriations for public works and objects 
which are already in progress.



[[Page 656]]

propriation, except germane provisions that retrench expenditures by 
the reduction of amounts of money covered by the bill, which may include 
those recommended to the Committee on Appropriations by direction of a 
legislative committee having jurisdiction over the subject matter 
thereof, and except rescissions of appropriations contained in 
appropriation Acts.


Sec. 834b. Legislation in reported general appropriation 
bills; exceptions.

  (b)  No provision changing existing law shall be 
reported in a general appropriation bill, including a provision making 
the availability of funds contingent on the receipt or possession of 
information not required by existing law for the period of the 
ap-




Sec. 834c. Legislation or limitations in amendments to 
general appropriation bills.

  (c)  No amendment to a general appropriation 
bill shall be in order if changing existing law, including an amendment 
making the availability of funds contingent on the receipt or possession 
of information not required by existing law for the period of the 
appropriation. Except as provided in paragraph (d), no amendment shall 
be in order during consideration of a general appropriation bill 
proposing a limitation not specifically contained or authorized in 
existing law for the period of the limitation.



[[Page 657]]

amounts of money covered by the bill may be 
considered; but after the vote on any such amendment, the privileged 
motion made in order under this paragraph may be renewed.


Sec. 834d. Motion to rise and report as preferential to 
limitation or retrenchment amendments.

  (d)  After a general appropriation 
bill has been read for amendment, motions that the Committee of the 
Whole rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may 
have been adopted shall, if offered by the Majority Leader or a 
designee, have precedence over motions to further amend the bill. If any 
such motion is rejected, amendments proposing limitations not 
specifically contained or authorized in existing law for the period of 
the limitation or proposing germane amendments which retrench 
expenditures by reduction of 




Sec. 834e. Designated emergencies in reported 
appropriation bills.

  (e)  No provision shall be reported in any 
appropriation bill or joint resolution containing an emergency 
designation for purposes of section 251(b)(2)(D) or section 252(e) of 
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, or shall be in 
order as an amendment thereto, if the provision or amendment is not 
designated as an emergency, unless the provision or amendment rescinds 
budget authority or reduces direct spending, or reduces an amount for a 
designated emergency.





Sec. 834f. Offsetting amendments en bloc to appropriation 
bills.

  (f)  During the reading of any appropriation bill for amendment in 
the Committee of the Whole, it shall be in order to consider en bloc 
amendments proposing only to transfer appropriations among objects in 
the bill without increasing the levels of budget authority or outlays in 
the bill. When considered en bloc pursuant to this paragraph, such 
amendments may amend portions of the bill not yet read for amendment 
(following the disposition of any points of order against such portions) 
and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question in the 
House or in the Committee of the Whole.



[[Page 658]]

of contention over propositions of legislation. In 1838 
that Congress added the exception to permit unauthorized appropriations 
for continuation of works in progress and for contingencies for carrying 
on departments of the Government. The rule remained in that form until 
the 44th Congress in 1876, when William S. Holman of Indiana persuaded 
the House to amend the rule to permit germane legislative retrenchments. 
In 1880, the 46th Congress dropped the exception which permitted 
unauthorized appropriations for contingencies of Government departments, 
and modified the ``Holman Rule'' to define retrenchments as the 
reduction of the number and salary of officers of the United States, the 
reduction of compensation of any person paid out of the Treasury of the 
United States, or the reduction of the amounts of money covered by the 
bill. That form of the retrenchment exception remained in place until 
the 49th Congress in 1885, when it was dropped until the 52d Congress in 
1891, and then re-inserted through the 53d Congress until 1894. It was 
again dropped in the 54th Congress from 1895 until re-inserted in the 
62d Congress in 1911 (IV, 3578; VII, 1125).


Sec. 834g. Clause 2 of rule XXI, generally.

  The  25th 
Congress in 1837 was the first to adopt a rule prohibiting 
appropriations in a general appropriation bill or amendment thereto not 
previously authorized by law, in order to prevent delay of appropriation 
bills because 


  The clause remained unamended until January 3, 1983, when the 98th 
Congress restructured it in the basic form of paragraphs (a)-(d).

  Paragraph (a) retained the prohibition against unauthorized 
appropriations in general appropriation bills and amendments thereto 
except in continuation of works in progress.

  Paragraph (b) narrowed the ``Holman Rule'' exception from the 
prohibition against legislation to cover only retrenchments reducing 
amounts of money included in the bill as reported, and permitted 
legislative committees with proper jurisdiction to recommend such 
retrenchments to the Appropriations Committee for discretionary 
inclusion in the reported bill. The last exception in paragraph (b), 
permitting the inclusion of legislation rescinding appropriations in 
appropriation Acts, was added in the 99th Congress by the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (sec. 228(a), P.L. 99-
177). The latter feature of the paragraph does not extend to a 
rescission of contract authority provided by a law other than an 
appropriation Act (Sept. 22, 1993, p. ----; p. ----; May 15, 1997, p. --
--; July 23, 1997, p. ----). In the 105th Congress paragraph (b) was 
amended to treat as legislation a provision reported in a general 
appropriation bill that makes funding contingent on whether 
circumstances not made determinative by existing law are ``known'' (H. 
Res. 5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. ----).


[[Page 659]]

appropriation Act, and not 
merely where the limitation is alleged to be ``consistent with existing 
law'' (June 28, 1988, p. 16267). Although the Committee on 
Appropriations may include a limitation in its reported bill, if it is 
stricken with other legislative language on a point of order it may be 
reinserted during the reading only if in compliance with clause 2(c) or 
in accordance with clause 2(d) (June 18, 1991, p. 15199).
  Paragraph (c) retained the prohibition against amendments changing 
existing law but permitted limitation amendments during the reading of 
the bill by paragraph only if specifically authorized by existing law 
for the period of the limitation. In the 105th Congress paragraph (c) 
was amended to treat as legislation an amendment to a general 
appropriation bill that makes funding contingent on whether 
circumstances not made determinative by existing law are ``known'' (H. 
Res. 5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. ----). The exception for limitations is 
strictly construed to apply only where existing law requires or permits 
the inclusion of limiting language in an 


[[Page 660]]

the Committee of the Whole rise and report 
to the House with the recommendation that the enacting clause be 
stricken out takes precedence over the motion to amend under clause 7 of 
rule XXIII and thus over the motion to rise and report under clause 2(d) 
(July 24, 1986, p. 17641).
  Paragraph (d) provided a new procedure for consideration of 
retrenchment and other limitation amendments only when reading of a 
general appropriation bill has been completed and only if the Committee 
of the Whole does not adopt a motion to rise and report the bill back to 
the House (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1983, p. 34). In the 104th Congress 
paragraph (d) was amended to limit the availability of its preferential 
motion to rise and report to the Majority Leader or his designee (sec. 
215(a), H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. ----). In the 105th Congress it was 
further amended to make the motion preferential to any motion to amend 
at that stage (H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. ----). Where the reading of a 
general appropriation bill for amendment has been completed (or 
dispensed with), including the last paragraph of the bill containing the 
citation to the short title (July 30, 1986, p. 18214), the Chair (under 
the former form of the rule, which made the preferential motion 
available to any Member) might first inquire whether any Member sought 
to offer an amendment (formerly, one not prohibited by clauses 2(a) or 
(c)) prior to recognizing Members to offer limitation or retrenchment 
amendments (June 2, 1983, p. 14317; Sept. 22, 1983, p. 25406; Oct. 27, 
1983, p. 29630), including pro forma amendments (Aug. 2, 1989, p. 
18126). Pursuant to clause 2(d), a motion that the Committee rise and 
report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been 
adopted is not debatable (Apr. 23, 1987, p. 9613) and takes precedence 
over any amendment (formerly only a limitation or retrenchment 
amendment) (July 30, 1985, p. 21534; July 23, 1986, p. 17431; Apr. 23, 
1987, p. 9613), but only after completion of the reading and disposition 
of amendments not otherwise precluded (June 30, 1992, p. ----). Thus a 
motion that the Committee rise and report the bill to the House with the 
recommendation that it be recommitted, with instructions to report back 
to the House (forthwith or otherwise) with an amendment proposing a 
limitation, does not take precedence over the motion to rise and report 
the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted 
(sustained on appeal, Sept. 19, 1983, p. 24647). An amendment not only 
reducing an amount in a paragraph of an appropriation bill but also 
limiting expenditure of those funds on a particular project (i.e., a 
limitation not contained in existing law) was held not in order during 
the reading of that paragraph but only at the end of the bill under 
clause 2(d) (July 23, 1986, p. 17431; June 15, 1988, p. 14719). Where 
language of limitation was stricken from a general appropriation bill on 
a point of order that it changed existing law, an amendment proposing to 
reinsert the limitation without its former legislative content was held 
not in order before completion of the reading for amendment (Sept. 23, 
1993, p. ----). A motion that 

  Paragraphs (e) and (f) were added in the 104th Congress (sec. 215, H. 
Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. ----).



Sec. 835. Points of order on general appropriation 
bills.

  As the rule  applies only to general appropriation bills, which are not 
enumerated or defined in the rules (VII, 1116) bills appropriating only 
for one purpose have been held not to be ``general'' within the meaning 
of this rule (VII, 1122). Neither a resolution providing an 
appropriation for a single government agency (Jan. 31, 1962, p. 1352), 
nor a joint resolution only containing continuing appropriations for 
diverse agencies to provide funds until regular appropriation bills are 
enacted (Sept. 21, 1967, p. 26370), nor a joint resolution providing an 
appropriation for a single government agency and permitting a transfer 
of a portion of those funds to another agency (Oct. 25, 1979, pp. 29627-
28), nor a joint resolution transferring funds already appropriated from 
one specific agency to another (Mar. 26, 1980, pp. 6716-17), nor a joint 
resolution transferring unobligated balances to the President to be 
available for specified purposes but containing no new budget authority 
(Mar. 3, 1988, p. 3239), are ``general appropriation bills'' within the 
purview of this clause. A point of order under this rule does not apply 
to a special order reported from the Committee on Rules ``self-
executing'' the adoption in the House of an amendment changing existing 
law (July 27, 1993, p. ----).


  As all bills making or authorizing appropriations require 
consideration in Committee of the Whole, it follows that the enforcement 
of the rule must ordinarily occur during consideration in Committee of 
the Whole, where the Chair, in response to a point of order, may rule 
out any portion of the bill in conflict with the rule (IV, 3811; Sept. 
8, 1965, pp. 23140, 23182). Portions of the bill thus stricken are not 
reported back to the House.


[[Page 661]]

ruled on the ground that the Chairman 
of the Committee of the Whole lacked authority to pass upon the question 
(Apr. 8, 1943, pp. 3150-51, 3153). The enforcement of the rule also 
occurs in the House in that a motion to recommit a general appropriation 
bill may not propose an amendment containing legislation (Sept. 1, 1976, 
pp. 28883-84) or a limitation not considered in the Committee of the 
Whole (Speaker Foley, Aug. 1, 1989, p. 17159; Aug. 3, 1989, p. 18546); 
and such amendment is precluded whether the Committee of the Whole has 
risen and reported automatically pursuant to a special rule or, instead, 
by a motion at the end of the reading for amendment (June 22, 1995, p. 
----).
  Prior to the adoption of clause 8 of rule XXI in the 104th Congress 
(see Sec. 848a, infra), it was necessary that some Member reserve points 
of order when a general appropriation bill was referred to the calendar 
of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, in order 
that provisions in violation of the rule could be stricken in the 
Committee (V, 6921-6925; VIII, 3450; Chairman Chindblom, Feb. 6, 1926, 
p. 3456). Where points of order had been reserved pending a unanimous-
consent request that the committee be permitted to file its report when 
the House would not be in session, it was not necessary that they be 
reserved again when the report ultimately was presented as privileged 
when the House was in session, as the initial reservation carried over 
to the subsequent filing (Mar. 1, 1983, p. 3241). In an instance where 
points of order were not reserved against an appropriation bill when it 
was reported to the House and referred to the Committee of the Whole, 
points of order in the Committee of the Whole against a proposition in 
violation of this clause were over-

  By unanimous consent the Committee of the Whole may vacate proceedings 
under specified points of order (June 7, 1991, p. 13973).


[[Page 662]]

chapter (June 11, 1985, p. 15181). It is too 
late to rule out the entire paragraph after points of order against 
specific portions have been sustained and an amendment to the paragraph 
has been offered (June 27, 1974, pp. 21670-72).
  Points of order against unauthorized appropriations or legislation on 
general appropriation bills may be made as to the whole or only a 
portion of a paragraph (IV, 3652; V, 6881). The fact that a point is 
made against a portion of a paragraph does not prevent another point 
against the whole paragraph (V, 6882; July 31, 1985, p. 21895). If a 
portion of a proposed amendment is out of order, it is sufficient for 
the rejection of the whole amendment (V, 6878-6880); and if a point of 
order is sustained against any portion of a package of amendments 
considered en bloc, all the amendments are ruled out of order and must 
be reoffered separately, or those which are not subject to a point of 
order may be considered en bloc by unanimous consent (Sept. 16, 1981, 
pp. 20735-38; June 21, 1984, p. 17687). Where a point is sustained 
against the whole of a paragraph the whole must go out, but it is 
otherwise when the point is made only against a portion (V, 6884, 6885). 
General appropriation bills are read ``scientifically'' only by 
paragraph headings and appropriation amounts, and points of order 
against a paragraph must be made before an amendment is offered thereto 
or before the Clerk reads the next paragraph heading and amount 
(Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 2.26). A point of order 
against a paragraph under this clause may be made only after that 
paragraph has been read by the Clerk, and not prior to its reading 
pending consideration of an amendment inserting language immediately 
prior thereto (June 6, 1985, pp. 14605, 14609). Where the reading of a 
paragraph of a general appropriation bill has been dispensed with by 
unanimous consent, the Chair inquires whether there are points of order 
against the paragraph before entertaining amendments or directing the 
Clerk to read further, but he does not make such an inquiry where the 
Clerk has actually read the paragraph (May 31, 1984, p. 14608). Where 
the bill is considered as having been read and open to amendment by 
unanimous consent, points of order against provisions in the bill must 
be made before amendments are offered, and cannot be reserved pending 
subsequent action on amendments (Dec. 1, 1982, p. 28175). Where a 
chapter is considered as read by unanimous consent and open to amendment 
at any point, no amendments are offered and the Clerk begins to read the 
next chapter, it is too late to make a point of order against a 
paragraph in the preceding 


[[Page 663]]

  In the administration of the rule, it is the practice that those 
upholding an item of appropriation should have the burden of showing the 
law authorizing it (IV, 3597; VII, 1179, 1233, 1276). Thus the burden of 
proving the authorization for language carried in an appropriation bill, 
or that the language in the bill constitutes a valid limitation which 
does not change existing law, falls on the proponents and managers of 
the bill (May 28, 1968, p. 15357; Nov. 30, 1982, p. 28062). Where a 
provision is susceptible to more than one interpretation, that burden 
may be met by a showing that only the requirements of existing law, and 
not any new requirements, are recited in the language (Sept. 23, 1993, 
p. ----). The Chair may overrule a point of order that appropriations 
for a certain agency are unauthorized upon citation to an organic 
statute creating the agency, absent any showing that the organic law has 
been overtaken by a scheme of periodic reauthorization; the Chair may 
hear further argument and reverse his ruling, however, where existing 
law not previously called to the Chair's attention would require the 
ruling to be reversed (VIII, 3435; June 8, 1983, p. 14854, where a law 
amending the statute creating the Bureau of the Mint with the express 
purpose of requiring annual authorizations was subsequently called to 
the Chair's attention). Reported provisions in a general appropriation 
bill described in the accompanying report (pursuant to clause 3 of rule 
XXI) as directly or indirectly changing the application of existing law 
are presumably legislation, absent rebuttal by the committee (May 31, 
1984, p. 14591). The burden of proof to show that an appropriation 
contained in an amendment is authorized by law is on the proponent of 
the amendment (May 11, 1971, p. 14471; Oct. 29, 1991, p. 28791; July 26, 
1995, p. ----; July 27, 1995, pp. ----, ----; July 31, 1995, p. ----; 
May 15, 1997, p. ----) and the burden is on the proponent of an 
amendment to a general appropriation bill to prove that language offered 
under the guise of a limitation does not change existing law (July 17, 
1975, p. 23239; June 16, 1976, pp. 18666-67; July 18, 1995, p. ----). If 
the amendment is susceptible to more than one interpretation, it is 
incumbent upon the proponent to show that it is not in violation of the 
rule (Procedure, ch. 25, sec. 6.3; July 28, 1980, pp. 19924-25). The 
mere recitation in an amendment that a determination is to be made 
pursuant to existing laws and regulations, absent a citation to the law 
imposing such responsibility, is not sufficient proof by the proponent 
of an amendment to overcome a point of order that the amendment 
constitutes legislation (Sept. 16, 1980, pp. 25606-07). The 
authorization must be enacted before the appropriation may be included 
in an appropriation bill; thus delaying the availability of an 
appropriation pending enactment of an authorization does not protect the 
item of appropriation against a point of order under this clause (Apr. 
26, 1972, p. 14455).

  Where an unauthorized appropriation or legislation is permitted to 
remain in a general appropriation bill by failure to raise or by waiver 
of a point of order, an amendment merely changing that amount and not 
adding legislative language or earmarking separate funds for another 
unauthorized purpose is in order (July 27, 1954, p. 12287; Oct. 1, 1975, 
p. 31058; June 8, 1977, pp. 17941-42; July 17, 1985, p. 19435), but an 
amendment adding further unauthorized items of appropriation or 
earmarking for another unauthorized purpose or adding legislation in the 
form of new duties or broadening the application of a legislative 
provision permitted to remain to other funds is not in order (Dec. 8, 
1971, p. 45487; Aug. 7, 1978, pp. 24710-12; July 30, 1985, p. 21532; 
July 17, 1986, p. 16918; July 23, 1986, p. 17446; June 26, 1987, p. 
17655; May 25, 1988, p. 12256; June 28, 1988, pp. 16203, 16213).

  To a legislative provision permitted to remain conferring assistance 
on a certain class of recipients, an amendment adding another class is 
further legislation and is not merely perfecting in nature (June 22, 
1983, p. 16851). An amendment to a general appropriation bill is not 
subject to a point of order as adding legislation if containing, 
verbatim, a legislative provision already contained in the bill and 
permitted to remain (Aug. 27, 1980, p. 23519).


[[Page 664]]

  Where by unanimous consent an amendment is offered en bloc to a 
paragraph containing an unauthorized amount not yet read for amendment, 
the amendment increasing that unauthorized figure is subject to a point 
of order since at that point it is not being offered to a paragraph 
which has been read and permitted to remain (June 21, 1984, p. 17687). 
As required by clause 2(f), the Chair will query for points of order 
against the provisions of an appropriation bill not yet reached in the 
reading but addressed by an amendment offered en bloc under that clause 
as budget authority and outlay neutral (July 22, 1997, p. ----). An 
amendment adding a new paragraph indirectly increasing an unauthorized 
amount contained in a prior paragraph passed in the reading is subject 
to a point of order because the new paragraph is adding a further 
unauthorized amount not textually protected by the waiver (July 12, 
1995, p. ----; July 16, 1997, p. ----, p.----; Sept. 9, 1997, p. ----). 
However, a new paragraph indirectly reducing an unauthorized amount 
permitted to remain in a prior paragraph passed in the reading is not 
subject to a point of order because it is not adding a further 
unauthorized amount (July 16, 1997, p. ----). To a legislative provision 
in a general appropriation bill, permitted to remain, exempting cases 
where the life of the mother would be endangered if a fetus were carried 
to term from a denial of funds for abortions, an amendment exempting 
instead cases where the health of the mother would be endangered if the 
fetus were carried to term was held not to constitute further 
legislation, since determinations on the endangerment of life 
necessarily subsume determinations on the endangerment of health, and 
the amendment did not therefore require any different or more onerous 
determinations (June 27, 1984, p. 19113).

  The inclusion of funds in a general appropriation bill in the form of 
a ``not to exceed'' limitation does not obviate a point of order that 
the funds are not authorized by law (June 21, 1988, p. 15440). The fact 
that legislative jurisdiction over the subject matter of an amendment 
may rest with the Committee on Appropriations does not immunize the 
amendment from the application of clause 2(c) of rule XXI (July 17, 
1996, p. ----; July 24, 1996, p. ----). The ``works in progress 
exception'' under clause 2(a) of rule XXI is a defense to a point of 
order against an unauthorized appropriation reported in a general 
appropriation bill and is not a defense to a point of order under clause 
2(c) of rule XXI that an amendment to an appropriation bill constitutes 
legislation (July 24, 1996, p.----).


[[Page 665]]

thorizing additional 
employment contained in an appropriation bill enacted for that fiscal 
year, constituted sufficient authorization for a lump sum supplemental 
appropriation for the White House for the same fiscal year (Nov. 30, 
1973, pp. 38854-55). By a general provision of law appropriations for 
investigations and the acquisition and diffusion of information by the 
Agricultural Department on subjects related to agriculture are generally 
in order in the agricultural appropriation bill (IV, 3649). It has once 
been held that this law would also authorize appropriations for the 
instrumentalities of such investigations (IV, 3615); but these would not 
include the organization of a bureau to conduct the work (IV, 3651). The 
law does not authorize general investigations by the department (IV, 
3652), or cooperation with state investigations (IV, 3650; VII, 1301, 
1302), or the investigation of foods in relation to commerce (IV, 3647, 
3648; VII, 1298), or the compiling of tests at an exposition (IV, 3653). 
A paragraph of a general appropriation bill both establishing and 
funding a commission was ruled out as constituting legislation and 
carrying unauthorized appropriations (June 29, 1988, p. 16470). A 
paragraph appropriating funds for matching-grants to States was held 
unauthorized where the authorizing law did not require State matching 
funds (June 28, 1993, p. ----). A paragraph funding a project from the 
Highway Trust Fund was held unauthorized where such funding was 
authorized only from the general fund (Sept. 23, 1993, p. ----).


Sec. 836. Authorization of law for 
appropriations.

  The authorization  by existing law required in the rule to justify 
appropriations may be made also by a treaty if it has been ratified by 
both the contracting parties (IV, 3587); however, where existing law 
authorizes appropriations for the U.S. share of facilities to be 
recommended in an agreement with another country containing specified 
elements, an agreement in principle with that country predating the 
authorization law and lacking the required elements is insufficient 
authorization (June 28, 1993, p. ----). An executive order does not 
constitute sufficient authorization in law absent proof of its 
derivation from a statute enacted by Congress authorizing the order and 
expenditure of funds (June 15, 1973, p. 19855; June 25, 1974, p. 21036). 
Thus a Reorganization Plan submitted by the President pursuant to 5 
U.S.C. 906 has the status of statutory law when it becomes effective and 
is sufficient authorization to support an appropriation for an office 
created by executive order issued pursuant to the Reorganization Plan 
(June 21, 1974, pp. 20595-96). A resolution of the House has been held 
sufficient authorization for an appropriation for the salary of an 
employee of the House (IV, 3656-3658) even though the resolution may 
have been agreed to only by a preceding House (IV, 3660). Previous 
enactment of items of appropriation unauthorized by law does not justify 
similar appropriations in subsequent bills (VII, 1145, 1150, 1151) 
unless if through appropriations previously made, a function of the 
government has been established which would bring it into the category 
of continuation of works in progress (VII, 1280), or unless legislation 
in a previous appropriation act has become permanent law (May 20, 1964, 
p. 11422). The omission to appropriate during a series of years for an 
object authorized by law does not repeal the law, and consequently an 
appropriation when proposed is not subject to the point of order (IV, 
3595). The law authorizing each head of a department to employ such 
numbers of clerks, messengers, copyists, watchmen, laborers, and other 
employees as may be appropriated for by Congress from year to year is 
held to authorize appropriations for those positions not otherwise 
authorized by law (IV, 3669, 3675, 4739); but this law does not apply to 
offices not within departments or not at the seat of government (IV, 
3670-3674). A permanent law authorizing the President to appoint certain 
staff, together with legislative provisions au-


  The failure of Congress to enact into law separate legislation 
specifically modifying eligibility requirements for grant programs under 
existing law does not necessarily render appropriations for those 
programs subject to a point of order, where more general existing law 
authorizes appropriations for all of the programs proposed to be 
modified by new legislation pending before Congress (June 8, 1978, p. 
16778). But whether organic statutes or general grants of authority in 
law constitute sufficient authorization to support appropriations 
depends on whether the general laws applicable to the function or 
department in question require specific or annual authorizations (June 
14, 1978, pp. 17616, 17622, 17626, 17630) or on whether a periodic 
authorization scheme has subsequently occupied the field (Sept. 9, 1997, 
p. ----). An authorization of ``such sums as may be necessary'' is 
sufficient to support any dollar amount, but has no tendency to relieve 
other conditions of the authorization law (June 28, 1993, p. ----). 
Where existing law authorizes certain appropriations from a particular 
trust fund without fiscal year limitation, language that such an 
appropriation remain available until expended does not constitute 
legislation (July 15, 1993, p. ----).


[[Page 666]]

  Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XLVIII, no funds may be appropriated to 
certain agencies carrying out intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities, unless such funds have been authorized by law for the fiscal 
year in question.



Sec. 837. Authorization for claims and 
salaries.

  Judgments of  courts certified to Congress in accordance with law or 
authorized by treaty (IV, 3634, 3635, 3644) and audited under authority 
of law have been held to be authorization for appropriations for the 
payment of claims (IV, 3634, 3635). But unadjudicated claims (IV, 3628), 
even though ascertained and transmitted by an executive officer (IV, 
3625-3640), and findings filed under the Bowman Act do not constitute 
authorization (IV, 3643).


  An appropriation for an object not otherwise authorized does not 
constitute authorization to justify a continuance of the appropriation 
another year (IV, 3588, 3589; VII, 1128, 1145, 1149, 1191), and the mere 
appropriation for a salary does not create an office so as to justify 
appropriations in succeeding years (IV, 3590, 3672, 3697), it being a 
general rule that propositions to appropriate for salaries not 
established by law or to increase salaries fixed by law are out of order 
(IV, 3664-3667, 3676-3679). But an exception to these general principles 
is found in the established practice that in the absence of a general 
law fixing a salary the amount appropriated in the last appropriation 
bill has been held to be the legal salary (IV, 3687-3696). A law having 
established an office and fixed a salary, it is not in order to provide 
for an unauthorized office and salary in lieu of it (IV, 3680).


[[Page 667]]



Sec. 838. Authorizations for public works.

  An  appropriation 
for a public work in excess of a fixed limit of cost (IV, 3583, 3584; 
VII, 1133), or for extending a service beyond the limits assigned by an 
executive officer exercising a lawful discretion (IV, 3598), or by 
actual law (IV, 3582, 3585), or for purposes prohibited by law are out 
of order (IV, 3580, 3581, 3702), as is an appropriation from the Highway 
Trust Fund where the project is specifically authorized from the general 
fund (Sept. 23, 1993, p. ----). But the mere appropriation of a sum ``to 
complete'' a work does not fix a limit of cost such as would exclude 
future appropriations (IV, 3761). A declaration of policy in an act 
followed by specific provisions conferring authority upon a governmental 
agency to perform certain functions is not construed to authorize 
appropriations for purposes germane to the policy but not specifically 
authorized by the act (VII, 1200). A point of order will not lie against 
an amendment proposing to increase a lump sum for public works projects 
where language in the bill limits use of the lump sum appropriation to 
``projects as authorized by law'' (Procedure, ch. 25, sec. 5.5), but 
where language in the bill limits use of the lump sum both to projects 
``authorized by laws'' and ``subject, where appropriate, to enactment of 
authorizing legislation,'' that paragraph constitutes an appropriation 
in part for some unauthorized projects and is not in order (June 6, 
1985, p. 14617).




Sec. 839. Continuation of a public work by 
appropriations.

  The rule  requiring appropriations to be authorized by existing 
law excepts those ``in continuance of appropriations for such public 
works and objects as are already in progress'' (IV, 3578); and the 
``works in progress'' exception has historically been applied only in 
cases of general revenue funding (Sept. 22, 1993, pp. ----; Sept. 23, 
1993, pp. ----). But an appropriation in violation of existing law or to 
extend a service beyond a fixed limit is not in order as the continuance 
of a public work (IV, 3585, 3702-3724; VII, 1332; Sept. 23, 1993, pp. --
--; June 8, 1983, Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 8.9). The 
``works in progress'' exception may not be invoked to fund a project 
governed by a lapsed authorization and may not be invoked to fund a 
project that is not yet under construction (July 31, 1995, p. ----). 
Where existing law (40 U.S.C. 606) specifically prohibits the making of 
an appropriation to construct or alter any public building involving 
more than $500,000 unless approved by the House and Senate Public Works 
Committees, an appropriation for such purposes not authorized by both 
committees is out of order notwithstanding the ``works in progress'' 
exemption, since the law specifically precludes the appropriation from 
being made (June 8, 1983, p. 14855). An appropriation from the Highway 
Trust Fund for an ongoing project was held not in order under the 
``works in progress'' exception where the Internal Revenue Code 
``occupied the field'' with a comprehensive authorization scheme not 
embracing the specified project (Sept. 22, 1993, pp. ----; Sept. 23, 
1993, pp. ----). Interruption of a work does not necessarily remove it 
from the privileges of the rule (IV, 3705-3708); but the continuation of 
the work must not be so conditioned in relation to place as to become a 
new work (IV, 3704). It has been held that a work has not been begun 
within the meaning of the rule when an appropriation has been made for a 
site for a public building (IV, 3785), or when a commission has been 
created to select a site or when a site has actually been selected for a 
work (IV, 3762-3763), or when a survey has been made (IV, 3782-3784). By 
``public works and objects already in progress'' are meant tangible 
matters like buildings, roads, etc., and not duties of officials in 
executive departments (IV, 3709-3713), or the continuance of a work 
indefinite as to completion and intangible in nature like the gauging of 
streams (IV, 3714, 3715). A general system of roads on which some work 
has been done cannot be admitted as a work in progress (VII, 1333), nor 
can an extension of an existing road (Sept. 22, 1993, p. ----). 
Concerning reappropriation for continuation of public works in progress, 
see Sec. 847, infra.



[[Page 668]]

tions (IV, 3719; VII, 1345), duties of a commission (IV, 3720; 
VII, 1344), extension of foreign markets for goods (IV, 3722), printing 
of a series of opinions indefinite in continuance (IV, 3718), free 
evening lectures in the District of Columbia (IV, 3789), certain ongoing 
projects from the Highway Trust Fund (Sept. 22, 1993, pp. ----; Sept. 
23, 1993, pp. ----), extension of an existing road (Sept. 22, 1993, p. 
----), continuation of an extra compensation for ordinary facility for 
carrying the mails (IV, 3808), although the continuation of certain 
special mail facilities has been admitted (IV, 3804-3806). But 
appropriations for rent and repairs of buildings or Government roads 
(IV, 3793, 3798) and bridges (IV, 3803) have been admitted as in 
continuation of a work (IV, 3777, 3778), although it is not in order as 
such to provide for a new building in place of one destroyed (IV, 3606). 
Nor is it in order to repair paving adjacent to a public building but in 
a city street, although it may have been laid originally by the 
Government (IV, 3779). The purchase of adjoining land for a work already 
established has been admitted under this principle (IV, 3766-3773) and 
also additions to existing buildings in cases where no limits of cost 
have been shown (IV, 3774, 3775). But the purchase of a separate and 
detached lot of land is not admitted (IV, 3776). The continuation of 
construction at the Kennedy Library, a project owned by the United 
States and funded by a prior year's appropriation, has been admitted 
notwithstanding the absence of any current authorization (June 14, 1988, 
p. 14335). A provision of law authorizing Commissioners of the District 
of Columbia to take over and operate the fish wharves of the city of 
Washington was held insufficient authority to admit an appropriation for 
reconstructing the fish wharf (VII, 1187).


Sec. 840. Examples illustrating the continuation of a 
public work.

  Thus the  continuation of the following works has been admitted: A 
topographical survey (IV, 3796, 3797; VII, 1382), a geological map (IV, 
3795), marking of a boundary line (IV, 3717), marking graves of soldiers 
(IV, 3788), a list of claims (IV, 3717), and recoinage of coins in the 
Treasury (IV, 3807); but the following works have not been admitted: 
Investigation of materials, like coal (IV, 3721), scientific investiga-




Sec. 841a. New buildings at existing 
institutions as in continuance of a public work.

  Appropriations for  new buildings at 
Government institutions have sometimes been admitted (IV, 3741-3750) 
when intended for the purposes of the institution (IV, 3747); but later 
decisions, in view of the indefinite extent of the practice made 
possible by the early decisions, have ruled out propositions to 
appropriate for new buildings in navy yards (IV, 3755-3759) and other 
establishments (IV, 3751-3754). Appropriations for new schoolhouses in 
the District of Columbia (IV, 3750; VII, 1358), for new Army hospitals 
(IV, 3740), for new lighthouses (IV, 3728), armor-plate factories (IV, 
3737-3739), and for additional playgrounds for children in the District 
of Columbia (IV, 3792) have also been held not to be in continuation of 
a public work.



[[Page 669]]

former interpretation was confined to naval vessels, and did 
not apply to vessels in other services, like the Coast and Geodetic 
Survey or Lighthouse Service (IV, 3725, 3726), or to floating or 
stationary dry docks (IV, 3729-3736). The construction of a submarine 
cable in extension of one already laid was held not to be the 
continuation of a public work (IV, 3716), but an appropriation for the 
Washington-Alaska military cable has been held in order (VII, 1348).


Sec. 841b. New vessel for naval and other services 
as in continuation of a public work.

  By a former  broad construction of the rule an 
appropriation of a new and not otherwise authorized vessel of the Navy 
had been held to be a continuance of a public work (IV, 3723, 3724); but 
this line of decisions has been overruled (VII, 1351; Chairman Lehlbach, 
Jan. 22, 1926, p. 2621). While appropriations for new construction and 
procurement of aircraft and equipment for the Navy are not in order, 
appropriations for continuing experiments and development work on all 
types of aircraft are in order (Chairman Lehlbach, Jan. 22, 1926, p. 
2623). This 




Sec. 842a. Legislation on appropriation bills 
generally.

  The provision of  the rule forbidding in any general appropriation bill a 
``provision changing existing law'' is construed to mean the enactment 
of law where none exists (IV, 3812, 3813), such as permitting funds to 
remain available until expended or beyond the fiscal year covered by the 
bill, where existing law permits no such availability (Aug. 1, 1973, pp. 
27288-89), or immediately upon enactment (July 29, 1986, p. 17981; June 
28, 1988, p. 16255) or merely permits availability to the extent 
provided in advance in appropriation Acts but not explicitly beyond the 
fiscal year in question (July 21, 1981, p. 16687). Language waiving the 
provisions of existing law that did not specifically permit inclusion of 
such a waiver in an appropriation bill (Nov. 13, 1975, p. 36271; June 
20, 1996, p. ----), has been ruled out, as has language identical to 
that contained in an authorization bill previously passed by the House 
but not yet signed into law (Aug. 4, 1978, p. 24436), or a proposition 
for repeal of existing law (VII, 1403). Although clause 2(b) permits the 
Committee on Appropriations to report rescissions of appropriations, an 
amendment proposing a rescission constitutes legislation under clause 
2(c) (May 26, 1993, p. ----). A proposal to amend existing law to 
provide for automatic continuation of appropriations in the absence of 
timely enactment of a regular appropriation bill constitutes legislation 
in contravention of clause 2(c) (July 17, 1996, p. ----; July 24, 1996, 
p. ----).


  Existing law may be repeated verbatim in an appropriation bill (IV, 
3814, 3815), but the slightest change of the text causes it be ruled out 
(IV, 3817; VII, 1391, 1394; June 4, 1970, p. 18405). It is in order to 
include language descriptive of authority provided in law for the 
operation of government agencies and corporations so long as the 
description is precise and does not change that authority in any respect 
(June 15, 1973, pp. 19843-44; Aug. 3, 1978, p. 24249); and while 
language merely reciting the applicability of current law to the use of 
earmarked funds is permitted, an amendment that elevates existing 
guidelines to mandates for spending has been ruled out (July 12, 1989, 
p. 14432).


[[Page 670]]

year to year of a law intended to apply during the year of its 
enactment only is not relieved, however, from the point that it is 
legislation (IV, 3822).
  Although the object to be appropriated for may be described without 
violating the rule (IV, 3864), an amendment proposing an appropriation 
under a heading that indicates an unauthorized purpose as its object has 
been ruled out (Oct. 29, 1991, p. 28814). The fact that an item has been 
carried in appropriation bills for many years does not exempt it from a 
point of order as being legislation (VII, 1445, 1656). The reenactment from 

  Limits of cost for public works may not be made or changed (IV, 3761, 
3865-3867; VII, 1446), or contracts authorized (IV, 3868-3870; May 14, 
1937, p. 4595).

  The Chair may examine legislative history established during debate on 
an amendment against which a point of order has been reserved to resolve 
any ambiguity therein when ruling on the eventual point of order (June 
14, 1978, p. 17651), and may inquire after its author's intent when 
attempting to construe an ambiguous amendment (Oct. 29, 1991, p. 28818).



Sec. 842b. Contingencies and congressional 
actions.

  An  amendment making an appropriation contingent upon a 
recommendation (June 27, 1979, pp. 17054-55) or action not specifically 
required by law (July 23, 1980, pp. 19295-97; July 29, 1980, pp. 20098-
20100) is legislation. For example, a provision limiting the use of 
funds in a bill ``unless'' or ``until'' an action contrary to existing 
law is taken constitutes legislation (Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 
26, sec. 47.1; July 24, 1996, p. ----). Where existing law requires an 
agency to furnish certain information to congressional committees upon 
request, without a subpoena, it is not in order on an appropriation bill 
to make funding for that agency contingent upon its furnishing 
information to subcommittees upon request (July 29 and July 30, 1980, 
pp. 20475-76), or contingent upon submission of an agreement by a 
Federal official to Congress and Congressional review thereof (July 31, 
1986, p. 18370). Similarly, it is not in order on a general 
appropriation bill to condition funds on legal determinations to be made 
by a federal court and an executive department (June 28, 1988, p. 16261; 
see Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 47.2).



[[Page 671]]

tive branch policy determinations not required by law (Nov. 2, 1983, p. 
30503); an amendment changing a permanent appropriation in existing law 
to restrict its availability until all general appropriation bills are 
presented to the President was held to constitute legislation (June 29, 
1987, p. 18083); and an amendment limiting funds in the bill for certain 
peacekeeping operations unless authorized by Congress was held to 
constitute legislation (June 27, 1994, p. ----).
  Amendments making the availability of funds in a general appropriation 
bill contingent upon subsequent Congressional action have, under the 
most recent precedents, been ruled out as legislation. An amendment 
prohibiting the availability of funds to enforce certain executive 
orders, unless those orders were approved by concurrent resolutions of 
the Congress, was held to be legislation imposing new requirements of 
further legislative action (June 30, 1942, p. 5826). An amendment 
providing that a certain appropriation did not grant authority for a 
certain use of funds unless specific approval of Congress was 
subsequently granted was held to be legislation (May 15, 1947, p. 5378). 
Two subsequent rulings upholding the admissibility of amendments making 
the availability of funds in a general appropriation bill contingent 
upon subsequent Congressional action (June 11, 1968, p. 16692; Sept. 6, 
1979, pp. 23360-61) have, in turn, been superseded by four more recent 
rulings. A provision making the availability of certain funds contingent 
upon subsequent Congressional action on legislative proposals resolving 
the policy issue was held to constitute legislation (Nov. 18, 1981, p. 
28064); an amendment making the availability of funds therein contingent 
upon subsequent enactment of legislation containing specified findings 
was ruled out as legislation requiring new legislative and execu-

  It is not in order on a general appropriation bill to require a 
congressional committee to promulgate regulations to limit the use of an 
appropriation (June 13, 1979, pp. 14670-71), or otherwise to direct the 
activities of a committee (June 24, 1992, pp. ----); nor is it in order 
to direct the Selective Service Administration to issue regulations to 
bring its classifications into conformance with a Supreme Court decision 
(July 20, 1989, p. 15405). Also a proposition to change a rule of the 
House is subject to the point of order (IV, 3819). A provision 
constituting Congressional disapproval of a deferral of budget authority 
proposed by the President pursuant to the Impoundment Control Act is not 
in order if included in a general appropriation bill rather than in a 
separate resolution of disapproval under that Act (July 29, 1982, pp. 
18625, 18626). An amendment making the availability of funds in a 
general appropriation bill contingent upon a substantive determination 
by a state or local government official or agency which is not otherwise 
required by existing law has been ruled out as legislation (July 25, 
1985, p. 20569).



Sec. 842c. Construing or amending existing 
law.

  A provision  proposing to construe existing law is itself legislative and 
therefore not in order (IV, 3936-3938; May 2, 1951, pp. 4747-48; July 
26, 1951, p. 8982). However, an official's general responsibility to 
construe the language of a limitation on the use of funds, absent 
imposition of an affirmative direction not required by law, does not 
destroy the validity of the limitation (June 27, 1974, pp. 21687-94).


  Where it is asserted that duties ostensibly occasioned by a limitation 
are already imposed by existing law, the Chair may take cognizance of 
judicial decisions and rule the limitation out on the basis that the 
case law is not uniform, current, or finally dispositive (June 16, 1977, 
pp. 19365-74; June 7, 1978, p. 16676). For example, a limitation 
prohibiting the use of funds for an inspection conducted by a regulatory 
agency without a search warrant has been held out of order as imposing a 
new duty not uniformly required by case law (June 16, 1977, pp. 19365-
74). Similarly, an amendment denying the use of funds for an agency to 
apply certain provisions of law under court decisions in effect on a 
prior date has been held out of order as requiring the official to apply 
non-current case law (June 7, 1978, p. 16655). A paragraph of a general 
appropriation bill changing existing law concerning Federal diversity 
jurisdiction is legislation (July 1, 1987, p. 18638).


[[Page 672]]

sion construing a limitation in a bill by 
affirmatively declaring the meaning of the prohibition (May 17, 1988, p. 
11305). Similarly, a limitation that prescribes definitions for terms 
contained in the limitation may be legislation (Deschler's Precedents, 
vol. 8, ch. 26, secs. 25.7, 25.11). On the other hand, language 
excepting certain appropriations from the sweep of a broader limitation 
may be in order (Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 25.2). It 
also has been held in order to except from the operation of a specific 
limitation on expenditures certain of those expenditures which are 
authorized by law by prohibiting a construction of the limitation in a 
way which would prevent compliance with that law (Deschler's Precedents, 
vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 25.10; June 18, 1991, p. 15218).
  A provision in an appropriation bill prescribing a rule of 
construction is legislation (Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 
25.15) as is a provi-

  The mere recitation in an amendment that a determination is to be made 
pursuant to existing laws and regulations, absent a citation to the law 
imposing such responsibility, is not sufficient proof by the proponent 
of an amendment to overcome a point of order that the amendment 
constitutes legislation (Sept. 16, 1980, pp. 25606-07; May 8, 1986, p. 
10156). A limitation denying the use of funds to apply certain 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code other than under regulations in 
effect on a prior date is legislation since requiring an official to 
apply regulations no longer current in order to render an appropriation 
available (June 7, 1978, p. 16655; Aug. 19, 1980, pp. 21978-80).



Sec. 842d. Imposing duties or requiring 
determinations.

  Propositions to  establish affirmative directions for executive 
officers (IV, 3854-3859; VII, 1443; July 31, 1969, p. 21675; June 18, 
1979, pp. 15286-87; July 1, 1987, pp. 18654 and 18655; June 27, 1994, p. 
----), even in cases where they may have discretion under the law so to 
do (IV, 3853; June 4, 1970, p. 18401; Aug. 8, 1978, pp. 24959-60), or to 
affirmatively take away an authority or discretion conferred by law (IV, 
3862, 3863; VII, 1975; Mar. 30, 1955, pp. 4065-66; June 21, 1974, p. 
20600; July 31, 1985, p. 21909), are subject to the point of order. 
While any limitation in an appropriation bill (see Sec. 483, supra) 
places some minimal duties on Federal officials, who must determine the 
effect of such a limitation on appropriated funds, an amendment or 
language in an appropriation bill may not impose additional duties, not 
required by law, or make the appropriation contingent upon the 
performance of such duties (May 28, 1968, p. 15350). Language in the 
form of a conditional limitation requiring determinations by Federal 
officials will be held to change existing law unless the proponent can 
show that the new duties are merely incidental to functions already 
required by law and do not involve substantive new determinations (July 
26, 1985, p. 20807).



[[Page 673]]

the words ``in order to overcome racial imbalance'' 
were held to impose additional duties, and Nov. 30, 1982, p. 28062, 
where the words ``to interfere with'' the rulemaking authority of any 
regulatory agency were held to implicitly require the Office of 
Management and Budget to make determinations not discernibly required by 
law in evaluating and executing its responsibilities). An amendment 
limiting funds for an agency or any ``successor agency'' requires a 
determination of ``successor agency'' status (Sept. 26, 1997, p. ----).
  Where an amendment to or language in a general appropriation bill 
implicitly places new duties on officers of the government or implicitly 
requires them to make investigations, compile evidence, or make 
judgments and determinations not otherwise required of them by law, such 
as to judge intent or motives, then it assumes the character of 
legislation and is subject to a point of order (July 31, 1969, pp. 
21653, 21675, where 


[[Page 674]]

the official being consulted to make determinations not specifically 
required by law (July 22, 1980, pp. 19087-88).
  An amendment authorizing the President to reduce each appropriation in 
the bill by not more than ten percent was ruled out as legislation 
conferring new authority on the President (May 31, 1984, p. 14617; June 
6, 1984, p. 15120). A limitation on the use of funds, or an exception 
therefrom, may not be accompanied by language stating or requiring a 
finding of a motive or purpose in carrying out the limitation (Aug. 8, 
1978, pp. 24969-70; July 22, 1980, pp. 19087-88; Sept. 16, 1980, p. 
25604; Sept. 22, 1981, p. 21577). A paragraph prohibiting the use of 
funds to perform abortions except where the mother's life would be 
endangered if the fetus were carried to term is legislation, since 
requiring Federal officials to make new determinations and judgments not 
required of them by law, regardless whether private or State officials 
administering the funds in question routinely make such determinations 
(June 17, 1977, p. 1969; June 30, 1993, p. ----). The fact that such a 
provision relating to abortion funding may have been included in 
appropriation Acts in prior years applicable to funds in those laws does 
not permit the inclusion of similar language requiring such 
determinations, not required by law, with respect to funds for the 
fiscal year in question (Sept. 22, 1983, p. 25406); and where the 
provision, applicable to Federal funds, was permitted to remain in a 
bill (no point of order having been made), an amendment striking the 
word ``Federal,'' and thereby broadening the provision to include 
District of Columbia funds as well, was ruled out (Nov. 15, 1989, p. 
29004). But to such a provision permitted to remain in a general 
appropriation bill, an amendment exempting instead cases where the 
health of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to 
term was held not to constitute further legislation by requiring any 
different or more onerous determinations (June 27, 1984, p. 19113). An 
amendment prohibiting the use of funds in an appropriation bill for the 
General Services Administration to dispose of U.S.-owned 
``agricultural'' land declared surplus was ruled out as legislation, 
since the determination whether surplus lands are ``agricultural'' was 
not required by law (Aug. 20, 1980, pp. 22156-58); but a limitation 
precluding funds for any transit project exceeding a specified cost-
effectiveness index was held not to impose new duties where the Chair 
was persuaded that the limitation applied to projects for which indexes 
were already required by law (Sept. 23, 1993, p. ----). The fact that an 
executive official may have been directed by an executive order to 
consult another executive official prior to taking an action does not 
permit inclusion of language directing 

  An amendment limiting use of funds in a bill may not condition the 
availability of funds or the exercise of contract authority upon an 
interpretation of local law where that interpretation is not required by 
existing law (July 17, 1981, p. 16327); may not require new 
determinations of full Federal compliance with mandates imposed upon 
States (July 22, 1981, p. 16829); may not require the evaluation of the 
theoretical basis of a program (July 22, 1981, p. 16822); may not 
require new determinations of propriety or effectiveness (Oct. 6, 1981, 
p. 23361; May 25, 1988, p. 12275), or satisfactory quality (Aug. 1, 
1986, p. 18647) or incorporate by reference determinations already made 
in administrative processes not affecting programs funded by the bill 
(Oct. 6, 1981, p. 23361); may not require new determinations of rates of 
interest payable (July 29, 1982, p. 18624; Dec. 9, 1982, p. 29691); may 
not apply standards of conduct to foreign entities where existing law 
requires such conduct only by domestic entities (July 17, 1986, p. 
16951); may not require the enforcement of a standard where existing law 
only requires inspection of an area (July 30, 1986, p. 18189); may not 
prohibit the availability of funds for the purchase of ``nondomestic'' 
goods and services (Sept. 12, 1986, p. 23178); may not mandate 
contractual provisions (May 18, 1988, p. 11389); may not authorize the 
adjustment of wages of government employees (June 21, 1988, p. 15451; 
Apr. 26, 1989, p. 7525) or permit an increase in Members' office 
allowances only ``if requested in writing'' (Oct. 21, 1990, p. ----); 
may not convert an existing legal prerequisite for the issuance of a 
regulatory permit into a prerequisite for even the preliminary 
processing of such a permit (July 22, 1992, p. ----); may not mandate 
reductions in various appropriations by a variable percentage calculated 
in relation to ``overhead'' (Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 
5.6; June 24, 1992, p. ----); may not require an agency to investigate 
and determine whether private airports are collecting certain fees for 
each enplaning passenger (Sept. 23, 1993, p. ----); and may not require 
an agency to investigate and determine whether a person or entity 
entering into a contract with funds under the pending bill is subject to 
a legal proceeding commenced by the Federal government and alleging 
fraud (Sept. 17, 1997, p. ----).


[[Page 675]]

17, 1996, p. ----). In the 105th Congress this entire line of precedent 
was overtaken by changes in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this clause that 
treat as legislation a provision that makes funding contingent on 
whether circumstances not determinative under existing law are ``known'' 
(H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. ----; July 15, 1997, p. ----; July 24, 1997, 
p. ----).
  Over a period dating from 1908, the House had developed a line of 
precedent to the effect that language restricting the availability of 
funds in a general appropriation bill could be a valid limitation if, 
rather than imposing new duties on a disbursing official or requiring 
new determinations of that official, it simply and passively addressed 
the state of knowledge of the official (VII, 1695; cf. Aug. 1, 1989, p. 
17156, and June 22, 1995, p. ---- [limitations in recommittal ruled out 
on basis of form rather than of legislative content]). This reasoning 
culminated in a ruling in the 104th Congress admitting as a valid 
limitation an amendment prohibiting the use of funds in the bill to 
execute certain accounting transactions when specified conditions were 
``made known'' to the disbursing official (July 



Sec. 842e. Mandating expenditures.

  A provision  which 
mandates a distribution of funds in contravention of an allocation 
formula in existing law is legislation (July 29, 1982, pp. 18637, 18638; 
Oct. 5, 1983, p. 27335; Aug. 2, 1989, p. 18123; July 24, 1995, p. ----), 
as is an amendment which by such a mandate interferes with an executive 
official's discretionary authority (Mar. 12, 1975, p. 6338), as in an 
amendment requiring not less than a certain sum to be used for a 
particular purpose where existing law does not mandate such expenditure 
(June 18, 1976, p. 19297; July 29, 1982, p. 18623), or where an 
amendment earmarks appropriated funds to the arts to require their 
expenditure pursuant to standards otherwise applicable only as 
guidelines (July 12, 1989, p. 14432). Where existing law directed a 
Federal official to provide for sale of certain government property to a 
private organization in ``necessary'' amounts, an amendment providing 
that no such property be withheld from distribution from qualifying 
purchasers is legislation, since requiring disposal of all property and 
restricting discretionary authority to determine ``necessary'' amounts 
(Aug. 7, 1978, p. 24707). An amendment directing the use of funds to 
assure compliance with an existing law, where existing law does not so 
mandate, also is legislation (June 24, 1976, p. 20370). So-called 
``hold-harmless'' provisions which mandate a certain level of 
expenditure for certain purposes or recipients, where existing law 
confers discretion or makes ratable reductions in such expenditures, 
also constitute legislation (Apr. 16, 1975, p. 10357; June 25, 1976, p. 
20557). A transfer of available funds from one Department to another 
with directions as to the use to which those funds must be put is 
legislation (and also a reappropriation in violation of clause 6 of this 
rule) (Dec. 8, 1982, p. 29449). A provision requiring states to match 
funds provided in an appropriation bill was held to constitute 
legislation where existing law contained no such requirement (June 28, 
1993, p. ----). Where existing law prescribes a formula for the 
allocation of funds among several categories, an amendment merely 
reducing the amount earmarked for one of the categories is not 
legislation, so long as it does not textually change the statutory 
formula (July 24, 1995, p. ----).



[[Page 676]]

1988, p. 14341), but this does not permit an amendment which 
adds additional legislation (IV, 3836, 3837, 3862; VII, 1402-1436; Dec. 
9, 1971, pp. 4595-96; Aug. 1, 1973, pp. 27291-92; June 10, 1977, p. 
1802; June 28, 1988, pp. 16203, 16213; Aug. 2, 1989, p. 18172; Nov. 15, 
1989, p. 29004), or earmarks for unauthorized purposes (July 17, 1985, 
p. 19435; July 17, 1986, p. 16918; July 26, 1995, p. ----; June 5, 1996, 
p. ----), or earmarks by directing a new use of funds not required by 
law (July 26, 1985, pp. 20811, 20813), or increases an unauthorized 
amount indirectly by inserting new language at another portion of the 
bill (July 12, 1995, p. ----). An amendment to a general appropriation 
bill is not subject to a point of order as adding legislation if 
containing, verbatim, a legislative provision already contained in the 
bill and permitted to remain (Aug. 27, 1980, p. 23519). To a paragraph 
permitted to remain though containing a legislative proviso restricting 
the obligation of funds until a date within the fiscal year, an 
amendment striking the delimiting date, thus applying the restriction 
for the entire year, was held to be perfecting (July 30, 1990, p. 
20442); but striking the date and inserting a new trigger (the enactment 
of other legislation), was held to be additional legislation (July 30, 
1990, p. 20442). An amendment in the form of a motion to strike that 
would extend the legislative reach of the pending text was held to 
propose additional legislation (July 17, 1996, p. ----). To a 
legislative title permitted to remain, which placed certain restrictions 
on recipients of a defined set of Federal payments and benefits, an 
amendment extending the restrictions to persons benefiting from a 
certain tax status determined on wholly unrelated criteria was held to 
add further legislation (Aug. 3, 1995, p. ----).


Sec. 842f. Waivers; amending legislation permitted 
to remain.

  The House  may, by agreeing to a report from the Committee on Rules or 
by adopting an order under suspension of the rules, allow legislation on 
general appropriation bills (IV, 3260-3263, 3839-3845). A paragraph 
which proposes legislation or an unauthorized appropriation being 
permitted to remain, by special order or by failure to raise a point of 
order, may be perfected by germane amendment (IV, 3823-3835, 3838; VII, 
1405, 1413-1415; June 9, 1954, pp. 5963-64; Sept. 11, 1985, p. 23398; 
June 14, 




Sec. 842g. Senate amendments.

  The principle  seems to be 
generally well accepted that the House proposing legislation on a 
general appropriation bill should recede if the other House persists in 
its objection (IV, 3904-3908), and clause 2 of rule XX (Sec. 829, supra) 
prohibits House conferees from agreeing to a Senate amendment which 
proposes legislation on an appropriation bill without specific authority 
from the House. But where a Senate amendment proposing legislation on a 
general appropriation bill is, pursuant to the edict of clause 2 of rule 
XX, reported back from conference in disagreement, a motion to concur in 
the Senate amendment with a further amendment is in order, even if the 
proposed amendment adds legislation to that contained in the Senate 
amendment, and the only test is whether the proposed amendment is 
germane to the Senate amendment reported in disagreement (IV, 3909; 
VIII, 3188, 3189; Speaker McCormack, Dec. 15, 1970, pp. 41504-05; Aug. 
1, 1979, pp. 22007-11; Speaker O'Neill, Dec. 12, 1979, pp. 35520-21; 
June 30, 1987, p. 18308).



[[Page 677]]

priate for a purpose authorized by law, so may it by limitation 
prohibit the use of the money for part of the purpose while 
appropriating for the remainder of it (IV, 3936; VII, 1595). The 
language of the limitation provides that no part of the appropriation 
under consideration shall be used for a certain designated purpose (IV, 
3917-3926; VII, 1580). And this designated purpose may reach the 
question of qualifications, for while it is not in order to legislate as 
to the qualifications of the recipients of an appropriation the House 
may specify that no part of the appropriation shall go to recipients 
lacking certain qualifications (IV, 3942-3952; VII, 1655; June 4, 1970, 
pp. 18412-13; June 27, 1974, p. 21662; Oct. 9, 1974, p. 34712; June 9, 
1978, p. 16990). The limitation must apply solely to the money of the 
appropriation under consideration (VII, 1597, 1600, 1720; Feb. 26, 1958, 
p. 2895), and may not be made applicable to money appropriated in other 
acts (IV, 3927, 3928; VII, 1495, 1525; June 28, 1971, pp. 22442-43; June 
27, 1974, pp. 21670-72; May 13, 1981, p. 9663), and may not require 
funds available to an agency in any future fiscal year for a certain 
purpose be subject to limitations specified in advance in appropriations 
Acts (May 8, 1986, p. 10156). A restriction on authority to incur 
obligations is legislative in nature and not a limitation on funds (July 
13, 1987, p. 19507; Sept. 23, 1993, p. ----).


Sec. 843a. Limitations on appropriation bills 
generally.

  Although the  rule forbids on any general appropriation bill a provision 
``changing existing law,'' which is construed to mean legislation 
generally, the practice of the House has established the principle that 
certain ``limitations'' may be admitted. Just as the House may decline 
to appro-


  The fact that existing law authorizes funds to be available until 
expended or without regard to fiscal year limitation does not prevent 
the Committee on Appropriations from limiting their availability to the 
fiscal year covered by the bill unless existing law mandates 
availability beyond the fiscal year (June 25, 1974, p. 21040; see also 
Procedure, ch. 25, secs. 9-17). The fact that a provision would 
constitute legislation for only a year does not make it a limitation in 
order under the rule (IV, 3936). Nor may a proposition to construe a law 
be admitted (IV, 3936-3938). Care should also be taken that the language 
of limitation be not such as, when fairly construed, would change 
existing law (IV, 3976-3983) or justify an executive officer in assuming 
an intent to change existing law (IV, 3984; VII, 1706). Although the 
Committee on Appropriations may include in a general appropriation bill 
language not in existing law limiting the use of funds in the bill, if 
such language also constitutes an appropriation it must be authorized by 
law (June 21, 1988, p. 15439). A provision limiting the use of funds in 
a bill ``unless'' or ``until'' a specified action not required by 
existing law has been taken constitutes legislation (Deschler's 
Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 47.1; July 24, 1996, p. ----).


[[Page 678]]

may be left unsatisfied thereby (IV, 3987; July 10, 1975, p. 
22005); but coupling a denial of an appropriation with a negative 
restriction on official duties constitutes by reason of the use of a 
double negative an affirmative direction and is not in order (VII, 1690-
1692). Similarly, using a double negative to limit the availability of 
funds to prohibit the obligation of funds for an unauthorized project 
(effectively authorizing an unauthorized project) is not in order (Sept. 
23, 1993, p. ----).


Sec. 843b. Effect of limitation on executive 
discretion.

  The limitation  may not be applied directly to the official functions of 
executive officers (IV, 3957-3966; VII, 1673, 1678, 1685), but it may 
restrict executive discretion so far as this may be done by a simple 
negative on the use of the appropriation (IV, 3968-3972; VII, 1583, 
1653, 1694; Sept. 14, 1972, pp. 30749-50; June 21, 1974, pp. 20601-02; 
Oct. 9, 1974, p. 34716). An appropriation may be withheld from a 
designated object by a negative limitation on the use of funds, although 
contracts 


  But such limitations must not give affirmative directions (IV, 3854-
3859, 3975; VII, 1637), and must not impose new duties upon an executive 
officer (VII, 1676; June 11, 1968, p. 16712; July 31, 1969, pp. 21631-
33); and may not directly interfere with discretionary authority in law 
by establishing a level of funding below which expenditures may not be 
made (VII, 1704; July 20, 1978, p. 21856).

  In construing a proposed limitation, if the Chair finds the purpose to 
be legislative, in that the intent is to restrict executive discretion 
to a degree that may be fairly termed a change in policy rather than a 
matter of administrative detail, he should sustain the point of order, 
as where a limitation is accompanied by language stating a legislative 
motive or purpose in carrying out the limitation (Aug. 8, 1978, p. 
24969), or where existing law and the Constitution require a census to 
be taken of all persons and an amendment seeks to preclude the use of 
funds to exclude another class ``known'' to the Secretary (Aug. 1, 1989, 
p. 17156). However, language in a general appropriation bill may, by 
negatively refusing to include funds for all or part of an authorized 
executive function, thereby affect policy to the extent of its denial of 
availability of funds (VII, 1694; Oct. 9, 1974, p. 34716).

  It is not in order, even by language in the form of a limitation, to 
restrict not the use or amount of appropriated funds but the 
discretionary authority conferred by law to administer their 
expenditure, such as by limiting the percentage of funds that may be 
apportioned for expenditure within a certain period of time (Deschler's 
Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 51.23), or by precluding the obligation 
of certain funds in the bill until funds provided by another Act have 
been obligated (Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 48.8). The 
burden is on the proponent to show that such a proposal does not change 
existing law by restricting the timing of the expenditure of funds 
rather than their availability for specified objects (Deschler's 
Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, secs. 64.23 and 80.5).


[[Page 679]]

collected by the District of Columbia, pursuant to the D.C. Code (July 
17, 1979, p. 19066).
  As long as a limitation on the use of funds restricts the expenditure 
of Federal funds carried in the bill without changing existing law, the 
limitation is in order, even if the Federal funds in question are 
commingled with non-Federal funds which would have to be accounted for 
separately in carrying out the limitation (Aug. 20, 1980, pp. 22171-72). 
An amendment providing that no Federal funds provided in the District of 
Columbia general appropriation bill be used to perform abortions is not 
legislation, since Federal officials have the responsibility to account 
for all appropriations for the annual Federal payment and for 
disbursement of all taxes 


[[Page 680]]

more general terms, was held in order as not containing legislation 
(June 27, 1979, pp. 17033-35), as was an exception from a valid 
limitation prohibiting construction of that limitation in such a way as 
to prevent funding of a particular authorized activity (Mar. 24, 1944, 
p. 3095; June 18, 1991, p. 15218). An amendment prohibiting the use of 
funds in the bill by the Forest Service to construct roads or prepare 
timber sales in certain roadless areas was held not to impose new 
duties, where the executive was already charged by law with ongoing 
responsibility to maintain a comprehensive and detailed inventory of all 
land and renewable resources of the National Forest System (July 18, 
1995, p. ----). The following amendments also have been in order as 
merely constricting the range of objects for which funds might be used: 
denying use of funds to eliminate an existing legal requirement for 
sureties on custom bonds (June 27, 1984, p. 19101); denying use of funds 
by any Federal official in any manner which would prevent a provision of 
existing law from being enforced (relating to import restrictions) (June 
27, 1984, p. 19101); denying use of funds for any reduction in Customs 
Service regions or for any consolidation of Customs Service offices 
(June 27, 1984, p. 19102); denying use of funds to carry out (or pay the 
salaries of persons who carry out) tobacco crop and insurance programs 
(July 20, 1995, p. ----). An amendment in the form of a limitation 
prohibiting the use of funds in a general appropriation bill for the 
construction of certain facilities unless such construction were subject 
to a project agreement was held not in order during the reading of the 
bill, even though existing law directed Federal officials to enter into 
such project agreements, on the ground that limitation amendments are in 
order during the reading only where existing law requires or permits the 
inclusion of limiting language in an appropriation Act, and not merely 
where the limitation is alleged to be ``consistent with existing law'' 
(June 28, 1988, p. 16267). Similarly, language in a general 
appropriation bill containing an averment necessary to qualify for 
certain scorekeeping under the Budget Act was conceded to be legislation 
(July 20, 1989, p. 15374), even though the Budget Act contemplates that 
expenditures may be mandated to occur before or following a fiscal 
period if the law making those expenditures specifies that the timing is 
the result of a ``significant'' policy change (July 20, 1989, p. 15374).



Sec. 843c. Limitations consistent with existing 
law.

  An amendment  denying the use of funds in the bill to pay the salaries of 
Federal officials who perform certain functions under existing law is a 
proper limitation if the description of those duties precisely follows 
existing law and does not require them to perform new duties (June 24, 
1976, p. 20373), just as an amendment denying such funds to a Federal 
official not in compliance with an existing law which he is charged with 
enforcing is a valid limitation placing no new duties on that Federal 
official (Sept. 10, 1981, p. 20110). The fact that a limitation on the 
use of funds may indirectly interfere with an executive official's 
discretionary authority by denying the use of funds (June 24, 1976, p. 
20408) or may impose certain incidental burdens on executive officials 
(Aug. 25, 1976, p. 27737) does not destroy the character of the 
limitation as long as it does not directly amend existing law and is 
descriptive of functions and findings already required to be undertaken 
by existing law. As it is in order by way of a limitation to deny the 
use of funds for implementation of an executive order, an amendment 
precisely describing the contents of the executive order does not 
constitute legislation solely for that reason (Mar. 16, 1977, p. 7748). 
And the fact that the regulation for which funds are denied may have 
been promulgated pursuant to court order and pursuant to constitutional 
provisions is an argument on the merits of the amendment and does not 
render it legislative in nature (Aug. 19, 1980, pp. 21981-84). An 
amendment prohibiting the use of funds to carry out any ruling of the 
Internal Revenue Service which rules that taxpayers are not entitled to 
certain charitable deductions was held in order as a limitation, since 
merely descriptive of an existing ruling already promulgated and not 
requiring any new determinations as to the applicability of the 
limitation to other categories of taxpayers (July 16, 1979, pp. 18808-
10). An amendment reducing the availability of funds for trade 
adjustment assistance by amounts of unemployment insurance entitlements 
was held in order where the law establishing trade adjustment assistance 
already required the disbursing agency to take into consideration levels 
of unemployment insurance in determining payment levels (June 18, 1980, 
pp. 15355-56). A limitation precluding funds for any transit project 
exceeding a specified cost-effectiveness index was held not to impose 
new duties where the Chair was persuaded that the limitation applied to 
projects for which indexes were already required by law (Sept. 23, 1993, 
p. ----). A limitation precluding the use of funds to enforce FAA 
regulations to require domestic air carriers to surrender more than a 
specified number of ``slots'' at a given airport in preference of 
international air carriers was held not to impose new duties on FAA 
officials because existing regulations already required the FAA to 
determine the origin of withdrawn slots (Sept. 23, 1993, p. ----). An 
exception stating that the limitation does not prohibit the use of funds 
for designated Federal activities which are already authorized by law in 



               ``holman rule'' on retrenching expenditures


[[Page 681]]

and 843, supra). Under the modern practice, the 
``Holman Rule'' only applies where an obvious reduction is achieved by 
the provision in question and does not apply to limiting language 
unaccompanied by a reduction of funds in the bill (July 16, 1979, pp. 
18808-10). It has no application to an amendment to an appropriation 
bill which does not legislate but is merely a negative limitation citing 
but not changing existing law (June 18, 1980, pp. 15355-56).


Sec. 844a. Legislation reducing 
expenditures.

  Decisions under  the so-called ``Holman Rule'' in clause 2 of rule XXI 
have been rare in the modern practice of the House. The trend in 
construing language in general appropriation bills or amendments thereto 
has been to minimize the importance of the ``Holman Rule'' in those 
cases where the decision can be made on other grounds. The practice of 
using limitations in appropriation bills has been perfected in recent 
years so that most modern decisions by the Chair deal with distinctions 
between such limitations and matters which are deemed to be legislation 
(see Sec. Sec. 842 


  A paragraph containing legislation reported in an appropriation bill 
to be in order must on its face show a retrenchment of a type which 
conforms to the requirements of the rule (Chairman Lehlbach, Mar. 17, 
1926, p. 5804).

  The reduction of expenditure must appear as a necessary result, in 
order to bring an amendment or provision within the exception to the 
rule. It is not sufficient that such reduction would probably, or would 
in the opinion of the Chair, result therefrom (IV, 3887; VII, 1530-
1534). Thus, an amendment to a general appropriation bill providing that 
appropriations made in that act are hereby reduced by $7 billion, though 
legislative in form, was held in order under the ``Holman Rule'' 
exception (Apr. 5, 1966, p. 7689), but an amendment providing for 
certain reductions of appropriations carried in the bill based on the 
President's budget estimates was held not to show a reduction on its 
face and to provide merely speculative reductions (Deschler's 
Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 5.6; June 24, 1992, p. ----). An 
amendment authorizing the President to reduce each appropriation in the 
bill by not more than ten percent was ruled out as legislation 
conferring new authority on the President (May 31, 1984, p. 14617; June 
6, 1984, p. 15120). An amendment reducing an unauthorized amount 
permitted to remain in a general appropriation bill is in order as a 
retrenchment under this clause (Oct. 1, 1975, p. 31058). An amendment to 
a general appropriation bill denying the availability of funds to 
certain recipients but which requires Federal officials to make 
additional determinations as to the qualifications of recipients is 
legislation and is not a retrenchment of expenditures where it is not 
apparent that the prohibition will reduce the amounts covered by the 
bill (June 26, 1973, p. 21389).

  The amendment must not only show on its face an attempt to retrench 
but must also be germane to some provision in the bill even though 
offered by direction of the committee having jurisdiction of the subject 
matter of the amendment (VII, 1549; Dec. 16, 1911, p. 442). An amendment 
providing that appropriations ``herein and heretofore made'' shall be 
reduced by $70 million through the reduction of Federal employees as the 
President determines was held to be legislative and not germane to the 
bill, since it went to funds other than those carried therein, and was 
therefore not within the ``Holman Rule'' exception (Oct. 18, 1966, p. 
27425).


[[Page 682]]

ment of expenditures even if assumed to be legislative (July 13, 1979, 
pp. 18453-55).
  An amendment reducing an amount in an appropriation bill for the 
Postal Service and prohibiting the use of funds therein to implement 
special bulk third-class rates for political committees was held in 
order since not specifically requiring new determination and since 
constituting a retrench-

  As long as an amendment calls for an obvious reduction at some point 
in time during the fiscal year, the amendment is in order under the 
``Holman Rule'' even if the reduction takes place in the future in an 
amount actually determined when the reduction takes place (for example, 
by formula) (VII, 1491, 1505; July 30, 1980, pp. 20499-20503). To an 
amendment that is in order under the ``Holman Rule,'' containing 
legislation but retrenching expenditures by formula for every agency 
funded by the bill, an amendment exempting from that reduction several 
specific programs does not add further legislation and is in order (July 
30, 1980, pp. 20499-20503).

  A motion to recommit the District of Columbia appropriation bill with 
instructions to reduce the proportion of the fund appropriated from the 
Public Treasury from one-half, as provided in the bill, to one-fourth of 
the entire appropriation is in order, since the effect of the amendment 
if adopted would reduce the expenditure of public money although not 
reducing the amount of the appropriation (VII, 1518).

  The term ``retrenchment'' means the reduction of the amount of money 
to be taken out of the Federal Treasury by the bill, and therefore a 
reduction of the amount of money to be contributed toward the expenses 
of the District of Columbia is in order as a retrenchment (VII, 1502).

  An amendment proposed to an item for the recoinage of uncurrent 
fractional silver, which amendment struck out the amount appropriated 
and added a provision for the coinage of all the bullion in the Treasury 
into standard silver dollars, the cost of such coinage and recoinage to 
be paid out of the Government's seigniorage, was held not to be in order 
under the rule; first, because not germane to the subject matter of the 
bill (the sundry civil); second, because it did not appear that any 
retrenchment of expenditure would result, the seigniorage being the 
property of the Government as other funds in the Treasury (VII, 1547).

  To an item of appropriation for inland transportation of mails by star 
routes an amendment was offered requiring the Postmaster General to 
provide routes and make contracts in certain cases, with the further 
provision ``and the amount of appropriation herein for star routes is 
hereby reduced to $500.'' A point of order made against the first or 
legislative part of the amendment was sustained, which decision was, on 
appeal, affirmed by the committee (VII, 1555).

  To a clause appropriating for the foreign mail service an amendment 
reducing the appropriation, and in addition repealing the act known as 
the ``subsidy act,'' was held not in order because the repealing of this 
act was not germane to the appropriation bill; and that to be in order 
both branches of the amendment must be germane to the bill (VII, 1548).


[[Page 683]]

of Agriculture is out of order, being a provision changing 
law and not retrenching expenditure (IV, 3886).
  A provision in the agricultural appropriation bill transferring the 
supervision of the importation of animals from the Treasury to the 
Department 

  Where a paragraph containing new legislation provides in one part for 
a discharge of employees, which means a retrenchment, and in another 
part embodies legislation to bring about the particular retrenchment 
which in turn shows on its face an expenditure the amount of which is 
not apparent, the Chair is unable to hold that the net result will 
retrench expenditures. But where the additional legislation does not 
show on its face an additional expenditure, the Chair will not speculate 
as to a possible expenditure under the additional legislation (VII, 
1500).


  As explained in the annotation in Sec. 834, supra, the amendment of 
clause 2(b) in the 98th Congress narrowed the ``Holman Rule'' exception 
to the general prohibition against legislation to cover only 
retrenchments reducing amounts of money covered by the bill, and not 
retrenchments resulting from reduction of the number and salary of 
officers of the United States or of the compensation of any person paid 
out of the U.S. Treasury. Accordingly, the Chair held out of order an 
amendment mandating the reduction of certain Federal salaries and 
expenses as not confined to a reduction of funds in the bill (June 17, 
1994, p. ----). Paragraph (b) also eliminated separate authority 
conferred upon legislative committees or commissions with proper 
jurisdiction to report amendments retrenching expenditures, and 
permitted legislative committees to recommend such retrenchments by 
reduction of amounts covered by the bill to the Appropriations Committee 
for discretionary inclusion in the reported bill. Paragraph (d) as added 
in the 98th Congress provides a new procedure for consideration of all 
retrenchment amendments only when reading of the bill has been completed 
and only if the Committee of the Whole does not adopt a motion to rise 
and report the bill back to the House. Other decisions which involved 
interpretation of the ``Holman Rule,'' but which do not reflect the 
current form or interpretation of that rule, are found in IV, 3846, 
3885-3892; VII, 1484, 1486-1492, 1498, 1500, 1515, 1563, 1564, 1569; 
June 1, 1892, p. 4920.


[[Page 683]]

(except for classified intelligence or national security programs, 
projects, or activities).



Sec. 844b. Content of reports on appropriation 
bills.

  3. A report  from the Committee on Appropriations accompanying any general 
appropriation bill making an appropriation for any purpose shall contain 
a concise statement describing fully the effect of any provision of the 
accompanying bill which directly or indirectly changes the application 
of existing law, and shall contain a list of all appropriations 
contained in the bill for any expenditure not previously authorized by law 



  This clause became a part of the rules under the Committee Reform 
Amendments of 1974, effective January 3, 1975 (H. Res. 988, 93d Cong., 
Oct. 8, 1974, p. 34470), and the subsequent clauses of this rule were 
renumbered at that time. This clause was amended on January 14, 1975 (H. 
Res. 5, 94th Cong., p. 32) to confine its applicability to general 
appropriation bills, and again in the 104th Congress to add the last 
requirement concerning unauthorized items (sec. 215(d), H. Res. 6, Jan. 
4, 1995, p. ----).




Sec. 845. Restriction on the reference of 
claims.

  4. No bill  for the payment or adjudication of any private claim against 
the Government shall be referred, except by unanimous consent, to any 
other than the following committees, namely: To the Committee on 
International Relations or to the Committee on the Judiciary.



  The present form of this clause was made effective January 2, 1947, as 
a part of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 812), was 
further amended on March 19, 1975 to reflect the change of the name of 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs to International Relations by H. Res. 
163 (p. 7343), was again amended on February 5, 1979 to change 
International Relations back to Foreign Affairs (H. Res. 89, pp. 1848-
49), and was once again amended on January 4, 1995, to change the name 
back to International Relations (sec. 202(b), H. Res. 6, 104th Cong., p. 
----). The old rule, adopted in 1885 and amended May 29, 1936, provided 
that private claims bills be referred to a Committee on Invalid 
Pensions, Claims, War Claims, Public Lands, and Accounts, in addition to 
the Committees on Foreign Affairs (now International Relations) and the 
Judiciary. Certain private bills, resolutions and amendments are barred 
(see Sec. 852, infra). Under this clause unanimous consent is required 
for the reference of a bill for the payment of a private claim to a 
committee other than the Committee on the Judiciary or the Committee on 
International Relations (May 4, 1978, p. 12615).


[[Page 685]]

be in order during the consideration of a bill or joint resolution 
reported by a committee not having that jurisdiction. A question of 
order on an appropriation in any such bill, joint resolution, or 
amendment thereto may be raised at any time.



Sec. 846a. Restriction of power to report 
appropriations.

  5. (a) No  bill or joint resolution carrying appropriations shall 
be reported by any committee not having jurisdiction to report 
appropriations, nor shall an amendment proposing an appropriation 


  This portion of the rule was adopted June 1, 1920 (VII, 2133).

  A point of order under this rule cannot be raised against a motion to 
suspend the rules (VIII, 3426), against a motion to discharge a 
nonappropriating committee from consideration of a bill carrying an 
appropriation (VII, 2144), or against a Senate amendment to an 
appropriation bill (VII, 1572), but it may be directed against an item 
of appropriation in a Senate bill (VII, 2136, 2147; July 30, 1957, pp. 
13056, 13181-82), and if the House deletes a provision in a Senate bill 
under this rule, the bill is messaged to the Senate with the deletion in 
the form of an amendment. The point of order may be made against an 
appropriation in a Senate bill that, although not reported in the House, 
is considered in lieu of a reported House ``companion bill'' (VII, 2137; 
Mar. 29, 1933, p. 988). This clause applies to an amendment proposed to 
a Senate amendment to a House bill not reported from the Committee on 
Appropriations (Oct. 1, 1980, pp. 28638-42). The rule does not apply to 
private bills since the committees having jurisdiction of bills for the 
payment of private claims may report bills making appropriations within 
the limits of their jurisdiction (VII, 2135; Dec. 12, 1924, p. 538). The 
point of order under this rule does not apply to an appropriation in a 
bill which has been taken away from a nonappropriating committee by a 
motion to discharge (VII, 1019a). The point of order under this rule 
does not apply to a special order reported from the Committee on Rules 
``self-executing'' the adoption in the House to a reported bill of an 
amendment containing an appropriation, since the amendment is not 
separately before the House during consideration of the special order 
(Feb. 24, 1993, p. ----).


[[Page 686]]

is limited to 
language originally contained in a Senate amendment where the House 
conferees have not been specifically authorized to agree thereto (May 1, 
1975, p. 12752). Where the House has adopted a resolution waiving points 
of order against certain appropriations in a legislative bill, a point 
of order may nevertheless be raised against an amendment to the bill 
containing an identical provision, since under this rule a point of 
order may be raised against the amendment ``at any time'' (Apr. 23, 
1975, p. 11512). A point of order against a direct appropriation in a 
bill initially reported from a legislative committee and then 
sequentially referred to and reported adversely by the Committee on 
Appropriations was conceded and sustained as in violation of this clause 
(Nov. 10, 1975, p. 35611).
  The provision in this clause that a point of order against an 
amendment containing an appropriation to a legislative bill may be made 
``at any time'' has been interpreted to require that the point of order 
be raised during the pendency of the amendment under the five-minute 
rule (Mar. 18, 1946, p. 2365; Apr. 28, 1975, pp. 12043-44), and a point 
of order will lie against an amendment during its pendency, even in its 
amended form, although the point of order is against the amendment as 
amended by a substitute and no point of order was raised against the 
substitute prior to its adoption (Apr. 23, 1975, p. 12043). But the 
point of order must be raised during the initial consideration of the 
bill or amendment under the five-minute rule, and a point of order 
against similar language permitted to remain in the House version and 
included in a conference report on a bill will not lie, since the only 
rule prohibiting such inclusion (clause 2 of rule XX) 

  The point of order should be directed to the item of appropriation in 
the bill and not to the act of reporting the bill (VII, 2143), and 
cannot be directed to the entire bill (VII, 2142; Apr. 28, 1975, p. 
12043).


[[Page 687]]

use of funds of the Shipping Board is not in order (VII, 2147). A 
direction to pay out of Indian trust funds is not in order (VII, 2149). 
A provision in an authorization bill making excess foreign currencies 
immediately available for a new purpose is in violation of clause 5 of 
rule XXI (Aug. 3, 1971, pp. 29109-10). Provisions authorizing the 
collection of fees or user charges by Federal agencies and making the 
revenues collected therefrom available without further appropriation 
have been ruled out in violation of this clause (June 17, 1937, pp. 
5915-18; Mar. 29, 1972, pp. 10749-51), and the transfer of existing 
Federal funds into a new Treasury trust fund to be immediately available 
for a new purpose has been construed as an appropriation (June 20, 1974, 
pp. 20273-75), as has a provision in a legislative bill transferring 
unexpended balances of appropriations from an existing agency to a new 
agency created therein (Apr. 9, 1979, pp. 7774-75). A provision in an 
omnibus reconciliation bill reported by the Budget Committee (pursuant 
to section 310(c)(2) of the Budget Act upon recommendation from the 
Energy and Commerce Committee) making a direct appropriation to carry 
out a part of the Energy Security Act was ruled out in violation of this 
clause (Oct. 24, 1985, p. 28812). An amendment requiring the diversion 
of previously appropriated funds in lieu of the enactment of new budget 
authority if a maximum deficit amount under the Deficit Control Act of 
1985 is exceeded, though its stated purpose may be to avoid the 
sequestration of funds, may nevertheless be in violation of clause 5(a) 
as an appropriation on a legislative bill (Aug. 10, 1988, p. 21719).
  The point of order provided for in this clause is not applicable to 
propositions authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to use proceeds 
from the sale of bonds under the Second Liberty Bond Act (public debt 
transactions) for the purpose of making loans, since such loans do not 
constitute ``appropriations'' within the purview of the rule (June 28, 
1949, pp. 8536-38; Aug. 2, 1950, p. 11599), and is not applicable to 
language exempting loan guarantees in a legislative bill from statutory 
limitations on expenditures (July 16, 1974, p. 23344). Legislation 
authorizing the availability of certain loan receipts is not an 
appropriation where it can be shown that the actual availability of 
those receipts remains contingent upon subsequent enactment of an 
appropriation act (Sept. 10, 1975, p. 28300). The term ``appropriation'' 
in the rule means the payment of funds from the Treasury, and the words 
``warranted and make available for expenditure for payments'' are 
equivalent to ``is hereby appropriated'' and therefore not in order 
(VII, 2150). The words ``available until expended,'' making an 
appropriation already made for one year available for ensuing years, are 
not in order (VII, 2145). Language reappropriating, making available, or 
diverting an appropriation or a portion of an appropriation already made 
for one purpose to another (VII, 2146; Mar. 29, 1933, p. 988; Aug. 10, 
1988, p. 21719), or for one fiscal year to another (Mar. 26, 1992, p. --
--), is not in order. An amendment expanding the definition in existing 
law of recipients under a Federal subsidy program was held to permit a 
new use of funds already appropriated in violation of this clause (May 
11, 1976, pp. 13409-11); and a provision in a legislative bill 
authorizing the use, without a subsequent appropriation, of funds 
directly appropriated by a previous statute for a new purpose 
constitutes an appropriation prohibited by this clause (Oct. 1, 1980, 
pp. 28637-40). But a modification of such a provision making payments 
for such new purposes ``effective only to the extent and in such amounts 
as are provided in advance in appropriation acts'' does not violate this 
clause (Oct. 1, 1980, pp. 28638-42). A direction to a departmental 
officer to pay a certain sum out of unexpended balances is equivalent to 
an appropriation and not in order (VII, 2154). Language authorizing the 


  An amendment increasing the duties of a commission is not necessarily 
an appropriation (VII, 1578). Language authorizing payment from an 
appropriation to be made or authorizing payment from an appropriation 
that has not yet been made is in order (Jan. 31, 1923, p. 2794). Section 
401(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 317) prohibits 
consideration in the House of any bill or resolution or amendment which 
provides new spending authority (as that term is defined in that 
section) unless that measure also provides that such new spending 
authority is to be available only to the extent provided in 
appropriation Acts (see Sec. 1007, infra). See also Procedure, ch. 25, 
sec. 3, addressing appropriations on legislative bills generally.


[[Page 688]]

not having that jurisdiction. A question of order on a tax or 
tariff measure in any such bill, joint resolution, or amendment thereto 
may be raised at any time.



Sec. 846b. Restriction on bills and amendments carrying 
taxes or tariffs.

  (b) No  bill or joint resolution carrying a tax or tariff 
measure shall be reported by any committee not having jurisdiction to 
report tax and tariff measures, nor shall an amendment in the House or 
proposed by the Senate carrying a tax or tariff measure be in order 
during the consideration of a bill or joint resolution reported by a 
committee 


  Paragraph (b) was added in the 98th Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1983, 
p. 34). A point of order under this paragraph against a provision in a 
bill is in order at any time during consideration of the bill for 
amendment in Committee of the Whole (Aug. 1, 1986, p. 18649). On October 
4, 1989, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, before ruling on 
several points of order under this paragraph, enunciated several 
guidelines to distinguish taxes and tariffs on the one hand and user or 
regulatory fees and other forms of revenue on the other (p. 23260). On 
the opening day of the 102d Congress Speaker Foley inserted in the 
Congressional Record a statement of jurisdictional concepts underlying 
those same distinctions and indicated his intention to exercise his 
referral authority under rule X in a manner consistent with this 
paragraph (Jan. 3, 1991, p. 64; see also Jan. 5, 1993, p. ----).

  Although in the case of most points of order against provisions in 
bills or against amendments the burden is on the proponent of the 
provision to show that it does not violate the cited rule, in the case 
of a point of order under clause 5(b) against a provision in or an 
amendment to a general appropriation bill affecting the use of funds 
therein (otherwise traditionally in order if admissible under clause 2 
of rule XXI), the burden is on the Member making the point of order to 
show a necessary, certain, and inevitable change in revenue collections 
or tax statuses or liabilities (Sept. 12, 1984, pp. 25108, 25109, 25120; 
July 26, 1985, p. 20806; Aug. 1, 1986, pp. 18649-50; July 13, 1990, p. 
17473; June 18, 1991, p. 15189). Thus, in determining whether a 
limitation in a general appropriation bill constitutes a tax or tariff 
measure proscribed by clause 5(b), the Chair will consider argument as 
to whether the limitation effectively and inevitably changes revenue 
collections and tax status or liability (Aug. 1, 1986, p. 18649). 
Similarly, in determining whether an amendment to a general 
appropriation bill proposing a change in IRS funding priorities 
constitutes a tax measure proscribed by clause 5(b), the Chair will 
consider argument as to whether the change would necessarily or 
inevitably result in a loss or gain in tax liability and in tax 
collection (June 18, 1991, p. 15189).


[[Page 689]]

and owing by law or require collection of revenue 
not legally due or owing (July 26, 1985, p. 20806; Aug. 1, 1986, pp. 
18649, 18650; July 17, 1996, p. ----); and (2) where a provision in a 
general appropriation bill prohibited the use of funds to impose or 
assess certain taxes due under specified portions of the Internal 
Revenue Code (July 13, 1990, p. 17473). In the 98th Congress, the Chair 
sustained points of order under clause 5(b) against motions to concur in 
three Senate amendments to a general appropriation bill (not reported by 
the Committee on Ways and Means): (1) an amendment denying the use of 
funds in that or any other Act by the IRS to impose or assess any tax 
due under a designated provision of the Internal Revenue Code, thereby 
rendering the tax uncollectable through the use of any funds available 
to the agency (Sept. 12, 1984, p. 25108); (2) an amendment directing the 
Secretary of the Treasury to admit free of duty certain articles 
imported by a designated organization (Sept. 12, 1984, p. 25109); and 
(3) an amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930 to expand the authority of 
the Customs Service to seize and use the proceeds from the sale of 
contraband imports to defray operational expenses, and to offset owed 
customs duties under one section of that law (Sept. 12, 1984, p. 25120). 
An amendment to a general appropriation bill proposing to divert an 
increase in funding for the IRS from spot-checks to targeted audits was 
held not to constitute a tax within the meaning of clause 5(b) because 
it did not necessarily affect revenue collection levels or tax 
liabilities (June 18, 1991, p. 15189).
  A limitation on the use of funds contained in a general appropriation 
bill was held to violate clause 5(b) by denying the use of funds by the 
Customs Service to enforce duty-free entry laws with respect to certain 
imported commodities, thereby requiring the collection of revenues not 
otherwise provided for by law (Oct. 27, 1983, p. 29611). Similar rulings 
were issued: (1) where it was shown that the imposition of the 
restriction on IRS funding for the fiscal year would effectively and 
inevitably preclude the IRS or the Customs Service from collecting 
revenues otherwise due 


[[Page 690]]

revenues to be transferred to the Department of Labor for 
the enforcement of that law (Oct. 5, 1989, p. 23328).
  In the 99th Congress, the following provisions in a reconciliation 
bill reported from the Budget Committee were ruled out as tax measures 
not reported from the Committee on Ways and Means: (1) containing a 
recommendation from the Committee on Education and Labor (now the 
Committee on Education and the Workforce) excluding certain interest on 
obligations from the Student Loan Marketing Association from application 
of the Internal Revenue Code, affecting interest deductions against 
income taxes (Oct. 24, 1985, pp. 28776, 28827); and (2) containing a 
recommendation from the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 
expanding tax benefits available to shipowners through a capital 
construction fund (Oct. 24, 1985, pp. 28802, 28827). In the 101st 
Congress, the following provisions in an omnibus budget reconciliation 
bill were ruled out: (1) a fee per passenger on cruise vessels, with 
revenues credited as proprietary receipts of the Coast Guard to be used 
for port safety, security, navigation, and antiterrorism activities 
(Oct. 4, 1989, p. 23260); (2) a per acre ``ocean protection fee'' on oil 
and gas leaseholdings in the Outer Continental Shelf, with receipts to 
be used to offset costs of various ocean protection programs (Oct. 4, 
1989, p. 23261); (3) an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code relating 
to the tax deductibility of pension fund contributions (Oct. 4, 1989, p. 
23262); (4) a fee incident to termination of employee benefit plans, 
with receipts to be applied to enforcement and administration of plans 
remaining with the system (Oct. 4, 1989, p. 23262); and (5) a fee 
incident to the filing of various pension benefit plan reports required 
by law, with 


  To a bill reported from the Committee on Education and Labor (now the 
Committee on Education and the Workforce) authorizing financial 
assistance to unemployed individuals for employment opportunities, an 
amendment providing instead for tax incentives to stimulate employment 
was held to be a tax measure in violation of this paragraph (Sept. 21, 
1983, p. 25145). A provision in a bill reported from the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs (now the Committee on International Relations) imposing 
a uniform fee at ports of entry to be collected by the Customs Service 
as a condition of importation of a commodity was held to constitute a 
tariff within the meaning of this paragraph (June 4, 1985, p. 14009), as 
was an amendment to a bill reported from that committee amending the 
tariff schedules to deny ``most favored nation'' trade treatment to a 
certain nation (July 11, 1985, p. 18590). A provision in a general 
appropriation bill creating a new tariff classification was held to 
constitute a tariff under this paragraph (June 15, 1994, p. ----). A 
motion to concur in a Senate amendment constituting a tariff measure 
(imposing an import ban on certain dutiable goods) to a bill reported by 
a committee not having tariff jurisdiction was ruled out under this 
paragraph (Sept. 30, 1988, p. 27316). A proposal to increase a fee 
incident to the filing of a securities registration statement, with the 
proceeds to be deposited in the general fund of the Treasury as 
offsetting receipts, was held to constitute a tax within the meaning of 
this paragraph because the amount of revenue derived and the manner of 
its deposit indicated a purpose to defray costs of government, generally 
(Oct. 23, 1990, p. 32650). To a bill reported by the Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, an amendment increasing a user fee 
was ruled out as a tax measure where the fee overcollected to offset a 
reduction in another fee, thus attenuating the relationship between the 
amount of the fee and the cost of the government activity for which it 
was assessed (May 9, 1995, p. ----). To a bill reported by the Committee 
on Science, Space, and Technology, an amendment proposing sundry changes 
in the Federal income tax by direct amendments to the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 was ruled out of order as carrying a tax measure in 
violation of this paragraph (Sept. 16, 1992, p. ----).


[[Page 691]]

amendment to subsection (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) of section 1, or to 
section 11(b) or 55(b), of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, that 
imposes a new percentage as a rate of tax and thereby increases the 
amount of tax imposed by any such section.



Sec. 846c. Threefifths vote to increase income tax 
rates.

  (c) No  bill or joint resolution, amendment, or conference report 
carrying a Federal income tax rate increase shall be considered as 
passed or agreed to unless so determined by a vote of not less than 
three-fifths of the Members voting. For purposes of the preceding 
sentence, the term ``Federal income tax rate increase'' means any 



  Paragraph (c) was added in the 104th Congress (sec. 106(a), H. Res. 6, 
Jan. 4, 1995, p. ----). In the 105th Congress it was amended to clarify 
the definition of ``Federal income tax rate increase'' (H. Res. 5, Jan. 
7, 1997, p. ----) . On one occasion the Chair held that a provision 
repealing a ceiling on total tax liability attributable to a net capital 
gain was not subject to this paragraph (Apr. 5, 1995, p. ----). This 
paragraph does not apply to a concurrent resolution (Speaker Gingrich, 
May 18, 1995, p. ----). A resolution reported from the Rules Committee 
waiving clause 5(c) may be adopted by majority vote (Oct. 26, 1995, p. 
----). The Speaker rules on the applicability of clause 5(c) only 
pending the question of final passage of a measure alleged to carry a 
Federal income tax rate increase, and not in advance upon adoption of a 
special order waiving that provision (Oct. 26, 1995, p. ----).



Sec. 846d. Prohibition against retroactive income tax 
rate increase.

  (d) It  shall not be in order to consider any bill, joint 
resolution, amendment, or conference report carrying a retroactive 
Federal income tax rate increase. For purposes of the preceding 
sentence--


          (1) the term ``Federal income tax rate increase'' means any 
amendment to subsection (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) of section 1, or to 
section 11(b) or 55(b), of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, that 
imposes a new percentage as a rate of tax and thereby increases the 
amount of tax imposed by any such section; and


[[Page 692]]

          (2) a Federal income tax rate increase is retroactive if it 
applies to a period beginning prior to the enactment of the provision.


  Paragraph (d) was added in the 104th Congress (sec. 106(b), H. Res. 6, 
Jan. 4, 1995, p. ----). In the 105th Congress it was amended to clarify 
the definition of ``Federal income tax rate increase'' (H. Res. 5, Jan. 
7, 1997, p. ----) .




Sec. 847. Reappropriations 
prohibited.

  6. No general  appropriation bill or amendment thereto shall be received 
or considered if it contains a provision reappropriating unexpended 
balances of appropriations; except that this provision shall not apply 
to appropriations in continuation of appropriations for public works on 
which work has commenced, and shall not apply to transfers of unexpended 
balances within the department or agency for which they were originally 
appropriated, reported by the Committee on Appropriations.


  This provision from section 139(c) of the Legislative Reorganization 
Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 190f(c)) was made part of the standing rules in 
the 83d Congress (Jan. 3, 1953,p. 24). Previously, a reappropriation of 
an unexpended balance for an object authorized by law was in order on a 
general appropriation bill (IV, 3591, 3592; VII, 1156, 1158). This 
clause was amended in the 99th Congress by section 228(b) of the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177, 
Dec. 12, 1985) to permit the Committee on Appropriations to report 
certain transfers of unexpended balances. Consistent with clause 2 of 
rule XXI, violations of this clause are enforced only against specific 
provisions in general appropriation bills containing reappropriations 
rather than against consideration of the bill (see, e.g., Procedure, ch. 
25, sec. 18).


[[Page 693]]

tions may be 
authorized in law for a specified object does not permit an amendment to 
a general appropriation bill to include legislative language mandating 
the reappropriation of funds from other Acts (July 28, 1992, p. ----).
  A provision in a general appropriation bill, or an amendment thereto, 
providing that funds for a certain purpose are to be derived by 
continuing the availability of funds previously appropriated for a prior 
fiscal year is in violation of clause 6 of rule XXI (Aug. 20, 1951, pp. 
10393-94; Mar. 29, 1960, p. 6862; June 17, 1960, p. 13138; June 20, 
1973, pp. 20530-31; July 29, 1982, p. 18625; June 28, 1988, p. 16255), 
and a reappropriation of unexpended prior year balances prohibited by 
this clause is not in order under the guise of a ``Holman Rule'' 
exception to clause 2 of rule XXI (Oct. 18, 1966, pp. 27424-25). An 
amendment to a general appropriation bill making any appropriations 
which are available for the current fiscal year available for certain 
new purposes was held out of order under this clause since it was not 
confined to the funds in the bill and would permit reappropriation of 
unexpended balances (Oct. 1, 1975, p. 31090). That appropria-

  This rule, however, is not applicable when the reappropriation 
language is identical to legislative authorization language enacted 
subsequent to the adoption of the rule, since the law is a more recent 
expression of the will of the House (Sept. 5, 1961, p. 18133), nor when 
a measure transferring unobligated balances of previously appropriated 
funds contains legislative provisions and rules changes but no 
appropriation of new budget authority and is neither in the form of an 
appropriation bill nor the subject of a privileged report by the 
Committee on Appropriations under rule XI (Mar. 3, 1988, p. 3239).


  The return of an unexpended balance to the Treasury is in order (IV, 
3594).




Sec. 848. Printed hearings and reports on 
appropriation bills.

  7. No general  appropriation bill shall be considered in the 
House until printed committee hearings and a committee report thereon 
have been available for the Members of the House for at least three 
calendar days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, or legal holidays except 
when the House is in session on such a day).



  This provision from section 139(a) of the Legislative Reorganization 
Act of 1946 was made a part of the standing rules January 3, 1953 (p. 
24), and was amended (by the addition of the parenthetical clause) on 
January 22, 1971 (p. 144). In counting the ``three calendar days'' 
specified in the clause, the date the bill is filed or the date on which 
it is to be called up for consideration are counted, but not both (May 
26, 1969, pp. 13720-21). Clause 2(l)(6) of rule XI became applicable to 
all other reports from the Committee on Appropriations under the 
Committee Reform Amendments of 1974, effective January 3, 1975 (H. Res. 
988, 93d Cong., Oct. 8, 1974, p. 34470). In the 104th Congress it was 
amended to count as a ``calendar day'' any day on which the House is in 
session (H. Res. 254, Nov. 30, 1995, p. ----).




Sec. 848a. Reservation of points of order.

  8.  At the time 
any appropriation bill is reported, all points of order shall be 
considered as reserved.



[[Page 694]]

reserve points of order when a general appropriation bill was 
referred to the calendar of the Committee of the Whole House on the 
state of the Union, in order that provisions in violation of rule XXI 
could be stricken in the Committee of the Whole (see Sec. 835, supra).



  Clause 8 was added in the 104th Congress (sec. 215(e), H. Res. 6, Jan. 
4, 1995, p. ----), rendering unnecessary the former practice that a Member