    [Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 105th Congress]
    [105th Congress]
    [House Document 104-272]
    [Jeffersons Manual of ParliamentaryPractice]
    [Pages 120-139]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

                              sec. iii.--privilege.

    [[Page 121]]

    one instance, indeed, it has been relaxed by the 10 G. 3, c. 50,
    which permits judiciary proceedings to go on against them. That these
    privileges must be continually progressive, seems to result from their
    rejecting all definition of them; the doctrine being, that ``their
    dignity and independence are preserved by keeping their privileges
    indefinite; and that `the maxims upon which they proceed, together
    with the method of proceeding, rest entirely in their own breast,
    and are not defined and ascertained by any particular stated laws.' ''
    1 Blackst., 163, 164.

    Sec. 287. Privileges of members of
    Parliament.

      The  privileges of members of Parliament, from small and
    obscure beginnings, have been advancing for centuries with a firm and
    never yielding pace. Claims seem to have been brought forward from time
    to time, and repeated, till some example of their admission enabled them
    to build law on that example. We can only, therefore, state the points
    of progression at which they now are. It is now acknowledged, 1st. That
    they are at all times exempted from question elsewhere, for anything
    said in their own House; that during the time of privilege, 2d. Neither
    a member himself, his, order H. of C. 1663, July 16, wife, nor his
    servants (familiares sui), for any matter of their own, may be, Elsynge,
    217; 1 Hats., 21; 1 Grey's Deb., 133, arrested on mesne process, in any
    civil suit: 3d. Nor be detained under execution, though levied before
    time of privilege: 4th. Nor impleaded, cited, or subpoenaed in any
    court: 5th. Nor summoned as a witness or juror: 6th. Nor may their lands
    or goods be distrained: 7th. Nor their persons assaulted, or characters
    traduced. And the period of time covered by privilege, before and after
    the session, with the practice of short prorogations under the
    connivance of the Crown, amounts in fact to a perpetual protection
    against the course of justice. In

    [[Page 122]]

    seems to stand at present on the following ground: 1. The act of arrest
    is void, ab initio. 2 Stra., 989. 2. The member arrested may be discharged on
    motion, 1 Bl., 166; 2 Stra., 990; or by habeas corpus under the Federal
    or State authority, as the case may be; or by a writ of privilege out of
    the chancery, 2 Stra., 989, in those States which have adopted that part
    of the laws of England. Orders of the House of Commons, 1550, February
    20. 3. The arrest being unlawful, is a trespass for which the officer
    and others concerned are liable to action or indictment in the ordinary
    courts of justice, as in other cases of unauthorized arrest. 4. The
    court before which the process is returnable is bound to act as in other
    cases of unauthorized proceeding, and liable, also, as in other similar
    cases, to have their proceedings stayed or corrected by the superior
    courts.

    Sec. 288. Privilege of Members of Congress under the
    Constitution.

      It  was probably from this view of the encroaching character
    of privilege that the framers of our Constitution, in their care to
    provide that the laws shall bind equally on all, and especially that
    those who make them shall not exempt themselves from their operation,
    have only privileged ``Senators and Representatives'' themselves from
    the single act of ``arrest in all cases except treason, felony, and
    breach of the peace, during their attendance at the session of their
    respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same, and from
    being questioned in any other place for any speech or debate in either
    House.'' Const. U.S. Art I, Sec. 6. Under the general authority ``to
    make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
    powers given them,'' Const. U.S., Art. II, Sec. 8, they may provide by
    law the details which may be necessary for giving full effect to the
    enjoyment of this privilege. No such law being as yet made, it

    [[Page 123]]

    road very nicely, nor forfeit his protection for a little deviation from that
    which is most direct; some necessity perhaps constraining him to it. 2
    Stra., 986, 987.

    Sec. 289. Privilege as to going and returning.

      The  time
    necessary for going to, and returning from, Congress, not being defined,
    it will, of course, be judged of in every particular case by those who
    will have to decide the case. While privilege was understood in England
    to extend, as it does here, only to exemption from arrest, eundo,
    morando, et redeundo, the House of Commons themselves decided that ``a
    convenient time was to be understood.'' (1580,) 1 Hats., 99, 100. Nor is
    the law so strict in point of time as to require the party to set out
    immediately on his return, but allows him time to settle his private
    affairs, and to prepare for his journey; and does not even scan his

    Sec. 290. Privilege of Members as related to rights of
    courts to summon witnesses and jurors.

      This  privilege from arrest,
    privileges, of course, against all process the disobedience to which is
    punishable by an attachment of the person; as a subpoena ad
    respondendum, or testificandum, or a summons on a jury; and with reason,
    because a Member has superior duties to perform in another place. When a
    Representative is withdrawn from his seat by summons, the 40,000 people
    whom he represents lose their voice in debate and vote, as they do on
    his voluntary absence; when a Senator is withdrawn by summons, his State
    loses half its voice in debate and vote, as it does on his voluntary
    absence. The enormous disparity of evil admits no comparison.

    [[Page 124]]

    to produce in court, in obedience to a summons, an original paper from
    the files, but has given the court facilities for making copies (III,
    2664, 2666; Apr. 15, 1948, p. 4552; Apr. 29, 1948, pp. 5161, 5162; May 6,
    1948, p. 5432; Jan. 18, 1950, p. 565; Feb. 8, 1950, p. 1695; Feb. 13, 1950,
    p. 1765; Sept. 22, 1950, p. 15636; Apr. 6, 1951, p. 3403; Apr. 12, 1951,
    p. 3800; Oct. 20, 1951, p. 13777; Jan. 22, 1953, p. 498; May 25, 1953,
    p. 5523; Jan. 28, 1954, pp. 964-65; Feb. 25, 1954, pp. 2281-82; July 1,
    1955, pp. 9818-19; Apr. 12, 1956, p. 6258; Apr. 24, 1958, p. 7262; Apr. 29,
    1958, p. 7636; Sept. 16, 1974, p. 31123; Jan. 19, 1977, pp. 1728-29), but on
    one occasion, where the circumstances warranted such action, the Clerk
    was permitted to respond and take with him certified copies of certain
    documents described in the subpoena (H. Res. 601, Oct. 29, 1969, p.
    32005); and on the rare occasions where the House has permitted the
    production of an original paper from its files, it has made explicit
    provision for its return (H. Res. 1022, 1023, Jan. 16, 1968, pp. 80-81;
    H. Res. 1429, July 27, 1976, pp. 24089-90). No officer or employee,
    except by authority of the House, should produce before any court a
    paper from the files of the House, nor furnish a copy of any paper
    except by authority of the House or a statute (III, 2663; VI, 587; Apr.
    15, 1948, p. 4552; Apr. 30, 1948, pp. 5161, 5162; May 6, 1948, p. 5432;
    Jan. 18, 1950, p. 565; Feb. 8, 1950, p. 1695; Feb. 13, 1950, p. 1765;
    Sept. 22, 1950, p. 15636; Apr. 6, 1951, p. 3403; Apr. 12, 1951, p. 3800;
    Oct. 20, 1951, p. 13777; Mar. 10, 1954, pp. 3046-47; Feb. 7, 1955, p.
    1215; May 7, 1956, p. 7588; Dec. 18, 1974, p. 40925). In the 98th
    Congress, the House adopted a resolution denying compliance with a
    subpoena issued by a Federal Court for the production of records in the
    possession of the Clerk (documents of a select committee from the prior
    Congress), where the Speaker and joint leadership had instructed the
    Clerk in the previous Congress not to produce such records and where the
    Court refused to stay the subpoena or to allow the select committee to
    intervene to protect its interest; the resolution directed the Counsel
    to the Clerk to assert the rights and privileges of the House and to
    take all steps necessary to protect the rights of the House (Apr. 28,
    1983, p. 10417). On appeal from a subsequent district court judgment
    finding the Clerk in contempt, the Court of Appeals reversed on the
    ground that a subpoena to depose a nonparty witness under the Federal
    Rules of Civil Procedure may only be served in the district (of
    Maryland) where it was issued. In re Guthrie, 733 F.2d 634 (4th Cir.
    1984). Where an official of both Houses of Congress is subpoenaed in his
    official capacity, the concurrence of both Houses by concurrent
    resolution is required to permit compliance (H. Con. Res. 342, July 16,
    1975, pp. 23144-46).

    Sec. 291a. Attitude of the House as to demands of the
    courts.

      The  House has decided that the summons of a court to Members to
    attend and testify constituted a breach of privilege, and directed them
    to disregard the mandate (III, 2661); but in other cases wherein Members
    informed the House that they had been summoned before the District Court
    of the United States for the District of Columbia or other courts, the
    House authorized them to respond (III, 2662; Feb. 23, 1948, p. 1557;
    Mar. 5, 1948, p. 2224; Apr. 8, 1948, p. 4264; Apr. 12, 1948, p. 4347;
    Apr. 14, 1948, p. 4461; Apr. 15, 1948, p. 4529; Apr. 28, 1948, p. 5009;
    May 6, 1948, pp. 5433, 5451; Feb. 2, 1950, p. 1399; Apr. 4, 1951, p.
    3320; Apr. 9, 1951, p. 3525; Apr. 12, 1951, pp. 3751, 3752; Apr. 13,
    1951, p. 3915; June 4, 1951, p. 6084; June 22, 1951, p. 7001; Sept. 18,
    1951, p. 11571; Sept. 27, 1951, p. 12292; Mar. 5, 1953, p. 1658; Mar.
    18, 1953, p. 2085; Mar. 11, 1954, p. 3102; July 19, 1954, p. 10904; Apr.
    9, 1956, p. 5970; Apr. 10, 1956, p. 5991). The House, however, has
    declined to make a general rule permitting Members to waive their
    privilege, preferring that the Member in each case should apply for
    permission (III, 2660). Also in maintenance of its privilege the House
    has refused to permit the Clerk or other officers

    [[Page 125]]

    thereof through the Clerk of the House
    (see, e.g., H. Res. 12, Jan. 3, 1973, pp. 30-31). In the 95th Congress,
    the House for the first time by resolution permitted this same type of
    general response whether or not the House is in session or in
    adjournment if a court has found that specific documents in possession
    of the House are material and relevant to judicial proceedings. The
    House reserved to itself the right to revoke this general permission in
    any specific case where the House desires to make a different response
    (H. Res. 10, Jan. 4, 1977, p. 73; H. Res. 10, Jan. 15, 1979, p. 19). The
    permission did not apply to executive session material, such as a
    deposition of a witness in executive session of a committee, which could
    be released only by a separate resolution passed by the House (H. Res.
    296, June 4, 1979, p. 13180). H. Res. 10 of the 96th Congress was
    clarified and revised later in that Congress by H. Res. 722 (Sept. 17,
    1980, pp. 25777-90) and became the basis for rule L added in the 97th
    Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 5, 1981, pp. 98-113, see Sec. 946, infra).
      A resolution routinely adopted up to the 95th Congress provided that
    when the House had recessed or adjourned Members, officers, and
    employees were authorized to appear in response to subpoenas duces
    tecum, but prohibited the production of official papers in response
    thereto; the resolution also provided that when a court found that
    official papers, other than executive session material, were relevant,
    the court could obtain copies

    [[Page 126]]

    tions authorizing the chairman of a
    subcommittee to intervene in any judicial proceeding concerning
    subpoenas duces tecum issued by that committee, authorizing the
    appointment of a special counsel to carry out the purposes of such a
    resolution, and providing for the payment from the contingent fund (now
    referred to as ``applicable accounts of the House described in clause
    1(h)(1) of rule X'') of expenses to employ such special counsel (H. Res.
    1420, Aug. 26, 1976, pp. 1858-59; H. Res. 334, May 9, 1977, pp. 13949-
    52), authorizing the Sergeant at Arms to employ a special counsel to
    represent him in a pending action in federal court in which he was named
    as a defendant, and providing for the payment from the contingent fund
    of expenses to employ such counsel (H. Res. 1497, Sept. 2, 1976, p.
    28937), and authorizing the Chairman of the Committee on House
    Administration to intervene as a party in a pending civil action in the
    U.S. Court of Claims, to defend on behalf of the House the
    constitutional authority to make laws necessary and proper for executing
    its constitutional powers, authorizing the employment of special counsel
    for such purpose, and providing for the payment from the contingent fund
    of expenses to employ such counsel (H. Res. 884, Nov. 2, 1977, p.
    36661). The House has authorized the Speaker to take any steps he
    considered necessary, including intervention as a party or by submission
    of briefs amicus curiae, in order to protect the interests of the House
    before the court (H. Res. 49, Jan. 29, 1981, p. 1304). The House has
    also on occasion adopted privileged resolutions, reported from the
    Committee on Rules, authorizing standing or select committees to make
    applications to courts in connection with their investigations (H. Res.
    252, Feb. 9, 1977, pp. 3966-75; H. Res. 760, Sept. 28, 1977, pp. 31329-
    36; H. Res. 67, Mar. 4, 1981, pp. 3529-33).

    Sec. 291b. Judicial appearances on behalf of
    House.

      While  the statutes provide that the Department of Justice may
    represent any officer of the House or Senate in the event of judicial
    proceedings against such officer in relation to the performance of
    official duties (see 2 U.S.C. 118), and that the Department of Justice
    shall generally represent the interests of the United States in Court
    (28 U.S.C. 517), the House has on occasion authorized special
    appearances on its own behalf by special counsel when the prerogatives
    or powers of the House have been questioned in the courts. The House has
    adopted privileged resolu-

    Sec. 292. Attitude of one House as to demands of the
    other for attendance or papers.

      When  either House desires the attendance of
    a Member of the other to give evidence it is the practice to ask the
    House of which he is a Member that the Member have leave to attend, and
    the use of a subpoena is of doubtful propriety (III, 1794). But in one
    case, at least, the Senate did not consider that its privilege forbade
    the House to summon one of its officers as a witness (III, 1798). But
    when the Secretary of the Senate was subpoenaed to appear before a
    committee of the House with certain papers from the files of the Senate,
    the Senate discussed the question of privilege before empowering him to
    attend (III, 2665). For discussion of the means by which one House may
    prefer a complaint against a Member or officer of the other, see
    Sec. 373, infra.

    [[Page 127]]

    Sec. 293. Power of the House to punish for contempts.

      So  far
    there will probably be no difference of opinion as to the privileges of
    the two Houses of Congress; but in the following cases it is otherwise.
    In December, 1795, the House of Representatives committed two persons of
    the name of Randall and Whitney for attempting to corrupt the integrity
    of certain Members, which they considered as a contempt and breach of
    the privileges of the House; and the facts being proved, Whitney was
    detained in confinement a fortnight and Randall three weeks, and was
    reprimanded by the Speaker. In March, 1796, the House of Representatives
    voted a challenge given to a Member of their House to be a breach of the
    privileges of the House; but satisfactory apologies and acknowledgments
    being made, no further proceeding was had. * * *

    Sec. 294. Decision of the court in Anderson's
    case.

      The  cases of Randall and Whitney (II, 1599-1603) were followed in
    1818 by the case of John Anderson, a citizen, who for attempted bribery
    of a Member was arrested, tried, and censured by the House (II, 1606).
    Anderson appealed to the courts and this procedure finally resulted in a
    discussion by the Supreme Court of the United States of the right of the
    House to punish for contempts, and a decision that the House by
    implication has the power to punish, since ``public functionaries must
    be left at liberty to exercise the powers which the people have
    intrusted to them,'' and ``the interests and dignity of those who
    created them require the exertion of the powers indispensable to the
    attainment of the ends of their creation. Nor is a casual conflict with
    the rights of particular individuals any reason to be urged against the
    exercise of such powers'' (II, 1607; Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheaton 204).
    In 1828 an assault on the President's secretary in the Capitol gave rise
    to a question of privilege which involved a discussion of the inherent
    power of the House to punish for contempt (II, 1615). Again in 1832,
    when the House censured Samuel Houston, a citizen, for assault on a
    Member for words spoken in debate (II, 1616), there was a discussion by
    the House of the doctrine of inherent and implied power as opposed to
    the other doctrine that the House might exercise no authority not
    expressly conferred on it by the Constitution or the laws of the land
    (II, 1619). In 1865 the House arrested and censured a citizen for
    attempted intimidation and assault on a member (II, 1625); in 1866, a
    citizen who had assaulted the clerk of a committee of the House in the
    Capitol was arrested by order of the House, but as there was not time to
    punish in the few remaining days of the session, the Sergeant-at-Arms
    was directed to turn the prisoner over to the civil authorities of the
    District of Columbia (II, 1629); and in 1870 one Woods, who had
    assaulted a Member on his way to the House, was arrested on warrant of
    the Speaker, arraigned at the bar, and imprisoned for a term extending
    beyond the adjournment of the session, although not beyond the term of
    the existing House (II, 1626-1628).

    [[Page 128]]

    exists as one necessary to enable either House
    of Congress to exercise successfully their function of legislation. This
    latter proposition is one that we do not propose to decide in the
    present case, because we are able to decide it without passing upon the
    existence or nonexistence of such a power in aid of the legislative
    function'' (103 U.S. 189; II, 1611). In 1894, in the case of Chapman,
    another contumacious witness, the Supreme Court affirmed the undoubted
    right of either House of Congress to punish for contempt in cases to
    which its power properly extends under the expressed terms of the
    Constitution (II, 1614; In Re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661). The nature of the
    punishment which the House may inflict was discussed by the Court in
    Anderson's case (II, 1607; Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheaton 204).

    Sec. 295. Views of the court in Kilbourn's case.

      In  1876 the
    arrest and imprisonment by the House of Hallet Kilbourn, a contumacious
    witness, resulted in a decision by the Supreme Court of the United
    States that the House had no general power to punish for contempt, as in
    a case wherein it was proposing to coerce a witness in an inquiry not
    within the constitutional authority of the House. The Court also
    discussed the doctrine of inherent power to punish, saying in
    conclusion, ``We are of opinion that the right of the Houses of
    Representatives to punish the citizen for a contempt of its authority or
    a breach of its privileges can derive no support from the precedents and
    practices of the two Houses of the English Parliament, nor from the
    adjudged cases in which the English courts have upheld these practices.
    Nor, taking what has fallen from the English judges, and especially the
    later cases on which we have just commented, is much aid given to the
    doctrine, that this power

    Sec. 296. Decision of the court in Marshall v. Gordon.

      In the case of Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, the Court stated:

    Appellant while United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
    York conducted a grand jury investigation which led to the indictment of
    a Member of the House of Representatives. Acting on charges of
    misfeasance and nonfeasance made by the Member against appellant in part
    before the indictment and renewed with additions afterward, the House by
    resolution directed its Judiciary Committee to make inquiry and report
    concerning appellant's liability to impeachment. Such inquiry being in
    progress through a subcommittee, appellant addressed to the
    subcommittee's chairman, and gave to the press, a letter, charging the
    subcommittee with an endeavor to probe into and frustrate the action of
    the grand jury, and couched in terms calculated to arouse the
    indignation of the members of that committee and those of the House
    generally. Thereafter, appellant was arrested in New York by the
    Sergeant at Arms pursuant to a resolution of the House whereby the
    letter was characterized as defamatory and insulting and as tending to
    bring that body into public contempt and ridicule, and whereby appellant
    in writing and publishing such letter was adjudged to be in contempt of
    the House in violating its privileges, honor, and dignity. He applied
    for habeas corpus.

      The court held that the proceedings concerning which the alleged
    contempt was committed were not impeachment proceedings; that, whether
    they were impeachment proceedings or not, the House was without power by
    its own action, as distinct from such action as might be taken under
    criminal laws, to arrest or punish for such acts as were committed by
    appellant.

    [[Page 129]]

    distinction between legislative, executive, and judicial
    power, and repugnant to limitations which the Constitution fixes
    expressly; hence there is no warrant whatever for implying such a dual
    power in aid of other powers expressly granted to Congress. The House
    has implied power to deal directly with contempt so far as is necessary
    to preserve and exercise the legislative authority expressly granted.
    Being, however, a power of self-preservation, a means and not an end,
    the power does not extend to infliction of punishment, as such; it is a
    power to prevent acts which in and of themselves inherently prevent or
    obstruct the discharge of legislative duty and to compel the doing of
    those things which are essential to the performance of the legislative
    functions. As pointed out in Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat., 204 this
    implied power in its exercise is limited to imprisonment during the
    session of the body affected by the contempt.
      No express power to punish for contempt was granted to the House of
    Representatives save the power to deal with contempts committed by its
    own Members (art. I, sec. 5). The possession by Congress of the
    commingled legislative and judicial authority to punish for contempts
    which was exerted by the House of Commons is at variance with the view
    and tendency existing in this country when the Constitution was adopted,
    as evidenced by the manner in which the subject was treated in many
    State constitutions, beginning at or about that time and continuing
    thereafter. Such commingling of powers would be destructive of the basic
    constitutional

      The authority does not cease when the act complained of has been
    committed, but includes the right to determine in the use of legitimate
    and fair discretion how far from the nature and character of the act
    there is necessity for repression to prevent immediate recurrence, i.e.,
    the continued existence of the interference or obstruction to the
    exercise of legislative power. In such case, unless there be manifest an
    absolute disregard of discretion, and a mere exertion of arbitrary power
    coming within the reach of constitutional limitations, the exercise of
    the authority is not subject to judicial interference. The power is the
    same in quantity and quality whether exerted on behalf of the
    impeachment powers or of the others to which it is ancillary. The
    legislative power to provide by criminal laws for the prosecution and
    punishment of wrongful acts is not here involved.

      The Senate may invoke its civil contempt statute (2 U.S.C. 288d) to
    direct the Senate legal counsel to bring an action in Federal court to
    compel a witness to comply with the subpoena of a committee of the
    Senate. The House, in contrast, may either certify such a witness to the
    appropriate United States Attorney for possible indictment under the
    criminal contempt statute (2 U.S.C. 192) or exercise its inherent power
    to commit for contempt by detaining the recalcitrant witness in the
    custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms.

      (See also McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135; Sinclair v. United
    States, 279 U.S. 263; Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125; Groppi v.
    Leslie, 404 U.S. 496.)

    [[Page 130]]

    the law of nature, and every body of men, possesses the right of
    self-defense; that all public functionaries are essentially invested
    with the powers of self-preservation; that they have an inherent
    right to do all acts necessary to keep themselves in a condition to
    discharge the trusts confided to them; that whenever authorities are
    given, the means of carrying them into execution are given by necessary
    implication; that thus we see the British Parliament exercise the right of
    punishing contempts; all the State Legislatures exercise the same power,
    and every court does the same; that, if we have it not, we sit at the
    mercy of every intruder who may enter our doors or gallery, and, by noise
    and tumult, render proceeding in business impracticable; that if our
    tranquillity is to be perpetually disturbed by newspaper defamation, it
    will not be possible to exercise our functions with the requisite coolness
    and deliberation; and that we must therefore have a power to punish these
    disturbers of our peace and proceedings. * * *

    Sec. 297. Jefferson's statement of arguments for
    inherent power to punish for contempt.

      * * *  The editor of the Aurora
    having, in his paper of February 19, 1800, inserted some paragraphs
    defamatory of the Senate, and failed in his appearance, he was ordered
    to be committed. In debating the legality of this order, it was
    insisted, in support of it, that every man, by

    [[Page 131]]

    Government by the same State laws adopted in each
    State, by a law of Congress; that none of these bodies, therefore,
    derive those powers from natural or necessary right, but from express
    law; that Congress have no such natural or necessary power, nor any
    powers but such as are given them by the Constitution; that that has
    given them, directly, exemption from personal arrest, exemption from
    question elsewhere for what is said in their House, and power over their
    own members and proceedings; for these no further law is necessary, the
    Constitution being the law; that, moreover, by that article of the
    Constitution which authorizes them ``to make all laws necessary and
    proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by the Constitution
    in them,'' they may provide by law for an undisturbed exercise of their
    functions, e.g., for the punishment of contempts, of affrays or tumult
    in their presence, &c.; but, till the law be made, it does not exist;
    and does not exist, from their own neglect; that, in the meantime,
    however, they are not unprotected, the ordinary magistrates and courts
    of law being open and competent to punish all unjustifiable disturbances
    or defamations, and even their own sergeant, who may appoint deputies ad
    libitum to aid him 3 Grey, 59, 147, 255,  is equal to small
    disturbances; that in requiring a previous law, the Constitution had
    regard to the inviolability of the citizen, as well as of the Member;
    as, should one House, in the regular form of a bill, aim at too broad
    privileges, it may be checked by the other, and both by the Presi-

    [[Page 132]]

    dent; and also as, the law being promulgated, the citizen will know how to
    avoid offense. But if one branch may assume its own privileges without
    control, if it may do it on the spur of the occasion, conceal the law in
    its own breast, and, after the fact committed, make its sentence both
    the law and the judgment on that fact; if the offense is to be kept
    undefined and to be declared only ex re nata, and according to the
    passions of the moment, and there be no limitation either in the manner
    or measure of the punishment, the condition of the citizen will be
    perilous indeed. * * *

    Sec. 298. Statement of arguments against the inherent
    power to punish for contempts.

      * * *  To this it was answered, that the
    Parliament and courts of England have cognizance of contempts by the
    express provisions of their law; that the State Legislatures have equal
    authority because their powers are plenary; they represent their
    constituents completely, and possess all their powers, except such as
    their constitutions have expressly denied them; that the courts of the
    several States have the same powers by the laws of their States, and
    those of the Federal

    Sec. 299. Jefferson's suggestion that a law might define
    procedure in cases of contempt.

      * * *  Which of these doctrines is to
    prevail, time will decide. Where there is no fixed law, the judgment on
    any particular case is the law of that single case only, and dies with
    it. When a new and even a similar case arises, the judgment which is to
    make and at the same time apply to the law, is open to question and
    consideration, as are all new laws. Perhaps Congress in the mean time,
    in their care for the safety of the citizen, as well as that for their
    own protection, may declare by law what is necessary and proper to
    enable them to carry into execution the powers vested in them, and
    thereby hang up a rule for the inspection of all, which may direct the
    conduct of the citizen, and at the same time test the judgments they
    shall themselves pronounce in their own case.

    [[Page 133]]

    (II, 1598). Congress has, however, prescribed that a witness
    summoned to appear before a committee of either House who does not
    respond or who refuses to answer a question pertinent to the subject of
    the inquiry shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor (2 U.S.C. 192). A
    resolution directing the Speaker to certify to the U.S. Attorney the
    refusal of a witness to respond to a subpoena issued by a House
    committee may be offered from the floor as privileged, since the
    privileges of the House are involved, and a committee report to
    accompany the resolution may therefore be presented to the House without
    regard to the 3-day availability requirement for other reports (see
    clause 2(l)(6) of rule XI; July 13, 1971, pp. 24720-23). A resolution
    with two resolve clauses separately directing the certification of the
    contemptuous conduct of two individuals is subject to a demand for a
    division of the question as to each individual (contempt proceedings
    against Ralph and Joseph Bernstein, Feb. 27, 1986, p. 3061). In the 97th
    Congress, the Committee on Energy and Commerce filed a report (H. Rept.
    97-898) on proceedings against the Secretary of the Interior James G.
    Watt for withholding subpoenaed documents and for failure to answer
    questions relating to reciprocity under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act.
    Also in the 97th Congress, the House adopted a resolution directing the
    Speaker to certify to the United States Attorney the failure of an
    official of the executive branch (Anne M. Gorsuch, Administrator,
    Environmental Protection Agency) to submit executive branch documents to
    a House subcommittee pursuant to a subcommittee subpoena; this was the
    first occasion on which the House cited an executive official for
    contempt of Congress (H. Res. 632, Dec. 16, 1982, p. 31754). In the
    following Congress, the 98th, the House adopted (as a question of
    privilege) a resolution reported from the same committee certifying to
    the United States Attorney the fact that an agreement has been entered
    into between the committee and the Executive Branch for access by the
    committee to the documents which Anne Gorsuch had failed to submit and
    which were the subject of the contempt citation (where the contempt had
    not yet been prosecuted) (Aug. 3, 1983, p. 22692). In other cases where
    subsequent compliance had been accomplished in the same Congress, the
    House has adopted privileged resolutions certifying the facts to the
    United States Attorney to the end that contempt proceedings be
    discontinued (see Deschler's Precedents, vol. 4, ch. 15, sec. 21). In
    the 98th Congress, the House adopted a privileged resolution directing
    the Speaker to certify to the United States Attorney the refusal of a
    former official of the executive branch to obey a subpoena to testify
    before a subcommittee (H. Res. 200, May 18, 1983, p. 12720).-
      In 1837 the House declined to proceed with a bill ``defining the
    offense of a contempt of this House, and to provide for the punishment
    thereof''

    [[Page 134]]

    vote until he is sworn, Memor., 107, 108. D'Ewes, 642, col. 2; 643, col. 1.
    Pet. Miscel. Parl., 119. Lex. Parl., c. 23.2 Hats., 22, 62.

    Sec. 300. Status of Memberelect as to privilege,
    oath, committee service, etc.

      Privilege  from arrest takes place by force of the
    election; and before a return be made a Member elected may be named of a
    committee, and is to every extent a Member except that he cannot

      The Constitution of the United States limits the broad Parliamentary
    privilege to the time of attendance on sessions of Congress, and of
    going to and returning therefrom. In a case wherein a Member was
    imprisoned during a recess of Congress, he remained in confinement until
    the House, on assembling, liberated him (III, 2676).

      It is recognized in the practice of the House that a Member may be
    named to a committee before he is sworn, and in some cases Members have
    not taken the oath until long afterwards (IV, 4483), although in the
    modern practice Members-elect have been elected to standing committees
    effective only when sworn (H. Res. 26, 27; Jan. 6, 1983, p. 132). In one
    case, wherein a Member did not appear to take the oath, the Speaker with
    the consent of the House appointed another Member to the committee place
    (IV, 4484). The status of a Member-elect under the Constitution
    undoubtedly differs greatly from the status of a Member-elect under the
    law of Parliament. In various inquiries by committees of the House this
    question has been examined, with the conclusions that a Member-elect
    becomes a Member from the very beginning of the term to which he was
    elected (I, 500), that he is as much an officer of the Government before
    taking the oath as afterwards (I, 185), and that his status is
    distinguished from that of a Member who has qualified (I, 183, 184).
    Members-elect may resign or decline before taking the oath (II, 1230-
    1233, 1235); they have been excluded (I, 449, 464, 474, 550, 551; VI,
    56; Mar. 1, 1967, pp. 4997-5038), and in one case a Member-elect was
    expelled (I, 476; II, 1262). The names of Members who have not been
    sworn are not entered on the roll from which the yeas and nays are
    called for entry on the Journal (V, 6048; VIII, 3122), nor are such
    Members-elect permitted to vote or introduce bills.

    Sec. 301. Relations of Members and others to
    privilege.

      Every  man must, at his peril, take notice who are members of
    either House returned of record. Lex. Parl., 23; 4 Inst., 24.

      On Complaint of a breach of privilege, the party may either be
    summoned, or sent for in custody of the sergeant. 1 Grey, 88, 95.

    [[Page 135]]

    not in effect waive the privilege of the House. 3 Grey, 140, 222.

      The privilege of a Member is the privilege of the House. If the Member
    waive it without leave, it is a ground for punishing him, but can-

      Although the privilege of Members of the House of Representatives is
    limited by the Constitution, these provisions of the Parliamentary law
    are applicable, and persons who have attempted to bribe Members (II,
    1599, 1606), assault them for words spoken in debate (II, 1617, 1625) or
    interfere with them while on the way to attend the sessions of the House
    (II, 1626), have been arrested by order of the House by the Sergeant-at-
    Arms, ``Wherever to be found.'' The House has declined to make a general
    rule to permit Members to waive their privilege in certain cases,
    preferring to give or refuse permission in each individual case (III,
    2660-2662).

      In United States v. Helstoski, 42 U.S. 477 (1979), the Supreme Court
    discussed the ability of either an individual Member or the entire
    Congress to waive the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause. The
    Court found first, that the Member's conduct in testifying before a
    grand jury and voluntarily producing documentary evidence of legislative
    acts protected by the Clause did not waive its protection. Assuming,
    without deciding, that a Member could waive the Clause's protection
    against being prosecuted for a legislative act, the Court said that such
    a waiver could only be found after an explicit and unequivocal
    renunciation of its immunity, which was absent in this case. Second,
    passage of the official bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. 201, did not amount
    to an institutional waiver of the Speech or Debate Clause for individual
    Members. Again assuming without deciding whether Congress could
    constitutionally waive the Clause for individual Members, such a waiver
    could be shown only by an explicit and unequivocal expression of
    legislative intent, and there was no evidence of that in the legislative
    history of the statute.

    [[Page 136]]

    Sec. 302. Parliamentary law as to questioning a Member in
    another place for speech or debate.

      For  any speech or debate in either
    House, they shall not be questioned in any other place. Const. U.S., I,
    6; S. P. protest of the Commons to James I, 1621; 2 Rapin, No. 54, pp.
    211, 212. But this is restrained to things done in the House in a
    parliamentary course. 1 Rush, 663. For he is not to have privilege
    contra morem parliamentarium, to exceed the bounds and limits of his
    place and duty. Com. p.

    Sec. 303. Relation of the courts to parliamentary
    privilege.

      If  an offense be committed by a member in the House, of which
    the House has cognizance, it is an infringement of their right for any
    person or court to take notice of it till the House has punished the
    offender or referred him to a due course. Lex. Parl., 63.

    Sec. 304. Breach of privilege to refuse to put a question which
    is in order.

      Privilege is in the power of the House, and is a restraint to the
    proceeding of inferior courts, but not of the House itself. 2 Nalson,
    450; 2 Grey, 399. For whatever is spoken in the House is subject to the
    censure of the House; and offenses of this kind have been severely
    punished by calling the person to the bar to make submission, committing
    him to the tower, expelling the House, &c. Scob., 72; L. Parl., c. 22.
       It is a breach of order for the Speaker to refuse to
    put a question which is in order. 1 Hats., 175-6; 5 Grey, 133.

      Where the Clerk, presiding during organization of the House, declined
    to put a question, a Member put the question from the floor (I, 67).

    [[Page 137]]

    under pretenses of treason, &c., to take any man from his service in the
    House, and so, as many, one after another, as would make the House what
    he pleaseth. Dec'l of the Com. on the King's declaring Sir John Hotham a
    traitor. 4 Rushw., 586. So, when a member stood indicted for felony, it
    was adjudged that he ought to remain of the House till conviction; for
    it may be any man's case, who is guiltless, to be accused and indicted
    of felony, or the like crime. 23 El., 1580; D'Ewes, 283, col. 1; Lex.
    Parl., 133.

    Sec. 305. Parliamentary law of privilege as related to
    treason, felony, etc.

      And  even in cases of treason, felony, and breach of
    the peace, to which privilege does not extend as to substance, yet in
    Parliament a member is privileged as to the mode of proceeding. The case
    is first to be laid before the House, that it may judge of the fact and
    of the ground of the accusation, and how far forth the manner of the
    trial may concern their privilege; otherwise it would be in the power of
    other branches of the government, and even of every private man,

      Where Members of the House of Representatives have been arrested by
    the State authorities the cases have not been laid first before the
    House; but when the House has learned of the proceedings, it has
    investigated to ascertain if the crime charged was actually within the
    exceptions of the Constitution (III, 2673), and in one case where it
    found a Member imprisoned for an offense not within the exceptions it
    released him by the hands of its own officer (III, 2676).

    Sec. 306. Practice as to Members indicted or
    convicted.

      The  House has not usually taken action in the infrequent
    instances where Members have been indicted for felony, and in one or two
    instances Members under indictment or pending appeal on conviction have
    been appointed to committees  (IV,  4479).  The  House  has,  however,
    adopted a resolution expressing the sense of the House that Members
    convicted of certain felonies should refrain from participation in
    committee business and from voting in the House until the presumption of
    innocence is reinstated or until re-elected to the House (see H. Res.
    128, Nov. 14, 1973, p. 36944), and that principle has been incorporated
    in the Code of Official Conduct (clause 10 of rule XLIII). A Senator
    after indictment was omitted from committees at his own request (IV,
    4479), and a Member who had been convicted in one case did not appear in
    the House during the Congress (IV, 4484, footnote). A Senator in one
    case withdrew from the Senate pending his trial (II, 1278), and on
    conviction resigned (II, 1282). In this case the Senate, after the
    conviction, took steps looking to action although an application for
    rehearing on appeal was pending (II, 1282).

    [[Page 138]]

    to affect the person of a member, it is the practice immediately to
    acquaint the House, that they may know the reasons for such a
    proceeding, and take such steps as they think proper. 2 Hats., 259. Of
    which see many examples. Ib., 256, 257, 258. But the communication is
    subsequent to the arrest. 1 Blackst., 167.

    Sec. 307. Parliamentary law as to arrest of a
    Member.

      When  it is found necessary for the public service to put a Member
    under arrest, or when, on any public inquiry, matter comes out which may
    lead

    Sec. 308. A breach of privilege for one House to encroach
    or interfere as to the other.

      It  is highly expedient, says Hatsel, for
    the due preservation of the privileges of the separate branches of the
    legislature, that neither should encroach on the other, or interfere in
    any matter depending before them, so as to preclude, or even influence,
    that freedom of debate which is essential to a free council. They are,
    therefore, not to take notice of any bills or other matters depending,
    or of votes that have been given, or of speeches which have been held,
    by the members of either of the other branches of the legislature, until
    the same have been communicated to them in the usual parliamentary
    manner. 2 Hats., 252; 4 Inst., 15; Seld. Jud., 53.

    [[Page 139]]

    opinion of the King on any bill or proceeding depending in
    either House of Parliament, with a view to influence the votes of the
    members, 2 Hats., 251, 6.

    * * * * *

    Sec. 309. Relations of the Sovereign to the Parliament
    and its Members.

      Thus  the King's taking notice of the bill for suppressing
    soldiers, depending before the House; his proposing a provisional clause
    for a bill before it was presented to him by the two Houses; his
    expressing displeasure against some persons for matters moved in
    Parliament during the debate and preparation of a bill, were breaches of
    privilege, 2 Nalson, 743; and in 1783, December 17, it was declared a
    breach of fundamental privileges, &c., to report any opinion or
    pretended