[Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 104th Congress]
[104th Congress]
[House Document 103-342]
[Rules of the House of Representatives]
[Pages 623-660]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



 

                                Rule XXI.


                                ON BILLS.




Sec. 830. Reading, engrossment, and passage of 
bills.

  1. Bills and  joint resolutions on their passage shall be read the first time 
by title and the second time in full, when, if the previous question is 
ordered, the Speaker shall state the question to be: Shall the bill be 
engrossed and read a third time? and, if decided in the affirmative, it 
shall be read the third time by title, and the question shall then be 
put upon its passage.


  This rule was adopted in 1789, amended in 1794, 1880 (IV, 3391), and 
on Jan. 4, 1965 (H. Res. 8, 89th Cong.). This latest amendment 
eliminated the provision which permitted a Member to demand the reading 
in full of the engrossed copy of a House bill.


[[Page 624]]
up in that committee. A bill read in full in Committee of the Whole and 
reported therefrom is not read in full again when acted on by the House 
(IV, 3409, 3410, 4916). But when a bill is taken up in Committee of the 
Whole its reading in full may be demanded before general debate begins, 
although it may have just been read in the House (IV, 4738); and may be 
dispensed with by unanimous consent, or by the special order providing 
for consideration of the bill, and a motion to that effect is not in 
order (VIII, 2335, 2436). The Speaker may object to a request for 
unanimous consent that a bill may be acted on without being read (IV, 
3390; VII, 1054).


Sec. 831. First and second readings.

  Formerly a  bill was 
read for the first time by title at the time of its introduction, but 
since 1890 all bills have been introduced by filing them with the Clerk, 
thus rendering a reading by title impossible at that time (IV, 3391). 
But the titles of all bills introduced are printed in the Journal and 
Record, thus carrying out the real purposes of the rule. The second 
reading formerly occurred in the House before commitment; but as the 
processes of handling bills have been shortened, the second reading now 
occurs for bills considered in the House alone when they are taken up 
for action (IV, 3391), and, for bills considered in Committee of the 
Whole, when they are taken 




Sec. 832. The third reading after 
engrossment.

  The right to  demand the reading in full of the engrossed copy of a 
bill formerly guaranteed by the rule, existed only immediately after it 
had passed to be engrossed and before it had been read a third time by 
title (IV, 3400, 3403, 3404; VII, 1061); or before the yeas and nays had 
been ordered on passage (IV, 3402). The right to demand the reading in 
full caused the bill to be laid aside until engrossed even though the 
previous question had been ordered (IV, 3395-3399; VII, 1062). A 
privileged motion may not intervene before the third reading (IV, 3405), 
and the question on engrossment and third reading is not subject to a 
demand for division of the question (Aug. 3, 1989, p. 18544). A vote on 
the passage has been reconsidered in order to remedy the omission to 
read a bill a third time (IV, 3406). Senate bills are not engrossed in 
the House; but are ordered to a third reading. The demand for the 
reading of the engrossed copy of a Senate bill cannot be made in the 
House (VIII, 2426).





Sec. 833. Voting on bills.

  A bill in  the House (as 
distinguished from the Committee of the Whole) is amended pending the 
engrossment and third reading (V, 5781; VI, 1051, 1052). The question on 
engrossment and third reading being decided in the negative the bill is 
rejected (IV, 3420, 3421). A bill must be considered and voted on by 
itself (IV, 3408). Where the two Houses pass similar but distinct bills 
on the same subject it is necessary that one or the other House act 
again on the subject (IV, 3386). The requirement of a two-thirds vote 
for proposed constitutional amendments has been construed in the later 
practice to apply only to the vote on the final passage (V, 7029, 7030; 
VIII, 3504). A bill having been rejected by the House, a similar but not 
identical bill on the same subject was afterwards held to be in order 
(IV, 3384).



[[Page 625]]
cept to continue appropriations for public works and objects which are 
already in progress.


Sec. 834a. Unauthorized appropriations in reported 
general appropriation bills or amendments thereto.

  2. (a)  No appropriation 
shall be reported in any general appropriation bill, or shall be in 
order as an amendment thereto, for any expenditure not previously 
authorized by law, ex




Sec. 834b. Legislation in reported general appropriation 
bills; exceptions.

  (b)  No provision changing existing law shall be 
reported in any general appropriation bill except germane provisions 
which retrench expenditures by the reduction of amounts of money covered 
by the bill, which may include those recommended to the Committee on 
Appropriations by direction of any legislative committee having 
jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof, and except rescissions of 
appropriations contained in appropriations Acts.




Sec. 834c. Legislation or limitations in amendments to 
general appropriation bills.

  (c)  No amendment to a general appropriation 
bill shall be in order if changing existing law. Except as provided in 
paragraph (d), no amendment shall be in order during consideration of a 
general appropriation bill proposing a limitation not specifically 
contained or authorized in existing law for the period of the 
limitation.



[[Page 626]]
ized in existing law for the period of the limitation or proposing 
germane amendments which retrench expenditures by reduction of amounts 
of money covered by the bill may be considered; but after the vote on 
any such amendment, the privileged motion made in order under this 
paragraph may be renewed.


Sec. 834d. Motion to rise and report as preferential to 
limitation or retrenchment amendments.

  (d)  After a general appropriation 
bill has been read for amendment and amendments not precluded by 
paragraphs (a) or (c) of this clause have been considered, motions that 
the Committee of the Whole rise and report the bill to the House with 
such amendments as may have been adopted shall, if offered by the 
majority leader or a designee, have precedence over motions to further 
amend the bill. If any such motion is rejected, amendments proposing 
limitations not specifically contained or author




Sec. 834e. Designated emergencies in reported 
appropriation bills.

  (e)  No provision shall be reported in any 
appropriation bill or joint resolution containing an emergency 
designation for purposes of section 251(b)(2)(D) or section 252(e) of 
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, or shall be in 
order as an amendment thereto, if the provision or amendment is not 
designated as an emergency, unless the provision or amendment rescinds 
budget authority or reduces direct spending, or reduces an amount for a 
designated emergency.




[[Page 627]]



Sec. 834f. Offsetting amendments en bloc to appropriation 
bills.

  (f)  During the reading of any appropriation bill for amendment in 
the Committee of the Whole, it shall be in order to consider en bloc 
amendments proposing only to transfer appropriations among objects in 
the bill without increasing the levels of budget authority or outlays in 
the bill. When considered en bloc pursuant to this paragraph, such 
amendments may amend portions of the bill not yet read for amendment 
(following the disposition of any points of order against such portions) 
and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question in the 
House or in the Committee of the Whole.


  The 25th Congress in 1837 was the first to adopt a rule prohibiting 
appropriations in a general appropriation bill or amendment thereto not 
previously authorized by law, in order to prevent delay of appropriation 
bills because of contention over propositions of legislation. In 1838 
that Congress added the exception to permit unauthorized appropriations 
for continuation of works in progress and for contingencies for carrying 
on departments of the Government. The rule remained in that form until 
the 44th Congress in 1876, when William S. Holman of Indiana persuaded 
the House to amend the rule to permit germane legislative retrenchments. 
In 1880, the 46th Congress dropped the exception which permitted 
unauthorized appropriations for contingencies of Government departments, 
and modified the ``Holman Rule'' to define retrenchments as the 
reduction of the number and salary of officers of the United States, the 
reduction of compensation of any person paid out of the Treasury of the 
United States, or the reduction of the amounts of money covered by the 
bill. That form of the retrenchment exception remained in place until 
the 49th Congress in 1885, when it was dropped until the 52d Congress in 
1891, and then re-inserted through the 53d Congress until 1894. It was 
again dropped in the 54th Congress from 1895 until re-inserted in the 
62d Congress in 1911 (IV, 3578; VII, 1125).

  The clause remained unamended until January 3, 1983, when the 98th 
Congress restructured it in the basic form of paragraphs (a)-(d).

  Paragraph (a) retained the prohibition against unauthorized 
appropriations in general appropriation bills and amendments thereto 
except in continuation of works in progress.

  Paragraph (b) narrowed the ``Holman Rule'' exception from the 
prohibition against legislation to cover only retrenchments reducing 
amounts of money included in the bill as reported, and permitted 
legislative committees with proper jurisdiction to recommend such 
retrenchments to the Appropriations Committee for discretionary 
inclusion in the reported bill. The last exception in paragraph (b), 
permitting the inclusion of legislation rescinding appropriations, was 
added in the 99th Congress by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985 (sec. 228(a), P.L. 99-177); however, that exception 
does not extend to the rescission of contract authority provided by laws 
other than appropriation acts (Sept. 22, 1993, p. ----; Sept. 23, 1993, 
p. ----).


[[Page 628]]
ance with clause 2(c) or in accordance with clause 2(d) (June 18, 1991, 
p. ----).
  Paragraph (c) retained the prohibition against amendments changing 
existing law but permitted limitation amendments during the reading of 
the bill by paragraph only if specifically authorized by existing law 
for the period of the limitation. The exception for limitations is 
strictly construed to apply only where existing law requires or permits 
the inclusion of limiting language in an appropriation Act, and not 
merely where the limitation is alleged to be ``consistent with existing 
law'' (June 28, 1988, p. 16267). Although the Committee on 
Appropriations may include a limitation in its reported bill, if it is 
stricken with other legislative language on a point of order it may be 
reinserted during the reading only if in compli


[[Page 629]]

  Paragraph (d) provided a new procedure for consideration of 
retrenchment and other limitation amendments only when reading of a 
general appropriation bill has been completed and only if the Committee 
of the Whole does not adopt a motion to rise and report the bill back to 
the House (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1983, p. 34). In the 104th Congress 
paragraph (d) was amended to limit the availability of its preferential 
motion to rise and report to the Majority Leader or his designee (sec. 
215(a), H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. ----). Where the reading of a 
general appropriation bill for amendment has been completed (or 
dispensed with), including the last paragraph of the bill containing the 
citation to the short title (July 30, 1986, p. 18214), the Chair may 
first inquire whether any Member seeks to offer an amendment not 
prohibited by clauses 2(a) or (c) prior to recognizing Members to offer 
limitation or retrenchment amendments, since the motion to rise and 
report to the House pursuant to clause 2(d) of this rule only supersedes 
that category of amendments and does not take precedence of amendments 
otherwise in order (June 2, 1983, p. 14317; Sept. 22, 1983, p. 25406; 
Oct. 27, 1983, p. 29630), including pro forma amendments (Aug. 2, 1989, 
p. 18126). Pursuant to clause 2(d), a motion that the Committee rise and 
report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been 
adopted is not debatable (Apr. 23, 1987, p. 9613) and takes precedence 
over a limitation (or retrenchment) amendment (July 30, 1985, p. 21534; 
July 23, 1986, p. 17431; Apr. 23, 1987, p. 9613), but only after 
completion of the reading and disposition of amendments not otherwise 
precluded (June 30, 1992, p. ----). Thus a motion that the Committee 
rise and report the bill to the House with the recommendation that it be 
recommitted, with instructions to report back to the House (forthwith or 
otherwise) with an amendment proposing a limitation, does not take 
precedence over the motion to rise and report the bill to the House with 
such amendments as may have been adopted (sustained on appeal, Sept. 19, 
1983, p. 24647). An amendment not only reducing an amount in a paragraph 
of an appropriation bill but also limiting expenditure of those funds on 
a particular project (i.e., a limitation not contained in existing law) 
was held not in order during the reading of that paragraph but only at 
the end of the bill under clause 2(d) (July 23, 1986, p. 17431; June 15, 
1988, p. 14719). Where language of limitation was stricken from a 
general appropriation bill on a point of order that it changed existing 
law, an amendment proposing to reinsert the limitation without its 
former legislative content was held not in order before completion of 
the reading for amendment (Sept. 23, 1993, p. ----). A motion that the 
Committee of the Whole rise and report to the House with the 
recommendation that the enacting clause be stricken out takes precedence 
over the motion to amend under clause 7 of rule XXIII and thus over the 
motion to rise and report under clause 2(d) (July 24, 1986, p. 17641). 

  Paragraphs (e) and (f) were added in the 104th Congress (sec. 215, H. 
Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. ----).



Sec. 835. Points of order on general appropriation 
bills.

  As the rule  applies only to general appropriation bills, which are not 
enumerated or defined in the rules (VII, 1116) bills appropriating only 
for one purpose have been held not to be ``general'' within the meaning 
of this rule (VII, 1122). Neither a resolution providing an 
appropriation for a single government agency (Jan. 31, 1962, p. 1352), 
nor a joint resolution only containing continuing appropriations for 
diverse agencies to provide funds until regular appropriation bills are 
enacted (Sept. 21, 1967, p. 26370), nor a joint resolution providing an 
appropriation for a single government agency and permitting a transfer 
of a portion of those funds to another agency (Oct. 25, 1979, pp. 29627-
28), nor a joint resolution transferring funds already appropriated from 
one specific agency to another (Mar. 26, 1980, pp. 6716-17), nor a joint 
resolution transferring unobligated balances to the President to be 
available for specified purposes but containing no new budget authority 
(Mar. 3, 1988, p. 3239), are ``general appropriation bills'' within the 
purview of this clause. A point of order under this rule does not apply 
to a special order reported from the Committee on Rules ``self-
executing'' the adoption in the House of an amendment changing existing 
law (July 27, 1993, p. ----).


  As all bills making or authorizing appropriations require 
consideration in Committee of the Whole, it follows that the enforcement 
of the rule must ordinarily occur during consideration in Committee of 
the Whole, where the Chair, on the raising of a point of order, may rule 
out any portion of the bill in conflict with the rule (IV, 3811; Sept. 
8, 1965, pp. 23140, 23182). Portions of the bill thus stricken are not 
reported back to the House.


[[Page 630]]
containing legislation (Sept. 1, 1976, pp. 28883-84) or a limitation 
not considered in the Committee of the Whole (Speaker Foley, Aug. 1, 
1989, p. 17159, and Aug. 3, 1989, p. 18546, each time sustained by 
tabling of appeal); and such amendment is precluded whether the 
Committee of the Whole has risen and reported automatically pursuant to 
a special rule or, instead, by a motion at the end of the reading for 
amendment (June 22, 1995, p. ----).
  Prior to the adoption of clause 8 of rule XXI in the 104th Congress 
(see Sec. 848a, infra), it was necessary that some Member reserve points 
of order when a general appropriation bill was referred to the calendar 
of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, in order 
that provisions in violation of the rule could be stricken in the 
Committee (V, 6921-6925; VIII, 3450; Chairman Chindblom, Feb. 6, 1926, 
p. 3456). Where points of order had been reserved pending a unanimous 
consent request that the committee be permitted to file its report when 
the House would not be in session, it was not necessary that they be 
reserved again when the report ultimately was presented as privileged 
when the House was in session, as the initial reservation carried over 
to the subsequent filing (Mar. 1, 1983, p. 3241). In an instance where 
points of order were not reserved against an appropriation bill when it 
was reported to the House and referred to the Committee of the Whole, 
points of order in the Committee of the Whole against a proposition in 
violation of this clause were overruled on the ground that the Chairman 
of the Committee of the Whole lacked authority to pass upon the question 
(Apr. 8, 1943, pp. 3150-51, 3153). The enforcement of the rule also 
occurs in the House in that a motion to recommit a general appropriation 
bill may not propose an amendment 

  By unanimous consent the Committee of the Whole may vacate proceedings 
under specified points of order (June 7, 1991, p. ----).


[[Page 631]]
and an amendment to the paragraph has been offered (June 27, 1974, pp. 
21670-72).
  Points of order against unauthorized appropriations or legislation on 
general appropriation bills may be made as to the whole or only a 
portion of a paragraph (IV, 3652; V, 6881). The fact that a point is 
made against a portion of a paragraph does not prevent another point 
against the whole paragraph (V, 6882; July 31, 1985, p. 21895). If a 
portion of a proposed amendment be out of order, it is sufficient for 
the rejection of the whole amendment (V, 6878-6880); and if a point of 
order is sustained against any portion of a package of amendments 
considered en bloc, all the amendments are ruled out of order and must 
be reoffered separately, or those which are not subject to a point of 
order may be considered en bloc by unanimous consent (Sept. 16, 1981, 
pp. 20735-38; June 21, 1984, p. 17687). Where a point is made against 
the whole of a paragraph the whole must go out, but it is otherwise when 
the point is made only against a portion (V, 6884, 6885). General 
appropriation bills are read ``scientifically'' only by paragraph 
headings and appropriation amounts, and points of order against a 
paragraph must be made before an amendment is offered thereto or before 
the Clerk reads the next paragraph heading and amount (Deschler's 
Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 2.26). A point of order against a 
paragraph under this clause may be made only after that paragraph has 
been read by the Clerk, and not prior to its reading pending 
consideration of an amendment inserting language immediately prior 
thereto (June 6, 1985, pp. 14605, 14609). Where the reading of a 
paragraph of a general appropriation bill has been dispensed with by 
unanimous consent, the Chair inquires whether there are points of order 
against the paragraph before entertaining amendments or directing the 
Clerk to read further, but he does not make such an inquiry where the 
Clerk has actually read the paragraph (May 31, 1984, p. 14608). Where 
the bill is considered as having been read and open to amendment by 
unanimous consent, points of order against provisions in the bill must 
be made before amendments are offered, and cannot be reserved pending 
subsequent action on amendments (Dec. 1, 1982, p. 28175). Where a 
chapter is considered as read by unanimous consent and open to amendment 
at any point, no amendments are offered and the Clerk begins to read the 
next chapter, it is too late to make a point of order against a 
paragraph in the preceeding chapter (June 11, 1985, p. 15181). It is too 
late to rule out the entire paragraph after points of order against 
specific portions have been sustained 

  In the administration of the rule, it is the practice that those 
upholding an item of appropriation should have the burden of showing the 
law authorizing it (IV, 3597; VII, 1179, 1233, 1276). Thus the burden of 
proving the authorization for language carried in an appropriation bill, 
or that the language in the bill constitutes a valid limitation which 
does not change existing law, falls on the proponents and managers of 
the bill (May 28, 1968, p. 15357; Nov. 30, 1982, p. 28062). Where a 
provision is susceptible to more than one interpretation, that burden 
may be met by a showing that only the requirements of existing law, and 
not any new requirements, are recited in the language (Sept. 23, 1993, 
p. ----). The Chair may overrule a point of order that appropriations 
for a certain agency are unauthorized upon citation to an organic 
statute creating the agency, absent any showing that the organic law has 
been overtaken by a scheme of periodic reauthorization; the Chair may 
hear further argument and reverse his ruling, however, where existing 
law not previously called to the Chair's attention would require the 
ruling to be reversed (VIII, 3435; June 8, 1983, p. 14854, where a law 
amending the statute creating the Bureau of the Mint with the express 
purpose of requiring annual authorizations was subsequently called to 
the Chair's attention). Reported provisions in a general appropriation 
bill described in the accompanying report (pursuant to clause 3 of rule 
XXI) as directly or indirectly changing the application of existing law 
are presumably legislation, absent rebuttal by the committee (May 31, 
1984, p. 14591). The burden of proof to show that an appropriation 
contained in an amendment is authorized by law is on the proponent of 
the amendment (May 11, 1971, p. 14471; Oct. 29, 1991, p. ----) and the 
burden is on the proponent of an amendment to a general appropriation 
bill to prove that language offered under the guise of a limitation does 
not change existing law (July 17, 1975, p. 23239; June 16, 1976, pp. 
18666-67). If the amendment is susceptible to more than one 
interpretation, it is incumbent upon the proponent to show that it is 
not in violation of the rule (Procedure, ch. 25, sec. 6.3; July 28, 
1980, pp. 19924-25). The mere recitation in an amendment that a 
determination is to be made pursuant to existing laws and regulations, 
absent a citation to the law imposing such responsibility, is not 
sufficient proof by the proponent of an amendment to overcome a point of 
order that the amendment constitutes legislation (Sept. 16, 1980, pp. 
25606-07). The authorization must be enacted before the appropriation 
may be included in an appropriation bill; thus delaying the availability 
of an appropriation pending enactment of an authorization does not 
protect the item of appropriation against a point of order under this 
clause (Apr. 26, 1972, p. 14455).


[[Page 632]]
authorized purpose is in order (July 27, 1954, p. 12287; Oct. 1, 1975, 
p. 31058; June 8, 1977, pp. 17941-42; July 17, 1985, p. 19435), but an 
amendment adding further unauthorized items of appropriation or 
earmarking for another unauthorized purpose or adding legislation in the 
form of new duties or broadening the application of a legislative 
provision permitted to remain to other funds is not in order (Dec. 8, 
1971, p. 45487; Aug. 7, 1978, pp. 24710-12; July 30, 1985, p. 21532; 
July 17, 1986, p. 16918; July 23, 1986, p. 17446; June 26, 1987, p. 
17655; May 25, 1988, p. 12256; June 28, 1988, pp. 16203, 16213). But to 
a legislative provision permitted to remain conferring assistance on a 
certain class of recipients, an amendment adding another class is 
further legislation and is not merely perfecting in nature (June 22, 
1983, p. 16851). An amendment to a general appropriation bill is not 
subject to a point of order as adding legislation if containing, 
verbatim, a legislative provision already contained in the bill and 
permitted to remain (Aug. 27, 1980, p. 23519). Where by unanimous 
consent an amendment is offered en bloc to a paragraph of a general 
appropriation bill containing an unauthorized amount not yet read for 
amendment, the amendment increasing that unauthorized figure is subject 
to a point of order since at that point it is not being offered to a 
paragraph which has been read and permitted to remain (June 21, 1984, p. 
17687). To a legislative provision in a general appropriation bill, 
permitted to remain, exempting cases where the life of the mother would 
be endangered if a fetus were carried to term from a denial of funds for 
abortions, an amendment exempting instead cases where the health of the 
mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term was held 
not to constitute further legislation, since determinations on the 
endangerment of life necessarily subsume determinations on the 
endangerment of health, and the amendment did not therefore require any 
different or more onerous determinations (June 27, 1984, p. 19113). The 
inclusion of funds in a general appropriation bill in the form of a 
``not to exceed'' limitation does not obviate a point of order that the 
funds are not authorized by law (June 21, 1988, p. 15440).
  Where an unauthorized appropriation or legislation is permitted to 
remain in a general appropriation bill by failure to raise or by waiver 
of a point of order, an amendment merely changing that amount and not 
adding legislative language or earmarking separate funds for another un


[[Page 633]]
tion for an office created by executive order issued pursuant to the 
Reorganization Plan (June 21, 1974, pp. 20595-96). A resolution of the 
House has been held sufficient authorization for an appropriation for 
the salary of an employee of the House (IV, 3656-3658) even though the 
resolution may have been agreed to only by a preceding House (IV, 3660). 
Previous enactment of items of appropriation unauthorized by law does 
not justify similar appropriations in subsequent bills (VII, 1145, 1150, 
1151) unless if through appropriations previously made, a function of 
the government has been established which would bring it into the 
category of continuation of works in progress (VII, 1280), or unless 
legislation in a previous appropriation act has become permanent law 
(May 20, 1964, p. 11422). The omission to appropriate during a series of 
years for an object authorized by law does not repeal the law, and 
consequently an appropriation when proposed is not subject to the point 
of order (IV, 3595). The law authorizing each head of a department to 
employ such numbers of clerks, messengers, copyists, watchmen, laborers, 
and other employees as may be appropriated for by Congress from year to 
year is held to authorize appropriations for those positions not 
otherwise authorized by law (IV, 3669, 3675, 4739); but this law does 
not apply to offices not within departments or not at the seat of 
government (IV, 3670-3674). And a permanent law authorizing the 
President to appoint certain staff, together with legislative provisions 
authorizing additional employment contained in an appropriation bill 
enacted for that fiscal year, constituted sufficient authorization for a 
lump sum supplemental appropriation for the White House for the same 
fiscal year (Nov. 30, 1973, pp. 38854-55). By a general provision of law 
appropriations for investigations and the acquisition and diffusion of 
information by the Agricultural Department on subjects related to 
agriculture are generally in order in the agricultural appropriation 
bill (IV, 3649). It has once been held that this law would authorize 
also appropriations for the instrumentalities of such investigations 
(IV, 3615); but these would not include the organization of a bureau to 
conduct the work (IV, 3651). The law does not authorize general 
investigations by the department (IV, 3652), or cooperation with state 
investigations (IV, 3650; VII, 1301, 1302), or the investigation of 
foods in relation to commerce (IV, 3647, 3648; VII, 1298), or the 
compiling of tests at an exposition (IV, 3653). A paragraph of a general 
appropriation bill both establishing and funding a commission was ruled 
out as constituting legislation and carrying unauthorized appropriations 
(June 29, 1988, p. 16470). A paragraph appropriating funds for matching-
grants to States was held unauthorized where the authorizing law did not 
require State matching funds (June 28, 1993, p. ----). A paragraph 
funding a project from the Highway Trust Fund was held unauthorized 
where such funding was authorized only from the general fund (Sept. 23, 
1993, p. ----).


Sec. 836. Authorization of law for 
appropriations.

  The authorization  by existing law required in the rule to justify 
appropriations may be made also by a treaty if it has been ratified by 
both the contracting parties (IV, 3587); however, where existing law 
authorizes appropriations for the U.S. share of facilities to be 
recommended in an agreement with another country containing specified 
elements, an agreement in principle with that country predating the 
authorization law and lacking the required elements is insufficient 
authorization (June 28, 1993, p. ----). An executive order does not 
constitute sufficient authorization in law absent proof of its 
derivation from a statute enacted by Congress authorizing the order and 
expenditure of funds (June 15, 1973, p. 19855; June 25, 1974, p. 21036). 
Thus a Reorganization Plan submitted by the President pursuant to 5 
U.S.C. 906 has the status of statutory law when it becomes effective and 
is sufficient authorization to support an appropria



[[Page 634]]
a point of order, where more general existing law authorizes 
appropriations for all of the programs proposed to be modified by new 
legislation pending before Congress (June 8, 1978, p. 16778). But 
whether organic statutes or general grants of authority in law 
constitute sufficient authorization to support appropriations depends on 
whether the general laws applicable to the function or department in 
question require specific and/or annual authorizations. For example, 22 
U.S.C. 2680(a)(1) provides that no funds are available to the Department 
of State for obligation or expenditure unless appropriations therefor 
have been authorized by law enacted after February, 1972; thus 
appropriations for direct operations of that Department and for related 
functions violate clause 2 of rule XXI absent enactment of specific 
authorizations for the fiscal year in question (June 14, 1978, p. 
17616). Similar statutes pertain to the Department of Justice and 
related agencies and bureaus (June 14, 1978, p. 17622), the National 
Bureau of Standards (June 14, 1978, p. 17626), the Federal Trade 
Commission (June 14, 1978, p. 17630), and a variety of other agencies 
(June 14, 1978, pp. 17624-30). An authorization of ``such sums as may be 
necessary'' is sufficient to support any dollar amount, but has no 
tendency to relieve other conditions of the authorization law (June 28, 
1993, p. ----). Where existing law authorizes certain appropriations 
from a particular trust fund without fiscal year limitation, language 
that such an appropriation remain available until expended does not 
constitute legislation (July 15, 1993, p. ----).
  The failure of Congress to enact into law separate legislation 
specifically modifying eligibility requirements for grant programs under 
existing law does not necessarily render appropriations for those 
programs subject to 

  Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XLVIII, no funds may be appropriated to 
certain agencies carrying out intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities, unless such funds have been authorized by law for the fiscal 
year in question.



Sec. 837. Authorization for claims and 
salaries.

  Judgments of  courts certified to Congress in accordance with law or 
authorized by treaty (IV, 3634, 3635, 3644) and audited under authority 
of law have been held to be authorization for appropriations for the 
payment of claims (IV, 3634, 3635). But unadjudicated claims (IV, 3628), 
even though ascertained and transmitted by an executive officer (IV, 
3625-3640), and findings filed under the Bowman Act do not constitute 
authorization (IV, 3643).



[[Page 635]]
not in order to provide for an unauthorized office and salary in lieu 
of it (IV, 3680).
  An appropriation for an object not otherwise authorized does not 
constitute authorization to justify a continuance of the appropriation 
another year (IV, 3588, 3589; VII, 1128, 1145, 1149, 1191), and the mere 
appropriation for a salary does not create an office so as to justify 
appropriations in succeeding years (IV, 3590, 3672, 3697), it being a 
general rule that propositions to appropriate for salaries not 
established by law or to increase salaries fixed by law are out of order 
(IV, 3664-3667, 3676-3679). But an exception to these general principles 
is found in the established practice that in the absence of a general 
law fixing a salary the amount appropriated in the last appropriation 
bill has been held to be the legal salary (IV, 3687-3696). A law having 
established an office and fixed a salary, it is 



Sec. 838. Authorizations for public works.

  An  appropriation 
for a public work in excess of a fixed limit of cost (IV, 3583, 3584; 
VII, 1133), or for extending a service beyond the limits assigned by an 
executive officer exercising a lawful discretion (IV, 3598), or by 
actual law (IV, 3582, 3585), or for purposes prohibited by law are out 
of order (IV, 3580, 3581, 3702), as is an appropriation from the Highway 
Trust Fund where the project is specifically authorized from the general 
fund (Sept. 23, 1993, p. ----). But the mere appropriation of a sum ``to 
complete'' a work does not fix a limit of cost such as would exclude 
future appropriations (IV, 3761). A declaration of policy in an act 
followed by specific provisions conferring authority upon a governmental 
agency to perform certain functions is not construed to authorize 
appropriations for purposes germane to the policy but not specifically 
authorized by the act (VII, 1200). A point of order will not lie against 
an amendment proposing to increase a lump sum for public works projects 
where language in the bill limits use of the lump sum appropriation to 
``projects as authorized by law'' (Procedure, ch. 25, sec. 5.5), but 
where language in the bill limits use of the lump sum both to projects 
``authorized by laws'' and ``subject, where appropriate, to enactment of 
authorizing legislation,'' that paragraph constitutes an appropriation 
in part for some unauthorized projects and is not in order (June 6, 
1985, p. 14617).



[[Page 636]]
(IV, 3704). It has been held that a work has not been begun within the 
meaning of the rule when an appropriation has been made for a site for a 
public building (IV, 3785), or when a commission has been created to 
select a site or when a site has actually been selected for a work (IV, 
3762-3763), or when a survey has been made (IV, 3782-3784). By ``public 
works and objects already in progress'' are meant tangible matters like 
buildings, roads, etc., and not duties of officials in executive 
departments (IV, 3709-3713), or the continuance of a work indefinite as 
to completion and intangible in nature like the gauging of streams (IV, 
3714, 3715). A general system of roads on which some work has been done 
cannot be admitted as a work in progress (VII, 1333), nor can an 
extension of an existing road (Sept. 22, 1993, p. ----). Concerning 
reappropriation for continuation of public works in progress, see 
Sec. 847, infra.


Sec. 839. Continuation of a public work by 
appropriations.

  The rule  requiring appropriations to be authorized by existing 
law excepts those ``in continuance of appropriations for such public 
works and objects as are already in progress'' (IV, 3578); and the 
``works in progress'' exception has historically been applied only in 
cases of general revenue funding (Sept. 22, 1993, pp. ----; Sept. 23, 
1993, pp. ----). But an appropriation in violation of existing law or to 
extend a service beyond a fixed limit is not in order as the continuance 
of a public work (IV, 3585, 3702-3724; VII, 1332; Sept. 23, 1993, pp. --
--; June 8, 1983, Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 8.9). 
Where existing law (40 U.S.C. 606) specifically prohibits the making of 
an appropriation to construct or alter any public building involving 
more than $500,000 unless approved by the House and Senate Public Works 
Committees, an appropriation for such purposes not authorized by both 
committees is out of order notwithstanding the ``works in progress'' 
exemption, since the law specifically precludes the appropriation from 
being made (June 8, 1983, p. 14855). An appropriation from the Highway 
Trust Fund for an ongoing project was held not in order under the 
``works in progress'' exception where the Internal Revenue Code 
``occupied the field'' with a comprehensive authorization scheme not 
embracing the specified project (Sept. 22, 1993, pp. ----; Sept. 23, 
1993, pp. ----). Interruption of a work does not necessarily remove it 
from the privileges of the rule (IV, 3705-3708); but the continuation of 
the work must not be so conditioned in relation to place as to become a 
new work 



[[Page 637]]



Sec. 840. Examples illustrating the continuation of a 
public work.

  Thus the  continuation of the following works has been admitted: A 
topographical survey (IV, 3796, 3797; VII, 1382), a geological map (IV, 
3795), marking of a boundary line (IV, 3717), marking graves of soldiers 
(IV, 3788), a list of claims (IV, 3717), and recoinage of coins in the 
Treasury (IV, 3807); but the following works have not been admitted: 
Investigation of materials, like coal (IV, 3721), scientific 
investigations (IV, 3719; VII, 1345), duties of a commission (IV, 3720; 
VII, 1344), extension of foreign markets for goods (IV, 3722), printing 
of a series of opinions indefinite in continuance (IV, 3718), free 
evening lectures in the District of Columbia (IV, 3789), certain ongoing 
projects from the Highway Trust Fund (Sept. 22, 1993, pp. ----; Sept. 
23, 1993, pp. ----), extension of an existing road (Sept. 22, 1993, p. 
----), continuation of an extra compensation for ordinary facility for 
carrying the mails (IV, 3808), although the continuation of certain 
special mail facilities has been admitted (IV, 3804-3806). But 
appropriations for rent and repairs of buildings or Government roads 
(IV, 3793, 3798) and bridges (IV, 3803) have been admitted as in 
continuation of a work (IV, 3777, 3778), although it is not in order as 
such to provide for a new building in place of one destroyed (IV, 3606). 
Nor is it in order to repair paving adjacent to a public building but in 
a city street, although it may have been laid originally by the 
Government (IV, 3779). The purchase of adjoining land for a work already 
established has been admitted under this principle (IV, 3766-3773) and 
also additions to existing buildings in cases where no limits of cost 
have been shown (IV, 3774, 3775). But the purchase of a separate and 
detached lot of land is not admitted (IV, 3776). The continuation of 
construction at the Kennedy Library, a project owned by the United 
States and funded by a prior year's appropriation, has been admitted 
notwithstanding the absence of any current authorization (June 14, 1988, 
p. 14335). A provision of law authorizing Commissioners of the District 
of Columbia to take over and operate the fish wharves of the city of 
Washington was held insufficient authority to admit an appropriation for 
reconstructing the fish wharf (VII, 1187).




Sec. 841a. New buildings at existing 
institutions as in continuance of a public work.

  Appropriations for  new buildings at 
Government institutions have sometimes been admitted (IV, 3741-3750) 
when intended for the purposes of the institution (IV, 3747); but later 
decisions, in view of the indefinite extent of the practice made 
possible by the early decisions, have ruled out propositions to 
appropriate for new buildings in navy yards (IV, 3755-3759) and other 
establishments (IV, 3751-3754). Appropriations for new schoolhouses in 
the District of Columbia (IV, 3750; VII, 1358), for new Army hospitals 
(IV, 3740), for new lighthouses (IV, 3728), armor-plate factories (IV, 
3737-3739), and for additional playgrounds for children in the District 
of Columbia (IV, 3792) have also been held not to be in continuation of 
a public work.




Sec. 841b. New vessel for naval and other services 
as in continuation of a public work.

  By a former  broad construction of the rule an 
appropriation of a new and not otherwise authorized vessel of the Navy 
had been held to be a continuance of a public work (IV, 3723, 3724); but 
this line of decisions has been overruled (VII, 1351; Chairman Lehlbach, 
Jan. 22, 1926, p. 2621). While appropriations for new construction and 
procurement of aircraft and equipment for the Navy are not in order, 
appropriations for continuing experiments and development work on all 
types of aircraft are in order (Chairman Lehlbach, Jan. 22, 1926, p. 
2623). This former interpretation was confined to naval vessels, and did 
not apply to vessels in other services, like the Coast and Geodetic 
Survey or Lighthouse Service (IV, 3725, 3726), or to floating or 
stationary dry docks (IV, 3729-3736). The construction of a submarine 
cable in extension of one already laid was held not to be the 
continuation of a public work (IV, 3716), but an appropriation for the 
Washington-Alaska military cable has been held in order (VII, 1348).



[[Page 638]]
1993, p. ----). Existing law may be repeated verbatim in an 
appropriation bill (IV, 3814, 3815), but the slightest change of the 
text causes it be ruled out (IV, 3817; VII, 1391, 1394; June 4, 1970, p. 
18405). It is in order to include language descriptive of authority 
provided in law for the operation of government agencies and 
corporations so long as the description is precise and does not change 
that authority in any respect (June 15, 1973, pp. 19843-44; Aug. 3, 
1978, p. 24249); and while language merely reciting the applicability of 
current law to the use of earmarked funds is permitted, an amendment 
that elevates existing guidelines to mandates for spending has been 
ruled out (July 12, 1989, p. 14432). Although the object to be 
appropriated for may be described without violating the rule (IV, 3864), 
an amendment proposing an appropriation under a heading that indicates 
an unauthorized purpose as its object has been ruled out (Oct. 29, 1991, 
p. ----). The fact that an item has been carried in appropriation bills 
for many years does not exempt it from a point of order as being 
legislation (VII, 1445, 1656). The reenactment from year to year of a 
law intended to apply during the year of its enactment only is not 
relieved, however, from the point that it is legislation (IV, 3822).


Sec. 842a. Legislation on appropriation bills 
generally.

  The provision of  the rule forbidding in any general appropriation bill a 
``provision changing existing law'' is construed to mean the enactment 
of law where none exists (IV, 3812, 3813), such as permitting funds to 
remain available until expended or beyond the fiscal year covered by the 
bill, where existing law permits no such availability (Aug. 1, 1973, pp. 
27288-89), or immediately upon enactment (July 29, 1986, p. 17981; June 
28, 1988, p. 16255) or merely permits availability to the extent 
provided in advance in appropriation Acts but not explicitly beyond the 
fiscal year in question (July 21, 1981, p. 16687). Language waiving the 
provisions of existing law where the law being waived permits exceptions 
therefrom to be contained in appropriation laws but not in appropriation 
bills (Nov. 13, 1975, p. 36271), has been ruled out, as has language 
identical to that contained in an authorization bill previously passed 
by the House but not yet signed into law (Aug. 4, 1978, p. 24436), or a 
proposition for repeal of existing law (VII, 1403). Although clause 2(b) 
permits the Committee on Appropriations to report rescissions of 
appropriations, an amendment proposing a rescission constitutes 
legislation under clause 2(c) (May 26, 


  Limits of cost for public works may not be made or changed (IV, 3761, 
3865-3867; VII, 1446), or contracts authorized (IV, 3868-3870; May 14, 
1937, p. 4595).

  The Chair may examine legislative history established during debate on 
an amendment against which a point of order has been reserved to resolve 
any ambiguity therein when ruling on the eventual point of order (June 
14, 1978, p. 17651), and may inquire after its author's intent when 
attempting to construe an ambiguous amendment (Oct. 29, 1991, p. ----).



Sec. 842b. Contingencies and congressional 
actions.

  An  amendment making an appropriation contingent upon a 
recommendation (June 27, 1979, pp. 17054-55) or action not specifically 
required by law (July 23, 1980, pp. 19295-97; July 29, 1980, pp. 20098-
200100) is legislation. For example, where existing law requires an 
agency to furnish certain information to congressional committees upon 
request, without a subpoena, it is not in order on an appropriation bill 
to make funding for that agency contingent upon its furnishing 
information to subcommittees upon request (July 29 and July 30, 1980, 
pp. 20475-76), or contingent upon submission of an agreement by a 
Federal official to Congress and Congressional review thereof (July 31, 
1986, p. 18370). Similarly, it is not in order on a general 
appropriation bill to condition funds on legal determinations to be made 
by a federal court and an executive department (June 28, 1988, p. 16261; 
see Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 47.2).



[[Page 639]]
concurrent resolutions of the Congress, was legislation imposing new 
requirements of further legislative action. On May 15, 1947 (p. 5378), 
the Chair ruled out as legislation an amendment providing that a certain 
appropriation did not grant authority for a certain use of funds unless 
specific approval of Congress was subsequently granted. Two subsequent 
rulings upholding the admissibility of amendments making the 
availability of funds in a general appropriation bill contingent upon 
subsequent Congressional action (June 11, 1968, p. 16692; Sept. 6, 1979, 
pp. 23360-61) have, in turn, been superseded by four more recent 
rulings. On November 18, 1981 (p. 28064), a provision making the 
availability of certain funds contingent upon subsequent Congressional 
action on legislative proposals resolving the policy issue was held to 
constitute legislation; on November 2, 1983 (p. 30503), an amendment to 
a general appropriation bill making the availability of funds therein 
contingent upon subsequent enactment of legislation containing specified 
findings was ruled out as legislation requiring new legislative and 
executive branch policy determinations not required by law; on June 29, 
1987 (p. 18083), an amendment changing a permanent appropriation in 
existing law to restrict its availability until all general 
appropriation bills are presented to the President was held to 
constitute legislation; and on June 27, 1994 (p. ----), an amendment 
limiting funds in the bill for certain peacekeeping operations unless 
authorized by Congress was held to constitute legislation.
  Amendments making the availability of funds in a general appropriation 
bill contingent upon subsequent Congressional action have, under the 
most recent precedents, been ruled out as legislation. On June 30, 1942 
(p. 5826) the Chair ruled that an amendment prohibiting the availability 
of funds to enforce certain executive orders, unless those orders were 
approved by 

  It is not in order on a general appropriation bill to require a 
congressional committee to promulgate regulations to limit the use of an 
appropriation (June 13, 1979, pp. 14670-71), or otherwise to direct the 
activities of a committee (June 24, 1992, p. ---- and ----); nor is it 
in order to direct the Selective Service Administration to issue 
regulations to bring its classifications into conformance with a Supreme 
Court decision (July 20, 1989, p. 15405). Also a proposition to change a 
rule of the House is subject to the point of order (IV, 3819). A 
provision constituting Congressional disapproval of a deferral of budget 
authority proposed by the President pursuant to the Impoundment Control 
Act is not in order if included in a general appropriation bill rather 
than in a separate resolution of disapproval under that Act (July 29, 
1982, pp. 18625, 18626). An amendment making the availability of funds 
in a general appropriation bill contingent upon a substantive 
determination by a state or local government official or agency which is 
not otherwise required by existing law has been ruled out as legislation 
(July 25, 1985, p. 20569).


[[Page 640]]
In interpreting the responsibilities imposed upon Federal officials by 
existing law to determine whether an amendment constitutes a change in 
that law, the Chair may take into account the fact that Federal court 
rulings have not been uniform or finally dispositive of procedural 
duties mandated by the Constitution, as in the case of the requirement 
of a search warrant, based on probable cause, for an inspection by an 
administrative and regulatory agency (June 16, 1977, pp. 19365-74; June 
7, 1978, p. 16676).


Sec. 842c. Construing or amending existing 
law.

  A provision  proposing to construe existing law is in itself a proposition of 
legislation and therefore not in order (IV, 3936-3938; May 2, 1951, pp. 
4747-48; July 26, 1951, p. 8982), but while a limitation on the use of 
funds may require executive officers to construe the language of that 
limitation in administering those funds, that duty of statutory 
construction, absent a further imposition of an affirmative direction 
not required by law, does not destroy the validity of the limitation 
(June 27, 1974, pp. 21687-94). 


  An amendment which does not limit or restrict the use or expenditure 
of funds in the bill, but which expresses the sense of Congress that 
reductions in appropriations in other bills should reflect the 
proportionate reductions made in the pending bill (Oct. 21, 1990, p. --
--) or directs the way in which all provisions in the bill must be 
interpreted or construed, is legislation (Aug. 27, 1980, p. 23535; May 
17, 1988, p. 11305), although it has been held in order to except from 
the operation of a specific limitation on expenditures, certain of those 
expenditures which are authorized by law, by prohibiting a construction 
of the limitation in a way which would prevent compliance with that law 
(Mar. 24, 1944, p. 3095; June 18, 1991, p. ----). The mere recitation in 
an amendment that a determination is to be made pursuant to existing 
laws and regulations, absent a citation to the law imposing such 
responsibility, is not sufficient proof by the proponent of an amendment 
to overcome a point of order that the amendment constitutes legislation 
(Sept. 16, 1980, pp. 25606-07; May 8, 1986, p. 10156). An amendment 
denying the use of funds for the Treasury Department to apply certain 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code other than under regulations and 
court decisions in effect on a prior date is legislation since requiring 
an official to apply interpretations no longer current in order to 
render an appropriation available (June 7, 1978, p. 16655; Aug. 19, 
1980, pp. 21978-80). A paragraph of a general appropriation bill 
changing existing law concerning federal diversity jurisdiction is 
legislation (July 1, 1987, p. 18638).


[[Page 641]]
the proponent can show that the new duties are merely incidental to 
functions already required by law and do not involve substantive new 
determinations (July 26, 1985, p. 20807). Where an amendment to or 
language in a general appropriation bill implicitly places new duties on 
officers of the government or implicitly requires them to make 
investigations, compile evidence, or make judgments and determinations 
not otherwise required of them by law, such as to judge intent or 
motives, then it assumes the character of legislation and is subject to 
a point of order (July 31, 1969, pp. 21653, 21675, where the words ``in 
order to overcome racial imbalance'' were held to impose additional 
duties, and Nov. 30, 1982, p. 28062, where the words ``to interfere 
with'' the rulemaking authority of any regulatory agency were held to 
implicitly require the Office of Management and Budget to make 
determinations not discernibly required by law in evaluating and 
executing its responsibilities). An amendment authorizing the President 
to reduce each appropriation in the bill by not more than ten percent 
was ruled out as legislation conferring new authority on the President 
(May 31, 1984, p. 14617; June 6, 1984, p. 15120). A limitation on the 
use of funds, or an exception therefrom, may not be accompanied by 
language stating or requiring a finding of a motive or purpose in 
carrying out the limitation (Aug. 8, 1978, pp. 24969-70; July 22, 1980, 
pp. 19087-88; Sept. 16, 1980, p. 25604; Sept. 22, 1981, p. 21577). A 
paragraph prohibiting the use of funds to perform abortions except where 
the mother's life would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term 
is legislation, since requiring federal officials to make new 
determinations and judgments not required of them by law, regardless 
whether private or State officials administering the funds in question 
routinely make such determinations (June 17, 1977, p. 1969; June 30, 
1993, p. ----). The fact that such a provision relating to abortion 
funding may have been included in appropriation Acts in prior years 
applicable to funds in those laws does not permit the inclusion of 
similar language requiring such determinations, not required by law, 
with respect to funds for the fiscal year in question (Sept. 22, 1983, 
p. 25406); and where the provision, applicable to federal funds, was 
permitted to remain in a bill (no point of order having been made), an 
amendment striking the word ``Federal,'' and thereby broadening the 
provision to include District of Columbia funds as well, was ruled out 
(Nov. 15, 1989, p. 29004). But to such a provision permitted to remain 
in a general appropriation bill, an amendment exempting instead cases 
where the health of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were 
carried to term was held not to constitute further legislation by 
requiring any different or more onerous determinations (June 27, 1984, 
p. 19113). An amendment prohibiting the use of funds in an appropriation 
bill for the General Services Administration to dispose of U.S.-owned 
``agricultural'' land declared surplus was ruled out as legislation, 
since the determination whether surplus lands are ``agricultural'' was 
not required by law (Aug. 20, 1980, pp. 22156-58); but a limitation 
precluding funds for any transit project exceeding a specified cost-
effectiveness index was held not to impose new duties where the 

[[Page 642]]
Chair was persuaded that the limitation applied to projects for which 
indexes were already required by law (Sept. 23, 1993, p. ----). The fact 
that an executive official may have been directed by an executive order 
to consult another executive official prior to taking an action does not 
permit inclusion of language directing the official being consulted to 
make determinations not specifically required by law (July 22, 1980, pp. 
19087-88).


Sec. 842d. Imposing duties or requiring 
determinations.

  Propositions to  establish affirmative directions for executive 
officers (IV, 3854-3859; VII, 1443; July 31, 1969, p. 21675; June 18, 
1979, pp. 15286-87; July 1, 1987, pp. 18654 and 18655; June 27, 1994, p. 
----), even in cases where they may have discretion under the law so to 
do (IV, 3853; June 4, 1970, p. 18401; Aug. 8, 1978, pp. 24959-60), or to 
affirmatively take away an authority or discretion conferred by law (IV, 
3862, 3863; VII, 1975; Mar. 30, 1955, pp. 4065-66; June 21, 1974, p. 
20600; July 31, 1985, p. 21909), are subject to the point of order. 
While any limitation in an appropriation bill (see Sec. 483, supra) 
places some minimal duties on federal officials, who must determine the 
effect of such a limitation on appropriated funds, an amendment or 
language in an appropriation bill may not impose additional duties, not 
required by law, or make the appropriation contingent upon the 
performance of such duties (May 28, 1968, p. 15350). Language in the 
form of a conditional limitation requiring determinations by Federal 
officials will be held to change existing law unless 


  An amendment limiting use of funds in a bill may not condition the 
availability of funds or the exercise of contract authority upon an 
interpretation of local law where that interpretation is not required by 
existing law (July 17, 1981, p. 16327); may not require new 
determinations of full Federal compliance with mandates imposed upon 
States (July 22, 1981, p. 16829); may not require the evaluation of the 
theoretical basis of a program (July 22, 1981, p. 16822); may not 
require new determinations of propriety or effectiveness (Oct. 6, 1981, 
p. 23361; May 25, 1988, p. 12275), or satisfactory quality (Aug. 1, 
1986, p. 18647) or incorporate by reference determinations already made 
in administrative processes not affecting programs funded by the bill 
(Oct. 6, 1981, p. 23361); may not require new determinations of rates of 
interest payable (July 29, 1982, p. 18624; Dec. 9, 1982, p. 29691); may 
not apply standards of conduct to foreign entities where existing law 
requires such conduct only by domestic entities (July 17, 1986, p. 
16951); may not require the enforcement of a standard where existing law 
only requires inspection of an area (July 30, 1986, p. 18189); may not 
prohibit the availability of funds for the purchase of ``nondomestic'' 
goods and services (Sept. 12, 1986, p. 23178); may not mandate 
contractual provisions (May 18, 1988, p. 11389); may not authorize the 
adjustment of wages of government employees (June 21, 1988, p. 15451; 
Apr. 26, 1989, p. 7525) or permit an increase in Members' office 
allowances only ``if requested in writing'' (Oct. 21, 1990, p. ----); 
may not convert an existing legal prerequisite for the issuance of a 
regulatory permit into a prerequisite for even the preliminary 
processing of such a permit (July 22, 1992, p. ----); may not mandate 
reductions in various appropriations by a variable percentaage 
calculated in relation to ``overhead'' (Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, 
ch. 26, sec. 5.6; June 24, 1992, p. ----); and may not require an agency 
to investigate and determine whether private airports are collecting 
certain fees for each enplaning passenger (Sept. 23, 1993, p. ----). 
However, an amendment limiting use of funds in the bill may deny the 
availability of funds in situations where certain information is 
``already known'' (VII, 1695; see also Aug. 1, 1989, p. ----, and June 
22, 1995, p. ----, where motions to recommit with ``made known'' 
limitations were ruled out as proposing limitations not considered by 
the Committee of the Whole rather than as proposing changes in existing 
law).


[[Page 643]]
ity (Mar. 12, 1975, p. 6338), as in an amendment requiring not less 
than a certain sum to be used for a particular purpose where existing 
law does not mandate such expenditure (June 18, 1976, p. 19297; July 29, 
1982, p. 18623), or where an amendment earmarks appropriated funds to 
the arts to require their expenditure pursuant to standards otherwise 
applicable only as guidelines (July 12, 1989, p. 14432). Where existing 
law directed a federal official to provide for sale of certain 
government property to a private organization in ``necessary'' amounts, 
an amendment providing that no such property be withheld from 
distribution from qualifying purchasers is legislation, since requiring 
disposal of all property and restricting discretionary authority to 
determine ``necessary'' amounts (Aug. 7, 1978, p. 24707). An amendment 
directing the use of funds to assure compliance with an existing law, 
where existing law does not so mandate, also is legislation (June 24, 
1976, p. 20370). So-called ``hold-harmless'' provisions which mandate a 
certain level of expenditure for certain purposes or recipients, where 
existing law confers discretion or makes ratable reductions in such 
expenditures, also constitute legislation (Apr. 16, 1975, p. 10357; June 
25, 1976, p. 20557). A transfer of available funds from one Department 
to another with directions as to the use to which those funds must be 
put is legislation (and also a reappropriation in violation of clause 6 
of this rule) (Dec. 8, 1982, p. 29449). A provision requiring States to 
match funds provided in an appropriation bill was held to constitute 
legislation where existing law contained no such requirement (June 28, 
1993, p. ----).


Sec. 842e. Mandating expenditures.

  A provision  which 
mandates a distribution of funds in contravention of an allocation 
formula in existing law is legislation (July 29, 1982, pp. 18637, 18638; 
Oct. 5, 1983, p. 27335; Aug. 2, 1989, p. 18123), as is an amendment 
which by such a mandate interferes with an executive official's 
discretionary author



[[Page 644]]
was held to be perfecting (July 30, 1990, p. ----); but striking the 
date and inserting a new trigger (the enactment of other legislation), 
was held to be additional legislation (July 30, 1990, p. ----).


Sec. 842f. Waivers; amending legislation permitted 
to remain.

  The House  may, by agreeing to a report from the Committee on Rules or 
by adopting an order under suspension of the rules, allow legislation on 
general appropriation bills (IV, 3260-3263, 3839-3845). A paragraph 
which proposes legislation or an unauthorized appropriation being 
permitted to remain, by special order or by failure to raise a point of 
order, may be perfected by germane amendment (IV, 3823-3835, 3838; VII, 
1405, 1413-1415; June 9, 1954, pp. 5963-64; Sept. 11, 1985, p. 23398; 
June 14, 1988, p. 14341), but this does not permit an amendment which 
adds additional legislation (IV, 3836, 3837, 3862; VII, 1402-1436; Dec. 
9, 1971, pp. 4595-96; Aug. 1, 1973, pp. 27291-92; June 10, 1977, p. 
1802; June 28, 1988, pp. 16203, 16213; Aug. 2, 1989, p. 18172; Nov. 15, 
1989, p. 29004), or earmarks for unauthorized purposes (July 17, 1985, 
p. 19435; July 17, 1986, p. 16918), or earmarks by directing a new use 
of funds not required by law (July 26, 1985, pp. 20811, 20813), or 
indirectly increases an unauthorized amount by adding to that amnount 
with new language at another portion of the bill (July 12, 1995, p. ----
). An amendment to a general appropriation bill is not subject to a 
point of order as adding legislation if containing, verbatim, a 
legislative provision already contained in the bill and permitted to 
remain (Aug. 27, 1980, p. 23519). To a paragraph permitted to remain 
though containing a legislative proviso restricting the obligation of 
funds until a date within the fiscal year, an amendment striking the 
delimiting date, thus applying the restriction for the entire year, 




Sec. 842g. Senate amendments.

  The principle  seems to be 
generally well accepted that the House proposing legislation on a 
general appropriation bill should recede if the other House persists in 
its objection (IV, 3904-3908), and clause 2 of rule XX (Sec. 829, supra) 
prohibits House conferees from agreeing to a Senate amendment which 
proposes legislation on an appropriation bill without specific authority 
from the House. But where a Senate amendment proposing legislation on a 
general appropriation bill is, pursuant to the edict of clause 2 of rule 
XX, reported back from conference in disagreement, a motion to concur in 
the Senate amendment with a further amendment is in order, even if the 
proposed amendment adds legislation to that contained in the Senate 
amendment, and the only test is whether the proposed amendment is 
germane to the Senate amendment reported in disagreement (IV, 3909; 
VIII, 3188, 3189; Speaker McCormack, Dec. 15, 1970, pp. 41504-05; Aug. 
1, 1979, pp. 22007-11; Speaker O'Neill, Dec. 12, 1979, pp. 35520-21; 
June 30, 1987, p. 18308).




Sec. 843a. Limitations on appropriation bills 
generally.

  Although the  rule forbids on any general appropriation bill a provision 
``changing existing law,'' which is construed to mean legislation 
generally, the practice of the House has established the principle that 
certain ``limitations'' may be admitted. Just as the House may decline 
to appropriate for a purpose authorized by law, so may it by limitation 
prohibit the use of the money for part of the purpose while 
appropriating for the remainder of it (IV, 3936; VII, 1595). The 
language of the limitation provides that no part of the appropriation 
under consideration shall be used for a certain designated purpose (IV, 
3917-3926; VII, 1580). And this designated purpose may reach the 
question of qualifications, for while it is not in order to legislate as 
to the qualifications of the recipients of an appropriation the House 
may specify that no part of the appropriation shall go to recipients 
lacking certain qualifications (IV, 3942-3952; VII, 1655; June 4, 1970, 
pp. 18412-13; June 27, 1974, p. 21662; Oct. 9, 1974, p. 34712; June 9, 
1978, p. 16990). The limitation must apply solely to the money of the 
appropriation under consideration (VII, 1597, 1600, 1720; Feb. 26, 1958, 
p. 2895), and may not be made applicable to money appropriated in other 
acts (IV, 3927, 3928; VII, 1495, 1525; June 28, 1971, pp. 22442-43; June 
27, 1974, pp. 21670-72; May 13, 1981, p. 9663), and may not require 
funds available to an agency in any future fiscal year for a certain 
purpose be subject to limitations specified in advance in appropriations 
Acts (May 8, 1986, p. 10156). A restriction on authority to incur 
obligations is legislative in nature and not a limitation on funds (July 
13, 1987, p. 19507; Sept. 23, 1993, p. ----).



[[Page 645]]
on Appropriations from limiting their availability to the fiscal year 
covered by the bill unless existing law mandates availability beyond the 
fiscal year (June 25, 1974, p. 21040; see also Procedure, ch. 25, secs. 
9-17). The fact that a provision would constitute legislation for only a 
year does not make it a limitation in order under the rule (IV, 3936). 
Nor may a proposition to construe a law be admitted (IV, 3936-3938). 
Care should also be taken that the language of limitation be not such 
as, when fairly construed, would change existing law (IV, 3976-3983) or 
justify an executive officer in assuming an intent to change existing 
law (IV, 3984; VII, 1706). Although the Committee on Appropriations may 
include in a general appropriation bill language not in existing law 
limiting the use of funds in the bill, if such language also constitutes 
an appropriation it must be authorized by law (June 21, 1988, p. 15439).
  The fact that existing law authorizes funds to be available until 
expended or without regard to fiscal year limitation does not prevent 
the Committee 



Sec. 843b. Effect of limitation on executive 
discretion.

  The limitation  may not be applied directly to the official functions of 
executive officers (IV, 3957-3966; VII, 1673, 1678, 1685), but it may 
restrict executive discretion so far as this may be done by a simple 
negative on the use of the appropriation (IV, 3968-3972; VII, 1583, 
1653, 1694; Sept. 14, 1972, pp. 30749-50; June 21, 1974, pp. 20601-02; 
Oct. 9, 1974, p. 34716). An appropriation may be withheld from a 
designated object by a negative limitation on the use of funds, although 
contracts may be left unsatisfied thereby (IV, 3987; July 10, 1975, p. 
22005); but coupling a denial of an appropriation with a negative 
restriction on official duties constitutes by reason of the use of a 
double negative an affirmative direction and is not in order (VII, 1690-
1692). Similarly, using a double negative to limit the availability of 
funds to prohibit the obligation of funds for an unauthorized project 
(effectively authorizing an unauthorized project) is not in order (Sept. 
23, 1993, p. ----).


  But such limitations must not give affirmative directions (IV, 3854-
3859, 3975; VII, 1637), and must not impose new duties upon an executive 
officer (VII, 1676; June 11, 1968, p. 16712; July 31, 1969, pp. 21631-
33); and may not directly interfere with discretionary authority in law 
by establishing a level of funding below which expenditures may not be 
made (VII, 1704; July 20, 1978, p. 21856).


[[Page 646]]
to the extent of its denial of availability of funds (VII, 1694; Oct. 
9, 1974, p. 34716).
  In construing a proposed limitation, if the Chair finds the purpose to 
be legislative, in that the intent is to restrict executive discretion 
to a degree that may be fairly termed a change in policy rather than a 
matter of administrative detail, he should sustain the point of order, 
as where a limitation is accompanied by language stating a legislative 
motive or purpose in carrying out the limitation (Aug. 8, 1978, p. 
24969), or where existing law and the Constitution require a census to 
be taken of all persons and an amendment seeks to preclude the use of 
funds to exclude another class ``known'' to the Secretary (Aug. 1, 1989, 
p. 17156). However, language in a general appropriation bill may, by 
negatively refusing to include funds for all or part of an authorized 
executive function, thereby affect policy 

  It is not in order, even by language in the form of a limitation, to 
restrict not the use or amount of appropriated funds but the 
discretionary authority conferred by law to administer their 
expenditure, such as by limiting the percentage of funds that may be 
apportioned for expenditure within a certain period of time (Deschler's 
Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 51.23), or by precluding the obligation 
of certain funds in the bill until funds provided by another Act have 
been obligated (Deschler's Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 48.8). The 
burden is on the proponent to show that such a proposal does not change 
existing law by restricting the timing of the expenditure of funds 
rather than their availability for specified objects (Deschler's 
Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, secs. 64.23 and 80.5).

  As long as a limitation on the use of funds restricts the expenditure 
of Federal funds carried in the bill without changing existing law, the 
limitation is in order, even if the Federal funds in question are 
commingled with non-Federal funds which would have to be accounted for 
separately in carrying out the limitation (Aug. 20, 1980, pp. 22171-72). 
An amendment providing that no Federal funds provided in the District of 
Columbia general appropriation bill be used to perform abortions is not 
legislation, since Federal officials have the responsibility to account 
for all appropriations for the annual Federal payment and for 
disbursement of all taxes collected by the District of Columbia, 
pursuant to the D.C. Code (July 17, 1979, p. 19066).


[[Page 647]]
amendment prohibiting the use of funds to carry out any ruling of the 
Internal Revenue Service which rules that taxpayers are not entitled to 
certain charitable deductions was held in order as a limitation, since 
merely descriptive of an existing ruling already promulgated and not 
requiring any new determinations as to the applicability of the 
limitation to other categories of taxpayers (July 16, 1979, pp. 18808-
10). An amendment reducing the availability of funds for trade 
adjustment assistance by amounts of unemployment insurance entitlements 
was held in order where the law establishing trade adjustment assistance 
already required the disbursing agency to take into consideration levels 
of unemployment insurance in determining payment levels (June 18, 1980, 
pp. 15355-56). A limitation precluding funds for any transit project 
exceeding a specified cost-effectiveness index was held not to impose 
new duties where the Chair was persuaded that the limitation applied to 
projects for which indexes were already required by law (Sept. 23, 1993, 
p. ----). A limitation precluding the use of funds to enforce FAA 
regulations to require domestic air carriers to surrender more than a 
specified number of ``slots'' at a given airport in preference of 
international air carriers was held not to impose new duties on FAA 
officials because existing regulations already required the FAA to 
determine the origin of withdrawn slots (Sept. 23, 1993, p. ----). An 
exception stating that the limitation does not prohibit the use of funds 
for designated Federal activities which are already authorized by law in 
more general terms, was held in order as not containing legislation 
(June 27, 1979, pp. 17033-35), as was an exception from a valid 
limitation prohibiting construction of that limitation in such a way as 
to prevent funding of a particular authorized activity (Mar. 24, 1944, 
p. 3095; June 18, 1991, p. ----). The following amendments also have 
been in order: denying use of funds to eliminate an existing legal 
requirement for sureties on custom bonds (June 27, 1984, p. 19101); 
denying use of funds by any federal official in any manner which would 
prevent a provision of existing law from being enforced (relating to 
import restrictions) (June 27, 1984, p. 19101); and denying use of funds 
for any reduction in Customs Service regions or for any consolidation of 
Customs Service offices (June 27, 1984, p. 19102). An amendment in the 
form of a limitation prohibiting the use of funds in a general 
appropriation bill for the construction of certain facilities unless 
such construction were subject to a project agreement was held not in 
order during the reading of the bill, even though existing law directed 
federal officials to enter into such project agreements, on the ground 
that limitation amendments are in order during the reading only where 
existing law requires or permits the inclusion of limiting language in 
an appropriation Act, and not merely where the limitation is alleged to 
be ``consistent with existing law'' (June 28, 1988, p. 16267). 
Similarly, language in a general appropriation bill containing an 
averment necessary to qualify for certain scorekeeping under the Budget 
Act was conceded to be legislation (July 20, 1989, p. 15374), even 
though the Budget Act contemplates that expenditures may be mandated to 
occur before or following a fiscal period 

[[Page 648]]
if the law making those expenditures specifies that the timing is the 
result of a ``significant'' policy change (July 20, 1989, p. 15374).



Sec. 843c. Limitations consistent with existing 
law.

  An amendment  denying the use of funds in the bill to pay the salaries of 
federal officials who perform certain functions under existing law is a 
proper limitation if the description of those duties precisely follows 
existing law and does not require them to perform new duties (June 24, 
1976, p. 20373), just as an amendment denying such funds to a Federal 
official not in compliance with an existing law which he is charged with 
enforcing is a valid limitation placing no new duties on that Federal 
official (Sept. 10, 1981, p. 20110). The fact that a limitation on the 
use of funds may indirectly interfere with an executive official's 
discretionary authority by denying the use of funds (June 24, 1976, p. 
20408) or may impose certain incidental burdens on executive officials 
(Aug. 25, 1976, p. 27737) does not destroy the character of the 
limitation as long as it does not directly amend existing law and is 
descriptive of functions and findings already required to be undertaken 
by existing law. As it is in order by way of a limitation to deny the 
use of funds for implementation of an executive order, an amendment 
precisely describing the contents of the executive order does not 
constitute legislation solely for that reason (Mar. 16, 1977, p. 7748). 
And the fact that the regulation for which funds are denied may have 
been promulgated pursuant to court order and pursuant to constitutional 
provisions is an argument on the merits of the amendment and does not 
render it legislative in nature (Aug. 19, 1980, pp. 21981-84). An 



               ``holman rule'' on retrenching expenditures



Sec. 844a. Legislation reducing 
expenditures.

  Decisions under  the so-called ``Holman Rule'' in clause 2 of rule XXI 
have been rare in the modern practice of the House. The trend in 
construing language in general appropriation bills or amendments thereto 
has been to minimize the importance of the ``Holman Rule'' in those 
cases where the decision can be made on other grounds. The practice of 
using limitations in appropriation bills has been perfected in recent 
years so that most modern decisions by the Chair deal with distinctions 
between such limitations and matters which are deemed to be legislation 
(see Secs. 842 and 843, supra). Under the modern practice, the 
``Holman Rule'' only applies where an obvious reduction is achieved by 
the provision in question and does not apply to limiting language 
unaccompanied by a reduction of funds in the bill (July 16, 1979, pp. 
18808-10). It has no application to an amendment to an appropriation 
bill which does not legislate but is merely a negative limitation citing 
but not changing existing law (June 18, 1980, pp. 15355-56).


  A paragraph containing legislation reported in an appropriation bill 
to be in order must on its face show a retrenchment of a type which 
conforms to the requirements of the rule (Chairman Lehlbach, Mar. 17, 
1926, p. 5804).


[[Page 649]]

  The reduction of expenditure must appear as a necessary result, in 
order to bring an amendment or provision within the exception to the 
rule. It is not sufficient that such reduction would probably, or would 
in the opinion of the Chair, result therefrom (IV, 3887; VII, 1530-
1534). Thus, an amendment to a general appropriation bill providing that 
appropriations made in that act are hereby reduced by $7 billion, though 
legislative in form, was held in order under the ``Holman Rule'' 
exception (Apr. 5, 1966, p. 7689), but an amendment providing for 
certain reductions of appropriations carried in the bill based on the 
President's budget estimates was held not to show a reduction on its 
face and to provide merely speculative reductions (Deschler's 
Precedents, vol. 8, ch. 26, sec. 5.6; June 24, 1992, p. ----). An 
amendment authorizing the President to reduce each appropriation in the 
bill by not more than ten percent was ruled out as legislation 
conferring new authority on the President (May 31, 1984, p. 14617; June 
6, 1984, p. 15120). An amendment reducing an unauthorized amount 
permitted to remain in a general appropriation bill is in order as a 
retrenchment under this clause (Oct. 1, 1975, p. 31058). An amendment to 
a general appropriation bill denying the availability of funds to 
certain recipients but which requires federal officials to make 
additional determinations as to the qualifications of recipients is 
legislation and is not a retrenchment of expenditures where it is not 
apparent that the prohibition will reduce the amounts covered by the 
bill (June 26, 1973, p. 21389). 

  The amendment must not only show on its face an attempt to retrench 
but must also be germane to some provision in the bill even though 
offered by direction of the committee having jurisdiction of the subject 
matter of the amendment (VII, 1549; Dec. 16, 1911, p. 442). An amendment 
providing that appropriations ``herein and heretofore made'' shall be 
reduced by $70 million through the reduction of Federal employees as the 
President determines was held to be legislative and not germane to the 
bill, since it went to funds other than those carried therein, and was 
therefore not within the ``Holman Rule'' exception (Oct. 18, 1966, p. 
27425).

  An amendment reducing an amount in an appropriation bill for the 
Postal Service and prohibiting the use of funds therein to implement 
special bulk third-class rates for political committees was held in 
order since not specifically requiring new determination and since 
constituting a retrenchment of expenditures even if assumed to be 
legislative (July 13, 1979, pp. 18453-55).

  As long as an amendment calls for an obvious reduction at some point 
in time during the fiscal year, the amendment is in order under the 
``Holman Rule'' even if the reduction takes place in the future in an 
amount actually determined when the reduction takes place (for example, 
by formula) (VII, 1491, 1505; July 30, 1980, pp. 20499-20503). To an 
amendment that is in order under the ``Holman Rule,'' containing 
legislation but retrenching expenditures by formula for every agency 
funded by the bill, an amendment exempting from that reduction several 
specific programs does not add further legislation and is in order (July 
30, 1980, pp. 20499-20503).

  A motion to recommit the District of Columbia appropriation bill with 
instructions to reduce the proportion of the fund appropriated from the 
Public Treasury from one-half, as provided in the bill, to one-fourth of 
the entire appropriation is in order, since the effect of the amendment 
if adopted would reduce the expenditure of public money although not 
reducing the amount of the appropriation (VII, 1518).

  The term ``retrenchment'' means the reduction of the amount of money 
to be taken out of the Federal Treasury by the bill, and therefore a 
reduction of the amount of money to be contributed toward the expenses 
of the District of Columbia is in order as a retrenchment (VII, 1502).

  An amendment proposed to an item for the recoinage of uncurrent 
fractional silver, which amendment struck out the amount appropriated 
and added a provision for the coinage of all the bullion in the Treasury 
into standard silver dollars, the cost of such coinage and recoinage to 
be paid out of the Government's seigniorage, was held not to be in order 
under the rule; first, because not germane to the subject matter of the 
bill (the sundry civil); second, because it did not appear that any 
retrenchment of expenditure would result, the seigniorage being the 
property of the Government as other funds in the Treasury (VII, 1547).


[[Page 650]]
provide routes and make contracts in certain cases, with the further 
provision ``and the amount of appropriation herein for star routes is 
hereby reduced to $500.'' A point of order made against the first or 
legislative part of the amendment was sustained, which decision was, on 
appeal, affirmed by the committee (VII, 1555).
  To an item of appropriation for inland transportation of mails by star 
routes an amendment was offered requiring the Postmaster General to 

  To a clause appropriating for the foreign mail service an amendment 
reducing the appropriation, and in addition repealing the act known as 
the ``subsidy act,'' was held not in order because the repealing of this 
act was not germane to the appropriation bill; and that to be in order 
both branches of the amendment must be germane to the bill (VII, 1548).

  A provision in the agricultural appropriation bill transferring the 
supervision of the importation of animals from the Treasury to the 
Department of Agriculture is out of order, being a provision changing 
law and not retrenching expenditure (IV, 3886).

  Where a paragraph containing new legislation provides in one part for 
a discharge of employees, which means a retrenchment, and in another 
part embodies legislation to bring about the particular retrenchment 
which in turn shows on its face an expenditure the amount of which is 
not apparent, the Chair is unable to hold that the net result will 
retrench expenditures. But where the additional legislation does not 
show on its face an additional expenditure, the Chair will not speculate 
as to a possible expenditure under the additional legislation (VII, 
1500).



[[Page 651]]

  As explained in the annotation in Sec. 834, supra, the amendment of 
clause 2(b) in the 98th Congress narrowed the ``Holman Rule'' exception 
to the general prohibition against legislation to cover only 
retrenchments reducing amounts of money covered by the bill, and not 
retrenchments resulting from reduction of the number and salary of 
officers of the United States or of the compensation of any person paid 
out of the U.S. Treasury. Accordingly, the Chair held out of order an 
amendment mandating the reduction of certain Federal salaries and 
expenses as not confined to a reduction of funds in the bill (June 17, 
1994, p. ----). Paragraph (b) also eliminated separate authority 
conferred upon legislative committees or commissions with proper 
jurisdiction to report amendments retrenching expenditures, and 
permitted legislative committees to recommend such retrenchments by 
reduction of amounts covered by the bill to the Appropriations Committee 
for discretionary inclusion in the reported bill. Paragraph (d) as added 
in the 98th Congress provides a new procedure for consideration of all 
retrenchment amendments only when reading of the bill has been completed 
and only if the Committee of the Whole does not adopt a motion to rise 
and report the bill back to the House. Other decisions which involved 
interpretation of the ``Holman Rule,'' but which do not reflect the 
current form or interpretation of that rule, are found in IV, 3846, 
3885-3892; VII, 1484, 1486-1492, 1498, 1500, 1515, 1563, 1564, 1569; 
June 1, 1892, p. 4920.




Sec. 844b. Content of reports on appropriation 
bills.

  3. A report  from the Committee on Appropriations accompanying any general 
appropriation bill making an appropriation for any purpose shall contain 
a concise statement describing fully the effect of any provision of the 
accompanying bill which directly or indirectly changes the application 
of existing law, and shall contain a list of all appropriations 
contained in the bill for any expenditure not previously authorized by 
law (except for classified intelligence or national security programs, 
projects, or activities).



  This clause became a part of the rules under the Committee Reform 
Amendments of 1974, effective January 3, 1975 (H. Res. 988, 93d Cong., 
Oct. 8, 1974, p. 34470), and the subsequent clauses of this rule were 
renumbered at that time. This clause was amended on January 14, 1975 (H. 
Res. 5, 94th Cong., p. 32) to confine its applicability to general 
appropriation bills, and again in the 104th Congress to add the last 
requirement concerning unauthorized items (sec. 215(d), H. Res. 6, Jan. 
4, 1995, p. ----).




Sec. 845. Restriction on the reference of 
claims.

  4. No bill  for the payment or adjudication of any private claim against 
the Government shall be referred, except by unanimous consent, to any 
other than the following committees, namely: To the Committee on 
International Relations or to the Committee on the Judiciary.



[[Page 652]]
War Claims, Public Lands, and Accounts, in addition to the Committees 
on Foreign Affairs (now International Relations) and the Judiciary. 
Certain private bills, resolutions and amendments are barred (Sec. 852). 
Under this clause unanimous consent is required for the reference of a 
bill for the payment of a private claim to a committee other than the 
Committee on the Judiciary or the Committee on International Relations 
(May 4, 1978, p. 12615).

  The present form of this clause was made effective January 2, 1947, as 
a part of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 812), was 
further amended on March 19, 1975 to reflect the change of the name of 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs to International Relations by H. Res. 
163 (p. 7343), was again amended on February 5, 1979 to change 
International Relations back to Foreign Affairs (H. Res. 89, pp. 1848-
49), and was once again amended on January 4, 1995, to change the name 
back to International Relations (sec. 202(b), H. Res. 6, 104th Cong., p. 
----). The old rule, adopted in 1885 and amended May 29, 1936, provided 
that private claims bills be referred to a Committee on Invalid 
Pensions, Claims, 




Sec. 846a. Restriction of power to report 
appropriations.

  5. (a) No  bill or joint resolution carrying appropriations shall 
be reported by any committee not having jurisdiction to report 
appropriations, nor shall an amendment proposing an appropriation be in 
order during the consideration of a bill or joint resolution reported by 
a committee not having that jurisdiction. A question of order on an 
appropriation in any such bill, joint resolution, or amendment thereto 
may be raised at any time.


  This portion of the rule was adopted June 1, 1920 (VII, 2133).


[[Page 653]]
amendment is not separately before the House during consideration of 
the special order (Feb. 24, 1993, p. ----).
  A point of order under this rule cannot be raised against a motion to 
suspend the rules (VIII, 3426), against a motion to discharge a 
nonappropriating committee from consideration of a bill carrying an 
appropriation (VII, 2144), or against a Senate amendment to an 
appropriation bill (VII, 1572), but it may be directed against an item 
of appropriation in a Senate bill (VII, 2136, 2147; July 30, 1957, pp. 
13056, 13181-82), and if the House deletes a provision in a Senate bill 
under this rule, the bill is messaged to the Senate with the deletion in 
the form of an amendment. The point of order may be made against an 
appropriation in a Senate bill that, although not reported in the House, 
is considered in lieu of a reported House ``companion bill'' (VII, 2137; 
Mar. 29, 1933, p. 988). This clause applies to an amendment proposed to 
a Senate amendment to a House bill not reported from the Committee on 
Appropriations (Oct. 1, 1980, pp. 28638-42). The rule does not apply to 
private bills since the committees having jurisdiction of bills for the 
payment of private claims may report bills making appropriations within 
the limits of their jurisdiction (VII, 2135; Dec. 12, 1924, p. 538). The 
point of order under this rule does not apply to an appropriation in a 
bill which has been taken away from a nonappropriating committee by a 
motion to discharge (VII, 1019a). The point of order under this rule 
does not apply to a special order reported from the Committee on Rules 
``self-executing'' the adoption in the House to a reported bill of an 
amendment containing an appropriation, since the 

  The provision in this clause that a point of order against an 
amendment containing an appropriation to a legislative bill may be made 
``at any time'' has been interpreted to require that the point of order 
be raised during the pendency of the amendment under the five-minute 
rule (Mar. 18, 1946, p. 2365; Apr. 28, 1975, pp. 12043-44), and a point 
of order will lie against an amendment during its pendency, even in its 
amended form, although the point of order is against the amendment as 
amended by a substitute and no point of order was raised against the 
substitute prior to its adoption (Apr. 23, 1975, p. 12043). But the 
point of order must be raised during the initial consideration of the 
bill or amendment under the five-minute rule, and a point of order 
against similar language permitted to remain in the House version and 
included in a conference report on a bill will not lie, since the only 
rule prohibiting such inclusion (clause 2 of rule XX) is limited to 
language originally contained in a Senate amendment where the House 
conferees have not been specifically authorized to agree thereto (May 1, 
1975, p. 12752). Where the House has adopted a resolution waiving points 
of order against certain appropriations in a legislative bill, a point 
of order may nevertheless be raised against an amendment to the bill 
containing an identical provision, since under this rule a point of 
order may be raised against the amendment ``at any time'' (Apr. 23, 
1975, p. 11512). A point of order against a direct appropriation in a 
bill initially reported from a legislative committee and then 
sequentially referred to and reported adversely by the Committee on 
Appropriations was conceded and sustained as in violation of this clause 
(Nov. 10, 1975, p. 35611).

  The point of order should be directed to the item of appropriation in 
the bill and not to the act of reporting the bill (VII, 2143), and 
cannot be directed to the entire bill (VII, 2142; Apr. 28, 1975, p. 
12043).


[[Page 654]]
priation or a portion of an appropriation already made for one purpose 
to another (VII, 2146; Mar. 29, 1933, p. 988; Aug. 10, 1988, p. 21719), 
or for one fiscal year to another (Mar. 26, 1992, p. ----), is not in 
order. An amendment expanding the definition in existing law of 
recipients under a federal subsidy program was held to permit a new use 
of funds already appropriated in violation of this clause (May 11, 1976, 
pp. 13409-11); and a provision in a legislative bill authorizing the 
use, without a subsequent appropriation, of funds directly appropriated 
by a previous statute for a new purpose constitutes an appropriation 
prohibited by this clause (Oct. 1, 1980, pp. 28637-40). But a 
modification of such a provision making payments for such new purposes 
``effective only to the extent and in such amounts as are provided in 
advance in appropriation acts'' does not violate this clause (Oct. 1, 
1980, pp. 28638-42). A direction to a departmental officer to pay a 
certain sum out of unexpended balances is equivalent to an appropriation 
and not in order (VII, 2154). Language authorizing the use of funds of 
the Shipping Board is not in order (VII, 2147). A direction to pay out 
of Indian trust funds is not in order (VII, 2149). A provision in an 
authorization bill making excess foreign currencies immediately 
available for a new purpose is in violation of clause 5 of rule XXI 
(Aug. 3, 1971, pp. 29109-10). Provisions authorizing the collection of 
fees or user charges by Federal agencies and making the revenues 
collected therefrom available without further appropriation have been 
ruled out in violation of this clause (June 17, 1937, pp. 5915-18; Mar. 
29, 1972, pp. 10749-51), and the transfer of existing federal funds into 
a new Treasury trust fund to be immediately available for a new purpose 
has been construed as an appropriation (June 20, 1974, pp. 20273-75), as 
has a provision in a legislative bill transferring unexpended balances 
of appropriations from an existing agency to a new agency created 
therein (Apr. 9, 1979, pp. 7774-75). A provision in an omnibus 
reconciliation bill reported by the Budget Committee (pursuant to 
section 310(c)(2) of the Budget Act upon recommendation from the Energy 
and Commerce Committee) making a direct appropriation to carry out a 
part of the Energy Security Act was ruled out in violation of this 
clause (Oct. 24, 1985, p. 28812). An amendment requiring the diversion 
of previously appropriated funds in lieu of the enactment of new budget 
authority if a maximum deficit amount under the Deficit Control Act of 
1985 is exceeded, though its stated purpose may be to avoid the 
sequestration of funds, may nevertheless be in violation of clause 5(a) 
as an appropriation on a legislative bill (Aug. 10, 1988, p. 21719).
  The point of order provided for in this clause is not applicable to 
propositions authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to use proceeds 
from the sale of bonds under the Second Liberty Bond Act (public debt 
transactions) for the purpose of making loans, since such loans do not 
constitute ``appropriations'' within the purview of the rule (June 28, 
1949, pp. 8536-38; Aug. 2, 1950, p. 11599), and is not applicable to 
language exempting loan guarantees in a legislative bill from statutory 
limitations on expenditures (July 16, 1974, p. 23344). Legislation 
authorizing the availability of certain loan receipts is not an 
appropriation where it can be shown that the actual availability of 
those receipts remains contingent upon subsequent enactment of an 
appropriation act (Sept. 10, 1975, p. 28300). The term ``appropriation'' 
in the rule means the payment of funds from the Treasury, and the words 
``warranted and make available for expenditure for payments'' are 
equivalent to ``is hereby appropriated'' and therefore not in order 
(VII, 2150). The words ``available until expended,'' making an 
appropriation already made for one year available for ensuing years, are 
not in order (VII, 2145). Language reappropriating, making available, or 
diverting an appro


[[Page 655]]
able only to the extent provided in appropriation Acts (see Sec. 1007, 
infra). See also Procedure, ch. 25, sec. 3, addressing appropriations on 
legislative bills generally.

  An amendment increasing the duties of a commission is not necessarily 
an appropriation (VII, 1578). Language authorizing payment from an 
appropriation to be made or authorizing payment from an appropriation 
that has not yet been made is in order (Jan. 31, 1923, p. 2794). Section 
401(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 317) prohibits 
consideration in the House of any bill or resolution or amendment which 
provides new spending authority (as that term is defined in that 
section) unless that measure also provides that such new spending 
authority is to be avail




Sec. 846b. Restriction on bills and amendments carrying 
taxes or tariffs.

  (b) No  bill or joint resolution carrying a tax or tariff 
measure shall be reported by any committee not having jurisdiction to 
report tax and tariff measures, nor shall an amendment in the House or 
proposed by the Senate carrying a tax or tariff measure be in order 
during the consideration of a bill or joint resolution reported by a 
committee not having that jurisdiction. A question of order on a tax or 
tariff measure in any such bill, joint resolution, or amendment thereto 
may be raised at any time.


  Paragraph (b) was added in the 98th Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1983, 
p. 34). A point of order under this paragraph against a provision in a 
bill is in order at any time during consideration of the bill for 
amendment in Committee of the Whole (Aug. 1, 1986, p. 18649). On October 
4, 1989, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, before ruling on 
several points of order under this paragraph, enunciated several 
guidelines to distinguish taxes and tariffs on the one hand and user or 
regulatory fees and other forms of revenue on the other (p. 23260). On 
the opening day of the 102d Congress Speaker Foley inserted in the 
Congressional Record a statement of jurisdictional concepts underlying 
those same distinctions and indicated his intention to exercise his 
referral authority under rule X in a manner consistent with this 
paragraph (Jan. 3, 1991, p. ----; see also Jan. 5, 1993, p. ----).


[[Page 656]]
nue collections and tax status or liability (Aug. 1, 1986, p. 18649). 
Similarly, in determining whether an amendment to a general 
appropriation bill proposing a change in IRS funding priorities 
constitutes a tax measure proscribed by clause 5(b), the Chair will 
consider argument as to whether the change would necessarily or 
inevitably result in a loss or gain in tax liability and in tax 
collection (June 18, 1991, p. ----).
  Although in the case of most points of order against provisions in 
bills or against amendments the burden is on the proponent of the 
provision to show that it does not violate the cited rule, in the case 
of a point of order under clause 5(b) against a provision in or an 
amendment to a general appropriation bill affecting the use of funds 
therein (otherwise traditionally in order if admissible under clause 2 
of rule XXI), the burden is on the Member making the point of order to 
show a necessary, certain, and inevitable change in revenue collections 
or tax statuses or liabilities (Sept. 12, 1984, pp. 25108, 25109, 25120; 
July 26, 1985, p. 20806; Aug. 1, 1986, pp. 18649-50; July 13, 1990, p. 
----; June 18, 1991, p. ----). Thus, in determining whether a limitation 
in a general appropriation bill constitutes a tax or tariff measure 
proscribed by clause 5(b), the Chair will consider argument as to 
whether the limitation effectively and inevitably changes reve

  A limitation on the use of funds contained in a general appropriation 
bill was held to violate clause 5(b) by denying the use of funds by the 
Customs Service to enforce duty-free entry laws with respect to certain 
imported commodities, thereby requiring the collection of revenues not 
otherwise provided for by law (Oct. 27, 1983, p. 29611). Similar rulings 
were issued: (1) where it was shown that the imposition of the 
restriction on IRS funding for the fiscal year would effectively and 
inevitably preclude the IRS from collecting revenues otherwise due and 
owing by law or require collection of revenue not legally due or owing 
(July 26, 1985, p. 20806; Aug. 1, 1986, pp. 18649, 18650); and (2) where 
a provision in a general appropriation bill prohibited the use of funds 
to impose or assess certain taxes due under specified portions of the 
Internal Revenue Code (July 13, 1990, p. ----). In the 98th Congress, 
the Chair sustained points of order under clause 5(b) against motions to 
concur in three Senate amendments to a general appropriation bill (not 
reported by the Committee on Ways and Means): (1) an amendment denying 
the use of funds in that or any other Act by the IRS to impose or assess 
any tax due under a designated provision of the Internal Revenue Code, 
thereby rendering the tax uncollectable through the use of any funds 
available to the agency (Sept. 12, 1984, p. 25108); (2) an amendment 
directing the Secretary of the Treasury to admit free of duty certain 
articles imported by a designated organization (Sept. 12, 1984, p. 
25109); and (3) an amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930 to expand the 
authority of the Customs Service to seize and use the proceeds from the 
sale of contraband imports to defray operational expenses, and to offset 
owed customs duties under one section of that law (Sept. 12, 1984, p. 
25120). An amendment to a general appropriation bill proposing to divert 
an increase in funding for the IRS from spot-checks to targeted audits 
was held not to constitute a tax within the meaning of clause 5(b) 
because it did not necessarily affect revenue collection levels or tax 
liabilities (June 18, 1991, p. ----).


[[Page 657]]
the following provisions in an omnibus budget reconciliation bill were 
ruled out: (1) a fee per passenger on cruise vessels, with revenues 
credited as proprietary receipts of the Coast Guard to be used for port 
safety, security, navigation, and antiterrorism activities (Oct. 4, 
1989, p. 23260); (2) a per acre ``ocean protection fee'' on oil and gas 
leaseholdings in the Outer Continental Shelf, with receipts to be used 
to offset costs of various ocean protection programs (Oct. 4, 1989, p. 
23261); (3) an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code relating to the 
tax deductibility of pension fund contributions (Oct. 4, 1989, p. 
23262); (4) a fee incident to termination of employee benefit plans, 
with receipts to be applied to enforcement and administration of plans 
remaining with the system (Oct. 4, 1989, p. 23262); and (5) a fee 
incident to the filing of various pension benefit plan reports required 
by law, with revenues to be transferred to the Department of Labor for 
the enforcement of that law (Oct. 5, 1989, p. 23328).
  In the 99th Congress, the following provisions in a reconciliation 
bill reported from the Budget Committee were ruled out as tax measures 
not reported from the Committee on Ways and Means: (1) containing a 
recommendation from the Committee on Education and Labor excluding 
certain interest on obligations from the Student Loan Marketing 
Association from application of the Internal Revenue Code, affecting 
interest deductions against income taxes (Oct. 24, 1985, pp. 28776, 
28827); and (2) containing a recommendation from the Committee on 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries expanding tax benefits available to 
shipowners through a capital construction fund (Oct. 24, 1985, pp. 
28802, 28827). In the 101st Congress, 


-
[[Page 658]]

  To a bill reported from the Committee on Education and Labor 
authorizing financial assistance to unemployed individuals for 
employment opportunities, an amendment providing instead for tax 
incentives to stimulate employment was held to be a tax measure in 
violation of this paragraph (Sept. 21, 1983, p. 25145). A provision in a 
bill reported from the Committee on Foreign Affairs imposing a uniform 
fee at ports of entry to be collected by the Customs Service as a 
condition of importation of a commodity was held to constitute a tariff 
within the meaning of this paragraph (June 4, 1985, p. 14009), as was an 
amendment to a bill reported from that committee amending the tariff 
schedules to deny ``most favored nation'' trade treatment to a certain 
nation (July 11, 1985, p. 18590). A provision in a general appropriation 
bill creating a new tariff classification was held to constitute a 
tariff under this paragraph (June 15, 1994, p. ----). A motion to concur 
in a Senate amendment constituting a tariff measure (imposing an import 
ban on certain dutiable goods) to a bill reported by a committee not 
having tariff jurisdiction was ruled out under this paragraph (Sept. 30, 
1988, p. 27316). A proposal to increase a fee incident to the filing of 
a securities registration statement, with the proceeds to be deposited 
in the general fund of the Treasury as offsetting receipts, was held to 
constitute a tax within the meaning of this paragraph because the amount 
of revenue derived and the manner of its deposit indicated a purpose to 
defray costs of government, generally (Oct. 23, 1990, p. ----). To a 
bill reported by the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, an 
amendment increasing a user fee was ruled out as a tax measure where the 
fee overcollected to offset a reduction in another fee, thus attenuating 
the relationship between the amount of the fee and the cost of the 
government activity for which it was assessed (May 9, 1995, p. ----). To 
a bill reported by the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, an 
amendment proposing sundry changes in the Federal income tax by direct 
amendments to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 was ruled out of order 
as carrying a tax measure in violation of this paragraph (Sept. 16, 
1992, p. ----).




Sec. 846c. Threefifths vote to increase income tax 
rates.

  (c) No  bill or joint resolution, amendment, or conference report 
carrying a Federal income tax rate increase shall be considered as 
passed or agreed to unless so determined by a vote of not less than 
three-fifths of the Members voting.



  Paragraph (c) was added in the 104th Congress (sec. 106(a), H. Res. 6, 
Jan. 4, 1995, p. ----). On one occasion the Chair held that a provision 
repealing a ceiling on total tax liability attributable to a net capital 
gain was not subject to this paragraph (Apr. 5, 1995, p. ----). This 
paragraph does not apply to a concurrent resolution (Speaker Gingrich, 
May 18, 1995, p. ----).




Sec. 846d. Prohibition against retroactive income tax 
rate increase.

  (d) It  shall not be in order to consider any bill, joint 
resolution, amendment, or conference report carrying a retroactive 
Federal income tax rate increase. For purposes of this paragraph a 
Federal income tax rate increase is retroactive if it applies to a 
period beginning prior to the enactment of the provision.



  Paragraph (d) was added in the 104th Congress (sec. 106(b), H. Res. 6, 
Jan. 4, 1995, p. ----).



[[Page 659]]



Sec. 847. Reappropriations 
prohibited.

  6. No general  appropriation bill or amendment thereto shall be received 
or considered if it contains a provision reappropriating unexpended 
balances of appropriations; except that this provision shall not apply 
to appropriations in continuation of appropriations for public works on 
which work has commenced, and shall not apply to transfers of unexpended 
balances within the department or agency for which they were originally 
appropriated, reported by the Committee on Appropriations.


  This provision from section 139(c) of the Legislative Reorganization 
Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 812) was made part of the standing rules January 
3, 1953 (p. 24). Prior to the adoption of this rule in 1946, a 
reappropriation of an unexpended balance for an object authorized by law 
was in order on a general appropriation bill (IV, 3591, 3592; VII, 1156, 
1158). This clause was amended in the 99th Congress by section 228(b) of 
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-
177, Dec. 12, 1985) to permit the Committee on Appropriations to report 
certain transfers of unexpended balances.

  A provision in a general appropriation bill, or an amendment thereto, 
providing that funds for a certain purpose are to be derived by 
continuing the availability of funds previously appropriated for a prior 
fiscal year is in violation of clause 6 of rule XXI (Aug. 20, 1951, pp. 
10393-94; Mar. 29, 1960, p. 6862; June 17, 1960, p. 13138; June 20, 
1973, pp. 20530-31; July 29, 1982, p. 18625; June 28, 1988, p. 16255), 
and a reappropriation of unexpended prior year balances prohibited by 
this clause is not in order under the guise of a ``Holman Rule'' 
exception to clause 2 of rule XXI (Oct. 18, 1966, pp. 27424-25). An 
amendment to a general appropriation bill making any appropriations 
which are available for the current fiscal year available for certain 
new purposes was held out of order under this clause since it was not 
confined to the funds in the bill and would permit reappropriation of 
unexpended balances (Oct. 1, 1975, p. 31090). That appropriations may be 
authorized in law for a specified object does not permit an amendment to 
a general appropriation bill to include legislative language mandating 
the reappropriation of funds from other Acts (July 28, 1992, p. ----).

  This rule, however, is not applicable when the reappropriation 
language is identical to legislative authorization language enacted 
subsequent to the adoption of the rule, since the law is a more recent 
expression of the will of the House (Sept. 5, 1961, p. 18133), nor when 
a measure transferring unobligated balances of previously appropriated 
funds contains legislative provisions and rules changes but no 
appropriation of new budget authority and is neither in the form of an 
appropriation bill nor the subject of a privileged report by the 
Committee on Appropriations under rule XI (Mar. 3, 1988, p. 3239).


  The return of an unexpended balance to the Treasury is in order (IV, 
3594).


[[Page 660]]
three calendar days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays).



Sec. 848. Printed hearings and reports on 
appropriation bills.

  7. No general  appropriation bill shall be considered in the 
House until printed committee hearings and a committee report thereon 
have been available for the Members of the House for at least 



  This provision from section 139(a) of the Legislative Reorganization 
Act of 1946 was made a part of the standing rules January 3, 1953 (p. 
24), and was amended (by the addition of the parenthetical clause) on 
January 22, 1971 (p. 144). In counting the ``three calendar days'' 
specified in the clause, the date the bill is filed or the date on which 
it is to be called up for consideration are counted, but not both (May 
26, 1969, pp. 13720-21). Clause 2(l)(6) of rule XI became applicable to 
all other reports from the Committee on Appropriations under the 
Committee Reform Amendments of 1974, effective January 3, 1975 (H. Res. 
988, 93d Cong., Oct. 8, 1974, p. 34470).




Sec. 848a. Reservation of points of order.

  8.  At the time 
any appropriation bill is reported, all points of order shall be 
considered as reserved.





  Clause 8 was added in the 104th Congress (sec. 215(e), H. Res. 6, Jan. 
4, 1995, p. ----), rendering unnecessary the former practice that a 
Member reserve points of order when a general appropriation bill was 
referred to the calendar of the Committee of the Whole House on the 
state of the Union, in order that provisions in violation of rule XXI 
could be stricken in the Committee of the Whole (see Sec. 835, supra).