[Journal of the House of Representatives, 1998]
[Wednesday, January 28, 1998 (2), Para 2.11 Message from the President--U.S.-Swiss Nuclear Energy Agreement]
[Pages 41-42]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]
para.2.11 message from the president--u.s.-Swiss nuclear energy
agreement
The SPEAKER pro tempore, Mr. SNOWBARGER, laid before the House a
message from the President, which was read as follows:
To the Congress of the United States:
I am pleased to transmit to the Congress, pursuant to sections 123 b.
and 123 d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2153(b), (d)), the text of a proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between
the Government of the United States of America and the Swiss Federal
Council Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, with accompanying
agreed minute, annexes, and other attachments. I am also pleased to
transmit my written approval, authorization, and determination
concerning the agreement, and the memorandum of the Director of the
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency with the Nuclear
Proliferation Assessment Statement concerning the agreement. The joint
memorandum submitted to me by the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Energy, which includes a summary of the provisions of the agreement
and other attachments, including the views of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, is also enclosed.
The proposed new agreement with Switzerland has been negotiated in
accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) and as otherwise amended. It
replaces an earlier agreement with Switzerland signed December 30, 1965,
which expired by its terms August 8, 1996. The proposed new agreement
will provide an updated, comprehensive framework for peaceful nuclear
cooperation between the United States and Switzerland, will facilitate
such cooperation, and will establish strengthened nonproliferation
conditions and controls including all those required by the NNPA. The
new agreement provides for the transfer of moderator material, nuclear
material, and equipment for both nuclear research and nuclear power
purposes. It does not provide for transfers under the agreement of any
sensitive nuclear technology (SNT). (U.S. law permits SNT to be
transferred outside the coverage of an agreement for cooperation
provided that certain other conditions are satisfied. However, the
Administration has no plans to transfer SNT to Switzerland outside the
agreement.)
The proposed agreement has an initial term of 30 years, and will
continue in force indefinitely thereafter in increments of 5 years each
until terminated in accordance with its provisions. In the event of
termination, key nonproliferation conditions and controls, including
guarantees of safeguards, peaceful use and adequate physical protection,
and the U.S. right to approve retransfers to third parties, will remain
effective with respect to transferred moderator materials, nuclear
materials, and equipment, as well as nuclear material produced through
their use. The agreement also establishes procedures for determining the
survival of additional controls.
Switzerland has strong nonproliferation credentials. It is a party to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and has an
agreement with the International Atomic
[[Page 42]]
Energy Agency (IAEA) for the application of full-scope IAEA safeguards
within its territory. In negotiating the proposed agreement, the United
States and Switzerland took special care to elaborate a preamble setting
forth in specific detail the broad commonality of our shared
nonproliferation commitments and goals.
The proposed new agreement provides for very stringent controls over
certain fuel cycle activities, including enrichment, reprocessing, and
alteration in form or content and storage of plutonium and other
sensitive nuclear materials. The United States and Switzerland have
accepted these controls on a reciprocal basis, not as a sign of either
Party's distrust of the other, and not for the purpose of interfering
with each other's fuel cycle choices, which are for each Party to
determine for itself, but rather as a reflection of our common
conviction that the provisions in question represent an important norm
for peaceful nuclear commerce.
In view of the strong commitment of Switzerland to the international
nonproliferation regime, the comprehensive nonproliferation commitments
that Switzerland has made, the advanced technological character of the
Swiss civil nuclear program, the long history of U.S.-Swiss cooperation
in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without any risk of
proliferation, and the long-standing close and harmonious political
relationship between Switzerland and the United States, the proposed
new agreement provides to Switzerland advance, long-term U.S. approval
for retransfers to specified facilities in the European Atomic Energy
Community (EURATOM) of nuclear material subject to the agreement for
reprocessing, alteration in form or content, and storage, and for the
return to Switzerland of recovered nuclear materials, including
plutonium, for use or storage at specified Swiss facilities. The
proposed agreement also provides advance, long-term U.S. approval for
retransfers from Switzerland of source material, uranium (other than
high enriched uranium), moderator material, and equipment to a list of
countries and groups of countries acceptable to the United States. Any
advance, long-term approval may be suspended or terminated if it ceases
to meet the criteria set out in U.S. law, including criteria relating
to safeguards and physical protection.
In providing advance, long-term approval for certain nuclear fuel
cycle activities, the proposed agreement has features similar to those
in several other agreements for cooperation that the United States has
entered into subsequent to enactment of the NNPA. These include U.S.
agreements with Japan and EURATOM. Among the documents I am
transmitting herewith to the Congress is an analysis of the advance,
long-term approvals contained in the proposed U.S. agreement with
Switzerland. The analysis concludes that the approvals meet all
requirements of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended.
I believe that the proposed agreement for cooperation with
Switzerland will make an important contribution to achieving our
nonproliferation, trade, and other significant foreign policy goals.
In particular, I am convinced that this agreement will strengthen the
international nuclear nonproliferation regime, support of which is a
fundamental objective of U.S. national security and foreign policy, by
setting a high standard for rigorous nonproliferation conditions and
controls.
Because the agreement contains all the consent rights and guarantees
required by current U.S. law, it represents a substantial upgrading of
the U.S. controls in the recently-expired 1965 agreement with
Switzerland.
I believe that the new agreement will also demonstrate the U.S.
intention to be a reliable nuclear trading partner with Switzerland,
and thus help ensure the continuation and, I hope, growth of U.S. civil
nuclear exports to Switzerland.
I have considered the views and recommendations of the interested
agencies in reviewing the proposed agreement and have determined that
its performance will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable
risk to, the common defense and security. Accordingly, I have approved
the agreement and authorized its execution and urge that the Congress
give it favorable consideration.
Because this agreement meets all applicable requirements of the
Atomic Energy Act, as amended, for agreements for peaceful nuclear
cooperation, I am transmitting it to the Congress without exempting it
from any requirement contained in section 123 a. of the Act. This
transmission shall constitute a submittal for purposes of both sections
123 b. and 123 d. of the Atomic Energy Act. The Administration is
prepared to begin immediately the consultations with the Senate Foreign
Relations and House International Relations Committees as provided in
section 123 b. Upon completion of the 30-day continuous session period
provided for in section 123 b., the 60-day continuous session period
provided for in section 123 d. shall commence.
William J. Clinton.
The White House, January 28, 1998.
By unanimous consent, the message, together with the accompanying
papers, was referred to the Committee on International Relations and
ordered to be printed (H. Doc. 105-184).