    [Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 105th Congress]
    [105th Congress]
    [House Document 104-272]
    [The United States Constitution]
    [Pages 1-114]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

    [[Page 1]]

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                                  CONSTITUTION

                                   __________

    Sec. 1. The preamble.

      We the People  of the United States, in
    Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
    Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general
    Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
    Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United
    States of America.

    [House Rules Manual -- House Document No. 104-272]
    [From the U.S. Government Printing Office Online Database]
    [Pages 4-61]
    [DOCID:hrmanual-3]

    [[Page 4]]

    Sec. 2. Formation of the
    Constitution.

      The First Continental  Congress met in Philadelphia in September of 1774 and
    adopted the Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress,
    embodying rights and principles later to be incorporated into the
    Constitution of the United States. The Second Continental Congress
    adopted in November of 1777 the Articles of Confederation, which the
    States approved in July, 1778. Upon recommendation of the Continental
    Congress, a convention of State representatives met in May, 1787 to
    revise the Articles of Confederation and reported to the Continental
    Congress in September a new Constitution, which the Congress submitted
    to the States for ratification. Nine States, as required by the
    Constitution for its establishment, had ratified by June 21, 1788, and
    eleven States had ratified by July 26, 1788. The Continental Congress
    adopted a resolution on September 13, 1788, putting the new Constitution
    into effect; the First Congress of the United States convened on March
    4, 1789, and George Washington was inaugurated as the first President on
    April 30, 1789.

                                   ARTICLE I.

    Sec. 3. Legislative powers vested in
    Congress.

      Section 1. All  legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
    Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House
    of Representatives.

    <>   Section 2. \1\ The House of Representatives shall be composed
    of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States,
    * * *.

    Sec. 4. Power to
    investigate.

      The power to legislate includes the power to conduct inquiries and
    investigations. See Kilbourn v.   Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273
    U.S. 135 (1927); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957);
    Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). For the power of the
    House to punish for contempt in the course of investigations, see
    Sec. 293, infra.

      This clause requires election by the people and State authority may
    not determine a tie by lot (I, 775).

      The phrase ``by the people of the several States'' means that as
    nearly as practicable one person's vote in a congressional election is
    to be worth as much as another's. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
    (1964); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 385 U.S. 450 (1967). 2 U.S.C. 2a
    mandates apportionment of Representatives based upon population, and 2
    U.S.C. 2c requires the establishment by the States of single-Member
    congressional districts. For elections generally, see Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 8.

    [[Page 5]]

    resolution fixing the daily hour of meeting at 12
    o'clock meridian or some other hour is agreed to at the beginning of
    each session.

    Sec. 6. Term of a Congress.

      The term of a  Congress, before
    the ratification of the 20th amendment to the Constitution, began on the
    4th of March of the odd numbered years and extended through two years.
    This resulted from the action of the Continental Congress on September
    13, 1788, in declaring, on authority conferred by the Federal
    Convention, ``the first Wednesday in March next'' to be ``the time for
    commencing proceedings under the said Constitution.'' This date was the
    4th of March, 1789. And soon after the first Congress assembled a joint
    committee determined that the terms of Representatives and Senators of
    the first class commenced on that day, and must necessarily terminate
    with the 3d of March, 1791 (I, 3). Under the 20th amendment to the
    Constitution the terms of Representatives and Senators begin on the 3d
    of January of the odd-numbered years, regardless of when Congress
    actually convenes. By a practice having the force of common law, the
    House meets at 12 m. when no other hour is fixed (I. 4, 210). In the
    later practice a

      Prior to adoption of the 20th amendment, the legislative day of March
    3 extended to 12 m. on March 4 (V, 6694-6697) and, unless earlier
    adjourned, the Speaker could at that time declare the House adjourned
    sine die, without motion or vote, even to the point of suspending a roll
    call then in progress (V, 6715-6718).

    <> * * * and
    the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for
    Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

      The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (84 Stat. 1140) provides
    that unless Congress otherwise specifies the two Houses shall adjourn
    sine die not later than the last day in July. This requirement is not
    applicable, under the terms of that Act, where a state of war exists
    pursuant to a Congressional declaration or where, in an odd-numbered
    (non-election) year, the Congress has agreed to adjourn for the month
    preceding Labor Day. For more on this provision, see Sec. 947, infra.

      The House, in the decision of an election case, has rejected votes
    cast by persons not naturalized citizens of the United States, although
    they were entitled to vote under the statutes of a State (I, 811); but
    where an act of Congress had provided that a certain class of persons
    should be deprived of citizenship, a question arose over the proposed
    rejection of their votes in a State wherein citizenship in the United
    States was not a qualification of the elector (I, 451). In an
    exceptional case the House rejected votes cast by persons lately in
    armed resistance to the Government, although by the law of the State
    they were qualified voters (I, 448); but later, the House declined to
    find persons disqualified as voters because they had formerly borne arms
    against the Government (II, 879).

    Sec. 8. Decisions of the Court.

      The power  of the States to
    set qualifications for electors is not unlimited, being subject to the
    15th, 19th, 24th, and 26th amendments, and to the equal protection
    clause of the United States Constitution. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
    89 (1965); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).

    <>   \2\ No
    Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age
    of twenty five Years, * * *.

    [[Page 6]]

      Congress has some power in setting qualifications for electors, as in
    protecting the right to vote and lowering the minimum age for electors
    in congressional elections. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966);
    Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).

    <> * * *
    and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, * * *.

      A Member-elect not being of the required age, was not enrolled by the
    Clerk and he did not take the oath until he had reached the required age
    (I, 418).

    <> * * *
    and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which
    he shall be chosen.

      Henry Ellenbogen, Pa., had not been a citizen for seven years when
    elected to the 73d Congress, nor when the term commenced on March 4,
    1933. He was sworn at the beginning of the second session on January 3,
    1934, when a citizen for seven and one-half years (see H. Rept. 1431 and
    H. Res. 370, 73d Cong.). A native of South Carolina who had been abroad
    during the Revolution and on his return had not resided in the country
    seven years, was held to be qualified as a citizen (I, 420). A woman who
    forfeited her citizenship through marriage to a foreign subject and
    later resumed it through naturalization less than seven years prior to
    her election, was held to fulfill the constitutional requirement as to
    citizenship and entitled to a seat in the House (VI, 184). A Member who
    had long been a resident of the country, but who could not produce
    either the record of the court nor his final naturalization papers, was
    nevertheless retained in his seat by the House (I, 424).

    [[Page 7]]

    bia for years as a newspaper correspondent and maintenance there of
    church membership were not considered to outweigh payment of poll and
    income taxes, ownership of real estate, and a record for consistent voting
    in the district from which elected (VI, 55), and in the same case excuse
    from jury duty in the District of Columbia on a plea of citizenship in
    the State from which elected and exercise of incidental rights of such
    citizenship, were accepted as evidence of inhabitancy (VI, 55).
      The meaning of the word ``inhabitant'' and its relation to citizenship
    has been discussed (I, 366, 434; VI, 174), and the House has held that a
    mere sojourner in a State was not qualified as an inhabitant (I, 369),
    but a contestant was found to be an actual inhabitant of the State
    although for sufficient reason his family resided in another State (II,
    1091). Residence abroad in the service of the Government does not
    destroy inhabitancy as understood under the Constitution (I, 433). One
    holding an office and residing with his family for a series of years in
    the District of Columbia exclusively was held disqualified to sit as a
    Member from the State of his citizenship (I, 434); and one who had his
    business and a residence in the District of Columbia and had no business
    or residence in Virginia was held ineligible to a seat from that State
    (I, 436). One who had a home in the District of Columbia, and had
    inhabited another home in Maryland a brief period before his election,
    but had never been a citizen of any other State, was held to be
    qualified (I, 432). Also a Member who had resided a portion of a year in
    the District of Columbia, but who had a home in the State of his
    citizenship and was actually living there at the time of the election,
    was held to be qualified (I, 435). In the Updike v. Ludlow case, 71st
    Congress, it was decided that residence in the District of Colum-

    Sec. 12. Qualifications other than those
    specified by the Constitution.

      Whether Congress  may by law establish qualifications
    other than those prescribed by the Constitution has been the subject of
    much discussion (I, 449, 451, 457, 458, 478); but in a case wherein a
    statute declared a Senator convicted of a certain offense ``forever
    thereafter incapable of holding any office of honor, trust, or profit
    under the Government of the United States,'' the Supreme Court expressed
    the opinion that the final judgment of conviction did not operate, ipso
    facto, to vacate the seat or compel the Senate to expel or regard the
    Senator as expelled by force alone of the judgment (II, 1282). Whether
    the House or Senate alone may set up qualifications other than those of
    the Constitution has also been a subject often discussed (I, 414, 415,
    443, 457, 458, 469, 481, 484). The Senate has always declined to act on
    the supposition that it had such a power (I, 443, 483), and during the
    stress of civil war the House of Representatives declined to exercise
    the power, even under circumstances of great provocation (I, 449, 465).
    But later, in one instance, the House excluded a Member-elect on the
    principal argument that it might itself prescribe a qualification not
    specified in the Constitution (I, 477). The matter was extensively
    debated in the 90th Congress in connection with the consideration of
    resolutions relating to the seating of Representative-elect Adam C.
    Powell of New York (H. Res. 1, Jan. 10, 1967, p. 14; H. Res. 278, Mar.
    1, 1967, p. 4997).

      The exclusion of Mr. Powell was the subject of litigation reaching the
    Supreme Court of the United States. In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
    (1969), the Court found that the power of Congress to judge the
    qualifications of its Members was limited to an examination of the
    express qualifications stated in the Constitution.

      It has been decided by the House and Senate that no State may add to
    the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution (I, 414-416, 632); and
    the Supreme Court so ruled in U.S. Term Limits, Inc., v. Thorton, 63
    U.S.L.W. 4413 (1995). There, the Court held that States may not
    ``change, add to, or diminish'' constitutional qualifications of
    Members, striking down a State statute prohibiting three-term incumbents
    from appearing on the general election ballot. For qualifications
    generally, see Deschler's Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 7, secs. 9-14.

    [[Page 8]]

      For expulsion of seated Members, which requires a two-thirds vote
    rather than a majority vote, see article I, section 5, clause 2
    (Sec. 62, infra).

    Sec. 13. Minority candidate not seated when
    returned Member is disqualified.

      Both Houses of  Congress have decided, when a Member-
    elect is found to be disqualified, that the person receiving the next
    highest number of votes is not entitled to the seat (I, 323, 326, 450,
    463, 469; VI, 58, 59), even in a case wherein seasonable notice of the
    disqualification was given to the electors (I, 460). In the event of the
    death of a Member-elect, the candidate receiving the next highest number
    of votes is not entitled to the seat (VI, 152).

    Sec. 14. The old provision for
    apportionment of Representatives and direct taxes.

      \3\ [Representatives and direct  Taxes shall be
    apportioned among the several States which may be included within this
    Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined
    by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to
    Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three
    fifths of all other Persons.] * * *

    * * * The actual <> Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the
    first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every
    subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law
    direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every
    thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative;
    and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire
    shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode- Island and
    Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersey
    four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland

    [[Page 9]]

    six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.

      The part of this clause relating to the mode of apportionment of
    Representatives was changed after the Civil War by section 2 of the 14th
    amendment and as to taxes on incomes without apportionment, by the 16th
    amendment.

      The census has been taken decennially since 1790, and, with the
    exception of 1920, was followed each time by reapportionment. In the
    First Congress the House had 65 Members; increased after each census,
    except that of 1840, until 435 was reached in 1913 (VI, 39, 40). The Act
    of June 18, 1929 (46 Stat. 26), as amended by the Act of November 15,
    1941 (55 Stat. 761), provides for reapportionment of the existing number
    (435) among the States following each new census (VI, 41-43; see 2
    U.S.C. 2a). Membership was temporarily increased to 436, then to 437,
    upon admission of Alaska (72 Stat. 345) and Hawaii (73 Stat. 8), but
    returned to 435 on January 3, 1963, the effective date of the
    reapportionment under the 18th Decennial census.

      Under the later but not the earlier practice, bills relating to the
    census and apportionment are not privileged for consideration (I, 305-
    308; VI, 48, VII, 889; Apr. 8, 1926, p. 7147).

    Sec. 16. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 Howard, 393;
    Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall., 533; Scholey v. Rew, 23 Wall., 331; De
    Treville v. Smalls, 98 U.S. 517; Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116
    U.S. 404; Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. (Income Tax case), 157
    U.S. 429; Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Rehearing), 158 U.S.
    601; Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,
    220 U.S. 107; Corporation Tax cases, 220 U.S. 107; Eisner v. Macomber,
    252 U.S. 189; New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345.

    Sec. 17. Writs for elections to vacancies
    in representation.

      \4\ When vacancies  happen in the Representation from any State, the
    Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such
    Vacancies.

      Vacancies are caused by death, resignation, declination, withdrawal,
    or by action of the House in declaring a vacancy as existing or causing
    one by expulsion.

    [[Page 10]]

    of votes may not receive the credentials (I, 323; VI 152). A Member whose
    seat was contested dying, the House did not admit a claimant with
    credentials until contestant's claim was settled (I, 326); where a
    contestant died after a report in his favor, the House unseated the
    returned Member and declared the seat vacant (II, 965), and in a later
    case the contestant having died, the committee did not recommend to the
    House a resolution it had agreed to declaring he had not been elected
    (VI, 112). In the 93d Congress, where two Members-elect had been
    passengers on a missing aircraft and were presumed dead, the Speaker lay
    before the House documentary evidence of the presumptive death of one
    Member-elect and the declaration of a vacancy by the Governor, as-well-
    as evidence that the status of the other Member-elect had not been
    officially determined by State authority. The House then adopted a
    privileged resolution declaring vacant the seat of the latter Member-
    elect to enable the Governor of that State to call a special election
    (Jan. 3, 1973, pp. 15-16). For further discussion, see Sec. 23, infra.

    Sec. 18. Vacancy from death.

      It was long the  practice to
    notify the executive of the State when a vacancy was caused by the death
    of a Member during a session (II, 1198-1202); but since improvements in
    transportation have made it possible for deceased Members to be buried
    at their homes it has been the practice for State authorities to take
    cognizance of the vacancies without notice. When a Member dies while not
    in attendance on the House or during a recess the House is sufficiently
    informed of the vacancy by the credentials of his successor, when they
    set forth the fact of the death (I, 568). The death of a Member-elect
    creates a vacancy, although no certificate may have been awarded (I,
    323), and in such a case the candidate having the next highest number

    [[Page 11]]

    ignation was not so treated (II, 1213). The Speaker
    having been elected Vice President and a Representative of the
    succeeding Congress at the same election, transmitted to the Governor of
    his State his resignation as a Member-elect (VI, 230, 453). A Member of
    the House having been nominated and confirmed as Vice President pursuant
    to the 25th amendment, submitted a letter of resignation as a
    Representative to the Governor of his State, and a copy of his letter of
    resignation was laid before the House by the Speaker following the
    completion of a Joint Meeting for his swearing-in as Vice President
    (Dec. 6, 1973, p. 39927). A sitting Member having been confirmed as
    Secretary of Defense, his letter of resignation was laid before the
    House prior to his taking the oath of that office (Mar. 20, 1989, p.
    4976).

    Sec. 19. Vacancy from resignation.

      In recent practice  the
    Member frequently informs the House by letter that his resignation has
    been sent to the State executive (II, 1167-1176) and this is
    satisfactory evidence of the resignation (I, 567) but Members have
    resigned by letter to the House alone, it being presumed that the Member
    would also notify his Governor (VI, 226), and where a Member resigned by
    letter to the House the Speaker was authorized to notify the Governor
    (Nov. 27, 1944, p. 8450; July 12, 1957, p. 11536; Sept. 1, 1976, p.
    28887). Where a Member does not inform the House the State executive may
    do so (II, 1193, 1194; VI, 232). But sometimes the House learns of a
    Member's resignation only by means of the credentials of his successor
    (II, 1195, 1356). Where the fact of a Member's resignation has not
    appeared either from the credentials of his successor or otherwise, the
    Clerk has been ordered to make inquiry (II, 1209), or the House has
    ascertained the vacancy from information given by other Members (II,
    1208). It has been established that a Member or Senator may resign,
    appointing a future date for his resignation to take effect, and until
    the arrival of the date may participate in the proceedings (II, 1220-
    1225, 1228, 1229; VI, 227, 228). In one case a Member who had resigned
    was not permitted by the House to withdraw the resignation (II, 1213),
    but the House permitted it later in another case (VI, 229). Acceptance
    of the resignation of a Member of the House is unnecessary (VI, 65,
    226), and the refusal of a Governor to accept a resignation cannot
    operate to continue membership in the House (VI, 65). Only in a single
    exceptional case has the House taken action in the direction of
    accepting a resignation (II, 1214). Sometimes Members who have resigned
    have been reelected to the same House and taken seats (II, 1210, 1212,
    1256; Jan. 28, 1965 and June 16, 1965, pp. 1452 and 13774; Jan. 6, 1983
    and Feb. 22, 1983, pp. 114 and 2575). A Member who has not taken his
    seat resigned (II, 1231). A letter of resignation is presented as
    privileged (II, 1167-1176); but a resolution to permit a Member to
    withdraw his res-

    Sec. 20. Vacancy from declination.

      A Member who  has been
    elected to a seat may decline to accept it, and in such a case the House
    informed the executive of the State of the vacancy (II, 1234). The House
    has decided an election contest against a returned Member who had not
    appeared to claim the seat (I, 638). In one instance a Member-elect who
    had been convicted in the courts did not appear during the term (IV,
    4484, footnote).

    Sec. 21. Vacancy by withdrawal.

      At the time  of the secession
    of several States, members of the House from those States withdrew (II,
    1218). In the Senate, in cases of such withdrawals, the Secretary was
    directed to omit the names of the Senators from the roll (II, 1219), and
    the act of withdrawal was held to create a vacancy which the legislature
    might recognize (I, 383).

    Sec. 22. Vacancy by action of the House.

      Where the House,  by
    its action in a question of election or otherwise, creates a vacancy,
    the Speaker is directed to notify the Executive of the State (I, 502,
    709, 824; II, 1203-1205; Mar. 1, 1967, p. 5038; Jan. 3, 1973, pp. 15-16;
    Feb. 24, 1981, pp. 2916-18). A resolution as to such notification is
    presented as a question of privilege (III, 2589), as is a resolution
    declaring a vacancy where the Member-elect was unable to take the oath
    of office or to resign because of an incapacitating illness (Feb. 24,
    1981, pp. 2916-18).

    [[Page 12]]

    where the plane was lost, the House declared the seat vacant
    (H. Res. 1, 93d Cong., Jan. 3, 1973, pp. 15-16).

    Sec. 23. Questions as to the existence of a
    vacancy.

      The House declines  to give prima facie effect to credentials, even though they
    be regular in form, until it has ascertained whether or not the seat is
    vacant (I, 322, 518, 565, 569), and a person returned as elected at a
    second election was unseated on ascertainment that another person had
    actually been chosen at the first election (I, 646). Where a Member was
    reelected to the House, although at the time of the election he had been
    unaccounted for for several weeks following the disappearance of the
    plane on which he was a passenger, the Governor of the State from which
    he was elected transmitted his certificate to the House in the regular
    fashion. When the Member-elect was still missing at the time the new
    Congress convened, and circumstances were such that other passengers on
    the missing plane had been presumed dead following judicial inquiries in
    the State

    <>   \5\
    The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other
    Officers; * * *

    Sec. 24. Functions of the state executive
    in filling vacancies.

      The term ``vacancy''  as occurring in this paragraph of the
    Constitution has been examined in relation to the functions of the State
    executive (I, 312, 518). A federal law empowers the States and
    Territories to provide by law the times of elections to fill vacancies
    (I, 516; 2 U.S.C. 8); but an election called by a governor in pursuance
    of constitutional authority was held valid although no state law
    prescribed time, place, or manner of such election (I, 517). Where two
    candidates had an equal number of votes, the governor did not issue
    credentials to either, but ordered a new election after they had waived
    their respective claims (I, 555). A candidate elected for the 104th
    Congress was ``appointed'' by the Governor to fill a vacancy for the
    remainder of the 103d Congress pursuant to a State law requiring the
    Governor to appoint the candidate who won the election to the 104th
    Congress. In that case the House authorized the Speaker to administer
    the oath to the Member-elect and referred the question of his final
    right to the seat in the 103d Congress to the Committee on House
    Administration (Nov. 29, 1994, p. ----).
    <>   A
    Member elected to fill a vacancy serves no longer time than the
    remainder of the term of the Member whose place he fills (I, 3). For the
    compensation and allowances of such Members, see Sec. 87, infra.

      The officers of the House are the Speaker, who has always been one of
    its Members and whose term as Speaker must expire with his term as a
    Member; and the Clerk, Sergeant-at-Arms, Doorkeeper (abolished by the
    104th Congress, see Sec. 651d, infra), Postmaster (abolished during the
    102d Congress, see Sec. 654a, infra), Chief Administrative Officer, and
    Chaplain (I, 187), no one of whom has ever been chosen from the sitting
    membership of the House, and who continue in office until their
    successors are chosen and qualified (I, 187), in one case continuing
    through the entire Congress succeeding that in which they were elected
    (I, 244, 263). The House formerly provided by special rule that the
    Clerk should continue in office until another should be chosen (I, 187,
    188, 235, 244); and in later years the statutes have imposed on the
    Clerk, Sergeant-at-Arms, and former Doorkeeper duties which contemplate
    their continuance (I, 14, 15; 2 U.S.C. 75a-1, 83).

    [[Page 13]]

    quorum being present (I, 216; VI, 24; Jan. 7, 1997, p. ----). The Clerk appoints
    tellers for this election (I, 217). Ultimately, the House, and not the
    Clerk, decides by what method it shall elect the Speaker (I, 210). On
    two occasions, by special rules, Speakers were chosen by a plurality of
    votes; but in each case the House by majority vote adopted a resolution
    declaring the result (I, 221, 222). The House has declined to choose a
    Speaker by lot (I, 221).

    Sec. 27. Election of a Speaker.

      The Speaker, who  was at
    first elected by ballot, has been chosen by viva voce vote by surname in
    response to a call of the roll since 1839 (I, 187). The Speaker is
    elected by a majority of Members-elect voting by surname, a

      The motion to proceed to the election of a Speaker is privileged (I,
    212, 214; VIII, 3883), and debatable unless the previous question is
    ordered (I, 213). Relying on the Act of June 1, 1789 (2 U.S.C. 25), the
    Clerk recognized for nominations for Speaker as being of higher
    constitutional privilege than a resolution to postpone the election of a
    Speaker and instead provide for the election of a Speaker pro tempore
    pending the disposition of certain ethics charges against the nominee of
    the majority party (Jan. 7, 1997, p. ----). On several occasions the
    choice of a Speaker has been delayed for several weeks by contests (I,
    222; V, 5356, 6647, 6649; VI, 24). The contest over the election of a
    Speaker in 1923 was resolved after a procedure for the adoption of rules
    for the 68th Congress had been presented (VI, 24). In 1860 the voting
    for Speaker proceeded slowly, being interspersed with debate (I, 223),
    and in one instance the House asked candidates for Speaker to state
    their views before proceeding to election (I, 218).

    [[Page 14]]

    Speaker and, following the roll call, declared
    Representative Foley ``duly elected Speaker'' (p. 10801). When the
    Speaker resigns no action of the House excusing him from service is
    taken (I, 232). In one instance a Speaker resigned on the last day of
    the Congress, and the House elected a successor for the day (I, 225).
    Instance wherein the Speaker, following a vote upon an essential
    question indicating a change in the party control of the House,
    announced that under the circumstances it was incumbent upon the Speaker
    to resign or to recognize for a motion declaring vacant the office of
    Speaker (VI, 35).
    <>   The effect of a law to regulate the action of the House in
    choosing its own officers has been discussed (IV, 3819), and such a law
    has been considered of doubtful validity (V, 6765, 6766) in theory and
    practice (I, 241, 242). The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2
    U.S.C. 75a-1) authorizes the Speaker to fill temporary vacancies in the
    offices of Clerk, Sergeant-at-Arms, Chief Administrative Officer, and
    Chaplain. For a history of the Speaker's exercise of such authority, see
    Sec. 635, infra;  and, for further information on the elections of
    officers, see Deschler's Precedents, vol. 1, ch. 6.

    Sec. 28. Vacancies in the office of
    Speaker.

      The Speaker  having died during the recess of Congress, the Clerk at the
    next session called the House to order, ascertained the presence of a
    quorum, and then the House proceeded to elect a successor (I, 234; Jan.
    10, 1962, p. 5). Speaker Joseph W. Byrns having died during a session of
    Congress but not while the House was sitting, the Clerk on the following
    day called the House to order and his successor, Hon. William B.
    Bankhead, was elected by resolution (June 4, 1936, p. 9016). Speaker
    Bankhead also died during a session, on a day when the House was not
    meeting. The Clerk on the following day called the House to order and
    Hon. Sam Rayburn was elected by resolution (Sept. 16, 1940, p. 12231).
    Form of resolution offered on death of a Speaker (Sept. 16, 1940, p.
    12232; Jan. 10, 1962, p. 9) and a former Speaker (VIII, 3564; Mar. 7,
    1968, p. 5742). A resolution declaring vacant the office of Speaker is
    presented as a matter of high constitutional privilege (VI, 35). A
    proposition to elect a Speaker is in order at any time and presents a
    question of the highest privilege (VIII, 3383). Speakers have resigned
    by rising in their place and addressing the House (I, 231, 233), by
    calling a Member to the Chair and tendering the resignation verbally
    from the floor (I, 225), or by sending a letter which the Clerk reads to
    the House at the beginning of a new session (I, 232). In the 101st
    Congress, Speaker Wright took the floor on a question of personal
    privilege, to respond to charges made against him, and announced his
    intention to resign as Speaker ``on the election of my successor'' (May
    31, 1989, p. 10440). On June 6, 1989, Speaker Wright entertained
    nominations for

    <> * * * and
    [the House of Representatives] shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

    Sec. 30. Election of Clerk in relation to
    business.

      The office of  Clerk becoming vacant, it was held that the House would not
    be organized for business until a Clerk should be elected (I, 237); but
    in another instance some business intervened before a Clerk was elected
    (I, 239). At the time of organization, while the Clerk of the preceding
    House was yet officiating, and after the Speaker had been elected, the
    House proceeded to legislation and other business before electing a
    Clerk (I, 242, 244). But in one case it was held that the law of 1789
    (see 2 U.S.C. 25) bound the House to elect the Clerk before proceeding
    to business (I, 241).

      In 1868 the Senate ceased in its rules to describe the House, acting
    in an impeachment, as the ``grand inquest of the nation'' (III, 2126).
    See also art. II, sec. 4 (Sec. 173, infra); Deschler's Precedents, vol.
    3, ch. 14.

      A federal court having subpoenaed certain evidence gathered by a
    committee of the House in an impeachment inquiry, the House adopted a
    resolution granting such limited access to the evidence as would not
    infringe upon its sole power of impeachment (Aug. 22, 1974, p. 30047).

    [[Page 15]]

    islature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator
    shall have one Vote.]

    Sec. 32. Numbers, terms, and votes
    of Senators.

      Section 3. \1\ [The Senate  of the United States shall be composed of two Senators
    from each State, chosen by the Leg-

      This provision has now been changed by the 17th amendment to the
    Constitution.

    Sec. 33. Division of the Senate into
    classes.

      \2\ Immediately  after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first
    Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes.
    The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the
    Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of
    the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of
    the <> sixth Year,
    so that one-third may be chosen every second Year; [and if Vacancies
    happen by Resignation,
    or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the
    Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting
    of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.]

      That part of the above paragraph in brackets was changed by the 17th
    amendment.

    Sec. 35. Qualifications of Senators.

      \3\ No Person  shall be
    a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and
    been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when
    elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

    [[Page 16]]

    being a citizen of the United States, had been an
    inhabitant of the State from which he was appointed for less than a year
    (I, 437). Also one who, while stationed in a State as an army officer
    had declared his intention of making his home in the State, was admitted
    by the Senate (I, 438). A Senator who at the time of his election was
    actually residing in the District of Columbia as an officeholder, but
    who voted in his old home and had no intent of making the District his
    domicile, was held to be qualified (I, 439).

      In 1794 the Senate decided that Albert Gallatin was disqualified, not
    having been a citizen nine years although he had served in the war of
    Independence and was a resident of the country when the Constitution was
    formed (I, 428); and in 1849 that James Shields was disqualified, not
    having been a citizen for the required time (I, 429). But in 1870 the
    Senate declined to examine as to H. R. Revels, a citizen under the
    recently adopted 14th amendment (I, 430). As to inhabitancy the Senate
    seated one who,

    Sec. 36. The Vice President and his
    vote.

      \4\ The Vice  President of the United States shall be President of the Senate,
    but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.

    <>   \5\ The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and
    also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or
    when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.-
      The right of the Vice President to vote has been construed to extend
    to questions relating to the organization of the Senate (V, 5975), as
    the election of officers of the Senate (V, 5972-5974), or a decision on
    the title of a claimant to a seat (V, 5976, 5977). The Senate has
    declined to make a rule relating to the vote of the Vice President (V,
    5974).

    Sec. 38. Senate tries impeachment and convicts
    by twothirds vote.

      \6\ The Senate  shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.
    When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation.
    When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice
    shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence
    of two thirds of the Members present.

    [[Page 17]]

      For the exclusive power of the Senate to try impeachments under the
    United States Constitution, see Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cls. 293
    (1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 668 (1937). See also Mississippi v.
    Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867) (dictum). For the
    nonjusticiability of a claim that Senate Rule XI violates the
    impeachment trial clause by delegating to a committee of 12 Senators the
    responsibility to receive evidence, hear testimony, and report to the
    Senate thereon, see Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).

      In 1868, after mature consideration, the Senate overruled the old view
    of its functions (III, 2057), and decided that it sat for impeachment
    trials as the Senate and not as a court (III, 2057), and eliminated from
    its rules all mention of itself as a ``high court of impeachment'' (III,
    2079, 2082).

    Sec. 39. The presiding officer.

      An anxiety lest  the Chief
    Justice might have a vote in the approaching trial of the President
    seems to have prompted this action (III, 2057). There was examination of
    the question of the Chief Justice's power to vote (III, 2098); but the
    Senate declined to declare his incapacity to vote, and he did in fact
    give a casting vote on incidental questions (III, 2067). The Senate
    declined to require that the Chief Justice be sworn when about to
    preside (III, 2080); but the Chief Justice had the oath administered by
    an associate justice (III, 2422).

      In impeachments for officers other than the President of the United
    States the presiding officer of the Senate presides, whether he be Vice
    President, the regular President pro tempore (III, 2309, footnote, 2337,
    2394) or a special President pro tempore chosen to preside at the trial
    only (III, 2089, 2477).

    Sec. 40. Oath and quorum.

      Senators elected after  the
    beginning of an impeachment trial are sworn as in the case of other
    Senators (III, 2375). The quorum of the Senate sitting for an
    impeachment trial is a quorum of the Senate itself, and not merely a
    quorum of the Senators sworn for the trial (III, 2063). The vote
    required for conviction is two-thirds of those Senators present and
    voting (Oct. 20, 1989, p. 25335). In 1868, when certain States were
    without representation, the Senate declined to question its competency
    to try an impeachment case (III, 2060). See S. Doc. 93-102, ``Procedure
    and Guidelines for Impeachment Trials in the United States Senate,'' for
    precedents relating to the conduct of Senate impeachments.

    Sec. 41. Judgment in cases of
    impeachment.

      \7\ Judgment in  Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to
    removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office
    of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party
    convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial,
    Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.

    [[Page 18]]

    nounced (III, 2397). The question on removal and
    disqualification has been held divisible for the vote (III, 2397; VI,
    512).
      There has been discussion as to whether or not the Constitution
    requires both removal and disqualification on conviction (III, 2397);
    but in the case of Pickering, the Senate decreed only removal (III,
    2341). In the case of Humphreys, judgment of both removal and
    disqualification was pro-

      The question of judgment requires only a majority vote (VI, 512; Apr.
    17, 1936, p. 5606).

      In the Ritter case, it was first held that upon conviction of the
    respondent, judgment of removal required no vote, following
    automatically from conviction under article II, section 4 (Apr. 17,
    1936, p. 5607). In the 99th Congress, having tried to conviction the
    first impeachment case against a federal district judge since 1936, the
    Senate ordered his removal from office (Oct. 9, 1986, p. 29870). In the
    101st Congress, two other federal district judges were removed from
    office following their convictions in the Senate (Oct. 20, 1989, p.
    25335; Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27101).

    Sec. 42. Times, places, and manner
    of elections of Representatives and Senators.

      Section 4. \1\ The Times,  Places and Manner of
    holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed
    in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any
    time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the places of
    chusing Senators.

      The relative powers of the Congress and the States under this graph
    have been the subject of much discussion (I, 311, 313, 507, footnote);
    but Congress has in fact fixed by law the time of elections (I, 508; VI,
    66; 2 U.S.C. 7), and has controlled the manner to the extent of
    prescribing a ballot or voting machine (II, 961; VI, 150; 2 U.S.C. 9).
    When a State delegated to a municipality the power to regulate the
    manner of holding an election, a question arose (II, 975). A question
    has arisen as to whether or not a State, in the absence of action by
    Congress, might make the time of election of Congressmen contingent on
    the time of the State election (I, 522). This paragraph gives Congress
    the power to protect the right to vote in primaries where they are an
    integral part of the election process. United States v. Classic, 313
    U.S. 299 (1941); United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930).
    Congress may legislate under this paragraph to protect the exercise of
    the franchise in congressional elections. Ex parte Siebolt, 100 U.S. 371
    (1880); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).

    [[Page 19]]

    522). But the House held that where a legislature has been in existence
    a constitutional convention might not exercise the power (I, 363, 367). It
    has been argued generally that the legislature derives the power herein discussed from the Federal and not the State Constitution (II, 856, 947),
    and therefore that the State constitution might not in this respect control the State legislature (II, 1133). The House has sustained this view by its
    action (I, 525). But where the State constitution fixed a date for an election
    and the legislature had not acted, although it had the opportunity, the House
    held the election valid (II, 846).

    Sec. 43. Functions of a State legislature in
    fixing time, etc., of elections.

      The meaning of  the word ``legislature'' in this
    clause of the Constitution has been the subject of discussion (II, 856),
    as to whether or not it means a constitutional convention as well as a
    legislature in the commonly accepted meaning of the word (I, 524). The
    House has sworn in Members chosen at an election the time, etc., of
    which was fixed by the schedule of a constitution adopted on that
    election day (I, 519, 520,

    Sec. 44. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Ex
    parte Clark, 100 U.S. 399 (1880); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651
    (1884); In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888); Ohio v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565
    (1916); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); United States  v.
    Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917); Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232
    (1921); Smiley v. Holme, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); United States v. Classic,
    313 U.S. 299 (1941); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Roudebush
    v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); and
    U.S. Term Limits, Inc., v. Thorton, 63 U.S.L.W. 4413 (1995). In Public
    Law 91-285, Congress lowered the minimum age of voters in all federal,
    state and local elections from 21 to 18 years. In Oregon v. Mitchell,
    400 U.S. 112 (1970), the Supreme Court upheld the power of Congress
    under article I, section 4 and under section 5 of the 14th amendment to
    the Constitution to fix the age of voters in federal elections, but held
    that the tenth amendment to the Constitution reserved to the States the
    power to establish voter age qualifications in State and local
    elections. The 26th amendment to the Constitution extended the right of
    persons 18 years of age or older to vote in elections held under State
    authority.

    Sec. 45. Annual meeting of Congress.

      \2\ [The Congress  shall
    assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the
    first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different
    Day.]

      This provision of the Constitution has been superseded by the 20th
    amendment.

    [[Page 20]]

    appointed by law a day for the meeting (I, 4, 5, 10-12, footnote; see also
    Sec. 243, infra).

      In the later but not the earlier practice (I, 5), prior to the 20th
    amendment, the fact that Congress had met once within the year did not
    make uncertain the constitutional mandate to meet on the first Monday of
    December (I, 6, 9-11). Early Congresses, convened either by proclamation
    or law on a day earlier than the constitutional day, remained in
    continuous session to a time beyond that day (I, 6, 9-11). But in the
    later view an existing session ends with the day appointed by the
    Constitution for the regular annual session (II, 1160); see Sec. 84,
    infra. Congress has frequently

    Sec. 46. House the judge of elections,
    returns, and qualifications.

      Section 5. \1\ Each  House shall be the Judge of the
    Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, * * *.

      In judging the qualifications of its Members, the House may not add
    qualifications to those expressly stated in the United States
    Constitution. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). This phrase
    allows the House or Senate to deny the right to a seat without
    unlawfully depriving a State of its right to equal representation. Barry
    v. United States ex rel Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929). But a State may
    conduct a recount of votes without interfering with the authority of the
    House under this phrase. Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972). For
    discussion of the power of the House to judge elections, see Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 8 (elections) and ch. 9 (election contests); for
    discussion of the power of the House to judge qualifications, see
    Deschler's Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 7.

      The House has the same authority to determine the right of a Delegate
    to his seat that it has in the case of a Member (I, 423). The House may
    not delegate the duty of judging its elections to another tribunal (I,
    608), and the courts of a State have nothing to do with it (II, 959).
    The House has once examined the relations of this power to the power to
    expel (I, 469).

    [[Page 21]]

    Sec. 47. Power of judging as related to State
    laws as to returns.

      As nearly all  the laws governing the elections of
    Representatives in Congress are State laws, questions have often arisen
    as to the relation of this power of judging to those laws (I, 637). The
    House decided very early that the certificate of a State executive
    issued in strict accordance with State law does not prevent examination
    of the votes by the House and a reversal of the return (I, 637). The
    House has also held that it is not confined to the conclusions of
    returns made up in strict conformity to State law, but may examine the
    votes and correct the returns (I, 774); and the fact that a State law
    gives canvassers the right to reject votes for fraud and irregularities
    does not preclude the House from going behind the returns (II, 887). The
    highest court in one State (Colorado) has ruled that it lacked
    jurisdiction to pass upon a candidate's allegations of irregularities in
    a primary election and that the House had exclusive jurisdiction to
    decide such questions and to declare the rightful nominee (Sept. 23,
    1970, p. 33320).

    Sec. 48. Power of judging as related to
    State laws as to acts of the voter.

      When the question  concerns not the acts of returning
    officers, but the act of the voter in giving his vote, the House has
    found more difficulty in determining on the proper exercise of its
    constitutional power. While the House has always acted on the principle
    of giving expression to the intent of the voter (I, 575, 639, 641; II,
    1090), yet it has held that a mandatory State law, even though
    arbitrary, may cause the rejection of a ballot on which the intent of
    the voter is plain (II, 1009, 1056, 1077, 1078, 1091). See Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 8, sec. 8.11, for discussion of distinction
    between directory state laws governing the conduct of election officials
    as to ballots, and mandatory laws regulating the conduct of voters.

    Sec. 49. Power of House as related to
    constitutionality of State laws.

      Where the State  courts have upheld a State election
    law as constitutional the House does not ordinarily question the law
    (II, 856, 1071). But where there has been no such decision the House, in
    determining its election cases, has passed on the validity of State laws
    under State constitutions (II, 1011, 1134), and has acted on its
    decision that they were unconstitutional (II, 1075, 1126), but it is not
    the policy of the House to pass upon the validity of State election laws
    alleged to be in conflict with the State constitution (VI, 151).

    Sec. 50. Effect of interpretation of State
    election laws by State courts.

      The courts of  a State have nothing to do directly
    with judging the elections, qualifications, and returns of
    Representatives in Congress (II, 959), but where the highest State court
    has interpreted the State law the House has concluded that it should
    generally be governed by this interpretation (I, 645, 731; II, 1041,
    1048), but does not consider itself bound by such interpretations (VI,
    58). The House is not bound, however, by a decision on an analogous but
    not the identical question in issue (II, 909); and where the alleged
    fraud of election judges was in issue, the acquittal of those judges in
    the courts was held not to be an adjudication binding on the House (II,
    1019). For a recent illustration of a protracted election dispute
    lasting four months see House Report 99-58, culminating in House
    Resolution 146 of the 99th Congress (May 1, 1985, p. 9998).

    Sec. 51. Laws of Congress not binding on the
    House in its function of judging its elections.

      The statutes of  the United States
    provide specific methods for institution of a contest as to the title to
    a seat in the House (I, 678, 697-706) (2 U.S.C. 381 et seq.); but the
    House regards this law as not of absolute binding force, but rather a
    wholesome rule not to be departed from except for cause (I, 597, 719,
    825, 833), and it sometimes by resolution modifies the procedure
    prescribed by the law (I, 449, 600).

    [[Page 22]]

    Sec. 51a. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: In re Loney, 134 U.S. 317 (1890); Reed v.
    County Commissioners, 277 U.S. 376 (1928); Barry v. United States ex
    rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15
    (1972).

    Sec. 52. The quorum.

      * * * and a  Majority of each [House]
    shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may
    adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance
    of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each
    House may provide.

    Sec. 53. Interpretation of the Constitution
    as to number constituting a quorum.

      Out of conditions  arising between 1861 and 1891 the
    rule was established that a majority of the Members chosen and living
    constituted the quorum required by the Constitution (IV, 2885-2888); but
    later examination has resulted in a decision confirming in the House of
    Representatives the construction established in the Senate that a quorum
    consists of a majority of Senators duly chosen and sworn (I, 630; IV,
    2891-2894). So the decision of the House now is that after the House is
    once organized the quorum consists of a majority of those Members
    chosen, sworn, and living whose membership has not been terminated by
    resignation or by the action of the House (IV, 2889, 2890; VI, 638).

    [[Page 23]]

    2935-2949); also a line of rulings made under the old theory were overruled,
    and it was established that the point of no quorum might be made after
    the House had declined to verify a division by tellers or the yeas and
    nays (IV, 2918-2926).

    Sec. 54. The theory of the quorum present; and
    the count by the Speaker.

      For many years  the quorum was determined only by noting the
    numbers of Members voting (IV, 2896, 2897), with the result that Members
    by refusing to vote could often break a quorum and obstruct the public
    business (II, 1034; IV, 2895, footnote; V, 5744). But in 1890 Mr.
    Speaker Reed directed the clerk to enter on the Journal as part of the
    record of a yea-and-nay vote names of Members present but not voting,
    thereby establishing a quorum of record (IV, 2895). This decision,
    afterwards sustained by the Supreme Court (IV, 2904; United States v.
    Ballin, 144 U.S. (1892)), established the principle that a quorum
    present made valid any action by the House, although an actual quorum
    might not vote (I, 216, footnote; IV, 2932). And thenceforth the point
    of order as to a quorum was required to be that no quorum was present
    and not that no quorum had voted (IV, 2917). At the time of the
    establishment of this principle the Speaker revived the count by the
    Chair as a method of determining the presence of a quorum at a time when
    no record vote was ordered (IV, 2909). The Speaker has permitted his
    count of a quorum to be verified by tellers (IV, 2888), but did not
    concede it as a right of the House to have tellers under the
    circumstances (IV, 2916; VI 647-651; VIII, 2369, 2436), claiming that
    the Chair might determine the presence of a quorum in such manner as he
    should deem accurate and suitable (IV, 2932). The Chair counts all
    members in sight, whether in the cloak rooms, or within the bar (IV,
    2970; VIII, 3120). Later, as the complement to the new view of the
    quorum, the early theory that the presence of a quorum was as necessary
    during debate or other business as on a vote was revived (IV,

    Sec. 55. Relations of the quorum to acts of the
    House.

      The absence of  a quorum having been disclosed, there must be a quorum of
    record before the House may proceed to business (IV, 2952, 2953; VI,
    624, 660, 662), and the point of no quorum may not be withdrawn even by
    unanimous consent after the absence of a quorum has been ascertained and
    announced by the Chair (IV, 2928-2931; VI, 657; Apr. 13, 1978, p. 10119;
    Sept. 25, 1984, p. 26778). But when an action has been completed, it is
    too late to make the point of order that a quorum was not present when
    it was done (IV, 2927; VI, 655). But where action requiring a quorum was
    taken in the ascertained absence of a quorum by ruling of a Speaker pro
    tempore, the Speaker on the next day ruled that the action was null and
    void (IV, 2964; see also VIII, 3161). But such absence of a quorum
    should appear from the Journal if a legislative act is to be vacated for
    such reason (IV, 2962), and where the assumption that a quorum was
    present when the House acted was uncontradicted by the Journal, it was
    held that this assumption might not be overthrown by expressions of
    opinion by Members individually (IV, 2961).

    [[Page 24]]

      Major revisions in the House Rules concerning the necessity and
    establishment of a quorum have occurred in the 94th, 95th and 96th
    Congresses. Under the practice in the 93d Congress, for example, a point
    of no quorum would prevent the report of the Chairman of a Committee of
    the Whole (VI, 666); but in the 93d Congress clause 6 was added to rule
    XV to provide that after the presence of a quorum is once ascertained on
    any day, a point of no quorum may not be entertained after the Committee
    has risen and pending the report of the Chairman to the House (see
    Sec. 774c, infra). Clause 6 now specifically precludes a point of no
    quorum during the reception of any message from the President or the
    Senate, before or during the prayer, during the administration of oaths,
    during motions incidental to a call of the House, and (once a quorum has
    been established on that day) during special orders when no legislative
    business is pending. In the 95th Congress, the same clause of rule XV
    was further amended to provide that it is not in order to make or
    entertain a point of order that a quorum is not present unless the
    Speaker has put the pending motion or proposition to a vote, but the
    Speaker retains the right to recognize a Member to move a call of the
    House at any time. A point of order of no quorum during debate only in
    the House does not lie independently under this clause of the
    Constitution since clause 6(e) of rule XV is a proper exercise of the
    House's constitutional rulemaking authority which can be interpreted
    consistently with the requirement that a quorum be present to conduct
    business (as opposed to mere debate) (Sept. 8, 1977, p. 28114; Sept. 12,
    1977, pp. 28800-01).

      Before these recent changes to rule XV, a quorum was required at all
    times during the reading of the Journal (IV, 2732, 2733; VI, 625, 629)
    or messages from the President or the Senate (IV, 3522; VI 6600, 6650;
    VIII 3339); but the modern practice would require the presence of a
    quorum only when the question is put on a pending motion or proposition
    in the House such as on a motion incident to the reading, amendment, or
    approval of the Journal or on the referral or other disposition of other
    papers read to the House. A point of no quorum no longer lies during
    debate in the House. The practice in the Committee of the Whole is now
    governed by clause 2 of rule XXIII. No motion is in order on the failure
    of a quorum but the motions to adjourn and for a call of the House (IV,
    2950; VI 680) and the motion to adjourn has precedence over the motion
    for a call of the House (VIII, 2642). A call of the House is in order
    under the Constitution before the adoption of the rules (IV, 2981).
    Those present on a call of the House may prescribe a fine as a condition
    on which an arrested Member may be discharged (IV, 3013, 3014), but this
    is rarely done. A quorum is not required on motions incidental to a call
    of the House (IV, 2994; VI, 681; Oct. 8, 1940, p. 13403; and Oct. 8,
    1968, p. 30090). The House may adjourn sine die in the absence of a
    quorum where both Houses have already adopted a concurrent resolution
    providing for a sine die adjournment on that day (Oct. 18, 1972, p.
    37200).

    Sec. 56. Relations of the quorum to organization
    of the House.

      At the time  of organization the two Houses inform one another of the
    appearance of the quorum in each, and the two Houses jointly inform the
    President (I, 198-203). A message from one House that its quorum has
    appeared is not delivered in the other until a quorum has appeared there
    also (I, 126). But at the beginning of a second session of a Congress
    the House proceeded to business, although a quorum had not appeared in
    the Senate (I, 126). At the beginning of a second session of a Congress
    unsworn Members-elect were taken into account in ascertaining the
    presence of a quorum (I, 175); however, at the beginning of the second
    session of the 87th Congress, the Clerk called the House to order,
    announced the death of Speaker Rayburn during the sine die adjournment,
    and did not call unsworn Members-elect or Members who had resigned
    during the hiatus to establish a quorum or elect a new Speaker (Jan. 10,
    1962, p. 5). In both Houses the oath has been administered to Members-
    elect in the absence of a quorum (I, 174, 181, 182; VI, 22), although in
    one case the Speaker objected to such proceedings (II, 875). Prayer by
    the Chaplain is not business requiring the presence of a quorum and the
    Speaker declines to entertain a point of no quorum before prayer is
    offered (VI, 663; clause 6 of rule XV).

    [[Page 25]]

    <>   \2\ Each House may
    determine the Rules of its Proceedings, * * *

    Sec. 57. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892);
    Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 190 (1881); Burton v. United States, 202
    U.S. 344 (1906).

    Sec. 59. Power to make rules not impaired by
    rules or law.

      The power of  each House of Representatives to make its own rules may
    not be impaired or controlled by the rules of a preceding House (I, 187,
    210; V, 6002, 6743-6747), or by a law passed by a prior Congress (I, 82,
    245; IV, 3298, 3579; V, 6765, 6766). The House in adopting its rules
    may, however, incorporate by reference as a part thereof all applicable
    provisions of law which constituted the rules of the House at the end of
    the preceding Congress (H. Res. 5, 95th Cong., Jan. 4, 1977, pp. 53-70)
    and has also incorporated provisions of concurrent resolutions which
    were intended to remain applicable under the Budget Act (H. Res. 5, 98th
    Cong., Jan. 3, 1983, p. 34). The ordinary rights and functions of the
    House under the Constitution are exercised in accordance with the rules
    (III, 2567), and under later decisions questions of so-called
    constitutional privilege should also be considered in accordance with
    the rules (VI, 48; VII, 889; Apr. 8, 1926, p. 7147). But a law passed by
    an existing Congress with the concurrence of the House has been
    recognized by that House as of binding force in matters of procedure (V,
    6767, 6768). In exercising its constitutional power to change its rules
    the House may confine itself within certain limitations (V, 6756; VIII,
    3376); but the attempt of the House to deprive the Speaker of his vote
    as a Member by a rule was successfully resisted (V, 5966, 5967). While a
    law of 1789 (see 2 U.S.C. 25) requires the election of a Clerk before
    the House proceeds to business yet the House has held that it may adopt
    rules before electing a clerk (I, 245). Although the Speaker ceases to
    be an officer of the House with the expiration of a Congress, the Clerk,
    by old usage, continues in a new Congress (I, 187, 188, 235, 244; see 2
    U.S.C. 26). In case of a vacancy in the office of Clerk, Sergeant-at-
    Arms, Doorkeeper (abolished by the 104th Congress; see Sec. 651d,
    infra), Postmaster (abolished during the 102d Congress; see Sec. 654a,
    infra), Chaplain, or Chief Administrative Officer, the Speaker is
    authorized to make temporary appointments (2 U.S.C. 75a-1). The House
    has adopted a rule before election of a Speaker (I, 94, 95); but in 1839
    was deterred by the law of 1789 and the Constitution from adopting rules
    before the administration of the oath to Members-elect (I, 140). The
    earlier theory that an officer might be empowered to administer oaths by
    a rule of either House has been abandoned in later practice and the
    authority has been conferred by law (III, 1823, 1824, 2079, 2303, 2479;
    2 U.S.C. 191).

    [[Page 26]]

    assemblies, especially of the House of Representatives (V,
    6761-6763; Jan. 3, 1953, p. 24), but the provisions of the House's
    accustomed rules are not necessarily followed (V, 5509, 5604). Prior to
    the adoption of rules, the statutory enactments incorporated into the
    rules of the prior Congress as an exercise of the rule-making power do
    not control the proceedings of the new House until it adopts rules
    incorporating those provisions (Jan. 22, 1971, p. 132).

    Sec. 60. Procedure in the House before the
    adoption of rules.

      Before the adoption  of rules the House is governed by general
    parliamentary law, but the Speakers have been inclined to give weight to
    the precedents of the House in modifying the usual constructions of that
    law (V, 6758-6760; VIII, 3384; Jan. 3, 1953, p. 24; Jan. 10, 1967, pp.
    14-15). The general parliamentary law as understood in the House is
    founded on Jefferson's Manual as modified by the practice of American
    legislative

      Before the adoption of rules, it is in order for any Member who is
    recognized by the Chair to offer a proposition relating to the order of
    business without asking consent of the House (IV, 3060). Relying on the
    Act of June 1, 1789 (2 U.S.C. 25), the Clerk recognized for nominations
    for Speaker as being of higher constitutional privilege than a
    resolution to postpone the election of a Speaker and instead provide for
    the election of a Speaker pro tempore pending the disposition of certain
    ethics charges against the nominee of the majority party (Jan. 7, 1997,
    p. ----). The Speaker may recognize the Majority Leader to offer an
    initial resolution providing for the adoption of the rules as a question
    of privilege in its own right (IV, 3060; Deschler's Precedents, vol. 1,
    ch. 1, sec. 8; Jan. 5, 1993, p. ----), even prior to recognizing another
    Member to offer as a question of privilege another resolution calling
    into question the constitutionality of that resolution (Speaker Foley,
    Jan. 5, 1993, p. ----). The Speaker may also recognize a Member to offer
    for immediate consideration a special order providing for the
    consideration of a resolution adopting the rules (V, 5450; Jan. 4, 1995,
    p. ----). The resolution adopting rules for the 104th Congress included
    a special order of business for consideration of a bill to make certain
    laws applicable to the legislative branch (sec. 108, H. Res. 6, Jan. 4,
    1995, p. ----).

      During debate on the resolution adopting rules, any Member may make a
    point of order that a quorum is not present based upon general
    parliamentary precedents, since the provisions of clause 6(e) of rule XV
    prohibiting the Chair from entertaining such a point of order unless the
    question has been put on the pending proposition are not yet applicable
    (Jan. 15, 1979, p. 10). Before adoption of rules, under general
    parliamentary law as modified by usage and practice of the House, an
    amendment may be subject to the point of order that it is not germane to
    the proposition to which offered (Jan. 3, 1969, p. 23). Before adoption
    of rules, the Speaker may maintain decorum by directing a Member who has
    not been recognized in debate beyond an allotted time to be removed from
    the well and by directing the Sergeant-at-Arms to present the mace as
    the traditional symbol of order (Jan. 3, 1991, p. 58).

    [[Page 27]]

    p. ----). Such a motion to commit is not divisible, but if it is
    agreed to and more than one amendment is reported back pursuant thereto,
    then separate votes may be had on the reported amendments (Jan. 5, 1993,
    p. ----). The motion to refer has also been permitted upon the offering
    of a resolution adopting the rules, and prior to debate thereon, subject
    to the motion to lay on the table (Jan. 5, 1993, p. ----).
      The motion to commit is permitted after the previous question has been
    ordered on the resolution adopting the rules (V, 5604; Jan. 3, 1989, p.
    81; Jan. 3, 1991, p. 61) but is not debatable (Jan. 7, 1997, p. ----).
    It is the prerogative of the minority to offer a motion to commit even
    prior to the adoption of the rules, but at that point the proponent need
    not qualify as opposed to the resolution (Jan. 3, 1991, p. 61; Jan. 4,
    1995,

    Sec. 61. Joint rules.

      The two Houses  of Congress adopted in
    the early years of the Government joint rules to govern their procedure
    in matters requiring concurrent action; but in 1876 these joint rules
    were abrogated (IV, 3430; V, 6782-6787). The most useful of their
    provision continue to be observed in practice, however (IV, 3430; V,
    6592).

    Sec. 61a. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6 (1932);
    Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949); United States v.
    Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950); Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109
    (1963); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).

    Sec. 62. Punishment and expulsion of
    Members.

      * * * [Each House may]  punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the
    Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.

    [[Page 28]]

    Members have been censured for personalities and other disorder in debate
    (II, 1251, 1253, 1254, 1259), assaults on the floor (II, 1665), for
    presenting a resolution alleged to be insulting to the House (II, 1246),
    and for corrupt acts (II, 1274, 1286). For abuse of the leave to print,
    the House censured a Member after a motion to expel him had failed (VI,
    236). In one instance Members were censured for acts before the election
    of the then existing House (II, 1286).

    Sec. 63. Punishment by reprimand or
    censure.

      Among the  punishments that the House may impose under this provision,
    the rules of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct outline the
    following: (1) expulsion from the House; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; (4)
    fine; (5) denial or limitation of any right, power, privilege, or
    immunity of the Member if not in violation of the Constitution; or (6)
    any other sanction determined by the Committee to be appropriate (Rule
    20(e), House Comm. on Standards of Official Conduct, 104th Cong.). In
    action for censure the House has discussed whether or not the principles
    of the procedure of the courts should be followed (II, 1255). In one
    instance, pending consideration of a resolution to censure a Member, the
    Speaker informed him that he should retire (II, 1366), but this is not
    usual, and Members, against whom resolutions have been pending have
    participated in debate either by consent (II, 1656) or without question
    as to consent (II, 1246, 1253). A Member against whom a resolution of
    censure was pending was asked by the Speaker if he desired to be heard
    (VI, 236). But after the House had voted censure and the Member has been
    brought to the bar by the Sergeant-at-Arms to be censured, it was held
    that he might not then be heard (II, 1259). A resolution of censure
    should not apply to more than one Member (II, 1240, 1621). Censure is
    inflicted by the Speaker (II, 1259) and the words are entered in the
    Journal (II, 1251, 1656; VI 236), but the Speaker may not pronounce
    censure except by order of the House (VI, 237). When Members have
    resigned pending proceedings for censure, the House has nevertheless
    adopted the resolutions of censure (II, 1239, 1273, 1275, 1656).

    [[Page 29]]

    of the costs of the investigation by the Committee on Standards of Official
    Conduct (Jan. 21, 1997, p. ----).
      In the 94th Congress the House by adopting a report from the Committee
    on Standards of Official Conduct reprimanded a Member for failing to
    report certain financial holdings in violation of rule XLIV, the Code of
    Official Conduct, and for investing in stock in a Navy bank the
    establishment of which he was promoting, in violation of the Code of
    Ethics for Government Service (H. Res. 1421, July 29, 1976, pp. 24379-
    82). (For the Code of Ethics for Government Service, see H. Con. Res.
    175, 85th Cong., 72 Stat. B12.) In the 95th Congress following an
    investigation by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct into
    whether Members or employees had improperly accepted things of value
    from the Republic of Korea or representatives thereof, the House
    reprimanded three Members, one for falsely answering an unsworn
    questionnaire relative to such gifts and violating the Code of Official
    Conduct, one for failing to report as required by law the receipt of a
    campaign contribution and violating the Code of Official Conduct, and
    one for failing to report a campaign contribution, converting a campaign
    contribution to personal use, testifying falsely to the committee under
    oath, and violating the Code of Official Conduct (Oct. 13, 1978, pp.
    36984, 37009, 37017). In the 96th Congress two Members were censured by
    the House: (1) A Member who during a prior Congress both knowingly
    increased an office employee's salary for repayment of that Member's
    personal expenses and who was unjustly enriched by clerk-hire employees'
    payments of personal expenses later compensated by salary increases, was
    censured and ordered to repay the amount of the unjust enrichment with
    interest (July 31, 1979, p. 21592); (2) a Member was censured for
    receiving over a period of time sums of money from a person with a
    direct interest in legislation in violation of clause 4 of rule XLIII,
    and for transferring campaign funds into office and personal accounts
    (June 10, 1980, pp. 13801-20). In the 98th Congress the House adopted
    two resolutions (as amended in the House) censuring two Members for
    improper relationships with House pages in prior Congresses (July 20,
    1983, p. 20020 and p. 20030). In the 100th Congress the House adopted a
    resolution reprimanding a Member for ``ghost voting,'' improperly
    diverting government resources, and maintaining a ``ghost employee'' on
    his staff (Dec. 18, 1987, p. 36266). In the 101st Congress another was
    reprimanded for seeking dismissal of parking tickets received by a
    person with whom he had a personal relationship and not related to
    official business and for misstatements of fact in a memorandum relating
    to the criminal probation record of that person (July 26, 1990,
    p.19717). In the 105th Congress the House reprimanded the Speaker and
    ordered him to reimburse a portion

      Debate on a resolution recommending a disciplinary sanction against a
    Member may not exceed the scope of the conduct of the accused Member
    (Dec. 18, 1987, p. 36271).

    Sec. 64. Punishment by expulsion.

      The power of  expulsion has
    been the subject of much discussion (I, 469, 476, 481; II, 1264, 1265,
    1269; VI, 56, 398; see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)). In one
    case a Member-elect who had not taken the oath was expelled (II, 1262),
    and in another case the power to do this was discussed (I, 476). In one
    instance the Senate assumed to annul its action of expulsion (II, 1243).
    The Supreme Court has decided that a judgment of conviction under a
    disqualifying statute does not compel the Senate to expel (II, 1282;
    Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906)). The power of expulsion in
    its relation to offenses committed before the Members' election has been
    discussed (II, 1286), and in one case the Judiciary Committee of the
    House concluded that a Member might not be punished for an offense
    alleged to have been committed against a preceding Congress (II, 1283);
    but the House itself declined to express doubt as to its power to expel
    and proceeded to inflict censure (II, 1286). Both Houses have distrusted
    their power to punish in such cases (II, 1264, 1284, 1285, 1288, 1289;
    VI, 56, 238). However, the 96th Congress punished Members on two
    occasions for offenses committed during a prior Congress (H. Res. 378,
    July 31, 1979, p. 21592; H. Res. 660, June 10, 1980, pp. 13801-20). It
    has been held that the power of the House to expel one of its Members is
    unlimited; a matter purely of discretion to be exercised by a two-thirds
    vote, from which there is no appeal (VI, 78). The resignation of the
    accused Member has always caused a suspension of proceedings for
    expulsion (II, 1275, 1276, 1279; VI, 238).

    [[Page 30]]

    <>   A proposition to reprimand, censure, or expel a Member
    presents a question of privilege (II, 1254; III, 2648-2651; VI, 236;
    July 26, 1990, p. 19717); and, if reported by the Committee on Standards
    of Official Conduct (or a derivation thereof), may be called up at any
    time after the Committee has filed its report (Jan. 21, 1997, p. ----).
    An expulsion resolution when offered may be laid on the table (Oct. 1,
    1976, p. 35111) or referred to committee (Mar. 1, 1979, p. 3753) before
    the proponent is recognized to debate it. A proposition to censure is
    not germane to a proposition to expel (VI, 236). On Oct. 2, 1980, the
    House expelled a Member who had been found guilty of accepting money in
    exchange for a promise to perform certain legislative acts (H. Res. 794,
    96th Cong., pp. 28953-78).

    Sec. 65. Procedure for expulsion.

      The House, in  a proceeding
    for expulsion, declined to give the Member a trial at the bar (II,
    1275); but the Senate has permitted a counsel to appear at its bar (II,
    1263), although it declined to grant a request for a specific statement
    of charges or compulsory process for witnesses (II, 1264). Members
    threatened with expulsion have been heard on their own behalf by consent
    (II, 1273, 1275), or as a matter of right (II, 1269, 1286). In general,
    there has been discussion as to whether or not the principles of the
    procedure of the courts should be followed (II, 1264). The Senate once
    expelled several Senators by a single resolution (II, 1266). Members and
    Senators have been expelled for treason (II, 1261), for high misdemeanor
    inconsistent with public duty (II, 1263), for friendship or association
    with enemies of the Government and absence from their seats (II, 1269,
    1270), and for bearing arms against the Government (II, 1267). In the
    96th Congress, the House expelled a Member who had been convicted of
    bribery (a felony) for accepting funds to perform official duties as a
    Member of Congress (H. Res. 794, Oct. 2, 1980, pp. 28953-78).

      A resolution providing that the House immediately proceed to consider
    whether a Member should be expelled presents a question of privilege
    (Speaker Clark, Dec. 9, 1913, pp. 584-86).

    Sec. 67. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wh. 204 (1821); Kilbourn
    v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881); United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1
    (1892); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897); Burton v. United States, 202
    U.S. 344 (1906); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).

    Sec. 68. Each House to keep a journal.

      \3\ Each House  shall
    keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the
    same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; * *
    *

    Sec. 69. The Journal the official
    record.

      The Journal and  not the Congressional Record is the official record of the
    proceedings of the House (IV, 2727). Its nature and functions have been
    the subject of extended discussions (IV, 2730, footnote). The House has
    fixed its title (IV, 2728). While it ought to be a correct transcript of
    the proceedings of the House, the House has not insisted on a strict
    chronological order of entries (IV, 2815). The Journal is dated as of
    the legislative and not the calendar day (IV, 2746).

    [[Page 31]]

    Sec. 70. Journal a record of proceedings
    and not of reasons.

      The Journal records  proceedings but not the reasons therefor (IV,
    2811) or the circumstances attending (IV, 2812), or the statements or
    opinions of Members (IV, 2817-2820). Exceptions to this rule are rare
    (IV, 2808, 2825). Protests have on rare occasions been admitted by the
    action of the House (IV, 2806, 2807), but the entry of a protest on the
    Journal may not be demanded by a Member as a matter of right (IV, 2798)
    and such demand does not present a question of privilege (IV, 2799). A
    motion not entertained is not entered on the Journal (IV, 2813, 2844-
    46).

    Sec. 71. House's absolute control of entries
    in the Journal.

      While the House  controls the Journal and may decide what are
    proceedings, even to the extent of omitting things actually done or
    recording things not done (IV, 2784; VI, 634), and while the Speaker has
    entertained a motion to amend the Journal so as to cause it to state
    what was not the fact, leaving it for the House to decide on the
    propriety of the act (IV, 2785), holding that he could not prevent a
    majority of the House from so amending the Journal as to undo an actual
    transaction (IV, 3091-93), in none of those rulings was an amendment
    permitted to correct the Journal which had the effect of collaterally
    changing the tabling of a motion to reconsider. In fact, under the
    precedents cited in Sec. 775, infra, under clause 1 of rule XVI it has
    been held not in order to amend or strike out a Journal entry setting
    forth a motion exactly as made (IV, 2783, 2789), and thus it was held
    not in order to amend the Journal by striking out a resolution actually
    offered (IV, 2789), but on one occasion the House vacated the Speaker's
    referral of an executive communication by amending the Journal of the
    preceding day (Mar. 19, 1990, p.4488). Only on rare instances has the
    House nullified proceedings by rescinding the records of them in the
    Journal (IV, 2787), the House and Senate usually insisting on the
    accuracy of its Journal (IV, 2783, 2786). In rare instances the House
    and Senate have rescinded or expunged entries in Journals of preceding
    Congresses (IV, 2730, footnote, 2792, 2793).

    Sec. 72. Record of votes in the
    Journal.

      The Journal should  record the result of every vote and state in general terms
    the subject of it (IV, 2804); but the result of a vote is recorded in
    figures only when the yeas and nays are taken (IV, 2827), when the vote
    is recorded by electronic device or by clerks, under the provisions of
    clause 5 of rule I, or when a vote is taken by ballot, it having been
    determined in latest practice that the Journal should show not only the
    result but the state of the ballot or ballots (IV, 2832).

    Sec. 73. Approval of the Journal.

      It is the  uniform practice
    of the House to approve its Journal for each legislative day (IV, 2731).
    Where Journals of more than one session remain unapproved, they are
    taken up for approval in chronological order (IV, 2771-2773). In
    ordinary practice the Journal is approved by the House without the
    formal putting of the motion to vote (IV, 2774).

      The former rule required the reading of the Journal on each
    legislative day. The reading could be dispensed with only by unanimous
    consent (VI, 625) or suspension of the rules (IV, 2747-2750) and had to
    be in full when demanded by any Member (IV, 2739-2741; VI, 627-628; Feb.
    22, 1950, p. 2152).

    [[Page 32]]

    the Speaker is authorized to announce his approval of
    the Journal which is deemed agreed to by the House, subject to the right
    of any Member to demand a vote on agreeing to the Speaker's approval
    (which if decided in the affirmative is not subject to the motion to
    reconsider). In the 98th Congress, the Speaker was given the authority
    to postpone a record vote on agreeing to his approval of the Journal to
    a later time on that legislative day (clause 5(b) of rule I; H. Res. 5,
    Jan. 3, 1983, p. 34). While the transaction of any business is not in
    order before approval of the Journal (VI, 2751; VI, 629, 637; Oct. 8,
    1968, p. 30096), approval of the Journal yields to the simple motion to
    adjourn (IV, 2757), administration of the oath (I, 171, 172), an
    arraignment of impeachment (VI, 469), and questions of the privileges of
    the House (II, 1630), and the Speaker may in his discretion recognize
    for a parliamentary inquiry before approval of the Journal (VI, 624).
    Under clause 1 of rule I, as amended in the 96th Congress, a point of
    order of no quorum is not in order before the Speaker announces his
    approval of the Journal. A point of order of no quorum is not in order
    during the reading of the Journal if a quorum has once been established
    on that day under clause 6(c)(1) of rule XV, and clause 6 of rule XV
    generally prohibits the making of points of order of no quorum unless
    the Speaker has put the question on the pending motion or proposition.
      The present form of the rule (clause 1 of rule I; see Sec. 621, infra)
    was drafted from section 127 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
    1970 (84 Stat. 1140), incorporated into the standing rules in the 92d
    Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 22, 1971, p. 144), and was further amended in
    the 96th Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 15, 1979, pp. 7-16). Under the
    current practice,

    Sec. 74. Motions to amend the
    Journal.

      Under the practice  before clause 1 of rule I was adopted in its present form,
    the motion to amend the Journal took precedence over the motion to
    approve it (IV, 2760; VI, 633); but the motion to amend may not be
    admitted after the previous question is demanded on a motion to approve
    (IV, 2770; VI, 633; VIII, 2684). An expression of opinion as to a
    decision of the Chair was held not in order as an amendment to the
    Journal (IV, 2848). A proposed amendment to the Journal being tabled
    does not carry the Journal with it (V, 5435, 5436). While a proposed
    correction of the Journal may be recorded in the Journal, yet it is not
    in order to insert in full in this indirect way what has been denied
    insertion in the first instance (IV, 2782, 2804, 2805). The earlier
    practice was otherwise, however (IV, 2801-2803). The Journal of the last
    day of a session is not approved on the assembling of the next session,
    and is not ordinarily amended (IV, 2743, 2744). For further discussion
    of the composition and approval of the Journal, see Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 1, ch. 5.

    Sec. 74a. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United
    States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892).

    [[Page 33]]

    Sec. 75. Yeas and Nays entered on the
    Journal.

      * * * and the  Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question
    shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the
    Journal.

    Sec. 76. Conditions of ordering yeas and
    nays.

      The yeas and  nays may be ordered before the organization of the House (I, 91;
    V, 6012, 6013), but are not taken in Committee of the Whole (IV, 4722,
    4723). They are not necessarily taken on the passage of a resolution
    proposing an amendment to the Constitution (V, 7038, 7039; VIII, 3506),
    but are required to pass a bill over a veto (Sec. 104; VII, 1110). In
    the earlier practice of the House it was held that less than a quorum
    might not order the yeas and nays, but for many years the decisions have
    been uniformly the other way (V, 6016-6028). Neither is a quorum
    necessary on a motion to reconsider the vote whereby the yeas and nays
    are ordered (V, 5693). When a quorum fails on a yea and nay vote it is
    the duty of the Speaker and the House to take notice of that fact (IV,
    2953, 2963, 2988). If the House adjourns, the order for the yeas and
    nays remains effective whenever the bill again comes before the House
    (V, 6014, 6015; V, 740; VIII, 3108), and it has been held that the
    question of consideration might not intervene on a succeeding day before
    the second calling of the yeas and nays (V, 4949). However, when the
    call of the House is automatic under clause 4 of rule XV, the Speaker
    directs the roll to be called or the vote to be taken by electronic
    device without motion from the floor (VI, 678, 679, 694, 695); and
    should a quorum fail to vote and the House adjourn, proceedings under
    the automatic call are vacated and the question recurs de novo when the
    bill again comes before the House (Oct. 10, 1940, pp. 13534-35; Oct. 13,
    1962, pp. 23474-75; Oct. 19, 1966, p. 27641). While the Constitution and
    the rules of the House guarantee that votes taken by the yeas and nays
    be spread upon the Journal, neither requires that a Member's vote be
    announced to the public immediately during the vote (Sept. 19, 1985, p.
    24245).

      The yeas and nays may not be demanded until the Speaker has put the
    question in the form prescribed by clause 5 of rule I (Oct. 2, 1974, p.
    33623).

    [[Page 34]]

    Sec. 77. Demanding the yeas and nays.

      The yeas and  nays may
    be demanded while the Speaker is announcing the result of a division (V,
    6039), while a vote by tellers is being taken (V, 6038), and even after
    the announcement of the vote if the House has not passed to other
    business (V, 6040, 6041; VIII, 3110). But after the Speaker has
    announced the result of a division on a motion and is in the act of
    putting the question on another motion it is too late to demand the yeas
    and nays on the first motion (V, 6042). And it is not in order during
    the various processes of a division to repeat a demand for the yeas and
    nays which has once been refused by the House (V, 6029, 6030, 6031). The
    constitutional right of a Member to demand the yeas and nays may not be
    overruled as dilatory (V, 5737; VIII, 3107); but this constitutional
    right does not exist as to a vote to second a motion when such second is
    required by the rules (V, 6032-6036; VIII, 3109). The right to demand
    yeas and nays is not waived by the fact that the Member demanding them
    has just made the point of no quorum and caused the Chair to count the
    House (V, 6044).

    Sec. 78. Yeas and nays ordered by onefifth.

      In passing on  a
    demand for the yeas and nays the Speaker need determine only whether
    one-fifth of those present sustain the demand (V, 6043; VIII, 3112,
    3115). In ascertaining whether one-fifth of those present support a
    demand for the yeas and nays the Speaker counts the entire number
    present and not merely those who rise to be counted (VIII, 3111, 3120).
    Such count is not subject to verification by appeal (Sept. 12, 1978, p.
    28984)), and a request for a rising vote of those opposed to the demand
    is not in order (VIII, 3112-3114). Where the Chair prolongs his count of
    the House in determining whether one-fifth have supported the demand for
    yeas and nays, he counts latecomers in support of the demand as well as
    for the number present (Sept. 24, 1990, p. 25521). After the House, on a
    vote by tellers, has refused to order the yeas and nays it is too late
    to demand the count of the negative on an original vote (V, 6045).

    Sec. 79. Reconsideration of the vote ordering the
    yeas and nays.

      A motion to  reconsider the vote ordering the yeas and nays is in
    order (V, 6029; VIII, 2790), and the vote may be reconsidered by a
    majority. If the House votes to reconsider the yeas and nays may again
    be ordered by one-fifth (V, 5689-5691). But when the House, having
    reconsidered, again orders the yeas and nays, a second motion to
    reconsider may not be made (V, 6037). In one instance it was held that
    the yeas and nays might be demanded on a motion to reconsider the vote
    whereby the yeas and nays were ordered (V, 5689), but evidently there
    must be a limit to this process. The vote whereby the yeas and nays are
    refused may be reconsidered (V, 5692).

    Sec. 80. Effect of an order of the yeas and
    nays.

      In the general  but not the universal practice debate has not been closed by the
    ordering of the yeas and nays until one Member has responded to the call
    (V, 6101-6105, 6160, 6161). A motion to adjourn may be admitted after
    the yeas and nays are ordered and before the roll call has begun (V,
    5366); and a motion to suspend the rules has been entertained after the
    yeas and nays have been demanded on another matter (V, 6835).
    Consideration of a conference report (V, 6457), and a motion to
    reconsider the vote by which the yeas and nays were ordered (V, 6029;
    VIII, 2790) may be admitted. A demand for tellers or for a division is
    not precluded or set aside by the fact that the yeas and nays are
    demanded and refused (V, 5998; VIII, 3103).

    Sec. 81. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United
    States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S.
    196 (1897); Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 U.S. 506 (1901); Marshall v.
    Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917).

    [[Page 35]]

    three days, nor to any other Place than that in
    which the two Houses shall be sitting.

    Sec. 82. Adjournment for more than three
    days.

      \4\ Neither House,  during the Session of Congress shall, without the Consent of the
    other, adjourn for more than

      The word ``Place'' in the above paragraph was construed to mean the
    seat of Government, and consent of the Senate is not required where the
    House orders its meetings to be held in another structure at the seat of
    Government (Speaker Rayburn, Aug. 17, 1949, pp. 11651, 11683).

      On November 22, 1940, p. 13715, the House of Representatives adopted a
    resolution providing that thereafter until otherwise ordered its
    meetings be held in the Caucus room of the new House Office Building.
    Likewise the Senate on the same day, p. 13709, provided that its
    meetings be held in the Chamber formerly occupied by the Supreme Court
    in the Capitol. The two Houses continued to hold their sessions in these
    rooms until the opening of the 77th Congress. These actions were
    necessitated because of the precarious condition of the roofs in the two
    Chambers. On June 28, 1949, p. 8571, and on September 1, 1950, p. 14140,
    the House provided that until otherwise ordered its meetings be held in
    the Caucus room of the new House Office Building, pending the remodeling
    of its Chamber. On June 29, 1949, p. 8584, and on Aug. 9, 1950, p.
    12106, the Senate provided that its meetings be held in the Chamber
    formerly occupied by the Supreme Court in the Capitol, pending
    remodeling of its Chamber. The House returned to its Chamber on January
    3, 1950, and again on January 1, 1951. The Senate returned to its
    Chamber on January 3, 1950, and again on January 3, 1951.

    [[Page 36]]

    Sec. 83. Adjournment of the House within the
    threeday limit.

      The House of  Representatives in adjourning for not ``more than
    three days'' must take into the count either the day of adjourning or
    the day of the meeting, and Sunday is not taken into account in making
    this computation (V, 6673, 6674). By special order, the House may
    provide for a session of the House on a Sunday, traditionally a ``dies
    non'' under the precedents of the House (Dec. 17, 1982, p. 31946; Dec.
    18, 1987, p. 36352; Nov. 17, 1989, p. 30029; Aug. 20, 1994, p. ----).
    The House has by standing order provided that it should meet on two days
    only of each week instead of daily (V, 6675). Before the election of
    Speaker, the House has adjourned for more than one day (I, 89, 221). The
    House has by unanimous consent agreed to an adjournment for less than
    three days but specified that it would continue in adjournment for ten
    days pursuant to a concurrent resolution already passed by the House if
    the Senate adopted the concurrent resolution before the third day of the
    House's adjournment (Nov. 20, 1987, p. 33054). The Committee on Rules
    has reported a rule authorizing the Speaker to declare the House in
    recesses subject to calls of the Chair during five discrete periods,
    each consistent with the Constitutional constraint that neither House
    (recess or) adjourn for more than three days without consent of the
    other House (Dec. 21, 1995, p. ----; Jan. 5, 1996, p. ----).

    [[Page 37]]

    of the House and Senate until 11:55 a.m. on January 3, 1992, or until
    recalled by their joint leaderships, with the proviso that when the second
    session convened at noon on January 3, 1992, the Senate and House would
    not conduct organizational or legislative business but would adjourn on
    that day until January 21 and 22, 1992, respectively, unless sooner recalled
    (H. Con. Res. 260, 102d Cong., Nov. 26, 1991, p. 35840); and that prohibition
    against the conduct of business was considered not to preclude recognition
    for one-minute speeches and special-order speeches by unanimous consent
    (Jan. 3, 1992, p. ----).

    Sec. 84. Resolutions for adjournment of
    the two Houses.

      Congress is adjourned  for more than three days by a concurrent resolution
    (IV, 4031, footnote). When it adjourns in this way, but not to or beyond
    the day fixed by Constitution or law for the next regular session to
    begin, the session is not thereby necessarily terminated (V, 6676,
    6677). Until the 67th Congress neither House had ever adjourned for more
    than three days by itself with the consent of the other, but resolutions
    had been offered for the accomplishment of that end (V, 6702, 6703). On
    June 30, 1922, the House adjourned until August 15, 1922, with the
    consent of the Senate. Pursuant to a concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res.
    266) the Senate granted its consent to an adjournment sine die of the
    House on August 20, 1954, and the House granted its consent to the
    Senate to an adjournment sine die at any time prior to December 25,
    1954. The Senate acting under the authority of the aforementioned
    resolution adjourned sine die on December 2, 1954. The adjournment
    resolution in the second session of the 97th Congress provided for
    adjournment sine die of the House on December 20 or December 21 pursuant
    to a motion made by the Majority Leader or his designee, and granted the
    consent of the House to adjournment sine die of the Senate at any time
    prior to January 3, 1983, as determined by the Senate, and the consent
    of the House for adjournments or recesses of the Senate for periods of
    more than three days as determined by the Senate during such period (H.
    Con. Res. 438, Dec. 20, 1982, p. 32951). Another concurrent resolution
    in the 97th Congress provided for an adjournment of the Senate to a day
    certain and granted the consent of the Senate to an adjournment of the
    House for more than three days to a day certain, or to any day before
    that day as determined by the House (S. Con. Res. 102, May 27, 1982, pp.
    12504, 12505). On one occasion the two Houses provided for an
    adjournment to a certain day, with a provision that if there should be
    no quorum present on that day the session should terminate (V, 6686).
    The two Houses have adjourned to a certain day, with a provision that
    they may be reassembled by the Leadership if legislative expediency so
    required such reassembling (July 8, 1943, p. 7516; June 23, 1944, p.
    6667; Sept. 21, 1944, p. 8109; July 18, 1945, p. 7733; July 26, 1947, p.
    10521; June 20, 1948, p. 9348; Aug. 7, 1948, p. 10247), and in the 91st
    Congress, the two Houses agreed to a concurrent resolution adjourning
    both to dates certain but which also provided that the House was subject
    to recall by the Speaker if legislative expediency so warranted (July
    20, 1970, p. 24978). In the 93d Congress, first and second sessions, the
    two Houses agreed to concurrent resolutions adjourning the Congress sine
    die with a provision that the two Houses could be reassembled by the
    Leadership (Dec. 22, 1973, p. 43327; Dec. 20, 1974, p. 41815). Recall
    provisions were also included in the sine die adjournment resolutions
    for the first and second sessions of the 101st Congress (Nov. 21, 1989,
    p. 31156; Oct. 27, 1990, p. 36850) and the second session of the 104th
    Congress (Oct. 3, 1996, p. ----). In the first session of the 102d
    Congress, the two Houses agreed to a concurrent resolution providing for
    an adjournment

      A concurrent resolution to provide for adjournment for more than three
    days is offered in the House as a matter of privilege (V, 6701-6706),
    and is not debatable (VIII, 3372-3374). The Legislative Reorganization
    Act of 1970 provides for a sine die adjournment, or (in an odd numbered
    year) an adjournment of slightly over a month (from that Friday in
    August which is at least 30 days before Labor Day to the Wednesday
    following Labor Day) unless the nation is in a state of war, declared by
    Congress (sec. 461(b); 84 Stat. 1140). Congress can, of course, waive,
    this requirement and make other determinations regarding its adjournment
    (see Sec. 948, infra).

      The requirement that resolutions providing for an adjournment sine die
    of either House may not be considered until Congress has completed
    action on the second concurrent resolution on the budget for the fiscal
    year in question, and on any reconciliation legislation required by such
    a resolution, contained in section 310(f) of the Congressional Budget
    Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344), was repealed by the Balanced Budget and
    Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177). That law amended
    sections 309 and 310 of the Congressional Budget Act to prohibit the
    consideration of concurrent resolutions during the month of July
    providing adjournments in excess of three days until the House has
    approved general annual appropriation bills within the jurisdictions of
    all the subcommittees on Appropriations for the ensuing fiscal year, and
    until the House has completed action on all reconciliation legislation
    for the ensuing fiscal year required to be reported by the concurrent
    resolution on the budget for that year (see Sec. 1007, infra).

     * * *

      A resolution providing for an adjournment sine die is not debatable
    (VIII, 3372-3374), though a Member may be recognized during its
    consideration under a reservation of objection to a unanimous-consent
    request that the resolution be agreed to (Oct. 27, 1990, p. 36850).

    [[Page 38]]

    Sec. 85. Compensation of
    Members.

      Section 6. \1\ The Senators and  Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their
    Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the
    United States.

    Sec. 86. Salary and
    deductions.

      The 27th amendment to the Constitution addresses laws ``varying the
    compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives (see
    Sec. 258, infra). The present rate of compensation of Representatives,
    the Resident Commissioner from  Puerto Rico, and Delegates is $133,600 per annum. The rate
    of compensation of the Speaker and the Vice President is $171,500 per
    annum (2 U.S.C. 31; 3 U.S.C. 104) with an additional $10,000 per annum
    to assist in defraying expenses (2 U.S.C. 31b; 3 U.S.C. 111). The
    Majority and Minority Leaders of the House receive $148,400 per annum (2
    U.S.C. 31). These rates of compensation are all (except for the expense
    allowances) subject to annual cost of living adjustments (2 U.S.C.
    31(2)). The present rate of compensation of Senators is that fixed by
    section 1101 of Public Law 101-194, as adjusted pursuant to 2 U.S.C.
    31(2).

      Under the Federal Salary Act of 1967 (2 U.S.C. 351-362), the Citizens'
    Commission on Public Service and Compensation (formerly the Commission
    on Executive, Legislative and Judicial Salaries) is authorized and
    directed to conduct quadrennial reviews of the rates of pay of specified
    government officials, including Members of Congress, and to report to
    the President the results of each review and its recommendations for
    adjustments in such rates. Not later than the first Monday after January
    3 of the calendar year following a report of the Commission, the
    President transmits to Congress his recommendations in light of such
    report (2 U.S.C. 358). The recommendations of the President take effect
    only after the enactment into law of a bill or joint resolution
    approving them in their entirety and an intervening general election of
    Representatives. A bill or joint resolution to approve such
    recommendations is privileged (see Sec. 1013, infra) if offered by the
    Majority Leader or his designee within 60 calendar days of the
    President's transmittal, and must undergo a recorded vote on passage (2
    U.S.C. 359).

    [[Page 39]]

    of that review to the President by December 15 of that year (2 U.S.C.
    357). Adjustments hereafter are to maintain equal levels of pay among
    the Speaker, the Vice President, and the Chief Justice; among the Majority
    and Minority Leaders, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and level
    I of the Executive Schedule; and among Representatives, Senators, certain
    judges, and level II of the Executive Schedule (2 U.S.C. 362).
      In 1985, the Salary Act was amended (P.L. 99-190, sec. 135) to require
    a salary commission report with respect to fiscal year 1987. The
    President transmitted his recommendations concerning that report in his
    fiscal year 1988 Budget message (Jan. 5, 1987, H. Doc. 100-11). When not
    disapproved by the Congress in accordance with the Salary Act (2 U.S.C.
    359), those recommendations took effect on March 1, 1987. On return to
    the normal quadrennial cycle, the President transmitted with his fiscal
    year 1990 Budget message recommendations concerning a salary commission
    report with respect to fiscal year 1989 (Jan. 9, 1989, H. Doc. 101-21).
    Those recommendations were disapproved by Public Law 101-1 (H. J. Res.
    129, 101st Cong., Feb. 7, 1989, p. 1708). In 1989, the Salary Act was
    amended (P.L. 101-194, sec. 701) to redesignate the Commission, refine
    the parameters for quadrennial adjustments, and provide for privileged
    consideration of legislation to approve adjustments recommended by the
    President. The quadrennial review contemplated by the statute did not
    occur in 1993. The next quadrennial review contemplated by the statute
    would be conducted in 1997 (2 U.S.C. 356), and the Commission is to
    report the results

      The statutes also provides for deductions from the pay of Members and
    Delegates who are absent from the sessions of the House for reasons
    other than illness of themselves and families, or who retire before the
    end of the Congress (2 U.S.C. 39; IV, 3011, footnote). The law as to
    deductions has been held to apply only to Members who have taken the
    oath (II, 1154). Members and Delegates are paid monthly on certificate
    of the Speaker (2 U.S.C. 34, 35, 37, 57a). The Sergeant-at-Arms, or in
    case of his disability the Treasurer of the United States, disburses the
    pay of Members (31 U.S.C. 148). 4 U.S.C. 113 provides that the residence
    of a Member of Congress for purpose of imposing State income tax laws
    shall be the State from which elected and not the State or subdivision
    thereof in which the Member maintains an abode for the purpose of
    attending sessions of Congress.

    Sec. 87. Questions as to
    compensation.

      Questions have arisen  frequently as to compensation of Members especially in
    cases of Members elected to fill vacancies (I, 500; II, 1155) and where
    there have been questions as to incompatible offices (I, 500) or titles
    seat (II, 1206). The Supreme Court has held that a Member chosen to fill
    a vacancy is entitled to salary only from the time that the compensation
    of his predecessor has ceased, Page v. United States, 127 U.S. 67
    (1888). See also 2 U.S.C. 37.

    Sec. 88. Travel and Members' representational
    allowances.

      In the 92d  Congress, the provisions of H. Res. 457 of that Congress,
    authorizing the Committee on House Administration (now House Oversight)
    to adjust allowances of Members and committees without further action by
    the House, were enacted into permanent law (85 Stat. 636; 2 U.S.C. 57),
    but the 94th Congress enacted into permanent law H. Res. 1372 of that
    Congress, stripping the Committee of that authority and requiring House
    approval of the committee's recommendations, except in cases made
    necessary by price changes in materials and supplies, technological
    advances in office equipment, and cost of living increases (90 Stat.
    1448; 2 U.S.C. 57a). The Committee on House Administration (now House
    Oversight) retains authority under 2 U.S.C. 57 to independently adjust
    amounts within total allowances and to set terms and conditions of such
    allowances (Mar. 21, 1977, p. 8227; Apr. 21, 1983, p. 9339).

    [[Page 40]]

    Member's Washington and district offices, official expenses incurred
    by the Member, and the postage expenses of first, third, and fourth
    class frankable mail.
      In the 104th Congress the Committee on House Oversight promulgated an
    order abolishing separate allowances for Clerk Hire, Official Expenses,
    and Official Mail, in favor of a single ``Members' Representational
    Allowance'' (MRA). The MRA is provided for the employment of staff in
    the

      Until January 1, 1988, the maximum salary for staff members was the
    rate of basic pay authorized for Level V of the Executive Schedule (by
    order of the Committee on House Administration, Mar. 21, 1977, p. 8227).
    Under section 311 of the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1988, as
    contained in section 101(i) of Public Law 100-202 (2 U.S.C. 60a-2a), the
    maximum salary for staff members is set by pay order of the Speaker. A
    Member may not employ a relative on his MRA (5 U.S.C. 3110).

      Until the 103d Congress, a Member could employ a ``Lyndon Baines
    Johnson Congressional Intern'' for a maximum of two months at not to
    exceed $1,160 per month. Such internships were available for college
    students and secondary or postsecondary school teachers (H. Res. 420,
    93d Cong., Sept. 18, 1973, p. 30186). Any paid internship is now funded
    through the MRA.

      The statutes provide for continuation of the pay of clerical
    assistants to a Member upon his or her death or resignation, until a
    successor is elected to fill the vacancy, such clerical assistants to
    perform their duties under the direction of the Clerk of the House (2
    U.S.C. 92a-92d). Upon the explusion of a Member in the 96th Congress,
    the House by resolution extended those provisions to any termination of
    service by a Member during the term of office (H. Res. 804, Oct. 2,
    1980, p. 28978).

      For current information on the MRA and the method of its accounting
    and disbursement, see current U.S. House of Representatives
    Congressional Handbook, Committee on House Oversight.

    Sec. 88a. Ban on Legislative Service
    Organizations.

      At its  organization the 104th Congress prohibited the
    establishment or continuation of any legislative service organization
    (as that term had been understood in the 103d Congress) and directed the
    Committee on House Oversight to take such steps as were necessary to
    ensure an orderly termination and accounting for funds of any
    legislative service organization in existence on January 3, 1995 (sec.
    222, H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. ----).

    Sec. 89. Leadership staff allowances.

      Separate from the  MRA
    specified above, the leaders of the House (the Speaker, Majority Leader,
    Minority Leader, Majority Whip and Minority Whip) are entitled to office
    staffing allowances consisting of certain statutory positions as well as
    lump-sum appropriations authorized by section 473 (84 Stat. 1140). The
    portion of these allowances for leadership office personnel may be
    adjusted by the Clerk of the House in certain situations when the
    President effects a pay adjustment for certain classes of federal
    employees under the Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-656;
    84 Stat. 1946).

    [[Page 41]]

    parable levels in the Senate and in the other branches of government.
    For the text of section 311(d), see Sec. 1013(13), infra.

    Sec. 89a. Speaker's ``pay orders.''

      Under  section 311(d) of
    the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1988 [2 U.S.C. 60a-2a], the
    Speaker may issue ``pay orders'' that adjust pay levels for officers and
    employees of the House to maintain certain relationships with com-

    Sec. 90. Privilege of Members from
    arrest.

      * * * They [the  Senators and Representatives] shall in all Cases, except
    Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest
    during their attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and
    in going to and returning from the same; * * *

    <>   * * * and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they
    [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other
    place.

    [[Page 42]]

    Sec. 91. Assertions of privilege of
    Members by the House.

      The word ``felony''  in this provision has been interpreted not to
    refer to a delinquency in a matter of debt (III, 2676), and ``treason,
    felony, and breach of the peace'' have been construed to mean all
    indictable crimes (III, 2673). The Supreme Court has held that the
    privilege does not apply to arrest in any criminal case. Williamson v.
    United States, 207 U.S. 425 (1908). The courts have discussed and
    sustained the privilege of the Member in going to and returning from the
    session (III, 2674); and where a person assaulted a Member on his way to
    the House, although at a place distant therefrom, the House arrested him
    on warrant of the Speaker, arraigned him at the bar and committed him
    (II, 1626, 1628). Other assaults under these circumstances have been
    treated as breaches of privilege (II, 1645). Where a Member had been
    arrested and detained under mesne process in a civil suit during a
    recess of Congress, the House decided that he was entitled to discharge
    on the assembling of Congress, and liberated him and restored him to his
    seat by the hands of its own officer (III, 2676). Service of process is
    distinguished from arrest in civil cases and related historical data are
    collected in Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76 (1934), where the Supreme Court
    held that the clause was applicable only to arrests in civil suits, now
    largely obsolete but common at the time of the adoption of the United
    States Constitution. Rule L, infra, was added in the 97th Congress to
    provide a standing procedure governing subpoenas to Members, officers,
    and employees directing their appearance as witnesses relating to the
    official functions of the House, or for the production of House
    documents.

    Sec. 93. Scope of the privilege.

      This privilege as  to ``any
    speech or debate'' applies generally to ``things done in a session of
    the House by one of its Members in relation to the business before it.''
    Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881), cited at III, 2675. See also
    II, 1655 and Sec. Sec. 301-302, infra, for provisions in Jefferson's
    Manual on the privilege; and Deschler's Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 7. The
    clause precludes judicial inquiry into the motivation, preparation, or
    content of a Member's speech on the floor and prevents such a speech
    from being made the basis for a criminal conspiracy charge against the
    Member. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966). The Supreme Court
    held in United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 447 (1979), that under the
    Speech or Debate Clause, neither evidence of nor references to
    legislative acts of a Member of Congress may be introduced by the
    Government in a prosecution under the official bribery statute. But the
    Supreme Court has limited the scope of legislative activity which is
    protected under the clause by upholding grand jury inquiry into the
    possession and nonlegislative use of classified documents by a Member.
    Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). The Court has also
    sustained the validity of an indictment of a Member for accepting an
    illegal bribe to perform legislative acts. United States v. Brewster,
    408 U.S. 501 (1972). Nor does the clause protect transmittal of
    allegedly defamatory material issued in press releases and newsletters
    by a Senator, as neither was essential to the deliberative process of
    the Senate. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). A complaint
    against an officer of the House relating to the dismissal of an official
    reporter of debates has been held nonjusticiable on the basis that her
    duties were directly related to the due functioning of the legislative
    process. Browning v. Clerk, 789 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. den.
    479 U.S. 996 (1986).

      Legislative employees acting under orders of the House are not
    necessarily protected under the clause from judicial inquiry into the
    constitutionality of their actions. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
    (1969); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 165 (1880); Dombrowski v.
    Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967). But see Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S.
    606 (1972), where the Supreme Court held that the aide of a Senator was
    protected under the clause when performing legislative acts which would
    have been protected under the clause if performed by the Senator
    himself. There is no distinction between the Members of a Senate
    subcommittee and its chief counsel insofar as complete immunity under
    the Speech and Debate Clause is provided for the issuance of a subpoena
    pursuant to legitimate legislative inquiry. Eastland v. U.S.
    Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975). See also Doe v. McMillan, 412
    U.S. 306 (1973) (relating to the dissemination of a congressional
    report) for the immunity under this clause of Members of the House and
    their staffs, and for the common-law immunity of the Public Printer and
    Superintendent of Documents.

    [[Page 43]]

    293 U.S. 76 (1934); Methodist Federation for Social
    Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp. 729 (1956). For inquiry into a Member's
    use of the franking privilege, see Hoellen v. Annunzio, 468 F.2d 522
    (1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973); Schiaffo v. Helstoski, 350 F.
    Supp. 1076 (1972), rev'd 492 F.2d 413 (1974). For inquiry into the
    printing of committee reports, see Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973);
    Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175 (1970).
      For federal court decisions on the applicability of the clause to
    unofficial circulation of reprints from the Congressional Record, see
    McGovern v. Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343 (1960); Long v. Ansell, 69 F.2d 386
    (1934), aff'd,

    Sec. 94. Action by the House.

      For assaulting a  Member for
    words spoken in debate, Samuel Houston, not a Member, was arrested,
    tried, and censured by the House (II, 1616-1619). Where Members have
    assaulted other Members for words spoken in debate (II, 1656), or
    proceeded by duel (II, 1644), or demanded explanation in a hostile
    manner (II, 1644), the House has considered the cases as of privilege. A
    communication addressed to the House by an official in an Executive
    Department calling in question words uttered by a Member in debate was
    criticized as a breach of privilege and withdrawn (III, 2684). An
    explanation having been demanded of a Member by a person not a Member
    for a question asked of the latter when a witness before the House, the
    matter was considered but not pressed as a breach of privilege (III,
    2681). A letter from a person supposed to have been assailed by a Member
    in debate, asking properly and without menace if the speech was
    correctly reported, was held to involve no question of privilege (III,
    2682). Unless it be clear that a Member has been questioned for words
    spoken in debate, the House declines to act (II, 1620; III, 2680).

      For assaulting a Member, Charles C. Glover was arrested, arraigned at
    the bar of the House, and censured by the Speaker by direction of the
    House, although the provocation of the assault was words spoken in
    debate in the previous Congress (VI, 333).

    Sec. 95. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881);
    Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); United States v. Johnson, 383
    U.S. 169 (1966); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); Powell v.
    McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606
    (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); United States v.
    Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111
    (1979).

    [[Page 44]]

    Sec. 96. Restriction on appointment of
    Members to office.

      \2\ No Senator or  Representative shall, during the Time for which he
    was elected, be appointed to any Civil Office under the Authority of the
    United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof
    shall have been encreased during such time; *  *  *.

    <>
    *  *  * and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall
    be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.

      In a few cases questions have arisen under this paragraph (I, 506,
    footnote; and see 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 36 (1969); see also Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 7).

      The meaning of the word ``office'' as used in this paragraph has been
    discussed (I, 185, 417, 478, 493; II, 993; VI, 60, 64), as has also the
    general subject of incompatible offices (I, 563).

    [[Page 45]]

    Sec. 98. As to what are incompatible
    offices.

      The Judiciary Committee  has concluded that members of commissions created by law to
    investigate and report, but having no legislative, executive, or
    judicial powers, and visitors to academies, regents, directors, and
    trustees of public institutions, appointed under the law by the Speaker,
    are not officers within the meaning of the Constitution (I, 493).
    Membership on joint committees created by the statute is not an office
    in the contemplation of the Constitutional provision prohibiting Members
    of Congress from holding simultaneously other offices under the United
    States (VII, 2164). A Member of either House is eligible to appointment
    to any office not forbidden him by law, the duties of which are not
    incompatible with those of a Member (VI, 63) and the question as to
    whether a Member may be appointed to the Board of Managers of the
    Soldiers' Home and become local manager of one of the Homes, is a matter
    for the decision of Congress itself (VI, 63). The House has also
    distinguished between the performance of paid services for the Executive
    (I, 495), like temporary service as assistant United States attorney
    (II, 993), and the acceptance of an incompatible office. The House has
    declined to hold that a contractor under the Government is
    constitutionally disqualified to serve as a Member (I, 496). But the
    House, or its committees, have found disqualified a Member who was
    appointed a militia officer in the District of Columbia (I, 486) and in
    various States (VI, 60), and Members who have accepted commissions in
    the Army (I, 491, 492, 494). But the Judiciary Committee has expressed
    the opinion that persons on the retired list of the Army do not hold
    office under the United States in the constitutional sense (I, 494). A
    Member-elect has continued to act as governor of a State after the
    assembling of the Congress to which he was elected (I, 503), but the
    duties of a Member of the House and the Governor of a State are
    absolutely inconsistent and may not be simultaneously discharged by the
    same Member (VI, 65).

    Sec. 99. Appointment of Memberselect to
    offices under the United States.

      The House decided  that the status of a Member-elect was
    not affected by the constitutional requirement (I, 499), the theory
    being advanced that the status of the Member-elect is distinguished from
    the status of the Member who has qualified (I, 184). And a Member-elect,
    who continued in an office after his election but resigned before taking
    his seat, was held entitled to the seat (I, 497, 498). But when a
    Member-elect held an incompatible office after the meeting of Congress
    he was held to have disqualified himself (I, 492). In other words, the
    Member-elect may defer until the meeting of Congress his choice between
    the seat and an incompatible office (I, 492). As early as 1874 the
    Attorney General opined that a Member-elect is not officially a Member
    of the House, and thus may hold any office until sworn (14 Op. Att'y
    Gen. 408 (1874)).

    Sec. 100. Relation of contestants to
    incompatible offices.

      The House has  manifestly leaned to the idea that a contestant
    holding an incompatible office need not make his election until the
    House has declared him entitled to the seat (I, 505). Although a
    contestant had accepted and held a State office in violation of the
    state constitution, if he were really elected a Congressman, the House
    did not treat his contest as abated (II, 1003). Where a Member had been
    appointed to an incompatible office a contestant not found to be elected
    was not admitted to fill the vacancy (I, 807).

    Sec. 101. Procedure of the House when
    incompatible offices are accepted.

      Where a Member  has accepted an incompatible
    office, the House has assumed or declared the seat vacant (I, 501, 502;
    VI, 65). In the cases of Baker and Yell, the Elections Committee
    concluded that the acceptance of a commission as an officer of
    volunteers in the national army vacated the seat of a Member (I, 488),
    and in another similar case the Member was held to have forfeited his
    right to a seat (I, 490). The House has seated a person bearing regular
    credentials on ascertaining that his predecessor in the same Congress
    had accepted a military office (I, 572). But usually the House by
    resolution formally declares the seat vacant (I, 488, 492). A Member-
    elect may defer until the meeting of Congress his choice between the
    seat and an incompatible office (I, 492). But when he retains the
    incompatible office and does not qualify, a vacancy has been held to
    exist (I, 500). A resolution excluding a Member who has accepted an
    incompatible office may be agreed to by a majority vote (I, 490). A
    Member charged with acceptance of an incompatible office was heard in
    his own behalf during the debate (I, 486).

    [[Page 46]]

      Where it was held in federal court that a Member of Congress may not
    hold a commission in the Armed Forces Reserve under this clause, the
    U.S. Supreme Court reversed on other grounds, the plaintiff's lack of
    standing to maintain the suit. Reservists Committee to Stop the War v.
    Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833 (1971), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1075 (1972), rev'd on
    other grounds, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).

    Sec. 102. Bills raising revenue to
    originate in the House.

      Section 7. \1\ All Bills  for raising Revenue shall originate in the
    House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with
    Amendments as on other Bills.

    [[Page 47]]

    passed bill providing for the sale of Conrail and containing provisions relating to the tax treatment of the sale, notwithstanding inclusion in that
    bill of a ``disclaimer'' section requiring all revenue provisions therein to
    be contained in separate legislation originating in the House (Sept. 25,
    1986, p. 26202); a Senate passed bill prohibiting the importation of
    commodities subject to tariff (July 30, 1987, p. 21582); a Senate-passed
    bill banning all imports from Iran, a tariff measure as affecting
    revenue from dutiable imports (June 16, 1988, p. 14780); a Senate-passed
    bill dealing with the tax treatment of income derived from the exercise
    of Indian treaty fishing rights (June 21, 1988, p. 15425); a Senate bill
    creating a tax-exempt government corporation (June 15, 1989, p. 12167);
    a Senate-passed bill addressing the tax treatment of police-corps
    scholarships and the regulation of firearms under the Internal Revenue
    Code (Oct. 22, 1991, p. ----); a Senate-passed bill including certain
    import sanctions in an export administration statute (Oct. 31, 1991, p.
    29284); a Senate-passed bill requiring the President to impose sanctions
    including import restrictions against countries that fail to eliminate
    largescale driftnet fishing (Feb. 25, 1992, p. ----); a Senate-passed
    bill proposing to regulate toxic substances by prohibiting the import of
    products containing more than specified level of lead (July 21, 1994, p.
    ----); and a Senate amendment to a general appropriation bill proposing
    a user fee raising revenue to finance broader activities of the agency
    imposing the levy, thereby raising general revenue (Aug. 12, 1994, p. --
    --).
      This provision has been the subject of much discussion (II, 1488,
    1494). In the earlier days the practice was not always correct (II,
    1484); but in later years the House has insisted on its prerogative and
    the Senate has often shown reluctance to infringe thereon (II, 1482,
    1483, 1493). In several instances, however, the subject has been matter
    of contention, conference (II, 1487, 1488), and final disagreement (II,
    1485, 1487, 1488). Sometimes, however, when the House has questioned an
    invasion of prerogative, the Senate has receded (II, 1486, 1493). The
    disagreements have been especially vigorous over the right of the Senate
    to concur with amendments (II, 1489), and while the Senate has
    acquiesced in the sole right of the House to originate revenue bills, it
    has at the same time held to a broad power of amendment (II, 1497-1499).
    The House has frequently challenged the Senate on this point (II, 1481,
    1491, 1496; Sept. 14, 1965, p. 23632). When the House has conceived that
    its prerogative has been invaded, it has ordered the bill or Senate
    amendment to be returned to the Senate (II, 1480-1499; VI, 315, 317;
    Mar. 30, 1937, p. 2930; July 2, 1960, p. 15818; Oct. 10, 1962, p. 23014;
    May 20, 1965, p. 11149; June 20, 1968, p. 22127; Nov. 8, 1979, p. 31518;
    May 17, 1983, p. 12486; Oct. 1, 1985, p. 25418; Sept. 25, 1986, p.
    26202; July 30, 1987, p. 21582; June 16, 1988, p. 14780; June 21, 1988,
    p. 15425; Sept. 23, 1988, p. 25094; Sept. 28, 1988, p. 26415; Oct. 21,
    1988, pp. 33110-11; June 15, 1989, p. 12167; Nov. 9, 1989, p. 28271;
    Oct. 22, 1991, p. 27087; Oct. 31, 1991, p. 29284; Feb. 25, 1992, p. ----
    ; July 21, 1994, p. ----; Aug. 12, 1994, p. ----; Oct. 7, 1994, p. ----;
    Mar. 21, 1996, p. ----; Apr. 16, 1996, p. ----; Sept. 27, 1996, p. ----;
    Sept. 28, 1996, p. ----), or declined to proceed further with it (II,
    1485). A bill raising revenue incidentally was held not to infringe upon
    the Constitutional prerogative of the House to originate revenue
    legislation (VI, 315). Discussion of differentiation between bills for
    the purpose of raising revenue and bills which incidentally raise
    revenue (VI, 315). A question relating to the invasion of the
    Constitutional prerogatives of the House by a Senate amendment may be
    raised at any time when the House is in possession of the papers, but
    not otherwise; thus, the question has been presented pending the motion
    to call up a conference report on the bill (June 20, 1968, Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 3, ch. 13, sec. 14.2; Aug. 19, 1982, p. 22127), but has
    been held nonprivileged with respect to a bill already presented to the
    President (Apr. 6, 1995, p. ----). On January 16, 1924, p. 1027, the
    Senate decided that a bill proposing a gasoline tax in the District of
    Columbia should not originate in the Senate (VI, 316). Among the
    measures the House has returned to the Senate: a Senate

      Clause 5(b) of rule XXI, added in the 98th Congress, prohibits
    consideration of any amendment, including any Senate amendment,
    proposing a tax or tariff measure during consideration of a bill or
    joint resolution reported by a committee not having that jurisdiction
    (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1983, p. 34).

      For discussion as to the prerogatives of the House under this clause,
    and discussion of the prerogatives of the House to originate
    appropriation bills, see Deschler's Precedents, vol. 3, ch. 13.

    Sec. 103. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); Twin
    City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S.
    429 (1906); Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914); Flint v. Stone
    Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911).

    [[Page 48]]

    nated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their
    Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two
    thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent,
    together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall
    likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House,
    it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses
    shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons
    voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each
    House respectively. * * *.

    Sec. 104. Approval and disapproval of bills by
    the President.

      \2\ Every Bill  which shall have passed the House of Representatives
    and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the
    President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if
    not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it
    shall have origi-

    [[Page 49]]

    House discussed the act of President Jackson in writing above his signature
    of approval a memorandum of his construction of the bill (IV, 3492). But
    where the President has accompanied his message announcing the approval
    with a statement of his reasons there has been no question in the House
    (IV, 3491). The statutes require that bills signed by the President
    shall be received by the Archivist of the United States and deposited in
    his office (1 U.S.C. 106a). Formerly these bills were received by the
    Secretary of State (IV, 3485) and deposited in his office (IV, 3429).

    Sec. 105. The act of approval.

      Under the usual  practice,
    bills are considered to have been ``presented to the President'' at the
    time they are delivered to the White House. In 1959, bills delivered to
    the White House while the President was abroad were ``held for
    presentation to the President upon his return to the United States'' by
    the White House. The United States Court of Claims held, in Eber Bros.
    Wine and Liquor Corp. v. United States, 337 F.2d 624 (1964), cert.
    denied, 380 U.S. 950 (1965), that where the President had determined,
    with the informal acquiescence of leaders of Congress, that bills from
    the Congress were to be received at the White House only for
    presentation to him upon his return to the United States and the bill
    delivered to the White House was so stamped, the presidential veto of
    the bill more than 10 days after delivery to the White House but less
    than 10 days after his return to the country was timely. The second
    session of the 89th Congress adjourned sine die while President Johnson
    was on an Asian tour and receipts for bills delivered to the White House
    during that time were marked in like manner. The approval of a bill by
    the President of the United States is valid only with his signature (IV,
    3490). Prior to the adoption of the 20th amendment to the Constitution,
    at the close of a Congress, when the two Houses prolonged their sessions
    into the forenoon of March 4, the approvals were dated on the prior
    legislative day, as the legislative portion of March 4 belonged to the
    term of the new Congress. In one instance, however, bills signed on the
    forenoon of March 4 were dated as of that day with the hour and minute
    of approval given with the date (IV, 3489). The 20th amendment to the
    Constitution changed the date of meeting of the Congress to January 3d.
    The act of President Tyler in filing with a bill an exposition of his
    reasons for signing it was examined and severely criticized by a
    committee of the House (IV, 3492); and in 1842 a committee of the

    Sec. 106. Notice of approval sent by
    message.

      Notice of the  signature of a bill by the President is sent by message to
    the House in which it originated (VII, 1089) and that House informs the
    other (IV, 3429). But this notice is not necessary to the validity of
    the act (IV, 3495). Sometimes, at the close of a Congress the President
    informs the House of such bills as he has approved and of such as he has
    allowed to fail (IV, 3499-3502). In one instance he communicated his
    omission to sign a bill through the committee appointed to notify him
    that Congress was about to adjourn (IV, 3504). A bill that had not
    actually passed having been signed by the President, he disregarded it
    and a new bill was passed (IV, 3498). Messages of the President giving
    notice of bills approved are entered in the Journal and published in the
    Congressional Record (V, 6593).

    Sec. 107. Disapproval (or veto) of
    bills.

      A message withholding  approval of a bill, called a veto message, is sent to the House
    in which the bill originated; but it has been held that such a message
    may not be returned to the President on his request after it has been
    laid before the Senate (IV, 3521). Instance where a veto message which
    had not been laid before the House was returned to the President on his
    request (Aug. 1, 1946, p. 10651). A vetoed bill received in the House by
    way of the Senate is considered as if received directly from the
    President and supersedes the regular order of business (IV, 3537; VII,
    1109). A veto message may not be read in the absence of a quorum, even
    though the House be about to adjourn sine die (IV, 3522; VII, 1094); but
    the message may be read and acted on at the next session of the same
    Congress (IV, 3522). When the President has been prevented by
    adjournment from returning a bill with his objections he has sometimes
    at the next session communicated his reasons for not approving (V, 6618-
    6620).

      Although the ordinary form of a return veto is a message under seal
    returning the enrollment with a statement of the President's objections,
    an enrolled House bill returned to the Clerk during the August recess
    with a ``memorandum of disapproval'' setting forth the objections of the
    President was considered as a return veto (Sept. 11, 1991, p. 22643).

    [[Page 50]]

    it has been held that the constitutional mandate that ``the House
    shall proceed to consider'' means that the House shall immediately
    proceed to consider it under the rules of the House, such that the
    ordinary motions under the rules of the House (e.g., to refer or to
    postpone to a day certain) are in order (IV, 3542-3550; VII, 1100, 1105,
    1113; Speaker Wright, Aug. 3, 1988, p. 20280) and (for the stated
    examples) debatable under the hour rule (VIII, 2740). Although under
    clause 4 of rule XVI, and under the precedents the motion for the
    previous question takes precedence over motions to postpone or to refer
    when a question is under debate, where the Speaker has laid before the
    House a veto message from the President but has not yet stated the
    question to be on overriding the veto, that question is not ``under
    debate'' and the motion for the previous question does not take
    precedence (Speaker Wright, Aug. 3, 1988; Procedure, ch. 24, sec. 15.8).
    A resolution asserting that to recognize for a motion to refer a veto
    message before stating the question on overriding the veto would
    interfere with the constitutional prerogative of the House to proceed to
    that question, and directing the Speaker to state the question on
    overriding the veto as pending before recognizing for a motion to refer,
    did not give rise to a question of the privileges of the House (Speaker
    Wright, Aug. 3, 1988, p. 20281). A motion to refer a vetoed bill, either
    with or without the message, has been held allowable within the
    constitutional mandate that the House ``shall proceed to reconsider''
    (IV, 3550; VII, 1104, 1105, 1108, 1114), and in the 101st Congress, a
    veto pending as unfinished business was referred with instructions to
    consider and report promptly (Jan. 24, 1990, p. 421). But while the
    ordinary motion to refer may be applied to a vetoed bill, it is not in
    order to move to recommit it pending the demand for the previous
    question or after it is ordered (IV, 3551; VII, 1102). When a veto
    message is before the House for consideration de novo or as unfinished
    business, a motion to refer the message to committee takes precedence
    over the question of passing the bill, the objections of the President
    to the contrary notwithstanding (Procedure, ch. 24, sec. 15.8; Oct. 25,
    1983, p. 29188), but the motion to refer may be laid on the table (Oct.
    25, 1983, p. 29188). A vetoed bill having been rejected by the House,
    the message was referred (IV, 3552; VII, 1103). Committees to which
    vetoed bills have been referred have sometimes neglected to report (IV,
    3523, 3550, footnotes; VII, 1108, 1114).

    Sec. 108. Consideration of a vetoed bill in the
    House.

      It is the  usual but not invariable rule that a bill returned with the
    objections of the President shall be voted on at once (IV, 3534-3536)
    and when laid before the House the question on the passage is considered
    as pending and no motion from the floor is required (VII, 1097-1099),
    but

    [[Page 51]]

      A vetoed bill may be laid on the table (IV, 3549; VII, 1105), but it
    is still highly privileged and a motion to take it from the table is in
    order at any time (IV, 3550; V, 5439). Also a motion to discharge a
    committee from the consideration of such a bill is privileged (IV, 3532;
    Aug. 4, 1988, p. 20365; Sept. 19, 1996, p. ----) and (in the modern
    practice) is debatable (Mar. 7, 1990, p. 3620) but is subject to the
    motion to lay on the table (Sept. 7, 1965, pp. 22958-59; Aug. 4, 1988,
    p. 20365). When the motion to discharge is agreed to, the veto message
    is pending as unfinished business (Mar. 7, 1990, p. 3621). While a
    vetoed bill is always privileged, the same is not true of a bill
    reported in lieu of it (IV, 3531; VII, 1103).

    Sec. 109. Action on a vetoed bill.

      If two-thirds of  the
    House to which a bill is returned with the President's objections agree
    to pass it, and then two-thirds of the other House also agree, it
    becomes a law (IV, 3520). The yeas and nays are required to pass a bill
    over the President's veto (art. I, sec. 7; IV, 2726, 3520; VII, 1110).
    The two-thirds vote required to pass the bill is two-thirds of the
    Members present and voting and not two-thirds of the total membership of
    the House (IV, 3537, 3538; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276
    (1919)). Only Members voting should be considered in determining whether
    two-thirds voted in the affirmative (VII, 1111). The motion to
    reconsider may not be applied to the vote on reconsideration of a bill
    returned with the objections of the President (V, 5644; VIII, 2778).

      It is the practice for one House to inform the other by message of its
    decision that a bill returned with the objections of the President shall
    not pass (IV, 3539-3541). A bill passed notwithstanding the objections
    of the President is sent by the presiding officer of the House which
    last acts on it to the Archivist, who receives it and deposits it in his
    office (1 U.S.C. 106a). Formerly these bills were sent to the Secretary
    of State (IV, 3524) and deposited in his office (IV, 3485).

    Sec. 110. Errors in bills sent to the
    President.

      A bill incorrectly  enrolled has been recalled from the President, who erased
    his signature (IV, 3506). Bills sent to the President but not yet signed
    by him are sometimes recalled by concurrent resolution of the two Houses
    (IV, 3507-3509; VII, 1091; Sept. 4, 1962, p. 18405; May 6, 1974, p.
    13076), and amended; but this proceeding is regarded as irregular (IV,
    3510-3518). When the two Houses of Congress request the President by
    concurrent resolution to return an enrolled bill delivered to him and
    the President honors the request, the ten-day period under this clause
    runs anew from the time the bill is re-enrolled and is again presented
    to the President. Thus, in the 93d Congress the President returned on
    May 7, 1974 a bill pursuant to the request of Congress (H. Con. Res.
    485, May 6, 1974, p. 13076). The bill was again enrolled, presented to
    the President on May 7, and marked ``received May 7'' at the White
    House. An error in an enrolled bill that has gone to the President may
    also be corrected by a joint resolution (IV, 3519; VII, 1092). In the
    99th Congress, two enrollments of a continuing appropriation bill for FY
    1987 were presented to and signed by the President, the second
    correcting an omission in the first (see P.L. 99-500 and 99-591).

    [[Page 52]]

    Sec. 110a. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States,
    175 U.S. 423 (1899); Gardner v. Collector, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 499 (1868);
    Matthews v. Zane, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 164 (1822); Lapeyre v. United
    States, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 191 (1873); Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v.
    Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919); Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482
    (1932); Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938).

    Sec. 111. Bills which become laws without the
    President's approval.

      * * * If any  Bill shall not be returned by the President
    within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to
    him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it,
    unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which
    Case it shall not be a Law.

      A bill signed by the President within ten days (Sunday excepted) after
    it has been presented to him becomes a law even though such signing
    takes place when Congress is not in session, whether during the period
    of an adjournment to a day certain or after the final adjournment of a
    session. Presidents currently sign bills after sine die adjournment but
    within ten days after their receipt. President Truman signed several
    bills passed in the 81st Congress after the convening of the 82d
    Congress but within ten days (P.L. 910-921; 64 Stat. 1221-1257); and
    President Reagan approved bills passed in the 97th Congress which were
    presented after the convening of the 98th Congress (P.L. 97-419 et
    seq.). It was formerly contended that the President might not approve
    bills during a recess (IV, 3493, 3494), and in one instance, in 1864,
    when the President signed a bill after final adjournment of Congress but
    within ten days grave doubts were raised and an adverse report was made
    by a House committee (IV, 3497). Later opinions of the Attorney General
    have been to the effect that the President has the power to approve
    bills within ten days after they have been presented to him during the
    period of an adjournment to a day certain (IV, 3496) and after an
    adjournment sine die (VII, 1088). The Supreme Court has held valid as
    laws bills signed by the President within ten days during a recess for a
    specified time (La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 451
    (1899); IV, 3495) and also those signed after an adjournment sine die
    (Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482 (1932)).

    [[Page 53]]

    Sec. 112. The pocket veto.

      A bill which  is passed by both
    Houses of Congress during the first regular session of a Congress and
    presented to the President less than ten days (Sundays excepted) before
    the sine die adjournment of that session, but is neither signed by the
    President, nor returned by him to the House in which it originated, does
    not become a law (``The Pocket Veto Case,'' 279 U.S. 655 (1929); VII,
    1115). President Truman during an adjournment to a day certain pocket
    vetoed several bills passed by the 81st Congress and also, after the
    convening of the 82d Congress, pocket vetoed one bill passed in the 81st
    Congress. The Supreme Court has held that the adjournment of the House
    of origin for not exceeding three days while the other branch of the
    Congress remained in session, did not prevent a return of the vetoed
    bill to the House of origin (Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583
    (1938)).

    Sec. 113. Effect of adjournment to a day
    certain.

      Doubt has existed  as to whether a bill which remains with the President ten
    days without his signature, Congress meanwhile before the tenth day
    having adjourned to a day certain, becomes a law (IV, 3483, 3496; VII,
    1115); an opinion of the Attorney General in 1943 stated that under such
    circumstances a bill not signed by the President did not become a law
    (40 Op. Att'y Gen. 274 (1943)). However, more recently, where a Member
    of the Senate challenged in federal court the effectiveness of such a
    pocket veto, a United States Court of Appeals held that a Senate bill
    could not be pocket-vetoed by the President during an ``intrasession''
    adjournment of Congress to a day certain for more than three days, where
    the Secretary of the Senate had been authorized to receive Presidential
    messages during such adjournment. Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C.
    Cir., 1974). See also Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1976).
    Following a consent decree in this case, it was announced that President
    Ford would utilize a ``return'' veto, subject to override, in
    intersession and intrasession adjournments where authority exists for
    the appropriate House to receive such messages notwithstanding the
    adjournment.

      In the 101st Congress, when President Bush returned an enrolled bill
    during the intersession adjournment, not by way of message under seal
    but with a ``memorandum of disapproval'' setting forth his objections,
    the House treated it as a return veto subject to override under article
    I, section 7 (Jan. 23, 1990, p. 4). Similarly, in the 102d Congress, an
    enrolled House bill returned to the Clerk during the August recess, not
    by way of message under seal but with a ``memorandum of disapproval''
    setting forth the objections of the President, was considered as a
    return veto (Sept. 11, 1991, p. 22643). Also in the 102d Congress,
    President Bush purported on December 20, 1991, to pocket veto a bill (S.
    1176) that was presented to him on December 9, 1991, notwithstanding
    that the Congress was in an intrasession adjournment (from Nov. 27,
    1991, until 11:55 a.m., Jan. 3, 1992) rather than an adjournment sine
    die (see Jan. 21, 1992, p. ----); and during debate on a subsequent bill
    (S. 2184) purporting to repeal the provisions of S. 1176 and to enact
    instead provisions acceding to the objections of the President, the
    Speaker inserted remarks on the pocket veto in light of modern
    Congressional practice concerning the receipt of messages and
    communications during recesses and adjournments (Mar. 3, 1992, p. ----).

    [[Page 54]]

    36246; veto override, Nov. 20, 1974, p. 36621). Subsequently, on November
    21, 1974, the Senate also voted to override the veto (p. 36882) and pursuant
    to 1 U.S.C. 106a the Enrolling Clerk of the Senate forwarded the bill to
    the Archives for publication as a public law. The Administrator of General
    Services at the Archives (now Archivist), upon instructions from the
    Department of Justice, declined to promulgate the bill as public law on the
    day received. The question as to the efficacy of the Congressional action in
    passing the bill over the President's veto was mooted when the House and
    Senate passed on November 26, 1974 (pp. 37406, 37603), an identical bill
    which was signed into law on December 7, 1974 (P.L. 93-516). As part of
    the concurrent resolution providing for the sine die adjournment of the
    first session of the 101st Congress, the Congress reaffirmed its position
    that an intersession adjournment did not prevent the return of a bill where
    the Clerk and the Secretary of the Senate were authorized to receive
    messages during the adjournment (H. Con. Res. 239, Nov. 21, 1989, p.
    31156). For the views of the Speaker, the Minority Leader, and the
    Attorney General concerning pocket veto authority during an intrasession
    adjournment, see correspondence inserted in the Record (Jan. 23, 1990,
    p. 3); and for discussions of the constitutionality of intersession or
    intrasession pocket vetoes see Kennedy, ``Congress, The President, and
    The Pocket Veto,'' 63 Va. L. Rev. 355 (1977), and Hearing, Subcommittee
    on Legislative Process, Committee on Rules, on H.R. 849, 101st Congress.
      In the 93d Congress, the President returned a House bill without his
    signature to the Clerk of the House, who had been authorized to receive
    messages from the President during an adjournment to a day certain, and
    the President asserted in his veto message that he had ``pocket vetoed''
    the bill during the adjournment of the House to a day certain. The House
    regarded the President's return of the bill without his signature as a
    veto within the meaning of article I, section 7 of the Constitution and
    proceeded to reconsider and to pass the bill over the President's veto,
    after postponing consideration to a subsequent day (motion to postpone,
    Nov. 18, 1974, p.

    Sec. 114. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States,
    175 U.S. 423 (1899); Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 U.S. 506; the Pocket
    Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929); Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482
    (1932); Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938); Burke v. Barnes,
    479 U.S. 361 (1987) (vacating and remanding as moot the decision sub
    nom. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).

    [[Page 55]]

    Sec. 115. As to presentation of orders and
    resolutions for approval.

      \3\ Every Order,  Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence
    of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a
    question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the
    United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved
    by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of
    the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and
    Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.

      It has been settled conclusively that a joint resolution proposing an
    amendment to the Constitution should not be presented to the President
    for his approval (V, 7040; Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. [3 Dall.]
    378 (1798) ). Such joint resolutions, after passage by both Houses, are
    presented to the Archivist (1 U.S.C. 106b). Although the requirement of
    the Constitution seems specific, the practice of Congress has been to
    present to the President for approval only such concurrent resolutions
    as are legislative in effect (IV, 3483, 3484) which is not within the
    scope of the modern form of concurrent resolutions. See section 192,
    infra, for a discussion of Presidential approval of a joint resolution
    extending the period for State ratification of a constitutional
    amendment already submitted to the States. For discussion of
    ``Congressional Disapproval'' provisions contained in public laws, see
    Sec. 1013, infra.

    Sec. 116. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United
    States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United
    States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); INS v. Chadha, 103 S.Ct. 2764 (1983);
    Consumer's Union, Inc. v. FTC, 103 S.Ct. 3556 (1983); Consumer Energy
    Council of America v. FERC, 103 S.Ct. 3556 (1983).

    Sec. 117. The revenue power.

      Section 8. The Congress  shall
    have Power \1\ To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to
    pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of
    the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
    throughout the United States;
    <>   \2\ To borrow Money on the
    credit of the United States:

    Sec. 119. Power over commerce.

      \3\ To regulate  Commerce with
    foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
    Tribes;

    [[Page 56]]

    Sec. 120. Naturalization and bankruptcy.

      \4\ To establish  an
    uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of
    Bankruptcies throughout the United States;
    <>   \5\ To coin Money,
    regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of
    Weights and Measures;

    Sec. 122. Counterfeiting.

      \6\ To provide  for the Punishment
    of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;-
    -
    <>   \7\ To establish Post
    Offices and Post Roads;

    Sec. 124. Patents and copyrights.

      \8\ To promote  the
    Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
    Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
    and Discoveries;
    <>   \9\ To constitute Tribunals
    inferior to the supreme Court;
    <>   \10\
    To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,
    and Offenses against the Law of Nations;
    <>   \11\
    To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules
    concerning Captures on Land and Water;

    [[Page 57]]

    Sec. 128. War powers of Congress and the
    President.

      In the 93d  Congress, the Congress passed over the President's veto
    Public Law 93-148, relating to the power of Congress to declare war
    under this clause and the power of the President as Commander in Chief
    under article II, section 2, clause 1 (Sec. 178, infra). The law
    requires that the President report to Congress on the introduction of
    United States Armed Forces in the absence of a declaration of war. The
    President must terminate use of the Armed Forces unless Congress, within
    sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be
    submitted, (1) declares war or authorizes use of the Armed Forces; (2)
    extends by law the sixty-day period; or (3) is physically unable to meet
    as result of armed attack. The Act also provided that Congress could
    adopt a concurrent resolution requiring the removal of Armed Forces
    engaged in foreign hostilities, a provision which should be read in
    light of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Sections 6 and 7 of the Act
    provide congressional procedures for joint resolutions, bills, and
    concurrent resolutions introduced pursuant to the provisions of the Act
    (see Sec. 1013(2), infra). For further discussion of that Act, and war
    powers generally, see Deschler's Precedents, vol. 3, ch. 13.

    Sec. 129. Raising and support of armies.

      \12\ To raise  and
    support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a
    longer Term than two Years;
    <>   \13\ To provide and
    maintain a Navy;
    <>   \14\ To make Rules for the
    Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

    Sec. 132. Calling out the militia.

      \15\ To provide  for
    calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
    Insurrections and repel Invasions;

    Sec. 133. Power over militia.

      \16\ To provide  for
    organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing
    such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United
    States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the
    Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the
    discipline prescribed by Congress;

    [[Page 58]]

    Sec. 134. Power over territory of the United
    States.

      \17\ To exercise  exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such
    District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of
    particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of
    the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over
    all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in
    which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals,
    dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;--And

    -  \18\ To make <> all Laws
    which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
    foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
    the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
    thereof.

    Sec. 135. Congressional authority over
    the District of Columbia.

      Congress has provided  by law that ``all that part of the territory
    of the United States included within the present limits of the District
    of Columbia shall be the permanent seat of government of the United
    States'' (4 U.S.C. 71). Pursuant to its authority under this clause,
    Congress provided in 1970 for the people of the District of Columbia to
    be represented in the House of Representatives by a Delegate and for a
    Commission to report to the Congress on the organization of the
    government of the District of Columbia (P.L. 91-405; 84 Stat. 845). For
    the powers and duties of the Delegate from the District of Columbia, see
    rule XII (Sec. 740, infra) and Deschler's Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 7,
    sec. 3. In 1973, Congress passed the District of Columbia Self-
    Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, which reorganized the
    governmental structure of the District, provided a charter for local
    government subject to acceptance by a majority of the registered
    qualified voters of the District, delegated certain legislative powers
    to the District, and implemented certain recommendations of the
    Commission on the Organization of the Government of the District of
    Columbia (P.L. 93-198; 87 Stat. 774). Section 604 of that Act provides
    for Congressional action on certain district matters by providing a
    procedure for approval and disapproval of certain actions by the
    District of Columbia Council. The section, as amended by Public Law 98-
    473, permits a highly privileged motion to discharge a joint resolution
    of approval or disapproval which has not been reported by the committee
    to which referred within twenty calendar days after its introduction
    (see Sec. 1013(5), infra).

    [[Page 59]]

    Sec. 137. Migration or importation of
    persons.

      Section 9. \1\ The  Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States
    now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the
    Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a
    Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten
    dollars for each Person.

    Sec. 138. Writ of habeas corpus.

      \2\ The Privilege of  the
    Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
    Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.
    <>   \3\ No
    Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.

    Sec. 140. Capitation and direct
    taxes.

      \4\ [No Capitation,  or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the
    Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.]

    Sec. 141. Export duties.

      This provision was changed in 1913 by the 16th amendment to the
    Constitution.
       \5\ No Tax or Duty shall be laid on
    Articles exported from any State.

    Sec. 142. Freedom of commerce.

      \6\ No Preference  shall be
    given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State
    over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State,
    be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.

    Sec. 143. Appropriations and accounting of public
    money.

      \7\ No Money  shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
    Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the
    Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from
    time to time.

    [[Page 60]]
    Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever,
    from any King, Prince, or foreign State.

    Sec. 144. Titles of nobility and gifts from
    foreign states.

      \8\ No Title of  Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no
    Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without
    the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present,

    Sec. 145. Foreign gifts and
    decorations.

      Consent has been  granted to officers and employees of the government,
    under enumerated conditions, to accept certain gifts and decorations
    from foreign governments (see 5 U.S.C. 7342). The adoption of this act
    largely has obviated the practice of passing private bills to permit the
    officer or employee to retain the award. However, where the Speaker (who
    was one of the officers empowered by an earlier law to approve retention
    of decorations by Members of the House) was himself tendered an award
    from a foreign government, a private law (Private Law 91-244) was
    enacted to permit him to accept and wear the award so that he would not
    be in the position of reviewing his own application under the provisions
    of the law.

      Public Law 95-105 amended the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act (now 5
    U.S.C. 7342) to designate the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct
    of the House of Representatives as the ``employing agency'' for the
    House with respect to foreign gifts and decorations received by Members
    and employees; under that statute the Committee may approve the
    acceptance of foreign decorations and has promulgated regulations to
    carry out the Act with respect to Members and employees (Jan. 23, 1978,
    pp. 452-53), and disposes of foreign gifts which may not be retained by
    the donee.

      Opinions of Attorneys General:

      Gifts from Foreign Prince, 24 Op. Att'y Gen. 117 (1902); Foreign
    Diplomatic Commission, 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 538 (1871); Marshal of Florida,
    6 Op. Att'y Gen. 409 (1854).

    Sec. 146. States not to make treaties, coin
    money, pass ex post facto laws, impair contracts, etc.

      Section 10. \1\ No  State shall
    enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of
    Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing
    but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of
    Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of
    Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

    [[Page 61]]

    and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the
    Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be
    subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.

    Sec. 147. States not to lay imposts or
    duties.

      \2\ No State  shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or
    Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary
    for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties

    [House Rules Manual -- House Document No. 104-272]
    [From the U.S. Government Printing Office Online Database]
    [Pages 61-72]
    [DOCID:hrmanual-4]

    Sec. 148. States not to lay tonnage taxes, make
    compacts, or go to war.

      \3\ No State  shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay
    any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace,
    enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a
    foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such
    imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

                                  ARTICLE II.

    Sec. 149. Terms of the President and
    VicePresident.

      Section 1. \1\ The  executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
    United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of
    four years, and together with the Vice President, chosen for the same
    Term, be elected, as follows:

    [[Page 62]]

    ning of President Reagan's second term, with the
    oath being given at the White House on January 20, 1985, followed by a
    public ceremony on Monday, January 21, in the Rotunda of the Capitol.
    The 22d amendment provides that no person shall be elected President
    more than twice.

    Sec. 150. Commencement of President's term of
    office.

      George  Washington took the oath of office, as the first President on
    April 30, 1789 (III, 1986). The two Houses of the First Congress found,
    after examination by a joint committee, that by provisions made in the
    Federal Constitution and by the Continental Congress, the term of the
    President had, notwithstanding begun on March 4, 1789 (I, 3). The 20th
    amendment, declared to have been ratified on February 6, 1933, provides
    that Presidential terms shall end and successor terms shall begin at
    noon on January 20. Thus, Franklin D. Roosevelt's first term began on
    March 4, 1933, but ended at noon on January 20, 1937. Formerly, when
    March 4 fell on Sunday, the public inauguration of the President
    occurred at noon on March 5 (III, 1996; VI, 449). Following ratification
    of the 20th amendment, the first time inauguration day fell on Sunday
    was January 20, 1957, and Dwight David Eisenhower took the oath for his
    second term in a private ceremony at the White House on that day
    followed by a public inauguration ceremony on the steps of the East
    Front of the Capitol on Monday, January 21, 1957. A similar scenario was
    followed at the begin-

    Sec. 151. Electors of President and VicePresident
    and their qualifications.

      \2\ Each  State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
    Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole
    Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be
    entitled in the Congress; but no Senator or Representative, or Person
    holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be
    appointed an Elector.

    Sec. 152. Questions as to qualifications of
    electors.

      Questions  of the qualifications of electors have arisen, and in one
    instance certain ones were found disqualified, but as their number was
    not sufficient to affect the result and as there was doubt as to what
    tribunal should pass on the question the votes were counted (III, 1941).
    In other cases there were objections, but the votes were counted (III,
    1972-1974, 1979). In one instance an elector found to be disqualified
    resigned both offices, whereupon he was made eligible to fill the
    vacancy thus caused among electors (III, 1975).

    [[Page 63]]

    ber of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a
    majority of the whole Number of Electors
    appointed: and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and
    have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall
    immediately chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person
    have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House
    shall in like manner chuse the President. But in chusing the President,
    the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State
    having one Vote; A quorum for this purpose shall consist of a Member or
    Members from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States
    shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the
    President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the
    Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or
    more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot
    the Vice-President.]

    Sec. 152a. Original provision for failure of
    electoral college to choose, superseded by 12th amendment.

      \3\ [The  Electors
    shall meet in their respective States and vote by Ballot for two
    Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same
    State with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons
    voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall
    sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of Government of the
    United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of
    the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of
    Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be
    counted. The Person having the greatest Num-

    <>   \4\ The Congress may determine the Time of chusing
    the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which
    Day shall be the same throughout the United States.

      This third clause of article II, section 1 was superseded by the 12th
    amendment (see Sec. Sec. 219-223, infra).

    [[Page 64]]

    President of the Senate certificates of the appointment of the electors and
    of their votes (III, 1915-1917; VI, 439; 3 U.S.C. 11).

      The time for choosing electors has been fixed on ``the Tuesday next
    after the first Monday in November, in every fourth year''; and the
    electors in each State ``meet and give in their votes on the first
    Monday after the second Wednesday in December next following their
    appointment, at such place in each State as the legislature of such
    State shall direct'' (III, 1914; VI, 438; 3 U.S.C. 1, 7). The statutes
    also provide for transmitting to the

    Sec. 154. Qualifications of President of the United
    States.

      \5\ No  Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the
    United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall
    be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be
    eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty
    five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United
    States.-

    Sec. 155. Succession in case of removal, death,
    resignation, or disability of President and VicePresident.

      \6\ In  Case of the
    Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or
    Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the
    Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law
    provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both
    of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then
    act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the
    Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

    Sec. 156. Resignation of the President.

      Amendment  XXV
    provides for filling a vacancy in the office of the Vice President and,
    when the President is unable to perform the duties of his office, for
    the Vice President to assume those powers and duties as Acting
    President. During the 93d Congress, President Richard M. Nixon resigned
    from office on August 9, 1974, by delivering a signed resignation to the
    office of the Secretary of State, pursuant to 3 U.S.C. 20. Pursuant to
    amendment XXV, Vice President Gerald R. Ford became President and the
    House and Senate confirmed his nominee, Nelson A. Rockefeller, to become
    Vice President (December 19, 1974, p. 41516).

    [[Page 65]]

      Congress has also provided for the performance of the duties of the
    President in case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of
    the President and Vice President (3 U.S.C. 19).

    Sec. 157. Compensation of President.

      \7\ The  President
    shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which
    shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the Period for which he
    shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any
    other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.

      The compensation of the President is fixed at $200,000 per annum (3
    U.S.C. 102). In addition the law provides an expense allowance of
    $50,000 (3 U.S.C. 102; P.L. 91-1), and authorizes a travel allowance of
    not to exceed $100,000 (3 U.S.C. 103).

    Sec. 158. Oath of the President.

      \8\ Before  he enter on the
    Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or
    Affirmation:--``I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully
    execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the
    best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
    United States.''

    [[Page 66]]

    on the West Front, as scheduled, on January 21, 1985. Permission for such
    use was authorized by S. Con. Res. 144, 98th Congress.

    Sec. 159. Inauguration of the President.

      The  taking of this
    oath, which is termed the inauguration, is made the occasion of certain
    ceremonies which are arranged for by a joint committee of the two Houses
    (III, 1998, 1999; VI, 451). For many years the oath was normally taken
    at the east portico of the Capitol, although in earlier years it was
    taken in the Senate Chamber or Hall of the House (III, 1986-1995). On
    March 4, 1909, owing to inclemency of the weather, the President-elect
    took the oath and delivered his inaugural address in the Senate Chamber
    (VI, 447). And when Vice-President Fillmore succeeded to the vacancy in
    the office of President, Congress being in session, he took the oath in
    the Hall of the House in the presence of the Senate and House (III,
    1997). In 1945 Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had been elected for his
    fourth term as President, took the oath of office on the south portico
    at the White House. On August 9, 1974, Gerald R. Ford, who as Vice
    President succeeded to the Presidency following the resignation of
    President Nixon on that day, was sworn in in the East Room of the White
    House. The west front of the Capitol was first used for the inaugural
    ceremony for Ronald W. Reagan, Jan. 20, 1981. Because of extreme cold,
    the public administration of the oath was for the first time held in the
    Rotunda of the Capitol, rather than

    Sec. 160. The President the Commander in
    Chief.

      Section 2. \1\ The  President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of
    the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called
    into the actual Service of the United States; he may require
    the <> Opinion,
    in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive
    Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their
    respective <> Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and
    Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of
    Impeachment.

    Sec. 163. War powers of Congress and the President.

      In  the
    93d Congress, the Congress passed over the President's veto Public Law
    93-148, relating to the power of Congress to declare war under article
    I, section 8, clause 11 (Sec. 127, supra) and the power of the President
    as Commander in Chief. For further discussion of the reports to Congress
    required and the procedure for Congressional action provided under
    Public Law 93-148, see Sec. 128, supra.

    Sec. 164. Pardon of former President.

      In  1974, President
    Ford exercised his power under the last phrase of this clause by
    pardoning former President Nixon for any crimes he might have committed
    during a certain period in office (Proclamation 4311, September 8,
    1974). The former President had resigned following an impeachment
    inquiry in the House and the decision of the Committee on the Judiciary
    to report to the House recommending his impeachment by the House (Aug.
    20, 1974, p. 29219).

    [[Page 67]]

    Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, <> other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of
    the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
    Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
    established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
    such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in
    the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

    Sec. 165. President makes treaties.

      \2\ He  shall have Power,
    by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
    provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall
    nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the

      The power of the President to appoint diplomatic representatives to
    foreign governments and to determine their rank is derived from the
    Constitution and may not be circumscribed by statutory enactments (VII,
    1248). In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) the Supreme Court held
    that any appointee exercising significant authority (not merely internal
    delegable authorities within the Legislative Branch) pursuant to the
    laws of the United States is an Officer of the United States and must
    therefore be appointed pursuant to this clause, and that Congress cannot
    by law vest such appointment authority in its own officers or require
    that Presidential appointments be subject to confirmation by both
    Houses.

    Sec. 167. President's power to fill vacancies during
    recess of the Senate.

      \3\ The  President shall have Power to fill up all
    Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting
    Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.

    Sec. 168. Messages from the President.

      Section 3.  He shall
    from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the
    Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall
    judge necessary and expedient; * * *

    [[Page 68]]

    son. A message in writing is usually communicated to
    both Houses on the same day, but an original document accompanying can
    of course be sent to but one House (V, 6616, 6617). The President's
    State of the Union message delivered in person to the 95th Congress,
    second Session, together with separate hand-delivered written messages,
    were referred on motion to the Union Calendar and ordered printed (Jan.
    19, 1978, p. 152). In early years confidential messages were often sent
    and considered in secret session of the House (V, 7251, 7252).
      In the early years of the Government the President made a speech to
    Congress on its assembling (V, 6629), but in 1801 President Jefferson
    discontinued this practice and transmitted a message ``in writing.''
    This precedent was followed until April 8, 1913, when the custom of
    addressing Congress in person was resumed by President Wilson and, with
    the exception of President Hoover (VIII, 3333) has been followed
    generally by subsequent Presidents. Only messages of major importance
    are delivered in per-

    Sec. 169. Messages required by law.

      By  law (31 U.S.C. 1105),
    the President is required to transmit the Budget to Congress on or after
    the first Monday in January but not later than the first Monday in
    February each year. In addition, he is required to submit a supplemental
    budget summary by July 16 each year (31 U.S.C. 1106). Submission of the
    Economic Report of the President is required within 10 days after the
    submission of the January budget (15 U.S.C. 1022). The Congressional
    Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344; 88 Stat. 297)
    requires the transmittal to Congress by the President of amendments and
    revisions related to the budget on or before April 10 and July 15 of
    each year (sec. 601). In addition, the Act provides for the transmittal
    of messages proposing rescissions and deferrals of budget authority
    (sec. 1012-1014).

      When the President has indicated that he will address Congress in
    person a concurrent resolution is passed by both Houses arranging for a
    joint session to receive the message. At the appointed hour the Members
    of the Senate arrive and occupy the three front rows of the House. The
    President of the Senate (the Vice President) sits to the right of the
    Speaker, but in the absence of the Vice President, the President pro
    tempore sits to the left of the Speaker (Nov. 27, 1963, p. 22838). The
    Speaker presides.

    * * * <> he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both
    Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them,
    with Respect to the

    [[Page 69]]

    Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to
    such Time as he shall think proper; * * *

    Sec. 170. Reception of messages from the
    President.

      The  ceremony of receiving a message in writing is simple (V,
    6591), and may occur during consideration of a question of privilege (V,
    6640-6642) or before the organization of the House (V, 6647-6649) and in
    the absence of a quorum (V, 6650; VIII, 3339; clause 6 of rule XV).
    But, with the exception of vetoes, messages are regularly laid before
    the House only at the time prescribed by the rule for the order of
    business (V, 6635-6638) within the discretion of the Speaker (VIII,
    3341). While a message of the President is always read in full the
    latest rulings have not permitted the reading of the accompanying
    documents to be demanded as a matter of right (V, 5267-5271; VII, 1108).
    A concurrent resolution providing for a joint session to receive the
    President's message was held to be of the highest privilege (VIII,
    3335).

    * * * <> he shall receive Ambassadors and other
    public Ministers; he shall take Care That the Laws be faithfully
    executed, and shall Commission all the officers of the United States.

      In certain exigencies the President may convene Congress at a place
    other than the seat of government (I, 2; 2 U.S.C. 27). Congress has
    frequently been convened by the President (I, 10, 11; Nov. 17, 1947, p.
    10578; July 26, 1948, p. 9362), and in one instance, when Congress had
    provided by law for meeting, the President called it together on an
    earlier day (I, 12). The Congress having adjourned on July 27, 1947, p.
    10521, and on June 20, 1948, p. 9350, to a day certain, the President
    called it together on an earlier date than that to which it adjourned
    (Nov. 17, 1947, p. 10577, and July 26, 1948, p. 9362). There has been
    some discussion as to whether or not there is a distinction between a
    session called by the President and other sessions of Congress (I, 12,
    footnote).

    Sec. 173. Impeachment of civil officers.

      Section 4.  The
    President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States,
    shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
    Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

    [[Page 70]]

    vote held a Commissioner of the District of Columbia not to be a civil
    officer subject to impeachment under the Constitution (VI, 548).

    Sec. 174. As to the officers who may be impeached.

      In  the
    Blount trial the managers contended that all citizens of the United
    States were liable to impeachment, but this contention was not admitted
    (III, 2315), and in the Bellknap trial both managers and counsel for
    respondent agreed that a private citizen, apart from offense in an
    office, might not be impeached (III, 2007). But resignation of the
    office, does not prevent impeachment for crime or misdemeanor therein
    (III, 2007, 2317, 2444, 2445, 2459, 2509). In Blount's case it was
    decided that a Senator was not a civil officer within the meaning of the
    impeachment provisions of the Constitution (III, 2310, 2316). Questions
    have also arisen as to whether or not the Congressional Printer (III,
    1785), or a vice-consul-general (III, 2515), might be impeached.
    Proceedings for the impeachment of territorial judges have been taken in
    several instances (III, 2486, 2487, 2488), although various opinions
    have been given that such an officer is not impeachable (III, 2022,
    2486, 2493). A committee of the House by majority

    Sec. 175. Nature of impeachable offenses.

      As  to what are
    impeachable offenses there has been much discussion (III, 2008, 2019,
    2020, 2356,-2362, 2379-2381, 2405, 2406, 2410, 2498, 2510; VI, 455;
    Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States,
    Committee on the Judiciary, H. Rept. 93-1305, August 20, 1974, p. 29219;
    Associate Justice William O. Douglas, Final Report by the Special
    Subcommittee on H. Res. 920, Committee on the Judiciary, September 17,
    1970). For a time the theory that indictable offenses only were
    impeachable was stoutly maintained and as stoutly denied (III, 2356,
    2360-2362, 2379-2381, 2405, 2406, 2410, 2416); but on the tenth and 11th
    articles of the impeachment of the President (Andrew Johnson) the House
    concluded to impeach for other than indictable offenses (III, 2418), and
    in the Swayne trial the theory was definitely abandoned (III, 2019).
    While there has not been definite concurrence in the claim of the
    managers in the trial of the President that an impeachable offense is
    any misbehavior that shows disqualification to hold and exercise the
    office, whether moral, intellectual, or physical (III, 2015), yet the
    House has impeached judges for improper personal habits (III, 2328,
    2505), and in the impeachment of the President one of the articles
    charged him with ``intemperate, inflammatory, and scandalous harangues''
    in public addresses, tending to the harm of the Government (III, 2420).
    There was no conviction under these charges except in the single case of
    Judge Pickering, who was charged with intoxication on the bench (III,
    2328-2341). As to the impeachment of judges for other delinquencies,
    there has been much contention as to whether they may be impeached for
    any breach of good behavior (III, 2011, 2016, 2497), or only for
    judicial misconduct occurring in the actual administration of justice in
    connection with the court (III, 2010, 2013, 2017). The intent of the
    judge (III, 2014, 2382) as related to mistakes of the law, and the
    relations of intent to conviction have been discussed at length (III,
    2014, 2381, 2382, 2518, 2519). The statutes make nonresidence of a judge
    an impeachable offense, and the House has taken steps to impeach for
    this cause (III, 2476, 2512). There has, however, been some question as
    to the power of Congress to make an impeachable offense (III, 2014,
    2015, 2021, 2512). Usurpation of power has been examined several times
    in its relations as a cause for impeachment (III, 2404, 2508, 2509,
    2516, 2517). There has also been discussion as to whether or not there
    is distinction between a misdemeanor and a high misdemeanor (III, 2270,
    2367, 2492). Review of impeachments in Congress showing the nature of
    charges upon which impeachments have been brought and judgments of the
    Senate thereon (VI, 466).

    [[Page 71]]

    into scandal and disrepute and to destroy public confidence in his court and
    in the judicial system (Impeachment by the House, March 2, 1936, p.
    3091; Conviction by the Senate, April 17, 1936, p. 5606). Following his
    conviction by the Senate, former Judge Ritter brought an action for back
    salary, contending that the Senate had tried and convicted him for non-
    impeachable offenses. The U.S. Court of Claims held that the Senate's
    power to try impeachments was exclusive and not subject to judicial
    review. Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cls. 293 (1936), cert. denied,
    300 U.S. 668 (1937).

    Sec. 176. Later impeachment inquiries.

      The  articles of
    impeachment adopted by the House in 1936 against Judge Ritter charged a
    variety of judicial misconduct, including violations of criminal law;
    the seventh and general article, upon which Judge Ritter was convicted
    by the Senate, charged general misconduct to bring his court

      In 1970, a special subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary
    considered charges of impeachment against Associate Justice Douglas of
    the Supreme Court. The subcommittee recommended against his impeachment
    but concluded that a federal judge could be impeached (1) for judicial
    conduct which is a serious dereliction from public duty and (2) for
    nonjudicial conduct which is criminal in nature (Associate Justice
    William O. Douglas, Final Report by the Special Subcommittee on H. Res.
    920, Committee on the Judiciary, September 17, 1970).

      In 1974, the Committee on the Judiciary investigated charges of
    impeachment against President Nixon, and determined to recommend his
    impeachment to the House. The President having resigned, the committee
    reported to the House without submitting a resolution of impeachment,
    and the House accepted the report by resolution (H. Res. 1333, August
    20, 1974, p. 29361). The report of the committee included the text of
    the three articles of impeachment adopted by the committee. The
    committee had concluded that impeachable offenses need not be indictable
    offenses and had impeached the President (1) for violating his oath of
    office and his duty under the Constitution by preventing, obstructing,
    and impeding the administration of justice; (2) for engaging in a course
    of conduct violating the constitutional rights of citizens, impairing
    the administration of justice, and contravening the laws governing
    executive agencies; and (3) for failing to honor subpoenas issued by the
    Committee on the Judiciary in the course of its impeachment inquiry
    (Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States,
    Committee on the Judiciary, H. Rept. 93-1305, Aug. 20, 1974, printed in
    full in the Cong. Record, Aug. 22, 1974, p. 29219).

    [[Page 72]]

    the Senate, Judge Claiborne was convicted on three of the four articles
    of impeachment and removed from office on October 9, 1986.
      In 1986, for the first time since 1936, the House agreed to a
    resolution impeaching a federal district judge. Judge Harry Claiborne
    had been convicted of falsifying federal income tax returns. His final
    appeal was denied by the Supreme Court in April, and he began serving
    his prison sentence in May. Because he declined to resign, however,
    Judge Claiborne was still receiving his judicial salary and, absent
    impeachment, would resume the bench on his release from prison.
    Consequently, a resolution of impeachment was introduced on June 3, and
    on July 16, the Committee on the Judiciary reported to the House four
    articles of impeachment against Judge Claiborne. On July 22, the
    resolution was called up as a question of privilege and agreed to by a
    recorded vote of 406 yeas, 0 nays. After trial in

      In 1988, the House agreed to a resolution reported from the Committee
    on the Judiciary and called up as a question of the privileges of the
    House impeaching Federal district judge Alcee L. Hastings for high
    crimes and misdemeanors specified in 17 articles of impeachment, some of
    them addressing allegations on which the judge had been acquitted in a
    federal criminal trial (H. Res. 499, 100th Cong., Aug. 3, 1988, p.
    20206). No trial in the Senate was had before the adjournment of the
    100th Congress. In the 101st Congress, the House reappointed managers to
    conduct this impeachment in the Senate (Jan. 3, 1989, p. 84); the Senate
    began its deliberations on March 15, 1989 (p. 4219); conviction and
    removal from office occurred on October 20, 1989 (p. 25335). Also in the
    101st Congress, the Senate convicted Federal district judge Walter L.
    Nixon on two of the three impeachment charges brought against him (Nov.
    3, 1989, p. 27101). For further discussion of the continuance of
    impeachment proceedings in a succeeding Congress, see Sec. 620, infra.

    [House Rules Manual -- House Document No. 104-272]
    [From the U.S. Government Printing Office Online Database]
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    [DOCID:hrmanual-5]

      For further discussion of impeachment proceedings, see Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 3, ch. 14.

                              ARTICLE III.

    Sec. 177. The judges, their terms, and
    compensation.

      Section 1.  The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
    in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
    from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme
    and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and
    shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation,
    which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

    [[Page 73]]

    ralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which
    the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or
    more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between
    Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State
    claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or
    the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

    Sec. 178. Extent of the judicial
    power.

      Section 2. \1\ The  judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
    arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
    Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all
    Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all
    Cases of admi-

    Sec. 179. Original and appellate jurisdiction of the
    Supreme Court.

      \2\ In  all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
    and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme
    Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before
    mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as
    to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
    Congress shall make.

    Sec. 180. Places of trial of crimes by jury.

      \3\ The  Trial
    of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and
    such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have
    been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall
    be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.

    [[Page 74]]

    Sec. 181. Treason against the United
    States.

      Section 3. \1\ Treason  against the United States, shall consist only in levying War
    against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and
    Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony
    of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.

    [House Rules Manual -- House Document No. 104-272]
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    Sec. 182. Punishment for treason.

      \2\ The  Congress shall
    have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of
    Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the
    Life of the Person Attainted.

                                   ARTICLE IV.

    Sec. 183. Each State to give credit to acts,
    records, etc., of other States.

      Section 1.  Full Faith and Credit shall be given
    in each State to the Public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of
    every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the
    Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and
    the Effect thereof.
    <>   Section 2.
    \1\ The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
    Immunities of Citizens in the several States.

    Sec. 185. Extradition for treason, felony, or other
    crime.

      \2\ A  Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other
    Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall
    on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be
    delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the
    Crime.

    [[Page 75]]

    Sec. 186. Persons held to service or labor.

      \3\ No  Person
    held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping
    into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be
    discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on
    Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.

    Sec. 187. Admission and formation of new
    States.

      Section 3. \1\ New  States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no
    new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any
    other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more
    States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of
    the States concerned as well as of the Congress.

    Sec. 188. Power of Congress over territory and other
    national property.

      \2\ The  Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make
    all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
    Property belonging to
    the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so
    construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any
    particular State.

      The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held
    that the property clause does not prohibit the transfer of United States
    property to foreign nations through self-executing treaties. Edwards v.
    Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (1978), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978).

    [House Rules Manual -- House Document No. 104-272]
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    [[Page 76]]

    Sec. 189. Republican form of government and
    protection from domestic violence guaranteed to the States.

      Section 4. The  United
    States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
    Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on
    Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the
    Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence.

                                      ARTICLE V.

    Sec. 190. Amendments to the Constitution.

      The  Congress,
    whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
    propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the
    Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a
    Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be
    valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when
    ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or
    by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of
    Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment
    which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight
    shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth
    Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent,
    shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

    [[Page 77]]

    Sec. 191. Form of and action on amendments to the
    Constitution.

      Amendments  to the Constitution are proposed in the form of joint
    resolutions, which have their several readings and are enrolled and
    signed by the presiding officers of the two Houses (V, 7029, footnote),
    but are not presented to the President for his approval (V, 7040; see
    discussion under Sec. 115, supra; Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. [3
    Dall.] 378 (1798)). They are filed with the Archivist who, under the law
    (1 U.S.C. 106b; 1 U.S.C. 112), has the responsibility for the
    certification and publication of such amendments, once they are ratified
    by the States. Under the earlier procedure, the two Houses sometimes
    requested the President to transmit to the States certain proposed
    amendments (V, 7041, 7043), but a concurrent resolution to that end was
    without privilege (VIII, 3508). The President notified Congress by
    message of the promulgation of the ratification of a constitutional
    amendment (V, 7044).

    Sec. 192. The twothirds vote on proposed
    amendments.

      The  vote required on a joint resolution proposing an amendment
    to the Constitution is two-thirds of those voting, a quorum being
    present, and not two-thirds of the entire membership (V, 7027, 7028;
    VIII, 3503). The majority required to pass a constitutional amendment,
    like the majority required to pass a bill over the President's veto
    (VII, 1111) and the majority required to adopt a motion to suspend the
    rules (Dec. 16, 1981, pp. 31850, 31851, 31855, 31856), is two-thirds of
    those Members voting either in the affirmative or negative, a quorum
    being present, and Members who only indicate that they are ``present''
    are not counted in this computation (Speaker pro tempore Wright, Nov.
    15, 1983, p. 32685). The requirement of the two-thirds vote applies to
    the vote on the final passage and not to amendments (V, 7031, 7032;
    VIII, 3504), or prior stages (V, 7029, 7030), but is required where the
    House votes on agreeing to Senate amendments (V, 7033, 7034; VIII,
    3505), or on agreeing to a conference report (V, 7036). One House
    having, by a two-thirds vote, passed in amended form a proposed
    constitutional amendment from the other House, and then having by a
    majority vote receded from its amendment, the constitutional amendment
    was held not to be passed (V, 7035).

      In the 95th Congress, both the House and Senate agreed by a majority
    vote to House Joint Resolution 638, extending the time period for
    ratification by the States of the Equal Rights Amendment, where House
    Joint Resolution 208 of the 92d Congress, proposing the amendment, had
    provided for a seven-year ratification period. The House determined in
    the 95th Congress, by laying on the table by a rollcall vote a
    privileged resolution asserting that a vote of two-thirds of the Members
    present and voting was required to pass a joint resolution extending the
    ratification period for a constitutional amendment already submitted to
    the States, that only a majority vote was required on H.J. Res. 638
    (Speaker O'Neill, Aug. 15, 1978, pp. 26203-04).

      The joint resolution extending the ratification period for the Equal
    Rights Amendment was delivered to the President, who signed it although
    expressing doubt as to the necessity for his doing so (Presidential
    Documents, Oct. 19, 1978). When sent to the Archivist, the joint
    resolution was not assigned a public law number, but the Archivist
    notified the States of the action of the Congress in extending the
    ratification period. For a judicial decision voiding this extension as
    well as declaring that a State does have the power to rescind a prior
    ratification of a proposed constitutional amendment, see Idaho v.
    Freeman, 529 F.Supp. 1107 (D.C.D. Idaho, 1981), judgment stayed sub nom.
    National Organization of Women v. Idaho, 455 U.S. 918 (1982), vacated
    and remanded to dismiss, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).

      The yeas and nays are not required to pass a joint resolution
    proposing to amend the Constitution (V, 7038-7039; VIII, 3506).

    [[Page 78]]

      Question has arisen as to the power of a State to recall its assent to
    a constitutional amendment (V, 7042; footnotes to Sec. Sec. 225, 234,
    infra) but has not been the subject of a final judicial determination.

    [House Rules Manual -- House Document No. 104-272]
    [From the U.S. Government Printing Office Online Database]
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    Sec. 193. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350
    (1920); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S.
    221 (1920); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921); Chandler v. Wise, 307
    U.S. 474 (1939); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).

                                   ARTICLE VI.

    Sec. 194. Validity of debts and engagements.

      \1\ All  Debts
    contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this
    Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this
    Constitution, as under the Confederation.

    Sec. 195. Constitution, laws, and treaties the
    supreme law of the land.

      \2\ This  Constitution, and the Laws of the United
    States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
    or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
    be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
    bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
    Contrary notwithstanding.

    Sec. 196. Oaths of public officers; and prohibition of
    religious tests.

      \3\ The  Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and
    the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and
    judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States,
    shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but
    no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any
    Office or public Trust under the United States.

    [[Page 79]]

    discharge the duties of the office on which I am
    about to enter. So help me God.''

    Sec. 197. Form of oath.

      The  form of the oath is prescribed
    by statute (5 U.S.C. 3331; I, 128): ``I, AB, do solemnly swear (or
    affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United
    States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true
    faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely,
    without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that I will
    well and faithfully

    Sec. 198. Administration of oath at organization.

      The  Act of
    June 1, 1789 (2 U.S.C. 25), provides that on the organization of the
    House and previous to entering on any other business the oath shall be
    administered by any Member (generally the Member with longest continuous
    service) (I, 131; VI, 6) to the Speaker and by the Speaker to the other
    Members and Clerk (I, 130). The Act, has at times been considered in the
    House as directory merely (I, 118, 242, 243, 245; VI, 6); but at other
    times has been observed carefully (I, 118, 140). The Act was cited by
    the Clerk in recognizing for nominations for Speaker as being of higher
    constitutional privilege than a resolution to postpone the election of a
    Speaker and instead provide for the election of a Speaker pro tempore
    pending the disposition of certain ethics charges against the nominee of
    the majority party (Jan. 7, 1997, p. ----).

      Previously it was the custom to administer the oath by State
    delegations, but beginning with the 71st Congress Members-elect have
    been sworn in en masse (VI, 8). The Clerk supplies printed copies of the
    oath to Members and Delegates who have taken the oath in accordance with
    law, which shall be subscribed by the Members and Delegates and
    delivered to the Clerk to be recorded in the Journal and Congressional
    Record as conclusive proof of the fact that the signer duly took the
    oath in accordance with law (2 U.S.C. 25). See Deschler's Precedents,
    vol. 1, ch. 2. The Speaker has requested that guests in the gallery rise
    with the Members during the administration of the oath of office to a
    Member-elect (Nov. 12, 1991, p. 31255).

    [[Page 80]]

    Sec. 199. Functions of the Speaker in administering the
    oath.

      The  Speaker possesses no arbitrary power in the administration of
    the oath (I, 134), and when objection is made the question must be
    decided by the House and not by the Chair (I, 519, 520). An objection
    prevents the Speaker from administering the oath of his own authority,
    even though the credentials be regular in form (I, 135-138). The Speaker
    has frequently declined to administer the oath in cases wherein the
    House has, by its action, indicated that he should not do so (I, 139,
    140). And in case of doubt he has waited the instruction of the House
    (I, 396; VI, 11). There has been discussion as to the competency of a
    Speaker pro tempore to administer the oath (I, 170), and in the absence
    of the Speaker a Member-elect waited until the Speaker should be present
    (I, 179), but in 1920 a Speaker pro tempore whose designation by the
    Speaker had been approved by the House, administered the oath to a
    Member (VI, 20). The House may authorize the Speaker to administer the
    oath to a Member away from the House (I, 169), or may, in such a case,
    authorize another than the Speaker to administer the oath (I, 170; VI,
    14). For forms used in this procedure see (VI, 14).

    Sec. 200. Administration of the oath as related
    to the quorum.

      Members-elect  have been sworn at the beginning of a second session
    before the ascertainment of a quorum (I, 176-178), but when the Clerk
    called the second session of the 87th Congress to order, Members-elect
    were not sworn prior to ascertainment of a quorum and election of
    Speaker McCormack to succeed Speaker Rayburn, who had died during the
    sine die adjournment (Jan. 10, 1962, p. 5). Members-elect have also been
    sworn where a roll call or other ascertainment has shown the absence of
    a quorum (I, 178, 181, 182; VI, 21) but in one instance, however, the
    Speaker declined to administer the oath under such circumstances (II,
    875).

    Sec. 201. Privilege of administration of the
    oath.

      A  proposition to administer the oath to a Member is a matter of
    high privilege (VI, 14), and the oath has been administered during a
    call of the roll on a motion to agree to rules at the time of
    organization (I, 173; VI, 22), before the reading of the Journal (I,
    172), in the absence of a quorum (VI, 22), on Calendar Wednesday (VI,
    22), before a pending motion to amend the Journal (I, 171), and after
    the previous question has been ordered on a bill reported back to the
    House from the Committee of the Whole (Oct. 3, 1969, p. 28487). A
    division being demanded on a resolution for seating several claimants,
    the oath may be administered to each as soon as his case is decided (I,
    623). Where a Member-elect whose right to a seat has been determined by
    the House presents himself to take the oath, his right to be sworn is
    complete and cannot be deferred even by a motion to adjourn (I, 622),
    but the Speaker has entertained the motion to adjourn after adoption of
    a seating resolution but before the Member-elect was present in the
    Chamber to take the oath (May 1, 1985, p. 10019).

    Sec. 202. Challenge of the right to take the oath.

      The  right
    of a Member-elect to take the oath is sometimes challenged and the
    Speaker requests the Member-elect to stand aside temporarily (VI, 9-11,
    174; VIII, 3386). This usually occurs at the time of organization of the
    House. The challenge proceeds from some Member, but the fact that he has
    not yet taken the oath himself does not debar him from making the
    challenge (I, 141). The Member challenging does so on his responsibility
    as a Member or on the strength of documents (I, 448) or on both (I, 443,
    474). And where an objection was sustained neither by affidavit nor on
    the responsibility of the Member objecting, the House declined to
    entertain it (I, 455).

    [[Page 81]]

    held that the House might direct contested
    names to be passed over until the other Members-elect had been sworn in
    (I, 154). Motions and debate are in order on the questions involved in a
    challenge, and in a few cases other business has intervened by unanimous
    consent (I, 149, 150). By unanimous consent the consideration of a
    challenge is sometimes deferred until after the completion of the
    organization (I, 474), and by unanimous consent also the House has
    sometimes proceeded to legislative business pending consideration of the
    right of a Member to be sworn (I, 151-152).

    Sec. 203. Consideration of an objection to the taking of
    the oath.

      It  has been held, although not uniformly, that in cases where
    the right of a Member-elect to take the oath is challenged, the Speaker
    may direct the Member to stand aside temporarily (I, 143-146, 474; VI,
    9, 174; VIII, 3386). The Member so challenged is not thereby deprived of
    any right (I, 155). Similarly, the seating of a Member-elect does not
    prejudice a pending contest, brought under the Federal Contested
    Elections Act (2 U.S.C. 381-396), over final right to the seat (Jan. 7,
    1997, p. ----). When several are challenged and stand aside the question
    is first taken on the Member-elect first required to stand aside (I,
    147, 148). In 1861 it was

    Sec. 204. Relation of credentials to the right to
    take the oath.

      Although  the House has emphasized the impropriety of swearing in
    a Member without credentials (I, 162-168), yet it has been done in cases
    wherein the credentials are delayed or lost and there is no doubt of the
    election (I, 85, 176-178; VI, 12, 13), or where the governor of a State
    has declined to give credentials to a person whose election was
    undoubted and uncontested (I, 553). A certificate of election in due
    form having been filed, the Clerk placed the name of the Member-elect on
    the roll, although he was subsequently advised that a State Supreme
    Court had issued a writ restraining the Secretary of State from issuing
    such certificate (Jan. 3, 1949, p. 8). Where the prima facie right is
    contested the Speaker declines to administer the oath (I, 550), but the
    House admits on his prima facie showing and without regard to final
    right a Member-elect from a recognized constituency whose credentials
    are in due form and whose qualifications are unquestioned (I, 528-534).
    If the status of the constituency is in doubt, the House usually defers
    the oath (I, 361, 386, 448, 461). In the 99th Congress, the House
    declined to give prima facie effect to a certificate of election, the
    results of the election being in doubt, and referred the issue of
    initial as well as final right to the Committee on House Administration
    (H. Res. 1, Jan. 3, 1985, p. 380-7). After a recount of the votes was
    conducted by that committee, the House on its recommendation declared
    the candidate without the certificate entitled to the seat (H. Res. 146,
    May 1, 1985, p. 9998). The House also may defer the oath when a question
    of qualifications arises (I, 474), but it may investigate qualifications
    after the oath is taken (I, 156-159, 420, 462, 481), and after
    investigation unseat the Member by majority vote (I, 428).

    [[Page 82]]

    the Constitution. In Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966), the Supreme Court
    held that the exclusion by a State legislature of a member-elect of that
    body was unconstitutional, where the legislature had asserted the power to
    judge the sincerity with which the Member-elect could take the oath to
    support the Constitution of the United States. In the 97th Congress, the
    House declared vacant a seat where the Member-elect was unable to take the
    oath because of illness, where the medical prognosis showed no likelihood
    of improvement to permit the Member-elect to take the oath or assume the
    duties of a Representative (H. Res. 80, Feb. 24, 1981, pp. 2916-18).

    Sec. 205. Sanity and loyalty as related to the
    oath.

      Questions  of sanity (I, 441) and loyalty (I, 448) seem to pertain to the
    competency to take the oath rather than to the question of
    qualifications, although there has been not a little debate on this
    subject (I, 479). In one case a Member-elect who had not taken the oath,
    was excluded from the House because of disloyalty, where the resolution
    of exclusion and the committee report thereon concluded that he was
    ineligible to take a seat as a Representative under the express
    provisions of section 3 of the 14th amendment (VI, 56-59). This action
    by the House was cited in the Supreme Court decision of Powell v.
    McCormack (395 U.S. 486, 545 fn. 83) which denied the power of the House
    to exclude Members-elect by a majority vote for other than failure to
    meet the express qualifications stated in

    [House Rules Manual -- House Document No. 104-272]
    [From the U.S. Government Printing Office Online Database]
    [Pages 82-83]
    [DOCID:hrmanual-9]

    Sec. 206. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
    316 (1819); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867); Davis v.
    Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Mormon Church  v. United States, 136 U.S. 1
    (1890).

                                  ARTICLE VII.

    Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the

    Sec. 207. Ratification of the Constitution.

      The  Ratification
    of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the
    Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the
    Same.

        Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand

        seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United

        States of America the Twelfth In Witness whereof We have hereunto

        subscribed our Names,

                                         Go WASHINGTON--Presidt.

                                                   and Deputy from Virginia.

        [Signed also by the deputies of twelve States.]

    John Langdon,                        Nicholas Gilman.

                                 New Hampshire.

    Nathaniel Gorham,                    Rufus King.

    [[Page 83]]
                                 Massachusetts.

    Wm. Saml. Johnson,                   Roger Sherman.

                                  Connecticut.

    Alexander Hamilton.

                                    New York.

    Wil: Livingston,                     Wm. Paterson,

    David Brearley,                      Jona: Dayton.

                                   New Jersey.

    B Franklin,                          Thomas Mifflin,

    RobT. Morris,                   Geo. Clymer,

    Thos. FitzSimons,                    Jared Ingersoll,

    James Wilson,                        Gouv Morris.

                                  Pennsylvania.

    Geo. Read,                           Gunning Bedford jun,

    John Dickinson,                      Richard Bassett.

    Jaco Broom,

                                    Delaware.

    James McHenry,                       Dan of ST Thos. Jenifer.

    Danl Carroll,

                                    Maryland.

    John Blair,                          James Madison Jr.

                                    Virginia.

    Wm. Blount,                          Rich'D. Dobbs Spaight.

    Hu Williamson,

                                 North Carolina.

    J. Rutledge,                         Charles Cotesworth Pinckney,

    Charles Pinckney,                    Pierce Butler.

                                 South Carolina.

    William Few,                         Abr Baldwin.

                                    Georgia.

    [House Rules Manual -- House Document No. 104-272]
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    [[Page 84]]

      Attest:                            William Jackson, Secretary.

       articles in addition to, and amendment of, the constitution of the

      united states of america, proposed by congress, and ratified by the

          several states pursuant to the fifth article of the original

                              constitution\1\

                                  AMENDMENT I.

    Sec. 208. Freedom of religion, of speech, and of
    peaceable assembly.

      Congress  shall make no law respecting an establishment of
    religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
    freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
    to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

                                  AMENDMENT II.

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sec. 209. The right to bear arms.

      A  well regulated Militia
    being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people
    to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.

    [[Page 85]]

      \1\ The first ten amendments to the Constitution of the United
    States were proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the
    First Congress on September 25, 1789 (this date and the date succeeding
    amendments were proposed is the date of final Congressional action--
    signature by the presiding officer of the Senate--as is shown in the
    Senate Journals). They were ratified by the following States, on the
    dates shown, and the notifications by the governors thereof of
    ratification were communicated by the President to Congress: New Jersey,
    November 20, 1789; Maryland, December 19, 1789; North Carolina, December
    22, 1789; South Carolina, January 19, 1790; New Hampshire, January 25,
    1790; Delaware, January 28, 1790; New York, February 27, 1790;
    Pennsylvania, March 10, 1790; Rhode Island, June 7, 1790; Vermont,
    November 3, 1791; and Virginia, December 15, 1791. Ratification was
    completed on December 15, 1791. The amendments were subsequently
    ratified by Massachusetts, March 2, 1939; Georgia, March 18, 1939; and
    Connecticut, April 19, 1939.

                                 AMENDMENT III.

    Sec. 210. Quartering of soldiers in houses.

      No  soldier
    shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent
    of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by
    law.

                                  AMENDMENT IV.

    Sec. 211. Security from unreasonable searches and
    seizures.

      The  right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
    papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
    not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
    supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
    to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

                                  AMENDMENT V.

    [[Page 86]]

    Sec. 212. Security as to accusations, trials, and
    property.

      No  person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
    infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
    except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,
    when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any
    person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
    life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be a
    witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
    without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
    public use, without just compensation.

                                  AMENDMENT VI.

    Sec. 213. Right to trial by jury and to confront witnesses
    and secure testimony.

      In  all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
    enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
    the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
    which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
    informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
    with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
    witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
    defence.

                                 AMENDMENT VII.

    Sec. 214. Jury trial in suits at common law.

      In  suits at
    common law, where the value in Controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
    the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
    jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,
    than according to the rules of the common law.

    <>   Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
    fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

    [[Page 87]]

                                 AMENDMENT VIII.

    <>   The enumeration in
    the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
    construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

                                  AMENDMENT IX.

                                  AMENDMENT X.

    Sec. 217. Powers reserved to the States.

      The  powers not
    delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
    to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
    people.

                              AMENDMENT XI.\2\

    Sec. 218. Extent of the judicial power

      The  Judicial power of
    the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
    equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
    Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
    State.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [[Page 88]]
      \2\ The 11th amendment to the Constitution of the United States
    was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the Third
    Congress on March 11, 1794; and was declared in a message from the
    President to Congress dated the 8th of January, 1798, to have been
    ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the States. The dates
    of ratification were: New York, March 27, 1794; Rhode Island, March 31,
    1794; Connecticut, May 8, 1794; New Hampshire, June 16, 1794;
    Massachusetts, June 26, 1794; Vermont, October 28, 1794; Virginia,
    November 18, 1794; Georgia, November 29, 1794; Kentucky, December 7,
    1794; Maryland, December 26, 1794; Delaware, January 23, 1795; and North
    Carolina, February 7, 1795. Ratification was completed on February 7,
    1795. The amendment was subsequently ratified by South Carolina on
    December 4, 1797. New Jersey and Pennsylvania did not take action on the
    amendment.

                             AMENDMENT XII.\3\

    Sec. 219. Meeting of the electors and transmission and
    count of their votes.

      The  Electors shall meet in their respective states,
    and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at
    least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves;
    they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and
    in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they
    shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of
    all persons voted for as Vice-President, and the number of votes for
    each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to
    the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the
    President of the Senate;--The President of the Senate shall, in presence
    of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates
    and the votes shall then be counted;-- * * *
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [[Page 89]]

      \3\ The 12th amendment to the Constitution of the United States
    was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the Eighth
    Congress on December 12, 1803, in lieu of the original third paragraph
    of the first section of the second article, and was declared in a
    proclamation of the Secretary of State, dated the 25th of September,
    1804, to have been ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the
    States. The dates of ratification were: North Carolina, December 21,
    1803; Maryland, December 24, 1803; Kentucky, December 27, 1803; Ohio,
    December 30, 1803; Virginia, December 31, 1803; Pennsylvania, January 5,
    1804; Vermont, January 30, 1804; New York, February 10, 1804; New
    Jersey, February 22, 1804; Rhode Island, March 12, 1804; South Carolina,
    May 15, 1804; Georgia, May 19, 1804; New Hampshire, June 15, 1804.
    Ratification was completed on June 15, 1804. The amendment was
    subsequently ratified by Tennessee on July 27, 1804. The amendment was
    rejected by Delaware, January 18, 1804; Massachusetts, February 3, 1804;
    and by Connecticut at its session begun May 10, 1804.

    Sec. 220. The electoral count.

      The  electoral count occurs in
    the Hall of the House (III, 1819) at 1 p.m. on the sixth day of January
    succeeding every meeting of electors (3 U.S.C. 15). However, the date
    for the 1957 count was changed to Monday, January 7 (P.L. 84-436); the
    date for the 1985 count was changed to Monday, January 7 (P.L. 98-456);
    the date for the 1989 count was changed to Wednesday, January 4 (P.L.
    100-646); and the date for the 1997 count was changed to Thursday,
    January 9 (P.L. 104-296). While a law prescribes in detail the procedure
    at the count, the two Houses by concurrent resolution provide for the
    meeting to count the vote, for the appointment of tellers and for the
    declaration of the state of the vote (III, 1961). Under the law
    governing the proceedings, the two Houses divide to consider objections
    to the counting of any electoral vote (3 U.S.C. 15; Jan. 6, 1969, pp.
    145-47); and when they have divided, a motion in the House to lay the
    objection on the table is not in order (Jan. 6, 1969; pp. 169-72). The
    Vice President-elect, as Speaker of the House, has participated in the
    ceremonies (VI, 446). See Deschler's Precedents, vol. 3, ch. 10 for
    discussion of the electoral college and the counting of electoral votes
    by the House and Senate.

    [[Page 90]]

    as in the case of the death or other constitutional
    disability of the President. The person having the greatest number of
    votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be
    a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person
    have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the
    Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall
    consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of
    the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person
    constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible
    to that of Vice-President of the United States.

    Sec. 221. Elections of President and VicePresident
    by the House and Senate in certain cases.

      * * * The  person having the greatest
    number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be
    a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person
    have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not
    exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House
    of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President.
    But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the
    representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this
    purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the
    states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice.
    And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President
    whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth
    day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as
    President,

    Sec. 222. History of original provision for failure of
    electoral college to choose.

      The  20th amendment to the Constitution has
    clarified some of the provisions of the 12th amendment. In 1801 (III,
    1983), the House of Representatives chose a President under article II,
    section 1, clause 3 (see Sec. 152a, supra), the constitutional provision
    superseded by the 12th amendment.

    Sec. 223. Occasions of election by House and Senate after
    1803.

      In  1825 the House elected a President under the 12th amendment
    (III, 1985); and in 1837 the Senate elected a Vice-President (III,
    1941).

                             AMENDMENT XIII.\4\

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sec. 224. Prohibition of slavery and involuntary
    servitude.

      Section 1.  Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
    punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
    shall

    [[Page 91]]

    exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
    jurisdiction.

      \4\ The 13th amendment to the Constitution of the United States
    was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 38th
    Congress, on February 1, 1865, and was declared, in a proclamation of
    the Secretary of State, dated the 18th of December 1865, to have been
    ratified by the legislatures of twenty-seven of the thirty-six States.
    The dates of ratification were: Illinois, February 1, 1865; Rhode
    Island, February 2, 1865; Michigan, February 2, 1865; Maryland, February
    3, 1865; New

      Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
    appropriate legislation.

                             AMENDMENT XIV.\5\

    _______________

    York, February 3, 1865; Pennsylvania, February 3, 1865;
    West Virginia, February 3, 1865; Missouri, February 6, 1865; Maine,
    February 7, 1865; Kansas, February 7, 1865; Massachusetts, February 7,
    1865; Virginia, February 9, 1865; Ohio, February 16, 1865; Indiana,
    February 13, 1865; Nevada, February 16, 1865; Louisiana, February 17,
    1865; Minnesota, February 23, 1865; Wisconsin, February 24, 1865;
    Vermont, March 9, 1865; Tennessee, April 7, 1865; Arkansas, April 14,
    1865; Connecticut, May 4, 1865; New Hampshire, July 1, 1865; South
    Carolina, November 13, 1865; Alabama, December 2, 1865; North Carolina,
    December 4, 1865; and Georgia, December 6, 1865. Ratification was
    completed on December 6, 1865. The amendment was subsequently ratified
    by Oregon, December 8, 1865; California, December 19, 1865; Florida,
    December 28, 1865 (Florida again ratified on June 9, 1868, upon its
    adoption of a new constitution); Iowa, January 15, 1866; New Jersey,
    January 23, 1866 (after having rejected the amendment on March 16,
    1865); Texas, February 18, 1870; Delaware, February 12, 1901 (after
    having rejected the amendment on February 8, 1865); Kentucky, March 30,
    1976 (after hearing rejected the amendment on February 24, 1865). The
    amendment was rejected by Mississippi, December 4, 1865.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sec. 225. Citizenship: security and equal
    protection of citizens.

      Section 1. All  persons born or naturalized in the United
    States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
    United States and of the

      \5\ The 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States
    was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 39th
    Congress, on June 15, 1866. On July 20, 1868, the Secretary of State
    issued a proclamation that the 14th amendment was a part of the
    Constitution if withdrawals of ratification were ineffective. On July
    21, 1868, Congress adopted and transmitted to the Department of State a
    concurrent resolution declaring that ``the legislatures of the States of
    Connecticut, Tennessee, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, New York, Ohio,
    Illinois, West Virginia, Kansas, Maine, Nevada, Missouri, Indiana,
    Minnesota, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Iowa, Arkansas,
    Florida, North Carolina, Alabama, South Carolina, and Louisiana, being
    three-fourths

    [[Page 92]]

    State wherein they reside. No State shall make
    or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
    citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
    life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
    person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
    --------------
    and more of the several States of the Union, have ratified
    the fourteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United
    States, duly proposed by two-thirds of each House of the Thirty-ninth
    Congress: Therefore Resolved, That said fourteenth article is hereby
    declared to be a part of the Constitution of the United States, and it
    shall be duly promulgated as such by the Secretary of State.'' The
    Secretary of State accordingly issued a proclamation, dated July 28,
    1868, declaring that the proposed 14th amendment had been ratified, in
    the manner hereafter mentioned, by the legislatures of 28 States. The
    dates of ratification were: Connecticut, June 30, 1866; New Hampshire,
    July 6, 1866; Tennessee, July 18, 1866; New Jersey, September 11, 1866
    (subsequently, on February 20, 1868, the legislature rescinded its
    ratification, and on March 24, 1868, readopted its resolution of
    rescission over the Governor's veto); Oregon, September 19, 1866; New
    York, January 10, 1867; Ohio, January 11, 1867 (subsequently rescinded
    its ratification on January 13, 1868); Illinois, January 15, 1867; West
    Virginia, January 16, 1867; Michigan, January 16, 1867; Minnesota,
    January 16, 1867; Kansas, January 17, 1867; Maine, January 19, 1867;
    Nevada, January 22, 1867; Indiana, January 23, 1867; Missouri, January
    25, 1867; Pennsylvania, February 6, 1867; Rhode Island, February 7,
    1867; Wisconsin, February 13, 1867; Massachusetts, March 20, 1867;
    Nebraska, June 15, 1867; Iowa, March 16, 1868; Arkansas, April 6, 1868;
    Florida, June 9, 1868; North Carolina, July 4, 1868 (after having
    rejected the amendment December 14, 1866); Louisiana, July 9, 1868
    (after having rejected the amendment February 6, 1867); South Carolina,
    July 9, 1868 (after having rejected the amendment December 20, 1866).
    Ratification was completed on July 9, 1868. The amendment was
    subsequently ratified by Alabama, July 13, 1868; Georgia, July 21, 1868
    (after having rejected it on November 9, 1866); Virginia, October 8,
    1869 (after having rejected it on January 9, 1867); Mississippi, January
    17, 1870; Texas, February 18, 1870 (after having rejected it on October
    27, 1866); Delaware, February 12, 1901 (after having rejected it on
    February 8, 1867); Maryland, April 4, 1959 (after having rejected it on
    March 23, 1867); California, May 6, 1959; Kentucky, March 30, 1976
    (after having rejected it on January 10, 1867).

    [[Page 93]]

                  Continued

    Sec. 226. Apportionment of
    representation.

      Section 2.  Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
    States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number
    of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the
    right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President
    and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress,
    the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the
    Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such
    State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States,
    or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
    crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the
    proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the
    whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

    [[Page 94]]

    statute for the elections to
    the 91st Congress by Public Law 90-196; see 2 U.S.C. 2c). After any
    apportionment, until a State is redistricted in a manner provided by its
    own law and in compliance with the Congressional mandate, the question
    of whether its Representatives shall be elected by districts, at large,
    or by a combination of both, is determined by the Apportionment Act of
    1941 (2 U.S.C. 2a). See Deschler's Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 8 for
    apportionment and districting.

    Sec. 227. Law governing the establishment of
    districts.

      There  has been a readjustment of House representation each ten
    years except during the period 1911 to 1929 (VI, 41; footnote). From
    March 4, 1913, permanent House membership has remained fixed at 435 (VI,
    40, 41; 37 Stat. 13). Upon admission of Alaska and Hawaii to state-hood,
    total membership was temporarily increased to 437 until the next
    reapportionment (72 Stat. 339, 345; 73 Stat. 8). Congress has by law
    provided for automatic apportionment of the 435 Representatives among
    the States according to each census including and after that of 1950 (2
    U.S.C. 2a). The Apportionment Act formerly provided that the districts
    in a State were to be composed of contiguous and compact territory
    containing as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants (I,
    303; VI, 44); but subsequent apportionment Acts, those of 1929 (46 Stat.
    26) and 1941 (55 Stat. 761), omitted such provisions (see Wood v. Broom,
    287 U.S. 1 (1932)). Congress has by law provided that for the 91st and
    subsequent Congresses each State entitled to more than one
    Representative shall establish a number of districts equal to the number
    of such Representatives, and that Representatives shall be elected only
    from the single-Member districts so established. (Hawaii and New Mexico
    were excepted from the operation of this

    Sec. 228. Questions as to elections.

      The  House has always
    seated Members elected at large in the States, although the law required
    election by districts (I, 310, 519). Questions have arisen from time to
    time when a vacancy has occurred soon after a change in districts, with
    the resulting question whether the vacancy should be filled by election
    in the old or new district (I, 311, 312, 327). The House has declined to
    interfere with the act of a State in changing the boundaries of a
    district after the apportionment has been made (I, 313).

      The Attorney General has stated that all Indians are subject to
    taxation. 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 518 (1940).

    Sec. 229. Requirement that districts be equally
    populated.

      The Supreme  Court has ruled that Congressional districts must be as
    equally populated as practicable. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
    (1964); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 385 U.S. 450 (1967). The Court has made
    clear that variances in population among Congressional districts within
    a State may be considered de minimis only if they cannot practicably be
    avoided. If such variances, no matter how mathematically miniscule,
    could have been reduced or eliminated by a good faith effort, then they
    may be justified only on the basis of a consistent, rational State
    policy. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983). The Court has also made
    evident that it will take judicial review of a claims that apportionment
    schemes lack consistent, rational bases. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109
    (1986) (holding political gerrymandering complaint justiciable under
    equal protection clause).

    [[Page 95]]

    bellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
    thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove
    such disability.

    -  Congress <> has by law removed generally the
    disabilities arising from the Civil War (30 Stat. L., p. 432). Soon
    after the war various questions arose under this section (I, 386, 393,
    455, 456). For disloyalty to the United States, for giving aid and
    comfort to a public enemy, for publication of expressions hostile to the
    Government a Member-elect was denied a seat in the House (VI, 56, 58).
    As to the meaning of the words ``aid or comfort'' as used in the 14th
    amendment (VI, 57).

    Sec. 230. Loyalty as a qualification of Senators
    and Representatives.

      Section 3.  No person shall be a Senator or Representative in
    Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any
    office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State,
    who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an
    officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature,
    or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the
    Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or
    re-

    <>   Section 5. The
    Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
    provisions of this article.

    Sec. 232. Validity of the national debt, etc.

      Section 4.  The
    validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
    including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for
    services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be
    questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or
    pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion
    against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of
    any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held
    illegal and void.

    [[Page 96]]

      Congress may legislate under this section to protect voting rights by
    pre-empting state qualifications for electors which are discriminatory
    (Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)), and may lower the voting
    age in federal (but not State) elections (Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
    112 (1970)).

                              AMENDMENT XV.\6\

    Sec. 234. Suffrage not to be abridged for race,
    color, etc.

      Section 1.  The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
    not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
    account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
    appropriate legislation.

    [[Page 97]]

      \6\ The 15th amendment to the Constitution of the United States
    was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 40th
    Congress on February 26, 1869, and was declared, in a proclamation of
    the Secretary of State, dated March 30, 1870, to have been ratified by
    the legislatures of twenty-nine of the thirty-seven States. The dates of
    these ratifications were: Nevada, March 1, 1869; West Virginia, March 3,
    1869; North Carolina, March 5, 1869; Illinois, March 5, 1869; Louisiana,
    March 5, 1869; Michigan, March 8, 1869; Wisconsin, March 9, 1869; Maine,
    March 11, 1869; Massachusetts, March 12, 1869; Arkansas, March 15, 1869;
    South Carolina, March 15, 1869; Pennsylvania, March 25, 1869; New York,
    April 14, 1869 (subsequently ``withdrew'' its consent to the
    ratification on January 5, 1870 but rescinded this action on March 30,
    1970); Indiana, May 14, 1869; Connecticut, May 19, 1869; Florida, June
    14, 1869; New Hampshire, July 1, 1869; Virginia, October 8, 1869;
    Vermont, October 20, 1869; Alabama, November 16, 1869; Missouri, January
    7, 1870 (Missouri had ratified the first section of the 15th amendment
    on March 1, 1869, but had failed to include in its ratification the
    second section of the amendment); Minnesota, January 13, 1870;
    Mississippi, January 17, 1870; Rhode Island, January 18, 1870; Kansas,
    January 19, 1870; Ohio, January 27, 1870 (after having rejected the
    amendment April 30, 1869); Georgia, February 2, 1870; Iowa, February 3,
    1870. Ratification was completed on February 3, 1870, unless the
    withdrawal of ratification by New York was effective; in which event
    ratification was completed on February 17, 1870, when ratified by
    Nebraska. The amendment was subsequently ratified by Texas, February 18,
    1870; New Jersey, February 15, 1871 (after having rejected it on
    February 7, 1870); Delaware, February 12, 1901 (after having rejected it
    on March 18, 1869); Oregon, February 24, 1959; California, April 3, 1962
    (after having rejected it on January 28, 1870); Maryland, May 7, 1973
    (after having rejected it on February 4, 26, 1870); Kentucky, March 30,
    1976 (after having rejected it on March 11, 12, 1869); and Tennessee,
    April 2, 1997, (after having rejected it on November 16, 1869).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             AMENDMENT XVI.\7\

    Sec. 235. Taxes on incomes.

      The  Congress shall have power to
    lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without
    apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census
    or enumeration.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [[Page 98]]

      \7\ The 16th amendment to the Constitution of the United States
    was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 61st
    Congress on July 16, 1909, and was declared, in a proclamation of the
    Secretary of State dated February 25, 1913, to have been ratified by the
    legislatures of thirty-six of the forty-eight States. The dates of
    ratification were: Alabama, August 10, 1909; Kentucky, February 8, 1910;
    South Carolina, February 19, 1910; Illinois, March 1, 1910; Mississippi,
    March 7, 1910; Oklahoma, March 10, 1910; Maryland, April 8, 1910;
    Georgia, August 3, 1910; Texas, August 16, 1910; Ohio, January 19, 1911;
    Idaho, January 20, 1911; Oregon, January 23, 1911; Washington, January
    26, 1911; Montana, January 30, 1911; Indiana, January 30, 1911;
    California, January 31, 1911; Nevada, January 31, 1911; South Dakota,
    February 3, 1911; Nebraska, February 9, 1911; North Carolina, February
    11, 1911; Colorado, February 15, 1911; North Dakota, February 17, 1911;
    Kansas, February 18, 1911; Michigan, February 23, 1911; Iowa, February
    24, 1911; Missouri, March 16, 1911; Maine, March 31, 1911; Tennessee,
    April 7, 1911; Arkansas, April 22, 1911 (after having rejected it at the
    session begun January 9, 1911); Wisconsin, May 26, 1911; New York, July
    12, 1911; Arizona, April 6, 1912; Minnesota, June 11, 1912; Louisiana,
    June 28, 1912; West Virginia, January 31, 1913; Delaware, February 3,
    1913; Wyoming, February 3, 1913; New Mexico, February 3, 1913.
    Ratification was completed on February 3, 1913. The amendment was
    subsequently ratified by New Jersey, February 4, 1913; Vermont, February
    19, 1913 (after having rejected the amendment January 17, 1911);
    Massachusetts, March 4, 1913; New Hampshire, March 7, 1913 (after having
    rejected the amendment March 2, 1911). The amendment was rejected by
    Rhode Island, April 29, 1910; Utah, March 9, 1911; Connecticut, June 28,
    1911; and Florida, May 31, 1913. Pennsylvania and Virginia did not
    complete action.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             AMENDMENT XVII.\8\

                           (See Article I, Section 3.)

    Sec. 236. Election of Senators by direct vote.

      The  Senate of
    the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State,
    elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall
    have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications
    requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State
    legislatures.

      When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the
    Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of
    election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any
    State may empower the executive
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [[Page 99]]

    thereof to make temporary appointments until
    the people fill the vacancies by election as the
    legislature may
    direct.
      \8\ The 17th amendment to the Constitution of the United States
    was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 62d
    Congress on May 15, 1912, and was declared, in a proclamation by the
    Secretary of State dated May 31, 1913, to have been ratified by the
    legislatures of thirty-six of the forty-eight States. The dates of
    ratification were: Massachusetts, May 22, 1912; Arizona, June 3, 1912;
    Minnesota, June 10, 1912; New York, January 15, 1913; Kansas, January
    17, 1913; Oregon, January 23, 1913; North Carolina, January 25, 1913;
    California, January 28, 1913; Michigan, January 28, 1913; Iowa, January
    30, 1913; Montana, January 30, 1913; Idaho, January 31, 1913; West
    Virginia, February 4, 1913; Colorado, February 5, 1913; Nevada, February
    6, 1913; Texas, February 7, 1913; Washington, February 7, 1913; Wyoming,
    February 8, 1913; Arkansas, February 11, 1913; Maine, February 11, 1913;
    Illinois, February 13, 1913; North Dakota, February 14, 1913; Wisconsin,
    February 18, 1913; Indiana, February 19, 1913; New Hampshire, February
    19, 1913; Vermont, February 19, 1913; South Dakota, February 19, 1913;
    Oklahoma, February 24, 1913; Ohio, February 25, 1913; Missouri, March 7,
    1913; New Mexico, March 13, 1913; Nebraska, March 14, 1913; New Jersey,
    March 17, 1913; Tennessee, April 1, 1913; Pennsylvania, April 2, 1913;
    Connecticut, April 8, 1913. Ratification was completed on April 8, 1913.
    The amendment was subsequently ratified by Louisiana, June 11, 1914. The
    amendment was rejected by Utah, February 26, 1913; Delaware, March 18,
    1913. Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Rhode Island, and South Carolina did
    not complete action.

      This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or
    term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the
    Constitution.

    Sec. 237. Filling vacancies in the Senate.

      Senator  Rebecca
    L. Felton, appointed during the recess of the Senate on October 3, 1922,
    to fill a vacancy, was the first woman to sit in the Senate (VI, 156).
    Senator Walter F. George was elected to fill the vacancy on Novem-
    ber 7, 1922. Mrs. Felton took the oath of office on November 21, 1922,
    and Senator George took the oath November 22, 1922 (VI, 156). Discussion
    as to the term of service of a Senator appointed by a State executive to
    fill a vacancy (VI, 156).

    Sec. 238. Qualifications of electors.

      The  right of an
    elector to vote for a Senator is fundamentally derived from the United
    States Constitution (United States v. Aczel 219 F.2d 917 (1915)) and may
    not be denied in a discriminatory fashion (Chapman v. King, 154 F.2d 460
    (1946), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 800 (1946); Forssenius v. Harman, 235 F.
    Supp. 66 (1964), affd., 380 U.S. 529 (1965)).

                            AMENDMENT XVIII.\9\

                  [See Amendment XXI, repealing this Amendment]

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sec. 239. Prohibition of intoxicating
    liquors.

      Section 1.  [After one year from the ratification of this article the
    manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicat-

      \9\ The 18th amendment to the Constitution of the United States
    was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 65th
    Congress on December 18, 1917, and was declared in a proclamation by the
    Secretary of State dated January 29, 1919, to have been ratified by the
    legislatures of thirty-six of the forty-eight States. The dates of these
    ratifications were: Mississippi, January 8, 1918; Virginia, January 11,
    1918; Kentucky, January 14, 1918; North Dakota, January 25, 1918; South
    Carolina, January 29, 1918; Maryland, February 13, 1918; Montana,
    February 19, 1918; Texas, March 4, 1918; Delaware, March 18, 1918; South
    Dakota, March 20, 1918; Massachusetts, April 2, 1918; Arizona, May 24,
    1918; Georgia, June 26, 1918; Louisiana, August 3, 1918; Flor-

    [[Page 100]]

    ing liquors within, the
    importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United
    States and all territories subject to the jurisdiction thereof for
    beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.

                                                             Continued

      Section 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent
    power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

    _________________
    ida, December 3, 1918; Michigan, January 2, 1919; Ohio, January 7, 1919;
    Oklahoma, January 7, 1919; Idaho, January 8, 1919; Maine, January 8,
    1919; West Virginia, January 9, 1919; California, January 13, 1919;
    Tennessee, January 13, 1919; Washington, January 13, 1919; Arkansas,
    January 14, 1919; Kansas, January 14, 1919; Alabama, January 15, 1919;
    Colorado, January 15, 1919; Iowa, January 15, 1919; New Hampshire,
    January 15, 1919; Oregon, January 15, 1919; Nebraska, January 16, 1919;
    North Carolina, January 16, 1919; Utah, January 16, 1919; Missouri,
    January 16, 1919; Wyoming, January 16, 1919. Ratification was completed
    on January 16, 1919. The amendment was subsequently ratified by
    Minnesota, January 17, 1919; Wisconsin, January 17, 1919; New Mexico,
    January 20, 1919; Nevada, January 21, 1919; New York, January 29, 1919;
    Vermont, January 29, 1919; Pennsylvania, February 25, 1919; Connecticut,
    May 6, 1919; and New Jersey, March 9, 1922. Rhode Island rejected the
    amendment.

    [[Page 101]]

      Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
    ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the
    several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from
    the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.]

                             AMENDMENT XIX.\10\

    Sec. 240. Women's suffrage.

      The  right of citizens of the
    United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
    States or by any State on account of sex.

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
    legislation.

    [[Page 102]]

      \10\ The 19th amendment to the Constitution of the United States
    was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 66th
    Congress on June 5, 1919, and was declared in a proclamation by the
    Secretary of State dated August 26, 1920, to have been ratified by the
    legislatures of thirty-six of the forty-eight States. The dates of these
    ratifications were: Illinois, June 10, 1919 (and that State readopted
    its resolution of ratification June 17, 1919); Michigan, June 10, 1919;
    Wisconsin, June 10, 1919; Kansas, June 16, 1919; New York, June 16,
    1919; Ohio, June 16, 1919; Pennsylvania, June 24, 1919; Massachusetts,
    June 25, 1919; Texas, June 28, 1919; Iowa, July 2, 1919; Missouri, July
    3, 1919; Arkansas, July 28, 1919; Montana, August 2, 1919; Nebraska,
    August 2, 1919; Minnesota, September 8, 1919; New Hampshire, September
    10, 1919; Utah, October 2, 1919; California, November 1, 1919; Maine,
    November 5, 1919; North Dakota, December 1, 1919; South Dakota, December
    4, 1919; Colorado, December 15, 1919; Kentucky, January 6, 1920; Rhode
    Island, January 6, 1920; Oregon, January 13, 1920; Indiana, January 16,
    1920; Wyoming, January 27, 1920; Nevada, February 7, 1920; New Jersey,
    February 9, 1920; Idaho, February 11, 1920; Arizona, February 12, 1920;
    New Mexico, February 21, 1920; Oklahoma, February 28, 1920; West
    Virginia, March 10, 1920; Washington, March 22, 1920; Tennessee, August
    28, 1920. Ratification was completed on August 28, 1920. The amendment
    was subsequently ratified by Connecticut, September 14, 1920 (and that
    State reaffirmed on September 21, 1920); Vermont, February 8, 1921;
    Delaware, March 6, 1923 (after having rejected the amendment on June 2,
    1920); Maryland, March 29, 1941 (after having rejected the amendment on
    February 24, 1920; ratification certified February 25, 1958); Virginia,
    February 21, 1952 (after having rejected the amendment February 12,
    1920); Alabama, September 8, 1953 (after having rejected the amendment
    September 22, 1919); Florida, May 13, 1969; South Carolina, July 1, 1969
    (after having rejected the amendment on January 28, 1920); Georgia,
    February 20, 1970 (after having rejected the amendment on July 24,
    1919); Louisiana, June 11, 1970 (after having rejected it on July 1,
    1920); North Carolina, May 6, 1971; Mississippi, March 22, 1984 (after
    having rejected the amendment on March 29, 1920).

                             AMENDMENT XX.\11\

    Sec. 241. Commencement of terms of Pres., Vice
    Pres., Senators, and Representatives.

      Section 1.  The terms of the President and
    Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the
    terms of Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January,
    of the years in which such terms would have ended if this article had
    not been ratified; and the terms of their successors shall then begin.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      \11\ The 20th amendment to the Constitution of the United States
    was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 72d
    Congress, on March 3, 1932, and was declared in a proclamation by the
    Secretary of State dated February 6, 1933, to have been ratified by the
    legislatures of thirty-six of the forty-eight States. The dates of these
    ratifications were: Virginia, March 4, 1932; New York, March 11, 1932;
    Mississippi, March 16, 1932; Arkansas, March 17, 1932; Kentucky, March
    17, 1932; New Jersey, March 21, 1932; South Carolina, March 25, 1932;
    Michigan, March 31, 1932; Maine, April 1, 1932; Rhode Island, April 14,
    1932; Illinois, April 21, 1932; Louisiana, June 22, 1932; West Virginia,
    July 30, 1932; Pennsylvania, August 11, 1932; Indiana, August 15, 1932;
    Texas, September 7, 1932; Alabama, September 13, 1932; California,
    January 4, 1933; North Carolina, January 5, 1933; North Dakota, January
    9, 1933; Minnesota, January 12, 1933; Montana, January 13, 1933;
    Nebraska, January 13, 1933; Oklahoma, January 13, 1933; Arizona, January
    13, 1933; Kansas, January 16, 1933; Oregon, January 16, 1933; Wyoming,
    January 19, 1933; Delaware, January 19, 1933; Washington, January 19,
    1933; South Dakota, January 20, 1933; Tennessee, January 20, 1933; Iowa,
    January 20, 1933; Idaho, January 21, 1933; New Mexico, January 21, 1933;
    Ohio, January 23, 1933; Utah, January 23, 1933; Missouri, January 23,
    1933; Georgia, January 23, 1933. Ratification was completed on January
    23, 1933. The amendment was subsequently ratified by Massachusetts,
    January 24, 1933; Wisconsin, January 24, 1933; Colorado, January 24,
    1933; Nevada, January 26, 1933; Connecticut, January 27, 1933; New
    Hampshire, January 31, 1933; Vermont, February 2, 1933; Maryland, March
    24, 1933; Florida, April 26, 1933.

    [[Page 103]]

      The ratification of this amendment to the Constitution shortened the
    first term of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Vice President John N.
    Garner, and the terms of all Senators and Representatives of the 73d
    Congress.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sec. 242. Meeting of Congress.

      Section 2.  The Congress shall
    assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at
    noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a
    different day.

      Prior to the ratification of the 20th amendment Congress met on the
    first Monday in December as provided in article I, section 4, of the
    Constitution. For discussion of the term of Congress prior to and
    pursuant to the 20th amendment, see Sec. 6, supra (accompanying art. I,
    sec. 2, cl. 1), and Deschler's Precedents, vol. 1, ch. 1.

      Pursuant to section 2 of the 20th amendment, a regular session of a
    Congress must begin at noon on January 3 of every year unless Congress
    sets a different date by law, and if the House is in session at that
    time the Speaker declares the House adjourned sine die without a motion
    from the floor, in order that the next regular session of that Congress,
    or the first session of the next Congress (as the case may be) may
    assemble at noon on that day (Jan. 3, 1981, p. 3774; Jan. 3, 1996, p. --
    --).

    Sec. 243. Laws appointing different day for
    convening.

      Since  ratification, laws appointing a different day for
    assembling have been enacted as follows: Public Law 74-120, Jan. 5,
    1937; Public Law 77-395, Jan. 5, 1942; Public Law 77-819, Jan. 6, 1943;
    Public Law 78-210, Jan. 10, 1944; Public Law 79-289, Jan. 14, 1946;
    Public Law 80-358, Jan. 6, 1948; Public Law 82-244, Jan. 8, 1952; Public
    Law 83-199, Jan. 6, 1954; Public Law 83-700, Jan. 5, 1955; Public Law
    85-290, Jan. 7, 1958; Public Law 85-819, Jan. 7, 1959; Public Law 86-
    305, Jan. 6, 1960; Public Law 87-348, Jan. 10, 1962; Public Law 87-864,
    Jan. 9, 1963; Public Law 88-247, Jan. 7, 1964; Public Law 88-649, Jan.
    4, 1965; Public Law 89-340, Jan. 10, 1966; Public Law 89-704, Jan. 10,
    1967; Public Law 90-230, Jan. 15, 1968; Public Law 91-182, Jan. 19,
    1970; Public Law 91-643, Jan. 21, 1971; Public Law 92-217, Jan. 18,
    1972; Public Law 93-196, Jan. 21, 1974; Public Law 93-553, Jan. 14,
    1975; Public Law 94-186, Jan. 19, 1976; Public Law 94-494, Jan. 4, 1977;
    Public Law 95-594, Jan. 15, 1979; Public Law 96-566, Jan. 5, 1981;
    Public Law 97-133, Jan. 25, 1982; Public Law 98-179, Jan. 23, 1984;
    Public Law 99-379, Jan. 21, 1986; Public Law 99-613, Jan. 6, 1987;
    Public Law 100-229, Jan. 25, 1988; Public Law 101-228, Jan. 23, 1990;
    Public Law 102-475, Jan. 5, 1993; Public Law 103-395, Jan. 4, 1995;
    Public Law 104-296, Jan. 7, 1997.

    [[Page 104]]

    been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning
    of his term, or if the President elect
    shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as
    President until a President shall have qualified; and the Congress may
    by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice
    President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as
    President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected,
    and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice
    President shall have qualified.

    Sec. 244. Death or disqualification of President
    elect.

      Section 3.  If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the
    President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect
    shall become President. If a President shall not have

    Sec. 245. Statutory succession and the 25th
    amendment.

      Congress  provided by law in 1947 for the performance of the duties
    of the President in case of removal, death, resignation or inability,
    both of the President and Vice President (3 U.S.C. 19). Earlier
    succession statutes covering the periods 1792-1886 and 1887-1948 can be
    found in 18 Stat. 21, and 24 Stat. 1, respectively. Also see the 25th
    amendment to the Constitution, relating to vacancies in the office of
    Vice President and Presidential inability.

      Prior to the 20th amendment there was no provision in the Constitution
    to take care of a case wherein the President elect was disqualified or
    had died.

    Sec. 246. Congress to provide for case wherein
    death occurs among those from whom House chooses a President.

      Section 4.  The
    Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the
    persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a President
    whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the
    case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may choose
    a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon
    them.

    [[Page 105]]

      The above section changes the 12th amendment insofar as it gives
    Congress the power to provide by law the manner in which the House
    should proceed in the event no candidate had a majority and one of the
    three highest on the list of those voted for as President had died.

      Section 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of
    October following the ratification of this article.

      Section 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
    ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of
    three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of
    its submission.

                             AMENDMENT XXI.\12\

    Sec. 247. Repeal of prohibition.

      Section 1.  The eighteenth
    article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby
    repealed.

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sec. 248. Transportation into States
    prohibited.

      Section 2.  The transportation or importation into any State,
    Territory, or possession of the United States for deliv-

    [[Page 106]]

    ery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation
    of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.

      \12\ The 21st amendment to the Constitution of the United States
    was proposed to conventions of the several States by the 72d Congress on
    February 20, 1933, and was declared in a proclamation by the Acting
    Secretary of State dated December 5, 1933, to have been ratified by
    conventions in thirty-six of the forty-eight States. The dates of these
    ratifications were: Michigan, April 10, 1933; Wisconsin, April 25, 1933;
    Rhode Island, May 8, 1933; Wyoming, May 25, 1933; New Jersey, June 1,
    1933; Delaware, June 24, 1933; Massachusetts, June 26, 1933; Indiana,
    June 26, 1933; New York, June 27, 1933; Illinois, July 10, 1933; Iowa,
    July 10, 1933; Connecticut, July 11, 1933; New Hampshire, July 11, 1933;
    California, July 24, 1933; West Virginia, July 25, 1933; Arkansas,
    August 1, 1933; Oregon, August 7, 1933; Alabama, August 8, 1933;
    Tennessee, August 11, 1933; Missouri, August 29, 1933; Arizona,
    September 5, 1933; Nevada, September 5, 1933; Vermont, September 23,
    1933; Colorado, September 26, 1933; Washington, October 3, 1933;
    Minnesota, October 10, 1933; Idaho, October 17, 1933; Maryland, October
    18, 1933; Virginia, October 25, 1933; New Mexico, November 2, 1933;
    Florida, November 14, 1933; Texas, November 24, 1933; Kentucky, November
    27, 1933; Ohio, December 5, 1933; Pennsylvania, December 5, 1933; Utah,
    December 5, 1933. The amendment was subsequently ratified by Maine on
    December 6, 1933; Montana, August 6, 1934. The convention held in the
    State of South Carolina on December 4, 1933, rejected the 21st
    amendment.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
    ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the
    several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from
    the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.

                            AMENDMENT XXII.\13\

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sec. 249. No person shall be elected President more
    than twice.

      Section 1.  No person shall be elected to the office of the President
    more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or
    acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some
    other person was elected President

    [[Page 107]]

    shall be elected to the office of the
    President more than once. But this Article shall not apply to any person
    holding the office of President when this Article was proposed by the
    Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office
    of President, or acting as President, during the term within which this
    Article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting
    as President during the remainder of such term.

      \13\ The 22d amendment to the Constitution of the United States
    was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 80th
    Congress on March 24, 1947, and was declared by the Administrator of
    General Services, in a proclamation dated March 1, 1951, to have been
    ratified by the legislatures of thirty-six of the forty-eight States.
    The dates of these ratifications were: Maine, March 31, 1947; Michigan,
    March 31, 1947; Iowa, April 1, 1947; Kansas, April 1, 1947; New
    Hampshire, April 1, 1947; Delaware, April 2, 1947; Illinois, April 3,
    1947; Oregon, April 3, 1947; Colorado, April 12, 1947; California, April
    15, 1947; New Jersey, April, 15, 1947; Vermont, April 15, 1947; Ohio,
    April 16, 1947; Wisconsin, April 16, 1947; Pennsylvania, April 29, 1947;
    Connecticut, May 21, 1947; Missouri, May 22, 1947; Nebraska, May 23,
    1947; Virginia, January 28, 1948; Mississippi, February 12, 1948; New
    York, March 9, 1948; South Dakota, January 21, 1949; North Dakota,
    February 25, 1949; Louisiana, May 17, 1950; Montana, January 25, 1951;
    Indiana, January 29, 1951; Idaho, January 30, 1951; New Mexico, February
    12, 1951; Wyoming, February 12, 1951; Arkansas, February 15, 1951;
    Georgia, February 17, 1951; Tennessee, February 20, 1951; Texas,
    February 22, 1951; Nevada, February 26, 1951; Utah, February 26, 1951;
    Minnesota, February 27, 1951. Ratification was completed February 27,
    1951. The amendment was subsequently ratified by North Carolina,
    February 28, 1951; South Carolina, March 13, 1951; Maryland, March 14,
    1951; Florida, April 16, 1951; Alabama, May 4, 1951.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      Section 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
    ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of
    three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of
    its submission to the States by the Congress.

                            AMENDMENT XXIII.\14\

    Sec. 250. Representation in the Electoral College
    to the District of Columbia.

      Section 1.  The District constituting the seat of
    Government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as the
    Congress may direct:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      \14\ The 23d amendment to the Constitution of the United States
    was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 86th
    Congress on June 17, 1960, and was declared by the Administrator of
    General Services, in a proclamation dated April 3, 1961, to have been
    ratified by the legislatures of thirty-nine of the fifty States. The
    dates of these ratifications were: Hawaii, June 23, 1960; Massachusetts,
    August 22, 1960; New Jersey, December 19, 1960; New York, January 17,
    1961; California, January 19, 1961; Oregon, January 27, 1961; Maryland,
    January 30, 1961; Idaho, January 31, 1961; Maine, January 31, 1961;
    Minnesota, January 31, 1961; New Mexico, February 1, 1961; Nevada,
    February 2, 1961; Montana, February 26, 1961; Colorado, February 8,
    1961; Washington, February 9, 1961; West Virginia, February 9, 1961;
    Alaska, February 10, 1961; Wyoming, February 13, 1961; South Dakota,
    February 14, 1961; Delaware, February 20, 1961; Utah, February 21, 1961;
    Wis-

    [[Page 108]]

                                                          Continued

      A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the
    whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the
    District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than
    the least populous State; they shall be in addition to those appointed
    by the States, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the
    election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a
    State; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as
    provided by the twelfth article of amendment.

      Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
    appropriate legislation.

                            AMENDMENT XXIV.\15\

    Sec. 251. Right to vote not denied for failure to
    pay poll tax.

      Section 1.  The right of citizens of the United States to vote in
    any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for
    electors for President
    -------------
    consin, February 21, 1961; Pennsylvania, February 28, 1961; Indiana,
    March 3, 1961; North Dakota, March 3, 1961; Tennessee, March 6, 1961;
    Michigan, March 8, 1961; Connecticut, March 9, 1961; Arizona, March 10,
    1961; Illinois, March 14, 1961; Nebraska, March 15, 1961; Vermont, March
    15, 1961; Iowa, March 16, 1961; Missouri, March 20, 1961; Oklahoma,
    March 21, 1961; Rhode Island, March 22, 1961; Kansas, March 29, 1961;
    and Ohio, March 29, 1961. Ratification was completed March 29, 1961. The
    amendment was subsequently ratified by New Hampshire on March 30, 1961
    (when that State annulled and then repeated its ratification of March
    29, 1961). Arkansas rejected the amendment January 24, 1961.

    [[Page 109]]

    or Vice President, or for Senator or
    Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the
    United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or
    other tax.

      \15\ The 24th amendment to the Constitution of the United States
    was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 87th
    Congress on August 28, 1962, and was declared by the Administrator of
    General Services, in a proclamation dated February 4, 1964, to have been
    ratified by the legislatures of thirty-eight of the fifty States. The
    dates of these ratifications were: Illinois, November 14, 1962; New
    Jersey, December 3,

      Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965); Harper v. Virginia State
    Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).

      Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
    appropriate legislation.

                             AMENDMENT XXV.\16\

    -----------------
    1962; Oregon, January 25, 1963; Montana, January 28,
    1963; West Virginia, February 1, 1963; New York, February 4, 1963;
    Maryland, February 6, 1963; California, February 7, 1963; Alaska,
    February 11, 1963; Rhode Island, February 14, 1963; Indiana, February
    19, 1963; Utah, February 20, 1963; Michigan, February 20, 1963;
    Colorado, February 21, 1963; Ohio, February 27, 1963; Minnesota,
    February 27, 1963; New Mexico, March 5, 1963; Hawaii, March 6, 1963;
    North Dakota, March 7, 1963; Idaho, March 8, 1963; Washington, March 14,
    1963; Vermont, March 15, 1963; Nevada, March 19, 1963; Connecticut,
    March 20, 1963; Tennessee, March 21, 1963; Pennsylvania, March 25, 1963;
    Wisconsin, March 26, 1963; Kansas, March 28, 1963; Massachusetts, March
    28, 1963; Nebraska, April 4, 1963; Florida, April 18, 1963; Iowa, April
    24, 1963; Delaware, May 1, 1963; Missouri, May 13, 1963; New Hampshire,
    June 12, 1963; Kentucky, June 27, 1963; Maine, January 16, 1964; and
    South Dakota, January 23, 1964. Ratification was completed on January
    23, 1964. Mississippi rejected the amendment on December 20, 1962.

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sec. 252. Presidential succession and
    inability.

      Section 1.  In case of the removal of the President from office or of
    his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.

      \16\ The 25th amendment to the Constitution of the United States
    was proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the 89th
    Congress on July 7, 1965, and was declared by the Administrator of
    General Services, in a proclamation dated February 23, 1967, to have
    been ratified by the legislatures of thirty-nine of the fifty States.
    The dates of these ratifications were: Nebraska, July 12, 1965;
    Wisconsin, July 13, 1965; Oklahoma, July 16, 1965; Massachusetts, August
    9, 1965; Pennsylvania, August 18, 1965; Kentucky, September 15, 1965;
    Arizona, September 22, 1965; Michigan, October 5, 1965; Indiana, October
    20, 1965; California,

    [[Page 110]]

                     Continued

    Sec. 253. Confirmation by House and Senate of
    nominee to fill vice presidential vacancy.

      Section 2.  Whenever there is a vacancy
    in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice
    President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of
    both Houses of Congress.

    _______________________
    October 21, 1965; Arkansas, November 4, 1965; New
    Jersey, November 29, 1965; Delaware, December 7, 1965; Utah, January 17,
    1966; West Virginia, January 20, 1966; Maine, January 24, 1966; Rhode
    Island, January 28, 1966; Colorado, February 3, 1966; New Mexico,
    February 3, 1966; Kansas, February 8, 1966; Vermont, February 10, 1966;
    Alaska, February 18, 1966; Idaho, March 2, 1966; Hawaii, March 3, 1966;
    Virginia, March 8, 1966; Mississippi, March 10, 1966; New York, March
    14, 1966; Maryland, March 23, 1966; Missouri, March 30, 1966; New
    Hampshire, June 13, 1966; Louisiana, July 5, 1966; Tennessee, January
    12, 1967; Wyoming, January 25, 1967; Iowa, January 26, 1967; Washington,
    January 26, 1967; Oregon, February 2, 1967; Minnesota, February 10,
    1967; Nevada, February 10, 1967. Ratification was completed February 10,
    1967. The amendment was subsequently ratified by Connecticut, February
    14, 1967; Montana, February 15, 1967; South Dakota, March 6, 1967; Ohio,
    March 7, 1967; Alabama, March 14, 1967; North Carolina, March 22, 1967;
    Illinois, March 22, 1967; Texas, April 25, 1967; Florida, May 25, 1967.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [[Page 111]]

    Sec. 254. President's declaration of
    disability.

      Section 3.  Whenever the President transmits to the President pro
    tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
    his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and
    duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
    declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged
    by the Vice President as Acting President.

    Sec. 255. Determination of presidential inability
    and Vice President as Acting President.

      Section 4.  Whenever the Vice President
    and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive
    departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide,
    transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of
    the House of Representatives their written declaration that the
    President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
    the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the
    office as Acting President.

    [[Page 112]]

    to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice
    President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President;
    otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his
    office.

      Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore
    of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
    written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers
    and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of
    either the principal officers of the executive department or of such
    other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to
    the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
    Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable
    to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress
    shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that
    purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after
    receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in
    session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble,
    determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is
    unable

    [[Page 113]]

    Sec. 256. Instances where House and Senate have
    confirmed nominee as Vice President.

      Congress  has twice performed its
    responsibility under section two of the 25th amendment. On October 13,
    1973, the Speaker laid before the House a message from President Nixon
    transmitting his nomination of Gerald R. Ford, Representative and
    Minority Leader in the House of Representatives, to be Vice President of
    the United States, Vice President Agnew having resigned on October 10,
    1973. The Speaker referred the nomination to the Committee on the
    Judiciary, which under clause 1(m)(15) of rule X has jurisdiction over
    messages and matters relating to Presidential succession (Oct. 13, 1973,
    p. 34032). The nomination of Mr. Ford to be Vice President was confirmed
    by the Senate on November 27, 1973 (p. 38225) and by the House on
    December 6, 1973 (p. 39900), and Vice President Ford was sworn in in the
    Chamber of the House of Representatives on December 6 (p. 39925).
    Subsequently, President Nixon resigned from office by delivering his
    written resignation into the office of the Secretary of State, pursuant
    to 3 U.S.C. 20, on August 9, 1974. Pursuant to section one of the 25th
    amendment, Vice President Ford became President, and was sworn in in the
    East Room at the White House. He nominated Nelson A. Rockefeller to be
    Vice President which nomination was received in the House of
    Representatives and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary on August
    20, 1974; the nomination was confirmed by the Senate on December 10,
    1974 (p. 38936) and by the House on December 19, 1974 (p. 41516), and
    Vice President Rockefeller was sworn in in the Senate Chamber on
    December 19, 1974 (p. 41181). On both instances, the House received the
    message from the Senate, announcing that body's confirmation of the
    nominee for Vice President, following the vote on confirmation by the
    House. On July 15, 1985 (pp. 18955-56) the Speaker laid before the House
    two communications from the President of the United States advising (1)
    of the President's temporary period of incapacity of discharging the
    Constitutional powers and duties of the Office of President and
    directing that the Vice President discharge those duties in his stead
    and (2) a subsequent Presidential determination of his ability to resume
    those powers and duties.

                               AMENDMENT XXVI.\17\

    Sec. 257. Right to vote extended to persons 18
    years of age or older.

      Section 1.  The right of citizens of the United States, who
    are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or
    abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
    appropriate legislation.

      \17\ The 26th amendment to the Constitution was proposed by the
    Congress on March 23, 1971. It was declared, in a certificate of the
    Administrator of General Services, dated July 5, 1971, to have been
    ratified by the legislatures of 39 of the 50 States. The dates of
    ratification were: Connecticut, March 23, 1971; Delaware, March 23,
    1971; Minnesota, March 23, 1971; Tennessee, March 23, 1971; Washington,
    March 23, 1971; Hawaii, March 24, 1971; Massachusetts, March 24, 1971;
    Montana, March 29, 1971; Arkansas, March 30, 1971; Idaho, March 30,
    1971; Iowa, March 30, 1971; Nebraska, April 2, 1971; New Jersey, April
    3, 1971; Kansas, April 7, 1971; Michigan, April 7, 1971; Alaska, April
    8, 1971; Maryland, April 8, 1971; Indiana, April 8, 1971; Maine, April
    9, 1971; Vermont, April 16, 1971; Louisiana, April 17, 1971; California,
    April 19, 1971; Colorado, April 27, 1971; Pennsylvania, April 27, 1971;
    Texas, April 27, 1971; South Carolina, April 28, 1971; West Virginia,
    April 28, 1971; New Hampshire, May 13, 1971; Arizona, May 14, 1971;
    Rhode Island, May 27, 1971; New York, June 2, 1971; Oregon, June 4,
    1971; Missouri, June 14, 1971; Wisconsin, June 22, 1971; Illinois, June
    29, 1971; Alabama, June 30, 1971; Ohio, June 30, 1971; North Carolina,
    July 1, 1971; Oklahoma, July 1, 1971.

      Ratification was completed on July 1, 1971.

    [[Page 114]]

      The amendment was subsequently ratified by Virginia, July 8, 1971;
    Wyoming, July 8, 1971; Georgia, October 4, 1971.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            AMENDMENT XXVII.\18\

    Sec. 258. Timing of law varying
    Congressional compensation.

      No law, varying the  compensation for the services of the
    Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of
    Representatives shall have intervened.

      To quell speculation over the efficacy of a ratification process
    spanning two centuries, the House adopted a concurrent resolution
    declaring the ratification of the amendment (H. Con. Res. 320, 102d
    Cong., May 19, 1992, p. ----). The Senate adopted both a separate
    concurrent resolution and a simple resolution making similar
    declarations (S. Con. Res. 120 and S. Res. 298, 102d Cong., May 20,
    1992, p. ----). Neither House considered the concurrent resolution of
    the other. For a concurrent resolution declaring the ratification of the
    14th amendment, see July 21, 1868. For opinions of the Supreme Court
    concerning the duration of the ratification process and the
    contemporaneity of State ratifications, see Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S.
    368 (1921), and Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      \18\ The 27th amendment to the Constitution was proposed on
    September 25, 1789. It was declared to have been ratified by the
    legislatures of 39 of the 50 States in a certificate of the Archivist
    dated May 18, 1992. The dates of ratification were: Maryland, December
    19, 1789; North Carolina, December 22, 1789; South Carolina, January 19,
    1790; Delaware, January 28, 1790; Vermont, November 3, 1791; Virginia,
    December 15, 1791; Ohio, May 6, 1873; Wyoming, March 6, 1978; Maine,
    April 27, 1983; Colorado, April 22, 1984; South Dakota, February 21,
    1985; New Hampshire, March 7, 1985; Arizona, April 3, 1985; Tennessee,
    May 23, 1985; Oklahoma, July 10, 1985; New Mexico, February 14, 1986;
    Indiana, February 24, 1986; Utah, February 25, 1986; Arkansas, March 6,
    1987; Montana, March 17, 1987; Connecticut, May 13, 1987; Wisconsin,
    July 15, 1987; Georgia, February 2, 1988; West Virginia, March 10, 1988;
    Louisiana, July 7, 1988; Iowa, February 9, 1989; Idaho, March 23, 1989;
    Nevada, April 26, 1989; Alaska, May 6, 1989; Oregon, May 19, 1989;
    Minnesota, May 22, 1989; Texas, May 25, 1989; Kansas, April 5, 1990;
    Florida, May 31, 1990; North Dakota, March 25, 1991; Alabama, May 5,
    1992; Missouri, May 5, 1992; Michigan, May 7, 1992; and New Jersey, May
    7, 1992.

      Ratification was completed on May 7, 1992. The amendment was
    subsequently ratified by Illinois, May 12, 1992; and California, June
    26, 1992.