    [Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 105th Congress]
    [105th Congress]
    [House Document 104-272]
    [Rules of the House of Representatives]
    [Pages 654-694]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

    [[Page 654]]

                                    Rule XXI.

                                    on bills.

    Sec. 830. Reading, engrossment, and passage of
    bills.

      1. Bills and  joint resolutions on their passage shall be read the first time
    by title and the second time in full, when, if the previous question is
    ordered, the Speaker shall state the question to be: Shall the bill be
    engrossed and read a third time? and, if decided in the affirmative, it
    shall be read the third time by title, and the question shall then be
    put upon its passage.

      This rule was adopted in 1789, amended in 1794, 1880 (IV, 3391), and
    on Jan. 4, 1965 (H. Res. 8, 89th Cong.). This latest amendment
    eliminated the provision which permitted a Member to demand the reading
    in full of the engrossed copy of a House bill.

    Sec. 831. First and second readings.

      Formerly a  bill was
    read for the first time by title at the time of its introduction, but
    since 1890 all bills have been introduced by filing them with the Clerk,
    thus rendering a reading by title impossible at that time (IV, 3391).
    But the titles of all bills introduced are printed in the Journal and
    Record, thus carrying out the real purposes of the rule.

    [[Page 655]]

      The second reading of a bill is in full and occurs when the bill is
    considered in the House (IV, 3391) or in the Committee of the Whole
    (Apr. 28, 1977, p. 12635). The initial step of consideration in the
    Committee of the Whole is sometimes referred to as the ``first reading''
    and is customarily dispensed with by unanimous consent or special rule.
    Thus, the second reading of a bill comprises its reading for amendment
    in the Committee of the Whole (Apr. 28, 1977, p. 12635). Any Member may
    demand a full reading of a bill before general debate begins in the
    Committee of the Whole or, if considered in the House, when first taken
    up for action (IV, 3391, 4738). However, the second reading is normally
    affected by unanimous consent, suspension of the rules, or a special
    rule providing for the consideration of the bill. A motion to dispense
    with the reading of a bill in full is not in order (VIII, 2335, 2436).
    The Speaker may object to a request for unanimous consent that a bill
    may be acted on without being read (IV, 3390; VII, 1054).

    Sec. 832. The third reading after
    engrossment.

      The right to  demand the reading in full of the engrossed copy of a
    bill formerly guaranteed by the rule, existed only immediately after it
    had passed to be engrossed and before it had been read a third time by
    title (IV, 3400, 3403, 3404; VII, 1061); or before the yeas and nays had
    been ordered on passage (IV, 3402). The right to demand the reading in
    full caused the bill to be laid aside until engrossed even though the
    previous question had been ordered (IV, 3395-3399; VII, 1062). A
    privileged motion may not intervene before the third reading (IV, 3405),
    and the question on engrossment and third reading is not subject to a
    demand for division of the question (Aug. 3, 1989, p. 18544). A vote on
    passage must first be reconsidered to remedy the omission to read a bill
    a third time (IV, 3406). Senate bills are not engrossed in the House;
    but are ordered to a third reading. The demand for the reading of the
    engrossed copy of a Senate bill cannot be made in the House (VIII,
    2426).

    Sec. 833. Voting on bills.

      A bill in  the House (as
    distinguished from the Committee of the Whole) is amended pending the
    engrossment and third reading (V, 5781; VI, 1051, 1052). The question on
    engrossment and third reading being decided in the negative the bill is
    rejected (IV, 3420, 3421). A bill must be considered and voted on by
    itself (IV, 3408). Where the two Houses pass similar but distinct bills
    on the same subject it is necessary that one or the other House act
    again on the subject (IV, 3386). The requirement of a two-thirds vote
    for proposed constitutional amendments has been construed in the later
    practice to apply only to the vote on the final passage (V, 7029, 7030;
    VIII, 3504). A bill having been rejected by the House, a similar but not
    identical bill on the same subject was afterwards held to be in order
    (IV, 3384).

    Sec. 834a. Unauthorized appropriations in reported
    general appropriation bills or amendments thereto.

      2. (a)  No appropriation
    shall be reported in a general appropriation bill, or shall be in order
    as an amendment thereto, for any expenditure not previously authorized
    by law, except to continue appropriations for public works and objects
    which are already in progress.

    [[Page 656]]

    propriation, except germane provisions that retrench expenditures by
    the reduction of amounts of money covered by the bill, which may include
    those recommended to the Committee on Appropriations by direction of a
    legislative committee having jurisdiction over the subject matter
    thereof, and except rescissions of appropriations contained in
    appropriation Acts.

    Sec. 834b. Legislation in reported general appropriation
    bills; exceptions.

      (b)  No provision changing existing law shall be
    reported in a general appropriation bill, including a provision making
    the availability of funds contingent on the receipt or possession of
    information not required by existing law for the period of the
    ap-

    Sec. 834c. Legislation or limitations in amendments to
    general appropriation bills.

      (c)  No amendment to a general appropriation
    bill shall be in order if changing existing law, including an amendment
    making the availability of funds contingent on the receipt or possession
    of information not required by existing law for the period of the
    appropriation. Except as provided in paragraph (d), no amendment shall
    be in order during consideration of a general appropriation bill
    proposing a limitation not specifically contained or authorized in
    existing law for the period of the limitation.

    [[Page 657]]

    amounts of money covered by the bill may be
    considered; but after the vote on any such amendment, the privileged
    motion made in order under this paragraph may be renewed.

    Sec. 834d. Motion to rise and report as preferential to
    limitation or retrenchment amendments.

      (d)  After a general appropriation
    bill has been read for amendment, motions that the Committee of the
    Whole rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may
    have been adopted shall, if offered by the Majority Leader or a
    designee, have precedence over motions to further amend the bill. If any
    such motion is rejected, amendments proposing limitations not
    specifically contained or authorized in existing law for the period of
    the limitation or proposing germane amendments which retrench
    expenditures by reduction of

    Sec. 834e. Designated emergencies in reported
    appropriation bills.

      (e)  No provision shall be reported in any
    appropriation bill or joint resolution containing an emergency
    designation for purposes of section 251(b)(2)(D) or section 252(e) of
    the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, or shall be in
    order as an amendment thereto, if the provision or amendment is not
    designated as an emergency, unless the provision or amendment rescinds
    budget authority or reduces direct spending, or reduces an amount for a
    designated emergency.

    Sec. 834f. Offsetting amendments en bloc to appropriation
    bills.

      (f)  During the reading of any appropriation bill for amendment in
    the Committee of the Whole, it shall be in order to consider en bloc
    amendments proposing only to transfer appropriations among objects in
    the bill without increasing the levels of budget authority or outlays in
    the bill. When considered en bloc pursuant to this paragraph, such
    amendments may amend portions of the bill not yet read for amendment
    (following the disposition of any points of order against such portions)
    and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question in the
    House or in the Committee of the Whole.

    [[Page 658]]

    of contention over propositions of legislation. In 1838
    that Congress added the exception to permit unauthorized appropriations
    for continuation of works in progress and for contingencies for carrying
    on departments of the Government. The rule remained in that form until
    the 44th Congress in 1876, when William S. Holman of Indiana persuaded
    the House to amend the rule to permit germane legislative retrenchments.
    In 1880, the 46th Congress dropped the exception which permitted
    unauthorized appropriations for contingencies of Government departments,
    and modified the ``Holman Rule'' to define retrenchments as the
    reduction of the number and salary of officers of the United States, the
    reduction of compensation of any person paid out of the Treasury of the
    United States, or the reduction of the amounts of money covered by the
    bill. That form of the retrenchment exception remained in place until
    the 49th Congress in 1885, when it was dropped until the 52d Congress in
    1891, and then re-inserted through the 53d Congress until 1894. It was
    again dropped in the 54th Congress from 1895 until re-inserted in the
    62d Congress in 1911 (IV, 3578; VII, 1125).

    Sec. 834g. Clause 2 of rule XXI, generally.

      The  25th
    Congress in 1837 was the first to adopt a rule prohibiting
    appropriations in a general appropriation bill or amendment thereto not
    previously authorized by law, in order to prevent delay of appropriation
    bills because

      The clause remained unamended until January 3, 1983, when the 98th
    Congress restructured it in the basic form of paragraphs (a)-(d).

      Paragraph (a) retained the prohibition against unauthorized
    appropriations in general appropriation bills and amendments thereto
    except in continuation of works in progress.

      Paragraph (b) narrowed the ``Holman Rule'' exception from the
    prohibition against legislation to cover only retrenchments reducing
    amounts of money included in the bill as reported, and permitted
    legislative committees with proper jurisdiction to recommend such
    retrenchments to the Appropriations Committee for discretionary
    inclusion in the reported bill. The last exception in paragraph (b),
    permitting the inclusion of legislation rescinding appropriations in
    appropriation Acts, was added in the 99th Congress by the Balanced
    Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (sec. 228(a), P.L. 99-
    177). The latter feature of the paragraph does not extend to a
    rescission of contract authority provided by a law other than an
    appropriation Act (Sept. 22, 1993, p. ----; p. ----; May 15, 1997, p. --
    --; July 23, 1997, p. ----). In the 105th Congress paragraph (b) was
    amended to treat as legislation a provision reported in a general
    appropriation bill that makes funding contingent on whether
    circumstances not made determinative by existing law are ``known'' (H.
    Res. 5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. ----).

    [[Page 659]]

    appropriation Act, and not
    merely where the limitation is alleged to be ``consistent with existing
    law'' (June 28, 1988, p. 16267). Although the Committee on
    Appropriations may include a limitation in its reported bill, if it is
    stricken with other legislative language on a point of order it may be
    reinserted during the reading only if in compliance with clause 2(c) or
    in accordance with clause 2(d) (June 18, 1991, p. 15199).
      Paragraph (c) retained the prohibition against amendments changing
    existing law but permitted limitation amendments during the reading of
    the bill by paragraph only if specifically authorized by existing law
    for the period of the limitation. In the 105th Congress paragraph (c)
    was amended to treat as legislation an amendment to a general
    appropriation bill that makes funding contingent on whether
    circumstances not made determinative by existing law are ``known'' (H.
    Res. 5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. ----). The exception for limitations is
    strictly construed to apply only where existing law requires or permits
    the inclusion of limiting language in an

    [[Page 660]]

    the Committee of the Whole rise and report
    to the House with the recommendation that the enacting clause be
    stricken out takes precedence over the motion to amend under clause 7 of
    rule XXIII and thus over the motion to rise and report under clause 2(d)
    (July 24, 1986, p. 17641).
      Paragraph (d) provided a new procedure for consideration of
    retrenchment and other limitation amendments only when reading of a
    general appropriation bill has been completed and only if the Committee
    of the Whole does not adopt a motion to rise and report the bill back to
    the House (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1983, p. 34). In the 104th Congress
    paragraph (d) was amended to limit the availability of its preferential
    motion to rise and report to the Majority Leader or his designee (sec.
    215(a), H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. ----). In the 105th Congress it was
    further amended to make the motion preferential to any motion to amend
    at that stage (H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. ----). Where the reading of a
    general appropriation bill for amendment has been completed (or
    dispensed with), including the last paragraph of the bill containing the
    citation to the short title (July 30, 1986, p. 18214), the Chair (under
    the former form of the rule, which made the preferential motion
    available to any Member) might first inquire whether any Member sought
    to offer an amendment (formerly, one not prohibited by clauses 2(a) or
    (c)) prior to recognizing Members to offer limitation or retrenchment
    amendments (June 2, 1983, p. 14317; Sept. 22, 1983, p. 25406; Oct. 27,
    1983, p. 29630), including pro forma amendments (Aug. 2, 1989, p.
    18126). Pursuant to clause 2(d), a motion that the Committee rise and
    report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been
    adopted is not debatable (Apr. 23, 1987, p. 9613) and takes precedence
    over any amendment (formerly only a limitation or retrenchment
    amendment) (July 30, 1985, p. 21534; July 23, 1986, p. 17431; Apr. 23,
    1987, p. 9613), but only after completion of the reading and disposition
    of amendments not otherwise precluded (June 30, 1992, p. ----). Thus a
    motion that the Committee rise and report the bill to the House with the
    recommendation that it be recommitted, with instructions to report back
    to the House (forthwith or otherwise) with an amendment proposing a
    limitation, does not take precedence over the motion to rise and report
    the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted
    (sustained on appeal, Sept. 19, 1983, p. 24647). An amendment not only
    reducing an amount in a paragraph of an appropriation bill but also
    limiting expenditure of those funds on a particular project (i.e., a
    limitation not contained in existing law) was held not in order during
    the reading of that paragraph but only at the end of the bill under
    clause 2(d) (July 23, 1986, p. 17431; June 15, 1988, p. 14719). Where
    language of limitation was stricken from a general appropriation bill on
    a point of order that it changed existing law, an amendment proposing to
    reinsert the limitation without its former legislative content was held
    not in order before completion of the reading for amendment (Sept. 23,
    1993, p. ----). A motion that

      Paragraphs (e) and (f) were added in the 104th Congress (sec. 215, H.
    Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. ----).

    Sec. 835. Points of order on general appropriation
    bills.

      As the rule  applies only to general appropriation bills, which are not
    enumerated or defined in the rules (VII, 1116) bills appropriating only
    for one purpose have been held not to be ``general'' within the meaning
    of this rule (VII, 1122). Neither a resolution providing an
    appropriation for a single government agency (Jan. 31, 1962, p. 1352),
    nor a joint resolution only containing continuing appropriations for
    diverse agencies to provide funds until regular appropriation bills are
    enacted (Sept. 21, 1967, p. 26370), nor a joint resolution providing an
    appropriation for a single government agency and permitting a transfer
    of a portion of those funds to another agency (Oct. 25, 1979, pp. 29627-
    28), nor a joint resolution transferring funds already appropriated from
    one specific agency to another (Mar. 26, 1980, pp. 6716-17), nor a joint
    resolution transferring unobligated balances to the President to be
    available for specified purposes but containing no new budget authority
    (Mar. 3, 1988, p. 3239), are ``general appropriation bills'' within the
    purview of this clause. A point of order under this rule does not apply
    to a special order reported from the Committee on Rules ``self-
    executing'' the adoption in the House of an amendment changing existing
    law (July 27, 1993, p. ----).

      As all bills making or authorizing appropriations require
    consideration in Committee of the Whole, it follows that the enforcement
    of the rule must ordinarily occur during consideration in Committee of
    the Whole, where the Chair, in response to a point of order, may rule
    out any portion of the bill in conflict with the rule (IV, 3811; Sept.
    8, 1965, pp. 23140, 23182). Portions of the bill thus stricken are not
    reported back to the House.

    [[Page 661]]

    ruled on the ground that the Chairman
    of the Committee of the Whole lacked authority to pass upon the question
    (Apr. 8, 1943, pp. 3150-51, 3153). The enforcement of the rule also
    occurs in the House in that a motion to recommit a general appropriation
    bill may not propose an amendment containing legislation (Sept. 1, 1976,
    pp. 28883-84) or a limitation not considered in the Committee of the
    Whole (Speaker Foley, Aug. 1, 1989, p. 17159; Aug. 3, 1989, p. 18546);
    and such amendment is precluded whether the Committee of the Whole has
    risen and reported automatically pursuant to a special rule or, instead,
    by a motion at the end of the reading for amendment (June 22, 1995, p.
    ----).
      Prior to the adoption of clause 8 of rule XXI in the 104th Congress
    (see Sec. 848a, infra), it was necessary that some Member reserve points
    of order when a general appropriation bill was referred to the calendar
    of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, in order
    that provisions in violation of the rule could be stricken in the
    Committee (V, 6921-6925; VIII, 3450; Chairman Chindblom, Feb. 6, 1926,
    p. 3456). Where points of order had been reserved pending a unanimous-
    consent request that the committee be permitted to file its report when
    the House would not be in session, it was not necessary that they be
    reserved again when the report ultimately was presented as privileged
    when the House was in session, as the initial reservation carried over
    to the subsequent filing (Mar. 1, 1983, p. 3241). In an instance where
    points of order were not reserved against an appropriation bill when it
    was reported to the House and referred to the Committee of the Whole,
    points of order in the Committee of the Whole against a proposition in
    violation of this clause were over-

      By unanimous consent the Committee of the Whole may vacate proceedings
    under specified points of order (June 7, 1991, p. 13973).

    [[Page 662]]

    chapter (June 11, 1985, p. 15181). It is too
    late to rule out the entire paragraph after points of order against
    specific portions have been sustained and an amendment to the paragraph
    has been offered (June 27, 1974, pp. 21670-72).
      Points of order against unauthorized appropriations or legislation on
    general appropriation bills may be made as to the whole or only a
    portion of a paragraph (IV, 3652; V, 6881). The fact that a point is
    made against a portion of a paragraph does not prevent another point
    against the whole paragraph (V, 6882; July 31, 1985, p. 21895). If a
    portion of a proposed amendment is out of order, it is sufficient for
    the rejection of the whole amendment (V, 6878-6880); and if a point of
    order is sustained against any portion of a package of amendments
    considered en bloc, all the amendments are ruled out of order and must
    be reoffered separately, or those which are not subject to a point of
    order may be considered en bloc by unanimous consent (Sept. 16, 1981,
    pp. 20735-38; June 21, 1984, p. 17687). Where a point is sustained
    against the whole of a paragraph the whole must go out, but it is
    otherwise when the point is made only against a portion (V, 6884, 6885).
    General appropriation bills are read ``scientifically'' only by
    paragraph headings and appropriation amounts, and points of order
    against a paragraph must be made before an amendment is offered thereto
    or before the Clerk reads the next paragraph heading and amount
    (Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 2.26). A point of order
    against a paragraph under this clause may be made only after that
    paragraph has been read by the Clerk, and not prior to its reading
    pending consideration of an amendment inserting language immediately
    prior thereto (June 6, 1985, pp. 14605, 14609). Where the reading of a
    paragraph of a general appropriation bill has been dispensed with by
    unanimous consent, the Chair inquires whether there are points of order
    against the paragraph before entertaining amendments or directing the
    Clerk to read further, but he does not make such an inquiry where the
    Clerk has actually read the paragraph (May 31, 1984, p. 14608). Where
    the bill is considered as having been read and open to amendment by
    unanimous consent, points of order against provisions in the bill must
    be made before amendments are offered, and cannot be reserved pending
    subsequent action on amendments (Dec. 1, 1982, p. 28175). Where a
    chapter is considered as read by unanimous consent and open to amendment
    at any point, no amendments are offered and the Clerk begins to read the
    next chapter, it is too late to make a point of order against a
    paragraph in the preceding

    [[Page 663]]

      In the administration of the rule, it is the practice that those
    upholding an item of appropriation should have the burden of showing the
    law authorizing it (IV, 3597; VII, 1179, 1233, 1276). Thus the burden of
    proving the authorization for language carried in an appropriation bill,
    or that the language in the bill constitutes a valid limitation which
    does not change existing law, falls on the proponents and managers of
    the bill (May 28, 1968, p. 15357; Nov. 30, 1982, p. 28062). Where a
    provision is susceptible to more than one interpretation, that burden
    may be met by a showing that only the requirements of existing law, and
    not any new requirements, are recited in the language (Sept. 23, 1993,
    p. ----). The Chair may overrule a point of order that appropriations
    for a certain agency are unauthorized upon citation to an organic
    statute creating the agency, absent any showing that the organic law has
    been overtaken by a scheme of periodic reauthorization; the Chair may
    hear further argument and reverse his ruling, however, where existing
    law not previously called to the Chair's attention would require the
    ruling to be reversed (VIII, 3435; June 8, 1983, p. 14854, where a law
    amending the statute creating the Bureau of the Mint with the express
    purpose of requiring annual authorizations was subsequently called to
    the Chair's attention). Reported provisions in a general appropriation
    bill described in the accompanying report (pursuant to clause 3 of rule
    XXI) as directly or indirectly changing the application of existing law
    are presumably legislation, absent rebuttal by the committee (May 31,
    1984, p. 14591). The burden of proof to show that an appropriation
    contained in an amendment is authorized by law is on the proponent of
    the amendment (May 11, 1971, p. 14471; Oct. 29, 1991, p. 28791; July 26,
    1995, p. ----; July 27, 1995, pp. ----, ----; July 31, 1995, p. ----;
    May 15, 1997, p. ----) and the burden is on the proponent of an
    amendment to a general appropriation bill to prove that language offered
    under the guise of a limitation does not change existing law (July 17,
    1975, p. 23239; June 16, 1976, pp. 18666-67; July 18, 1995, p. ----). If
    the amendment is susceptible to more than one interpretation, it is
    incumbent upon the proponent to show that it is not in violation of the
    rule (Procedure, ch. 25, sec. 6.3; July 28, 1980, pp. 19924-25). The
    mere recitation in an amendment that a determination is to be made
    pursuant to existing laws and regulations, absent a citation to the law
    imposing such responsibility, is not sufficient proof by the proponent
    of an amendment to overcome a point of order that the amendment
    constitutes legislation (Sept. 16, 1980, pp. 25606-07). The
    authorization must be enacted before the appropriation may be included
    in an appropriation bill; thus delaying the availability of an
    appropriation pending enactment of an authorization does not protect the
    item of appropriation against a point of order under this clause (Apr.
    26, 1972, p. 14455).

      Where an unauthorized appropriation or legislation is permitted to
    remain in a general appropriation bill by failure to raise or by waiver
    of a point of order, an amendment merely changing that amount and not
    adding legislative language or earmarking separate funds for another
    unauthorized purpose is in order (July 27, 1954, p. 12287; Oct. 1, 1975,
    p. 31058; June 8, 1977, pp. 17941-42; July 17, 1985, p. 19435), but an
    amendment adding further unauthorized items of appropriation or
    earmarking for another unauthorized purpose or adding legislation in the
    form of new duties or broadening the application of a legislative
    provision permitted to remain to other funds is not in order (Dec. 8,
    1971, p. 45487; Aug. 7, 1978, pp. 24710-12; July 30, 1985, p. 21532;
    July 17, 1986, p. 16918; July 23, 1986, p. 17446; June 26, 1987, p.
    17655; May 25, 1988, p. 12256; June 28, 1988, pp. 16203, 16213).

      To a legislative provision permitted to remain conferring assistance
    on a certain class of recipients, an amendment adding another class is
    further legislation and is not merely perfecting in nature (June 22,
    1983, p. 16851). An amendment to a general appropriation bill is not
    subject to a point of order as adding legislation if containing,
    verbatim, a legislative provision already contained in the bill and
    permitted to remain (Aug. 27, 1980, p. 23519).

    [[Page 664]]

      Where by unanimous consent an amendment is offered en bloc to a
    paragraph containing an unauthorized amount not yet read for amendment,
    the amendment increasing that unauthorized figure is subject to a point
    of order since at that point it is not being offered to a paragraph
    which has been read and permitted to remain (June 21, 1984, p. 17687).
    As required by clause 2(f), the Chair will query for points of order
    against the provisions of an appropriation bill not yet reached in the
    reading but addressed by an amendment offered en bloc under that clause
    as budget authority and outlay neutral (July 22, 1997, p. ----). An
    amendment adding a new paragraph indirectly increasing an unauthorized
    amount contained in a prior paragraph passed in the reading is subject
    to a point of order because the new paragraph is adding a further
    unauthorized amount not textually protected by the waiver (July 12,
    1995, p. ----; July 16, 1997, p. ----, p.----; Sept. 9, 1997, p. ----).
    However, a new paragraph indirectly reducing an unauthorized amount
    permitted to remain in a prior paragraph passed in the reading is not
    subject to a point of order because it is not adding a further
    unauthorized amount (July 16, 1997, p. ----). To a legislative provision
    in a general appropriation bill, permitted to remain, exempting cases
    where the life of the mother would be endangered if a fetus were carried
    to term from a denial of funds for abortions, an amendment exempting
    instead cases where the health of the mother would be endangered if the
    fetus were carried to term was held not to constitute further
    legislation, since determinations on the endangerment of life
    necessarily subsume determinations on the endangerment of health, and
    the amendment did not therefore require any different or more onerous
    determinations (June 27, 1984, p. 19113).

      The inclusion of funds in a general appropriation bill in the form of
    a ``not to exceed'' limitation does not obviate a point of order that
    the funds are not authorized by law (June 21, 1988, p. 15440). The fact
    that legislative jurisdiction over the subject matter of an amendment
    may rest with the Committee on Appropriations does not immunize the
    amendment from the application of clause 2(c) of rule XXI (July 17,
    1996, p. ----; July 24, 1996, p. ----). The ``works in progress
    exception'' under clause 2(a) of rule XXI is a defense to a point of
    order against an unauthorized appropriation reported in a general
    appropriation bill and is not a defense to a point of order under clause
    2(c) of rule XXI that an amendment to an appropriation bill constitutes
    legislation (July 24, 1996, p.----).

    [[Page 665]]

    thorizing additional
    employment contained in an appropriation bill enacted for that fiscal
    year, constituted sufficient authorization for a lump sum supplemental
    appropriation for the White House for the same fiscal year (Nov. 30,
    1973, pp. 38854-55). By a general provision of law appropriations for
    investigations and the acquisition and diffusion of information by the
    Agricultural Department on subjects related to agriculture are generally
    in order in the agricultural appropriation bill (IV, 3649). It has once
    been held that this law would also authorize appropriations for the
    instrumentalities of such investigations (IV, 3615); but these would not
    include the organization of a bureau to conduct the work (IV, 3651). The
    law does not authorize general investigations by the department (IV,
    3652), or cooperation with state investigations (IV, 3650; VII, 1301,
    1302), or the investigation of foods in relation to commerce (IV, 3647,
    3648; VII, 1298), or the compiling of tests at an exposition (IV, 3653).
    A paragraph of a general appropriation bill both establishing and
    funding a commission was ruled out as constituting legislation and
    carrying unauthorized appropriations (June 29, 1988, p. 16470). A
    paragraph appropriating funds for matching-grants to States was held
    unauthorized where the authorizing law did not require State matching
    funds (June 28, 1993, p. ----). A paragraph funding a project from the
    Highway Trust Fund was held unauthorized where such funding was
    authorized only from the general fund (Sept. 23, 1993, p. ----).

    Sec. 836. Authorization of law for
    appropriations.

      The authorization  by existing law required in the rule to justify
    appropriations may be made also by a treaty if it has been ratified by
    both the contracting parties (IV, 3587); however, where existing law
    authorizes appropriations for the U.S. share of facilities to be
    recommended in an agreement with another country containing specified
    elements, an agreement in principle with that country predating the
    authorization law and lacking the required elements is insufficient
    authorization (June 28, 1993, p. ----). An executive order does not
    constitute sufficient authorization in law absent proof of its
    derivation from a statute enacted by Congress authorizing the order and
    expenditure of funds (June 15, 1973, p. 19855; June 25, 1974, p. 21036).
    Thus a Reorganization Plan submitted by the President pursuant to 5
    U.S.C. 906 has the status of statutory law when it becomes effective and
    is sufficient authorization to support an appropriation for an office
    created by executive order issued pursuant to the Reorganization Plan
    (June 21, 1974, pp. 20595-96). A resolution of the House has been held
    sufficient authorization for an appropriation for the salary of an
    employee of the House (IV, 3656-3658) even though the resolution may
    have been agreed to only by a preceding House (IV, 3660). Previous
    enactment of items of appropriation unauthorized by law does not justify
    similar appropriations in subsequent bills (VII, 1145, 1150, 1151)
    unless if through appropriations previously made, a function of the
    government has been established which would bring it into the category
    of continuation of works in progress (VII, 1280), or unless legislation
    in a previous appropriation act has become permanent law (May 20, 1964,
    p. 11422). The omission to appropriate during a series of years for an
    object authorized by law does not repeal the law, and consequently an
    appropriation when proposed is not subject to the point of order (IV,
    3595). The law authorizing each head of a department to employ such
    numbers of clerks, messengers, copyists, watchmen, laborers, and other
    employees as may be appropriated for by Congress from year to year is
    held to authorize appropriations for those positions not otherwise
    authorized by law (IV, 3669, 3675, 4739); but this law does not apply to
    offices not within departments or not at the seat of government (IV,
    3670-3674). A permanent law authorizing the President to appoint certain
    staff, together with legislative provisions au-

      The failure of Congress to enact into law separate legislation
    specifically modifying eligibility requirements for grant programs under
    existing law does not necessarily render appropriations for those
    programs subject to a point of order, where more general existing law
    authorizes appropriations for all of the programs proposed to be
    modified by new legislation pending before Congress (June 8, 1978, p.
    16778). But whether organic statutes or general grants of authority in
    law constitute sufficient authorization to support appropriations
    depends on whether the general laws applicable to the function or
    department in question require specific or annual authorizations (June
    14, 1978, pp. 17616, 17622, 17626, 17630) or on whether a periodic
    authorization scheme has subsequently occupied the field (Sept. 9, 1997,
    p. ----). An authorization of ``such sums as may be necessary'' is
    sufficient to support any dollar amount, but has no tendency to relieve
    other conditions of the authorization law (June 28, 1993, p. ----).
    Where existing law authorizes certain appropriations from a particular
    trust fund without fiscal year limitation, language that such an
    appropriation remain available until expended does not constitute
    legislation (July 15, 1993, p. ----).

    [[Page 666]]

      Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XLVIII, no funds may be appropriated to
    certain agencies carrying out intelligence and intelligence-related
    activities, unless such funds have been authorized by law for the fiscal
    year in question.

    Sec. 837. Authorization for claims and
    salaries.

      Judgments of  courts certified to Congress in accordance with law or
    authorized by treaty (IV, 3634, 3635, 3644) and audited under authority
    of law have been held to be authorization for appropriations for the
    payment of claims (IV, 3634, 3635). But unadjudicated claims (IV, 3628),
    even though ascertained and transmitted by an executive officer (IV,
    3625-3640), and findings filed under the Bowman Act do not constitute
    authorization (IV, 3643).

      An appropriation for an object not otherwise authorized does not
    constitute authorization to justify a continuance of the appropriation
    another year (IV, 3588, 3589; VII, 1128, 1145, 1149, 1191), and the mere
    appropriation for a salary does not create an office so as to justify
    appropriations in succeeding years (IV, 3590, 3672, 3697), it being a
    general rule that propositions to appropriate for salaries not
    established by law or to increase salaries fixed by law are out of order
    (IV, 3664-3667, 3676-3679). But an exception to these general principles
    is found in the established practice that in the absence of a general
    law fixing a salary the amount appropriated in the last appropriation
    bill has been held to be the legal salary (IV, 3687-3696). A law having
    established an office and fixed a salary, it is not in order to provide
    for an unauthorized office and salary in lieu of it (IV, 3680).

    [[Page 667]]

    Sec. 838. Authorizations for public works.

      An  appropriation
    for a public work in excess of a fixed limit of cost (IV, 3583, 3584;
    VII, 1133), or for extending a service beyond the limits assigned by an
    executive officer exercising a lawful discretion (IV, 3598), or by
    actual law (IV, 3582, 3585), or for purposes prohibited by law are out
    of order (IV, 3580, 3581, 3702), as is an appropriation from the Highway
    Trust Fund where the project is specifically authorized from the general
    fund (Sept. 23, 1993, p. ----). But the mere appropriation of a sum ``to
    complete'' a work does not fix a limit of cost such as would exclude
    future appropriations (IV, 3761). A declaration of policy in an act
    followed by specific provisions conferring authority upon a governmental
    agency to perform certain functions is not construed to authorize
    appropriations for purposes germane to the policy but not specifically
    authorized by the act (VII, 1200). A point of order will not lie against
    an amendment proposing to increase a lump sum for public works projects
    where language in the bill limits use of the lump sum appropriation to
    ``projects as authorized by law'' (Procedure, ch. 25, sec. 5.5), but
    where language in the bill limits use of the lump sum both to projects
    ``authorized by laws'' and ``subject, where appropriate, to enactment of
    authorizing legislation,'' that paragraph constitutes an appropriation
    in part for some unauthorized projects and is not in order (June 6,
    1985, p. 14617).

    Sec. 839. Continuation of a public work by
    appropriations.

      The rule  requiring appropriations to be authorized by existing
    law excepts those ``in continuance of appropriations for such public
    works and objects as are already in progress'' (IV, 3578); and the
    ``works in progress'' exception has historically been applied only in
    cases of general revenue funding (Sept. 22, 1993, pp. ----; Sept. 23,
    1993, pp. ----). But an appropriation in violation of existing law or to
    extend a service beyond a fixed limit is not in order as the continuance
    of a public work (IV, 3585, 3702-3724; VII, 1332; Sept. 23, 1993, pp. --
    --; June 8, 1983, Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 8.9). The
    ``works in progress'' exception may not be invoked to fund a project
    governed by a lapsed authorization and may not be invoked to fund a
    project that is not yet under construction (July 31, 1995, p. ----).
    Where existing law (40 U.S.C. 606) specifically prohibits the making of
    an appropriation to construct or alter any public building involving
    more than $500,000 unless approved by the House and Senate Public Works
    Committees, an appropriation for such purposes not authorized by both
    committees is out of order notwithstanding the ``works in progress''
    exemption, since the law specifically precludes the appropriation from
    being made (June 8, 1983, p. 14855). An appropriation from the Highway
    Trust Fund for an ongoing project was held not in order under the
    ``works in progress'' exception where the Internal Revenue Code
    ``occupied the field'' with a comprehensive authorization scheme not
    embracing the specified project (Sept. 22, 1993, pp. ----; Sept. 23,
    1993, pp. ----). Interruption of a work does not necessarily remove it
    from the privileges of the rule (IV, 3705-3708); but the continuation of
    the work must not be so conditioned in relation to place as to become a
    new work (IV, 3704). It has been held that a work has not been begun
    within the meaning of the rule when an appropriation has been made for a
    site for a public building (IV, 3785), or when a commission has been
    created to select a site or when a site has actually been selected for a
    work (IV, 3762-3763), or when a survey has been made (IV, 3782-3784). By
    ``public works and objects already in progress'' are meant tangible
    matters like buildings, roads, etc., and not duties of officials in
    executive departments (IV, 3709-3713), or the continuance of a work
    indefinite as to completion and intangible in nature like the gauging of
    streams (IV, 3714, 3715). A general system of roads on which some work
    has been done cannot be admitted as a work in progress (VII, 1333), nor
    can an extension of an existing road (Sept. 22, 1993, p. ----).
    Concerning reappropriation for continuation of public works in progress,
    see Sec. 847, infra.

    [[Page 668]]

    tions (IV, 3719; VII, 1345), duties of a commission (IV, 3720;
    VII, 1344), extension of foreign markets for goods (IV, 3722), printing
    of a series of opinions indefinite in continuance (IV, 3718), free
    evening lectures in the District of Columbia (IV, 3789), certain ongoing
    projects from the Highway Trust Fund (Sept. 22, 1993, pp. ----; Sept.
    23, 1993, pp. ----), extension of an existing road (Sept. 22, 1993, p.
    ----), continuation of an extra compensation for ordinary facility for
    carrying the mails (IV, 3808), although the continuation of certain
    special mail facilities has been admitted (IV, 3804-3806). But
    appropriations for rent and repairs of buildings or Government roads
    (IV, 3793, 3798) and bridges (IV, 3803) have been admitted as in
    continuation of a work (IV, 3777, 3778), although it is not in order as
    such to provide for a new building in place of one destroyed (IV, 3606).
    Nor is it in order to repair paving adjacent to a public building but in
    a city street, although it may have been laid originally by the
    Government (IV, 3779). The purchase of adjoining land for a work already
    established has been admitted under this principle (IV, 3766-3773) and
    also additions to existing buildings in cases where no limits of cost
    have been shown (IV, 3774, 3775). But the purchase of a separate and
    detached lot of land is not admitted (IV, 3776). The continuation of
    construction at the Kennedy Library, a project owned by the United
    States and funded by a prior year's appropriation, has been admitted
    notwithstanding the absence of any current authorization (June 14, 1988,
    p. 14335). A provision of law authorizing Commissioners of the District
    of Columbia to take over and operate the fish wharves of the city of
    Washington was held insufficient authority to admit an appropriation for
    reconstructing the fish wharf (VII, 1187).

    Sec. 840. Examples illustrating the continuation of a
    public work.

      Thus the  continuation of the following works has been admitted: A
    topographical survey (IV, 3796, 3797; VII, 1382), a geological map (IV,
    3795), marking of a boundary line (IV, 3717), marking graves of soldiers
    (IV, 3788), a list of claims (IV, 3717), and recoinage of coins in the
    Treasury (IV, 3807); but the following works have not been admitted:
    Investigation of materials, like coal (IV, 3721), scientific investiga-

    Sec. 841a. New buildings at existing
    institutions as in continuance of a public work.

      Appropriations for  new buildings at
    Government institutions have sometimes been admitted (IV, 3741-3750)
    when intended for the purposes of the institution (IV, 3747); but later
    decisions, in view of the indefinite extent of the practice made
    possible by the early decisions, have ruled out propositions to
    appropriate for new buildings in navy yards (IV, 3755-3759) and other
    establishments (IV, 3751-3754). Appropriations for new schoolhouses in
    the District of Columbia (IV, 3750; VII, 1358), for new Army hospitals
    (IV, 3740), for new lighthouses (IV, 3728), armor-plate factories (IV,
    3737-3739), and for additional playgrounds for children in the District
    of Columbia (IV, 3792) have also been held not to be in continuation of
    a public work.

    [[Page 669]]

    former interpretation was confined to naval vessels, and did
    not apply to vessels in other services, like the Coast and Geodetic
    Survey or Lighthouse Service (IV, 3725, 3726), or to floating or
    stationary dry docks (IV, 3729-3736). The construction of a submarine
    cable in extension of one already laid was held not to be the
    continuation of a public work (IV, 3716), but an appropriation for the
    Washington-Alaska military cable has been held in order (VII, 1348).

    Sec. 841b. New vessel for naval and other services
    as in continuation of a public work.

      By a former  broad construction of the rule an
    appropriation of a new and not otherwise authorized vessel of the Navy
    had been held to be a continuance of a public work (IV, 3723, 3724); but
    this line of decisions has been overruled (VII, 1351; Chairman Lehlbach,
    Jan. 22, 1926, p. 2621). While appropriations for new construction and
    procurement of aircraft and equipment for the Navy are not in order,
    appropriations for continuing experiments and development work on all
    types of aircraft are in order (Chairman Lehlbach, Jan. 22, 1926, p.
    2623). This

    Sec. 842a. Legislation on appropriation bills
    generally.

      The provision of  the rule forbidding in any general appropriation bill a
    ``provision changing existing law'' is construed to mean the enactment
    of law where none exists (IV, 3812, 3813), such as permitting funds to
    remain available until expended or beyond the fiscal year covered by the
    bill, where existing law permits no such availability (Aug. 1, 1973, pp.
    27288-89), or immediately upon enactment (July 29, 1986, p. 17981; June
    28, 1988, p. 16255) or merely permits availability to the extent
    provided in advance in appropriation Acts but not explicitly beyond the
    fiscal year in question (July 21, 1981, p. 16687). Language waiving the
    provisions of existing law that did not specifically permit inclusion of
    such a waiver in an appropriation bill (Nov. 13, 1975, p. 36271; June
    20, 1996, p. ----), has been ruled out, as has language identical to
    that contained in an authorization bill previously passed by the House
    but not yet signed into law (Aug. 4, 1978, p. 24436), or a proposition
    for repeal of existing law (VII, 1403). Although clause 2(b) permits the
    Committee on Appropriations to report rescissions of appropriations, an
    amendment proposing a rescission constitutes legislation under clause
    2(c) (May 26, 1993, p. ----). A proposal to amend existing law to
    provide for automatic continuation of appropriations in the absence of
    timely enactment of a regular appropriation bill constitutes legislation
    in contravention of clause 2(c) (July 17, 1996, p. ----; July 24, 1996,
    p. ----).

      Existing law may be repeated verbatim in an appropriation bill (IV,
    3814, 3815), but the slightest change of the text causes it be ruled out
    (IV, 3817; VII, 1391, 1394; June 4, 1970, p. 18405). It is in order to
    include language descriptive of authority provided in law for the
    operation of government agencies and corporations so long as the
    description is precise and does not change that authority in any respect
    (June 15, 1973, pp. 19843-44; Aug. 3, 1978, p. 24249); and while
    language merely reciting the applicability of current law to the use of
    earmarked funds is permitted, an amendment that elevates existing
    guidelines to mandates for spending has been ruled out (July 12, 1989,
    p. 14432).

    [[Page 670]]

    year to year of a law intended to apply during the year of its
    enactment only is not relieved, however, from the point that it is
    legislation (IV, 3822).
      Although the object to be appropriated for may be described without
    violating the rule (IV, 3864), an amendment proposing an appropriation
    under a heading that indicates an unauthorized purpose as its object has
    been ruled out (Oct. 29, 1991, p. 28814). The fact that an item has been
    carried in appropriation bills for many years does not exempt it from a
    point of order as being legislation (VII, 1445, 1656). The reenactment from

      Limits of cost for public works may not be made or changed (IV, 3761,
    3865-3867; VII, 1446), or contracts authorized (IV, 3868-3870; May 14,
    1937, p. 4595).

      The Chair may examine legislative history established during debate on
    an amendment against which a point of order has been reserved to resolve
    any ambiguity therein when ruling on the eventual point of order (June
    14, 1978, p. 17651), and may inquire after its author's intent when
    attempting to construe an ambiguous amendment (Oct. 29, 1991, p. 28818).

    Sec. 842b. Contingencies and congressional
    actions.

      An  amendment making an appropriation contingent upon a
    recommendation (June 27, 1979, pp. 17054-55) or action not specifically
    required by law (July 23, 1980, pp. 19295-97; July 29, 1980, pp. 20098-
    20100) is legislation. For example, a provision limiting the use of
    funds in a bill ``unless'' or ``until'' an action contrary to existing
    law is taken constitutes legislation (Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch.
    26, sec. 47.1; July 24, 1996, p. ----). Where existing law requires an
    agency to furnish certain information to congressional committees upon
    request, without a subpoena, it is not in order on an appropriation bill
    to make funding for that agency contingent upon its furnishing
    information to subcommittees upon request (July 29 and July 30, 1980,
    pp. 20475-76), or contingent upon submission of an agreement by a
    Federal official to Congress and Congressional review thereof (July 31,
    1986, p. 18370). Similarly, it is not in order on a general
    appropriation bill to condition funds on legal determinations to be made
    by a federal court and an executive department (June 28, 1988, p. 16261;
    see Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 47.2).

    [[Page 671]]

    tive branch policy determinations not required by law (Nov. 2, 1983, p.
    30503); an amendment changing a permanent appropriation in existing law
    to restrict its availability until all general appropriation bills are
    presented to the President was held to constitute legislation (June 29,
    1987, p. 18083); and an amendment limiting funds in the bill for certain
    peacekeeping operations unless authorized by Congress was held to
    constitute legislation (June 27, 1994, p. ----).
      Amendments making the availability of funds in a general appropriation
    bill contingent upon subsequent Congressional action have, under the
    most recent precedents, been ruled out as legislation. An amendment
    prohibiting the availability of funds to enforce certain executive
    orders, unless those orders were approved by concurrent resolutions of
    the Congress, was held to be legislation imposing new requirements of
    further legislative action (June 30, 1942, p. 5826). An amendment
    providing that a certain appropriation did not grant authority for a
    certain use of funds unless specific approval of Congress was
    subsequently granted was held to be legislation (May 15, 1947, p. 5378).
    Two subsequent rulings upholding the admissibility of amendments making
    the availability of funds in a general appropriation bill contingent
    upon subsequent Congressional action (June 11, 1968, p. 16692; Sept. 6,
    1979, pp. 23360-61) have, in turn, been superseded by four more recent
    rulings. A provision making the availability of certain funds contingent
    upon subsequent Congressional action on legislative proposals resolving
    the policy issue was held to constitute legislation (Nov. 18, 1981, p.
    28064); an amendment making the availability of funds therein contingent
    upon subsequent enactment of legislation containing specified findings
    was ruled out as legislation requiring new legislative and execu-

      It is not in order on a general appropriation bill to require a
    congressional committee to promulgate regulations to limit the use of an
    appropriation (June 13, 1979, pp. 14670-71), or otherwise to direct the
    activities of a committee (June 24, 1992, pp. ----); nor is it in order
    to direct the Selective Service Administration to issue regulations to
    bring its classifications into conformance with a Supreme Court decision
    (July 20, 1989, p. 15405). Also a proposition to change a rule of the
    House is subject to the point of order (IV, 3819). A provision
    constituting Congressional disapproval of a deferral of budget authority
    proposed by the President pursuant to the Impoundment Control Act is not
    in order if included in a general appropriation bill rather than in a
    separate resolution of disapproval under that Act (July 29, 1982, pp.
    18625, 18626). An amendment making the availability of funds in a
    general appropriation bill contingent upon a substantive determination
    by a state or local government official or agency which is not otherwise
    required by existing law has been ruled out as legislation (July 25,
    1985, p. 20569).

    Sec. 842c. Construing or amending existing
    law.

      A provision  proposing to construe existing law is itself legislative and
    therefore not in order (IV, 3936-3938; May 2, 1951, pp. 4747-48; July
    26, 1951, p. 8982). However, an official's general responsibility to
    construe the language of a limitation on the use of funds, absent
    imposition of an affirmative direction not required by law, does not
    destroy the validity of the limitation (June 27, 1974, pp. 21687-94).

      Where it is asserted that duties ostensibly occasioned by a limitation
    are already imposed by existing law, the Chair may take cognizance of
    judicial decisions and rule the limitation out on the basis that the
    case law is not uniform, current, or finally dispositive (June 16, 1977,
    pp. 19365-74; June 7, 1978, p. 16676). For example, a limitation
    prohibiting the use of funds for an inspection conducted by a regulatory
    agency without a search warrant has been held out of order as imposing a
    new duty not uniformly required by case law (June 16, 1977, pp. 19365-
    74). Similarly, an amendment denying the use of funds for an agency to
    apply certain provisions of law under court decisions in effect on a
    prior date has been held out of order as requiring the official to apply
    non-current case law (June 7, 1978, p. 16655). A paragraph of a general
    appropriation bill changing existing law concerning Federal diversity
    jurisdiction is legislation (July 1, 1987, p. 18638).

    [[Page 672]]

    sion construing a limitation in a bill by
    affirmatively declaring the meaning of the prohibition (May 17, 1988, p.
    11305). Similarly, a limitation that prescribes definitions for terms
    contained in the limitation may be legislation (Deschler's Precedents,
    vol. 8, ch. 26, secs. 25.7, 25.11). On the other hand, language
    excepting certain appropriations from the sweep of a broader limitation
    may be in order (Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 25.2). It
    also has been held in order to except from the operation of a specific
    limitation on expenditures certain of those expenditures which are
    authorized by law by prohibiting a construction of the limitation in a
    way which would prevent compliance with that law (Deschler's Precedents,
    vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 25.10; June 18, 1991, p. 15218).
      A provision in an appropriation bill prescribing a rule of
    construction is legislation (Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec.
    25.15) as is a provi-

      The mere recitation in an amendment that a determination is to be made
    pursuant to existing laws and regulations, absent a citation to the law
    imposing such responsibility, is not sufficient proof by the proponent
    of an amendment to overcome a point of order that the amendment
    constitutes legislation (Sept. 16, 1980, pp. 25606-07; May 8, 1986, p.
    10156). A limitation denying the use of funds to apply certain
    provisions of the Internal Revenue Code other than under regulations in
    effect on a prior date is legislation since requiring an official to
    apply regulations no longer current in order to render an appropriation
    available (June 7, 1978, p. 16655; Aug. 19, 1980, pp. 21978-80).

    Sec. 842d. Imposing duties or requiring
    determinations.

      Propositions to  establish affirmative directions for executive
    officers (IV, 3854-3859; VII, 1443; July 31, 1969, p. 21675; June 18,
    1979, pp. 15286-87; July 1, 1987, pp. 18654 and 18655; June 27, 1994, p.
    ----), even in cases where they may have discretion under the law so to
    do (IV, 3853; June 4, 1970, p. 18401; Aug. 8, 1978, pp. 24959-60), or to
    affirmatively take away an authority or discretion conferred by law (IV,
    3862, 3863; VII, 1975; Mar. 30, 1955, pp. 4065-66; June 21, 1974, p.
    20600; July 31, 1985, p. 21909), are subject to the point of order.
    While any limitation in an appropriation bill (see Sec. 483, supra)
    places some minimal duties on Federal officials, who must determine the
    effect of such a limitation on appropriated funds, an amendment or
    language in an appropriation bill may not impose additional duties, not
    required by law, or make the appropriation contingent upon the
    performance of such duties (May 28, 1968, p. 15350). Language in the
    form of a conditional limitation requiring determinations by Federal
    officials will be held to change existing law unless the proponent can
    show that the new duties are merely incidental to functions already
    required by law and do not involve substantive new determinations (July
    26, 1985, p. 20807).

    [[Page 673]]

    the words ``in order to overcome racial imbalance''
    were held to impose additional duties, and Nov. 30, 1982, p. 28062,
    where the words ``to interfere with'' the rulemaking authority of any
    regulatory agency were held to implicitly require the Office of
    Management and Budget to make determinations not discernibly required by
    law in evaluating and executing its responsibilities). An amendment
    limiting funds for an agency or any ``successor agency'' requires a
    determination of ``successor agency'' status (Sept. 26, 1997, p. ----).
      Where an amendment to or language in a general appropriation bill
    implicitly places new duties on officers of the government or implicitly
    requires them to make investigations, compile evidence, or make
    judgments and determinations not otherwise required of them by law, such
    as to judge intent or motives, then it assumes the character of
    legislation and is subject to a point of order (July 31, 1969, pp.
    21653, 21675, where

    [[Page 674]]

    the official being consulted to make determinations not specifically
    required by law (July 22, 1980, pp. 19087-88).
      An amendment authorizing the President to reduce each appropriation in
    the bill by not more than ten percent was ruled out as legislation
    conferring new authority on the President (May 31, 1984, p. 14617; June
    6, 1984, p. 15120). A limitation on the use of funds, or an exception
    therefrom, may not be accompanied by language stating or requiring a
    finding of a motive or purpose in carrying out the limitation (Aug. 8,
    1978, pp. 24969-70; July 22, 1980, pp. 19087-88; Sept. 16, 1980, p.
    25604; Sept. 22, 1981, p. 21577). A paragraph prohibiting the use of
    funds to perform abortions except where the mother's life would be
    endangered if the fetus were carried to term is legislation, since
    requiring Federal officials to make new determinations and judgments not
    required of them by law, regardless whether private or State officials
    administering the funds in question routinely make such determinations
    (June 17, 1977, p. 1969; June 30, 1993, p. ----). The fact that such a
    provision relating to abortion funding may have been included in
    appropriation Acts in prior years applicable to funds in those laws does
    not permit the inclusion of similar language requiring such
    determinations, not required by law, with respect to funds for the
    fiscal year in question (Sept. 22, 1983, p. 25406); and where the
    provision, applicable to Federal funds, was permitted to remain in a
    bill (no point of order having been made), an amendment striking the
    word ``Federal,'' and thereby broadening the provision to include
    District of Columbia funds as well, was ruled out (Nov. 15, 1989, p.
    29004). But to such a provision permitted to remain in a general
    appropriation bill, an amendment exempting instead cases where the
    health of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to
    term was held not to constitute further legislation by requiring any
    different or more onerous determinations (June 27, 1984, p. 19113). An
    amendment prohibiting the use of funds in an appropriation bill for the
    General Services Administration to dispose of U.S.-owned
    ``agricultural'' land declared surplus was ruled out as legislation,
    since the determination whether surplus lands are ``agricultural'' was
    not required by law (Aug. 20, 1980, pp. 22156-58); but a limitation
    precluding funds for any transit project exceeding a specified cost-
    effectiveness index was held not to impose new duties where the Chair
    was persuaded that the limitation applied to projects for which indexes
    were already required by law (Sept. 23, 1993, p. ----). The fact that an
    executive official may have been directed by an executive order to
    consult another executive official prior to taking an action does not
    permit inclusion of language directing

      An amendment limiting use of funds in a bill may not condition the
    availability of funds or the exercise of contract authority upon an
    interpretation of local law where that interpretation is not required by
    existing law (July 17, 1981, p. 16327); may not require new
    determinations of full Federal compliance with mandates imposed upon
    States (July 22, 1981, p. 16829); may not require the evaluation of the
    theoretical basis of a program (July 22, 1981, p. 16822); may not
    require new determinations of propriety or effectiveness (Oct. 6, 1981,
    p. 23361; May 25, 1988, p. 12275), or satisfactory quality (Aug. 1,
    1986, p. 18647) or incorporate by reference determinations already made
    in administrative processes not affecting programs funded by the bill
    (Oct. 6, 1981, p. 23361); may not require new determinations of rates of
    interest payable (July 29, 1982, p. 18624; Dec. 9, 1982, p. 29691); may
    not apply standards of conduct to foreign entities where existing law
    requires such conduct only by domestic entities (July 17, 1986, p.
    16951); may not require the enforcement of a standard where existing law
    only requires inspection of an area (July 30, 1986, p. 18189); may not
    prohibit the availability of funds for the purchase of ``nondomestic''
    goods and services (Sept. 12, 1986, p. 23178); may not mandate
    contractual provisions (May 18, 1988, p. 11389); may not authorize the
    adjustment of wages of government employees (June 21, 1988, p. 15451;
    Apr. 26, 1989, p. 7525) or permit an increase in Members' office
    allowances only ``if requested in writing'' (Oct. 21, 1990, p. ----);
    may not convert an existing legal prerequisite for the issuance of a
    regulatory permit into a prerequisite for even the preliminary
    processing of such a permit (July 22, 1992, p. ----); may not mandate
    reductions in various appropriations by a variable percentage calculated
    in relation to ``overhead'' (Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec.
    5.6; June 24, 1992, p. ----); may not require an agency to investigate
    and determine whether private airports are collecting certain fees for
    each enplaning passenger (Sept. 23, 1993, p. ----); and may not require
    an agency to investigate and determine whether a person or entity
    entering into a contract with funds under the pending bill is subject to
    a legal proceeding commenced by the Federal government and alleging
    fraud (Sept. 17, 1997, p. ----).

    [[Page 675]]

    17, 1996, p. ----). In the 105th Congress this entire line of precedent
    was overtaken by changes in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this clause that
    treat as legislation a provision that makes funding contingent on
    whether circumstances not determinative under existing law are ``known''
    (H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 1997, p. ----; July 15, 1997, p. ----; July 24, 1997,
    p. ----).
      Over a period dating from 1908, the House had developed a line of
    precedent to the effect that language restricting the availability of
    funds in a general appropriation bill could be a valid limitation if,
    rather than imposing new duties on a disbursing official or requiring
    new determinations of that official, it simply and passively addressed
    the state of knowledge of the official (VII, 1695; cf. Aug. 1, 1989, p.
    17156, and June 22, 1995, p. ---- [limitations in recommittal ruled out
    on basis of form rather than of legislative content]). This reasoning
    culminated in a ruling in the 104th Congress admitting as a valid
    limitation an amendment prohibiting the use of funds in the bill to
    execute certain accounting transactions when specified conditions were
    ``made known'' to the disbursing official (July

    Sec. 842e. Mandating expenditures.

      A provision  which
    mandates a distribution of funds in contravention of an allocation
    formula in existing law is legislation (July 29, 1982, pp. 18637, 18638;
    Oct. 5, 1983, p. 27335; Aug. 2, 1989, p. 18123; July 24, 1995, p. ----),
    as is an amendment which by such a mandate interferes with an executive
    official's discretionary authority (Mar. 12, 1975, p. 6338), as in an
    amendment requiring not less than a certain sum to be used for a
    particular purpose where existing law does not mandate such expenditure
    (June 18, 1976, p. 19297; July 29, 1982, p. 18623), or where an
    amendment earmarks appropriated funds to the arts to require their
    expenditure pursuant to standards otherwise applicable only as
    guidelines (July 12, 1989, p. 14432). Where existing law directed a
    Federal official to provide for sale of certain government property to a
    private organization in ``necessary'' amounts, an amendment providing
    that no such property be withheld from distribution from qualifying
    purchasers is legislation, since requiring disposal of all property and
    restricting discretionary authority to determine ``necessary'' amounts
    (Aug. 7, 1978, p. 24707). An amendment directing the use of funds to
    assure compliance with an existing law, where existing law does not so
    mandate, also is legislation (June 24, 1976, p. 20370). So-called
    ``hold-harmless'' provisions which mandate a certain level of
    expenditure for certain purposes or recipients, where existing law
    confers discretion or makes ratable reductions in such expenditures,
    also constitute legislation (Apr. 16, 1975, p. 10357; June 25, 1976, p.
    20557). A transfer of available funds from one Department to another
    with directions as to the use to which those funds must be put is
    legislation (and also a reappropriation in violation of clause 6 of this
    rule) (Dec. 8, 1982, p. 29449). A provision requiring states to match
    funds provided in an appropriation bill was held to constitute
    legislation where existing law contained no such requirement (June 28,
    1993, p. ----). Where existing law prescribes a formula for the
    allocation of funds among several categories, an amendment merely
    reducing the amount earmarked for one of the categories is not
    legislation, so long as it does not textually change the statutory
    formula (July 24, 1995, p. ----).

    [[Page 676]]

    1988, p. 14341), but this does not permit an amendment which
    adds additional legislation (IV, 3836, 3837, 3862; VII, 1402-1436; Dec.
    9, 1971, pp. 4595-96; Aug. 1, 1973, pp. 27291-92; June 10, 1977, p.
    1802; June 28, 1988, pp. 16203, 16213; Aug. 2, 1989, p. 18172; Nov. 15,
    1989, p. 29004), or earmarks for unauthorized purposes (July 17, 1985,
    p. 19435; July 17, 1986, p. 16918; July 26, 1995, p. ----; June 5, 1996,
    p. ----), or earmarks by directing a new use of funds not required by
    law (July 26, 1985, pp. 20811, 20813), or increases an unauthorized
    amount indirectly by inserting new language at another portion of the
    bill (July 12, 1995, p. ----). An amendment to a general appropriation
    bill is not subject to a point of order as adding legislation if
    containing, verbatim, a legislative provision already contained in the
    bill and permitted to remain (Aug. 27, 1980, p. 23519). To a paragraph
    permitted to remain though containing a legislative proviso restricting
    the obligation of funds until a date within the fiscal year, an
    amendment striking the delimiting date, thus applying the restriction
    for the entire year, was held to be perfecting (July 30, 1990, p.
    20442); but striking the date and inserting a new trigger (the enactment
    of other legislation), was held to be additional legislation (July 30,
    1990, p. 20442). An amendment in the form of a motion to strike that
    would extend the legislative reach of the pending text was held to
    propose additional legislation (July 17, 1996, p. ----). To a
    legislative title permitted to remain, which placed certain restrictions
    on recipients of a defined set of Federal payments and benefits, an
    amendment extending the restrictions to persons benefiting from a
    certain tax status determined on wholly unrelated criteria was held to
    add further legislation (Aug. 3, 1995, p. ----).

    Sec. 842f. Waivers; amending legislation permitted
    to remain.

      The House  may, by agreeing to a report from the Committee on Rules or
    by adopting an order under suspension of the rules, allow legislation on
    general appropriation bills (IV, 3260-3263, 3839-3845). A paragraph
    which proposes legislation or an unauthorized appropriation being
    permitted to remain, by special order or by failure to raise a point of
    order, may be perfected by germane amendment (IV, 3823-3835, 3838; VII,
    1405, 1413-1415; June 9, 1954, pp. 5963-64; Sept. 11, 1985, p. 23398;
    June 14,

    Sec. 842g. Senate amendments.

      The principle  seems to be
    generally well accepted that the House proposing legislation on a
    general appropriation bill should recede if the other House persists in
    its objection (IV, 3904-3908), and clause 2 of rule XX (Sec. 829, supra)
    prohibits House conferees from agreeing to a Senate amendment which
    proposes legislation on an appropriation bill without specific authority
    from the House. But where a Senate amendment proposing legislation on a
    general appropriation bill is, pursuant to the edict of clause 2 of rule
    XX, reported back from conference in disagreement, a motion to concur in
    the Senate amendment with a further amendment is in order, even if the
    proposed amendment adds legislation to that contained in the Senate
    amendment, and the only test is whether the proposed amendment is
    germane to the Senate amendment reported in disagreement (IV, 3909;
    VIII, 3188, 3189; Speaker McCormack, Dec. 15, 1970, pp. 41504-05; Aug.
    1, 1979, pp. 22007-11; Speaker O'Neill, Dec. 12, 1979, pp. 35520-21;
    June 30, 1987, p. 18308).

    [[Page 677]]

    priate for a purpose authorized by law, so may it by limitation
    prohibit the use of the money for part of the purpose while
    appropriating for the remainder of it (IV, 3936; VII, 1595). The
    language of the limitation provides that no part of the appropriation
    under consideration shall be used for a certain designated purpose (IV,
    3917-3926; VII, 1580). And this designated purpose may reach the
    question of qualifications, for while it is not in order to legislate as
    to the qualifications of the recipients of an appropriation the House
    may specify that no part of the appropriation shall go to recipients
    lacking certain qualifications (IV, 3942-3952; VII, 1655; June 4, 1970,
    pp. 18412-13; June 27, 1974, p. 21662; Oct. 9, 1974, p. 34712; June 9,
    1978, p. 16990). The limitation must apply solely to the money of the
    appropriation under consideration (VII, 1597, 1600, 1720; Feb. 26, 1958,
    p. 2895), and may not be made applicable to money appropriated in other
    acts (IV, 3927, 3928; VII, 1495, 1525; June 28, 1971, pp. 22442-43; June
    27, 1974, pp. 21670-72; May 13, 1981, p. 9663), and may not require
    funds available to an agency in any future fiscal year for a certain
    purpose be subject to limitations specified in advance in appropriations
    Acts (May 8, 1986, p. 10156). A restriction on authority to incur
    obligations is legislative in nature and not a limitation on funds (July
    13, 1987, p. 19507; Sept. 23, 1993, p. ----).

    Sec. 843a. Limitations on appropriation bills
    generally.

      Although the  rule forbids on any general appropriation bill a provision
    ``changing existing law,'' which is construed to mean legislation
    generally, the practice of the House has established the principle that
    certain ``limitations'' may be admitted. Just as the House may decline
    to appro-

      The fact that existing law authorizes funds to be available until
    expended or without regard to fiscal year limitation does not prevent
    the Committee on Appropriations from limiting their availability to the
    fiscal year covered by the bill unless existing law mandates
    availability beyond the fiscal year (June 25, 1974, p. 21040; see also
    Procedure, ch. 25, secs. 9-17). The fact that a provision would
    constitute legislation for only a year does not make it a limitation in
    order under the rule (IV, 3936). Nor may a proposition to construe a law
    be admitted (IV, 3936-3938). Care should also be taken that the language
    of limitation be not such as, when fairly construed, would change
    existing law (IV, 3976-3983) or justify an executive officer in assuming
    an intent to change existing law (IV, 3984; VII, 1706). Although the
    Committee on Appropriations may include in a general appropriation bill
    language not in existing law limiting the use of funds in the bill, if
    such language also constitutes an appropriation it must be authorized by
    law (June 21, 1988, p. 15439). A provision limiting the use of funds in
    a bill ``unless'' or ``until'' a specified action not required by
    existing law has been taken constitutes legislation (Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 47.1; July 24, 1996, p. ----).

    [[Page 678]]

    may be left unsatisfied thereby (IV, 3987; July 10, 1975, p.
    22005); but coupling a denial of an appropriation with a negative
    restriction on official duties constitutes by reason of the use of a
    double negative an affirmative direction and is not in order (VII, 1690-
    1692). Similarly, using a double negative to limit the availability of
    funds to prohibit the obligation of funds for an unauthorized project
    (effectively authorizing an unauthorized project) is not in order (Sept.
    23, 1993, p. ----).

    Sec. 843b. Effect of limitation on executive
    discretion.

      The limitation  may not be applied directly to the official functions of
    executive officers (IV, 3957-3966; VII, 1673, 1678, 1685), but it may
    restrict executive discretion so far as this may be done by a simple
    negative on the use of the appropriation (IV, 3968-3972; VII, 1583,
    1653, 1694; Sept. 14, 1972, pp. 30749-50; June 21, 1974, pp. 20601-02;
    Oct. 9, 1974, p. 34716). An appropriation may be withheld from a
    designated object by a negative limitation on the use of funds, although
    contracts

      But such limitations must not give affirmative directions (IV, 3854-
    3859, 3975; VII, 1637), and must not impose new duties upon an executive
    officer (VII, 1676; June 11, 1968, p. 16712; July 31, 1969, pp. 21631-
    33); and may not directly interfere with discretionary authority in law
    by establishing a level of funding below which expenditures may not be
    made (VII, 1704; July 20, 1978, p. 21856).

      In construing a proposed limitation, if the Chair finds the purpose to
    be legislative, in that the intent is to restrict executive discretion
    to a degree that may be fairly termed a change in policy rather than a
    matter of administrative detail, he should sustain the point of order,
    as where a limitation is accompanied by language stating a legislative
    motive or purpose in carrying out the limitation (Aug. 8, 1978, p.
    24969), or where existing law and the Constitution require a census to
    be taken of all persons and an amendment seeks to preclude the use of
    funds to exclude another class ``known'' to the Secretary (Aug. 1, 1989,
    p. 17156). However, language in a general appropriation bill may, by
    negatively refusing to include funds for all or part of an authorized
    executive function, thereby affect policy to the extent of its denial of
    availability of funds (VII, 1694; Oct. 9, 1974, p. 34716).

      It is not in order, even by language in the form of a limitation, to
    restrict not the use or amount of appropriated funds but the
    discretionary authority conferred by law to administer their
    expenditure, such as by limiting the percentage of funds that may be
    apportioned for expenditure within a certain period of time (Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 51.23), or by precluding the obligation
    of certain funds in the bill until funds provided by another Act have
    been obligated (Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 48.8). The
    burden is on the proponent to show that such a proposal does not change
    existing law by restricting the timing of the expenditure of funds
    rather than their availability for specified objects (Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, secs. 64.23 and 80.5).

    [[Page 679]]

    collected by the District of Columbia, pursuant to the D.C. Code (July
    17, 1979, p. 19066).
      As long as a limitation on the use of funds restricts the expenditure
    of Federal funds carried in the bill without changing existing law, the
    limitation is in order, even if the Federal funds in question are
    commingled with non-Federal funds which would have to be accounted for
    separately in carrying out the limitation (Aug. 20, 1980, pp. 22171-72).
    An amendment providing that no Federal funds provided in the District of
    Columbia general appropriation bill be used to perform abortions is not
    legislation, since Federal officials have the responsibility to account
    for all appropriations for the annual Federal payment and for
    disbursement of all taxes

    [[Page 680]]

    more general terms, was held in order as not containing legislation
    (June 27, 1979, pp. 17033-35), as was an exception from a valid
    limitation prohibiting construction of that limitation in such a way as
    to prevent funding of a particular authorized activity (Mar. 24, 1944,
    p. 3095; June 18, 1991, p. 15218). An amendment prohibiting the use of
    funds in the bill by the Forest Service to construct roads or prepare
    timber sales in certain roadless areas was held not to impose new
    duties, where the executive was already charged by law with ongoing
    responsibility to maintain a comprehensive and detailed inventory of all
    land and renewable resources of the National Forest System (July 18,
    1995, p. ----). The following amendments also have been in order as
    merely constricting the range of objects for which funds might be used:
    denying use of funds to eliminate an existing legal requirement for
    sureties on custom bonds (June 27, 1984, p. 19101); denying use of funds
    by any Federal official in any manner which would prevent a provision of
    existing law from being enforced (relating to import restrictions) (June
    27, 1984, p. 19101); denying use of funds for any reduction in Customs
    Service regions or for any consolidation of Customs Service offices
    (June 27, 1984, p. 19102); denying use of funds to carry out (or pay the
    salaries of persons who carry out) tobacco crop and insurance programs
    (July 20, 1995, p. ----). An amendment in the form of a limitation
    prohibiting the use of funds in a general appropriation bill for the
    construction of certain facilities unless such construction were subject
    to a project agreement was held not in order during the reading of the
    bill, even though existing law directed Federal officials to enter into
    such project agreements, on the ground that limitation amendments are in
    order during the reading only where existing law requires or permits the
    inclusion of limiting language in an appropriation Act, and not merely
    where the limitation is alleged to be ``consistent with existing law''
    (June 28, 1988, p. 16267). Similarly, language in a general
    appropriation bill containing an averment necessary to qualify for
    certain scorekeeping under the Budget Act was conceded to be legislation
    (July 20, 1989, p. 15374), even though the Budget Act contemplates that
    expenditures may be mandated to occur before or following a fiscal
    period if the law making those expenditures specifies that the timing is
    the result of a ``significant'' policy change (July 20, 1989, p. 15374).

    Sec. 843c. Limitations consistent with existing
    law.

      An amendment  denying the use of funds in the bill to pay the salaries of
    Federal officials who perform certain functions under existing law is a
    proper limitation if the description of those duties precisely follows
    existing law and does not require them to perform new duties (June 24,
    1976, p. 20373), just as an amendment denying such funds to a Federal
    official not in compliance with an existing law which he is charged with
    enforcing is a valid limitation placing no new duties on that Federal
    official (Sept. 10, 1981, p. 20110). The fact that a limitation on the
    use of funds may indirectly interfere with an executive official's
    discretionary authority by denying the use of funds (June 24, 1976, p.
    20408) or may impose certain incidental burdens on executive officials
    (Aug. 25, 1976, p. 27737) does not destroy the character of the
    limitation as long as it does not directly amend existing law and is
    descriptive of functions and findings already required to be undertaken
    by existing law. As it is in order by way of a limitation to deny the
    use of funds for implementation of an executive order, an amendment
    precisely describing the contents of the executive order does not
    constitute legislation solely for that reason (Mar. 16, 1977, p. 7748).
    And the fact that the regulation for which funds are denied may have
    been promulgated pursuant to court order and pursuant to constitutional
    provisions is an argument on the merits of the amendment and does not
    render it legislative in nature (Aug. 19, 1980, pp. 21981-84). An
    amendment prohibiting the use of funds to carry out any ruling of the
    Internal Revenue Service which rules that taxpayers are not entitled to
    certain charitable deductions was held in order as a limitation, since
    merely descriptive of an existing ruling already promulgated and not
    requiring any new determinations as to the applicability of the
    limitation to other categories of taxpayers (July 16, 1979, pp. 18808-
    10). An amendment reducing the availability of funds for trade
    adjustment assistance by amounts of unemployment insurance entitlements
    was held in order where the law establishing trade adjustment assistance
    already required the disbursing agency to take into consideration levels
    of unemployment insurance in determining payment levels (June 18, 1980,
    pp. 15355-56). A limitation precluding funds for any transit project
    exceeding a specified cost-effectiveness index was held not to impose
    new duties where the Chair was persuaded that the limitation applied to
    projects for which indexes were already required by law (Sept. 23, 1993,
    p. ----). A limitation precluding the use of funds to enforce FAA
    regulations to require domestic air carriers to surrender more than a
    specified number of ``slots'' at a given airport in preference of
    international air carriers was held not to impose new duties on FAA
    officials because existing regulations already required the FAA to
    determine the origin of withdrawn slots (Sept. 23, 1993, p. ----). An
    exception stating that the limitation does not prohibit the use of funds
    for designated Federal activities which are already authorized by law in

                   ``holman rule'' on retrenching expenditures

    [[Page 681]]

    and 843, supra). Under the modern practice, the
    ``Holman Rule'' only applies where an obvious reduction is achieved by
    the provision in question and does not apply to limiting language
    unaccompanied by a reduction of funds in the bill (July 16, 1979, pp.
    18808-10). It has no application to an amendment to an appropriation
    bill which does not legislate but is merely a negative limitation citing
    but not changing existing law (June 18, 1980, pp. 15355-56).

    Sec. 844a. Legislation reducing
    expenditures.

      Decisions under  the so-called ``Holman Rule'' in clause 2 of rule XXI
    have been rare in the modern practice of the House. The trend in
    construing language in general appropriation bills or amendments thereto
    has been to minimize the importance of the ``Holman Rule'' in those
    cases where the decision can be made on other grounds. The practice of
    using limitations in appropriation bills has been perfected in recent
    years so that most modern decisions by the Chair deal with distinctions
    between such limitations and matters which are deemed to be legislation
    (see Sec. Sec. 842

      A paragraph containing legislation reported in an appropriation bill
    to be in order must on its face show a retrenchment of a type which
    conforms to the requirements of the rule (Chairman Lehlbach, Mar. 17,
    1926, p. 5804).

      The reduction of expenditure must appear as a necessary result, in
    order to bring an amendment or provision within the exception to the
    rule. It is not sufficient that such reduction would probably, or would
    in the opinion of the Chair, result therefrom (IV, 3887; VII, 1530-
    1534). Thus, an amendment to a general appropriation bill providing that
    appropriations made in that act are hereby reduced by $7 billion, though
    legislative in form, was held in order under the ``Holman Rule''
    exception (Apr. 5, 1966, p. 7689), but an amendment providing for
    certain reductions of appropriations carried in the bill based on the
    President's budget estimates was held not to show a reduction on its
    face and to provide merely speculative reductions (Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 5.6; June 24, 1992, p. ----). An
    amendment authorizing the President to reduce each appropriation in the
    bill by not more than ten percent was ruled out as legislation
    conferring new authority on the President (May 31, 1984, p. 14617; June
    6, 1984, p. 15120). An amendment reducing an unauthorized amount
    permitted to remain in a general appropriation bill is in order as a
    retrenchment under this clause (Oct. 1, 1975, p. 31058). An amendment to
    a general appropriation bill denying the availability of funds to
    certain recipients but which requires Federal officials to make
    additional determinations as to the qualifications of recipients is
    legislation and is not a retrenchment of expenditures where it is not
    apparent that the prohibition will reduce the amounts covered by the
    bill (June 26, 1973, p. 21389).

      The amendment must not only show on its face an attempt to retrench
    but must also be germane to some provision in the bill even though
    offered by direction of the committee having jurisdiction of the subject
    matter of the amendment (VII, 1549; Dec. 16, 1911, p. 442). An amendment
    providing that appropriations ``herein and heretofore made'' shall be
    reduced by $70 million through the reduction of Federal employees as the
    President determines was held to be legislative and not germane to the
    bill, since it went to funds other than those carried therein, and was
    therefore not within the ``Holman Rule'' exception (Oct. 18, 1966, p.
    27425).

    [[Page 682]]

    ment of expenditures even if assumed to be legislative (July 13, 1979,
    pp. 18453-55).
      An amendment reducing an amount in an appropriation bill for the
    Postal Service and prohibiting the use of funds therein to implement
    special bulk third-class rates for political committees was held in
    order since not specifically requiring new determination and since
    constituting a retrench-

      As long as an amendment calls for an obvious reduction at some point
    in time during the fiscal year, the amendment is in order under the
    ``Holman Rule'' even if the reduction takes place in the future in an
    amount actually determined when the reduction takes place (for example,
    by formula) (VII, 1491, 1505; July 30, 1980, pp. 20499-20503). To an
    amendment that is in order under the ``Holman Rule,'' containing
    legislation but retrenching expenditures by formula for every agency
    funded by the bill, an amendment exempting from that reduction several
    specific programs does not add further legislation and is in order (July
    30, 1980, pp. 20499-20503).

      A motion to recommit the District of Columbia appropriation bill with
    instructions to reduce the proportion of the fund appropriated from the
    Public Treasury from one-half, as provided in the bill, to one-fourth of
    the entire appropriation is in order, since the effect of the amendment
    if adopted would reduce the expenditure of public money although not
    reducing the amount of the appropriation (VII, 1518).

      The term ``retrenchment'' means the reduction of the amount of money
    to be taken out of the Federal Treasury by the bill, and therefore a
    reduction of the amount of money to be contributed toward the expenses
    of the District of Columbia is in order as a retrenchment (VII, 1502).

      An amendment proposed to an item for the recoinage of uncurrent
    fractional silver, which amendment struck out the amount appropriated
    and added a provision for the coinage of all the bullion in the Treasury
    into standard silver dollars, the cost of such coinage and recoinage to
    be paid out of the Government's seigniorage, was held not to be in order
    under the rule; first, because not germane to the subject matter of the
    bill (the sundry civil); second, because it did not appear that any
    retrenchment of expenditure would result, the seigniorage being the
    property of the Government as other funds in the Treasury (VII, 1547).

      To an item of appropriation for inland transportation of mails by star
    routes an amendment was offered requiring the Postmaster General to
    provide routes and make contracts in certain cases, with the further
    provision ``and the amount of appropriation herein for star routes is
    hereby reduced to $500.'' A point of order made against the first or
    legislative part of the amendment was sustained, which decision was, on
    appeal, affirmed by the committee (VII, 1555).

      To a clause appropriating for the foreign mail service an amendment
    reducing the appropriation, and in addition repealing the act known as
    the ``subsidy act,'' was held not in order because the repealing of this
    act was not germane to the appropriation bill; and that to be in order
    both branches of the amendment must be germane to the bill (VII, 1548).

    [[Page 683]]

    of Agriculture is out of order, being a provision changing
    law and not retrenching expenditure (IV, 3886).
      A provision in the agricultural appropriation bill transferring the
    supervision of the importation of animals from the Treasury to the
    Department

      Where a paragraph containing new legislation provides in one part for
    a discharge of employees, which means a retrenchment, and in another
    part embodies legislation to bring about the particular retrenchment
    which in turn shows on its face an expenditure the amount of which is
    not apparent, the Chair is unable to hold that the net result will
    retrench expenditures. But where the additional legislation does not
    show on its face an additional expenditure, the Chair will not speculate
    as to a possible expenditure under the additional legislation (VII,
    1500).

      As explained in the annotation in Sec. 834, supra, the amendment of
    clause 2(b) in the 98th Congress narrowed the ``Holman Rule'' exception
    to the general prohibition against legislation to cover only
    retrenchments reducing amounts of money covered by the bill, and not
    retrenchments resulting from reduction of the number and salary of
    officers of the United States or of the compensation of any person paid
    out of the U.S. Treasury. Accordingly, the Chair held out of order an
    amendment mandating the reduction of certain Federal salaries and
    expenses as not confined to a reduction of funds in the bill (June 17,
    1994, p. ----). Paragraph (b) also eliminated separate authority
    conferred upon legislative committees or commissions with proper
    jurisdiction to report amendments retrenching expenditures, and
    permitted legislative committees to recommend such retrenchments by
    reduction of amounts covered by the bill to the Appropriations Committee
    for discretionary inclusion in the reported bill. Paragraph (d) as added
    in the 98th Congress provides a new procedure for consideration of all
    retrenchment amendments only when reading of the bill has been completed
    and only if the Committee of the Whole does not adopt a motion to rise
    and report the bill back to the House. Other decisions which involved
    interpretation of the ``Holman Rule,'' but which do not reflect the
    current form or interpretation of that rule, are found in IV, 3846,
    3885-3892; VII, 1484, 1486-1492, 1498, 1500, 1515, 1563, 1564, 1569;
    June 1, 1892, p. 4920.

    [[Page 683]]

    (except for classified intelligence or national security programs,
    projects, or activities).

    Sec. 844b. Content of reports on appropriation
    bills.

      3. A report  from the Committee on Appropriations accompanying any general
    appropriation bill making an appropriation for any purpose shall contain
    a concise statement describing fully the effect of any provision of the
    accompanying bill which directly or indirectly changes the application
    of existing law, and shall contain a list of all appropriations
    contained in the bill for any expenditure not previously authorized by law

      This clause became a part of the rules under the Committee Reform
    Amendments of 1974, effective January 3, 1975 (H. Res. 988, 93d Cong.,
    Oct. 8, 1974, p. 34470), and the subsequent clauses of this rule were
    renumbered at that time. This clause was amended on January 14, 1975 (H.
    Res. 5, 94th Cong., p. 32) to confine its applicability to general
    appropriation bills, and again in the 104th Congress to add the last
    requirement concerning unauthorized items (sec. 215(d), H. Res. 6, Jan.
    4, 1995, p. ----).

    Sec. 845. Restriction on the reference of
    claims.

      4. No bill  for the payment or adjudication of any private claim against
    the Government shall be referred, except by unanimous consent, to any
    other than the following committees, namely: To the Committee on
    International Relations or to the Committee on the Judiciary.

      The present form of this clause was made effective January 2, 1947, as
    a part of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 812), was
    further amended on March 19, 1975 to reflect the change of the name of
    the Committee on Foreign Affairs to International Relations by H. Res.
    163 (p. 7343), was again amended on February 5, 1979 to change
    International Relations back to Foreign Affairs (H. Res. 89, pp. 1848-
    49), and was once again amended on January 4, 1995, to change the name
    back to International Relations (sec. 202(b), H. Res. 6, 104th Cong., p.
    ----). The old rule, adopted in 1885 and amended May 29, 1936, provided
    that private claims bills be referred to a Committee on Invalid
    Pensions, Claims, War Claims, Public Lands, and Accounts, in addition to
    the Committees on Foreign Affairs (now International Relations) and the
    Judiciary. Certain private bills, resolutions and amendments are barred
    (see Sec. 852, infra). Under this clause unanimous consent is required
    for the reference of a bill for the payment of a private claim to a
    committee other than the Committee on the Judiciary or the Committee on
    International Relations (May 4, 1978, p. 12615).

    [[Page 685]]

    be in order during the consideration of a bill or joint resolution
    reported by a committee not having that jurisdiction. A question of
    order on an appropriation in any such bill, joint resolution, or
    amendment thereto may be raised at any time.

    Sec. 846a. Restriction of power to report
    appropriations.

      5. (a) No  bill or joint resolution carrying appropriations shall
    be reported by any committee not having jurisdiction to report
    appropriations, nor shall an amendment proposing an appropriation

      This portion of the rule was adopted June 1, 1920 (VII, 2133).

      A point of order under this rule cannot be raised against a motion to
    suspend the rules (VIII, 3426), against a motion to discharge a
    nonappropriating committee from consideration of a bill carrying an
    appropriation (VII, 2144), or against a Senate amendment to an
    appropriation bill (VII, 1572), but it may be directed against an item
    of appropriation in a Senate bill (VII, 2136, 2147; July 30, 1957, pp.
    13056, 13181-82), and if the House deletes a provision in a Senate bill
    under this rule, the bill is messaged to the Senate with the deletion in
    the form of an amendment. The point of order may be made against an
    appropriation in a Senate bill that, although not reported in the House,
    is considered in lieu of a reported House ``companion bill'' (VII, 2137;
    Mar. 29, 1933, p. 988). This clause applies to an amendment proposed to
    a Senate amendment to a House bill not reported from the Committee on
    Appropriations (Oct. 1, 1980, pp. 28638-42). The rule does not apply to
    private bills since the committees having jurisdiction of bills for the
    payment of private claims may report bills making appropriations within
    the limits of their jurisdiction (VII, 2135; Dec. 12, 1924, p. 538). The
    point of order under this rule does not apply to an appropriation in a
    bill which has been taken away from a nonappropriating committee by a
    motion to discharge (VII, 1019a). The point of order under this rule
    does not apply to a special order reported from the Committee on Rules
    ``self-executing'' the adoption in the House to a reported bill of an
    amendment containing an appropriation, since the amendment is not
    separately before the House during consideration of the special order
    (Feb. 24, 1993, p. ----).

    [[Page 686]]

    is limited to
    language originally contained in a Senate amendment where the House
    conferees have not been specifically authorized to agree thereto (May 1,
    1975, p. 12752). Where the House has adopted a resolution waiving points
    of order against certain appropriations in a legislative bill, a point
    of order may nevertheless be raised against an amendment to the bill
    containing an identical provision, since under this rule a point of
    order may be raised against the amendment ``at any time'' (Apr. 23,
    1975, p. 11512). A point of order against a direct appropriation in a
    bill initially reported from a legislative committee and then
    sequentially referred to and reported adversely by the Committee on
    Appropriations was conceded and sustained as in violation of this clause
    (Nov. 10, 1975, p. 35611).
      The provision in this clause that a point of order against an
    amendment containing an appropriation to a legislative bill may be made
    ``at any time'' has been interpreted to require that the point of order
    be raised during the pendency of the amendment under the five-minute
    rule (Mar. 18, 1946, p. 2365; Apr. 28, 1975, pp. 12043-44), and a point
    of order will lie against an amendment during its pendency, even in its
    amended form, although the point of order is against the amendment as
    amended by a substitute and no point of order was raised against the
    substitute prior to its adoption (Apr. 23, 1975, p. 12043). But the
    point of order must be raised during the initial consideration of the
    bill or amendment under the five-minute rule, and a point of order
    against similar language permitted to remain in the House version and
    included in a conference report on a bill will not lie, since the only
    rule prohibiting such inclusion (clause 2 of rule XX)

      The point of order should be directed to the item of appropriation in
    the bill and not to the act of reporting the bill (VII, 2143), and
    cannot be directed to the entire bill (VII, 2142; Apr. 28, 1975, p.
    12043).

    [[Page 687]]

    use of funds of the Shipping Board is not in order (VII, 2147). A
    direction to pay out of Indian trust funds is not in order (VII, 2149).
    A provision in an authorization bill making excess foreign currencies
    immediately available for a new purpose is in violation of clause 5 of
    rule XXI (Aug. 3, 1971, pp. 29109-10). Provisions authorizing the
    collection of fees or user charges by Federal agencies and making the
    revenues collected therefrom available without further appropriation
    have been ruled out in violation of this clause (June 17, 1937, pp.
    5915-18; Mar. 29, 1972, pp. 10749-51), and the transfer of existing
    Federal funds into a new Treasury trust fund to be immediately available
    for a new purpose has been construed as an appropriation (June 20, 1974,
    pp. 20273-75), as has a provision in a legislative bill transferring
    unexpended balances of appropriations from an existing agency to a new
    agency created therein (Apr. 9, 1979, pp. 7774-75). A provision in an
    omnibus reconciliation bill reported by the Budget Committee (pursuant
    to section 310(c)(2) of the Budget Act upon recommendation from the
    Energy and Commerce Committee) making a direct appropriation to carry
    out a part of the Energy Security Act was ruled out in violation of this
    clause (Oct. 24, 1985, p. 28812). An amendment requiring the diversion
    of previously appropriated funds in lieu of the enactment of new budget
    authority if a maximum deficit amount under the Deficit Control Act of
    1985 is exceeded, though its stated purpose may be to avoid the
    sequestration of funds, may nevertheless be in violation of clause 5(a)
    as an appropriation on a legislative bill (Aug. 10, 1988, p. 21719).
      The point of order provided for in this clause is not applicable to
    propositions authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to use proceeds
    from the sale of bonds under the Second Liberty Bond Act (public debt
    transactions) for the purpose of making loans, since such loans do not
    constitute ``appropriations'' within the purview of the rule (June 28,
    1949, pp. 8536-38; Aug. 2, 1950, p. 11599), and is not applicable to
    language exempting loan guarantees in a legislative bill from statutory
    limitations on expenditures (July 16, 1974, p. 23344). Legislation
    authorizing the availability of certain loan receipts is not an
    appropriation where it can be shown that the actual availability of
    those receipts remains contingent upon subsequent enactment of an
    appropriation act (Sept. 10, 1975, p. 28300). The term ``appropriation''
    in the rule means the payment of funds from the Treasury, and the words
    ``warranted and make available for expenditure for payments'' are
    equivalent to ``is hereby appropriated'' and therefore not in order
    (VII, 2150). The words ``available until expended,'' making an
    appropriation already made for one year available for ensuing years, are
    not in order (VII, 2145). Language reappropriating, making available, or
    diverting an appropriation or a portion of an appropriation already made
    for one purpose to another (VII, 2146; Mar. 29, 1933, p. 988; Aug. 10,
    1988, p. 21719), or for one fiscal year to another (Mar. 26, 1992, p. --
    --), is not in order. An amendment expanding the definition in existing
    law of recipients under a Federal subsidy program was held to permit a
    new use of funds already appropriated in violation of this clause (May
    11, 1976, pp. 13409-11); and a provision in a legislative bill
    authorizing the use, without a subsequent appropriation, of funds
    directly appropriated by a previous statute for a new purpose
    constitutes an appropriation prohibited by this clause (Oct. 1, 1980,
    pp. 28637-40). But a modification of such a provision making payments
    for such new purposes ``effective only to the extent and in such amounts
    as are provided in advance in appropriation acts'' does not violate this
    clause (Oct. 1, 1980, pp. 28638-42). A direction to a departmental
    officer to pay a certain sum out of unexpended balances is equivalent to
    an appropriation and not in order (VII, 2154). Language authorizing the

      An amendment increasing the duties of a commission is not necessarily
    an appropriation (VII, 1578). Language authorizing payment from an
    appropriation to be made or authorizing payment from an appropriation
    that has not yet been made is in order (Jan. 31, 1923, p. 2794). Section
    401(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 317) prohibits
    consideration in the House of any bill or resolution or amendment which
    provides new spending authority (as that term is defined in that
    section) unless that measure also provides that such new spending
    authority is to be available only to the extent provided in
    appropriation Acts (see Sec. 1007, infra). See also Procedure, ch. 25,
    sec. 3, addressing appropriations on legislative bills generally.

    [[Page 688]]

    not having that jurisdiction. A question of order on a tax or
    tariff measure in any such bill, joint resolution, or amendment thereto
    may be raised at any time.

    Sec. 846b. Restriction on bills and amendments carrying
    taxes or tariffs.

      (b) No  bill or joint resolution carrying a tax or tariff
    measure shall be reported by any committee not having jurisdiction to
    report tax and tariff measures, nor shall an amendment in the House or
    proposed by the Senate carrying a tax or tariff measure be in order
    during the consideration of a bill or joint resolution reported by a
    committee

      Paragraph (b) was added in the 98th Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1983,
    p. 34). A point of order under this paragraph against a provision in a
    bill is in order at any time during consideration of the bill for
    amendment in Committee of the Whole (Aug. 1, 1986, p. 18649). On October
    4, 1989, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, before ruling on
    several points of order under this paragraph, enunciated several
    guidelines to distinguish taxes and tariffs on the one hand and user or
    regulatory fees and other forms of revenue on the other (p. 23260). On
    the opening day of the 102d Congress Speaker Foley inserted in the
    Congressional Record a statement of jurisdictional concepts underlying
    those same distinctions and indicated his intention to exercise his
    referral authority under rule X in a manner consistent with this
    paragraph (Jan. 3, 1991, p. 64; see also Jan. 5, 1993, p. ----).

      Although in the case of most points of order against provisions in
    bills or against amendments the burden is on the proponent of the
    provision to show that it does not violate the cited rule, in the case
    of a point of order under clause 5(b) against a provision in or an
    amendment to a general appropriation bill affecting the use of funds
    therein (otherwise traditionally in order if admissible under clause 2
    of rule XXI), the burden is on the Member making the point of order to
    show a necessary, certain, and inevitable change in revenue collections
    or tax statuses or liabilities (Sept. 12, 1984, pp. 25108, 25109, 25120;
    July 26, 1985, p. 20806; Aug. 1, 1986, pp. 18649-50; July 13, 1990, p.
    17473; June 18, 1991, p. 15189). Thus, in determining whether a
    limitation in a general appropriation bill constitutes a tax or tariff
    measure proscribed by clause 5(b), the Chair will consider argument as
    to whether the limitation effectively and inevitably changes revenue
    collections and tax status or liability (Aug. 1, 1986, p. 18649).
    Similarly, in determining whether an amendment to a general
    appropriation bill proposing a change in IRS funding priorities
    constitutes a tax measure proscribed by clause 5(b), the Chair will
    consider argument as to whether the change would necessarily or
    inevitably result in a loss or gain in tax liability and in tax
    collection (June 18, 1991, p. 15189).

    [[Page 689]]

    and owing by law or require collection of revenue
    not legally due or owing (July 26, 1985, p. 20806; Aug. 1, 1986, pp.
    18649, 18650; July 17, 1996, p. ----); and (2) where a provision in a
    general appropriation bill prohibited the use of funds to impose or
    assess certain taxes due under specified portions of the Internal
    Revenue Code (July 13, 1990, p. 17473). In the 98th Congress, the Chair
    sustained points of order under clause 5(b) against motions to concur in
    three Senate amendments to a general appropriation bill (not reported by
    the Committee on Ways and Means): (1) an amendment denying the use of
    funds in that or any other Act by the IRS to impose or assess any tax
    due under a designated provision of the Internal Revenue Code, thereby
    rendering the tax uncollectable through the use of any funds available
    to the agency (Sept. 12, 1984, p. 25108); (2) an amendment directing the
    Secretary of the Treasury to admit free of duty certain articles
    imported by a designated organization (Sept. 12, 1984, p. 25109); and
    (3) an amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930 to expand the authority of
    the Customs Service to seize and use the proceeds from the sale of
    contraband imports to defray operational expenses, and to offset owed
    customs duties under one section of that law (Sept. 12, 1984, p. 25120).
    An amendment to a general appropriation bill proposing to divert an
    increase in funding for the IRS from spot-checks to targeted audits was
    held not to constitute a tax within the meaning of clause 5(b) because
    it did not necessarily affect revenue collection levels or tax
    liabilities (June 18, 1991, p. 15189).
      A limitation on the use of funds contained in a general appropriation
    bill was held to violate clause 5(b) by denying the use of funds by the
    Customs Service to enforce duty-free entry laws with respect to certain
    imported commodities, thereby requiring the collection of revenues not
    otherwise provided for by law (Oct. 27, 1983, p. 29611). Similar rulings
    were issued: (1) where it was shown that the imposition of the
    restriction on IRS funding for the fiscal year would effectively and
    inevitably preclude the IRS or the Customs Service from collecting
    revenues otherwise due

    [[Page 690]]

    revenues to be transferred to the Department of Labor for
    the enforcement of that law (Oct. 5, 1989, p. 23328).
      In the 99th Congress, the following provisions in a reconciliation
    bill reported from the Budget Committee were ruled out as tax measures
    not reported from the Committee on Ways and Means: (1) containing a
    recommendation from the Committee on Education and Labor (now the
    Committee on Education and the Workforce) excluding certain interest on
    obligations from the Student Loan Marketing Association from application
    of the Internal Revenue Code, affecting interest deductions against
    income taxes (Oct. 24, 1985, pp. 28776, 28827); and (2) containing a
    recommendation from the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
    expanding tax benefits available to shipowners through a capital
    construction fund (Oct. 24, 1985, pp. 28802, 28827). In the 101st
    Congress, the following provisions in an omnibus budget reconciliation
    bill were ruled out: (1) a fee per passenger on cruise vessels, with
    revenues credited as proprietary receipts of the Coast Guard to be used
    for port safety, security, navigation, and antiterrorism activities
    (Oct. 4, 1989, p. 23260); (2) a per acre ``ocean protection fee'' on oil
    and gas leaseholdings in the Outer Continental Shelf, with receipts to
    be used to offset costs of various ocean protection programs (Oct. 4,
    1989, p. 23261); (3) an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code relating
    to the tax deductibility of pension fund contributions (Oct. 4, 1989, p.
    23262); (4) a fee incident to termination of employee benefit plans,
    with receipts to be applied to enforcement and administration of plans
    remaining with the system (Oct. 4, 1989, p. 23262); and (5) a fee
    incident to the filing of various pension benefit plan reports required
    by law, with

      To a bill reported from the Committee on Education and Labor (now the
    Committee on Education and the Workforce) authorizing financial
    assistance to unemployed individuals for employment opportunities, an
    amendment providing instead for tax incentives to stimulate employment
    was held to be a tax measure in violation of this paragraph (Sept. 21,
    1983, p. 25145). A provision in a bill reported from the Committee on
    Foreign Affairs (now the Committee on International Relations) imposing
    a uniform fee at ports of entry to be collected by the Customs Service
    as a condition of importation of a commodity was held to constitute a
    tariff within the meaning of this paragraph (June 4, 1985, p. 14009), as
    was an amendment to a bill reported from that committee amending the
    tariff schedules to deny ``most favored nation'' trade treatment to a
    certain nation (July 11, 1985, p. 18590). A provision in a general
    appropriation bill creating a new tariff classification was held to
    constitute a tariff under this paragraph (June 15, 1994, p. ----). A
    motion to concur in a Senate amendment constituting a tariff measure
    (imposing an import ban on certain dutiable goods) to a bill reported by
    a committee not having tariff jurisdiction was ruled out under this
    paragraph (Sept. 30, 1988, p. 27316). A proposal to increase a fee
    incident to the filing of a securities registration statement, with the
    proceeds to be deposited in the general fund of the Treasury as
    offsetting receipts, was held to constitute a tax within the meaning of
    this paragraph because the amount of revenue derived and the manner of
    its deposit indicated a purpose to defray costs of government, generally
    (Oct. 23, 1990, p. 32650). To a bill reported by the Committee on
    Transportation and Infrastructure, an amendment increasing a user fee
    was ruled out as a tax measure where the fee overcollected to offset a
    reduction in another fee, thus attenuating the relationship between the
    amount of the fee and the cost of the government activity for which it
    was assessed (May 9, 1995, p. ----). To a bill reported by the Committee
    on Science, Space, and Technology, an amendment proposing sundry changes
    in the Federal income tax by direct amendments to the Internal Revenue
    Code of 1986 was ruled out of order as carrying a tax measure in
    violation of this paragraph (Sept. 16, 1992, p. ----).

    [[Page 691]]

    amendment to subsection (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) of section 1, or to
    section 11(b) or 55(b), of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, that
    imposes a new percentage as a rate of tax and thereby increases the
    amount of tax imposed by any such section.

    Sec. 846c. Threefifths vote to increase income tax
    rates.

      (c) No  bill or joint resolution, amendment, or conference report
    carrying a Federal income tax rate increase shall be considered as
    passed or agreed to unless so determined by a vote of not less than
    three-fifths of the Members voting. For purposes of the preceding
    sentence, the term ``Federal income tax rate increase'' means any

      Paragraph (c) was added in the 104th Congress (sec. 106(a), H. Res. 6,
    Jan. 4, 1995, p. ----). In the 105th Congress it was amended to clarify
    the definition of ``Federal income tax rate increase'' (H. Res. 5, Jan.
    7, 1997, p. ----) . On one occasion the Chair held that a provision
    repealing a ceiling on total tax liability attributable to a net capital
    gain was not subject to this paragraph (Apr. 5, 1995, p. ----). This
    paragraph does not apply to a concurrent resolution (Speaker Gingrich,
    May 18, 1995, p. ----). A resolution reported from the Rules Committee
    waiving clause 5(c) may be adopted by majority vote (Oct. 26, 1995, p.
    ----). The Speaker rules on the applicability of clause 5(c) only
    pending the question of final passage of a measure alleged to carry a
    Federal income tax rate increase, and not in advance upon adoption of a
    special order waiving that provision (Oct. 26, 1995, p. ----).

    Sec. 846d. Prohibition against retroactive income tax
    rate increase.

      (d) It  shall not be in order to consider any bill, joint
    resolution, amendment, or conference report carrying a retroactive
    Federal income tax rate increase. For purposes of the preceding
    sentence--

              (1) the term ``Federal income tax rate increase'' means any
    amendment to subsection (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) of section 1, or to
    section 11(b) or 55(b), of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, that
    imposes a new percentage as a rate of tax and thereby increases the
    amount of tax imposed by any such section; and

    [[Page 692]]

              (2) a Federal income tax rate increase is retroactive if it
    applies to a period beginning prior to the enactment of the provision.

      Paragraph (d) was added in the 104th Congress (sec. 106(b), H. Res. 6,
    Jan. 4, 1995, p. ----). In the 105th Congress it was amended to clarify
    the definition of ``Federal income tax rate increase'' (H. Res. 5, Jan.
    7, 1997, p. ----) .

    Sec. 847. Reappropriations
    prohibited.

      6. No general  appropriation bill or amendment thereto shall be received
    or considered if it contains a provision reappropriating unexpended
    balances of appropriations; except that this provision shall not apply
    to appropriations in continuation of appropriations for public works on
    which work has commenced, and shall not apply to transfers of unexpended
    balances within the department or agency for which they were originally
    appropriated, reported by the Committee on Appropriations.

      This provision from section 139(c) of the Legislative Reorganization
    Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 190f(c)) was made part of the standing rules in
    the 83d Congress (Jan. 3, 1953,p. 24). Previously, a reappropriation of
    an unexpended balance for an object authorized by law was in order on a
    general appropriation bill (IV, 3591, 3592; VII, 1156, 1158). This
    clause was amended in the 99th Congress by section 228(b) of the
    Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177,
    Dec. 12, 1985) to permit the Committee on Appropriations to report
    certain transfers of unexpended balances. Consistent with clause 2 of
    rule XXI, violations of this clause are enforced only against specific
    provisions in general appropriation bills containing reappropriations
    rather than against consideration of the bill (see, e.g., Procedure, ch.
    25, sec. 18).

    [[Page 693]]

    tions may be
    authorized in law for a specified object does not permit an amendment to
    a general appropriation bill to include legislative language mandating
    the reappropriation of funds from other Acts (July 28, 1992, p. ----).
      A provision in a general appropriation bill, or an amendment thereto,
    providing that funds for a certain purpose are to be derived by
    continuing the availability of funds previously appropriated for a prior
    fiscal year is in violation of clause 6 of rule XXI (Aug. 20, 1951, pp.
    10393-94; Mar. 29, 1960, p. 6862; June 17, 1960, p. 13138; June 20,
    1973, pp. 20530-31; July 29, 1982, p. 18625; June 28, 1988, p. 16255),
    and a reappropriation of unexpended prior year balances prohibited by
    this clause is not in order under the guise of a ``Holman Rule''
    exception to clause 2 of rule XXI (Oct. 18, 1966, pp. 27424-25). An
    amendment to a general appropriation bill making any appropriations
    which are available for the current fiscal year available for certain
    new purposes was held out of order under this clause since it was not
    confined to the funds in the bill and would permit reappropriation of
    unexpended balances (Oct. 1, 1975, p. 31090). That appropria-

      This rule, however, is not applicable when the reappropriation
    language is identical to legislative authorization language enacted
    subsequent to the adoption of the rule, since the law is a more recent
    expression of the will of the House (Sept. 5, 1961, p. 18133), nor when
    a measure transferring unobligated balances of previously appropriated
    funds contains legislative provisions and rules changes but no
    appropriation of new budget authority and is neither in the form of an
    appropriation bill nor the subject of a privileged report by the
    Committee on Appropriations under rule XI (Mar. 3, 1988, p. 3239).

      The return of an unexpended balance to the Treasury is in order (IV,
    3594).

    Sec. 848. Printed hearings and reports on
    appropriation bills.

      7. No general  appropriation bill shall be considered in the
    House until printed committee hearings and a committee report thereon
    have been available for the Members of the House for at least three
    calendar days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, or legal holidays except
    when the House is in session on such a day).

      This provision from section 139(a) of the Legislative Reorganization
    Act of 1946 was made a part of the standing rules January 3, 1953 (p.
    24), and was amended (by the addition of the parenthetical clause) on
    January 22, 1971 (p. 144). In counting the ``three calendar days''
    specified in the clause, the date the bill is filed or the date on which
    it is to be called up for consideration are counted, but not both (May
    26, 1969, pp. 13720-21). Clause 2(l)(6) of rule XI became applicable to
    all other reports from the Committee on Appropriations under the
    Committee Reform Amendments of 1974, effective January 3, 1975 (H. Res.
    988, 93d Cong., Oct. 8, 1974, p. 34470). In the 104th Congress it was
    amended to count as a ``calendar day'' any day on which the House is in
    session (H. Res. 254, Nov. 30, 1995, p. ----).

    Sec. 848a. Reservation of points of order.

      8.  At the time
    any appropriation bill is reported, all points of order shall be
    considered as reserved.

    [[Page 694]]

    reserve points of order when a general appropriation bill was
    referred to the calendar of the Committee of the Whole House on the
    state of the Union, in order that provisions in violation of rule XXI
    could be stricken in the Committee of the Whole (see Sec. 835, supra).

      Clause 8 was added in the 104th Congress (sec. 215(e), H. Res. 6, Jan.
    4, 1995, p. ----), rendering unnecessary the former practice that a Member