    [Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 104th Congress]
    [104th Congress]
    [House Document 103-342]
    [The United States Constitution]
    [Pages 4-61]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

    [[Page 4]]

                                   ARTICLE I.

    Sec. 3. Legislative powers vested in
    Congress.

      Section 1. All  legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
    Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House
    of Representatives.

    <>   Section 2. \1\ The House of Representatives shall be composed
    of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States,
    * * *.

    Sec. 4. Power to
    investigate.

      The power to legislate includes the power to conduct inquiries and
    investigations. See Kilbourn v.   Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273
    U.S. 135 (1927); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957);
    Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). For the power of the
    House to punish for contempt in the course of investigations, see
    Sec. 293, infra.

      This clause requires election by the people and State authority may
    not determine a tie by lot (I, 775).

      The phrase ``by the people of the several States'' means that as
    nearly as practicable one person's vote in a congressional election is
    to be worth as much as another's. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
    (1964); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 385 U.S. 450 (1967). 2 U.S.C. 2a
    mandates apportionment of Representatives based upon population, and 2
    U.S.C. 2c requires the establishment by the States of single-Member
    congressional districts. For elections generally, see Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 8.

    [[Page 5]]
    resolution fixing the daily hour of meeting at 12 o'clock meridian or
    some other hour is agreed to at the beginning of each session.

    Sec. 6. Term of a Congress.

      The term of a  Congress, before
    the ratification of the 20th amendment to the Constitution, began on the
    4th of March of the odd numbered years and extended through two years.
    This resulted from the action of the Continental Congress on September
    13, 1788, in declaring, on authority conferred by the Federal
    Convention, ``the first Wednesday in March next'' to be ``the time for
    commencing proceedings under the said Constitution.'' This date was the
    4th of March, 1789. And soon after the first Congress assembled a joint
    committee determined that the terms of Representatives and Senators of
    the first class commenced on that day, and must necessarily terminate
    with the 3d of March, 1791 (I, 3). Under the 20th amendment to the
    Constitution the terms of Representatives and Senators begin on the 3d
    of January of the odd-numbered years, regardless of when Congress
    actually convenes. By a practice having the force of common law, the
    House meets at 12 m. when no other hour is fixed (I. 4, 210). In the
    later practice a

      Prior to adoption of the 20th amendment, the legislative day of March
    3 extended to 12 m. on March 4 (V, 6694-6697) and, unless earlier
    adjourned, the Speaker could at that time declare the House adjourned
    sine die, without motion or vote, even to the point of suspending a roll
    call then in progress (V, 6715-6718).

    <> * * * and
    the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for
    Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

      The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (84 Stat. 1140) provides
    that unless Congress otherwise specifies the two Houses shall adjourn
    sine die not later than the last day in July. This requirement is not
    applicable, under the terms of that Act, where a state of war exists
    pursuant to a Congressional declaration or where, in an odd-numbered
    (non-election) year, the Congress has agreed to adjourn for the month
    preceding Labor Day. For more on this provision, see Sec. 947, infra.

      The House, in the decision of an election case, has rejected votes
    cast by persons not naturalized citizens of the United States, although
    they were entitled to vote under the statutes of a State (I, 811); but
    where an act of Congress had provided that a certain class of persons
    should be deprived of citizenship, a question arose over the proposed
    rejection of their votes in a State wherein citizenship in the United
    States was not a qualification of the elector (I, 451). In an
    exceptional case the House rejected votes cast by persons lately in
    armed resistance to the Government, although by the law of the State
    they were qualified voters (I, 448); but later, the House declined to
    find persons disqualified as voters because they had formerly borne arms
    against the Government (II, 879).

    Sec. 8. Decisions of the court.

      The power  of the States to
    set qualifications for electors is not unlimited, being subject to the
    15th, 19th, 24th, and 26th amendments, and to the equal protection
    clause of the United States Constitution. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
    89 (1965); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).

    <>   \2\ No
    Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age
    of twenty five Years, * * *.

    [[Page 6]]

      Congress has some power in setting qualifications for electors, as in
    protecting the right to vote and lowering the minimum age for electors
    in congressional elections. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966);
    Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).

    <> * * *
    and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, * * *.

      A Member-elect not being of the required age, was not enrolled by the
    Clerk and he did not take the oath until he had reached the required age
    (I, 418).

    <> * * *
    and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which
    he shall be chosen.

      Henry Ellenbogen, Pa., had not been a citizen for seven years when
    elected to the 73d Congress, nor when the term commenced on March 4,
    1933. He was sworn at the beginning of the second session on January 3,
    1934, when a citizen for seven and one-half years (see H. Rept. 1431 and
    H. Res. 370, 73d Cong.). A native of South Carolina who had been abroad
    during the Revolution and on his return had not resided in the country
    seven years, was held to be qualified as a citizen (I, 420). A woman who
    forfeited her citizenship through marriage to a foreign subject and
    later resumed it through naturalization less than seven years prior to
    her election, was held to fulfill the constitutional requirement as to
    citizenship and entitled to a seat in the House (VI, 184). A Member who
    had long been a resident of the country, but who could not produce
    either the record of the court nor his final naturalization papers, was
    nevertheless retained in his seat by the House (I, 424).

    [[Page 7]]
    bia for years as a newspaper correspondent and maintenance there of
    church membership were not considered to outweigh payment of poll and
    income taxes, ownership of real estate, and a record for consistent
    voting in the district from which elected (VI, 55), and in the same case
    excuse from jury duty in the District of Columbia on a plea of
    citizenship in the State from which elected and exercise of incidental
    rights of such citizenship, were accepted as evidence of inhabitancy
    (VI, 55).
      The meaning of the word ``inhabitant'' and its relation to citizenship
    has been discussed (I, 366, 434; VI, 174), and the House has held that a
    mere sojourner in a State was not qualified as an inhabitant (I, 369),
    but a contestant was found to be an actual inhabitant of the State
    although for sufficient reason his family resided in another State (II,
    1091). Residence abroad in the service of the Government does not
    destroy inhabitancy as understood under the Constitution (I, 433). One
    holding an office and residing with his family for a series of years in
    the District of Columbia exclusively was held disqualified to sit as a
    Member from the State of his citizenship (I, 434); and one who had his
    business and a residence in the District of Columbia and had no business
    or residence in Virginia was held ineligible to a seat from that State
    (I, 436). One who had a home in the District of Columbia, and had
    inhabited another home in Maryland a brief period before his election,
    but had never been a citizen of any other State, was held to be
    qualified (I, 432). Also a Member who had resided a portion of a year in
    the District of Columbia, but who had a home in the State of his
    citizenship and was actually living there at the time of the election,
    was held to be qualified (I, 435). In the Updike v. Ludlow case, 71st
    Congress, it was decided that residence in the District of Colum

    Sec. 12. Qualifications other than those
    specified by the Constitution.

      Whether Congress  may by law establish qualifications
    other than those prescribed by the Constitution has been the subject of
    much discussion (I, 449, 451, 457, 458, 478); but in a case wherein a
    statute declared a Senator convicted of a certain offense ``forever
    thereafter incapable of holding any office of honor, trust, or profit
    under the Government of the United States,'' the Supreme Court expressed
    the opinion that the final judgment of conviction did not operate, ipso
    facto, to vacate the seat or compel the Senate to expel or regard the
    Senator as expelled by force alone of the judgment (II, 1282). Whether
    the House or Senate alone may set up qualifications other than those of
    the Constitution has also been a subject often discussed (I, 414, 415,
    443, 457, 458, 469, 481, 484). The Senate has always declined to act on
    the supposition that it had such a power (I, 443, 483), and during the
    stress of civil war the House of Representatives declined to exercise
    the power, even under circumstances of great provocation (I, 449, 465).
    But later, in one instance, the House excluded a Member-elect on the
    principal argument that it might itself prescribe a qualification not
    specified in the Constitution (I, 477). The matter was extensively
    debated in the 90th Congress in connection with the consideration of
    resolutions relating to the seating of Representative-elect Adam C.
    Powell of New York (H. Res. 1, Jan. 10, 1967, p. 14; H. Res. 278, Mar.
    1, 1967, p. 4997).

      The exclusion of Mr. Powell was the subject of litigation reaching the
    Supreme Court of the United States. In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
    (1969), the Court found that the power of Congress to judge the
    qualifications of its Members was limited to an examination of the
    express qualifications stated in the Constitution.

      It has been decided by the House and Senate that no State may add to
    the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution (I, 414-416, 632); and
    the Supreme Court so ruled in U.S. Term Limits, Inc., v. Thorton, 63
    U.S.L.W. 4413 (1995). There, the Court held that States may not
    ``change, add to, or diminish'' constitutional qualifications of
    Members, striking down a State statute prohibiting three-term incumbents
    from appearing on the general election ballot. For qualifications
    generally, see Deschler's Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 7, secs. 9-14.

    [[Page 8]]

      For expulsion of seated Members, which requires a two-thirds vote
    rather than a majority vote, see article I, section 5, clause 2
    (Sec. 62, infra).

    Sec. 13. Minority candidate not seated when
    returned Member is disqualified.

      Both Houses of  Congress have decided, when a
    Member-elect is found to be disqualified, that the person receiving the
    next highest number of votes is not entitled to the seat (I, 323, 326,
    450, 463, 469; VI, 58, 59), even in a case wherein seasonable notice of
    the disqualification was given to the electors (I, 460). In the event of
    the death of a Member-elect, the candidate receiving the next highest
    number of votes is not entitled to the seat (VI, 152).

    Sec. 14. The old provision for
    apportionment of Representatives and direct taxes.

      \3\ [Representatives and direct  Taxes shall be
    apportioned among the several States which may be included within this
    Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined
    by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to
    Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three
    fifths of all other Persons.] * * *

    * * * The actual <> Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the
    first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every
    subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law
    direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every
    thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative;
    and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire
    shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode- Island and
    Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersey
    four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland

    [[Page 9]]
    six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and
    Georgia three.

      The part of this clause relating to the mode of apportionment of
    Representatives was changed after the Civil War by section 2 of the 14th
    amendment and as to taxes on incomes without apportionment, by the 16th
    amendment.

      The census has been taken decennially since 1790, and, with the
    exception of 1920, was followed each time by reapportionment. In the
    First Congress the House had 65 Members; increased after each census,
    except that of 1840, until 435 was reached in 1913 (VI, 39, 40). The Act
    of June 18, 1929 (46 Stat. 26), as amended by the Act of November 15,
    1941 (55 Stat. 761), provides for reapportionment of the existing number
    (435) among the States following each new census (VI, 41-43; see 2
    U.S.C. 2a). Membership was temporarily increased to 436, then to 437,
    upon admission of Alaska (72 Stat. 345) and Hawaii (73 Stat. 8), but
    returned to 435 on January 3, 1963, the effective date of the
    reapportionment under the 18th Decennial census.

      Under the later but not the earlier practice, bills relating to the
    census and apportionment are not privileged for consideration (I, 305-
    308; VI, 48, VII, 889; Apr. 8, 1926, p. 7147).

    Sec. 16. Decisions of the court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 Howard, 393;
    Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall., 533; Scholey v. Rew, 23 Wall., 331; De
    Treville v. Smalls, 98 U.S. 517; Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116
    U.S. 404; Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. (Income Tax case), 157
    U.S. 429; Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Rehearing), 158 U.S.
    601; Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,
    220 U.S. 107; Corporation Tax cases, 220 U.S. 107; Eisner v. Macomber,
    252 U.S. 189; New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345.

    Sec. 17. Writs for elections to vacancies
    in representation.

      \4\ When vacancies  happen in the Representation from any State, the
    Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such
    Vacancies.

      Vacancies are caused by death, resignation, declination, withdrawal,
    or by action of the House in declaring a vacancy as existing or causing
    one by expulsion.

    [[Page 10]]
    of votes may not receive the credentials (I, 323; VI 152). A Member
    whose seat was contested dying, the House did not admit a claimant with
    credentials until contestant's claim was settled (I, 326); where a
    contestant died after a report in his favor, the House unseated the
    returned Member and declared the seat vacant (II, 965), and in a later
    case the contestant having died, the committee did not recommend to the
    House a resolution it had agreed to declaring he had not been elected
    (VI, 112). In the 93d Congress, where two Members-elect had been
    passengers on a missing aircraft and were presumed dead, the Speaker lay
    before the House documentary evidence of the presumptive death of one
    Member-elect and the declaration of a vacancy by the Governor, as-well-
    as evidence that the status of the other Member-elect had not been
    officially determined by State authority. The House then adopted a
    privileged resolution declaring vacant the seat of the latter Member-
    elect to enable the Governor of that State to call a special election
    (Jan. 3, 1973, pp. 15-16). For further discussion, see Sec. 23, infra.

    Sec. 18. Vacancy from death.

      It was long the  practice to
    notify the executive of the State when a vacancy was caused by the death
    of a Member during a session (II, 1198-1202); but since improvements in
    transportation have made it possible for deceased Members to be buried
    at their homes it has been the practice for State authorities to take
    cognizance of the vacancies without notice. When a Member dies while not
    in attendance on the House or during a recess the House is sufficiently
    informed of the vacancy by the credentials of his successor, when they
    set forth the fact of the death (I, 568). The death of a Member-elect
    creates a vacancy, although no certificate may have been awarded (I,
    323), and in such a case the candidate having the next highest number

    [[Page 11]]
    ignation was not so treated (II, 1213). The Speaker having been elected
    Vice President and a Representative of the succeeding Congress at the
    same election, transmitted to the Governor of his State his resignation
    as a Member-elect (VI, 230, 453). A Member of the House having been
    nominated and confirmed as Vice President pursuant to the 25th
    amendment, submitted a letter of resignation as a Representative to the
    Governor of his State, and a copy of his letter of resignation was laid
    before the House by the Speaker following the completion of a Joint
    Meeting for his swearing-in as Vice President (Dec. 6, 1973, p. 39927).
    A sitting Member having been confirmed as Secretary of Defense, his
    letter of resignation was laid before the House prior to his taking the
    oath of that office (Mar. 20, 1989, p. 4976).

    Sec. 19. Vacancy from resignation.

      In recent practice  the
    Member frequently informs the House by letter that his resignation has
    been sent to the State executive (II, 1167-1176) and this is
    satisfactory evidence of the resignation (I, 567) but Members have
    resigned by letter to the House alone, it being presumed that the Member
    would also notify his Governor (VI, 226), and where a Member resigned by
    letter to the House the Speaker was authorized to notify the Governor
    (Nov. 27, 1944, p. 8450; July 12, 1957, p. 11536; Sept. 1, 1976, p.
    28887). Where a Member does not inform the House the State executive may
    do so (II, 1193, 1194; VI, 232). But sometimes the House learns of a
    Member's resignation only by means of the credentials of his successor
    (II, 1195, 1356). Where the fact of a Member's resignation has not
    appeared either from the credentials of his successor or otherwise, the
    Clerk has been ordered to make inquiry (II, 1209), or the House has
    ascertained the vacancy from information given by other Members (II,
    1208). It has been established that a Member or Senator may resign,
    appointing a future date for his resignation to take effect, and until
    the arrival of the date may participate in the proceedings (II, 1220-
    1225, 1228, 1229; VI, 227, 228). In one case a Member who had resigned
    was not permitted by the House to withdraw the resignation (II, 1213),
    but the House permitted it later in another case (VI, 229). Acceptance
    of the resignation of a Member of the House is unnecessary (VI, 65,
    226), and the refusal of a Governor to accept a resignation cannot
    operate to continue membership in the House (VI, 65). Only in a single
    exceptional case has the House taken action in the direction of
    accepting a resignation (II, 1214). Sometimes Members who have resigned
    have been reelected to the same House and taken seats (II, 1210, 1212,
    1256; Jan. 28, 1965 and June 16, 1965, pp. 1452 and 13774; Jan. 6, 1983
    and Feb. 22, 1983, pp. 114 and 2575). A Member who has not taken his
    seat resigned (II, 1231). A letter of resignation is presented as
    privileged (II, 1167-1176); but a resolution to permit a Member to
    withdraw his res

    Sec. 20. Vacancy from declination.

      A Member who  has been
    elected to a seat may decline to accept it, and in such a case the House
    informed the executive of the State of the vacancy (II, 1234). The House
    has decided an election contest against a returned Member who had not
    appeared to claim the seat (I, 638). In one instance a Member-elect who
    had been convicted in the courts did not appear during the term (IV,
    4484, footnote).

    Sec. 21. Vacancy by withdrawal.

      At the time  of the secession
    of several States, members of the House from those States withdrew (II,
    1218). In the Senate, in cases of such withdrawals, the Secretary was
    directed to omit the names of the Senators from the roll (II, 1219), and
    the act of withdrawal was held to create a vacancy which the legislature
    might recognize (I, 383).

    Sec. 22. Vacancy by action of the House.

      Where the House,  by
    its action in a question of election or otherwise, creates a vacancy,
    the Speaker is directed to notify the Executive of the State (I, 502,
    709, 824; II, 1203-1205; Mar. 1, 1967, p. 5038; Jan. 3, 1973, pp. 15-16;
    Feb. 24, 1981, pp. 2916-18). A resolution as to such notification is
    presented as a question of privilege (III, 2589), as is a resolution
    declaring a vacancy where the Member-elect was unable to take the oath
    of office or to resign because of an incapacitating illness (Feb. 24,
    1981, pp. 2916-18).

    [[Page 12]]
    where the plane was lost, the House declared the seat vacant (H. Res.
    1, 93d Cong., Jan. 3, 1973, pp. 15-16).

    Sec. 23. Questions as to the existence of a
    vacancy.

      The House declines  to give prima facie effect to credentials, even though they
    be regular in form, until it has ascertained whether or not the seat is
    vacant (I, 322, 518, 565, 569), and a person returned as elected at a
    second election was unseated on ascertainment that another person had
    actually been chosen at the first election (I, 646). Where a Member was
    reelected to the House, although at the time of the election he had been
    unaccounted for for several weeks following the disappearance of the
    plane on which he was a passenger, the Governor of the State from which
    he was elected transmitted his certificate to the House in the regular
    fashion. When the Member-elect was still missing at the time the new
    Congress convened, and circumstances were such that other passengers on
    the missing plane had been presumed dead following judicial inquiries in
    the State

    <>   \5\
    The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other
    Officers; * * *

    Sec. 24. Functions of the state executive
    in filling vacancies.

      The term ``vacancy''  as occurring in this paragraph of the
    Constitution has been examined in relation to the functions of the State
    executive (I, 312, 518). A federal law empowers the States and
    Territories to provide by law the times of elections to fill vacancies
    (I, 516; 2 U.S.C. 8); but an election called by a governor in pursuance
    of constitutional authority was held valid although no state law
    prescribed time, place, or manner of such election (I, 517). Where two
    candidates had an equal number of votes, the governor did not issue
    credentials to either, but ordered a new election after they had waived
    their respective claims (I, 555). A candidate elected for the 104th
    Congress was ``appointed'' by the Governor to fill a vacancy for the
    remainder of the 103d Congress pursuant to a State law requiring the
    Governor to appoint the candidate who won the election to the 104th
    Congress. In that case the House authorized the Speaker to administer
    the oath to the Member-elect and referred the question of his final
    right to the seat in the 103d Congress to the Committee on House
    Administration (Nov. 29, 1994, p. ----).
    <>   A
    Member elected to fill a vacancy serves no longer time than the
    remainder of the term of the Member whose place he fills (I, 3). For the
    compensation and allowances of such Members, see Sec. 87, infra.

      The officers of the House are the Speaker, who has always been one of
    its Members and whose term as Speaker must expire with his term as a
    Member; and the Clerk, Sergeant-at-Arms, Doorkeeper (abolished by the
    104th Congress, see Sec. 651d, infra), Postmaster (abolished during the
    102d Congress, see Sec. 654a, infra), Chief Administrative Officer, and
    Chaplain (I, 187), no one of whom has ever been chosen from the sitting
    membership of the House, and who continue in office until their
    successors are chosen and qualified (I, 187), in one case continuing
    through the entire Congress succeeding that in which they were elected
    (I, 244, 263). The House formerly provided by special rule that the
    Clerk should continue in office until another should be chosen (I, 187,
    188, 235, 244); and in later years the statutes have imposed on the
    Clerk, Sergeant-at-Arms, and Doorkeeper duties which contemplate their
    continuance (I, 14, 15; 2 U.S.C. 75a-1, 83).

    [[Page 13]]
    held that a majority of all the membership of the House was not
    required, but only a majority of those present if a quorum (I, 216). On
    two occasions, by special rule, Speakers were chosen by a plurality of
    votes; but in each case the House by majority vote adopted a resolution
    declaring the result (I, 221, 222). The House has declined to choose a
    Speaker by lot (I, 221). The contest over the election of a Speaker in
    1923 was resolved after procedure for adoption of rules for the 68th
    Congress had been presented (VI, 24).

    Sec. 27. The vote on election of a
    Speaker.

      The Speaker, who  was at first elected by ballot, has been chosen by viva voce
    vote on a roll call since 1839 (I, 187). In 1809 the House held that a
    Speaker should be elected by a majority of all present (I, 215); and in
    1879 it was

    [[Page 14]]
    enacted by the 83d Congress (2 U.S.C. 75a-1) authorizing temporary
    appointments by the Speaker to fill vacancies in the offices of Clerk,
    Sergeant-at-Arms, Doorkeeper, Postmaster, or Chaplain. Under this
    authority, temporary Sergeants-at-Arms (Jan. 6, 1954, p. 8; June 30,
    1972, p. 23665; Feb. 28, 1980, p. 4350; and Mar. 12, 1992, p. ----), a
    temporary Clerk (Nov. 15, 1975, p. 36901), a temporary Chaplain (Mar.
    14, 1966, p. 5712), and a temporary Doorkeeper (Dec. 20, 1974, p. 41855)
    have been appointed. The Office of the Postmaster was abolished during
    the 102d Congress (see Sec. 654a, infra); and the Office of the
    Doorkeeper was abolished by the 104th Congress (see Sec. 651d, infra).
    For further information on the elections of officers, see Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 1, ch. 6.

    Sec. 28. Vacancies in the office of
    Speaker.

      The Speaker  having died during the recess of Congress, the Clerk at the
    next session called the House to order, ascertained the presence of a
    quorum, and then the House proceeded to elect a successor (I, 234; Jan.
    10, 1962, p. 5). Speaker Joseph W. Byrns having died during a session of
    Congress but not while the House was sitting, the Clerk on the following
    day called the House to order and his successor, Hon. William B.
    Bankhead, was elected by resolution (June 4, 1936, p. 9016). Speaker
    Bankhead also died during a session, on a day when the House was not
    meeting. The Clerk on the following day called the House to order and
    Hon. Sam Rayburn was elected by resolution (Sept. 16, 1940, p. 12231).
    Form of resolution offered on death of a Speaker (Sept. 16, 1940, p.
    12232; Jan. 10, 1962, p. 9) and a former Speaker (VIII, 3564; Mar. 7,
    1968, p. 5742). A resolution declaring vacant the office of Speaker is
    presented as a matter of high constitutional privilege (VI, 35). A
    proposition to elect a Speaker is in order at any time and presents a
    question of the highest privilege (VIII, 3383). Speakers have resigned
    by rising in their place and addressing the House (I, 231, 233), by
    calling a Member to the Chair and tendering the resignation verbally
    from the floor (I, 225), or by sending a letter which the Clerk reads to
    the House at the beginning of a new session (I, 232). In the 101st
    Congress, Speaker Wright took the floor on a question of personal
    privilege, to respond to charges made against him, and announced his
    intention to resign as Speaker ``on the election of my successor'' (May
    31, 1989, p. 10440). On June 6, 1989, Speaker Wright entertained
    nominations for Speaker and, following the roll call, declared
    Representative Foley ``duly elected Speaker'' (p. 10801). When the
    Speaker resigns no action of the House excusing him from service is
    taken (I, 232). In one instance a Speaker resigned on the last day of
    the Congress, and the House elected a successor for the day (I, 225).
    Instance wherein the Speaker, following a vote upon an essential
    question indicating a change in the party control of the House,
    announced that under the circumstances it was incumbent upon the Speaker
    to resign or to recognize for a motion declaring vacant the office of
    Speaker (VI, 35).
    <>   The effect of a law to regulate the action of the House in
    choosing its own officers has been discussed (IV, 3819), and such a law
    has been considered of doubtful validity (V, 6765, 6766) in theory and
    practice (I, 241, 242). An amendment to the Legislative Reorganization
    Act of 1946 was

    <> * * * and
    [the House of Representatives] shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

    Sec. 30. Election of Clerk in relation to
    business.

      The office of  Clerk becoming vacant, it was held that the House would not
    be organized for business until a Clerk should be elected (I, 237); but
    in another instance some business intervened before a Clerk was elected
    (I, 239). At the time of organization, while the Clerk of the preceding
    House was yet officiating, and after the Speaker had been elected, the
    House proceeded to legislation and other business before electing a
    Clerk (I, 242, 244). But in one case it was held that the law of 1789
    (see 2 U.S.C. 25) bound the House to elect the Clerk before proceeding
    to business (I, 241).

      In 1868 the Senate ceased in its rules to describe the House, acting
    in an impeachment, as the ``grand inquest of the nation'' (III, 2126).
    See also art. II, sec. 4 (Sec. 173, infra); Deschler's Precedents, vol.
    3, ch. 14.

      A federal court having subpoenaed certain evidence gathered by a
    committee of the House in an impeachment inquiry, the House adopted a
    resolution granting such limited access to the evidence as would not
    infringe upon its sole power of impeachment (Aug. 22, 1974, p. 30047).

    Sec. 32. Numbers, terms, and votes
    of Senators.

      Section 3. \1\ [The Senate  of the United States shall be composed of two Senators
    from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and
    each Senator shall have one Vote.]

    [[Page 15]]

      This provision has now been changed by the 17th amendment to the
    Constitution.

    Sec. 33. Division of the Senate into
    classes.

      \2\ Immediately  after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first
    Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes.
    The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the
    Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of
    the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of
    the <> sixth Year,
    so that one-third may be chosen every second Year; [and if Vacancies
    happen by Resignation,
    or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the
    Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting
    of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.]

      That part of the above paragraph in brackets was changed by the 17th
    amendment.

    Sec. 35. Qualifications of Senators.

      \3\ No Person  shall be
    a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and
    been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when
    elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

    [[Page 16]]
    District of Columbia as an officeholder, but who voted in his old home
    and had no intent of making the District his domicile, was held to be
    qualified (I, 439).

      In 1794 the Senate decided that Albert Gallatin was disqualified, not
    having been a citizen nine years although he had served in the war of
    Independence and was a resident of the country when the Constitution was
    formed (I, 428); and in 1849 that James Shields was disqualified, not
    having been a citizen for the required time (I, 429). But in 1870 the
    Senate declined to examine as to H. R. Revels, a citizen under the
    recently adopted 14th amendment (I, 430). As to inhabitancy the Senate
    seated one who, being a citizen of the United States, had been an
    inhabitant of the State from which he was appointed for less than a year
    (I, 437). Also one who, while stationed in a State as an army officer
    had declared his intention of making his home in the State, was admitted
    by the Senate (I, 438). A Senator who at the time of his election was
    actually residing in the

    Sec. 36. The Vice President and his
    vote.

      \4\ The Vice  President of the United States shall be President of the Senate,
    but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.

    <>   \5\ The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and
    also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or
    when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.-
      The right of the Vice President to vote has been construed to extend
    to questions relating to the organization of the Senate (V, 5975), as
    the election of officers of the Senate (V, 5972-5974), or a decision on
    the title of a claimant to a seat (V, 5976, 5977). The Senate has
    declined to make a rule relating to the vote of the Vice President (V,
    5974).

    Sec. 38. Senate tries impeachment and convicts
    by twothirds vote.

      \6\ The Senate  shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.
    When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation.
    When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice
    shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence
    of two thirds of the Members present.

      For the exclusive power of the Senate to try impeachments under the
    United States Constitution, see Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cls. 293
    (1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 668 (1937). See also Mississippi v.
    Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867) (dictum). For the
    nonjusticiability of a claim that Senate Rule XI violates the
    impeachment trial clause by delegating to a committee of 12 Senators the
    responsibility to receive evidence, hear testimony, and report to the
    Senate thereon, see Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).

    [[Page 17]]

      In 1868, after mature consideration, the Senate overruled the old view
    of its functions (III, 2057), and decided that it sat for impeachment
    trials as the Senate and not as a court (III, 2057), and eliminated from
    its rules all mention of itself as a ``high court of impeachment'' (III,
    2079, 2082).

    Sec. 39. The presiding officer.

      An anxiety lest  the Chief
    Justice might have a vote in the approaching trial of the President
    seems to have prompted this action (III, 2057). There was examination of
    the question of the Chief Justice's power to vote (III, 2098); but the
    Senate declined to declare his incapacity to vote, and he did in fact
    give a casting vote on incidental questions (III, 2067). The Senate
    declined to require that the Chief Justice be sworn when about to
    preside (III, 2080); but the Chief Justice had the oath administered by
    an associate justice (III, 2422).

      In impeachments for officers other than the President of the United
    States the presiding officer of the Senate presides, whether he be Vice
    President, the regular President pro tempore (III, 2309, footnote, 2337,
    2394) or a special President pro tempore chosen to preside at the trial
    only (III, 2089, 2477).

    Sec. 40. Oath, and quorum.

      Senators elected after  the
    beginning of an impeachment trial are sworn as in the case of other
    Senators (III, 2375). The quorum of the Senate sitting for an
    impeachment trial is a quorum of the Senate itself, and not merely a
    quorum of the Senators sworn for the trial (III, 2063). The vote
    required for conviction is two-thirds of those Senators present and
    voting (Oct. 20, 1989, p. 25335). In 1868, when certain States were
    without representation, the Senate declined to question its competency
    to try an impeachment case (III, 2060). See S. Doc. 93-102, ``Procedure
    and Guidelines for Impeachment Trials in the United States Senate,'' for
    precedents relating to the conduct of Senate impeachments.

    Sec. 41. Judgment in cases of
    impeachment.

      \7\ Judgment in  Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to
    removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office
    of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party
    convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial,
    Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.

      There has been discussion as to whether or not the Constitution
    requires both removal and disqualification on conviction (III, 2397);
    but in the case of Pickering, the Senate decreed only removal (III,
    2341). In the case of Humphreys, judgment of both removal and
    disqualification was pronounced (III, 2397). The question on removal and
    disqualification has been held divisible for the vote (III, 2397; VI,
    512).

    [[Page 18]]

      The question of judgment requires only a majority vote (VI, 512; Apr.
    17, 1936, p. 5606).

      In the Ritter case, it was first held that upon conviction of the
    respondent, judgment of removal required no vote, following
    automatically from conviction under article II, section 4 (Apr. 17,
    1936, p. 5607). In the 99th Congress, having tried to conviction the
    first impeachment case against a federal district judge since 1936, the
    Senate ordered his removal from office (Oct. 9, 1986, p. 29870). In the
    101st Congress, two other federal district judges were removed from
    office following their convictions in the Senate (Oct. 20, 1989, p.
    25335; Nov. 3, 1989, p. ----).

    Sec. 42. Times, places, and manner
    of elections of Representatives and Senators.

      Section 4. \1\ The Times,  Places and Manner of
    holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed
    in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any
    time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the places of
    chusing Senators.

      The relative powers of the Congress and the States under this graph
    have been the subject of much discussion (I, 311, 313, 507, footnote);
    but Congress has in fact fixed by law the time of elections (I, 508; VI,
    66; 2 U.S.C. 7), and has controlled the manner to the extent of
    prescribing a ballot or voting machine (II, 961; VI, 150; 2 U.S.C. 9).
    When a State delegated to a municipality the power to regulate the
    manner of holding an election, a question arose (II, 975). A question
    has arisen as to whether or not a State, in the absence of action by
    Congress, might make the time of election of Congressmen contingent on
    the time of the State election (I, 522). This paragraph gives Congress
    the power to protect the right to vote in primaries where they are an
    integral part of the election process. United States v. Classic, 313
    U.S. 299 (1941); United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930).
    Congress may legislate under this paragraph to protect the exercise of
    the franchise in congressional elections. Ex parte Siebolt, 100 U.S. 371
    (1880); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).

    [[Page 19]]
    and therefore that the State constitution might not in this respect
    control the State legislature (II, 1133). The House has sustained this
    view by its action (I, 525). But where the State constitution fixed a
    date for an election and the legislature had not acted, although it had
    the opportunity, the House held the election valid (II, 846).

    Sec. 43. Functions of a State legislature in
    fixing time, etc., of elections.

      The meaning of  the word ``legislature'' in this
    clause of the Constitution has been the subject of discussion (II, 856),
    as to whether or not it means a constitutional convention as well as a
    legislature in the commonly accepted meaning of the word (I, 524). The
    House has sworn in Members chosen at an election the time, etc., of
    which was fixed by the schedule of a constitution adopted on that
    election day (I, 519, 520, 522). But the House held that where a
    legislature has been in existence a constitutional convention might not
    exercise the power (I, 363, 367). It has been argued generally that the
    legislature derives the power herein discussed from the Federal and not
    the State Constitution (II, 856, 947),

    Sec. 44. Decisions of the court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Ex
    parte Clark, 100 U.S. 399 (1880); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651
    (1884); In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888); Ohio v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565
    (1916); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); United States  v.
    Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917); Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232
    (1921); Smiley v. Holme, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); United States v. Classic,
    313 U.S. 299 (1941); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Roudebush
    v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); and
    U.S. Term Limits, Inc., v. Thorton, 63 U.S.L.W. 4413 (1995). In Public
    Law 91-285, Congress lowered the minimum age of voters in all federal,
    state and local elections from 21 to 18 years. In Oregon v. Mitchell,
    400 U.S. 112 (1970), the Supreme Court upheld the power of Congress
    under article I, section 4 and under section 5 of the 14th amendment to
    the Constitution to fix the age of voters in federal elections, but held
    that the tenth amendment to the Constitution reserved to the States the
    power to establish voter age qualifications in State and local
    elections. The 26th amendment to the Constitution extended the right of
    persons 18 years of age or older to vote in elections held under State
    authority.

    Sec. 45. Annual meeting of Congress.

      \2\ [The Congress  shall
    assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the
    first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different
    Day.]

      This provision of the Constitution has been superseded by the 20th
    amendment.

    [[Page 20]]

      In the later but not the earlier practice (I, 5), prior to the 20th
    amendment, the fact that Congress had met once within the year did not
    make uncertain the constitutional mandate to meet on the first Monday of
    December (I, 6, 9-11). Early Congresses, convened either by proclamation
    or law on a day earlier than the constitutional day, remained in
    continuous session to a time beyond that day (I, 6, 9-11). But in the
    later view an existing session ends with the day appointed by the
    Constitution for the regular annual session (II, 1160); see Sec. 84,
    infra. Congress has frequently appointed by law a day for the meeting
    (I, 4, 5, 10-12, footnote; see also Sec. 243, infra).

    Sec. 46. House the judge of elections,
    returns, and qualification.

      Section 5. \1\ Each  House shall be the Judge of the
    Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, * * *.

      In judging the qualifications of its Members, the House may not add
    qualifications to those expressly stated in the United States
    Constitution. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). This phrase
    allows the House or Senate to deny the right to a seat without
    unlawfully depriving a State of its right to equal representation. Barry
    v. United States ex rel Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929). But a State may
    conduct a recount of votes without interfering with the authority of the
    House under this phrase. Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972). For
    discussion of the power of the House to judge elections, see Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 8 (elections) and ch. 9 (election contests); for
    discussion of the power of the House to judge qualifications, see
    Deschler's Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 7.

      The House has the same authority to determine the right of a Delegate
    to his seat that it has in the case of a Member (I, 423). The House may
    not delegate the duty of judging its elections to another tribunal (I,
    608), and the courts of a State have nothing to do with it (II, 959).
    The House has once examined the relations of this power to the power to
    expel (I, 469).

    Sec. 47. Power of judging as related to State
    laws as to returns.

      As nearly all  the laws governing the elections of
    Representatives in Congress are State laws, questions have often arisen
    as to the relation of this power of judging to those laws (I, 637). The
    House decided very early that the certificate of a State executive
    issued in strict accordance with State law does not prevent examination
    of the votes by the House and a reversal of the return (I, 637). The
    House has also held that it is not confined to the conclusions of
    returns made up in strict conformity to State law, but may examine the
    votes and correct the returns (I, 774); and the fact that a State law
    gives canvassers the right to reject votes for fraud and irregularities
    does not preclude the House from going behind the returns (II, 887). The
    highest court in one State (Colorado) has ruled that it lacked
    jurisdiction to pass upon a candidate's allegations of irregularities in
    a primary election and that the House had exclusive jurisdiction to
    decide such questions and to declare the rightful nominee (Sept. 23,
    1970, p. 33320).

    [[Page 21]]
    1078, 1091). See Deschler's Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 8, sec. 8.11, for
    discussion of distinction between directory state laws governing the
    conduct of election officials as to ballots, and mandatory laws
    regulating the conduct of voters.

    Sec. 48. Power of judging as related to
    State laws as to acts of the voter.

      When the question  concerns not the acts of returning
    officers, but the act of the voter in giving his vote, the House has
    found more difficulty in determining on the proper exercise of its
    constitutional power. While the House has always acted on the principle
    of giving expression to the intent of the voter (I, 575, 639, 641; II,
    1090), yet it has held that a mandatory State law, even though
    arbitrary, may cause the rejection of a ballot on which the intent of
    the voter is plain (II, 1009, 1056, 1077,

    Sec. 49. Power of House as related to
    constitutionality of State laws.

      Where the State  courts have upheld a State election
    law as constitutional the House does not ordinarily question the law
    (II, 856, 1071). But where there has been no such decision the House, in
    determining its election cases, has passed on the validity of State laws
    under State constitutions (II, 1011, 1134), and has acted on its
    decision that they were unconstitutional (II, 1075, 1126), but it is not
    the policy of the House to pass upon the validity of State election laws
    alleged to be in conflict with the State constitution (VI, 151).

    Sec. 50. Effect of interpretation of State
    election laws by State courts.

      The courts of  a State have nothing to do directly
    with judging the elections, qualifications, and returns of
    Representatives in Congress (II, 959), but where the highest State court
    has interpreted the State law the House has concluded that it should
    generally be governed by this interpretation (I, 645, 731; II, 1041,
    1048), but does not consider itself bound by such interpretations (VI,
    58). The House is not bound, however, by a decision on an analogous but
    not the identical question in issue (II, 909); and where the alleged
    fraud of election judges was in issue, the acquittal of those judges in
    the courts was held not to be an adjudication binding on the House (II,
    1019). For a recent illustration of a protracted election dispute
    lasting four months see House Report 99-58, culminating in House
    Resolution 146 of the 99th Congress (May 1, 1985, p. 9998).

    Sec. 51. Laws of Congress not binding on the
    House in its function of judging its elections.

      The statutes of  the United States
    provide specific methods for institution of a contest as to the title to
    a seat in the House (I, 678, 697-706) (2 U.S.C. 381 et seq.); but the
    House regards this law as not of absolute binding force, but rather a
    wholesome rule not to be departed from except for cause (I, 597, 719,
    825, 833), and it sometimes by resolution modifies the procedure
    prescribed by the law (I, 449, 600).

    Sec. 51a. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: In re Loney, 134 U.S. 317 (1890); Reed v.
    County Commissioners, 277 U.S. 376 (1928); Barry v. United States ex
    rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15
    (1972).

    [[Page 22]]
    such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.

    Sec. 52. The quorum.

      * * * and a  Majority of each [House]
    shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may
    adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance
    of absent Members, in

    Sec. 53. Interpretation of the Constitution
    as to number constituting a quorum.

      Out of conditions  arising between 1861 and 1891 the
    rule was established that a majority of the Members chosen and living
    constituted the quorum required by the Constitution (IV, 2885-2888); but
    later examination has resulted in a decision confirming in the House of
    Representatives the construction established in the Senate that a quorum
    consists of a majority of Senators duly chosen and sworn (I, 630; IV,
    2891-2894). So the decision of the House now is that after the House is
    once organized the quorum consists of a majority of those Members
    chosen, sworn, and living whose membership has not been terminated by
    resignation or by the action of the House (IV, 2889, 2890; VI, 638).

    [[Page 23]]

    Sec. 54. The theory of the quorum present; and
    the count by the Speaker.

      For many years  the quorum was determined only by noting the
    numbers of Members voting (IV, 2896, 2897), with the result that Members
    by refusing to vote could often break a quorum and obstruct the public
    business (II, 1034; IV, 2895, footnote; V, 5744). But in 1890 Mr.
    Speaker Reed directed the clerk to enter on the Journal as part of the
    record of a yea-and-nay vote names of Members present but not voting,
    thereby establishing a quorum of record (IV, 2895). This decision,
    afterwards sustained by the Supreme Court (IV, 2904; United States v.
    Ballin, 144 U.S. (1892)), established the principle that a quorum
    present made valid any action by the House, although an actual quorum
    might not vote (I, 216, footnote; IV, 2932). And thenceforth the point
    of order as to a quorum was required to be that no quorum was present
    and not that no quorum had voted (IV, 2917). At the time of the
    establishment of this principle the Speaker revived the count by the
    Chair as a method of determining the presence of a quorum at a time when
    no record vote was ordered (IV, 2909). The Speaker has permitted his
    count of a quorum to be verified by tellers (IV, 2888), but did not
    concede it as a right of the House to have tellers under the
    circumstances (IV, 2916; VI 647-651; VIII, 2369, 2436), claiming that
    the Chair might determine the presence of a quorum in such manner as he
    should deem accurate and suitable (IV, 2932). The Chair counts all
    members in sight, whether in the cloak rooms, or within the bar (IV,
    2970; VIII, 3120). Later, as the complement to the new view of the
    quorum, the early theory that the presence of a quorum was as necessary
    during debate or other business as on a vote was revived (IV, 2935-
    2949); also a line of rulings made under the old theory were overruled,
    and it was established that the point of no quorum might be made after
    the House had declined to verify a division by tellers or the yeas and
    nays (IV, 2918-2926).

    Sec. 55. Relations of the quorum to acts of the
    House.

      The absence of  a quorum having been disclosed, there must be a quorum of
    record before the House may proceed to business (IV, 2952, 2953; VI,
    624, 660, 662), and the point of no quorum may not be withdrawn even by
    unanimous consent after the absence of a quorum has been ascertained and
    announced by the Chair (IV, 2928-2931; VI, 657; Apr. 13, 1978, p. 10119;
    Sept. 25, 1984, p. 26778). But when an action has been completed, it is
    too late to make the point of order that a quorum was not present when
    it was done (IV, 2927; VI, 655). But where action requiring a quorum was
    taken in the ascertained absence of a quorum by ruling of a Speaker pro
    tempore, the Speaker on the next day ruled that the action was null and
    void (IV, 2964; see also VIII, 3161). But such absence of a quorum
    should appear from the Journal if a legislative act is to be vacated for
    such reason (IV, 2962), and where the assumption that a quorum was
    present when the House acted was uncontradicted by the Journal, it was
    held that this assumption might not be overthrown by expressions of
    opinion by Members individually (IV, 2961).

      Major revisions in the House Rules concerning the necessity and
    establishment of a quorum have occurred in the 94th, 95th and 96th
    Congresses. Under the practice in the 93d Congress, for example, a point
    of no quorum would prevent the report of the Chairman of a Committee of
    the Whole (VI, 666); but in the 93d Congress clause 6 was added to rule
    XV to provide that after the presence of a quorum is once ascertained on
    any day, a point of no quorum may not be entertained after the Committee
    has risen and pending the report of the Chairman to the House (see
    Sec. 774c, infra). Clause 6 now specifically precludes a point of no
    quorum during the reception of any message from the President or the
    Senate, before or during the prayer, during the administration of oaths,
    during motions incidental to a call of the House, and (once a quorum has
    been established on that day) during special orders when no legislative
    business is pending. In the 95th Congress, the same clause of rule XV
    was further amended to provide that it is not in order to make or
    entertain a point of order that a quorum is not present unless the
    Speaker has put the pending motion or proposition to a vote, but the
    Speaker retains the right to recognize a Member to move a call of the
    House at any time. A point of order of no quorum during debate only in
    the House does not lie independently under this clause of the
    Constitution since clause 6(e) of rule XV is a proper exercise of the
    House's constitutional rulemaking authority which can be interpreted
    consistently with the requirement that a quorum be present to conduct
    business (as opposed to mere debate) (Sept. 8, 1977, p. 28114; Sept. 12,
    1977, pp. 28800-01).

    [[Page 24]]
    House such as on a motion incident to the reading, amendment, or
    approval of the Journal or on the referral or other disposition of other
    papers read to the House. A point of no quorum no longer lies during
    debate in the House. The practice in the Committee of the Whole is now
    governed by clause 2 of rule XXIII. No motion is in order on the failure
    of a quorum but the motions to adjourn and for a call of the House (IV,
    2950; VI 680) and the motion to adjourn has precedence over the motion
    for a call of the House (VIII, 2642). A call of the House is in order
    under the Constitution before the adoption of the rules (IV, 2981).
    Those present on a call of the House may prescribe a fine as a condition
    on which an arrested Member may be discharged (IV, 3013, 3014), but this
    is rarely done. A quorum is not required on motions incidental to a call
    of the House (IV, 2994; VI, 681; Oct. 8, 1940, p. 13403; and Oct. 8,
    1968, p. 30090). The House may adjourn sine die in the absence of a
    quorum where both Houses have already adopted a concurrent resolution
    providing for a sine die adjournment on that day (Oct. 18, 1972, p.
    37200).
      Before these recent changes to rule XV, a quorum was required at all
    times during the reading of the Journal (IV, 2732, 2733; VI, 625, 629)
    or messages from the President or the Senate (IV, 3522; VI 6600, 6650;
    VIII 3339); but the modern practice would require the presence of a
    quorum only when the question is put on a pending motion or proposition
    in the

    Sec. 56. Relations of the quorum to organization
    of the House.

      At the time  of organization the two Houses inform one another of the
    appearance of the quorum in each, and the two Houses jointly inform the
    President (I, 198-203). A message from one House that its quorum has
    appeared is not delivered in the other until a quorum has appeared there
    also (I, 126). But at the beginning of a second session of a Congress
    the House proceeded to business, although a quorum had not appeared in
    the Senate (I, 126). At the beginning of a second session of a Congress
    unsworn Members-elect were taken into account in ascertaining the
    presence of a quorum (I, 175); however, at the beginning of the second
    session of the 87th Congress, the Clerk called the House to order,
    announced the death of Speaker Rayburn during the sine die adjournment,
    and did not call unsworn Members-elect or Members who had resigned
    during the hiatus to establish a quorum or elect a new Speaker (Jan. 10,
    1962, p. 5). In both Houses the oath has been administered to Members-
    elect in the absence of a quorum (I, 174, 181, 182; VI, 22), although in
    one case the Speaker objected to such proceedings (II, 875). Prayer by
    the Chaplain is not business requiring the presence of a quorum and the
    Speaker declines to entertain a point of no quorum before prayer is
    offered (VI, 663; clause 6 of rule XV).

    <>   \2\ Each House may
    determine the Rules of its Proceedings, * * *

    [[Page 25]]

    Sec. 57. Decisions of the court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892);
    Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 190 (1881); Burton v. United States, 202
    U.S. 344 (1906).

    Sec. 59. Power to make rules not impaired by
    rules or law.

      The power of  each House of Representatives to make its own rules may
    not be impaired or controlled by the rules of a preceding House (I, 187,
    210; V, 6002, 6743-6747), or by a law passed by a prior Congress (I, 82,
    245; IV, 3298, 3579; V, 6765, 6766). The House in adopting its rules
    may, however, incorporate by reference as a part thereof all applicable
    provisions of law which constituted the rules of the House at the end of
    the preceding Congress (H. Res. 5, 95th Cong., Jan. 4, 1977, pp. 53-70)
    and has also incorporated provisions of concurrent resolutions which
    were intended to remain applicable under the Budget Act (H. Res. 5, 98th
    Cong., Jan. 3, 1983, p. 34). The ordinary rights and functions of the
    House under the Constitution are exercised in accordance with the rules
    (III, 2567), and under later decisions questions of so-called
    constitutional privilege should also be considered in accordance with
    the rules (VI, 48; VII, 889; Apr. 8, 1926, p. 7147). But a law passed by
    an existing Congress with the concurrence of the House has been
    recognized by that House as of binding force in matters of procedure (V,
    6767, 6768). In exercising its constitutional power to change its rules
    the House may confine itself within certain limitations (V, 6756; VIII,
    3376); but the attempt of the House to deprive the Speaker of his vote
    as a Member by a rule was successfully resisted (V, 5966, 5967). While a
    law of 1789 (see 2 U.S.C. 25) requires the election of a Clerk before
    the House proceeds to business yet the House has held that it may adopt
    rules before electing a clerk (I, 245). While the Speaker ceases to be
    an officer of the House with the expiration of a Congress, the Clerk, by
    old usage, continues in a new Congress (I, 187, 188, 235, 244; see 2
    U.S.C. 26). In case of a vacancy in the office of Clerk, Sergeant-at-
    Arms, Doorkeeper (abolished by the 104th Congress; see Sec. 651d,
    infra), Postmaster (abolished during the 102d Congress; see Sec. 654a,
    infra), or Chaplain, the Speaker is authorized to make temporary
    appointments (2 U.S.C. 75a-1). The House has adopted a rule before
    election of a Speaker (I, 94, 95); but in 1839 was deterred by the law
    of 1789 and the Constitution from adopting rules before the
    administration of the oath to Members-elect (I, 140). The earlier theory
    that an officer might be empowered to administer oaths by a rule of
    either House has been abandoned in later practice and the authority has
    been conferred by law (III, 1823, 1824, 2079, 2303, 2479; 2 U.S.C. 191).

    [[Page 26]]
    the statutory enactments incorporated into the rules of the prior
    Congress as an exercise of the rule-making power do not control the
    proceedings of the new House until it adopts rules incorporating those
    provisions (Jan. 22, 1971, p. 132).

    Sec. 60. Procedure in the House before the
    adoption of rules.

      Before the adoption  of rules the House is governed by general
    parliamentary law, but the Speakers have been inclined to give weight to
    the precedents of the House in modifying the usual constructions of that
    law (V, 6758-6760; VIII, 3384; Jan. 3, 1953, p. 24; Jan. 10, 1967, pp.
    14-15). The general parliamentary law as understood in the House is
    founded on Jefferson's Manual as modified by the practice of American
    legislative assemblies, especially of the House of Representatives (V,
    6761-6763; Jan. 3, 1953, p. 24), but the provisions of the House's
    accustomed rules are not necessarily followed (V, 5509, 5604). Prior to
    the adoption of rules,

      Before the adoption of rules, it is in order for any Member who is
    recognized by the Chair to offer a proposition relating to the order of
    business without asking consent of the House (IV, 3060). The resolution
    adopting rules for the 104th Congress included a special order of
    business for consideration of a bill to make certain laws applicable to
    the legislative branch (sec. 108, H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. ----).
    During debate on the resolution adopting rules, any Member may make a
    point of order that a quorum is not present based upon general
    parliamentary precedents, since the provisions of clause 6(e) of rule XV
    prohibiting the Chair from entertaining such a point of order unless the
    question has been put on the pending proposition are not yet applicable
    (Jan. 15, 1979, p. 10). Before adoption of rules, under general
    parliamentary law as modified by usage and practice of the House, an
    amendment may be subject to the point of order that it is not germane to
    the proposition to which offered (Jan. 3, 1969, p. 23). Before adoption
    of rules, the Speaker may maintain decorum by directing a Member who has
    not been recognized in debate beyond an allotted time to be removed from
    the well and by directing the Sergeant-at-Arms to present the mace as
    the traditional symbol of order (Jan. 3, 1991, p. ----).

      The motion to commit has been permitted after the previous question
    has been ordered on the resolution adopting the rules (V, 5604; Jan. 3,
    1989, p. 81; Jan. 3, 1991, p. ----). It is the prerogative of the
    minority to offer a motion to commit even prior to the adoption of the
    rules, but at that point the proponent need not qualify as opposed to
    the resolution (Jan. 3, 1991, p. ----; Jan. 4, 1995, p. ----). Such a
    motion to commit is not divisible, but if it is agreed to and more than
    one amendment is reported back pursuant thereto, then separate votes may
    be had on the reported amendments (Jan. 5, 1993, p. ----). The motion to
    refer has also been permitted upon the offering of a resolution adopting
    the rules, and prior to debate thereon, subject to the motion to lay on
    the table (Jan. 5, 1993, p. ----).

    [[Page 27]]

      The Speaker in his discretion may recognize the Majority Leader to
    offer an initial resolution providing for the adoption of the rules as a
    question of privilege in its own right (IV, 3060; Deschler's Precedents,
    vol. 1, ch. 1, sec. 8; Jan. 5, 1993, p. ----), even prior to recognizing
    another Member to offer as a question of privilege another resolution
    calling into question the constitutionality of that resolution (Speaker
    Foley, Jan. 5, 1993, p. ----). Before the House adopts rules, a Member
    may offer for immediate consideration a special order providing for the
    consideration of a resolution adopting the rules (V, 5450; Jan. 4, 1995,
    p. ----).

    Sec. 61. Joint rules.

      The two Houses  of Congress adopted in
    the early years of the Government joint rules to govern their procedure
    in matters requiring concurrent action; but in 1876 these joint rules
    were abrogated (IV, 3430; V, 6782-6787). The most useful of their
    provision continue to be observed in practice, however (IV, 3430; V,
    6592).

    Sec. 61a. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6 (1932);
    Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949); United States v.
    Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950); Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109
    (1963); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).

    Sec. 62. Punishment and expulsion of
    Members.

      * * * [Each House may]  punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the
    Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.

    [[Page 28]]
    Code of Official Conduct, and for investing in stock in a Navy bank the
    establishment of which he was promoting, in violation of the Code of
    Ethics for Government Service (H. Res. 1421, July 29, 1976, pp. 24379-
    82). (For the Code of Ethics for Government Service, see H. Con. Res.
    175, 85th Cong., 72 Stat. B12.) In the 95th Congress, following an
    investigation by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct into
    whether Members or employees had improperly accepted things of value
    from the Republic of Korea or representatives thereof, the House
    reprimanded three Members, one for falsely answering an unsworn
    questionnaire relative to such gifts and violating the Code of Official
    Conduct, one for failing to report as required by law the receipt of a
    campaign contribution and violating the Code of Official Conduct, and
    one for failing to report a campaign contribution, converting a campaign
    contribution to personal use, testifying falsely to the committee under
    oath, and violating the Code of Official Conduct (Oct. 13, 1978, pp.
    36984, 37009, 37017). In the 96th Congress, two Members were censured by
    the House: (1) A Member who during a prior Congress both knowingly
    increased an office employee's salary for repayment of that Member's
    personal expenses and who was unjustly enriched by clerk-hire employees'
    payments of personal expenses later compensated by salary increases, was
    censured and ordered to repay the amount of the unjust enrichment with
    interest (July 31, 1979, p. 21592); (2) a Member was censured for
    receiving over a period of time sums of money from a person with a
    direct interest in legislation in violation of clause 4 of rule XLIII,
    and for transferring campaign funds into office and personal accounts
    (June 10, 1980, pp. 13801-20). In the 98th Congress, the House adopted
    two resolutions (as amended in the House) censuring two Members for
    improper relationships with House pages in prior Congresses (July 20,
    1983, p. 20020 and p. 20030). In the 100th Congress, the House adopted a
    resolution reprimanding a Member for ``ghost voting,'' improperly
    diverting government resources, and maintaining a ``ghost employee'' on
    his staff (Dec. 18, 1987, p. 36266). In the 101st Congress, another was
    reprimanded for seeking dismissal of parking tickets received by a
    person with whom he had a personal relationship and not related to
    official business and for misstatements of fact in a memorandum relating
    to the criminal probation record of that person (July 26, 1990, p. ----
    ).

    Sec. 63. Punishment by censure.

      Three methods of punishment have been reprimand, censure, and
    expulsion. In action for censure the House has discussed
    whether  or not the principles
    of the procedure of the courts should be followed (II, 1255). In one
    instance, pending consideration of a resolution to censure a Member, the
    Speaker informed him that he should retire (II, 1366), but this is not
    usual, and Members, against whom resolutions have been pending have
    participated in debate either by consent (II, 1656) or without question
    as to consent (II, 1246, 1253). A Member against whom a resolution of
    censure was pending was asked by the Speaker if he desired to be heard
    (VI, 236). But after the House had voted censure and the Member has been
    brought to the bar by the Sergeant-at-Arms to be censured, it was held
    that he might not then be heard (II, 1259). A resolution of censure
    should not apply to more than one Member (II, 1240, 1621). Debate on a
    resolution recommending a disciplinary sanction against a Member may not
    exceed the scope of the conduct of the accused Member (Dec. 18, 1987, p.
    36271). Censure is inflicted by the Speaker (II, 1259) and the words are
    entered in the Journal (II, 1251, 1656; VI 236), but the Speaker may not
    pronounce censure except by order of the House (VI, 237). When Members
    have resigned pending proceedings for censure, the House has
    nevertheless adopted the resolutions of censure (II, 1239, 1273, 1275,
    1656). Members have been censured for personalities and other disorder
    in debate (II, 1251, 1253, 1254, 1259), assaults on the floor (II,
    1665), for presenting a resolution alleged to be insulting to the House
    (II, 1246), and for corrupt acts (II, 1274, 1286). For abuse of the
    leave to print, the House censured a Member after a motion to expel him
    had failed (VI, 236). In one instance Members were censured for acts
    before the election of the then existing House (II, 1286). In the 94th
    Congress, the House by adopting a report from the Committee on Standards
    of Official Conduct reprimanded a Member for failing to report certain
    financial holdings in violation of rule XLIV, the

    [[Page 29]]
    that a Member might not be punished for an offense alleged to have been
    committed against a preceding Congress (II, 1283); but the House itself
    declined to express doubt as to its power to expel and proceeded to
    inflict censure (II, 1286). Both Houses have distrusted their power to
    punish in such cases (II, 1264, 1284, 1285, 1288, 1289; VI, 56, 238).
    However, the 96th Congress punished Members on two occasions for
    offenses committed during a prior Congress (H. Res. 378, July 31, 1979,
    p. 21592; H. Res. 660, June 10, 1980, pp. 13801-20). It has been held
    that the power of the House to expel one of its Members is unlimited; a
    matter purely of discretion to be exercised by a two-thirds vote, from
    which there is no appeal (VI, 78). The resignation of the accused Member
    has always caused a suspension of proceedings for expulsion (II, 1275,
    1276, 1279; VI, 238).

    Sec. 64. Punishment by expulsion.

      The power of  expulsion has
    been the subject of much discussion (I, 469, 476, 481; II, 1264, 1265,
    1269; VI, 56, 398; see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)). In one
    case a Member-elect who had not taken the oath was expelled (II, 1262),
    and in another case the power to do this was discussed (I, 476). In one
    instance the Senate assumed to annul its action of expulsion (II, 1243).
    The Supreme Court has decided that a judgment of conviction under a
    disqualifying statute does not compel the Senate to expel (II, 1282;
    Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906)). The power of expulsion in
    its relation to offenses committed before the Members' election has been
    discussed (II, 1286), and in one case the Judiciary Committee of the
    House concluded

    Sec. 65. Procedure for expulsion.

      The House, in  a proceeding
    for expulsion, declined to give the Member a trial at the bar (II,
    1275); but the Senate has permitted a counsel to appear at its bar (II,
    1263), although it declined to grant a request for a specific statement
    of charges or compulsory process for witnesses (II, 1264). Members
    threatened with expulsion have been heard on their own behalf by consent
    (II, 1273, 1275), or as a matter of right (II, 1269, 1286). In general,
    there has been discussion as to whether or not the principles of the
    procedure of the courts should be followed (II, 1264). The Senate once
    expelled several Senators by a single resolution (II, 1266). Members and
    Senators have been expelled for treason (II, 1261), for high misdemeanor
    inconsistent with public duty (II, 1263), for friendship or association
    with enemies of the Government and absence from their seats (II, 1269,
    1270), and for bearing arms against the Government (II, 1267). In the
    96th Congress, the House expelled a Member who had been convicted of
    bribery (a felony) for accepting funds to perform official duties as a
    Member of Congress (H. Res. 794, Oct. 2, 1980, pp. 28953-78).
    <>   A proposition to reprimand, censure, or expel a Member
    presents a question of privilege (II, 1254; III, 2648-2651; VI, 236;
    July 26, 1990, p. ----). An expulsion resolution when offered may be
    laid on the table (Oct. 1, 1976, p. 35111) or referred to committee
    (Mar. 1, 1979, p. 3753) before the proponent is recognized to debate it.
    A proposition to censure is not germane to a proposition to expel (VI,
    236). On Oct. 2, 1980, the House expelled a Member who had been found
    guilty of accepting money in exchange for a promise to perform certain
    legislative acts (H. Res. 794, 96th Cong., 2d Session, pp. 28953-78).

    [[Page 30]]

      A resolution providing that the House immediately proceed to consider
    whether a Member should be expelled presents a question of privilege
    (Speaker Clark, Dec. 9, 1913, pp. 584-86).

    Sec. 67. Decisions of the court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wh. 204 (1821); Kilbourn
    v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881); United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1
    (1892); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897); Burton v. United States, 202
    U.S. 344 (1906); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).

    Sec. 68. Each House to keep a journal.

      \3\ Each House  shall
    keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the
    same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; * *
    *

    Sec. 69. The Journal the official
    record.

      The Journal and  not the Congressional Record is the official record of the
    proceedings of the House (IV, 2727). Its nature and functions have been
    the subject of extended discussions (IV, 2730, footnote). The House has
    fixed its title (IV, 2728). While it ought to be a correct transcript of
    the proceedings of the House, the House has not insisted on a strict
    chronological order of entries (IV, 2815). The Journal is dated as of
    the legislative and not the calendar day (IV, 2746).

    Sec. 70. Journal a record of proceedings
    and not of reasons.

      The Journal records  proceedings but not the reasons therefor (IV,
    2811) or the circumstances attending (IV, 2812), or the statements or
    opinions of Members (IV, 2817-2820). Exceptions to this rule are rare
    (IV, 2808, 2825). Protests have on rare occasions been admitted by the
    action of the House (IV, 2806, 2807), but the entry of a protest on the
    Journal may not be demanded by a Member as a matter of right (IV, 2798)
    and such demand does not present a question of privilege (IV, 2799). A
    motion not entertained is not entered on the Journal (IV, 2813, 2844-
    46).

    [[Page 31]]
    instances has the House nullified proceedings by rescinding the records
    of them in the Journal (IV, 2787), the House and Senate usually
    insisting on the accuracy of its Journal (IV, 2783, 2786). In rare
    instances the House and Senate have rescinded or expunged entries in
    Journals of preceding Congresses (IV, 2730, footnote, 2792, 2793).

    Sec. 71. House's absolute control of entries
    in the Journal.

      While the House  controls the Journal and may decide what are
    proceedings, even to the extent of omitting things actually done or
    recording things not done (IV, 2784; VI, 634), and while the Speaker has
    entertained a motion to amend the Journal so as to cause it to state
    what was not the fact, leaving it for the House to decide on the
    propriety of the act (IV, 2785), holding that he could not prevent a
    majority of the House from so amending the Journal as to undo an actual
    transaction (IV, 3091-93), in none of those rulings was an amendment
    permitted to correct the Journal which had the effect of collaterally
    changing the tabling of a motion to reconsider. In fact, under the
    precedents cited in Sec. 775, infra, under clause 1 of rule XVI it has
    been held not in order to amend or strike out a Journal entry setting
    forth a motion exactly as made (IV, 2783, 2789), and thus it was held
    not in order to amend the Journal by striking out a resolution actually
    offered (IV, 2789), but on one occasion the House vacated the Speaker's
    referral of an executive communication by amending the Journal of the
    preceding day (Mar. 19, 1990, p. ----). Only on rare

    Sec. 72. Record of votes in the
    Journal.

      The Journal should  record the result of every vote and state in general terms
    the subject of it (IV, 2804); but the result of a vote is recorded in
    figures only when the yeas and nays are taken (IV, 2827), when the vote
    is recorded by electronic device or by clerks, under the provisions of
    clause 5 of rule I, or when a vote is taken by ballot, it having been
    determined in latest practice that the Journal should show not only the
    result but the state of the ballot or ballots (IV, 2832).

    Sec. 73. Approval of the Journal.

      It is the  uniform practice
    of the House to approve its Journal for each legislative day (IV, 2731).
    Where Journals of more than one session remain unapproved, they are
    taken up for approval in chronological order (IV, 2771-2773). In
    ordinary practice the Journal is approved by the House without the
    formal putting of the motion to vote (IV, 2774).

      The former rule required the reading of the Journal on each
    legislative day. The reading could be dispensed with only by unanimous
    consent (VI, 625) or suspension of the rules (IV, 2747-2750) and had to
    be in full when demanded by any Member (IV, 2739-2741; VI, 627-628; Feb.
    22, 1950, p. 2152).

    [[Page 32]]
    on that day under clause 6(c)(1) of rule XV, and clause 6 of rule XV
    generally prohibits the making of points of order of no quorum unless
    the Speaker has put the question on the pending motion or proposition.
      The present form of the rule (clause 1 of rule I; see Sec. 621, infra)
    was drafted from section 127 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
    1970 (84 Stat. 1140), incorporated into the standing rules in the 92d
    Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 22, 1971, p. 144), and was further amended in
    the 96th Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 15, 1979, pp. 7-16). Under the
    current practice, the Speaker is authorized to announce his approval of
    the Journal which is deemed agreed to by the House, subject to the right
    of any Member to demand a vote on agreeing to the Speaker's approval
    (which if decided in the affirmative is not subject to the motion to
    reconsider). In the 98th Congress, the Speaker was given the authority
    to postpone a record vote on agreeing to his approval of the Journal to
    a later time on that legislative day (clause 5(b) of rule I; H. Res. 5,
    Jan. 3, 1983, p. 34). While the transaction of any business is not in
    order before approval of the Journal (VI, 2751; VI, 629, 637; Oct. 8,
    1968, p. 30096), approval of the Journal yields to the simple motion to
    adjourn (IV, 2757), administration of the oath (I, 171, 172), an
    arraignment of impeachment (VI, 469), and questions of the privileges of
    the House (II, 1630), and the Speaker may in his discretion recognize
    for a parliamentary inquiry before approval of the Journal (VI, 624).
    Under clause 1 of rule I, as amended in the 96th Congress, a point of
    order of no quorum is not in order before the Speaker announces his
    approval of the Journal. A point of order of no quorum is not in order
    during the reading of the Journal if a quorum has once been established

    Sec. 74. Motions to amend the
    Journal.

      Under the practice  before clause 1 of rule I was adopted in its present form,
    the motion to amend the Journal took precedence over the motion to
    approve it (IV, 2760; VI, 633); but the motion to amend may not be
    admitted after the previous question is demanded on a motion to approve
    (IV, 2770; VI, 633; VIII, 2684). An expression of opinion as to a
    decision of the Chair was held not in order as an amendment to the
    Journal (IV, 2848). A proposed amendment to the Journal being tabled
    does not carry the Journal with it (V, 5435, 5436). While a proposed
    correction of the Journal may be recorded in the Journal, yet it is not
    in order to insert in full in this indirect way what has been denied
    insertion in the first instance (IV, 2782, 2804, 2805). The earlier
    practice was otherwise, however (IV, 2801-2803). The Journal of the last
    day of a session is not approved on the assembling of the next session,
    and is not ordinarily amended (IV, 2743, 2744). For further discussion
    of the composition and approval of the Journal, see Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 1, ch. 5.

    Sec. 74a. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United
    States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892).

    Sec. 75. Yeas and Nays entered on the
    Journal.

      * * * and the  Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question
    shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the
    Journal.

    [[Page 33]]
    yeas and nays (V, 4949). However, when the call of the House is
    automatic under clause 4 of rule XV, the Speaker directs the roll to be
    called or the vote to be taken by electronic device without motion from
    the floor (VI, 678, 679, 694, 695); and should a quorum fail to vote and
    the House adjourn, proceedings under the automatic call are vacated and
    the question recurs de novo when the bill again comes before the House
    (Oct. 10, 1940, pp. 13534-35; Oct. 13, 1962, pp. 23474-75; Oct. 19,
    1966, p. 27641). While the Constitution and the rules of the House
    guarantee that votes taken by the yeas and nays be spread upon the
    Journal, neither requires that a Member's vote be announced to the
    public immediately during the vote (Sept. 19, 1985, p. 24245).

    Sec. 76. Conditions of ordering yeas and
    nays.

      The yeas and  nays may be ordered before the organization of the House (I, 91;
    V, 6012, 6013), but are not taken in Committee of the Whole (IV, 4722,
    4723). They are not necessarily taken on the passage of a resolution
    proposing an amendment to the Constitution (V, 7038, 7039; VIII, 3506),
    but are required to pass a bill over a veto (Sec. 104; VII, 1110). In
    the earlier practice of the House it was held that less than a quorum
    might not order the yeas and nays, but for many years the decisions have
    been uniformly the other way (V, 6016-6028). Neither is a quorum
    necessary on a motion to reconsider the vote whereby the yeas and nays
    are ordered (V, 5693). When a quorum fails on a yea and nay vote it is
    the duty of the Speaker and the House to take notice of that fact (IV,
    2953, 2963, 2988). If the House adjourns, the order for the yeas and
    nays remains effective whenever the bill again comes before the House
    (V, 6014, 6015; V, 740; VIII, 3108), and it has been held that the
    question of consideration might not intervene on a succeeding day before
    the second calling of the

      The yeas and nays may not be demanded until the Speaker has put the
    question in the form prescribed by clause 5 of rule I (Oct. 2, 1974, p.
    33623).

    Sec. 77. Demanding the yeas and nays.

      The yeas and  nays may
    be demanded while the Speaker is announcing the result of a division (V,
    6039), while a vote by tellers is being taken (V, 6038), and even after
    the announcement of the vote if the House has not passed to other
    business (V, 6040, 6041; VIII, 3110). But after the Speaker has
    announced the result of a division on a motion and is in the act of
    putting the question on another motion it is too late to demand the yeas
    and nays on the first motion (V, 6042). And it is not in order during
    the various processes of a division to repeat a demand for the yeas and
    nays which has once been refused by the House (V, 6029, 6030, 6031). The
    constitutional right of a Member to demand the yeas and nays may not be
    overruled as dilatory (V, 5737; VIII, 3107); but this constitutional
    right does not exist as to a vote to second a motion when such second is
    required by the rules (V, 6032-6036; VIII, 3109). The right to demand
    yeas and nays is not waived by the fact that the Member demanding them
    has just made the point of no quorum and caused the Chair to count the
    House (V, 6044).-

    [[Page 34]]

    Sec. 78. Yeas and nays ordered by onefifth.

      In passing on  a
    demand for the yeas and nays the Speaker need determine only whether
    one-fifth of those present sustain the demand (V, 6043; VIII, 3112,
    3115). In ascertaining whether one-fifth of those present support a
    demand for the yeas and nays the Speaker counts the entire number
    present and not merely those who rise to be counted (VIII, 3111, 3120).
    Such count is not subject to verification by appeal (Sept. 12, 1978, p.
    28984)), and a request for a rising vote of those opposed to the demand
    is not in order (VIII, 3112-3114). Where the Chair prolongs his count of
    the House in determining whether one-fifth have supported the demand for
    yeas and nays, he counts latecomers in support of the demand as well as
    for the number present (Sept. 24, 1990, p. ----). After the House, on a
    vote by tellers, has refused to order the yeas and nays it is too late
    to demand the count of the negative on an original vote (V, 6045).

    Sec. 79. Reconsideration of the vote ordering the
    yeas and nays.

      A motion to  reconsider the vote ordering the yeas and nays is in
    order (V, 6029; VIII, 2790), and the vote may be reconsidered by a
    majority. If the House votes to reconsider the yeas and nays may again
    be ordered by one-fifth (V, 5689-5691). But when the House, having
    reconsidered, again orders the yeas and nays, a second motion to
    reconsider may not be made (V, 6037). In one instance it was held that
    the yeas and nays might be demanded on a motion to reconsider the vote
    whereby the yeas and nays were ordered (V, 5689), but evidently there
    must be a limit to this process. The vote whereby the yeas and nays are
    refused may be reconsidered (V, 5692).

    Sec. 80. Effect of an order of the yeas and
    nays.

      In the general  but not the universal practice debate has not been closed by the
    ordering of the yeas and nays until one Member has responded to the call
    (V, 6101-6105, 6160, 6161). A motion to adjourn may be admitted after
    the yeas and nays are ordered and before the roll call has begun (V,
    5366); and a motion to suspend the rules has been entertained after the
    yeas and nays have been demanded on another matter (V, 6835).
    Consideration of a conference report (V, 6457), and a motion to
    reconsider the vote by which the yeas and nays were ordered (V, 6029;
    VIII, 2790) may be admitted. A demand for tellers or for a division is
    not precluded or set aside by the fact that the yeas and nays are
    demanded and refused (V, 5998; VIII, 3103).

    Sec. 81. Decisions of the court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United
    States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S.
    196 (1897); Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 U.S. 506 (1901); Marshall v.
    Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917).

    Sec. 82. Adjournment for more than three
    days.

      \4\ Neither House,  during the Session of Congress shall, without the Consent of the
    other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than
    that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

      The word ``Place'' in the above paragraph was construed to mean the
    seat of Government, and consent of the Senate is not required where the
    House orders its meetings to be held in another structure at the seat of
    Government (Speaker Rayburn, Aug. 17, 1949, pp. 11651, 11683).

    [[Page 35]]
    of the precarious condition of the roofs in the two Chambers. On June
    28, 1949, p. 8571, and on September 1, 1950, p. 14140, the House
    provided that until otherwise ordered its meetings be held in the Caucus
    room of the new House Office Building, pending the remodeling of its
    Chamber. On June 29, 1949, p. 8584, and on Aug. 9, 1950, p. 12106, the
    Senate provided that its meetings be held in the Chamber formerly
    occupied by the Supreme Court in the Capitol, pending remodeling of its
    Chamber. The House returned to its Chamber on January 3, 1950, and again
    on January 1, 1951. The Senate returned to its Chamber on January 3,
    1950, and again on January 3, 1951.-
      On November 22, 1940, p. 13715, the House of Representatives adopted a
    resolution providing that thereafter until otherwise ordered its
    meetings be held in the Caucus room of the new House Office Building.
    Likewise the Senate on the same day, p. 13709, provided that its
    meetings be held in the Chamber formerly occupied by the Supreme Court
    in the Capitol. The two Houses continued to hold their sessions in these
    rooms until the opening of the 77th Congress. These actions were
    necessitated because

    Sec. 83. Adjournment of the House within the
    threeday limit.

      The House of  Representatives in adjourning for not ``more than
    three days'' must take into the count either the day of adjourning or
    the day of the meeting, and Sunday is not taken into account in making
    this computation (V, 6673, 6674). By special order, the House may
    provide for a session of the House on a Sunday, traditionally a ``dies
    non'' under the precedents of the House (Dec. 17, 1982, p. 31946; Dec.
    18, 1987, p. 36352; Nov. 19, 1989, p. ----; Aug. 20, 1994, p. ----). The
    House has by standing order provided that it should meet on two days
    only of each week instead of daily (V, 6675). Before the election of
    Speaker, the House has adjourned for more than one day (I, 89, 221). The
    House has by unanimous consent agreed to an adjournment for less than
    three days but specified that it would continue in adjournment for ten
    days pursuant to a concurrent resolution already passed by the House if
    the Senate adopted the concurrent resolution before the third day of the
    House's adjournment (Nov. 20, 1987, p. 33054).

    [[Page 36]]
    of the Senate for periods of more than three days as determined by the
    Senate during such period (H. Con. Res. 438, Dec. 20, 1982, p. 32951).
    Another concurrent resolution in the 97th Congress provided for an
    adjournment of the Senate to a day certain and granted the consent of
    the Senate to an adjournment of the House for more than three days to a
    day certain, or to any day before that day as determined by the House
    (S. Con. Res. 102, May 27, 1982, pp. 12504, 12505). On one occasion the
    two Houses provided for an adjournment to a certain day, with a
    provision that if there should be no quorum present on that day the
    session should terminate (V, 6686). The two Houses have adjourned to a
    certain day, with a provision that they may be reassembled by the
    Leadership if legislative expediency so required such reassembling (July
    8, 1943, p. 7516; June 23, 1944, p. 6667; Sept. 21, 1944, p. 8109; July
    18, 1945, p. 7733; July 26, 1947, p. 10521; June 20, 1948, p. 9348; Aug.
    7, 1948, p. 10247), and in the 91st Congress, the two Houses agreed to a
    concurrent resolution adjourning both to dates certain but which also
    provided that the House was subject to recall by the Speaker if
    legislative expediency so warranted (July 20, 1970, p. 24978). In the
    93d Congress, 1st and 2d Sessions, the two Houses agreed to concurrent
    resolutions adjourning the Congress sine die with a provision that the
    two Houses could be reassembled by the Leadership (Dec. 22, 1973, p.
    43327; Dec. 20, 1974, p. 41815). Recall provisions were also included in
    1st and 2d session sine die adjourment resolutions in the 101st Congress
    (Nov. 21, 1989, p. 31156; Oct. 27, 1990, p. ----). In the 1st session of
    the 102d Congress, the two Houses agreed to a concurrent resolution
    providing for an adjournment of the House and Senate until 11:55 a.m. on
    January 3, 1992, or until recalled by their joint leaderships, with the
    proviso that when the 2d session convened at noon on January 3, 1992,
    the Senate and House would not conduct organizational or legislative
    business but would adjourn on that day until January 21 and 22, 1992,
    respectively, unless sooner recalled (H. Con. Res. 260, 102d Cong., Nov.
    26, 1991, p. ----); and that prohibition against the conduct of business
    was considered not to preclude recognition for one-minute speeches and
    special-order speeches by unanimous consent (Jan. 3, 1992, p. ----).

    Sec. 84. Resolutions for adjournment of
    the two Houses.

      Congress is adjourned  for more than three days by a concurrent resolution
    (IV, 4031, footnote). When it adjourns in this way, but not to or beyond
    the day fixed by Constitution or law for the next regular session to
    begin, the session is not thereby necessarily terminated (V, 6676,
    6677). Until the 67th Congress neither House had ever adjourned for more
    than three days by itself with the consent of the other, but resolutions
    had been offered for the accomplishment of that end (V, 6702, 6703). On
    June 30, 1922, the House adjourned until August 15, 1922, with the
    consent of the Senate. Pursuant to a concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res.
    266) the Senate granted its consent to an adjournment sine die of the
    House on August 20, 1954, and the House granted its consent to the
    Senate to an adjournment sine die at any time prior to December 25,
    1954. The Senate acting under the authority of the aforementioned
    resolution adjourned sine die on December 2, 1954. The adjournment
    resolution in the 97th Congress, 2d Session provided for adjournment
    sine die of the House on December 20 or December 21 pursuant to a motion
    made by the Majority Leader or his designee, and granted the consent of
    the House to adjournment sine die of the Senate at any time prior to
    January 3, 1983, as determined by the Senate, and the consent of the
    House for adjournments or recesses

      A concurrent resolution to provide for adjournment for more than three
    days is offered in the House as a matter of privilege (V, 6701-6706),
    and is not debatable (VIII, 3372-3374). The Legislative Reorganization
    Act of 1970 provides for a sine die adjournment, or (in an odd numbered
    year) an adjournment of slightly over a month (from that Friday in
    August which is at least 30 days before Labor Day to the Wednesday
    following Labor Day) unless the nation is in a state of war, declared by
    Congress (sec. 461(b); 84 Stat. 1140). Congress can, of course, waive,
    this requirement and make other determinations regarding its adjournment
    (see Sec. 948, infra).

    [[Page 37]]
    on the second concurrent resolution on the budget for the fiscal year
    in question, and on any reconciliation legislation required by such a
    resolution, contained in section 310(f) of the Congressional Budget Act
    of 1974 (P.L. 93-344), was repealed by the Balanced Budget and Emergency
    Deficit Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177). That law amended sections 309
    and 310 of the Congressional Budget Act to prohibit the consideration of
    concurrent resolutions during the month of July providing adjournments
    in excess of three days until the House has approved general annual
    appropriation bills within the jurisdictions of all the subcommittees on
    Appropriations for the ensuing fiscal year, and until the House has
    completed action on all reconciliation legislation for the ensuing
    fiscal year required to be reported by the concurrent resolution on the
    budget for that year (see Sec. 1007, infra).
      The requirement that resolutions providing for an adjournment sine die
    of either House may not be considered until Congress has completed
    action

     * * *
      A resolution providing for an adjournment sine die is not debatable
    (VIII, 3372-3374), though a Member may be recognized during its
    consideration under a reservation of objection to a unanimous consent
    request that the resolution be agreed to (Oct. 27, 1990, p. ----).

    Sec. 85. Compensation of
    Members.

      Section 6. \1\ The Senators and  Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their
    Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the
    United States.

    Sec. 86. Salary and
    deductions.

      The 27th amendment to the Constitution addresses laws ``varying the
    compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives (see
    Sec. 258, infra). The present rate of compensation of Representatives,
    the Resident Commissioner from  Puerto Rico, and Delegates is $133,600 per annum. The rate
    of compensation of the Speaker and the Vice President is $171,500 per
    annum (2 U.S.C. 31; 3 U.S.C. 104) with an additional $10,000 per annum
    to assist in defraying expenses (2 U.S.C. 31b; 3 U.S.C. 111). The
    Majority and Minority Leaders of the House receive $148,400 per annum (2
    U.S.C. 31). These rates of compensation are all (except for the expense
    allowances) subject to annual cost of living adjustments (2 U.S.C.
    31(2)). The present rate of compensation of Senators is that fixed by
    section 1101 of Public Law 101-194, as adjusted pursuant to 2 U.S.C.
    31(2).

    [[Page 38]]
    the calendar year following a report of the Commission, the President
    transmits to Congress his recommendations in light of such report (2
    U.S.C. 358). The recommendations of the President take effect only after
    the enactment into law of a bill or joint resolution approving them in
    their entirety and an intervening general election of Representatives. A
    bill or joint resolution to approve such recommendations is privileged
    (see Sec. 1013, infra) if offered by the Majority Leader or his designee
    within 60 calendar days of the President's transmittal, and must undergo
    a recorded vote on passage (2 U.S.C. 359).
      Under the Federal Salary Act of 1967 (2 U.S.C. 351-362), the Citizens'
    Commission on Public Service and Compensation (formerly the Commission
    on Executive, Legislative and Judicial Salaries) is authorized and
    directed to conduct quadrennial reviews of the rates of pay of specified
    government officials, including Members of Congress, and to report to
    the President the results of each review and its recommendations for
    adjustments in such rates. Not later than the first Monday after January
    3 of

      In 1985, the Salary Act was amended (P.L. 99-190, sec. 135) to require
    a salary commission report with respect to fiscal year 1987. The
    President transmitted his recommendations concerning that report in his
    fiscal year 1988 Budget message (Jan. 5, 1987, H. Doc. 100-11). When not
    disapproved by the Congress in accordance with the Salary Act (2 U.S.C.
    359), those recommendations took effect on March 1, 1987. On return to
    the normal quadrennial cycle, the President transmitted with his fiscal
    year 1990 Budget message recommendations concerning a salary commission
    report with respect to fiscal year 1989 (Jan. 9, 1989, H. Doc. 101-21).
    Those recommendations were disapproved by Public Law 101-1 (H. J. Res.
    129, 101st Cong., Feb. 7, 1989, p. 1708). In 1989, the Salary Act was
    amended (P.L. 101-194, sec. 701) to redesignate the Commission, refine
    the parameters for quadrennial adjustments, and provide for privileged
    consideration of legislation to approve adjustments recommended by the
    President. The quadrennial review contemplated by the statute did not
    occur in 1993. The next quadrennial review contemplated by the statute
    would be conducted in 1997 (2 U.S.C. 356), and the Commission is to
    report the results of that review to the President by December 15 of
    that year (2 U.S.C. 357). Adjustments hereafter are to maintain equal
    levels of pay among the Speaker, the Vice President, and the Chief
    Justice; among the Majority and Minority Leaders, the President pro
    tempore of the Senate, and level I of the Executive Schedule; and among
    Representatives, Senators, certain judges, and level II of the Executive
    Schedule (2 U.S.C. 362).

    [[Page 39]]

      The statutes also provides for deductions from the pay of Members and
    Delegates who are absent from the sessions of the House for reasons
    other than illness of themselves and families, or who retire before the
    end of the Congress (2 U.S.C. 39; IV, 3011, footnote). The law as to
    deductions has been held to apply only to Members who have taken the
    oath (II, 1154). Members and Delegates are paid monthly on certificate
    of the Speaker (2 U.S.C. 34, 35, 37, 57a). The Sergeant-at-Arms, or in
    case of his disability the Treasurer of the United States, disburses the
    pay of Members (31 U.S.C. 148). 4 U.S.C. 113 provides that the residence
    of a Member of Congress for purpose of imposing State income tax laws
    shall be the State from which elected and not the State or subdivision
    thereof in which the Member maintains an abode for the purpose of
    attending sessions of Congress.

    Sec. 87. Questions as to compensation.

      Questions have arisen  frequently as to compensation of Members especially in cases of
    Members elected to fill vacancies (I, 500; II, 1155) and where there
    have been questions as to incompatible offices (I, 500) or titles seat
    (II, 1206). The Supreme Court has held that a Member chosen to fill a
    vacancy is entitled to salary only from the time that the compensation
    of his predecessor has ceased, Page v. United States, 127 U.S. 67
    (1888). See also 2 U.S.C. 37.

    Sec. 88. Travel and other official expense
    allowances.

      In the 92d  Congress, the provisions of H. Res. 457 of that Congress,
    authorizing the Committee on House Administration (now House Oversight)
    to adjust allowances of Members and committees without further action by
    the House, were enacted into permanent law (85 Stat. 636; 2 U.S.C. 57),
    but the 94th Congress enacted into permanent law H. Res. 1372 of that
    Congress, stripping the Committee of that authority and requiring House
    approval of the committee's recommendations, except in cases made
    necessary by price changes in materials and supplies, technological
    advances in office equipment, and cost of living increases (90 Stat.
    1448; 2 U.S.C. 57a). The Committee on House Administration (now House
    Oversight) retains authority under 2 U.S.C. 57 to independently adjust
    amounts within total allowances and to set terms and conditions of such
    allowances (Mar. 21, 1977, p. 8227; Apr. 21, 1983, p. 9339).

      Each Member is authorized three allowances, an Official Expenses
    Allowance, a Clerk Hire Allowance, and an Official Mail Allowance (for
    franking costs), for the conduct of the official and representational
    duties of his office. A Member may transfer up to $75,000 each session
    between the Clerk Hire Allowance and the Official Expenses Allowance (by
    order of the Committee on House Administration on July 26, 1985, p.
    20795), and may transfer up to $25,000 from the Official Expenses
    Allowance or the Clerk Hire Allowance to the Official Mail Allowance.

      The Official Expenses Allowance, consolidating nine previously
    separate allowances, was authorized by order of the Committee on House
    Administration on June 30, 1976, pp. 21623-24, effective Jan. 3, 1977.
    Effective Jan. 3, 1989, the Official Expenses Allowance consists of a
    base of $122,500 per year plus variable expenses for travel and district
    office space:

              (a) The equivalent of 64 multiplied by the rate per mile

            multiplied by the mileage between the District of Columbia and

            the furthest point in the Member's District plus 10 percent, but

            in no case shall this amount be less than $6,200. Effective Jan.

            3, 1985 (for appropriate rates per mile, see U.S. House of

            Representatives Congressional Handbook, prepared by the

            Committee on House Administration (now House Oversight)).

              (b) The dollar equivalent of 2,500 square feet multiplied by

            the maximum per square foot rental rate charged to Federal

            Agencies by the General Services Administration in the Member's

            District.

    [[Page 40]]

    This allowance is available and may be obligated from January 3 of one
    year through January 2 of the following year and may be used for the
    expenses of travel, office equipment, district office lease, stationery,
    telecommunications, mass mailings, postage, computer services and other
    office and operational expenses (except for hiring and employment).
    Reimbursement for or payment of qualifying official expenses in any
    category and in any amount, up to the total of the consolidated
    allowance, is in the discretion of the Member. Clause 4 of rule XLIII
    and rule XLV limit the use of other funds or sources for defraying such
    official office and operational expenses. The Chief Administrative
    Officer maintains a stationery room where Members may purchase supplies
    (II, 1161; 2 U.S.C. 110).

      The annual Clerk Hire Allowance (for not to exceed 18 permanent clerks
    and 4 non-permanent clerks) is authorized for each Member, Delegate, and
    Resident Commissioner, up to a total sum of $568,560 per year (adjusted
    by order of the Committee on House Administration of June 30, 1976, pp.
    21623-24, and further adjusted by cost-of-living increases each October
    pursuant to section 204a of Public Law 94-82). Until January 1, 1988,
    the maximum salary for staff members was the rate of basic pay
    authorized for Level V of the Executive Schedule (by order of the
    Committee on House Administration, Mar. 21, 1977, p. 8227). Under
    section 311 of the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1988, as
    contained in section 101(i) of Public Law 100-202 (2 U.S.C. section 60a-
    2a), the maximum salary for staff members is set by pay order of the
    Speaker. A Member may not employ a relative on his Clerk Hire Allowance
    (5 U.S.C. 3110).

      The Official Mail Allowance is subject to regulations prescribed by
    the Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards with respect to
    matters governed by 39 U.S.C. 3210(a)(6)(D) and by the Committee on
    House Administration (now House Oversight) with respect to allocations
    and expenditures of the allowance. It is provided to pay the postage
    costs of first, third, and fourth class franked mailings in support of a
    Member's official and representational duties.

      Until the 103d Congress, each Member could also employ a ``Lyndon
    Baines Johnson Congressional Intern'' for a maximum of two months at not
    to exceed $1,160 per month. Such internships were available for college
    students and secondary or postsecondary school teachers (H. Res. 420,
    93d Cong., Sept. 18, 1973, p. 30186). Any paid internship is now funded
    through the Clerk Hire Allowance.

      The statutes provide for continuation of the pay of clerical
    assistants to a Member upon his or her death or resignation, until a
    successor is elected to fill the vacancy, such clerical assistants to
    perform their duties under the direction of the Clerk of the House (2
    U.S.C. 92a-92d). Upon the explusion of a Member in the 96th Congress,
    the House by resolution extended those provisions to any termination of
    service by a Member during the term of office (H. Res. 804, Oct. 2,
    1980, p. 28978).

    [[Page 41]]
    atives Congressional Handbook, Committee on House Administration (now
    House Oversight).
      For current information on the allowances for Members and the method
    of their accounting and disbursement, see current U.S. House of
    Represent

    Sec. 88a. Ban on Legislative Service
    Organizations.

      At its  organization the 104th Congress prohibited the
    establishment or continuation of any legislative service organization
    (as that term had been understood in the 103d Congress) and directed the
    Committee on House Oversight to take such steps as were necessary to
    ensure an orderly termination and accounting for funds of any
    legislative service organization in existence on January 3, 1995 (sec.
    222, H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. ----).

    Sec. 89. Leadership staff
    allowances.

      Separate from the  Clerk Hire Allowance specified above, the leaders of the
    House (the Speaker, Majority Leader, Minority Leader, Majority Whip and
    Minority Whip) are entitled to office staffing allowances consisting of
    certain statutory positions as well as lump-sum appropriations
    authorized by section 473 (84 Stat. 1140). The portion of these
    allowances for leadership office personnel may be adjusted by the Clerk
    of the House in certain situations when the President effects a pay
    adjustment for certain classes of federal employees under the Federal
    Pay Comparability Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-656; 84 Stat. 1946).

    Sec. 90. Privilege of Members from
    arrest.

      * * * They [the  Senators and Representatives] shall in all Cases, except
    Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest
    during their attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and
    in going to and returning from the same; * * *

    [[Page 42]]
    cases and related historical data are collected in Long v. Ansell, 293
    U.S. 76 (1934), where the Supreme Court held that the clause was
    applicable only to arrests in civil suits, now largely obsolete but
    common at the time of the adoption of the United States Constitution.
    Rule L, infra, was added in the 97th Congress to provide a standing
    procedure governing subpoenas to Members, officers, and employees
    directing their appearance as witnesses relating to the official
    functions of the House, or for the production of House documents.

    <>   * * * and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they
    [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other
    place.

    Sec. 91. Assertions of privilege of
    Members by the House.

      The word ``felony''  in this provision has been interpreted not to
    refer to a delinquency in a matter of debt (III, 2676), and ``treason,
    felony, and breach of the peace'' have been construed to mean all
    indictable crimes (III, 2673). The Supreme Court has held that the
    privilege does not apply to arrest in any criminal case. Williamson v.
    United States, 207 U.S. 425 (1908). The courts have discussed and
    sustained the privilege of the Member in going to and returning from the
    session (III, 2674); and where a person assaulted a Member on his way to
    the House, although at a place distant therefrom, the House arrested him
    on warrant of the Speaker, arraigned him at the bar and committed him
    (II, 1626, 1628). Other assaults under these circumstances have been
    treated as breaches of privilege (II, 1645). Where a Member had been
    arrested and detained under mesne process in a civil suit during a
    recess of Congress, the House decided that he was entitled to discharge
    on the assembling of Congress, and liberated him and restored him to his
    seat by the hands of its own officer (III, 2676). Service of process is
    distinguished from arrest in civil

    Sec. 93. Scope of the privilege.

      This privilege as  to ``any
    speech or debate'' applies generally to ``things done in a session of
    the House by one of its Members in relation to the business before it.''
    Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881), cited at III, 2675. See also
    II, 1655 and Secs. 301-302, infra, for provisions in Jefferson's
    Manual on the privilege; and Deschler's Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 7. The
    clause precludes judicial inquiry into the motivation, preparation, or
    content of a Member's speech on the floor and prevents such a speech
    from being made the basis for a criminal conspiracy charge against the
    Member. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966). The Supreme Court
    held in United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 447 (1979), that under the
    Speech or Debate Clause, neither evidence of nor references to
    legislative acts of a Member of Congress may be introduced by the
    Government in a prosecution under the official bribery statute. But the
    Supreme Court has limited the scope of legislative activity which is
    protected under the clause by upholding grand jury inquiry into the
    possession and nonlegislative use of classified documents by a Member.
    Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). The Court has also
    sustained the validity of an indictment of a Member for accepting an
    illegal bribe to perform legislative acts. United States v. Brewster,
    408 U.S. 501 (1972). Nor does the clause protect transmittal of
    allegedly defamatory material issued in press releases and newsletters
    by a Senator, as neither was essential to the deliberative process of
    the Senate. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). A complaint
    against an officer of the House relating to the dismissal of an official
    reporter of debates has been held nonjusticiable on the basis that her
    duties were directly related to the due functioning of the legislative
    process. Browning v. Clerk, 789 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. den.
    479 U.S. 996 (1986).

    [[Page 43]]
    the Supreme Court held that the aide of a Senator was protected under
    the clause when performing legislative acts which would have been
    protected under the clause if performed by the Senator himself. There is
    no distinction between the Members of a Senate subcommittee and its
    chief counsel insofar as complete immunity under the Speech and Debate
    Clause is provided for the issuance of a subpoena pursuant to legitimate
    legislative inquiry. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491
    (1975). See also Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) (relating to the
    dissemination of a congressional report) for the immunity under this
    clause of Members of the House and their staffs, and for the common-law
    immunity of the Public Printer and Superintendent of Documents.
      Legislative employees acting under orders of the House are not
    necessarily protected under the clause from judicial inquiry into the
    constitutionality of their actions. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
    (1969); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 165 (1880); Dombrowski v.
    Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967). But see Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S.
    606 (1972), where

      For federal court decisions on the applicability of the clause to
    unofficial circulation of reprints from the Congressional Record, see
    McGovern v. Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343 (1960); Long v. Ansell, 69 F.2d 386
    (1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 76 (1934); Methodist Federation for Social
    Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp. 729 (1956). For inquiry into a Member's
    use of the franking privilege, see Hoellen v. Annunzio, 468 F.2d 522
    (1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973); Schiaffo v. Helstoski, 350 F.
    Supp. 1076 (1972), rev'd 492 F.2d 413 (1974). For inquiry into the
    printing of committee reports, see Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973);
    Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175 (1970).

    Sec. 94. Action by the House.

      For assaulting a  Member for
    words spoken in debate, Samuel Houston, not a Member, was arrested,
    tried, and censured by the House (II, 1616-1619). Where Members have
    assaulted other Members for words spoken in debate (II, 1656), or
    proceeded by duel (II, 1644), or demanded explanation in a hostile
    manner (II, 1644), the House has considered the cases as of privilege. A
    communication addressed to the House by an official in an Executive
    Department calling in question words uttered by a Member in debate was
    criticized as a breach of privilege and withdrawn (III, 2684). An
    explanation having been demanded of a Member by a person not a Member
    for a question asked of the latter when a witness before the House, the
    matter was considered but not pressed as a breach of privilege (III,
    2681). A letter from a person supposed to have been assailed by a Member
    in debate, asking properly and without menace if the speech was
    correctly reported, was held to involve no question of privilege (III,
    2682). Unless it be clear that a Member has been questioned for words
    spoken in debate, the House declines to act (II, 1620; III, 2680).

      For assaulting a Member, Charles C. Glover was arrested, arraigned at
    the bar of the House, and censured by the Speaker by direction of the
    House, although the provocation of the assault was words spoken in
    debate in the previous Congress (VI, 333).

    [[Page 44]]
    (1967); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Gravel v. United
    States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501
    (1972); United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979); Hutchinson v.
    Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).

    Sec. 95. Decisions of the court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881);
    Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); United States v. Johnson, 383
    U.S. 169 (1966); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82

    Sec. 96. Restriction on appointment of
    Members to office.

      \2\ No Senator or  Representative shall, during the Time for which he
    was elected, be appointed to any Civil Office under the Authority of the
    United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof
    shall have been encreased during such time; *  *  *.

    <>
    *  *  * and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall
    be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.

      In a few cases questions have arisen under this paragraph (I, 506,
    footnote; and see 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 36 (1969); see also Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 7).

      The meaning of the word ``office'' as used in this paragraph has been
    discussed (I, 185, 417, 478, 493; II, 993; VI, 60, 64), as has also the
    general subject of incompatible offices (I, 563).

    [[Page 45]]
    House, or its committees, have found disqualified a Member who was
    appointed a militia officer in the District of Columbia (I, 486) and in
    various States (VI, 60), and Members who have accepted commissions in
    the Army (I, 491, 492, 494). But the Judiciary Committee has expressed
    the opinion that persons on the retired list of the Army do not hold
    office under the United States in the constitutional sense (I, 494). A
    Member-elect has continued to act as governor of a State after the
    assembling of the Congress to which he was elected (I, 503), but the
    duties of a Member of the House and the Governor of a State are
    absolutely inconsistent and may not be simultaneously discharged by the
    same Member (VI, 65).-

    Sec. 98. As to what are incompatible
    offices.

      The Judiciary Committee  has concluded that members of commissions created by law to
    investigate and report, but having no legislative, executive, or
    judicial powers, and visitors to academies, regents, directors, and
    trustees of public institutions, appointed under the law by the Speaker,
    are not officers within the meaning of the Constitution (I, 493).
    Membership on joint committees created by the statute is not an office
    in the contemplation of the Constitutional provision prohibiting Members
    of Congress from holding simultaneously other offices under the United
    States (VII, 2164). A Member of either House is eligible to appointment
    to any office not forbidden him by law, the duties of which are not
    incompatible with those of a Member (VI, 63) and the question as to
    whether a Member may be appointed to the Board of Managers of the
    Soldiers' Home and become local manager of one of the Homes, is a matter
    for the decision of Congress itself (VI, 63). The House has also
    distinguished between the performance of paid services for the Executive
    (I, 495), like temporary service as assistant United States attorney
    (II, 993), and the acceptance of an incompatible office. The House has
    declined to hold that a contractor under the Government is
    constitutionally disqualified to serve as a Member (I, 496). But the

    Sec. 99. Appointment of Memberselect to
    offices under the United States.

      The House decided  that the status of a Member-elect was
    not affected by the constitutional requirement (I, 499), the theory
    being advanced that the status of the Member-elect is distinguished from
    the status of the Member who has qualified (I, 184). And a Member-elect,
    who continued in an office after his election but resigned before taking
    his seat, was held entitled to the seat (I, 497, 498). But when a
    Member-elect held an incompatible office after the meeting of Congress
    he was held to have disqualified himself (I, 492). In other words, the
    Member-elect may defer until the meeting of Congress his choice between
    the seat and an incompatible office (I, 492). As early as 1874 the
    Attorney General opined that a Member-elect is not officially a Member
    of the House, and thus may hold any office until sworn (14 Op. Att'y
    Gen. 408 (1874)).

    Sec. 100. Relation of contestants to
    incompatible offices.

      The House has  manifestly leaned to the idea that a contestant
    holding an incompatible office need not make his election until the
    House has declared him entitled to the seat (I, 505). Although a
    contestant had accepted and held a State office in violation of the
    state constitution, if he were really elected a Congressman, the House
    did not treat his contest as abated (II, 1003). Where a Member had been
    appointed to an incompatible office a contestant not found to be elected
    was not admitted to fill the vacancy (I, 807).

    [[Page 46]]
    accepted an incompatible office may be agreed to by a majority vote (I,
    490). A Member charged with acceptance of an incompatible office was
    heard in his own behalf during the debate (I, 486).

    Sec. 101. Procedure of the House when
    incompatible offices are accepted.

      Where a Member  has accepted an incompatible
    office, the House has assumed or declared the seat vacant (I, 501, 502;
    VI, 65). In the cases of Baker and Yell, the Elections Committee
    concluded that the acceptance of a commission as an officer of
    volunteers in the national army vacated the seat of a Member (I, 488),
    and in another similar case the Member was held to have forfeited his
    right to a seat (I, 490). The House has seated a person bearing regular
    credentials on ascertaining that his predecessor in the same Congress
    had accepted a military office (I, 572). But usually the House by
    resolution formally declares the seat vacant (I, 488, 492). A Member-
    elect may defer until the meeting of Congress his choice between the
    seat and an incompatible office (I, 492). But when he retains the
    incompatible office and does not qualify, a vacancy has been held to
    exist (I, 500). A resolution excluding a Member who has

      Where it was held in federal court that a Member of Congress may not
    hold a commission in the Armed Forces Reserve under this clause, the
    U.S. Supreme Court reversed on other grounds, the plaintiff's lack of
    standing to maintain the suit. Reservists Committee to Stop the War v.
    Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833 (1971), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1075 (1972), rev'd on
    other grounds, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).

    Sec. 102. Bills raising revenue to
    originate in the House.

      Section 7. \1\ All Bills  for raising Revenue shall originate in the
    House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with
    Amendments as on other Bills.

    [[Page 47]]
    3, ch. 13, sec. 14.2; Aug. 19, 1982, p. 22127), but has been held
    nonprivileged with respect to a bill already presented to the President
    (Apr. 6, 1995, p. ----). On January 16, 1924, p. 1027, the Senate
    decided that a bill proposing a gasoline tax in the District of Columbia
    should not originate in the Senate (VI, 316). The House returned to the
    Senate: a Senate passed bill providing for the sale of Conrail and
    containing provisions relating to the tax treatment of the sale,
    notwithstanding inclusion in that bill of a ``disclaimer'' section
    requiring all revenue provisions therein to be contained in separate
    legislation originating in the House (Sept. 25, 1986, p. 26202); a
    Senate passed bill prohibiting the importation of commodities subject to
    tariff (July 30, 1987, p. 21582); a Senate-passed bill banning all
    imports from Iran, a tariff measure as affecting revenue from dutiable
    imports (June 16, 1988, p. 14780); a Senate-passed bill dealing with the
    tax treatment of income derived from the exercise of Indian treaty
    fishing rights (June 21, 1988, p. 15425); a Senate bill creating a tax-
    exempt government corporation (June 15, 1989, p. 12167); a Senate-passed
    bill addressing the tax treatment of police-corps scholarships and the
    regulation of firearms under the Internal Revenue Code (Oct. 22, 1991,
    p. ----); a Senate-passed bill including certain import sanctions in an
    export administration statute (Oct. 31, 1991, p. ----); a Senate-passed
    bill requiring the President to impose sanctions including import
    restrictions against countries that fail to eliminate largescale
    driftnet fishing (Feb. 25, 1992, p. ----); and a Senate amendment to a
    general appropriation bill proposing a user fee raising revenue to
    finance broader activities of the agency imposing the levy, thereby
    raising general revenue (Aug. 12, 1994, p. ----).
      This provision has been the subject of much discussion (II, 1488,
    1494). In the earlier days the practice was not always correct (II,
    1484); but in later years the House has insisted on its prerogative and
    the Senate has often shown reluctance to infringe thereon (II, 1482,
    1483, 1493). In several instances, however, the subject has been matter
    of contention, conference (II, 1487, 1488), and final disagreement (II,
    1485, 1487, 1488). Sometimes, however, when the House has questioned an
    invasion of prerogative, the Senate has receded (II, 1486, 1493). The
    disagreements have been especially vigorous over the right of the Senate
    to concur with amendments (II, 1489), and while the Senate has
    acquiesced in the sole right of the House to originate revenue bills, it
    has at the same time held to a broad power of amendment (II, 1497-1499).
    The House has frequently challenged the Senate on this point (II, 1481,
    1491, 1496; Sept. 14, 1965, p. 23632). When the House has conceived that
    its prerogative has been invaded, it has ordered the bill to be returned
    to the Senate (II, 1493-1495; VI, 317; Mar. 30, 1937, p. 2930; H. Res.
    598, July 2, 1960, p. 15818; H. Res. 831, Oct. 10, 1962, p. 23014; H.
    Res. 397, May 20, 1965, p. 11149; H. Res. 478, Nov. 8, 1979, p. 31518;
    H. Res. 195, May 17, 1983, p. 12486; Oct. 1, 1985, p. 25418; June 16,
    1988, p. 14780; June 21, 1988, p. 15425; Sept. 23, 1988, p. 25094; Sept.
    28, 1988, p. 26415; Oct. 21, 1988, p. 33110, 33111; Nov. 9, 1989, p.
    28271; Aug. 12, 1994, p. ----), or declined to proceed further with it
    (II, 1485). A bill raising revenue incidentally was held not to infringe
    upon the Constitutional prerogative of the House to originate revenue
    legislation (VI, 315). Discussion of differentiation between bills for
    the purpose of raising revenue and bills which incidentally raise
    revenue (VI, 315). A question relating to the invasion of the
    Constitutional prerogatives of the House by a Senate amendment may be
    raised at any time when the House is in possession of the papers, but
    not otherwise; thus, the question has been presented pending the motion
    to call up a conference report on the bill (June 20, 1968, Deschler's
    Precedents, vol.

      Clause 5(b) of rule XXI, added in the 98th Congress, prohibits
    consideration of any amendment, including any Senate amendment,
    proposing a tax or tariff measure during consideration of a bill or
    joint resolution reported by a committee not having that jurisdiction
    (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1983, p. 34).

      For discussion as to the prerogatives of the House under this clause,
    and discussion of the prerogatives of the House to originate
    appropriation bills, see Deschler's Precedents, vol. 3, ch. 13.

    Sec. 103. Decisions of the court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); Twin
    City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S.
    429 (1906); Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914); Flint v. Stone
    Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911).

    [[Page 48]]
    tions to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter
    the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.
    If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to
    pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the
    other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved
    by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such
    Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and
    the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be
    entered on the Journal of each House respectively. * * *.

    Sec. 104. Approval and disapproval of bills by
    the President.

      \2\ Every Bill  which shall have passed the House of Representatives
    and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the
    President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if
    not he shall return it, with his Objec

    [[Page 49]]
    exposition of his reasons for signing it was examined and severely
    criticized by a committee of the House (IV, 3492); and in 1842 a
    committee of the House discussed the act of President Jackson in writing
    above his signature of approval a memorandum of his construction of the
    bill (IV, 3492). But where the President has accompanied his message
    announcing the approval with a statement of his reasons there has been
    no question in the House (IV, 3491). The statutes require that bills
    signed by the President shall be received by the Archivist of the United
    States and deposited in his office (1 U.S.C. 106a). Formerly these bills
    were received by the Secretary of State (IV, 3485) and deposited in his
    office (IV, 3429).

    Sec. 105. The act of approval.

      Under the usual  practice,
    bills are considered to have been ``presented to the President'' at the
    time they are delivered to the White House. In 1959, bills delivered to
    the White House while the President was abroad were ``held for
    presentation to the President upon his return to the United States'' by
    the White House. The United States Court of Claims held, in Eber Bros.
    Wine and Liquor Corp. v. United States, 337 F.2d 624 (1964), cert.
    denied, 380 U.S. 950 (1965), that where the President had determined,
    with the informal acquiescence of leaders of Congress, that bills from
    the Congress were to be received at the White House only for
    presentation to him upon his return to the United States and the bill
    delivered to the White House was so stamped, the presidential veto of
    the bill more than 10 days after delivery to the White House but less
    than 10 days after his return to the country was timely. The second
    session of the 89th Congress adjourned sine die while President Johnson
    was on an Asian tour and receipts for bills delivered to the White House
    during that time were marked in like manner. The approval of a bill by
    the President of the United States is valid only with his signature (IV,
    3490). Prior to the adoption of the 20th amendment to the Constitution,
    at the close of a Congress, when the two Houses prolonged their sessions
    into the forenoon of March 4, the approvals were dated on the prior
    legislative day, as the legislative portion of March 4 belonged to the
    term of the new Congress. In one instance, however, bills signed on the
    forenoon of March 4 were dated as of that day with the hour and minute
    of approval given with the date (IV, 3489). The 20th amendment to the
    Constitution changed the date of meeting of the Congress to January 3d.
    The act of President Tyler in filing with a bill an

    Sec. 106. Notice of approval sent by
    message.

      Notice of the  signature of a bill by the President is sent by message to
    the House in which it originated (VII, 1089) and that House informs the
    other (IV, 3429). But this notice is not necessary to the validity of
    the act (IV, 3495). Sometimes, at the close of a Congress the President
    informs the House of such bills as he has approved and of such as he has
    allowed to fail (IV, 3499-3502). In one instance he communicated his
    omission to sign a bill through the committee appointed to notify him
    that Congress was about to adjourn (IV, 3504). A bill that had not
    actually passed having been signed by the President, he disregarded it
    and a new bill was passed (IV, 3498). Messages of the President giving
    notice of bills approved are entered in the Journal and published in the
    Congressional Record (V, 6593).

    Sec. 107. Disapproval (or veto) of
    bills.

      A message withholding  approval of a bill, called a veto message, is sent to the House
    in which the bill originated; but it has been held that such a message
    may not be returned to the President on his request after it has been
    laid before the Senate (IV, 3521). Instance where a veto message which
    had not been laid before the House was returned to the President on his
    request (Aug. 1, 1946, p. 10651). A vetoed bill received in the House by
    way of the Senate is considered as if received directly from the
    President and supersedes the regular order of business (IV, 3537; VII,
    1109). A veto message may not be read in the absence of a quorum, even
    though the House be about to adjourn sine die (IV, 3522; VII, 1094); but
    the message may be read and acted on at the next session of the same
    Congress (IV, 3522). When the President has been prevented by
    adjournment from returning a bill with his objections he has sometimes
    at the next session communicated his reasons for not approving (V, 6618-
    6620).

    [[Page 50]]

      Although the ordinary form of a return veto is a message under seal
    returning the enrollment with a statement of the President's objections,
    an enrolled House bill returned to the Clerk during the August recess
    with a ``memorandum of disapproval'' setting forth the objections of the
    President was considered as a return veto (Sept. 11, 1991, p. ----).

    [[Page 51]]
    (Sept. 7, 1965, pp. 22958-59; Aug. 4, 1988, p. 20365). When the motion
    to discharge is agreed to, the veto message is pending as unfinished
    businesss (Mar. 7, 1990, p. 3621). While a vetoed bill is always
    privileged, the same is not true of a bill reported in lieu of it (IV,
    3531; VII, 1103).

    Sec. 108. Consideration of a vetoed bill in the
    House.

      It is the  usual but not invariable rule that a bill returned with the
    objections of the President shall be voted on at once (IV, 3534-3536)
    and when laid before the House the question on the passage is considered
    as pending and no motion from the floor is required (VII, 1097-1099),
    but it has been held that the constitutional mandate that ``the House
    shall proceed to consider'' means that the House shall immediately
    proceed to consider it under the rules of the House, and that the
    ordinary motions under the rules of the House--to refer, to commit, or
    to postpone to a day certain--are in order (IV, 3542-3550; VII, 1100,
    1105, 1113; Speaker Wright, Aug. 3, 1988, p. 20280), and are debatable
    under the hour rule (VIII, 2740). Although under clause 4 of rule XVI,
    and under the precedents the motion for the previous question takes
    precedence over motions to postpone or to refer when a question is under
    debate, where the Speaker has laid before the House a veto message from
    the President but has not yet stated the question to be on overriding
    the veto, that question is not ``under debate'' and the motion for the
    previous question does not take precedence (Speaker Wright, Aug. 3,
    1988; Procedure, ch. 24, sec. 15.8). A resolution asserting that to
    recognize for a motion to refer a veto message before stating the
    question on overriding the veto would interfere with the constitutional
    prerogative of the House to proceed to that question, and directing the
    Speaker to state the question on overriding the veto as pending before
    recognizing for a motion to refer, did not give rise to a question of
    the privileges of the House (Speaker Wright, Aug. 3, 1988, p. 20281). A
    motion to refer a vetoed bill, either with or without the message, has
    been held allowable within the constitutional mandate that the House
    ``shall proceed to reconsider'' (IV, 3550; VII, 1104, 1105, 1108, 1114),
    and in the 101st Congress, a veto pending as unfinished business was
    referred with instructions to consider and report promptly (Jan. 24,
    1990, p. 421). But while the ordinary motion to refer may be applied to
    a vetoed bill, it is not in order to move to recommit it pending the
    demand for the previous question or after it is ordered (IV, 3551; VII,
    1102). When a veto message is before the House for consideration de novo
    or as unfinished business, a motion to refer the message to committee
    takes precedence over the question of passing the bill, the objections
    of the President to the contrary notwithstanding (Procedure, ch. 24,
    sec. 15.8; Oct. 25, 1983, p. 29188), but the motion to refer may be laid
    on the table (Oct. 25, 1983, p. 29188). A vetoed bill having been
    rejected by the House, the message was referred (IV, 3552; VII, 1103).
    Committees to which vetoed bills have been referred have sometimes
    neglected to report (IV, 3523, 3550, footnotes; VII, 1108, 1114). A
    vetoed bill may be laid on the table (IV, 3549; VII, 1105), but it is
    still highly privileged and a motion to take it from the table is in
    order at any time (IV, 3550; V, 5439). Also a motion to discharge a
    committee from the consideration of such a bill is privileged (IV, 3532;
    Aug. 4, 1988, p. 20365) and (in the modern practice) is debatable (Mar.
    7, 1990, p. 3620) but is subject to the motion to lay on the table

    Sec. 109. Action on a vetoed bill.

      If two-thirds of  the
    House to which a bill is returned with the President's objections agree
    to pass it, and then two-thirds of the other House also agree, it
    becomes a law (IV, 3520). The yeas and nays are required to pass a bill
    over the President's veto (art. I, sec. 7; IV, 2726, 3520; VII, 1110).
    The two-thirds vote required to pass the bill is two-thirds of the
    Members present and voting and not two-thirds of the total membership of
    the House (IV, 3537, 3538; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276
    (1919)). Only Members voting should be considered in determining whether
    two-thirds voted in the affirmative (VII, 1111). The motion to
    reconsider may not be applied to the vote on reconsideration of a bill
    returned with the objections of the President (V, 5644; VIII, 2778).

      It is the practice for one House to inform the other by message of its
    decision that a bill returned with the objections of the President shall
    not pass (IV, 3539-3541). A bill passed notwithstanding the objections
    of the President is sent by the presiding officer of the House which
    last acts on it to the Archivist, who receives it and deposits it in his
    office (1 U.S.C. 106a). Formerly these bills were sent to the Secretary
    of State (IV, 3524) and deposited in his office (IV, 3485).

    Sec. 110. Errors in bills sent to the
    President.

      A bill incorrectly  enrolled has been recalled from the President, who erased
    his signature (IV, 3506). Bills sent to the President but not yet signed
    by him are sometimes recalled by concurrent resolution of the two Houses
    (IV, 3507-3509; VII, 1091; Sept. 4, 1962, p. 18405; May 6, 1974, p.
    13076), and amended; but this proceeding is regarded as irregular (IV,
    3510-3518). When the two Houses of Congress request the President by
    concurrent resolution to return an enrolled bill delivered to him and
    the President honors the request, the ten-day period under this clause
    runs anew from the time the bill is re-enrolled and is again presented
    to the President. Thus, in the 93d Congress the President returned on
    May 7, 1974 a bill pursuant to the request of Congress (H. Con. Res.
    485, May 6, 1974, p. 13076). The bill was again enrolled, presented to
    the President on May 7, and marked ``received May 7'' at the White
    House. An error in an enrolled bill that has gone to the President may
    also be corrected by a joint resolution (IV, 3519; VII, 1092). In the
    99th Congress, two enrollments of a continuing appropriation bill for FY
    1987 were presented to and signed by the President, the second
    correcting an omission in the first (see P.L. 99-500 and 99-591).

    [[Page 52]]
    ed States, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 191 (1873); Missouri Pacific Railway Co.
    v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919); Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482
    (1932); Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938).

    Sec. 110a. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States,
    175 U.S. 423 (1899); Gardner v. Collector, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 499 (1868);
    Matthews v. Zane, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 164 (1822); Lapeyre v. Unit

    Sec. 111. Bills which become laws without the
    President's approval.

      * * * If any  Bill shall not be returned by the President
    within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to
    him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it,
    unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which
    Case it shall not be a Law.

      A bill signed by the President within ten days (Sunday excepted) after
    it has been presented to him becomes a law even though such signing
    takes place when Congress is not in session, whether during the period
    of an adjournment to a day certain or after the final adjournment of a
    session. Presidents currently sign bills after sine die adjournment but
    within ten days after their receipt. President Truman signed several
    bills passed in the 81st Congress after the convening of the 82d
    Congress but within ten days (P.L. 910-921; 64 Stat. 1221-1257); and
    President Reagan approved bills passed in the 97th Congress which were
    presented after the convening of the 98th Congress (P.L. 97-419 et
    seq.). It was formerly contended that the President might not approve
    bills during a recess (IV, 3493, 3494), and in one instance, in 1864,
    when the President signed a bill after final adjournment of Congress but
    within ten days grave doubts were raised and an adverse report was made
    by a House committee (IV, 3497). Later opinions of the Attorney General
    have been to the effect that the President has the power to approve
    bills within ten days after they have been presented to him during the
    period of an adjournment to a day certain (IV, 3496) and after an
    adjournment sine die (VII, 1088). The Supreme Court has held valid as
    laws bills signed by the President within ten days during a recess for a
    specified time (La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 451
    (1899); IV, 3495) and also those signed after an adjournment sine die
    (Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482 (1932)).

    [[Page 53]]
    ing three days while the other branch of the Congress remained in
    session, did not prevent a return of the vetoed bill to the House of
    origin (Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938)).

    Sec. 112. The pocket veto.

      A bill which  is passed by both
    Houses of Congress during the first regular session of a Congress and
    presented to the President less than ten days (Sundays excepted) before
    the sine die adjournment of that session, but is neither signed by the
    President, nor returned by him to the House in which it originated, does
    not become a law (``The Pocket Veto Case,'' 279 U.S. 655 (1929); VII,
    1115). President Truman during an adjournment to a day certain pocket
    vetoed several bills passed by the 81st Congress and also, after the
    convening of the 82d Congress, pocket vetoed one bill passed in the 81st
    Congress. The Supreme Court has held that the adjournment of the House
    of origin for not exceed

    Sec. 113. Effect of adjournment to a day
    certain.

      Doubt has existed  as to whether a bill which remains with the President ten
    days without his signature, Congress meanwhile before the tenth day
    having adjourned to a day certain, becomes a law (IV, 3483, 3496; VII,
    1115); an opinion of the Attorney General in 1943 stated that under such
    circumstances a bill not signed by the President did not become a law
    (40 Op. Att'y Gen. 274 (1943)). However, more recently, where a Member
    of the Senate challenged in federal court the effectiveness of such a
    pocket veto, a United States Court of Appeals held that a Senate bill
    could not be pocket-vetoed by the President during an ``intrasession''
    adjournment of Congress to a day certain for more than three days, where
    the Secretary of the Senate had been authorized to receive Presidential
    messages during such adjournment. Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C.
    Cir., 1974). See also Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1976).
    Following a consent decree in this case, it was announced that President
    Ford would utilize a ``return'' veto, subject to override, in
    intersession and intrasession adjournments where authority exists for
    the appropriate House to receive such messages notwithstanding the
    adjournment.

      In the 101st Congress, when President Bush returned an enrolled bill
    during the intersession adjournment, not by way of message under seal
    but with a ``memorandum of disapproval'' setting forth his objections,
    the House treated it as a return veto subject to override under article
    I, section 7 (Jan. 23, 1990, p. 4). Similarly, in the 102d Congress, an
    enrolled House bill returned to the Clerk during the August recess, not
    by way of message under seal but with a ``memorandum of disapproval''
    setting forth the objections of the President, was considered as a
    return veto (Sept. 11, 1991, p. ----). Also in the 102d Congress,
    President Bush purported on December 20, 1991, to pocket veto a bill (S.
    1176) that was presented to him on December 9, 1991, notwithstanding
    that the Congress was in an intrasession adjournment (from Nov. 27,
    1991, until 11:55 a.m., Jan. 3, 1992) rather than an adjournment sine
    die (see Jan. 21, 1992, p. ----); and during debate on a subsequent bill
    (S. 2184) purporting to repeal the provisions of S. 1176 and to enact
    instead provisions acceding to the objections of the President, the
    Speaker inserted remarks on the pocket veto in light of modern
    Congressional practice concerning the receipt of messages and
    communications during recesses and adjournments (Mar. 3, 1992, p. ----).

    [[Page 54]]
    within the meaning of article I, section 7 of the Constitution and
    proceeded to reconsider and to pass the bill over the President's veto,
    after postponing consideration to a subsequent day (motion to postpone,
    Nov. 18, 1974, p. 36246; veto override, Nov. 20, 1974, p. 36621).
    Subsequently, on November 21, 1974, the Senate also voted to override
    the veto (p. 36882) and pursuant to 1 U.S.C. 106a the Enrolling Clerk of
    the Senate forwarded the bill to the Archives for publication as a
    public law. The Administrator of General Services at the Archives (now
    Archivist), upon instructions from the Department of Justice, declined
    to promulgate the bill as public law on the day received. The question
    as to the efficacy of the Congressional action in passing the bill over
    the President's veto was mooted when the House and Senate passed on
    November 26, 1974 (pp. 37406, 37603), an identical bill which was signed
    into law on December 7, 1974 (P.L. 93-516). In 1989, as part of the
    concurrent resolution providing for the sine die adjournment of the
    first session, the Congress reaffirmed its position that an intersession
    adjournment did not prevent the return of a bill where the Clerk and the
    Secretary of the Senate were authorized to receive messages during the
    adjournment (H. Con. Res. 239, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., Nov. 21, 1989, p.
    31156). For the views of the Speaker, the Minority Leader, and the
    Attorney General concerning pocket veto authority during an intrasession
    adjournment, see correspondence inserted in the Record (Jan. 23, 1990,
    p. 3); and for discussions of the constitutionality of intersession or
    intrasession pocket vetoes see Kennedy, ``Congress, The President, and
    The Pocket Veto,'' 63 Va. L. Rev. 355 (1977), and Hearing, Subcommittee
    on Legislative Process, Committee on Rules, on H.R. 849, 101st Congress.
      In the 93d Congress, the President returned a House bill without his
    signature to the Clerk of the House, who had been authorized to receive
    messages from the President during an adjournment to a day certain, and
    the President asserted in his veto message that he had ``pocket vetoed''
    the bill during the adjournment of the House to a day certain. The House
    regarded the President's return of the bill without his signature as a
    veto

    Sec. 114. Decisions of the court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States,
    175 U.S. 423 (1899); Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 U.S. 506; the Pocket
    Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929); Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482
    (1932); Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938); Burke v. Barnes,
    479 U.S. 361 (1987) (vacating and remanding as moot the decision sub
    nom. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).

    [[Page 55]]
    resentatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the
    Case of a Bill.

    Sec. 115. As to presentation of orders and
    resolutions for approval.

      \3\ Every Order,  Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence
    of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a
    question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the
    United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved
    by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of
    the Senate and House of Rep

      It has been settled conclusively that a joint resolution proposing an
    amendment to the Constitution should not be presented to the President
    for his approval (V, 7040; Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. [3 Dall.]
    378 (1798) ). Such joint resolutions, after passage by both Houses, are
    presented to the Archivist (1 U.S.C. 106b). Although the requirement of
    the Constitution seems specific, the practice of Congress has been to
    present to the President for approval only such concurrent resolutions
    as are legislative in effect (IV, 3483, 3484) which is not within the
    scope of the modern form of concurrent resolutions. See section 192,
    infra, for a discussion of Presidential approval of a joint resolution
    extending the period for State ratification of a constitutional
    amendment already submitted to the States. For discussion of
    ``Congressional Disapproval'' provisions contained in public laws, see
    Sec. 1013, infra.

    Sec. 116. Decisions of the Court.

      Decisions  of the Supreme
    Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United
    States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United
    States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); INS v. Chadha, 103 S.Ct. 2764 (1983);
    Consumer's Union, Inc. v. FTC, 103 S.Ct. 3556 (1983); Consumer Energy
    Council of America v. FERC, 103 S.Ct. 3556 (1983).

    Sec. 117. The revenue power.

      Section 8. The Congress  shall
    have Power \1\ To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to
    pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of
    the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
    throughout the United States;
    <>   \2\ To borrow Money on the
    credit of the United States:

    Sec. 119. Power over commerce.

      \3\ To regulate  Commerce with
    foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
    Tribes;

    [[Page 56]]

    <>   \5\ To coin Money,
    regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of
    Weights and Measures;

    Sec. 120. Naturalization and bankruptcy.

      \4\ To establish  an
    uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of
    Bankruptcies throughout the United States;

    Sec. 122. Counterfeiting.

      \6\ To provide  for the Punishment
    of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;-
    -
    <>   \7\ To establish Post
    Offices and Post Roads;

    Sec. 124. Patents and copyrights.

      \8\ To promote  the
    Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
    Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
    and Discoveries;
    <>   \9\ To constitute Tribunals
    inferior to the supreme Court;
    <>   \10\
    To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,
    and Offenses against the Law of Nations;
    <>   \11\
    To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules
    concerning Captures on Land and Water;

    [[Page 57]]
    6 and 7 of the Act provide congressional procedures for joint
    resolutions, bills, and concurrent resolutions introduced pursuant to
    the provisions of the Act (see Sec. 1013(2), infra). For further
    discussion of that Act, and war powers generally, see Deschler's
    Precedents, vol. 3, ch. 13.

    Sec. 128. War powers of Congress and the
    President.

      In the 93d  Congress, the Congress passed over the President's veto
    Public Law 93-148, relating to the power of Congress to declare war
    under this clause and the power of the President as Commander in Chief
    under article II, section 2, clause 1 (Sec. 178, infra). The law
    requires that the President report to Congress on the introduction of
    United States Armed Forces in the absence of a declaration of war. The
    President must terminate use of the Armed Forces unless Congress, within
    sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be
    submitted, (1) declares war or authorizes use of the Armed Forces; (2)
    extends by law the sixty-day period; or (3) is physically unable to meet
    as result of armed attack. The Act also provided that Congress could
    adopt a concurrent resolution requiring the removal of Armed Forces
    engaged in foreign hostilities, a provision which should be read in
    light of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Sections

    Sec. 129. Raising and support of armies.

      \12\ To raise  and
    support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a
    longer Term than two Years;
    <>   \13\ To provide and
    maintain a Navy;
    <>   \14\ To make Rules for the
    Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

    Sec. 132. Calling out the militia.

      \15\ To provide  for
    calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
    Insurrections and repel Invasions;

    Sec. 133. Power over militia.

      \16\ To provide  for
    organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing
    such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United
    States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the
    Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the
    discipline prescribed by Congress;

    [[Page 58]]
    the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other
    needful Buildings;--And

    Sec. 134. Power over territory of the United
    States.

      \17\ To exercise  exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such
    District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of
    particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of
    the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over
    all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in
    which the Same shall be, for

    -  \18\ To make <> all Laws
    which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
    foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
    the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
    thereof.

    Sec. 135. Congressional authority over
    the District of Columbia.

      Congress has provided  by law that ``all that part of the territory
    of the United States included within the present limits of the District
    of Columbia shall be the permanent seat of government of the United
    States'' (4 U.S.C. 71). Pursuant to its authority under this clause,
    Congress provided in 1970 for the people of the District of Columbia to
    be represented in the House of Representatives by a Delegate and for a
    Commission to report to the Congress on the organization of the
    government of the District of Columbia (P.L. 91-405; 84 Stat. 845). For
    the powers and duties of the Delegate from the District of Columbia, see
    rule XII (Sec. 740, infra) and Deschler's Precedents, vol. 2, ch. 7,
    sec. 3. In 1973, Congress passed the District of Columbia Self-
    Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, which reorganized the
    governmental structure of the District, provided a charter for local
    government subject to acceptance by a majority of the registered
    qualified voters of the District, delegated certain legislative powers
    to the District, and implemented certain recommendations of the
    Commission on the Organization of the Government of the District of
    Columbia (P.L. 93-198; 87 Stat. 774). Section 604 of that Act provides
    for Congressional action on certain district matters by providing a
    procedure for approval and disapproval of certain actions by the
    District of Columbia Council. The section, as amended by Public Law 98-
    473, permits a highly privileged motion to discharge a joint resolution
    of approval or disapproval which has not been reported by the committee
    to which referred within twenty calendar days after its introduction
    (see Sec. 1013(5), infra).

    [[Page 59]]
    be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each
    Person.

    Sec. 137. Migration or importation of
    persons.

      Section 9. \1\ The  Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States
    now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the
    Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a
    Tax or duty may

    Sec. 138. Writ of habeas corpus.

      \2\ The Privilege of  the
    Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
    Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.
    <>   \3\ No
    Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.

    Sec. 140. Capitation and direct
    taxes.

      \4\ [No Capitation,  or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the
    Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.]

    Sec. 141. Export duties.

      This provision was changed in 1913 by the 16th amendment to the
    Constitution.
       \5\ No Tax or Duty shall be laid on
    Articles exported from any State.

    Sec. 142. Freedom of commerce.

      \6\ No Preference  shall be
    given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State
    over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State,
    be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.

    Sec. 143. Appropriations and accounting of public
    money.

      \7\ No Money  shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
    Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the
    Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from
    time to time.

    [[Page 60]]
    sent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or
    Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.

    Sec. 144. Titles of nobility and gifts from
    foreign states.

      \8\ No Title of  Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no
    Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without
    the Con

    Sec. 145. Foreign gifts and
    decorations.

      Consent has been  granted to officers and employees of the government,
    under enumerated conditions, to accept certain gifts and decorations
    from foreign governments (see 5 U.S.C. 7342). The adoption of this act
    largely has obviated the practice of passing private bills to permit the
    officer or employee to retain the award. However, where the Speaker (who
    was one of the officers empowered by an earlier law to approve retention
    of decorations by Members of the House) was himself tendered an award
    from a foreign government, a private law (Private Law 91-244) was
    enacted to permit him to accept and wear the award so that he would not
    be in the position of reviewing his own application under the provisions
    of the law.

      Public Law 95-105 amended the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act (now 5
    U.S.C. 7342) to designate the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct
    of the House of Representatives as the ``employing agency'' for the
    House with respect to foreign gifts and decorations received by Members
    and employees; under that statute the Committee may approve the
    acceptance of foreign decorations and has promulgated regulations to
    carry out the Act with respect to Members and employees (Jan. 23, 1978,
    pp. 452-53), and disposes of foreign gifts which may not be retained by
    the donee.

      Opinions of Attorneys General:

      Gifts from Foreign Prince, 24 Op. Att'y Gen. 117 (1902); Foreign
    Diplomatic Commission, 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 538 (1871); Marshal of Florida,
    6 Op. Att'y Gen. 409 (1854).

    Sec. 146. States not to make treaties, coin
    money, pass ex post facto laws, impair contracts, etc.

      Section 10. \1\ No  State shall
    enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of
    Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing
    but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of
    Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of
    Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

    [[Page 61]]
    spection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by
    any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of
    the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision
    and Controul of the Congress.

    Sec. 147. States not to lay imposts or
    duties.

      \2\ No State  shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or
    Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary
    for executing it's in

    Sec. 148. States not to lay tonnage taxes, make
    compacts, or go to war.

      \3\ No State  shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay
    any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace,
    enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a
    foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such
    imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.