FINAL REPORT

Select Commitee to Investigate the

January 6th

Attack on the United States Capitol

December 22, 2022

117th Congress Second Session

House Report 117-663

SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES CAPITOL

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman

LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming, Vice Chair

ZOE LOFGREN, California

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California

PETE AGUILAR, California

STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida

JAMIE RASKIN, Maryland

ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois

COMMITTEE STAFF

David B. Buckley, Staff Director

Kristin L. Amerling, Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel

Hope Goins, Senior Counsel to the Chairman

Joseph B. Maher, Senior Counsel to the Vice Chair

Timothy J. Heaphy, Chief Investigative Counsel

Jamie Fleet, Senior Advisor

Timothy R. Mulvey, Communications Director

Candyce Phoenix, Senior Counsel and Senior Advisor

John F. Wood, Senior Investigative Counsel and Of Counsel to the Vice Chair


Katherine B. Abrams, Staff Associate

Temidayo Aganga-Williams, Senior Investigative Counsel

Alejandra Apecechea, Investigative Counsel

Lisa A. Bianco, Director of Member Services and Security Manager

Jerome P. Bjelopera, Investigator

Bryan Bonner, Investigative Counsel

Richard R. Bruno, Senior Administrative Assistant

Marcus Childress, Investigative Counsel

John Marcus Clark, Security Director

Jacqueline N. Colvett, Digital Director

Heather I. Connelly, Professional Staff Member

Meghan E. Conroy, Investigator

Heather L. Crowell, Printer Proofreader

William C. Danvers, Senior Researcher

Soumyalatha O. Dayananda, Senior Investigative Counsel

Stephen W. DeVine, Senior Counsel

Lawrence J. Eagleburger, Professional Staff Member

Kevin S. Elliker, Investigative Counsel

Margaret E. Emamzadeh, Staff Associate

Sadallah A. Farah, Professional Staff Member

Daniel A. George, Senior Investigative Counsel

Jacob H. Glick, Investigative Counsel

Aaron S. Greene, Clerk

Marc S. Harris, Senior Investigative Counsel

Alice K. Hayes, Clerk

Quincy T. Henderson, Staff Assistant

Jenna Hopkins, Professional Staff Member

Camisha L. Johnson, Professional Staff Member

Thomas E. Joscelyn, Senior Professional Staff Member

Rebecca L. Knooihuizen, Financial Investigator

Casey E. Lucier, Investigative Counsel

Damon M. Marx, Professional Staff Member

Evan B. Mauldin, Chief Clerk

Yonatan L. Moskowitz, Senior Counsel

Hannah G. Muldavin, Deputy Communications Director

Jonathan D. Murray, Professional Staff Member

Jacob A. Nelson, Professional Staff Member

Elizabeth Obrand, Staff Associate

Raymond OâMara, Director of External Affairs

Elyes Ouechtati, Technology Partner

Robin M. Peguero, Investigative Counsel

Sandeep A. Prasanna, Investigative Counsel

Barry Pump, Parliamentarian

Sean M. Quinn, Investigative Counsel

Brittany M. J. Record, Senior Counsel

Denver Riggleman, Senior Technical Advisor

Joshua D. Roselman, Investigative Counsel

James N. Sasso, Senior Investigative Counsel

Grant H. Saunders, Professional Staff Member

Samantha O. Stiles, Chief Administrative Officer

Sean P. Tonolli, Senior Investigative Counsel

David A. Weinberg, Senior Professional Staff Member

Amanda S. Wick, Senior Investigative Counsel

Darrin L. Williams, Jr., Staff Assistant

Zachary S. Wood, Clerk

CONTRACTORS & CONSULTANTS

Rawaa Alobaidi

Melinda Arons

Steve Baker

Elizabeth Bisbee

David Canady

John Coughlin

Aaron Dietzen

Gina Ferrise

Angel Goldsborough

James Goldston

Polly Grube

L. Christine Healey

Danny Holladay

Percy Howard

Dean Jackson

Stephanie J. Jones

Hyatt Mamoun

Mary Marsh

Todd Mason

Ryan Mayers

Jeff McBride

Fred Muram

Alex Newhouse

John Norton

Orlando Pinder

Owen Pratt

Dan Pryzgoda

Brian Sasser

William Scherer

Driss Sekkat

Chris Stuart

Preston Sullivan

Brian Young

Innovative Driven

Foreword: Speaker of the House

âI do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter: So help me God.â

All Members of the United States Congress take this sacred oath. On January 6, 2021, Democrats and Republicans agreed that we would fulfill this oathâand that we had an obligation to signal to the world that American Democracy would prevail.

In furtherance of fulfilling this duty, the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol was charged with investigating the facts, circumstances and causes that led to this domestic terror attack on the Capitol, the Congress and the Constitution.

We owe a debt of gratitude to Chairman Bennie Thompson, Vice Chair Liz Cheney, the patriotic Members of Congress and dedicated staffâwho devoted themselves to this investigation, to uncovering the truth and to writing a report that is a âRoadmap for Justice.â

The Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack has succeeded in bringing clarity and demonstrating with painstaking detail the fragility of our Democracy. Above all, the work of the Select Committee underscores that our democratic institutions are only as strong as the commitment of those who are entrusted with their care.

As the Select Committee concludes its work, their words must be a clarion call to all Americans: to vigilantly guard our Democracy and to give our vote only to those dutiful in their defense of our Constitution.

Let us always honor our oath to, as Abraham Lincoln said, ânobly save, or meanly lose, the last best hope of earth.â So help us God.

NANCY PELOSI

Speaker of the House

Foreword: Chairman

We were told to remove our lapel pins.

At the start of every new Congress, House Members are presented with lapel pins. They are about the size of a quarter and carry a seal of a bald eagle.

On a routine day in the Capitol, there are thousands of tourists, advocates, and workers. Typically, the pins are an easy way to spot House members.

However, on January 6, 2021, the pin that once was a badge of honor and distinction turned into a bullseye.

On that day, tear gas fogged the air as gunfire rang out, and a violent mob crashed against the sealed doors. Concerned for our safety, Capitol Police officers told us that our lapel pins would make us a target for rioters.

As the Capitol Police rushed Members of Congress and staff to safety, that simple and, in context, sensible warning stuck with me. On January 6, 2021, my colleagues and I came to work with the intent of fulfilling our oaths of office and constitutional duty to carry out the peaceful transfer of power. We were the peopleâs representatives in the peopleâs House doing the peopleâs business. Sadly, on that day, the danger was too great for our work to continue and for us to remain in the Capitol. It was too dangerous to be identified as a representative of the American people.

Iâve been a Member of the House for nearly 30 years. In that time, thereâs not a day that goes by that I donât feel a profound sense of duty and responsibility to the men and women who sent me to Congress to be their voice. After all, Iâm from a part of the country where, in my lifetime, Black people were excluded entirely from political processes. Jim Crow laws prevented my father from registering to vote, and tragically during his life, he never cast a vote.

For generations, the people in communities I represent have struggled to have their voices heard by their government. Therefore, I take my duties and responsibilities seriously, advocating for greater economic opportunity, robust infrastructure, better schools, and safer housing for my constituents.

However, that long struggle to overcome oppression and secure basic civil and human rights continues to be my highest priority. I am always mindful of the journey that brought me to Washington as a member of Congress to be the voice of the women and men of Mississippi. As a violent mob stormed the Capitol trying to take away peopleâs votes, rioters carried the battle flag from a failed rebellion of confederate states. This moment resonated deeply with me because of my personal history. Additionally, I continually think about the ongoing struggle to ensure justice and equality for all Americans.

The Capitol building itself is a fixture in our countryâs history, of both good and bad. After all, this structure is among the most recognizable symbols of American democracy. The Capitolâs shining dome, topped with the statue of goddess Freedom, was built partially by the labor of enslaved people in the 18th and 19th centuries. Dark chapters of Americaâs history are written into the buildingâs marble, sandstone, and mortar. And yet in the halls and chambers of this building, leaders of courage passed amendments to our Constitution and enacted the laws that banned slavery, guaranteed equal rights under the law, expanded the vote, promoted equality, and moved our country, and her people, forward. The Capitol Building itself is a symbol of our journey toward a more perfect union. It is a temple to our democracy.

Those great moments in our history have come when men and women put loyalty to our country and Constitution ahead of politics and party. They did the right thing. The work of the Select Committee certainly originates from the same tradition. Our bipartisan membership has moved politics to the side and focused on the facts, circumstances, and causes of January 6th.

When I think back to January 6th, after nearly a year and a half of investigation, I am frightened about the peril our democracy faced. Specifically, I think about what that mob was there to do: to block the peaceful transfer of power from one president to another based on a lie that the election was rigged and tainted with widespread fraud.

I also think about why the rioters were there, besieging the legislative branch of our government. The rioters were inside the halls of Congress because the head of the executive branch of our government, the then-President of the United States, told them to attack. Donald Trump summoned that mob to Washington, D.C. Afterward, he sent them to the Capitol to try to prevent my colleagues and me from doing our Constitutional duty to certify the election. They put our very democracy to the test.

Trumpâs mob came dangerously close to succeeding. Courageous law enforcement officers put their lives on the line for hours while Trump sat in the White House, refusing to tell the rioters to go home, while watching the assault on our republic unfold live on television.

When it was clear the insurrection would fail, Trump finally called off the mob, telling them, âWe love you.â Afterward, Congress was able to return to this Capitol Building and finish the job of counting the Electoral College votes and certifying the election.

This is the key conclusion of the Select Committee, all nine of us, Republicans and Democrats alike.

But who knows what would have happened if Trumpâs mob had succeeded in stopping us from doing our job? Who knows what sort of constitutional grey zone our country would have slid into? Who would have been left to correct that wrong?

As required by House Resolution 503, which established the Select Committee, weâve explored in great detail the facts, circumstances, and causes of the attack. This report will provide new details that supplement those findings the committee already presented during our hearings.

But there are some questions for which there are still no clear answers, even if all the facts, circumstances, and causes are brought to bear. The âWhat If?â questions. For the good of American democracy, those questions must never again be put to the test. So, while itâs important that this report lays out what happened, itâs just as important to focus on how to make sure that January 6th was a one-time eventâto identify the ongoing threats that could lead us down that dangerous path againâwith hopes and humble prayers that the committeeâs work is carried on through corrective action.

This report will provide greater detail about the multistep effort devised and driven by Donald Trump to overturn the 2020 election and block the transfer of power. Building on the information presented in our hearings earlier this year, we will present new findings about Trumpâs pressure campaign on officials from the local level all the way up to his Vice President, orchestrated and designed solely to throw out the will of the voters and keep him in office past the end of his elected term.

As weâve shown previously, this plan faltered at several points because of the courage of officials (nearly all of them Republicans) who refused to go along with it. Donald Trump appeared to believe that anyone who shared his partisan affiliation would also share the same callous disregard for his or her oath to uphold the rule of law. Fortunately, he was wrong.

The failure of Trumpâs plan was not assured. To the contrary, Trumpâs plan was successful at several turns. When his scheme to stay in power through political pressure hit roadblocks, he relentlessly pushed ahead with a parallel plan: summoning a mob to gather in Washington, DC on January 6th, promising things âwill be wild!â

That mob showed up. They were armed. They were angry. They believed the âBig Lieâ that the election had been stolen. And when Donald Trump pointed them toward the Capitol and told them to âfight like hell,â thatâs exactly what they did.

Donald Trump lit that fire. But in the weeks beforehand, the kindling he ultimately ignited was amassed in plain sight.

Thatâs why as part of the Select Committeeâs investigation, we took a hard look at whether enough was done to mitigate that risk. Our investigative teams focused on the way intelligence was gathered, shared, and assessed. We probed preparations by law enforcement agencies and security responses on the day of the attack. We followed the money, to determine who paid for a number of events in the run-up to the attack and to gain a clearer understanding of the way the former Presidentâs campaign apparatus cashed in on the big lie. And we pulled back the curtain at certain major social media companies to determine if their policies and protocols were up to the challenge when the President spread a message of violence and his supporters began to plan and coordinate their descent on Washington.

The Select Committeeâs conclusion on these mattersâparticularly dealing with intelligence and law enforcementâis consistent with our broader findings about the causes of January 6th. Were agencies perfect in their preparations for January 6th and their responses as the violence unfolded? Of course not. Relevant oversight committees and watchdogs should continue to find efficiencies and improvements, some of which are laid out in Committeeâs recommendations.

But the shortfall of communications, intelligence and law enforcement around January 6th was much less about what they did or did not know. It was more about what they could not know. The President of the United States inciting a mob to march on the Capitol and impede the work of Congress is not a scenario our intelligence and law enforcement communities envisioned for this country. Prior to January 6th, it was unimaginable. Whatever weaknesses existed in the policies, procedures, or institutions, they were not to blame for what happened on that day.

And so, when I think about the ongoing threatsâwhen I think about how to avoid having to confront those âWhat-Ifs?â in the futureâmy concerns are less with the mechanics of intelligence gathering and security posture, as important as those questions are. My concerns remain first and foremost with those who continue to seek power at the expense of American democracy.

What if those election officials had given in to Donald Trumpâs pressure? What if the Justice Department had gone along with Trumpâs scheme to declare the 2020 election fraudulent? What if the Vice President had tried to throw out electoral votes? What if the rioters bent on stopping the peaceful transfer of power hadnât been repelled?

To cast a vote in the United States of America is an act of both hope and faith. When you drop that ballot in the ballot box, you do so with the confidence that every person named on that ballot will hold up their end of the bargain. The person who wins must swear an oath and live up to it. The people who come up short must accept the ultimate results and abide by the will of the voters and the rule of law. This faith in our institutions and laws is what upholds our democracy.

If that faith is brokenâif those who seek power accept only the results of elections that they winâthen American democracy, only a few centuries old, comes tumbling down.

Thatâs the danger.

Whatâs the solution?

The Committee believes a good starting point is the set of recommendations we set forth in our report, pursuant to House Resolution 503. Driven by our investigative findings, these recommendations will help strengthen the guardrails of our democracy.

Beyond what we recommend, in my view and as I said during our hearings, the best way to prevent another January 6th is to ensure accountability for January 6th. Accountability at all levels.

I have confidence in our Department of Justice and institutions at the state and local level to ensure accountability under the law. As this report is released, we see those processes moving forward.

But preventing another January 6th will require a broader sort of accountability. Ultimately, the American people chart the course for our countryâs future. The American people decide whom to give the reins of power. If this Select Committee has accomplished one thing, I hope it has shed light on how dangerous it would be to empower anyone whose desire for authority comes before their commitment to American democracy and the Constitution.

I believe most Americans will turn their backs on those enemies of democracy.

But some will rally to the side of the election deniers, and when I think about who some of those people are, it troubles me deep inside. White supremacists. Violent extremists. Groups that subscribe to racism, anti-Semitism, and violent conspiracy theories; those who would march through the halls of the Capitol waving the Confederate battle flag.

These are people who want to take America backward, not toward some imagined prior greatness, but toward repression. These are people who want to roll back what weâve accomplished. I believe that those who aligned with the scheme to overturn the election heeded Donald Trumpâs call to march on the Capitol because they thought taking up Donald Trumpâs cause was a way to advance their vile ambitions.

That is why I did not remove my lapel pin on January 6th.

Our country has come too far to allow a defeated President to turn himself into a successful tyrant by upending our democratic institutions, fomenting violence, and, as I saw it, opening the door to those in our country whose hatred and bigotry threaten equality and justice for all Americans.

We can never surrender to democracyâs enemies. We can never allow America to be defined by forces of division and hatred. We can never go backward in the progress we have made through the sacrifice and dedication of true patriots. We can never and will never relent in our pursuit of a more perfect union, with liberty and justice for all Americans.

I pray that God continues to bless the United States of America.

BENNIE G. THOMPSON

Chairman

Foreword: Vice Chair

In April 1861, when Abraham Lincoln issued the first call for volunteers for the Union Army, my great-great grandfather, Samuel Fletcher Cheney, joined the 21st Ohio Volunteer Infantry. He fought through all four years of the Civil War, from Chickamauga to Stones River to Atlanta. He marched with his unit in the Grand Review of Troops up Pennsylvania Avenue in May 1865, past a reviewing stand where President Johnson and General Grant were seated.

Silas Canfield, the regimental historian of the 21st OVI, described the men in the unit this way:

Industry had taught them perseverance, and they had learned to turn aside for no obstacle. Their intelligence gave them a just appreciation of the value and advantage of free government, and the necessity of defending and maintaining it, and they enlisted prepared to accept all the necessary labors, fatigues, exposures, dangers, and even death for the unity of our Nation, and the perpetuity of our institutions. 1

I have found myself thinking often, especially since January 6th, of my great-great grandfather, and all those in every generation who have sacrificed so much for âthe unity of our Nation and the perpetuity of our institutions.â

At the heart of our Republic is the guarantee of the peaceful transfer of power. Members of Congress are reminded of this every day as we pass through the Capitol Rotunda. There, eight magnificent paintings detail the earliest days of our Republic. Four were painted by John Trumbull, including one depicting the moment in 1793 when George Washington resigned his commission, handing control of the Continental Army back to Congress. Trumbull called this, âone of the highest moral lessons ever given the world.â With this noble act, George Washington established the indispensable example of the peaceful transfer of power in our nation.

Standing on the West Front of the Capitol in 1981, President Ronald Reagan described it this way:

To a few of us here today, this is a solemn and most momentous occasion, and yet in the history of our nation it is a commonplace occurrence. The orderly transfer of authority as called for in the Constitution routinely takes place, as it has for almost two centuries, and few of us stop to think how unique we really are. In the eyes of many in the world, this every-4-year ceremony we accept as normal is nothing less than a miracle.

Every President in our history has defended this orderly transfer of authority, except one. January 6, 2021 was the first time one American President refused his Constitutional duty to transfer power peacefully to the next.

In our work over the last 18 months, the Select Committee has recognized our obligation to do everything we can to ensure this never happens again. At the outset of our investigation, we recognized that tens of millions of Americans had been persuaded by President Trump that the 2020 Presidential election was stolen by overwhelming fraud. We also knew this was flatly false, and that dozens of state and federal judges had addressed and resolved all manner of allegations about the election. Our legal system functioned as it should, but our President would not accept the outcome.

What most of the public did not know before our investigation is this: Donald Trumpâs own campaign officials told him early on that his claims of fraud were false. Donald Trumpâs senior Justice Department officials âeach appointed by Donald Trump himself âinvestigated the allegations and told him repeatedly that his fraud claims were false. Donald Trumpâs White House lawyers also told him his fraud claims were false. From the beginning, Donald Trumpâs fraud allegations were concocted nonsense, designed to prey upon the patriotism of millions of men and women who love our country.

Most Americans also did not know exactly how Donald Trump, along with a handful of others, planned to defeat the transfer of Presidential power on January 6th. This was not a simple plan, but it was a corrupt one. This report lays that plan out in detailâa plan that ultimately had seven parts, anticipating that Vice President Pence, serving in his role as President of the Senate, would refuse to count official Biden electoral slates from multiple states. We understood from the beginning that explaining all the planning and machinations would be complex and would require many hours of public presentations and testimony. We also understood that our presentations needed to be organized into a series of hearings that presented the key evidence for the American public to watch live or streamed over a reasonable time period, rather than rely on second-hand accounts as reported by media organizations with their own editorial biases. We organized our hearings in segments to meet that goal. Tens of millions of Americans watched.

Among the most shameful findings from our hearings was this: President Trump sat in the dining room off the Oval Office watching the violent riot at the Capitol on television. For hours, he would not issue a public statement instructing his supporters to disperse and leave the Capitol, despite urgent pleas from his White House staff and dozens of others to do so. Members of his family, his White House lawyers, virtually all those around him knew that this simple act was critical. For hours, he would not do it. During this time, law enforcement agents were attacked and seriously injured, the Capitol was invaded, the electoral count was halted and the lives of those in the Capitol were put at risk. In addition to being unlawful, as described in this report, this was an utter moral failureâand a clear dereliction of duty. Evidence of this can be seen in the testimony of his White House Counsel and several other White House witnesses. No man who would behave that way at that moment in time can ever serve in any position of authority in our nation again. He is unfit for any office.

* * *

In presenting all of the information in our hearings, we decided that the vast majority of our witnesses needed to be Republicans. They were. We presented evidence from two former Trump Administration Attorneys General, a former White House Counsel, many former Trump-appointed White House, Justice Department, and Trump Campaign staff, a respected former conservative judge, the former Secretary of Labor, and many others.

Like our hearings, this report is designed to deliver our findings in detail in a format that is accessible for all Americans. We do so in an executive summary, while also providing immense detail for historians and others. We are also releasing transcripts and evidence for the public to review, consistent with a small number of security and privacy concerns. A section of this report also explains the legal conclusions we draw from the evidence, and our concerns about efforts to obstruct our investigation.

The Committee recognizes that this investigation is just a beginning; it is only an initial step in addressing President Trumpâs effort to remain in office illegally. Prosecutors are considering the implications of the conduct we describe in this report. As are voters. John Adams wrote in 1761, âThe very ground of our liberties is the freedom of elections.â Faith in our elections and the rule of law are paramount to our Republic. Election-deniersâthose who refuse to accept lawful election resultsâpurposely attack the rule of law and the foundation of our country.

As you read this report, please consider this: Vice President Pence, along with many of the appointed officials who surrounded Donald Trump, worked to defeat many of the worst parts of Trumpâs plan to overturn the election. This was not a certainty. It is comforting to assume that the institutions of our Republic will always withstand those who try to defeat our Constitution from within. But our institutions are only strong when those who hold office are faithful to our Constitution. We do not know what would have happened if the leadership of the Department of Justice declared, as Donald Trump requested, that the election was âcorrupt,â if Jeff Clarkâs letters to State Legislatures had been sent, if Pat Cipollone, Jeff Rosen, Richard Donoghue, Steve Engel and others were not serving as guardrails on Donald Trumpâs abuses.

Part of the tragedy of January 6 th is the conduct of those who knew that what happened was profoundly wrong, but nevertheless tried to downplay it, minimize it or defend those responsible. That effort continues every day. Today, I am perhaps most disappointed in many of my fellow conservatives who know better, those who stood against the threats of communism and Islamic terrorism but concluded that it was easier to appease Donald Trump, or keep their heads down. I had hoped for more from them.

The late Charles Krauthammer wrote, âThe lesson of our history is that the task of merely maintaining strong and sturdy the structures of a constitutional order is unending, the continuing and ceaseless work of every generation.â This task is unending because democracy can be fragile and our institutions do not defend themselves.

The history of our time will show that the bravery of a handful of Americans, doing their duty, saved us from an even more grave Constitutional crisis. Elected officials, election workers, and public servants stood against Donald Trumpâs corrupt pressure. Many of our witnesses showed selfless patriotism and their words and courage will be remembered.

The brave men and women of the Capitol Police, Metropolitan Police and all the other law enforcement officers who fought to defend us that day undoubtedly saved lives and our democracy.

Finally, I wish to thank all who honorably contributed to the work of the Committee and to this Report. We accomplished much over a relatively short period of time, and many of you sacrificed for the good of your nation. You have helped make history and, I hope, helped right the ship.

LIZ CHENEY

Vice Chair

ENDNOTE

Â Â 1. Silas S. Canfield, History of the 21st Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry in the War of the Rebellion (Vrooman, Anderson & Bateman, printers, 1893), p. 10.

Table of Contents

Preliminaries

Foreword: Speaker of the House

Executive Summary: Overview of the Evidence Developed

Referrals to the U.S. Department of Justice Special Counsel and House Ethics Committee

Efforts to Avoid Testifying, Evidence of Obstruction, and Assessments of Witness Credibility

Summary: Creation of the Select Committee; Purposes.

Select Committee Witnesses Were Almost Entirely Republican

Narrative

1.1 The Big Lie Reflected Deliberate Exploitation of the âRed Mirageâ

1.2 Trumpâs Pre-Election Plans to Declare Victory

1.3 Trumpâs Pre-Election Efforts to Delegitimize the Election Process

1.4 President Trumpâs Launch of the Big Lie

1.5 Post-Election: President Trump Replaces His Campaign Team

1.7 President Trump Had His Day in Court

1.8 President Trump Repeatedly Promoted Conspiracy Theories

1.9 President Trumpâs January 6th Speech

Chapter 2. âI JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTESâ

2.1 The Electoral College, and President Trumpâs Attempt to Subvert It

2.3 Outreach and Implementation of the Plan

2.4 An Outright Request for Victory

2.5 Some Officials Eagerly Assisted President Trump With His Plans

2.6 The Final Outreach to State Legislators

2.7 The Harm Caused by Demonizing Public Servants

Chapter 3. FAKE ELECTORS AND THE âTHE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE STRATEGYâ

3.1 Laying the Groundwork for the Fake Elector Plan: The Chesebro Memos

3.2 President Trump and the Campaign Adopt the Fake Elector Scheme

3.3 The Campaign Legal Team Bows Out, and Giuliani Steps In

3.4 Some of the Proposed Fake Electors Express Concerns About the Plan

3.5 On December 14th, The Fake Electors Meet and Vote

3.6 The Fallout from the Fake Elector Plan

Chapter 4. âJUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO MEâ

4.1 The DOJ Found No Significant Evidence of Fraud

4.2 November 23, 2020: Barr Challenges President Trumpâs Election Lies

4.3 December 1, 2020: President Trump is Irate After Barr Says There is No Significant Fraud

4.4 December 14, 2020: Barr Submits His Resignation

4.6 President Trump is Introduced to Jeffrey Clark

4.8 Congressman Scott Perry Calls Donoghue

4.9 December 28, 2020: The Clark Letter

4.11 Rosenâs December 30th Call with President Trump

4.13 January 2, 2021: Rosen and Donoghue Confront Clark Again

4.14 January 3, 2021: Clark Informs DOJ Leadership that He Will Accept President Trumpâs Offer

4.15 President Trumpâs Unprecedented Attempt to Subvert the DOJ

Chapter 5. âA COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORYâ

Chapter 6. âBE THERE, WILL BE WILD!â

6.1 How Far-right Extremists and Conspiracy Theorists Planned for January 6th

6.2 The Proud Boys: â[Y]ou Want to Storm the Capitolâ

6.3 The Oath Keepers: âHe Called Us All to the Capitol and Wants Us to Make it Wild!!!â

6.4 âTrump Said Itâs Gonna be Wild!!!!!!! Itâs Gonna be Wild!!!!!!!â

6.5 âReady to Step in And Do What Is Neededâ

6.7 White Nationalists: âThe Capitol Siege was Fucking Awesomeâ¦â

6.8 The Three (III%) Percenters: â#OccupyCongressâ

6.9 QAnon: âOperation Occupy the Capitolâ

6.10 TheDonald.win: âOccupy the Capitolâ

6.11 How the White House and Rally Organizers Prepared for January 6th

6.12 âHeâs Calling on You, He Needs Your Helpâ

6.13 âTrump is Supposed to Order Us to the Capitolâ

6.14 âWell, I Should Walk With the People.â

6.15 âPOTUSâ¦Likes the Crazies.â

6.16 January 5, 2021: âFort Trumpâ

6.17 âTogether, We Will STOP THE STEAL.â

Chapter 7. 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION

7.1 âReinsert the Mike Pence Linesâ

7.2 âIâll Be There With Youâ

7.3 The Presidentâs Anger When He Could Not March to the Capitol

7.4 âWeâre Going to Try to Get the President to Put Out a Statementâ

7.5 âHe Doesnât Want to Do Anythingâ

7.6 âHe Thinks Mike Deserves Itâ

7.7 âI Guess Theyâre Just More Upset About the Election Theft Than You Areâ

7.9 âThe President Needs to Stop This ASAPâ

7.10 âWe Love You. Youâre Very Specialâ

7.11 âRemember This Day Forever!â

7.12 President Trump Still Sought to Delay the Joint Session

7.13 He âJust Didnât Want to Talk About It Anymoreâ

7.14 President Trumpâs âRhetoric Killed Someoneâ

Chapter 8. ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK

8.1 The Mob Assembles in Washington

8.4 President Trumpâs Mob Descends on the U.S. Capitol

8.6 The United States Capitol is Breached

8.7 President Trump Pours Fuel on the Fire

8.9 Clearing the U.S. Capitol Building and Restricted Grounds

Recommendations

Appendices

APPENDIX 1: GOVERNMENT AGENCY PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO JANUARY 6TH

APPENDIX 2: DC NATIONAL GUARD PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO JANUARY 6TH

Executive Summary

On October 31, 2022, in a Federal courthouse in Washington, DC, Graydon Young testified against Stewart Rhodes and other members of the Oath Keepers militia group. The defendants had been charged with seditious conspiracy against the United States and other crimes related to the January 6, 2021, attack on Congress.1

In his testimony that day, Young explained to the jury how he and other Oath Keepers were provoked to travel to Washington by President Donald Trumpâs tweets and by Trumpâs false claims that the 2020 Presidential election was âstolenâ from him.2 And, in emotional testimony, Young acknowledged what he and others believed they were doing on January 6th: attacking Congress in the manner the French had attacked the Bastille at the outset of the French Revolution.3 Reflecting on that day more than a year and half later, Young testified:

Prosecutor: And so how do you feel about the fact that you were pushing towards a line of police officers?

Young: Today I feel extremely ashamed and embarrassed. . . .

Prosecutor: How did you feel at the time?

Young: I felt like, again, we were continuing in some kind of historical event to achieve a goal.

* * *

Prosecutor: Looking back now almost two years later, what would that make you as someone who was coming to D.C. to fight against the government?

Young: I guess I was [acting] like a traitor, somebody against my own government.4

Youngâs testimony was dramatic, but not unique. Many participants in the attack on the Capitol acknowledged that they had betrayed their own country:

Hundreds of other participants in the January 6th attack have pleaded guilty, been convicted, or await trial for crimes related to their actions that day. And, like Young, hundreds of others have acknowledged exactly what provoked them to travel to Washington, and to engage in violence. For example:

The Committee has compiled hundreds of similar statements from participants in the January 6th attack.17

House Resolution 503 instructed the Select Committee to âinvestigate and report upon the facts, circumstances, and causes relating to the January 6, 2021, domestic terrorist attack upon the United States Capitol Complexâ and to âissue a final reportâ containing âfindings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures.â The Select Committee has conducted nine public hearings, presenting testimony from more than 70 witnesses. In structuring our investigation and hearings, we began with President Trumpâs contentions that the election was stolen and took testimony from nearly all of the Presidentâs principal advisors on this topic. We focused on the rulings of more than 60 Federal and State courts rejecting President Trumpâs and his supportersâ efforts to reverse the electoral outcome.

Despite the rulings of these courts, we understood that millions of Americans still lack the information necessary to understand and evaluate what President Trump has told them about the election. For that reason, our hearings featured a number of members of President Trumpâs inner circle refuting his fraud claims and testifying that the election was not in fact stolen. In all, the Committee displayed the testimony of more than four dozen Republicansâby far the majority of witnesses in our hearingsâincluding two of President Trumpâs former Attorneys General, his former White House Counsel, numerous members of his White House staff, and the highest-ranking members of his 2020 election campaign, including his campaign manager and his campaign general counsel. Even key individuals who worked closely with President Trump to try to overturn the 2020 election on January 6th ultimately admitted that they lacked actual evidence sufficient to change the election result, and they admitted that what they were attempting was unlawful.18

This Report supplies an immense volume of information and testimony assembled through the Select Committeeâs investigation, including information obtained following litigation in Federal district and appellate courts, as well as in the U.S. Supreme Court. Based upon this assembled evidence, the Committee has reached a series of specific findings,19 including the following:

*â*â*

This Report begins with a factual overview framing each of these conclusions and summarizing what our investigation found. That overview is in turn supported by eight chapters identifying the very specific evidence of each of the principal elements of President Trumpâs multi-part plan to overturn the election, along with evidence regarding intelligence gathered before January 6th and security shortfalls that day.

Although the Committeeâs hearings were viewed live by tens of millions of Americans and widely publicized in nearly every major news source,22 the Committee also recognizes that other news outlets and commentators have actively discouraged viewers from watching, and that millions of other Americans have not yet seen the actual evidence addressed by this Report. Accordingly, the Committee is also releasing video summaries of relevant evidence on each major topic investigated.

This Report also examines the legal implications of Donald Trump and his co-conspiratorsâ conduct and includes criminal referrals to the Department of Justice regarding President Trump and certain other individuals. The criminal referrals build upon three relevant rulings issued by a Federal district court and explain in detail how the facts found support further evaluation by the Department of Justice of specific criminal charges. To assist the public in understanding the nature and importance of this material, this Report also contains sections identifying how the Committee has evaluated the credibility of its witnesses and suggests that the Department of Justice further examine possible efforts to obstruct our investigation. We also note that more than 30 witnesses invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, others invoked Executive Privilege or categorically refused to appear (including Steve Bannon, who has since been convicted of contempt of Congress).

Finally, this report identifies a series of legislative recommendations, including the Presidential Election Reform Act, which has already passed the House of Representatives.

In the Committeeâs hearings, we presented evidence of what ultimately became a multi-part plan to overturn the 2020 Presidential election. That evidence has led to an overriding and straightforward conclusion: the central cause of January 6th was one man, former President Donald Trump, whom many others followed. None of the events of January 6th would have happened without him.

In the weeks before election day 2020, Donald Trumpâs campaign experts, including his campaign manager Bill Stepien, advised him that the election results would not be fully known on election night.23 This was because certain States would not begin to count absentee and other mail-in votes until election day or after election-day polls had closed.24 Because Republican voters tend to vote in greater numbers on election day and Democratic voters tend to vote in greater numbers in advance of election day, it was widely anticipated that Donald Trump could initially appear to have a lead, but that the continued counting of mail-in, absentee and other votes beginning election night would erode and could overcome that perceived lead.25 Thus, as President Trumpâs campaign manager cautioned, understanding the results of the 2020 election would be a lengthy âprocess,â and an initial appearance of a Trump lead could be a âred mirage.ââ26 This was not unique to the 2020 election; similar scenarios had played out in prior elections as well.27

Prior to the 2020 election, Donald Trumpâs campaign manager Bill Stepien, along with House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy, urged President Trump to embrace mail-in voting as potentially beneficial to the Trump Campaign.28 Presidential advisor and son-in-law Jared Kushner recounted others giving Donald Trump the same advice: â[M]ail in ballots could be a good thing for us if we looked at it correctly.ââ29 Multiple States, including Florida, had successfully utilized mail-in voting in prior elections, and in 2020.30 Trump White House Counselor Hope Hicks testified: âI think he [President Trump] understood that a lot of people vote via absentee ballot in places like Florida and have for a long time and that itâs worked fine.ââ31 Donald Trump won in numerous States that allowed no-excuse absentee voting in 2020, including Alaska, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wyoming.32

On election night 2020, the election returns were reported in almost exactly the way that Stepien and other Trump Campaign experts predicted, with the counting of mail-in and absentee ballots gradually diminishing President Trumpâs perceived lead. As the evening progressed, President Trump called in his campaign team to discuss the results. Stepien and other campaign experts advised him that the results of the election would not be known for some time, and that he could not truthfully declare victory.33 âIt was far too early to be making any calls like that. Ballotsâballots were still being counted. Ballots were still going to be counted for days.ââ34

Campaign Senior Advisor Jason Miller told the Select Committee that he argued against declaring victory at that time as well, because âit was too early to say one way [or] the otherâ who had won.35 Stepien advised Trump to say that âvotes were still being counted. Itâs too early to tell, too early to call the race but, you know, we are proud of the race we runâwe ran and we, you know, think weâreâthink weâre in a good positionâ and would say more in the coming days.36

President Trump refused, and instead said this in his public remarks that evening: âThis is a fraud on the American public. This is an embarrassment to our country. We were getting ready to win this election. Frankly, we did win this election. We did win this election . . . . We want all voting to stop.ââ37 And on the morning of November 5th, he tweeted âSTOP THE COUNT!ââ38 Halting the counting of votes at that point would have violated both State and Federal laws.39

According to testimony received by the Select Committee, the only advisor present who supported President Trumpâs inclination to declare victory was Rudolph Giuliani, who appeared to be inebriated.40 President Trumpâs Attorney General, William Barr, who had earlier left the election night gathering, perceived the Presidentâs statement this way:

[R]ight out of the box on election night, the President claimed that there was major fraud underway. I mean, this happened, as far as I could tell, before there was actually any potential of looking at evidence. He claimed there was major fraud. And it seemed to be based on the dynamic that, at the end of the evening, a lot of Democratic votes came in which changed the vote counts in certain States, and that seemed to be the basis for this broad claim that there was major fraud. And I didnât think much of that, because people had been talking for weeks and everyone understood for weeks that that was going to be what happened on election night . . . . 41

President Trumpâs decision to declare victory falsely on election night and, unlawfully, to call for the vote counting to stop, was not a spontaneous decision. It was premeditated. The Committee has assembled a range of evidence of President Trumpâs preplanning for a false declaration of victory. This includes multiple written communications on October 31 and November 3, 2020, to the White House by Judicial Watch President Tom Fitton.42 This evidence demonstrates that Fitton was in direct contact with President Trump and understood that President Trump would falsely declare victory on election night and call for vote counting to stop. The evidence also includes an audio recording of President Trumpâs advisor Steve Bannon, who said this on October 31, 2020, to a group of his associates from China:

And what Trumpâs gonna do is just declare victory, right? Heâs gonna declare victory. But that doesnât mean heâs a winner. Heâs just gonna say heâs a winner . . . The Democratsâmore of our people vote early that count. Theirs vote in mail. And so theyâre gonna have a natural disadvantage, and Trumpâs going to take advantage of itâthatâs our strategy. Heâs gonna declare himself a winner. So when you wake up Wednesday morning, itâs going to be a firestorm . . . . Also, if Trump, if Trump is losing, by 10 or 11 oâclock at night, itâs going to be even crazier. No, because heâs gonna sit right there and say âThey stole it. Iâm directing the Attorney General to shut down all ballot places in all 50 states.â Itâs going to be, no, heâs not going out easy. If Trumpâif Bidenâs winning, Trump is going to do some crazy shit.43

Also in advance of the election, Roger Stone, another outside advisor to President Trump, made this statement:

I really do suspect it will still be up in the air. When that happens, the key thing to do is to claim victory. Possession is nine-tenths of the law. No, we won. Fuck you, Sorry. Over. We won. Youâre wrong. Fuck you.44

On election day, Vice President Penceâs staff, including his Chief of Staff and Counsel, became concerned that President Trump might falsely claim victory that evening. The Vice Presidentâs Counsel, Greg Jacob, testified about their concern that the Vice President might be asked improperly to echo such a false statement.45 Jacob drafted a memorandum with this specific recommendation: â[I]t is essential that the Vice President not be perceived by the public as having decided questions concerning disputed electoral votes prior to the full development of all relevant facts.ââ46

Millions of Americans believed that President Trump was telling the truth on election nightâthat President Trump actually had proof the election was stolen and that the ongoing counting of votes was an act of fraud.

As votes were being counted in the days after the election, President Trumpâs senior campaign advisors informed him that his chances of success were almost zero.

Former Trump Campaign Manager Bill Stepien testified that he had come to this conclusion by November 7th, and told President Trump:

Committee Staff: What was your view on the state of the election at that point?

Stepien: You know, very, very, very bleak. You know, Iâwe told himâthe group that went over there outlined, you know, my belief and chances for success at this point. And then we pegged that at, you know, 5, maybe 10 percent based on recounts that wereâthat, you know, either were automatically initiated or could beâcould be initiated based on, you know, realistic legal challenges, not all the legal challenges that eventually were pursued. But, you know, it wasâyou know, my belief is that it was a very, veryâ5 to 10 percent is not a very good optimistic outlook.47

Trump Campaign Senior Advisor Jason Miller testified to the Committee about this exchange:

Miller: I was in the Oval Office. And at some point in the conversation Matt Oczkowski, who was the lead data person, was brought on, and I remember he delivered to the President in pretty blunt terms that he was going to lose.

Committee Staff: And that was based, Mr. Miller, on Matt and the data teamâs assessment of this sort of county-by-county, State-by-State results as reported?

Miller: Correct.48

In one of the Select Committeeâs hearings, former Fox News political editor Chris Stirewalt was asked what the chance President Trump had of winning the election after November 7th, when the votes were tallied and every news organization had called the race for now-President Biden. His response: âNone.ââ49

As the Committeeâs hearings demonstrated, President Trump made a series of statements to White House staff and others during this time period indicating his understanding that he had lost.50 President Trump also took consequential actions reflecting his understanding that he would be leaving office on January 20th. For example, President Trump personally signed a Memorandum and Order instructing his Department of Defense to withdraw all military forces from Somalia by December 31, 2020, and from Afghanistan by January 15, 2021.51 General Keith Kellogg (ret.), who had been appointed by President Trump as Chief of Staff for the National Security Council and was Vice President Penceâs National Security Advisor on January 6th, told the Select Committee that â[a]n immediate departure that that memo said would have been catastrophic. Itâs the same thing what President Biden went through. It would have been a debacle.ââ52

In the weeks that followed the election, President Trumpâs campaign experts and his senior Justice Department officials were informing him and others in the White House that there was no genuine evidence of fraud sufficient to change the results of the election. For example, former Attorney General Barr testified:

And I repeatedly told the President in no uncertain terms that I did not see evidence of fraud, you know, that would have affected the outcome of the election. And, frankly, a year and a half later, I havenât seen anything to change my mind on that.53

Former Trump Campaign lawyer Alex Cannon, who was asked to oversee incoming information about voter fraud and set up a voter fraud tip line, told the Select Committee about a pertinent call with White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows in November 2020:

Cannon: So I remember a call with Mr. Meadows where Mr. Meadows was asking me what I was finding and if I was finding anything. And I remember sharing with him that we werenât finding anything that would be sufficient to change the results in any of the key States.

Committee Staff: When was that conversation?

Cannon: Probably in November. Mid- to late November . . . .

Committee Staff: And what was Mr. Meadowsâs reaction to that information?

Cannon: I believe the words he used were: âSo there is no there there?ââ54

President Trumpâs Campaign Manager Bill Stepien recalled that President Trump was being told âwild allegationsâ and that it was the Campaignâs job to âtrack [the allegations] downâ:

Committee Staff: You said that you were very confident that you were telling the President the truth in your dealings with [him]. And had your team been able to verify any of these allegations of fraud, would you have reported those to the President?

Stepien: Sure.

Committee Staff: Did you ever have to report thatâ

Stepien: One of my frustrations would be that, you know, people would throw out, you know, these reports, these allegations, these things that they heard or saw in a State, and theyâd tell President Trump. And, you know, it would be the campaignâs job to track down the information, the facts. And, you know, President Trump, you knowâif someoneâs saying, hey, you know, all these votes arenât counted or were miscounted, you know, if youâre down in a State like Arizona, you liked hearing that. It would be our job to track it down and come up dry because the allegation didnât prove to be true. And weâd have to, you know, relay the news that, yeah, that tip that someone told you about those votes or that fraud or, you know, nothing came of it.

That would be our job as, you know, the truth telling squad and, you know, notânot a fun job to be, you know, muchâitâs an easier job to be telling the President about, you know, wild allegations. Itâs a harder job to be telling him on the back end that, yeah, that wasnât true.

Committee Staff: How did he react to those types of conversations where you [told] him that an allegation or another wasnât true?

Stepien: He wasâhe hadâusually he had pretty clear eyes. Like, he understood, you knowâyou know, we told him where we thought the race was, and I think he was pretty realistic with our viewpoint, in agreement with our viewpoint of kind of the forecast and the uphill climb we thought he had.55

Trump Campaign Senior Advisor Jason Miller told the Committee that he informed President Trump âseveralâ times that âspecific to election day fraud and irregularities, there were not enough to overturn the election.ââ56

Vice President Pence has also said publicly that he told President Trump there was no basis to allege that the election was stolen. When a reporter recently asked âDid you ever point blank say to the President [that] we lost this election?,â Pence responded that âI did . . . Many times.ââ57 Pence has also explained:

There was never evidence of widespread fraud. I donât believe fraud changed the outcome of the election. But the President and the Campaign had every right to have those examined in court. But I told the President that, once those legal challenges played out, he should simply accept the outcome of the election and move on.58

The General Counsel of President Trumpâs campaign, Matthew Morgan, informed members of the White House staff, and likely many others, of the Campaignâs conclusion that none of the allegations of fraud and irregularities could be sufficient to change the outcome of the election:

What was generally discussed on that topic was whether the fraud, maladministration, abuse, or irregularities, if aggregated and read most favorably to the campaign, would that be outcome determinative. And I think everyoneâs assessment in the room, at least amongst the staff, Marc Short, myself, and Greg Jacob, was that it was not sufficient to be outcome determinative.59

In a meeting on November 23rd, Barr told President Trump that the Justice Department was doing its duty by investigating every fraud allegation âif itâs specific, credible, and couldâve affected the outcome,â but that âtheyâre just not meritorious. Theyâre not panning out.ââ60

Barr then told the Associated Press on December 1st that the Department had ânot seen fraud on a scale that could have effected a different outcome in the election.ââ61 Next, he reiterated this point in private meetings with the President both that afternoon and on December 14th, as well as in his final press conference as Attorney General later that month.62 The Department of Homeland Security had reached a similar determination two weeks earlier: âThere is no evidence that any voting system deleted or lost votes, changed votes, or was in any way compromised.ââ63

In addition, multiple other high ranking Justice Department personnel appointed by President Trump also informed him repeatedly that the allegations were false. As January 6th drew closer, Acting Attorney General Rosen and Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue had calls with President Trump on almost a daily basis explaining in detail what the Departmentâs investigations showed.64 Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue told the Select Committee that he and Acting Attorney General Rosen tried âto put it in very clear terms to the President. And I said something to the effect of âSir, weâve done dozens of investigations, hundreds of interviews. The major allegations are not supported by the evidence developed. Weâve looked in Georgia, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Nevada. Weâre doing our job.âââ65 On December 31st, Donoghue recalls telling the President that âpeople keep telling you these things and they turn out not to be true.ââ66 And then on January 3rd, Donoghue reiterated this point with the President:

[A]s in previous conservations, we would say to him, you know, âWe checked that out, and thereâs nothing to it.ââ67

Acting Attorney General Rosen testified before the Select Committee that âthe common elementâ of all of his communications with President Trump was President Trump urging the Department to find widespread fraud that did not actually exist. None of the Departmentâs investigations identified any genuine fraud sufficient to impact the election outcome:

During my tenure as the Acting Attorney General, which began on December 24 of [2020], the Department of Justice maintained the position, publicly announced by former Attorney General William Barr, that the Department had been presented with no evidence of widespread voter fraud in a scale sufficient to change the outcome of the 2020 election.68

As President Trump was hearing from his campaign and his Justice Department that the allegations of widespread fraud were not supported by the evidence, his White House legal staff also reached the same conclusions, and agreed specifically with what Barr told President Trump. Both White House Counsel Pat Cipollone and White House Senior Advisor Eric Herschmann reinforced to President Trump that the Justice Department was doing its duty to investigate allegations of supposed voter fraud.69

Cipollone told the Select Committee that he âhad seen no evidence of massive fraud in the electionâ and that he âforcefullyâ made this point âover and over again.â For example, during a late-night group meeting with President Trump on December 18th, at which he and Herschmann urged Trump not to heed the advice of several election conspiracists at the meeting:

Cipollone: They didnât think that we were, you knowâthey didnât think we believed this, you know, that there had been massive fraud in the election, and the reason they didnât think we believed it is because we didnât.

Committee Staff: And you articulated that forcefully to them during the meeting?

Cipollone: I did, yeah. I had seen no evidence of massive fraud in the election. . . . At some point, you have to deliver with the evidence. And Iâagain, I just to go back to what [Barr] said, he had not seen and I was not aware of any evidence of fraud to the extent that it would change the results of the election. That was made clear to them, okay, over and over again.70

Similarly, White House Attorney Eric Herschmann was also very clear about his views:

[T]hey never proved the allegations that they were making, and they were trying to develop.71

In short, President Trump was informed over and over again, by his senior appointees, campaign experts and those who had served him for years, that his election fraud allegations were nonsense.

How did President Trump continue to make false allegations despite all of this unequivocal information? President Trump sought out those who were not scrupulous with the facts, and were willing to be dishonest. He found a new legal team to assert claims that his existing advisors and the Justice Department had specifically informed him were false. President Trumpâs new legal team, headed by Rudolph Giuliani, and their allies ultimately lost dozens of election lawsuits in Federal and State courts.

The testimony of Trump Campaign Manager Bill Stepien helps to put this series of events in perspective. Stepien described his interaction with Giuliani as an intentional âself-demotion,â with Stepien stepping aside once it became clear that President Trump intended to spread falsehoods.

Stepien knew the Presidentâs new team was relying on unsupportable accusations, and he refused to be associated with their approach:

There were two groups of family. We called them kind of my team and Rudyâs team. I didnât mind being characterized as being part of âteam normal,â as reporters, you know, kind of started to do around that point in time.72

Having worked for Republican campaigns for over two decades, Stepien said, âI think along the way Iâve built up a pretty goodâI hope a good reputation for being honest and professional, and I didnât think what was happening was necessarily honest or professional at that point in time.ââ73

As Giuliani visited Campaign headquarters to discuss election litigation, the Trump Campaignâs professional staff began to view him as unhinged.74 In addition, multiple law firms previously engaged to work for the Trump Campaign decided that they could not participate in the strategy being instituted by Giuliani. They quit. Campaign General Counsel Matthew Morgan explained that he had conversations with âprobably all of our counsel who [we]re signed up to assist on election day as they disengaged with the campaign.ââ75 The âgeneral consensus was that the law firms were not comfortable making the arguments that Rudy Giuliani was making publicly.ââ76 When asked how many outside firms expressed this concern, Morgan recalled having âa similar conversation with most all of them.ââ77

Stepien grew so wary of the new team that he locked Giuliani out of his office:

Committee Staff: Yeah. Iâm getting the sense from listening to you here for a few hours that you sort of chose to pull back, that you were uncomfortable with what Mr. Giuliani and others were saying and doing and, therefore, you were purposefully stepping back from a day-to-day role as the leader of the campaign. Is thatâI donât want to put words in your mouth. Is that accurate?

Stepien: Thatâs accurate. Thatâs accurate. You know, I had my assistantâit was a big glass kind of wall office in our headquarters, and I had my assistant lock my door. I told her, donât let anyone in. You know, Iâll be around when I need to be around. You know, tell me what I need to know. Tell me whatâs going on here, but, you know, youâre going to see less of me.

And, you know, sure enough, you know, Mayor Giuliani tried to, you know, get in my office and ordered her to unlock the door, and she didnât do that, you know. Sheâs, you know, smart about that. But your words are ones I agree with.78

Over the weeks that followed, dozens of judges across the country specifically rejected the allegations of fraud and irregularities being advanced by the Trump team and their allies. For example, courts described the arguments as âan amalgamation of theories, conjecture, and speculation,â âallegations . . . sorely wanting of relevant or reliable evidence,â âstrained legal arguments without merit,â assertions that âdid not prove by any standard of proof that any illegal votes were cast and counted,â and even a âfundamental and obvious misreading of the Constitution.ââ79

Reflecting back on this period, Trump Campaign Communications Director Tim Murtaugh texted colleagues in January 2021 about a news report that the New York State Bar was considering expelling Rudolph Giuliani over the Ellipse rally: âWhy wouldnât they expel him based solely on the outrageous lies he told for 2 1/2 months?ââ80

This is exactly what ultimately came to pass. When suspending his license, a New York court said that Giuliani âcommunicated demonstrably false and misleading statements to courts, lawmakers and the public at large in his capacity as lawyer for former President Donald J. Trump and the Trump campaign in connection with Trumpâs failed effort at reelection in 2020.ââ81 The court added that â[t]he seriousness of [Giulianiâs] uncontroverted misconduct cannot be overstated.ââ82

Other Trump lawyers were sanctioned for making outlandish claims of election fraud without the evidence to back them up, including Sidney Powell, Lin Wood and seven other pro-Trump lawyers in a case that a Federal judge described as âa historic and profound abuse of the judicial processâ:

It is one thing to take on the charge of vindicating rights associated with an allegedly fraudulent election. It is another to take on the charge of deceiving a federal court and the American people into believing that rights were infringed, without regard to whether any laws or rights were in fact violated. This is what happened here.83

A group of prominent Republicans have more recently issued a reportâtitled Lost, Not Stolenâexamining âevery count of every case brought in these six battleground statesâ by President Trump and his allies. The report concludes âthat Donald Trump and his supporters had their day in court and failed to produce substantive evidence to make their case.ââ84 President Trump and his legal allies âfailed because of a lack of evidence and not because of erroneous rulings or unfair judges . . . . In many cases, after making extravagant claims of wrongdoing, Trumpâs legal representatives showed up in court or state proceedings empty-handed, and then returned to their rallies and media campaigns to repeat the same unsupported claims.ââ85

There is no reasonable basis for the allegation that these dozens of rulings by State and Federal courts were somehow politically motivated.86 The outcome of these suits was uniform regardless of who appointed the judges. One of the authors of Lost, Not Stolen, longtime Republican election lawyer Benjamin Ginsberg, testified before the Select Committee that âin no instance did a court find that the charges of fraud were real,â without variation based on the judges involved.87 Indeed, eleven of the judges who ruled against Donald Trump and his supporters were appointed by Donald Trump himself.

One of those Trump nominees, Judge Stephanos Bibas of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, rejected an appeal by the Trump Campaign claiming that Pennsylvania officials âdid not undertake any meaningful effortâ to fight illegal absentee ballots and uneven treatment of voters across counties.88 Judge Bibas wrote in his decision that âcalling an election unfair does not make it so. Charges require specific allegations and then proof. We have neither here.ââ89 Another Trump nominee, Judge Brett Ludwig of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, ruled against President Trumpâs lawsuit alleging that the result was skewed by illegal procedures that governed drop boxes, ballot address information, and individuals who claimed âindefinitely confinedâ status to vote from home.90 Judge Ludwig wrote in his decision, that â[t]his Court has allowed plaintiff the chance to make his case and he has lost on the meritsâ because the procedures used âdo not remotely rise to the levelâ of breaking Wisconsinâs election rules.91

Nor is it true that these rulings focused solely on standing, or procedural issues. As Ginsberg confirmed in his testimony to the Select Committee, President Trumpâs team âdid have their day in court.ââ92 Indeed, he and his co-authors determined in their report that 30 of these post-election cases were dismissed by a judge after an evidentiary hearing had been held, and many of these judges explicitly indicated in their decisions that the evidence presented by the plaintiffs was wholly insufficient on the merits.93

Ultimately, even Rudolph Giuliani and his legal team acknowledged that they had no definitive evidence of election fraud sufficient to change the election outcome. For example, although Giuliani repeatedly had claimed in public that Dominion voting machines stole the election, he admitted during his Select Committee deposition that âI do not think the machines stole the election.ââ94 An attorney representing his lead investigator, Bernard Kerik, declared in a letter to the Select Committee that âit was impossible for Kerik and his team to determine conclusively whether there was widespread fraud or whether that widespread fraud would have altered the outcome of the election.ââ95 Kerik also emailed President Trumpâs chief of staff on December 28, 2020, writing: âWe can do all the investigations we want later, but if the president plans on winning, itâs the legislators that have to be moved and this will do just that.ââ96 Other Trump lawyers and supporters, Jenna Ellis, John Eastman, Phil Waldron, and Michael Flynn, all invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when asked by the Select Committee what supposed proof they uncovered that the election was stolen.97 Not a single witness--nor any combination of witnesses--provided the Select Committee with evidence demonstrating that fraud occurred on a scale even remotely close to changing the outcome in any State.98

By mid-December 2020, Donald Trump had come to what most of his staff believed was the end of the line. The Supreme Court rejected a lawsuit he supported filed by the State of Texas in the Supreme Court, and Donald Trump had this exchange, according to Special Assistant to the President Cassidy Hutchinson:

The President was fired up about the Supreme Court decision. And so I was standing next to [Chief of Staff Mark] Meadows, but I had stepped back . . . The President [was] just raging about the decision and how itâs wrong, and why didnât we make more calls, and just this typical anger outburst at this decision . . . And the President said I thinkâso he had said something to the effect of, âI donât want people to know we lost, Mark. This is embarrassing. Figure it out. We need to figure it out. I donât want people to know that we lost.ââ99

On December 14, 2020, the Electoral College met to cast and certify each Stateâs electoral votes. By this time, many of President Trumpâs senior staff, and certain members of his family, were urging him to concede that he had lost.

Labor Secretary Gene Scalia told the Committee that he called President Trump around this time and gave him such feedback quite directly:

[S]o, I had put a call in to the PresidentâI might have called on the 13th; we spoke, I believe, on the 14thâin which I conveyed to him that I thought that it was time for him to acknowledge that President Biden had prevailed in the election . . . . But I communicated to the President that when that legal process is exhausted and when the electors have voted, that thatâs the point at which that outcome needs to be expected . . . . And I told him that I did believe, yes, that once those legal processes were run, if fraud had not been established that had affected the outcome of the election, that, unfortunately, I believed that what had to be done was concede the outcome.100

Deputy White House Press Secretary Judd Deere also told President Trump that he should concede. He recalled other staffers advising President Trump at some point to concede and that he âencouraged him to do it at least once after the electoral college met in mid-December.ââ101 White House Counsel Pat Cipollone also believed that President Trump should concede: â[I]f your question is did I believe he should concede the election at a point in time, yes, I did.ââ102

Attorney General Barr told the Select Committee this: âAnd in my view, that [the December 14 electoral college vote] was the end of the matter. I didnât seeâyou know, I thought that this would lead inexorably to a new administration. I was not aware at that time of any theory, you know, why this could be reversed. And so I felt that the die was cast . . . .ââ103

Barr also told the Committee that he suggested several weeks earlier that the Presidentâs efforts in this regard needed to come to an end soon, in conversation with several White House officials after his meeting with Trump on November 23rd:

[A]s I walked out of the Oval Office, Jared was there with Dan Scavino, who ran the Presidentâs social media and who I thought was a reasonable guy and believe is a reasonable guy. And I said, how long is he going to carry on with this âstolen electionâ stuff? Where is this going to go?

And by that time, Meadows had caught up with me andâleaving the office, and caught up to me and said thatâhe said, look, I think that heâs becoming more realistic and knows that thereâs a limit to how far he can take this. And then Jared said, you know, yeah, weâre working on this, weâre working on it.104

Despite all that Donald Trump was being told, he continued to purposely and maliciously make false claims. To understand the very stark differences between what he was being told and what he said publicly and in fundraising solicitations, the Committee has assembled the following examples.

Then-Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen (12/15/20): âAnd so he said, âWell, what about this? I saw it on the videotape, somebody delivering a suitcase of ballots.â And we said, âIt wasnât a suitcase. It was a bin. Thatâs what they use when theyâre counting ballots. Itâs benign.âââ105 |
President Trump one week later (12/22/20): âThere is even security camera footage from Georgia that shows officials telling poll watchers to leave the room before pulling suitcases of ballots out from under the tables and continuing to count for hours.ââ106 |

Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue (12/27 & 12/31/20): âI told the President myself that several times, in several conversations, that these allegations about ballots being smuggled in in a suitcase and run through the machine several times, it was not true, that we looked at it, we looked at the video, we interviewed the witnesses, that it was not true . . . . I believe it was in the phone call on December 27th. It was also in a meeting in the Oval Office on December 31st.ââ107 |
President Trump later that week (1/2/21): â[S]he stuffed the machine. She stuffed the ballot. Each ballot went three times, they were showing: Hereâs ballot number one. Here it is a second time, third time, next ballot.ââ 108 |

GA Sec. State Brad Raffensperger (1/2/21): âYouâre talking about the State Farm video. And I think itâs extremely unfortunate that Rudy Giuliani or his people, they sliced and diced that video and took it out of context.â . . . â[W]e did an audit of that and we proved conclusively that they were not scanned three times. . . . Yes, Mr. President, weâll send you the link from WSB.â [Trump]: âI donât care about a link. I donât need it.ââ109 |
President Trump one day later (1/3/21): âI spoke to Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger yesterday about Fulton County and voter fraud in Georgia. He was unwilling, or unable, to answer questions such as the âballots under tableâ scam, ballot destruction, out of state âvotersâ, dead voters, and more. He has no clue!ââ110 |

Attorney General Barr (12/1/20): âThen he raised the âbig vote dump,â as he called it, in Detroit. And, you know, he said, people saw boxes coming into the counting station at all hours of the morning and so forth. . . . I said, âMr. President, there are 630 precincts in Detroit, and unlike elsewhere in the State, they centralize the counting process, so theyâre not counted in each precinct, theyâre moved to counting stations, and so the normal process would involve boxes coming in at all different hours.â And I said, âDid anyone point out to youâdid all the people complaining about it point out to you, you actually did better in Detroit than you did last time? I mean, thereâs no indication of fraud in Detroit.âââ111 |
President Trump one day later (12/2/20): âIâll tell you whatâs wrong, voter fraud. Hereâs an example. This is Michigan. At 6:31 in the morning, a vote dump of 149,772 votes came in unexpectedly. We were winning by a lot. That batch was received in horror. . . . In Detroit everybody saw the tremendous conflict. . . there were more votes than there were voters.ââ112 |

Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue (12/27/20): âThe President then continued, there are âmore votes than voters. . .â. But I was aware of that allegation, and I said, you know, that was just a matter of them âcomparing the 2020 votes cast to 2016 registration numbers.â That is ânot a valid complaint.âââ113 |
President Trump ten days later (1/6/21): âMore votes than they had voters. And many other States also.ââ114 |

Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue (1/3/21): â[W]e would say to him, you know, âWe checked that out, and thereâs nothing to it. . . . And we would cite to certain allegations. And soâlike such as Pennsylvania, right. âNo, there were not 250,000 more votes reported than were actually cast. Thatâs not true.â So we would say things like that.ââ115 |
President Trump three days later (1/6/21): âIn Pennsylvania, you had 205,000 more votes than you had voters. And the number is actually much greater than that now. That was as of a week ago. And this is a mathematical impossibility unless you want to say itâs a total fraud.ââ116 |

GA Sec. State Brad Raffensperger (1/2/21): [Trump]: â[I]tâs 4,502 who voted, but they werenât on the voter registration roll, which they had to be. You had 18,325 vacant address voters. The address was vacant, and theyâre not allowed to be counted. Thatâs 18,325.â . . . [Raffensperger]: âWell, Mr. President, the challenge that you have is the data you have is wrong.ââ117 |
President Trump two days later (1/4/21): â4,502 illegal ballots were cast by individuals who do not appear on the stateâs voter rolls. Well, thatâs sort of strange. 18,325 illegal ballots were cast by individuals who registered to vote using an address listed as vacant according to the postal service.ââ118 |

GA Sec. of State Brad Raffensperger (1/2/21): [Trump]: âSo dead people voted, and I think the number is close to 5,000 people. And they went to obituaries. They went to all sorts of methods to come up with an accurate number, and a minimum is close to about 5,000 voters.â . . . [Raffensperger]: âThe actual number were two. Two. Two people that were dead that voted. So thatâs wrong.ââ119 |
President Trump four days later (1/6/21): â[T]he number of fraudulent ballots that weâve identified across the state is staggering. Over 10,300 ballots in Georgia were cast by individuals whose names and dates of birth match Georgia residents who died in 2020 and prior to the election.ââ120 |

GA Sec. State General Counsel Ryan Germany (1/2/21): [Trump]: âYou had out-of-state voters. They voted in Georgia, but they were from out of state, of 4,925.â . . . [Germany]: âEvery one weâve been through are people that lived in Georgia, moved to a different state, but then moved back to Georgia legitimately.â . . . âThey moved back in years ago. This was not like something just before the election. So thereâs something about that data that, itâs just not accurate.ââ121 |
President Trump four days later (1/6/21): âAnd at least 15,000 ballots were cast by individuals who moved out of the state prior to November 3rd election. They say they moved right back.ââ122 |

White House Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany (n.d.): â[T]he one specific I remember referencing was I donât agree with the Dominion track.â . . . âI specifically referenced waving him off of the Dominion theory earlier in my testimony.â . . . [Q] âAre you saying you think he still continued to tweet that after you waved him off of it?â [A] âYeah. . .ââ123 |
President Trump: Between mid-November and January 5, 2021, President Trump tweeted or retweeted conspiracy theories about Dominion nearly three dozen times.124 |

Trump Campaign Senior Advisor Jason Miller: â. . .the international allegations for Dominion were not valid.â [Q] âOkay. Did anybody communicate that to the President?â [A]: âI know that that wasâI know that was communicated. I know I communicated itââ125 |
President Trump: âYou have Dominion, which is very, very suspect to start off with. Nobody knows the ownership. People say the votes are counted in foreign countries and much worse. . .ââ126 |

Attorney General Barr (11/23/20): âI specifically raised the Dominion voting machines, which I found to be one of the most disturbing allegationsâ âdisturbingâ in the sense that I saw absolutely zero basis for the allegations . . . I told him that it was crazy stuff and they were wasting their time on that and it was doing great, great disservice to the country.ââ127 |
President Trump three days later (11/26/20): â[T]hose machines are fixed, theyâre rigged. You can press Trump and the vote goes to Biden. . . . All you have to do is play with a chip, and they played with a chip, especially in Wayne County and Detroit.ââ128 |

Attorney General Barr (12/1/20): âI explained, I said, look, if you have a machine and it counts 500 votes for Biden and 500 votes for Trump, and then you go back later and you have aâyou will have the 1,000 pieces of paper put through that machine, and you can see if thereâs any discrepancy. . . there has been no discrepancy.ââ129 |
President Trump one day later (12/2/20): âIn one Michigan County, as an example, that used Dominion systems, they found that nearly 6,000 votes had been wrongly switched from Trump to Biden, and this is just the tip of the iceberg. This is what we caught. How many didnât we catch?ââ130 |

Attorney General Barr (12/14/20): ââI will, Mr. President. But there are a couple of things,â I responded. âMy understanding is that our experts have looked at the Antrim situation and are sure it was a human error that did not occur anywhere else. And, in any event, Antrim is doing a hand recount of the paper ballots, so we should know in a couple of days whether there is any real problem with the machines.âââ131 |
President Trump one day later (12/15/20): âThis is BIG NEWS. Dominion Voting Machines are a disaster all over the Country. Changed the results of a landslide election. Canât let this happen. . . .ââ132 |

Then-Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen (12/15/20): â[O]ther people were telling him there was fraud, you know, corruption in the election. The voting machines were no good. And we were telling him that is inconsistent, by âwe,â I mean Richard Donoghue and myself, that that was not what we were seeing.â . . . âThere was this open issue as to the Michigan report. AndâI think it was Mr. Cuccinelli, not certain, but had indicated that there was a hand recount. And I think he said, âThatâs the gold standard.âââ133 |
President Trump one day later (12/16/20): ââStudy: Dominion Machines shifted 2-3% of Trump Votes to Biden. Far more votes than needed to sway election.â Florida, Ohio, Texas and many other states were won by even greater margins than projected. Did just as well with Swing States, but bad things happened. @OANNââ134 |

National Security Adviser Robert OâBrien (12/18/20): âI got a call from, I think, Molly Michael in outer oval, the Presidentâs assistant, and she said, âIâm connecting you to the Ovalâ. . . somebody asked me, was thereâdid I have any evidence of election fraud in the voting machines or foreign interference in our voting machines. And I said, no, weâve looked into that and thereâs no evidence of it.ââ135 |
President Trump one day later (12/19/20): â. . .There could also have been a hit on our ridiculous voting machines during the election, which is now obvious that I won big, making it an even more corrupted embarrassment for the USA. @DNI_Ratcliffe @SecPompeoââ136 |

Acting Deputy AG Richard Donoghue (12/31/20): âWe definitely talked about Antrim County again. That was sort of done at that point, because the hand recount had been done and all of that. But we cited back to that to say, you know, this is an example of what people are telling you and whatâs being filed in some of these court filings that are just not supported by the evidence.ââ137 |
President Trump two days later (1/2/21): âWell, Brad. Not that thereâs not an issue, because we have a big issue with Dominion in other states and perhaps in yours. . . . in other states, we think we found tremendous corruption with Dominion machines, but weâll have to see.â . . . âI wonât give Dominion a pass because we found too many bad things.ââ138 |

GA Sec. State Brad Raffensperger (1/2/21): âI donât believe that youâre really questioning the Dominion machines. Because we did a hand re-tally, a 100 percent re-tally of all the ballots, and compared them to what the machines said and came up with virtually the same result. Then we did the recount, and we got virtually the same result.ââ139 |
President Trump four days later (1/6/21): âIn addition, there is the highly troubling matter of Dominion Voting Systems. In one Michigan county alone, 6,000 votes were switched from Trump to Biden and the same systems are used in the majority of states in our country.â . . . âThere is clear evidence that tens of thousands of votes were switched from President Trump to former Vice President Biden in several counties in Georgia.ââ140 |


Evidence gathered by the Committee indicates that President Trump raised roughly one quarter of a billion dollars in fundraising efforts between the election and January 6th.141 Those solicitations persistently claimed and referred to election fraud that did not exist. For example, the Trump Campaign, along with the Republican National Committee, sent millions of emails to their supporters, with messaging claiming that the election was ârigged,â that their donations could stop Democrats from âtrying to steal the election,â and that Vice President Biden would be an âillegitimate presidentâ if he took office.

Ultimately, Attorney General Barr suggested that the Department of Justiceâs investigations disproving President Trumpâs fraud claims may have prevented an even more serious series of events:

[F]rankly, I think the fact that I put myself in the position that I could say that we had looked at this and didnât think there was fraud was really important to moving things forward. And I sort of shudder to think what the situation would have been if the position of the Department was, âWeâre not even looking at this until after Bidenâs in office.â Iâm not sure we wouldâve had a transition at all.142

President Trump disregarded the rulings of the courts and rejected the findings and conclusions and advice from his Justice Department, his campaign experts, and his White House and Cabinet advisors. He chose instead to try to overturn the election on January 6th and took a series of very specific steps to attempt to achieve that result.

A central element of Donald Trumpâs plan to overturn the election relied upon Vice President Mike Pence. As Vice President, Pence served as the President of the Senate, the presiding officer for the joint session of Congress on January 6th. Beginning in December, and with greater frequency as January 6th approached, Trump repeatedly and unlawfully pressured Pence in private and public to prevent Congress from counting lawful electoral votes from several States.

To understand the plan President Trump devised with attorney and law professor John Eastman, it is necessary to understand the constitutional structure for selecting our President.

At the Constitutional Convention 233 years ago, the framers considered but rejected multiple proposals that Congress itself vote to select the President of the United States.143 Indeed the Framers voiced very specific concerns with Congress selecting the President. They viewed it as important that the electors, chosen for the specific purpose of selecting the President, should make the determination rather than Congress:

It was desireable, that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. This end will be answered by committing the right of making it, not to any pre-established body, but to men, chosen by the people for the special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture.144

The Framers understood that a thoughtful structure for the appointment of the President was necessary to avoid certain evils: âNothing was more to be desired, than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue and corruption.ââ145 They were careful to ensure that âthose who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the president in officeâ âwere not among those that chose the president.ââ146 For that reason, â[n]o senator, representative, or other person holding a place of trust or profit under the United States, can be of the number of the electors.ââ147

Article II of our Constitution, as modified by the Twelfth Amendment, governs election of the President. Article II created the electoral college, providing that the States would select electors in the manner provided by State legislatures, and those electors would in turn vote for the President. Today, every State selects Presidential electors by popular vote, and each Stateâs laws provide for procedures to resolve election disputes, including through lawsuits if necessary. After any election issues are resolved in State or Federal court, each Stateâs government transmits a certificate of the ascertainment of the appointed electors to Congress and the National Archives.

The electoral college meets in mid-December to cast their votes, and all of these electoral votes are then ultimately counted by Congress on January 6th. The Vice President, as President of the Senate, presides over the joint session of Congress to count votes. The Twelfth Amendment provides this straightforward instruction: âThe president of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted; The person having the greatest number of votes for President shall be the President. . .â The Vice President has only a ministerial role, opening the envelopes and ensuring that the votes are counted. Likewise, the Electoral Count Act of 1887 provides no substantive role for the Vice President in counting votes, reinforcing that he or she can only act in a ministerial fashionâthe Vice President may not choose, for example, to decline to count particular votes. In most cases (e.g., when one candidate has a majority of votes submitted by the States) Congress has only a ministerial role, as well. It simply counts electoral college votes provided by each Stateâs governor. Congress is not a court and cannot overrule State and Federal court rulings in election challenges.

As January 6th approached, John Eastman and others devised a plan whereby Vice President Pence would, as the presiding officer, declare that certain electoral votes from certain States could not be counted at the joint session.148 John Eastman knew before proposing this plan that it was not legal. Indeed, in a pre-election document discussing Congressâs counting of electoral votes, Dr. Eastman specifically disagreed with a colleagueâs proposed argument that the Vice President had the power to choose which envelopes to âopenâ and which votes to âcount.â Dr. Eastman wrote:

I donât agree with this. The 12th Amendment only says that the President of the Senate opens the ballots in the joint session then, in the passive voice, that the votes shall then be counted. 3 USC Â§ 12 [of the Electoral Count Act] says merely that he is the presiding officer, and then it spells out specific procedures, presumptions, and default rules for which slates will be counted. Nowhere does it suggest that the president of the Senate gets to make the determination on his own. Â§ 15 [of the Electoral Count Act] doesnât either.149

Despite recognizing prior to the 2020 election that the Vice President had no power to refuse to count certain electoral votes, Eastman nevertheless drafted memoranda two months later proposing that Pence could do exactly that on January 6thârefuse to count certified electoral votes from Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.150

Eastmanâs theory was related to other efforts overseen by President Trump (described in detail below, see infra) to create and transmit fake electoral slates to Congress and the National Archives, and to pressure States to change the election outcome and issue new electoral slates. Eastman supported these ideas despite writing two months earlier that:

Article II [of the Constitution] says the electors are appointed âin such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,â but I donât think that entitles the Legislature to change the rules after the election and appoint a different slate of electors in a manner different than what was in place on election day. And 3 U.S.C. Â§15 [of the Electoral Count Act] gives dispositive weight to the slate of electors that was certified by the Governor in accord with 3 U.S.C. Â§5.151

Even after Eastman proposed the theories in his December and January memoranda, he acknowledged in conversations with Vice President Penceâs counsel Greg Jacob that Pence could not lawfully do what his own memoranda proposed.152 Eastman admitted that the U.S. Supreme Court would unanimously reject his legal theory. âHe [Eastman] had acknowledged that he would lose 9-0 at the Supreme Court.ââ153 Moreover, Eastman acknowledged to Jacob that he didnât think Vice President Al Gore had that power in 2001, nor did he think Vice President Kamala Harris should have that power in 2025.154

In testimony before the Select Committee, Jacob described in detail why the Trump plan for Pence was illegal:

[T]he Vice Presidentâs first instinct, when he heard this theory, was that there was no way that our Framers, who abhorred concentrated power, who had broken away from the tyranny of George III, would ever have put one personâparticularly not a person who had a direct interest in the outcome because they were on the ticket for the electionâin a role to have decisive impact on the outcome of the election. And our review of text, history, and, frankly, just common sense, all confirmed the Vice Presidentâs first instinct on that point. There is no justifiable basis to conclude that the Vice President has that kind of authority.155

This is how the Vice President later described his views in a public speech:

I had no right to overturn the election. The Presidency belongs to the American people, and the American people alone. And frankly, there is no idea more un-American than the notion that any one person could choose the American President. Under the Constitution, I had no right to change the outcome of our election.156

But as January 6th approached, President Trump nevertheless embraced the new Eastman theories, and attempted to implement them. In a series of meetings and calls, President Trump attempted to pressure Pence to intervene on January 6th to prevent Congress from counting multiple Statesâ electoral votes for Joe Biden. At several points in the days before January 6th, President Trump was told directly that Vice President Pence could not legally do what Trump was asking. For example, at a January 4th meeting in the Oval Office, Eastman acknowledged that any variation of his proposalâwhether rejecting electoral votes outright or delaying certification to send them back to the Statesâwould violate several provisions of the Electoral Count Act. According to Greg Jacob:

In the conversation in the Oval Office on the 4th, I had raised the fact that . . . [ Eastmanâs] preferred course had issues with the Electoral Count Act, which he had acknowledged was the case, that there would be an inconsistency with the Electoral Count Act[.]157

Jacob recorded Eastmanâs admission in an internal memo he drafted for Vice President Pence on the evening of January 4th: âProfessor Eastman acknowledges that his proposal violates several provisions of statutory law.ââ158 And, during a phone call with President Trump and Eastman on the evening of January 5, 2021, Eastman again acknowledged that his proposal also would violate several provisions of the Electoral Count Act.

[W]e did have an in-depth discussion about [the Electoral Count Act] in the subsequent phone calls as I walked him through provision after provision on the recess and on the fact that . . . Congressmen and Senators are supposed to get to object and debate. And he acknowledged, one after another, that those provisions wouldâin order for us to send it back to the States, we couldnât do those things as well. We canât do a 10-day, send it back to the States, and honor an Electoral Count Act provision that says you canât recess for more than one day and, once you get to the 5th, you have to stay continuously in session.159

As Penceâs Chief of Staff, Marc Short, testified that the Vice President also repeatedly informed President Trump that the Vice Presidentâs role on January 6th was only ministerial.

Committee Staff: But just to pick up on that, Mr. Short, was it your impression that the Vice President had directly conveyed his position on these issues to the President, not just to the world through a Dear Colleague Letter, but directly to President Trump?

Marc Short: Many times.

Committee Staff: And had been consistent in conveying his position to the President?

Short: Very consistent.160

As the situation grew increasingly acrimonious, Vice President Penceâs private counsel Richard Cullen contacted former Fourth Circuit Judge Michael Luttig, a renowned conservative judge for whom Eastman had previously clerked, and asked Luttig to make a public statement. On January 5th, Luttig wrote the following on Twitter: âThe only responsibility and power of the Vice President under the Constitution is to faithfully count the electoral college votes as they have been cast.ââ161 As Judge Luttig testified in the Committeeâs hearings, âthere was no basis in the Constitution or laws of the United States at all for the theory espoused by Dr. Eastmanâat all. None.ââ162 Judge Luttig completely rejected Eastmanâs âblueprint to overturn the 2020 electionâ as âconstitutional mischiefâ and âthe most reckless, insidious, and calamitous failure[] in both legal and political judgment in American history.ââ163

Contemporaneous written correspondence also confirms both that: (1) Eastman himself recognized Pence could not lawfully refuse to count electoral votes, and (2) President Trump also knew this. While sheltering in a loading dock with the Vice President during the violent January 6th attack, Greg Jacob asked Eastman in an email, âDid you advise the President that in your professional judgment the Vice President DOES NOT have the power to decide things unilaterally?â Eastmanâs response stated that the President had âbeen so advised,â but then indicated that President Trump continued to pressure the Vice President to act illegally: âBut you know himâonce he gets something in his head, it is hard to get him to change course.ââ164

To be absolutely clear, no White House lawyer believed Pence could lawfully refuse to count electoral votes. White House Counsel Pat Cipollone told the Select Committee this:

I thought that the Vice President did not have the authority to do what was being suggested under a proper reading of the law. I conveyed that, ok? I think I actually told somebody, you know, in the Vice Presidentâsâ âJust blame me.â You know this isâIâm not a politician, you know. . . but, you know, I just said, âIâm a lawyer. This is my legal opinion.ââ165

Cipollone also testified that he was âsure [he] conveyedâ his views.166 Indeed, other testimony from Cipollone indicates that Trump knew of Cipolloneâs view and suggests that Trump purposely excluded Cipollone from the meeting with Pence and Penceâs General Counsel on January 4th.167 Indeed, at one point, Cipollone confronted Eastman in the hallway outside the Oval Office and expressed his disapproval of and anger with Eastmanâs position. According to Jason Miller, âPat Cipollone thought the idea was nutty and had at one point confronted Eastman basically with the same sentimentâ outside the Oval Office.168 Pat Cipollone did not deny having an angry confrontation with Eastman outside of the Oval Officeâthough he said he didnât have a specific recollection, he had no reason to contradict what Jason Miller said and, moreover, said that Eastman was aware of his views.169

Likewise, Eric Herschmann, another White House lawyer, expressed the same understanding that Eastmanâs plan âobviously made no senseâ and âhad no practical ability to work.ââ170 Herschmann also recounted telling Eastman directly that his plan was âcompletely crazyâ:

And I said to [Eastman], hold on a second, I want to understand what youâre saying. Youâre saying you believe the Vice President, acting as President of the Senate, can be the sole decisionmaker as to, under your theory, who becomes the next President of the United States? And he said, yes. And I said, are you out of your Fâing mind, right. And that was pretty blunt. I said, youâre completely crazy.171

Deputy White House Counsel Pat Philbin also had the same understanding.172 Indeed, as Herschmann testified, even Rudolph Giuliani doubted that Vice President Mike Pence had any legal ability to do what Eastman had proposed.173

Despite all this opposition from all White House lawyers, Trump nevertheless continued to exert immense pressure on Pence to refuse to count electoral votes.

The pressure began before the January 4th Oval Office meeting with Pence, Eastman, Jacob, Short, and Trump, but became even more intense thereafter. On the evening of January 5, 2021, the New York Times published an article reporting that âVice President Mike Pence told President Trump on Tuesday that he did not believe he had the power to block congressional certification of Joseph R. Biden, Jr.âs victory in the Presidential election despite President Trumpâs baseless insistence that he did.ââ174 This reporting was correctâboth as to the Vice Presidentâs power and as to Vice President Pence having informed President Trump that he did not have the authority to change the outcome of the election. But in response to that story, late in the evening before the January 6th joint session, President Trump dictated to Jason Miller a statement falsely asserting, âThe Vice President and I are in total agreement that the Vice President has the power to act.ââ175 This statement was released at President Trumpâs direction and was false.176

Thereafter, Trump continued to apply public pressure in a series of tweets. At 1:00 a.m. on January 6th, â[i]f Vice President @Mike_Pence comes through for us, we will win the Presidency. Many States want to decertify the mistake they made in certifying incorrect & even fraudulent numbers in a process NOT approved by their State Legislatures (which it must be). Mike can send it back!ââ177 At 8:17 a.m. on January 6th, he tweeted again: âStates want to correct their votes, which they now know were based on irregularities and fraud, plus corrupt process never received legislative approval. All Mike Pence has to do is send them back to the States, AND WE WIN. Do it Mike, this is a time for extreme courage!ââ178

President Trump tried to reach the Vice President early in the morning of January 6th, but the Vice President did not take the call. The President finally reached the Vice President later that morning, shouting from the Oval Office to his assistants to âget the Vice President on the phone.ââ179 After again telling the Vice President that he had âthe legal authority to send [electoral votes] back to the respective states,â President Trump grew very heated.180 Witnesses in the Oval Office during this call told the Select Committee that the President called Vice President Pence a âwimp,ââ181 told him it would be âa political career killerâ to certify the lawful electoral votes electing President Biden,182 and accused him of ânot [being] tough enough to make the call.ââ183 As Ivanka Trump would recount to her chief of staff moments later, her father called the Vice President âthe p-wordâ for refusing to overturn the election.184

In response, Vice President Pence again refused to take any action other than counting the lawfully certified electoral votes of the States. But President Trump was angry and undeterred. After the conclusion of this call, he edited his speech for the Ellipse to insert language to which his lawyers objectedâtargeting Vice President Pence directly.185

Earlier that morning, Eric Herschmann had tried to remove the reference to Vice President Pence from the speech. As he told speechwriter Stephen Miller, he âdidnât concur with the legal analysisâ that John Eastman had advanced and believed it âwouldnât advance the ballâ to discuss it publicly.186 But after the call with Vice President Pence, speechwriters were instructed to reinsert the line. Although the final written draft of his speech referred to Pence just onceâa line President Trump didnât end up reading187âthe President went off-script five different times to pressure the Vice President:

âI hope Mike is going to do the right thing. I hope so. Because if Mike Pence does the right thing, we win the election,â Trump first told the crowd.188

âMike Pence is going to have to come through for us,â Trump later said, âand if he doesnât, that will be a, a sad day for our country because youâre sworn to uphold our Constitution.ââ189

Addressing Pence directly, Trump told the assembled crowd: âMike Pence, I hope youâre going to stand up for the good of our Constitution and for the good of our country.â Trump said at another point, âAnd if youâre not, Iâm going to be very disappointed in you. I will tell you right now. Iâm not hearing good stories.ââ190

âSo I hope Mike has the courage to do what he has to do. And I hope he doesnât listen to the RINOs and the stupid people that heâs listening to,â Trump said.191

These statements to the assembled crowd at the Ellipse had Trumpâs intended effectâthey produced substantial anger against Pence. When Pence released a statement confirming that he would not act to prevent Congress from counting electoral votes, the crowdâs reaction was harshly negative:

âIâm telling you what, Iâm hearing that Pence â hearing the Pence just caved. No. Is that true? I didnât hear it. Iâm hear â Iâm hearing reports that Pence caved. No way. Iâm telling you, if Pence caved, weâre going to drag motherfuckers through the streets. You fucking politicians are going to get fucking drug through the streets.ââ192

Pence voted against Trump. [Interviewer: âOk. And thatâs when all this started?â] Yup. Thatâs when we marched on the Capitol. 193

âWe just heard that Mike Pence is not going to reject any fraudulent electoral votes. [Other speaker: âBoo. Youâre a traitor!â] Thatâs right. Youâve heard it here first. Mike Pence has betrayed the United States of America. [Other speaker: âFuck you, Mike Pence!â] Mike Pence has betrayed this President and he has betrayed the people of the United States and we will never, ever forget.â [Cheers]194

âThis woman cames [sic] up to the side of us and she says Pence folded. So it was kind of, like, Ok, well â in my mind I was thinking, well thatâs it. You know. Well, my son-in-law looks at me and he says I want to go in.ââ195

[Q] âWhat percentage of the crowd is going to the Capitol?â [A] [Oath Keeper Jessica Watkins]: âOne hundred percent. It has, it has spread like wildfire that Pence has betrayed us, and everybodyâs marching on the Capitol. All million of us. Itâs insane.ââ196

âBring him out. Bring out Pence. Bring him out. Bring out Pence. Bring him out. Bring out Pence. Bring him out. Bring out Pence.ââ197

âHang Mike Pence. Hang Mike Pence. Hang Mike Pence. Hang Mike Pence. Hang Mike Pence.ââ198

Once Trump returned to the White House, he was informed almost immediately that violence and lawlessness had broken out at the Capitol among his supporters.199 At 2:24 p.m., President Trump applied yet further pressure to Pence (see infra), posting a tweet accusing Vice President Mike Pence of cowardice for not using his role as President of the Senate to change the outcome of the election: âMike Pence didnât have the courage to do what should have been done to protect our Country and our Constitution, giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to previously certify. USA demands the truth!ââ200 Almost immediately thereafter, the crowd around the Capitol surged, and more individuals joined the effort to confront police and break further into the building.

The sentiment expressed in President Trumpâs 2:24 p.m. tweet, already present in the crowd, only grew more powerful as the Presidentâs words spread. Timothy Hale-Cusanelliâa white supremacist who expressed Nazi sympathiesâheard about the tweet while in the Crypt around 2:25 p.m., and he, according to the Department of Justice, âknew what that meant.â Vice President Pence had decided not to keep President Trump in power.201 Other rioters described what happened next as follows:

Once we found out Pence turned on us and that they had stolen the election, like officially, the crowd went crazy. I mean, it became a mob. We crossed the gate.202

Then we heard the news on [P]ence. . . And lost it . . . So we stormed.203

Theyâre making an announcement right now saying if Pence betrays us you better get your mind right because weâre storming that building.204

Minutes after the tweetâat 2:35 p.m.ârioters continued their surge and broke a security line of the DC Metropolitan Police Department, resulting in the first fighting withdrawal in the history of that force.205

President Trump issued this tweet after he had falsely claimed to the angry crowd that Vice President Mike Pence could âdo the right thingâ and ensure a second Trump term, after that angry crowd had turned into a violent mob assaulting the Capitol while chanting, âHang Mike Pence!ââ206 and after the U.S. Secret Service had evacuated the Vice President from the Senate floor.207 One minute after the Presidentâs tweet, at 2:25 p.m., the Secret Service determined they could no longer protect the Vice President in his ceremonial office near the Senate Chamber, and evacuated the Vice President and his family to a secure location, missing the violent mob by a mere 40 feet.208

Further evidence presented at our hearing shows the violent reaction following President Trumpâs 2:24 p.m. tweet and the efforts to protect Vice President Pence in the time that followed.209

The day after the attack on the Capitol, Eastman called Eric Herschmann to talk about continuing litigation on behalf of the Trump Presidential Campaign in Georgia. Herschmann described his reaction to Eastman this way:

And I said to him, are you out of your Fâing mind? Right? I said, because I only want to hear two words coming out of your mouth from now on: Orderly transition. I said, I donât want to hear any other Fâing words coming out of your mouth, no matter what, other than orderly transition. Repeat those words to me.ââ210

Herschmann concluded the call by telling Eastman: âNow Iâm going to give you the best free legal advice youâre ever getting in your life. Get a great Fâing criminal defense lawyer, youâre going to need it,â and hanging up the phone.211

In the course of investigating this series of facts, the Select Committee subpoenaed Eastmanâs emails from his employer, Chapman University.212 Eastman sued to prevent Chapman from producing the emails, arguing that the emails were attorney-client privileged. Federal District Court Judge David Carter reviewed Eastmanâs emails in camera to determine, among other things, whether the emails had to be produced because they likely furthered a crime committed by one of Eastmanâs clients or by Eastman himself. In addition to reviewing the emails themselves, Judge Carter reviewed substantial additional evidence presented by the Select Committee and by Eastman.

After reciting a series of factual findings regarding President Trumpâs multi-part plan to overturn the election, Judge Carter concluded that President Trump likely violated two criminal statutes: 18 U.S.C. Â§ 1512(c) (corruptly obstructing, impeding or influencing Congressâs official proceeding to count electoral votes); and 18 U.S.C. Â§ 371 (conspiring to defraud the United States). The Court also concluded that John Eastman likely violated at least one of these criminal laws. As to Â§1512(c), Judge Carter explained:

Taken together, this evidence demonstrates that President Trump likely knew the electoral count plan had no factual justification.

The plan not only lacked factual basis but also legal justification. . . .

The illegality of the plan was obvious. Our nation was founded on the peaceful transition of power, epitomized by George Washington laying down his sword to make way for democratic elections. Ignoring this history, President Trump vigorously campaigned for the Vice President to single-handedly determine the results of the 2020 election. . . . Every Americanâand certainly the President of the United Statesâknows that in a democracy, leaders are elected, not installed. With a plan this âBOLD,â President Trump knowingly tried to subvert this fundamental principle. Based on the evidence, the Court finds it more likely than not that President Trump corruptly attempted to obstruct the Joint Session of Congress on January 6, 2021.213

As to 18 U.S.C. Â§ 371, Judge Carter identified evidence demonstrating that both President Trump and John Eastman knew their electoral count plan was illegal, and knew it could not âsurvive judicial scrutinyâ in any of its iterations:

Dr. Eastman himself repeatedly recognized that his plan had no legal support. . . . Dr. Eastman likely acted deceitfully and dishonestly each time he pushed an outcome-driven plan that he knew was unsupported by the law.214

Finally, Judge Carter concluded:

Dr. Eastman and President Trump launched a campaign to overturn a democratic election, an action unprecedented in American history. Their campaign was not confined to the ivory towerâit was a coup in search of a legal theory. The plan spurred violent attacks on the seat of our nationâs government, led to the deaths of several law enforcement officers, and deepened public distrust in our political process.215

Judge Luttig reached similar conclusions during his live hearing testimony: âI have written, as you said, Chairman Thompson, that, today, almost two years after that fateful day in January 2021, that, still, Donald Trump and his allies and supporters are a clear and present danger to American democracy.ââ216

During the hearing, Judge Luttig took issue with certain of Greg Jacobâs characterizations of the 12th Amendmentâs text, explaining that the applicable text was not ambiguous in any way. The Committee agrees with Judge Luttig: the application of the Twelfth Amendmentâs text is plain in this context; it does not authorize Congress to second-guess State and Federal courts and refuse to count State electoral votes based on concerns about fraud. See infra. Although Jacob did not discuss his position in great detail during the hearing, his private testimony gives more insight on his actual views:

In my view, a lot has been said about the fact that the role of the Vice President in the electoral count on January 6th is purely ministerial, and that is a correct conclusion. But if you look at the constitutional text, the role of Congress is purely ministerial as well. You open the certificates and you count them. Those are the only things provided for in the Constitution.217

Anticipating that the Eastman strategy for January 6th would be implemented, President Trump worked with a handful of others to prepare a series of false Trump electoral slates for seven States Biden actually won. President Trump personally conducted a teleconference with Eastman and Republican National Committee Chair Ronna McDaniel âa few days before December 14â and solicited the RNCâs assistance with the scheme.218 McDaniel agreed to provide that assistance.219

A series of contemporaneous documents demonstrate what President Trump and his allies, including attorney Kenneth Chesebro, were attempting to accomplish: they anticipated that the President of the Senate (which, under the Constitution, is the Vice President) could rely upon these false slates of electors on January 6th to justify refusing to count genuine electoral votes.220

The false slates were created by fake Republican electors on December 14th, at the same time the actual, certified electors in those States were meeting to cast their Statesâ Electoral College votes for President Biden. By that point in time, election-related litigation was over in all or nearly all of the subject States, and Trump Campaign election lawyers realized that the fake slates could not be lawful or justifiable on any grounds. Justin Clark, the Trump Campaign Deputy Campaign Manager and Senior Counsel told the Select Committee that he âhad real problems with the process.ââ221 Clark warned his colleagues, âunless we have litigation pending like in these States, like, I donât think this is appropriate or, you know, this isnât the right thing to do. I donât remember how I phrased it, but I got into a little bit of a back and forth and I think it was with Ken Chesebro, where I said, âAlright, you know, you just get after it, like, Iâm out.âââ222

Matthew Morgan, the Trump Campaign General Counsel, told the Select Committee that without an official State certificate of ascertainment,223 âthe [fake] electors were, for lack of a better way of saying it, no good or notânot valid.ââ224

The Office of White House Counsel also appears to have expressed concerns with this fake elector plan. In his interview by the Select Committee, White House Counsel Pat Cipollone acknowledged his view that by mid-December, the process was âdoneâ and that his deputy, Pat Philbin, may have advised against the fake elector strategy.225 In an informal Committee interview, Philbin described the fake elector scheme as one of the âbad theoriesâ that were like âWhac-A-Moleâ in the White House during this period.226 Cipollone agreed with this characterization.227

In her testimony, Cassidy Hutchinson testified that she heard at least one member of the White House Counselâs Office say that the plan was not legal:

Committee Staff: [T]o be clear, did you hear the White House Counselâs Office say that this plan to have alternate electors meet and cast votes for Donald Trump in States that he had lost was not legally sound?

Hutchinson: Yes, sir.228

Multiple Republicans who were persuaded to sign the fake certificates also testified that they felt misled or betrayed, and would not have done so had they known that the fake votes would be used on January 6th without an intervening court ruling. One elector told the Select Committee that he thought his vote would be strictly contingent: â[I]t was a very consistent message that we were told throughout all of that, is this is the only reason why weâre doing this, is to preserve the integrity of being able to have a challenge.ââ229

The âChairpersonâ of the Wisconsin fake electors, who was also at the time Chairman of the Wisconsin Republican Party, insisted in testimony to the Select Committee that he âwas told that these would only count if a court ruled in our favorâ and that he wouldnât have supported anyone using the Trump electorsâ votes without a court ruling.230

Despite the fact that all major election lawsuits thus far had failed, President Trump and his co-conspirators in this effort, including John Eastman and Kenneth Chesebro, pressed forward with the fake elector scheme. Ultimately, these false electoral slates, five of which purported to represent the âduly electedâ electoral college votes of their States, were transmitted to Executive Branch officials at the National Archives, and to the Legislative Branch, including to the Office of the President of the Senate, Vice President Mike Pence.231

The fake electors followed Chesebroâs step-by-step instructions for completing and mailing the fake certificates to multiple officials in the U.S. Government,232 complete with registered mail stickers and return address labels identifying senders like the âArizona Republican Partyâ and the âGeorgia Republican Party.ââ233 The Wisconsin Republican Partyâs fake certificates apparently werenât properly delivered, however, so the Trump Campaign arranged to fly them to Washington just before the joint session on January 6th, and try to deliver them to the Vice President via Senator Ron Johnson and Representative Mike Kellyâs offices.234 Both Johnson and Kellyâs offices attempted to do so, but Vice President Penceâs aide refused the delivery.235

Despite pressure from President Trump, Vice President Pence and the Senate parliamentarian refused to recognize or count the unofficial fake electoral votes. Greg Jacob testified that he advised Vice President Pence on January 2nd that ânone of the slates that had been sent in would qualify as an alternate slateâ under the law and that the Senate Parliamentarian âwas in agreementâ with this conclusion.236

* * *

In addition to this plan to create and transmit fake electoral slates, Donald Trump was also personally and substantially involved in multiple efforts to pressure State election officials and State legislatures to alter official lawful election results. As U.S. District Judge Carter stated in his June 7, 2022, opinion:

Dr. Eastmanâs actions in these few weeks [in December 2020] indicate that his and President Trumpâs pressure campaign to stop the electoral count did not end with Vice President Penceâit targeted every tier of federal and state elected officials. Convincing state legislatures to certify competing electors was essential to stop the count and ensure President Trumpâs reelection.237

Judge Carter also explained that âDr. Eastman and President Trumpâs plan to disrupt the Joint Session was fully formed and actionable as early as December 7, 2020.ââ238

Chapter 2 of this report provides substantial detail on many of President Trumpâs specific efforts to apply pressure to State officials and legislators. We provide a few examples here:

During a January 2, 2021, call, President Trump pressured Georgiaâs Republican Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger to âfind 11,780 votes.â During that call, President Trump asserted conspiracy theories about the election that Department of Justice officials had already debunked. President Trump also made a thinly veiled threat to Raffensperger and his attorney about his failure to respond to President Trumpâs demands: âThatâs a criminal, thatâs a criminal offense . . . Thatâs a big risk to you and to Ryan, your lawyer . . . Iâm notifying you that youâre letting it happen.ââ239

Judge Carter drew these conclusions:

Mr. Raffensperger debunked the Presidentâs allegations âpoint by pointâ and explained that âthe data you have is wrong;â however, President Trump still told him, âI just want to find 11,780 votes.ââ240

* * *

President Trumpâs repeated pleas for Georgia Secretary of State Raffensperger clearly demonstrate that his justification was not to investigate fraud, but to win the election. . . . Taken together, this evidence demonstrates that President Trump likely knew the electoral count plan had no factual justification. The plan not only lacked factual basis but also legal justification.241

That call to Raffensperger came on the heels of President Trumpâs repeated attacks on Raffensperger, election workers, and other public servants about President Trumpâs loss in the election. A month earlier, the Georgia Secretary of Stateâs Chief Operating Officer, Gabriel Sterling, had given this explicit public warning to President Trump and his team, a warning that the Select Committee has determined President Trump apparently saw and disregarded:242

[I]t has all gone too far. All of it. . . .

A 20-something tech in Gwinnett County today has death threats and a noose put out, saying he should be hung for treason because he was transferring a report on batches from an EMS to a county computer so he could read it.

It has to stop.

Mr. President, you have not condemned these actions or this language. Senators, you have not condemned this language or these actions. This has to stop. We need you to step up. And if youâre going to take a position of leadership, show some.

My boss, Secretary Raffenspergerâhis address is out there. They have people doing caravans in front of their house, theyâve had people come onto their property. Tricia, his wife of 40 years, is getting sexualized threats through her cellphone.

It has to stop.

This is elections, this is the backbone of democracy, and all of you who have not said a damn word are complicit in this. Itâs too much. . . .

What you donât have the ability to doâand you need to step up and say thisâis stop inspiring people to commit potential acts of violence. Someoneâs going to get hurt. Someoneâs going to get shot. Someoneâs going to get killed.243

The stark warning was entirely appropriate, and prescient. In addition to the examples Sterling identified, President Trump and his team were also fixated on Georgia election workers Ruby Freeman and Wandrea âShayeâ Moss. He and Giuliani mentioned Freeman repeatedly in meetings with State legislators, at public rallies, and in the January 2nd call with Raffensperger. Referring to a video clip, Giuliani even accused Freeman and Moss of trading USB drives to affect votes âas if they [were] vials of heroin or cocaine.ââ244 This was completely bogus: it was not a USB drive; it was a ginger mint.245

After their contact information was published, Trump supporters sent hundreds of threats to the women and even showed up at Freemanâs home.246 As Freeman testified to the Select Committee, President Trump and his followersâ conduct had a profound impact on her life. She left her home based on advice from the FBI, and wouldnât move back for months.247 And she explained, âIâve lost my sense of securityâall because a group of people, starting with Number 45 [Donald Trump] and his ally Rudy Giuliani, decided to scapegoat me and my daughter Shaye to push their own lies about how the Presidential election was stolen.ââ248 The treatment of Freeman and Moss was callous, inhumane, and inexcusable. Rudolph Giuliani and others with responsibility should be held accountable.

In Arizona, a primary target of President Trumpâs pressure, and ire, was House Speaker Russell âRustyâ Bowers, a longtime Republican who had served 17 years in the State legislature. Throughout November and December, Bowers spoke to President Trump, Giuliani, and members of Giulianiâs legal team, in person or on the phone. During these calls, President Trump and others alleged that the results in Arizona were affected by fraud and asked that Bowers consider replacing Presidential electors for Biden with electors for Trump.249 Bowers demanded proof for the claims of fraud, but never got it. At one point, after Bowers pressed Giuliani on the claims of fraud, Giuliani responded, âweâve got lots of theories, we just donât have the evidence.ââ250 Bowers explained to Giuliani: âYou are asking me do something against my oath, and I will not break my oath.ââ251

President Trump and his supportersâ intimidation tactics affected Bowers, too. Bowersâs personal cell phone and home address were doxed,252 leading demonstrators to show up at his home and shout insults until police arrived. One protestor who showed up at his home was armed and believed to be a member of an extremist militia.253 Another hired a truck with a defamatory and profane allegation that Bowers, a deeply religious man, was a pedophile, and drove it through Bowersâs neighborhood.254 This, again, is the conduct of thugs and criminals, each of whom should be held accountable.

In Michigan, President Trump focused on Republican Senate Majority Leader Mike Shirkey and Republican House Speaker Lee Chatfield. He invited them to the White House for a November 20, 2020, meeting during which President Trump and Giuliani, who joined by phone, went through a âlitanyâ of false allegations about supposed fraud in Michiganâs election.255 Chatfield recalled President Trumpâs more generic directive for the group to âhave some backbone and do the right thing,â which he understood to mean overturning the election by naming Michiganâs Electoral College electors for Trump.256 Shirkey told President Trump that he wouldnât do anything that would violate Michigan law,257 and after the meeting ended, issued a joint statement with Chatfield: âWe have not yet been made aware of any information that would change the outcome of the election in Michigan and as legislative leaders, we will follow the law and follow the normal process regarding Michiganâs electors, just as we have said throughout this election.ââ258

When President Trump couldnât convince Shirkey and Chatfield to change the outcome of the election in Michigan during that meeting or in calls after, he or his team maliciously tweeted out Shirkeyâs personal cell phone number and a number for Chatfield that turned out to be wrong.259 Shirkey received nearly 4,000 text messages after that, and another private citizen reported being inundated with calls and texts intended for Chatfield.260

None of Donald Trumpâs efforts ultimately succeeded in changing the official results in any State. That these efforts had failed was apparent to Donald Trump and his co-conspirators well before January 6th. By January 6th, there was no evidence at all that a majority of any State legislature would even attempt to change its electoral votes.261

This past October, U.S. District Court Judge David Carter issued a further ruling relating to one of President Trumpâs lawsuits in Georgia. Judge Carter applied the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege again, and identified potential criminal activity related to a knowingly false representation by Donald Trump to a Federal court. He wrote:

The emails show that President Trump knew that the specific numbers of voter fraud were wrong but continued to tout those numbers, both in court and in public.262

As John Eastman wrote in an email on December 31, 2020, President Trump was âmade aware that some of the allegations (and evidence proffered by the experts)â in a verified State court complaint was âinaccurate.ââ263 Dr. Eastman noted that âwith that knowledgeâ President Trump could not accurately verify a Federal court complaint that incorporated by reference the âinaccurateâ State court complaint: âI have no doubt that an aggressive DA or US Atty someplace will go after both the President and his lawyers once all the dust settles on this.ââ264 Despite this specific warning, âPresident Trump and his attorneys ultimately filed the complaint with the same inaccurate numbers without rectifying, clarifying, or otherwise changing them.ââ265 And President Trump personally âsigned a verification swearing under oath that the incorporated, inaccurate numbers âare true and correctâ or âbelieved to be true and correctâ to the best of his knowledge and belief.ââ266 The numbers were not correct, and President Trump and his legal team knew it.

In the weeks after the 2020 election, Attorney General Barr advised President Trump that the Department of Justice had not seen any evidence to support Trumpâs theory that the election was stolen by fraud. Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen and his Deputy repeatedly reinforced to President Trump that his claims of election fraud were false when they took over in mid-December. Also in mid-December 2020, Attorney General Barr announced his plans to resign. Between that time and January 6th, Trump spoke with Acting Attorney General Jeff Rosen and Acting Deputy Richard Donoghue repeatedly, attempting to persuade them and the Department of Justice to find factual support for his stolen election claims and thereby to assist his efforts to reverse election results.

As Rosen publicly testified, â. . . between December 23rd and January 3rd, the President either called me or met with me virtually every day, with one or two exceptions, like Christmas Day.ââ267 As discussed earlier, Justice Department investigations had demonstrated that the stolen election claims were false; both Rosen and Donoghue told President Trump this comprehensively and repeatedly.

One of those conversations occurred on December 27th, when President Trump called Rosen to go through a âstream of allegationsâ about the election.268 Donoghue described that call as an âescalation of the earlier conversationsâ they had.269 Initially, President Trump called Rosen directly. When Donoghue joined the call, he sought to âmake it clear to the President [that] these allegations were simply not true.ââ270

So [the President] went through [the allegations]âin what for me was a 90-minute conversation or so, and what for the former Acting AG was a 2-hour conversationâas the President went through them I went piece by piece to say âno, thatâs false, that is not true,â and to correct him really in a serial fashion as he moved from one theory to another.271

The President raised, among others, debunked claims about voting machines in Michigan, a truck driver who allegedly moved ballots from New York to Pennsylvania, and a purported election fraud at the State Farm Arena in Georgia.272 None of the allegations were credible, and Rosen and Donoghue said so to the President.273

At one point during the December 27th call in which Donoghue refuted President Trumpâs fraud allegations, Donoghue recorded in handwritten notes a request President Trump made specifically to him and Acting Attorney General Rosen: âJust say the election was corrupt and leave the rest to me and the Republican Congressmen.ââ274 Donoghue explained: â[T]he Department had zero involvement in anyoneâs political strategy,â and âhe wanted us to say that it was corrupt.ââ275 âWe told him we were not going to do that.ââ276 At the time, neither Rosen nor Donoghue knew the full extent to which Republican Congressmen, including Representative Scott Perry, were attempting to assist President Trump to overturn the election results.

The Committeeâs investigation has shown that Congressman Perry was working with one Department of Justice official, Jeffrey Clark, regarding the stolen election claims. Perry was working with Clark and with President Trump and Chief of Staff Mark Meadows with this goal: to enlist Clark to reverse the Department of Justiceâs findings regarding the election and help overturn the election outcome.277

After introducing Clark to the President, Perry sent multiple text messages to Meadows between December 26th and December 28th, pressing that Clark be elevated within the Department. Perry reminded Meadows that there are only â11 days to 1/6. . .We gotta get going!,â and, as the days went on, one asking, âDid you call Jeff Clark?ââ278

Acting Attorney General Rosen first learned about Clarkâs contact with President Trump in a call on Christmas Eve. On that call, President Trump mentioned Clark to Rosen, who was surprised to learn that Trump knew Clark and had met with him. Rosen later confronted Clark about the contact: âJeff, anything going on that you think I should know about?ââ279 Clark didnât âimmediately volunteerâ the fact that he had met with the President, but ultimately âacknowledged that he had been at a meeting with the President in the Oval Office, not alone, with other people.ââ280 Clark was âkind of defensiveâ and âsomewhat apologetic,â âcasting it as that he had had a meeting with Congressman Perry from Pennsylvania and that, to his surprise, or, you know, he hadnât anticipated it, that they somehow wound up at a meeting in the Oval Office.ââ281 Clarkâs contact with President Trump violated both Justice Department and White House policies designed to prevent political pressure on the Department.282

While Clark initially appeared apologetic and assured Rosen that â[i]t wonât happen again,ââ283 he nevertheless continued to work and meet secretly with President Trump and Congressman Perry. Less than five days after assuring Rosen that he would comply with the Departmentâs White House contacts policy, Clark told Rosen and Donoghue that he had again violated that policy. Donoghue confronted him: âI reminded him that I was his boss and that I had directed him to do otherwise.ââ284

Around the same time, Representative Perry called Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue, criticized the FBI, and suggested that the Department hadnât been doing its job. Perry told Donoghue that Clark âwould do something about this.ââ285

On December 28th, Clark worked with a Department employee named Kenneth Klukowskiâa political appointee who had earlier worked with John Eastmanâto produce a draft letter from the Justice Department to the State legislature of Georgia.286 That letter mirrored a number of the positions President Trump and Eastman were taking at the time.287 (Although both Clark and Eastman refused to answer questions by asserting their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, evidence shows that Clark and Eastman were in communication in this period leading up to January 6th.288 The draft letter to Georgia was intended to be one of several Department letters to State legislatures in swing States that had voted for Biden.289

The letter read: âThe Department of Justice is investigating various irregularities in the 2020 election for President of the United States.ââ290 Clark continued: âThe Department will update you as we are able on investigatory progress, but at this time we have identified significant concerns that may have impacted the outcome of the election in multiple States, including the State of Georgia.ââ291 This was affirmatively untrue. The Department had conducted many investigations of election fraud allegations by that point, but it absolutely did not have âsignificant concernsâ that fraud âmay have impacted the outcome of the electionâ in any State. Jeff Clark knew this; Donoghue confirmed it again in an email responding to Clarkâs letter: â[W]e simply do not currently have a basis to make such a statement. Despite dramatic claims to the contrary, we have not seen the type of fraud that calls into question the reported (and certified) results of the election.ââ292

The letter also explicitly recommended that Georgiaâs State legislature should call a special session to evaluate potential election fraud. âIn light of these developments, the Department recommends that the Georgia General Assembly should convene in special session so that its legislators are in a special position to take additional testimony, receive new evidence, and deliberate on the matter consistent with its duties under the U.S. Constitution.ââ293

Clarkâs draft letter also referenced the fake electors that President Trump and his campaign organizedâarguing falsely that there were currently two competing slates of legitimate Presidential electors in Georgia:294

The Department believes that in Georgia and several other States, both a slate of electors supporting Joseph R. Biden, Jr., and a separate slate of electors supporting Donald J. Trump, gathered on [December 14, 2020] at the proper location to cast their ballots, and that both sets of those ballots have been transmitted to Washington, D.C., to be opened by Vice President Pence.295

This, of course, was part of Donald Trump and John Eastmanâs plan for January 6th. This letter reflects an effort to use the Department of Justice to help overturn the election outcome in Georgia and elsewhere. Rosen and Donoghue reacted immediately to this draft letter:

â[T]hereâs no chance that I would sign this letter or anything remotely like this,â Donoghue wrote.296 The plan set forth by Clark was ânot even within the realm of possibility,ââ297 and Donoghue warned that if they sent Clarkâs letter, it âwould be a grave step for the Department to take and it could have tremendous Constitutional, political and social ramifications for the country.ââ298

As Richard Donoghue testified when describing his response to Clarkâs proposed letter:

Well, I had to read both the email and the attached letter twice to make sure I really understood what he was proposing because it was so extreme to me I had a hard time getting my head around it initially.

But I read it, and I did understand it for what he intended, and I had to sit down and sort of compose what I thought was an appropriate response. . . .

In my response I explained a number of reasons this is not the Departmentâs role to suggest or dictate to State legislatures how they should select their electors. But more importantly, this was not based on fact. This was actually contrary to the facts as developed by Department investigations over the last several weeks and months.

So, I respond to that. And for the department to insert itself into the political process this way I think would have had grave consequences for the country. It may very well have spiraled us into a constitutional crisis.299

Rosen and Donoghue also met with Clark about the letter. Their conversation âwas a very difficult and contentiousâ one, according to Donoghue.300 âWhat youâre proposing is nothing less than the United States Justice Department meddling in the outcome of a Presidential election,â Donoghue admonished Clark, to which Clark indignantly responded, âI think a lot of people have meddled in this election.ââ301

Both Rosen and Donoghue refused to sign the letter, and confronted Clark with the actual results of the Departmentâs investigations.302 They also permitted Clark access to a classified briefing from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (âODNIâ) showing Clark that allegations he made to Rosen and Donoghue about foreign interference with voting machines were not true. According to Rosen, the decision to give Clark the briefing at that point âwas a difficult question because, if heâs going to brief the President, I reluctantly think itâs probably better that heâs heard from Director Ratcliffe than that he not, even ifâI donât think he should brief the President. But, at this point, heâs telling me that this is happening whether I agree with it or not. So, so I let him have that briefing.ââ303

After Clark received the ODNI briefing, âhe acknowledged [to Donoghue] that there was nothing in that briefing that would have supported his earlier suspicion about foreign involvement.ââ304 While Clark then dropped his claims about foreign interference, he continued to press to send the letter to Georgia and other States, despite being told that the Department of Justice investigations had found no fraud sufficient to overturn the election outcome in Georgia or any other States. This was an intentional choice by Jeff Clark to contradict specific Department findings on election fraud, and purposely insert the Department into the Presidential election on President Trumpâs behalf and risk creating or exacerbating a constitutional crisis.

By this point, President Trump recognized that neither Rosen nor Donoghue would sign the letter or support his false election claims. President Trump and his team then communicated further with Clark and offered him the job of Acting Attorney General. On January 2nd, Clark told Rosen that he âwould turn down the Presidentâs offer if [Rosen] reversed [his] position and signed the letterâ that he and Klukowski had drafted.305 The next day, Clark decided to accept and informed Rosen, who then called White House Counsel to seek a meeting directly with President Trump. As Rosen put it, âI wasnât going to accept being fired by my subordinate, so I wanted to talk to the President directly.ââ306

On January 3rd, that meeting was convened. Although contemporaneous White House documents suggest that Clark had already been appointed as the Acting Attorney General,307 all the participants in the meeting other than Clark and President Trump aggressively opposed Clarkâs appointment.

At that point, Rosen decided to âbroaden the circleâ and ask that his subordinates inform all the other Assistant Attorneys General (AAGs) what was afoot.308 Rosen wanted to know how the AAGs would respond if Jeff Clark was installed as the Acting Attorney General. Pat Hovakimian, who worked for Rosen, then set up a conference call. The AAGs almost immediately agreed that they would resign if Rosen was removed from office.309

Rosen, Donoghue, and Steve Engel, the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, attended the meeting. White House lawyers Pat Cipollone, Eric Herschmann and Pat Philbin joined as well.

When the meeting started, Clark attempted to defend his appointment. Clark declared that this was the âlast opportunity to sort of set things straight with this defective election,â and he had the âintelligence,â the âwill,â and âdesireâ to âpursue these matters in the way that the President thought most appropriate.ââ310 Everyone else present disagreed that Clark could conceivably accomplish these things.

White House Counsel Pat Cipollone threatened to resign as well, describing Clarkâs letter as a âmurder-suicide pact.ââ311 Cipollone warned that the letter would âdamage everyone who touches itâ and no one should have anything to do with it.312

President Trump asked Donoghue and Engel what they would do if Clark took office. Both confirmed they would resign.313 Steve Engel recalled that the President next asked if he would resign:

At some point, [] I believe Rich Donoghue said that senior Department officials would all resign if Mr. Clark were put in, and the President turned to me and said, âSteve, you wouldnât resign, would you?â I said, âWell, Mr. President, Iâve been with you through four Attorneys General, including two Acting Attorneys General, and I just couldnât be part of this if Mr. Clark were here.â And I said, âAnd I believe that the other senior Department officials would resign as well. And Mr. Clark would be here by himself with a hostile building, those folks who remained, and nothing would get done.ââ314

Donoghue added that they would not be the only ones to resign. âYou should understand that your entire Department leadership will resign,â Donoghue recalled saying. This included every Assistant Attorney General. âMr. President, these arenât bureaucratic leftovers from another administration,â Donoghue reminded Trump, âYou picked them. This is your leadership team.â Donoghue added, âAnd what happens if, within 48 hours, we have hundreds of resignations from your Justice Department because of your actions? What does that say about your leadership?ââ315 Steve Engel then reinforced Donoghueâs point, saying that Clark would be leading a âgraveyard.â

Faced with mass resignations and recognizing that the âbreakageâ could be too severe, Donald Trump decided to rescind his offer to Clark and drop his plans to use the Justice Department to aid in his efforts to overturn the election outcome.316 The President looked at Clark and said, âI appreciate your willingness to do it. I appreciate you being willing to suffer the abuse. But the reality is, youâre not going to get anything done. These guys are going to quit. Everyone else is going to resign. Itâs going to be a disaster. The bureaucracy will eat you alive. And no matter how much you want to get things done in the next few weeks, you wonât be able to get it done, and itâs not going to be worth the breakage.ââ317

* * *

Evidence gathered by the Committee also suggests that President Trump offered Sidney Powell the position of Special Counsel for election related matters during a highly charged White House meeting on December 18, 2020.318 White House lawyers vehemently opposed Powellâs appointment, and it also was not ultimately made formal.

In the early morning hours of December 19th, shortly after the contentious December 18th White House meeting with Sidney Powell and others, Donald Trump sent a tweet urging his supporters to travel to Washington for January 6th. In that tweet, President Trump attached false allegations that the election was stolen and promised a âwildâ time on January 6th.319 This Twitter invitation was followed by over a dozen other instances in which he used Twitter to encourage supporters to rally for him in Washington, DC on January 6th.320

The Committee has assembled detailed material demonstrating the effects of these communications on members of far-right extremist groups, like the Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, Three Percenters, and others, and on individuals looking to respond to their presidentâs call to action. President Trumpâs supporters believed the election was stolen because they listened to his words,321 and they knew what he had called them to do; stop the certification of the electoral count.322

For example, one supporter, Charles Bradford Smith, noted on December 22, 2020, that âTrump is asking everyone to goâ to Washington, DC on January 6th âto fill the streetsâ on the âday Pence counts up the votes.ââ323 Derek Sulenta posted to Facebook on December 23, 2020, that âIâll be there Jan 6th to support the president no matter what happensâ because âThatâs the day he called for patriots to show up.ââ324 By December 31, 2020, Robert Morss believed January 6th stood for the moment when â1776 Will Commence Againâ because President Trump asked them to âBe there, Will be Wild.ââ325 Kenneth Grayson predicted what would eventually happen on January 6th, when on December 23, 2020, he wrote on Facebook that President Trump called people to Washington, DC through his December 19th tweet and then added âIF TRUMP TELLS US TO STORM THE FUKIN CAPITAL IMA DO THAT THEN!ââ326 Some demonstrated their inspiration for January 6th by circulating flyers, which proclaimed â#OccupyCongressâ over images of the United States Capitol.327 Robert Gieswein, a Coloradan affiliated with Three Percenters who was among the first to breach the Capitol, said that he came to Washington, DC âto keep President Trump in.ââ328

Chapter 8 of this report documents how the Proud Boys led the attack, penetrated the Capitol, and led hundreds of others inside. Multiple Proud Boys reacted immediately to President Trumpâs December 19th tweet and began their planning. Immediately, Proud Boys leaders reorganized their hierarchy, with Enrique Tarrio, Joseph Biggs, and Ethan Nordean messaging groups of Proud Boys about what to expect on January 6th.329 Tarrio created a group chat known as the Ministry of Self-Defense for hand-selected Proud Boys whom he wanted to âorganize and directâ plans for January 6th.330 On social media, Tarrio referenced ârevoltâ and â[r]evolution,â and conspicuously asked âWhat if we invade it?â on Telegram.331 As of December 29, 2020, Tarrio told the group the events on January 6th would be âcentered around the Capitol.ââ332

At the time of publication of this report, prosecutions of certain Proud Boys are ongoing. To date, one Proud Boy has pled guilty to seditious conspiracy and other Proud Boys have pled guilty to other crimes, including conspiracy to obstruct Congress.333 Jeremy Bertino, a Proud Boy who pled guilty to seditious conspiracy, admitted that he:

understood from internal discussions among the Proud Boys that in the leadup to January 6, the willingness to resort to unlawful conduct increasingly included a willingness to use and promote violence to achieve political objectives.334

Moreover,

Bertino believed that the 2020 election had been âstolenâ and, as January 6, 2021, approached, believed that drastic measures, including violence, were necessary to prevent Congress from certifying the Electoral College Vote on January 6, 2021. Bertino made his views in this regard known publicly, as well as in private discussions with MOSD leadership. Bertino understood from his discussions with MOSD leadership that they agreed that the election had been stolen, that the purpose of traveling to Washington, D.C., on January 6, 2021, was to stop the certification of the Electoral College Vote, and that the MOSD leaders were willing to do whatever it would take, including using force against police and others, to achieve that objective.335

As set out in Bertinoâs plea agreement, members of MOSD:

openly discussed plans for potential violence at the Capitol [. . . and] members of MOSD leadership were discussing the possibility of storming the Capitol. Bertino believed that storming the Capitol would achieve the groupâs goal of stopping Congress from certifying the Electoral College Vote. Bertino understood that storming the Capitol or its grounds would be illegal and would require using force against police or other government officials.336

Another Proud Boy who has pled guilty to conspiracy and assault charges, Charles Donohoe, understood that the Proud Boys planned to storm the Capitol. Donohoe, a Proud Boys local chapter leader from North Carolina:

was aware [as early as January 4, 2021] that members of MOSD leadership were discussing the possibility of storming the Capitol. Donohoe believed that storming the Capitol would achieve the groupâs goal of stopping the government from carrying out the transfer of presidential power.337

The Department of Justice has charged a number of Oath Keepers with seditious conspiracy. Specifically, the government alleges that â[a]fter the Presidential Election, Elmer Stewart Rhodes III conspired with his co-defendants, introduced below, and other co-conspirators, known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to oppose by force the lawful transfer of presidential power.ââ338 A jury agreed, convicting Stewart Rhodes and Kelly Meggsâthe leader of the Florida Oath Keepers chapterâof seditious conspiracy. The jury also convicted Rhodes and Meggs, as well as fellow Oath Keepers Jessica Watkins, Kenneth Harrelson, and Thomas Caldwell,339 of other serious felonies for their actions on January 6th.340

Meggs celebrated the December 19th tweet, sending an encrypted Signal message to Florida Oath Keepers that President Trump âwants us to make it WILD thatâs what heâs saying. He called us all to the Capitol and wants us to make it wild!!! . . . Gentlemen we are heading to DC pack your shit!!ââ341 Similarly, Oath Keeper Joshua Jamesâwho pleaded guilty to seditious conspiracyâtold Oath Keepers that there was now a âNATIONAL CALL TO ACTION FOR DC JAN 6THâ following President Trumpâs words.342

Stewart Rhodes, the Oath Keepersâ founder, felt that âthe time for peaceful protest is overâ after December 19th and, according to the government, âurged President Trump to use military force to stop the lawful transfer of presidential power, describing January 6, 2021, as âa hard constitutional deadlineâ to do so.343 Rhodes created a âan invitation-only Signal group chat titled, âDC OP: Jan 6 21ââ on December 30, 2020, which he and other Oath Keepers, like Meggs and James, used to plan for January 6th, including by creating a âquick reaction forceâ of firearms to be stashed in Virginia.344

Multiple members of the Oath Keepers have pleaded guilty to seditious conspiracy. Brian Ulrich started planning for January 6th right after President Trump sent out his December 19th tweet. The Department of Justice summarized Ulrichâs communications, as follows:

Ulrich messaged the âOath Keepers of Georgiaâ Signal group chat, âTrump acts now maybe a few hundred radicals die trying to burn down cities . . . Trump sits on his hands Biden wins . . . millions die resisting the death of the 1st and 2nd amendment.â On December 20, 2020, an individual in the âOath Keepers of Georgiaâ Signal group chat, who later traveled with Ulrich to Washington, D.C., and breached the Capitol grounds with Ulrich on January 6, 2021, messaged, âJanuary 6th. The great reset. America or not.ââ345

The Justice Departmentâs Statement of Offense for Oath Keeper Joshua James provided these details:

In advance of and on January 6, 2021, James and others agreed to take part in the plan developed by Rhodes to use any means necessary, up to and including the use of force, to stop the lawful transfer of presidential power. In the weeks leading up to January 6, 2021, Rhodes instructed James and other coconspirators to be prepared, if called upon, to report to the White House grounds to secure the perimeter and use lethal force if necessary against anyone who tried to remove President Trump from the White House, including the National Guard or other government actors who might be sent to remove President Trump as a result of the Presidential Election.346

The former Presidentâs call also galvanized Three Percenters to act. A group known as The Three Percenters Original sent a message to its members on December 16, 2020, noting they âstand ready and are standing by to answer the call from our President should the need ariseâ to combat the âpure evil that is conspiring to steal our country away from the american peopleâ through the â2020 presidential election.ââ347 After President Trumpâs tweet, the group put out another letter instructing âany member who can attend . . . to participateâ on January 6th because â[t]he President of the United States has put out a general call for the patriots of this Nation to gatherâ in Washington, DC.348

Other Three Percenter groups also responded. Alan Hostetter and Russell Taylor led a group of Three Percenters calling themselves the California PatriotsâDC Brigade, who have been charged with conspiracy to obstruct Congress because they organized to fight to keep President Trump in power on January 6th after President Trumpâs December 19th tweet inspired them to come to Washington, DC.349 On December 19th, Hostetter posted on Instagram:

President Trump tweeted that all patriots should descend on Washington DC on Wednesday l/6/2021. This is the date of the Joint Session of Congress in which they will either accept or reject the fake/phony/stolen electoral college votes.350

Between December 19th and January 6th, Hostetter, Taylor, and other members of the California PatriotsâDC Brigade exchanged messages and posted to social media about bringing gear, including âweaponry,â like âhatchet[s],â âbat[s],â or â[l]arge metal flashlights,â and possibly âfirearms,â and, about being âready and willing to fightâ like it was â1776.â Taylor even spoke in front of the Supreme Court on January 5, 2021, explaining that â[p]atriotsâ would ânot return to our peaceful way of life until this election is made right . . . .ââ351 On December 29, 2020, Taylor exclaimed âI personally want to be on the front steps and be one of the first ones to breach the doors!ââ352

Similarly, members of the Florida Guardians of Freedom, Three Percent sent around a flyer on December 24, 2020, saying they were âresponding to the call from President Donald J. Trump to assist in the security, protection, and support of the people as we all protest the fraudulent election and re-establish liberty for our nation.ââ353 Their leader, Jeremy Liggett, posted a meme to Facebook stating that â3% Will Show In Record Numbers In DCââ354 and put out a âsafety videoâ instructing people that they could bring âan expandable metal baton, a walking cane and a folding knifeââ355 to Washington, DC on January 6th. Several have been arrested for participating in the violence around the tunnel on January 6th.356

When interviewed by the FBI on March 31, 2021, Danny Rodriguezâa Three Percenter from California who tased Officer Michael Fanone in the neck as rioters tried to break through a door on the west side of the Capitolâreflected on his decision to go to Washington, DC357:

Trump called us to D.C. . . . and heâs calling for helpâI thought he was calling for help. I thought he wasâI thought we were doing the right thing. . . . [W]e thought we were going to hit it like a civil war. There was going to be a big battle. . . . I thought that the main fight, the main battle, was going to be in D.C. because Trump called everyone there.358

These groups were not operating in silos. Meggs bragged on Facebook that following President Trumpâs December 19th tweet he had formed an alliance between the Oath Keepers, the Florida Three Percenters, and the Proud Boys âto work together to shut this shit down.ââ359 On December 19th, Meggs called Enrique Tarrio and they spoke for more than three minutes.360 Three days later, Meggs messaged Liggett, echoing his excitement about the December 19th tweet and specifically referencing the seat of Congress: âHe called us all to the Capitol and wants us to make it wild!!!ââ361 Liggett said âI will have a ton of men with meâ and Meggs replied that âwe have made Contact [sic] with PB [Proud Boys] and they always have a big group. Force multiplier. . . . I figure we could splinter off the main group of PB and come up behind them. Fucking crush them for good.ââ362 Aside from Meggs, Stewart Rhodes brought in at least one local militia leader363 and Three Percenters into the Oath Keepers January 6th planning chats that came about following President Trumpâs tweet.364

Even on January 6th, rioters referenced the tweet. An unknown rioter was caught on video as they ascended the Capitol steps saying âHe said it was gonna be wild. He didnât lie.ââ365 MPD body-worn cameras captured Cale Clayton around 3:15 p.m. as he taunted officers from under the scaffolding: âYour fucking president told us to be here. You should be on this side, right here, going with us. You are an American citizen. Your fucking President told you to do that. You too. You too. You. All of you guys. That Tweet was for you guys. For us. For you.ââ366

As January 6th neared, intelligence emerged indicating that January 6th was likely to be violent, and specifically that the Capitol was a target. On January 3rd, an intelligence summary informed Department of Justice officials of plans to âoccupy the Capitolâ and âinvadeâ the Capitol on January 6th. This summarized a âSITE Intelligence Groupâ report about the âonline rhetoric focused on the 6 Jan event.â Some of the reporting includes: âCalls to occupy federal buildings.â âintimidating Congress and invading the capitol building.â The email also quoted WUSA9 local reporting: âone of the websites used for organizing the event was encouraging attendees to bring guns.ââ367

Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue testified:

And we knew that if you have tens of thousands of very upset people showing up in Washington, DC, that there was potential for violence.368

At the same time, a Defense Department official predicted on a White House National Security Council call that violence could be targeted at the Capitol on January 6th. According to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley:

So during these calls, I â I only remember in hindsight because he was almost like clairvoyant. [Deputy Secretary of Defense David] Norquist says during one of these calls, the greatest threat is a direct assault on the Capitol. Iâll never forget it.369

Likewise, documentation received by the Committee from the Secret Service demonstrates a growing number of warnings both that January 6th was likely to be violent, and specifically that the Capitol would likely be the target, including intelligence directly regarding the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers militia groups.

Even two weeks ahead of January 6th, the intelligence started to show what could happen. On December 22, 2020, the FBI received a screenshot of an online chat among Oath Keepers, seemingly referring to the State capitols besieged by protesters across the country earlier that year: âif they were going to go in, then they should have went all the way.ââ370 âThere is only one way. It is not signs. Itâs not rallies. Itâs fucking bullets,â one user replied.371

A public source emailed the Secret Service a document titled âArmed and Ready, Mr. President,â on December 24th, which summarized online comments responding to President Trumpâs December 19th tweet.372 Protestors should âstart marching into the chambers,â one user wrote.373 Trump âcanât exactly openly tell you to revolt,â another replied. âThis is the closest heâll ever get.ââ374 âI read [the Presidentâs tweet] as armed,â someone said.375 â[T]here is not enough cops in DC to stop what is coming,â replied yet another.376 â[B]e already in place when Congress tries to get to their meeting,â the comments continued, and âmake sure they know who to fear.âââ377 â[W]aiting for Trump to say the word,â a person said, and âthis is what Trump expects,â exclaimed another.378 Capitol Policeâs head of intelligence, Jack Donohue, got the same compilation from a former colleague at the New York Police Department on December 28, 2020.379

On December 26, 2020, the Secret Service received a tip about the Proud Boys detailing plans to have âa large enough group to march into DC armed [that] will outnumber the police so they canât be stopped.ââ380 âTheir plan is to literally kill people,â the informant stated. âPlease please take this tip seriously . . . .ââ381 On December 29, 2020, Secret Service forwarded related warnings to Capitol Police that pro-Trump demonstrators were being urged to âoccupy federal building[s],â including âmarch[ing] into the capital building and mak[ing] them quake in their shoes by our mere presence.ââ382

Civilians also tipped off Capitol Police about people bringing weapons to besiege the Capitol. One tipster, who had âtrack[ed] online far right extremism for years,â emailed Capitol Police warning âIâve seen countless tweets from Trump supporters saying they will be armed,â and âI[â]ve also seen tweets from people organizing to âstorm the Capitolâ on January 6th.ââ383

On December 29, 2020, Secret Service forwarded related warnings to Capitol Police that pro-Trump demonstrators were being urged to âoccupy federal building,â including âmarch[ing] into the capital building and mak[ing] them quake in their shoes by our mere presence.ââ384 Indeed, a Secret Service intelligence briefing on December 30th entitled âMarch for Trump,â highlighted the Presidentâs âWill be wild!â tweet alongside hashtags #WeAreTheStorm, #1776Rebel, and #OccupyCapitols, writing âPresident Trump supporters have proposed a movement to occupy Capitol Hill.ââ385

On January 1, 2021, a lieutenant in the intelligence branch at DC Police forwarded a civilian tip about âa website planning terroristic behavior on Jan 6th, during the rallyâ to Capitol Police intelligence.386 âThere are detailed plans to storm federal buildings,â including âthe capitol in DC on Jan 6th,â the tipster reported, linking to thedonald.win.387

On January 2, 2021, the FBI discovered a social media posting that read, âThis is not a rally and itâs no longer a protest. This is a final stand . . . many are ready to die to take back #USA . . . . And donât be surprised if we take the #capital building.ââ388

On January 3, 2021, a Parler userâs postâunder the name 1776(2.0) Minutemanânoting âafter weds we are going to need a new congressâ and âJan 6 may actually be their [Members of Congress] last day in officeâ reached the FBI and Capitol Police.389

The FBI field office in Norfolk, Virginia issued an alert to law enforcement agencies on January 5th tiled âPotential for Violence in Washington, D.C. Area in Connection with Planned âStopTheStealâ Protest on 6 January 2021,â which noted:

An online thread discussed specific calls for violence to include stating, âBe ready to fight. Congress needs to hear glass breaking, doors being kicked in, and blood. . . being spilled. Get violent. . .stop calling this a march, or rally, or a protest. Go there ready for war. We get our President or we die. NOTHING else will achieve this goal.ââ390

In addition, the alert copied âperimeter maps [of the Capitol] and caravan pictures [that] were postedâ on thedonald.win, particularly worrying that the âcaravans . . . had the same colors as the sections of the perimeterâ of the Capitol.391 Secret Service also knew about caravans planning to come to DC to âOccupy the Capitol.ââ392

That same day, representatives from DHS, FBI, DCâs Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency, Secret Service, DC Police, and Capitol Police shared a website, Red State Secession, which had a post titled âWhy the Second American Revolution Starts Jan 6.â A user asked visitors to post where they could find the home addresses of Democratic congressmen and âpolitical enemiesâ and asked if âany of our enemies [will] be working in offices in DC that afternoon.â 393 âWhat are their routes to and from the event?â the post continued.394 â[T]he crowd will be looking for enemies.ââ395

A Secret Service open-source unit flagged an account on thedonald.win that threatened to bring a sniper rifle to a rally on January 6th. The user also posted a picture of a handgun and rifle with the caption, âSunday Gun Day Providing Overwatch January 6th Will be Wild.ââ396

The Secret Service learned from the FBI on January 5th about right-wing groups establishing armed quick reaction forces in Virginia, where they could amass firearms illegal in DC.397 Trump supporters staged there waiting across the river âto respond to âcalls for help.âââ398 The Oath Keepers were such a group.399

President Trumpâs closest aides knew about the political power of sites like thedonald.win, which is where much of this violent rhetoric and planning happened. On December 30, 2020, Jason Millerâa Senior Adviser to and former spokesman for the former Presidentâtexted Chief of Staff Mark Meadows a link to the thedonald.win, adding âI got the base FIRED UP.ââ400 The link connected to a page with comments like âGallows donât require electricity,â âif the filthy commie maggots try to push their fraud through, there will be hell to pay,â and Congress can certify Trump the winner or leave âin a bodybag.ââ401 Symbolic gallows were constructed on January 6th at the foot of the Capitol.402

After President Trumpâs signal, his supporters did not hide their plans for violence at the Capitol, and those threats made their way to national and local law enforcement agencies. As described in this report, the intelligence agencies did detect this planning, and they shared it with the White House and with the U.S. Secret Service.

Testimony from White House staff also suggests real concerns about the risk of violence as January 6th approached. Cassidy Hutchinson, for example, testified about a conversation she had with her boss, Mark Meadows, on January 2nd:

I went into Markâs office, and he was still on his phone. . . . . I said to Mark, âRudy [Giuliani] said these things to me. Whatâs going on here? Anything I should know about?â

This wasâhe was, like, looking at his phone. He was like, âOh, itâs all about the rally on Wednesday. Isnât that what he was talking to you about?â

I said, âYeah. Yeah, sounds like weâre going to the Capitol.â

He said, âYeah. Are you talking with Tony?â

âIâm having a conversation, sir.â

He saidâstill looking at his phone. I remember he was scrolling. He was like, âYeah. You know, things might get real, real bad on the 6th.â

And I remember saying to him, âWhat do you mean?â

He was like, âI donât know. Thereâs just going to be a lot of people here, and thereâs a lot of different ideas right now. Iâm not really sure of everything thatâs going on. Letâs just make sure we keep tabs on it.ââ403

Hutchinson also testified about a conversation she had with Director of National Intelligence, Ratcliffe:

He had expressed to me that he was concerned that it could spiral out of control and potentially be dangerous, either for our democracy or the way that things were going for the 6th.404

Hope Hicks texted Trump Campaign spokesperson Hogan Gidley in the midst of the January 6th violence, explaining that she had âsuggested . . . several timesâ on the preceding days (January 4th and January 5th) that President Trump publicly state that January 6th must remain peaceful and that he had refused her advice to do so.405 Her recollection was that Herschmann earlier advised President Trump to make a preemptive public statement in advance of January 6th calling for no violence that day.406 No such statement was made.

The District of Columbia Homeland Security office explicitly warned that groups were planning to âoccupy the [Capitol] to halt the vote.ââ407

[W]e got derogatory information from OSINT suggesting that some very, very violent individuals were organizing to come to DC, and not only were they organized to come to DC, but they were â these groups, these nonaligned groups were aligning. And so all the red flags went up at that point, you know, when you have armed militia, you know, collaborating with White supremacy groups, collaborating with conspiracy theory groups online all toward a common goal, you start seeing what we call in, you know, terrorism, a blended ideology, and thatâs a very, very bad sign. . . . [T]hen when they were clearly across â not just across one platform but across multiple platforms of these groups coordinating, not just like chatting, âHey, howâs it going, whatâs the weather like where youâre at,â but like, âwhat are you bringing, what are you wearing, you know, where do we meet up, do you have plans for the Capitol.â Thatâs operationalâthatâs like preoperational intelligence, right, and that is something thatâs clearly alarming.408

Again, this type of intelligence was shared, including obvious warnings about potential violence prior to January 6th.409 What was not shared, and was not fully understood by intelligence and law enforcement entities, is what role President Trump would play on January 6th in exacerbating the violence, and later refusing for multiple hours to instruct his supporters to stand down and leave the Capitol. No intelligence collection was apparently performed on President Trumpâs plans for January 6th, nor was there any analysis performed on what he might do to exacerbate potential violence. Certain Republican members of Congress who were working with Trump and the Giuliani team may have had insight on this particular risk, but none appear to have alerted the Capitol Police or any other law enforcement authority.

On January 2, 2021, Katrina Pierson wrote in an email to fellow rally organizers, âPOTUS expectations are to have something intimate at the [E]llipse, and call on everyone to march to the Capitol.ââ410 And, on January 4, 2021, another rally organizer texted Mike Lindell, the MyPillow CEO, that President Trump would âunexpectedlyâ call on his supporters to march to the Capitol:

This stays only between us . . . . It can also not get out about the march because I will be in trouble with the national park service and all the agencies but POTUS is going to just call for it âunexpectedly.ââ411

Testimony obtained by the Committee also indicates that President Trump was specifically aware that the crowd he had called to Washington was fired up and angry on the evening of January 5th. Judd Deere, a deputy White House press secretary recalled a conversation with President Trump in the Oval Office on the evening of January 5th:

Judd Deere: I said he should focus on policy accomplishments. I didnât mention the 2020 election.

Committee Staff: Okay. What was his response?

Deere: He acknowledged that and said, âWeâve had a lot,â something along those lines, but didnâtâhe fairly quickly moved to how fired up the crowd is, or was going to be.

Committee Staff: Okay. What did he say about it?

Deere: Just that they wereâthey were fired up. They were angry. They feel like the electionâs been stolen, that the election was rigged, thatâhe went on and on about that for a little bit.412

Testimony indicated that President Trump was briefed on the risk of violence on the morning of the 6th before he left the White House. Cassidy Hutchinson provided this testimony:

Vice Chair Cheney: So, Ms. Hutchinson, is it your understanding that Mr. Ornato told the President about weapons at the rally on the morning of January 6th?

Hutchinson: That is what Mr. Ornato relayed to me.413

The head of President Trumpâs security detail, Bobby Engel, told the Select Committee that when he shared critical information with White House Deputy Chief of Staff Anthony Ornato, it was a means of conveying that information with the Oval Office: âSo, when it came to passing information to Mr. Ornato, Iâmy assumption was that it would get to the chief [of staff, Mark Meadows], or that he was sharing the information with the chief. I donâtâand the filtering process, or if the chief thinks it needs to get to the President, then he would share it with the President.ââ414 Also, Engel confirmed that if âinformation would come to my attention, whether it was a protective intelligence issue or a concern orâprimarily, I wouldâI would make sure that the information got filtered up through the appropriate chain usually through Mr. Ornato. So if I received a report on something that was happening in the DC area, Iâd either forward that information to Mr. Ornato, or call him about that information or communicate in some way.ââ415

The Select Committee also queried Deputy Chief of Staff Ornato this November about what he generally would have done in this sort of situation, asking him the following: âGenerally you receive information about things like the groups that are coming, the stuff that we talked earlier. You would bring that to Mr. Meadows and likely did here, although you donât have a specific recollection?ââ416 Ornato responded: âThat is correct, sir.ââ417 Ornato also explained to the Committee that â. . . in my normal daily functions, in my general functions as my job, I wouldâve had a conversation with him about all the groups coming in and what was expected from the secret service.ââ418 As for the morning of January 6th itself, he had the following answer:

Committee Staff: Do you remember talking to Chief of Staff Mark Meadows about any of your concerns about the threat landscape going into January 6th?

Ornato: I donât recall; however, in my position I wouldâve made sure he was tracking the demos, which he received a daily brief, Presidential briefing. So he most likely was getting all this in his daily brief as well. I wouldnât know what was in his intelligence brief that day, but I wouldâve made sure that he was tracking these things and just mentioned, âHey, are you tracking the demos?â If he gave me a âyeahâ, I donât recall it today, but Iâm sure that was something that took place.419

Ornato had access to intelligence that suggested violence at the Capitol on January 6th, and it was his job to inform Meadows and President Trump of that. Although Ornato told us that he did not recall doing so, the Select Committee found multiple parts of Ornatoâs testimony questionable. The Select Committee finds it difficult to believe that neither Meadows nor Ornato told President Trump, as was their job, about the intelligence that was emerging as the January 6th rally approached.

Hours before the Ellipse rally on January 6th, the fact that the assembled crowd was prepared for potential violence was widely known. In addition to intelligence reports indicating potential violence at the Capitol, weapons and other prohibited items were being seized by police on the streets and by Secret Service at the magnetometers for the Ellipse speech. Secret Service confiscated a haul of weapons from the 28,000 spectators who did pass through the magnetometers: 242 cannisters of pepper spray, 269 knives or blades, 18 brass knuckles, 18 tasers, 6 pieces of body armor, 3 gas masks, 30 batons or blunt instruments, and 17 miscellaneous items like scissors, needles, or screwdrivers.420 And thousands of others purposely remained outside the magnetometers, or left their packs outside.421

Others brought firearms. Three men in fatigues from Broward County, Florida brandished AR-15s in front of Metropolitan police officers on 14th Street and Independence Avenue on the morning of January 6th.422 MPD advised over the radio that one individual was possibly armed with a âGlockâ at 14th and Constitution Avenue, and another was possibly armed with a ârifleâ at 15th and Constitution Avenue around 11:23 a.m.423 The National Park Service detained an individual with a rifle between 12 and 1 p.m.424 Almost all of this was known before Donald Trump took the stage at the Ellipse.

By the time President Trump was preparing to give his speech, he and his advisors knew enough to cancel the rally. And he certainly knew enough to cancel any plans for a march to the Capitol. According to testimony obtained by the Select Committee, President Trump knew that elements of the crowd were armed, and had prohibited items, and that many thousands would not pass through the magnetometers for that reason. Testimony indicates that the President had received an earlier security briefing, and testimony indicates that the Secret Service mentioned the prohibited items again as they drove President Trump to the Ellipse.

Cassidy Hutchinson was with the President backstage. Her contemporaneous text messages indicate that President Trump was âeffing furiousâ about the fact that a large number of his supporters would not go through the magnetometers:

Cassidy Hutchinson: But the crowd looks good from this vanish [sic] point. As long as we get the shot. He was fucking furious

Tony Ornato: He doesnât get it that the people on the monument side donât want to come in. They can see from there and donât want to come in. They can see from there and donât have to go through mags. With 30k magged inside.

Cassidy Hutchinson: Thatâs what was relayed several times and in different iterations

Cassidy Hutchinson: Poor max got chewed out

Cassidy Hutchinson: He also kept mentioning [an off the record trip] to Capitol before he took the stage

Tony Ornato: Bobby will tell him no. Itâs not safe to do. No assets available to safely do it.425

And Hutchinson described what President Trump said as he prepared to take the stage:

When we were in the off-stage announce area tent behind the stage, he was very concerned about the shot. Meaning the photograph that we would get because the rally space wasnât full. One of the reasons, which Iâve previously stated, was because he wanted it to be full and for people to not feel excluded because they had come far to watch him at the rally. And he felt the mags were at fault for not letting everybody in, but another leading reason and likely the primary reasons is because he wanted it full and he was angry that we werenât letting people through the mags with weaponsâwhat the Secret Service deemed as weapons, and are, are weapons. But when we were in the off-stage announce tent, I was a part of a conversation, I was in the vicinity of a conversation where I overheard the President say something to the effect of, âI donât Fâing care that they have weapons. Theyâre not here to hurt me. Take the Fâing mags away. Let my people in. They can march to the Capitol from here. Let the people in. Take the Fâing mags away.ââ426

The Secret Service special agent who drove the President after his speech told the Select Committee that Trump made a similar remark in the vehicle when his demand to go to the Capitol was refusedâessentially that Trump did not believe his supporters posed a security risk to him personally.427

Minutes after the exchange that Hutchinson describedâwhen President Trump took the stageâhe pointedly expressed his concern about the thousands of attendees who would not enter the rally area and instructed Secret Service to allow that part of the crowd to enter anyway:

. . . Iâd love to have if those tens of thousands of people would be allowed. The military, the secret service. And we want to thank you and the police law enforcement. Great. Youâre doing a great job. But Iâd love it if they could be allowed to come up here with us. Is that possible? Can you just let [them] come up, please?428

Although President Trump and his advisors knew of the risk of violence, and knew specifically that elements of the crowd were angry and some were armed, from intelligence and law enforcement reports that morning, President Trump nevertheless went forward with the rally, and then specifically instructed the crowd to march to the Capitol: âBecause youâll never take back our country with weakness. You have to show strength and you have to be strong. We have come to demand that Congress do the right thing and only count the electors who have been lawfully slated, lawfully slated.ââ429 Much of President Trumpâs speech was improvised. Even before his improvisation, during the review of President Trumpâs prepared remarks, White House lawyer Eric Herschmann specifically requested that âif there were any factual allegations, someone needed to independently validate or verify the statements.ââ430 And in the days just before January 6th, Herschmann âchewed outâ John Eastman and told him he was âout of [his] Fâing mindâ to argue that the Vice President could be the sole decision-maker as to who becomes the next President.431 Herschmann told us, âI so berated him that I believed that theory would not go forward.ââ432 But President Trump made that very argument during his speech at the Ellipse and made many false statements. Herschmann attended that speech, but walked out during the middle of it.433

President Trumpâs speech to the crowd that day lasted more than an hour. The speech walked through dozens of known falsehoods about purported election fraud. And Trump again made false and malicious claims about Dominion voting systems.434 As discussed earlier, he again pressured Vice President Mike Pence to refuse to count lawful electoral votes, going off script repeatedly, leading the crowd to believe falsely that Pence could and would alter the election outcome:

And I actually, I just spoke to Mike. I said: âMike, that doesnât take courage. What takes courage is to do nothing. That takes courage.â And then weâre stuck with a president who lost the election by a lot and we have to live with that for four more years. Weâre just not going to let that happen. . . .

When you catch somebody in a fraud, youâre allowed to go by very different rules.

So I hope Mike has the courage to do what he has to do. And I hope he doesnât listen to the RINOs and the stupid people that heâs listening to.435

This characterization of Vice President Penceâs decision had a direct impact on those who marched to and approached the Capitol, as illustrated by this testimony from a person convicted of crimes committed on January 6th:

So this woman came up to the side of us, and she, says, Pence folded. So it was kind of, like, okay. Well, in my mind I was thinking, âWell, thatâs it,â you know. Well, my son-in-law looks at me, and he says, âI want to go in.ââ436

Trump used the word âpeacefully,â written by speech writers, one time. But he delivered many other scripted and unscripted comments that conveyed a very different message:

Because youâll never take back our country with weakness. You have to show strength and you have to be strong. We have come to demand that Congress do the right thing and only count the electors who have been lawfully slated, lawfully slated. . . .

And we fight. We fight like hell. And if you donât fight like hell, youâre not going to have a country anymore. . . .437

Trump also was not the only rally speaker to do these things. Giuliani, for instance, also said, âLetâs have trial by combat.ââ438 Likewise, Eastman used his two minutes on the Ellipse stage to make a claim already known to be falseâthat corrupted voted machines stole the election.439

The best indication of the impact of President Trumpâs words, both during the Ellipse speech and beforehand, are the comments from those supporters who attended the Ellipse rally and their conduct immediately thereafter. Videoclips show several of the attendees on their way to the Capitol or shortly after they arrived:

Iâm telling you what, Iâm hearing that Pence â hearing the Pence just caved. No. Is that true? I didnât hear it. Iâm hear â Iâm hearing reports that Pence caved. No way. Iâm telling you, if Pence caved, weâre going to drag motherfuckers through the streets. You fucking politicians are going to get fucking drug through the streets.440

Yes. I guess the hope is that thereâs such a show of force here that Pence will decide do the right thing, according to Trump.441

Pence voted against Trump. [Interviewer: Ok. And thatâs when all this started?] Yup. Thatâs when we marched on the Capitol.442

We just heard that Mike Pence is not going to reject any fraudulent electoral votes. [Other speaker: Boo. Youâre a traitor! Boo!] Thatâs right. Youâve heard it here first. Mike Pence has betrayed the United States of America. [Other speaker: Boo! Fuck you, Mike Pence!] Mike Pence has betrayed this President and he has betrayed the people of the United States and we will never, ever forget. [Cheers]443

[Q] What percentage of the crowd is going to the Capitol? [A] [Oath Keeper Jessica Watkins]: One hundred percent. It has, it has spread like wildfire that Pence has betrayed us, and everybodyâs marching on the Capitol. All million of us. Itâs insane.444

Another criminal defendantâcharged with assaulting an officer with a flagpole and other crimesâexplained in an interview why he went to the Capitol and fought:

Dale Huttle: We were not there illegally, we were invited there by the President himself. . . . Trumpâs backers had been told that the election had been stolen. . . .

Reporter Megan Hickey: But do you think he encouraged violence?

Dale Huttle: Well, I sat there, or stood there, with half a million people listening to his speech. And in that speech, both Giuliani and [Trump] said we were going to have to fight like hell to save our country. Now, whether it was a figure of speech or notâit wasnât taken that way.

Reporter Megan Hickey: You didnât take it as a figure of speech?

Dale Huttle: No.445

President Trump concluded his speech at 1:10 p.m.

Among other statements from the Ellipse podium, President Trump informed the crowd that he would be marching to the Capitol with them:

Now, it is up to Congress to confront this egregious assault on our democracy. And after this, weâre going to walk down, and Iâll be there with you, weâre going to walk down, weâre going to walk down. Anyone you want, but I think right here, weâre going to walk down to the Capitol, and weâre going to cheer on our brave senators and congressmen and women, and weâre probably not going to be cheering so much for some of them.446

Hutchinson testified that she first became aware of President Trumpâs plans to attend Congressâs session to count votes on or about January 2nd. She learned this from a conversation with Giuliani: âItâs going to be great. The Presidentâs going to be there. Heâs going to look powerful. Heâsâheâs going to be with the members. Heâs going to be with the Senators.ââ447 Evidence also indicates that multiple members of the White House staff, including White House lawyers, were concerned about the Presidentâs apparent intentions to go to the Capitol.448

After he exited the stage, President Trump entered the Presidential SUV and forcefully expressed his intention that Bobby Engel, the head of his Secret Service detail, direct the motorcade to the Capitol. The Committee has now obtained evidence from several sources about a âfurious interactionâ in the SUV. The vast majority of witnesses who have testified before the Select Committee about this topic, including multiple members of the Secret Service, a member of the Metropolitan police, and national security officials in the White House, described President Trumpâs behavior as âirate,â âfurious,â âinsistent,â âprofaneâ and âheated.â Hutchinson heard about the exchange second-hand and related what she heard in our June 28, 2022, hearing from Ornato (as did another witness, a White House employee with national security responsibilities, who shared that Ornato also recounted to him President Trumpâs âirateâ behavior in the Presidential vehicle). Other members of the White House staff and Secret Service also heard about the exchange after the fact. The White House employee with national security responsibilities gave this testimony:

Committee Staff: But it sounds like you recall some rumor or some discussion around the West Wing about the Presidentâs anger about being told that he couldnât go to the Capitol. Is that right?

Employee: So Mr. Ornato said that he was angry that he couldnât go right away. In the days following that, I do remember, you know, again, hearing again how angry the President was when, you know, they were in the limo. But beyond specifics of that, thatâs pretty much the extent of the cooler talk.449

The Committee has regarded both Hutchinson and the corroborating testimony by the White House employee with national security responsibilities as earnest and has no reason to conclude that either had a reason to invent their accounts. A Secret Service agent who worked on one of the details in the White House and was present in the Ellipse motorcade had this comment:

Committee Staff: Ms. Hutchinson has suggested to the committee that you sympathized with her after her testimony, and believed her account. Is that accurate?

Special Agent: I have noâyeah, thatâs accurate. I have no reasonâI mean, weâwe became friends. We workedâI worked every day with her for 6 months. Yeah, she became a friend of mine. We had a good working relationship. I have no reasonâsheâs never done me wrong. Sheâs never lied that I know of.450

The Committeeâs principal concern was that the President actually intended to participate personally in the January 6th efforts at the Capitol, leading the attempt to overturn the election either from inside the House Chamber, from a stage outside the Capitol, or otherwise. The Committee regarded those facts as important because they are relevant to President Trumpâs intent on January 6th. There is no question from all the evidence assembled that President Trump did have that intent.451

As it became clear that Donald Trump desired to travel to the Capitol on January 6th, a White House Security Official in the White House complex became very concerned about his intentions:

To be completely honest, we were all in a state of shock. . . . it justâone, I think the actual physical feasibility of doing it, and then also we all knew what that implicated and what that meant, that this was no longer a rally, that this was going to move to something else if he physically walked to the Capitol. IâI donât know if you want to use the word âinsurrection,â âcoup,â whatever. We all knew that this would move from a normal, democratic, you know, public event into something else.452

President Trump continued to push to travel to the Capitol even after his return to the White House, despite knowing that a riot was underway. Kayleigh McEnany, the White House press secretary, spoke with President Trump about his desire to go to the Capitol after he returned to the White House from the Ellipse. âSo to the best of my recollection, I recall him beingâwanting toâsaying that he wanted to physically walk and be a part of the march and then saying that he would ride the Beast if he needed to, ride in the Presidential limo.ââ453

Later in the afternoon, Mark Meadows relayed to Cassidy Hutchinson that President Trump was still upset that he would not be able to go to the Capitol that day. As he told Hutchinson, âthe President wasnât happy that Bobby [Engel] didnât pull it off for him and that Mark didnât work hard enough to get the movement on the books.ââ454

Just after 1:00 p.m., Vice President Pence, serving as President of the Senate under Article I of the Constitution, gaveled the Congress into its Joint Session. President Trump was giving a speech at the Ellipse, which he concluded at 1:10 pm. For the next few hours, an attack on our Capitol occurred, perpetrated by Trump supporters many of whom were present at the Ellipse for President Trumpâs speech. More than 140 Capitol and Metropolitan police were injured, some very seriously.455 A perimeter security line of Metropolitan Police intended to secure the Capitol against intrusion broke in the face of thousands of armed riotersâmore than 2,000 of whom gained access to the interior of the Capitol building.456 A woman who attempted to forcibly enter the Chamber of the House of Representatives through a broken window while the House was in session was shot and killed by police guarding the chamber. Vice President Pence and his family were at risk, as were those Secret Service professionals protecting him. Congressional proceedings were halted, and legislators were rushed to secure locations.

From the outset of the violence and for several hours that followed, people at the Capitol, people inside President Trumpâs Administration, elected officials of both parties, members of President Trumpâs family, and Fox News commentators sympathetic to President Trump all tried to contact him to urge him to do one singular thingâone thing that all of these people immediately understood was required: Instruct his supporters to stand down and disperseâto leave the Capitol.

As the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates, President Trump specifically and repeatedly refused to do soâfor multiple hoursâwhile the mayhem ensued. Chapter 8 of this report explains in meticulous detail the horrific nature of the violence taking place, that was directed at law enforcement officers at the Capitol and that put the lives of American lawmakers at risk. Yet in spite of this, President Trump watched the violence on television from a dining room adjacent to the Oval Office, calling Senators to urge them to help him delay the electoral count, but refusing to supply the specific help that everyone knew was unequivocally required. As this report shows, when Trump finally did make such a statement at 4:17 p.m. âafter hours of violenceâthe statement immediately had the expected effect; the rioters began to disperse immediately and leave the Capitol.457

To fully understand the Presidentâs behavior during those hoursânow commonly known as the â187 minutesââit is important to understand the context in which it occurred. As outlined in this report, by the afternoon of January 6th, virtually all of President Trumpâs efforts to overturn the outcome of the 2020 election had failed. Virtually all the lawsuits had already been lost. Vice President Mike Pence had refused Trumpâs pressure to stop the count of certain electoral votes. State officials and legislators had refused to reverse the election outcomes in every State where Trump and his team applied pressure. The Justice Departmentâs investigations of alleged election fraud had all contradicted Trumpâs allegations.

The only factor working in Trumpâs favor that might succeed in materially delaying the counting of electoral votes for President-elect Biden was the violent crowd at the Capitol. And for much of the afternoon of January 6th, it appeared that the crowd had accomplished that purpose. Congressional leaders were advised by Capitol Police at one or more points during the attack that it would likely take several days before the Capitol could safely be reopened.458

By the time the Presidentâs speech concluded, the lawlessness at the United States Capitol had already begun, but the situation was about to get much worse.

By 1:25 p.m., President Trump was informed that the Capitol was under attack.

Minutes after arriving back at the White House, the President ran into a member of the White House staff and asked if they had watched his speech on television. âSir, they cut it off because theyâre rioting down at the Capitol,â the employee said. The President asked what they meant by that. â[T]heyâre rioting down there at the Capitol,â the employee repeated. âOh really?â the President asked. âAll right, letâs go see.ââ459 A photograph taken by the White House photographerâthe last one permitted until later in the dayâcaptures the moment the President was made aware of the violent uprising at the Capitol.460

Not long thereafter, as thousands of Trump supporters from the Ellipse speech continued to arrive at the Capitol, the DC Metropolitan Police Department declared a riot at the Capitol at 1:49 p.m., the same time Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund informed the DC National Guard âthat there was a dire emergency on Capitol Hill and requested the immediate assistanceâ of as many national guard troops as possible.461

No photographs exist of the President for the remainder of the afternoon until after 4 p.m. President Trump appears to have instructed that the White House photographer was not to take any photographs.462 The Select Committee also was unable to locate any official records of President Trumpâs telephone calls that afternoon.463 And the Presidentâs official Daily Diary contains no information for this afternoon between the hours of 1:19 p.m. and 4:03 p.m., at the height of the worst attack on the seat of the United States Congress in over two centuries.464

The Select Committee did, however, obtain records from non-official sources that contained data of some phone calls President Trump made that afternoon. Even though âhe was placing lots of callsâ that afternoon, according to his personal assistant,465 the Select Committee was given no records of any calls from the President to security or law enforcement officials that afternoon, and that absence of data is consistent with testimony of witnesses who would have knowledge of any such calls, who said that he did not do so.466 Based on testimony from President Trumpâs close aides, we know that President Trump remained in the Dining Room adjacent to the Oval Office for the rest of the afternoon until after 4:03 p.m.467

In fact, from cellular telephone records, it appears that at 1:39 p.m. and 2:03 p.m., after being informed of the riot at the Capitol, President Trump called his lawyer, Rudolph Giuliani. These calls lasted approximately four minutes and eight minutes, respectively.468 And Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany testified that President Trump also called a number of Senators.469 The number or names of all such Members of Congress is unknown, although Senator Mike Lee (RâUT) received one such outgoing call from the President within the hour that followed.470

At 1:49 p.m., just as the DC Metropolitan Police officially declared a riot and the Capitol Police were calling for help from the National Guard to address the crisis, President Trump sent a tweet with a link to a recording of his speech at the Ellipse.471

At about that point, White House Counsel Pat Cipollone became aware of the Capitol riot. The Committee collected sworn testimony from several White House officials, each with similar accounts. The Presidentâs White House Counsel Pat Cipollone testified that he raced downstairs, and went to the Oval Office Dining Room as soon as he learned about the violence at the Capitolâlikely just around or just after 2 p.m. Cipollone knew immediately that the President had to deliver a message to the riotersâasking them to leave the Capitol.

Here is how he described this series of events:

. . . the first time I remember going downstairs was when people had breached the Capitol. . . But I went down with [Deputy White House Counsel] Pat [Philbin], and I remember we were both very upset about what was happening. And we both wanted, you know, action to be taken related to that. . . But we went down to the Oval Office, we went through the Oval office, and we went to the back where the President was. . . . I think he was already in the dining room. . . I canât talk about conversations [with the President]. I think I was pretty clear there needed to be an immediate and forceful response, statement, public statement, that people need to leave the Capitol now.472

Cipollone also left little doubt that virtually everyone among senior White House staff had the same view:

There were a lot of people in the White House that day . . . Senior people who, you know, felt the same way that I did and who were working very hard to achieve that result. There wereâI think Ivanka was one of them. And Eric Herschmann was there, Pat Philbin was there, and a number of other people. . . . many people suggested it. . . . Many people felt the same way. Iâm sure I had conversations with Mark [Meadows] about this during the course of the day and expressed my opinion very forcefully that this needs to be done.473

Likewise, senior staff cooperated to produce a message for the President on a notecard, which read:

ANYONE WHO ENTERED THE CAPITOL ILLEGALLY WITHOUT PROPER AUTHORITY SHOULD LEAVE IMMEDIATELY474

The President declined to make the statement. Cipollone also made it clear that the advice they were giving to the President never changed throughout this three-hour period. Trump refused to do what was necessary.

Committee Staff: [I]t sounds like you from the very onset of violence at the Capitol right around 2 oâclock were pushing for a strong statement that people should leave the Capitol. Is that right?

Cipollone: I was, and others were as well.475

Cassidy Hutchinson, who worked closely with Mark Meadows and sat directly outside his office, confirmed this account and described several additional details:

I see Pat Cipollone barreling down the hallway towards our office. And he rushed right in, looked at me, said, âIs Mark in his office?â And I said, âYes.â And on a normal day he wouldâve said, âCan I pop in,â or, âIs he talking to anyone,â or, âIs it an appropriate time for me to go chat with him,â and myself or Eliza would go let him in or tell him no. But after I had said yes, he just looked at me and started shaking his head and went over, opened Markâs office door, stood there with the door propped open, and said something to theâMark was still sitting on his phone. I remember, like, glancing in. He was still sitting on his phone.

And I remember Pat saying to him something to the effect of, âThe rioters have gotten to the Capitol, Mark. We need to go down and see the President now.â And Mark looked up at him and said, âHe doesnât want to do anything, Pat.â And Pat said something to the effect ofâand very clearly said this to Markâsomething to the effect of, âMark, something needs to be done, or people are going to die and the bloodâs gonna be on your Fâing hands. This is getting out of control. Iâm going down there.ââ476

The Select Committee believes that the entire White House senior staff was in favor of a Presidential statement specifically instructing the violent rioters to leave. But President Trump refused. White House Counsel Pat Cipollone answered certain questions from the Select Committee on this subject as follows:

Vice Chair Cheney: And when you talk about others on the staff thinking more should be done, or thinking that the President needed to tell people to go home, who would you put in that category?

Cipollone: Well, I would put . . . Pat Philbin, Eric Herschmann. Overall, Mark Meadows, Ivanka. Once Jared got there, Jared. General Kellogg. Iâm probably missing some, but those areâKayleigh I think was there. But I donâtâDan Scavino.

Vice Chair Cheney: And who on the staff did not want people to leave the Capitol?â

Cipollone: On the staff?

Vice Chair Cheney In the White House?

Cipollone: I canât think of anybody on that day who didnât want people to get out of the Capitol once theâparticularly once the violence started. No. I meanâ

Mr. Schiff: What about the President?

Vice Chair Cheney: Yeah.

. . .

[Consultation between Mr. Cipollone and his counsel.]

Cipollone: Yeah. I canât reveal communications. But obviously I think, you knowâ yeah.477

The testimony of a White House employee with national security responsibilities also corroborated these facts. This employee testified about a conversation between Pat Cipollone and Eric Herschmann in which Herschmann indicated that the President did not want to do anything to halt the violence. That employee told the Select Committee that he overheard Herschmann saying something to the effect of âthe President didnât want anything done.ââ478

Deputy Press Secretary Judd Deere also testified to the Select Committee that as soon as it was clear that the Capitolâs outer perimeter had been breached, he urged that the President make a statement telling the rioters to go home:

Committee Staff: And so what did you do at that point?

Judd Deere: If I recall, I went back up to [Press Secretary] Kayleigh [McEnany]âs office and indicated that we now likely needed to say something.

Committee Staff: Okay. And why did you think it was necessary to say something?

Deere: Well, I mean, it appears that individuals are storming the U.S. Capitol building. They also appear to be supporters of Donald Trump, who may have been in attendance at the rally. Weâre going to need to say something.

Committee Staff: And did you have a view as to what should be said by the White House?

Deere: If I recall, I told Kayleigh that I thought that we needed to encourage individuals to stop, to respect law enforcement, and to go home. . . . And it wasâit was incumbent upon us to encourage those individuals, should they be supporters of ours, to stop.479

Testimony from both Deputy Press Secretary Matthews and White House Counsel Cipollone indicated that it would have been easy, and nearly instantaneous, for Trump to make a public statement insisting that the crowd disperse. As Matthews explained, he could have done so in under a minute:

. . . it would take probably less than 60 seconds from the Oval Office dining room over to the Press Briefing Room. And, for folks that might not know, the Briefing Room is the room that you see the White House Press Secretary do briefings from with the podium and the blue backdrop. And there is a camera that is on in there at all times. And so, if the President had wanted to make a statement and address the American people, he could have been on camera almost instantly.480

Cipollone also shared that assessment:

Committee Staff: Would it have been possible at any moment for the President to walk down to the podium in the briefing room and talk to the nation at any time between when you first gave him that advice at 2 oâclock and 4:17 when the video statement went out? Would that have been possible?

Cipollone: Would it have been possible?

Committee Staff: Yes.

Cipollone: Yes, it would have been possible.481

At 2:13 p.m., rioters broke into the Capitol and flooded the building.482

As the violence began to escalate, many Trump supporters and others outside the White House began urgently seeking his intervention. Mark Meadowsâs phone was flooded with text messages. These are just some of them:

2:32 p.m. from Fox News anchor Laura Ingraham: âHey Mark, The president needs to tell people in the Capitol to go home.ââ483

2:35 p.m. from Mick Mulvaney: âMark: he needs to stop this, now. Can I do anything to help?ââ484

2:46 p.m. from Rep. William Timmons (RâSC): âThe president needs to stop this ASAPââ485

2:53 p.m. from Donald Trump, Jr.: âHeâs got to condem [sic] this shit. Asap. The captiol [sic] police tweet is not enough.ââ486

3:04 p.m. from Rep. Jeff Duncan (RâSC): âPOTUS needs to calm this shit downââ487

3:09 p.m. from former White House Chief of Staff Reince Priebus: âTELL THEM TO GO HOME !!!ââ488

3:13 p.m. from Alyssa Farah Griffin: âPotus has to come out firmly and tell protestors to dissipate. Someone is going to get killed.ââ489

3:15 p.m. from Rep. Chip Roy (RâTX): âFix this now.ââ490

3:31 p.m. from Fox News anchor Sean Hannity: âCan he make a statement. I saw the tweet. Ask people to peacefully leave the capital [sic]ââ491

3:58 p.m. from Fox News anchor Brian Kilmeade: âPlease get him on tv. Destroying every thing you guys have accomplishedââ492

Others on Capitol Hill appeared in the media, or otherwise appeared via internet. Representative Mike Gallagher (RâWI) issued a video appealing directly to the President:

Mr. President, you have got to stop this. You are the only person who can call this off. Call it off. The election is over. Call it off!493

Some Members of Congress sent texts to President Trumpâs immediate staff or took to Twitter, where they knew the President spent time:

Sen. Bill Cassidy (RâLA) issued a tweet: @realDonaldTrump please appear on TV, condemn the violence and tell people to disband.494

Rep. Jaime Herrera Beutler (RâWA) sent a text to Mark Meadows: We need to hear from the president. On TV. I hate that Biden jumped him on it.495

Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy tried repeatedly to reach President Trump, and did at least once. He also reached out for help to multiple members of President Trumpâs family, including Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner.496 Kushner characterized Leader McCarthyâs demeanor on the call as âscaredâ:

Kushner: I could hear in his voice that he really was nervous, and so, obviously, I took that seriously. And, you know, I didnât know if Iâd be able to have any impact, but I said, you know, itâs better to at least try. And so Iâlike I said, I turned the shower off, threw on a suit, and, you know, and rushed into the White House as quickly as I could.

Committee Staff: Yeah. What did he ask you to do? When you say have an impact, what is it specifically that he needed your help with?

Kushner: I donât recall a specific ask, just anything you could do. Again, I got the sense that, you know, they wereâthey wereâyou know, they were scared.

Committee Staff: âTheyâ meaning Leader McCarthy and people on the Hill because of the violence?

Kushner: That he was scared, yes.497

Kevin McCarthy told Fox News at 3:09 p.m. about his call with the President498 and elaborated about its contents in a conversation with CBS Newsâs Norah OâDonnell at around 3:30 p.m.:

OâDonnell: Have you spoken with the President and asked him to perhaps come to the Capitol and tell his supporters itâs time to leave?

Leader McCarthy: I have spoken to the President. I asked him to talk to the nation and tell them to stop this. . . .

* * *

OâDonnell: The President invited tens of thousands of people to quote unquote stop the steal. I donât know if you heard his more-than-hour-long remarks or the remarks of his son, who was the wind-up. It was some heated stuff, Leader McCarthy. I just wonder whether someone is going to accurately call a spade a spade, and I am giving you the opportunity right now that your precious and beloved United States Capitol and our democracy is witnessing this. Call a spade a spade.

Leader McCarthy: I was very clear with the President when I called him. This has to stop. And he has to, heâs gotta go to the American public and tell them to stop this.

* * *

OâDonnell: Leader McCarthy, the President of the United States has a briefing room steps from the Oval Office. It is, the cameras are hot 24/7, as you know. Why hasnât he walked down and said that, now?

Leader McCarthy: I conveyed to the President what I think is best to do, and Iâm hopeful the President will do it.499

The Committee has evidence from multiple sources regarding the content of Kevin McCarthyâs direct conversation with Donald Trump during the violence.

Rep. Jaime Herrera Beutler (RâWA), to whom McCarthy spoke soon after, relayed more of the conversation between McCarthy and President Trump:

And he said [to President Trump], âYou have got to get on TV. Youâve got to get on Twitter. Youâve got to call these people off.â You know what the President said to him? This is as itâs happening. He said, âWell Kevin, these arenât my people. You know, these are Antifa. And Kevin responded and said, âNo, theyâre your people. They literally just came through my office windows and my staff are running for cover. I mean theyâre running for their lives. You need to call them off.â And the Presidentâs response to Kevin to me was chilling. He said, âWell Kevin, I guess theyâre just more upset about the election, you know, theft than you areâ.500

Rep. Herrera Beutlerâs account of the incident was also corroborated by former Acting White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, who testified that Leader McCarthy told him several days later that President Trump had said during their call: âKevin, maybe these people are just more angry about this than you are. Maybe theyâre more upset.ââ501

Mulvaney was also trying to reach administration officials to urge President Trump to instruct his supporters to leave the Capitol.502 As were many elected officials in both parties, including Nancy Pelosi and Chuck Schumer, and several Republican Members of Congress.503

As already noted, Cipollone and others in the White House repeatedly urged President Trump to tell his supporters to leave the Capitol. Cipollone described his conversations with Meadows after they failed to convince President Trump to deliver the necessary message:

Committee Staff: Do you remember any discussion with Mark Meadows with respect to his view that the President didnât want to do anything or was somehow resistant to wanting to say something along the lines that you suggested.

Pat Cipollone: Not justâjust to be clear, many people suggested it.

Committee Staff: Yeah.

Cipollone: Not just me. Many people felt the same way. Iâm sure I had conversations with Mark about this during the course of the day and expressed my opinion very forcefully that this needs to be done.504

* * *

Committee Staff: So your advice was tell people to leave the Capitol, and that took over 2 hours when there were subsequent statements made, tweets put forth, that in your view were insufficient. Did you continue, Mr. Cipollone, throughout the period of time up until 4:17, continue, you and others, to push for a stronger statement?

Cipollone: Yes.505

* * *

Committee Staff: . . . at the onset of the violence when you first notice on television or wherever that rioters have actually breached the Capitol, did you have a conversation with Mark Meadows in which Meadows indicated he doesnât want to do anything, âheâ meaning the President?

Cipollone: I donâtâI had a conversation Iâm sure with Mark Meadows, Iâm sure with other people, of what I thought should be done. Did Mark say that to me? I donât have a recollection of him saying that to me, but he may have said something along the lines.506

At 2:16 p.m., security records indicate that the Vice President was âbeing pulledâ to a safer location.507

In an interview with the Select Committee, a White House Security Official on duty at the White House explained his observations as he listened to Secret Service communications and made contemporaneous entries into a security log. In particular, he explained an entry he made at 2:24 p.m.:

Committee Staff: Ok. That last entry on this page is: âService at the Capitol does not sound good right now.â

Official: Correct.

Committee Staff: What does that mean?

Official: The members of the VP detail at this time were starting to fear for their own lives. There were a lot ofâthere was a lot of yelling, a lot ofâI donât knowâa lot [of] very personal calls over the radio. Soâit was disturbing. I donât like talking about it, but there were calls to say good-bye to family members, so on and so forth. It was gettingâfor whatever the reason was on the ground, the VP detail thought that this was about to get very ugly.

Committee Staff: And did you hear that over the radio?

Official: Correct.

. . .

Committee Staff: . . . obviously, youâve conveyed thatâs disturbing, but what prompted you to put it into an entry as it states there, âService at the Capitolââ

Official: That theyâre running out of options, and theyâre getting nervous. It sounds like that we came very close to either Service having to use lethal options or worse. At that point, I donât know. Is the VP compromised? Is the detailâlike, I donât know. Like, we didnât have visibility, but it doesnâtâif theyâre screaming and saying things, like, say good-bye to the family, like, the floor needs to know this is going to a whole another level soon.508

Also at 2:24 p.m., knowing the riot was underway and that Vice President Pence was at the Capitol, President Trump sent this tweet:

Mike Pence didnât have the courage to do what should have been done to protect our Country and our Constitution, giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to previously certify. USA demands the truth!509

Evidence shows that the 2:24 p.m. tweet immediately precipitated further violence at the Capitol. Immediately after this tweet, the crowds both inside and outside of the Capitol building violently surged forward.510 Outside the building, within ten minutes thousands of rioters overran the line on the west side of the Capitol that was being held by the Metropolitan Police Forceâs Civil Disturbance Unit, the first time in history of the DC Metro Police that such a security line had ever been broken.511

Virtually everyone on the White House staff the Select Committee interviewed condemned the 2:24 p.m. tweet in the strongest terms.

Deputy National Security Adviser Matthew Pottinger told the Select Committee that the 2:24 p.m. tweet was so destructive that it convinced him to resign as soon as possible:

One of my aides handed me a sheet of paper that contained the tweet that you just read. I read it and was quite disturbed by it. I was disturbed and worried to see that the President was attacking Vice President Pence for doing his constitutional duty.

So the tweet looked to me like the opposite of what we really needed at that moment, which was a de-escalation. And that is why I had said earlier that it looked like fuel being poured on the fire.

So that was the moment that I decided that I was going to resign, that that would be my last day at the White House. I simply didnât want to be associated with the events with the events that were unfolding at the Capitol.512

Deputy Press Secretary Sarah Matthews had a similar reaction:

So it was obvious that the situation at the Capitol was violent and escalating quickly. And so I thought that the tweet about the Vice President was the last thing that was needed in that moment.

And I remember thinking that this was going to be bad for him to tweet this, because it was essentially him giving the green light to these people, telling them that what they were doing at the steps of the Capitol and entering the Capitol was okay, that they were justified in their anger.

And he shouldnât have been doing that. He should have been telling these people to go home and to leave and to condemn the violence that we were seeing.

And I am someone who has worked with him, you know, I worked on the campaign, traveled all around the country, going to countless rallies with him, and I have seen the impact that his words have on his supporters. They truly latch onto every word and every tweet that he says.

And so, I think that in that moment for him to tweet out the message about Mike Pence, it was him pouring gasoline on the fire and making it much worse.513

Deputy Press Secretary Judd Deere stated the following:

Committee Staff: What was your reaction when you saw that tweet?

Deere: Extremely unhelpful.

Committee Staff: Why?

Deere: It wasnât the message that we needed at that time. It wasnât going toâthe scenes at the U.S. Capitol were only getting worse at that point. This was not going to help that.514

White House Counsel Pat Cipollone told the Select Committee, âI donât remember when exactly I heard about that tweet, but my reaction to it is thatâs a terrible tweet, and I disagreed with the sentiment. And I thought it was wrong.ââ515

Likewise, Counselor to the President Hope Hicks texted a colleague that evening: âAttacking the VP? Wtf is wrong with him.ââ516

At 2:26 p.m., Vice President Pence was again moved to a different location.517

President Trump had the TV on in the dining room.518 At 2:38 p.m., Fox News was showing video of the chaos and attack, with tear gas filling the air in the Capitol Rotunda. And a newscaster reported, â[T]his is a very dangerous situation.ââ519 This is the context in which Trump sent the tweet.

Testimony obtained by the Committee indicates that President Trump knew about the riotersâ anger at Vice President Pence and indicated something to the effect that the Vice President âdeserves it.ââ520 As Cassidy Hutchinson explained:

I remember Pat saying something to the effect of, âMark, we need to do something more. Theyâre literally calling for the Vice President to be fâing hung.â And Mark had responded something to the effect of, âYou heard him, Pat. He thinks Mike deserves it. He doesnât think theyâre doing anything wrong.â To which Pat said something, â[t]his is fâing crazy, we need to be doing something more,â briefly stepped into Markâs office, and when Mark had said somethingâwhen Mark had said something to the effect of, âHe doesnât think theyâre doing anything wrong,â knowing what I had heard briefly in the dining room coupled with Pat discussing the hanging Mike Pence chants in the lobby of our office and then Markâs response, I understood âtheyâreâ to be the rioters in the Capitol that were chanting for the Vice President to be hung.521

Although White House Counsel Pat Cipollone was limited in what he would discuss because of privilege concerns, he stated the following:

Committee Staff: Do you remember any discussion at any point during the day about rioters at the Capitol chanting âhang Mike Pence?â

Cipollone: Yes. I rememberâI remember hearing thatâabout that. Yes.

Committee Staff: Yeah. Andâ

Cipollone: I donât know if I observed that myself on TV. I donât remember.

Committee Staff: Iâm just curious, I understand the privilege line youâve drawn, but do you remember what you can share with us about the discussion about those chants, the âhang Mike Penceâ chants?

Cipollone: I could tell you my view of that.

Committee Staff: Yeah. Please.

Cipollone: My view of that is that is outrageous.

Committee Staff: Uh-huh.

Cipollone: And for anyone to suggest such a thing as the Vice President of the United States, for people in that crowd to be chanting that I thought was terrible. I thought it was outrageous and wrong. And I expressed that very clearly to people.522

Almost immediately after the 2:24 p.m. tweet, Eric Herschmann went upstairs in the West Wing to try to enlist Ivanka Trumpâs assistance to persuade her father to do the right thing.523 Ivanka rushed down to the Oval Office dining room. Although no one could convince President Trump to call for the violent rioters to leave the Capitol, Ivanka persuaded President Trump that a tweet could be issued to discourage violence against the police.

At 2:38 p.m., President Trump sent this tweet:

âPlease support our Capitol Police and Law Enforcement. They are truly on the side of our Country. Stay peaceful!ââ524

While some in the meeting invoked executive privilege, or failed to recall the specifics, others told us what happened at that point. Sarah Matthews, the White House Deputy Press Secretary, had urged her boss, Kayleigh McEnany, to have the President make a stronger statement. But she informed us that President Trump resisted using the word âpeacefulâ in his message:

Committee Staff: Ms. Matthews, Ms. McEnany told us she came right back to the press office after meeting with the President about this particular tweet. What did she tell you about what happened in that dining room?

Sarah Matthews: When she got back, she told me that a tweet had been sent out. And I told her that I thought the tweet did not go far enough, that I thought there needed to be a call to action and he needed to condemn the violence. And we were in a room full of people, but people werenât paying attention. And so, she looked directly at me and in a hushed tone shared with me that the President did not want to include any sort of mention of peace in that tweet and that it took some convincing on their part, those who were in the room. And she said that there was a back and forth going over different phrases to find something that he was comfortable with. And it wasnât until Ivanka Trump suggested the phrase âstay peacefulâ that he finally agreed to include it.525

At 3:13 p.m., President Trump sent another tweet, but again declined to tell people to go home:

âI am asking for everyone at the U.S. Capitol to remain peaceful. No violence! Remember, WE are the Party of Law & Orderârespect the Law and our great men and women in Blue. Thank you!ââ526

Almost everyone, including staff in the White House also found the Presidentâs 2:38 p.m. and 3:13 p.m. tweets to be insufficient because they did not instruct the rioters to leave the Capitol. As mentioned, President Trumpâs son, Donald Trump Jr., texted Meadows:

Heâs got to condem [sic] this shit. Asap. The captiol [sic] police tweet is not enough.527

Sean Hannity also texted Mark Meadows:

Can he make a statement. I saw the tweet. Ask people to peacefully leave the capital [sic].528

None of these efforts resulted in President Trump immediately issuing the message that was needed. White House staff had these comments:

Pottinger: Yeah. It was insufficient. I think whatâyou could count me among those who was hoping to see an unequivocal strong statement clearing out the Capitol, telling people to stand down, leave, go home. I think thatâs what we were hoping for.529

. . .

Matthews: Yeah. So a conversation started in the press office after the President sent out those two tweets that I deemed were insufficient. . . . I thought that we should condemn the violence and condemn it unequivocally. And I thought that he needed to include a call to action and to tell these people to go home.530

And they were right. Evidence showed that neither of these tweets had any appreciable impact on the violent rioters. Unlike the video-message tweet that did not come until 4:17 finally instructing rioters to leave, neither the 2:38 nor the 3:13 tweets made any difference.

At some point after 3:05 p.m. that afternoon, President Trumpâs Chief of Staffâand President Trump himselfâwere informed that someone had been shot.531 That person was Ashli Babbitt, who was fatally shot at 2:44 p.m. as she and other rioters tried to gain access to the House chamber.532 There is no indication that this affected the Presidentâs state of mind that day, and we found no evidence that the President expressed any remorse that day.

Meanwhile, leaders in Congressâincluding Speaker Pelosi, Senator Schumer, Senator McConnellâand the Vice President, were taking action. They called the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, governors and officials in Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia, begging for assistance.533

President-elect Biden also broadcast a video calling on President Trump to take action:

I call on President Trump to go on national television now to fulfill his oath and defend the Constitution and demand an end to this siege.534

President Trump could have done this, of course, anytime after he learned of the violence at the Capitol. At 4:17 p.m., 187 minutes after finishing his speech (and even longer after the attack began), President Trump finally broadcast a video message in which he asked those attacking the Capitol to leave:

I know your pain. I know youâre hurt. We had an election that was stolen from us. It was a landslide election, and everyone knows it, especially the other side, but you have to go home now. We have to have peace.535

President Trumpâs Deputy Press Secretary, Sarah Matthews testified about her reaction to this video message:

[H]e told the people who we had just watched storm our nationâs Capitol with the intent on overthrowing our democracy, violently attack police officers, and chant heinous things like, âHang Mike Pence,â âWe love you. Youâre very special.â As a spokesperson for him, I knew that I would be asked to defend that. And to me, his refusal to act and call off the mob that day and his refusal to condemn the violence was indefensible. And so, I knew that I would be resigning that evening.536

By this time, the National Guard and other additional law enforcement had begun to arrive in force and started to turn the tide of the violence. Many of those attackers in the Capitol saw or received word of President Trumpâs 4:17 p.m. message, and they understood this message as an instruction to leave:537

At 6:01 p.m., President Trump sent his last tweet of the day, not condemning the violence, but instead attempting to justify it:

These are the things and events that happen when a sacred election landslide victory is so unceremoniously & viciously stripped away from great patriots who have been badly & unfairly treated for so long. Go home with love & in peace. Remember this day forever!541

Staff in President Trumpâs own White House and campaign had a strong reaction to this message:

Sarah Matthews: At that point I had already made the decision to resign and this tweet just further cemented my decision. I thought that January 6, 2021, was one of the darkest days in our Nationâs history and President Trump was treating it as a celebratory occasion with that tweet. And so, it just further cemented my decision to resign.542

Tim Murtaugh: I donât think itâs a patriotic act to attack the Capitol. But I have no idea how to characterize the people other than they trespassed, destroyed property, and assaulted the U.S. Capitol. I think calling them patriots is a, letâs say, a stretch, to say the least. . . . I donât think itâs a patriotic act to attack the U.S. Capitol.543

Pat Cipollone: [W]hat happened at the Capitol cannot be justified in any form or fashion. It was wrong, and it was tragic. And a lotâand it was a terrible day. It was a terrible day for this country.544

Greg Jacob: I thought it was inappropriate. . . . To my mind, it was a day that should live in infamy.545

At 6:27 p.m., President Trump retired to his residence for the night. As he did, he had one final comment to an employee who accompanied him to the residence. The one takeaway that the President expressed in that moment, following a horrific afternoon of violence and the worst attack against the U.S. Capitol building in over two centuries, was this: âMike Pence let me down.ââ546

President Trumpâs inner circle was still trying to delay the counting of electoral votes into the evening, even after the violence had been quelled. Rudolph Giuliani tried calling numerous Members of Congress in the hour before the joint session resumed, including Rep. Jim Jordan (RâOH) and Senators Marsha Blackburn (RâTN), Tommy Tuberville (RâAL), Bill Hagerty (RâTN), Lindsey Graham (RâSC), Josh Hawley (RâMO), and Ted Cruz (RâTX).547 His voicemail intended for Senator Tuberville at 7:02 p.m. that evening eventually was made public:

Guiliani: Sen. Tuberville? Or I should say Coach Tuberville. This is Rudy Giuliani, the Presidentâs lawyer. Iâm calling you because I want to discuss with you how theyâre trying to rush this hearing and how we need you, our Republican friends, to try to just slow it down so we can get these legislatures to get more information to you.548

Reflecting on President Trumpâs conduct that day, Vice President Pence noted that President Trump âhad made no effort to contact me in the midst of the rioting or any point afterward.ââ549 He wrote that President Trumpâs âreckless words had endangered my family and all those serving at the Capitol.ââ550

President Trump did not contact a single top national security official during the day. Not at the Pentagon, nor at the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the F.B.I., the Capitol Police Department, or the D.C. Mayorâs office.551 As Vice President Pence has confirmed, President Trump didnât even try to reach his own Vice President to make sure that Pence was safe.552 President Trump did not order any of his staff to facilitate a law enforcement response of any sort.553 His Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffâwho is by statute the primary military advisor to the Presidentâhad this reaction:

General Milley: You know, youâre the Commander in Chief. Youâve got an assault going on on the Capitol of the United States of America. And thereâs nothing? No call? Nothing? Zero?554

General Milley did, however, receive a call from President Trumpâs Chief of Staff Mark Meadows that day. Here is how he described that call:

He said, âWe have to kill the narrative that the Vice President is making all the decisions. We need to establish the narrative, you know, that the President is still in charge and that things are steady or stable,â or words to that effect. I immediately interpreted that as politics, politics, politics. Red flag for me, personally. No action. But I remember it distinctly. And I donât do political narratives.555

Some have suggested that President Trump gave an order to have 10,000 troops ready for January 6th.556 The Select Committee found no evidence of this. In fact, President Trumpâs Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller directly refuted this when he testified under oath:

Committee Staff: To be crystal clear, there was no direct order from President Trump to put 10,000 troops to be on the ready for January 6th, correct?

Miller: No. Yeah. Thatâs correct. There was no directâthere was no order from the President.557

Later, on the evening of January 6th, President Trumpâs former campaign manager, Brad Parscale, texted Katrina Pierson, one of President Trumpâs rally organizers, that the events of the day were the result of a âsitting president asking for civil warâ and that âThis week I feel guilty for helping him winâ now that â. . . a woman is dead.â Pierson answered: âYou do realize this was going to happen.â Parscale replied: âYeah. If I was Trump and knew my rhetoric killed someone.â âIt wasnât the rhetoric,â Pierson suggested. But Parscale insisted: âYes it was.ââ558

In days following January 6th, President Trumpâs family and staff attempted repeatedly to persuade him not to repeat his election fraud allegations, to concede defeat, and to allow the transition to President Biden to proceed. Trump did make two video recordings, which initially appeared contrite. But evidence suggests that these statements were designed at least in part to ward off other potential consequences of January 6th, such as invocation of the 25th Amendment or impeachment.

In fact, Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy indicated after the attack, in a discussion with House Republican leaders, that he would ask President Trump to resign:

Rep. Cheney: I guess thereâs a question when we were talking about the 25th Amendment resolution, and you asked what would happen after heâs gone? Is there any chance? Are you hearing that he might resign? Is there any reason to think that might happen?

Leader McCarthy: Iâve had a few discussions. My gut tells me no. Iâm seriously thinking of having that discussion with him tonight. I havenât talked to him in a couple of days. From what I know of him, I mean, you guys all know him too, do you think heâd ever back away? But what I think Iâm going to do is Iâm going to call him. This is what I think. We know [the 25th Amendment resolution] will pass the House. I think thereâs a chance it will pass the Senate, even when heâs gone. And I think thereâs a lot of different ramifications for that. . . . Again, the only discussion I would have with him is that I think this will pass, and it would be my recommendation you should resign.559

Before January 6th, Fox News personality Sean Hannity warned that January 6th could be disastrous:

Dec. 31, 2020 text from Sean Hannity to Mark Meadows: âWe canât lose the entire WH counsels office. I do NOT see January 6 happening the way he is being told. After the 6 th [sic]. He should announce will lead the nationwide effort to reform voting integrity. Go to Fl and watch Joe mess up daily. Stay engaged. When he speaks people will listen.ââ560

January 5, 2021 texts from Sean Hannity to Mark Meadows:

âIm very worried about the next 48 hoursâ

âPence pressure. WH counsel will leave.â

âSorry, I canât talk right now.â

âOn with bossâ 561

A member of the Republican Freedom caucus also warned, on December 31, 2020, and on January 1, 2021:

The President should call everyone off. Itâs the only path. If we substitute the will of states through electors with a vote by Congress every 4 years. . . we have destroyed the electoral college. . . Respectfully.562 If POTUS allows this to occur. . . weâre driving a stake in the heart of the federal republic. . .563

After January 6th, Hannity worked to persuade President Trump to stop talking about election fraud, proposed that Trump pardon Hunter Biden, and discussed attending the Inauguration:

Ultimately, President Trump took little of the advice from Hannity and his White House staff. A few days later, Hannity wrote again to Meadows and Jim Jordan:

Guys, we have a clear path to land the plane in 9 days. He canât mention the election again. Ever. I did not have a good call with him today. And worse, Iâm not sure what is left to do or say, and I don t like not knowing if itâs truly understood. Ideas?565

Likewise, despite her many contrary public statements, Republican Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene privately texted her concerns on January 6th about a continuing and real threat of violence:

Mark I was just told there is an active shooter on the first floor of the Capitol Please tell the President to calm people This isnât the way to solve anything566

Donald Trump was impeached on January 13th. In a speech that day, Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy made this statement from the House floor, but voted against impeachment:

The President bears responsibility for Wednesdayâs attack on Congress by mob rioters. He should have immediately denounced the mob when he saw what was unfolding. These facts require immediate action by President Trump, accept his share of responsibility, quell the brewing unrest and ensure President-elect Biden is able to successfully begin his term. The Presidentâs immediate action also deserves congressional action, which is why I think a fact-finding commission and a censure resolution would be prudent.567

Later, McCarthy told members of the House Republican conference that Trump had acknowledged that he was at least partially responsible for the January 6th attack.

I asked him personally today, does he hold responsibility for what happened? Does he feel bad about what happened? He told me he does have some responsibility for what happened. And he need to acknowledge that.568

Since January 6th, President Trump has continued to claim falsely that the 2020 Presidential election was stolen. Not only that, he has urged other politicians to push this argument as well. Representative Mo Brooks has issued a public statement appearing to represent Trumpâs private views and intentions:

President Trump asked me to rescind the 2020 elections, immediately remove Joe Biden from the White House, immediately put President Trump back in the White House, and hold a new special election for the presidency.569

The Committeeâs work has produced a substantial body of new information. We know far more about the Presidentâs plans and actions to overturn the election than almost all Members of Congress did when President Trump was impeached on January 13, 2021, or when he was tried by the Senate in February of that year. Fifty-seven of 100 Senators voted to convict President Trump at that time, and more than 20 others condemned the Presidentâs conduct and said they were voting against conviction because the Presidentâs term had already expired.570 At the time, the Republican Leader of the U.S. Senate said this about Donald Trump: âA mob was assaulting the Capitol in his name. These criminals were carrying his banners, hanging his flags, and screaming their loyalty to him. It was obvious that only President Trump could end this. He was the only one who could.ââ571 House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy, who spoke directly with President Trump during the violence of January 6th, expressed similar views both in private and in public. Privately, Leader McCarthy stated: âBut let me be very clear to you and I have been very clear to the President. He bears responsibility for his words and actions. No if, ands or buts.ââ572 In public, Leader McCarthy concluded: âThe President bears responsibility for Wednesdayâs attack on Congress by mob rioters.ââ573

Today we know that the planning to overturn the election on January 6th was substantially more extensive, and involved many other players, and many other efforts over a longer time period. Indeed, the violent attack and invasion of the Capitol, and what provoked it, are only a part of the story.

From the outset of its hearings, the Committee has explained that President Trump and a number of other individuals made a series of very specific plans, ultimately with multiple separate elements, but all with one overriding objective: to corruptly obstruct, impede, or influence the counting of electoral votes on January 6th, and thereby overturn the lawful results of the election. The underlying and fundamental feature of that planning was the effort to get one man, Vice President Mike Pence, to assert and then exercise unprecedented and lawless powers to unilaterally alter the actual election outcome on January 6th. Evidence obtained by the Committee demonstrates that John Eastman, who worked with President Trump to put that and other elements of the plan in place, knew, even before the 2020 Presidential election, that Vice President Pence could not lawfully refuse to count official, certified electoral slates submitted by the Governors of the States.574 Testimony and contemporaneous documentary evidence also indicate that President Trump knew that the plan was unlawful before January 6th.575 When the Vice Presidentâs counsel wrote to Eastman on January 6th to ask whether the latter had informed the President that the Vice President did not have authority to decide the election unilaterally, Eastman responded: âHeâs been so advised,â and added, â[b]ut you know himâonce he gets something in his head, it is hard to get him to change course.ââ576

Many of the other elements of President Trumpâs plans were specifically designed to create a set of circumstances on January 6th to assist President Trump in overturning the lawful election outcome during Congressâs joint session that day. For example, President Trump pressured State legislatures to adopt new electoral slates that Vice President Pence could, unlawfully, count. Trump solicited State officials to âfindâ a sufficient number of votes to alter the final count, and instructed the Department of Justice to âjust say that the election was was [sic] corrupt + leave the rest to me and the R[epublican] Congressmen.ââ577 President Trump offered the job of Acting Attorney General to Jeffrey Clark. As our evidence has unequivocally demonstrated, Clark intended to use that position to send a series of letters from the Department of Justice to multiple States falsely asserting that the Department had found fraud and urging those States to convene their legislatures to alter their official electoral slates.578 And President Trump, with the help of the Republican National Committee and others, oversaw an effort to create and transmit to Government officials a series of intentionally false electoral slates for Vice President Pence to utilize on January 6th to alter or delay the count of lawful votes.579

Of course, other elements of the plan complemented these efforts too. As this Report documents, President Trump was advised by his own experts and the Justice Department that his election fraud allegations were false, and he knew he had lost virtually all the legal challenges to the election, but he nevertheless engaged in a successful but fraudulent effort to persuade tens of millions of Americans that the election was stolen from him. This effort was designed to convince Americans that President Trumpâs actions to overturn the election were justified. President Trump then urged his supporters to travel to Washington on January 6th to apply pressure to Congress to halt the count and change the election outcome, explaining to those who were coming to Washington that they needed to âtake backâ their country and âstop the steal.ââ580

It is helpful in understanding these facts to focus on specific moments in time when President Trump made corrupt, dishonest and unlawful choices to pursue his plans. For example, by December 14th when the electoral college met and certified Joe Bidenâs victory, President Trump knew that he had failed in all the relevant litigation; he had been advised by his own experts and the Justice Department that his election fraud claims were false; and he had been told by numerous advisors that he had lost and should concede. But despite his duty as President to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, he chose instead to ignore all of the judicial rulings and the facts before him and push forward to overturn the election. Likewise, in the days and hours before the violence of January 6th, President Trump knew that no State had issued any changed electoral slate. Indeed, neither President Trump nor his co-conspirators had any evidence that any majority of any State legislature was willing to do so. President Trump also knew that Vice President Pence could not lawfully refuse to count legitimate votes. Despite all of these facts, President Trump nevertheless proceeded to instruct Vice President Pence to execute a plan he already knew was illegal. And then knowing that a violent riot was underway, President Trump breached his oath of office; our Commander in Chief refused for hours to take the one simple step that his advisors were begging him to takeâto instruct his supporters to disperse, stand down, and leave the Capitol. Instead, fully understanding what had unfolded at the Capitol, President Trump exacerbated the violence with a tweet attacking Vice President Pence.581 Any rational person who had watched the events that day knew that President Trumpâs 2:24 p.m. tweet would lead to further violence. It did. And, at almost exactly the same time, President Trump continued to lobby Congress to delay the electoral count.

As the evidence demonstrates, the rioters at the Capitol had invaded the building and halted the electoral count. They did not begin to relent until President Trump finally issued a video statement instructing his supporters to leave the Capitol at 4:17 p.m., which had an immediate and helpful effect: rioters began to disperse582âbut not before the Capitol was invaded, the election count was halted, feces were smeared in the Capitol, the Vice President and his family and many others were put in danger, and more than 140 law enforcement officers were attacked and seriously injured by mob rioters. Even if it were true that President Trump genuinely believed the election was stolen, this is no defense. No President can ignore the courts and purposely violate the law no matter what supposed âjustificationâ he or she presents.

These conclusions are not the Committeeâs alone. In the course of its investigation, the Committee had occasion to present evidence to Federal District Court Judge David Carter, who weighed that evidence against submissions from President Trumpâs lawyer, John Eastman. Judge Carter considered this evidence in the context of a discovery disputeâspecifically whether the Committee could obtain certain of Eastmanâs documents pursuant to the âcrime-fraudâ exception to the attorney-client privilege. That exception provides that otherwise privileged documents may lose their privilege if they were part of an effort to commit a crime or a fraud, in this case by President Trump. Judge Carter set out his factual findings, discussing multiple elements of President Trumpâs multi-part plan to overturn the election,583 and then addressed whether the evidence, including Eastmanâs email communications, demonstrated that Trump and Eastman committed crimes. âBased on the evidence,â Judge Carter explained, âthe Court finds it more likely than notâ that President Trump corruptly attempted to obstruct the Joint Session of Congress on January 6, 2021,â and âmore likely than not that President Trump and Dr. Eastman dishonestly conspired to obstruct the Joint Session of Congress on January 6th.ââ584 Judge Carter also concluded that President Trumpâs and Eastmanâs âpressure campaign to stop the electoral count did not end with Vice President Penceâit targeted every tier of federal and state elected officialsââ585 and was âa coup in search of a legal theory.ââ586 âThe plan spurred violent attacks on the seat of our nationâs government,â Judge Carter wrote, and it threatened to âpermanently end[] the peaceful transition of power. . . .ââ587

The U.S. Department of Justice has been investigating and prosecuting persons who invaded the Capitol, engaged in violence, and planned violence on that day. The Department has charged more than 900 individuals, and nearly 500 have already been convicted or pleaded guilty as we write.588 As the Committeeâs investigation progressed through its hearings, public reporting emerged suggesting that the Department of Justice had also begun to investigate several others specifically involved in the events being examined by the Committee. Such reports indicated that search warrants had been issued, based on findings of probable cause, for the cell phones of John Eastman, Jeffrey Clark, and Representative Scott Perry.589 Other reports suggested that the Department had empaneled one or more grand juries and was pursuing a ruling compelling several of this Committeeâs witnesses, including Pat Cipollone and Greg Jacob, to give testimony on topics for which President Trump had apparently asserted executive privilege. Recent reporting suggests that a Federal district court judge has now rejected President Trumpâs executive privilege claims in that context.590

Criminal referrals from a congressional committee are often made in circumstances where prosecutors are not yet known to be pursuing some of the same facts and evidence. That is not the case here. During the course of our investigation, both the U.S. Department of Justice and at least one local prosecutorâs office (Fulton County, Georgia) have been actively conducting criminal investigations concurrently with this congressional investigation.591 In fact, the U.S. Department of Justice has recently taken the extraordinary step of appointing a Special Counsel to investigate the former Presidentâs conduct.592

The Committee recognizes that the Department of Justice and other prosecutorial authorities may be in a position to utilize investigative tools, including search warrants and grand juries, superior to the means the Committee has for obtaining relevant information and testimony. Indeed, both the Department of Justice and the Fulton County District Attorney may now have access to witness testimony and records that have been unavailable to the Committee, including testimony from President Trumpâs Chief of Staff Mark Meadows, and others who either asserted privileges or invoked their Fifth Amendment rights.593 The Department may also be able to access, via grand jury subpoena or otherwise, the testimony of Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy, Representative Scott Perry, Representative Jim Jordan and others, each of whom appears to have had materially relevant communications with Donald Trump or others in the White House but who failed to comply with the Select Committeeâs subpoenas.

Taking all of these facts into account, and based on the breadth of the evidence it has accumulated, the Committee makes the following criminal referrals to the Department of Justiceâs Special Counsel.

Section 1512(c)(2) of Title 18 of the United States Code makes it a crime to âcorruptlyâ âobstruct[], influence[], or impede[] any official proceeding, or attempt[] to do so.ââ594 Sufficient evidence exists of one or more potential violations of this statute for a criminal referral of President Trump and others.595

First, there should be no question that Congressâs joint session to count electoral votes on January 6th was an âofficial proceedingâ under section 1512(c). Many Federal judges have already reached that specific conclusion.596

Second, there should be no doubt that President Trump knew that his actions were likely to âobstruct, influence or impedeâ that proceeding. Based on the evidence developed, President Trump was attempting to prevent or delay the counting of lawful certified electoral college votes from multiple States.597 President Trump was directly and personally involved in this effort, personally pressuring Vice President Pence relentlessly as the joint session on January 6th approached.598

Third, President Trump acted with a âcorruptâ purpose. Vice President Pence, Greg Jacob, and others repeatedly told the President that the Vice President had no unilateral authority to prevent certification of the election.599 Indeed, in an email exchange during the violence of January 6th, Eastman admitted that President Trump had been âadvisedâ that Vice President Pence could not lawfully refuse to count votes under the Electoral Count Act, but âonce he gets something in his head, itâs hard to get him to change course.ââ600 In addition, President Trump knew that he had lost dozens of State and Federal lawsuits, and that the Justice Department, his campaign and his other advisors concluded that there was insufficient fraud to alter the outcome. President Trump also knew that no majority of any State legislature had taken or manifested any intention to take any official action that could change a Stateâs electoral college votes.601 But President Trump pushed forward anyway. As Judge Carter explained, â[b]ecause President Trump likely knew that the plan to disrupt the electoral count was wrongful, his mindset exceeds the threshold for acting âcorruptlyâ under Â§ 1512(c).ââ602

Sufficient evidence exists of one or more potential violations of 18 U.S.C. Â§ 1512(c) for a criminal referral of President Trump based solely on his plan to get Vice President Pence to prevent certification of the election at the joint session of Congress. Those facts standing alone are sufficient. But such a charge under that statute can also be based on the plan to create and transmit to the executive and legislative branches fraudulent electoral slates, which were ultimately intended to facilitate an unlawful action by Vice President Penceâto refuse to count legitimate, certified electoral votes during Congressâs official January 6th proceeding.603 Additionally, evidence developed about the many other elements of President Trumpâs plans to overturn the election, including soliciting State legislatures, State officials, and others to alter official electoral outcomes, provides further evidence that President Trump was attempting through multiple means to corruptly obstruct, impede, or influence the counting of electoral votes on January 6th. This is also true of President Trumpâs personal directive to the Department of Justice to âjust say that the election was was [sic] corrupt + leave the rest to me and the R[epublican] Congressmen.ââ604

We also stress in particular the draft letter to the Georgia legislature authored by Jeffrey Clark and another Trump political appointee at the Department of Justice. The draft letter embraces many of the same theories that John Eastman and others were asserting in President Trumpâs effort to lobby State legislatures. White House Counsel Pat Cipollone described that letter as âa murder-suicide pact,â and other White House and Justice Department officials offered similar descriptions.605 As described herein, that draft letter was intended to help persuade a State legislature to change its certified slate of electoral college electors based on false allegations of fraud, so Vice President Pence could unilaterally and unlawfully decide to count a different slate on January 6th.606 The letter was transparently false, improper, and illegal. President Trump had multiple communications with Clark in the days before January 6th, and there is no basis to doubt that President Trump offered Clark the position of Acting Attorney General knowing that Clark would send the letter and others like it.607

Of course, President Trump is also responsible for recruiting tens of thousands of his supporters to Washington for January 6th, and knowing they were angry and some were armed, instructing them to march to the Capitol and âfight like hell.ââ608 And then, while knowing a violent riot was underway, he refused for multiple hours to take the single step his advisors and supporters were begging him to take to halt the violence: to make a public statement instructing his supporters to disperse and leave the Capitol.609 Through action and inaction, President Trump corruptly obstructed, delayed, and impeded the vote count.

In addition, the Committee believes sufficient evidence exists for a criminal referral of John Eastman and certain other Trump associates under 18 U.S.C. Â§1512(c). The evidence shows that Eastman knew in advance of the 2020 election that Vice President Pence could not refuse to count electoral votes on January 6th.610 In the days before January 6th, Eastman was warned repeatedly that his plan was illegal and âcompletely crazy,â and would âcause riots in the streets.ââ611 Nonetheless, Eastman continued to assist President Trumpâs pressure campaign in public and in private, including in meetings with the Vice President and in his own speech at the Ellipse on January 6th. And even as the violence was playing out at the Capitol, Eastman admitted in writing that his plan violated the law but pressed for Pence to do it anyway.612 In the immediate aftermath of January 6th, White House lawyer Eric Herschmann told Eastman that he should â[g]et a great Fâing criminal defense lawyer, youâre going to need it.ââ613 Others working with Eastman likely share in Eastmanâs culpability. For example, Kenneth Chesebro was a central player in the scheme to submit fake electors to the Congress and the National Archives.

The Committee notes that multiple Republican Members of Congress, including Representative Scott Perry, likely have material facts regarding President Trumpâs plans to overturn the election. For example, many Members of Congress attended a White House meeting on December 21, 2020, in which the plan to have the Vice President affect the outcome of the election was disclosed and discussed. Evidence indicates that certain of those Members unsuccessfully sought Presidential pardons from President Trump after January 6th,614 as did Eastman,615 revealing their own clear consciousness of guilt.

Section 371 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code provides that â[i]f two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.â The Committee believes sufficient evidence exists for a criminal referral of President Trump and others under this statute.616

First, President Trump entered into an agreement with individuals to obstruct a lawful function of the government (the certification of the election). The evidence of this element overlaps greatly with the evidence of the section 1512(c)(2) violations, so we will not repeat it at length here. President Trump engaged in a multi-part plan described in this Report to obstruct a lawful certification of the election. Judge Carter focused his opinions largely on John Eastmanâs role, as Eastmanâs documents were at issue in that case, concluding that âthe evidence shows that an agreement to enact the electoral count plan likely existed between President Trump and Eastman.ââ617 But President Trump entered into agreementsâwhether formal or informal618âwith several other individuals who assisted with the multi-part plan. With regard to the Department of Justice, Jeffrey Clark stands out as a participant in the conspiracy, as the evidence suggests that Clark entered into an agreement with President Trump that if appointed Acting Attorney General, he would send a letter to State officials falsely stating that the Department of Justice believed that State legislatures had a sufficient factual basis to convene to select new electors. This was falseâthe Department of Justice had reached the conclusion that there was no factual basis to contend that the election was stolen. Again, as with section 1512(c), the conspiracy under section 371 appears to have also included other individuals such as Chesebro, Rudolph Giuliani, and Mark Meadows, but this Committee does not attempt to determine all of the participants of the conspiracy, many of whom refused to answer this Committeeâs questions.

Second, there are several bases for finding that the conspirators used âdeceitful or dishonest means.â For example, President Trump repeatedly lied about the election, after he had been told by his advisors that there was no evidence of fraud sufficient to change the results of the election.619 In addition, the plot to get the Vice President to unilaterally prevent certification of the election was manifestly (and admittedly) illegal, as discussed above. Eastman and others told President Trump that it would violate the Electoral Count Act if the Vice President unilaterally rejected electors. Thus Judge Carter once again had little trouble finding that the intent requirement (âdeceitful or dishonest meansâ) was met, stating that âPresident Trump continuing to push that plan despite being aware of its illegality constituted obstruction by âdishonestâ means under Â§ 371.ââ620 Judge Carter rejected the notion that Eastmanâs planâwhich the President adopted and actualizedâwas a âgood faith interpretationâ of the law, finding instead that it was âa partisan distortion of the democratic process.ââ621 Similarly, both President Trump and Clark had been told repeatedly that the Department of Justice had found no evidence of significant fraud in any of its investigations, but they nonetheless pushed the Department of Justice to send a letter to State officials stating that the Department had found such fraud. And Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger and others made clear to President Trump that they had no authority to âfindâ him 11,780 votes, but the President relentlessly insisted that they do exactly that, even to the point of suggesting there could be criminal consequences if they refused.622

Third, there were numerous overt acts in furtherance of the agreement, including each of the parts of the Presidentâs effort to overturn the election. As Judge Carter concluded, President Trump and Eastman participated in ânumerous overt acts in furtherance of their shared plan.ââ623 These included, but certainly were not limited to, direct pleas to the Vice President to reject electors or delay certification, including in Oval Office meetings and the Presidentâs vulgar comments to the Vice President on the morning of January 6th. Judge Carter also addressed evidence that President Trump knowingly made false representations to a court. Judge Carter concluded that Eastmanâs emails showed âthat President Trump knew that the specific numbers of voter fraudâ cited in a complaint on behalf of President Trump âwere wrong but continued to tout those numbers, both in court and to the public.â Judge Carter found that the emails in question were related to and in furtherance of a conspiracy to defraud the United States.624

In finding that President Trump, Eastman, and others engaged in conspiracy to defraud the United States under section 371, Judge Carter relied on the documents at issue (largely consisting of Eastmanâs own emails) and evidence presented to the court by this Committee. This Committeeâs investigation has progressed significantly since Judge Carter issued his first crime-fraud ruling in March 2022. The evidence found by this Committee and discussed in detail in this Report further documents that the conspiracy to defraud the United States under section 371 extended far beyond the effort to pressure the Vice President to prevent certification of the election. The Committee believes there is sufficient evidence for a criminal referral of the multi-part plan described in this Report under section 371, as the very purpose of the plan was to prevent the lawful certification of Joe Bidenâs election as President.

President Trump, through others acting at his behest, submitted slates of fake electors to Congress and the National Archives. Section 1001 of Title 18 of the United States Code applies, in relevant part, to âwhoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfullyâ

(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;

(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or

(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry.â

According to the Department of Justice, whether a false statement is criminal under section 1001 âdepends on whether there is an affirmative response to each of the following questions:

In addition, and as explained above, 18 U.S.C. Â§ 371 makes it a crime to conspire to âcommit any offense against the United States.ââ626

The evidence suggests President Trump conspired with others to submit slates of fake electors to Congress and the National Archives. Sufficient evidence exists of a violation of 18 U.S.C. Â§Â§ 371 and 1001 for a criminal referral of President Trump and others.

As explained earlier and in Chapter 3 of this Report, the certifications signed by Trump electors in multiple States were patently false. Vice President Biden won each of those States, and the relevant State authorities had so certified. It can hardly be disputed that the false slates of electors were material, as nothing can be more material to the joint session of Congress to certify the election than the question of which candidate won which States. Indeed, evidence obtained by the Committee suggests that those attempting to submit certain of the electoral votes regarded the need to provide that material to Vice President Pence as urgent.627

There should be no question that section 1001 applies here. The false electoral slates were provided both to the executive branch (the National Archives) and the legislative branch.628 The statute applies to âany matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States.ââ629 It is well established that false statements to Congress can constitute violations of section 1001.630

Finally, the false statement was made knowingly and willfully. There is some evidence suggesting that some signatories of the fake certificates believed that the certificates were contingent, to be used only in the event that President Trump prevailed in litigation challenging the election results in their States. That may be relevant to the question whether those electors knowingly and willfully signed a false statement at the time they signed the certificates. But it is of no moment to President Trumpâs conduct, as President Trump (including acting through co-conspirators such as John Eastman and Kenneth Chesebro) relied on the existence of those fake electors as a basis for asserting that the Vice President could reject or delay certification of the Biden electors. In fact, as explained earlier and in Chapter 5 of this Report, Eastmanâs memorandum setting out a six-step plan for overturning the election on January 6th begins by stating that â7 states have transmitted dual slates of electors to the President of the Senate.â

The remaining question is who engaged in this conspiracy to make the false statement to Congress under section 1001. The evidence is clear that President Trump personally participated in a scheme to have the Trump electors meet, cast votes, and send their votes to the joint session of Congress in several States that Vice President Biden won, and then his supporters relied on the existence of these fake electors as part of their effort to obstruct the joint session. Republican National Committee (RNC) Chairwoman Ronna McDaniel testified before this Committee that President Trump and Eastman directly requested that the RNC organize the effort to have these fake (i.e., Trump) electors meet and cast their votes.631 Thus, the Committee believes that sufficient evidence exists for a criminal referral of President Trump for illegally engaging in a conspiracy to violate section 1001; the evidence indicates that he entered into an agreement with Eastman and others to make the false statement (the fake electoral certificates), by deceitful or dishonest means, and at least one member of the conspiracy engaged in at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy (e.g., President Trump and Eastmanâs call to Ronna McDaniel).

Section 2383 of Title 18 of the United States Code applies to anyone who âincites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto.ââ632 The Committee recognizes that section 2383 does not require evidence of an âagreementâ between President Trump and the violent rioters to establish a violation of that provision; instead, the President need only have incited, assisted, or aided and comforted those engaged in violence or other lawless activity in an effort to prevent the peaceful transition of the Presidency under our Constitution. A Federal court has already concluded that President Trumpâs statements during his Ellipse speech were âplausibly words of incitement not protected by the First Amendment.ââ633 Moreover, President Trump was impeached for âIncitement of Insurrection,â and a majority of the Senate voted to convict, with many more suggesting they might have voted to convict had President Trump still been in office at the time.634

As explained throughout this Report and in this Committeeâs hearings, President Trump was directly responsible for summoning what became a violent mob to Washington, DC, urging them to march to the Capitol, and then further provoking the already violent and lawless crowd with his 2:24 p.m. tweet about the Vice President. Even though President Trump had repeatedly been told that Vice President Pence had no legal authority to stop the certification of the election, he asserted in his speech on January 6th that if the Vice President âcomes through for usâ that he could deliver victory to Trump: â[I]f Mike Pence does the right thing, we win the election.â This created a desperate and false expectation in President Trumpâs mob that ended up putting the Vice President and his entourage and many others at the Capitol in physical danger. When President Trump tweeted at 2:24 p.m., he knew violence was underway. His tweet exacerbated that violence.635

During the ensuing riot, the President refused to condemn the violence or encourage the crowd to disperse despite repeated pleas from his staff and family that he do so. The Committee has evidence from multiple sources establishing these facts, including testimony from former White House Counsel Pat Cipollone. Although Cipolloneâs testimony did not disclose a number of direct communications with President Trump in light of concerns about executive privilege, the Department now appears to have obtained a ruling that Cipollone can testify before a grand jury about these communications. Based on the information it has obtained, the Committee believes that Cipollone and others can provide direct testimony establishing that President Trump refused repeatedly, for multiple hours, to make a public statement directing his violent and lawless supporters to leave the Capitol. President Trump did not want his supporters (who had effectively halted the vote counting) to disperse. Evidence obtained by the Committee also indicates that President Trump did not want to provide security assistance to the Capitol during that violent period.636 This appalling behavior by our Commander in Chief occurred despite his affirmative constitutional duty to act to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.637

The Committee believes that sufficient evidence exists for a criminal referral of President Trump for âassist[ing]â or âai[ding] and comfort[ing]â those at the Capitol who engaged in a violent attack on the United States. The Committee has developed significant evidence that President Trump intended to disrupt the peaceful transition of power and believes that the Department of Justice can likely elicit testimony relevant to an investigation under section 2383.

For example, Chief of Staff Mark Meadows told White House Counsel Pat Cipollone that the President âdoesnât want to do anythingâ to stop the violence.638 Worse, at 2:24 p.m., the President inflamed and exacerbated the mob violence by sending a tweet stating that the Vice President âdidnât have the courage to do what should have been done.ââ639 The President threw gasoline on the fire despite knowing that there was a violent riot underway at the Capitol. Indeed, video and audio footage from the attack shows that many of the rioters specifically mentioned Vice President Pence.640 And immediately after President Trump sent his tweet, the violence escalated. Between 2:25 p.m. and 2:28 p.m., rioters breached the East Rotunda doors, other rioters breached the police line in the Capitol Crypt, Vice President Pence had to be evacuated from his Senate office, and Leader McCarthy was evacuated from his Capitol office.641

Evidence developed in the Committeeâs investigation showed that the President, when told that the crowd was chanting âHang Mike Pence,â responded that perhaps the Vice President deserved to be hanged.642 And President Trump rebuffed pleas from Leader McCarthy to ask that his supporters leave the Capitol stating, âWell, Kevin, I guess these people are more upset about the election than you are.â After hours of deadly riot, President Trump eventually released a videotaped statement encouraging the crowd to disperse, though openly professing his âloveâ for the members of the mob and empathizing with their frustration at the âstolenâ election. President Trump has since expressed a desire to pardon those involved in the attack.643

Both the purpose and the effect of the Presidentâs actions were to mobilize a large crowd to descend on the Capitol. Several defendants in pending criminal cases identified the Presidentâs allegations about the âstolen electionâ as the key motivation for their activities at the Capitol. Many of them specifically cited the Presidentâs tweets asking his supporters to come to Washington, DC, on January 6th. For example, one defendant who later pleaded guilty to threatening House Speaker Nancy Pelosi texted a family member on January 6th to say: â[Trump] wants heads and Iâm going to deliver.ââ644 Another defendant released a statement through his attorney stating: âI was in Washington, DC on January 6, 2021, because I believed I was following the instructions of former President Trump and he was my President and the commander-in-chief. His statements also had me believing the election was stolen from him.ââ645

As the violence began to subside and law enforcement continued to secure the Capitol, President Trump tweeted again, at 6:01 pm to justify the actions of the rioters: âThese are the things and events that happen,â he wrote, when his so-called victory was âso unceremoniously & viciously stripped away. . . .ââ646 When he wrote those words, he knew exactly what he was doing. Before President Trump issued the tweet, a White House staffer cautioned him that the statement would imply that he âhad something to do with the events that happened at the Capitolââbut he tweeted it anyway.647 The final words of that tweet leave little doubt about President Trumpâs sentiments toward those who invaded the Capitol: âRemember this day forever!ââ648

Depending on evidence developed by the Department of Justice, the Presidentâs actions with the knowledge of the risk of violence could also constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C. Â§ 372 and Â§ 2384, both of which require proof of a conspiracy. Section 372 prohibits a conspiracy between two or more persons âto prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust, or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof, or to induce by like means any officer of the United States to leave the place, where his duties as an officer are required to be performed, or to injure him in the discharge of his official duties.ââ649 Oath Keepers Kelly Meggs, Kenneth Harrelson, and Jessica Watkins were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. Â§ 372 in connection with the January 6th attack on the Capitol.650 The Committee believes that former Chief of Staff Mark Meadows (who refused to testify and was held in contempt of Congress) could have specific evidence relevant to such charges, as may witnesses who invoked their Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination before this Committee.

Section 2384, the seditious conspiracy statute, prohibits âconspir[acy] to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States . . . or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder or delay the execution of any law of the United States . . . .ââ651 A jury has already determined beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed under section 2384, as the leader of the Oath Keepers and at least one other individual were convicted of seditious conspiracy under section 2384 for their actions related to the attack on the Capitol.652 A trial regarding a series of other âProud Boyâ defendants may also address similar issues.653

The Department of Justice, through its investigative tools that exceed those of this Committee, may have evidence sufficient to prosecute President Trump under sections 372 and 2384. Accordingly, we believe sufficient evidence exists for a criminal referral of President Trump under these two statutes.

The Committee has substantial concerns regarding potential efforts to obstruct its investigation, including by certain counsel (some paid by groups connected to the former President) who may have advised clients to provide false or misleading testimony to the Committee.654 Such actions could violate 18 U.S.C. Â§Â§ 1505, 1512. The Committee is aware that both the U.S. Department of Justice and the Fulton County District Attorneyâs Office have already obtained information relevant to these matters, including from the Committee directly. We urge the Department of Justice to examine the facts to discern whether prosecution is warranted. The Committeeâs broad concerns regarding obstruction and witness credibility are addressed in the Executive Summary to this Report.

To date, the Justice Department has pursued prosecution of hundreds of individuals who planned and participated in the January 6th invasion of and attack on our Capitol. But the Department has not yet charged individuals who engaged in the broader plan to overturn the election through the means discussed in this Report. The Committee has concluded that it is critical to hold those individuals accountable as well, including those who worked with President Trump to create and effectuate these plans.

In his speech from the Ellipse on January 6th, President Trump recited a host of election fraud allegations he knew to be false, and then told tens of thousands of his angry supporters this:

And fraud breaks up everything, doesnât it? When you catch somebody in a fraud, youâre allowed to go by very different rules. So I hope Mike has the courage to do what he has to do. And I hope he doesnât listen to the RINOs and the stupid people that heâs listening to. 655

The meaning of President Trumpâs comments was sufficiently clear then, but he recently gave America an even more detailed understanding of his state of mind. Trump wrote that allegations of âmassive fraudâ related to the 2020 election âallow[] for the termination of all rules, regulations and articles, even those found in the Constitution.ââ656 And President Trump considered pardoning those involved in the attack and has since expressed a desire to pardon themâand even give them an apologyâif he returns to the Oval Office.657

In the Committeeâs judgment, based on all the evidence developed, President Trump believed then, and continues to believe now, that he is above the law, not bound by our Constitution and its explicit checks on Presidential authority. This recent Trump statement only heightens our concern about accountability. If President Trump and the associates who assisted him in an effort to overturn the lawful outcome of the 2020 election are not ultimately held accountable under the law, their behavior may become a precedent, and invitation to danger, for future elections. A failure to hold them accountable now may ultimately lead to future unlawful efforts to overturn our elections, thereby threatening the security and viability of our Republic.

During the course of the Select Committeeâs investigation of President Trumpâs efforts to subvert the election, the Committee learned that various Members of Congress had information relevant to the investigation. Accordingly, the Committee wrote letters to a number of Members involved in that activity inviting them to participate voluntarily in the Select Committeeâs investigation. None of the members was willing to provide information, which forced the Select Committee to consider alternative means of securing evidence about the conduct of these Members and the information they might have. On May 12, 2022, the Select Committee subpoenaed several members of Congressâincluding House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, Representative Jim Jordan, Representative Scott Perry, and Representative Andy Biggsâto obtain information related to the Committeeâs investigation.

This was a significant step, but it was one that was warranted by the certain volume of information these Members possessed that was relevant to the Select Committeeâs investigation, as well as the centrality of their efforts to President Trumpâs multi-part plan to remain in power.

Representative McCarthy, among other things, had multiple communications with President Trump, Vice President Pence, and others on and related to January 6th. For example, during the attack on the Capitol, Representative McCarthy urgently requested that the former President issue a statement calling off the rioters, to which President Trump responded by âpush[ing] backâ and said: âWell, Kevin, I guess these people are more upset about the election than you are.ââ658 And, after the attack, Representative McCarthy spoke on the House floor and said that, â[t]here is absolutely no evidenceâ that Antifa caused the attack on the Capitol and instead called on President Trump to âaccept his share of responsibilityâ for the violence.659 As noted above, Representative McCarthy privately confided in colleagues that President Trump accepted some responsibility for the attack on the Capitol.660

Representative Jordan was a significant player in President Trumpâs efforts. He participated in numerous post-election meetings in which senior White House officials, Rudolph Giuliani, and others, discussed strategies for challenging the election, chief among them claims that the election had been tainted by fraud. On January 2, 2021, Representative Jordan led a conference call in which he, President Trump, and other Members of Congress discussed strategies for delaying the January 6th joint session. During that call, the group also discussed issuing social media posts encouraging President Trumpâs supporters to âmarch to the Capitolâ on the 6th.661 An hour and a half later, President Trump and Representative Jordan spoke by phone for 18 minutes.662 The day before January 6th, Representative Jordan texted Mark Meadows, passing along advice that Vice President Pence should âcall out all the electoral votes that he believes are unconstitutional as no electoral votes at all.ââ663 He spoke with President Trump by phone at least twice on January 6th, though he has provided inconsistent public statements about how many times they spoke and what they discussed.664 He also received five calls from Rudolph Giuliani that evening, and the two connected at least twice, at 7:33 p.m. and 7:49 p.m.665 During that time, Giuliani has testified, he was attempting to reach Members of Congress after the joint session resumed to encourage them to continue objecting to Joe Bidenâs electoral votes.666 And, in the days following January 6th, Representative Jordan spoke with White House staff about the prospect of Presidential pardons for Members of Congress.667

Like Representative Jordan, Representative Perry was also involved in early post-election messaging strategy. Both Representative Jordan and Representative Perry were involved in discussions with White House officials about Vice President Penceâs role on January 6th as early as November 2020.668 Representative Perry was present for conversations in which the White House Counselâs Office informed him and others that President Trumpâs efforts to submit fake electoral votes were not legally sound.669 But perhaps most pivotally, he was involved in President Trumpâs efforts to install Jeffrey Clark as the Acting Attorney General in December 2020 and January 2021. Beginning in early December 2020, Representative Perry suggested Clark as a candidate to Mark Meadows,670 then introduced Clark to President Trump.671 In the days before January 6th, Representative Perry advocated for President Trump to speak at the Capitol during the joint session, speaking to Mark Meadows on at least one occasion about it.672 He was also a participant in the January 2, 2021, call in which Representative Jordan, President Trump, and others discussed issuing social media posts to encourage Trump supporters to march to the Capitol on January 6th.673 After January 6th, Representative Perry reached out to White House staff asking to receive a Presidential pardon.674

Representative Biggs was involved in numerous elements of President Trumpâs efforts to contest the election results. As early as November 6, 2020, Representative Biggs texted Mark Meadows, urging him to âencourage the state legislatures to appoint [electors].ââ675 In the following days, Representative Biggs told Meadows not to let President Trump concede his loss.676 Between then and January 6th, Representative Biggs coordinated with Arizona State Representative Mark Finchem to gather signatures from Arizona lawmakers endorsing fake Trump electors.677 He also contacted fake Trump electors in at least one State seeking evidence related to voter fraud.678

To date, none of the subpoenaed Members has complied with either voluntary or compulsory requests for participation.

Representative McCarthy initially responded to the Select Committeeâs subpoena in two letters on May 27 and May 30, 2022, in which he objected to the Select Committeeâs composition and validity of the subpoena and offered to submit written interrogatories in lieu of deposition testimony. Although the Select Committee did not release Representative McCarthy from his subpoena obligations, Representative McCarthy failed to appear for his scheduled deposition on May 31, 2022. The Select Committee responded to Representative McCarthyâs letters this same day, rejecting his proposal to participate via written interrogatories and compelling his appearance for deposition testimony no later than June 11, 2022. Although Representative McCarthy again responded via letter on June 9, 2022, he did not appear for deposition testimony on or before the specified June 11, 2022, deadline.

Representative Jordan also responded to the Select Committeeâs subpoena just before his scheduled deposition in a letter on May 25, 2022, containing a variety of objections. Representative Jordan also requested material from the Select Committee, including all materials referencing him in the Select Committeeâs possession and all internal legal analysis related to the constitutionality of Member subpoenas. Although the Select Committee did not release Representative Jordan from his subpoena obligations, Representative Jordan failed to appear for his scheduled deposition on May 27, 2022. On May 31, 2022, the Select Committee responded to the substance of Representative Jordanâs May 25th letter and indicated that Representative Jordan should appear for deposition testimony no later than June 11, 2022. On June 9, 2022, Representative Jordan again wrote to reiterate the points from his May 25th letter. That same day, Representative Jordan sent out a fundraising email with the subject line: âIâVE BEEN SUBPOENED.ââ679 Representative Jordan did not appear before the Select Committee on or before the June 11, 2022, deadline.

Representative Perry likewise responded to the Select Committeeâs subpoena on May 24, 2022, in a letter, âdeclin[ing] to appear for depositionâ and requesting that the subpoena be âimmediately withdrawn.ââ680 Although the Select Committee did not release Representative Perry from his subpoena obligations, Representative Perry failed to appear on May 26, 2022, for his scheduled deposition. Representative Perry sent a second letter to the Select Committee on May 31, 2022, with additional objections. That same day, the Select Committee responded to Representative Perryâs letters and stated that he should appear before the Select Committee no later than June 11, 2022, for deposition testimony. Representative Perry responded via letter on June 10, 2022, maintaining his objections. He did not appear before the June 11, 2022, deadline.

Representative Biggs issued a press release on the day the Select Committee issued its subpoena, calling the subpoena âillegitimateâ and âpure political theater.â The day before his scheduled deposition, Representative Biggs sent a letter to the Select Committee with a series of objections and an invocation of Speech or Debate immunity. Although the Select Committee did not release Representative Biggs from his subpoena obligations, Representative Biggs did not appear for his scheduled deposition on May 26, 2022. On May 31, 2022, the Select Committee responded to the substance of Representative Biggsâs May 25th letter and indicated that Representative Biggs should appear for deposition testimony no later than June 11, 2022. Although Representative Biggs responded with another letter on June 9th, he did not appear before the June 11, 2022, deadline.

Despite the Select Committeeâs repeated attempts to obtain information from these Members and the issuance of subpoenas, each has refused to cooperate and failed to comply with a lawfully issued subpoena. Accordingly, the Select Committee is referring their failure to comply with the subpoenas issued to them to the Ethics Committee for further action. To be clear, this referral is only for failure to comply with lawfully issued subpoenas.

The Rules of the House of Representatives make clear that their willful noncompliance violates multiple standards of conduct and subjects them to discipline. Willful non-compliance with compulsory congressional committee subpoenas by House Members violates the spirit and letter of House rule XXIII, clause 1, which requires House Members to conduct themselves âat all times in a manner that shall reflect creditably on the House.â As a previous version of the House Ethics Manual explained, this catchall provision encompasses ââflagrantâ violations of the law that reflect on âCongress as a whole,â and that might otherwise go unpunished.ââ681 The subpoenaed House Membersâ refusal to comply with their subpoena obligations satisfies these criteria. A House Memberâs willful failure to comply with a congressional subpoena also reflects discredit on Congress. If left unpunished, such behavior undermines Congressâs longstanding power to investigate in support of its lawmaking authority and suggests that Members of Congress may disregard legal obligations that apply to ordinary citizens.

For these reasons, the Select Committee refers Leader McCarthy and Representatives Jordan, Perry, and Biggs for sanction by the House Ethics Committee for failure to comply with subpoenas. The Committee also believes that each of these individuals, along with other Members who attended the December 21st planning meeting with President Trump at the White House,682 should be questioned in a public forum about their advance knowledge of and role in President Trumpâs plan to prevent the peaceful transition of power.

More than 30 witnesses before the Select Committee exercised their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused on that basis to provide testimony. They included individuals central to the investigation, such as John Eastman, Jeffrey Clark, Roger Stone, Michael Flynn, Kenneth Chesebro, and others.683 The law allows a civil litigant to rely upon an âadverse inferenceâ when a witness invokes the Fifth Amendment. â[T]he Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions . . ..ââ684 The Committee has not chosen to rely on any such inference in this Report or in its hearings.

We do note that certain witness assertions of the Fifth Amendment were particularly troubling, including this:

Vice Chair Cheney: General Flynn, do you believe the violence on January 6th was justified?

Counsel for the Witness: Can I get clarification, is that a moral question or are you asking a legal question?

Vice Chair Cheney: Iâm asking both.

General Flynn: The Fifth.

Vice Chair Cheney: Do you believe the violence on January 6th was justified morally?

General Flynn: Take the Fifth.

Vice Chair Cheney: Do you believe the violence on January 6th was justified legally?

General Flynn: Fifth.

Vice Chair Cheney: General Flynn, do you believe in the peaceful transition of power in the United States of America?

General Flynn: The Fifth.685

President Trump refused to comply with the Committeeâs subpoena, and also filed suit to block the National Archives from supplying the Committee with White House records. The Committee litigated the National Archives case in Federal District Court, in the Federal Appellate Court for the District of Columbia, and before the Supreme Court. The Select Committee was successful in this litigation. The opinion of the D.C. Circuit explained:

On January 6, 2021, a mob professing support for then-President Trump violently attacked the United States Capitol in an effort to prevent a Joint Session of Congress from certifying the electoral college votes designating Joseph R. Biden the 46th President of the United States. The rampage left multiple people dead, injured more than 140 people, and inflicted millions of dollars in damage to the Capitol. Then-Vice President Pence, Senators, and Representatives were all forced to halt their constitutional duties and flee the House and Senate chambers for safety.686

Benjamin Franklin said, at the founding, that we have â[a] Republicâââif [we] can keep it.â The events of January 6th exposed the fragility of those democratic institutions and traditions that we had perhaps come to take for granted. In response, the President of the United States and Congress have each made the judgment that access to this subset of presidential communication records is necessary to address a matter of great constitutional moment for the Republic. Former President Trump has given this court no legal reason to cast aside President Bidenâs assessment of the Executive Branch interests at stake, or to create a separation of powers conflict that the Political Branches have avoided.687

Several other witnesses have also avoided testifying in whole or in part by asserting Executive Privilege or Absolute Immunity from any obligation to appear before Congress. For example, the Presidentâs Chief of Staff Mark Meadows invoked both, and categorically refused to testify, even about text messages he provided to the Committee. The House of Representatives voted to hold him in criminal contempt.688 Although the Justice Department has taken the position in litigation that a former high level White House staffer for a former President is not entitled to absolute immunity,689 and that any interests in the confidentiality of his communications with President Trump and others are overcome in this case, the Justice Department declined to prosecute Meadows for criminal contempt. The reasons for Justiceâs refusal to do so are not apparent to the Committee.690 Commentators have speculated that Meadows may be cooperating in the Justice Departmentâs January 6th investigation.691 The same may be true for Daniel Scavino, President Trumpâs White House Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications and Director of Social Media, whom the House also voted to hold in contempt.692

Steve Bannon also chose not to cooperate with the Committee, and the Justice Department prosecuted him for contempt of Congress.693 Bannon has been sentenced and is currently appealing his conviction. Peter Navarro, another White House Staffer who refused to testify, is currently awaiting his criminal trial.694

Although the Committee issued letters and subpoenas to seven Republican members of Congress who have unique knowledge of certain developments on or in relation to January 6th, none agreed to participate in the investigation; none considered themselves obligated to comply with the subpoenas. A number of these same individuals were aware well in advance of January 6th of the plotting by Donald Trump, John Eastman, and others to overturn the election, and certain of them had an active role in that activity.695 None seem to have alerted law enforcement of this activity, or of the known risk of violence. On January 5th, after promoting unfounded objections to election results, Rep. Debbie Lesko appears to have recognized the danger in a call with her colleagues:

I also ask leadership to come up with a safety plan for Members [of Congress]. . . . We also have, quite honestly, Trump supporters who actually believe that we are going to overturn the election, and when that doesnât happenâmost likely will not happenâthey are going to go nuts.696

During our hearings, the Committee presented the testimony of numerous White House witnesses who testified about efforts by certain Republican Members of Congress to obtain Presidential pardons for their conduct in connection with January 6th.697 Cassidy Hutchinson provided extensive detail in this regard:

Vice Chair Cheney: And are you aware of any members of Congress seeking pardons?

Hutchinson: I guess Mr. Gaetz and Mr. Brooks, I know, have both advocated for thereâd be a blanket pardon for members involved in that meeting, and a â a handful of other members that werenât at the December 21st meeting as the presumptive pardons. Mr. Gaetz was personally pushing for a pardon, and he was doing so since early December.

Iâm not sure why Mr. Gaetz would reach out to me to ask if he could have a meeting with Mr. Meadows about receiving a presidential pardon.

Vice Chair Cheney: Did they all contact you?

Hutchinson: Not all of them, but several of them did.

Vice Chair Cheney: So, you mentioned Mr. Gaetz, Mr. Brooks.

Hutchinson: Mr. Biggs did. Mr. Jordan talked about Congressional pardons, but he never asked me for one. It was more for an update on whether the White House was going to pardon members of Congress. Mr. Gohmert asked for one as well. Mr. Perry asked for a pardon, too. Iâm sorry.

Vice Chair Cheney: Mr. Perry? Did he talk to you directly?

Hutchinson: Yes, he did.

Vice Chair Cheney: Did Marjorie Taylor Greene contact you?

Hutchinson: No, she didnât contact me about it. I heard that she had asked White House Counselâs Office for a pardon from Mr. Philbin, but I didnât frequently communicate with Ms. Greene.698

Many of these details were also corroborated by other sources. President Personnel Director Johnny McEntee confirmed that he was personally asked for a pardon by Representative Matt Gaetz (RâFL).699 Eric Herschmann recalled that Representative Gaetz â. . . asked for a very, very broad pardon.. . . And I said Nixonâs pardon was never nearly that broad.ââ700 When asked about reporting that Representatives Mo Brooks and Andy Biggs also requested pardons, Herschmann did not reject either possibility out of hand, instead answering: âItâs possible that Representative Brooks or Biggs, but I donât remember.ââ701 The National Archives produced to the Select Committee an email from Representative Mo Brooks to the Presidentâs executive assistant stating that âPresident Trump asked me to send you this letterâ and â. . . pursuant to a request from Matt Gaetzâ that recommended blanket Presidential pardons to every Member of Congress who objected to the electoral college votes on January 6th.702

These requests for pardons suggest that the Members identified above were conscious of the potential legal jeopardy arising from their conduct. As noted infra 136, the Committee has referred a number of these individuals to the House Ethics Committee for their failure to comply with subpoenas, and believes that they each owe the American people their direct and unvarnished testimony.

The Select Committee has also received a range of evidence suggesting specific efforts to obstruct the Committeeâs investigation. Much of this evidence is already known by the Department of Justice and by other prosecutorial authorities. For example:

1. The Committee received testimony from a witness about her decision to terminate a lawyer who was receiving payments for the representation from a group allied with President Trump. Among other concerns expressed by the witness:

Further details regarding these instances will be available to the public when transcripts are released.

2. Similarly, the witness testified that multiple persons affiliated with President Trump contacted her in advance of the witnessâs testimony and made the following statements:

What they said to me is, as long as I continue to be a team player, they know that I am on the right team. I am doing the right thing. I am protecting who I need to protect. You know, I will continue to stay in good graces in Trump World. And they have reminded me a couple of times that Trump does read transcripts and just keep that in mind as I proceed through my interviews with the committee.

Here is another sample in a different context. This is a call received by one of our witnesses:

[A person] let me know you have your deposition tomorrow. He wants me to let you know heâs thinking about you. He knows youâre a team player, youâre loyal, and youâre going do the right thing when you go in for your deposition.703

3. The Select Committee is aware of multiple efforts by President Trump to contact Select Committee witnesses. The Department of Justice is aware of at least one of those circumstances.

4. Rather than relying on representation by Secret Service lawyers at no cost, a small number of Secret Service agents engaged private counsel for their interviews before the Committee.704 During one such witnessâs transcribed interview, a retained private counsel was observed writing notes to the witness regarding the content of the witnessâs testimony while the questioning was underway. The witnessâs counsel admitted on the record that he had done so.705

Recently, published accounts of the Justice Departmentâs Mar-a-Lago investigation suggest that the Department is investigating the conduct of counsel for certain witnesses whose fees are being paid by President Trumpâs Save America Political Action Committee.706 The public report implies the Department is concerned that such individuals are seeking to influence the testimony of the witnesses they represent.707 This Committee also has these concerns, including that lawyers who are receiving such payments have specific incentives to defend President Trump rather than zealously represent their own clients. The Department of Justice and the Fulton County District Attorney have been provided with certain information related to this topic.

The Select Committee recognizes of course that most of the testimony we have gathered was given more than a year after January 6th. Recollections are not perfect, and the Committee expects that different accounts of the same events will naturally vary. Indeed, the lack of any inconsistencies in witness accounts would itself be suspicious. And many witnesses may simply recall different things than others.

Many of the witnesses before this Committee had nothing at all to gain from their testimony, gave straightforward responses to the questions posted, and made no effort to downplay, deflect, or rationalize. Trump Administration Justice Department officials such as Attorney General Barr, Acting Attorney General Rosen, and Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue are good examples. Multiple members of President Trumpâs White House staff were also suitably forthcoming, including Sarah Matthews, Matthew Pottinger, Greg Jacob, and Pat Philbin, as were multiple career White House and agency personnel whose names the Committee agreed not to disclose publicly; as were former Secretary of Labor Eugene Scalia, Bill Stepien, and certain other members of the Trump Campaign. The Committee very much appreciates the earnestness and bravery of Cassidy Hutchinson, Rusty Bowers, Shaye Moss, Ruby Freeman, Brad Raffensperger, Gabriel Sterling, Al Schmidt, and many others who provided important live testimony during the Committees hearings.708

The Committee, along with our nation, offers particular thanks to Officers Caroline Edwards, Michael Fanone, Harry Dunn, Aquilino Gonell, and Daniel Hodges, along with hundreds of other members of law enforcement who defended the Capitol on that fateful day, all of whom should be commended for their bravery and sacrifice. We especially thank the families of Officer Brian Sicknick, Howard Liebengood and Jeffrey Smith, whose loss can never be repaid.

The Committee very much appreciates the invaluable testimony of General Milley and other members of our military, Judge J. Michael Luttig, and the important contributions of Benjamin Ginsberg and Chris Stirewalt. This, of course is only a partial list, and the Committee is indebted to many others, as well.

The Committee believes that White House Counsel Pat Cipollone gave a particularly important account of the events of January 6th, as did White House lawyer, Eric Herschmann. For multiple months, Cipollone resisted giving any testimony at all, asserting concerns about executive privilege and other issues, until after the Committeeâs hearing with Hutchinson. When he did testify, Cipollone corroborated key elements of testimony given by several White House staff, including Hutchinsonâmost importantly, regarding what happened in the White House during the violence of January 6thâbut also frankly recognized the limits on what he could say due to privilege: âAgain, Iâm not going to get into either my legal advice on matters, and the other thing I donât want to do is, again, other witnesses have their own recollections of things.â Cipollone also told the Committee that, to the extent that other witnesses recall communications attributable to White House counsel that he does not, the communications might have been with his deputy Pat Philbin, or with Eric Herschmann, who had strong feelings and was particularly animated about certain issues.709

Of course, that is not to say that all witnesses were entirely frank or forthcoming. Other witnesses, including certain witnesses from the Trump White House, displayed a lack of full recollection of certain issues, or were not otherwise as frank or direct as Cipollone. We cite two examples here, both relating to testimony played during the hearings.

Kayleigh McEnany was President Trumpâs Press Secretary on January 6th. Her deposition was taken early in the investigation. McEnany seemed to acknowledge that President Trump: (1) should have instructed his violent supporters to leave the Capitol earlier than he ultimately did on January 6th;710 (2) should have respected the rulings of the courts;711 and (3) was wrong to publicly allege that Dominion voting machines stole the election.712 But a segment of McEnanyâs testimony seemed evasive, as if she was testifying from pre-prepared talking points. In multiple instances, McEnanyâs testimony did not seem nearly as forthright as that of her press office staff, who testified about what McEnany said.

For example, McEnany disputed suggestions that President Trump was resistant to condemning the violence and urging the crowd at the Capitol to act peacefully when they crafted his tweet at 2:38 p.m. on January 6th.713 Yet one of her deputies, Sarah Matthews, told the Select Committee that McEnany informed her otherwise: that McEnany and other advisors in the dining room with President Trump persuaded him to send the tweet, but that â. . . she said that he did not want to put that in and that they went through different phrasing of that, of the mention of peace, in order to get him to agree to include it, and that it was Ivanka Trump who came up with âstay peacefulâ and that he agreed to that phrasing to include in the tweet, but he was initially resistant to mentioning peace of any sort.ââ714 When the Select Committee asked âDid Ms. McEnany describe in any way how resistant the President was to including something about being peaceful,â Matthews answered: âJust that he didnât want to include it, but they got him to agree on the phrasing âstay peaceful.âââ715

The Committee invites the public to compare McEnanyâs testimony with the testimony of Pat Cipollone, Sarah Matthews, Judd Deere, and others.

Ivanka Trump is another example. Among other things, Ivanka Trump acknowledged to the Committee that: (1) she agreed with Attorney General Barrâs statements that there was no evidence of sufficient fraud to overturn the election; (2) the President and others are bound by the rulings of the courts and the rule of law; (3) President Trump pressured Vice President Pence on the morning of January 6th regarding his authorities at the joint session of Congress that day to count electoral votes; and (4) President Trump watched the violence on television as it was occurring.716 But again, Ivanka Trump was not as forthcoming as Cipollone and others about President Trumpâs conduct.

Indeed, Ivanka Trumpâs Chief of Staff Julie Radford had a more specific recollection of Ivanka Trumpâs actions and statements. For example, Ivanka Trump had the following exchange with the Committee about her attendance at her fatherâs speech on January 6th that was at odds with what the Committee learned from Radford:

Committee Staff: Itâs been reported that you ultimately decided to attend the rally because you hoped that you would calm the President and keep the event on an even keel. Is that accurate?

Ivanka Trump: No. I donât know who said that or where that came from.717

However, this is what Radford said about her bossâs decision:

Committee Staff: What did she share with you about why it was concerning that her father was upset or agitated after that call with Vice President Pence in relation to the Ellipse rally? Why did that matter? Why did he have to be calmed down, I should say.

Radford: Well, she shared that he had called the Vice President a notâan expletive word. I think that bothered her. And I think she could tell based on the conversations and what was going on in the office that he was angry and upset and people were providing misinformation. And she felt like she might be able to help calm the situation down, at least before he went on stage.

Committee Staff: And the word that she relayed to you that the President called the Vice Presidentâapologize for being impoliteâbut do you remember what she said her father called him?

Radford: The âPâ word.718

When the Committee asked Ivanka Trump whether there were â[a]ny particular words that you recall your father using during the conversationâ that morning with Vice President Pence, she answered simply: âNo.ââ719

In several circumstances, the Committee has found that less senior White House aides had significantly better recollection of events than senior staff purported to have.

The Select Committee also has concerns regarding certain other witnesses, including those who still rely for their income or employment on organizations linked to President Trump, such as the America First Policy Institute. Certain witnesses and lawyers were unnecessarily combative, answered hundreds of questions with variants of âI do not recallâ in circumstances where that answer seemed unbelievable, appeared to testify from lawyer-written talking points rather than their own recollections, provided highly questionable rationalizations or otherwise resisted telling the truth. The public can ultimately make its own assessment of these issues when it reviews the Committee transcripts and can compare the accounts of different witnesses and the conduct of counsel.

One particular concern arose from what the Committee realized early on were a number of intentional falsehoods in former White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadowsâs December 7, 2021 book, The Chiefâs Chief. 720 Here is one of several examples: Meadows wrote, âWhen he got offstage, President Trump let me know that he had been speaking metaphorically about going to the Capitol.ââ721 Meadows goes on in his book to claim that it âwas clear the whole timeâ President Trump didnât intend to go to the Capitol.722 This appeared to be an intentional effort to conceal the facts. Multiple witnesses directly contradicted Meadowsâs account about President Trumpâs desire to travel to the Capitol, including Kayleigh McEnany, Cassidy Hutchinson, multiple Secret Service agents, a White House employee with national security responsibilities and other staff in the White House, a member of the Metropolitan Police and others. This and several other statements in the Meadows book were false, and the Select Committee was concerned that multiple witnesses might attempt to repeat elements of these false accounts, as if they were the party line. Most witnesses did not, but a few did.

President Trumpâs desire to travel to the Capitol was particularly important for the Committee to evaluate because it bears on President Trumpâs intent on January 6th. One witness account suggests that President Trump even wished to participate in the electoral vote count from the House floor, standing with Republican Congressmen, perhaps in an effort to apply further pressure to Vice President Mike Pence and others.723

Mark Meadowsâs former Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Anthony Ornato gave testimony consistent with the false account in Meadowsâs book. In particular, Ornato told the Committee that he was not aware of a genuine push by the President to go to the Capitol, suggesting instead that âit was one of those hypotheticals from the good idea fairy . . . [b]ecause itâs ridiculous to think that a President of the United States can travel especially with, you know, people around just on the street up to the Capitol and peacefully protest outside the Capitol . . ..â 724 He told the Select Committee that the only conversation he had about the possibility of the President traveling to the Capitol was in a single meeting officials from the Presidentâs advance team,725 and his understanding is that this idea âwasnât from the President.ââ726 Two witnesses before the Committee, including a White House employee with national security responsibilities and Hutchinson, testified that Ornato related an account of President Trumpâs âirateâ behavior when he was told in the Presidential SUV on January 6th that he would not be driven to the Capitol.727 Both accounts recall Ornato doing so from his office in the White House, with another member of the Secret Service present.728 Multiple other witness accounts indicate that the President genuinely was âirate,â âheated,â âangry,â and âinsistentâ in the Presidential vehicle.729 But Ornato professed that he did not recall either communication, and that he had no knowledge at all about the Presidentâs anger.730

Likewise, despite a significant and increasing volume of intelligence information in the days before January 6th showing that violence at the Capitol was indeed possible or likely, and despite other intelligence and law enforcement agencies similar conclusions,731 Ornato claimed never to have reviewed or had any knowledge of that specific information732 He testified that he was only aware of warnings that opposing groups might âclash on the Washington Monumentâ and that is what he âwould have briefed to [Chief of Staff] Meadows.ââ733 The Committee has significant concerns about the credibility of this testimony, including because it was Ornatoâs responsibility to be aware of this information and convey it to decisionmakers.734 The Committee will release Ornatoâs November Transcript so the public can review his testimony on these topics.

In the week after January 6th, House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy initially supported legislation to create a bipartisan commission to investigate the January 6th attack on the United States Capitol, stating that âthe President bears responsibility for Wednesdayâs attack on Congress by mob riotersâ and calling for creation of a âfact-finding commission.ââ735 Leader McCarthy repeated his support for a bipartisan commission during a press conference on January 21st: âThe only way you will be able to answer these questions is through a bipartisan commission.ââ736

On February 15th, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi announced in a letter to the House Democratic Caucus her intent to establish the type of independent commission McCarthy had supported, to âinvestigate and report on the facts and causes relating to the January 6, 2021 domestic terrorist attack upon the United States Capitol Complex.ââ737 A few days thereafter, Leader McCarthy provided the Speaker a wish list that mirrored âsuggestions from the Co-Chairs of the 9/11 Commissionâ that he and House Republicans hoped would be included in the Houseâs legislation to establish the Commission.738

In particular, Leader McCarthy requested an equal ratio of Democratic and Republican nominations, equal subpoena power for the Democratic Chair and Republican Vice Chair of the Commission, and the exclusion of predetermined findings or outcomes that the Commission itself would produce. Closing his letter, Leader McCarthy quoted the 9/11 Commission Co-Chairs, writing that a âbipartisan independent investigation will earn credibility with the American public.ââ739 He again repeated his confidence in achieving that goal.740 In April 2021, Speaker Pelosi agreed to make the number of Republican and Democratic Members of the Commission equal, and to provide both parties with an equal say in subpoenas, as McCarthy had requested.741

In May 2021, House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Bennie G. Thompson began to negotiate more of the details for the Commission with his Republican counterpart, Ranking Member John Katko.742 On May 14th, Chairman Thompson announced that he and Ranking Member Katko had reached an agreement on legislation to âform a bipartisan, independent Commission to investigate the January 6th domestic terrorism attack on the United States Capitol and recommend changes to further protect the Capitol, the citadel of our democracy.ââ743

On May 18th, the day before the Houseâs consideration of the Thompson-Katko agreement, Leader McCarthy released a statement in opposition to the legislation.744 Speaker Pelosi responded to that statement, saying: âLeader McCarthy wonât take yes for an answer.ââ745 The Speaker referred to Leader McCarthyâs February 22nd letter where âhe made three requests to be addressed in Democratsâ discussion draft.ââ746 She noted that âevery single one was granted by Democrats, yet he still says no.ââ747

In the days that followed, Republican Ranking Member Katko defended the bipartisan nature of the bill to create the Commission:

As I have called for since the days just after the attack, an independent, 9/11-style review is critical for removing the politics around January 6 and focusing solely on the facts and circumstances of the security breach at the Capitol, as well as other instances of violence relevant to such a review. Make no mistake about it, Mr. Thompson and I know this is about facts. Itâs not partisan politics. We would have never gotten to this point if it was about partisan politics.748

That evening, the House passed the legislation to establish a National Commission to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol Complex in a bipartisan fashion, with 35 Republicans joining 217 Democrats voting in favor and 175 Republicans voting against.749 In the days thereafter, however, only six Senate Republicans joined Senate Democrats in supporting the legislation, killing the bill in the Senate.750

On June 24th, Speaker Pelosi announced her intent to create a House select committee to investigate the attack.751 On June 25th, Leader McCarthy met with DC Metropolitan Police Officer Michael Fanone, who was seriously injured on January 6th.752 Officer Fanone pressed Leader McCarthy âfor a commitment not to put obstructionists and the wrong people in that position.ââ753

On June 30th, the House voted on H. Res. 503 to establish a 13-Member Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol by a vote of 222 Yeas and 190 Nays with just two Republicans supporting the measure: Representative Liz Cheney and Representative Adam Kinzinger.754 On July 1st, Speaker Pelosi named eight initial Members to the Select Committee, including one Republican: Representative Cheney.755

On July 17th, Leader McCarthy proposed his selection of five members:

Representative Jim Jordan, Ranking Member of the House Judiciary Committee;

Representative Kelly Armstrong of North Dakota; House Energy and Commerce Committee;

Representative Troy Nehls, House Transportation & Infrastructure and Veteransâ Affairs Committees.

Representative Jim Banks, Armed Services, Veteransâ Affairs and Education and Labor Committees;

Representative Rodney Davis, Ranking Member of the Committee on House Administration.756

Jordan was personally involved in the acts and circumstances of January 6th, and would be one of the targets of the investigation. By that point, Banks had made public statements indicating that he had already reached his own conclusions and had no intention of cooperating in any objective investigation of January 6th, proclaiming, for example, that the Select Committee was created â. . . solely to malign conservatives and to justify the Leftâs authoritarian agenda.ââ757

On July 21st, Speaker Nancy Pelosi exercised her power under H. Res. 503 not to approve the appointments of Representatives Jordan or Banks, expressing âconcern about statements made and actions taken by these Membersâ and âthe impact their appointments may have on the integrity of the investigation.ââ758 However, she also stated that she had informed Leader McCarthy â. . . that I was prepared to appoint Representatives Rodney Davis, Kelly Armstrong and Troy Nehls, and requested that he recommend two other Members.ââ759

In response, Leader McCarthy elected to remove all five of his Republican appointments, refusing to allow Representatives Armstrong, Davis and Nehls to participate on the Select Committee.760 On July 26, 2021, Speaker Pelosi then appointed Republican Representative Adam Kinzinger.761 In resisting the Committeeâs subpoenas, certain litigants attempted to argue that the Select Committeeâs composition violated House Rules or H. Res. 503, but those arguments failed in court.762

In its ten hearings or business meetings, the Select Committee called live testimony or played video for several dozen witnesses, the vast majority of whom were Republicans. A full list is set forth below.

Republicans:

Democrats:

Other:

ENDNOTES

Â Â 1. A few weeks later, Rhodes and his associate Kelly Meggs were found guilty of seditious conspiracy, and other Oath Keepers were found guilty on numerous charges for obstructing the electoral count. Trial Transcript at 10502-508, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2022); Alan Feuer and Zach Montague, âOath Keepers Leader Convicted of Sedition in Landmark Jan. 6 Case,â New York Times, (Nov. 29, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/29/us/politics/oath-keepers-trial-verdict-jan-6.html.

Â Â 2. Trial Transcript at 5698, 5759, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2022).

Â Â 3. Trial Transcript at 5775, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2022) (âfor me at the time, it meant I felt it was like a Bastille type moment in history where in the French Revolution it was that big turning point moment where the population made their presence felt. I thought it was going to be a similar type of event for usâ).

Â Â 4. Trial Transcript at 5783, 5866, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2022).

Â Â 5. Sentencing Transcript at 15-17, United States v. Reimler, No. 1:21-cr-239 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2022), ECF No. 37.

Â Â 6. Sentencing Transcript at 33, United States v. Pert, No. 1:21-cr-139 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2022), ECF No. 64.

Â Â 7. Sentencing Memorandum by Abram Markofski, Exhibit B, United States v. Markofski, No. 1:21-cr-344 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2021), ECF No. 44-2.

Â Â 8. Sentencing Transcript at 49, United States v. Witcher, No. 1:21-cr-235 (D.D.C. Feb. 24, 2022), ECF No. 53.

Â Â 9. Sentencing Transcript at 19â20, United States v. Edwards, No. 1:21-cr-366 (D.D.C. Jan. 21, 2022), ECF No. 33. See also, Sentencing Memorandum by Brandon Nelson, Exhibit B, United States v. Nelson, No. 1:21-cr-344 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2021), ECF No. 51-2; Sentencing Transcript at 65â66, United States v. Griffith, No. 1:21-cr-204 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2021), ECF No. 137; Sentencing Transcript at 45, United States v. Schornak, 1:21-cr-278 (D.D.C. May 11, 2022), ECF No. 90; Sentencing Transcript at 35, United States v. Wilkerson, No. 1:21-cr-302 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 2021), ECF No. 31; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Barber, (Mar. 16, 2022), pp. 50â51.

Â 10. Statement of Facts at 5, United States v. Sandlin, No. 1:21-cr-88 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2021), ECF No. 1-1; Ryan J. Reily (@ryanjreily), Twitter Oct. 1, 2022 3:33 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/ryanjreilly/status/1576295667412017157; Ryan J. Reily (@ryanjreily), Twitter, Oct. 1, 2022 3:40 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/ryanjreilly/status/1576296016512692225; Governmentâs Sentencing Memorandum at 2, 16, United States v. Sandlin, No. 1:21-cr-88 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2022), ECF No. 92.

Â 11. Governmentâs Opposition to Defendantâs Motion to Revoke Magistrate Judgeâs Detention Order at 4, United States v. Miller, No. 1:21-cr-119 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2021), ECF No 16; Dan Mangan, âCapitol Rioter Garret Miller Says He Was Following Trumpâs Orders, Apologizes to AOC for Threat,â CNBC, (Jan. 25, 2021), available at https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/25/capitol-riots-garret-miller-says-he-was-following-trumps-orders-apologizes-to-aoc.html.

Â 12. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of John Douglas Wright, (Mar. 31, 2022), pp. 22, 63.

Â 13. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Lewis Cantwell, (Apr. 26, 2022), p. 54.

Â 14. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Stephen Ayres, (June 22, 2022), p. 8.

Â 15. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â 16. Affidavit at 8, United States v. Ayres, No. 1:21-cr-156 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 2021), ECF No. 5-1.

Â 17. See infra, Chapter 6. See also Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Select Committee Chart Compiling Defendant Statements). The Select Committee Chart Compiling Defendant Statements identifies hundreds of examples of such testimony. Select Committee staff tracked cases filed by the Department of Justice against defendants who committed crimes related to the attack on the United States Capitol. Through Department of Justice criminal filings, through public reporting, through social media research, and through court hearings, staff collected a range of statements by these defendants about why they came to Washington, DC, on January 6th. Almost always, it was because President Trump had called upon them to support his big lie. Those defendants also discussed plans for violence at the Capitol, against law enforcement, against other American citizens, and against elected officials in the days leading up to January 6th. In the days immediately following the attack, defendants also bragged about their conduct. Some defendants later reflected on their actions at sentencing. The Select Committee Chart Compiling Defendant Statements is not meant to be comprehensive or polished; it is a small sampling of the tremendous work the Department of Justice has done tracking down and prosecuting criminal activity during the attempted insurrection. Moreover, the trial of multiple members of the Proud Boys on seditious conspiracy and other charges is set to begin on December 19, 2022, and may provide additional information directly relevant to this topic. See Court Calendar: December 9, 2022âDecember 31, 2022, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, available at https://media.dcd.uscourts.gov/datepicker/index.html (last accessed Dec. 9, 2022); Alan Feuer, âOutcome in Oath Keepers Trial Could Hold Lessons for Coming Jan. 6 Cases,â New York Times, (Nov. 30, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/30/us/politics/oath-keepers-stewart-rhodes.html.

Â 18. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000001890_00001 (December 28, 2020, email from Bernard Kerik to Mark Meadows explaining that â[w]e can do all the investigations we want laterâ); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000005090_0001 (January. 6, 2021, email from John Eastman to Gregory Jacob acknowledging that President Trump had âbeen so advisedâ that Vice President Pence âDOES NOT have the power to decide things unilaterallyâ); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th (Russell âRustyâ Bowers testimony recalling Rudolph Giuliani stating that â[w]eâve got lots of theories; we just donât have the evidenceâ); see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 128 (âWhether Rudy was at this stage of his life in the same abilities to manage things at this level or not, I mean, obviously, I think Bernie Kerik publicly said it, they never proved the allegations that they were making, and they were trying to develop.â) Note: Some documents cited in this report show timestamps based on a time zone other than Eastern Timeâsuch as Greenwich Mean Timeâbecause that is how they were produced to the Committee.

Â 19. The Committee notes that a number of these findings are similar to those Federal Judge David Carter reached after reviewing the evidence presented by the Committee. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 31-40, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM); Order Re Privilege of 599 Documents Dated November 3, 2020 - January 20, 2021 at 23-24, Eastman v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-cv-99 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2022), ECF No. 356; Order Re Privilege of Remaining Documents at 13-17, Eastman v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-cv-99 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2022), ECF No. 372.

Â 20. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000091086 (United States Secret Service Protective Intelligence Division communication noting left-wing groups telling members to âstay at homeâ on January 6th).

Â 21. Committee on House Administration, Oversight of the United States Capitol Police and Preparations for and Response to the Attack of January 6th: Part I, 117th Cong., 1st sess., (Apr. 21, 2021), available at https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/oversight-united-states-capitol-police-and-preparations-and-response; Committee on House Administration, Oversight of the United States Capitol Police and Preparations for and Response to the Attack of January 6th: Part II, 117th Cong., 1st sess.,, (May 10, 2021), available at https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/oversight-january-6th-attack-united-states-capitol-police-threat; Committee on House Administration, Oversight of the January 6th Attack: Review of the Architect of the Capitolâs Emergency Preparedness, 117th Cong., 1st sess., (May 12, 2021), available at https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/oversight-january-6th-attack-review-architect-capitol-s-emergency; Committee on House Administration, Reforming the Capitol Police and Improving Accountability for the Capitol Police Board, 117th Cong., 1st sess., (May 19, 2021), available at https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/reforming-capitol-police-and-improving-accountability-capitol-police; Committee on House Administration, Oversight of the January 6th Attack: United States Capitol Police Containment Emergency Response Team and First Responders Unit, 117th Cong., 1st sess., (June 15, 2021), available at https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/oversight-january-6th-attack-united-states-capitol-police-containment; Committee on House Administration, Oversight of the January 6th Capitol Attack: Ongoing Review of the United States Capitol Police Inspector General Flash Reports, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Feb. 17, 2022), available at https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/oversight-january-6th-capitol-attack-ongoing-review-united-states.

Â 22. John Koblin, âAt Least 20 Million Watched Jan. 6 Hearing,â New York Times, (June 10, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/10/business/media/jan-6-hearing-ratings.html. Their findings were also widely noted by major media outlets, including conservative ones. âEditorial: What the Jan. 6 Hearings Accomplished,â Wall Street Journal, (Oct. 14, 2022), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-the-jan-6-inquiry-accomplished-donald-trump-liz-cheney-subpoena-congress-11665699321; âEditorial: The Jan. 6 Hearings are Over. Time to Vote.,â Washington Post, (Oct. 13, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/10/13/jan-6-hearings-are-over-time-vote/; âEditorial: The President Who Stood Still on Jan. 6,â Wall Street Journal, (July 22, 2022), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-president-who-stood-still-donald-trump-jan-6-committee-mike-pence-capitol-riot-11658528548; âEditorial: âWe All have a Duty to Ensure that What Happened on Jan. 6 Never Happens Againâ,â New York Times, (June 10, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/10/opinion/january-6-hearing-trump.html; âEditorial: Trumpâs Silence on Jan. 6 is Damning,â New York Post, (July 22, 2022), available at https://nypost.com/2022/07/22/trumps-jan-6-silence-renders-him-unworthy-for-2024-reelection/

Â 23. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 45 (âAnd I told him it was going to be a process. It was going to be, you knowâyou know, weâre going to have to wait and see how this turned out. So I, just like I did in 2016, I did the same thing in 2020.â).

Â 24. âWhen States Can Begin Processing and Counting Absentee/Mail-In Ballots, 2020,â Ballotpedia (accessed on Dec. 5, 2022), available at https://ballotpedia.org/When_states_can_begin_processing_and_counting_absentee/mail-in_ballots,_2020.

Â 25. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â 26. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 45; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â 27. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â 28. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 36.

Â 29. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), p. 21.

Â 30. John J. Martin, Mail-in Ballots and Constraints on Federal Power under the Electors Clause, 107 Va. L. Rev. Online 84, 86 (Apr. 2021) (noting that 45 States and DC permitted voters to request a mail-in ballot or automatically receive one in the 2020 election); Nathanial Rakich and Jasmine Mithani, âWhat Absentee Voting Looked Like In All 50 States,â FiveThirtyEight, (Feb. 9, 2021), available at https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-absentee-voting-looked-like-in-all-50-states/; Lisa Danetz, âMail Ballot Security Features: A Primer,â Brennan Center for Justice, (Oct. 16, 2020), available at https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/mail-ballot-security-features-primer.

Â 31. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hope Hicks, (Oct. 25, 2022), p. 24.

Â 32. He also won in Utah, which mailed absentee ballots to all active voters, and won one or more electoral votes in both Maine and Nebraska, which allowed no-excuse absentee voting and assign their electoral votes proportionally. See âTable 1: States with No-Excuse Absentee Voting,â National Conference of State Legislatures, (July 12, 2022), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201004185006/https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/vopp-table-1-states-with-no-excuse-absentee-voting.aspx (archived); âVoting Outside the Polling Place: Absentee, All-Mail and Other Voting at Home Options,â National Conference of State Legislatures, (Sep. 24, 2020), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201103175057/https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-early-voting.aspx (archived); Federal Election Commission, âFederal Elections 2020 â Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives,â (Oct. 2022), p. 12, available at https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/federalelections2020.pdf.

Â 33. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb.Â 10, 2022), p. 66; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb.Â 3, 2022), pp. 75-76.

Â 34. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 54, 66.

Â 35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 74-77.

Â 36. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 60-61.

Â 37. âDonald Trump 2020 Election Night Speech Transcript,â Rev, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-2020-election-night-speech-transcript.

Â 38. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 5, 2020 9:12 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201105170250/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1324353932022480896 (archived). Note: Citations in this report that refer to an archived tweet may list a timestamp that is several hours earlier or later than the one shown on the suggested webpage because tweets are archived from various time zones.

Â 39. See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. Â§ 10307; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Â§ 16-1010.

Â 40. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 77-78.

Â 41. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 8.

Â 42. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001 (November 3, 2020, email exchange between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael copying proposed election day victory statement).

Â 43. Dan Friedman, âLeaked Audio: Before Election Day, Bannon Said Trump Planned to Falsely Claim Victory,â Mother Jones, (July 12, 2022), available at https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2022/07/leaked-audio-steve-bannon-trump-2020-election-declare-victory. We note that Mr. Bannon refused to testify and has been convicted of criminal contempt by a jury of his peers. âStephen K. Bannon Sentenced to Four Months in Prison on Two counts of Contempt of Congress,â Department of Justice, (Oct. 21, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/stephen-k-bannon-sentenced-four-months-prison-two-counts-contempt-congress.

Â 44. At his interview, Stone invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself in response to over 70 questions, including questions regarding his direct communications with Donald Trump and his role in January 6th. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Roger Stone (Dec. 17, 2021). See also Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Christoffer Guldbrandsen Production), Video file 201101_1 (November 1, 2020, footage of Roger Stone speaking to associates).

Â 45. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 12-13.

Â 46. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 79VP-R000011578_0001, 079VP-R000011579_0001, 079VP-R000011579_0002 (November 3, 2020, email and memorandum from Gregory Jacob to Marc Short regarding electoral vote count).

Â 47. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 117-18.

Â 48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 91.

Â 49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â 50. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 121; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alyssa Farah Griffin, (Apr. 15, 2022), p. 62; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Sep. 14, 2022), p. 113; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kellyanne Conway, (Nov. 28, 2022), pp. 79-84.

Â 51. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), pp. 212-21; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 108-10; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28, 2022), pp. 44, 46, 48-51; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Douglas Macgregor, (June 7, 2022), pp. 27-41.

Â 52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 215.

Â 53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 6.

Â 54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alex Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 22, 33-34.

Â 55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 111-12.

Â 56. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 119.

Â 57. ABC News, âPence Opens Up with David Muir on Jan. 6: Exclusive,â YouTube, at 2:13, Nov. 14, 2022, available at https://youtu.be/-AAyKAoPFQs?t=133.

Â 58. âCNN Townhall: Former Vice President Mike Pence,â CNN, (Nov. 16, 2022), available at https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/se/date/2022-11-16/segment/01.

Â 59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 118.

Â 60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.

Â 61. Michael Balsamo, âDisputing Trump, Barr Says No Widespread Election Fraud,â Associated Press, (Dec. 1, 2020, updated June 28, 2022), available at https://apnews.com/article/barr-no-widespread-election-fraud-b1f1488796c9a98c4b1a9061a6c7f49d.

Â 62. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 24-30; âBill Barr Press Conference Transcript: No Special Counsels Needed to Investigate Election or Hunter Biden,â Rev, (Dec. 21, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/bill-barr-press-conference-transcript-no-special-counsels-needed-to-investigate-election-or-hunter-biden.

Â 63. âJoint Statement from Elections Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council & the Election Infrastructure Sector Coordinating Executive Committees,â Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, (Nov. 12, 2020), available at https://www.cisa.gov/news/2020/11/12/joint-statement-elections-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-election (emphasis in original).

Â 64. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â 65. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 21, 2021), pp. 59-60.

Â 66. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 21, 2021), pp. 108-09.

Â 67. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Transcribed Interview of Richard Donoghue, (Aug. 6, 2021), p. 156, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Donoghue%20Transcript.pdf.

Â 68. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 18-19.

Â 69. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 50, 123; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 168-69, 184, 187.

Â 70. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 50.

Â 71. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (April 6, 2022), p. 128.

Â 72. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 172-73.

Â 73. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 174.

Â 74. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 63-70; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 57-62; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Timothy Murtaugh, (May 19, 2022), pp, 66-68; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alex Cannon, (Apr. 19, 2022), pp. 37-38; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Tim Murtaugh production), XXM-0021349 (text chain with Giuliani, Ellis, Epshteyn, Ryan, Bobb, and Herschmann).

Â 75. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 58.

Â 76. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 58.

Â 77. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 58.

Â 78. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 173.

Â 79. King v. Whitmer, 505 F. Supp. 3d 720, 738 (E.D. Mich. 2020), also available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/King-v-Whitmer-Doc62.pdf; Bowyer v. Ducey, 506 F. Supp. 3d 699, 706 (D. Ariz. 2020), also available at https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.azd.1255923/gov.uscourts.azd.1255923.84.0_2.pdf; Donald J. Trump for President v. Boockvar, 502 F. Supp. 3d 899, 906 (M.D. Pa. 2020), also available at https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.127057/gov.uscourts.pamd.127057.202.0_1.pdf; Law v. Whitmer, No. 10 OC 00163 1B, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1160, at *1, 29-31, 33, 48-49, 52, 54 (Nev. Dec. 8, 2020), available at https://casetext.com/case/law-v-whitmer-1 (attaching and affirming lower court decision), also available at https://election.conservative.org/files/2020/12/20-OC-00163-Order-Granting-Motion-to-Dismiss-Statement-of-Contest.pdf; Wisconsin Voters Alliance v. Pence, 514 F. Supp. 3d 117, 119 (D.D.C. 2021), also available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/WVA-v-Pence-Doc10.pdf.

Â 80. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Zach Parkinson Production), Parkinson0620 (text message between Tim Murtaugh, Zach Parkinson, and âMattâ).

Â 81. In the Matter of Rudolph W. Giuliani, No. 2021-00506, slip op at *2, 22 (N.Y. App. Div. May 3, 2021), available at https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/giuliani-law-license-suspension/1ae5ad6007c0ebfa/full.pdf.

Â 82. In the Matter of Rudolph W. Giuliani, No. 2021-00506, slip op at *2, 22 (N.Y. App. Div. May 3, 2021), available at https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/giuliani-law-license-suspension/1ae5ad6007c0ebfa/full.pdf.

Â 83. Opinion and Order at 1, King v. Whitmer, 505 F. Supp. 3d 720 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2020) (No. 20-13134), ECF No. 172.

Â 84. Senator John Danforth, Benjamin Ginsberg, The Honorable Thomas B. Griffith, et al., Lost, Not Stolen: The Conservative Case that Trump Lost and Biden Won the 2020 Presidential Election, (July 2022), p. 3, available at https://lostnotstolen.org/download/378/.

Â 85. Senator John Danforth, Benjamin Ginsberg, The Honorable Thomas B. Griffith, et al., Lost, Not Stolen: The Conservative Case that Trump Lost and Biden Won the 2020 Presidential Election, (July 2022), pp. 3-4, available at https://lostnotstolen.org/download/378/. We also note this: The authors of Lost, Not Stolen also conclude that one of the pieces of supposed evidence that President Trump and his allies have pointed to since January 6, 2021, to try to bolster their allegations that the 2020 election was stolen shows nothing of the sort. Lost, Not Stolen explains that Dinesh DâSouzaâs â2000 Mulesâ tries to establish widespread voter fraud in the 2020 election using phone-tracking data. âYet the film, heartily endorsed by Trump at its Mar-a-Lago premiere, has subsequently been thoroughly debunked in analysis. What the film claims to portray is simply not supported by the evidence invoked by the film.â Id., at 6. Likewise, former Attorney General Barr told the Select Committee: â. . . I havenât seen anything since the election that changes my mind [that fraud determined the outcome] including, the 2000 Mules movie.â Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 37. He called its cell phone tracking data âsingularly unimpressiveâ because â. . . in a big city like Atlanta or wherever, just by definition youâre going to find many hundreds of them have passed by and spent time in the vicinity of these boxesâ for submitting ballots, and to argue that those people must be âmulesâ delivering fraudulent ballots was âjust indefensible.â Id., at 37-38.

Â 86. White House Senior Advisor Eric Herschmann told the Committee that when he disputed allegations of election fraud in a December 18th Oval Office meeting, Sidney Powell fired back that âthe judges are corrupt. And I was like, every one? Every single case that youâve done in the country you guys lost every one of them is corrupt, even the ones we appointed?â Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 171.

Â 87. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), at 1:53:10-1:53:20, available at https://january6th.house.gov/legislation/hearings/06132022-select-committee-hearing.

Â 88. Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 46-47, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Boockvar, No. 4:20-cv-02078 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2020), available at https://cdn.donaldjtrump.com/public-files/press_assets/2020-11-09-complaint-as-filed.pdf.

Â 89. Opinion at 2, 3, 16, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Boockvar, No. 20-3371 (3d Cir. Nov. 27, 2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Donald-J.-Trump-for-President-v-Boockvar-3rd-Cir-Doc91.pdf.

Â 90. Complaint for Expedited Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Pursuant to Article II of the United States Constitution, Trump v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, No. 2:20-cv-01785 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Trump-v-WEC-Doc1.pdf.

Â 91. Trump v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 506 F. Supp. 3d 620, 21, 22 (E.D. Wis. 2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Trump-v-WEC-Doc134.pdf.

Â 92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), at 1:52:45 to 1:53:20, available at https://january6th.house.gov/legislation/hearings/06132022-select-committee-hearing.

Â 93. The authors determined that thirty cases were dismissed by a judge after an evidentiary hearing had been held, compared to twenty cases that were dismissed by a judge beforehand, while the remaining fourteen were withdrawn voluntarily by plaintiffs. See Senator John Danforth, Benjamin Ginsberg, The Honorable Thomas B. Griffith, et al, Lost, Not Stolen: The Conservative Case that Trump Lost and Biden Won the 2020 Presidential Election, (July 2022), p. 3, available at https://lostnotstolen.org/download/378/.

Â 94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 111.

Â 95. Letter from Timothy C. Parlatore to Chairman Bennie G. Thompson on âRe: Subpoena to Bernard B. Kerik,â (Dec. 31, 2021).

Â 96. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000004125_0001 (December 28, 2020, email from Kerik to Meadows).

Â 97. When our courts weigh evidence to determine facts, they often infer that disputed facts do not favor a witness who refuses to testify by invoking his Fifth Amendment right against incriminating himself. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) (the Fifth Amendment allows for âadverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify to probative evidence offered against themâ).

Â 98. Nor was there such evidence of widespread fraud in any of the documents produced in response to Select Committee subpoenas issued to the proponents of the claims, including Rudy Giuliani and his team members and investigators Bernard Kerik and Christina Bobb, or other proponents of election fraud claims such as Pennsylvania Senator Doug Mastriano, Arizona legislator Mark Finchem, disbarred attorney Phill Kline, and attorneys Sidney Powell, Cleta Mitchell, and John Eastman. Not one of them provided evidence raising genuine questions about the election outcome. In short, it was a big scam.

Â 99. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Business Meeting on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 19, 2022), at 56:30 to 58:10, available at https://january6th.house.gov/legislation/hearings/101322-select-committee-hearing.

100. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eugene Scalia (June 30, 2022), pp. 11-13. Then-Secretary Scalia also sent a memorandum to President Trump on January 8, 2021. In that memorandum, he requested that the President âconvene an immediate meeting of the Cabinet.â He told the President that he was âconcerned by certain statements you made since the election . . . of further actions you may be considering,â and he âconcluded that [his] responsibilities as a Cabinet Secretary obligate[d] [him] to take further steps to address those concerns.â The Select Committee will make this memorandum available to the public. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Labor Production), CTRL0000087637, (January 8, 2021, Memorandum for The President of the United States from Secretary of Labor Eugene Scalia, regarding Request for Cabinet Meeting).

101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 23-25.

102. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone (July 8, 2022), p. 12.

103. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 3, 2022), p. 62.

104. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 3, 2022), pp. 19-20.

105. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Aug. 7, 2021), pp. 30-31, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rosen%20Transcript.pdf; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 14-15 (in which Rosen confirms the general accuracy of the transcription of his Senate testimony and then is asked and agrees to the following question: [Committee staff]: âAnd we are going toâthe select committee is going to essentially incorporate those transcripts as part of our record and rely upon your testimony there for our purposes going forward, as long as youâre comfortable with that?â [Rosen]: âYes.â)

106. âDonald Trump Vlog: Contesting Election Results â December 22, 2020,â Factba.se, at 9:11-9:25 (Dec. 22, 2020), available at https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-vlog-contesting-election-results-december-22-2020.

107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 43.

108. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

109. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

110. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 8:57 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20210103135742/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1345731043861659650 (archived).

111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 25-26.

112. âDonald Trump Speech on Election Fraud Claims Transcript December 2,â Rev, at 15:12-15:44, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-december-2.

113. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 64.

114. PBS NewsHour, âWATCH LIVE: Trump Speaks as Congress Prepares to Count Electoral College Votes in Biden Win,â YouTube, at 1:42:58-1:43:02, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://youtu.be/pa9sT4efsqY?t=6178.

115. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Interview of Richard Donoghue, (Aug. 6, 2021), p. 156, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Donoghue%20Transcript.pdf.

116. PBS NewsHour, âWATCH LIVE: Trump Speaks as Congress Prepares to Count Electoral College Votes in Biden Win,â YouTube, at 1:15:19-1:15:39, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://youtu.be/pa9sT4efsqY?t=4519.

117. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html

118. âDonald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia: Senate Runoff Election,â Rev, at 51:38-52:01, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-rally-speech-transcript-dalton-georgia-senate-runoff-election.

119. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

120. PBS NewsHour, âWATCH LIVE: Trump Speaks as Congress Prepares to Count Electoral College Votes in Biden Win,â YouTube, at 1:32:25-1:32:43, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://youtu.be/pa9sT4efsqY?t=5545.

121. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

122. PBS NewsHour, âWATCH LIVE: Trump Speaks as Congress Prepares to Count Electoral College Votes in Biden Win,â YouTube, at 1:33:35-1:33:44, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://youtu.be/pa9sT4efsqY?t=5615.

123. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 143, 290-91.

124. Search results for âdominionâ, Trump Twitter Archive v2, (accessed Sep. 20, 2022), https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22dominion%22&results=1.

125. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 117, 133.

126. âDonald Trump Thanksgiving Call to Troops Transcript 2020: Addresses Possibility of Conceding Election,â Rev, at 23:35-23:46, (Nov. 26, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-thanksgiving-call-to-troops-transcript-2020-addresses-possibility-of-conceding-election.

127. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), p. 19.

128. âDonald Trump Thanksgiving Call to Troops Transcript 2020: Addresses Possibility of Conceding Election,â Rev, at 24:16-24:35 (Nov. 26, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-thanksgiving-call-to-troops-transcript-2020-addresses-possibility-of-conceding-election.

129. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), p. 27.

130. âDonald Trump Speech on Election Fraud Claims Transcript December 2,â Rev, at 10:46-11:06, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-december-2.

131. William P. Barr, One Damn Thing After Another: Memoirs of an Attorney General, (New York: HarperCollins, 2022), at p. 554.

132. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 15, 2020 12:21 a.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1338715842931023873.jpg (archived).

133. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Aug. 7, 2021), pp. 25, 31, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rosen%20Transcript.pdf.

134. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 16, 2020 1:09 a.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1339090279429775363.jpg (archived).

135. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert OâBrien, (Aug. 23, 2022), pp. 164-65.

136. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 19, 2020 11:30 a.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1340333619299147781.jpg (archived).

137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 109.

138. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

139. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

140. PBS NewsHour, âWATCH LIVE: Trump Speaks as Congress Prepares to Count Electoral College Votes in Biden Win,â YouTube, at 1:39:09 to 1:39:27 and 1:40:51 to 1:41:01, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://youtu.be/pa9sT4efsqY?t=5949.

141. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 15.

143. The framers specifically considered and rejected two constitutional plans that would have given Congress the power to select the Executive. Under both the Virginia and New Jersey Plans, the national executive would have been chosen by the national legislature. See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 545, 592, 595 (2004); see also 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 21, 244 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (introducing Virginia and New Jersey Plans), available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/farrand-the-records-of-the-federal-convention-of-1787-vol-1; James Madison, Notes of the Constitutional Convention (Sep. 4, 1787) (Gov. Morris warning of âthe danger of intrigue & factionâ if Congress selected the President), available at https://www.consource.org/document/james-madisons-notes-of-the-constitutional-convention-1787-9-4/.

144. The Federalist No. 68, at 458 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

145. The Federalist No. 68, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

146. The Federalist No. 68, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

147. The Federalist No. 68, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). See also U.S. Const. art. II, Â§ 1, cl. 2 (âbut no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Electorâ).

148. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976 (Eastman Jan 6 scenario dual slates of electors memo); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), CTRL0000923171 (Eastman Jan. 6 scenario conduct by elected officials memo).

149. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman003228 (Eastman memo to President Trump).

150. See Eastman v. Thompson et al. at 6-8, 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).

151. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman003228 (Eastman memo to President Trump).

152. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 118.

153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 110, 117.

154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 109-10; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

156. âFormer Vice President Pence Remarks at Federalist Society Conference,â C-SPAN (Feb. 4, 2022), available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?517647-2/vice-president-pence-remarks-federalist-society-conference.

157. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 122.

158. Document on file with the Select Committee (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107 (January 5, 2021, Greg Jacob memo to Vice President); see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 127-28 (discussing memorandum).

159. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 122-23.

160. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 26-27.

161. Judge Luttig (@judgeluttig), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 9:53 a.m. ET available at https://twitter.com/judgeluttig/status/1346469787329646592.

162. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

163. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

164. Documents on file with the Select Committee, (Chapman University Production), Chapman005442 (Eastman emails with Greg Jacob).

165. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 88.

166. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 85.

167. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 85-86.

168. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 157.

169. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 86-87.

170. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 34.

171. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 26.

172. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 85.

173. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 40.

174. Maggie Haberman and Annie Karni, âPence Said to Have Told Trump He Lacks Power to Change Election Result,â New York Times, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/05/us/politics/pence-trump-election-results.html.

175. Meredith Lee (@meredithllee), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 9:58 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/meredithllee/status/1346652403605647367; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 174-76; Greg Jacob testified that the Presidentâs statement was âcategorically untrue.â Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Marc Short testified that the statement was âincorrectâ and âfalse.â Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 224; Chris Hodgson testified that it was not an accurate statement. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 184-85.

176. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 175-77 (acknowledging that Miller normally would have called the Vice Presidentâs office before issuing a public statement describing the Vice Presidentâs views but stating âI donât think that ultimatelyâdonât know if it ultimately would have changed anything as the President was very adamant that this is where they both wereâ and acknowledging that âthe way this [statement] came out was the way that [Trump] wanted [it] to.â).

177. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 1:00 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20210106072109/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1346698217304584192 (archived).

178. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 8:17 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20210106175200/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1346808075626426371 (archived).

179. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 47; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 126.

180. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of General Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 90; See also, Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Donald John Trump Jr., (May 3, 2022), p. 84; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 49; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), pp. 21-22. The Select Committee is not revealing the identity of this witness to guard against the risk of retaliation.

181. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 127.

182. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee (June 10, 2022), p. 20. The Select Committee is not revealing the identity of this witness to guard against the risk of retaliation.

183. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of General Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 92.

184. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Julie Radford, (May 24, 2022), p. 19. See also Peter Baker, Maggie Haberman, and Annie Karni, âPence Reached His Limit with Trump. It Wasnât Pretty,â New York Times, (Jan. 12, 2021), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/us/politics/mike-pence-trump.html; Jonathan Karl, Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump Show, (New York: Dutton, 2021), at pp. 273-74.

185. At 11:33 a.m., Stephen Millerâs assistant, Robert Gabriel, emailed the speechwriting team with the line: âREINSERT THE MIKE PENCE LINES.â Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007531_0001 (January 6, 2021, Robert Gabriel email to Trump speechwriting team at 11:33 a.m.).

186. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Stephen Miller (Apr. 14, 2022), p. 153.

187. Document on file with the Select Committee (Ross Worthington Production), RW_0002341-2351 (S. Miller Jan. 6 Speech Edits Native File), pp. 2-3.

188. âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Ross Worthington Production), CTRL0000924249, (changes in speech between draft and as delivered), pp. 2, 5, 12, 16, 22.

189. âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.

190. âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.

191. âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.

192. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 0:14:11-0:14:29, available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851.

193. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 2:07:02-2:07:07, available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=7609.

194. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 2:07:02-2:07:07, available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=7609.

195. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:00:46-1:01:12, available at https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=3645.

196. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:01:13-1:01:26, available at https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=3645.

197. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 0:14:37-0:14:46, available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851.

198. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 0:14:47-0:14:55, available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851.

199. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), pp. 26-27 (establishing time as 1:21 p.m. based on time stamp of a photograph recognized and described).

200. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210106192450/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1346900434540240897 (archived).

201. Governmentâs Sentencing Memorandum at 32-33,Â United States v. Cusanelli, No. 1:21-cr-37 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2022), ECF No. 110.

202. See Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant at 5, United States v. Black, No. 1:21-cr-127 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021), ECF No. 1-1, available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1354806/download.

203. Indictment at 9, United States v. Neefe, No. 1:21-cr-567 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2021), ECF No. 1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1432686/download.

204. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant at 8, United States v. Evans, No. 1:21-cr-337 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2021), ECF No. 1-1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1351946/download.

205. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Business Meeting on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13, 2022), at 2:26:06-2:26:26, available at https://youtu.be/IQvuBoLBuC0?t=8766; Sentencing Transcript at 19, United States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2022), ECF No. 170 (testifying for a victim impact statement, Officer Michael Fanone said: âAt approximately 1435 hours, with rapidly mounting injuries and most of the MPD less than lethal munitions expended, the defending officers were forced to conduct a fighting withdrawal back towards the United States Capitol Building entrance. This is the first fighting withdrawal in the history of the Metropolitan Police Departmentâ).

206. See Transcript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.

207. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Frequency at 14:16.

208. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Frequency at 14:25; see also Spencer S. Hsu, âPence Spent Jan. 6 at Underground Senate Loading Dock, Secret Service Confirms,â Washington Post, (Mar. 21, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/03/21/couy-griffin-cowboys-trump-jan6/.

209. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 2:11:22-2:13:55, available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=7882.

210. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 43-44.

211. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 44.

212. Complaint, Exhibit 2 (Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol subpoena to Chapman University, dated Jan. 21, 2022), Eastman v. Thompson et al. et al., No. 8:22-cv-99, (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2022) ECF No. 1-2.

213. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 51-52, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).

214. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 56-57, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).

215. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 63-64, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).

216. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

217. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 223.

218. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ronna Romney McDaniel, (June 1, 2022), pp. 7-8.

219. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ronna Romney McDaniel, (June 1, 2022), pp. 9-11.

220. On December 13th, Chesebro memorialized the strategy in an email he sent Rudy Giuliani with the subject line: âPRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL â Brief notes on âPresident of the Senate strategy.â Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708 (Dec. 13, 2020, Kenneth Chesebro email to Rudy Giuliani). Chesebro argued that the Trump team could use the fake slates of electors to complicate the joint session on January 6th if the President of the Senate âfirmly t[ook] the position that he, and he alone, is charged with the constitutional responsibility not just to open the votes, but to count themâincluding making judgments about what to do if there are conflicting votes.â Id. In the weeks that followed, Chesebro and John Eastman would build upon that framework and write two memos asserting that Joe Bidenâs certification could be derailed on January 6th if Vice President Pence acted as the âultimate arbiterâ when opening the real and fake Electoral College votes during the joint session of Congress. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053476 (December 23, 2020, Eastman memo titled âPRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL â Dec 23 memo on Jan 6 scenario.docxâ); see also Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman061863 (January 1, 2021, Chesebro email to Eastman).

221. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 114, 116.

222. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 116.

223. The âcertificate of ascertainmentâ is a State executiveâs official documentation announcing the official electors appointed pursuant to State law. See 3 U.S.C. Â§ 6.

224. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 70.

225. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone (July 8, 2022), pp. 70-72.

226. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Informal Interview of Patrick Philbin (Apr. 13, 2022).

227. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone (July 8, 2022), p. 75.

228. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Mar. 7, 2022), p. 64.

229. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Shawn Still, (Feb. 25, 2022), p. 24.

230. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Andrew Hitt, (Feb. 28, 2022), pp. 50â51.

231. The National Archives produced copies of the seven slates of electoral votes they received from Trump electors in States that President Trump lost. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037568, CTRL0000037944, CTRL0000037945, CTRL0000037946, CTRL0000037947, CTRL0000037948, CTRL0000037949 (December 14, 2020, memoranda from slates of purported electors in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, New Mexico, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000323_0001 (Senate Parliamentarian office tracking receipt and attaching copies of the seven slates); See also Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Robert Sinners Production), CTRL0000083893 (Trump campaign staffers emailing regarding submission); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Bill Stepien Production), WS 00096 â WS 00097 (Trump campaign staffers emailing regarding submission).

232. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (David Shafer Production), 108751.0001 000004 (December 10, 2020, Kenneth Chesebro email to David Shafer).

233. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037944 (December 14, 2020, certificate and mailing envelope from Georgia); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037941 (December 14, 2020, certificate and mailing envelope from Arizona), Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037945 (December 14, 2020, certificate and mailing envelope from Michigan).

234. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000080 (January 4, 2021, Hitt text message with Mark Jefferson); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Angela McCallum Production), McCallum_01_001576 - McCallum_01_001577 (January 5, 2021, McCallum text messages with G. Michael Brown); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production) CTRL0000056548_00007 (January 6, 2021, Hodgson text messages with Matt Stroia); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), CTRL0000056548_00035 (January 6, 2021, text messages from Senator Johnsonâs Chief of Staff, Sean Riley, to Chris Hodgson around 12:37 p.m.).

235. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 206â07; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production) CTRL0000056548_00007 (January 6, 2021, text message from Rep. Kellyâs Chief of Staff, Matt Stroia, to Chris Hodgson at 8:41 a.m.), CTRL0000056548_00035 (January 6, 2021, text messages from Senator Johnsonâs Chief of Staff, Sean Riley, to Chris Hodgson around 12:37 p.m.); Jason Lennon, âJohnson Says Involvement with 1/6 Fake Electors Plan Only âLasted Secondsâ,â Newsweek, (Aug. 21, 2022), available at https://www.newsweek.com/johnson-says-involvement-1-6-fake-electors-plan-only-lasted-seconds-1735486.

236. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 52â54.

237. Order Re Privilege of 599 Documents Dated November 3, 2020 - January 20, 2021 at 6, Eastman v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-cv-99 (C.D. Cal June 7, 2022), ECF No. 356.

238. Order Re Privilege of 599 Documents Dated November 3, 2020 - January 20, 2021 at 20, Eastman v. Thompson et al.., No. 8:22-cv-99 (C.D. Cal June 7, 2022), ECF No. 356.

239. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

240. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 5, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM), also available at https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Dkt%20260%2C%20Order%20RE%20Privilege%20of%20Jan.%204-7%2C%202021%20Documents_0.pdf.

241. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 35, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM), also available at https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Dkt%20260%2C%20Order%20RE%20Privilege%20of%20Jan.%204-7%2C%202021%20Documents_0.pdf.

242. After a journalist tweeted a video clip of key remarks from Gabriel Sterlingâs warning addressed to President Trump, President Trump responded by quote-tweeting that post, along with a comment that doubled down on demonizing Georgia election workers in spite of Sterlingâs stark and detailed warning. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 1, 2020 10:27 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201203173245/https://mobile.twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1333975991518187521 (archived) (âRigged Election. Show signatures and envelopes. Expose the massive voter fraud in Georgia. What is Secretary of State and @BrianKempGA afraid of. They know what weâll find!!! [linking to] twitter.com/BrendanKeefe/status/1333884246277189633â); Brendan Keefe (@BrendanKeefe), Twitter, Dec. 1, 2020 4:22 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/BrendanKeefe/status/1333884246277189633 (âIt. Has. All. Gone. Too. Far,â says @GabrielSterling with Georgia Sec of State after a Dominion techâs life was threatened with a noose. âMr. President, you have not condemned these actions or this language. . . .all of you who have not said a damn word are complicit in this.â with embedded video of Gabriel Sterlingâs remarks); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

243. Stephen Fowler, ââSomeoneâs Going to Get Killedâ: Election Official Blasts GOP Silence on Threats,â GPB News, (Dec. 1, 2020, updated Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://www.gpb.org/news/2020/12/01/someones-going-get-killed-election-official-blasts-gop-silence-on-threats.

244. House Governmental Affairs Committee, Georgia House of Representatives, Public Hearing (Dec. 10, 2020), YouTube, at 1:55:10-1:59:10, available at https://youtu.be/9EfgETUKfsI?t=6910.

245. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 2:25:45 to 2:26:00, available at https://youtu.be/xa43_z_82Og?t=8745.

246. Jason Szep and Linda So, âA Reuters Special Report: Trump Campaign Demonized Two Georgia Election Workers â and Death Threats Followed,â Reuters (Dec. 1, 2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-threats-georgia/.

247. Amended Complaint at 52, Freeman v. Giuliani, No. 21-cv-03354-BAH (D.D.C. filed May 10, 2022), ECF No. 22, available at https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/61642105/22/freeman-v-herring-networks-inc.

248. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ruby Freeman, (May 31, 2022), pp. 7-8.

249. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 41:30-46:35, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og; Yvonne Wingett Sanchez and Ronald J. Hansen, âWhite House Phone Calls, Baseless Fraud Charges: The Origins of the Arizona Election Review,â Arizona Republic, (Nov. 17, 2021), available at https://www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/17/arizona-audit-trump-allies-pushed-to-undermine-2020-election/6045151001/; Yvonne Wingett Sanchez and Ronald J. Hansen, ââAsked to do Something Hugeâ: An Audacious Pitch to Reserve Arizonaâs Election Results,â Arizona Republic, (Nov. 18, 2021, updated Dec. 2, 2021), available at https://www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/18/arizona-audit-rudy-giuliani-failed-effort-replace-electors/6349795001/.

250. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 53:00-53:40, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.

251. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 41:30-46:35, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.

252. Dennis Welch (@dennis_welch), Twitter, Dec. 8, 2020 11:23 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/dennis_welch/status/1336526978640302080 (retweeting people who were posting Bowersâs personal information); Dennis Welch (@dennis_welch), Twitter, Dec. 8, 2020 11:28 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/dennis_welch/status/1336528029791604737.

253. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Russel âRustyâ Bowers, (June 19, 2022), pp. 50-52; Kelly Weill, âArizona GOP Civil War Somehow Keeps Getting Weirder,â Daily Beast, (Dec. 11, 2020), available at https://www.thedailybeast.com/arizona-republican-party-civil-war-somehow-keeps-getting-weirder; Yvonne Wingett Sanchez and Ronald J. Hansen, ââAsked to do Something Hugeâ: An Audacious Pitch to Reserve Arizonaâs Election Results,â Arizona Republic, (Nov. 18, 2021, updated Dec. 2, 2021), available at https://www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/18/arizona-audit-rudy-giuliani-failed-effort-replace-electors/6349795001/.

254. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

255. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), pp. 16-22.

256. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Lee Chatfield, (Oct. 15, 2021).

257. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 57.

258. âLegislative Leaders Meet with President Trump,â State Senator Mike Shirkey, (Nov. 20, 2020), available at https://www.senatormikeshirkey.com/legislative-leaders-meet-with-president-trump/.

259. Team Trump (Text TRUMP to 88022) (@TeamTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 9:00 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20210103170109/https://twitter.com/TeamTrump/status/1345776940196659201 (archived); Beth LeBlanc, âTrump Campaign Lists Lawmakersâ Cells, Misdirects Calls for Chatfield to Former Petoskey Resident,â Detroit News, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2021/01/04/trump-campaign-lists-michigan-lawmakers-cell-numbers-misdirects-private-citizen/4130279001/; Jaclyn Peiser, âTrump Shared the Wrong Number for a Michigan Lawmaker: A 28-Year-Old Has Gotten Thousands of Angry Calls,â Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/01/05/michigan-trump-wrong-number-chatfield/.

260. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 52; Aaron Parseghian, âFormer Michigan Resident Slammed with Calls After Trump Campaign Mistakenly Posts Number on Social Media,â Fox 17 West Michigan, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://www.fox17online.com/news/politics/former-michigan-resident-slammed-with-calls-after-trump-campaign-mistakenly-posts-number-on-social-media.

261. Nor would any State legislature have had such authority.

262. Order Re Privilege of Remaining Documents at 16-17, Eastman v. Thompson et al.., No. 8:22-cv-99 (C.D. Cal Oct. 19, 2022), ECF No. 372, available at https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Dkt.%20372%2C%20Order%20Re%20Privilege%20of%20Remaining%20Documents.pdf.

263. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman060742, (December 31, 2020, from John Eastman to Alex Kaufman and Kurt Hilbert).

264. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman060742, (December 31, 2020, from John Eastman to Alex Kaufman and Kurt Hilbert).

265. Order Re Privilege of Remaining Documents at 17, Eastman v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-cv-99 (C.D. Cal Oct. 19, 2022), ECF No. 372, available at https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Dkt.%20372%2C%20Order%20Re%20Privilege%20of%20Remaining%20Documents.pdf.

266. Order Re Privilege of Remaining Documents at 17, Eastman v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-cv-099 (C.D. Cal Oct. 19, 2022), ECF No. 372, available at https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Dkt.%20372%2C%20Order%20Re%20Privilege%20of%20Remaining%20Documents.pdf.

267. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

268. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 53.

269. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 47-48, 53; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

270. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

271. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

272. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

273. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

274. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 58; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000738, HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).

275. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 59.

276. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 59.

277. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014099 (December 26, 2020, message from Representative Perry to Meadows stating: âMark, just checking in as time continues to count down. 11 days to 1/6 and 25 days to inauguration. We gotta get going!â), MM014100 (December 26, 2020, message from Representative Perry to Meadows stating: âMark, you should call Jeff. I just got off the phone with him and he explained to me why the principal deputy wonât work especially with the FBI. They will view it as as [sic] not having the authority to enforce what needs to be done.â), MM014101 (Dec. 26, 2020 Message from Meadows to Rep. Perry stating: âI got it. I think I understand. Let me work on the deputy positionâ), MM014102 (Dec. 26, 2020 Message from Rep. Perry to Meadows stating: âRoger. Just sent you something on Signalâ), MM014162 (December 27, 2020, message from Rep. Perry to Meadows stating: âCan you call me when you get a chance? I just want to talk to you for a few moments before I return the presidents [sic] call as requested.â), MM014178 (December 28, 2020, message from Rep. Perry to Meadows stating: âDid you call Jeff Clark?â), MM014208 (December 29, 2020, message from Representative Perry to Meadows stating: âMark, I sent you a note on signalâ), MM014586 (January 2, 2021, message from Representative Perry to Meadows stating: âPlease call me the instant you get off the phone with Jeff.â). President Trump, Mark Meadows, and Representative Perry refused to testify before the Select Committee, and Jeffrey Clark asserted his Fifth Amendment rights in refusing to answer questions from the Select Committee. âThompson & Cheney Statement on Donald Trumpâs Defiance of Select Committee Subpoena,â Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Nov. 14, 2022), available at https://january6th.house.gov/news/press-releases/thompson-cheney-statement-donald-trump-s-defiance-select-committee-subpoena; Luke Broadwater, âTrump Sues to Block Subpoena from Jan. 6 Committee,â New York Times, (Nov. 11, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/11/us/politics/trump-subpoena-jan-6-committee.html; H. Rept. 117-216, Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives Find Mark Randall Meadows in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 1st Sess. (2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt216/CRPT-117hrpt216.pdf; Letter from John P. Rowley III to the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, re: Subpoena to Representative Scott Perry, May 24, 2022, available at https://keystonenewsroom.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2022/05/575876667-Rep-perry-Ltr-SelectComm.pdf; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeffrey Clark, (Nov. 5, 2021); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Deposition of Jeffrey Clark, (Feb. 2, 2022). See also Jonathan Tamari and Chris Brennan, âPa. Congressman Scott Perry Acknowledges Introducing Trump to Lawyer at the Center of Election Plot,â Philadelphia Inquirer, (Jan. 25, 2021), available at https://www.inquirer.com/politics/pennsylvania/scott-perry-trump-georgia-election-results-20210125.html.

278. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014099-014103, MM014178.

279. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 54-55.

280. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack at the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 55.

281. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack at the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 56.

282. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 114; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000681 (Department of Justice policy), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000685 (White House policy).

283. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack at the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 56.

284. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 82.

285. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 72-73; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000698, (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with Congressman Perry).

286. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 15-17, 64-80, 179-191; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697, HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000698 (email with draft letter attached to December 28, 2020, email from Jeffrey Clark to Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue).

287. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 184-88; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697, HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000698 (email with draft letter attached to Dec. 28 email from Jeffrey Clark to Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue). As further discussed in Chapter 4 of this report, Klukowski, a lawyer, joined DOJâs Civil Division with just weeks remaining in President Trumpâs term and helped Clark on issues related to the 2020 election, despite the fact that âelection-related matters are not part of the Civil portfolio.â Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth Klukowski (Dec. 15, 2021), p. 66-67. Although Klukowski told the Select Committee that the Trump Campaign was his client before joining DOJ, id. at p. 190, and despite the fact that he had sent John Eastman draft talking points titled âTRUMP RE-ELECTIONâ that encouraged Republican State legislatures to âsummonâ new Electoral College electors for the 2020 election less than a week before starting at DOJ, Klukowski nevertheless helped Clark draft the December 28th letter described in this Report that, if sent, would have encouraged one or more State legislatures to take actions that they believed could have changed the outcome of the 2020 election. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman028219, Chapman028220 (December 9, 2020, email from Klukowski to Eastman with attached memo). The Select Committee has concerns about whether Klukowskiâs actions at DOJ, and his continued contacts with those working for, or to benefit, the Trump Campaign, may have presented a conflict of interest to the detriment of DOJâs mission. In addition, the Select Committee has concerns about many of the âprivilegeâ claims Klukowski used to withhold information responsive to his subpoena, as well as concerns about some of his testimony, including his testimony about contacts with, among others, John Eastman. The Committee has learned that their communications included at least four known calls between December 22, 2020, and January 2, 2021. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Verizon Production, July 1, 2022) (showing that Klukowski called Eastman on 12/22 at 7:38 a.m. EST for 22.8 min, that Klukowski called Eastman on 12/22 at 7:09 p.m. EST for 6.4 min, that Eastman called Klukowski on 12/30 at 9:11 p.m. EST for 31.9 min, and that Klukowski called Eastman on 1/02 at 6:59 p.m. EST for 6.4 min).

288. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman061893 (Jan. 1, 2021, emails between Jeffrey Clark and John Eastman); seeÂ Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Verizon Production, July 1, 2022) (showing five calls between John Eastman and Jeffrey Clark from January 1, 2021, through January 8, 2021).

289. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 (Dec. 28 email from Jeffrey Clark to Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue titled âTwo Urgent Action Itemsâ) (âThe concept is to send it to the Governor, Speaker, and President pro temp of each relevant state. . .â); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 68-69, 79.

290. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 (draft letter attached to December 28, 2020, email from Jeffrey Clark to Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue).

291. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 (draft letter attached to December 28, 2020, email from Jeffrey Clark to Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue).

292. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000703.

293. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 (draft letter attached to December 28, 2020, email from Jeffrey Clark to Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue).

294. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 (draft letter attached to December 28, 2020, email from Jeffrey Clark to Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue).

295. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 (draft letter attached to December 28, 2020, email from Jeffrey Clark to Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue).

296. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000200 (January 2, 2021, email from Jeffrey Rosen to Richard Donoghue titled âRE: Two Urgent Action Itemsâ).

297. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000200 (January 2, 2021, email from Jeffrey Rosen to Richard Donoghue titled âRE: Two Urgent Action Itemsâ).

298. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000200 (January 2, 2021, email from Jeffrey Rosen to Richard Donoghue titled âRE: Two Urgent Action Itemsâ).

299. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

300. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 82.

301. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 82.

302. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 79-82; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000703 (December 28, 2020, email from Richard Donoghue to Jeffrey Clark, ccâing Jeffrey Rosen re: Two Urgent Action Items in which Donoghue writes: âthere is no chance that I would sign this letter or anything remotely like this.â).

303. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack at the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 73; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000703 (December 28, 2020, email from Richard Donoghue to Jeffrey Clark, ccâing Jeffrey Rosen re: Two Urgent Action Items in which Donoghue writes: âthere is no chance that I would sign this letter or anything remotely like this.â); Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Interview of Richard Donoghue, (August 6, 2021), at p. 99, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Donoghue%20Transcript.pdf.

304. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 113.

305. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

306. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

307. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000083040 (January 3, 2021, White House Presidential Call Log).

308. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 119.

309. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 119-20. (âAnd so it was unanimous; everyone was going to resign if Jeff Rosen was removed from the seat.â The only exception was John Demers, the Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division. Donoghue encouraged Demers to stay on because he didnât want to further jeopardize national security.)

310. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 124.

311. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 126-28; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 120.

312. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 126.

313. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.

314. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven A. Engel, (Jan. 13, 2022), p. 64.

315. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.

316. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 131-132.

317. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 131-32.

318. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Sidney Powell, (May 7, 2022), pp. 75, 84.

319. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 19, 2020 1:42 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201219064257/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1340185773220515840 (archived).

320. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 26, 2020 8:14 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1342821189077622792; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 27, 2020 5:51 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1343328708963299338; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 30, 2020 2:06 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1344359312878149634; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021 12:52 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40KylieJaneKremer%22 (archived) (retweeting @KylieJaneKremer, Dec. 19, 2020 3:50 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/KylieJaneKremer/status/1340399063875895296)); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021 2:53 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345095714687377418; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021 3:34 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345106078141394944; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021 6:38 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345152408591204352; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 2, 2021 9:04 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345551634907209730; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 1:29 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40realDonaldTrump%3A+https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2FnslWcFwkCj%22 (archived) (retweeting Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Jan. 2, 2021 9:04 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345551634907209730)); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:15 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40JenLawrence21%22 (archived) (retweeting Jennifer Lynn Lawrence (@JenLawrence21)), Jan. 3, 2021 12:17 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/JenLawrence21/status/1345600194826686464); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:17 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40CodeMonkeyZ+if%22 (archived) (retweeting Ron Watkins (@CodeMonkeyZ) Jan. 2, 2021 9:14 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20210103151826/https://twitter.com/CodeMonkeyZ/status/1345599512560078849 (archived)); Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:24 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40realMikeLindell%22 (archived) (retweeting Mike Lindell (@realMikeLindell), Jan. 2, 2021 5:47 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20210103152421/https://twitter.com/realMikeLindell/status/1345547185836978176 (archived)); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:27 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345753534168506370; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:28 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40AmyKremer+we%22 (archived) (retweeting Amy Kremer (@AmyKremer), Jan. 2, 2021 2:58 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/AmyKremer/status/1345459488107749386); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 4, 2021 9:46 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40realDonaldTrump+I+will+be+there.+Historic+day%21%22 (retweeting Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Jan. 3, 2021 10:27 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345753534168506370); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 10:27 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1346478482105069568; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 5:43 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1346588064026685443.

321. See, e.g., Sentencing Memorandum of Daniel Johnson at 5, United States v. Johnson, No. 1:21-cr-407 (D.D.C. May 25, 2022), ECF No. 56 (âMr. Johnson believed what he read on the internet and heard from the President himselfâ that the election had been stolen.â); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Zac Martin, (Mar. 9, 2022), p. 20 (answering that he believed President Trump wanted âpatriots to show up in Washington, DC on January 6thâ because âwe felt like our rights were being taken away from usâ given the election results).

322. See, e.g., Trial Transcript at 4106-08, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2022) (Oath Keeper Jason Dolan testified that the Oath Keepers came to Washington, DC âto stop the certification of the election. . . . [b]y any means necessary. Thatâs why we brought our firearms.â); Motion to Suppress, Exhibit A at 34, 85-86, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2021), ECF No. 38-1 (âTrump called us. Trump called us to D.C. . . . and heâs calling for helpâI thought he was calling for help. I thought he wasâI thought we were doing the right thing.â); Statement of Facts at 2, United States v. Martin, No. 1:21-cr-394 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2021) (âMARTIN reported that he decided to travel to Washington, DC after reading then-President Donald Trumpâs tweets regarding the election being stolen and a protest on January 6, 2021, flying to DC on January 5, 2021, and attending the rallies on January 6, 2021, and then heading to the U.S. Capitol where he entered along with a crowd of other individuals.â); Statement of Facts at 9-10, United States v. Denney, No. 1:22-cr-70 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021) (âSo Trump has called this himself. For everyone to come. Itâs the day the electoral college is suppose [sic] to be certified by congress to officially elect Biden.â); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6thth Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Dustin Thompson (Nov. 16, 2022), pp. 34, 44, 70-71 (noting that he went to the Capitol at President Trumpâs direction and that he âfigured [stopping the certification of the vote] was [President Trumpâs] planâ; see also, Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Select Committee Chart Compiling Defendant Statements).

323. Indictment at 6, United States v. Smith, No. 1:21-cr-567 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.

324. Statement of Facts at 3, United States v. Sulenta, No. 1:22-mj-00129-ZMF (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF No. 1-1.

325. Stipulated Statement of Facts at 7, United States v. Morss, No. 1:21-cr-40 (D.D.C. August 23, 2022), ECF No. 430.

326. Statement of Facts at 9, United States v. Grayson, No. 1:21-cr-224 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.

327. Statement of Facts at 11, United States v. Denney, No. 1:21-mj-00686-RMM-ZMF (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.

328. Gieswein denies that he was a Three Percenter as of January 6, 2021, even though he affiliated with an apparent Three Percenter group at previous times. See Giesweinâs Motion for Hearing & Revocation of Detention Order at 2-3, 18-19, 25, United States v. Gieswein, No. 1:21-cr-24 (D.D.C. June 8, 2021), ECF No. 18. When the FBI arrested Gieswein, the criminal complaint noted that he âappears to be affiliated with the radical militia group known as the Three Percenters.â Criminal Complaint at 5, United States v. Gieswein, No. 1:21-cr-24 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1360831/download. See also Adam Rawnsley (@arawnsley), Twitter, Jan. 17, 2021 9:13 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/arawnsley/status/1350989535954530315 (highlighting photos of Gieswein flashing a Three Percenter symbol).

329. Second Superseding Indictment at 9-10, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. March 7, 2022), ECF No. 305.

330. Statement of Offense at 5, United States v. Bertino, No. 1:22-cr-329 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022), ECF No. 5; Third Superseding Indictment at 6, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380; Statement of Offense at 3, United States v. Donohoe, No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2022), ECF No. 336.

331. Third Superseding Indictment at 13, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380; Georgia Wells, Rebecca Ballhaus, and Keach Hagey, âProud Boys, Seizing Trumpâs Call to Washington, Helped Lead Capitol Attack,â Wall Street Journal, (Jan.17, 2021), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/proud-boys-seizing-trumps-call-to-washington-helped-lead-capitol-attack-11610911596.

332. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Jay Thaxton Production), CTRL0000070865, (December 29, 2020, Telegram chat at 11:09 a.m. from Enrique Tarrio under the name âHEIKA NOBLELEAD.â).

333. âFormer Leader of Proud Boys Pleads Guilty to Seditious Conspiracy for Efforts to Stop Transfer of Power Following 2020 Presidential Election,â Department of Justice, (Oct. 6, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-leader-proud-boys-pleads-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-efforts-stop-transfer-power; âLeader of North Carolina Chapter of Proud Boys Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy and Assault Charges in Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (Apr. 8, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-north-carolina-chapter-proud-boys-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-and-assault-charges-jan-6.

334. Statement of Offense at 2, United States v. Bertino, No. 1:22-cr-329 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022), ECF No. 5.

335. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Bertino, No. 1:22-cr-329 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022), ECF No. 5.

336. Statement of Offense at 4-5, United States v. Bertino, No. 1:22-cr-329 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022), ECF No. 5.

337. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Donohoe, No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2022), ECF No. 336. Indeed, Proud Boys leaders Biggs and Nordean told MOSD on January 5th about a plan they had discussed with Tarrio for January 6th. Although Biggs and Nordean did not share the planâs precise details, Proud Boys like Bertino and Donohoe nonetheless understood the âobjective in Washington, D.C., on January 6, 2021, was to obstruct, impede, or interfere with the certification of the Electoral College vote, including by force if necessary,â and that the Proud Boys âwould accomplish this through the use of force and violence, which could include storming the Capitol through police lines and barricades if necessary.â Statement of Offense at 8, United States v. Bertino, No. 1:22-cr-329 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022), ECF No. 5; Statement of Offense at 6, United States v. Donohoe, No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2022), ECF No. 336.

338. Superseding Indictment at 2-3, United States v. Rhodes et al, No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167.

339. Caldwell testified that he was not an Oath Keeper. See Trial Transcript at 8778-79, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2022); Hannah Rabinowitz and Holmes Lybrand, âCapitol Riot Defendant Calls Himself a âLittle Bit of a Goofâ Regarding Pelosi and Pence Comments,â CNN, (Nov. 15, 2022), available at https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/15/politics/thomas-caldwell-testifies-oath-keeper-trial. Because the government tried Caldwell in a conspiracy case with known Oath Keepers, the Select Committee has referred to him as an Oath Keeper.

340. See Trial Transcript at 10502-08, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2022).

341. Trial Exhibit 6860 (1.S.656.9328 - 9396), United States v. Rhodes, No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 2022).

342. Superseding Indictment at 13, United States v. Rhodes, III, et al., No. 22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No 167.

343. Superseding Indictment at 13-14, United States v. Rhodes, et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167.

344. Superseding Indictment at 15-17, United States v. Rhodes, et al., No. 22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No 167.

345. Statement of Offense at 5, United States v. Ulrich, No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 2022), ECF No. 117.

346. Statement of Offense at 5, United States v. James, No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2022), ECF No. 60.

347. âTTPO Stance on Election Fraud,â The Three Percenters - Original, available at https://archive.ph/YemCC#selection-289.0-289.29 (archived).

348. Statement of Facts at 7-8, United States v. Buxton, No. 1:21-cr-739 (D.D.C. Dec. 8, 2021), ECF No. 1-1; Post: âOath Keepers claim to stand for the constitution yet will not call up its 30k membership to attend the 6th. I thought you guys stood for the constitution? Itâs your only job as an organization. . .now or never boys,â Patriots.win, Dec. 29, 2020, available at https://patriots.win/p/11RO2hdyR2/x/c/4DrwV8RcV1s.

349. Indictment at 1, 7, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.

350. Indictment at 7, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.

351. Indictment at 8-13, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.

352. Indictment at 9, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.

353. Statement of Facts at 4, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1.

354. Statement of Facts at 5, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1. When the Select Committee asked about this post to the leader of the Florida Guardians of Freedom, Liggett downplayed any significance or any knowledge about other Three Percenter groups that might âshow in record numbers.â Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Liggett, (May 17, 2022), pp. 51-52.

355. Statement of Facts at 5-6, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1; #SeditionHunters (@SeditionHunters), Twitter, June 7, 2021 2:11 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/SeditionHunters/status/1401965056980627458.

356. Statement of Facts at 15-17, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1. The âtunnelâ is actually a flight of stairs leading to a doorway from which the President emerges on Inauguration Day to take the oath of office. When the inauguration stage is present, the stairs leading to the doorway are converted into a â10-foot-wide, slightly sloped, short tunnel that was approximately 15 feet long.â Governmentâs Sentencing Memorandum at 5-6, United States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291-3 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2022), ECF No. 140. For other examples of how extremist groups responded to President Trumpâs call to action, see Chapter 6.

357. Indictment at 11, United States v. Rodriguez et al., No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2021), ECF No. 65; Motion to Suppress, Exhibit A at 70, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2021), ECF No. 38-1.

358. Motion to Suppress, Exhibit A at 34, 85-86, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2021), ECF No. 38-1.

359. Governmentâs Opposition to Defendantâs Renewed Request for Pretrial Release at 7, United States v. Meggs, No. 1:21-cr-28 (D.D.C Mar. 23, 2021), ECF No. 98.

360. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol ( Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Google Voice Production, Feb. 25, 2022).

361. Trial Exhibit 6868 (2000.T.420), United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 2022).

362. Trial Exhibit 6868 (2000.T.420), United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 2022).

363. Trial Exhibit 9221, United States v. Rhodes et al., No.1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Nov. 9, 2022).

364. Motion for Bond, Exhibit 1 at 125-26, United States v. Vallejo, No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 2022), ECF No. 102-1 (Collection of redacted text messages, labeled as Exhibit 8, showing Rhodes adding âa CA Oath Keeper who is in with a four man team, followed by that person announcing his identifiable radio frequency) Ryan J. Reilly, âNew Evidence Reveals Coordination Between Oath Keepers, Three Percenters on Jan. 6,â NBC News, (May 28, 2022), available at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/new-evidence-reveals-coordination-oath-keepers-three-percenters-jan-6-rcna30355 (noting how public source investigators linked the identifiable radio frequency to Derek Kinnison, who is one of the California Three Percenters indicted on conspiracy charges for their conduct on January 6th. See Indictment, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1).

365. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), CTRL 0000010471, at 7:01 (January 6, 2021, video footage recorded by Samuel Montoya at the U.S. Capitol).

366. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (District of Columbia Production), Axon Body 3 X6039BKH5 13.53.47 20210106-FELONYRIOT-FIRSTSTSE, at 15:28:13 (MPD body camera footage); Statement of Facts at 3, United States v. Cale, No. 1:22-cr-139 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2022), ECF No. 1-1.

367. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Jan6-07222021-000603.

368. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 143.

369. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 199.

370. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mary McCord Production), CTRL0000930476 (December 22, 2020, email to the FBI noting troubling Oath Keepers chats).

371. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mary McCord Production), CTRL0000930476 (December 22, 2020, email to the FBI noting troubling Oath Keepers chats).

372. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637, (December 25, 2020, email chain from PIOC on January 6th intelligence).

373. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637, (December 25, 2020, email chain from PIOC on January 6th intelligence).

374. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637, (December 25, 2020, email chain from PIOC on January 6th intelligence).

375. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637, (December 25, 2020, email chain from PIOC on January 6th intelligence).

376. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637, (December 25, 2020, email chain from PIOC on January 6th intelligence).

377. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637, (December 25, 2020, email chain from PIOC on January 6th intelligence).

378. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637, (December 25, 2020, email chain from PIOC on January 6th intelligence).

379. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000080 (December 28, 2020, email to John Donohue re: (LES) Armed and Ready SITE.pdf.); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jack Donohue, (Jan. 31, 2022), p. 8; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jack Donohue, (Jan. 7, 2022).

380. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000067420 (December 26, 2020, email to PIOC regarding possible Proud Boys plan for January 6, 2021).

381. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000067420 (December 26, 2020, email to PIOC regarding possible Proud Boys plan for January 6, 2021).

382. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001473 (December 29, 2020, email from PIOC-ONDUTY to THREAT ASSESSMENT re: FW: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Neo-Nazi Calls on D.C. Pro-Trump Protesters to Occupy Federal Building.).

383. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000087 (December 28, 2020, email re: 1/6 warning.).

384. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001473 (December 29, 2020, email from [email protected] to [email protected] titled âFW: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Neo-Nazi Calls on D.C. Pro-Trump Protesters to Occupy Federal Building.â).

385. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000101135.0001, pp. 1, 3 (December 30, 2020, Protective Intelligence Brief titled âWild Protestâ).

386. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001527 (Email titled âFwd: MPD MMS Text Tip.â).

387. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001527 (Email titled âFwd: MPD MMS Text Tip.â).

388. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Parler Production) PARLER_00000013 (January 2, 2021, email from Parler to the FBI re: Another to check out, attaching Parler posts).

389. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001487 (January 2, 2021, email to Capitol Police and Department of Justice with screenshots of Parler posts); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000116, CTRL0000000116.0001 (January 4, 2021, email from U.S. Capitol Police re: Comments of concern for Jan 6 rally, collecting Parler posts).

390. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001532.0001, p.2 (January 5, 2021, FBI Situational Information Report).

391. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001532.0001, p.2 (January 5, 2021, FBI Situational Information Report).

392. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000293417 (December 30, 2020, email to OSU-ALL titled âDiscovery of Event Website- MAGA Drag the Interstate & Occupy the Capitolâ).

393. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6thÂ Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000083, CTRL0000000083.0001 (January 5, 2021, email re: (U//FOUO//LES) OSINT Post of Concern.).

394. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6thÂ Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000083, CTRL0000000083.0001 (January 5, 2021, email re: (U//FOUO//LES) OSINT Post of Concern.).

395. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6thÂ Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000083, CTRL0000000083.0001 (January 5, 2021, email re: (U//FOUO//LES) OSINT Post of Concern.).

396. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6thÂ Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000066986, USSS0000066986.0001 (January 5, 2021, Secret Service email noting social media user threatening to bring a firearm to Washington, D.C. on January 6th).

397. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6thÂ Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Interior Production), DOI_46000114_00000238, DOI_46000114_00000239 (January 5, 2021, Situational Information Report Federal Bureau of Investigation. âPotential for Violence in Washington, D.C. Area in Connection with Planned âStopTheStealâ Protest on 6 January 2021.â).

398. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6thÂ Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Interior Production), DOI_46000114_00000238, DOI_46000114_00000239 (January 5, 2021, Situational Information Report Federal Bureau of Investigation. âPotential for Violence in Washington, D.C. Area in Connection with Planned âStopTheStealâ Protest on 6 January 2021.â).

399. Trial Exhibit 6923 (1.S.159.817, 955), United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2022) ( Rhodes sent an encrypted message to Oath Keeper leadership on January 5, 2021, stating: âWe will have several well equipped QRFs outside DC. And there are many, many others, from other groups, who will be watching and waiting on the outside in case of worst case scenarios.â).

400. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014441-MM01442 (December 30, 2020, 6:05 p.m. ET text from Jason Miller to Mark Meadows).

401. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), Exhibit 45, pp. 4, 13. Miller claimed he had no idea about the comments and would have âflag[ged]â them for âSecret Serviceâ had he seen them. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 210-12.

402. On his way to the Capitol, Proud Boy David Nicholas Dempsey stopped on the National Mall in front of an erected gallows, fitted with a noose, to tell the world what he hoped would happen: âThem worthless shitholes like Jerry Nadler, fuckin Pelosi . . . They donât need a jail cell. They need to hang from these motherfuckers [pointing to gallows]. They need to get the point across that the time for peace is over. . . . For four, or five years really, theyâve been fucking demonizing us, belittling us, . . . doing everything they can to stop what this is, and people are sick of that shit . . . . Hopefully one day soon we really have someone hanging from one of these motherfuckers . . . .â Statement of Facts at 2-3, United States v. Dempsey, No. 1:21-cr-566 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 2021); #SeditionHunters (@SeditionHunters), Twitter, Mar. 11, 2021 8:12 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/SeditionHunters/status/1370180789770588163.

403. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 49.

404. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (May 17, 2022), p. 92.

405. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC_HH_035, SC_HH_036 (January 6, 2021, text messages with Hogan Gidley).

406. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hope Hicks, (Oct. 25, 2022), pp. 109-10.

407. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency, DC Production), CTRL0000926794 (Talking points put together by Dr. Christopher Rodriguez, Director of HSEMA, for a briefing with Mayor Muriel Bowers on December 30, 2020).

408. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Donnell Harvin, (Jan. 24, 2022), pp. 22-23.

409. Given the timing of receipt of much of this intelligence immediately in advance of January 6th, it is unclear that any comprehensive intelligence community analytical product could have been reasonably expected. But it is clear that the information itself was communicated.

410. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000181 (January 2, 2021, email from Katrina Pierson to Caroline Wren and Taylor Budowich re: 1/6 Speaker Schedule).

411. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Kylie Kremer Production), KKremer5449; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

412. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 83, 86.

413. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

414. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert âBobbyâ Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 64.

415. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 21.

416. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), p. 152.

417. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), p. 152.

418. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), p. 152.

419. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Mar. 29, 2022), p. 16.

420. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000086772, p. 4 (November 18, 2021, document titled: United States Secret Service - Coordinated Response to a Request for Information from the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol).

421. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file ML_DC_20210106_Sony_FS7-GC_1935.mov; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478 (Summary of updates from January 6, 2021); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Dustin Thompson, (Nov. 16, 2022), pp. 30-31 (âI was seeing these, like, piles of backpacks and flagpoles [outside the magnetometers]. And some people were watching that for other people. And I justâthere were lots of piles all over the place of stuff like that.â).

422. Tom Jackman, Rachel Weiner, and Spencer S. Hsu, âEvidence of Firearms in Jan. 6 Crowd Grows as Arrests and Trials Mount,â Washington Post, (July 8, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/07/08/jan6-defendants-guns/.

423. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478 (summary of radio traffic on January 6, 2021).

424. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (District of Columbia Production), MPD 73-78 (District of Columbia, Metropolitan Police Department, Transcript of Radio Calls, January 6, 2021); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (District of Columbia Production), CTRL0000070375, at 3:40 (District of Columbia, Metropolitan Police Department, audio file of radio traffic from January 6, 2021, from 12:00 - 13:00).

425. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Cassidy Hutchinson Production), CH-CTRL0000000069.

426. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

427. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee, (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 77 (âThe most--the thing that sticks out most was he kept asking why we couldnât go, why we couldnât go, and that he wasnât concerned about the people that were there or referenced them being Trump people or Trump supporters.â).

428. âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.

429. âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.

430. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 20-21.

431. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 24, 26.

432. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 26.

433. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 23.

434. See âDonald Trump Speech âSave Americaâ Rally Transcript January 6,â Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), at 1:00:00 â 1:02:31, available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-transcript-january-6 (timestamping the speech).

435. âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.

436. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:00:45-1:01:12, available at https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=3645; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Janet West Buhler, (Feb. 28, 2022), p. 40.

437. âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.

438. âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.

439. âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.

440. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 0:14:11-0:15:00, available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851; Hearing on Motion to Modify Conditions of Release, Exhibit 07 at 7:43 - 8:00, United States v. Nichols, No. 1:21-cr-117 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2021).

441. Unframe of Mind, âUnframe of Mind in DC #stopthesteal Rally,â YouTube, at 9:40 â 9:47, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OFbvpBu_7ws&t=579s; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at, at 0:14:11-0:15:00, available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851.

442. Walter Masterson, âLive from the Trump Rally in Washington, D.C.,â YouTube, at 17:32 â 17:50, Jan. 11, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OFbvpBu_7ws&t=579s; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at, at 2:07:02-2:07:07, available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=7609.

443. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022) at, at 2:07:13-2:07:47, available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=7609.

444. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:00:45-1:01:12, available at https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=3645; On the Media, âJessica Watkins on âStop the Steal J6â Zello Channel (Unedited),â Soundcloud, at 4:00-4:18, available at https://soundcloud.com/user-403747081/jessica-watkins-on-stop-the-steal-j6-zello-channel-unedited.

445. For a video of the interview, see âCrown Point, Indiana Man Charged in Jan. 6 Capitol Riot Says He Has âNo Regretsâ,â CBS Chicago, Nov. 29, 2022, available at https://www.cbsnews.com/chicago/video/crown-point-indiana-man-charged-in-jan-6-capitol-riot-says-he-has-no-regrets/#x.

446. âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27 (emphasis added).

447. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 49.

448. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 131 (âI just didnât think it would be, you know, a good idea for the President to go up to the Capitol.â). While Cipollone did not specifically recall talking with Cassidy Hutchinson about this topic, he informed the Select Committee that he was sure that he did express his view to some people. Id. Hutchinson believes it was Pat Cipollone, but also testified that it may have been a different lawyer. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 113-16.

449. For security reasons, the Select Committee is not releasing the name of this employee. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House employee with national security responsibilities, (July 19, 2022) at p. 73. See also Chapter 7, which discusses this topic in greater detail.

450. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of United States Secret Service Agent, (Nov. 21, 2022), pp. 22-23. The Select Committee has agreed to keep confidential the identity of this witness due to their sensitive national security responsibilities.

451. A book written by Chief of Staff Mark Meadows in December 2021 made the categorical claim that the President never intended to travel to the Capitol that day. See Mark Meadows, The Chiefâs Chief (St. Petersburg, FL: All Seasons Press, 2021), p. 250. The Committeeâs evidence demonstrates that Meadowsâs claim is categorically false. Because the Meadows book conflicted sharply with information that was being received by the Select Committee, the Committee became increasingly wary that other witnesses might intentionally conceal what happened. That appeared to be the case with Ornato. Ornato does not recall that he conveyed the information to Cassidy Hutchinson regarding the SUV, and also does not recall that he conveyed similar information to a White House employee with national security responsibilities who testified that Ornato recalled a similar account to him. The Committee is skeptical of Ornatoâs account.

452. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Security Official, (July 11, 2022), p. 45. The Select Committee has agreed to keep confidential the identity of this witness due to their sensitive national security responsibilities.

453. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 159.

454. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 8.

455. Governmentâs Sentencing Memorandum at 2-9, United States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2022), ECF No. 140; 167 Cong. Rec. S619 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf; Michael S. Schmidt and Luke Broadwater, âOfficersâ Injuries, Including Concussions, Show Scope of Violence at Capitol Riot,â New York Times, (Feb. 11, 2021), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/11/us/politics/capitol-riot-police-officer-injuries.html.

456. See Sentencing Transcript at 35, United States v. Griffith, No. 1:21-cr-204 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2021), ECF No. 137; Kyle Cheney and Josh Gerstein, âWhere Jan. 6 Prosecutions Stand, 18 Months after the Attack,â Politico, (July 7, 2022), available at https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/07/jan-6-prosecutions-months-later-00044354.

457. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at 2:36:58-2:37:30, 2:44:00-2:45:05, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrUa0hfG6Lo (â[W]hen President Trump put his tweet out, we literally left right after that come out . . . As soon as that come out, everybody started talking about it . . . it definitely dispersed a lot of the crowd. . . . We left.â); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:58:00, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo (âIâm here delivering the Presidentâs message. Donald Trump has asked everybody to go home. . . . Thatâs our order.â).

458. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:50:59-1:52:19, available at https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=6659; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Business Meeting on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13, 2022), at 2:15:45-2:17:12, available at https://youtu.be/IQvuBoLBuC0?t=8145; CBS News, âFormer Vice President Mike Pence on âFace the Nation with Margaret Brennanâ | Full Interview,â YouTube, at 16:23-19:01, Nov. 21, 2022, available at https://youtu.be/U9GbkPhG1Lo?t=983; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 173.

459. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 27. The Select Committee is not revealing the identity of this witness to guard against the risk of retaliation; See âDonald Trump Speech âSave Americaâ Rally Transcript January 6,â Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-transcript-january-6 (timestamping the speech).

460. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), Photo file 40a8_hi_j0087_0bea; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 34:18, available at https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=2058.

461. Washington Post, âD.C. Police requested backup at least 17 times in 78 minutes during Capitol riot | Visual Forensics,â YouTube, at 7:58 to 8:45, Apr. 15, 2021, available at https://youtu.be/rsQTY9083r8?t=478; Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Public Hearing, (Mar. 3, 2021), Written Testimony of William J. Walker, Commanding General District of Columbia National Guard, p. 3, available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Walker-2021-03-03.pdf.

462. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Shealah Craighead, (June 8, 2022), pp. 42, 46.

463. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000261; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

464. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000257; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

465. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Molly Michael, (Mar. 24, 2022), p. 138.

466. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (Jul. 8, 2022), p. 174; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), pp. 126â27; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), pp. 151-52; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 124-26; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 80-82; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 186-90.

467. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Molly Michael, (Mar. 24, 2022), pp. 127, 129, 131-32, 137, 141, 143-44, 148-49, 159.

468. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).

469. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 163-64; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

470. Senator Lee wrote to a reporter that he received a call from the President moments after the Senate halted its proceedings and that the President claimed he had dialed Sen. Tommy Tuberville (R-AL), so Lee let Tuberville talk to the President on his phone for 5 or 10 minutes until they were ordered to evacuate. Bryan Schott, âWhat Sen. Mike Lee Told Me about Trumpâs Call the Day of the Capitol Riot,â Salt Lake Tribune, (Feb. 10, 2021, updated Feb. 11, 2021), available at https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2021/02/11/what-sen-mike-lee-told-me/; see also Kyle Cheney, âTuberville Says He Informed Trump of Penceâs Evacuation before Rioters Reached Senate,â Politico, (Feb. 11, 2021), available at https://www.politico.com/news/2021/02/11/tuberville-pences-evacuation-trump-impeachment-468572.

471. 167 Cong. Rec. S634 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 1:49 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20210107235835/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1346891760174329859 (archived).

472. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 149-50.

473. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 150-51.

474. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), at 1:39:03-1:40:42, available at https://youtu.be/HeQNV-aQ_jU?t=5943. Two witnesses recall writing this note: Cassidy Hutchinson and Eric Herschmann, although Hutchinson recalls that Herschmann was responsible for the revision made to the note. The Committeeâs review of Hutchinsonâs handwriting was consistent with the script of the note. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 167; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 67-68. Who wrote the note is not material to the Select Committeeâthe important point is that it was prepared for the President.

475. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 162.

476. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), at 1:27:52-1:28:53, available at https://youtu.be/HeQNV-aQ_jU?t=5272; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 25-26.

477. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 161; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:29:30 - 1:31:51, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo.

478. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House employee with national security responsibilities, (July 19, 2022), pp. 12-15, 98-99; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 38:02-38:44, available at https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=2283.

479. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 108-09.

480. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

481. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 163.

482. Third Superseding Indictment at 21, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380 (noting that Dominic Pezzola âused [a] riot shield . . . to break a window of the Capitolâ at â2:13 p.m.â and that â[t]he first members of the mob entered the Capitol through this broken window.â); 167 Cong. Rec. S634 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf.

483. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014907.

484. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014912.

485. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014919.

486. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014925.

487. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014933.

488. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014935.

489. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014937.

490. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014939.

491. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014944.

492. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014961.

493. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

494. U.S. Senator Bill Cassidy, M.D. (@SenBillCassidy), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 4:03 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/SenBillCassidy/status/1346925444189327361.

495. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014971.

496. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), pp. 149-50; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Julie Radford, (May 25, 2022), p. 37.

497. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), pp. 145, 150.

498. Leader McCarthy spoke on the air to Fox News starting at 3:05 p.m. ET and told the network that âIâve already talked to the President. I called him. I think we need to make a statement, make sure that we can calm individuals down.â Fox News (FoxNews), âLISTEN: Rep. Kevin McCarthy on protesters storming Capitol,â Facebook, at 3:27-3:40, Jan. 6, 2021 (uploaded to Facebook at 3:35 p.m. ET), available at https://www.facebook.com/FoxNews/videos/listen-rep-kevin-mccarthy-on-protesters-storming-capitol/232725075039919/.

499. CBS News, âLive coverage: Protesters Swarm Capitol, Abruptly Halting Electoral Vote Count,â YouTube, at 3:29:02-3:29:15, 3:29:43-3:30:03, 3:31:28-3:32:07, 3:33:52-3:34:12, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://youtu.be/3Fsf4aWudJk?t=12542.

500. Rep. Herrera Beutler Describes Efforts to Get Trump to Intervene in Stopping Jan. 6 riot,â WTHR (Feb. 13, 2021), at 1:20 - 1:50, available at https://www.wthr.com/video/news/nation-world/capitol-riot-herrera-beutler-trump-mccarthy-call/507-477fa84f-1277-444a-aad6-716c5ec9f66f.

501. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of John Michael âMickâ Mulvaney, (July 28, 2022), p. 43. CNNâs Jamie Gangel related that she also confirmed the account with multiple other sources, reporting that âIâve spoken to multiple Republican Members of the House who have knowledge of that call, who tell us that after Trump tried to say to Kevin, âthese are not my people, itâs Antifa,â Kevin McCarthy said to Trump, âno, itâs not Antifa. These are your peopleâ. . . . Weâre also told by several other Republican Members that Kevin McCarthy wasnât shy about this heated exchange with Trump, that he wanted his Members to know about it.â CNN, âNew Details Emerge in McCarthyâs Call with Trump on January 6,â YouTube, at 0:25 - 1:50, Feb. 12, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gy1FPNluoOE.

502. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of John Michael âMickâ Mulvaney, (July 28, 2022), pp. 10-12 (describing calls and text messages to Dan Scavino and Mark Meadows).

503. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (HBO Production), Video file Reel_204I - All Clips Compilation.mp4 at 5:32â5:55 (January 6, 2021, footage of Nancy Pelosi and Chuck Schumer on phone call with Jeffrey Rosen); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014906 (January 6, 2021 text message from Marjorie Taylor Greene to Mark Meadows), MM014919 (January 6, 2021 text message from William Timmons to Mark Meadows), MM014939 (January 6, 2021 text message from Chip Roy to Mark Meadows).

504. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 151.

505. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 162.

506. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 152.

507. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 0:57:48 - 0:58:19, available at https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=3468.

508. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Security Official, (July 11, 2022), pp. 81-83; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th. The Select Committee is not revealing the identity of this witness because of national security concerns as well as to guard against the risk of retaliation.

509. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1346900434540240897.jpg (archived).

510. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 2:11:22-2:13:55, available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=7882.

511. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 2:26:06-2:26:26, available at https://youtu.be/IQvuBoLBuC0?t=8766; Sentencing Transcript at 19, United States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2022), ECF No. 170 (testifying for a victim impact statement, Officer Michael Fanone said: âAt approximately 1435 hours, with rapidly mounting injuries and most of the MPD less than lethal munitions expended, the defending officers were forced to conduct a fighting withdrawal back towards the United States Capitol Building entrance. This is the first fighting withdrawal in the history of the Metropolitan Police Department.â).

512. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

513. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

514. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), p. 113.

515. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 160.

516. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC_HH_043-044 (January 6, 2021, text message from Hope Hicks to Julie Radford at 7:18 p.m.).

517. 167 Cong. Rec. S635 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf; Spencer S. Hsu, âPence Spent Jan. 6 at Underground Senate Loading Dock, Secret Service Confirms,â Washington Post, (Mar. 21, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/03/21/couy-griffin-cowboys-trump-jan6/.

518. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Molly Michael, (Mar. 24, 2022), p. 137.

519. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

520. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 27.

521. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), at 1:31:25 â 1:32:22, available at https://youtu.be/HeQNV-aQ_jU?t=5359; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 27-28.

522. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 182.

523. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 68-69, 71.

524. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:38 p.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1346904110969315332.jpg (archived).

525. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

526. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 3:13 p.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1346912780700577792.jpg (archived).

527. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014925.

528. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014944.

529. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

530. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th].

531. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000004112_0001 (January 6, 2021 email at 3:05 p.m. notifying Beau Harrison of Ashli Babbitt shooting); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Beau Harrison (Aug. 18, 2022), pp. 73â76 (describing writing note and passing it to Mark Meadows or Tony Ornato); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000241 (January 6, 2021 pocket card written by Beau Harrison with the message, â1x CIVILIAN GUNSHOT WOUND TO CHEST @ DOOR OF HOUSE CHABER [sic]â); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), pp. 46â47 (âI remember seeing that [note] in front of [President Trump], yeah.â). The Select Committee is not revealing the identity of this witness to guard against the risk of retaliation. See also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Anthony Ornato, (January 28, 2022), p. 115; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 87 (recalling announcing during the afternoon that a Trump supporter had been killed).

532. âDepartment of Justice Closes Investigation into the Death of Ashli Babbitt,â Department of Justice, (Apr. 14, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/department-justice-closes-investigation-death-ashli-babbitt.

533. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Business Meeting on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; ABC News, âMike Pence Opens Up with David Muir on Jan. 6: Exclusive,â YouTube, at 9:27-10:00, Nov. 14, 2022, available at https://youtu.be/-AAyKAoPFQs?t=567; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark A. Milley (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 80-81; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 124-25; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 172-73, 182-84; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 186.

534. NBC News, âBiden Condemns Chaos at the Capitol as âInsurrection,ââ YouTube, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FBCWTqJT7M4; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

535. âTrump Video Telling Protesters at Capitol Building to Go Home: Transcript,â Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/trump-video-telling-protesters-at-capitol-building-to-go-home-transcript.

536. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

537. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th

538. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at 2:36:58-2:37:30, 2:44:00-2:45:05, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrUa0hfG6Lo (â[W]hen President Trump put his tweet out, we literally left right after that come out . . . As soon as that come out, everybody started talking about it . . . it definitely dispersed a lot of the crowd. . . . We left.â).

539. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at 1:58:00, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo.

540. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at 1:58:00, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo.

541. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 at 6:01 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20210106232133/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1346954970910707712 (archived).

542. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

543. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Timothy Murtaugh, (May 19, 2022), p. 175; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

544. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 194; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

545. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 192.

546. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 53. The Select Committee is not revealing the identity of this witness to guard against the risk of retaliation.

547. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).

548. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 205-07; Sunlen Serfaty, Devan Cole, and Alex Rogers, âAs Riot Raged at Capitol, Trump Tried to Call Senators to Overturn Election,â CNN, (Jan. 8, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/08/politics/mike-lee-tommy-tuberville-trump-misdialed-capitol-riot; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).

549. Mike Pence, So Help Me God (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2022), p. 475.

550. Mike Pence, So Help Me God (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2022), p. 474.

551. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 170-71; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (Jul. 8, 2022), p. 174; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), pp. 126â27; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), pp. 151-52; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 124-26; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 80-82; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 186-89; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 21-22.

552. ABC News, âPence Opens Up with David Muir on Jan. 6: Exclusive,â YouTube, at 10:45-11:02, Nov. 14, 2022, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-AAyKAoPFQs.

553. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 170-71; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (Jul. 8, 2022), p. 174; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), pp. 126â27; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), pp. 151-52; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 124-26; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 80-82; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 186-89; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 21-22.

554. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark A. Milley (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 17, 268.

555. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark A. Milley (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 296; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

556. Glenn Kessler, âTrump Falsely Claims He âRequestedâ 10,000 Troops Rejected by Pelosi,â Washington Post, (Mar. 2, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/03/02/trump-falsely-claims-he-requested-10000-troops-rejected-by-pelosi/; âMark Meadows: Biden Administration Policies Put âAmerica Lastâ,â Fox News, (Feb. 7, 2021), available at https://www.foxnews.com/transcript/mark-meadows-biden-administration-policies-put-america-last.

557. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 100-01. On January 4, 2021, Max Miller and Katrina Pierson exchanged text messages discussing their planning activities for the 6th. In those messages, Max Miller stated: âJust glad we killed the national guard and a processionâ and that â. . . chief [Mark Meadows] already had said no for days!â. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Max Miller Production), Miller Production 0001 (January 4, 2021, text messages between Max Miller and Katrina Pierson).

558. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at 2:22:45-2:23:22, available at https://youtu.be/rrUa0hfG6Lo?t=8565; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0717-719.

559. âHouse Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy on Asking President Trump for his Resignation,â ed. Alex Burns and Jonathan Martin, ThisWillNotPass.com, (Jan. 8, 2021), available at https://www.thiswillnotpass.com/bookresources.

560. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014456.

561. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014858 - MM014861.

562. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014467 (December 31, 2020, text message from telephone number assigned to Carrah Jo Roy, wife of Rep. Chip Roy. to Mark Meadows). The Select Committee believes that Rep. Chip Roy sent this message.

563. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014503 (January 1, 2021, text message from telephone number assigned to Carrah Jo Roy, wife of Rep. Chip Roy. to Mark Meadows). The Select Committee believes that Rep. Chip Roy sent this message.

564. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Kayleigh McEnany Production), CTRL0000925383, p. 3 (January 7, 2021, text message from Sean Hannity to Kayleigh McEnany)

565. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM015209 (January 10, 2021, text message Sean Hannity to Mark Meadows and Jim Jordan).

566. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014906.

567. âU.S. House Impeaches President Trump for Second Time, 232-197,â C-SPAN, at 4:14:56 - 4:15:31, Jan. 13, 2021, available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?507879-101/house-impeaches-president-trump-time-232-197&live=.

568. âRepublican Leader Kevin McCarthy says Pres. Trump Admitted He Bears Some Responsibility for the January 6 Insurrection at the U.S. Capitol,â ed. Alex Burns and Jonathan Martin, ThisWillNotPass.com, (Jan. 11, 2021), available at https://www.thiswillnotpass.com/bookresources.

569. âStatement by Mo Brooks,â Mo Brooks for U.S. Senate, available at https://mobrooks.com/statement-by-mo-brooks/; Joe Walsh, âGOP Rep. Mo Brooks Claims Trump Asked Him to Reinstate Trump Presidency,â Forbes, (Mar. 23, 2022), available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/joewalsh/2022/03/23/gop-rep-mo-brooks-claims-trump-asked-him-to-reinstate-trump-presidency/?sh=7264e1d91edd (noting that Rep. Mo Brooks issued this statement on Wednesday, March 23, 2022).

570. See Ryan Goodman and Josh Asabor, âIn Their Own Words: The 43 Republicansâ Explanations of Their Votes Not to Convict Trump in Impeachment Trial,â Just Security, (Feb. 15, 2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/74725/in-their-own-words-the-43-republicans-explanations-of-their-votes-not-to-convict-trump-in-impeachment-trial/.

571. C-SPAN, âSenate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell Remarks Following Senate Impeachment Vote,â YouTube, at 5:10 â 5:46, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yxRMoqNnfvw.

572. âRepublican Leader Kevin McCarthy Says Pres. Trump Admitted He Bears Some Responsibility for the January 6 Insurrection at the U.S. Capitol,â Alex Burns and Jonathan Martin, eds., ThisWillNotPass.com, (Jan. 11, 2021), available at https://www.thiswillnotpass.com/bookresources; Melanie Zanona, âNew Audio Reveals McCarthy said Trump Admitted Bearing Some Responsibility for Capitol Attack,â CNN, (April 22, 2022), available at https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/22/politics/trump-january-6-responsibility-book/index.html. Leader McCarthy also relayed this conversation with President Trump to his Republican colleagues: âI asked him [Trump] personally today, does he hold responsibility for what happened. And he needs to acknowledge that.â Id. The Committee believes that House Republican Leader McCarthyâs testimony would be material to any criminal investigation of Donald Trump, not just to probe this apparent Trump acknowledgement of culpability, but also because Leader McCarthy spoke directly to Donald Trump and others who were in the White House on January 6th and unsuccessfully pleaded for the Presidentâs immediate assistance to halt the violence. Leader McCarthy did not comply with the Select Committeeâs subpoena.

573. âU.S. House Impeaches President Trump for Second Time, 232-197,â C-SPAN, at 4:14:56 - 4:15:31, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?507879-101/house-impeaches-president-trump-time-232-197&live=; 167 Cong. Rec. H172 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/01/13/CREC-2021-01-13-pt1-PgH165.pdf.

574. See supra, Executive Summary.

575. See supra, Executive Summary.

576. Documents on file with the Select Committee (National Archives Production), VP-R0000156_0001 (January 6, 2021, email chain between John Eastman and Greg Jacob re: Pennsylvania letter).

577. Documents on file with Select Committee (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000738 â HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue).

578. See supra, Executive Summary. The State legislatures lacked authority to change the lawful outcome of the State elections at that point. Nevertheless Eastman, Trump, and others nevertheless pushed for such action.

579. See supra, Executive Summary.

580. See supra, Executive Summary; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 19, 2020 1:42 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201219064257/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1340185773220515840 (archived); see also, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 26, 2020 8:14 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1342821189077622792; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 27, 2020 5:51 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1343328708963299338; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 30, 2020 2:06 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1344359312878149634; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021 12:52 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40KylieJaneKremer%22 (retweeting @KylieJaneKremer, Dec. 19, 2020 3:50 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/KylieJaneKremer/status/1340399063875895296); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021 2:53 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345095714687377418; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021 3:34 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345106078141394944; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021 6:38 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345152408591204352; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 2, 2021 9:04 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345551634907209730; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 1:29 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40realDonaldTrump%3A+https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2FnslWcFwkCj%22 (retweeting Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Jan. 2, 2021 9:04 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345551634907209730); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:15 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40JenLawrence21%22 (retweeting Jennifer Lynn Lawrence (@JenLawrence21), Jan. 3, 2021 12:17 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/JenLawrence21/status/1345600194826686464); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:17 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40CodeMonkeyZ+if%22 (retweeting Ron Watkins (@CodeMonkeyZ) Jan. 2, 2021 9:14 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20210103151826/https://twitter.com/CodeMonkeyZ/status/1345599512560078849 (archived)); Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:24 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40realMikeLindell%22 (retweeting Mike Lindell (@realMikeLindell), Jan. 2, 2021 5:47 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20210103152421/https://twitter.com/realMikeLindell/status/1345547185836978176 (archived)); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:27 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345753534168506370; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:28 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40AmyKremer+we%22 (retweeting Amy Kremer (@AmyKremer), Jan. 2, 2021 2:58 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/AmyKremer/status/1345459488107749386); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 4, 2021 9:46 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40realDonaldTrump+I+will+be+there.+Historic+day%21%22 (retweeting Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Jan. 3, 2021 10:27 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345753534168506370); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 10:27 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1346478482105069568; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 5:43 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1346588064026685443.

581. Donald J. Trump (@realDonldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22mike+pence+%22&results=1 (archived) (âMikeÂ PenceÂ didnât have the courage to do what should have been done to protect our Country and our Constitution, giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to previously certify. USA demands the truth!â); USA Today Graphics (@usatgraphics), Twitter, Jan. 7, 2021 9:56 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/usatgraphics/status/1347376642956603392 (screenshotting the since-deleted tweet).

582. âTrump Video Telling Protesters at Capitol Building to Go Home: Transcript,â Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/trump-video-telling-protesters-at-capitol-building-to-go-home-transcript; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at 2:36:58-2:37:30 and 2:44:00-2:45:05, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrUa0hfG6Lo (â[W]hen President Trump put his tweet out, we literally left right after that come out . . . As soon as that come out, everybody started talking about it . . . it definitely dispersed a lot of the crowd. . . . We left.â).

583. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 3â16, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. March 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).

584. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 53â53, 58, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. March 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM) (referring to two Federal criminal statutes).Â

585. Order Re Privilege of 599 Documents Dated November 3, 2020 â January 20, 2021 at 24, Eastman v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM, (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2022), ECF No. 24.

586. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 63â64, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. March 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).

587. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 64, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. March 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).

588. See â23 Months Since the January 6th Attack on the Capitol,â Department of Justice, (Dec. 8, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/23-months-january-6-attack-capitol.

589. Kyle Cheney, âRep. Scott Perry Suing to Block DOJ Access to His Cell Phone,â Politico, (Aug. 24, 2022), available at https://www.politico.com/news/2022/08/24/rep-scott-perry-suing-to-block-doj-access-to-his-cell-phone-00053486; Betsy Woodruff Swan, Josh Gerstein, and Kyle Cheney, âDOJ Searches Home of Former Official Who Aided Alleged Pro-Trump âCoupâ,â Politico, (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/23/law-enforcement-trump-official-coup-00041767.

590. See, e.g., Sarah Murray, Evan Perez, and Katelyn Polantz, âFederal Judge Orders Former Top Lawyers in Trumpâs White House to Testify in Criminal Grand Jury Probe,â CNN, (Dec. 1, 2022), available at https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/01/politics/cipollone-philbin-trump-lawyers-testify.

591. Sara Murray and Jason Morris, âFulton County Prosecutor Investigating Trump Aims for Indictments as Soon as December,â CNN, (Oct. 6, 2022), available at https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/06/politics/fani-willis-georgia-prosecutor-trump-indictments-december/index.html.

592. The Special Counsel is to oversee the Departmentâs ongoing investigation âinto whether any person or entity unlawfully interfered with the transfer of power following the 2020 Presidential election or the certification of the Electoral College vote held on or about January 6, 2021.â âAppointment of a Special Counsel,â Department of Justice, (Nov. 18, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/appointment-special-counsel-0. In addition, the Special Counsel is to oversee the Departmentâs âongoing investigation involving classified documents and other Presidential records, as well as the possible obstruction of that investigation. . . .â Id.

593. The House of Representatives held Meadows in contempt for refusing to testify before the Committee, 167 Cong. Rec. H7814-7815 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2021), but DOJ declined to prosecute him. See Josh Gerstein, Kyle Cheny, and Nicholas Wu, âDOJ Declines to Charge Meadows, Scavino with Contempt of Congress for Defying Jan. 6 Committee,â Politico, (June 3, 2022), available at https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/03/doj-declines-to-charge-meadows-scavino-with-contempt-of-congress-for-defying-jan-6-committee-00037230.

594. 18 U.S.C. Â§ 1512(c)(2).

595. According to DOJ, â[a] conviction under Section 1512(c)(2) requires proof thatâ: (1) âthe natural and probable effect of the defendantâs actions were to obstruct [influence or impede] the official proceeding;â (2) âthat [defendant] knew that his actions were likely to obstruct [influence or impede] that proceeding;â and (3) âthat he acted with the wrongful or improper purpose of delaying or stopping the official proceeding.â United States v. Andries, No. 21-93 (RC), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44794 at *37 n.8 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2022) (quoting Governmentâs Response to Defendantâs Second Supplemental Brief at 6); see United States v. Aguilar; 515 U.S. 593, 616 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (describing the âlongstanding and well-accepted meaningâ of âcorruptlyâ as denoting âan act done with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of othersâ (quoting United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233, 238 (10th Cir. 1979))).

596. See, e.g., United States v. Gillespie, No. 22-CR-60 (BAH), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214833, at *7-8 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2022); United States v. Seefried, No. 1:21-cr-287 (TNM), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196980, at *2-3 (D.D.C. Oct. 29, 2022); United States v. Miller, 589 F. Supp. 3d 60, 67 (D.D.C. 2022), reconsideration denied, No. 1:21-CR-119 (CJN), 589 F. Supp. 3d 60 (D.D.C. May 27, 2022); United States v. Puma, No. 1:21-CR-454 (PLF), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48875, at *10 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2022); United States v. McHugh, 583 F. Supp. 3d 1, 14-15 (D.D.C. 2022). See also T. Kanefield, âJanuary 6 Defendants Are Raising a Creative Defense. It Isnât Working,â Washington Post, (Feb. 15, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/02/15/jan-6-official-proceeding/.

597. See supra, Executive Summary.

598. See supra, Executive Summary.

599. See supra, Executive Summary.

600. Documents on file with the Select Committee (National Archives Production), VP-R0000156_0001 (January 6, 2021, email chain between John Eastman and Greg Jacob re: Pennsylvania letter). One judge on the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, in the course of concluding that section 1512(c) is not void for vagueness, interpreted the âcorruptlyâ element as meaning âcontrary to law, statute, or established rule.â United States v. Sandlin, 575 F. Supp. 3d. 15â16, (D.D.C. 2021). As explained above, President Trump attempted to cause the Vice President to violate the Electoral Count Act, and even Dr. Eastman advised President Trump that the proposed course of action would violate the Act. We believe this satisfies the âcorruptlyâ element of the offense under the Sandlin opinion.

601. Indeed, it would not have been legally possible for a State to have done so in the days before January 6th.

602. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 49-50, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. March 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).

603. See supra, Executive Summary.

604. Documents on file with Select Committee (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000738 - COR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue).

605. See supra, Executive Summary.

606. See supra, Executive Summary.

607. See supra, Executive Summary. Jeffrey Clark invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to questions regarding this letter. As already noted, the political appointee who assisted in drafting the letter was hired at the Justice Department on December 15, 2020, but had worked on behalf of President Trump on election challenges in the weeks beforehand (including, apparently, while simultaneously serving as Special Counsel for the White House Office of Management and Budget).

608. See supra, Executive Summary.

609. See supra, Executive Summary.

610. See supra, Executive Summary.

611. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 26.

612. Documents on file with the Select Committee (National Archives Production), VP-R0000156_0001 (January 6, 2021, email chain between John Eastman and Greg Jacob re: Pennsylvania letter).

613. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 44. Although Eastman invoked his Fifth Amendment rights as a reason not to answer any of this Committeeâs substantive questions during his deposition, he has recently suggested in public that he only wished to delay the count of votes by multiple days. As the evidence developed by this Committee demonstrates, Eastman knew that such an effort to delay the count would also be illegal. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 1:32:00-1:35:13, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vBjUWVKuDj0 (â[D]id Dr. Eastman seem to admit that both of these theories suffered from similar legal flaws? [T]his new theory, as I was pointing out to him, or the procedural theory, still violates several provisions of the Electoral Count Act, as he acknowledged. . . . So, he acknowledged in those conversations that the underlying legal theory was the same. . . .â). In addition, neither Eastman nor any other co-conspirator had information establishing that any delay in counting votes would or could have changed the outcome of the election in any State.

614. See supra, Executive Summary. We also note that these Republican Members of Congress, who had more knowledge of Trumpâs planning for January 6th than any other Members of Congress, were also likely in a far superior position than any other Members to warn the Capitol Police of the risks of violence at the Capitol on January 6th.

615. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 2:29:50, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vBjUWVKuDj0 (âIâve decided that I should be on the pardon list, if that is still in the works.â).

616. The elements of a section 371 conspiracy to defraud the United States are: (1) at least two people entered into an agreement to obstruct a lawful function of the government, (2) by deceitful or dishonest means, and (3) aÂ member of the conspiracy engaged in at least one overt act in furtherance of the agreement. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 53, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM). Put similarly, to prove a violation section 371âs âdefraudâ provision, the Government must prove that the defendant: (1) agreed with at least one other person to defraud the United States, (2) knowingly participated in the conspiracy with the intent to defraud the United States, and (3) that at least one overt act was taken in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Dean, 55 F.3d 640, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Treadwell, 760 F.2d 327, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1985)); see also United States v. Mellen, 158, 393 F.3d 175, 181 (D.C. Cir. 2004). An individual âdefraudsâ the Government for purposes of section 371 if he âinterfere[s] with or obstruct[s] one of its lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest.â Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924); see also United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 122 n.255 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (upholding jury verdict on instruction defining âdefrauding the United Statesâ as: âdepriv[ing] the Government of its right to have the officials of its departments and agencies transact their official business honestly and impartially, free from corruption, fraud, improper and undue influence, dishonesty and obstructionâ).

617. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 54-55, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).

618. See Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 53, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM). (âAn âagreementâ between co-conspirators need not be express and can be inferred from the conspiratorsâ conduct.â).

619. See infra, Chapter 1.

620. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 55, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).

621. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 57, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).

622. See infra, Chapter 2. President Trumpâs call with Secretary Raffensperger may have violated several provisions of both Federal and Georgia law. We do not attempt to catalogue all the possible violations here.

623. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 57, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).

624. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 59, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).

625. â908. ELEMENTS OF 18 U.S.C. Â§ 1001,â Department of Justice, (last accessed on Dec. 13, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-908-elements-18-usc-1001.

626. The elements of a section 371 conspiracy are discussed above.

627. As explained in Chapter 3, staffers for Rep. Mike Kelly (R-PA) and Sen. Ron Johnson (R-WI) reached out to Vice President Penceâs director of legislative affairs, apparently seeking to deliver fake certificates on January 6. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), 00012 (January 6, 2021, text message from Rep. Kellyâs chief of staff, Matt Stroia, to Chris Hodgson on January at 8:41 a.m.), 00058 (January 6, 2021, text messages from Senator Johnsonâs chief of staff, Sean Riley, to Chris Hodgson around 12:37 p.m.).

628. See infra, Chapter 3.

629. 18 U.S.C. Â§ 1001 (emphasis added).

630. See, e.g., United States v. Bowser, 964 F.3d 26, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1390 (2021) (â[T]he False Statements Act applies to âany investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of any committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the Congress.â 18 U.S.C. Â§ 1001(c)(2) (emphasis added).â); United States v. Stone, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2019).

631. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Business Meeting on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13, 2022), at 1:14:59-1:15:22 available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQvuBoLBuC0 (â[President Trump] turned the call over to Mr. Eastman, who then proceeded to talk about the importance of the RNC helping the campaign gather these contingent electors, in case any of the legal challenges that were ongoing changed the result of any of the states.â).

632. 18 U.S.C. Â§ 2383.

633. Thompson v. Trump, 590 F. Supp. 3d 46, 115 (D.D.C. 2022), appeal pending, No. 22-5069 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 2022).

634. See Ryan Goodman and Josh Asabor, âIn Their Own Words: The 43 Republicansâ Explanations of Their Votes Not to Convict Trump in Impeachment Trial,â Just Security, (Feb. 15, 2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/74725/in-their-own-words-the-43-republicans-explanations-of-their-votes-not-to-convict-trump-in-impeachment-trial/.

635. See supra, Executive Summary.

636. See supra, Executive Summary. The evidence suggests that the Vice President and certain members of President Trumpâs staff urged DOD to deploy the National Guard notwithstanding the Presidentâs wishes.

637. A prominent U.S. professor of criminal law has opined that President Trump can be held criminally responsible under section 2383 for his failure to act, when he had a duty to act given his constitutional obligation under Article II section 3 of the Constitution to âtake Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.â See Albert W. Alschuler, âTrump and the Insurrection Act: The Legal Framework,â Just Security, (Aug. 16, 2022), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/82696/trump-and-the-insurrection-act-the-true-legal-framework/. Professor Albert Alschuler, the Julius Kreeger Professor Emeritus at the University of Chicago Law School, taught criminal law for over 50 years at many of our Nationâs leading law schools. He has published a number of analytical pieces applying the âassistsâ and âaid and comfortâ clauses of that provisions (which he analogizes to âaiding and abettingâ accomplice liability) to the evidence presented at the Committeeâs hearings. In any event, as described above, President Trump did act, including through his 2:24 p.m. tweet about the Vice President that inflamed the crowd attacking the Capitol.

638. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022) p. 26.

639. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:02:53, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox="didnât+have+the+courage+to+do+what+should+have+been+done" (archived).

640. See infra, Chapter 8.

641. See supra, Executive Summary.

642. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 27.

643. See Mariana Alfaro, âTrump Vows Pardons, Government Apology to Capitol Rioters if Elected,â Washington Post, (Sept. 1, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/01/trump-jan-6-rioters-pardon/.

644. Jordan Fischer, Eric Flack, and Stephanie Wilson, âGeorgia Man Who Wanted to âRemove Some Craniumsâ on January 6 Sentenced to More than 2 Years in Prison,â WUSA9, (Dec. 14, 2021), available at https://perma.cc/RSY2-J3RU.

645. Dan Mangan, âCapitol Rioter Garret Miller Says He Was Following Trumpâs Orders, Apologizes to AOC for Threat,â CNBC, (Jan. 25, 2021), available at https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/25/capitol-riots-garret-miller-says-he-was-following-trumps-orders-apologizes-to-aoc.html.

646. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 6:01 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22these+are+the+things+and+events%22 (archived).

647. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), pp. 166â67.

648. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 6:01 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22these+are+the+things+and+events%22 (archived).

649. 18 U.S.C. Â§Â 372.

650. See âLeader of Oath Keepers and Oath Keepers Member Found Guilty of Seditious Conspiracy and Other Charges Related to U.S. Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (Nov. 29, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-oath-keepers-and-oath-keepers-member-found-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-and-other.

651. 18 U.S.C. Â§Â 2384. To establish a violation of section 2384, the government must establish (1) a conspiracy, (2) to overthrow, put down, or destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof. See United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477, 487 (4th Cir. 2006).

652. âLeader of Oath Keepers and Oath Keepers Member Found Guilty of Seditious Conspiracy and Other Charges Related to U.S. Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (Nov. 29, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-oath-keepers-and-oath-keepers-member-found-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-and-other.

653. âLeader of Proud Boys and Four Other Members Indicted in Federal Court for Seditious Conspiracy and Other Offenses Related to U.S. Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (June 6, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-proud-boys-and-four-other-members-indicted-federal-court-seditious-conspiracy-and.

654. See supra, Executive Summary.

655. Brian Naylor, âRead Trumpâs Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial,â NPR, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.

656. Kristen Holmes, âTrump Calls for the Termination of the Constitution in Truth Social Post,â CNN, (Dec. 4, 2022), available at https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/03/politics/trump-constitution-truth-social/index.html.

657. See Mariana Alfaro, âTrump Vows Pardons, Government Apology to Capitol Rioters if Elected,â Washington Post, (Sept. 1, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/01/trump-jan-6-rioters-pardon/.

658. See infra, Chapter 7.

659. 167 Cong. Rec. H171-72 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 2021).

660. See supra, Executive Summary.

661. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 84â87.Â

662. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008962_0009 (January 2, 2021, White House Presidential Call Log).

663. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014864 (January 5, 2021, text message from Rep. Jim Jordan to Mark Meadows describing the Vice Presidentâs actions on January 6th).

664. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255-259 (January 6, 2021, Presidential Daily Diary); Felicia Somnez, âRep. Jim Jordan Tells House Panel He Canât Recall How Many Times He Spoke with Trump on Jan. 6,â Washington Post, (Oct. 20, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/jordan-trump-calls-capitol-attack/2021/10/20/1a570d0e-31c7-11ec-9241-aad8e48f01ff_story.html.

665. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).Â

666. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 205â07.

667. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (May 17, 2022), p. 106.

668. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 72â73.

669. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Mar. 7, 2022), pp. 66â67.

670. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 62â64.

671. See Sarah Lynch and David Shepardson, âWatchdog to Probe if Justice Dept. Officials Improperly Tried to Alter 2020 Election,â Reuters, (Jan. 25, 2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-justice/watchdog-to-probe-if-justice-dept-officials-improperly-tried-to-alter-2020-election-idUSKBN29U21E (âThroughout the past four years, I worked with Assistant Attorney General Clark on various legislative matters. When President Trump asked if I would make an introduction, I obliged,â Perry said in a statement.â).

672. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 48.

673. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 45.

674. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (May 17, 2022), pp. 106â07.

675. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011449.

676. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011506, (November 2020 text messages from Rep. Andy Biggs to Mark Meadows).

677. Josh Kelety, âCongressman Andy Biggs Coordinated Efforts with Mark Finchem before Capitol Riot,â Phoenix New Times, (Feb. 18, 2021), available at https://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/congressman-andy-biggs-coordinated-with-mark-finchem-before-capitol-riot-11532527.

678. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Jim DeGraffenreid Production), DEGRAFFENREID 000554 (December 18, 2020, text messages between James DeGraffenreid, a Nevada fake elector for Trump, and another remarking that âAndy Biggs . . . has reached out to NV to ask about our evidenceâ).

679. Audrey Fahlberg, âJanuary 6 Hearings Become Fundraising Fodder,â The Dispatch, (July 7, 2022), available at https://thedispatch.com/p/january-6-hearings-become-fundraising; Archive of Political Emails, Jim Jordan, âThe January 6th Committee Is After Me,â June 9, 2022 12:41 p.m., available at https://politicalemails.org/messages/686023.

680. John Rowley III to the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson re: âSubpoena to Representative Scott Perry,â (May 24, 2022), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/22061774-scott-perry-j6-response.

681. Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, House Ethics Manual, p. 13 (2008).

682. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R001080 (December 21, 2020, WAVES records showing Representatives Babin, Biggs, Brooks, Gaetz, Gohmert, Gosar, Taylor Greene, Harris, Hice, Jordan, and Perry entering the White House).

683. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John Eastman, (Dec. 9, 2021); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Roger Stone, (Dec. 17, 2021); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeffrey Clark, (Feb. 2, 2022); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Michael Flynn, (Mar. 10, 2022).

684. Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 328 (1999)). Justice Scalia not only agreed with this principle, but he also reasoned that the Fifth Amendment does not prevent an adverse inference in even criminal cases. This is because the text of that Amendment does not require such a rule and applying an adverse inference to a refusal to testify is exactly in keeping with ânormal evidentiary inferences.â See Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 332 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas agreed with Justice Scalia. See id. at 341-42 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

685. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Michael Flynn, (Mar. 10, 2022), p. 82.

686. Trump v. Thompson, 20 F.4th 10, 15-16 (D.C. Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 1350 (2022).

687. Trump v. Thompson, 20 F.4th 10, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 1350 (2022). Former President Trump also asked the United State Supreme Court to block the Select Committee from accessing his documents. The Supreme Court denied that request stating, âBecause the Court of Appeals concluded that President Trumpâs claims would have failed even if he were the incumbent, his status as a former President necessarily made no difference to the courtâs decision.â Trump v. Thompson, 142 S.Ct. 680, 680 (2022) (citation omitted).

688. H. Res. 851, 117th Cong., (2021); H. Rept. 117-216, Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives Find Mark Randall Meadows in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 1st Sess. (2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt216/CRPT-117hrpt216.pdf.

689. Statement of Interest of the United States at 9-10, Meadows v. Pelosi et al., No. 1:21-cv-03217 (CJN) (D.D.C. July 15, 2022), ECF No. 42.

690. âThompson & Cheney Statement on Justice Department Decisions on Contempt Referrals,â Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (June 3, 2022), available at https://january6th.house.gov/news/press-releases/thompson-cheney-statement-justice-department-decisions-contempt-referrals.

691. Dennis Aftergut, âWhy the DOJ Did Not Indict Mark Meadows (and What It Should Do Next),â NBC News, (June 7, 2022), available at https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/trump-lackey-mark-meadows-escaped-january-6-prosecution-peter-navarro-rcna32319.

692. H. Res. 1037, 117th Cong., (2022); H. Rept. 117-284, Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives Find Peter K. Navarro and Daniel Scavino, Jr., in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 2d Sess. (2022), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt284/CRPT-117hrpt284.pdf. In particular, Scavino may have further information on President Trumpâs advance knowledge from social media posts of the riotersâ plans to invade the Capitol. See supra __.

693. H. Res. 730, 117th Cong., (2021); H. Rept. 117-152, Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives Find Stephen K. Bannon in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 1st Sess. (2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt152/CRPT-117hrpt152.pdf.

694. H. Res. 1037, 117th Cong., (2022); âPeter Navarro Indicted for Contempt of Congress,â Department of Justice, (June 3, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/peter-navarro-indicted-contempt-congress; H. Rept. 117-284, Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives Find Peter K. Navarro and Daniel Scavino, Jr., in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 2d Sess. (2022), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt284/CRPT-117hrpt284.pdf.

695. See infra 136.

696. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at 2;14:00-2:14:50, available at https://youtu.be/rrUa0hfG6Lo.

697. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28, 2022), pp. 153-55; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 129-35; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 176-77; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (May 17, 2022), pp. 104-06.

698. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), at 2:22:05-2:23:41, available at https://www.youtube.com/live/Z4535-VW-bY?feature=share&t=8525.

699. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28, 2022), pp. 153-55; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), at 2:23:41-2:24:42, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z4535-VW-bY&t=8620s.

700. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 129-35, esp. pp. 130-131; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), at 2:21:26-2:22:04, available at https://www.youtube.com/live/Z4535-VW-bY?feature=share&t=8486.

701. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 133.

702. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000005854_0001 (January 11, 2021, email from Molly Michael to Rep. Mo Brooks, confirming receipt of email from Brooks recommending pardons, including for âEvery Congressman and Senator who voted to reject the electoral college vote submissions of Arizona and Pennsylvaniaâ); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), at 2:20:52-2:21:12, available at https://www.youtube.com/live/Z4535-VW-bY?feature=share&t=8452.

703. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

704. The Committee has enormous respect for the U.S. Secret Service and recognized that the testimony regarding their work is sensitive for law enforcement, protectee security, and national security reasons. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of USSS Employee âDriverâ, (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 4 (the Select Committee is not releasing the name of this individual); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 28, 2022), p. 4; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of USSS Employee, (Nov. 21, 2022), p. 4; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of USSS Employee, (Nov. 18, 2022), p. 4 Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 4.

705. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of USSS Employee, (Nov. 7, 2022), pp. 4, 86-87.

706. See, e.g., Devlin Barrett, Jacqueline Alemany, Josh Dawsey, and Rosalind S. Heldeman, âThe Justice Dept.âs Jan. 6 Investigation Is Looking at . . . Everything,â Washington Post, (Sept. 16, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/15/trump-january-6-subpoenas-meadows/; Josh Dawsey and Isaac Arnsdorf, âProsecutors Seek Details from Trumpâs PAC in Expanding Jan. 6 Probe,â Washington Post, (Sept. 8, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/08/trump-subpoenas-pac-jan-6/.

707. See Devlin Barrett, Josh Dawsey, and Isaac Stanley-Becker, âTrumpâs Committee Paying for Lawyers of Key Mar-a-Lago Witnesses,â Washington Post, (Dec. 5, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/12/05/trump-witnesses-legal-bills-pac/.

708. The Committee sat for dozens of hours with Hutchinson and concluded that she is brave and earnest, and understood the intense backlash that would inevitably result from those who were enlisted to defend President Trumpâs behavior. [See infra, Chapter 7]. The thuggish behavior from President Trumpâs team, including efforts to intimidate described elsewhere in this report (see e.g. Chapter 3), gave rise to many concerns about Hutchinsonâs security, both in advance of and since her public testimony. (We note that multiple members of the Committee were regularly receiving threats of violence during this period.) Accordingly, the Committee attempted to take appropriate measures to help ensure her safety in advance of her testimony, including measures designed to minimize the risk of leaks that might put her safety at risk.

709. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 71-72 (noting that another witness reference may have been to Pat Philbin).

710. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 264-65.

711. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 52-57, 70-74, 282-88.

712. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 142-45, 288-92. See also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 12-15.

713. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 183-86.

714. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 39-41.

715. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), p. 41.

716. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 38-39, 120, 205, 210, 213-14.

717. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 27.

718. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Julie Radford, (May 24, 2022), p. 19.

719. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 40.

720. Mark Meadows, The Chiefâs Chief (Ft. Lauderdale, FL: All Seasons Press, 2021).

721. Mark Meadows, The Chiefâs Chief (Ft. Lauderdale, FL: All Seasons Press, 2021), p. 259.

722. Mark Meadows, The Chiefâs Chief (Ft. Lauderdale, FL: All Seasons Press, 2021), p. 259.

723. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 47-49.

724. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Jan.y 28, 2022), pp. 76-77.

725. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Mar. 29, 2022), pp. 46-47. Ornato was interviewed at length by the Select Committee in November 2022, after the Secret Service produced nearly a million new internal documents in August and September of this year.

726. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), p. 92; see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Mar. 29, 2022), pp. 45-46 (stating that he had not heard about President Trumpâs instruction to others to ask Ornato about going to the Capitol).

727. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Interview of White House employee with national security responsibilities, (July 19, 2022), pp. 69-70; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 4-6.

728. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Interview of White House employee with national security responsibilities, (July 19, 2022), pp. 69-70; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 4-6.

729. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House employee with national security responsibilities, (July 19, 2022), pp. 69-70; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 4-7; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of USSS Employee âDriverâ, (Nov. 7, 2022), pp. 77-80, 92-93; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark Robinson, (July 7, 2022), pp. 17-18.

730. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), pp. 104-105, 131-32, 135-36. See also Chapter 7.

731. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 199 (describing another senior intelligence official worrying, ahead of January 6th, about violence at the Capitol); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Donnell Harvin, (Jan. 24, 2022), pp. 22-23 (former Chief of Homeland Security and Intelligence for the District of Columbia describing the threat scene ahead of January 6th); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001532.0001, p.2 (January 5, 2021, FBI Situational Information Report).

732. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), pp. 54-56.

733. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), pp. 55-56.

734. See supra pp. 81-83. See also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), p. 13 (Ornato confirming that one of his responsibilities was briefing the chief of staff and, through the chief of staff at times, the President on security-related issues).

735. âU.S. House of Representatives Debate on Impeachment of President Trump,â C-SPAN, at 1:03:53 - 1:13:42, Jan. 13, 2021, available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?507879-4/debate-impeachment-president-trump; Tyler Moyer, âMcCarthy: âPresident Bears Responsibility for Wednesdayâs Attackâ,â Bakersfield Now, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://bakersfieldnow.com/news/local/mccarthy-president-bears-responsibility-for-wednesdays-attack.

736. âHouse Minority Leader Weekly Briefing.â C-SPAN, at 7:30 - 8:44, Jan. 21, 2021, available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?508185-1/minority-leader-mccarthy-backs-gop-conference-chair-liz-cheney; Rudy Talaka, âGOP Leader McCarthy Calls for Bipartisan Commission to Investigate Allegations of Members Helping Rioters,â Mediaite, (Jan. 21, 2021), available at https://www.mediaite.com/news/gop-leader-mccarthy-calls-for-bipartisan-commission-to-investigate-allegations-of-members-helping-rioters/; âRep. McCarthy Calls for Bipartisan Commission to Probe Capitol Riot,â Newsmax, (Jan. 22, 2021), available at https://www.newsmax.com/politics/kevin-mccarthy-capitol-riot-boebert-probe/2021/01/21/id/1006648/.

737. Clare Foran, Ryan Nobles, and Annie Grayer, ââPelosi Announces Plans for â9/11-Type Commissionâ to Investigate Capitol Attack,â CNN, (Feb. 15, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/15/politics/pelosi-capitol-attack-commission/index.html.

738. âLetter to The Honorable Speaker Nancy Pelosi,â House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy, (Feb. 22, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/Sharp%20MX-4141_20210518_081238.pdf.

739. âLetter to The Honorable Speaker Nancy Pelosi,â House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy, (Feb. 22, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/Sharp%20MX-4141_20210518_081238.pdf.

740. âLetter to The Honorable Speaker Nancy Pelosi,â House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy, (Feb. 22, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/Sharp%20MX-4141_20210518_081238.pdf.

741. Ryan Nobles, Annie Grayer, and Jeremy Herb, âPelosi Concedes to Even Partisan Split on 1/6 Commission in Effort to Jumpstart Talks,â CNN, (Apr. 20, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/20/politics/nancy-pelosi-january-6-commission-talks/index.html; Ryan Nobles and Daniella Diaz, âPelosi Makes Concession on Subpoenas for 9/11 Style Commission to Investigate Insurrection,â CNN, (Apr. 22, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/22/politics/nancy-pelosi-911-style-commission-insurrection-subpoenas/index.html.

742. John Bresnahan, Anna Palmer, and Jake Sherman, âPelosi Taps Top Dem to Negotiate on Jan. 6 Commission,â Punchbowl News, (May 11, 2021), available at https://punchbowl.news/archive/punchbowl-news-am-5-11/.

743. âChairman Thompson Announces Bipartisan Agreement with Ranking Member Katko to Create Commission to Investigate the January 6 Attack on the Capitol,â House Committee on Homeland Security, (May 14, 2021), available at https://homeland.house.gov/news/press-releases/chairman-thompson-announces-bipartisan-agreement-with-ranking-member-katko-to-create-commission-to-investigate-the-january-6-attack-on-the-capitol.

744. âMcCarthy Statement on January 6 Commission Legislation,â House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy, (May 18, 2021), available at https://www.republicanleader.gov/mccarthy-statement-on-january-6-commission-legislation/.

745. âPelosi Statement on McCarthy Opposition to January 6th Commission,â Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, (May 18, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/51821.

746. âPelosi Statement on McCarthy Opposition to January 6th Commission,â Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, (May 18, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/51821; âLetter to The Honorable Speaker Nancy Pelosi,â House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy, (Feb. 22, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/Sharp%20MX-4141_20210518_081238.pdf.

747. âPelosi Statement on McCarthy Opposition to January 6th Commission,â Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, (May 18, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/51821.

748. âU.S. House of Representatives House Session,â C-SPAN, at 4:12:23-4:12:55, May 19, 2021, available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?511820-2/houses-passes-bill-create-january-6-commission-252-175.

749. âRoll Call 154 | Bill Number: H. R. 3233,â Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives, (May 19, 2021), available at https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2021154?Page=1&Date=05%2F19%2F2021.

750. âRoll Call Vote 117th Congress - 1st Session,â Question: On the Cloture Motion (Motion to Invoke Cloture Re: Motion to Proceed to H.R. 3233), H.R. 3233 - 117th Congress (2021): National Commission to Investigate the January 6 Attack on the United States Capitol Complex Act, H.R.3233, 117th Cong. (2021), available at https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1171/vote_117_1_00218.htm.

751. âHouse Speaker Nancy Pelosi Announces Select Committee on the January 6th Insurrection,â C-SPAN, at 4:44-5:26, June 24, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=guCcy9tUfn8.

752. Manu Raju and Clare Foran, âOfficer Injured in Capitol Riot asks McCarthy to Denounce GOP January 6 Conspiracies,â CNN, (June 25, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/25/politics/michael-fanone-kevin-mccarthy-meeting/index.html.

753. Manu Raju and Clare Foran, âOfficer Injured in Capitol Riot asks McCarthy to Denounce GOP January 6 Conspiracies,â CNN, (June 25, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/25/politics/michael-fanone-kevin-mccarthy-meeting/index.html.

754. âRoll Call 197 | Bill Number: H. Res. 503,â Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives, (June 30, 2021), available at https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2021197.

755. âPelosi Names Members to Select Committee to Investigate January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol,â House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, (July 1, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/7121-0.

756. âMcCarthy Names House Republicans to Serve on Select Committees,â House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy, (July 19, 2021), available at https://www.republicanleader.gov/mccarthy-names-house-republicans-to-serve-on-select-committees/.

757. âMcCarthy Taps Banks to Lead Republicans on Jan 6 Committee,â Congressman Jim Banks, (Jul. 19, 2021), available at https://banks.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=1921.

758. âPelosi Statement on Republican Recommendations to Serve on the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol,â Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, (Jul. 21, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/72121-2.

759. âPelosi Statement on Republican Recommendations to Serve on the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol,â Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, (Jul. 21, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/72121-2.

760. âMcCarthy Statement about Pelosiâs Abuse of Power on January 6th Select Committee,â Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy, (July 21, 2021), available at https://republicanleader.house.gov/mccarthy-statement-about-pelosis-abuse-of-power-on-january-6th-select-committee/; âMcCarthy Pulls Republicans from Jan. 6 Select Committee after Pelosi Rejects Picks,â Axios, (July 21, 2021), available at https://www.axios.com/2021/07/21/pelosi-jim-jordan-banks-select-committee.

761. âPelosi Announces Appointment of Congressman Adam Kinzinger to Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol,â House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, (July 25, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/72521; 167 Cong. Rec. H3885 (daily ed. July 26, 2021).

762. See, e.g., Eastman v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25546, at *12-14 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2022); Memorandum Opinion, Republican National Committee v. Nancy Pelosi et al. https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.241102/gov.uscourts.dcd.241102.33.0.pdf.

1

Late on election night 2020, President Donald J. Trump addressed the nation from the East Room of the White House. When Trump spoke, at 2:21 a.m. on November 4th, the Presidentâs re-election was very much in doubt. Fox News, a conservative media outlet, had correctly called Arizona for former Vice President Joseph R. Biden. Every Republican presidential candidate since 1996 had won Arizona. If the President lost the State, and in the days ahead it became clear that he had, then his campaign was in trouble. But as the votes continued to be counted, President Trumpâs apparent early lead in other key StatesâStates he needed to winâsteadily shrank. Soon, he would not be in the lead at allâheâd be losing.

So, the President of the United States did something he had planned to do long before election day: he lied.

âThis is a fraud on the American public. This is an embarrassment to our country,â President Trump said. âWe were getting ready to win this election,â the President continued. âFrankly, we did win this election. We did win this election.â Trump claimed, without offering any evidence, that a âmajor fraudâ was occurring âin our nation.ââ1

Neither of President Trumpâs claims were true. He had no basis for claiming victory or that fraud was taking place. Millions of votes still had not been counted. The States were simply tabulating the ballots cast by the American people. Trumpâs own campaign advisors told him to waitâthat it was far too early to declare victory.

As the evening progressed, President Trump called in his campaign team to discuss the results. Trump Campaign Manager William Stepien and other campaign experts advised him that the results of the election would not be known for some time, and that he could not truthfully declare victory. Stepien was of the view that, because ballots were going to be counted for days, âit was far too early to be making any proclamation [about having won the election].â Stepien told President Trump that his recommendation was to say, âvotes are still being counted. It's . . . too early to call the race.ââ2

Jason Miller, another senior Trump Campaign advisor, told the Select Committee that he argued in conversations with Stepien and others that night against declaring victory at the time as well, because âit was too early to say one way [or] the otherâ who had won. Miller recalled recommending that âwe should not go and declare victory until we had a better sense of the numbers.ââ3

According to testimony received by the Committee, the only advisor present who supported President Trumpâs inclination to declare victory was Rudy Giuliani, who, according to Miller, was âdefinitely intoxicatedâ that evening.4

President Trumpâs decision to declare victory falsely on election night and, unlawfully, to call for the vote counting to stop, was not a spontaneous decision. It was premeditated. The Committee has assembled a range of evidence of President Trumpâs preplanning for a false declaration of victory. This includes multiple written communications on October 31st and November 3, 2020, to the White House by Judicial Watch President Tom Fitton.5 This evidence demonstrates that Fitton was in direct contact with President Trump and understood that he would falsely declare victory on election night and call for vote counting to stop. The evidence also includes an audio recording of President Trumpâs advisor Steve Bannon, who said this on October 31, 2020, to a group of his associates from China:

And what Trumpâs going to do is just declare victory, right? Heâs gonna declare victory. But that doesnât mean heâs the winner. Heâs just gonna say heâs a winnerâ¦ The Democrats, more of our people vote early that count. Their vote in mail. And so theyâre gonna have a natural disadvantage, and Trumpâs going to take advantage of it. Thatâs our strategy. Heâs gonna declare himself a winner. So when you wake up Wednesday morning, itâs going to be a firestorm . . . Also, if Trump, if Trump is losing, by ten or eleven oâclock at night, itâs going to be even crazier. No, because heâs gonna sit right there and say âThey stole it. Iâm directing the Attorney General to shut down all ballot places in all 50 states. Itâs going to be, no, heâs not going out easy. If Trumpâif Bidenâs winning, Trump is going to do some crazy shit.6

Also in advance of the election, Roger Stone, another outside advisor to President Trump, made this statement:

I really do suspect it will still be up in the air. When that happens, the key thing to do is to claim victory. Possession is 9/10s of the law. No, we won. Fuck you, Sorry. Over. We won. Youâre wrong. Fuck you.7

In the days after the election, the Presidentâs own campaign team told him he had lost and there was no evidence of significant fraud. When his campaign staff wouldnât tell him what he wanted to hear, President Trump replaced them with what Attorney General William Barr described as a âclown carâ of individuals willing to promote various conspiracy theories.8

But Donald Trump was no passive consumer of these lies. He actively propagated them. Time and again President Trump was informed that his election fraud claims were not true. He chose to spread them anyway. He did so even after they were legally tested and rejected in dozens of lawsuits. Not even the electoral collegeâs certification of former Vice President Bidenâs victory on December 14, 2020, stopped the President from lying. Throughout, the Big Lie remained central to President Trumpâs efforts to block the peaceful transfer of power on January 6, 2021.

President Trumpâs âBig Lieâ on election night was based on simple differences in how Americans vote. In 2020, it was well-known that Democrats were much more likely to vote via mail-in ballots than in person in 2020. On the other hand, Republicans generally preferred to vote in person on election day.9 In key swing States with tight margins between the candidates, the election day votes would favor President Trump and disproportionately be counted first. Mail-in ballots, which would favor former Vice President Biden, would disproportionately be counted later. In some States it would take days to process the remaining mail-in ballots.

The timing of how votes are counted created the potential for what is known as a âRed Mirageââor an illusion of a Republican (Red) victory in the early stages of vote counting. President Trump would appear to be in the lead on election night, but this was not the whole picture. Many mail-in votes for former Vice President Biden would not be counted on election day. Therefore, the actual winner would likely not be known on election night.

The âRed Mirageâ phenomenon was widely known prior to the 2020 presidential election. Chris Stirewalt was the head of the Fox News elections desk that correctly called Arizona for Biden. Stirewalt and his team tried to warn viewers of the Red Mirage. He testified that over the past 40 or 50 years, âAmericans have increasingly chosen to vote by mail or early or absentee,â and that âDemocrats prefer that method of voting more than Republicans do.ââ10 In nearly âevery election,â Stirewalt elaborated, âRepublicans win Election Day and Democrats win the early vote, and then you wait and start counting.â It â[h]appens every time.ââ11

President Trumpâs campaign team made sure the President was briefed on the timing of vote tallying. Stepien, his campaign manager, told the Select Committee that President Trump was reminded on election day that large numbers of mail-in ballots would still remain to be counted over the coming days.12 Stepien added that he personally reminded the President that while early returns may be favorable, the counting would continue: âI recounted back to 2016 when I had a very similar conversation with him on election day . . . I recounted back to that conversation with him in which I said, just like I said in 2016 was going to be a long night, I told him in 2020 that, you know, it was going to be a process again, as, you know, the early returns are going to be positive. Then weâre going to, you know, be watching the returns of ballots as, you know, they rolled in thereafter.ââ13

Ordinarily, the âRed Mirageâ anomaly does not create problems in the election process because candidates wait for the votes to be tallied before declaring victory or conceding. As Stirewalt emphasized, prior to President Trump, âno candidate had ever tried to avail themselves of this quirk in the election counting system.ââ14

President Trump, however, made a different choice. In an extraordinary breach of the American democratic process, he decided to exploit the potential for confusion about the staggered timing of vote counting to deceive the American public about the election results. He and his allies foreshadowed this decision in their statements in the months leading up to the November 2020 election.

On Halloween, advisor Steve Bannon, who had served four years earlier as Donald Trumpâs 2016 campaign manager, laid out the election night plan. âWhat Trumpâs gonna do is just declare victory. Right? Heâs gonna declare victory. But that doesnât mean heâs a winner,â Bannon told a private audience. âHeâs just gonna say heâs a winner.ââ15

Bannon explained that the Democrats â[would] have a natural disadvantageâ on election night, because more Democrats would vote by mail than Republicans and it would take time to count the mail-in ballots. This would give President Trump the illusion of a lead. âAnd Trumpâs going to take advantage of it,â Bannon said. âThatâs our strategy. Heâs gonna declare himself a winner.ââ16

In an interview on Fox News the morning of the election, Bannon insisted that President Trump needed to address the nation that night, to âprovide the narrative engine for how we go forward.ââ17 During an episode of his podcast later that same day, Bannon clarified what he meant: President Trump is âgoing to claim victory. Right? Heâs going to claim victory.ââ18

Tom Fitton drafted a victory statement for the President to read on election night.19 On October 31st, he emailed the statement to President Trumpâs assistant, Molly Michael, and social media guru, Dan Scavino. Fitton wrote that election day, November 3rd, was the âdeadline by which voters in states across the country must choose a president.â Fitton argued that counting ballots that arrived after election day would be part of an effort by âpartisansâ to âoverturnâ the election results.20

Of course, that claim wasnât trueâmail-in ballots are regularly processed after election day. Regardless, Fitton encouraged the President to pre-emptively declare victory. âWe had an election todayâand I won,â Fitton wrote for President Trump.21 Early in the evening on election day, Fitton emailed Michael again to say he had â[j]ust talked to him [President Trump] about the draft [statement].ââ22 Later that evening, before President Trump made his election night remarks, Michael replied that she was â . . redelivering to him [President Trump] now.ââ23

Roger Stone, President Trumpâs longtime political confidante, told several associates just prior to the election that Trump needed to declare victoryâespecially if the race wasnât called on election day. âLetâs just hope we are celebratingâ on election night, Stone said. âI really do suspect it will still be up in the air. When that happens, the key thing to do is claim victory.â Stone elaborated with colorful language. âPossession is nine-tenths of the law. No, we won. Fuck you. Sorry. Over. We won. Youâre wrong. Fuck you.ââ24

Indeed, published reports echoed these warnings about President Trumpâs election strategy. Two days before the election, Jonathan Swan of Axios reported that President Trump âhas told confidants he'll declare victory on Tuesday night if it looks like he's âahead.âââ25 Swan added that âTrump's team is preparing to falsely claim that mail-in ballots counted after Nov. 3âa legitimate count expected to favor Democratsâare evidence of election fraud.ââ26 If the vote tally swung against Trump after election night in States such as Pennsylvania, then the Trump team would claim the Democrats had âstolenâ the election.27 Fox News election analysis Chris Stirewalt testified that he and his team âhad gone to painsâ to inform viewers that early votes would favor Republicans but the lead would be illusory âbecause the Trump campaign and the President had made it clear that they were going to try to exploit this anomaly.ââ28 Others warned that President Trump could exploit the Red Mirage as well.29

President Trump also paved the way for his false election-night declaration of victory by blanketing voters with a blizzard of lies and statements delegitimizing mail-in voting in the middle of a deadly pandemic and consistently questioning the security of ballots. President Trump used the presidentâs bully pulpit, including his heavily-trafficked Twitter feed, to tell one lie after another.

The Select Committee found dozens of instances in which President Trump claimed that mail-in voting would produce a âriggedâ election. Trump repeatedly denounced mail-in voting on Twitter, during interviews, and even during the presidential debate. Here is a small sample of President Trumpâs attempts to delegitimize mail-in balloting.

On April 7, 2020, President Trump claimed:

Mail ballots are a very dangerous thing for this country, because theyâre cheaters. They go and collect them. Theyâre fraudulent in many cases. â¦These mailed ballots come in. The mailed ballots are corrupt, in my opinion. And they collect them, and they get people to go in and sign them. And then they â theyâre forgeries in many cases. Itâs a horrible thing.30

The following day, April 8, President Trump tweeted:

Republicans should fight very hard when it comes to statewide mail-in voting. Democrats are clamoring for it. Tremendous potential for voter fraud, and for whatever reason, doesnât work out well for Republicans. @foxandfriends31

On May 24, President Trump tweeted:

The United States cannot have all Mail In Ballots. It will be the greatest Rigged Election in history. People grab them from mailboxes, print thousands of forgeries and âforceâ people to sign. Also, forge names. Some absentee OK, when necessary. Trying to use Covid for this Scam!32

On September 17, President Trump falsely alleged that mail-in ballots were ripe for foreign interference:

@TrueTheVote There is a group of people (largely Radical Left Democrats) that want ELECTION MAYHEM. States must end this CRAZY mass sending of Ballots. Also, a GIFT to foreign interference into our election!!! Stop it now, before it is too late.33

Before the election, as President Trump campaigned against mail-in voting, Bill Stepien sought an intercession. Along with House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, Stepien attempted to convince the President that mail-in voting was ânotâ¦a bad thing for his campaign.ââ34 They argued that President Trumpâs decision to discourage mail-in voting, while âurging [his] voters to vote only on election day leaves a lot to chanceâ and would fail to take advantage of a superior grassroots operation that could encourage Trump voters to return their ballots.35 President Trump did not heed their warning. He continued to demonize mail-in voting. The Red Mirage was a key part of his âBig Lie.â

Ominously, President Trump consistently refused to commit to accepting the outcome of the election. During an interview on Fox News in July, Chris Wallace asked: âCan you give a direct answer [if] you will accept the election?â President Trump responded: âI have to see. Look, youâI have to see. No, Iâm not going to just say yes. Iâm not going to say no, and I didnât last time either.ââ36

On September 23, 2020, a reporter asked President Trump if he would commit to a âpeaceful transferal of power after the election.â The President refused, saying, âweâre going to have to see what happens.ââ37 The President claimed, âthe ballots are disaster,â adding that if he could âget rid of the ballots . . . weâll have a very peacefulâthere wonât be a transfer, frankly; thereâll be a continuation.ââ38 That is, according to President Trump, there would be a âcontinuationâ of his presidency.

The following day, September 24, another reporter followed up by asking if the election would be legitimate only if President Trump won. The President again suggested there was something suspect about mail-in ballots, adding that he was ânot sureâ the election could be an honest one.39

Consistent with the pre-election narrative planted by President Trump, within hours of polls closing, President Trump began pushing the claim that late-reported vote tallies were illegitimate.40 Even though he had been reminded by his Campaign Manager that very day that a large number of mail-in ballots would not be counted for several hours or days,41 President Trump claimed that Democrats were going to âfind . . . ballots at four oâclock in the morning and add them to the list.ââ42 He also suggested that Democrats were continuing to vote after the polls had closed.43

Indeed, this is exactly what Steve Bannon described when he said President Trump would âtake advantageâ of the Democratsâ ânatural disadvantageâ on election night.44

In the ensuing days and weeks, President Trump often referred to âdumpsâ of votes that were injected into the counting process.45 His supporters latched onto these false claims.46 There were no âdumpsâ of votesâjust tallies of absentee ballots as they were reported by jurisdictions throughout the country in a fully transparent process.47 These batches of ballots included votes for both Trump and Biden. The late-reported votes favored the former Vice President, just as President Trumpâs campaign advisors said they would, particularly in primarily Democratic cities.48

Attorney General Bill Barr recognized immediately that the âRed Mirageâ was the basis for President Trumpâs erroneous claim of fraud. â[R]ight out of the box on election night, the President claimed that there was major fraud underway,â Barr said. âI mean, this happened, as far as I could tell, before there was actually any potential of looking at evidence.ââ49 President Trumpâs claim âseemed to be based on the dynamic that, at the end of the evening, a lot of Democratic votes came in which changed the vote counts in certain states, and that seemed to be the basis for this broad claim that there was major fraud.ââ50

President Trump knew about the Red Mirage. He chose to lie about it repeatedlyâeven after being directly informed that his claims were false. This was often the case in the post-election period. The President consciously disregarded facts that did not support his Big Lie.

President Trumpâs campaign leadership, including Bill Stepien (the campaignâs manager) and Justin Clark (the campaignâs deputy manager), supported President Trump, and were willing to pursue recounts and other standard post-election litigation, but they were not willing to promote baseless conspiracy theories.51 Stepien and others characterized this group as âTeam Normal.ââ52

Less than two weeks after the election, President Trump pushed âTeam Normalâ aside because its members didnât tell him what he wanted to hear. In their place, Trump promoted Rudy Giuliani and his associates, men and women who spread baseless and extreme claims of election fraud. Giuliani, the former mayor of New York City, recruited several investigators and lawyers to assist him.53 Giulianiâs team included Jenna Ellis, Bernard Kerik, Boris Epshteyn, Katherine Friess, and Christina Bobb.54 Ellis functioned as Giulianiâs deputy on the new Trump Campaign legal team.55 Kerik, the former commissioner of the New York Police Department and a pardoned felon, served as Giulianiâs chief investigator.56 Other attorneys who collaborated with Giulianiâs legal team included Sidney Powell, Cleta Mitchell, and John Eastman. As discussed elsewhere in this report, Eastman became a key player in President Trumpâs efforts to overturn the election.

President Trumpâs campaign team quickly realized that none of the significant fraud claims were real. Bill Stepien testified that, as of November 5th, the Trump Campaign had not found any proof of fraudulent activity. There were âallegations and reports,â but ânothing hard [and] fastâ that drew the results of the election into question.57

The Campaign continued to investigate claims of fraud into the second week after the election. According to Stepien, as people shared âwild allegationsâ with the President, the campaign team was forced to review the facts and then serve as a âtruth telling squadâ to the President regarding why the claims âdidnât prove to be true.ââ58 For example, Stepien recalled someone alleging that thousands of illegal votes had been cast in Arizona. That wasnât true. The votes had been submitted by overseas voters (such as military deployed or stationed abroad) who were obviously eligible to participate in the election.59

Alex Cannon was a lawyer for the Trump Campaign and previously worked for the Trump Organization. After the election, Cannon was tasked with looking into allegations of voter fraud in the 2020 electionâincluding the claim that thousands of ineligible votes had been cast in Arizona.60 Cannon recalled that Vice President Pence asked him what he was finding. âAnd I said that I didn't believe we were finding it, or I was not personally finding anything sufficient to alter the results of the election,â Cannon responded. Vice President Pence thanked him.61

Cannon reported his assessment to Mark Meadows, the White House Chief of Staff, as well. In mid to late-November 2020, Meadows asked Cannon what his investigation had turned up. âAnd I remember sharing with him that we weren't finding anything that would be sufficient to change the results in any of the key states,â Cannon told Meadows. âSo there is no there, there?â Meadows replied.62

Jason Miller, a senior advisor to the Trump Campaign, pushed claims of election fraud in public. In private, however, Miller says that he told President Trump a different story, informing him numerous times that there was not enough election fraud to have changed the election:

Miller: My understanding is that I think there are still very valid questions and concerns with the rules that were changed under the guise of COVID, but, specific to election day fraud and irregularities, there were not enough to overturn the election.

Committee Staff: And did you give your opinion on that to the President?

Miller: Yes.

Committee Staff: What was his reaction when you told him that?

Miller: âYou haven't seen or heardââIâm paraphrasing, butââyou haven't seen or heard all the different concerns and questions that have been raised.â

Committee Staff: How many times did you have this conversation with the President?

Miller: Several. I couldn't put a specific number on it, though.

Committee Staff: But more than one?

Miller: Correct.63

Matthew Morgan, the Trump Campaignâs top lawyer, came to a similar conclusion. Nearly two months after the election, on January 2nd, Morgan met with the Vice Presidentâs staff. According to Morgan, the consensus in the room was that even if all the claims of fraud and irregularities were âaggregated and read most favorably to the campaign . . . it was not sufficient to be outcome determinative.ââ64

As far as the Trump Campaignâs professional leadership was concerned, there was no evidence that the election had been âstolenâ from President Trump. To the contrary, they had seen ample evidence that President Trump simply lostâand told the President so.

On November 6th, Jared Kushner arranged for the senior campaign staff to brief President Trump in the Oval Office on the state of the race.65 Since election day, Matt Oczkowski, the Campaignâs leading data expert, had tracked voting returns in the swing States to analyze the campaignâs odds of success.66 Miller texted such updates on data from key States to Meadows.67 The Trump Campaignâs data did not add up to victory. Oczkowski âdelivered to the President in pretty blunt terms that he was going to loseâ the election.68 There were not enough outstanding votes in the battleground States for President Trump to overcome Bidenâs lead. President Trump disagreed and insisted that he would still prevail through legal challenges.69

But the data did not lie.

On November 7th, the Associated Press called Pennsylvania and the overall presidential election for former Vice President Biden.70 At that point, a small team of the Presidentâs campaign advisors including Stepien met with the President and told him that his path to victory was virtually non-existent.71 The campaign team conveyed to the President that his chance of success was only â5, maybe 10 percent,â which Stepien explained to the Committee was a âvery, very, very bleakâ assessment.72

In retrospect, the campaignâs estimate of a 5 to 10 percent chance of winning, as of November 7th, was far too optimistic. In one of the most favorable possible scenarios, for example, President Trump and his team would need to win recounts in Arizona and Georgia, while also prevailing in litigation challenging absentee or vote by mail ballots in Wisconsin, or possibly Michigan or Pennsylvania.73 But the election wasnât even close enough to trigger automatic recounts in Arizona or Georgia.

The narrowest margin of total votes between the two candidates was in Arizona, where former Vice President Biden won by more than 10,000 votes. This may seem like a small number of votes, but it was more than enough to avoid an automatic recount. As Benjamin Ginsberg, a longtime Republican elections lawyer, explained to the Select Committee, âthe 2020 election was not close.ââ74 Previous campaigns had successfully challenged vote differentials in the hundredsânot thousandsâof votes.75 Ginsberg explained, âyou just don't make up those sorts of numbers in recounts.ââ76 Georgia performed a hand recount of all the ballots anyway, confirming within weeks of the election that Biden had won the State.77 Also, by January 6th, Arizona and New Mexico had conducted statutory post-election audits of voting machines or randomly-selected, representative samples of ballots at the State- or county-level that affirmed the accuracy of their election results.78

Chris Stirewalt, who led the elections desk at Fox News at the time, concurred with Ginsbergâs analysis. Asked what President Trumpâs odds of victory were as of November 7th, Stirewalt replied: âNone.ââ79

Meanwhile, the Trump Campaign continued to crunch the numbers. On the morning of November 12th, Oczkowski circulated among top campaign advisors a presentation describing what happened in each of the battleground States the campaign was monitoring.80 This analysis by the data team examined the turnout and margins on a county-by-county basis in a dozen States while also analyzing demographic changes that impacted the results.81 Among the States were Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Nevada, and Wisconsin.82 Oczkowskiâs team determined that President Trump lost each of those six States because Biden had performed better than President Trump in certain areas like population centers or suburbs.83 Yet, in the weeks that followed, President Trump and his new legal teamâthe âclown carââwent to great lengths to challenge the results of the election in these six states, spreading multiple conspiracy theories.

The voting data told a clear story: President Trump lost. But, regardless of the facts, the President had no intention of conceding defeat.

On election night, President Trump and Rudy Giuliani agreed that the President should just declare victoryâeven though he had no basis for doing so. Giuliani also told the Select Committee that President Trump asked him on November 4th to take over his campaignâs legal operation.84 Giuliani thought the only way that it would work would be for the President to call the existing campaign team to announce Giulianiâs takeover because, in Giulianiâs words, âthey are going to be extraordinarily resentful, because they donât like me already, and I donât trust them.ââ85 He said that the President agreed.86

Although Giuliani wouldnât assume leadership of the Campaignâs legal operations until mid-November, the former New York City mayor quickly began to butt heads with âTeam Normal.â

On November 6th, Giuliani and his team met with the Trump Campaignâs leadership at its headquarters in Arlington, Virginia.87

âTeam Normalâ was not impressed. Stepien told the Select Committee the campaign team was concerned that Giuliani would be a distraction to them and to President Trump.88 When Giuliani suggested traveling to Pennsylvania to assist in the campaignâs efforts, the campaign team âdidnât dissuade him from doing so.ââ89 After just 10 to 15 minutes in the conference room, Stepien and other staffers left the meeting.90

That same day, President Trump discussed the Campaignâs legal strategy in the Oval Office with Giuliani, Clark, and Matt Morgan, the Trump Campaignâs General Counsel.91 Prior to the election, Morgan was responsible for the Campaignâs litigation strategy.92 Morgan and his team filed lawsuits challenging the changes States made to voting practices during the coronavirus pandemic.93 Morgan also studied previous elections to determine the types of cases that were likely to succeed.94 Clark described how the Campaignâs original legal strategy was based on his general theory for election cases: âto look at what do you think, what do you know, and what can you proveâ and then determine which cases to file from there.95

Giuliani had other ideas and advocated to President Trump that he be put in charge of the Campaignâs legal operation so that he could pursue his preferred strategy.96 âMr. Giuliani didnât seem bound by those cases or by those precedents. He felt he could press forward on anything that he thought was wrong with the election and bring a strategy around that,â Morgan explained.97 âRudy was just chasing ghosts,â Clark said.98 Morgan and Clark excused themselves from the meeting because it âwas going nowhere.ââ99

The next day, November 7th, Giuliani held a press conference at Four Seasons Total Landscaping in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He immediately began making outlandish claims, arguing that the Democrats had conspired to steal the election. âAs you know from the very beginning, mail-in ballots were a source of some degree of skepticism, if not a lot of skepticism, as being innately prone to fraud,â Giuliani said. âThose mail-in ballots could have been written the day before by the Democratic Party hacks that were all over the Convention Center.ââ100 Giuliani offered no evidence to support his shocking and baseless allegation. Echoes of President Trumpâs relentless campaign against mail-in balloting, and his decision to exploit the Red Mirage, were easy to hear.

On November 10th, Giuliani and Kerik met with President Trump in the Oval Office to discuss their investigation into voter fraud. White House Counsel Pat Cipollone and White House Senior Advisor Eric Herschmann were also in attendance. After Giulianiâs presentation, President Trump asked Cipollone whether he had spoken to Attorney General Barr about the allegations of fraud.101 One day before, Barr had issued a memorandum outlining a shift in DOJ policy that allowed Federal prosecutors to investigate claims of voting irregularities without waiting for the results to be certified.102 President Trumpâs question was an early indication that he was going to pressure the DOJ to endorse his phony fraud claims.

Days later, Giuliani and Justin Clark engaged in a screaming match during a meeting in the Oval Office.103 Giuliani was urging President Trump to file a lawsuit in Georgia, but Clark pointed out that a hand recount was already being conducted and argued it was better to wait.104 Giuliani told President Trump that Clark was lying to him.105 A formal changing of the guard would follow.

On November 14th, President Trump announced on Twitter that Giuliani was now the head of his campaignâs legal team.106 âTeam Normalâ saw drastic changes to their roles on the newly-structured campaign teamâsome self-imposedâand many outside law firms that had signed up to support the campaignâs legal efforts disengaged completely.107

âI didnât think what was happening was necessarily honest or professional at that point in time,â Stepien explained. âThis wasnât a fight that I was comfortable with,â he added.108

On the day the leadership change was announced, Giuliani participated in a âsurrogateâ briefing to coordinate messaging by Trump loyalists during their media appearances.109 Giuliani announced that the messaging strategy should be âto go hard on Dominion/Smartmatic, bringing up Chavez and Maduro.ââ110 Giuliani claimed that additional lawsuits would soon be filed âto invalidate upwards of 1M ballots.ââ111

Consistent with the messaging advanced by the new campaign team, President Trump in mid-November remained dug-in, still refusing to concede defeat. President Trump continued to insist that he was cheated out of victory, endorsing one wild conspiracy theory after another to deny the simple fact that he lost.

âWeâve provenâ the election was stolen, but âno judge, including the Supreme Court of the United States, has had the courage to allow it to be heard.ââ112 That was how President Trump described efforts to overturn the election in court one day before the electoral college met on December 14, 2020. That was false.

Judges across the nation did evaluate President Trumpâs claims that the election was stolen. As longtime Republican election attorney Benjamin Ginsberg testified before the Select Committee, the Presidentâs camp âdid have their day in court,â itâs just that âin no instance did a court find that the charges of fraud were real.ââ113 In total, the Trump Campaign and allies of President Trump filed 62 separate lawsuits between November 4, 2020, and January 6, 2021, calling into question or seeking to overturn the election results.114 Out of 62 cases, only one case resulted in a victory for the President Trump or his allies, which affected relatively few votes, did not vindicate any underlying claims of fraud, and would not have changed the outcome in Pennsylvania.115 Thirty of the cases were dismissed by a judge after a hearing on the merits.116

In every State in which claims were brought, one or more judges specifically explained as part of their dismissal orders that they had evaluated the plaintiffsâ allegations or supposed proof of widespread election fraud or other irregularities, and found the claims to be entirely unconvincing. In Arizona, for example, the plaintiffs in Bowyer v. Ducey alleged that the election was tainted by the introduction of âhundreds of thousands of illegal, ineligible, duplicate or purely fictitious ballots.ââ117 A Federal judge dismissed their suit, finding it âvoid of plausible allegationsâ and âsorely wanting of relevant or reliable evidence.ââ118 Likewise, in Ward v. Jackson, an Arizona State-court judge dismissed a lawsuit by the State GOP chair following a two-day trial, finding no evidence of misconduct, fraud, or illegal votes.119 This ruling was unanimously upheld by the State supreme court, where all seven justices were appointed by GOP governors.120

In Georgia, a State court dismissed Boland v. Raffensperger, which alleged that tens of thousands of illegal ballots were cast by out-of-State voters or with invalid signature matches.121 The judge found that âthe Complaintâs factual allegations . . . rest on speculation rather than duly pled factsâ and âdo not support . . . a conclusion that sufficient illegal votes were cast to change or place in doubt the result of the election.ââ122 The judge who issued this decision had been appointed by a Republican governor, as had seven of the eight justices of the State supreme court who upheld her ruling.123 Likewise, a Federal judge denied relief to the plaintiff in Wood v. Raffensperger, which alleged that new procedures for checking absentee ballot signatures spoiled the result by making it harder to reject illegal ballots, finding âno basis in fact or law to grant him the relief he seeks.ââ124 The judge wrote that â[t]his argument is belied by the recordâ because absentee ballots were actually rejected for signature issues at the same rate as in 2018.125

In Michigan, a Federal judge found in King v. Whitmer that the plaintiffsâ claims of âmassive election fraudâ were based on ânothing but speculation and conjecture that votes for President Trump were destroyed, discarded or switched to votes for Vice President Biden. . . .ââ126 Similarly, a State-court judge rejected plaintiffsâ claims in two cases brought against Detroit and the surrounding county that accused them of systematic fraud in how absentee ballots were counted; the judge found that one group of plaintiffs â. . . offered no evidence to support their assertions,ââ127 and that the other groupâs âinterpretation of events is incorrectâ and âdecidedly contradictedâ by âhighly-respectedâ election experts.128

In Nevada, a State-court judge rejected a litany of claims of systematic election fraud in Law v. Whitmer, ruling that plaintiffs âdid not prove under any standard of proof that illegal votes were cast and counted, or legal votes were not counted at all, due to voter fraudâ or âfor any other improper or illegal reason.ââ129 The ruling was unanimously upheld by the Nevada Supreme Court.130

In Pennsylvania, a Federal judge dismissed Donald Trump for President v. Boockvar, finding that the Trump Campaign had presented nothing but âstrained legal arguments without merit and speculative accusations unpled in the operative complaint and unsupported by evidence.ââ131 The dismissal was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which held: â[C]alling an election unfair does not make it so. Charges require specific allegations and then proof. We have neither here.ââ132 That opinion was authored by another Trump appointee.133

Lastly, in Wisconsin, another judge dismissed a lawsuit accusing the Wisconsin Elections Commission of âconstitutional violationsâ that âlikely tainted more than 50,000 ballots.ââ134 The judge ruled: âThis Court has allowed plaintiff the chance to make his case and he has lost on the merits,â failing to show that the outcome was affected by Commission rules about drop boxes, ballot addresses, or individuals who claimed âindefinitely confinedâ status to vote from home.135 The ruling was upheld by a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, all of whom were Republican appointees, including one appointed by President Trump himself.136

In all, the judges who heard these post-election cases included 22 Federal judges appointed by Republican presidents.137

President Trump and his lawyers were well-aware that courts were consistently rejecting his claims. During a December 18th meeting in the Oval Office with President Trump, Sidney Powell and others, White House Senior Advisor Eric Herschmann pointed out that President Trumpâs lawyers had their opportunity to prove their case in court, and failed. Powell fired back that âthe judges are corrupt.â Herschmann responded: âEvery one? Every single case that youâve done in the country you guys lost, every one of them is corrupt, even the ones we appointed?ââ138

President Trump was faced with another choice after having his day in court. He could accept that there was no real evidence of voter fraud, or he could continue to amplify conspiracy theories and lies. He chose the latter.

Instead of accepting his defeat, President Trump attempted to justify his Big Lie with a series of increasingly preposterous claims. The President was not simply led astray by those around him. The opposite was true. He actively promoted conspiracy theories and false election fraud claims even after being informed they were baseless. Millions of President Trumpâs supporters believed the election was stolen from him. Many of them still do, but President Trump knew the truth and chose to lie about it.

The power of the Presidentâs bully pulpit should not be underestimated, especially in the digital age.139 President Trumpâs relentless lying sowed seeds of distrust in Americaâs election system. Researchers who studied this election-denial phenomenon have noted: âPresident Trump didnât just prime his audience to be receptive to false narratives of election fraudâhe inspired them to produce those narratives and then echoed those false claims back to them.ââ140 Social media played a prominent role in amplifying erroneous claims of election fraud. Shortly after election day, the âStop the Stealâ campaign, discussed more fully in Chapter 6, went viral. âStop the Stealâ influencers echoed President Trumpâs premature declaration of victory, asserting that he won the election, the Democrats stole it from him, and it was the responsibility of American âpatriotsâ to combat this supposed injustice.141

This resulted in what Attorney General Barr has described as an âavalancheâ of false claims, as President Trumpâs supporters attempted to justify his âBig Lie.ââ142 The post-election allegations of fraud or other malfeasance were âcompletely bogus,â âsillyâ and âusually based on complete misinformation,â Barr explained.143 Nonetheless, many of President Trumpâs supporters wanted to believe them. The stolen election narrative has proven to be remarkably durable precisely because it is a matter of beliefânot evidence, or reason. Each time a claim was debunked, more claims emerged in its place. Barr later complained that this dynamic forced him and others to play âwhack-a-mole.ââ144

The United States Department of Justice, under Barrâs leadership and then Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen, was forced to knock down one lie after another. As discussed in Chapter 4, Barr took unprecedented steps to investigate the âavalancheâ of lies. Claims of election fraud were referred to United States Attorneyâs offices and the FBI for investigation. Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue tracked dozens of investigations. None of them were found to have merit.145 The top officials in President Trumpâs Justice Department personally told the President that the claims he was promoting were false. But that did not matter to the President. As Barr told the Select Committee, President Trump never showed any âindication of interest in what the actual facts were.ââ146

For example, on December 27th, Rosen and Donoghue spent approximately two hours on the phone with President Trump. They debunked a litany of claims regarding the election, explaining that each had been investigated and found to be baseless.147 According to Donoghue, President Trump âhad this arsenal of allegations that he wanted to rely on.â Donoghue thought it was necessary to explain to the President âbased on actual investigations, actual witness interviews, actual reviews of documents, that these allegations simply had no merit.â Donoghue wanted âto cut through the noiseâ and be âvery bluntâ with the President, making it clear âthese allegations were simply not true.ââ148

During their December 27th conversation with President Trump, Rosen and Donoghue rebutted false claims regarding: suitcases of ballots in Georgia, Dominionâs voting machines in Antrim County, a truckload of ballots in Pennsylvania, ballots being scanned multiple times, people voting more than once, dead people voting, Native Americans being paid to vote, and more votes than voters in particular jurisdictions.149 As the officials debunked each claim, President Trump âwould just roll on to another one.ââ150 Donoghue told President Trump that Federal law enforcement officials had conducted dozens of investigations and hundreds of interviews, and they had concluded that the major allegations were not supported by the evidence developed.151 Donoghue and Rosen told President Trump âflat outâ that âmuch of the information he [was] getting [was] false and/or just not supported by the evidence.ââ152 President Trump responded: âYou guys may not be following the internet the way I do.ââ153

The Department of Justice was not alone in trying to contain the Presidentâs conspiracy-mongering. President Trumpâs lies were often debunked in real-time by State authorities, judges, experts, journalists, Federal officials, and even members of his own legal team. As discussed above, the Presidentâs campaign team found that there was no significant fraud in the election. So, the President pushed them aside. The courts rejected nearly every claim brought by the Presidentâs legal team. Even though courts rejected the claims as speculative, unsupported and meritless, President Trump, Rudy Giuliani, and others continued to assert them as truth to Trumpâs followers in speeches, tweets, and podcasts.154

The burden of refuting the false claims made by President Trump and his surrogates often fell on State and local officials. For example, in Michigan, the Secretary of Stateâs office posted thorough and prompt responses to the claims of election fraud on a âFact Checkâ page on its website.155 In Georgia, the Secretary of Stateâs office issued news releases and held frequent press conferences in the weeks following the election to respond to claims of fraud.156 County clerks in the contested States also spoke out publicly to refute allegations. Even as the President undermined the publicâs confidence in how votes are cast and counted, these clerks assured voters that their elections were secure and they could have confidence in the results.157 Outside experts also publicly denounced and dismantled the claims being raised and amplified by President Trump. This was done in the context of litigation, congressional hearings, and press releases.158 President Trump simply ignored these authoritative sources and continued to promote false claims that had been soundly discredited.

Below, the Select Committee presents two case studies demonstrating how President Trump and his surrogates lied in the face of overwhelming evidence. The first case study deals with Dominion Voting Systems. President Trump repeatedly claimed that Dominionâs software âswitched votesâ and âriggedâ the election well after the leaders of campaign and Justice Department officials told him that these claims were baseless. The Presidentâs smear of Dominion was central to his âBig Lie.â

The second case study examines video footage recorded in Fulton County on election night. President Trump and his representatives concocted a fictional narrative based on a deceptively edited version of the footage. After these two case studies, the Select Committee examines a variety of other claims the President repeatedly made. Once again, these claims had no basis in truth.

Between election day and January 6th, President Trump repeatedly spread conspiracy theories about Dominion voting machines. The President tweeted or retweeted false claims about Dominion more than 30 times.159 He also repeatedly lied about the companyâs software during his post-election speeches and interviews.160 President Trumpâs own campaign staff, administration officials, and State officials, all told him the claims had no merit. Hand recounts confirmed the fidelity of the machines. But none of this overwhelming evidence mattered. President Trump demonstrated a conscious disregard for the facts and continued to maliciously smear Dominion.

President Trumpâs allies began spreading false claims regarding Dominion within days of the election. On November 8th, the day after networks called the election for Joe Biden, Sidney Powell claimed on Fox News that Dominion machines âwere flipping votes in the computer system or adding votes that did not exist.ââ161 On November 12th, Rudy Giuliani appeared on Fox News to claim that Dominion was connected to Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chavez and its software was created âin order to fix elections.ââ162 The same day, President Trump retweeted a âREPORTâ claiming that Dominion had âDELETED 2.7 MILLION TRUMP VOTES NATIONWIDEâ and switched hundreds of thousands of votes in key swing states.163

By that time, the Trump Campaign team had looked into allegations regarding Dominion and its software and concluded that the claims were false. An internal campaign memo, dated November 12, said that Dominionâs software âdid not lead to improper vote countsâ and cited reports concluding that, among other things, Dominion machines âDid Not Affect The Final Vote Count.ââ164 The memo also addressed various claims of foreign influence regarding Dominion.165 Jason Miller told the Select Committee that by November 12th he had told President Trump the results of the analysis of the Dominion claims by the campaignâs internal research team, specifically telling him âthat the international allegations for Dominion were not valid.ââ166 Emails and text messages show that this same analysis was shared with Mark Meadows, President Trumpâs chief of staff.167 White House Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany told the Select Committee that she found herself âwaving [President Trump] off of the Dominion theory,â encouraging him to use more âfact-drivenâ arguments.168 But it was to no avail.

Even though members of the Trump Campaign team reported that the result of the election was not compromised by any problems with Dominion machines, the President continued to assail Dominion on Twitter in the days that followed, for example retweeting a false claim that Dominionâs machines were âengineered by China, Venezuela, [and] Cubaâ and claiming that Dominion had â[r]iggedâ the election.169

Officials in the Trump administration also worked to debunk the false rumors about vote manipulation. The United States Department of Homeland Securityâs Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released a joint statement of election security officials on November 12, reassuring voters that the election was âthe most secure in American history.â CISA emphasized: âThere is no evidence that any voting system deleted or lost votes, changed votes, or was in any way compromised.ââ170

This was another decision point for the President. He could choose to endorse the findings of his administrationâs own cyber security experts, or he could continue to promote baseless fictions about Dominion. President Trump chose the lies. The President and his supporters never did produce any evidence showing that Dominionâs machines affected the results of the election. But President Trump was undeterred by the facts. Indeed, the President and his supporters seized upon a simple human error in a small Michigan county as their initial pretense for these allegations as well as to keep the Dominion conspiracy theory alive.

During the early-morning hours of November 4th, Sheryl Guy, a clerk in Antrim County, Michigan, reported the unofficial results of the vote count.171 Guyâs online report was odd. It showed that former Vice President Biden had somehow won Antrim, a county that is majority-Republican and President Trump was expected to easily win. Trumpâs supporters quickly pointed to Bidenâs improbable win as evidence that Dominion had tampered with the votes.172 That wasnât true. Guy had made a mistake in updating the election counting software after a late addition of a local candidate to the ballot in some of the countyâs precincts, which caused her unofficial counts to be off when she tallied the votes reported by the various precincts.173 Guy, a Republican, was informed of the odd result and began to investigate immediately. The result was corrected, and President Trump won Antrim just as was expected.174

Within days, local and State officials in Michigan explained to the public what had happened. On November 7th, the Michigan Secretary of Stateâs office issued a detailed description of Guyâs error and assured the public that the official results were not impacted.175 The Michigan Senateâs Committee on Oversight, led by Republican Senator Ed McBroom, conducted its own comprehensive review of the claims related to Antrim County and confirmed that the initial reporting error was entirely attributable to an honest mistake by the county clerk.176

The mix-up in Antrim County was quickly corrected. A human erredânot the voting machines. But President Trump used it as a pretext to continue lying about Dominion.

On November 12th, the same day CISA released its statement on election security, President Trump asked Tim Walberg, a Republican Congressman from Michigan, to âcheck with key leadership in Michiganâs Legislature as to how supportive they could be in regards to pushing back on election irregularities and potential fraud.ââ177 That night, President Trump asked his Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, Chad Wolf, to look into allegations of election irregularities in Michigan.178 The next day, President Trumpâs assistant sent Wolf a letter from Michigan State legislators raising claims about the election, including an incorrect claim that flawed Dominion software had caused votes to be counted for the wrong candidate.179

Administration officials quickly knocked down the Dominion claim. Wolf forwarded the allegations to the leadership of CISA, including CISA Director Christopher Krebs.180 Krebs provided Wolf with a press release from the Michigan Secretary of State that debunked the false claim about Antrim County and Dominionâs software in detail.181 Wolf shared an update about the information he received from Krebs with White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows.182

On November 17th, Krebs tweeted out a statement issued by the nationâs leading election scientists that dismissed claims that election systems had been manipulated as either âunsubstantiatedâ or âtechnically incoherent.ââ183 President Trump fired Krebs that same day.184 President Trump claimed the statement released by Krebs was âhighly inaccurate, in that there were massive improprieties and fraud.ââ185 The President had no evidence for his claim.

On November 19th, Rudy Giuliani, Sidney Powell, and Jenna Ellis held a press conference at the Republican National Committee (RNC) headquarters in Washington, DC. Powell asserted that there was âmassive influence of communist money through Venezuela, Cuba, and likely China in the interference with our elections here in the United States.ââ186 She pointed a finger at Dominion, claiming its software was âcreated in Venezuela at the direction of Hugo Chavez to make sure he never lost an election,â and Giuliani echoed her claims.187

Hope Hicks told the Select Committee how that press conference was received in the White House. The day after the press conference, President Trump spoke by phone with Sidney Powell from the Oval Office. During the call, Powell repeated the same claims of foreign interference in the election she had made at the press conference. While she was speaking, the President muted his speakerphone and laughed at Powell, telling the others in the room, âThis does sound crazy, doesnât it?ââ188

A few days later, the Trump Campaign issued a statement claiming Powell was not part of the Trump Campaignâs legal team.189 But Powellâs outlandish claims were no different from those President Trump was making himself. On November 19th, the same day as Powellâs appearance at the RNC, President Trump tweeted and retweeted a link to a segment on One America News Network (OAN) that was captioned, âDominion-izing the Vote.ââ190 The segment claimed that Dominion had switched votes from Trump to Biden. OAN featured a supposed cyber expert, Ron Watkins, a key figure in the QAnon conspiracy movement.191 On his own Twitter account, Watkins celebrated and thanked his supporters just minutes after President Trump tweeted the clip, and President Trump went on to share the clip again several times in the days that followed.192

Officials inside the Trump administration continued to debunk the Dominion conspiracy theory, including during in-person meetings with President Trump. Attorney General Bill Barr met with President Trump face-to-face on three occasions after the election.193 Barr told the Select Committee, âevery time I was with the President, I raised the machines as sort of Exhibit A of how irresponsible this was.ââ194 During the first of these meetings, on November 23rd, Barr explained to the President that the conspiracy theory about Dominionâs voting machines had âzero basis,â and was âone of the most disturbing allegations.â Barr stressed that this was âcrazy stuffâ and was poisoning Americansâ confidence in the voting system for no reason. This âcomplete nonsenseâ was âdoing [a] great, great disservice to the country,â Barr said.195

President Trump ignored Barrâs grave concerns. On November 29th, President Trump was interviewed by Fox Newsâ Maria Bartiromo. It was the Presidentâs first interview since he lost his bid for reelection. He claimed the election was âriggedâ and rife with âtheftâ and âa total fraud.ââ196 He repeated various conspiracy theories, leading with the claim that Dominionâs voting machines had âglitches,â which he alleged moved âthousands of votes from my account to Bidenâs account.ââ197 He claimed that there had been âbig, massive dumpsâ of votesâa reference to the Red Mirage.198 He rambled off various other, spurious allegations, including that dead people voted in significant numbers.199 None of it was true.

On December 1st, Attorney General Barr met again with President Trump and told him that âthe stuff his people were shoveling out to the public was bullshit.ââ200 Attorney General Barr specifically told President Trump that the claims about Dominion voting machines were âidiotic claims.ââ201 President Trump was still not dissuaded from continuing the lie. The day after his meeting with the Attorney General, President Trump released a video in which he repeated several claims of election fraud, including a claim that âvotes had been wrongly switched from Trump to Bidenâ using Dominion voting machines.202

By early-December, courts had assessed and rejected claims that Dominion machines were manipulated to affect the outcome of the 2020 election. In Michigan, a Federal judge found that claims, including those related to fraud due to the use of Dominion voting machines, were based on ânothing but speculation and conjecture that votes were destroyed, discarded or switched. . . .ââ203 In Arizona, a Federal judge dismissed claims that Dominion machines had deleted, switched, or changed votes.204 But President Trump and his supporters refused to accept denunciations of the fabricated Dominion claims.

Through December, President Trump and his legal team tried to echo the Dominion conspiracy theory by claiming to have found evidence that votes were switched in Antrim County. The clerkâs unintentional error was fixed weeks earlier and there was no evidence showing that Dominion had altered the vote tally in Antrim, or anywhere else.205 But President Trumpâs legal team used a case challenging a local marijuana ordinance that had passed by one vote to gain access to Dominionâs voting machines. An Antrim County judge issued an order granting the plaintiffâs experts access to the countyâs computer, Dominion voting machines, thumb drives and memory cards.206 Although the purpose of the order was to allow the plaintiff to seek evidence related to his ordinance challenge, it soon became clear that President Trumpâs legal team was behind the effort.207

An organization named Allied Security Operations Group (âASOGâ), led by Russell Ramsland, conducted an analysis of Antrim Countyâs voting machines and related systems. On December 13th, ASOG released a report on its findings. The inspection yielded no evidence of vote manipulation. Still, the report included an unsubstantiated assertion that the Dominion voting machines used in Antrim County and throughout Michigan were âpurposefully designed with inherent error to create systemic fraud and influence election resultsâ and that a malicious algorithm was used to manipulate the results of the 2020 election.208 Documents obtained by the Select Committee show that President Trump and Vice President Mike Pence were briefed on ASOGâs findings by Giulianiâs team.209 On December 14th, President Trump widely disseminated the ASOG report and accompanying talking points prepared by Giulianiâs team.210 He also trumpeted the report on Twitter, writing on December 14th: âWOW. This report shows massive fraud. Election changing result!ââ211

During a meeting with Attorney General Bill Barr that day, President Trump claimed the ASOG report was âabsolute proof that the Dominion machines were riggedâ and meant he was âgoing to have a second term.ââ212 Barr told the Select Committee that he believed the ASOG report was âvery amateurish,â its authors lacked âany real qualifications,â and it failed to provide any supporting information for its sweeping conclusions about Dominion.213 Barr told President Trump he would look into the report, but that the DOJ already had a good idea of what happened in Antrim County and it was human error, not a problem with the machines.214 In any event, Barr promised President Trump they would have a definitive answer within a couple of days because a hand recount was being conducted.215

In the ensuing days, as Barr predicted, the ASOG report was swiftly and soundly criticized by experts within and outside the Trump Administration, including the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security.216 The initial analysis of election security experts at the Department of Homeland Security was that the ASOG report was âfalse and misleadingâ and âdemonstrates a callous misunderstanding of the actual current voting certification process.ââ217 Subsequent analyses of the ASOG report and the underlying data from Antrim County were even more critical.218 These thorough assessments of the Antrim County data and the ASOG report demonstrate that virtually every one of the claims that President Trump and his surrogates made about the report was false.219 ASOGâs inspection did not reveal any malicious software or algorithms or any other evidence that the voting machines had been compromised.220

Most importantly, as Attorney General Barr had promised President Trump, within days of the release of the ASOG report, a full hand recount of every ballot cast in Antrim County confirmed the results reported by the Dominion machines and refuted ASOGâs assertion that an algorithm has manipulated the vote count.221 Giulianiâs chief investigator, Bernie Kerik, acknowledged that his team was not able to find any proof that a Dominion voting machine improperly switched, deleted, or injected votes during the 2020 election.222

President Trump was not swayed by these basic facts. The President continued to promote the ASOG report, hounding DOJ to investigate the matter further. He returned to ASOGâs claims during a December 27th call with Acting Attorney General Rosen and Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue, citing the reportâs claimed error rate of 68 percent in Antrim County. Donoghue pointed out to the President that the difference between the computer and hand count was only one vote and that he âcannot and should not be relying onâ ASOGâs fraudulent claim, because it was simply ânot true.ââ223

President Trumpâs fixation on Dominionâs voting machines and the baseless theory that the machines had manipulated votes led to a concerted effort to gain access to voting machines in States where President Trump was claiming election fraud. On the evening of December 18th, Powell, Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn (ret.) and Patrick Byrne met with the President at the White House. Over several hours, they argued that President Trump had the authority, under a 2018 executive order, to seize voting machines. Several administration officials joined the meeting and forcefully rejected this extreme proposal.224 Multiple lawyers in the White House, including Eric Herschmann, Derek Lyons, and White House Counsel Pat Cipollone âpushed back stronglyâ against the idea of seizing voting machines. Cipollone told the Select Committee it was a âhorrible idea,â which had âno legal basis,ââ225 and he emphasized that he had âseen no evidence of massive fraud in the election.ââ226 White House advisor Eric Herschmann similarly told the Select Committee that he ânever saw any evidence whatsoeverâ to sustain the allegations against Dominion.227 National Security Adviser Robert OâBrien phoned into the December 18th meeting and was asked if he had seen âany evidence of election fraud in the voting machines or foreign interference in our voting machines.â OâBrien responded that his team had âlooked into that, and thereâs no evidence of it.ââ228

Around the same time, President Trump, Mark Meadows, and Rudy Giuliani were repeatedly asking the leadership of DHS whether the agency had authority to seize voting machines, and they were repeatedly told that DHS has no such unilateral authority.229 Giuliani and Powell were also engaged in efforts to access voting machines in multiple States with the assistance of sympathetic local election officials.230 Those efforts turned up no evidence of any vote manipulation by any Dominion machine, but President Trump continued to press this bogus claim.

On January 2, 2021, President Trump had a lengthy phone call with Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger. The President repeatedly brought up Dominionâs voting machines, alleging that they were at the heart of a conspiracy against him.231 Raffensperger was incredulous. âI donât believe that youâre really questioning the Dominion machines,â Raffensperger said. âBecause we did a hand re-tally, a 100 percent re-tally of all the ballots, and compared them to what the machines said and came up with virtually the same result. Then we did the recount, and we got virtually the same result.ââ232 In other words, the story in Georgia was the same as the story in Antrim County, Michigan: Officials performed a hand recount to put to rest any allegations that Dominionâs machines had manipulated the vote. But once again, President Trump consciously disregarded these basic facts and persisted with his lies.

During a January 4, 2021, speech in Dalton, Georgia, President Trump chose to ignore Secretary Raffenspergerâs straightforward observations. The President rhetorically attacked Dominion once again, claiming that a âcrimeâ had been âcommitted in this stateâ and it was âimmeasurable.ââ233 The President called for an âimmediate forensic audit of an appropriate sampling of Dominionâs voting machines and related equipment.ââ234 His allegations were both false and nonsensical. Georgia had already performed a statewide hand recount of all ballots.

President Trump and his allies have never provided any evidence showing that Dominionâs voting software altered votes in the 2020 presidential election. In fact, some of the most vocal proponents of the Dominion claims harbored their own misgivings about the claims they were making in public. For example, Rudy Giuliani repeatedly claimed in public that Dominion voting machines stole the election, and that foreign countries had interfered in the election, but the evidence uncovered by the Select Committee reveals that he did not believe either of those things to be true. Giuliani testified that he did not believe that voting machines stole the election.235 He also acknowledged that he had seen no evidence that foreign countries had interfered in the election or manipulated votes.236

This testimony is consistent with his lead investigator Bernie Kerikâs acknowledgment that he had not come across proof that voting machines were used to switch, delete, or inject votes improperly.237 Christina Bobb, an attorney who worked with Giuliani, similarly could not point to any evidence of wrongdoing by Dominion.238 Even Sidney Powell, perhaps the most committed proponent of the Dominion falsehoods, was unable to provide the Select Committee with any evidence or expert report that demonstrated that the 2020 election outcome in any State had been altered through manipulation of voting machines.239 And Powell defended herself in a defamation suit brought by Dominion by claiming that âno reasonable person would conclude that her statements were truly statements of fact.ââ240

By January 6, 2021, President Trumpâs claims regarding Dominion had been debunked time and again. The President knew, or should have known, that he had no basis for alleging that Dominionâs voting machines had cost him the election.

President Trump also recklessly promoted allegations that video footage from a ballot counting center in Fulton County, Georgia, was proof of major election fraud. He was repeatedly informed that these allegations were false, but he pressed them anyway.

On December 3rd, Rudy Giuliani presented State legislators with selectively edited footage of ballots being counted on Election Night at Fulton Countyâs State Farm Arena.241 Giuliani misrepresented the video as âa smoking gunâ proving election fraud.242 The President repeatedly claimed that he would have won Georgia, if not for a supposed conspiracy that unfolded on election night. President Trump and some of his supporters alleged that political operatives faked a water main rupture to expel Republican poll watchers.243 These same operatives then supposedly took illegal ballots from suitcases hidden under tables and added those ballots to the official count multiple times over by scanning them more than once.244 Not one of these allegations was true.

In a speech on December 5th, President Trump made the false claim about the State Farm Arena and claimed that âif you just take the crime of what those Democrat workers were doing . . . [t]hatâs 10 times more than I need to win this state.ââ245 During a December 22nd speech, he played the same deceptive footage presented by Giuliani several weeks earlier.246 President Trump also repeatedly scapegoated one of these Fulton County election workers during his January 2nd phone call with Georgiaâs Secretary of State, repeatedly referencing her by name and calling her âa professional vote scammer and hustler.â 247 It was a malicious smear.

President Trump was directly notified at least four different times that the allegations he was making were false. On December 15th, then-Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen told him: âIt wasnât a suitcase. It was a bin. Thatâs what they use when theyâre counting ballots. Itâs benign.ââ248 Rosenâs deputy, Richard Donoghue, also debunked this claim, including on a phone call on December 27th and in a meeting in the Oval Office on December 31st: âI told the President myself . . . several times, in several conversations, that these allegations about ballots being smuggled in in a suitcase and run through the machines several times, it was not true, that we had looked at it, we looked at the video, we interviewed the witnesses, and it was not true.ââ249

Likewise, Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger told President Trump that his allegations about the video were false. During his January 2nd call with the President, Raffensperger explained that Giulianiâs team âsliced and diced that video and took it out of contextâ and that âthe events that transpired are nowhere near what was projectedâ once one looks at more complete footage.250 Raffensperger also explained to the President that his team âdid an audit of that, and we proved conclusively that they were not scanned three times.ââ251 Yet, when Raffensperger said he would send President Trump a link to the television segment, the President refused: âI donât care about the link. I donât need it.ââ252

The actual evidence contradicted all of President Trumpâs claims about what the Fulton County video depicted. For example, the chief investigator for Raffenspergerâs office explained in a December 6th court filing that âthere were no mystery ballots that were brought in from an unknown location and hidden under tablesâ¦.ââ253 As the investigator noted, the security footage showed there was nothing under the table when it was brought into the room. Hours later, with reporters and observers present, the âvideo shows ballots that had already been opened but not counted placed in the boxes, sealed up, [and] stored under the table.ââ254 This finding was affirmed by the FBI, DOJ, and the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, which interviewed witnesses and reviewed the full video footage and machine data from the site.255

The ballots in question were not double counted. This was confirmed by a full hand recount in November, as well as a subsequent review by investigators.256 They found that although one of the workers was shown in the video scanning certain batches multiple times, this was for a valid reason: her scanner kept jamming. The investigators confirmed from scanner logs, as well as the footage, that she only hit the âacceptâ button once per batch.257 Investigators also found that staff likely did not tell the observers to leave, let alone forcefully eject them from the facility.258

Despite this conclusive evidence and testimony, President Trump continued to point to the Fulton County video as evidence of a grand conspiracy. On January 5th, for instance, President Trumpâs executive assistant emailed a document âfrom POTUSâ to Senator Josh Hawley (R-MO), Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX), and Representative Jim Jordan (R-OH) that cited âSuitcase Gateâ among the âworst fraud incidentsâ in Georgia.259

During his January 6th speech, President Trump told the crowd that âin Fulton County, Republican poll watchers were ejected, in some cases, physically from the room under the false pretense of a pipe burst.â The President continued:

â¦then election officials pull boxes, Democrats, and suitcases of ballots out from under a table. You all saw it on television, totally fraudulent. And illegally scanned them for nearly two hours, totally unsupervised. Tens of thousands of votes. This act coincided with a mysterious vote dump of up to 100,000 votes for Joe Biden, almost none for Donald Trump.260

No part of President Trumpâs story was true. He had already been informed that it was false.

In June 2021, when Giulianiâs law license was revoked by a New York State appellate court, the courtâs ruling cited his statements about supposed suitcases of ballots in Georgia as one of its reasons for doing so. âIf, as respondent claims, he reviewed the entire video, he could not have reasonably reached a conclusion that illegal votes were being counted,â the courtâs ruling reads.261

President Trump's conspiracy-mongering endangered innocent public servants around the country, including in Fulton County. For example, during a December 10, 2020, appearance in Georgia, Giuliani falsely accused Ruby Freeman and Shaye Moss, two Black public servants shown in the Fulton County video, of âsurreptitiously passing around USB ports as if theyâre vials of heroin or cocaine.ââ262 In fact, Moss had been given a ginger mint by her mother, Freeman.263 As described in Chapter 2, baseless accusations like these forever changed the lives of election workers like Freeman and Moss. All in service of President Trump's Big Lie.

The Trump Campaignâs distortion of the State Farm Arena video is just one example of the âfake ballotsâ lie. President Trump frequently claimed that âfake ballotsâ for Biden were injected into the vote-counting process. To hear the President tell it, there were truckloads of ballots delivered in the middle of the night to vote-counting centers and millions more votes were cast than there were registered voters. Judges, Trump administration officials, State authorities, and independent election experts found each iteration of the âfake ballotâ claim to be just that: fake. The Trump Campaign and its surrogates brought nine cases that raised some version of a âfake ballotsâ claim. Every one of those cases was promptly dismissed.264 For example, in Costantino v. City of Detroit, a Michigan court ruled that the plaintiffâs claims regarding forged, backdated and double-counted votes in Detroit were âincorrect and not credibleâ and ârife with speculation and guess-work about sinister motives.ââ265

Many of the fake ballot claims were publicly raised and repeated by President Trump, but never included in any lawsuit. For example, a truck driver for the U.S. Postal Service claimed that he delivered hundreds of thousands of completed ballots from Bethpage, New York to Lancaster, Pennsylvania.266 President Trump repeated this allegation numerous times.267 The DOJ and FBI interviewed the relevant witnesses, including the truck driver, and reviewed the loading manifests. They determined that the allegation was not true.268 Both Attorney General Barr and his successor, Jeffrey Rosen, told President Trump this claim was false. But that didnât stop the President from repeating it.

Another alleged âtruckload of ballotsâ was supposedly delivered to the Detroit counting center at 4:30 a.m. on election night. This truck allegedly carried 100,000 ballots in garbage cans, wastepaper bins, cardboard boxes, and shopping baskets.269 A widely circulated video purportedly showed an unmarked van dropping off ballots, which were then wheeled into the counting center on a wagon.270 In fact, the only ballot delivery in Detroit after midnight on election night was an official delivery of 16,000 ballots, stacked in 45 well-organized trays of approximately 350 ballots each.271 The wagon depicted in the video contained camera equipment being pulled by a reporter.272 The claim of 100,000 fake ballots being smuggled into the counting center in the middle of the night is even more ridiculous in light of the fact that only 174,384 absent voter ballots were recorded in the City of Detroit in the 2020 election.273 The addition of 100,000 fake ballots to approximately 74,000 legitimate ballots would certainly have been obvious to election officials.274

President Trump also repeatedly claimed that more votes were cast than there were registered voters in certain States, cities, or precincts. It was easy to fact-check these allegations and demonstrate they were false.

For example, in Pennsylvania, approximately nine million people were registered to vote and approximately 6.8 million votes were cast in the 2020 presidential election.275 Nevertheless, President Trump and his allies made numerous âmore votes than votersâ claims in Pennsylvania. Citing 2020 mail-in voting data tweeted by Pennsylvania State Senator Doug Mastriano, President Trump claimed that 1.1 million ballots had been âcreatedâ and counted improperly.276 In fact, there was no discrepancy in the actual numbersâMastriano erroneously compared the 2.6 million mail-in ballots cast in the November general election to the 1.5 million ballots that were returned in the June primary election.277

President Trump also promoted a false claim by a different Pennsylvania legislator that Pennsylvania had 205,000 more votes than voters.278 This claim was based on a flawed comparison by State Representative Frank Ryan of the votes recorded by State election authorities as having been cast and those reflected in a separate State registry.279 In fact, the discrepancy was a result of some counties not yet uploading their official results to the registry.280 In late-December 2020, Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue told President Trump that this allegation was baseless.281 President Trump kept repeating it anyway.282

The President and his surrogates made similar false claims concerning excess votes in Michigan. Many of those claims originated with a grossly inaccurate affidavit submitted by Russell Ramsland, the person behind the âvery amateurishâ and âfalse and misleadingâ ASOG report regarding Dominion voting machines in Antrim County.283 Ramsland claimed in a similar affidavit filed in Federal court in Georgia that 3,276 precincts in Michigan had turnout of between 84% and 350%, with 19 precincts reporting turnout in excess of 100%.284 Ramslandâs affidavit was widely ridiculed, in part, because he relied on data for dozens of precincts that are located in Minnesota, not Michigan.285 Even after he corrected his affidavit to remove the Minnesota townships, his Michigan data remained wildly off-base.286

The President and his surrogates repeatedly claimed that ballots for former Vice President Biden were counted multiple times.287 These claims originated when some noticed election officials re-running stacks of ballots through counting machines. But the allegation is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the vote-counting processâit is routine and appropriate for election officials to re-scan ballots if they are not properly scanned and tabulated in the initial effort. In Costantino v. City of Detroit, the court rejected the âincorrect and not credibleâ affidavits speculating that ballots were run through scanners and counted multiple times in favor of the âmore accurate and persuasive explanation of activityâ put forward by the âhighly-respectedâ election official with 40 years of experience.288

As with other misguided claims of election fraud, the claim that ballots were counted multiple times disregards the safeguards in the voting process. In particular, as noted above, it would certainly have been apparent in the canvassing process if hundreds of ballots were counted multiple times in Detroit because the total number of ballots would greatly exceed the number of voters who voted. But that was not the case.

In addition to their false claims regarding fake ballots, President Trump and his surrogates also relentlessly asserted that tens of thousands of ballots were cast by dead or otherwise ineligible voters. For example, President Trump and Giuliani frequently alleged that more than 66,000 unregistered juveniles voted in Georgia.289 In fact, no underage people voted in Georgia.290 Giuliani offered several different made-up figures of the number of non-citizens who supposedly voted in Arizona, but provided no evidence to substantiate his claims.291 In fact, Arizona requires every new voter to provide proof of citizenship in order to register to voteâor to complete a Federal voter registration form that requires the individual to sign an attestation to citizenship status under penalty of perjuryâand no person can vote without being registered.292 By mid-November, Trump Campaign staff determined this allegation that thousands of non-citizens voted in Arizona was based on âhighly unreliableâ information, and it is one of the false claims that led to Giuliani losing his New York law license.293 These âineligibleâ voters did not exist.

Nor were thousands of votes cast in the names of dead Americans.

During his January 2nd, call with Georgia Secretary of State Raffensperger, the President claimed that âclose to about 5,000 [dead] votersâ cast ballots in the election. Raffensperger quickly informed the President this wasnât true. 294 But the âdead voterâ lie wasnât limited to Georgia. President Trump wanted Americans to believe that âdead votersâ contributed to his defeat in several battleground States.295

But even the Trump Campaign and its lawyers recognized early on that the claims regarding âdead votersâ were grossly exaggerated, to say the least. By early November, Trump lawyers discovered that many people listed by the campaign as having died were actually alive and well.296 In early December, Eric Herschmann advised Chief of Staff Meadows by text message that the Trump legal team had determined that the claim of more than 10,000 dead people voting in Georgia was not accurate.297 The ensuing exchange makes clear that both men knew that Giulianiâs claims were absurd:

Herschmann: Just an FYI. Alex Cannon and his team verified that the 10k+ supposed dead people voting in GA is not accurate

Meadows: I didnât hear that claim. It is not accurate. I think I found 22 if I remember correctly. Two of them died just days before the general

Herschmann: It was alleged in Rudy's hearing today. Your number is much closer to what we can prove. I think it's 12

Meadows: My son found 12 obituaries and 6 other possibles depending on the Voter roll acuracy [sic]

Herschmann: That sounds more like it. Maybe he can help Rudy find the other 10k ??

Meadows: lol298

Shortly thereafter, a Georgia court dismissed the claim that there were tens of thousands of votes cast by ineligible voters, noting the claims ârest on speculation rather than duly pled facts.ââ299

The Trump Campaignâs own expert on the supposed âdead votersâ admitted that the Campaign lacked the necessary data to make any conclusions about whether any (or how many) votes were cast in the name of a deceased person.300 State officials did have such data, however, and were able to conduct the type of matching analysis required. These State authorities determined that there were only a handful of cases in which people voted on behalf of deceased individuals.301

Even in those cases where the person who voted actually did die, President Trumpâs lawyers knew that the vast majority of the voters included on their list of dead voters actually cast their votes before they passed.302 In early-January 2021, just days before January 6th, Republican Senator Lindsey Graham asked several Trump lawyers to provide evidence to support the Campaignâs claims regarding dead voters.303 As Giulianiâs team investigated, they concluded that they could not find evidence of dead voters anywhere near the number that Giuliani and President Trump were claiming publicly. After noting the shortcomings in their evidence, Katherine Friess, a lawyer working with the Giuliani legal team, warned that Senator Graham would âpush backâ on their evidence.304 As predicted by Friess, Senator Graham was not impressed by the information provided by Giulianiâs team. In his speech on the Senate floor on January 6th, Graham explained why he would not object to the certification of electoral votes. Senator Graham referred to the failure of the Trump attorneys to provide the evidence he requested:

They said thereâs 66,000 people in Georgia under 18 voted. How many people believe that? I asked, âGive me 10.â Hadnât had one. They said 8,000 felons in prison in Arizona voted. Give me 10. Hadnât gotten one. Does that say thereâsâThereâs problems in every election. I donât buy this. Enoughâs enough. Weâve got to end it.305

Documents obtained by the Select Committee reveal that President Trump and his lawyers knew that the claims being made in court about dead or ineligible voters in Georgia were inaccurate, and the lawyers were concerned that if the President vouched for those claims in another court pleading he might be criminally prosecuted. On December 31st, as the lawyers rushed to file a Federal lawsuit in Georgia, some of the lawyers raised concerns about the President signing a âverificationâ under oath that the allegations regarding voter fraud in Georgia, including claims regarding dead people voting, were true. As Dr. Eastman noted in an email to his colleagues on December 31st:

Although the President signed a verification [regarding the Georgia claims] back on Dec. 1, he has since been made aware that some of the allegations (and evidence proffered by the experts) has been inaccurate. For him to sign a new verification with that knowledge . . . would not be accurate. And I have no doubt that an aggressive DA or US Atty someplace will go after both the President and his lawyers once all the dust settles on this.306

Despite these concerns, President Trump and his attorneys filed a complaint that incorporated the same inaccurate numbers, and President Trump signed a verification swearing under oath that the inaccurate numbers were âtrue and correctâ or âbelieved to be true and correctâ to the best of his knowledge and belief.307 A Federal judge reviewing the relevant emails and pleadings recently concluded:

The emails show that President Trump knew that the specific numbers of voter fraud were wrong but continued to tout those numbers, both in court and to the public. The Court finds that these emails are sufficiently related to and in furtherance of a conspiracy to defraud the United States.308

At noon on January 6, 2021, President Trump addressed thousands of his supporters at a rally just south of the White House. The election had been decided two months earlier. The courts found there was no evidence of significant fraud. The States certified their votes by mid-December. It was overâPresident Trump lost. But thatâs not what the President told those in attendance. He delivered an incendiary speech from beginning to end, arguing that nothing less than the fate of America was at stake.

âOur country has had enough,â President Trump said. âWe will not take it anymore and that's what this is all about.ââ309 He claimed that his followers had descended on Washington to âsave our democracyâ and âstop the steal.ââ310 He refused, once again, to concede. And he proclaimed that â[t]oday I will lay out just some of the evidence proving that we won this election and we won it by a landslide.ââ311

For months, President Trump had relentlessly promoted his Big Lie.312 He and his associates manufactured one tale after another to justify it. For more than an hour on January 6th, the President wove these conspiracy theories and lies together.313

By the Select Committeeâs assessment, there were more than 100 times during his speech in which President Trump falsely claimed that either the election had been stolen from him, or falsely claimed that votes had been compromised by some specific act of fraud or major procedural violations. That day, President Trump repeated many of the same lies he had told for monthsâeven after being informed that many of these claims were false. He lied about Dominion voting machines in Michigan, suitcases of ballots in Georgia, more votes than voters in Pennsylvania, votes cast by non-citizens in Arizona, and dozens of other false claims of election fraud.314 None of those claims were true.

As explained in the chapters that follow, the Big Lie was central to President Trumpâs plan to stay in power. He used the Big Lie to pressure State and local officials to undo the will of the people. His campaign convened fake electors on the baseless pretense that former Vice President Biden won several States due to fraud or other malfeasance. The President tried to subvert the Department of Justice by browbeating its leadership to endorse his election lies. And when the DOJâs senior personnel did not acquiesce, President Trump sought to install a loyalist who would.

When all those efforts failed, President Trump betrayed his own Vice President. He pressured Vice President Pence to obstruct the joint session of Congress on January 6th, falsely claiming that he had the power to refuse to count certain electoral votes. President Trump knew this was illegal but attempted to justify it with lies about the election.

On December 19, 2020, President Trump summoned a mob to Washington, DC on the same day that Congress was set to certify former Vice President Bidenâs victory by claiming the election was stolen and promising a âwildâ protest.315

And the bogus stolen election claim was the focus of President Trumpâs speech on January 6th. The litany of lies he told riled up a mob that would march to the U.S. Capitol to intimidate Vice President Pence and Members of Congress.

âAnd we fight. We fight like hell. And if you don't fight like hell, you're not going to have a country anymore,â President Trump told the crowd.316 He incited them with these words just after praising his own election night lieâthe Big Lie.

President Trump told his followers to âfightâ to âsaveâ their country from a bogus specter of supposed election fraud.317 And many of them did.

ENDNOTES

Â Â 1. âDonald Trump 2020 Election Night Speech Transcript,â Rev, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-2020-election-night-speech-transcript.

Â Â 2. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 54, 60.

Â Â 3. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 74-75.

Â Â 4. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 75, 78.

Â Â 5. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001 (Email chain between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael, starting on October 31, 2020, and ending on November 3, 2020, discussing a draft victory statement for President Trump).

Â Â 6. We note that Bannon refused to testify and has been convicted of criminal contempt by a jury of his peers. See âStephen K. Bannon Sentenced to Four Months in Prison on Two Counts of Contempt of Congress,â Department of Justice, (Oct. 21, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/stephen-k-bannon-sentenced-four-months-prison-two-counts-contempt-congress; Dan Friedman, âLeaked Audio: Before Election Day, Bannon Said Trump Planned to Falsely Claim Victory,â Mother Jones, (July 12, 2022), available at https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2022/07/leaked-audio-steve-bannon-trump-2020-election-declare-victory/.

Â Â 7. At his interview, Stone invoked his Fifth Amendment Right not to incriminate himself, including to questions regarding his direct communications with Donald Trump and his role in January 6th. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Business Meeting on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13, 2022), at 39:15 - 39:33 available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQvuBoLBuC0.

Â Â 8. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 27.

Â Â 9. Jennifer Agiesta and Marshall Cohen, âCNN Poll: Questions about Accuracy of Vote Counting Rise as Most Want to Vote before Election Day,â CNN, (Aug. 18, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/18/politics/cnn-poll-trump-biden-election-security-mail-in-voting/index.html; Mark Murray, âBiden Leads Trump by 10 points in Final Pre-Election NBC News/WSJ poll,â NBC News, (Nov. 1, 2020, updated Nov. 2, 2020), available at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/biden-leads-trump-10-points-final-pre-election-nbc-news-n1245667.

Â 10. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â 11. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â 12. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 44.

Â 13. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 44-45.

Â 14. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â 15. Dan Friedman, âLeaked Audio: Before Election Day, Bannon Said Trump Planned to Falsely Claim Victory,â Mother Jones, (July 12, 2022), available at https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2022/07/leaked-audio-steve-bannon-trump-2020-election-declare-victory/. During our October 13 hearing, Robert Costa tweeted: âCBS News has confirmed that Oct. 31, 2020, was a key date in the pre-election maneuvers by Trump. Set off alarm with WH counsel and Herschmann, among others. Iâve seen texts from that night from some aides and they knew it was no joke; declaring victory was Trumpâs plan. Period.â Maggie Haberman retweeted Costa, writing: âTrump told a conference call of a bunch of lawyers and informal advisers working for him earlier that month that he was going to go up and say he won, first reported by @jonathanvswan.â Robert Costa (@costareports), Twitter, Oct. 13, 2022 1:29 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/costareports/status/1580611586674151424?lang=en; see also Maggie Haberman (@maggieNYT), Twitter, Oct. 13, 2022 1:35 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/maggienyt/status/1580613143637635072 (âTrump told a conference call of a bunch of lawyers and informal advisers working for him earlier that month that he was going to go up and say he won, first reported by @jonathanvswanâ).

Â 16. Dan Friedman, âLeaked Audio: Before Election Day, Bannon Said Trump Planned to Falsely Claim Victory,â Mother Jones, (July 12, 2022), available at https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2022/07/leaked-audio-steve-bannon-trump-2020-election-declare-victory/.

Â 17. Fox Business, âSteve Bannon: Trump Wonât Allow the Election to Be Stolen,â YouTube, at 3:24, Nov. 3, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PDdxoyAUqoo.

Â 18. âSteve Bannon: Donald Trump Will Claim Victory âRight Before the 11 Oâclock Newsâ,â Media Matters, (Nov. 3, 2020), available at https://www.mediamatters.org/steve-bannon/steve-bannon-donald-trump-will-claim-victory-right-11-oclock-news-0.

Â 19. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001 (Email chain between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael, starting on October 31, 2020, and ending on November 3, 2020, discussing a draft victory statement for President Trump).

Â 20. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001 (Email chain between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael, starting on October 31, 2020, and ending on November 3, 2020, discussing a draft victory statement for President Trump).

Â 21. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001 (Email chain between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael, starting on October 31, 2020, and ending on November 3, 2020, discussing a draft victory statement for President Trump).

Â 22. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001 (Email chain between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael, starting on October 31, 2020, and ending on November 3, 2020, discussing a draft victory statement for President Trump).

Â 23. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001 (Email chain between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael, starting on October 31, 2020, and ending on November 3, 2020, discussing a draft victory statement for President Trump).

Â 24. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Business Meeting on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13, 2022), at 38:18 - 39:32, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQvuBoLBuC0.

Â 25. Jonathan Swan, âTrump Plans to Declare Premature Victory If He Appears on Election Night,â Axios, (Nov. 1, 2020), available at https://www.axios.com/2020/11/01/trump-claim-election-victory-ballots.

Â 26. Jonathan Swan, âTrump Plans to Declare Premature Victory If He Appears on Election Night,â Axios, (Nov. 1, 2020), available at https://www.axios.com/2020/11/01/trump-claim-election-victory-ballots.

Â 27. Jonathan Swan, âTrump Plans to Declare Premature Victory If He Appears on Election Night,â Axios, (Nov. 1, 2020), available at https://www.axios.com/2020/11/01/trump-claim-election-victory-ballots.

Â 28. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â 29. Months prior to the election, Josh Mendelsohn, the CEO of Hawkfish, a Democratic data and analytics firm, warned that President Trump would try to take advantage of the Red Mirage. See Margaret Talev, âExclusive: Dem Group Warns of Apparent Trump Election Day Landslide,â Axios, (Sept. 1, 2020), available at https://www.axios.com/2020/09/01/bloomberg-group-trump-election-night-scenarios. For other accounts warning that election night would see a Red Mirage, see Marshall Cohen, âDeciphering the âRed Mirage,â the âBlue Shift,â and the Uncertainty Surrounding Election Results This November,â CNN, (Sept. 1, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/01/politics/2020-election-count-red-mirage-blue-shift/index.html; Darragh Roche, âTrump Is Heading for a âRed Mirageâ Win on Election Night, Bloomberg-Funded Data Firm Says,â Newsweek, (Sept. 1, 2020), available at https://www.newsweek.com/trump-phantom-win-election-1528948; Tom McCarthy, ââRed Mirageâ: The âInsidiousâ Scenario If Trump Declares Victory,â The Guardian, (Oct. 31, 2020), available at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/31/red-mirage-trump-election-scenario-victory.

Â 30. âRemarks by President Trump, Vice President Pence, and Members of the Coronavirus Task Force in Press Briefing,â White House, April 7, 2020, available at https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-vice-president-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-briefing-april-7-2020/.

Â 31. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Apr. 8, 2020 8:20 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201201162757/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1247861952736526336 (archived).

Â 32. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, May 24, 2020 10:08 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20200701075716/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1264558926021959680 (archived).

Â 33. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Sept. 17, 2020 7:56 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201115164217/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1306562791894122504 (archived).

Â 34. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 36; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010941_0001-2, , 076P-R000010940_0001-6 (July 23, 2020, emails regarding scheduling a meeting for the President with McCarthy, Stepien, and others).

Â 35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 36.

Â 36. Fox News, âPresident Trump Goes One-on-One with Chris Wallace,â YouTube, July 19, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6XdpDOH1JA; Pat Ward (@WardDPatrick), Twitter, July 19, 2020 10:15 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/WardDPatrick/status/1284854318575878144.

Â 37. âRemarks by President Trump in Press Briefing,â White House, Sept. 23, 2020, available at https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-briefing-092420/.

Â 38. âRemarks by President Trump in Press Briefing,â White House, Sept. 23, 2020, available at https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-briefing-092420/.

Â 39. Barbara Sprunt, âTrump Questions Election Again after White House Walked Back His Earlier Remarks,â NPR, (Sept. 24, 2020), available at https://www.npr.org/2020/09/24/916440816/republican-leaders-reject-trump-hedging-on-transfer-of-power-amid-war-over-confi.

Â 40. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 4, 2020 12:49 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201105044240/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1323864823680126977 (archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 4, 2020 10:04 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201104153504/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1324004491612618752 (archived).

Â 41. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 44-45.

Â 42. âDonald Trump 2020 Election Night Speech Transcript,â Rev, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-2020-election-night-speech-transcript.

Â 43. See âDonald Trump 2020 Election Night Speech Transcript,â Rev, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-2020-election-night-speech-transcript; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 4, 2020 12:49 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201104060648/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1323864823680126977 (archived).

Â 44. Dan Friedman, âLeaked Audio: Before Election Day, Bannon Said Trump Planned to Falsely Claim Victory,â Mother Jones, (July 12, 2022), available at https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2022/07/leaked-audio-steve-bannon-trump-2020-election-declare-victory/.

Â 45. Factba.se, âInterview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,â Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, at esp. 1:42-3:35, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 4, 2020 10:17 a.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1324007806694023169.jpg (archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 4, 2020 10:04 a.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1324004491612618752.jpg (archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 18, 2020 8:22 p.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1329233502139715586.jpg (archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 19, 2020 8:49 p.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1329602736053252107.jpg (archived).

Â 46. For example, one widely shared post claimed that, in the early-morning hours of November 4, hundreds of thousands of mail in ballots were âfoundâ in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, and all of the ballots were for Biden. Nick Adams (@NickAdamsinUSA), Twitter, Nov. 4, 2020 4:48 p.m., available at https://web.archive.org/web/20201110150437/https://twitter.com/NickAdamsinUSA/status/1324151663641448448 (archived).

Â 47. In many metropolitan areas, absentee ballots are counted in centralized locations and reported in batches. For example, the ballots that were supposedly âfoundâ in Wisconsin were absentee ballots reported by Milwaukee County when that county completed its tally. Of the approximately 181,000 votes reported between 3:26 and 3:44 a.m., Biden received approximately 83% of the votes and Trump received approximately 17%. See Eric Litke and Madeline Heim, âFact check: Wisconsin Did Not âFindâ 100K Ballots around 4 a.m. the Morning after the Election, or Take Break from Counting Votes,â Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/11/04/wisconsin-didnt-find-ballots-stop-count-voter-fraud-claims-untrue-politifact/6165435002/. In Michigan, no ballots were âfoundâ between 3:30-5:00 a.m. Rather, approximately 200,000 votes were reported by Wayne County shortly after 6:00 a.m., the vast majority of which were for Biden. See Geoffrey Skelley, âLive Bog: 2020 Election Results Coverage: Michiganâs Morning Update,â FiveThirtyEight, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at https://fivethirtyeight.com/live-blog/2020-election-results-coverage/#294294. Overall, Biden won 68% of the vote in Wayne County, to 30% for Trump. However, among absentee voters, Biden won 75% to Trumpâs 23%. See âNovember 3, 2020 - General Election Results,â Charter County of Wayne, Michigan, available at https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/clerk/november-3-2020-general-election-results.aspx.

Â 48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 45; See also John Curiel, Charles Stewart III, and Jack Williams, One Shift, Two Shifts, Red Shift, Blue Shifts: Reported Election Returns in the 2020 Election, MIT Election Data and Science Lab, (July 9, 2021), p. 40, available at https://electionlab.mit.edu/sites/default/files/2021-07/curiel_stewart_williams_blue_shift_esra_final.pdf, (detailed analysis of timed reporting data shows that âsmaller and more rural counties, which favored Trump, could report their ballots before the counties with hundreds of precincts and hundreds of thousands of votersâ).

Â 49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 8.

Â 50. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 8.

Â 51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 119, 124-26, 174.

Â 52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 174.

Â 53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudy Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 22â23.

Â 54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudy Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 23, 26.

Â 55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudy Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 35 (describing Ellis as âa co-counselâ and âmy number two personâ so âgenerally, if you got an opinion from Jenna, it would be just like getting an opinion from meâ).

Â 56. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bernard Kerik, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 10, 15â18.

Â 57. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 92.

Â 58. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 111â112.

Â 59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 134; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Mark Meadows Production), MM007288, (November 13, 2020, email from Bill Stepien to Mark Meadows, Justin Clark, and Jason Miller titled âFwd: AZ Federal ID Votersâ).

Â 60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alex Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 19â23.

Â 61. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alex Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 38â39.

Â 62. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alex Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 33-34.

Â 63. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 119.

Â 64. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 117â18.

Â 65. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 112â13.

Â 66. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 88â91.

Â 67. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM010951-52 (November 3, 2020, Jason Miller text message to Mark Meadows at 10:27 pm); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM010972 (November 3, 2020, Jason Miller group text message to Mark Meadows and David Bossie at 11:53 pm); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011343 (November 6, 2020, Jason Miller group text message to Mark Meadows, Ivanka Trump, Bill Stepien, Hope Hicks, Dan Scavino, and Jared Kushner at 11:10 am).

Â 68. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 91.

Â 69. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 91.

Â 70. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 115â 17; Brian Slodysko, âExplainer: Why AP Called Pennsylvania for Biden,â Associated Press (Nov. 7, 2020), available at https://apnews.com/article/ap-called-pennsylvania-joe-biden-why-f7dba7b31bd21ec2819a7ac9d2b028d3.

Â 71. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 115â 20.

Â 72. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 118.

Â 73. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 119.

Â 74. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â 75. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.; Federal Election Commission, âFederal Elections 2020 â Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives,â Oct. 2022, p. 12, available at https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/federalelections2020.pdf.

Â 76. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â 77. âRisk-Limiting Audit Report â Georgia Presidential Contest, November 2020,â Georgia Secretary of State, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://sos.ga.gov/sites/default/files/2022-02/11.19_.20_risk_limiting_audit_report_memo_1.pdf.

Â 78. See âSummary of Hand Count Audits â 2020 General Election,â Arizona Secretary of State, (Nov. 17, 2020), available at https://azsos.gov/2020-general-election-hand-count-results ; âAgreed Upon Procedures Report â Evaluation of the Accuracy of Voting Machine Tabulators Used for the 2020 General Elections Held on November 3, 2020 (Voting System Check),â New Mexico Secretary of State, (Dec. 15, 2020), available at https://api.realfile.rtsclients.com/PublicFiles/ee3072ab0d43456cb15a51f7d82c77a2/f740346c-7b6b-4479-acd6-068829382307/2020%20Post%20Election%20Voting%20System%20Check%20Audit%20Results.pdf. Similar audits conducted by Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin also affirmed the results in those states, but their results are excluded from this list because in those instances their audit results were not available until after January 6th. Shortly after the election, Nevada also conducted some post-election checks that supported the validity of the results there too, including testing a sample of the voting machines to make sure votes were accurately recorded. Deposition of Joseph Gloria at 33, Law v. Whitmer, No. A-22-858609-W (Nev. Ct., Clark Cty. Dec. 1, 2020), p. 33, available at https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/2022.10.31-NV-Poll-Worker-Response-to-Application-for-Mandamus-STAMPED.pdf; Rex Briggs, âTrump Supporters Asked me to Look into Voter Fraud in Nevada; What I found Debunked What They were Alleging,â Nevada Independent, (Dec. 22, 2020), available at https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/trump-supporters-asked-me-to-look-into-voter-fraud-in-nevada-what-i-found-debunked-what-they-were-alleging.

Â 79. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â 80. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00115, JK00117-132(November 12, 2020, email from Matt Oczkowski, and attached analysis of battleground states).

Â 81. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00115, JK_00117-132 (November 12, 2020, email from Matt Oczkowski, and attached analysis of battleground states).

Â 82. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00115, JK_00117-132 (November 12, 2020, email from Matt Oczkowski, and attached analysis of battleground states).

Â 83. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00115, JK_00117-132 (November 12, 2020, email from Matt Oczkowski, and attached analysis of battleground states).

Â 84. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani (May 20, 2022), pp. 22-23.

Â 85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani (May 20, 2022), pp. 22-23.

Â 86. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani (May 20, 2022), pp. 22-23.

Â 87. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 106-107. Sidney Powell and Jenna Ellis accompanied Giuliani. The campaign was represented by Jared Kushner, Bill Stepien, David Bossie (a former senior official on President Trumpâs 2016 campaign), Derek Lyons, and Justin Clark. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), pp. 50-51; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Derek Lyons, (Mar. 17, 2022), pp. 64-65. Eric Herschmann also arrived at the campaign headquarters as the meeting was underway. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Mar. 17, 2022), pp. 160-61.

Â 88. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 109.

Â 89. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 109.

Â 90. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 107.

Â 91. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 63; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 34-35.

Â 92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 14-16.

Â 93. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 14-16.

Â 94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 41.

Â 95. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 63.

Â 96. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 34-35, 41-42.

Â 97. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 41.

Â 98. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 63.

Â 99. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 63.

100. âRudy Giuliani Trump Campaign Philadelphia Press Conference at Four Seasons Total Landscaping,â Rev, (Nov. 7, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-trump-campaign-philadelphia-press-conference-november-7.

101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bernard Kerik, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 30-32.

102. âMemorandum from Attorney General William Barr on Post-Voting Election Irregularity Inquiries to the United States Attorneys, to the Assistant Attorneys General for the Criminal Division, Civil Rights Division, and National Security Division, and to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,â Department of Justice, (Nov. 9, 2020), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20403358-william-barr-election-memo-november-9. Longstanding DOJ policy had been not to conduct such investigations prior to certification to avoid impacting election results. See Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses, 8th ed. Department of Justice, December 2017, at 84, available at https://www.justice.gov/criminal/file/1029066/download.

103. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 66-67; Mike Pence, So Help Me God, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2022), at pp. 431-432.

104. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 66-67.

105. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 67; Mike Pence, So Help Me God, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2022), at pp. 431.

106. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 15, 2020 7:11 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201117115935/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1327811527123103746 (archived).

107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 37-38.

108. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 174-175.

109. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Mark Meadows Production), MM007112 (Nov. 14, 2020 email from Jason Miller to Bill Stepien, Justin Clark, David Bossie, Mark Meadows, and Jared Kushner describing Rudy Giulianiâs surrogate briefing).

110. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Mark Meadows Production), MM007112 (Nov. 14, 2020 email from Jason Miller to Bill Stepien, Justin Clark, David Bossie, Mark Meadows, and Jared Kushner describing Rudy Giulianiâs surrogate briefing).

111. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Mark Meadows Production), MM007112 (Nov. 14, 2020 email from Jason Miller to Bill Stepien, Justin Clark, David Bossie, Mark Meadows, and Jared Kushner describing Rudy Giulianiâs surrogate briefing).

112. Factba.se, âInterview: Brian Kilmeade of Fox News Interviews Donald Trump - December 13, 2020,â Vimeo, at 7:47, Dec. 13, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/490517184.

113. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

114. Select Committee staff analyzed the lawsuits. See also, Brendan Williams, Did President Trumpâs 2020 Election Litigation Kill Rule11?, 30 Pub. Interest L. J. 181, 189 (2021), available at https://www.bu.edu/pilj/files/2021/06/Williams.pdf.

115. The only case that involved a victory for the campaign was the Pennsylvania case of Trump v. Boockvar. In that case, the court found that the Pennsylvania Secretary of State could not extend the deadline for voters to cure their failure to provide proper identification for absentee ballots. This decision affected just a few thousand votes, which were not included in any tallies. Trump v. Boockvar, No. 602 MD 2020 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Nov. 12, 2020), available at https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/602-MD-20-1.pdf.

116. See John Danforth, Benjamin Ginsberg, Thomas B. Griffith, et al., Lost, Not Stolen: The Conservative Case that Trump Lost and Biden Won the 2020 Presidential Election, (July 2022), p. 3, available at https://lostnotstolen.org/download/378/.

117. Complaint at 2, Bowyer v. Ducey, 506 F. Supp. 3d 699 (D. Ariz. Dec. 2, 2020) (No. 2:20-cv-02321), ECF No. 1.

118. Bowyer v. Ducey, 506 F. Supp. 3d 699, 706, 723 (D. Ariz. 2020).

119. Minute Entry and Order at 6-9, Ward v. Jackson, No. CV2020-015285 (Az. Sup. Ct. Dec. 4, 2020).

120. See Ward v. Jackson, No. CV-20-0343-AP, 2020 Ariz. LEXIS 313, at *6 (Ariz. 2020), also available at https://www.clerkofcourt.maricopa.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/1984/637437053596970000; Howard Fischer, âState Supreme Court rejects GOP bid to void election,â Arizona Capitol Times, (Dec. 8, 2020), available at https://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2020/12/08/federal-judge-hears-arguments-in-election-challenge/; âMeet the Justices,â Arizona Judicial Branch, (Dec. 8, 2020), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201208032900/https://www.azcourts.gov/meetthejustices/ (archived); âBrutinel Elected as Next Arizona Supreme Court Chief Justice,â Associated Press, (Nov. 20, 2018), available at https://apnews.com/article/27b725d44d384e2cb7a0e491ac82fe7f; Bob Christie, âDucey Names 2 to New Arizona Supreme Court Seats,â Associated Press, (Nov. 28, 2016), available at https://apnews.com/article/26fc7f154b0e4b4fb358987941ded8d0; âArizona Governor Appoints New Supreme Court Justice,â Associated Press, (Apr. 26, 2019), available at https://apnews.com/article/4ce4bf1d79724c03b1d4cf36f4b97cf1; Jonathan J. Cooper, âDucey Appoints Montgomery to Arizona Supreme Court,â Associated Press, (Sep. 4, 2019), available at https://apnews.com/article/bac43d42185c4b8bb9e8c465a59792c8.

121. Complaint at 1-2, Boland v. Raffensperger, No. 2020CV343018 (Ga. Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Boland-v-Raffensperger-Complaint.pdf.

122. Final Order at 5-6, Boland v. Raffensperger, No. No. 2020CV343018 (Ga. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Boland-v-Raffensperger-Order-Dismissing-Complaint.pdf.

123. Order Denying Appeal, Boland v. Raffensperger, No. S21M0565 (Ga. Dec. 14, 2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Boland-v-Raffensperger-GA-SC-Order-Denying-Appeal.pdf; Jonathan Ringel, âDeal Picks Krause, Richardson for Fulton Superior,â Law.com, (Dec. 28, 2018), available at https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/2018/12/28/deal-picks-krause-richardson-for-fulton-superior/; âChief Justice Harold D. Melton,â Supreme Court of Georgia, (Oct. 16, 2020), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201016174745/https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/biographies/justice-harold-d-melton/ (archived); âPresiding Justice David E. Nahmias,â Supreme Court of Georgia, (Nov. 20, 2020), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201120204518/https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/biographies/justice-david-e-nahmias/ (archived); âChief Justice Michael P. Boggs,â Supreme Court of Georgia, (last accessed Dec. 3, 2022), available at https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/biographies/justice-michael-p-boggs/; âPresiding Justice Nels S.D. Peterson,â Supreme Court of Georgia, (last accessed Dec. 3, 2022), available at https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/biographies/justice-nels-s-d-peterson/; âJustice Sarah Hawkins Warren,â Supreme Court of Georgia, (last accessed Dec. 3, 2022), available at https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/biographies/justice-sarah-hawkins-warren/; âJustice Charles J. Bethel,â Supreme Court of Georgia, (last accessed Dec. 3, 2022), available at https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/biographies/justice-charles-j-bethel/; âJustice Carla Wong McMillian,â Supreme Court of Georgia, (last accessed Dec. 3, 2022), available at https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/biographies/justice-carla-wong-mcmillian/.

124. Wood v. Raffensperger, 501 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1317, 1327, 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2020).

125. Wood v. Raffensperger, 501 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1327 (N.D. Ga. 2020).

126. Complaint for Declaratory, Emergency, and Permanent Injunctive Relief, King v. Whitmer, Case No. 2:20-cv-13134-LVP-RSW,(E.D. Mich. Nov. 25, 2020), ECF No. 1; King v. Whitmer, 505 F. Supp. 3d 720, 738 (E.D. Mich. 2020). In a subsequent decision, the judge called the case âa historic and profound abuse of the judicial processâ and sanctioned the attorneys who filed the lawsuit King v. Whitmer, 556 F. Supp. 3d 680, 688-89 (E.D. Mich. 2021).

127. Opinion and Order at 1, 4, Stoddard v. City Election Commission, No. 20-014604-CZ, (Mich. Cty. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2020), available at https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/AG/releases/2020/november/Stoddard_et_al_v_City_Election_Commission_et_al_-_11-06-2020.pdf?rev=2fa32f93caa94365a1ee8c1c492a4e75.

128. Opinion and Order at 12-13, Costantino v. Detroit, No. 20-014780-AW, (Mich. Cty. Cir. Ct. Nov. 13, 2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Costantino-v-Detroit-Opinion-and-Order.pdf.

129. Law v. Whitmer, No. 10 OC 00163 1B, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1160, at *1, 29-31, 33, 48-49, 52, 54 (Nev. Dec. 8, 2020), available at https://casetext.com/case/law-v-whitmer-1 (attaching and affirming lower court decision).

130. Law v. Whitmer, No. 10 OC 00163 1B, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1160, at *3-4 (Nev. Dec. 8, 2020), available at https://casetext.com/case/law-v-whitmer-1 (attaching and affirming lower court decision).

131. Donald J. Trump for President v. Boockvar, 502 F. Supp. 3d 899, 906 (M.D. Pa. 2020).

132. Donald J. Trump for President v. Boockvar, 803 Fed. App'x. 377, 381 (M.D. Pa. 2020).

133. âEleven Nominations Sent to the Senate Today,â Trump White House Archives, (June 19, 2017), available at https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/eleven-nominations-sent-senate-today-3/.

134. Complaint at 72, Trump v. Wisconsin Election Commission, 506 F. Supp. 3d 620 (E.D. Wis. 2020) (No. 2:20-cv-01785), ECF No. 1; Trump v. Wisconsin Election Commission, 506 F. Supp. 3d 620, 625 (E.D. Wis. 2020) (dismissing case with prejudice).

135. Trump v. Wisconsin Election Commission, 506 F. Supp. 3d 620, 637-39 (E.D. Wis. 2020).

136. Trump v. Wisconsin Election Commission, 983 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir. 2020); Bill Glauber, âFederal Appeals Court Turns Down Donald Trump Push to Overturn Election Results in Wisconsin,â Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, (Dec. 24, 2020), available at https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/12/24/federal-appeals-court-rejects-trump-bid-overturn-wisconsin-results/4043650001/.

137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

138. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 170-71.

139. For example, Select Committee data analysts found that certain legacy media networks played a role in promoting false claims of voter fraud and other election conspiracies. See Staff Memorandum from Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol Data Analysts, âLegacy Media Analysis,â (Dec. 3, 2022).

140. Center for an Informed Public, Digital Forensic Research Lab, Graphika, & Stanford Internet Observatory, The Long Fuse: Misinformation and the 2020 Election, (Jun. 15, 2021), p. 173, available at https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:tr171zs0069/EIP-Final-Report.pdf.

141. Center for an Informed Public, Digital Forensic Research Lab, Graphika, & Stanford Internet Observatory, The Long Fuse: Misinformation and the 2020 Election, (Jun. 15, 2021), p. 82, available at https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:tr171zs0069/EIP-Final-Report.pdf.

142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 9.

143. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 10.

144. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 9; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 67.

145. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021) pp. 59-60.

146. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 36-37.

147. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

148. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2022), p. 60.

149. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 60-61, 63-64.

150. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 53, 67.

151. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 59-60.

152. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 61-62.

153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 54-55.

154. See, e.g., âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27; Law v. Whitmer, No. 10 OC 00163 1B, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1160, at *3-4 (Nev. Dec. 8, 2020), available at https://casetext.com/case/law-v-whitmer-1 (attaching and affirming lower court decision); Donald J. Trump for President v. Boockvar, 502 F. Supp. 3d 899, 906 (M.D. Pa. 2020); Wood v. Raffensperger, 501 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1317, 1327, 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2020); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 26, 6:23 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201228020228/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1342974373632876545 (archived); Rudy Giulianiâs Common Sense, âWATCH this BEFORE January 6th | Rudy Giulianiâs Common Sense | Ep. 100,â Rumble, at 29:30, available at https://rumble.com/embed/vcrv8j/?pub=4.

155. âFact Checks,â Michigan Department of State, (last accessed on Dec. 3, 2022), available at https://www.michigan.gov/sos/faqs/elections-and-campaign-finance/fact-checks.

156. See, e.g., âSecretary of Stateâs Office Debunks Ware County Voting Machine Story,â Georgia Secretary of State, (Dec. 7, 2020), available at https://sos.ga.gov/news/secretary-states-office-debunks-ware-county-voting-machine-story; âNews Conference on Georgia Vote Count,â C-SPAN, Nov. 9, 2020, available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?477943-1/news-conference-georgia-vote-count; âGeorgia Election Security,â C-SPAN, Jan. 4, 2021, available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?507710-1/georgia-election-official-refutes-president-trumps-voter-fraud-allegations.

157. See, e.g., PBS NewsHour, âWATCH: Wisconsin Elections Commission Gives Vote Counting Update,â YouTube, Nov. 4, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yg5liyyrObc.

158. See, e.g., Declaration of Charles Stewart III, Trump v. Raffensperger, No. 2020CV33255 (Ga. Super. Ct. filed Dec. 14, 2020) (expert declaration of political scientist at MIT); Examining Irregularities in the 2020 Election Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (Dec. 16, 2020) (statement of Chris Krebs, former Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency); âScientists Say No Credible Evidence of Computer Fraud in the 2020 Election Outcome, But Policymakers Must Work with Experts to Improve Confidence,â Matt Blazeâs Exhaustive Search, (Nov. 16, 2020), available at https://www.mattblaze.org/blog/election-letter/.

159. Search results for âDominion,â Trump Twitter Archive V2, (last accessed Dec. 12, 2022), available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22dominion%22.

160. See, e.g., âRemarks by President Trump During Thanksgiving Video Teleconference with Members of the Military,â Trump White House archives, (Nov. 27, 2020), available at https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-thanksgiving-video-teleconference-members-military/; Factba.se, âInterview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News â November 29, 2020,â Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://factba.se/trump/transcript/donald-trump-interview-fox-news-sunday-morning-futures-maria-bartiromo-november-29-2020; âDonald Trump Speech on Election Fraud Claims Transcript December 2,â Rev, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-december-2; Factba.se, âDonald Trump Vlog: Contesting Election Results â December 22, 2020,â (Dec. 22, 2020), available at https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-vlog-contesting-election-results-december-22-2020; âDonald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia: Senate Runoff Election,â Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-rally-speech-transcript-dalton-georgia-senate-runoff-election; âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.

161. J.M. Rieger, âThe False Claims from Fox News and Trump Allies Cited in Dominionâs $1.6 Billion Lawsuit,â Washington Post, (Mar. 26, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/03/26/fox-trump-election-dominion/.

162. Elahe Izadi and Sarah Ellison, âFox News Has Dropped âLou Dobbs Tonight,â Promoter of Trumpâs False Election Fraud Claims,â Washington Post, (Feb. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/media/2021/02/05/lou-dobbs-canceled-fox/; 60 Minutes, âDominion Voting Systems and the Baseless Conspiracy Theories about the 2020 Election | 60 Minutes,â YouTube, at 2:12â3:20, (Oct. 23, 2022), at 2:12-2:51, available at https://youtu.be/492jILlPtlA?t=132.

163. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 12, 2020 11:34 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201112163413/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1326926226888544256 (archived).

164. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Zach Parkinson Production), Parkinson0388-0407 (Internal Trump Campaign memo dated November 12, 2020); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Andrew Zachary âZachâ Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), pp. 46-47.

165. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Zach Parkinson Production), Parkinson0388-0407 (Internal Trump Campaign memo dated November 12, 2020).

166. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 117, 133.

167. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM007666, MM007669 (November 12, 2020, email and attachment from Jason Miller to Mark Meadows transmitting abridged and full internal Trump Campaign memo); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011902, MM011974 (Nov. 12 and 13, 2020 text messages from Jason Miller to Mark Meadows discussing the investigation into Dominion and the lack of evidence of foreign interference).

168. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 143, 291.

169. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 16, 2020 8:22 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22engineered+by+china%22 (archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 16, 2020 8:26 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201116132750/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1328328547598000130 (archived).

170. âJoint Statement from Elections Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council & the Election Infrastructure Sector Coordinating Executive Committees,â Department of Homeland Securityâs Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, (Nov. 12, 2020), available at https://www.cisa.gov/news/2020/11/12/joint-statement-elections-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-election.

171. Mark Bowden and Matthew Teague, âHow a County Clerk in Michigan Found Herself at the Center of Trumpâs Attempt to Overthrow the Election,â Time, (Dec. 15, 2021), available at https://time.com/6128812/the-steal-antrim-county-michigan/; Emma Brown, Aaron C. Davis, Jon Swaine, and Josh Dawsey, âThe Making of a Myth,â Washington Post, (May 9, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2021/trump-election-fraud-texas-businessman-ramsland-asog/.

172. Steven Nelson, âMichigan Republicans Claim Software Issue Undercounted Trump Votes,â New York Post, (Nov. 6, 2020), available at https://nypost.com/2020/11/06/michigan-gop-claims-software-issue-undercounted-trump-votes/.

173. âIsolated User Error in Antrim County Does Not Affect Election Results, Has No Impact on Other Counties or States,â Michigan Secretary of State, (Nov. 7, 2020), available at https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim_Fact_Check.pdf?rev=7a929e4d262e4532bbe574a3b82ddbcf; âHand Audit of All Presidential Election Votes in Antrim County Confirms Previously Certified Results, Voting Machines Were Accurate,â Michigan Secretary of State, (Dec. 17, 2020), available at https://www.michigan.gov/sos/resources/news/2020/12/17/hand-audit-of-all-presidential-election-votes-in-antrim-county-confirms-previously-certified-result; J. Alex Halderman, Analysis of the Antrim County, Michigan November 2020 Election Incident, (Mar. 26, 2021), pp. 17-27, available at https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim.pdf?rev=fbfe881cdc0043a9bb80b783d1bb5fe9; Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, Report on the November 2020 Election in Michigan, (June 23, 2021), pp. 14-19, 36-55, available at https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf.

174. Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, Report on the November 2020 Election in Michigan, (June 23, 2021), pp. 14-15, available at https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf.

175. âIsolated User Error in Antrim County Does Not Affect Election Results, Has No Impact on Other Counties or States,â Michigan Secretary of State website, (Nov. 7, 2020), available at https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim_Fact_Check.pdf?rev=7a929e4d262e4532bbe574a3b82ddbcf.

176. Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, Report on the November 2020 Election in Michigan, (June 23, 2021), pp. 14-19, available at https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf.

177. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010292_0001 (November 12, 2020, email from Tim Walberg to Molly Michel re: Additional Presidential Phone call follow up).

178. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), pp. 70-74; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Department of Homeland Security Production), CTRL0000033284, (Nov. 13, 2020, email from Molly Michael to Chad Wolf titled âRe: Michigan Letterâ).

179. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), pp. 72-74; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Department of Homeland Security Production), CTRL0000033284, (Nov. 13, 2020, email from Molly Michael to Chad Wolf titled âRe: Michigan Letterâ); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), Exhibit 44, CTRL0000926977 (Nov. 13, 2020 letter to Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson from Michigan State Senators Lana Theis and Tom Barrett).

180. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), pp. 74-77 Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad Wolf (Jan. 21, 2022), Exhibit 45, CTRL0000926978, (Nov. 16, 2020 email from Christopher Krebs responding to Chad Wolf, Matthew Travis, and Brandon Wales entitled âRE: Allegationsâ).

181. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), pp. 74-77; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad Wolf (Jan. 21, 2022), Exhibit 45, CTRL0000926978, (Nov. 16, 2020 email from Christopher Krebs to Chad Wolf, Matthew Travis, and Brandon Wales entitled âRE: Allegationsâ); âIsolated User Error in Antrim County Does Not Affect Election Results, Has No Impact on Other Counties or States,â Michigan Secretary of State, (Nov. 7, 2020), available at https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim_Fact_Check.pdf?rev=7a929e4d262e4532bbe574a3b82ddbcf.

182. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), pp. 78-80. Even as the acting Secretary of DHS was providing Meadows information he received from his Director of CISA debunking the Dominion claims, the acting Assistant Secretary of DHS, Ken Cuccinelli, was providing back channel information to Meadows in a possible effort to promote the false Dominion claims. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), TEXT0000072, TEXT0000073, (Nov. 12, 2020 text messages from Ken Cuccinelli to Mark Meadows) (Cuccinelli: âI have the dominion list of everywhere the machines are deployed that we know of. [I]t is pretty extensive. It is in my DHS email account. Where do you want me to send it?â Meadows then provided Cuccinelli with his personal email address.).

183. Chris Krebs #Protect2020 (@CISAKrebs), Twitter, Nov. 17, 2020 11:45 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/CISAKrebs/status/1328741106624901120.

184. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010360_0001, 076P-R000010361_0001, (November 17, 2020 email and attached letter to Christopher Krebs from White House Office of Presidential Personnel, stating respectively that âthe President has terminated your appointmentâ and that âPursuant to the direction of the President, your appointmentâ¦ is hereby terminated, effective immediatelyâ).

185. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 17, 2020 7:07 p.m ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201118040513/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1328852352787484677 (archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 17, 2020 7:07 p.m ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201118040930/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1328852354049957888 (archived).

186. âRudy Giuliani Trump Campaign Press Conference Transcript November 19: Election Fraud Claims,â Rev, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-trump-campaign-press-conference-transcript-november-19-election-fraud-claims.

187. âRudy Giuliani Trump Campaign Press Conference Transcript November 19: Election Fraud Claims,â Rev, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-trump-campaign-press-conference-transcript-november-19-election-fraud-claims.

188. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hope Hicks, (Oct. 25, 2022), pp. 88-91. See also Tucker Carlson: âTime for Sidney Powell to Show Us Her Evidence: We Asked the Trump Campaign Attorney for Proof of her Bombshell Claims. She Gave Us Nothing,â Fox News, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/tucker-carlson-rudy-giuliani-sidney-powell-election-fraud.

189. Jenna Ellis (@JennaEllisEsq), Twitter, Nov. 22, 2020, 5:23 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/JennaEllisEsq/status/1330638034619035655.

190. Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 19, 2020 12:41 a.m. ET and 3:47 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22dominion-izing%22 (archived).

191. One America News Network, âCyber Analyst on Dominion Voting: Shocking Vulnerabilities,â YouTube, at 0:41-1:14, 1:37-2:23, 2:42-3:36, Nov. 15, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eKcPoCNW8AA.

192. Ron Watkins, (@codemonkeyz), Twitter, Nov. 19, 2020 12:45 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201121092200/https://twitter.com/CodeMonkeyZ/status/1329299640848584710 (archived); Ron Watkins, (@codemonkeyz), Twitter, Nov. 19, 2020 12:46 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201201175413/https://twitter.com/CodeMonkeyZ/status/1329300069623820289 (archived); Donald J. Trump, Twitter, Nov. 21, 2020 11:30 p.m. ET, Nov. 21, 2020, 11:31 p.m. ET, Nov. 21, 2020, 11:32 p.m. ET, Nov. 22, 2020, 3:35 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22dominion-izing%22&dates=%5B%222020-11-20%22%2C%222020-11-24%22%5D (archived).

193. Barr met with President Trump between election day and January 6th on November 23, December 1, and December 14. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 16, 22, 28.

194. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 25, 27, 50; William Barr, One Damn Thing After Another: Memoirs of an Attorney General, (New York: HarperCollins, 2022), at pp. 539, 554.

195. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), p. 19.

196. Factba.se, âInterview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,â Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, at. 1:00-1:43, 3:23-4:36, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163.

197. Factba.se, âInterview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,â Vimeo, at 1:00-1:43, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163.

198. Factba.se, âInterview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,â Vimeo, at 1:50-2:40, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163.

199. Factba.se, âInterview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,â Vimeo, at 3:50-4:24, 22:40-23:52, 24:26-24:50, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163.

200. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 22, 25-26.

201. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 22, 25-26.

202. âDonald Trump Speech on Election Fraud Claims Transcript December 2,â Rev, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-december-2.

203. King v. Whitmer, 505 F. Supp. 3d 720, 738 (E.D. Mich. 2020).

204. Bowyer v. Ducey, 506 F. Supp. 3d 699, 723 (D. Ariz. 2020) (finding the complaint âvoid of plausible allegations that Dominion voting machines were hacked or compromised in Arizona during the 2020 General Electionâ).

205. âIsolated User Error in Antrim County Does Not Affect Election Results, Has No Impact on Other Counties or States,â Michigan Secretary of State, (Nov. 7, 2020), available at https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim_Fact_Check.pdf?rev=7a929e4d262e4532bbe574a3b82ddbcf.

206. Decision and Order Granting Plaintiffâs Motion for an Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order, Show Cause Order and Preliminary Injunction, No. 2020009238CZ (Mich. Cty. Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2020).

207. Rudy W. Giuliani (@RudyGiuliani), Twitter, Dec. 4, 2020 7:12 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1335014224532221952?s=20&t=20AZkk4gS2DeBo6q6QR-mw; Ronn Blitzer, âTrump Legal Team Celebrates after Michigan Judge Allows Probe of Dominion Voting Machines,â Fox News, (Dec. 6, 2020), available at https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-legal-team-michigan-antrim-county-judge-order-dominion-machines; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bernard Kerik, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 19, 147.

208. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000001368_00001, pp. 1, 6 (Allied Security Operations Group Antrim Michigan Forensics Report, dated Dec. 13, 2020).

209. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R00001254_00001 (December 14, 2020, email from Joanna Miller to Peter Navarro attaching the ASOG Report and noting that âPOTUS and VPOTUS are briefedâ).

210. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HouseSelect-Jan6-PartII-01132022-000798(December 14, 2020, email from Molly Michael re: From POTUS asking the AG to look at ASOG report); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000001337_00001(December 14, 2020, email from Molly Michael to Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen re: From POTUS attaching ASOG report); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000001367_00001(December 14, 2020, email from Molly Michael to Michigan Senate Majority Leader Mike Shirkey re: From POTUS attaching ASOG report); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production) 076P-R000001361_00001(December 14, 2020, email from Molly Michael to Senator Kelly Loeffler re: From POTUS attaching ASOG report); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000001358_00001(December 14, 2020, email from Molly Michael to Arizona Governor Doug Ducey re: From POTUS attaching ASOG report); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000001370_00001 (December 14, 2020, email from Molly Michael to Republican Party Chairwoman Ronna McDaniel re: From POTUS attaching ASOG report); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000001378_00001 (December 14, 2020, email from Molly Michael to Pennsylvania State Senator Doug Mastriano re: From POTUS attaching ASOG report).

211. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 14, 2020 2:59 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201214214435/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1338574268154646528 (archived).

212. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 28-29.

213. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), p. 29.

214. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 29-30.

215. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 29-30.

216. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 29-30.

217. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Homeland Security Production) CTRL0000915111, CTRL0000915117- CTRL0000915118 (draft analyses of ASOG report). Notably, the final version of this review, which had been requested by the Attorney General, was edited by senior DHS officials to remove the language most critical of ASOG before being sent to the Department of Justice by Acting Assistant Secretary Ken Cuccinelli. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Homeland Security Production) CTRL0000915120 (emails circulating draft analyses), CTRL0000926941 (noting report was âcurrently in the Secretaryâs officeâ); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production) HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000687- HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000688 (email and report provided to Donoghue by Cuccinelli); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 29-31.

218. See Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, Report on the November 2020 Election in Michigan, (June 23, 2021), p. 16, available at https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf; J. Alex Halderman, Analysis of the Antrim County, Michigan November 2020 Election Incident,â (Mar. 26, 2021), available at https://www.michigan.gov//media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim.pdf?rev=fbfe881cdc0043a9bb80b783d1bb5fe9.

219. For example, President Trump and others frequently cited ASOGâs finding that the Dominion machines had a â68% error rate,â but that conclusion was based on a complete misunderstanding of the scanner log files reviewed by ASOG. Their report also claimed that, due to these perceived âerrors,â a âstaggering number of votesâ were determined through an adjudication process that allowed for manipulation of votes, but no adjudication software was installed on the Dominion machines. J. Alex Halderman, Analysis of the Antrim County, Michigan November 2020 Election Incident, (Mar. 26, 2021), pp. 40-41, available at https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim.pdf?rev=fbfe881cdc0043a9bb80b783d1bb5fe9.

220. Halderman concluded that âI am not aware of any credible evidence that any security problem was ever exploited against Antrim Countyâs election system. As my analysis shows, the anomalies that occurred in the November 2020 results are fully explained by human error.â J. Alex Halderman, Analysis of the Antrim County, Michigan November 2020 Election Incident, (Mar. 26, 2021), p. 46, available at https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim.pdf?rev=fbfe881cdc0043a9bb80b783d1bb5fe9.

221. âAudits of the November 3, 2020 General Election,â Michigan Secretary of State, (April 21, 2021), p. 32, available at https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/BOE_2020_Post_Election_Audit_Report_04_21_21.pdf?rev=a3c7ee8c06984864870c540a266177f2.; âHand Count Calculation Sheet (Office: President of the United States, County: Antrim),â Michigan Secretary of State, available at https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/AntrimCounty_Presidential_Race_Full_Hand_Count_November2020.pdf?rev=0bf12f08c33444c59bd145fbcfbb3e40.

222. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bernard Kerik, (Jan. 13, 2022), p. 182.

223. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

224. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Derek Lyons, (Mar. 17, 2022), pp. 21-22, 99; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (Jul. 8, 2022), pp. 44-50.

225. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (Jul. 8, 2022), pp. 42-43.

226. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (Jul. 8, 2022), p. 50.

227. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 129.

228. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert OâBrien, (Aug. 23, 2022), pp. 163-65.

229. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), pp. 97-98, 102-103; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ken Cuccinelli, (Dec. 7, 2021), pp. 49-54.

230. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani (May 20, 2022), pp. 157-59; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Sidney Powell, (May 7, 2022), pp. 102-03; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Jenna Ellis Production), J.007465Ellis, J.007467Ellis (December 28-29, 2020, emails with Katherine Freiss, Doug Mastriano, Christina Bobb, Giuliani, and others about accessing voting machines); Emma Brown and Jon Swaine, âInside the Secretive Effort by Trump Allies to Access Voting Machines,â Washington Post, (Oct. 28, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2022/10/28/coffee-county-georgia-voting-trump/.

231. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

232. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

233. âDonald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia: Senate Runoff Election,â Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-rally-speech-transcript-dalton-georgia-senate-runoff-election.

234. âDonald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia: Senate Runoff Election,â Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-rally-speech-transcript-dalton-georgia-senate-runoff-election.

235. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 111.

236. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 166.

237. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bernard Kerik (Jan. 13, 2022), p. 182. Kerik also emailed President Trumpâs chief of staff, Mark Meadows, on December 28, 2020, writing: âWe can do all the investigations we want later, but if the president plans on winning, itâs the legislators that have to be moved, and this will do just that.â Document on file with the Select Committee (National Archives Production) 076P-R000004125_0001.

238. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christina Bobb, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 46.

239. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Sidney Powell, (May 7, 2022), pp. 89-96.

240. Defendantâs Motion to Dismiss at 27-28, U.S. Dominion, Inc. v. Powell, No. 1:21-cv-00040 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 22, 2021), ECF No. 22-2.

241. Justin Gray, âGeorgia Election Officials Show Frame-by-Frame What Happened in Fulton Surveillance Video,â WSB-TV, (Dec. 4, 2020), https://www.wsbtv.com/news/politics/georgia-election-officials-show-frame-by-frame-what-really-happened-fulton-surveillance-video/T5M3PYIBYFHFFOD3CIB2ULDVDE/.

242. 11Alive, âSecond Georgia Senate election hearing,â YouTube, at 5:31:50-5:32:45, Dec. 3, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRCXUNOwOjw.

243. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldtrump), Twitter, Dec. 14, 2020 8:57 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201217181730/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1338483200046354434; Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

244. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

245. Ryan Taylor, âDonald Trump Georgia Rally Transcript Before Senate Runoff Elections December 5,â Rev, (Dec. 5, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-georgia-rally-transcript-before-senate-runoff-elections-december-5.

246. âDonald Trump Vlog: Contesting Election Results â December 22, 2020,â Factba.se, (Dec. 22, 2020), at 9:11â9:31, available at https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-vlog-contesting-election-results-december-22-2020.

247. Ryan Taylor, âDonald Trump Georgia Phone Call Transcript with Sec. of State Brad Raffensperger: Says He Wants to âFindâ Votes,â Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-georgia-phone-call-transcript-brad-raffensperger-recording.

248. U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Aug. 7, 2021), pp. 30-31, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rosen%20Transcript.pdf.

249. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 42-43.

250. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

251. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

252. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

253. Declaration of Frances Watson at 1-3, Pearson v. Kemp, 831 F. App'x. 467 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (No. 1:20-cv-04809), ECF No. 72-1.

254. Declaration of Frances Watson at 1-3, Pearson v. Kemp, 831 F. App'x. 467 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (No. 1:20-cv-04809), ECF No. 72-1.

255. U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Transcribed Interview of Byung J. âBJayâ Pak, (Aug. 11, 2021), pp. 14-25, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Pak%20Transcript.pdf; Response of the Georgia Secretary of State to the Courtâs Order of September 20, 2021 at 4-6, Favorito v. Wan, No. 2020CV343938 (Ga. Super. Ct. filed Oct. 12, 2021).

256. âGeorgia Election Officials Briefing Transcript December 7: Will Recertify Election Results Today,â Rev, (December 7, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/georgia-election-officials-briefing-transcript-december-7-will-recertify-election-results-today; Response of the Georgia Secretary of State to the Courtâs Order of September 20, 2021 at 4-6, Favorito v. Wan, No. 2020CV343938 (Ga. Super. Ct. filed Oct. 12, 2021).

257. âGeorgia Election Officials Briefing Transcript December 7: Will Recertify Election Results Today,â Rev, (December 7, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/georgia-election-officials-briefing-transcript-december-7-will-recertify-election-results-today; Response of the Georgia Secretary of State to the Courtâs Order of September 20, 2021, at 4-6 and Exhibit A: Videotaped Deposition of James P. Callaway (Deputy Chief Investigator of the Office of the Secretary of State) at 29-35, Favorito v. Wan, No. 2020CV343938 (Ga. Super. Ct. filed Oct. 12, 2021) available at, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21084096/favorito-sos-brief-in-response-to-order-of-92021-with-exs-a-and-b.pdf.

258. Declaration of Frances Watson at 2-3, Pearson v. Kemp, 831 F. App'x. 467 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (No. 1:20-cv-04809), ECF No. 72-1; U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Transcribed Interview of Byung J. âBJayâ Pak, (August 11, 2021), pp. 14-25, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Pak%20Transcript.pdf.

259. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), 076P-R000004670_0001-0013, 076P-R000004888_0001-0013, 076P-R000004948_0001-0013 (January 5, 2021, emails from Molly Michael re: âfrom POTUSâ to Senators Josh Hawley and Ted Cruz and to Representative Jim Jordan attaching Background Briefing on 2020 Fraud).

260. âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.

261. In the Matter of Rudolph W. Giuliani, No. 2021-00506, slip op at *2, 22 (N.Y. App. Div. May 3, 2021), available at https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/giuliani-law-license-suspension/1ae5ad6007c0ebfa/full.pdf.

262. GA House Mobile Streaming, Governmental Affairs 12.10.20, Vimeo â Livestream, at 2:09:03 to - 2:13:10, available at https://livestream.com/accounts/25225474/events/9117221/videos/214677184.

263. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

264. See John Danforth, Benjamin Ginsberg, Thomas B. Griffith, et al., âLost, Not Stolen: The Conservative Case that Trump Lost and Biden Won the 2020 Presidential Election,â (July 2022), p. 3, available at https://lostnotstolen.org/download/378/.

265. Opinion and Order at *6, 13, Costantino v. Detroit, No. 20-014780-AW (Mich. Cty. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 13, 2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Costantino-v-Detroit-Opinion-and-Order.pdf.

266. Complaint, Exhibit 2: Affidavit of Jesse Richard Morgan at 2, 10, Mecalfe v. Wolf, 2020 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 794 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2020) (No. 636 MD 2020), available at https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210603/212420-file-10836.pdf.

267. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Dec. 1, 2020 2:31 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201202014959/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1333856259662077954 (archived); Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Dec. 1, 2020 3:49 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201201221335/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1333875814585282567 (archived); Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Dec 2, 2020 6:42 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201203024425/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1334327204847775744 (archived).

268. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 45-46.

269. FOX News, âSean Hannity,â Nov. 19, 2020, available at https://archive.org/details/FOXNEWSW_20201120_060000_Hannity?start/1983.1.end/2077.5.

270. Brandon Waltens, âVIDEO: Wagons, Suitcases, and Coolers Roll into Detroit Voting Center at 4 AM [UPDATED],â Texas Scorecard, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at https://texasscorecard.com/federal/video-wagons-suitcases-and-coolers-roll-into-detroit-voting-center-at-4-am/; âRudy Giuliani Trump Campaign Press Conference Transcript November 19: Election Fraud Claims,â Rev, (Nov. 19, 2020), at 22:29-26:53, available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-trump-campaign-press-conference-transcript-november-19-election-fraud-claims.

271. Affidavit of Christopher Thomas Â¶ 18, Texas v. Pennsylvania, 592 U.S. ____ (2020) (describing ballot delivery), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22O155/163387/20201210145418055_22O155%20MI%20APP.pdf; see also Opinion and Order at *6, 13, Costantino v. Detroit, No. 20-014780-AW (Mich. Cty. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 13, 2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Costantino-v-Detroit-Opinion-and-Order.pdf (relying on Christopher Thomasâ affidavit to deny a petition for various relief related to allegations that the November 3, 2020 election in Michigan was fraudulent).

272. âHow a WXYZ Wagon Sparked False Election Fraud Claims in Detroit,â WXYZ, (Nov. 5, 2020), available at https://www.wxyz.com/news/how-a-wxyz-wagon-sparked-false-election-fraud-claims-in-detroit.

273. âElection Summary Report,â City of Detroit, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://detroitmi.gov/document/november-3-2020-general-election-official-results.

274. A canvassing process in every State verifies that the number of voters indicated as having voted matches the number of ballots cast. If, as claimed, tens of thousands of illegitimate ballots were counted at the TCF Center in Detroit, the total number of ballots counted would be substantially higher than the total number of voters who voted, but in Detroit slightly fewer ballots were counted than voters who were listed as having voted. The net number of ballots for the City of Detroit counting boards was 21 more names than ballots, out of approximately 174,000 absentee votes cast. Michigan Secretary of State, âAudits of the November 3, 2020 General Election,â (Apr. 21, 2021), p. 20, available at https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/BOE_2020_Post_Election_Audit_Report_04_21_21.pdf?rev=a3c7ee8c06984864870c540a266177f2.

275. Approximately 4.2 million ballots were cast in-person on election day and 2.6 million mail and absentee ballots were cast. See âPennsylvaniaâs Election Stats,â Pennsylvania Department of State, (accessed Dec. 4, 2022), available at https://www.dos.pa.gov/VotingElections/BEST/Pages/BEST-Election-Stats.aspx;âOfficial Returns â 2020 Presidential Election,â Pennsylvania Department of State, (accessed Dec. 4, 2022), available at https://www.electionreturns.pa.gov/General/SummaryResults?ElectionID=83&ElectionType=G&IsActive=0.

276. Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 28, 2020 12:09 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201128080915/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1332552283553476608 (archived), retweeting Senator Doug Mastriano (@SenMastriano), Twitter, Nov. 27, 2020, 1:59 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/SenMastriano/status/1332398733401591808.

277. Jessica Calefati, âFact-Checking False Claims about Pennsylvaniaâs Presidential Election by Trump and His Allies,â Philadelphia Inquirer, (Dec. 7, 2020), available at https://www.inquirer.com/politics/election/pennsylvania-election-results-trump-fraud-fact-check-20201206.html.

278. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 28, 2020, 4:00 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201228211304/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1343663159085834248 (archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 29, 2020, 8:59 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201229205204/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1343919651336712199 (archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 29, 2020, 5:55 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201229225512/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1344054358418345985. Note that timestamps in archived tweets may reflect a time zone different from that where the tweet originated.

279. See Pennsylvania House Republican Caucus, âPA Lawmakers: Numbers Donât Add Up, Certification of Presidential Results Premature and In Error,â (Dec. 28, 2020), available at https://www.pahousegop.com/News/18754/Latest-News/PA-Lawmakers-Numbers-Don%E2%80%99t-Add-Up,-Certification-of-Presidential-Results-Premature-and-In-Error. Representative Ryan also promoted the groundless claim of an unexplained discrepancy of 400,000 mail-in ballots in the stateâs database, which was based entirely on his ignorance of the fact that the database in question accounts for mail-in ballots and absentee ballots separately. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, Examining Irregularities in the 2020 Election, (Dec. 16, 2020), Written Testimony of Pennsylvania State Representative Frank Ryan, available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Ryan-2020-12-16.pdf; Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, Examining Irregularities in the 2020 Election, (Dec. 16, 2020), Letter Submitted by Pennsylvania Secretary of the Commonwealth Kathy Boockvar, available at https://www.dos.pa.gov/about-us/Documents/statements/2020-12-16-Senator-Johnson-and-Peters.pdf.

280. âDept. of State: Republicansâ Election Claims Are âRepeatedly Debunked Conspiracy Theoriesâ,â WJAC-TV, (Dec. 29, 2020), available at https://wjactv.com/news/local/dept-of-state-republicans-election-claims-are-repeatedly-debunked-conspiracy-theories.

281. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Transcribed Interview of Richard Donoghue, (Aug. 6, 2021), p. 156, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Donoghue%20Transcript.pdf.

282. See âDonald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia: Senate Runoff Election,â Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021), at 58:09, available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-rally-speech-transcript-dalton-georgia-senate-runoff-election; âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press (January 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.

283. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), p. 29; Affidavit of Russell James Ramsland, Jr., 556 F. Supp. 3d. 680, 724 (E.D. Mich. 2021), ECF 6-24, available at https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/18693929/6/24/king-v-whitmer/. Ramsland submitted a similar affidavit in a case in Georgia. See Affidavit of Russell Ramsland, Wood v. Raffensperger, 501 F. Supp. 3d 1310 (N.D. Ga. 2020), ECF No. 7-1.

284. Affidavit of Russell Ramsland, Wood v. Raffensperger, 501 F. Supp. 3d 1310 (N.D. Ga. 2020), ECF No. 7-1.

285. Aaron Blake, âThe Trump Campaignâs Much-Hyped Affidavit Features a Big, Glaring Error,â Washington Post, (Nov. 20, 2020), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/11/20/trump-campaigns-much-hyped-affidavit-features-big-glaring-error/.

286. For example, Ramsland claimed 781.91% turnout in North Muskegon (actual turnout: 77.78%); 460.51% turnout in Zeeland Charter Township (actual turnout: 80.11%); and 139.29% turnout in Detroit (actual turnout: 50.88%). See King v. Whitmer, 556 F. Supp. 3d. 680, 724 (E.D. Mich. 2021); Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, Report on the November 2020 Election in Michigan, (June 23, 2021), available at https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf.

287. See, e.g., âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27; âDonald Trump Speech on Election Fraud Claims Transcript December 2â Rev (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-december-2; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 3, 2020, 4:11 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201203211154/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1334606278388277253 (archived); âTrump Lawyers Rudy Giuliani & Jenna Ellis Testify Before Michigan House Oversight Committee: Full Transcript,â Rev, (Dec. 3, 2020), at 26:13, available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/trump-lawyers-rudy-giuliani-jenna-ellis-testify-before-michigan-house-oversight-committee-transcript; Affidavit of Mellissa A. Carone, King v. Whitmer, 505 F. Supp. 3d 720 (E.D. Mich. 2020), ECF No. 1-5, available at https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/18693929/1/5/king-v-whitmer/.

288. See, e.g., Opinion and Order at *3, 12-13, Costantino v. Detroit, No. 20-014780-AW (Mich. Cty. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 13, 2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Costantino-v-Detroit-Opinion-and-Order.pdf; Affidavit of Christopher Thomas Â¶Â¶ 2-18, Texas v. Pennsylvania, 592 U.S. ____ (2020) (describing his experience and the process for tabulating votes), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22O155/163387/20201210145418055_22O155%20MI%20APP.pdf.

289. See, e.g., âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press (January 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27; Rudy Giulianiâs Common Sense, âI CANâT SAY THIS On National Television | Rudy Giuliani | Ep. 98,â Rumble, at 13:10â13:25, Dec. 30, 2020, available at https://rumble.com/vex72l-i-cant-say-this-on-national-television-rudy-giuliani-ep.-98.html.

290. Right Side Broadcasting Network, âLIVE: Georgia House Hearing on Election Fraud, Brad Raffensperger to Participate 12/23/20,â YouTube, at 27:28, 43:02-43:28, Dec. 23, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R4cuakECmuA&t=2582s (Testimony of Ryan Germany, counsel to Georgia Secretary of State, before Georgia legislature stating: âThe total number of underage people who voted is zero. We were able to look at everyone who voted and look at their birthdate in the voter registration system, and I think there was four people who requested a ballot before they turned 18, and they all turned 18 prior to November 3rd, which means theyâre allowed to vote.â).

291. See, e.g. Bannonâs War Room, âEpisode 980 â The Border Tipping Point â¦ Peter Navarro on the Stolen Election and Desperation in Del Rio,â Rumble, May 27, 2021, available at https://rumble.com/vhpam3-episode-980the-border-tipping-pointpeter-navarro-on-the-stolen-election-and.html; Bannonâs War Room, âEpisode 979 â The HQ of the Runaway Train â¦ Rachel Maddowâs Anna Karenina Moment,â Rumble, May 27, 2021, available at https://rumble.com/vhp8yn-episode-979-the-hq-of-the-runaway-train-rachel-maddows-anna-karenina-moment.html; Right Side Broadcasting Network, âLIVE: Arizona State Legislature Holds Public Hearing on 2020 Election,â YouTube, at 2:06:33-2:07:02, Nov. 30, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rri6flxaXww.

292. âProof of Citizenship Requirements,â Arizona Secretary of State, (accessed Dec. 4, 2022), available at https://azsos.gov/elections/voting-election/proof-citizenship-requirements. In 2013, the Supreme Court struck down Arizonaâs âevidence-of-citizenshipâ requirement as applied to federal elections. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 4, 19 (2013). Arizona law allows voters to register as âfederal onlyâ voters without proof of citizenship, but those voters must provide a driverâs license or Social Security Number, which is then checked by election officials against immigration records before the person is added to voter registration rolls. Daniel GonzÃ¡lez, âAre Undocumented Immigrants Voting Illegally in Arizona?,â Arizona Republic, (Oct. 27, 2016), available at https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/10/27/voter-fraud-undocumented-immigrants-voting-illegally-arizona-donald-trump/91703916/.

293. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Mark Meadows Production), MM007288, (November 13, 2020, email from Bill Stepien to Mark Meadows, Justin Clark, and Jason Miller re: AZ Federal ID Voters); In the Matter of Rudolph W. Giuliani, No. 2021-00506, slip op at *23-25 (N.Y. App. Div. May 3, 2021), available at https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/giuliani-law-license-suspension/1ae5ad6007c0ebfa/full.pdf.

294. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

295. For example, the President alleged in his January 6th speech that large numbers of ballots were cast on behalf of dead people not just in Georgia but also in Michigan, Nevada, and Pennsylvania. âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press (January 13, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27; See also Rudy Giulianiâs Common Sense, âI CANâT SAY THIS On National Television | Rudy Giuliani | Ep. 98,â Rumble, at 15:10-15:46, (Dec. 30, 2020, reposted Mar. 22, 2021), available at https://rumble.com/vex72l-i-cant-say-this-on-national-television-rudy-giuliani-ep.-98.html (making similar claims).

296. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Alex Cannon Production) AC-0013946, (November 12, 2020, email from Alex Cannon to Matt Wolking, Zach Parkinson, Tim Murtaugh, Ali Pardo, Matthew Morgan, and Andrew Clark titled âRe: dead votersâ); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Tim Murtaugh Production) XXM-0009451 (November 8, 2020, email from Jason Miller to Zach Parkinson, Tim Murtaugh, and Matt Wolking re: PA Death Data stating that quality control checks will âsignificantly decrease[]â the number of âpossible dead votersâ), XXM-0009467 (November 8, 2020, email from Jason Miller to Zach Parkinson, Tim Murtaugh, and Matt Wolking re: GA Dead Voters), XXM-0009566 (November 9, 2020 email from Zach Parkinson to Jason Miller, Tim Murtaugh, and Matt Wolking re PA Death Data noting there âmay be errorsâ with their data about people who were dead voters); Mark Niesse, âAlleged âDeadâ Georgia Voters Found Alive and Well after 2020 Election,â Atlanta Journal-Constitution, (Dec. 27, 2021), available at https://www.ajc.com/politics/alleged-dead-georgia-voters-found-alive-and-well-after-2020-election/DAL3VY7NFNHL5OREMHD7QECOCA/.

297. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), TEXT0000198, (December 3, 2020, text message from Eric Herschmann to Mark Meadows).

298. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), TEXT0000198-203, (December 3, 2020, text messages between Eric Herschmann and Mark Meadows).

299. Final Order at 5-6, Boland v. Raffensperger, No.2020CV343018 (Ga. Super. Ct. filed Dec. 14 2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Boland-v-Raffensperger-Order-Dismissing-Complaint.pdf.

300. The expert, Bryan Geels, based his claims on a comparison of public voter information to public death records. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol (Christina Bobb Production), BOBB_CONG_00000683-84, 692-93, 706-07 (Affidavit of Bryan Geels dated Dec. 1, 2020, in Trump v. Barron, a case filed by the Trump Campaign in a Georgia Superior Court in Fulton County). However, the records reviewed included only name and year of birth for each individual listed. Id. at Â¶ 28. Based on this limited information, it was impossible for Geels (or anyone else) to conclude that the person with a particular name and birth year was the same person listed in public death records with that name and birth year. See id., at Â¶ 50 (only the Secretary of State has the information to conduct a full analysis of this issue); see also Declaration of Charles Stewart III at 22, Trump v. Raffensperger, No. 2020CV33255 (Ga. Super. Ct. filed Dec. 14, 2020).

301. In Georgia, the Secretary of State found four cases where people voted in the names of deceased individuals. Mark Niesse, âAlleged âDeadâ Georgia Voters Found Alive and Well after 2020 Election,â Atlanta Journal-Constitution, (Dec. 27, 2021), available at https://www.ajc.com/politics/alleged-dead-georgia-voters-found-alive-and-well-after-2020-election/DAL3VY7NFNHL5OREMHD7QECOCA/; In Arizona, the Attorney General recently concluded its investigation into claims of supposed dead voters in the 2020 election and found only one instance in which a vote was cast on behalf of a person who died prior to the election. Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General to The Honorable Karen Fann, Arizona Senate President, (Aug. 1, 2022), available at https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/2022-08/Letter%20to%20Fann%20-%20EIU%20Update%20080122.pdf. In Michigan, the Senate Oversight Committee found only two instances in which votes were cast in the names of dead people: one was a clerical error (poll worker attributed vote to deceased father of person with same name residing at same address) and the other was a woman who died four days before the election but had sent in her absentee ballot before her death. Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, Report on the November 2020 Election in Michigan, (June 23, 2021), available at https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf.

302. In an email obtained by the Select Committee, Katherine Friess, a lawyer who worked closely with Giuliani, shared this information with Giuliani and noted, âI donât think this makes a particularly strong case.â Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol (Christina Bobb Production), BOBB_CONG_00000621 (January 4, 2021, email from Katherine Friess re: Chairman Graham dead votes memo for your consideration).

303. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol (Cleta Mitchell Production), CM00026036 (January 5, 2021 email from Cleta Mitchell to Richard Perry re: GA Data request by Senator Graham); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol (Christina Bobb Production), BOBB_CONG_00000621 (January 4, 2021, email from Katherine Friess re: Chairman Graham dead votes memo for your consideration); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christina Bobb, (Apr. 21, 2022), pp. 141-42.

304. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol (Christina Bobb Production), BOBB_CONG_00000621 (January 4, 2021, email from Katherine Friess re: Chairman Graham dead votes memo for your consideration).

305. ABC News, âLindsey Graham Delivers Remarks on Capitol Breach,â YouTube, at 3:05-3:30, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JKHkYlRm_XM.

306. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Chapman University Production), Chapman060742, (Dec. 31, 2020 email from John Eastman to Alex Kaufman and Kurth Hibert); see also Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008384_0001 (December 31, 2020, email from Eric Herschmann to Cleta Mitchell and ccâed to Mark Meadows and Molly Michael in which Herschmann wrote: âI was concerned about the President signing a verification about facts that may not be sustainable upon detailed scrutiny.â).

307. Order Re Privilege of Remaining Documents at 17, Eastman v. Thompson, No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC_DFM, (Oct. 19, 2022), ECF no. 372, available at https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/62613089/372/john-c-eastman-v-bennie-g-thompson/.

308. Order Re Privilege of Remaining Documents at 17, Eastman v. Thompson, Case 8:22-cv-00099-DOC_DFM, (Oct. 19, 2022), ECF no. 372, available at https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/62613089/372/john-c-eastman-v-bennie-g-thompson/.

309. âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.

310. âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.

311. âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.

312. See âDonald Trump 2020 Election Night Speech Transcript,â Rev, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-2020-election-night-speech-transcript.

313. See âDonald Trump Speech âSave Americaâ Rally Transcript January 6,â Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-transcript-january-6.

314. âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.

315. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 19, 2020, 1:42 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22wild+protest%22 (archived).

316. âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.

317. âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.

2

In a now infamous telephone call on January 2, 2021, President Trump pressured Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger for more than an hour. The President confronted him with multiple conspiracy theories about the electionânone of which were true. Raffensperger and other Georgia officials debunked these allegations, one after another, during their call. Under Raffenspergerâs leadership, Georgia had, by that time, already conducted a statewide hand recount of all ballots. That recount and other post-election reviews proved that there was no widespread fraud, and that voting machines didnât alter the outcome of the election.1 This should have put President Trumpâs allegations to rest. But, undeterred by the facts, the President badgered Raffensperger to overturn the Georgia results.

President Trump insisted that âthe ballots are corruptâ and someone was âshreddingâ them.2 He issued a thinly veiled threat, telling Raffensperger, âit is more illegal for you than it is for them because you know what they did and youâre not reporting it.ââ3 Of course, the Georgia officials werenât doing anything âillegal,â and there was nothing to âreport.â Even so, President Trump suggested that both Raffensperger and his general counsel, Ryan Germany, could face criminal jeopardy.4 âThatâs a criminal, thatâs a criminal offense. And you canât let that happen,â the President said.5 âThatâs a big risk to you and to Ryan, your lawyer . . . Iâm notifying you that youâre letting it happen.ââ6

And then the President made his demand. âSo look. All I want to do is this. I just want to find 11,780 votes, which is one more than we have,â President Trump told Raffensperger.7

It was a stunning moment. The President of the United States was asking a Stateâs chief election officer to âfindâ enough votes to declare him the winner of an election he lost.

Raffensperger saw the Presidentâs warning to him on January 2nd as a threat. âI felt thenâand I still believe todayâthat this was a threat,â Raffensperger wrote in his book.8 And this threat was multifaceted: first, the President ânotifyingâ Raffensperger and his team of criminal activity could be understood as directing the law-enforcement power of the Federal Government against them. While Raffensperger did not know for certain whether President Trump was threatening such an investigation, he knew Trump had âpositional powerâ as President and appeared to be promising to âmake [my] life miserable.ââ9

But the threat was also of a more insidious kind. As Raffensperger wrote in his book: âOthers obviously thought [it was a threat], too, because some of Trumpâs more radical followers have responded as if it was their duty to carry out this threat.ââ10 Raffenspergerâs deputy held a press conference and publicly warned all Americans, including President Trump, that President Trumpâs rhetoric endangered innocent officials and private citizens, and fueled death threats against Georgia election workers, sexualized threats directed towards Raffenspergerâs wife, and harassment at the homes of Georgia election officials.11 The January 2nd call promised more of the same. The upshot of President Trumpâs message to Raffensperger was: do what I ask, or you will pay.

President Trumpâs phone call with Secretary Raffensperger received widespread coverage after it was leaked. But Georgia was not the only State targeted by President Trump and his allies. The call was one element of a larger and more comprehensive effortâmuch of it unseen by and unknown to the general publicâto overturn the votes cast by millions of American citizens across several States.

As Chapter 1 explained, the root of this effort was the âBig Lieâ: President Trump and his allies publicly claiming that the election was rife with fraud that could have changed the result, even though the Presidentâs own advisors, and the Department of Justice, told the President time and time again that this was not the case.12 But in parallel with this strategy, President Trump and his allies zeroed in on key battleground States the President had lost, leaning on Republican State officials to overrule voters, disregard valid vote counts, and deliver the Statesâ electoral votes to the losing candidate. Had this scheme worked, President Trump could have, for the first time in American history, subverted the results of a lawful election to stay in power. His was a deeply anti-democratic plan: to co-opt State legislaturesâthrough appeals to debunked theories of election fraud, or pure partisan politicsâto replace Biden electors with Trump electors, so President Trump would win the electoral vote count in the joint session of Congress on January 6th.

Had enough State officials gone along with President Trumpâs plot, his attempt to stay in power might have worked. It is fortunate that a critical mass of honorable officials withstood President Trumpâs pressure to participate in this scheme. They and others who stood up to him closed off avenues for thwarting the election so that, by noon on January 6th, President Trump was left with one desperate, final gambit for holding on to power: sending his armed, angry supporters to the U.S. Capitol.

When Americans vote for a presidential candidate on election day, they are actually casting votes for that candidateâs proposed presidential electors to participate in the electoral college. After a State certifies its election results and announces a winner, it also issues a âcertificate of ascertainment,â which contains the names of the duly chosen electoral college electors. The electors whose names appear as having received the most votes on the certificate of ascertainment will go on to participate in the electoral college, while a losing candidateâs proposed electors have no role to play and no standing to participate in the electoral college. This happens after every Presidential election, in each of the fifty States and the District of Columbia.

This process comes from a clause in the U.S. Constitution that gives States the power to choose electoral college electors according to State law.13 That clause says that each State âshall appointâ electoral college electors âin such [m]anner as the Legislature thereof may direct.â All 50 States have decreed that electors will be selected by popular vote.

Tuesday, November 3rd, was the day established by Federal law as election day in 2020. Each Stateâs rules had been setâand courts had weighed in when certain rules were challenged. Polls opened around the country and votes came in, whether in person or via the mail, according to each Stateâs laws.

Over 154 million voters cast votes according to the rules in place on election day.14 President Trump lost. He and his supporters went to court, filing long-shot legal challenges to the election, but they failed in courts around the country, before judges appointed by executives of both parties (including President Trump himself), and, for those judges who were elected, that are members of both parties.

Rather than abiding by the rule of law and accepting the courtsâ rulings, President Trump and his advisors tried every which way to reverse the outcome at the State level. They pressured local and State elections officials to stop counting votes once it became clear that former Vice President Joseph Biden would prevail in the final count. They pressured Governors, secretaries of State, and local officials not to certify the popular vote in several swing States that former Vice-President Biden had won. And, when that did not work, they pressured State legislators to disregard the vote counts and instead appoint Trump electors to vote in the electoral college.

This fundamentally anti-democratic effort was premised on the incorrect theory that, because the Constitution assigns to State legislatures the role of directing how electoral college electors are chosen (which every State legislature had done before the election, giving that power to the people at the ballot boxes) then the State legislatures could simply choose Trump/Pence electors after seeing the election results. In effect, President Trump and his advisors pushed for the rules to be changed after the electionâeven if it meant disenfranchising millions of Americans.

More than a month before the Presidential election, the media reported that the Trump Campaign was already developing a fallback plan that would focus on overturning certain election results at the State level. An article published on September 23, 2020, in The Atlantic explained, â[a]ccording to sources in the Republican Party at the State and national levels, the Trump Campaign is discussing contingency plans to bypass election results and appoint loyal electors in battleground States where Republicans hold the legislative majority.ââ15 Ominously, the same reporting predicted, almost exactly, what would later come to pass: âWith a justification based on claims of rampant fraud, Trump would ask State legislators to set aside the popular vote and exercise their power to choose a slate of electors directly.ââ16

Numerous senior Trump Campaign advisorsâincluding Campaign Manager William Stepien, Deputy Campaign Manager and Senior Counsel Justin Clark, and President Trumpâs lead attorney Rudolph Giulianiâall told the Select Committee that there was, indeed, a State-focused âstrategyâ or âtrackâ to challenge the outcome of the election, which included pressing State legislators to challenge results in key States and to appoint new electoral college electors.17

âYou know, in the days after election day, later in that first week, bleeding into the second, as our numbers and data looked bleaker, internally we knew that,â Stepien told the Select Committee.18 âAs the AP [Associated Press] called the race, I think some surrounding the President were looking for different avenues to pursue.â Thatâs when Stepien remembered the concept first coming up.19

Those around President Trump were pushing this idea, and pushing it hard.

Just two days after the election, President Trumpâs son, Donald Trump, Jr., forwarded to White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows a suggestion that âState Assemblies can step in and vote to put forward the electoral slate[,] Republicans control Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, North Carolina, etc. we get Trump electorsâ and so âwe either have a vote WE control and WE win OR it gets kicked to Congress 6 January . . .ââ20 Chief of Staff Meadows responded: âWorking on this for pa, ga and nc already.ââ21

Within one week after the election, Meadows had also sent or received several other similar messages:

âThe state legislature can take over the electoral processââMark Meadowsâs text to Georgia State Senator Marty Harbin.22

âAgreedââMark Meadowsâs text to a different sender, who suggested that the Trump Administration âshould get that out thereâ if they were âseriously considering the state legislature strategy.ââ23

âI will tell himââMark Meadowsâs text to a sender who suggested President Trump â[s]tart building momentum for the state legislatures.ââ24

âI love itââMark Meadowsâs text to Representative Andy Biggs, who relayed what he acknowledged as a âhighly controversialâ idea to have âRepublican legislatureâs (sic)â âappoint a look doors (sic) [electors].ââ25

â. . . Why canât the states of GA NC PENN and other R controlled state houses declare this is BS (where conflicts and election not called that night) and just send their own electorsâ¦ I wonder if POTUS knows this . . .ââformer Secretary of Energy Rick Perry to Mark Meadows.26

Another White House official exploring such a plan less than a week after the election was Vince Haley, Deputy Assistant to the President for Policy, Strategy and Speechwriting. He suggested:

â. . . Imagine if every red state legislature slated zero electors. It would reveal that we are a red country. To do this we would have to jack this to the nth degree as a battle of tribes . . . .ââ27

Haley pushed this strategy in several texts and emails, including to Assistant to the President and Director of Presidential Personnel Johnny McEntee,28 an individual Haley characterized as âa very trusted lieutenantâ for President Trump, âa direct conveyor to Boss with ideas,â and â[a]t his side almost all the time.ââ29

For Haley, however, purported election fraud was a way to justify President Trump-friendly legislatures changing the outcome of the election, but there were other reasons for doing so, too. Election fraud was âonly one rationale for slating Trump electors,â Haley told McEntee, and â[w]e should baldly assertâ that State legislators âhave the constitutional right to substitute their judgment for a certified majority of their constituentsâ if that prevents socialism.30 Haley added, â[i]ndependent of the fraudâor really along with that argumentâHarrisburg [Pennsylvania], Madison [Wisconsin], and Lansing [Michigan] do not have to sit idly by and submit themselves to rule by Beijing and Paris,â proposing that radio hosts ârally the grassroots to apply pressure to the weak kneed legislators in those states . . .ââ31

McEntee replied âYes!â and then: âLetâs find the contact info for all these people now.ââ32 Hours later, Haley sent him names andâin most casesâcell phone numbers for top GOP legislators in six States, suggesting â. . . for POTUS to invite them down for a WH meeting . . .ââ33 The President would later call several named in that message, including Rusty Bowers and Karen Fann in Arizona; Lee Chatfield and Mike Shirkey in Michigan; and Jake Corman in Pennsylvania.34

Others weighed in with the President about a State-focused plan, too. Some were already looking ahead to January 6th.

On November 8th, former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich met President Trump at the White House.35 Two days later, he sent a follow-up note to the Presidentâs executive assistant titled âplease give to POTUS[,] newt.ââ36 It suggested that â[t]he only way Trump loses is rigged systemâ and added that President Trump could encourage âGOP legislatures elect not to send in electors,â forcing a House vote by State delegations on January 6th that Gingrich expected President Trump would win.37 Meadows replied: âThanks Speaker.ââ38

Newsmax CEO Christopher Ruddy had President Trumpâs ear and reportedly spoke with him by phone at least four times before December.39 He forwarded a memo to other close advisors of the President recommending that the Trump team persuade one or more Republican-led chambers in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and even Minnesota to âpick a separate competitive State slate of Electors,â which the memo predicted might turn January 6th into âa cat-fight in Congress wherein VP Pence is Presiding.ââ40

Attorney and conservative activist Cleta Mitchell was recruited by Mark Meadows immediately after the election to assist the Trump Campaignâs legal work.41 By November 5th, she emailed Dr. John Eastman of Chapman University,42 who would later play an outsized role pushing a theory about what Vice President Pence could or couldnât do during the January 6th joint session of Congress that is detailed in Chapter 5 of this Report. In her email, Mitchell asked Eastman to write a memo justifying an idea that State legislators âreclaimâ the power to pick electors and asked, rhetorically, âAm I crazy?ââ43 Dr. Eastman wrote the memo, entitled âThe Constitutional Authority of State Legislatures to Choose Electors,â and sent it along for sharing âwidely.ââ44

According to the Office of Presidential Scheduling, President Trump was scheduled to meet in the Oval Office on November 10th with Morgan Warstler and John Robison, Texas entrepreneurs close to former Governor Rick Perry.45 The next day, Warstler tweeted that he â[w]as in Oval yesterday,ââ46 and months later wrote that âI told whole Trump team in Ovalâ that âState legislatures can choose the electors-no matter what current state law OR state courts say.ââ47

After this apparent meeting, John Robison sent the White House an email entitled âURGENT follow up to our Tuesday Meeting with POTUS,â that he asked be printed out for the President to âexplain the move forward plan for what was discussed.ââ48 The email stated that â[President Trump] liked the plan we presented to use a parallel path of state legislators,â and the attached memo proposed hundreds of briefings for State lawmakers by President Trumpâs surrogates and members of the Freedom Caucus.49 The email envisioned President Trump hosting â4+ MONSTER RALLY-TRIALSâ with â[t]ens of thousands of Trump voters staring up at the GOP state legislators from their districts who ALONE control which slate of electors their state will submit,â a proposal that seemed to foreshadow the State hearings that Rudolph Giuliani and President Trump championed less than a month later.50

Deputy White House Chief of Staff Dan Scavino called Robisonâs message âBat. Shit. Crazy,â but the Presidentâs executive assistant, who was asked to print it for the President, wrote âPrinted,â and may have shared it with the President anyway.51

By then, President Trump was engaged. According to Stepien, his Campaign Manager, the State-focused strategy came up in a November 11th meeting among close advisors as âsomething to consider.ââ52 At that point, the election had been called, but the President âwas very interested in keeping pathways to victory open, so [Stepien] believe[d] [the President] found the concept intriguing.ââ53 Then, the plan âjust started happeningâ even though it was something Stepien, âhonestly, kind of dismissed at hand,â characterizing it as one âof the crazy, crazier ideas that w[as] thrown out, in and around that time.ââ54

But not everyone was convinced. On November 19th, the prior Republican Presidential nominee, Senator Mitt Romney (R-UT), issued a harsh public condemnation of President Trumpâs open and notorious efforts to overturn the election:

Having failed to make even a plausible case of widespread fraud or conspiracy before a court of law, the President has now resorted to overt pressure on state and local officials to subvert the will of the people and overturn the election. It is difficult to imagine a worse, more undemocratic action by a sitting American President.55

Senator Romney was right to identify and decry President Trumpâs actions. And yet, in hindsight, it is clear that the effort to pressure State and local officials by the Trump team was only just getting started.

Just one day after the State-focused plan came up in the Oval Office with the President and his top lieutenants, President Trump started taking concrete steps aimed at State legislators. And in the weeks that followed, the President spearheaded outreach aimed at numerous officials in States he lost but that had GOP-led legislatures, including in Michigan, Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Arizona.

The Select Committee estimates that in the two months between the November election and the January 6th insurrection, President Trump or his inner circle engaged in at least 200 apparent acts of public or private outreach, pressure, or condemnation, targeting either State legislators or State or local election administrators, to overturn State election results. This included at least:

Furthermore, these efforts by President Trumpâs team also involved two other initiatives that tried to enlist support from large numbers of State legislators all at once:

It may be impossible to document each and every meeting, phone call, text message, or other contact that President Trump and his allies had with State and local officials in various battleground States. What follows is a summary that focuses on four States and that demonstrates the lengths to which President Trump would go in order to stay in power based on liesâthe Big Lieâabout the election.

To carry out his plan, President Trump, Rudolph Giuliani, and other surrogates of President Trump publicly and privately sought assistance from State and local officials whom they assumed would help as Republicans on the same team with the âsame goal.ââ60 Some helped. Others didnât.

On November 12th, U.S. Representative Tim Walberg (R-MI) sent an email to President Trumpâs Executive Assistant Molly Michael, describing a request he had received earlier that day:

During my conversation with the President this morning he asked me to check with key leadership in Michiganâs Legislature as to how supportive they could be in regards to pushing back on election irregularities and potential fraud. He wanted me to gauge their willingness to talk with him about efforts to bring about transparency and integrity in Michiganâs election and report back to him.61

Representative Walberg added that he had already acted on this request: âIâve had conversations with [Michigan] Speaker Lee Chatfield, Senate Majority Leader Mike Shirkey, and Senate President Pro Tempore Aric Nesbitt. They all assured me they would look forward to speaking with the President to report on their continuing effortsâ related to overseeing the election âand receiving any suggestions from President Trump.ââ62 The President would soon host Chatfield, Shirkey, Nesbitt, and four other Michigan State lawmakers at the White House.63

In Arizona, on November 13, 2020, the day after officials finished counting ballots cast in Maricopa County, Chairwoman Kelli Ward, of the Arizona Republican Party, texted Mark Meadows that she had â[j]ust talked to POTUSâ and that â[h]e may call the Chairman of the Maricopa Board of Supervisors,â Clint Hickman.64 Ward also left a message for Hickman that said, âI just talked to President Trump, and he would like me to talk to you and also see if he needs to give you a call to discuss whatâs happening on the ground in Maricopa. Give me a call back when you can.ââ65 According to Hickman, Ward was unusually active after the election, even for a party chair, and was the first person to pressure him. One of her first messages to Hickman before trying to connect him with President Trump was: âWe need you to stop the counting.ââ66

In Georgia, the President initially took a more public approach. After the Associated Press called the race there on November 12th, President Trump tweeted harsh criticisms of Governor Brian Kemp and Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger.67 Often these tweets called for them to take specific actions that would have shifted the election results in his favor, such as rejecting a court settlement (which he referred to as a consent decree) that dictated the procedures for verifying signatures on absentee ballots. And he was relentless.

In November alone, President Trump tweeted that Raffensperger was âa so-called Republican (RINO)â and asked âWhere is @BrianKempGA,ââ68 before suggesting that âThey knew they were going to cheat.ââ69 He called to âBreak the unconstitutional Consent Decree!ââ70 and urged stricter signature matches with a demand to âGet it done! @BrianKempGA.ââ71 He called Kemp âhaplessâ and asked why he wouldnât use emergency powers to overrule Raffensperger on the signature-verification procedures, declaring that âGeorgia Republicans are angry.ââ72 President Trump also retweeted posts asking, âWho needs Democrats when you have Republicans like Brian Kemp,â and âwhy bother voting for Republicans if what you get is Ducey and Kemp?ââ73

Pennsylvania was an early, but not unique, example of how President Trumpâs State-pressure campaign affected the lives of the public servants running this countryâs elections.

On November 7th, Rudy Giuliani headlined a Philadelphia press conference in front of a landscaping business called Four Seasons Total Landscaping, near a crematorium and down the street from a sex shop.74

Standing in front of former New York Police Commissioner and recently-pardoned convicted felon, Bernard Kerik, Giuliani gave opening remarks and handed the podium over to his first supposed eyewitness to election fraud, who turned out to be a convicted sex offender.75 Giuliani claimed âat least 600,000 ballots are in questionâ in Pennsylvania and falsely suggested that large numbers of ballots in the State had been cast for dead people, including boxer Joe Frazier and actor Will Smithâs father.76

Within days, Republican Philadelphia City Commissioner Al Schmidt and others publicly debunked Giulianiâs specific allegations of election fraud, including the claims about dead people voting in Pennsylvania elections.77 In reaction, President Trump tweeted on the morning of November 11th that â[a] guy named Al Schmidt, a Philadelphia Commissioner and so-called Republican (RINO), is being used big time by the Fake News Media to explain how honest things were with respect to the Election in Philadelphia. He refuses to look at a mountain of corruption & dishonesty. We win!ââ78

That statement targeting Schmidt led to a deluge of threatening and harassing phone calls and emails by people who heard President Trump and falsely held out hope that Schmidt or someone else could overturn the results of Pennsylvaniaâs election.79

As a public official, Schmidt was no stranger to threats. But being targeted by the President of the United States was different. In Schmidtâs public testimony to the Select Committee, he described why. â[P]rior to that the threats were pretty general in nature. âCorrupt election officials in Philadelphia are going to get whatâs coming to themââ and other similar threats.80 âAfter the President tweeted at me by name, calling me out the way that he did,â Schmidt explained, âthe threats became much more specific, much more graphic, and included not just me by name but included members of my family by name, their ages, our address, pictures of our home. Just every bit of detail that you could imagine.ââ81

As the President continued to push the Big Lie and vilify public officials, such threats multiplied.

Some of President Trumpâs early outreach was part of an effort to prevent State and local officials from certifying his loss. One example comes from Michigan, and the other from Arizona.

Wayne County, Michigan, includes Detroit and its surrounding areas. On November 17th, the countyâs Board of Canvassers met to certify election results, a process the Michigan Supreme Court described over a century ago as ministerial and clerical.82

The meeting started at 6:00 p.m. and lasted over three hours.83 Its two Republican members, Board Chair Monica Palmer and Board Member William Hartmann, first voted to block the certification of the election.84 After a brief break, Palmer and Hartmann returned, changed their votes, and certified the election results.85 Just over twenty minutes later, Palmer and Hartmann received a call from President Trump and RNC Chair Ronna McDaniel.86

Palmer claimed that the call âwas not pressure.â Rather, she said, â[i]t was genuine concern for my safetyâ and âthere were general comments about different States, but we really didnât discuss the details of the certification.ââ87

The Select Committee doesnât know exactly what President Trump privately said on that phone call.88 By the next evening, however, Palmer and Hartmann had each issued signed affidavits reassuming their earlier position that Wayne Countyâs results should not be certified.89 Palmerâs affidavit even declared that âI rescind my prior vote,â though rescinding wasnât possible and her statement had no legal effect.90 And, President Trump apparently knew before it was public that Hartmann and Palmer would try to change their votes; almost eight hours before either of these affidavits were publicly released, President Trump tweeted that these âtwo harassed patriot Canvassers refuse to sign the papers!ââ91

Republicans in Arizona experienced similar treatment. In the most populous and electorally significant county in Arizona, Maricopa Countyâs Board of Supervisors met on November 20th to certify the countyâs election results. Their Board, made up of four Republicans and one Democrat, carefully reviewed the official canvass, asked questions for approximately two hours, then unanimously voted to certify the results.92

Earlier that day, Kelli Ward contacted two of the boardâs members, Jack Sellers and Bill Gates, and asked them to delay the certification on the basis of supposed improprieties.93 According to Sellers and Gates, however, Arizona law required certification that day and they had no information (neither then, nor ever) to doubt the countyâs election results.94

When Arizona certified its 2020 statewide election results on November 30th, it fell to Governor Doug Ducey, a Republican, to sign the certification. While on camera during the signing ceremony, Governor Duceyâs phone played a ringtone for the song âHail to the Chief,â which he immediately silenced.95

The Governor later confirmed it had been President Trump calling and that he returned the Presidentâs call shortly afterwards, but declined to say what the two discussed other than saying that President Trump did not ask him to withhold certification.96 The Select Committee does not know whether that is true, but that evening President Trump blasted Ducey on Twitter, accusing him of ârushing to put a Democrat in office,â and warning that âRepublicans will long remember!ââ97 The President also retweeted posts bashing Ducey and his Georgia counterpart Brian Kemp, which asked âWho needs Democrats when you have Republicans like Brian Kemp and Doug Ducey?â, âwhy bother voting for Republicans if what you get is Ducey and Kemp?â, and âBrian Kemp: âMy state ran the most corrupt election in American history.â Doug Ducey: âHold my beer.âââ98 President Trump even commented âTRUE!â when retweeting a post that âGov Ducey has betrayed the people of Arizona.ââ99

Governor Ducey pushed back, writing on Twitter that, âIâve been pretty outspoken about Arizonaâs election system, and bragged about it quite a bit, including in the Oval Office . . . In Arizona, we have some of the strongest election laws in the country . . . The problems that exist in other states simply donât apply here.ââ100 Governor Ducey explained the law for certifying elections in Arizona and pointed out that the certification now triggered a â5-day window for any elector to bring a credible challenge to the election results in court. If you want to contest the results, now is the time. Bring your challenges.ââ101 And, Governor Ducey referenced his oath of office: âThatâs the law. Iâve sworn an oath to uphold it, and I take my responsibility seriously.ââ102 President Trump and his allies never brought a credible challenge and, instead, lost every case they brought challenging the results in Arizona.

Once counties and States certified the election, or when it was nearly certain that they would, President Trump and his teamâs focus largely shifted. President Trump and his team encouraged State legislators to meet in special sessions, if necessary, and choose electoral college electors who would vote for the Trump/Pence ticket. Ultimately, no State legislature took that step, but it was the basis for pressuring State officials from November through January 6, 2021.

The concept of State legislators appointing their own electors featured prominently in a series of hastily arranged official and unofficial âhearingsâ with State legislators that the Trump team announced on November 24, 2020.103

On November 25th, President Trump called in to an unofficial meeting with legislators in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.104 The meeting was set up to appear like an official hearing, but it was not. It took place in a hotel ballroom, and those presenting arguments or purported evidence, like Giuliani, Jenna Ellis, and others, were not placed under oath.105 According to President Pro Tempore of the Pennsylvania Senate Jake Corman, he had initially been asked by State Senator Doug Mastriano to hold a hearing about the election. Corman responded that any formal hearing should be official, with sworn testimony, and open to both parties.106 That was not what Senator Mastriano ultimately convened.

President Trump had originally made plans to attend the Pennsylvania gathering in person, but he cancelled after several advisors tested positive for COVIDâ19.107 When President Trump called in and spoke to those gathered in the hotel ballroom, his false claims were met with cheers, and he made his purpose clear: âthis election has to be turned around . . . Why wouldnât they overturn an election? Certainly overturn it in your State . . . We have to turn the election over.ââ108

President Trump made the ask and Giuliani told the legislators how to carry it out. Giuliani told the assembled legislators that it was their âpowerâ and âresponsibilityâ to pick Pennsylvaniaâs presidential electors and that â[they] have to convince the rest of [their] members, Republican and Democrat, they owe that to the people ofâ Pennsylvania.109 Jenna Ellis told them that although Pennsylvania law dictates that electors are chosen by popular vote, â[y]ou can take that power back at any time. You donât need a court to tell you that.ââ110

President Trump invited some of the lawmakers to come meet him at the White House that evening and, according to Giuliani, it was âa large groupâ that went.111 Special Assistant to the President Cassidy Hutchinsonâs text messages with Kerik included the guest list and descriptions of the vehicles that would need access to the White House grounds.112 Pennsylvania State Senator Doug Mastriano drove one car, a hired driver drove a van with most of the State legislators, and Kerik drove an SUV with attorney Katherine Friess and election-conspiracy proponent Phil Waldron.113 Hutchinson estimated that at least 29 visitors traveled from Pennsylvania to the White House that day, and she explained that their conversation with the President touched on holding a special session of the State legislature to appoint Trump electors.114

Just a few days later, on November 30, 2020, President Trump also called into another one of Giuliani and Jenna Ellisâs hotel âhearings,â this time in Arizona. Several Arizona State lawmakers hosted the meeting at a Hyatt Regency in Phoenix after they did not receive permission to organize an official hearing at the State Capitol.115 Before the hearing started, State GOP Representative Mark Finchem âpromised information to show that the stateâs 11 electoral votes should not go to Democrat Joe Biden,â and argued that âthe U.S. Constitution empowers lawmakers to decide, on their own, whether the election was valid and, if not, to select the electors of their choice.ââ116

Giuliani told the assembled legislators that the officials certifying Arizonaâs election results âhave made no effort to find outâ if the results of the election were accurate, âwhich seems to me gives the state legislature a perfect reason to take over the conduct of this election because itâs being conducted irresponsibly and unfairly.ââ117 Likewise, Jenna Ellis said that it was ânot just the choice, but the actual duty and obligation of the legislature to step in and to make sure that you donât certify false results.ââ118 During a recess, she also took to Twitter, writing, â[t]he certification of Arizonaâs FALSE results is unethical and knowingly participating in the corruption that has disenfranchised AZ voters. BUT, this in no way impacts the state legislatureâs ability to take back the proper selection of delegates.ââ119

When it was President Trumpâs turn to address this handful of lawmakers over the phone, he called them âlegends for taking this on,â and used the opportunity to criticize Governor Ducey: âyouâll have to figure out whatâs that all about with Ducey. He couldnât [certify] fast enoughâ and âArizona will not forget what Ducey just did. Weâre not gonna forget.ââ120 That night Giuliani joined President Trump in criticizing Governor Ducey, while at the same time making baseless allegations about voting machines in Arizona and calling for a special legislative session to change the outcome of the election: âGovernor Ducey of Arizona refuses to meet with me. He doesnât want to explain that he selected a foreign corrupt Voting Machine company to count the vote. I understand his reluctance, but [sic] just call a special session. Letâs find out how crooked your election really was?ââ121

Michigan was next. Giulianiâs team announced that the Michigan legislature would hold a hearing on December 1st, but the relevant committee chair excluded Giuliani because it was only open to witnesses âwith first hand knowledge.ââ122 That chairman, Michigan State Senator Edward McBroom (R-Vulcan), had already held Senate Oversight hearings by then in an actual effort to evaluate claims of fraud in the 2020 election, which ultimately resulted in a comprehensive report that concluded that the Republican-led committee âfound no evidence of widespread or systematic fraudâ in Michiganâs election.123

Michiganâs House Oversight Committee, however, did allow Giuliani to testify in a hearing on December 2nd. Before the hearing, Giuliani joined the Stateâs GOP chairwoman to give what was billed as a legal briefing. In the online presentation, Giuliani told the audience thereâs ânothing wrong with putting pressure on your state legislatorsââ124 to pick new electors and that âyou have got to get them to remember that their oath to the Constitution sometimes requires being criticized. Sometimes it even requires being threatened.ââ125

When Giuliani appeared for the hearing in Michigan, he was not placed under oath, used his time to refer to Michiganâs election as a âcon job,â and urged legislators to âhave the courage to say that certification that was done by your state is a complete phony.ââ126 The information presented was baselessâand sometimes racistâconspiracy theories. One witness brought to criticize Michiganâs voter verification even said: âI think Chinese all look alike. So how would you tell? If some Chow shows up, you can be anybody and you can vote.ââ127 And, as he had promised in the legal briefing the day before, Giuliani then called on the legislators to do what the Trump Campaign had reportedly been discussing since before election day. He said that the State legislature could still singlehandedly decide the election result âanytime you want to. Anytime. You can take it back tonight. You can take it back the day before the electors go down to Washington.ââ128 Jenna Ellis also participated, insisting âno honest person can hear these citizens of your own state today . . . and can let this proceed. What the Constitution obligates you to do is to take back your plenary power.ââ129

Finally, Georgia. There, Giuliani and others appeared in multiple hearings, the first of which was held on December 3, 2020. In that hearing, Giuliani was direct and called on Georgia legislators to overturn the election resultsââyou are the final arbiter of who the electors should beââbased on the false premise that âthere is more than ample evidence to conclude that this election was a sham.ââ130 Then, at a separate hearing on December 10th, he told State legislators that Georgiaâs Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and secretary of State were engaged in a âcover upâ of âa crime in plain sight,â and that it fell to âthe state legislature [ ] to vindicate the honor of the state.ââ131 And, Giuliani used yet another appearance, on December 30th, to call the 2020 election âthe most crooked election, the most manipulated election in American history,â and implore the Republican legislators to hold a special session to vote on appointing new electors, something he said that they could do âright up until the last momentâ before January 6th.132

More perniciously, Giuliani also used these hearings to advance conspiracy theories that falsely accused Fulton County election workers of rigging Georgiaâs election results. His delegation to the December 3rd hearing played clips of election-night surveillance footage from the State Farm Arena that showed election workers scanning ballots, sometimes after partisan poll watchers had gone home.133 Although the poll watchers should have been there the entire time while election workers counted the votes, there was nothing nefarious about the circumstances and no question about the end result. In fact, the FBI, Department of Justice, and Georgia Bureau of Investigation would determine that these ballots were legitimate ballots, that observers were not illegally ejected, and that the ballots were scanned and counted properly, contrary to claims by President Trump and his attorneys.134 And yet Giuliani baselessly declared at the December 3rd hearing that, to him, the video was a âpowerful smoking gunâ proving that âthose votes are not legitimate votes.ââ135

But Giulianiâs claims took a more ominous turn during the December 10th hearing. There, he publicly named two of the election workers shown in the video, Ruby Freeman and her daughter, Wandrea ArShaye âShayeâ Moss, and accused them of vote-tampering and engaging in criminal conduct.136 He seized on a clip of Freeman passing Moss a ginger mint, claiming that the two women, both Black, were smuggling USB drives âas if theyâre vials of heroin or cocaine.â He also suggested that Freeman and Moss should be jailed and that they deserved to have their homes searched.137 Not only were Giulianiâs claims about Freeman and Moss reckless, racist, and false, they had real-world consequences that turned both womenâs lives upside down. And further heightening the personal impact of these baseless attacks, President Trump supported, and even repeated, them, as described later.

In the end, the hearings were widely panned. In Michigan alone, current and former Republican lawmakers publicly questioned the hearings and implored President Trump and his team to stop. U.S. Representative Paul Mitchell (R-Mich.) implored on Twitter âPlease JUST STOP!â and âwondered why Republican leaders allowed testimony he said was âdriving the party into this ditch.âââ138 Similarly, former Michigan lawmaker Martin Howrylak (R-Oakland) said that he was âembarrassedâ by the hearing, and former Michigan Senator Ken Sikkema (R-Grand Rapids) said that âthe way the committee was run was atrocious.ââ139 Later, the President promoted a tweet calling a Democratic lawmaker a â#posâ for speaking out at the Michigan hearing.140 Months later, Giulianiâs license to practice law in New York was suspended for, among other reasons, the âfalse claimsâ he made on various dates, including during the hearings in Michigan, Pennsylvania, Arizona, and Georgia.141

Not only was replacing electors a theme during the official and unofficial State hearings, it was also a critical component of President Trumpâs plan both before and after the hearings took place.

In fact, while the hearings were happening, the Trump Campaign set up an operation to contact hundreds of State legislators and ask them to support an effort to appoint electoral college electors for the Trump/Pence ticket in States that President Trump had lost.

On the same day as Giulianiâs hearing in Michigan, Trump Campaign staff contacted dozens of Republicans in Michiganâs State legislature. A Trump Campaign supervisor sent text messages to his team, directing them to reach out to lawmakers âto explain the process for legislative redress and tell them how to send representative[s] to th[e] electoral college.ââ142 He added: âWeâre gonna be lobbyists. Woot.ââ143

According to a Campaign stafferâs spreadsheet produced to the Select Committee, the Trump Campaign apparently tried contacting over 190 Republican State legislators in Arizona, Georgia, and Michigan, alone.144

One voicemail left as part of this initiative was leaked to the press on December 1, 2020. In it, a Trump Campaign staffer said, âI did want to personally reach out to you on behalf of the President.ââ145 Her main point came later in the message: âwe want to know when there is a resolution in the House to appoint electors for Trump if the President can count on you to join in support.ââ146 Another message from this effort that reached reporters made the same ask and claimed that, â[a]fter a roundtable with the President, he asked us to reach out to you individuallyâ to whip support for a âjoint resolution from the State House and Senateâ that would âallow Michigan to send electors for Donald J. Trump to the Electoral College and save our country.ââ147

Soon after the voicemail leaked, the Campaign staffer who left this voicemail got a text message from one of her supervisors, who wrote: âHonest to god Iâm so proud of thisâ because â[t]hey unwittingly just got your message out there.ââ148 He elaborated: âyou used the awesome power of the presidency to scare a state rep into getting a statewide newspaper to deliver your talking points.ââ149

While Campaign aides blanketed State officials with these calls, some State officials received more personalized outreach directly from President Trump, Giuliani, and their allies throughout the post-election period about this issue.

As discussed earlier, Rep. Walberg reached out to State legislators in Michigan at the Presidentâs request in mid-November, including Senate Majority Leader Mike Shirkey and House Speaker Lee Chatfield. By November 18th, President Trump called Chatfield and Shirkey to invite them to what would become a meeting for a group of Michigan lawmakers in the Oval Office.150 Although President Trump didnât tell Shirkey what the meeting would be about, the President was focused on the election and asked Shirkey what he and others were doing to investigate election fraud.151 The meeting happened on November 20th.152

In Shirkeyâs words, there âwasnât a mysteryâ about why the group was at the White House once the meeting started.153 When the President mentioned several baseless claims of election fraud in Wayne County, Shirkey told the President that he had lost the election and that it had nothing to do with Wayne County, where he had actually performed better than he had in 2016.154

From the Presidentâs body language, Shirkey concluded that wasnât what he wanted to hear. But the meeting continued, and the President dialed in Giuliani, who delivered a âlong monologue,â reciting a âlitanyâ of allegations about supposed fraud that was short on substance.155 Shirkey challenged Giuliani, asking âwhen are you going to . . . file a lawsuit in Michigan,â which he said Giuliani did not answer.156 Although Shirkey says he did not recall the President making any precise âask,â Chatfield recalled President Trumpâs more generic directive for the group to âhave some backbone and do the right thing.ââ157 Chatfield understood that to mean they should investigate claims of fraud and overturn the election by naming electors for President Trump.158 Shirkey told the President that he was not going to do anything that would violate Michigan law.159

After the meeting ended, Shirkey and Chatfield issued a joint statement: âWe have not yet been made aware of any information that would change the outcome of the election in Michigan and as legislative leaders, we will follow the law and follow the normal process regarding Michiganâs electors, just as we have said throughout this election.ââ160

That was not the end, however. Chatfield and Shirkey received numerous calls from the President in the weeks following the election. Chatfield told the Select Committee that he received approximately five to ten phone calls from President Trump after the election, during which the President would usually ask him about various allegations of voter fraud.161 Chatfield said that he repeatedly looked into the Presidentâs claims, but never found anything persuasive that could have changed the outcome of the election.162

President Trumpâs calls were not enough, so he turned to the public. On January 3, 2021, the Trump Campaign posted a tweet that urged supporters to âContact Speaker Lee Chatfield & Senate Majority Leader Mike Shirkeyâ to âDemand [a] vote on decertification.ââ163 Why President Trump thought the Michigan legislature would convene to decertify the election in a matter of hours when it had refused to do so since early November is not clear. But that didnât stop the President from making things personal. The Presidentâs January 3rd tweet included Shirkeyâs personal cellphone number as well as a number for Chatfield that turned out to be wrong. As a result, Shirkey said he received nearly 4,000 text messages, and another private citizen reported being inundated with calls and texts intended for Chatfield.164

On November 21st, Mark Meadows texted a number apparently belonging to Representative Scott Perry (RâPA) and asked: âCan you send me the number for the speaker and the leader of the PA Legislature. POTUS wants to chat with them.ââ165 Hours later, Meadows received a response of âYes sir.ââ166 At the time, the leader of the Pennsylvania Senate was Jake Corman and the Speaker of the Pennsylvania House was Bryan Cutler.

Corman told the Select Committee that he received a call on Thanksgiving Day 2020 from Giuliani, urging him to call the legislature into a special session to replace Biden electors with Trump electors.167 This idea wasnât new to Corman. President Trump and his allies had gone public about their intentions before then, including during the Pennsylvania hotel hearing, but Corman had braced himself for this even before the election. Before election day in 2020, a reporter from The Atlantic interviewed Corman and other prominent Republicans in Pennsylvania about the possibility that President Trump would try to circumvent the popular vote in swing States by asking the legislatures to appoint Trump/Pence electors. After the article, Corman drafted an op-ed, making it clear that the Pennsylvania legislature did not have the legal authority to appoint Trump/Pence electors in contravention of the popular vote, a position that he would generally maintain through the 2020 Presidential election cycle.168

During that call, Giuliani first tried âpumping [Corman] up as a patriotâ before asking the Senator to call the Pennsylvania legislature into a special session. Corman told Giuliani that he did not have the authority to do that, a position with which his own lawyers agreed.169 Giulianiâs reply was that Corman must have bad lawyers. Corman said he offered to connect Giuliani with his legal team. His legal team spoke with Giuliani and a lawyer working with him, Jenna Ellis, the following day, reiterating their view that such a move by the legislature would be illegal.170 That same day, or possibly the next, Giuliani and Ellis called him back to renew their request for a special legislative session and to demean Cormanâs attorneys, calling them âterrible,â âbad,â and âwrong.ââ171 Corman, however, held his ground and ended the call.172

While packing to return to Pennsylvania from his Thanksgiving visit to Florida, Corman says he received a call from an unknown number with a Washington, DC area code, which he let go to voicemail.173 It turned out to be a White House operator calling on behalf of President Trump.174

Corman called back and spoke to President Trump, who insisted that he had won the election in Pennsylvania and said something to the effect of, âJake, this is a big issue. We need your help.ââ175 Corman told the President that he couldnât do what the Trump team was asking; President Trump replied, âIâm not sure your attorneys are very good.ââ176 Corman wanted to end the call and offered to have his lawyers speak again with President Trumpâs, but they never had another call with the Presidentâs lawyers.177

Pennsylvania House Speaker Bryan Cutler was another main target for the Presidentâs team. He received voicemails in late November for four days in a row from Giuliani and/or Jenna Ellis, which he provided to the Select Committee.178 Cutler explained that he did not feel comfortable talking with the Presidentâs team in case he ended up having to preside over a legislative session about the election, and he had his attorneys relay that to the Presidentâs team.179 Giuliani received the message but continued to call Speaker Cutler nonetheless.180

In the first of these voicemails, on November 26th, Giuliani asked to âget together, quietlyâ to discuss âthe amount of fraud that went on in your State,â and said that Giuliani and Ellis had also just spoken to Pennsylvania House Majority Leader Kerry Benninghoff.181 On November 27th, Ellis called and said in a second voicemail that they had just talked to Pennsylvania House Member Russ Diamond and were âvery gratefulâ to the Stateâs legislature âfor doing your Article II duty.ââ182 On November 28th, Giuliani left a third voicemail and claimed to have âsomething importantâ that âreally changes things,â and said that âthe president wanted me to make sure I got it to you.ââ183 And then on November 29th, Giuliani left a fourth message and said, âI understand that you donât want to talk to me nowâ but still sought âthe courtesy of being able to talk to you as the presidentâs lawyerâ and a âfellow Republicanâ because âyouâre certifying what is a blatantly false statement . . . I canât imagine how thatâs in your interests or in the interests of our party.ââ184

Giuliani and Ellis didnât get through, but the President did. â[I]f we wanted to do something, what were the options[?]â the President asked Cutler.185 Cutler explained to President Trump that he could file a legal challenge contesting the election, and asked the President why his team had never requested a statewide recount.186 Cutler was also clear about the âconstitutional peculiaritiesâ of Pennsylvania, where the State constitution specifically prohibits retroactive changes to how electors are chosen.187

Practically, President Trumpâs call achieved nothing. The President wasnât getting what he wanted in his calls to leaders in Pennsylvania: a special session of the legislature to appoint Trump/Pence electors.

Seemingly undeterred, President Trump invited several leaders of the Pennsylvania legislature to the White House for Christmas gatherings.188 Senator Corman decided not to go, although Speaker Cutler did. President Trump spoke with Cutler on December 3rd, while Cutler, his chief of staff, and their wives were at that White House Christmas tour.189 The issue of overturning the results of Pennsylvaniaâs election came up again, as did the possibility of a special session of the State legislature to appoint Trump electors.190 Cutler told the President that the State legislature could not reconvene without an order from the Governor and a petition from a supermajority of legislators, neither of which was likely to happen.191 Cutler also told the President that they could not appoint new electors without a court order. In Cutlerâs opinion, President Trump âseemed to understand. And that wasâthat was clear.ââ192 The Presidentâs apparent understanding, however, did not result in any meaningful changes to his public rhetoric.

On December 3rd, the same day that Cutler met with President Trump, Cutler, Corman, House Majority Leader Benninghoff, and Senate Majority Leader Kim Ward issued a three-page single-spaced joint statement asserting, in no uncertain terms, that Pennsylvaniaâs General Assembly âlacks the authority . . . to overturn the popular vote and appoint our own slate of electors,â since â[d]oing so would violate our Election Code and Constitution, particularly a provision that prohibits us from changing the rules for election contests of the President after the election.ââ193 In response, President Trump retweeted a December 4th post by Bernard Kerik, which tagged all four of these State legislators with the hashtag âTraitors,â and declared that âThese are the four cowardice[sic] Pennsylvania legislators that intend to allow the Democrat machine to #StealtheVote! #Cowards #Liars #Traitors.ââ194

But five days later, President Trump publicly thanked Cutler for signing onto a December 4th letter that encouraged Members of Congress from Pennsylvania to object to their Stateâs electoral votes on January 6th. The President tweeted: âThank you to Speaker Cutler and all others in Pennsylvania and elsewhere who fully understand what went on in the 2020 election. Itâs called total corruption!ââ195 When the Select Committee asked Cutler about this apparent change in his position, he said that he signed on to this letter not because of concerns that fraud or corruption meant the results of the election Pennsylvania were wrong, but rather because of concerns about âprogrammatic changes or areas for improvementâ related to the election.196 In fact, Cutler reiterated to the Committee that he âwas not personally aware ofâ any widespread election fraud that would have changed the result of the election.197

The pressure facing State legislators during this period was significant. On December 9th, the New York Times quoted Pennsylvaniaâs Senate Majority Leader Kim Ward, revealing that she too had received a call from President Trump in which he pushed his election fraud narrative.198 Ward told the Times that she hadnât been given enough time to sign the same December 4th letter that Cutler did, but commented that if she had taken a stand against it, âIâd get my house bombed tonight.ââ199

In late November, Arizona House Speaker Russell âRustyâ Bowers, a longtime Republican who served 17 years in the State legislature, received a call from President Trump and Giuliani.200 Giuliani alleged that Arizonaâs election results were skewed by illicit ballots, cast by non-citizens or on behalf of dead people.201 Bowers demanded proof for these audacious claims on the call and President Trump told Giuliani to comply, but the evidence never came.202 The point of the call, however, was different. Like in Michigan and Pennsylvania, President Trump and his allies were working the phones to get something. They wanted Bowers to hold a public hearing with the ultimate aim of replacing Presidential electors for former Vice President Joe Biden with electors for President Trump.203

Bowers had never heard of anything like that before, and Giuliani acknowledged that it had never been done. Where President Trump and Giuliani saw a potential opportunity, however, Bowers saw a fundamental problem.

As Bowers explained it, what they wanted him to do was âcounter to my oath when I swore to the Constitution to uphold it.ââ204 And he said that to the President and Giuliani: âyou are asking me to do something against my oath, and I will not break my oath.ââ205 Giuliani replied: âarenât we all Republicans here? I mean, I would think you would listen a little more open to my suggestions, that weâre all Republicans.ââ206

The pressure didnât stop with that call. On December 1st, Giuliani and Ellis got an audience with some of the most powerful Republican lawmakers in Arizona, including Bowers, Senate President Karen Fann, Senate President Pro Tempore Vince Leach, House Majority Leader and Senator-Elect Warren Petersen, Senate Majority Whip Sonny Borrelli, Senator Michelle Ugenti-Rita, and others.207 The Select Committee was unable to get Giuliani and Ellisâ perspective on this outreach because Giuliani claimed that his communications with Bowersâwho was not his client nor part of his legal teamâwere âprivileged,â while Ellis invoked her Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination.208

Bowers, on the other hand, told the Select Committee that Giuliani and Ellis asked the lawmakers to deliver Arizonaâs electors for President Trump, despite the certified popular vote count.209 To bolster their request, Giuliani and Ellis raised numerous allegations of election fraud at the meeting, though they never produced evidence in support of their claims. In live testimony before the Committee, Bowers recalled Giuliani saying in this meeting that âweâve got lots of theories, we just donât have the evidence.ââ210 At the time, Bowers didnât know whether it was a gaffe or an example of Giuliani not thinking through what he had just said.211 In any event, Bowers said he and others in his group made particular note of that comment.212 And it was borne out; Bowers testified that âNo one provided me, ever, such evidence.ââ213

In late December, in another phone call with President Trump, Bowers reiterated that he would not do anything illegal for him.214 Afterward, John Eastman joined the chorus of Trump allies attempting to change his mind. In a call on January 4th that included the Speakerâs chief counsel as well as Arizona House Majority Leader-Elect Ben Toma, Eastman urged Bowers to hold a vote to decertify Arizonaâs Presidential electors.215 When Bowers told Eastman he couldnât unilaterally reconvene the legislature, Eastman urged him to âjust do it and let the court sort it out.ââ216 Bowers refused and the Arizona legislature took no such action.

Many of President Trumpâs efforts in Arizona focused on State officials, but his team also continued to reach out to the Board of Supervisors for Maricopa County even after it certified the election. One focus was voting machines. According to the Arizona Republic, Giuliani left a voicemail in mid- to late-December for Board Member Steve Chucri that âI see weâre gonna get a chance to take a good look at those machines . . . give me a call as soon as you get a chance. The president also wanted me to pass on a few things to you, too.ââ217 On December 4th, Giuliani also left a message for the Boardâs Chairman Clint Hickman: âI was very happy to see that thereâs gonna be a forensic audit of the machines. And I really wanted to talk to you about it a bit. The President wanted me to give you a call. All right? Thank you. Give me a call back.ââ218 Hickman chose not to call back.219

Then, on Christmas Eve, Giuliani left voicemails for Board Members Bill Gates and Jack Sellers, asking them to call him back. In his message for Gates, Giuliani said:

Itâs Giuliani, President Trumpâs lawyer. If you get a chance, would you please give me a call? I have a few things Iâd like to talk over with you. Maybe we can get this thing fixed up. You know, I really think itâs a shame that Republicans sort of are both in this, kind of, situation. And I think there may be a nice way to resolve this for everybody.220

In his message for Sellers, Giuliani said âIâd like to see if there is a way that we can resolve this so that it comes out well for everyone. Weâre all Republicans, I think we all have the same goal. Letâs see if . . . we can get this done outside of the court.ââ221 Like Hickman, neither Gates nor Sellers returned Giulianiâs calls.222

So President Trump made the call himself. On December 31st, Board Chair Clint Hickman received a voicemail from the White House switchboard, asking him to call back for President Trump. Hickman said that he did not return the call, in part because the county was still facing litigation over the election.223 Another call from the White House came through on January 3rd with a request that Hickman call back for the President. But, by then, the Presidentâs call with Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger, described below, had leaked, and Hickman âdidnât want to walk into that space.ââ224

On December 5th, President Trump traveled to Georgia to headline a rally and mobilize voters in advance of a January Senate runoff. But the Presidentâs day started with a morning call to Governor Brian Kemp during which they discussed reconvening the legislature in a special session.225 After the call, Kemp took to Twitter. He acknowledged that he had spoken to the President and that he told the President that he supported the idea of, and had already called for, a signature audit in Georgia.226 President Trump responded later that night by complaining that Georgia had not yet done a signature-verification audit and instead insisted that the Governor should â[a]t least immediately ask for a Special Session of the Legislature.ââ227 The following day, Governor Kemp and Lieutenant Governor Geoff Duncan issued a definitive statement rejecting President Trump and his alliesâ calls to overturn the results in Georgia:

While we understand four members of the Georgia Senate are requesting the convening of a special session of the General Assembly, doing this in order to select a separate slate of presidential electors is not an option that is allowed under state or federal law.

State law is clear: the legislature could only direct an alternative method for choosing presidential electors if the election was not able to be held on the date set by federal law. In the 1960s, the General Assembly decided that Georgiaâs presidential electors will be determined by the winner of the Stateâs popular vote. Any attempt by the legislature to retroactively change that process for the November 3rd election would be unconstitutional and immediately enjoined by the courts, resulting in a long legal dispute and no short-term resolution.228

President Trump responded by directing his ire at Georgia officials and, throughout the month of December, President Trump grew even more relentless in his social media attacks against Kemp than he had been the previous month. He retweeted attorney Lin Wood calling on Georgians to call and urge the FBI to focus more on election fraud and â[t]ell them to also investigate @BrianKempGA @GeoffDuncanGA & @GaSecofState.ââ229 And he retweeted another post by Lin Wood that depicted Governor Kemp and Secretary Raffensperger wearing masks digitally altered to show the Chinese flag, and warned that they âwill soon be going to jail.ââ230 Even without his many retweets, President Trump posted an average of about one tweet per day in December 2020 either criticizing Governor Kemp or pressuring him explicitly or implicitly to take actions to help overturn the election.231

President Trump seemed consumed with his plans to overturn the election and, based on documents obtained by the Select Committee, it appears that the President received input from many outside donors or advisors who had access to his staffâs email addresses. On December 7th, a Trump donor named Bill White emailed senior Trump advisors, including Dan Scavino and Rudolph Giuliani, to say that he â[j]ust spoke to [Georgia State] Senator [William Burton] Jones [who] asked if Potus can R[e]T[weet] this now pls,â along with a tweet by Senator Jones that read: âGeorgia Patriot Call to Actionâ¦call your state Senate & House Reps & ask them to sign the petition for a special session.ââ232 President Trump and Giuliani each retweeted Senator Jonesâs tweet an hour later.233

Bill White also emailed Molly Michael, Dan Scavino, and Giuliani, on December 8th with information that he said âPOTUS asked me last nightâ to send right away.234 He recommended a Presidential tweet criticizing Georgiaâs Lt. Gov. Duncan as well as tweets to put pressure on Senate Majority Leader Mike Dugan and Senate President Pro Tempore Butch Miller.235 He wrote that President Trump would be calling Dugan and Miller âto ask them to call special session and strategize with them why they are keeping this from happening.ââ236 Dugan later confirmed that he had received a call from President Trumpâs office but that the two of them were not able to connect.237 And the following day, Steve Bannon revealed on his podcast that President Trump spoke to Georgia House Speaker Ralston and Speaker Pro Tempore Jan Jones.238 Speaker Ralston confirmed that he spoke to President Trump on December 7th about the election, during which he told the President that Georgia law made a special legislative session âvery much an uphill battle.ââ239

Beyond asking State officials to not certify, to decertify, or to appoint Trump electors for consideration during the joint session, President Trump and some of his closest advisors inserted themselves directly into the counting of ballots and asked, outright, for enough votes to win.

White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows did this. Not only did he place calls on behalf of the President to election officials in Georgia, Meadows traveled there to personally visit election officials and volunteers, coordinated with Members of Congress, and even suggested that the President send election workers Trump memorabilia like presidential challenge coins and autographed MAGA hats, a suggestion that his assistant Cassidy Hutchinson thought could be problematic and, ultimately, did not act on.240

When Meadows made a visit on short notice to examine the audit of absentee ballots in Cobb County, Georgia, he spoke to Deputy Secretary of State Jordan Fuchs and Frances Watson, the Secretary of Stateâs chief investigator. Ultimately, Meadows connected Watson with the President, who claimed that he had won the election and pressed her to say that he had won. The Select Committee obtained a copy of their recorded call, which is detailed below.

The President told Watson that he had âwon Georgia . . . by a lot,â told her, âyou have the most important job in the country right now,â and suggested, âwhen the right answer comes out youâll be praised.ââ241 Four days later, Meadows texted Deputy Secretary of State Fuchs, in which he asked, â[i]s there a way to speed up Fulton county signature verification in order to have results before Jan 6 if the trump campaign assist[s] financially.ââ242 Fuchs wrote in response that she âWill answer ASAP.ââ243

Meadows also played a central role in the lead up to the Presidentâs January 2, 2021, call with Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger. In fact, it was Meadows who originally sent text messages to Raffensperger and requested to speak: On November 19th, he texted âMr Secretary. Mark Meadows here. If you could give me a brief call at your convenience. Thank youâ.244 And on December 5th, Meadows texted, âmr Secretary. Can you call the White House switchboard at [phone number]. For a call. Your voicemail is full.ââ245 Then, on December 11th, Meadows texted, âThanks so muchâ to a number that apparently belongs to United States Representative Jody Hice (R-GA) after Rep. Hice told him that he had just made a statement âregarding a recall on Raffensperger. If this is something Potus wants to know and help push . . . .ââ246

All of that led to the remarkable January 2nd call between President Trump and his advisors on one side, and Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger and his advisors on the other. By January 2nd, the President had tried to speak by phone with Raffensperger at least 18 times.247 Raffensperger, for his part, had avoided talking to the President because of ongoing litigation with the Presidentâs Campaign.248 Despite Raffenspergerâs reluctance, the two spoke, with their respective lawyers on the line. During the call, President Trump went through his litany of false election-fraud claims and then asked Raffensperger to deliver him a second term by âfindingâ just enough votes to ensure victory. The President said, âI just want to find 11,780 votes, which is one more than we have because we won the State.ââ249 He reiterated it several different ways: âfellas, I need 11,000 votes. Give me a break. You know, we have that in spades already. Or we can keep going, but thatâs not fair to the voters of Georgia because theyâre going to see what happened.ââ250

When it was clear that Raffensperger and his advisors would not agree to the Presidentâs request, the President ramped up the pressure by accusing them of committing crimes: âthe ballots are corrupt. And you are going to find that they areâwhich is totally illegalâit is more illegal for you than it is for them because, you know, what they did and youâre not reporting it. Thatâs a criminal, thatâs a criminal offense. And you canât let that happen. Thatâs a big risk to you and to Ryan, your lawyer . . . Iâm notifying you that youâre letting it happen.ââ251

The President would stop at nothing to win Georgia. Separate from asking Raffensperger to alter, without justification, the election results in Georgia, he also attacked election workers. In that call, President Trump mentioned Ruby Freemanâs name 18 times, referred to her daughter Shaye Moss several of those times, and accused them of crimes.252 Raffensperger and his aides rebutted President Trumpâs false claims of fraud on the call and explained why they were wrong, but they did not deliver the one thing President Trump wanted most: the 11,780 votes he asked for.253

The next day, President Trump tweeted about his phone call with Raffensperger, falsely claiming that â[Secretary Raffensperger] was unwilling, or unable, to answer questions such as the âballots under tableâ scam . . . . He has no clue!ââ254 He added that Raffensperger, Governor Kemp, and Lt. Governor Duncan âare a disgraceâ and âhave done less than nothingâ about rampant political corruption.255

Even though Raffensperger and his team repeatedly told the President why his specific allegations of election fraud in Georgia were wrong,256 President Trump met the next day with the top leadership of the Justice Department in an effort to convince them to send a letter falsely claiming that the Department had âidentified significant concernsâ affecting the election results in Georgia and calling on Governor Kemp, Speaker Ralston, and Senate President Pro Tempore Miller to convene a special session.257 It was only after a showdown in the Oval Office, described in Chapter 4 during which the White House Counsel and others threatened to resign that President Trump decided against replacing Department of Justice leadership and issuing that letter.

While many State officials resisted President Trumpâs demands, some eagerly joined the Presidentâs efforts.

President Trump routinely coordinated with Pennsylvania State Senator Doug Mastriano, whose request led to the November 25, 2020, hotel âhearingâ in Gettysburg, and who traveled to Washington to meet with the President afterward.258 Senator Mastriano, who would later charter and pay for buses to Washington for the Presidentâs âStop the Stealâ rally on January 6th and was near the Capitol during the attack, quickly rose to favor with the President.259

On November 30th, President Trump called Mastriano, interrupting him during a radio interview and telling listeners that âDoug is the absolute heroâ and people are âreally angry in Pennsylvania.ââ260

On December 5th, Senator Mastriano sent an email to President Trumpâs executive assistant, Molly Michael, with a Supreme Court Amicus Brief for the President that the pair âdiscussed yesterday,â related to a case brought by Representative Mike Kelly (RâPA) against his own State, which the Supreme Court rejected just a few days later.261

On December 14th, President Trumpâs executive assistant sent Mastriano an email âFrom POTUSâ with talking points promoting a conspiracy theory about election machines.262

And on December 21st, Mastriano sent another email for President Trump, in which he wrote: âDear Mr. Presidentâattached please find the âkiller letterâ on the Pennsylvania election that we discussed last nightâ that âI only just completed.ââ263 This letter recapped the Gettysburg hotel hearing on November 25th, and claimed that âthere is rampant election fraud in Pennsylvania that must be investigated, remedied and rectified.ââ264 President Trump sent that letter to John Eastman, Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen, Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue, Rush Limbaugh, former Florida Attorney General Pam Bondi, Lou Dobbs, and others.265

As January 6th approached, Senator Mastrianoâs involvement in attempts to overturn the election only grew. On December 23rd, he led a second group of Pennsylvania State senators for a meeting with President Trump in the Oval Office, which Giuliani claimed âswayed about 20â of them.266 Neither Speaker Cutler nor Senate President Corman participated.

Mastriano also sent emails indicating that he spoke with President Trump on December 27th, 28th, and 30th, along with files that President Trump had requested or that he had promised to him.267 One of these was a pair of letters from State senators asking U.S. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy to reject Pennsylvaniaâs electoral votes on January 6th.268 President Trumpâs executive assistant notified the White Houseâs Director of Legislative Affairs that â[t]he President would like the below attached letters to be sent to Mitch and Kevin and all GOP house and senate members,â but was told in reply, â[g]iven the political nature of the letters, would you mind sending them?ââ269

On January 5th, President Trump spoke again with Mastriano and then notified the White House operator that Mastriano âwill be calling in for the Vice Presidentâ soon.270 That evening Senator Mastriano sent two more emails for the President. One was a letter addressed to Vice President Pence on behalf of nearly 100 legislators from various States; the other was a letter directed to McConnell and McCarthy from Pennsylvania lawmakers, this time asking Congress to postpone acting on the 6th.271 President Trump tweeted the letter that night, captioning it âBIG NEWS IN PENNSYLVANIA!â and, after midnight, he retweeted that âPennsylvania is going to Trump. The legislators have spoken.ââ272 As described elsewhere in this report, that letter, and letters like it, were used in the effort to convince Vice President Pence that he could and should affect the outcome of the joint session of Congress on January 6th.

The Select Committee subpoenaed Senator Mastriano to testify about these interactions with President Trump and his advisors, among other matters. Unlike numerous other witnesses who complied with subpoenas and provided deposition testimony to the Select Committee, Mastriano did not; he logged in to a virtual deposition at the appointed time but logged out before answering any substantive questions or even taking the oath to the tell the truth.273

The President apparently got what he wanted in State officials like Senator Mastriano, but not those who dared question or outright reject his anti-democratic efforts to overturn the election. In some cases, those who questioned him made the President and his advisors dig in and push harder. On January 1st, Campaign Senior Advisor Jason Miller asked for a âblast text and Twitter blast outâ that would urge President Trumpâs supporters to âContact House Speaker Bryan Cutler & Senate President Pro Tem Jake Corman!â to âDemand a vote on certification.ââ274 Senior Campaign attorneys, however, replied that this might violate Pennsylvaniaâs âvery stringentâ lobbying laws and get them prosecuted or fined.275 Instead, they agreed on a similar call to action aimed at Arizona Governor Doug Ducey and Arizona House Speaker Rusty Bowers rather than Speaker Cutler and President Pro Tempore Corman in Pennsylvania.276

The efforts to overturn the election through State legislatures continued throughout the final two weeks before the joint session of Congress on January 6th. Based on actual events and documents obtained by the Select Committee, President Trumpâs Campaign team, outside advisors, and motivated volunteers generally acted in accord with what was written down in a âStrategic Communications Planâ when engaging with, and sometimes demonizing, State officials. Activities that occurred thereafter were in accord with the plan.

The âPlanâ was explained in a document that was presented to the White House.277 The plan contemplated pressuring Republican legislators both in Congress and in six key swing States. The document itself purports to be the product of the âGIULIANI PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL DEFENSE TEAMâ and declared that âWe Have 10 Days to Execute This Plan & Certify President Trump!ââ278

Kerik told the Select Committee that pieces of the plan had been in place for some period of time before the document was actually created, and that he thought that the âcatalystâ for actually memorializing the plan was the approaching deadline of January 6th.279 In fact, the 10-day plan to help âcertify president Trumpâ had been the subject of âcontinual discussionsâ for â6 weeksâ and was âbeing discussed every day at some point prior to the 10 days that weâre talking about. So it was a continuous thing that went on.ââ280

Ultimately, the Giuliani team shared the Strategic Communications Plan and urged its implementation. Kerik sent the plan to Mark Meadows via email on December 28th with this note, in part:

There is only one thing thatâs going to move the needle and force the legislators to do what their [sic] constitutionally obligated to do, and that is apply pressure . . . . We can do all the investigations we want later, but if the president plans on winning, itâs the legislators that have to be moved, and this will do just that. Weâre just running out of time.281

Neither Giuliani nor Kerik told the Select Committee that they recalled officially implementing the plan, and Giuliani said that he thought Meadows even rejected it, but there is no doubt that President Trumpâs team took certain actions consistent with it.282

The document described its goal as a â[n]ationwide communications outreach campaign to educate the public on the fraud numbers, and inspire citizens to call upon legislators and Members of Congress to disregard the fraudulent vote count and certify the duly-elected President Trump.ââ283 The âFOCUS of CAMPAIGNâ was âSWING STATE REPUBLICAN SENATORSâ in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, âREPULBICAN [sic] MEMBERS OF THE HOUSEâ and âREPUBLICAN MEMBERS OF THE SENATE.ââ284 Among the steps that it recommended were âRALLIES AND PROTESTSâ in six key swing States, including protests at âGovernorâs Mansions,â âLt. Governorâs home[s],â âSecretary of Stateâs homes,â and âweak Membersâ homes.ââ285

Although the plan did not mention specific individuals by name, an apparently related document produced to the Select Committee by Giuliani did, naming State legislative leaders as âTARGETSâ under a header of âKEY TARGET STATE POINTS,â including Arizona House Speaker Rusty Bowers, Arizona Senate President Karen Fann (incorrectly described as the State Senateâs majority leader), Georgia House Speaker David Ralston, Georgia Senate Majority Leader Mike Dugan, Georgia Senate President Pro Tempore Butch Miller as a possible back up, Michigan House Speaker Lee Chatfield, Michigan Senate Majority leader Mike Shirkey, Pennsylvania House Speaker Brian Cutler, Pennsylvania House Majority Leader Kerry Benninghoff, Pennsylvania Senate President Pro Tempore Jake Corman, Pennsylvania Senate Majority Leader Kim Ward, Wisconsin State Assembly Speaker Robin Vos, and Wisconsin Senate Majority Leader Scott Fitzgerald.286

Consistent with these proposals, Giuliani appeared as a guest on Steve Bannonâs podcast on New Yearâs Eve and told him that âwe have a weak element to our party . . . a cowardly elementââ287 and, â[n]ow I think every Republican knowsâmaybe this is worseâthis election was stolen. Now the question is: can they live up to their oath of office? . . . We gotta start working on the leadership.ââ288 Giuliani also described President Trumpâs objective in this effort: âFor the president, the way forward is really itâs in the hands of the leaders of those legislatures and the Members of Congress, and what our people can do is let them know what they think, and that theyâre not gonna get away with pushing this aside. That the consequences of turning your back on a massive voter fraud are gonna be dire for them, and historically these people are gonna become enemies of the country.ââ289

A key component of this plan was to call out Republican officials who rejected President Trump and his teamâs efforts or claims of fraud. Kerik and numerous other members of the Campaignâs legal team did just that. On December 27th, Kerik suggested that Senator Pat Toomey (R-PA) was âcorruptâ and said that âfor any Pennsylvania official to certify their vote, itâs malfeasance and criminal.ââ290 That was entirely consistent with Kerikâs past tweets about the election, one of which apparently called public officials âwho betrayedâ President Trump âspineless disloyal maggots.ââ291 It wasnât just rhetoric, however, because, as described below, people showed up outside certain officialsâ homeâsometimes menacinglyâand, of course, showed up at the Capitol on January 6th.

The pressure in those final days did not stop with the types of activities outlined in the Strategic Communications Plan. January 2, 2021, was a busy day for a Saturday at the Trump White House. That was the day President Trump called on Georgia Secretary of State Raffensperger to find enough votes for victory in Georgia and participated in a call with Lindsay Graham and Members of the Freedom Caucus to plan for the joint session on January 6th.292

It was also the day that the President joined in a virtual briefing for nearly 300 Republican legislators from swing States.293 The event was hosted by a short-lived organization called âGot Freedom?â that listed Jenna Ellis among its leadership team,294 and included Giuliani, John Eastman, and Peter Navarro as the programâs âfeatured speakers.ââ295 A press release by Got Freedom? said that the meeting was hosted by Phillip Kline, a former attorney general of Kansas, who was disbarred in 2013.296 It indicated that purported proof of voter fraud âshould serve as an important resource for state legislators as they make calls for state legislatures to meet to investigate the election and consider decertifying their state election results.ââ297

According to the Washington Examiner, when President Trump joined the call he told the participants: âYou know that we won the election, and you were also given false numbers to certify.â It quoted him saying â[y]ou are the real powerâ because â[y]ouâre more important than the courts. Youâre more important than anything because the courts keep referring to you, and youâre the ones that are going to make the decision.â When asked about that quote, specifically, Giuliani, who was on the call, said he didnât recall the exact words that the President used but told the Select Committee âthat would be the sum or substance of what he had been saying and what he believed.ââ298 During the call, the President reportedly âreferenced the planned protests in Washingtonâ just days later on January 6th, and told the group âI donât think the country is going to take it.ââ299

When reporting on the call, the Washington Examiner also provided details about what Giuliani told the assembled State legislators. Consistent with his teamâs âStrategic Communications Plan,â Giuliani said, â[w]e need you to put excessive pressure on your leadership where the real weakness and cowardice is mostly located,â and the report quoted Navarro telling them that âYour job, I believe, is to take action, action, action.ââ300 That evening, Navarro stated on Fox News that âthese legislatorsâthey are hot, theyâre angry, they want action,â and âwe explained exactly how the Democrat Party as a matter of strategy stole this election from Donald J. Trump.ââ301

Organizers from Got Freedom? sent a follow-up email that evening to participants on behalf of Phill Kline, in which they described the event as âan important briefing for legislators who hold the power to decertify the results of their state elections.ââ302 It emphasized the following:

As elected officials in the House and Senate of your respective States, Professor Eastman laid out the Constitutional imperatives for you:

The email also recommended that they â. . . sign on to a joint letter from state legislators to Vice President Mike Pence to demand that he call for a 12-day delay on ratifying the election . . .â on January 6th.304 The letter ultimately garnered more than 100 signatures by State legislators from Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.305 Doug Mastriano forwarded a copy of the letter via email to President Trumpâs executive assistant, and the National Archives produced to the Select Committee a printed version with a stamp at the top indicating, âTHE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.ââ306

But this plan would fail to sway its intended audience. As discussed in Chapter 5, the Vice President rejected this and numerous other attempts to convince him to act unlawfully on January 6th. The election had been decided and certified by the States. It was the Vice President and Congressâs job to open and count the legitimate electoral college votes.

And in the early morning hours of January 7th, after a day unlike any seen in American history, when a mob of angry insurrectionists attempted to violently upend a Presidential election, the Vice President and Members of Congress, shaken but steady, delayed but resolute, regrouped and reconvened and did their Constitutional duty to certify Joseph R. Biden as the next President of the United States.

President Trumpâs plot to pressure State legislators to overturn the vote of the electoral college failedâbut only barely. Even so, the consequences of President Trumpâs efforts to overturn State election results were significant.

Many of the people who refused to be pushed into manipulating election resultsâgovernors, secretaries of State, State legislators, State and local election officials, and frontline election workers just doing their jobsâfound themselves subjected to public demonization and subsequent spamming, doxing, harassment, intimidation, and violent threats. Some of the threats were sexualized or racist in nature and targeted family members. President Trump never discouraged or condemned these tactics, and in fact he was an active participant in directing his supporters, through tweets and speeches, to apply pressure to public servants who would not comply.

President Trump and his team were not above using incendiary rhetoric or threats to achieve their goal of overturning the election. Giuliani said so before the purported hearing in Michigan in December. Recall that he told an online audience, thereâs ânothinâ wrong with putting pressure on your state legislatorsââ307 and âyou have got to get them to remember that their oath to the Constitution sometimes requires being criticized. Sometimes it even requires being threatened.ââ308

That pressure came privately and publicly in the post-election period.

Privately, for example, President Trump called Michigan Senate Majority Leader Mike Shirkey three times after their White House meeting: November 21st, November 25th, and December 14th.309 Shirkey did not recall many specifics of those calls and claimed he did not remember the President applying any specific pressure.310 The day after one of those calls, however, Shirkey tweeted that âour election process MUST be free of intimidation and threats,â and âitâs inappropriate for anyone to exert pressure on them.ââ311 From this and other public statements, it is clear that Shirkey was sensitive to outside forces pressuring people with roles in the election. In fact, the same day that the electoral college met and voted former Vice President Joe Biden as the winner of the 2020 Presidential election, Shirkey received another call from President Trump and issued another public statement. Shirkeyâs statement that day, December 14, 2020, read: âMichiganâs Democratic slate of electors should be able to proceed with their duty, free from threats of violence and intimidationâ and â[i]t is our responsibility as leaders to follow the law . . . .ââ312

Publicly, President Trump used both Twitter posts and paid social media and cable television ads to advance his pressure campaign.

In Arizona, for example, President Trump used social media to both praise and criticize legislators. When Speaker Bowers and Senate President Karen Fann requested an audit of Maricopa Countyâs election software and equipment, President Trump publicly commended them, retweeting a press release about their announcement and commenting: âThank you to Senate President Karen Fann and House Speaker Russell Bowersâand all, for what you are doing in Arizona. A fast check of signatures will easily give us the state.ââ313 But just days later, President Trump assailed Bowers for opposing a special session to appoint new electors. He retweeted a post by Campaign lawyer Christina Bobb that accused Bowers of âintentionally misleading the people of Arizonaâ and that included a demand by Stop-the-Steal organizer Ali Alexander for 50,000 phone calls to Rusty Bowers â[r]ight the heck nowâ to threaten him with a primary challenge.314

And, as his efforts to change the outcome of the election continued to meet resistance, President Trump personally approved a series of advertisements that the Campaign ran on cable television and social media in several important States. One advertisement in Arizona called for pressure on Governor Ducey in particular, alleging, âThe evidence is overwhelming. Call Governor Ducey and your legislators. Demand they inspect the machines and hear the evidence.ââ315 Another claimed that âillegal aliens voted, and here in Arizona Trump votes were discarded. Itâs an outrage. Call Governor Ducey and your legislators at 602â542â4331. Demand they inspect the machines and hear the evidence. Call Governor Ducey, at 602â542â4331. Stand up for President Trump. Call today. Paid for by Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.ââ316

Several days earlier, Trump Campaign Senior Advisor Jason Miller had explained the intention for this round of advertisements in an email. He wrote that, âthe President and Mayor Giuliani want to get back up on TV ASAP, and Jared [Kushner] has approved in budgetary concept, so hereâs the gameplanâ in order to âmotivate the GOP base to put pressure on the Republican Governors of Georgia and Arizona and the Republican-controlled State legislatures in Wisconsin and Michigan to hear evidence of voter fraud before January 6th.ââ317 Miller anticipated a budget of $5 million and asked for the messaging to follow an earlier round of advertisements, âbut the endings need to be changed to include phone numbers and directions to call the local Governor or state legislature.ââ318 On December 22nd, Jason Miller texted Jared Kushner that âPOTUS has approved the buy.ââ319

References to anger and fighting were featured in some of the Presidentâs remarks during that period. After the Georgia Secretary of Stateâs Chief Operating Officer, Gabriel Sterling, made an impassioned public plea and accurately warned that someone would die as a result of the threatening election-related rhetoric that President Trump failed to condemn, President Trump dismissively tweeted in response: âRigged Election. Show signatures and envelopes. Expose the massive voter fraud in Georgia. What is Secretary of State and @BrianKempGA afraid of. They know what weâll find!!!ââ320 The President also tweeted that, between Governor Ducey in Arizona and Governor Kemp in Georgia, âthe Democrat Party could not be happierâ because these Republicans âfight harder against us than do the Radical Leftâ and were singlehandedly responsible for losing him both States, something that âRepublicans will NEVER forget[.]ââ321 Regarding Kemp, he asked âWhatâs wrong with this guy? What is he hiding?ââ322 and he alleged that âRINOsâ Governor Kemp, Lieutenant Governor Geoff Duncan, and Secretary Raffensperger âwill be solely responsibleâ for Senators Loeffler and Perdue losing their senate runoff because they â[w]onât call a Special Session or check for Signature Verification! People are ANGRY!ââ323

President Trumpâs spoken remarks were not much different. After the President wrapped up a November 26th public phone call to wish U.S. service members a happy Thanksgiving, he answered a reporterâs question about election integrity in Georgia by lashing out at Secretary Raffensperger in particular. President Trump made several baseless claims of election fraud in Georgia, declared that Raffensperger himself appeared to be complicit, and labeled the Georgia Secretary of State âan enemy of the people.ââ324

President Trump and his teamâs practice of naming and viciously criticizing people had real consequences. Philadelphia City Commissioner Al Schmidtâs story, recounted earlier, is just one of many examples. And the consequences werenât just limited to high-profile public figures. Schmidtâs deputy, for example, Seth Bluestein faced threats after being demonized by a surrogate for President Trump, and many of the threats he received were anti-Semitic in nature. He received a Facebook message telling him that âEVERYONE WITH A GUN IS GOING TO BE AT YOUR HOUSE- AMERICANS LOOK AT THE NAME- ANOTHER JEW CAUGHT UP IN UNITED STATES VOTER FRAUD.ââ325 Bluestein got a security detail at his home, and the experience gave his three-year-old daughter nightmares.326

Similarly, after President Trump promoted online accusations that Arizona House Speaker Rusty Bowers had been âintentionally misleading the people of Arizona . . .ââ327 Bowersâs personal cell phone and home address were published,328 leading demonstrators to congregate at his home, honk horns and shout insults until police arrived.329 Bowers told the Select Committee this was the first of at least nine protests at his home, sometimes with protesters shouting into bullhorns and calling him a pedophile.330 One protestor who showed up at his home was armed and believed to be a member of an extremist militia.331

Sadly, those were not isolated incidents. Stories similar to Schmidtâs and Bowersâ proliferated after President Trumpâs loss in the election. Examples from each of the States discussed in this chapter are documented below, but this list is by no means exhaustive:

One of the most striking examples of the terror that President Trump and his allies caused came in Georgia, where election workers Ruby Freeman and Shaye Moss, mother and daughter, were besieged by incessant, terrifying harassment and threats that often evoked racial violence and lynching, instigated and incited by the President of the United States.

As described earlier, in a State legislative hearing in Georgia, Giuliani publiclyâand baselesslyâaccused Freeman and Moss of engaging in criminal conduct. He showed a video of Freeman passing Moss a ginger mint before claiming that the two women, both Black, were smuggling USB drives âas if theyâre vials of heroin or cocaine.ââ366

President Trump seemed fixated on Freeman and Moss, too. He played surveillance video showing them inside the State Farm Arena at a December 5th rally in Georgia,367 and mentioned Freeman by name 18 times during the January 2nd call to Secretary of State Raffensperger in which he asked the Secretary to simply âfindâ enough votes to ensure victory.368

Freemanâs and Mossâs lives were forever changed. After their contact information was published, they were besieged by the Presidentâs supporters. In early December 2020, Freeman âtold police she had received hundreds of threats at her home.ââ369 Mossâs son also started receiving threatening phone calls, including one stating he âshould hang alongside [his] nigger momma.ââ370

In the wake of President Trumpâs December 5, 2020, rally, Freeman called 911 because strangers had come to her home trying to lure her out, sending threatening emails and text messages.371 She pleaded with the 911 dispatcher for help after hearing loud banging on her door just before 10 p.m. âLord Jesus, whereâs the police?â she asked the dispatcher. âI donât know who keeps coming to my door.â âPlease help me!ââ372

Ultimately, Freeman fled from her own home based on advice from the FBI.373 She would not move back for months.374

In her testimony to the Select Committee, Freeman recounted how she had received âhundreds of racist, threatening, horrible calls and messagesâ and that now â[t]here is nowhere I feel safeânowhere.ââ375 But itâs not just a sense of security that the President and his followers took from Freeman. She told the Select Committee that she also lost her name and reputation:

My name is Ruby Freeman. Iâve always believed it when God says that heâll make your name great, but this is not the way it was supposed to be. I could have never imagined the events that followed the Presidential election in 2020. For my entire professional life, I was Lady Ruby. My community in Georgia where I was born and lived my whole life knew me as Lady Ruby . . . . Now I wonât even introduce myself by my name anymore. I get nervous when I bump into someone I know in the grocery store who says my name. Iâm worried about whoâs listening. I get nervous when I have to give my name for food orders. Iâm always concerned of whoâs around me. Iâve lost my name, and Iâve lost my reputation.

Iâve lost my sense of securityâall because a group of people, starting with Number 45 and his ally Rudy Giuliani, decided to scapegoat me and my daughter Shaye to push their own lies about how the presidential election was stolen.376

Freemanâs sense of dread is well-founded. According to Federal prosecutors, a member of the Oath Keepers militia convicted of multiple offenses for his role in the January 6th insurrection had a document in his residence with the words âDEATH LISTâ written across the top.377

His death list contained just two names: Ruby Freeman and Shaye Moss.378

ENDNOTES

Â Â 1. See, e.g., Stephen Fowler, âRisk-Limiting Audit Confirms Biden Won Georgia,â GPB, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://www.gpb.org/news/2020/11/19/risk-limiting-audit-confirms-biden-won-georgia; Addie Haney, âGeorgia Election Recount Results: Breaking Down Final Numbers,â 11Alive, (Dec. 7, 2020), available at https://www.11alive.com/article/news/politics/elections/georgia-election-recount-results-final-numbers/85-cbaacd70-f7e0-40ae-8dfa-3bf18f318645.

Â Â 2. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

Â Â 3. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

Â Â 4. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

Â Â 5. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

Â Â 6. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

Â Â 7. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

Â Â 8. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), at p. 194.

Â Â 9. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Brad Raffensperger, (Nov. 22, 2021), pp. 121-122, 126-27.

Â 10. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), at p. 194.

Â 11. The Georgia Secretary of Stateâs Chief Operating Officer, Gabriel Sterling, gave an impassioned public statement that included these points. âGeorgia Election Official Gabriel Sterling: âSomeoneâs Going to Get Killedâ Transcript,â Rev, (Dec. 1, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/georgia-election-official-gabriel-sterling-someones-going-to-get-killed-transcript. Shortly thereafter, President Trump fired back on Twitter in the form of a quote-tweet of a journalistâs post that included the full footage of these parts of Sterlingâs remarks. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 1, 2020 10:27 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201203173245/https://mobile.twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1333975991518187521 (quoting Brendan Keefe (@BrendanKeefe), Twitter, Dec. 1, 2020 4:22 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/BrendanKeefe/status/1333884246277189633).

Â 12. See Chapter 1.

Â 13. U.S. Const. art. II, Â§1, cl. 2 (âEach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.â).

Â 14. See âCensus Bureau Releases 2020 Presidential Election Voting Report,â United States Census Bureau, (Feb. 17, 2022), available at https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2022/2020-presidential-election-voting-report.html.

Â 15. Barton Gellman, âThe Election That Could Break America,â Atlantic, (Sept. 23, 2020) available at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/11/what-if-trump-refuses-concede/616424/.

Â 16. Barton Gellman, âThe Election That Could Break America,â Atlantic, (Sept. 23, 2020) available at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/11/what-if-trump-refuses-concede/616424/.

Â 17. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 145-46, 148-53, 158; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 96, 98; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 42. Although certain Select Committee witnesses confirmed the existence of this state-focused strategy, none testified that they knew about the strategy before the election.

Â 18. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 145-46.

Â 19. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 145-46.

Â 20. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011213. Donald Trump Jr. publicly urged State legislators to help the same day. He called on Twitter for his father to âgo to total war over this electionâ and retweeted a post by Fox News host Mark Levin urging Republican State legislatures to âGET READY TO DO YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL DUTYâ by exercising âTHE FINAL SAY OVER THE CHOOSING OF ELECTORS.â David Knowles, âAs Vote Count Swings Toward Biden, Trumpâs Backers Hit the Caps-Lock Key on Twitter,â Yahoo! News, (Nov. 5, 2020), available at https://www.yahoo.com/video/as-vote-count-swings-toward-biden-trump-backers-hit-the-caps-lock-on-twitter-223931950.html.

Â 21. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011318 (November 6, 2020, text message from Mark Meadows to Donald J. Trump, Jr.).

Â 22. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011296 (November 5, 2020, text message from Mark Meadows to Marty Harbin).

Â 23. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011686, MM011687 (November 9, 2020, text messages between Mark Meadows and Russell Vought).

Â 24. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011560, MM011563 (November 7, 2020, text messages between Mark Meadows and Rep. Warren Davidson).

Â 25. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011449, MM011451 (November 6, 2020, text messages between Mark Meadows and Rep. Andy Biggs).

Â 26. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011087 (November 4, 2020, text message from Rick Perry to Mark Meadows).

Â 27. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00004070, p. 44; see also Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00003041.

Â 28. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00003543 (November 5, 2020, email from Vincent Haley to Johnny McEntee and Dan Huff re: State legislature plenary power under Constitution to state electoral college electors); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00003559 (November 5, 2020, email from Vincent Haley to Johnny McEntee and Dan Huff re: more notes on state legislature strategy); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010233_0001 (November 6, 2020, email chain between Vincent Haley, Johnny McEntee, and Daniel Huff re: Contact Info of key leaders in key States); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010198_0001 (November 6, 2020, email from Vincent Haley to Johnny McEntee and Daniel Huff re: Horowitz: How Republican-controlled state legislatures can rectify election fraud committed by courts and governors - TheBlaze); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010225_0001-10226_0001 (November 6, 2020, email from Vincent Haley to Johnny McEntee and Daniel Huff re: Contact info of key leaders in key States and attaching contact info); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00004070, 4103-04, 4111-12, 4124-25 (various text messages between Vincent Haley, Johnny McEntee, and Daniel Huff discussing the state legislature plan).

Â 29. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00003009 (November 8, 2020, email chain between Vincent Haley and Newt Gingrich re: More of my exchange with John); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00004103 (November 6, 2020, text message from Vincent Haley to Randy Evans).

Â 30. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00002107 (November 5, 2020, email chain between Vincent Haley, Daniel Huff, and Jonny McEntee re: more notes on the state legislature strategy).

Â 31. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00004103 (November 6, 2020, text message from Vincent Haley to Johnny McEntee).

Â 32. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00004104 (November 6, 2020, text message from Vincent Haley to Johnny McEntee).

Â 33. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010225_0001 - 076P-R000010226_0001 (November 6, 2020, email from Vincent Haley to Johnny McEntee and Daniel Huff re: Contact info of key leaders in key States and attaching contact info); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010233_0001 (November 6, 2020, email chain between Vincent Haley, Johnny McEntee, and Daniel Huff re: Contact Info of key leaders in key States).

Â 34. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010225_0001 - 076P-R000010226_0001 (November 6, 2020, email from Vincent Haley to Johnny McEntee and Daniel Huff re: Contact info of key leaders in key States and attaching contact info).

Â 35. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00004122-VMH-00004123 (November 8, 2020, text messages between Vincent Haley and Johnny McEntee).

Â 36. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010533_0001 (November 10, 2020, email from Newt Gingrich to Molly Michael re: Only two options--please give to POTUS newt).

Â 37. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010533_0001 (November 10, 2020, email from Newt Gingrich to Molly Michael re: Only two options--please give to POTUS newt).

Â 38. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010586_0001 (November 10, 2020, email from Mark Meadows to Newt Gingrich re: Only two options--please give to POTUS newt).

Â 39. Solange Reyner, âNewsmax CEO Ruddy: Trump âVery Concernedâ That Dems Will Steal Election,â Newsmax, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at https://www.newsmax.com/newsmax-tv/chris-ruddy-2020-elections-democrats-white-house/2020/11/04/id/995386/; Christopher Ruddy (@ChrisRuddyNMX), Twitter, Nov. 12, 2020 4:43 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/ChrisRuddyNMX/status/1327004111154319360; âDigest of Other White House Announcements (Administration of Donald J. Trump, 2020),â Government Publishing Office, p. 114, available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-2020DIGEST/pdf/DCPD-2020DIGEST.pdf; Michael M. Grynbaum and John Koblin, âNewsmax, Once a Right-Wing Also-Ran, Is Rising, and Trump Approves,â New York Times, (Nov. 22, 2020), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/22/business/media/newsmax-trump-fox-news.html; Cordelia Lynch, âTrump Ally on Presidentâs Next Move after Thanksgiving Phone Call,â Sky News, (Dec. 4, 2020), available at https://news.sky.com/story/trump-ally-on-presidents-next-move-after-thanksgiving-phone-call-12150612; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000009409_0001 (December 2, 2020, email from John McLaughlin to Molly Michael re: Newsmax National Poll).

Â 40. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM008861-MM008865 (November 7, 2020, email from John McLaughlin to Mark Meadows and Newt Gingrich re: âGerald Brantâs birthday party/ my Nov 7, 2020 memo on ON âELECTORAL L COUNT ACT OF 1887â AND REPUBLICAN PATHWAYS: [sic],â and attaching memo forwarded by Christopher Ruddy).

Â 41. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Cleta Mitchell, (May 18, 2022), pp. 14-15; Jeremy Herb and Sunlen Serfaty, âHow GOP Lawyer Cleta Mitchell Joined Trumpâs âTeam Deplorablesâ Advancing His False Election Fraud Claims,â CNN, (Oct. 13, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/13/politics/trump-mitchell-georgia-election/index.html.

Â 42. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Cleta Mitchell, (May 18, 2022), pp. 74-75.

Â 43. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman006671.

Â 44. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman007670- Chapman007671, Chapman008087 (November 9, 2020, email chain between John Eastman, Lisa Nelson, Rep. Seth Grove, and Cleta Mitchell re: Connections for today! and attaching memo).

Â 45. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production),076P-R000010584_0001 (November 10, 2020, email chain scheduling an external meeting with President Trump).

Â 46. Break Up DC (@BreakItUp3), Twitter, Nov. 11, 2020, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201111104529/https://twitter.com/BreakItUp3/status/1326475581005950976 (âWas in Oval yesterday. You are right.â). For attribution of the account to Warstler, see The RSnake Show, âS01E10 - Morgan Warstler,â YouTube, at 1:43:00 - 1:44:00, Apr. 20, 2022, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k-ojD3QAYfo; Break Up DC (@BreakItUp3), Twitter, June 16, 2022, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20220616124842/https://twitter.com/BreakItUp3/status/1537414050510000128 (âNO it is not. I went to the Oval right after election and spent an hour with Trump sitting at Resolute desk. I explain it all here: https://youtu.be/k-ojD3QAYfo?t=2724 â¦ Hint : the electoral count act is unconstitutional - there is only one slate of electors- whatever the state leg saysâ).

Â 47. Break Up DC (@BreakItUp3), Twitter, June 15, 2022 7:40 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20220615234134/https://twitter.com/BreakItUp3/status/1537218579225268225 (archived) (âShe literally was advocating what I told whole Trump team in Oval- itâs a fact - state legislatures can choose the electors- no matter what current state law OR state courts say .Â .Â . just ratify it amongst themselves Thatâs WHY they call it a plenary power ever since Bush v. Gore.â).

Â 48. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008528_0001 - 076P-R000008530_0001.

Â 49. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008528_0001 - 076P-R000008528_0003, 076P-R000008530_0001 - 076P-R000008530_0002.

Â 50. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008528_0001-076P-R000008528_0003, 076P-R000008530_0001-076P-R000008530_0002.

Â 51. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008531_0001, 076P-R000008257_0001.

Â 52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 151-52.

Â 53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 153. This fits with several major news reports at the time. The New York Times reported that President Trump went into the meeting on the 11th with âsomething he wanted to discuss with his advisors,â and âpress[ed] them on whether Republican legislatures could pick pro-Trump electors in a handful of key states and deliver him the electoral votes he needs.â Maggie Haberman, âTrump Floats Improbable Survival Scenarios as He Ponders His Future,â New York Times, (Nov. 12, 2020, updated Nov. 23, 2020), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/12/us/politics/trump-future.html. Similarly, late on November 11th, the Washington Post reported that President Trump had âraised the idea of pressuring state legislators to pick electors favorable to him,â and the Wall Street Journal also called the option of state legislatures picking new electors âone potential strategyâ discussed by his legal team. Philip Rucker, Josh Dawsey & Ashley Parker, âTrump Insists Heâll Win, But Aides Say He Has No Real Plan to Overturn Results and Talks of 2024 Run,â Washington Post, (Nov. 11, 2020), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-election-results-strategy/2020/11/11/a32e2cba-244a-11eb-952e-0c475972cfc0_story.html; Rebecca Ballhaus, âWhat Is Trumpâs Legal Strategy? Try to Block Certification of Biden Victory in States,â Wall Street Journal, (Nov. 11, 2020), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-is-trumps-legal-strategy-try-to-block-certification-of-biden-victory-in-states-11605138852.

Â 54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 148-49.

Â 55. Senator Mitt Romney (@MittRomney), Twitter, Nov. 19, 2020 10:36 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/MittRomney/status/1329629701447573504.

Â 56. This figure is almost certainly a significant undercount, since it only includes public remarks by President Trump, public testimony, or the most noteworthy interviews conducted by one of his subordinates, but it does not include a review of every single remark targeting State or local officials during this period by those presidential subordinates.

Â 57. This figure is also almost certainly an undercount, since it only includes those posts by President Trumpâs campaign or advisors when they covered new ground that was substantially different from social media posts that were already made by President Trump. Also, many of these posts were replicated across multiple platforms.

Â 58. Jonathan Oosting, âTrump Campaign Lobbies Michigan Lawmakers to Ignore Vote, Give Him Electors,â Bridge Michigan, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-government/trump-campaign-lobbies-michigan-lawmakers-ignore-vote-give-him-electors; MIRS Monday Podcast, âCall to Legislator From Someone Claiming to be with Trump Campaign (12/1/2020),â PodBean, Dec. 1, 2020, available at https://www.podbean.com/media/share/pb-iqskx-f3cfc6; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Angela McCallum Production), McCallum_01_001570, (Undated Basic Script for calls to Representatives/Senators).

Â 59. Paul Bedard, âExclusive: Trump Urges State Legislators to Reject Electoral Votes, âYou Are the Real Power,ââ Washington Examiner, (Jan. 3, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/washington-secrets/exclusive-trump-urges-state-legislators-to-reject-electoral-votes-you-are-the-real-power.

Â 60. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Maricopa County Board of Supervisors Production), CTRL0000020072 (December 24, 2020, copy of voice message and a transcription) pp. 1â2); see also Yvonne Wingett Sanchez and Ronald J. Hansen, ââAsked to Do Something Hugeâ: An Audacious Pitch to Reverse Arizonaâs Election Results,â AZ Central, (Dec. 2, 2021), available at https://www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/18/arizona-audit-rudy-giuliani-failed-effort-replace-electors/6349795001/.

Â 61. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010292_0001 (November 12, 2020, email from Rep. Tim Walberg to Molly Michael).

Â 62. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010292_0001 (November 12, 2020, email from Rep. Tim Walberg to Molly Michael). The day after Representative Walbergâs call with the President, President Trumpâs assistant forwarded to the Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security a letter signed by two other Michigan legislators outlining claims of supposed election fraud. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Department of Homeland Security production), CTRL0000033284, (Nov. 13, 2020 email from Molly Michael to Chad Wolf titled âRe: Michigan Letterâ); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (no production listed, Ex. 44 from Chad Wolf interview), CTRL0000926977 (Nov. 13, 2020 letter to Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson from Michigan State Senators Lana Theis and Tom Barrett).

Â 63. âAdministration of Donald J. Trump, 2020, Digest of Other White House Announcements,â Government Publishing Office, (Dec. 31, 2020), p. 115, available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-2020DIGEST/pdf/DCPD-2020DIGEST.pdf; Annie Grayer, Jeremy Herb & Kevin Liptak, âTrump Courts Michigan GOP Leaders in Bid to Overturn Election He Lost,â CNN, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/19/politics/gop-michigan-results-trump/.

Â 64. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM012007 (text from Kelli Ward to Meadows).

Â 65. Brahm Resnik, ââStop the Countingâ: Records Show Trump and Allies Pressured Top Maricopa County Officials Over Election Results,â 12News, (July 7, 2021), available at https://www.12news.com/article/news/politics/stop-the-counting-records-show-trump-and-allies-pressured-top-maricopa-county-officials-over-election-results/75-61a93e63-36c4-4137-b65e-d3f8bde846a7.

Â 66. Select Committee to Investigation the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview with Clint Hickman, (Nov. 17, 2021); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Maricopa County Board of Supervisors Production), CTRL0000020004.

Â 67. Brian Slodysko, âEXPLAINER: Why AP called Georgia for Biden,â Associated Press, (Nov. 13, 2020), available at https://apnews.com/article/why-ap-called-georgia-for-joe-biden-29c1fb0502efde50fdccb5e2c3611017.

Â 68. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 13, 2020 7:50 p.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1327413534901350400.jpg (archived).

Â 69. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 14, 2020 9:29 a.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1327619653020110850.jpg (archived).

Â 70. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 16, 2020 9:04 a.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1328338211284616193.jpg (archived).

Â 71. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 19, 2020 1:46 p.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1329420741553643522.jpg (archived).

Â 72. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020 1:59 p.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1333410419554344964.jpg (archived).

Â 73. President Donald J. Trump, âTweets of November 30, 2020,â The American Presidency Project, available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/tweets-november-30-2020; see also Fox 10 Staff, âTweet mocking Arizona Gov. Doug Ducey and Georgia Gov. Brian Kemp Now on Billboard,â Fox 10 News, (Dec. 9, 2020), available at https://www.fox10phoenix.com/news/tweet-mocking-arizona-gov-doug-ducey-and-georgia-gov-brian-kemp-now-on-billboard.

Â 74. Miles Bryan, âFrom Obscure To Sold Out: The Story Of Four Seasons Total Landscaping In Just 4 Days,â NPR, (Nov. 11, 2020), available at https://www.npr.org/2020/11/11/933635970/from-obscure-to-sold-out-the-story-of-four-seasons-total-landscaping-in-just-4-d.

Â 75. Matt Friedman, âMan Featured at Giuliani Press Conference is a Convicted Sex Offender,â Politico, (Nov. 9, 2020), available at https://www.politico.com/states/new-jersey/story/2020/11/09/man-featured-at-giuliani-press-conference-is-a-sex-offender-1335241.

Â 76. McKenzie Sadeghi, âFact Check: No Evidence Vote Was Cast in Joe Frazierâs Name,â USA Today, (Nov. 14, 2020), available at https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/2020/11/14/fact-check-no-evidence-late-joe-frazier-voted-2020-election/6283956002/; Ledyard King and John Fritze, âTrump Attorney Rudy Giuliani Says Trump Wonât Concede, Revives Baseless Claims of Voter Fraud,â USA Today, (Nov. 7, 2020) available at https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/11/07/joe-biden-victory-president-trump-claims-election-far-over/6202892002/.

Â 77. Veronica Stracqualursi, âRepublican Election Official in Philadelphia Says Heâs Seen No Evidence of Widespread Fraud,â CNN, (Nov. 11, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/11/politics/philadelphia-city-commissioner-2020-election-cnntv/index.html.

Â 78. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 11, 2020 9:03 a.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1326525851752656898.jpg (archived).

Â 79. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), at 1:47:00 to 1:48:00, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pr5QUInmGI8.

Â 80. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), at 1:47:00 to 1:48:00, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pr5QUInmGI8.

Â 81. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), at 1:47:00 to 1:48:00, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pr5QUInmGI8.

Â 82. See McQuade v. Furgason, 91 Mich. 438 (1892). The various Boards of Canvassers in Michigan know that the certification process is clerical because they are so instructed in the official âMichigan Boards of County Canvassers Manual.â See âProcedures and Duties of the Boards of County Canvassers,â State of Michigan, (July 2022), pp. 18-19, available at https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/02lehman/BCC_Manual.pdf?rev=7270a5ddcefa465b8ab8b95930ef5890.

Â 83. âMinutes of Meeting Wayne County Board of Canvassers,â Wayne County Board of Canvassers, (Nov. 17, 2020), p. 1, available at https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/clerk/board-of-canvassers.aspx.

Â 84. âMinutes of Meeting Wayne County Board of Canvassers,â Wayne County Board of Canvassers, (Nov. 17, 2020), pp. 1-5, available at https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/clerk/board-of-canvassers.aspx.

Â 85. âMinutes of Meeting Wayne County Board of Canvassers,â Wayne County Board of Canvassers, (Nov. 17, 2020), p. 5, available at https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/clerk/board-of-canvassers.aspx.

Â 86. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Monica Palmer, (Sept. 28, 2021); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ronna Romney McDaniel, (Mar. 9, 2022); Phone records for Monica Palmer show calls from Ronna McDaniel at 9:53 PM and 10:04 PM. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Verizon Production, Feb. 9, 2022).

Â 87. Annie Grayer, Jeremy Herb, and Kevin Liptak, âTrump Courts Michigan GOP Leaders in Bid to Overturn Election He Lost,â CNN, (Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/19/politics/gop-michigan-results-trump/.

Â 88. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Monica Palmer, (Sept. 28, 2021). Palmer told the Select Committee that she could not recall the exact words that President Trump used on the call, and she claimed that she could not even recall whether the President raised issues related to the election.

Â 89. Kendall Karson, Katherine Faulders, and Will Steakin, âRepublican Canvassers Ask to âRescindâ Their Votes Certifying Michigan Election Results,â ABC News, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://abcnews.go.com/US/wayne-county-republican-canvassers-rescind-votes-certifying-election/story?id=74290114; Krystle Holleman and Spencer Soicher, âPair of Wayne Co. Board of Canvassers Members File Affidavits to Rescind Certification of Election Results,â WILX10, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://www.wilx.com/2020/11/19/pair-of-wayne-county-board-of-canvassers-members-file-affidavits-to-rescind-certification-of-election-results/; Paul Egan, âGOP Members of Wayne County Board of Canvassers Say They Want to Rescind Votes to Certify,â Detroit Free Press, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/11/19/wayne-county-board-of-canvassers-monica-palmer-william-hartmann/3775242001/.

Â 90. Kendall Karson, Katherine Faulders, and Will Steakin, âRepublican Canvassers Ask to âRescindâ Their Votes Certifying Michigan Election Results,â ABC News, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://abcnews.go.com/US/wayne-county-republican-canvassers-rescind-votes-certifying-election/story?id=74290114; Krystle Holleman and Spencer Soicher, âPair of Wayne Co. Board of Canvassers Members File Affidavits to Rescind Certification of Election Results,â WILX10, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://www.wilx.com/2020/11/19/pair-of-wayne-county-board-of-canvassers-members-file-affidavits-to-rescind-certification-of-election-results/; Paul Egan, âGOP Members of Wayne County Board of Canvassers Say They Want to Rescind Votes to Certify,â Detroit Free Press, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/11/19/wayne-county-board-of-canvassers-monica-palmer-william-hartmann/3775242001/.

Â 91. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 18, 2020 10:38 a.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1329086548093014022.jpg (archived).

Â 92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jack Sellers and Bill Gates, (Oct. 6, 2021).

Â 93. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jack Sellers and Bill Gates, (Oct. 6, 2021).

Â 94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jack Sellers and Bill Gates, (Oct. 6, 2021).

Â 95. Jonathan J. Cooper, âArizona Governor Silences Trumpâs Call, Certifies Election,â Associated Press, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-donald-trump-arizona-elections-doug-ducey-e2b8b0de5b809efcc9b1ad5d279023f4.

Â 96. Jonathan J. Cooper, âArizona Governor Silences Trumpâs Call, Certifies Election,â Associated Press, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-donald-trump-arizona-elections-doug-ducey-e2b8b0de5b809efcc9b1ad5d279023f4.

Â 97. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020 3:39 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201201024920mp_/https:/twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1333556242984431616 (archived).

Â 98. President Donald J. Trump, âTweets of November 30, 2020,â The American Presidency Project, available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/tweets-november-30-2020; âTweet Mocking Arizona Gov. Doug Ducey and Georgia Gov. Brian Kemp Now on Billboard,â Fox 10 News, (Dec. 9, 2020), available at https://www.fox10phoenix.com/news/tweet-mocking-arizona-gov-doug-ducey-and-georgia-gov-brian-kemp-now-on-billboard.

Â 99. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020 3:40 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201201022358/https:/twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1333556458575818754 (archived).

100. Doug Ducey (@DougDucey), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020 9:48 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/dougducey/status/1333603735855976450.

101. Doug Ducey (@DougDucey), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020 9:48 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/dougducey/status/1333603735855976450.

102. Doug Ducey (@DougDucey), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020 9:48 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/dougducey/status/1333603735855976450.

103. âPennsylvania, Arizona, Michigan Legislatures to Hold Public Hearings on 2020 Election,â Donald J. Trump for President, (Nov. 24, 2020), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201130045430/https:/www.donaldjtrump.com/media/pennsylvania-arizona-michigan-legislatures-to-hold-public-hearings-on-2020-election/.

104. âDonald Trump Remarks Transcript: Pennsylvania Republican Hearing on 2020 Election,â Rev, (Nov. 25, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-remarks-transcript-pennsylvania-republican-hearing-on-2020-election.

105. Teresa Boeckel and J.D. Prose, âPa. GOP Lawmakers Host Giuliani to Hear Election Concerns. Trump Visits Via Cell Phone,â York Daily Record, (Nov. 25, 2020), available at https://www.ydr.com/story/news/politics/2020/11/25/pa-gop-lawmakers-host-rudy-giuliani-hear-election-concerns/6420319002/.

106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).

107. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008474_0001 (November 25, 2020, email from Jared Small confirming that Trump will not be present in Gettysburg); Philip Rucker, Ashley Parker, Josh Dawsey, and Amy Gardner, â20 Days of Fantasy and Failure: Inside Trumpâs Quest to Overturn the Election,â Washington Post, (Nov. 28, 2020), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-election-overturn/2020/11/28/34f45226-2f47-11eb-96c2-aac3f162215d_story.html; Alayna Treene and Rebecca Falconer, âTrump Cancels Pennsylvania Trip for GOP Hearing on Voter Fraud Claims,â Axios, (Nov. 25, 2020) available at https://www.axios.com/2020/11/25/trump-pennsylvania-gop-hearing-voter-fraud-claims. Apparently, White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows also contemplated going to Pennsylvania for the hearing when the President couldnât attend. Text messages between Cassidy Hutchinson and Meadowsâs Secret Service detail say, âU heard how mark is motorcading to gburg right[,] and potus isnât anymore.â Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Cassidy Hutchinson production), CH-CTRL0000000080 (Nov. 25, 2020).

108. âDonald Trump Remarks Transcript: Pennsylvania Republican Hearing on 2020 Election,â Rev, (Nov. 25, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-remarks-transcript-pennsylvania-republican-hearing-on-2020-election.

109. âPennsylvania Senate Republican Lawmaker Hearing Transcript on 2020 Election,â Rev, (Nov. 26, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/pennsylvania-senate-republican-lawmaker-hearing-transcript-on-2020-election.

110. âPennsylvania Senate Republican Lawmaker Hearing Transcript on 2020 Election,â Rev, (Nov. 26, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/pennsylvania-senate-republican-lawmaker-hearing-transcript-on-2020-election.

111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 65â66; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Molly Michael, (Mar. 24, 2022), pp. 59â60, 62; âAdministration of Donald J. Trump, 2020, Digest of Other White House Announcements,â Government Publishing Office, (Dec. 31, 2020), p. 116, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-2020DIGEST/pdf/DCPD-2020DIGEST.pdf.

112. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Cassidy Hutchinson production), CH-CTRL0000000062 (Nov. 25, 2020, Cassidy Hutchinsonâs text messages with Bernie Kerik).

113. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Cassidy Hutchinson production), CH-CTRL0000000062 (Nov. 25, 2020, Cassidy Hutchinsonâs text messages with Bernie Kerik).

114. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson (Mar. 7, 2022), pp. 87, 91-92.

115. Howard Fischer, âGOP Officials Still Fighting Arizonaâs Vote Tally on Very Day Bidenâs Win Will Be Certified,â Tuscon.com, (Nov. 30, 2020), available at https://tucson.com/news/local/gop-officials-still-fighting-arizonas-vote-tally-on-very-day-bidens-win-will-be-certified/article_021fbb5c-673f-549a-9cbb-900178c17079.html.

116. Howard Fischer, âGOP Officials Still Fighting Arizonaâs Vote Tally on Very Day Bidenâs Win Will Be Certified,â Tuscon.com, (Nov. 30, 2020), available at https://tucson.com/news/local/gop-officials-still-fighting-arizonas-vote-tally-on-very-day-bidens-win-will-be-certified/article_021fbb5c-673f-549a-9cbb-900178c17079.html.

117. Right Side Broadcasting Network, âLIVE: Arizona State Legislature Holds Public Hearing on 2020 Election,â YouTube, at 2:08:56, Nov. 30, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rri6flxaXww&t=7738s.

118. Right Side Broadcasting Network, âLIVE: Arizona State Legislature Holds Public Hearing on 2020 Election,â YouTube, at 1:21:02, Nov. 30, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rri6flxaXww&t=4862s.

119. Jenna Ellis (@JennaEllisEsq), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020 3:04 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/jennaellisesq/status/1333502306176835588.

120. âRemarks: Donald Trump Calls in to Meeting of Arizona GOP Lawmakers on Election,â Factbase, (Nov. 30, 2020), available at https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-remarks-arizona-gop-meeting-election-november-30-2020.

121. Rudy Giuliani (@RudyGiuliani), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020 11;17 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1333626364805533696.

122. âPennsylvania, Arizona, Michigan Legislatures to Hold Public Hearings on 2020 Election,â Donald J. Trump, (Nov. 24, 2020), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201130045430/https:/www.donaldjtrump.com/media/pennsylvania-arizona-michigan-legislatures-to-hold-public-hearings-on-2020-election/; Jonathan Oosting (@jonathanoosting), Twitter, Nov. 24, 2020 5:35 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/jonathanoosting/status/1331365885123178499; Jonathan Oosting (@jonathanoosting), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020 3:42 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/jonathanoosting/status/1333511772448370689.

123. See âReport on the November 2020 Election in Michigan,â Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, (June 21, 2020), available at https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf.

124. Wood TV8, âGiuliani and Laura Cox Hold âLegal Briefingâ Before Giving Testimony Wednesday Evening,â Facebook Watch, at 10:30-10:45, Dec. 2, 2020, available at https://www.facebook.com/woodtv/videos/rudy-giuliani-and-laura-cox-hold-legal-briefing-before-giving-testimony-wednesda/1996033023872394/.

125. Wood TV8, âGiuliani and Laura Cox Hold âLegal Briefingâ Before Giving Testimony Wednesday Evening,â Facebook Watch, at 13:05-13:20, Dec. 2, 2020, available at https://www.facebook.com/woodtv/videos/rudy-giuliani-and-laura-cox-hold-legal-briefing-before-giving-testimony-wednesda/1996033023872394/.

126. Michigan House Oversight Committee, Public Hearing, (Dec. 12, 2020), at 4:03:13-4:04:22, 4:05:59-4:07:09, available at https://www.rev.com/tc-editor/shared/QQodU0TgHNW4ACZmBtqq6EbotJVTGos3UifEuLQA8ygjV7GrDDAeGJ6hdps86h_ywJAatI_KepUqEeZnloKHBiByyMI.

127. Edward-Isaac Dovere (@IsaacDovere), Twitter, Dec. 3, 2020 7:56 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/IsaacDovere/status/1334481562193317888.

128. Michigan House Oversight Committee, Public Hearing, (Dec. 12, 2020), at 4:09:04, available at https://www.rev.com/tc-editor/shared/QQodU0TgHNW4ACZmBtqq6EbotJVTGos3UifEuLQA8ygjV7GrDDAeGJ6hdps86h_ywJAatI_KepUqEeZnloKHBiByyMI.

129. Michigan House Oversight Committee, Public Hearing, (Dec. 12, 2020), at 4:35:15, available at https://www.rev.com/tc-editor/shared/QQodU0TgHNW4ACZmBtqq6EbotJVTGos3UifEuLQA8ygjV7GrDDAeGJ6hdps86h_ywJAatI_KepUqEeZnloKHBiByyMI.

130. 11Alive, âSecond Georgia Senate Election Hearing,â YouTube, at 1:56:30 to 1:57:15, 5:29:20-5:32:45, Dec. 3, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRCXUNOwOjw.

131. GA House Mobile Streaming, âGovernmental Affairs 12.10.20,â Vimeo â Livestream, at 1:51:55-1:52:55, available at https://livestream.com/accounts/25225474/events/9117221/videos/214677184.

132. Global TV Online, â#LIVE: Georgia State Senate Holds Meeting on 2020 Electionâ¦,â YouTube, at 3:08:00 to 3:09:30, 3:20:15 to 3:21:2, Dec. 30, 2020, available at https://youtu.be/D5c034r0RlU?t=12016.

133. 11Alive, âSecond Georgia Senate Election Hearing,â YouTube, at 0:33:30-0:58:00, December 3, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRCXUNOwOjw.

134. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Byung J. Pak, (May 19, 2022), pp. 10-23; United States Senate Judiciary Committee, Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (August 7, 2021), pp. 30-31, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/rosen-transcript-final; Declaration of Frances Watson at 1-3, Pearson v. Kemp, No. 1:20-cv-04809 (N.D. Ga., Dec. 6, 2020), ECF No. 72-1, available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20420664-frances-watson-affidavit; Response of the Georgia Secretary of State to the Courtâs Order of September 20, 2021 at 5-7, 41-47, 53, 55, Favorito v. Wan, No. 2020CV343938 (Fulton County Sup. Ct., Ga., October 12, 2021), available at https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21084096/favorito-sos-brief-in-response-to-order-of-92021-with-exs-a-and-b.pdf; William P. Barr, One Damn Thing After Another: Memoirs of an Attorney General (Harper Collins, 2022), at pp. 541-42; âGeorgia Election Officials Briefing Transcript December 7: Will Recertify Election Results Today,â Rev, (December 7, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/georgia-election-officials-briefing-transcript-december-7-will-recertify-election-results-today.

135. 11Alive, âSecond Georgia Senate Election Hearing,â YouTube, at 5:31:50-5:32:10, Dec. 3, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRCXUNOwOjw.

136. GA House Mobile Streaming, âGovernmental Affairs 12.10.20,â Vimeo â Livestream, at 2:09:00-2:13:00, available at https://livestream.com/accounts/25225474/events/9117221/videos/214677184.

137. GA House Mobile Streaming, âGovernmental Affairs 12.10.20,â Vimeo â Livestream, at 2:09:00-2:13:00, available at https://livestream.com/accounts/25225474/events/9117221/videos/214677184.

138. Mike Wilkinson, âThe Rudy Giuliani âCircusâ Has Left Lansing. The Reviews Are Bad,â Bridge Michigan, (Dec. 3, 2020), available at https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-government/rudy-giuliani-circus-has-left-lansing-reviews-are-bad.

139. Mike Wilkinson, âThe Rudy Giuliani âCircusâ Has Left Lansing. The Reviews Are Bad,â Bridge Michigan, (Dec. 3, 2020), available at https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-government/rudy-giuliani-circus-has-left-lansing-reviews-are-bad.

140. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 6, 2020 6:01 a.m. ET, https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1335464302766149632.jpg (archived).

141. In the Matter of Rudolph W. Giuliani, No. 2021-00506, slip op at *2, 32 (N.Y. App. Div. May 3, 2021), available at https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/giuliani-law-license-suspension/1ae5ad6007c0ebfa/full.pdf.

142. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Angela McCallum Production), McCallum_01_001501 (November 30, 2021, Michael Brown text message to group at 2:47 a.m.).

143. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Angela McCallum Production), McCallum_01_001501 (November 30, 2021, Michael Brown text message to group at 2:47 a.m.).

144. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Angela McCallum Production), McCallum_01_001528 - 1564 (Trump Campaign spreadsheet).

145. Mirs Monday Podcast, âCall to Legislator from Someone Claiming to Be With Trump Campaign (12/1/20),â Podbean.com, at 0:08, (Dec. 1, 2020), available at https://www.podbean.com/media/share/pb-iqskx-f3cfc6.

146. Mirs Monday Podcast, âCall to Legislator from Someone Claiming to Be With Trump Campaign (12/1/20),â Podbean.com, at 1:32, (Dec. 1, 2020), available at https://www.podbean.com/media/share/pb-iqskx-f3cfc6.

147. Jonathan Oosting, âTrump Campaign Lobbies Michigan Lawmakers to Ignore Vote, Give Him Electors,â Bridge Michigan, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-government/trump-campaign-lobbies-michigan-lawmakers-ignore-vote-give-him-electors.

148. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Angela McCallum production), McCallum_01_001523 (text messages with Michael Brown).

149. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Angela McCallum production), McCallum_01_001523 (text messages with Michael Brown).

150. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), pp. 8-10; Senator Mike Shirkey (@SenMikeShirkey), Twitter, Nov. 20, 2020 6:13 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/SenMikeShirkey/status/1329925843053899780.

151. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 10.

152. âAdministration of Donald J. Trump, 2020, Digest of Other White House Announcements,â Government Publishing Office, (December 31, 2020), p. 115, available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-2020DIGEST/pdf/DCPD-2020DIGEST.pdf.

153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 16.

154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), pp. 16-18.

155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), pp. 21-22.

156. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 22.

157. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Lee Chatfield (Oct. 15, 2021). Leader Shirkey did not remember any specific âaskâ from the President during the Oval Office meeting. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 16 (âOne thing I do remember is that he never, ever, to the best of my recollection, ever made a specific ask. It was always just general topics[.]â).

158. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Lee Chatfield (Oct. 15, 2021).

159. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 57.

160. âLegislative Leaders Meet with President Trump,â State Senator Mike Shirkey, (Nov. 20, 2020), available at https://www.senatormikeshirkey.com/legislative-leaders-meet-with-president-trump/.

161. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Lee Chatfield, (Oct. 15, 2021).

162. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Lee Chatfield, (Oct. 15, 2021).

163. Team Trump (Text TRUMP to 88022) (@TeamTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 9:00 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20210103170109/https://twitter.com/TeamTrump/status/1345776940196659201 (archived).

164. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 52; Aaron Parseghian, âFormer Michigan Resident Slammed with Calls after Trump Campaign Mistakenly Posts Number on Social Media,â Fox 17 West Michigan, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://www.fox17online.com/news/politics/former-michigan-resident-slammed-with-calls-after-trump-campaign-mistakenly-posts-number-on-social-media.

165. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM012414 (text to Rep. Scott Perry from Meadows).

166. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM012445 (text to Meadows from Rep. Scott Perry).

167. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022); Jake Corman and Kerry Benninghoff, âPa. Lawmakers Have No Role to Play in Deciding Presidential Election,â Centre Daily Times, (Oct. 19, 2020), available at https://www.centredaily.com/opinion/article246527648.html.

168. Barton Gellman, âThe Election That Could Break America,â The Atlantic, (Sept. 23, 2020), available at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/11/what-if-trump-refuses-concede/616424/; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022); see Jake Corman, âPa. Lawmakers Have No Role to Play in Deciding Presidential Election,â Centre Daily Times, (Oct. 19, 2020) available at https://www.centredaily.com/opinion/article246527648.html. Senator Corman and other Pennsylvania lawmakers sent a letter to Congress in January that mentioned ânumerous unlawful violationsâ of State law and asked that Congress âdelay certification of the electoral college.â Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000002160_00001. In his informal interview with the Select Committee, however, Senator Corman acknowledged that he signed the letter due to pressure he was receiving after the election, but explained that he believed fraud and these types of issues should be adjudicated in the courtroom, not the legislature, and, in any event, he said that he was never presented with credible evidence of voter fraud. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).

169. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).

170. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).

171. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).

172. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).

173. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).

174. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).

175. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).

176. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).

177. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).

178. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Bryan Cutler Production), B_CUTLER_0000131-0000134 (Giuliani and Ellis voicemails).

179. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), p. 21.

180. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), p. 21.

181. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Bryan Cutler Production), B_CUTLER_0000131 (Giuliani and Ellis voicemail).

182. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Bryan Cutler Production), B_CUTLER_0000132 (Jenna Ellis voicemail).

183. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Bryan Cutler Production), B_CUTLER_0000133 (Giuliani voicemail).

184. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Bryan Cutler Production), B_CUTLER_0000134 (Giuliani voicemail).

185. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), pp. 42-44, 46-47. The New York Times reported that Speaker Cutler spoke with President Trump twice by phone, Cutler told the Select Committee that this claim was incorrect and that he only spoke with the President by phone once, followed by their second conversation on December 3rd, which was in person. See Trip Gabriel, âTrump Asked Pennsylvania House Speaker about Overturning His Loss,â New York Times, (Dec. 8, 2020), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/08/us/politics/trump-pennsylvania-house-speaker.html; see also Amy Gardner, Josh Dawsey and Rachael Bade, âTrump Asks Pennsylvania House Speaker for Help Overturning Election Results, Personally Intervening in a Third State,â Washington Post, (Dec. 8, 2020), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-pennsylvania-speaker-call/2020/12/07/d65fe8c4-38bf-11eb-98c4-25dc9f4987e8_story.html.

186. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), pp. 43-44.

187. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), pp. 26-27, 44.

188. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), pp. 49-57; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).

189. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), p. 50.

190. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), pp. 50-55.

191. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), pp. 54-55.

192. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), pp. 56-57.

193. âStatement on Election Reform,â Pennsylvania Senate GOP (Dec 3, 2020, accessed July 14, 2022), available at https://www.pasenategop.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/election-reform-120320.pdf.

194. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 6, 2020 12:56 a.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1335463148137164802.jpg (archived).

195. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 8, 2020 2:51 p.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1336322408970559495.jpg (archived); âLetter to Pennsylvaniaâs Congressional Delegation,â Pennsylvania State GOP, (Dec. 4, 2020, last accessed July 14, 2022), available at http://www.pahousegop.com/Display/SiteFiles/1/2020/120420CongressElection2020B.pdf.

196. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), pp. 60-61.

197. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), p. 61.

198. Trip Gabriel, âEven in Defeat, Trump Tightens Grip on State G.O.P. Lawmakers,â New York Times, (Dec. 9, 2020), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/09/us/politics/trump-pennsylvania-electoral-college.html.

199. Trip Gabriel, âEven in Defeat, Trump Tightens Grip on State G.O.P. Lawmakers,â New York Times, (Dec. 9, 2020), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/09/us/politics/trump-pennsylvania-electoral-college.html.

200. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 41:30-46:35, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og; Yvonne Wingett Sanchez and Ronald J. Hansen, âWhite House Phone Calls, Baseless Fraud Charges: The Origins of the Arizona Election Review,â AZ Central, (Nov. 17, 2021), available at https://www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/17/arizona-audit-trump-allies-pushed-to-undermine-2020-election/6045151001/.

201. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 41:30-46:35, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og; Yvonne Wingett Sanchez and Ronald J. Hansen, âWhite House Phone Calls, Baseless Fraud Charges: The Origins of the Arizona Election Review,â AZ Central, (Nov. 17, 2021), available at https://www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/17/arizona-audit-trump-allies-pushed-to-undermine-2020-election/6045151001/.

202. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 41:30-46:35, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og; Yvonne Wingett Sanchez and Ronald J. Hansen, âWhite House Phone Calls, Baseless Fraud Charges: The Origins of the Arizona Election Review,â AZ Central, (Nov. 17, 2021), available at https://www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/17/arizona-audit-trump-allies-pushed-to-undermine-2020-election/6045151001/.

203. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 41:30-46:35, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og; Yvonne Wingett Sanchez and Ronald J. Hansen, âWhite House Phone Calls, Baseless Fraud Charges: The Origins of the Arizona Election Review,â AZ Central, (Nov. 17, 2021), available at https://www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/17/arizona-audit-trump-allies-pushed-to-undermine-2020-election/6045151001/.

204. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 41:30-46:35, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.

205. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 41:30-46:35, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.

206. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 41:30-46:35, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og. In his testimony to the Select Committee, Speaker Bowers said this appeal to party loyalty occurred in that call or in a later meeting, and that the President brought it up âmore than once.â

207. Dillon Rosenblatt and Julia Shumway, âGiuliani COVID-19 Diagnosis Closes Arizona Legislature,â Arizona Capitol Times, (Dec. 6, 2020), available at https://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2020/12/06/giuliani-covid-19-diagnosis-closes-arizona-legislature/; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Arizona House Speaker Rusty Bowers, (Nov. 17, 2021); Vince Leach (@VinceLeach), Twitter, Dec. 1, 2020 11:28 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/VinceLeach/status/1333991317500727298. Speaker Bowers told the Committee that Giuliani and Ellis were accompanied by Katherine Friess, J. Philip Waldron, Bernard Kerik, and others. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Arizona House Speaker Rusty Bowers, (Nov. 17, 2021).

208. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 58-59; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jenna Ellis, (Mar. 8, 2022), pp. 50-51.

209. âSelect Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Russel âRustyâ Bowers, (June 19, 2022), pp. 35-36; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Arizona House Speaker Rusty Bowers, (Nov. 17, 2021); âSpeaker Bowers Addresses Calls for the Legislature to Overturn 2020 Certified Election Results,â Arizona State Legislature, (Dec. 4, 2020), available at https://www.azleg.gov/press/house/54LEG/2R/201204STATEMENT.pdf.

210. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 53:00-53:40, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.

211. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 53:00-53:40, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.

212. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 53:00-53:40, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.

213. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 53:00-53:40, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.

214. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 56:00-59:50, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Russell Bowers, (June 19, 2022), pp. 39-41.

215. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 56:00-59:50, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.

216. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 56:00-59:50, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.

217. âTrump Allies Leave Voicemail Messages for Maricopa County Supervisors,â AZ Central, (July 2, 2021), available at https://www.azcentral.com/videos/news/politics/elections/2021/07/02/trump-allies-left-voicemail-messages-maricopa-county-supervisors-election-and-contested-results/7837919002/.

218. âTrump Allies Leave Voicemail Messages for Maricopa County Supervisors,â AZ Central, (July 2, 2021), available at https://www.azcentral.com/videos/news/politics/elections/2021/07/02/trump-allies-left-voicemail-messages-maricopa-county-supervisors-election-and-contested-results/7837919002/.

219. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Clint Hickman, (Nov. 17, 2021); see also Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, ââWe Need You to Stop the Countingâ: Records Detail Intense Efforts by Trump Allies to Pressure Maricopa County Supervisors,â AZ Central (July 2, 2021), available at https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2021/07/02/records-show-trump-allies-kelli-ward-rudy-giuliani-pressed-county-officials-over-election-results/7813304002/.

220. Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, ââFighting for Democracy Hereâ: Election Audit Pits Maricopa County Republicans vs. Arizona GOP,â AZ Central, (May 23, 2021) available at https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2021/05/23/election-audit-pits-maricopa-county-republicans-against-arizona-gop-senators/5186141001/; see also âTrump allies leave voicemail messages for Maricopa County supervisors,â AZ Central, (July 2, 2021), available at https://www.azcentral.com/videos/news/politics/elections/2021/07/02/trump-allies-left-voicemail-messages-maricopa-county-supervisors-election-and-contested-results/7837919002/.

221. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Maricopa County Board of Supervisors Production), CTRL0000020072, pp. 1-2 (December 24, 2020, copy of voice message and a transcription); see also Yvonne Wingett Sanchez and Ronald J. Hansen, ââAsked to Do Something Hugeâ: An Audacious Pitch to Reverse Arizonaâs Election Results,â AZ Central, (Dec. 2, 2021), available at https://www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/18/arizona-audit-rudy-giuliani-failed-effort-replace-electors/6349795001/.

222. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jack Sellers and Bill Gates, (Oct. 6, 2021).

223. Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, ââWe Need You to Stop the Countingâ: Records Detail Intense Efforts by Trump Allies to Pressure Maricopa County Supervisors,â AZ Central, (July 2, 2021), available at https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2021/07/02/records-show-trump-allies-kelli-ward-rudy-giuliani-pressed-county-officials-over-election-results/7813304002/.

224. Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, ââWe Need You to Stop the Countingâ: Records Detail Intense Efforts by Trump Allies to Pressure Maricopa County Supervisors,â AZ Central, (July 2, 2021), available at https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2021/07/02/records-show-trump-allies-kelli-ward-rudy-giuliani-pressed-county-officials-over-election-results/7813304002/.

225. Document on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Bill Stepien Production), WS00104-105 (December 5, 2021, email from Joshua Findlay to Matthew Morgan, Justin Clark, and Bill Stepien at 11:44 p.m.).

226. Brian Kemp (@BrianKempGA), Twitter, Dec. 5, 2020 12:44 p.m., available at https://twitter.com/briankempga/status/1335278871630008324.

227. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 5, 2020 9:35 p.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1335336916582084614.jpg (archived). As detailed later in this report, the call for special sessions of legislatures in various States, including Georgia, never gained traction and, when all else failed, became a focus for two Department of Justice lawyers.

228. Office of Governor Brian P. Kemp, âGov. Kemp, Lt. Gov. Duncan Issue Statement on Request for Special Session of General Assembly,â MadMimi.com, (Dec. 6, 2020), available at https://madmimi.com/p/50e7a11?pact=1301484-161142215-11561983238-b09ac0db7ff3f3c8bd594d6a33e7f63d0cf4c135.

229. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 8, 2020 3:07 p.m., available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201208200907/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1336401919422640128 (archived) (retweeting Lin Wood (@LLinWood), Twitter, Dec. 8, 2020, 11:22 a.m., available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201208200908/https://twitter.com/LLinWood/status/1336390712380813313 (archived)).

230. Brett Samuels, âTrump Retweets Lawyer Who Said Republican Officials in Georgia Are âGoing to Jailâ,â The Hill, (Dec. 15, 2020), available at https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/530250-trump-retweets-lawyer-who-says-republican-officials-in-georgia-are-going-to/.

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233. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 7, 2020 1:29 p.m. ET, available at https://factba.se/biden/topic/twitter?q=burtjonesforga&f= (archived); Rudy W. Giuliani (@RudyGiuliani), Twitter, Dec. 7, 2020 12:25 p.m., available at https://twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1335998988101804035.

234. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007693_00001.

235. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007693_00001.

236. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007693_00001.

237. David Wickert and Greg Bluestein, âInside the Campaign to Undermine Georgiaâs Election (Part I),â Atlanta Journal-Constitution, (Dec. 30, 2021), available at https://www.ajc.com/politics/election/georgia-2020-election-what-happened/.

238. Shepherdâs Sling, âSteven K. Bannon - War Room Pandemic - Ep. #568/569 (Full 2hrs Podcast),â BitChute, at 16:50 - 18:00, Dec. 8, 2020, available at https://www.bitchute.com/video/KyK4QPP7Ngyt/; John Fredericks (@jfradioshow), Twitter, Dec. 7, 2020 5:30 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/jfradioshow/status/1336075668090654724; Jim Hoft, âDeveloping: President Trump Speaks with Georgia House Speaker David Ralston and Speaker Pro-Tem Jan Jones on Endorsing Special Session,â Gateway Pundit, (Dec. 7, 2020), available at https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2020/12/developing-president-trump-speaks-georgia-house-speaker-david-ralston-speaker-pro-tem-jan-jones-endorsing-special-session/.

239. FYNTV FetchYourNews, â#BKP Has a Live Call-In with David Ralston,â YouTube, at 2:30 - 3:12 (Dec. 8, 2020), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201224164814/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZdN5vNOl6F4&gl=US&hl=en (archived); Julie Carr, âGeorgia Speaker of the House David Ralston Joins BKP Politics to Discuss His Call with President Trump and a Legal Path Forward,â Tennessee Star, (Dec. 20, 2020), available at https://tennesseestar.com/2020/12/20/georgia-speaker-of-the-house-david-ralston-joins-bkp-politics-to-discuss-his-call-with-president-trump-and-a-legal-path-forward/.

240. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Mar. 7, 2022), pp. 162-67.

241. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Georgia Secretary of State Production), GA SOS ORR (21-344) 005651(Dec. 23, 2020 call between President Trump and Frances Watson); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Informal Interview with Frances Watson (Dec. 15, 2021); see also âGeorgia Secretary of State Recording of Trump Phone Call to Election Investigator,â American Oversight (Mar. 10, 2021), available at https://www.americanoversight.org/document/georgia-secretary-of-state-recording-of-trump-phone-call-to-election-investigator.

242. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014152 (December 27, 2020 text message at 5:18 p.m. from Mark Meadows to Jordan Fuchs).

243. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014153 (December 27, 2020 text message at 5:20 p.m. from Jordan Fuchs to Mark Meadows).

244. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM012317 (November 19, 2020 text message at 9:56 a.m. from Mark Meadows to Brad Raffensperger).

245. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM013362.

246. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM013632-33; see also Newsmax (@newsmax), Twitter, Dec. 11, 2020 9:45 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/newsmax/status/1337589238078922752.

247. Philip Rucker, Ashley Parker, Josh Dawsey, and Seung Min Kim, âTrump Sabotaging GOP on His Way Out of Office with Push to Overturn Election,â Washington Post, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-sabotage-republicans/2021/01/04/df5d301e-4eb1-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

248. âGeorgia Sec. of State Discusses Phone Call with Trump About Election Results,â Good Morning America, at 1:40 to 2:20, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://www.goodmorningamerica.com/news/video/georgia-sec-state-discusses-phone-call-trump-election-75032599.

249. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

250. Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

251. Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

252. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html (the Washington Post redacted Freemanâs name and instead used â[name]â in the transcript); âDonald Trump Georgia Phone Call Transcript with Sec. of State Brad Raffensperger: Says He Wants to âFindâ Votes,â Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-georgia-phone-call-transcript-brad-raffensperger-recording.

253. Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

254. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 8:57 a.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1345731043861659650.jpg (archived). The archived image is in universal time.

255. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 8:29 a.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1345723944654024706.jpg, (archived).

256. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

257. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 117-32; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000698 â 000702 (Draft letter written by Jeffrey Clark).

258. âSenate Committee to Discuss Election Issues in Pennsylvania,â Pennsylvania Senate GOP website (Nov. 24, 2020, last accessed on July 15, 2022), available at https://www.pasenategop.com/blog/senate-committee-to-discuss-election-issues-in-pennsylvania/; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 65-66. https://www.pasenategop.com/blog/senate-committee-to-discuss-election-issues-in-pennsylvania/.

259. Jeremy Roebuck and Andrew Seidman, âPa. GOP lawmaker Doug Mastriano says he left the Capitol area before the riot. New videos say otherwise,â Philadelphia Inquirer, (May 25, 2021), available at https://www.inquirer.com/news/doug-mastriano-capitol-riot-pennslyvania-video-20210525.html.

260. Eric Metaxas, âInterview: Eric Metaxas Interviews Donald Trump with Douglas Mastriano,â Factba.se Archive, (Nov. 30, 2020), available at https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-interview-eric-metaxas-douglas-mastriano-november-30-2020; Senator Doug Mastriano (@SenMastriano), Twitter, Nov. 30, 2020 5:56 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/senmastriano/status/1333545380965986307.

261. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008230_0001, 076P-R000008231_0001 (email and attachment from Mastriano to Molly Michael); see also Kelly v. Pennsylvania, 141 S. Ct. 950 (2020) (order denying application for injunctive relief presented to Justice Alito and denying referral to the full Court).

262. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000001378_00001, 076P-R000001379_00001.

263. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000003771_0001, 076P-R000003772_0001 (Dec. 21, 2020, email from Doug Mastriano to Molly Michael titled âLetter Requested by the Presidentâ).

264. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000003771_0001, 076P-R000003772_0001 (Dec. 21, 2020, email from Doug Mastriano to Molly Michael titled âLetter requested by the Presidentâ).

265. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000003748_0001, 076P-R000003749_0001, (Dec. 29, 2020, Doug Mastriano email to Molly Michael titled âPennsylvania letter for AG Donoghue regarding electionâ; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), 076P-R000003753_0001, 076P-R000003754_0001, (Dec. 22, 2020, Molly Michael email to Rush Limbaugh titled âFrom POTUSâ); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives Production) 076P-R000003761_0001, 076P-R000003762_0001, (Dec. 22, 2020, Molly Michael email to Pam Bondi titled âFrom POTUSâ); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives Production) 076P-R000003766_0001, (Dec. 21, 2020, Molly Michael email to Lou Dobbs titled â2 attachments from POTUSâ); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008968_0001, (Jan. 1, 2021, Molly Michael email to Kevin McCarthy titled âFrom POTUSâ); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archive Production) 076P-R000003759_0001, (Dec. 22, 2020, Molly Michael email to John Eastman, Justin Clark, and Michael Farris titled âFrom POTUSâ); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives Production) 076P-R000003763_0001, (December 21, 2020, email from Molly Michael to Christopher Michel re: From POTUS).

266. Charlotte Cuthbertson, âTrump âResolved, Determinedâ about Election, Says Pennsylvania Senator,â Epoch Times (Dec. 24, 2020), available at https://www.theepochtimes.com/trump-resolved-determined-about-election-says-pennsylvania-senator_3632138.html; Marc Levy & Mark Scolforo, âWhite House Invites GOP Lawmakers in Pennsylvania to Lunch,â Associated Press, (Dec. 23, 2020), available at https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-pennsylvania-coronavirus-pandemic-c5b7f43af7794f01f6d339b7258b915a; Jan Murphy, âPa. Senators Head to White House for Pre-Holiday Lunch with President Trump,â Penn Live â Patriot-News, (Dec. 23, 2020), available at https://www.pennlive.com/news/2020/12/pa-senators-head-to-white-house-for-pre-holiday-lunch-with-president-trump.html; âEp 608- Pandemic: Merry Christmas Eve Special Hour 1 (w/ Mayor Giuliani, Dr. Peter K. Navarro, Major Sgt. Scotty Neil, Former Navy Seal Tej Gill, Christopher Flannery ),â War Room Podcast (Dec. 24, 2020), 25:17 to 25:25, available at https://warroom.org/2020/12/24/ep-608-pandemic-merry-christmas-eve-special-hour-1-w-dr-peter-k-navarro-major-sgt-scotty-neil-former-navy-seal-tej-gill-christopher-flannery/. Charlotte Cuthbertson, âTrump âResolved, Determinedâ about Election, Says Pennsylvania Senator,â Epoch Times (Dec. 24, 2020), available at https://www.theepochtimes.com/trump-resolved-determined-about-election-says-pennsylvania-senator_3632138.html; Marc Levy & Mark Scolforo, âWhite House Invites GOP Lawmakers in Pennsylvania to Lunch,â Associated Press (Dec. 23, 2020), available at https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-pennsylvania-coronavirus-pandemic-c5b7f43af7794f01f6d339b7258b915a; Jan Murphy, âPa. Senators Head to White House for Pre-Holiday Lunch with President Trump,â Penn Live â Patriot-News (Dec. 23, 2020), available at https://www.pennlive.com/news/2020/12/pa-senators-head-to-white-house-for-pre-holiday-lunch-with-president-trump.html; âEp 608- Pandemic: Merry Christmas Eve Special Hour 1 (w/ Mayor Giuliani, Dr. Peter K. Navarro, Major Sgt. Scotty Neil, Former Navy Seal Tej Gill, Christopher Flannery)â, War Room Podcast (Dec.https://warroom.org/2020/12/24/ep-608-pandemic-merry-christmas-eve-special-hour-1-w-dr-peter-k-navarro-major-sgt-scotty-neil-former-navy-seal-tej-gill-christopher-flannery/.

267. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008298_0001 (December 28, 2020, email from Molly Michael to Mark Meadows forwarding Senator Doug Mastriano info for the president), 076P-R000007593_0001 (December 28, 2020, email from Molly Michael to Scott Toland forwarding Senator Doug Mastriano info for the president), 076P-R000003748_0001, 076P-R000003749_0001 (December 29, 2020, email and attachments from Doug Mastriano to Molly Michael re: Pennsylvania letter for AG Donoghue regarding election), , 076P-R000003745_0001, 076P-R000003746_0001, 076P-R000003747_0001 (December 31, 2020, email from Doug Mastriano to Molly Michael re: Letters requested by President Trump and attachments).

268. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000003745_0001, 076P-R000003746_0001, 076P-R000003747_0001 (December 31, 2020, email from Doug Mastriano to Molly Michael re: Letters requested by President Trump and attachments).

269. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000003732_0001(Email from Molly Michael to Amy Swonger, passing along information from Mastriano, 076P-R000008399_0001 (Email from Amy Swonger to Molly Michael responding)). According to the White Houseâs Director of the Office of Legislative Affairs, Amy Swonger, the President repeatedly asked for her to distribute political materials after the election, which led her to seek advice from the White House Counselâs Office because fulfilling the Presidentâs request would likely violate the Hatch Act. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Amy Swonger, (Oct. 28, 2022), pp. 52-53.

270. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007439_0001 (White House switchboard call log from Jan. 5, 2022).

271. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000004788_0001, 076P-R000004789_0001-0066 (January 5, 2021, email from Mastriano attaching letter for Vice President Pence signed by Pennsylvania legislators), 076P-R000004957_0001 (Molly Michael acknowledging receipt), 076P-R000005084_0001 (Molly Michael passing the letter along to Marc Short), 076P-R000007338_0001 (acknowledgment that the letter was printed for POTUS), 076P-R000004687_0001, 076P-R000004688_0001 (January 5, 2021, email and attached letter to Molly Michael re: Caucus Letter to Sen. McConnell and Rep. McCarthy).

272. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 9:59 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&dates=%5B%222021-01-04%22%2C%222021-01-06%22%5D&searchbox=%22BIG+NEWS+IN+PENNSYLVANIA%21+https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2F7JqTWYUgOr%22 (archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 12:46 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22pennsylvania+is+going+to+trump.+The+legislators%22 (archived).

273. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Douglas Mastriano, (August 9, 2022), pp. 10-11.

274. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Alex Cannon Production), AC-0000150 - 153(emails with Jason Miller re: emails to PA/AZ).

275. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Alex Cannon Production), AC-0000150 - 153 (emails with Jason Miller re: emails to PA/AZ).

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277. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 225-26; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Interview of Christina Bobb, (Apr. 21, 2022), pp. 128-34.

278. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000001891_00001.

279. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bernard Kerik, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 138-39.

280. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bernard Kerik, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 136-37.

281. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000001890_00001, 076P-R000001891_00001 (December 28, 2020, email with attachment from Bernard Kerik to Mark Meadows re: GIULIANI TEAM STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS PLAN - v1.pdf).

282. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 225-27; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Interview of Bernard Kerik, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 139-140.

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290. Bernard B. Kerik (@BernardKerik), Twitter, Dec. 27, 2020 11:53 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/bernardkerik/status/1343238609768501253.

291. Bernard B. Kerik (@BernardKerik), Twitter, Dec. 13, 2020 1:05 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/bernardkerik/status/1338001989846888448.

292. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 43-45; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson (Mar. 7, 2022), pp. 184-85; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson (May 17, 2022), p. 74.

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294. Team, Got Freedom?, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201202221908/https:/got-freedom.org/team/ (archived).

295. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Ed McBroom Production), M11-12 (January 2, 2021, email from Jillian Anderson, signed by Phil Kline re: BRIEFING FOLLOW UP: ELECTION 2020 | GOT FREEDOM?); âElection Integrity Group Meets with Legislators from Contested States,â Cision PR Newswire, (Jan. 2, 2021), available https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/election-integrity-group-meets-with-legislators-from-contested-states-301199902.html.

296. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Ed McBroom Production), M11-12 (January 2, 2021, email from Jillian Anderson, signed by Phil Kline re: BRIEFING FOLLOW UP: ELECTION 2020 | GOT FREEDOM?); âElection Integrity Group Meets with Legislators from Contested States,â Cision PR Newswire, (Jan. 2, 2021), available https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/election-integrity-group-meets-with-legislators-from-contested-states-301199902.html.

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298. Paul Bedard, âExclusive: Trump Urges State Legislators to Reject Electoral Votes, âYou Are the Real Powerâ,â Washington Examiner, (Jan. 3, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/washington-secrets/exclusive-trump-urges-state-legislators-to-reject-electoral-votes-you-are-the-real-power; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 99-100.

299. Paul Bedard, âExclusive: Trump Urges State Legislators to Reject Electoral Votes, âYou Are the Real Powerâ,â Washington Examiner, (Jan. 3, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/washington-secrets/exclusive-trump-urges-state-legislators-to-reject-electoral-votes-you-are-the-real-power.

300. Paul Bedard, âExclusive: Trump Urges State Legislators to Reject Electoral Votes, âYou Are the Real Powerâ,â Washington Examiner, (Jan. 3, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/washington-secrets/exclusive-trump-urges-state-legislators-to-reject-electoral-votes-you-are-the-real-power.

301. Daniel Chaitan, âNavarro: Six-Person Team Briefed Hundreds of State Lawmakers Showed âReceiptsâ of âStolenâ Election,â Washington Examiner, (Jan. 2, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/navarro-6-person-team-briefed-hundreds-of-state-lawmakers-showed-receipts-of-stolen-election. The Select Committee attempted to ask Navarro about his participation in the call and other topics, but he ignored the Select Committeeâs subpoena and has been indicted by the Department of Justice.

302. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Ed McBroom Production), M11-12 (January 2, 2021, email from Jillian Anderson, signed by Phil Kline re: BRIEFING FOLLOW UP: ELECTION 2020 | GOT FREEDOM?).

303. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Ed McBroom Production), M11-12 (January 2, 2021, email from Jillian Anderson, signed by Phil Kline re: BRIEFING FOLLOW UP: ELECTION 2020 | GOT FREEDOM?) (quoted text bolded and italicized in original).

304. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Ed McBroom Production), M11-12 (January 2, 2021, email from Jillian Anderson, signed by Phil Kline re: BRIEFING FOLLOW UP: ELECTION 2020 | GOT FREEDOM?).

305. Melanie Conklin, âThese 15 State Legislators Asked Pence Not to Certify Election Results,â Wisconsin Examiner, (Jan. 14, 2021), available at https://wisconsinexaminer.com/2021/01/14/these-15-state-legislators-asked-pence-not-to-certify-election-results/.

306. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production Production), 076P-R000005084_0001 (January 5, 2021, email from Doug Mastriano to Molly Michael re: Final letter to VP Pence, attaching the letter signed); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production Production), 076P-R000008735_0001 (January 5, 2021, letter to Vice President Pence signed by state legislators with âThe President Has Seenâ stamp).

307. Wood TV8, âGiuliani and Laura Cox Hold âLegal Briefingâ Before Giving Testimony Wednesday Evening,â Facebook Watch, at 10:30-10:45, Dec. 2, 2020, available at https://www.facebook.com/woodtv/videos/rudy-giuliani-and-laura-cox-hold-legal-briefing-before-giving-testimony-wednesda/1996033023872394/.

308. Wood TV8, âGiuliani and Laura Cox Hold âLegal Briefingâ Before Giving Testimony Wednesday Evening,â Facebook Watch, at 13:05-13:20, Dec. 2, 2020, available at https://www.facebook.com/woodtv/videos/rudy-giuliani-and-laura-cox-hold-legal-briefing-before-giving-testimony-wednesda/1996033023872394/.

309. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), pp. 33, 37, & 47-48. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).

310. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), pp. 33-38.

311. Senator Mike Shirkey (@SenMikeShirkey), Twitter, Nov. 22, 2020 10:47 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/SenMikeShirkey/status/1330538438723063815.

312. âShirkey Issues Statement Regarding Election,â Michigan Senate GOP, (from text, December 14, 2020), available at https://www.misenategop.com/shirkey-issues-statement-regarding-election/.

313. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 4, 2020 2:49 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201211204139/https:/twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1334993249082236931 (archived).

314. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) RT of Christina Bobb (@christina_bobb) QT of Ali #StopTheSteal Alexander (@ali), Twitter, Dec. 6, 2020 12:53 a.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1335462365370994689.jpg (archived); âTweets of December 6, 2020,â The American Presidency Project at University of California Santa Barbara, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/tweets-december-6-2020.

315. Team Trump, Facebook, Dec. 24, 2020 1:52 p.m., available at https://www.facebook.com/officialteamtrump/videos/arizona-contact-governor-ducey-and-your-legislators-todaydemand-they-hear-the-ev/303213471090533/.

316. Team Trump, Facebook, Dec. 26, 2020 5:36 p.m., available at https://www.facebook.com/officialteamtrump/videos/arizona-contact-governor-ducey-and-your-legislators-today/3496886293698026/.

317. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Jamestown Associates Production), JTA000074-81(Dec. 20, 2020, email chain from Jason Miller).

318. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Jamestown Associates Production), JTA000074-81(Dec. 20, 2020, email chain from Jason Miller).

319. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00423-436 (Dec. 22, 2020, text messages between Jason Miller and Jared Kushner, pp. 10-13).

320. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, , Dec. 1, 2020 10:27 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201203173245/https://mobile.twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1333975991518187521 (archived).

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324. Donald Trump Thanksgiving Call to Troops Transcript 2020: Addresses Possibility of Conceding Election, Rev, (Nov. 26, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-thanksgiving-call-to-troops-transcript-2020-addresses-possibility-of-conceding-election.

325. Linda So and Jason Szep, âCampaign of Fear: U.S. Election Workers Get Little Help from Law Enforcement as Terror Threats Mount,â Reuters, (Sept. 8, 2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-threats-law-enforcement/.

326. Fredreka Schouten, âPersonal Threats, Election Lies and Punishing New Laws Rattle Election Officials, Raising Fears of a Mass Exodus,â CNN, (July 21, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/21/politics/election-officials-exodus/index.html.

327. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) RT of Christina Bobb (@christina_bobb) QT of Ali #StopTheSteal Alexander (@ali), Twitter, Dec. 6, 2020 12:53 a.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1335462365370994689.jpg (archive); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 6, 2020 12:53 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22rusty+bowers%22&dates=%5B%222020-11-29%22%2C%222020-12-29%22%5D&results=1 (archived) (retweeting Christina Bobb).

328. Dennis Welch (@dennis_welch), Twitter, Dec. 8, 2020 11:23 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/dennis_welch/status/1336526978640302080 (retweeting people who were posting Bowersâs personal information); Dennis Welch (@dennis_welch), Twitter, Dec. 8, 2020 11:28 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/dennis_welch/status/1336528029791604737.

329. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview with Russel âRustyâ Bowers (June 19, 2022), pp. 50-52; Kelly Weill, âArizona GOP Civil War Somehow Keeps Getting Weirder,â Daily Beast, (Dec. 11, 2020), available at https://www.thedailybeast.com/arizona-republican-party-civil-war-somehow-keeps-getting-weirder; Yvonne Wingett Sanchez and Ronald J. Hansen, ââAsked to do Something Hugeâ: An Audacious Pitch to Reserve Arizonaâs Election Results,â Arizona Republic, (Nov. 18, 2021, updated Dec. 2, 2021), available at https://www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/18/arizona-audit-rudy-giuliani-failed-effort-replace-electors/6349795001/.

330. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview with Russel âRustyâ Bowers (June 19, 2022), pp. 50-52.

331. House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed Interview with Russel âRustyâ Bowers (June 19, 2022), pp. 50-52.

332. Brahm Resnik, âVIDEO: Group chants âWe are watching youâ outside Arizona Secretary of State Katie Hobbsâ home,â KPNX 12 News, (Nov. 18, 2020), available at https://www.12news.com/article/news/politics/video-group-chants-we-are-watching-you-outside-arizona-secretary-of-state-katie-hobbs-home/75-a569ae35-3b62-424e-88f8-f03ca8b89458; âArizona Sec. of State Says She Hays Received Threats of Violence Following Election,â Fox 10 Phoenix, (Nov. 18, 2020, updated Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://www.fox10phoenix.com/news/arizona-sec-of-state-says-she-has-received-threats-of-violence-following-election; Brahm Resnik, âArizona Law Enforcement Investigating Social Media Threat against Top Elections Official,â KPNX 12 News, (Nov. 18, 2020), available at https://www.12news.com/article/news/local/arizona/arizona-law-enforcement-investigating-social-media-threat-against-top-elections-official/75-486474ea-11c9-47ad-a325-8bbed6e3e231.

333. âArizona Sec. of State Says She Hays Received Threats of Violence Following Election,â Fox 10 Phoenix, (Nov. 18, 2020, updated Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://www.fox10phoenix.com/news/arizona-sec-of-state-says-she-has-received-threats-of-violence-following-election; Brahm Resnik, âArizona Law Enforcement Investigating Social Media Threat against Top Elections Official,â KPNX 12 News, (Nov. 18, 2020), available at https://www.12news.com/article/news/local/arizona/arizona-law-enforcement-investigating-social-media-threat-against-top-elections-official/75-486474ea-11c9-47ad-a325-8bbed6e3e231.

334. Isaac Dovere and Jeremy Herb, ââItâs Absolutely Getting Worseâ: Secretaries of State Targeted by Trump Election Lies Live in Fear for their Safety and are Desperate for Protection,â CNN, (Oct. 26, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/26/politics/secretaries-of-state-personal-threats-trump-election-lies/index.html; Michael Wines and Eliza Fawcett, âViolent Threats to Election Workers are Common. Prosecutions are Not,â New York Times, (June 27, 2022, updated July 1, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/27/us/election-workers-safety.html.

335. Committee on House Administration, Election Subversion: A Growing Threat to Election Integrity, Statement of Adrian Fontes Maricopa County Recorder (2016-2020), at *1, 6 (July 28, 2020), available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HA/HA00/20210728/113971/HHRG-117-HA00-Wstate-FontesA-20210728.pdf.

336. Bob Christie, âMonths after Biden Win, Arizona Officials Still Face Threats,â Associated Press, (Feb. 12, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-donald-trump-arizona-phoenix-elections-2bd2306acb2ae89c0ef37182fbb415b7.

337. Nicole Valdes, âOnline Death Threats Target Maricopa County Board of Supervisors,â ABC 15 Arizona, (Jan. 8, 2021, updated Jan. 9, 2021), available at https://www.abc15.com/news/state/enough-is-enough-online-death-threats-target-maricopa-county-board-of-supervisors.

338. Washington Post, âThe Arizona election official who faced death threats for telling the truth,â YouTube, at 0:21, Nov. 2, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6gAc47ivjYk.

339. Genesis Sandoval, âHickman: A Year after 2020 Elections, Threats, Abuse Still Coming In,â Cronkite News Arizona PBS, (Nov. 2, 2021), available at https://cronkitenews.azpbs.org/2021/11/02/hickman-a-year-after-2020-elections-threats-abuse-still-coming-in/.

340. United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing on Protecting our Democracyâs Frontline Workers (Aug. 3, 2022), Written testimony by Jocelyn Benson, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony%20-%20Benson.pdf; Michigan Department of State, âStatement from Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson Concerning Threats against Her and Her Family,â (Dec. 6, 2020), available at https://www.michigan.gov/sos/Resources/News/2020/12/06/statement-from-secretary-of-state-jocelyn-benson-concerning-threats-against-her-and-her-family; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jocelyn Benson, (June 2, 2022), pp. 35-39.

341. Michigan Department of State, âStatement from Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson Concerning Threats against Her and Her Family, (Dec. 6, 2020), available at https://www.michigan.gov/sos/Resources/News/2020/12/06/statement-from-secretary-of-state-jocelyn-benson-concerning-threats-against-her-and-her-family; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jocelyn Benson (June 2, 2022), pp. 35-39.

342. Isaac Dovere and Jeremy Herb, ââItâs Absolutely Getting Worseâ: Secretaries of State Targeted by Trump Election Lies Live in Fear for their Safety and are Desperate for Protection,â CNN, (Oct. 26, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/26/politics/secretaries-of-state-personal-threats-trump-election-lies/index.html.

343. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Aaron Van Langevelde and Adrianne Van Langevelde, (Oct. 21, 2021); Tim Alberta, âThe Inside Story of Michiganâs Fake Voter Fraud Scandal,â Politico, (Nov. 24, 2020), available at https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/11/24/michigan-election-trump-voter-fraud-democracy-440475; Rod Meloni and Natasha Dado, âMichigan AG Launches Investigation into Threats against Canvassers,â Click on Detroit, (Nov. 24, 2020), available at https://www.clickondetroit.com/news/local/2020/11/24/michigan-ag-launches-investigation-into-threats-against-canvassers/.

344. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Aaron Van Langevelde, (Oct. 21, 2021).

345. Trey Grayson, Matthew Masterson, Orion Danjuma, and Ben Berwick, âState and Local Solutions Are Integral to Protect Election Officials and Democracy,â Just Security, (Feb. 9, 2022), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/80142/state-and-local-solutions-are-integral-to-protect-election-officials-and-democracy/; Stanford Internet Observatory, âTina Barton â Aftermath â Death Threats,â YouTube, (Sept. 20, 2021), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xi5Y7bwvy-Y.

346. Melissa Nann Burke and George Hunter, ââI Feel Afraidâ: Detroit Clerk Winfrey Testifies to U.S. House Panel on Death Threats She Received,â Detroit News, (July 28, 2021), available at https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2021/07/28/winfrey-testifies-before-house-panel-threats-election-workers/5400419001/.

347. Linda So and Jason Szep, âCampaign of Fear: U.S. Election Workers Get Little Help from Law Enforcement as Terror Threats Mount,â Reuters, (Sept. 8, 2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-threats-law-enforcement/.

348. Dave Boucher, âBlack Michigan Lawmaker Posts Voicemails Saying She Should be Lynched,â Detroit Free Press, (Dec. 6, 2020), available at https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/12/06/michigan-lawmaker-posts-voicemails-saying-she-should-lynched/3849695001/.

349. Dave Boucher, âBlack Michigan Lawmaker Posts Voicemails Saying She Should be Lynched,â Detroit Free Press, (Dec. 6, 2020), available at https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/12/06/michigan-lawmaker-posts-voicemails-saying-she-should-lynched/3849695001/.

350. Kayla Clarke, âMan faces felony charges for bomb threat at Michigan Capitol Building, threats against state representative,â Click on Detroit, (Jan. 8, 2021), available at https://www.clickondetroit.com/news/local/2021/01/08/man-faces-felony-charges-for-bomb-threat-at-michigan-capitol-building-threats-against-state-representative/ (linking to affidavit).

351. Isaac Dovere and Jeremy Herb, ââItâs Absolutely Getting Worseâ: Secretaries of State Targeted by Trump Election Lies Live in Fear for their Safety and are Desperate for Protection,â CNN, (Oct. 26, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/26/politics/secretaries-of-state-personal-threats-trump-election-lies/index.html; see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6thAttack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Kathy Boockvar, (Dec. 22, 2021).

352. Linda So and Jason Szep, âCampaign of Fear: U.S. Election Workers Get Little Help from Law Enforcement as Terror Threats Mount,â Reuters, (Sept. 8, 2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-threats-law-enforcement/.

353. Isaac Dovere and Jeremy Herb, ââItâs Absolutely Getting Worseâ: Secretaries of State Targeted by Trump Election Lies Live in Fear for their Safety and are Desperate for Protection,â CNN, (Oct. 26, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/26/politics/secretaries-of-state-personal-threats-trump-election-lies/index.html.

354. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Bryan Cutler, (May 31, 2022), pp. 83-84.

355. Geoff Rushton, âPolice Investigating Threat Made During State College Borough Council Meeting,â StateCollege.com, (Dec. 8, 2020), available at https://www.statecollege.com/police-investigating-threat-made-during-state-college-borough-council-meeting/.

356. Jan Murphy, âMeet Pa. Senate GOP Leader Kim Ward, the First Woman to Hold That Post: âI Have To Do a Good Jobââ, PennLive.com, (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.pennlive.com/news/2021/01/meet-pa-senate-gop-leader-kim-ward-the-first-woman-to-hold-that-post-i-have-to-do-a-good-job.html.

357. Matt Petrillo, ââWeâre Coming after Youâ: Philadelphia Elections Officials Still Receiving Death Threats Following 2020 Presidential Election,â CBS Philly 3, (Nov. 1, 2021), available at https://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2021/11/01/philadelphia-election-officials-death-threat-donald-trump-joe-biden/; Linda So and Jason Szep, âCampaign of Fear: U.S. Election Workers Get Little Help from Law Enforcement as Terror Threats Mount,â Reuters, (Sept. 8, 2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-threats-law-enforcement/.

358. Linda So and Jason Szep, âSpecial Report: Terrorized U.S. Election Workers Get Little Help from Law Enforcement,â Reuters, (Sept. 8, 2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/terrorized-us-election-workers-get-little-help-law-enforcement-2021-09-08/.

359. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 2:10:00 to 2:11:00, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.

360. Linda So, âSpecial Report: Trump-Inspired Death Threats are Terrorizing Election Workers,â Reuters, (June 11, 2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-georgia-threats-special-rep/special-report-trump-inspired-death-threats-are-terrorizing-election-workers-idUSKCN2DN14M.

361. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 2:10:00 to 2:11:00, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og; Linda So, âSpecial Report: Trump-Inspired Death Threats are Terrorizing Election Workers,â Reuters, (June 11, 2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-georgia-threats-special-rep/special-report-trump-inspired-death-threats-are-terrorizing-election-workers-idUSKCN2DN14M.

362. Jeff Pegues and Robert Legare, âTexas Man Charged with Making Election-Related Threats to Georgia Government Officials,â CBS News, (Jan. 21, 2022), available at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/chad-christopher-stark-charged-election-related-threats-georgia-government-officials/.

363. Linda So, âSpecial Report: Trump-Inspired Death Threats are Terrorizing Election Workers,â Reuters, (June 11, 2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-georgia-threats-special-rep/special-report-trump-inspired-death-threats-are-terrorizing-election-workers-idUSKCN2DN14M.

364. Linda So, âSpecial Report: Trump-Inspired Death Threats are Terrorizing Election Workers,â Reuters, (June 11, 2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-georgia-threats-special-rep/special-report-trump-inspired-death-threats-are-terrorizing-election-workers-idUSKCN2DN14M.

365. Linda So, âSpecial Report: Trump-Inspired Death Threats are Terrorizing Election Workers,â Reuters (June 11, 2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-georgia-threats-special-rep/special-report-trump-inspired-death-threats-are-terrorizing-election-workers-idUSKCN2DN14M.

366. GA House Mobile Streaming, âGovernmental Affairs 12.10.20,â Vimeo â Livestream, at 2:09:00-2:13:00, available at https://livestream.com/accounts/25225474/events/9117221/videos/214677184; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 2:25:45 to 2:26:00, available at https://youtu.be/xa43_z_82Og?t=8745.

367. Donald Trump Georgia Rally Transcript Before Senate Runoff Elections December 5,â Rev, (Dec. 5, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-georgia-rally-transcript-before-senate-runoff-elections-december-5; Jason Szep and Linda So, âA Reuters Special Report: Trump Campaign Demonized Two Georgia Election Workers â and Death Threats Followed,â Reuters, (Dec. 1, 2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-threats-georgia/.

368. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi,Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html (the Washington Post redacted Freemanâs name and instead used â[name]â in the transcript); âDonald Trump Georgia Phone Call Transcript with Sec. of State Brad Raffensperger: Says He Wants to âFindâ Votes,â Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-georgia-phone-call-transcript-brad-raffensperger-recording.

369. Jason Szep and Linda So, âA Reuters Special Report: Trump Campaign Demonized Two Georgia Election Workers â and Death Threats Followed,â Reuters, (Dec. 1, 2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-threats-georgia/.

370. Freeman v. Giuliani, No. 21-cv-03354-BAH (D.D.C. filed May 10, 2022), ECF No. 22 (Amended Complaint at 52), available at https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/61642105/22/freeman-v-herring-networks-inc.

371. Jason Szep and Linda So, âA Reuters Special Report: Trump Campaign Demonized Two Georgia Election Workers â and Death Threats Followed,â Reuters, (Dec. 1, 2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-threats-georgia/.

372. Jason Szep and Linda So, âA Reuters Special Report: Trump Campaign Demonized Two Georgia Election Workers â and Death Threats Followed,â Reuters, (Dec. 1, 2021), available at https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-threats-georgia/.

373. Amended Complaint at 52, Freeman v. Giuliani, No. 21-cv-03354-BAH (D.D.C. filed May 10, 2022), ECF No. 22, available at https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/61642105/22/freeman-v-herring-networks-inc.

374. Amended Complaint at 52, Freeman v. Giuliani, No. 21-cv-03354-BAH (D.D.C. filed May 10, 2022), ECF No. 22, available at https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/61642105/22/freeman-v-herring-networks-inc.

375. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ruby Freeman, (May 31, 2022), pp. 7-8.

376. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ruby Freeman, (May 31, 2022), pp. 7-8.

377. Governmentâs Motion Regarding Anticipated Trial Evidence and Notice Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) at 1-2, 24-26, United States v. Rhodes, et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. July 8, 2022), ECF No. 187; Brandi Buchman (@Brandi_Buchman), Twitter, Oct. 6, 2022 7:27 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/Brandi_Buchman/status/1577983997711421441.

378. Hannah Rabinowitz and Holmes Lybrand, âJudge Says Oath Keepers Jury Wonât See âDeath Listâ,â CNN (Oct. 6, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/06/politics/judge-says-oath-keepers-jury-wont-see-death-list-trial-day-3.

3

On the morning of January 6th, in his speech at the Ellipse, President Trump exhorted his thousands of assembled supporters to march to the U.S. Capitol, explaining that â[w]e have come to demand that Congress do the right thing and only count the electors who have been lawfully slated, lawfully slated.ââ1 This was no off-the-cuff remark; it was the culmination of a carefully planned scheme many weeks in the making. This plea by the President turned the truth on its head. There was only one legitimate slate of electors from the battleground States of Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, and Trump wanted them rejected. This scheme involved lawyers, such as Kenneth Chesebro and Rudy Giuliani, as well as Mark Meadows. It also was aided at key points by Chairwoman of the Republican National Committee Ronna McDaniel, Members of Congress, and Republican leaders across seven Statesâsome of whom did not know exactly what they were being asked to do. President Trump oversaw it himself.

President Trump and his allies prepared their own fake slates of electoral college electors in seven States that President Trump lost: Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. And on December 14, 2020âthe date when true, certified electors were meeting to cast their electoral votes for the candidate who had won the popular vote in each of those Statesâthese fake electors also met, ostensibly casting electoral votes for President Trump, the candidate who had lost.

There was no legitimate reason for Trump electors to meet, vote, and produce fake slates on December 14th in States that former Vice President Biden won. Instead, this effort was aimed directly at the President of the Senate (which, under the Constitution, is the Vice President) in his role at the joint session of Congress on January 6th. President Trump and his advisors wanted Vice President Pence to disregard real electoral college votes for former Vice President Biden, in favor of these fake competing electoral slates.

But there never were real, competing slates of electors. By the time the fake Trump electors met on December 14th, appropriate government officials in each of the seven States had already certified their Stateâs official election results for former Vice President Biden. No court had issued an order reversing or calling into question those results, and most election-related litigation was over. And as detailed in Chapter 2, despite the illicit efforts of President Trump and his allies, no State legislature had agreed to the Presidentâs request to reverse the result of the election by appointing a different slate of electors.

Given all of this, these groups of Trump backers who called themselves Presidential electors were never actually electors, and the votes they purported to cast on December 14th were not valid. They were fake. They had no legal standing, and their fake votes could not have been used by Vice President Pence to disregard the real votes of electors chosen by the voters.

By January 6th, President Trump had been discouraged by his top lawyers from following through on this plan. The Trump Campaignâs senior staff attorneys had concerns,2 and several days before the joint session, the Acting Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General blocked the sending of a letter indicating that there were âcompeting slatesâ of electors, including âin Georgia and several other States.ââ3 But this reasoning did nothing to change President Trumpâs rhetoric or plan. He continued to assert that there were âcompetingâ or âdualâ slates of electors to create an opportunity to stay in office on January 6th.4

These lawyers were right: President Trumpâs plan was illegal. In his June 7, 2022, opinion, Federal District Judge David Carter wrote that this initiative to âcertify alternate slates of electors for President Trumpâ constituted a âcritical objective of the January 6 plan.ââ5 This followed Judge Carterâs earlier determination in March that â[t]he illegality of the plan was obvious,â and â[e]very Americanâand certainly the President of the United Statesâknows that in a democracy, leaders are elected, not installed. With a plan this âBOLD,â President Trump knowingly tried to subvert this fundamental principle. Based on the evidence the Court finds it more likely than not that President Trump corruptly attempted to obstruct the Joint Session of Congress on January 6, 2021.ââ6

The fake elector effort was an unlawful, unprecedented and destructive break from the electoral college process that our country has used to select its President for generations.7 It led directly to the violence that occurred on January 6th. To address the damage that it caused, it is important to understand how it transpired.

The fake elector plan emerged from a series of legal memoranda written by an outside legal advisor to the Trump Campaign: Kenneth Chesebro. Although John Eastman would have a more prominent role in advising President Trump in the days immediately before January 6th, Chesebroâan attorney based in Boston and New York recruited to assist the Trump Campaign as a volunteer legal advisorâwas central to the creation of the plan.8 Memos by Chesebro on November 18th, December 9th, and December 13th, as discussed below, laid the planâs foundation.

Chesebroâs first memo on November 18th suggested that the Trump Campaign could gain a few extra weeks for litigation to challenge Wisconsinâs election results, so long as a Wisconsin slate of Republican nominees to the electoral college met on December 14th to cast placeholder electoral college votes on a contingent basis.9 This memo acknowledged that â[i]t may seem odd that the electors pledged to Trump and Pence might meet and cast their votes on December 14 even if, at that juncture, the Trump-Pence ticket is behind in the vote count, and no certificate of election has been issued in favor of Trump and Pence.ââ10 However, Chesebro argued that if such a slate of alternate electors gathered to cast electoral votes on a contingent basis, this would preserve the Trump Campaignâs options so âa court decision (or, perhaps, a state legislative determination) rendered after December 14 in favor of the Trump-Pence slate of electors should be timely.ââ11

On December 9th, Chesebro penned a second memo, which suggested another purpose for fake electoral college votes on January 6th. It stated that unauthorized Trump electors in these States could be retroactively recognized âby a court, the state legislature, or Congress.ââ12 Under this theory, there would be no need for a court to decide that the election had been decided in error; instead, Congress itself could choose among dueling slates of purported electoral votesâand thereby decide the Presidential electionâeven though Article II of the Constitution grants that power to the electoral college via the States.13

Chesebroâs contemporaneous communications make clear that the goal was having Congress act on the fake electoral votes. He emailed an organizer of the fake electors in Nevada that âthe purpose of having the electoral votes sent in to Congress is to provide the opportunity to debate the election irregularities in Congress, and to keep alive the possibility that the votes could be flipped to Trump . . .ââ14 And a legal advisor to the Arizona GOP reportedly described being told by Chesebro around this time that their supposed electors âwould just be sending in âfakeâ electoral votes to Pence so that âsomeoneâ in Congress can make an objection when they start counting votes, and start arguing that the âfakeâ votes should be counted.ââ15

Many of the States contested by the Trump team had laws that specified requirements for electors to validly cast and transmit their votesâand the December 9, 2020, memo recognized that some of these criteria would be difficult, if not impossible, for the fake electors to fulfill. (As described later, most were not fulfilled.) For example, Nevada State law required that the secretary of state preside when Presidential electors meet,16 and Nevada Secretary of State Barbara Cegavske, a Republican, had already signed a certificate ascertaining the Biden/Harris electors as the authorized, winning slate.17 Several States also had rules requiring electors to cast their votes in the State capitol building, or rules governing the process for approving substitutes if any original proposed electors from the November ballot were unavailable. As a result, Chesebroâs December 9, 2020, memo advised the Trump Campaign to abide by such rules, when possible, but also recognized that these slates could be âslightly problematic in Michigan,â âsomewhat dicey in Georgia and Pennsylvania,â and âvery problematic in Nevada.ââ18

On December 13th, the fake elector scheme became even clearer in an email sent by Chesebro to Giuliani. His message was entitled âBrief notes on âPresident of the Senateâ strategy.â It addressed how the fake electors meeting the next day, December 14th, could be exploited during the joint session of Congress on January 6th by the President of the Senateâa role that the Constitution grants to the Vice President of the United States.19 Chesebro argued that, on January 6th, the President of the Senate could:

. . . firmly take the position that he, and he alone, is charged with the constitutional responsibility not just to open the votes, but to count themâincluding making judgments about what to do if there are conflicting votes . . .20

Chesebroâs email suggested that the President of the Senate (which, under the Constitution, is the Vice President) could toss out former Vice President Bidenâs actual electoral votes for any State where the Trump Campaign organized fake electors, simply âbecause there are two slates of votes.ââ21 Of course, there were never two slates of electoral votes, so this premise itself was fundamentally wrong. But he was arguing that even if votes by fake electors were never retroactively ratified under State law, their mere submission to Congress would be enough to allow the presiding officer to disregard valid votes for former Vice President Biden.22 Chesebro suggested this might result in a second term for President Trump, or, at minimum, it would force a debate about purported election fraudâneither of which was a lawful, legitimate reason to organize and convene fake electors.23

As discussed below and in Chapter 5, John Eastman worked with Chesebro as January 6th approached and wrote two additional memos that built upon, and extended, the plan to use the fake electoral votes during the joint session.24

In early December, the highest levels of the Trump Campaign took note of Chesebroâs fake elector plan and began to operationalize it. On December 6th, White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows forwarded a copy of Chesebroâs November 18, 2020, memo to Trump Campaign Senior Advisor Jason Miller writing, âLetâs have a discussion about this tomorrow.ââ25 Miller replied that he just engaged with reporters on the subject, to which Meadows wrote: âIf you are on it then never mind the meeting. We just need to have someone coordinating the electors for states.ââ26 Miller clarified that he had only been âworking the PR angleâ and they should still meet, to which Meadows answered: âGot it.ââ27 Later that week, Miller sent Meadows a spreadsheet that the Trump Campaign had compiled.28 It listed contact information for nearly all of the 79 GOP nominees to the electoral college on the November ballot for Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.29 And on December 8th, Meadows received a text message from a former State legislator in Louisiana recommending that the proposed âTrump electors from AR [sic] MI GA PA WI NV all meet next Monday at their state capitols[,] [c]all themselves to order, elect officers, and cast their votes for the President. . . . Then they certify their votes and transmit that certificate to Washington.ââ30 Meadows replied: âWe are.ââ31

Cassidy Hutchinson, a Special Assistant to the President and an assistant to Chief of Staff Mark Meadows, confirmed Meadowsâs significant involvement in the plan. Hutchinson told the Select Committee that Meadows followed the progress of the fake elector effort closely and that she âremember[ed] him frequently having calls, meetings, and outreach with individuals and this just being a prominent topic of discussion in our office.â When asked how many of his calls or meetings it came up in, she estimated â[d]ozens.ââ32

The evidence indicates that by December 7th or 8th, President Trump had decided to pursue the fake elector plan and was driving it. Trump Campaign Associate General Counsel Joshua Findlay was tasked by the campaignâs general counsel, Matthew Morgan, around December 7th or 8th with exploring the feasibility of assembling unrecognized slates of Trump electors in a handful of the States that President Trump had lost.33 Findlay told the Select Committee âit was my understanding that the President made this decision. . . .ââ34 As recounted by Findlay, Morgan conveyed that the clientâPresident Trumpâdirected the campaign lawyers to âlook into electors in these potential litigation States[.]ââ35

President Trump personally called RNC Chairwoman Ronna Romney McDaniel days before December 14th to enlist the RNCâs assistance in the scheme.36 President Trump opened the call by introducing McDaniel to John Eastman, who described âthe importance of the RNC helping the campaign to gather these contingent electors in case any of the legal challenges that were ongoing changed the results in any of the States.ââ37 According to McDaniel, she called President Trump back soon after the call ended, letting him know that she agreed to his request and that some RNC staffers were already assisting.38

On December 13th and 14th, President Trump worked with Rudolph Giuliani on the planâs implementation. On the 13th, Miller texted some of his colleagues to check in about the fake elector meetings scheduled for the following day. He let them know that Giuliani had told him âPOTUS was awareâ that they would be filing litigation in four States just âto keep the effort goingââwhich the Select Committee believes was to create a pretext to claim that it was still possible for the fake electors to be authorized retroactively.39 (In subsequent litigation, a Federal district court found that President Trump âfiled certain lawsuits not to obtain legal relief, but to disrupt or delay the January 6th congressional proceedings through the courts.ââ40) The next day, Miller sent an email asking whether they were going to issue a press release about electors, and he was told the âMayor [is] going to discuss with POTUS.ââ41

Not everyone on the campaign was eager to pursue the fake elector plan. On December 11th, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a high-profile lawsuit filed by the State of Texas challenging the election results in Pennsylvania, Georgia, Michigan, and Wisconsin.42 After that decision, the Trump Campaignâs senior legal staffers said that they reduced their involvement in the fake elector effort, apparently because there was no longer a feasible scenario in which a court would determine that President Trump actually won any of the States he contested.43 Justin Clark, who oversaw the Trump Campaignâs general counselâs office, said that he basically conveyed, âIâm out,â and encouraged his colleagues on the legal team to do the same.44 Findlay told the Select Committee that âwe backed out of this thing,â and Morgan, his boss, said he had Findlay pass off responsibility for the electors as âmy way of taking that responsibility to zero.ââ45

Clark told the Select Committee that âit never sat right with me that there was no . . . contingency whereby these votes would count.ââ46 âI had real problems with the process,â Clark said, because âit morphed into something I didnât agree with.ââ47 In his view, the fake electors were ânot necessarily duly nominated electorsâ despite being presented as such.48 He said he believed he warned his colleagues that âunless we have litigation pending like in these States, like I donât think this is appropriate or, you know, this isnât the right thing to do.ââ49

Morgan told the Select Committee that he saw no value in pushing slates of purported electors if they were not authorized by a State governmentâs certificate of ascertainment. As he put it, â[M]y view was, as long as you didnât have a certificate of ascertainment, then the electors were, for lack of a better way of saying it, no good or notânot valid.ââ50 Findlay confirmed that Morgan told him after the Supreme Court ruling on December 11th that âthereâs not really anything left for us to do on this projectâ and that âit doesnât seem like a good idea for us to be involved in it.ââ51

Campaign lawyers were not the only ones who doubted the legality of the fake elector plan. The Office of White House Counsel appears to have expressed concerns about it, as well. In his testimony to the Select Committee, White House Counsel Pat Cipollone acknowledged his view that by mid-December, the electoral process was âdone.â Cipollone told the Select Committee that the White House Counselâs office âprobablyâ had discussions about the electors plan and that his Deputy, Pat Philbin, would have been involved in evaluating the electors issue.52 In an informal Committee interview, Philbin described the fake elector scheme as one of the âbad theoriesâ that were like âWhac-A-Moleâ in the White House during this period.53 Mr. Cipollone agreed with this characterization.54

In her testimony, Cassidy Hutchinson testified that she heard at least one member of the White House Counselâs Office say that the plan was not legal:

Committee Staff: . . . to be clear, did you hear the White House Counselâs Office say that this plan to have alternate electors meet and cast votes for Donald Trump in States that he had lost was not legally sound?

Hutchinson: Yes, sir.55

She also recalled a meeting that took place in or before mid-December during which this view was relayed to Giuliani and members of his team by lawyers in the White House Counselâs Office.56

By December 11th, Findlay emailed his main points of contact in six battleground States to say â[t]hank you for your work on the presidential elector projectâ and, in order to pass off his responsibilities, let them know that âRudyâs team has designated Kenneth Chesebro as the point person for the legal documentsâ going forward.57

While the campaignâs core legal team stepped back from the fake elector effort on December 11th, it nonetheless went forward because âRudy was in charge of [it]â and â[t]his is what he wanted to do,â according to Findlay.58 When Findlay was asked if this decision to let the effort proceed under Giulianiâs direction âwas coming from your client, the President,â Findlay responded: âYes, I believe so. I mean, he had made it clear that Rudy was in charge of this and that Rudy was executing what he wanted.ââ59 Findlay also recalled being told that Chesebroâs elector memos had become âthe justification for why Rudy and Ken were going to keep going forward with this stuff.ââ60 He explained that Giuliani âreally bought into Kenâs theory on this,â and that the two of them âwere kind of the main ones driving thisâ from that point forward.61 Clark told the Select Committee that â. . . my understanding of who was driving the process . . . was Mayor Giuliani and his team.ââ62 On December 10th, when Kenneth Chesebro emailed one of the State party officials involved in organizing the fake elector effort in Nevada, he reported that âI spoke this evening with Mayor Guiliani [sic], who is focused on doing everything possible to ensure that that [sic] all the Trump-Pence electors vote on Dec. 14.ââ63

In the days that followed this handoff, Chesebro would draft and distribute documents intended for use in the Trump teamâs fake elector ceremonies that were then shared with key contacts in Arizona,64 Georgia,65 Michigan,66 Nevada,67 New Mexico,68 Pennsylvania,69 and Wisconsin.70 He also gave some of the groups step-by-step logistical guidance, such as when and where they should convene, how many copies each person would need to sign, and to send their fake votes to Congress via registered mail.71 âPretty Simple!â he commented in some of these emails.72

A campaign operative named Michael Roman was also tapped for a major operational role in the fake elector effort. When Findlay sent his email handing off certain responsibilities for the initiative, he also wrote that Giulianiâs team had designated Roman âas the lead for executing the voting on Mondayâ December 14th.73 Roman was the Trump Campaignâs Director of Election Day Operations (EDO), with team members who specialized in political outreach and mobilization in battleground States where the Trump team now urgently needed the fake electors to meet on December 14th.

With help from his EDO staff, as well as Giulianiâs team and RNC staffers working alongside the Campaign as part of the Trump Victory Committee, Roman ran an improvised âElectors Whip Operation.ââ74 For example, Roman sent an email on December 12th directing an aide to create âa tracker for the electorsâ with tabs for Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, listing contact information, whether they had been contacted, whether they agreed to attend on December 14th, and names of â[s]ubstitute electorsâ to replace any reticent or unavailable participants as needed.75 Roman referred to others on this email as the âWHIP TEAMâ and directed them to fill out the spreadsheet, to update him on âwhat you have and what you need,â and to plan on a call that evening.76

In the days that followed, this group focused on tracking which Republicans previously named as President Trumpâs nominees to the electoral college would be willing to show up for fake elector ceremonies, finding adequate substitutes for those who refused to attend, and actually coordinating the unrecognized elector signing ceremonies in seven States on December 14th.77 In all seven States, these efforts to mobilize fake electors benefitted from support from the RNC, as well as the State Republican parties.78 However, it was the Trump team who drove the process from start to finish, as one of the fake electors and later co-chair of the Michigan Republican party, Meshawn Maddock, told an audience in January 2022: âWe fought to seat the electors. The Trump campaign asked us to do that.ââ79

The Trump teamâs fake elector plan raised concerns not just for several senior officials but also for some of the Republican activists being recruited to be the fake electors. Findlay told the Select Committee that âthere were definitely electors in probably most of the States that had concerns about this process.ââ80 After being tasked with reaching out to the potential fake electors, Findlay notified his colleagues on December 10th that âa lot of questions are arisingâ from them.ââ81 He also noted that an RNC staffer seconded to the Trump Victory Committee ârequested a call with the PA electors and/or leadership to address concerns,â which âmay be necessary to get people to appear.ââ82

The Republican Party of Pennsylvaniaâs general counsel relayed several specific concerns to the Trump Campaign via email on December 13th. Warning that â[w]eâre all getting call [sic] from concerned Electors,â he elaborated as follows:

Iâm told that on the call with the Electors they were told that the Ballot form would be conditioned upon ultimate certification by the Governor, indemnification by the campaign if someone gets sued or worse, (charged with something by the AG or someone else), and the receipt by the Electors of a legal opinion by a national firm and certified to be accurate by a Pa. lawyer.

What was sent was a âmemoâ by Chesebro not addressed to the Electors, and no certification by a Pa. lawyer. To make it worse, Chesebro describes the Pa. plan as âdiceyâ. And thereâs no indication by anyone with authority that thereâs any indemnification authorized by the campaign.83

Pennsylvania GOP Chairman Lawrence Tabas informed the Select Committee that his Stateâs fake electors never were indemnified by the Trump Campaign.84

When Wisconsin Republican Party Chairman Andrew Hitt was notified in late November that âthe campaign wants to [sic] list of electors,â he texted his executive director that âI am def concerned about their inquiryâ and that âI hope they are not planning on asking us to do anything like try and say we are only the proper electors.ââ85 On December 12th, after Hitt received a message about a phone call with Giuliani to discuss the fake elector issue, he texted a colleague: âThese guys are up to no good and its [sic] gonna fail miserably.ââ86 Despite such concerns, Hitt and many other fake electors participated anyway.87

Even so, 14 of the original Republicans who had been listed as electoral college nominees on the November ballot bowed out when the fake Trump electors gathered in December.88 Former Michigan Secretary of State Terri Lynn Land declined to attend, which the Stateâs GOP chair, Laura Cox, told the Select Committee was because âI think she just said she was uncomfortable with the whole thingâ and that she âhas her own beliefs.ââ89 A senior advisor for the Pennsylvania GOP said that Chairman Tabas âdid not serve as an elector because Joe Biden won the election and it was Bidenâs electors that were certified.ââ90 Former U.S. Representative Tom Marino (RâPA) said he backed out because âIâm a constitutionalist,â and âas a former prosecutor, when the attorney general says that heâs not finding anything there, thatâs good enough for me.ââ91 The other eleven dropouts included a Georgia State lawmaker, a former State party chair from New Mexico, two former State party chairs from Pennsylvania, and Pennsylvaniaâs RNC national committeewoman.92

Other participants asserted that they would have had much greater concerns if the Trump team had been more forthcoming about how the fake electoral votes would be used.93 The Trump Campaignâs director of election day operations in Georgia told the Select Committee that âI absolutely would not haveâ wanted to participate in organizing the Trump teamâs fake electors in Georgia âhad I known that the three main lawyers for the campaign that Iâd spoken to in the past and were leading up were not on board.ââ94 He said he felt âangryâ because âno one really cared ifâif people were potentially putting themselves in jeopardyâ by doing this, and âwe were just . . . useful idiots or rubes at that point.ââ95

On December 14th, using instructions provided by Chesebro, the fake Trump electors gathered and participated in signing ceremonies in all seven States. In five of these StatesâArizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, and Wisconsinâthe certificates they signed used the language that falsely declared themselves to be âthe duly elected and qualified Electorsâ from their State.96 This declaration was false because none of the signatories had been granted that official status by their State government in the form of a certificate of ascertainment.

The paperwork signed by the fake Trump electors in two other States contained partial caveats. In New Mexico, the document they signed made clear that they were participating âon the understanding that it might later be determined that we are the duly elected and qualified Electors. . . .ââ97 In Pennsylvania, the document they signed indicated that they were participating âon the understanding that if, as a result of a final non-appealable Court Order or other proceeding prescribed by law, we are ultimately recognized as being the duly elected and qualified Electors. . . .ââ98

All seven of these invalid sets of electoral votes were then transmitted to Washington, DC. Romanâs team member in Georgia, for example, sent him an email on the afternoon of December 14th that affirmed the following: âAll votes cast, paperwork complete, being mailed now. Ran pretty smoothly.ââ99 Likewise, Findlay updated Campaign Manager Bill Stepien and his bosses on the legal team that the Trump teamâs slate in Georgia was not able to satisfy all provisions of State law but still âvoted as legally as possible under the circumstancesâ before transmitting their fake votes to Washington, DC, by mail.100

On the evening of December 14th, RNC Chairwoman McDaniel provided an update for President Trump on the status of the fake elector effort. She forwarded President Trumpâs executive assistant an âElector Recapâ email, which conveyed that âPresident Trumpâs electors votedâ not just in âthe states that he wonâ but also in six âcontested statesâ (specifically, Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin).101 Minutes later, President Trumpâs executive assistant replied: âItâs in front of him!ââ102

The Trump team and the fake electors also engaged in acts of subterfuge to carry out their plans on December 14th. For instance, a campaign staffer notified the Georgia participants via email that he âmust ask for your complete discretion.ââ103 He explained that their efforts required âcomplete secrecy,â and told them to arrive at the State capitol building and âplease state to the guards that you are attending a meeting with either Senator Brandon Beach or Senator Burt Jones.ââ104 Indeed, Greg Bluestein of the Atlanta Journal-Constitution reported that he tried to enter this groupâs meeting room but â[a] guy at the door called it an âeducation meetingâ and scrambled when I tried to walk in.ââ105

Former Michigan GOP Chair Laura Cox told the Select Committee that an attorney who âsaid he was working with the Presidentâs Campaignâ informed her that the Michigan slate for President Trump was âplanning to meet in the capit[o]l and hide overnight so that they could fulfill the role of casting their vote in, per law, in the Michigan chambers.ââ106 She said that she âtold him in no uncertain terms that that was insane and inappropriate,â and that she warned Michiganâs senate majority leader as a precaution.107 Instead, the group of fake electors in Michigan signed their paperwork in the State GOP headquarters, where staff told them not to bring phones inside.108

In spite of the Trump Campaignâs efforts to give the fake electorsâ votes the sheen of authenticity, they failed. The U.S. Senate Parliamentarian noted in correspondence by January 3rd that materials from the Trump teamâs supposed electors in Arizona, Georgia, Nevada, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania had âno seal of the stateâ and âno evidence votes were delivered by the executive of the state for signature by electors,ââ109 and, as a result, these materials failed to meet requirements of federal law. Similarly, the Senate Parliamentarian noted that the Trump teamâs slates from Georgia, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania appeared to violate another statute which requires the approval of the Governor for the substitution of electors.110 Meanwhile, the documents from Michigan and Wisconsin did not even arrive to Congress on time, so they also had missed the required statutory deadline.111

Several of the Trump teamâs fake electoral slates also failed to follow State rules specifying where they were required to meet. In Georgia and Wisconsin, State lawmakers or their staff appear to have helped participants gather inside their State capitols.112 But in Michigan, the fake Trump electors were blocked from entering the State capitol building.113 Despite this, they still signed documents attesting that they âconvened and organized in the State Capitol, in the City of Lansing, Michigan, and at 2:00 p.m. . . . performed the duties enjoined upon us.ââ114 That document had been signed earlier in the day off-site, and one of the signatories even told the Committee she didnât join their march to the State capitol building because she âdidnât see a need to go.ââ115

If the entire premise of the fake votes was not enough, these infirmities also meant that they had no legal relevance. In no way could they ever have been used by the Vice President to disregard the real votes of electors chosen by the voters.

In the weeks between December 14th and January 6th, President Trumpâs team continued to embrace the idea that the fake electoral votes had a purpose. Although Giuliani and White House speechwriter Stephen Miller made public comments on December 14th suggesting that the uncertified Trump votes were merely contingent, that pretense was dropped in short order.116

For example, on December 17th, White House Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany said on Fox News that in numerous States âthere has been an alternate slate of electors voted upon that Congress will decide in January.ââ117 On December 21st, President Trump and Vice President Pence each joined parts of a White House meeting in which Members of Congress from the Freedom Caucus encouraged the Vice President to reject Biden electors from one or more of the seven contested States.118 And days later, Eastman cited the existence of the fake votes in an email to Boris Epshteyn, a member of the Giuliani legal team, writing, â[t]he fact that we have multiple slates of electors demonstrate[s] the uncertainty of either. That should be enough.ââ119

As discussed further in Chapter 5, that email contained Eastmanâs 2-page memo proposing a strategy for January 6th based on the incorrect legal theory that Vice President Pence could assert some authority as President of the Senate to prevent or delay the election of former Vice President Biden during the joint session. Eastmanâs memo relied on the fake votes, which the memo featured in the very first line: â7 states have transmitted dual slates of electors.ââ120 When Eastman submitted his memo to Epshteyn, he also copied Chesebro, who had edited the memo and called it â[r]eally awesome.ââ121

By that point, Chesebro and Eastman were coordinating their arguments about the fake-elector votes and how they should be used. On January 1, 2021, Chesebro sent an email to Eastman and Epshteyn that recommended that Vice President Pence derail the joint session of Congress. In it, he raised the idea of Vice President Pence declaring âthat there are two competing slates of electoral votesâ in several States, and taking the position that only he, or possibly Congress, could âresolve any disputes concerning them.ââ122

Two days later, Eastman completed his second major memo advising President Trump and his team on strategies for January 6th, again arguing that there were âdual slates of electors from 7 states,â and calling for Vice President Pence to assert power to act â[a]s the ultimate arbiterâ to take steps that could overturn the election, either by sending the election back to State legislatures to reassess or by rejecting Bidenâs certified electoral votes from States in which there were also fake Trump electors.123

By early January, most of the fake elector votes had arrived in Washington, except those from Michigan and Wisconsin.124 Undeterred, the Trump team arranged to fly them to Washington and hand deliver them to Congress for the Vice President himself. âFreaking trump idiots want someone to fly original elector papers to the senate President . . .â Wisconsin Republican Party official Mark Jefferson wrote to Party Chairman Hitt on January 4th.125 Hitt responded, âOk I see I have a missed call from [Mike] Roman and a text from someone else. Did you talk to them already? This is just nuts. . . .ââ126

The next day, Trump Campaign Deputy Director for Election Day Operations G. Michael Brown sent a text message to other campaign staff suggesting that he was the person who delivered the fake votes to Congress.127 After sending the group a photo of his face with the Capitol in the background, Brown said, âThis has got to be the cover a book I write one dayâ and âI should probably buy [Mike] [R]oman a tie or something for sending me on this one. Hasnât been done since 1876 and it was only 3 states that did it.ââ128 The reference to 1876 alludes to a controversy during that election about certain Statesâ electoral college votes.129

President Trump and his Campaign apparently had assistance from allies on Capitol Hill for this effort, including Senator Ron Johnson, his chief of staff, and the chief of staff to Representative Mike Kelly, although Senator Johnson has said that â[his] involvement in that attempt to deliverâ fake elector paperwork âspanned the course of a couple seconds.ââ130 On the morning of January 6th, Representative Kellyâs then-chief of staff texted an aide to the Vice President, Chris Hodgson, about hand-delivering the fake elector votes to the Vice Presidentâs team before the joint session, a message that Hodgson ignored: âJust following up-any chance you or someone from your team can meet to take the Michigan and Wisconsin packets.ââ131

According to the office of Senator Ron Johnson, Representative Kellyâs chief of staff then had a phone call with Senator Johnsonâs chief of staff at 11:58 a.m. âabout how Kellyâs office could get us the electors [sic] because they had it.ââ132 Shortly after 11:30 a.m., the Trump Campaignâs lead attorney in Wisconsin had texted Senator Johnson expressing a â[n]eed to get a document on Wisconsin electors to you [for] the VP immediately. Is there a staff person I can talk to immediately.ââ133 Senator Johnson then put his chief of staff in touch with the campaign to handle the issue.134

Shortly afterwards, Senator Johnsonâs chief of staff texted Hodgson: â[Sen.] Johnson needs to hand something to VPOTUS please advise.ââ135 When Hodgson asked what it was, the response he got was, âAlternate slate of electors for MI and WI because archivist didnât receive them.ââ136 Hodgson did not mince words: âDo not give that to him [the Vice President]. Heâs about to walk over to preside over the joint session, those were supposed to come in through the mail.ââ137

Those fake electoral votes, which the Trump team tried for weeks to manufacture and deliver, never made it to the Vice President. But they would have been invalid even if they did arrive on time. The Trump teamâs activities were based on the false pretense that these fake electoral votes had a decisive role to play at the joint session of Congress. And yet any such role that they could have played would have helped unlawfully obstruct an official proceeding that determines how our Nation carries out the peaceful transfer of power between Presidents.

Indeed, as the joint session approached, Senator Mike Lee had expressed grave concerns about the fake elector effort in a series of text messages to one of the Trump teamâs senior legal advisors. Although Senator Lee had spent a month encouraging the idea of having State legislatures endorse competing electors for Trump, he grew alarmed as it became clear that the Trump team wanted the fake electorsâ votes to be considered on January 6th even without authorization from any State government body.138

On December 30th, Senator Lee texted Trump advisor Cleta Mitchell that January 6th was âa dangerous idea,â including âfor the republic itself.ââ139 He explained that, âI donât think we have any valid basis for objecting to the electorsâ because âit cannot be true that we can object to any stateâs presidential electors simply because we donât think they handled their election well or suspect illegal activity.ââ140 Senator Lee even questioned her about the planâs dangerous long-term consequences: â[w]ill you please explain to me how this doesnât create a slippery slope problem for all future presidential elections?ââ141

ENDNOTES

Â Â 1. âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.

Â Â 2. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Tim Murtaugh Production), XXM-0021349 (December 13, 2020, and December 14, 2020, text messages between Tim Murtaugh, Justin Clark, Jason Miller, and Eric Herschmann); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 116; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 70â72; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), pp. 38â43.

Â Â 3. See Chapter 4; Senate Committee on the Judiciary Majority Staff Report, Subverting Justice: How the Former President and His Allies Pressured DOJ to Overturn the 2020 Election, (Oct. 7, 2021), pp. 20â39, 188, and Key Document H at pp. 185â191, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Interim%20Staff%20Report%20FINAL.pdf.

Â Â 4. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053475, Chapman053476 (December 23, 2020, email titled âPRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIALâDec 23 memo on Jan 6 scenario.docxâ from John Eastman to Boris Epshteyn and Kenneth Chesebro, with attached memo titled âJanuary 6 scenarioâ); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Public Source), CTRL0000923050 (Jan. 3, 2021, John Eastman 6-page memo); John C. Eastman, âPrivileged and ConfidentialâJan 6 Scenario,â (Jan. 3, 2021), available atÂ https://www.scribd.com/document/528776994/Privileged-and-Confidential-Jan-3-Memo-on-Jan-6-Scenario; John C. Eastman, âTrying to Prevent Illegal Conduct from Deciding an Election is Not Endorsing a âCoupâ,â American Greatness, (Sep. 30, 2021), available atÂ https://amgreatness.com/2021/09/30/trying-to-prevent-illegal-conduct-from-deciding-an-election-is-not-endorsing-a-coup/ (embedded). See also Chapter 5.

Â Â 5. Order Re Privilege of 599 Documents Dated November 3, 2020âJanuary 20, 2021 at 23, Eastman v. Thompson, No. 8:22-cv-99 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2022), ECF No. 356, available at https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.841840/gov.uscourts.cacd.841840.356.0_1.pdf.

Â Â 6. Order re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 36, Eastman v. Thompson, 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM), available at https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.841840/gov.uscourts.cacd.841840.260.0_10.pdf.

Â Â 7. The Trump team tried to justify its fake-elector scheme based in part on the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon election. At that time, following a close vote in Hawaii, Republican and Democratic electors each met and cast purported electoral college votes on the same day because there was ongoing litigation and a pending recount. Circumstances in 2020 were different, however, in part because there were no pending recounts. Kenneth Chesebro reportedly recognized this difference in an email copied to Rudolph Giuliani that acknowledged certain concerns about their efforts could be âvalid,â because, as he put it, âin the Hawaii 1960 incident, when the Kennedy electors voted[,] there was a pending recount.â Maggie Haberman and Luke Broadwater, âArizona Officials Warned Fake Electors Plan Could âAppear Treasonousâ,â New York Times, (Aug. 2, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/02/us/politics/arizona-trump-fake-electors.html.

Â Â 8. David Thomas, âLawyer Group Says Trump Attorney Broke Ethics Rules in Fake Elector Plan,â Reuters, (Oct. 12, 2022), available at https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/lawyer-group-says-trump-attorney-broke-ethics-rules-fake-elector-plan-2022-10-12/; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â Â 9. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman025125 (November 18, 2020, memo from Kenneth Chesebro titled âThe Real Deadline for Settling a Stateâs Electoral Votesâ); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman025124 (December 7, 2020, email from Kenneth Chesebro with attachment â2020-11-20 Chesebro memo on real deadline2.pdfâ); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), JF037 (November 18, 2020, memo from Kenneth Chesebro titled âThe Real Deadline for Settling a Stateâs Electoral Votesâ). See also Alan Feuer, Maggie Haberman, and Luke Broadwater, âMemos Show Roots of Trumpâs Focus on Jan. 6 and Alternate Electors,â New York Times, (Feb. 2, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/02/us/politics/trump-jan-6-memos.html.

Â 10. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman025125 (November 18, 2020, memo from Kenneth Chesebro titled âThe Real Deadline for Settling a Stateâs Electoral Votesâ); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman025124 (December 7, 2020, email from Kenneth Chesebro with attachment â2020-11-20 Chesebro memo on real deadline2.pdfâ); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), JF037 (Nov. 18, 2020, memo from Kenneth Chesebro titled âThe Real Deadline for Settling a Stateâs Electoral Votesâ). See also Alan Feuer, Maggie Haberman, and Luke Broadwater, âMemos Show Roots of Trumpâs Focus on Jan. 6 and Alternate Electors,â New York Times, (Feb. 2, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/02/us/politics/trump-jan-6-memos.html.

Â 11. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman025125, (November 18, 2020, memo from Kenneth Chesebro titled âThe Real Deadline for Settling a Stateâs Electoral Votesâ) (underlining in original); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman025124, (December 7, 2020, email from Kenneth Chesebro with attachment â2020-11-20 Chesebro memo on real deadline2.pdfâ); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), CTRL0000082463_00009, (November 18, 2020, memo from Kenneth Chesebro titled âThe Real Deadline for Settling a Stateâs Electoral Votesâ); Alan Feuer, Maggie Haberman, and Luke Broadwater, âMemos Show Roots of Trumpâs Focus on Jan. 6 and Alternate Electors,â New York Times, (Feb. 2, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/02/us/politics/trump-jan-6-memos.html.

Â 12. Emphasis added. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), JF044, (December 9, 2020, memo from Kenneth Chesebro titled âStatutory Requirements for December 14 Electoral Votesâ); Alan Feuer, Maggie Haberman, and Luke Broadwater, âMemos Show Roots of Trumpâs Focus on Jan. 6 and Alternate Electors,â New York Times, (Feb. 2, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/02/us/politics/trump-jan-6-memos.html.

Â 13. U.S. Const., art. II, Â§. 1, cl. 2: (âEach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.â).

Â 14. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (James DeGraffenreid Production), DEGRAFFENREID 000778, (December 11, 2020, email from Jim DeGraffenreid to Kenneth Chesebro with subject âURGENTâTrump-Pence campaign asked me to contact you to coordinate Dec. 14 voting by Nevada electorsâ).

Â 15. Maggie Haberman and Luke Broadwater, ââKind of Wild/Creativeâ: Emails Shed Light on Trump Fake Electors Plan,â New York Times, (July 26, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/26/us/politics/trump-fake-electors-emails.html (emphasis in original). Although this alleged email described by the New York Times was not produced to the Select Committee, it matches certain information in a privilege log provided to the Select Committee by its reported sender. This includes the same reported sender (Jack Wilenchik), direct recipient (Boris Epshteyn), seven ccâed recipients in the same order (Christina Bobb, Lee Miller, Dennis Wilenchik, Aaron Green, Josh Offenhartz, Christine Ferreira, and Victoria Stevens), title (âRE: [EXTERNAL]FW: petition for Cert and Motion for Expedited Considerationâ), and date (12/8/2020), with only a negligible one-minute discrepancy in the time sent (4:27 p.m. versus 4:26 p.m.). See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Jack Wilenchik Production), CTRL0000922311, line 9 (Sept. 7, 2022, Jack Wilenchik Production 09_07_2022 - PrivLog UPDATED).

Â 16. âNevada Revised Statutes,â Title 24âElections, Chapter 298âPresidential Electors and Elections, Nevada State Legislature, available at https://www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/nrs-298.html#NRS298Sec065.

Â 17. âNevada Certificate of Ascertainment 2020,â National Archives and Records Administration, (Dec. 2, 2020, also later updated Dec. 10, 2020), available at https://www.archives.gov/files/electoral-college/2020/ascertainment-nevada.pdf.

Â 18. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), JF044 (December 9, 2020, memo from Kenneth Chesebro titled âStatutory Requirements for December 14 Electoral Votesâ). Where it wouldnât be possible to comply with State law, as in Nevada, Chesebro advised the so-called electors to proceed anyway, writing: "[T]hese technical aspects of state law are unlikely to matter much in the end." Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (James DeGraffenreid Production), DEGRAFFENREID 000778, (December 11, 2020, email from Jim DeGraffenreid to Kenneth Chesebro with subject âURGENTâTrump-Pence campaign asked me to contact you to coordinate Dec. 14 voting by Nevada electorsâ).

Â 19. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708 (January 4, 2021, email from Kenneth Chesebro to John Eastman titled âFwd: Draft 2, with editsâ, which includes in the chain a Dec. 13, 2020, email from Kenneth Chesebro to Rudy Giuliani titled âPRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIALâBrief Notes on âPresident of the Senateâ strategyâ).

Â 20. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708 (January 4, 2021, email from Kenneth Chesebro to John Eastman titled âFwd: Draft 2, with editsâ, which includes in the chain a Dec. 13, 2020, email from Kenneth Chesebro to Rudy Giuliani titled âPRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIALâBrief Notes on âPresident of the Senateâ strategyâ).

Â 21. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708 (January 4, 2021, email from Kenneth Chesebro to John Eastman titled âFwd: Draft 2, with editsâ, which includes in the chain a Dec. 13, 2020, email from Kenneth Chesebro to Rudy Giuliani titled âPRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIALâBrief Notes on âPresident of the Senateâ strategyâ).

Â 22. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708 (January 4, 2021, email from Kenneth Chesebro to John Eastman titled âFwd: Draft 2, with editsâ, which includes in the chain a Dec. 13, 2020, email from Kenneth Chesebro to Rudy Giuliani titled âPRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIALâBrief Notes on âPresident of the Senateâ strategyâ). In his email, Mr. Chesebro argues that the President of the Senate should open âtwo envelopesâ from the contested States including Arizona, âannounce[] that he cannot and will not .Â .Â . count any electoral votes from [the contested State] because there are two slates of votes,â and refuse to count them unless the election is ârerun,â the courts engage in âadequate judicial review,â or the Stateâs legislature âappoint[s] electors.â From this language, it is clear that Mr. Chesebro contemplated the fake votes being used in Congress without a court or State government adopting, ratifying, or otherwise selecting them as the proper electoral college votes from a contested State. To be fair, Chesebro concludes this email by telling Giuliani that â[m]any more points would need to be analyzed in making a complete argument that the President of the Senate possesses the sole power to count electoral votes, and anything to the contrary in the Electoral Count Act is unconstitutional.â Despite that caution, the very next sentence advocates for a vigorous assertion of that power: âBut at minimum this seems a defensible interpretation of the Twelfth Amendment, and one that ought to be asserted, vigorously, by whoever has the role of President of the Senate.â

Â 23. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708 (January 4, 2021, email from Kenneth Chesebro to John Eastman titled âFwd: Draft 2, with editsâ, which includes in the chain a Dec. 13, 2020, email from Kenneth Chesebro to Rudy Giuliani titled âPRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIALâBrief Notes on âPresident of the Senateâ strategyâ).

Â 24. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053475, Chapman053476, (Dec. 23, 2020 email titled âPRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIALâDec 23 memo on Jan 6 scenario.docxâ from John Eastman to Boris Epshteyn and Kenneth Chesebro, with attached memo titled âJanuary 6 scenarioâ); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Public Source), CTRL0000923050 (Jan. 3, 2021, John Eastman 6-page memo); John C. Eastman, âPrivileged and ConfidentialâJan 6 Scenario,â (Jan. 3, 2021), available atÂ https://www.scribd.com/document/528776994/Privileged-and-Confidential-Jan-3-Memo-on-Jan-6-ScenarioÂ and embedded at John C. Eastman, âTrying to Prevent Illegal Conduct from Deciding an Election is Not Endorsing a âCoupâ,â American Greatness (Sep. 30, 2021), available atÂ https://amgreatness.com/2021/09/30/trying-to-prevent-illegal-conduct-from-deciding-an-election-is-not-endorsing-a-coup/.

Â 25. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM003771.

Â 26. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM003771 (emphasis added).

Â 27. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM003769.

Â 28. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM010783, MM010784.

Â 29. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM010783, MM010784.

Â 30. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM013515.

Â 31. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM013516.

Â 32. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Mar. 7, 2022), pp. 54â55.

Â 33. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), pp. 27â28.

Â 34. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), p. 29.

Â 35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), pp. 86â87.

Â 36. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ronna Romney McDaniel, (June 1, 2022), pp. 7â8. Ms. McDaniel didnât recall the exact date of the call, but thought it was at least âa few days before December 14thâ and may have been sometime before the Supreme Court rejected the case Texas v. Pennsylvania on December 11th.

Â 37. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ronna Romney McDaniel, (June 1, 2022), pp. 8â9.

Â 38. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ronna Romney McDaniel, (June 1, 2022), pp. 9â13. McDaniel asserted to the Select Committee that even after December 14th she was under the impression that the seven slates of fake electors were strictly contingent in nature pending authorization by a court of law, and that she relayed this to several concerned Republican officials in the contested States. See id., at 18. However, there is also no indication that she took action to condemn or block the misuse of these contingent elector slates by January 6th.

Â 39. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Tim Murtaugh Production), XXM-0021349, (December 13, 2020, text message from Jason Miller to Justin Clark and Eric Herschmann). For instance, on December 11th, Chesebro wrote to a lawyer working on litigation efforts in Arizona, asking him to file a petition that would keep the litigation alive through the 14th: â[C]an you get the cert. petition on file by Monday? Reason is that Kelli Ward & Kelly Townsend just spoke to the Mayor about the campaignâs request that all electors vote Monday in all contested states. Ward and Townsend are concerned it could appear treasonous for the AZ electors to vote on Monday if there is no pending court proceeding that might, eventually, lead to the electors being ratified as the legitimate ones. Which is a valid pointÂ .Â .Â .Â .â Maggie Haberman and Luke Broadwater, âArizona Officials Warned Fake Electors Plan Could âAppear Treasonous,ââ The New York Times, (Aug. 2, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/02/us/politics/arizona-trump-fake-electors.html (emphasis in original).

Â 40. Order re Privilege of Remaining Documents at 15, Eastman v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2022), ECF No. 372.

Â 41. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Tim Murtaugh Production), XXM-0019417 (December 14, 2020, emails between Jason Miller and Boris Epshteyn).

Â 42. Order Dismissing Bill of Complaint and Denying Certiorari,Â Texas v. Pennsylvania, 592 U.S. ___, (Dec. 11, 2020) (No. 155, Orig.), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/121120zr_p860.pdf.

Â 43. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), pp. 87â88.

Â 44. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 116.

Â 45. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), p. 69; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 74.

Â 46. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 118.

Â 47. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 114.

Â 48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 114, 116.

Â 49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 116, 118. However, Justin Clarkâs message in an email dated December 24th seems to potentially contradict his suggestions that the campaign legal team fully backed out: âIn terms of political judgements on January 6 I know .Â .Â . that plans are being discussed and executed: alternate slates have been submitted, votes are being whipped, all of the arguments are in place and a not insignificant ad b[u]y was made highlighting the issues in the election.âÂ Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (William Stepien Production), WS 00036.

Â 50. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 70.

Â 51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), pp. 39â40.

Â 52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 69â70, 73.

Â 53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Patrick Philbin, (Apr. 13, 2022).

Â 54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 75â76.

Â 55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Mar. 7, 2022), p. 64â65. (Hutchinson later clarified that she recalled hearing that from Pat Cipollone and, potentially, also Pat Philbin.)

Â 56. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Mar. 7, 2022), pp. 64â65.

Â 57. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), JF052.

Â 58. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), pp. 87â88.

Â 59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), pp. 87â88.

Â 60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), p. 44.

Â 61. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), p. 30.

Â 62. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 125.

Â 63. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (James DeGraffenreid Production), CTRL0000044010_00031 (Dec. 10, 2020 email from Kenneth Chesebro to James DeGraffenreid and others).

Â 64. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), JF051, JF054.

Â 65. Documents on file with the Select Committee to investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (David Shafer Production), 108751.0001_000004, 108751.0001_000019, 108751.0001_000020, 108751.0001_000021, 108751.0001_000024.

Â 66. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), JF049.

Â 67. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (James DeGraffenreid Production), DEGRAFFENREID 000786; Documents on file with the Select Committee to investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Michael McDonald Production), MCDONALD 000789.

Â 68. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), JF061.

Â 69. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Lawrence Tabas Production), CTRL0000061077.

Â 70. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000011.

Â 71. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000011.

Â 72. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000011; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (David Shafer Production), 108751.0001 000004; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Lawrence Tabas Production), CTRL0000061077; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (James DeGraffenreid Production), DEGRAFFENREID 000786; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Kenneth Chesebro Production), KC_Elector_Correspondence_000211, KC_Elector_Correspondence_000215.

Â 73. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Joshua Findlay Production), JF052.

Â 74. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Robert Sinners Production), CTRL0000083897, CTRL0000083898.

Â 75. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Robert Sinners Production), CTRL0000083897.

Â 76. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Robert Sinners Production), CTRL0000083897. Members of this team appear to have included Trump Victory Committee or Trump Campaign EDO State or regional directors for relevant States, including Arizona and New Mexico (Thomas Lane), Georgia (Robert Sinners), Michigan (Shawn Flynn), Nevada (Jesse Law and Valerie McConahay), Pennsylvania (James Fitzpatrick), and Wisconsin (Ryan Terrill, who had originally worked on North Carolina issues but later shifted to Wisconsin), as well as Mr. Romanâs deputy (G. Michael Brown). See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Laura Cox Production), Laura Cox 000339; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Rudy Giuliani Production), RGGLOBAL_DOM_00001373; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Tim Murtaugh Production) XXM-0010338, XXM-0008776, XXM-0011867; Richard Ruelas, âTrump Campaign Official Subpoenaed by FBI Appears to Be at Meeting of Fake Arizona Electors,â Arizona Republic, (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/arizona/2022/06/23/fbi-subpoenas-thomas-lane-trump-campaign-arizona/7708133001/; Jonathan Oosting, âTrump Fake Elector Probe into 2020 Race Expands with Michigan Subpoenas,â Bridge Michigan, (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-government/trump-fake-elector-probe-2020-race-expands-michigan-subpoenas; Zach Montellaro and Holly Otterbein, âTrump Calls for Poll Watchers. Election Officials Call for Calm,â Politico, (Sept. 30, 2020), available at https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/30/trump-poll-watchers-election-423996; Luke Broadwater, âJan. 6 Inquiry Subpoenas 6 Tied to False Pro-Trump Elector Effort,â New York Times, (Feb. 15, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/15/us/politics/jan-6-subpoenas-trump.html.

Â 77. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Robert Sinners Production), CTRL0000083898.

Â 78. David Shafer (@DavidShafer), Twitter, Dec. 14, 2020 12:51 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/DavidShafer/status/1338542161932021762; David Shafer (@DavidShafer), Twitter, Dec. 14, 2020 1:07 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/DavidShafer/status/1338546066346676224; âRepublican Electors Cast Procedural Vote, Seek to Preserve Trump Campaign Legal Challenge,â Pennsylvania Republican Party website, (Dec. 14, 2020), available at https://pagop.org/2020/12/14/republican-electors-cast-procedural-vote/; âStatement on Republican Electors Meeting,â Republican Party of Wisconsin, (Dec. 14, 2020), available at https://wisgop.org/republican-electors-2020/; Republican Party of Arizona (@AZGOP), Twitter, Dec. 14, 2020 5:13 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/AZGOP/status/1338608056985239554.

Â 79. Marshall Cohen, Zachary Cohen, and Dan Merica, âTrump Campaign Officials, Led by Rudy Giuliani, Oversaw Fake Electors Plot in 7 States,â CNN, (Jan. 20, 2022), available at https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/20/politics/trump-campaign-officials-rudy-giuliani-fake-electors/index.html.

Â 80. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), p. 58.

Â 81. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Tim Murtaugh Production), XXM-0016071 (December 10, 2020, email from Joshua Findlay to Nick Trainer and Matt Morgan re: Presidential Elector Issues).

Â 82. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Tim Murtaugh Production), XXM-0016071 (December 10, 2020, email from Joshua Findlay to Nick Trainer and Matt Morgan re: Presidential Elector Issues); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Joshua Findlay, (May 25, 2022), pp. 55â59; Michael C. Bender, âRepublicans Hire Nine Regional Directors for Trump 2020 Election,â Wall Street Journal, (May 8, 2019), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-campaign-hires-nine-regional-directors-for-2020-election-11557355628.

Â 83. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Lawrence Tabas Production), CTRL0000061085 (December 13, 2020, email chain between Thomas King III and James Fitzpatrick re: Pa. Electors).

Â 84. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Lawrence Tabas, (Apr. 11, 2022).

Â 85. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000076 (December 4, 2020, Text messages between Andrew Hitt and Mark Jefferson); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Andrew Hitt, (Feb. 28, 2022), p. 8.

Â 86. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000083 (December 12, 2020, Text messages between Andrew Hitt and Mark Jefferson).

Â 87. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037949 (December 14, 2020, memorandum from purported electors in Wisconsin).

Â 88. Kira Lerner, âUPDATED Trumpâs Fake Electors: Hereâs the Full List,â News from the States, (June 29, 2022), available at https://www.newsfromthestates.com/article/updated-trumps-fake-electors-heres-full-list; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037568, CTRL0000037944, CTRL0000037945, CTRL0000037946, CTRL0000037947, CTRL0000037948, CTRL0000037949 (December 14, 2020, memoranda from slates of purported electors in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, New Mexico, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin).

Â 89. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Laura Cox, (May 3, 2022), pp. 77â78.

Â 90. Beth Reinhard, Amy Gardner, Josh Dawsey, Emma Brown, and Rosalind S. Helderman, âAs Giuliani Coordinated Plan for Trump Electoral Votes in States Biden Won, Some Electors Balked,â Washington Post, (Jan. 20, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/electors-giuliani-trump-electoral-college/2022/01/20/687e3698-7587-11ec-8b0a-bcfab800c430_story.html.

Â 91. Beth Reinhard, Amy Gardner, Josh Dawsey, Emma Brown, and Rosalind S. Helderman, âAs Giuliani Coordinated Plan for Trump Electoral Votes in States Biden Won, Some Electors Balked,â Washington Post, (Jan. 20, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/electors-giuliani-trump-electoral-college/2022/01/20/687e3698-7587-11ec-8b0a-bcfab800c430_story.html.

Â 92. Kira Lerner, âUPDATED Trumpâs fake electors: Hereâs the full list,â News from the States, (June 29, 2022), available at https://www.newsfromthestates.com/article/updated-trumps-fake-electors-heres-full-list.

Â 93. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Andrew Hitt, (Feb. 28, 2022), pp. 50â51.

Â 94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert Sinners, (June 15, 2022), pp. 18-19.

Â 95. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert Sinners, (June 15, 2022), pp. 37-38.

Â 96. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037568, CTRL0000037944, CTRL0000037945 CTRL0000037946, CTRL0000037947, CTRL0000037948, CTRL0000037949 (December 14, 2020, memoranda from slates of purported electors in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, and Wisconsin).

Â 97. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037946 (December 14, 2020, memorandum from purported electors in New Mexico).

Â 98. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037948 (December 14, 2020, memorandum from purported electors in Pennsylvania).

Â 99. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Robert Sinners Production), CTRL0000083893 (December 14, 2020, email chain from Robert Sinners to Mike Roman and others re: Whip Update).

100. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (William Stepien Production), WS 00095, WS 00096 (December 14, 2020, email from Joshua Findlay to Matt Morgan, Justin Clark, and ccâing Bill Stepien re: Georgia Update).

101. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000009527_0001, (December 14, 2020, forwarded email from Ronna McDaniel to Molly Michael with the subject line: âFWD: Electors RecapâFinalâ).

102. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000009527_0001, (December 14, 2020, forwarded email from Ronna McDaniel to Molly Michael with the subject line: âFWD: Electors RecapâFinalâ).

103. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Shawn Still Production), CTRL0000042623_00018 (December 13, 2020, email from Shawn Still to Dana Pagan subject: âFwd: Information on Duties of Presidential Electors â Monday, December 14thâ).

104. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Shawn Still Production), CTRL0000042623_00018 (December 13, 2020, email from Shawn Still to Dana Pagan subject: âFwd: Information on Duties of Presidential Electors â Monday, December 14thâ).

105. Greg Bluestein (@bluestein), Twitter, Dec. 14, 2020 11:32 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/bluestein/status/1338522299360800771; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Shawn Still, (Feb. 25, 2022), pp. 41â48; Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman, âExclusive: Fulton County DA Sends âTargetâ Letters to Trump Allies in Georgia Investigation,â Yahoo! News, (July 15, 2022), available at https://news.yahoo.com/exclusive-fulton-county-da-sends-target-letters-to-trump-allies-in-georgia-investigation-152517469.html.

106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Laura Cox, (May 3, 2022), pp. 53â54.

107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Laura Cox, (May 3, 2022), pp. 53â54.

108. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Mayra Rodriguez, (Feb. 22, 2022), pp. 14â18.

109. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000417_0001, VP-R0000418_0001 (January 3, 2021, email from Elizabeth MacDonough, subject âRE: COV trackerâ with attachment); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), 00094 (Attachment to email from Elizabeth MacDonough, subject âRE: COV trackerâ).

110. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000417_0001, VP-R0000418_0001 (January 3, 2021, email from Elizabeth MacDonough, subject âRE: COV trackerâ with attachment); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), 00094 (Attachment to email from Elizabeth MacDonough, subject âRE: COV trackerâ).

111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 144â45, 206â07.

112. In Wisconsin they were able to enter with apparent help from the chief of staff for then majority leader of the Wisconsin State Senate, Scott Fitzgerald, who now represents Wisconsin in the U.S. House of Representatives. In Georgia, a freelance reporter who has testified to the Fulton County grand jury claims to have found that the room in which the fake electors met was reserved by the office of Georgia House Speaker David Ralston, which is consistent with what Georgia GOP Chairman David Shafer told the Select Committee. See âOpen Records Regarding Wisconsinâs Fake Electors Suggest Congressman Scott Fitzgerald Played Significant Role in Trying to Overturn a Free and Fair Election,â Office of Wisconsin State Senator Chris Larson, (Jan. 25, 2022), available at https://legis.wisconsin.gov/senate/07/Larson/media/2056/1-25-22-fitzgerald-electors-pr.pdf; Letter from Cyrus Anderson, Deputy Sergeant at Arms, Wisconsin State Senate to State Sen. Chris Larson, attaching documents, Jan. 24, 2022, available at https://legis.wisconsin.gov/senate/07/Larson/media/2052/12-14-20-open-records-request-results-short.pdf; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of David Shafer, (Feb. 25, 2022), pp. 93â94, 106; Michael Isikoff and Daniel Kladman, âExclusive: Fulton County DA Sends âTargetâ Letters to Trump Allies in Georgia Investigation,â Yahoo! News, (July 15, 2022), available at https://news.yahoo.com/exclusive-fulton-county-da-sends-target-letters-to-trump-allies-in-georgia-investigation-152517469.html; George Chidi, âBearing Witness,â The Atlanta Objective with George Chidi, (June 29, 2022), available at https://theatlantaobjective.substack.com/p/bearing-witness; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Shawn Still Production), 108755.0001_000009 (December 13, 2020, email from Shawn Still to Dana Pagan re: âFwd: Information of Duties of Presidential Electors â Monday Dec. 14thâ).

113. Daniel Villareal, âMichigan Republicans Tried to Submit Fake Electoral Votes to Capitol,â Newsweek, (Dec. 15, 2020), available at https://www.newsweek.com/michigan-republicans-tried-submit-fake-electoral-votes-capitol-1555028.

114. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037945, p. 2 (December 14, 2020, memorandum of purported Michigan electors for Donald J. Trump).

115. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Mayra Rodriguez, (Feb. 22, 2022), pp. 18, 21; Laina G. Stebbins, âFeds Serve Subpoenas to Pro-Trump Fake Electors in Michigan,â Michigan Advance (June 23, 2022), available at https://michiganadvance.com/blog/feds-serve-subpoenas-to-pro-trump-fake-electors-in-michigan/.

116. Brett Samuels, âStephen Miller: âAlternateâ Electors Will Keep Trump Election Challenge Alive,â The Hill, (Dec. 14, 2020), available at https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/530092-stephen-miller-alternate-electors-will-keep-trump-challenge-alive-post/; Steve Bannonâs War Room Radio, âSTEVE BANNONâS WAR ROOM RADIO SPECIAL EPISODE582,â BitChute, (aired on Dec. 14, 2020, reposted on BitChute Aug. 22, 2021), at 10:30â13:00, available at https://www.bitchute.com/video/v889V3Thxgcj/.

117. Mike Wereschagin, âPa. Republicansâ Hedged Language May Have Saved Them from Prosecution over Electoral Vote Scheme,â Lancaster Online, (Jan. 17, 2022), available at https://lancasteronline.com/news/politics/pa-republicans-hedged-language-may-have-saved-them-from-prosecution-over-electoral-vote-scheme/article_849d4f7e-7589-11ec-8881-6383a823557d.html.

118. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Mar. 7, 2022), pp. 143-48.

119. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053475 (December 23, 2020, John Eastman email to Boris Epshteyn and Ken Chesebro).

120. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053476 (Word Document, âPRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL January 6 Scenario,â attached in Dec. 23, 2020, John Eastman email to Boris Epshteyn and Ken Chesebro).

121. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053475 (December 23, 2020, John Eastman email to Boris Epshteyn and Ken Chesebro).

122. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman061863 (January 1, 2021, Kenneth Chesebro email to John Eastman and Boris Epshteyn at 10:26 p.m.).

123. Both of Dr. Eastmanâs memos described here are discussed at length in the chapter addressing President Trumpâs pressure on the Vice President. See Chapter 5. See also Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053475, Chapman053476, (Dec. 23, 2020 email titled âPRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIALâDec 23 memo on Jan 6 scenario.docxâ from John Eastman to Boris Epshteyn and Kenneth Chesebro, with attached memo titled âJanuary 6 scenarioâ); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Public Source), CTRL0000923050 (Jan. 3, 2021, John Eastman 6-page memo); John C. Eastman, âPrivileged and ConfidentialâJan 6 Scenario,â (Jan. 3, 2021), available atÂ https://www.scribd.com/document/528776994/Privileged-and-Confidential-Jan-3-Memo-on-Jan-6-ScenarioÂ and embedded at John C. Eastman, âTrying to Prevent Illegal Conduct from Deciding an Election is Not Endorsing a âCoupâ,â American Greatness (Sep. 30, 2021), available atÂ https://amgreatness.com/2021/09/30/trying-to-prevent-illegal-conduct-from-deciding-an-election-is-not-endorsing-a-coup/.

124. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000417_0001, VP-R0000418_0001 (January 3, 2021 email and attachment from Senate Parliamentarian to Office of the Vice President); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production) 00094 (additional copy of same attachment sent from Senate Parliamentarian to Office of the Vice President).

125. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000089 (January 4, 2021, Andrew Hitt text message to Mark Jefferson at 9:02 p.m.).

126. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000089 (January 4, 2021, Andrew Hitt text message to Mark Jefferson at 9:02 p.m.).

127. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Angela McCallum Production), McCallum_01_001576, McCallum_01_001577 (Michael Brown text message to Angela McCallum at undetermined time); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Angela McCallum (Dec. 8, 2021), p. 122.

128. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Angela McCallum Production), McCallum_01_001576, McCallum_01_001577 (Michael Brown text message to Angela McCallum at undetermined time); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Angela McCallum (Dec. 8, 2021), p. 122.

129. The Select Committee does not know where Brown delivered the fake votes. The Select Committee attempted to contact Brown multiple ways, including by subpoena, but servers could not locate him and he never responded to outreach. The Select Committee served Mike Roman with a subpoena, but he asserted his Fifth Amendment rights and did not answer any substantive questions about the fake-elector scheme. What the Select Committee has determined, however, is that Brown likely delivered the fake electoral college votes to at least one of President Trumpâs allies in Congress. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Michael Roman, (Aug. 10, 2022), p. 40.

130. Jason Lemon, âJohnson Says Involvement With 1/6 Fake Electors Plan Only âLasted Secondsâ,â Newsweek, (Aug. 21, 2022), available at https://www.newsweek.com/johnson-says-involvement-1-6-fake-electors-plan-only-lasted-seconds-1735486; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), CTRL0000056548_00007 (January 6, 2021, text message at 8:41 a.m. ET from Matt Stroia to Chris Hodgson); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), CTRL0000056548_000035 (Jan. 6, 2021, text message around 12:37 p.m. ET from Sean Riley to Chris Hodgson) (âJohnson needs to hand something to VPOTUS please advise .Â .Â . âAlternate slate of electors for MI and WI because archivist didnât receive themÂ .Â .Â .â).

131. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), CTRL0000056548_00007 (January 6, 2021, Matt Stroia text message to Chris Hodgson at 8:41 a.m.).

132. Lawrence Andrea, âPennsylvania Congressman Concludes Internal Investigation with Few Answers After Ron Johnsonâs Claims About False Electors,â Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, (July 14, 2022), available at https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2022/07/14/few-answers-mike-kellys-probe-into-false-electors-ron-johnson-pennsylvania-wisconsin/10059776002/.

133. âThe Vicki McKenna ShowâKeep and Bear Arms,â iHeart Radio, June 23, 2022, at 9:30â15:00, available at https://www.iheart.com/podcast/139-vicki-mckenna-27246267/episode/the-vicki-mckenna-show-keep-98666092/?position=570&embed=true; John Solomon, âJan. 6 Panelâs Ron Johnson Narrative Exposes Ills of One-Sided Hearing,â Just The News, (June 23, 2022), available at https://justthenews.com/government/jan-6-panels-ron-johnson-narrative-exposes-ills-one-sided-hearing (linking to image of text message available at https://justthenews.com/sites/default/files/2022-06/TroupisJohnson1.pdf).

134. âThe Vicki McKenna ShowâKeep and Bear Arms,â iHeart Radio, June 23, 2022, at 9:30â15:00, available at https://www.iheart.com/podcast/139-vicki-mckenna-27246267/episode/the-vicki-mckenna-show-keep-98666092/?position=570&embed=true; John Solomon, âJan. 6 Panelâs Ron Johnson Narrative Exposes Ills of One-Sided Hearing,â Just The News, (June 23, 2022), available at https://justthenews.com/government/jan-6-panels-ron-johnson-narrative-exposes-ills-one-sided-hearing (linking to image of text message available at https://justthenews.com/sites/default/files/2022-06/JohnsonTroupis2Redacted.pdf).

135. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), CTRL0000056548_00035 (January 6,2021, Sean Riley text message to Chris Hodgson at 12:37 p.m. ET).

136. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), CTRL0000056548_00035 (January 6, 2021, Sean Riley text message to Chris Hodgson at 12:37 p.m. ET).

137. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), CTRL0000056548_00035 (January 6, 2021, Sean Riley text message to Chris Hodgson at 12:37 p.m. ET).

138. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM013494, MM014589, MM014592, MM014595, MM014598, MM014722 (Mark Meadows text messages with Sen. Mike Lee on December 8, 2020, January 3, 2021, and January 4, 2021); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Cleta Mitchell Production), CM00015452, CM00015477 (Cleta Mitchell text messages with Sen. Mike Lee on December 9, 2020 and December 30, 2020).

139. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Cleta Mitchell Production), CM00015477.

140. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Cleta Mitchell Production), CM00015477.

141. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Cleta Mitchell Production), CM00015477.

4

U.S. Attorney General William Barr knew there would be trouble before all the votes had been counted. âSo, right out of the box on election night, the President claimed that there was major fraud underway,â Barr explained. âI mean, this happened, as far as I could tell, before there was actually any potential of looking at evidence.ââ1 President Trump was quick to claim, âthere was major fraudâ based solely on the phenomenon known as the âRed Mirage.ââ2

As explained elsewhere in this report, Democrats were more inclined to vote via mail-in ballot during the 2020 Presidential election than Republicans, who were more likely to vote in-person on election day. This was widely known, and partly a result of, President Trumpâs own public statements criticizing mail-in balloting. It also created a gap in the timing of how votes were tallied. The early vote tally favored Republicans on election night because the mail-in ballots, which skewed toward Democrats, were not yet fully counted. This occurred not just in 2020, but also in previous elections.3 The President knew of this phenomenon but exploited it on election night, nonetheless, as he and his allies had planned to do.4

President Trump exploited this timing gap and used it as âthe basis for this broad claim that there was major fraud,â Barr said.5 But the Attorney General âdidnât think much of that.â People âhad been talking for weeks and everyone understood for weeks that that was going to be what happened on election night,â Barr explained.6 Cities with Democratic majorities in the battleground States wouldnât have their votes fully counted until âthe end of the cycle,â with âa lot of Democratic votes coming in at the end.ââ7 This was not some well-guarded secret, as âeveryone understood that the dynamic of election night in many States would be whether or not the Democratic votes at the end of the day would overcome the election day votes.ââ8

Within days of the election, the President made an âavalancheâ of fraud allegations. It âwas like playing Whac-A-Mole,â Barr explained, âbecause something would come out one day and the next day it would be another issue.ââ9 Barr told his âstaff very soon after the electionâ that he âdidnât think the President would ever admit that he lost the election, and he would blame it on fraud, and then he would blame the actions and evidence on the Department of Justice.ââ10

Barr soon took steps to investigate claims of fraud in the 2020 Presidential election, even in the absence of evidence. The Department of Justiceâs (DOJ) longstanding policy had been to avoid any substantive investigations until after the electionâs results were certified.11 As the countryâs premier Federal law enforcement agency, DOJ is justifiably concerned that its substantial power can influence the outcome of an election, and it has enacted policies to mitigate this possibility.12

On November 7, 2020, the media declared former Vice President Biden the winner of the Presidential election. Two days later, on November 9th, Attorney General Barr authorized wider investigations into claims of election fraud.13 Barr instructed DOJ and FBI personnel âto pursue substantial allegations of voting and vote tabulation irregularities prior to the certification of elections in your jurisdictions in certain cases.ââ14 Barr noted that nothing in his memo âshould be taken as any indication that the Department has concluded that voting irregularities have impacted the outcome of any election.ââ15

As Barr predicted, the President did call on him for information about alleged election fraud. Trump challenged him with a blizzard of conspiracy theories in three face-to-face meetings after the election. The first such meeting occurred on November 23, 2020.

On November 23rd, the Attorney General spoke with White House Counsel Pat Cipollone, who said that it was important for him come to the White House and speak to President Trump.16 Barr had not seen the President since before the election in late October, and the White House counsel believed that it was important that the Attorney General explain what the Department of Justice was doing related to claims of election fraud.17

âThe President said there had been major fraud and that, as soon as the facts were out, the results of the election would be reversed,â Barr recalled. Trump continued âfor quite a while,â and Barr was âexpectingâ what came next.18 President Trump alleged that âthe Department of Justice doesnât think it has a role looking into these fraud claims.ââ19 Barr anticipated this line of attack because the Presidentâs counsel, Rudolph Giuliani, was making all sorts of wild, unsubstantiated claims.20 And Giuliani wanted to blame DOJ for the fact that no one had come up with any real evidence of fraud.21 Of course, by the time of this meeting, U.S. Attorneysâ Offices had been explicitly authorized to investigate substantial claims for 2 weeks and had yet to find any evidence of significant voter fraud.22

Barr explained to the President why he was wrong. DOJ was willing to investigate any âspecific and credible allegations of fraud.ââ23 The fact of the matter was that the claims being made were âjust not meritoriousâ and were ânot panning out.ââ24 Barr emphasized to the President that DOJ âdoesnât take sides in electionsâ and âis not an extension of your legal team.ââ25

During the November 23rd meeting, Barr also challenged one of President Trumpâs central lies. He âspecifically raised the Dominion voting machines, which I found to be one of the most disturbing allegations.ââ26 âDisturbing,â Barr explained, because there was âabsolutely zero basis for the allegations,â which were being âmade in such a sensational way that they obviously were influencing a lot of people, members of the public.ââ27 Americans were being deceived into thinking âthat there was this systematic corruption in the system and that their votes didnât count and that these machines, controlled by somebody else, were actually determining it, which was complete nonsense.ââ28 Barr stressed to the President that this was âcrazy stuff,â arguing that not only was the conspiracy theory a waste of time, but it was also âdoing [a] great, great disservice to the country.ââ29

As Attorney General Barr left the meeting, he talked with Mark Meadows, the White House Chief of Staff, and Jared Kushner, President Trumpâs son-in-law.30 âI think heâs become more realistic and knows that thereâs a limit to how far he can take this,â Meadows said, according to Barr.31 Kushner reassured Barr, âweâre working on this, weâre working on it.ââ32 Barr was hopeful that the President was beginning to accept reality.33 The opposite happened.

âI felt that things continued to deteriorate between the 23rd and the weekend of the 29th,â Barr recalled.34 Barr was concerned because President Trump began meeting with delegations of State legislators, and it appeared to him that âthere was maneuvering going on.ââ35 Barr had âno problemâ with challenging an election âthrough the appropriate process,â but âworriedâ that he âdidnât have any visibility into what was going onâ and that the âPresident was digging in.ââ36

Attorney General Barr had been clear that DOJ was investigating claims of fraud. The Department simply was not turning up any real evidence of malfeasance, and certainly nothing that would overturn the election. Just as Barr feared, the President turned on DOJ anyway.

On November 29, 2020, Fox Newsâs Maria Bartiromo interviewed President Trump. It was his first TV interview since he lost his bid for reelection. The President claimed the election was âriggedâ and rife with âfraud.ââ37 President Trump repeated various conspiracy theories, leading with the claim that Dominionâs voting machines had âglitches,â which moved âthousands of votes from my account to Bidenâs account.ââ38 President Trump pointed to âdumps of votes,â a reference to the batches of mail-in ballots that had been tabulated later in the counting process.39 He rambled off various other, spurious allegations, including that dead people voted in significant numbers.40

âThis is total fraud,â the President said.41 âAnd how the FBI and Department of JusticeâI donât knowâmaybe theyâre involved, but how people are getting away with this stuffâitâs unbelievable. This election was rigged. This election was a total fraud.ââ42

âWhere is the DOJ and the FBI in all of this, Mr. President?â Bartiromo asked.43 âYou have laid out some serious charges here. Shouldnât this be something that the FBI is investigating? Are they? Is the DOJ investigating?â Bartiromo asked incredulously.44

âMissing in action,â the President replied, âcanât tell you where they are.ââ45 He conceded that when he asked if DOJ and FBI were investigating, âeveryone says yes, theyâre looking at it.ââ46 But he didnât leave it there. âYou would think if youâre in the FBI or Department of Justice, this is, this is the biggest thing you could be looking at,â President Trump said. âWhere are they? Iâve not seen anything. I mean, just keep moving along. They go onto the next President.ââ47 He claimed the FBI was not even investigating Dominion, adding that votes processed in its machines âare counted in foreign countries.ââ48

None of this was true. Just 6 days earlier, Attorney General Barr had explained to President Trump how DOJ and FBI were investigating fraud claims. Barr also made it a point to emphasize that the Dominion claims were nonsense. The President simply lied. The âcrazy stuff,â as Barr put it, was all Trump could cite.

Attorney General Barr then decided to speak out. He invited Michael Balsamo, an Associated Press (AP) reporter, to lunch on December 1st. Barr told the journalist that âto date, we have not seen fraud on a scale that could have effected a different outcome in the election.ââ49

That made the President irate.

Later that evening, Attorney General Barr met with President Trump at the White House. It was their second face-to-face meeting after the November election.50 At first, President Trump didnât even look at Attorney General Barr.51 The President âwas as mad as Iâve ever seen him, and he was trying to control himself,â Barr said.52 The President finally âshoved a newspaperâ with the AP quote in Barrâs face.53

âWell, this is, you know, killing me. You didnât have to say this. You mustâve said this because you hate Trumpâyou hate Trump,â Barr remembered him saying.54 âNo, I donât hate you, Mr. President,â Barr replied. âYou know, I came in at a low time in your administration. Iâve tried to help your administration. I certainly donât hate you.ââ55

President Trump peppered him with unsupported conspiracy theories.56 Because he had authorized DOJ and FBI to investigate fraud claims, Attorney General Barr was familiar with the conspiracy theories raised by the President. The âbig onesâ he investigated included claims such as: Dominion voting machines switched votes, votes had been âdumped at the end of the night in Milwaukee and Detroit,â non-residents voted in Nevada, the number of ballots counted in Pennsylvania exceeded the number of votes cast, as well as a story about a truck driver supposedly driving thousands of pre-filled ballots from New York to Pennsylvania, among others.57 Under Attorney General Barr, DOJ would also investigate a false claim that a video feed in Fulton County captured multiple runs of ballots for former Vice President Biden. As explained in detail in Chapter 1 of this report, there was no truth to any of these allegations, but that didnât stop President Trump from repeatedly citing these fictional accounts.

âAnd I told him that the stuff that his people were shoveling out to the public was bullshit, I mean, that the claims of fraud were bullshit,â Barr recalled about the December 1st meeting.58 âAnd, you know, he was indignant about that. And I reiterated that they wasted a whole month of these claims on the Dominion voting machines and they were idiotic claims.ââ59

President Trump repeated that there had been a âbig vote dumpâ in Detroit.60 But Attorney General Barr quickly parried this claim.61 There was nothing suspicious in how the votes flowed into a central location, Barr explained, because that is how votes are always counted in Wayne County.62 Moreover, Barr pointed out that the President performed better in Detroit in 2020 than he had in 2016. âI mean, thereâs no indication of fraud in Detroit,â Barr said.63 Barr explained that the âthing about the truck driver is complete, you know, nonsense.ââ64 DOJ and FBI had investigated the matter, including by interviewing the relevant witnesses.65 There was no truck filled with ballots.

Nothing that Attorney General Barr said during that meeting could satisfy President Trump. So, the President shifted the focus to Barr. He complained that the Attorney General hadnât indicted former FBI Director James Comey and that U.S. Attorney John Durhamâs investigation into the origins of the FBIâs Crossfire Hurricane investigation hadnât made more progress.66 âLook, I know that youâre dissatisfied with me,â Barr said, âand Iâm glad to offer my resignation.ââ67 President Trump pounded the table in front of him with his fist and said, âAccepted.ââ68

White House lawyers Pat Cipollone and Eric Herschmann tracked Barr down in the parking lot after he left.69 They convinced Barr to stay in the administration.70 But his days as Attorney General were numbered. President Trump was not going to stop spreading conspiracy theories. Nor would the President cease in his effort to co-opt DOJ for his own corrupt political purposes.

President Trump released a video on Facebook the very next day.71 He repeated many of the same lies, including the conspiracy theory about Dominion voting machines switching votes. The President also offered charts, falsely claiming that fraudulent âvote dumpsâ had swung the election against him.72 Among the examples he cited was the supposed âvote dumpâ in Detroit, Michigan.73 In fact, Barr had already debunked this and other claims.

On December 3, 2020, Rudolph Giuliani appeared before the Georgia Senate Government Oversight Committee to allege that massive cheating had occurred during the election.74 Giuliani offered a video recorded on election night at the State Farm Arena in Atlanta, Georgia, as a key piece of evidence.75 Giuliani alleged that the video showed a secret suitcase of ballots being double- and triple-counted after Republican poll watchers had been inappropriately dismissed.76 The video was selectively edited and showed nothing of the sort. The Georgia Secretary of Stateâs Office investigated and immediately debunked the claim, finding that the secret suitcase was just a secure box and nothing nefarious had occurred.77 President Trump, Giuliani and others continued to push the lie anyway.

On December 4th, Attorney General Barr asked Byung J. (âBJayâ) Pak, who was then the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia, to independently investigate the State Farm claim. Barr told Pak that this was a âpriority,â because âhe was going to go to the White House for a meetingâ and the âissue might come up.â Barr asked Pak to âtry to substantiate the allegation made by Mr. Giuliani.ââ78

Pak watched the video from State Farm Arena and asked the FBI to investigate the matter further. Pak told the Select Committee that FBI agents âinterviewed the individualsâ shown in the video who were supposedly âdouble, triple countingâ the ballots, and âdetermined that nothing irregular happened in the counting and the allegations made by Mr. Giuliani were false.ââ79 And, as noted above, the supposed âsuitcaseâ was a secure storage container used to store ballots. With this evidence in hand, Pak told Attorney General Barr that there was no substance to the allegations.80

Finally, Attorney General Barr had had enough. He submitted his resignation on December 14, 2020.81 During an interview with the Select Committee, former Attorney General Barr reflected on his face-to-face encounters with President Trump in November and December 2020:

And, in that context, I made clear I did not agree with the idea of saying the election was stolen and putting out this stuff which I told the President was bullshit. And, you know, I didnât want to be part of it. And thatâs one of the reasons that went into me deciding to leave when I did.

I observed, I think it was on December 1st, thatâyou know, I believe you canât live in a world where the incumbent administration stays in power based on its view, unsupported by specific evidence, that the electionâthat there was fraud in the election.82

Around mid-day on December 14th, Attorney General Barr met with President Trump and Meadows in the Oval Office to discuss his resignation.83 When he arrived, and even before Barr could mention his resignation, President Trump began speaking at length about the recently released Allied Security Operations Group (ASOG) report on Dominion voting machines in Antrim County, Michigan.84 While the Attorney General had been briefed on the allegations in Antrim County and did not find them credible, he promised the President that he would have DOJ investigate them.85 The Attorney General then told President Trump that he had come for a separate reason and wished to speak to the President privately, so Meadows left.86

Barr told President Trump that it was clear the President was dissatisfied with him as Attorney General and that he had decided to resign.87 President Trump accepted his resignation and asked Barr who would replace him; Attorney General Barr recommended Jeffrey A. Rosen as Acting Attorney General and Richard Donoghue as his deputy.88 Although President Trump called Donoghue to discuss the possibility of appointing him Acting Attorney General, Donoghue advised that normal procedures be followed and Rosen be named Acting Attorney General.89 President Trump followed this advice, and upon Barrâs departure, Rosen became Acting Attorney General while Donoghue would function as his deputy.

Barr felt that he was leaving the Department in the hands of two trusted lieutenants. But President Trump immediately began to pressure Rosen and Donoghue, just as he had Barr.

On December 14, 2020, the day Barr resigned, Molly Michael, Special Assistant to the President and Oval Office Coordinator, sent an email to Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen. The email had two documents attached, both of which were labeled âFrom POTUS.ââ90 The first was a set of talking points focused on false allegations of voter fraud in Antrim County, Michigan. The second document was the same ASOG report the President had given Barr.91

The next day, President Trump held a meeting in the White House with Acting Attorney General Rosen, Acting Deputy Attorney Donoghue, Cipollone, Meadows, Acting Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security Ken Cuccinelli, and Acting General Counsel of the Department of Homeland Security Chad Mizelle.92 Barr did not attend, even though he was not scheduled to leave DOJ until the following week. The timing of the meeting was notable, as the previous day the electoral college had met and cast their votes in favor of former Vice President Biden.

During testimony before the Select Committee, Donoghue explained that the December 15th, meeting âwas largely focused onâ the ASOG report.93 According to Donoghue, the President âwas adamant that the report must be accurate, that it proved that the election was defective, that he in fact won the election, and the [D]epartment should be using that report to basically tell the American people that the results were not trustworthy.ââ94 President Trump discussed âother theories as well,â including erroneous allegations of voter fraud in Georgia and Pennsylvania, but âthe bulk of that conversation on December 15th focused on Antrim County, Michigan.ââ95 President Trump asked why DOJ wasnât âdoing more to look at thisâ and whether the Department was âgoing to do its job.ââ96

The Department of Justice was doing its job. In fact, Attorney General Barr had ordered unprecedented investigations into the many specious claims of voter fraud. The President simply didnât want to hear the truthâthat DOJ found that not one of the bogus claims was true. As explained in Chapter 1, the original vote totals in Antrim County were the result of a human error that had since been corrected, not the result of any problem with Dominion machines or software. There was no evidence of fraud.

On December 21, 2020, 11 House Republicans met with President Trump at the White House to discuss their plans for objecting to the certification of the electoral college vote on January 6th.97 After the meeting, Mark Meadows tweeted: âSeveral members of Congress just finished a meeting in the Oval Office with @realDonaldTrump preparing to fight back against mounting evidence of voter fraud. Stay tuned.ââ98 Among those in attendance was Congressman Scott Perry, a Republican from Pennsylvania.99

By the next day, Representative Perry had introduced a little-known DOJ official named Jeffrey Clark to the President.100 At the time, Clark was the Acting Head of the Civil Division and Head of the Environmental and Natural Resources Division at the Department of Justice.101 Clark had no experience in, or responsibilities related to, investigating allegations of election fraud.

President Trump called Acting Attorney General Rosen âvirtually every dayâ between December 23rd and January 3rd.102 The President usually discussed his âdissatisfactionâ with DOJ, claiming the Department was not doing enough to investigate election fraud.103 On Christmas Eve, Trump brought up Jeffrey Clarkâs name. Rosen found it âpeculiar,â telling the Select Committee: âI was quizzical as to how does the President even know Mr. Clark?ââ104

Rosen then spoke directly with Clark on December 26th.105 Clark revealed that he had met with the President in the Oval Office several days prior.106 Clark had told the President that if he were to change the leadership at the Department of Justice, âthen the Department might be able to do moreâ to support the Presidentâs claims that the election had been stolen from him.107

In his discussion with Acting Attorney General Rosen, Clark was âdefensiveâ and âapologetic,â claiming that the meeting with President Trump was âinadvertent and it would not happen again, and that if anyone asked him to go to such a meeting, he would notify Rich Donoghue and me [Rosen].ââ108 Of course, Clark had good reasons to be defensive. His meeting with President Trump and Representative Perry on December 22nd was a clear violation of Department policy, which limits interactions between the White House and the Departmentâs staff. As Steven Engel, former Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, explained to the Select Committee, âitâs critical that the Department of Justice conducts its criminal investigations free from either the reality or any appearance of political interference.ââ109 For that reason, the Department has longstanding polices in place, across administrations, to âkeep these communications as infrequent and at the highest levels as possible, just to make sure that people who are less careful about it, who donât really understand these implications, such as Mr. Clark, donât run afoul of the of those contact policies.ââ110 Rosen added that only the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General âcan have conversations about criminal matters with the White House,â or they can âauthorizeâ someone from within DOJ to do so.111 Clark had no such authorization.

Representative Perry continued to advocate on Clarkâs behalf. The Congressman texted Meadows on December 26th, writing: âMark, just checking in as time continues to count down. 11 days to 1/6 and 25 days to inauguration. We gotta get going!ââ112 Representative Perry followed up: âMark, you should call Jeff. I just got off the phone with him and he explained to me why the principal deputy [position] wonât work especially with the FBI. They will view it as not having the authority to enforce what needs to be done.ââ113 Meadows responded: âI got it. I think I understand. Let me work on the deputy position.ââ114 Representative Perry then sent additional texts: âRoger. Just sent you something on Signalâ, âJust sent you an updated fileâ, and âDid you call Jeff Clark?ââ115

On December 27, 2020, President Trump called Acting Attorney General Rosen once again. At some point during the lengthy call, Rosen asked that Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue be conferenced in.116 According to Donoghueâs contemporaneous notes, Trump referenced three Republican politicians, all of whom had supported the Presidentâs election lies and the âStop the Stealâ campaign.117 One was Representative Scott Perry. Another was Doug Mastriano, a State senator from Pennsylvania who would later be on the grounds of the U.S. Capitol during the January 6th attack.118 President Trump also referenced Representative Jim Jordan from Ohio, praising him as a âfighter.ââ119 Representatives Perry and Jordan had often teamed up to spread lies about the election. The two spoke at a âStop the Stealâ rally in front of the Pennsylvania State capitol in Harrisburg, just days after the November election.120 The pair also pressed their conspiratorial case during interviews with friendly media outlets.121

President Trump made a âstream of allegationsâ during the December 27th call.122 As reflected in his notes, Donoghue considered the call to be an âescalation of the earlier conversations,â with the President becoming more adamant that âwe werenât doing our job.ââ123 President Trump trafficked in âconspiracy theoriesâ he had heard from others, and Donoghue sought to âmake it clear to the President these allegations were simply not true.ââ124 Donoghue sought to âcorrectâ President Trump âin a serial fashion as he moved from one theory to another.ââ125

The President returned to the discredited ASOG report, which former Attorney General Barr had already dismissed as complete nonsense. ASOG had claimedâbased on no evidenceâthat the Dominion voting machines in Antrim County, Michigan had suffered from a 68 percent error rate. As noted above and in Chapter 1, that was not close to being true.

Bipartisan election officials in Antrim County completed a hand recount of all machine-processed ballots on December 17, 2020, which should have ended the lies about Dominionâs voting machines.126 The net difference between the machine count and the hand recount was only 12 out of 15,718 total votes.127 The machines counted just one vote more for former Vice President Biden than was tallied during the hand recount.128 Donoghue informed the President that he âcannot and should not be relying onâ ASOGâs claim, because it was âsimply not true.ââ129 This did not stop the President from later repeating the debunked allegation multiple times, including during his January 6th speech at the Ellipse.130

Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue debunked a âseriesâ of other conspiracy theories offered by President Trump during the December 27th call as well. One story involved a truck driver âwho claimed to have moved an entire tractor trailer of ballots from New York to Pennsylvania.ââ131 There was no truth to the story. The FBI âinterviewed witnesses at the front end and the back end ofâ the truckâs transit route, âlooked at loading manifests,â questioned the truck driver, and concluded that there were no ballots in the truck.132

President Trump then returned to the conspiracy theory about voting in Detroit. Former Attorney General Barr had already debunked the claim that a massive number of illegal votes had been dumped during the middle of the night, but the President would not let it go. President Trump alleged that someone âthrew the poll watchers out,â and âyou donât even need to look at the illegal aliens votingâdonât need to. Itâs so obvious.ââ133 The President complained that the âFBI will always say thereâs nothing there,â because while the Special Agents (âthe line guysâ) supported him, the Bureauâs leadership supposedly did not.134 This was inconsistent with Donoghueâs view.135 But President Trump complained that he had âmade some bad decisions on leadershipâ at the FBI.136

President Trump also âwanted to talk a great deal about Georgia, [and] the State Farm Arena video,â claiming it was âfraud staring you right in the face.ââ137 President Trump smeared Ruby Freeman, a Georgia election worker who was merely doing her job, as a âHucksterâ and an âElection scammer.ââ138 President Trump said the ânetworks,â meaning the television networks, had âmagnified the tape and saw them running them [ballots] through repeatedly.ââ139 The President repeated the lie that Democrats had â[c]losed the facility and then came back with hidden ballots under the table.ââ140 He suggested that both Rosen and Donoghue âgo to Fulton County and do a signature verification.â They would âsee how illegal it isâ and âfind tens of thousandsâ of illegal ballots.141

President Trump âkept fixatingâ on the supposed suitcase in the video.142 But Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue debunked the Presidentâs obsession. âThere is no suitcase,â Donoghue made clear.143 Donoghue explained that the DOJ had looked at the video and interviewed multiple witnesses. The âsuitcaseâ was an official lock box filled with genuine votes.144 And election workers simply did not scan ballots for former Vice President Biden multiple times.145 All of this was recorded by security cameras.146

In response to what President Trump was saying during the conversation, Rosen and Donoghue tried to make clear that the claims the President made werenât supported by the evidence. âYou guys must not be following the internet the way I do,â the President remarked.147 But President Trump was not finished peddling wild conspiracy theories.

The President pushed the claim that Pennsylvania had reported 205,000 more votes than there were voters in the state.148 âWeâll look at whether we have more ballots in Pennsylvania than registered voters,â Acting Attorney General Rosen replied, according to Donoghue. They â[s]hould be able to check that out quickly.ââ149 But Rosen wanted President Trump to âunderstand that the DOJ canât and wonât snap its fingers and change the outcome of the election. It doesnât work that way.ââ150

âI donât expect you to do that,â President Trump responded. âJust say the election was corrupt and leave the rest to me and the Republican Congressmen.ââ151

Donoghue explained this âis an exact quote from the President.ââ152

âWe have an obligation to tell people that this was an illegal, corrupt election,â President Trump told the DOJ team at another point in the call.153 President Trump insisted this was DOJâs âobligation,â even though Rosen and Donoghue kept telling him there was no evidence of fraud sufficient to overturn the outcome of the election. âWe are doing our job,â Donoghue informed the President. âMuch of the info youâre getting is false.ââ154

The call on December 27th was contentious for additional reasons. President Trump did not want to accept that the Department of Justice was not an arm of his election campaign. He wanted to know why the Department did not assist in his campaignâs civil suits against States. There was a simple answer: There was no evidence to support the campaignâs claims of fraud.155

Donoghue and Rosen also âtried to explain to the President on this occasion and on several other occasions that the Justice Department has a very important, very specific, but very limited role in these elections.ââ156 The States ârun their electionsâ and DOJ is not âquality control for the States.ââ157 DOJ has âa mission that relates to criminal conduct in relation to federal electionsâ and also has ârelated civil rights responsibilities.ââ158 But DOJ cannot simply intervene to alter the outcome of an election or support a civil suit.159

When President Trump made these demands on December 27th, it was already crystal clear that the Department of Justice had found no evidence of systemic fraud.160 The Department simply had no reason to assert that the 2020 Presidential contest was âan illegal corrupt election.ââ161

âPeople tell me Jeff Clark is greatâ and that âI should put him in,â President Trump said on the call. âPeople want me to replace the DOJ leadership.ââ162 Donoghue responded â[S]ir, thatâs fine, you should have the leadership you want, but understand, changing the leadership in the Department wonât change anything.ââ163

The President did not really care what facts had been uncovered by the Department of Justice. President Trump just wanted the Department to say the election was corrupt, so he and the Republican Congressmen could exploit the statement in the days to come, including on January 6th. And when Rosen and Donoghue resisted the Presidentâs entreaties, he openly mused about replacing Rosen with someone who would do the Presidentâs bidding.

Toward the end of the December 27th call, President Trump asked Donoghue for his cell number.164 Later that day, Representative Perry called Donoghue to press the Presidentâs case.165 Representative Perry was one of President Trumpâs key congressional allies in the effort to overturn the electionâs results. Representative Perry was an early supporter of the âStop the Stealâ campaign and, as noted above, addressed the crowd at one such event outside the Pennsylvania State capitol in Harrisburg on November 5, 2020.166 In December 2020, Representative Perry was also one of 27 Republican Congressmen who signed a letter requesting that President Trump âdirect Attorney General Barr to appoint a Special Counsel to investigate irregularities in the 2020 election.â December 9, 2020âmore than 1 week after Barr told the press there was no evidence of significant fraud.167 There was no reason to think that a Special Counsel was warranted. Representative Perry and the other congressmen advocated for one to be appointed anyway.

Representative Perry attended the December 21st Oval Office meeting along with at least 10 other congressional Republicans to discuss the strategy for objecting to the electoral college votes on January 6th. Along with 125 other Republican Members of Congress, Representative Perry also supported Texasâs lawsuit against Pennsylvania and three other states.168 That is, Representative Perry supported Texasâs effort to nullify the certified electoral college vote from four states, including his own home state.

Donoghue took notes during his conversation with Representative Perry and provided those notes to the Select Committee.169 The notes reflect that when Representative Perry called Donoghue on December 27th, Representative Perry explained that President Trump asked him to call and that he, Representative Perry, did not think DOJ had been doing its job on the election.170 Representative Perry brought up other, unrelated matters and argued that the âFBI doesnât always do the right thing in all instances.ââ171 Representative Perry also brought up Jeff Clark. He said he liked him and thought that Clark âwould do something about this,â meaning the election fraud allegations.172

On the evening of December 27th, Representative Perry emailed Donoghue a set of documents alleging significant voting fraud had occurred in Pennsylvania.173 One document asserted that election authorities had counted 205,000 more votes than had been cast.174 Representative Perry also shared this same claim on Twitter the following day.175 President Trump kept raising the same claim. Sometimes there was an alleged discrepancy of 205,000 votes, other times it was supposedly 250,000 votes.176 Either way, it was not true.

Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue forwarded Representative Perryâs email to Scott Brady, who was the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania at the time.177 As Brady soon discovered, there was no discrepancy.178 President Trumpâs supporters came up with the claim by comparing the Pennsylvania Secretary of Stateâs website, which reported the total number of votes as 5.25 million, to a separate State election registry, which showed only 5 million votes cast.179 The problem was simple: Pennsylvaniaâs election site had not been updated.180 The totals for four counties had not yet been reported on the election site. Once those votes were counted on the site, the totals matched. This was simply not an example of fraud, as President Trump, Representative Perry and others would have it.

On December 28, 2020, Clark sent a 5-page draft letter to Donoghue and Rosen.181 The letter was addressed to three Georgia State officials: Governor Brian Kemp, Speaker of the House David Ralston, and President Pro Tempore of the Senate Butch Miller. It contained places for Rosen and Donoghue to affix their signatures, which they steadfastly refused to do.182 The letter, if signed and sent, may very well have provoked a constitutional crisis.183

The letter was attached to an email from Clark, in which he requested authorization to attend a classified briefing by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) âled by DNI Ratcliffe on foreign election interference issues.ââ184 ODNI did not find any foreign interference in the voting process or counting,185 but Clark apparently believed some of the conspiracy theories that had been floated. Specifically, Clark claimed that âhackers have evidence (in the public domain) that a Dominion machine accessed the internet through a smart thermostat with a net connection trail leading back to China.â Clark added: âODNI may have additional classified evidence.ââ186 This crackpot claim had been shared by other Trump officials and associates as well.187 Ultimately, after Clark received the ODNI briefing, âhe acknowledged [to Donoghue] that there was nothing in that briefing that would have supported his earlier suspicion about foreign involvement.ââ188

Clark intended to send the letter to officials in Georgia and several other contested States that President Trump needed to flip if he was going to overturn the election results. âThe Department of Justice is investigating various irregularities in the 2020 election for President of the United States,â Clark wrote.189 Clark continued: âThe Department will update you as we are able on investigatory progress, but at this time we have identified significant concerns that may have impacted the outcome of the election in multiple States, including the State of Georgia.ââ190

Clark continued by arguing that Georgiaâs State legislature should call a special session. âIn light of these developments, the Department recommends that the Georgia General Assembly should convene in special session so that its legislators are in a special position to take additional testimony, receive new evidence, and deliberate on the matter consistent with its duties under the U.S. Constitution,â Clark wrote.191 Clark referenced the fake electors that the President and his campaign organized and argued that there were two competing slates of electors, both of which were legitimate.192 âThe Department believes that in Georgia and several other States, both a slate of electors supporting Joseph R. Biden, Jr., and a separate slate of electors supporting Donald J. Trump, gathered on [December 14, 2020] at the proper location to cast their ballots, and that both sets of those ballots have been transmitted to Washington, D.C., to be opened by Vice President Pence,â Clark wrote.193

The letter was a lie. Senior DOJ officialsâBarr, Rosen and Donoghueâhad repeatedly stated the opposite. They found no evidence of fraud that would have impacted the electionâs resultsânone. But since mid-November, the Trump Campaignâs legal team under Giuliani attempted to execute its dual-track strategy of both filing lawsuits and convincing state legislatures in contested states to appoint separate slates of Presidential electors for President Trump.194 By late December, however, the dual-track approach had largely failed, and no legislatures had sent a second lawful slate of electors for Trump to Congress. Clearly, President Trump and his campaign team could not get the job done. So, the President and those around him sought to use the hefty imprimatur of the U.S. Department of Justice to achieve the same thing. No doubt, a letter coming from the Department of Justice is different from a meandering call from Giuliani or one of his associates. And, because it was December 28th and there was little more than a week until the January 6th joint session of Congress, President Trump needed more, and soon. Clarkâs letter, which laid out a plan that was almost identical to what President Trump and his team had pressured State officials to carry out virtually since election day, could have been just what President Trump needed.

Several examples demonstrate the parallels between President Trumpâs and Rudolph Giulianiâs approach to overturning the election in November and December, and what Clark proposed in this letter. First, the letter sought to have the Georgia State legislature convene a special session to focus on allegations of fraud in the election.195 Giuliani and his team had been making calls to State legislatures and telling them in both official and unofficial State legislature committee hearings that State legislatures should convene in special sessions.196 They also argued that State legislatures had the authority to convene a special session themselves, despite limitations in State law requiring such a session to be convened by the governor.197 Clark included the same argument in his draft letter.198

Additionally, the draft letter recommended that the Georgia legislature consider choosing the alternateâfakeâslate of electoral college electors that sent fake electoral college votes to Congress and Vice President Pence.199 Having State legislatures choose Trump electors in States where President Trump lost was one of the Trump teamâs early goals immediately after the election, but it didnât work.200 When no State legislature appointed its own set of electors before December 14th, the Trump Campaign arranged for electors to meet in contested States anyway and cast fake electoral college votes.201 This letter, with the Department of Justice seal at the top, was just one more way that President Trump and those close to him could pressure State officials to send competing electoral college votes to Congress for consideration during the joint session, despite former Vice President Bidenâs certified victory in each of the contested States.

Despite the similarities between the requests in Clarkâs proposed letter and the requests that President Trump and his team made to State officials for nearly 2 months, the extent to which Clark directly coordinated his actions with the Trump Campaign and its outside advisors is unclear. Clark asserted his Fifth Amendment rights and various other privileges to avoid answering the Select Committeeâs questions about these and other topics.202 When Giuliani was asked during his Select Committee deposition whether he remembered discussing DOJ issuing a letter like Clarkâs, Giuliani refused to answer because it implicated attorney-client privilege with President Trump, but when asked if he recalled ever recommending that Clark be given election-related responsibilities at DOJ, Giuliani said, âI do recall saying to people that somebody should be put in charge of the Justice Department who isnât frightened of whatâs going to be done to their reputation, because the Justice Department was filled with people like that.ââ203 And the investigation has also revealed that Clark and John Eastman were in communication throughout this period.204

One person who had worked with Eastman and others in his circle was a lawyer installed to work with Clark at the Department of Justice in mid-Decemberâthe final weeks of the Trump administrationânamed Ken Klukowski.205 Klukowski was a Trump administration political appointee serving as a senior counsel under Clark in DOJâs Civil Division.206 After serving as a lawyer in the Office and Management and Budget (OMB) for more than a year and volunteering as a lawyer for the Trump Campaign after election day, Klukowski only joined the Department when the administrationâs personnel staff âexpedite[d]â his appointment because the White Houseâs Presidential Personnel Office âwant[ed] him in soon.ââ207

On the morning of December 28th, Clark asked Klukowski to draft the Georgia letter for him.208 Clark dictated the substantive key points of the letter to Klukowski and told him exactly what to include.209 After several meetings with Clark throughout the day to update him on progress, Klukowski turned in his assignment and gave the letter to Clark, which Clark sent along to Acting Attorney General Rosen and Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue, as described above.210

Donoghue quickly responded to Clarkâs email, stating âthere is no chance that I would sign this letter or anything remotely like this.ââ211 The plan set forth by Clark was ânot even within the realm of possibility.ââ212 Donoghue warned that if they sent Clarkâs letter, it âwould be a grave step for the Department to take and it could have tremendous Constitutional, political and social ramifications for the country.ââ213 Contrary to President Trumpâs and Clarkâs wild claims about the election, Donoghue stressed that DOJâs ongoing investigations related to matters of such a âsmall scale that they simply would not impact the outcome of the Presidential Election.ââ214 Clarkâs assertion to the contrary was baseless.

Donoghue and Rosen reaffirmed their strong opposition to the draft letter in a âcontentiousâ meeting with Clark on December 28th.215 âWhat you are doing is nothing less than the United States Justice Department meddling in the outcome of a presidential election,â Donoghue admonished Clark, to which Clark indignantly responded, âI think a lot of people have meddled in this election.ââ216

Under questioning by Rosen and Donoghue, Clark eventually also revealed that he had been in a meeting in the Oval Office with President Trump. Donoghue demanded to know, âWhy the hell are we hearing your name from the President of the United States and a Congressman?ââ217 When Clark was reminded that meeting the President without authorization or informing his superiors was a clear violation of the White House contacts policy, he retorted, âItâs a policy, thereâs a lot more at stake here than a policy.ââ218 In fact, the contacts policy was designed for situations just like this where political figures might try to influence criminal investigations or legal actions taken by the Department of Justice, as President Trump attempting to do.219

In the days that followed, Clark called witnesses, got a briefing from ODNI and pursued his own investigations. Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue was âshockedâ to learn that Clark did not cease his efforts even after learning there was âno foreign interference.ââ220 Instead of adhering to the facts, Clark âdoubled down.â During a follow-up meeting on January 2nd, Clark acknowledged he had received the ODNI briefing, and he acknowledged that there was nothing in the briefing that would have supported his earlier suspicion about foreign involvement, but he nevertheless âspewed out some of these theories, some of which weâd heard from the President, but others which were floating around the internet and media, and just kept insisting that the Department needed to act and needed to send those letters.ââ221

The next day, Rosen, Donoghue, and Engel had a meeting with Mark Meadows, Pat Cipollone, and Cipolloneâs deputy, Pat Philbin, in the White House Chief of Staffâs office.222 While the meeting dealt primarily with the Presidential transition, the group discussed a draft civil complaint modeled after Texas v. Pennsylvania that the President wanted the Department of Justice to file challenging the results of the Presidential election, tentatively called United States v. Pennsylvania.223 The DOJ officials said that they had not had time to thoroughly review the proposed suit, but initially indicated that it appeared to be flawed and did not seem âviableâ for DOJ to file.224 Meadows suggested that the DOJ leadership meet with William Olson and Kurt Olsen, the two attorneys affiliated with the Trump Campaign that had been working on the proposed suit, and added that Eastman and a retired judge from North Carolina named Mark Martin both had views about the lawsuit.225

In this meeting, Meadows also raised a new and outrageous allegation of election fraud: that an Italian company had been involved in changing votes in the Presidential election.226 According to Meadows, there was a man, whom Donoghue later learned was in an Italian prison, who claimed to have information supporting the allegation and that CIA officers stationed in Rome were either aware of the plot to interfere in the election or had participated in it.227 Donoghue described how it was apparent that Meadows was not clear on the specifics of the allegation but passed them along to DOJ to investigate, nonetheless.228 Following the meeting Donoghue provided the information to the FBI, which quickly determined that the allegations were not credible.229 Meadows and other senior officials in the Trump administration, however, pressed DOJ to investigate every allegation of fraud regardless of how absurd or specious.

In the days after the December 29th meeting with Meadows, the senior DOJ officials more closely examined the proposed United States v. Pennsylvania lawsuit and determined that DOJ could not file it.230 Engel was principally tasked with examining the veracity of the suit and summarized his analysis in a series of talking points that he provided to Donoghue on December 31st.231 Engel concluded that for multiple reasons, the proposed lawsuit lacked merit. First, the U.S. Government did not have standing to challenge how a State administered its election.232 Such a challenge could only be brought by President Trump as a candidate and his campaign, or, possibly, an aggrieved electoral college elector.233 Second, there was no identified precedent in the history of the Supreme Court establishing that such a lawsuit could be filed by the U.S. Government.234 Third, by late December, States had already certified the results of their elections and the electoral college had met, so suing States by this point would not impact the results of the election.235 Finally, unlike Texas v. Pennsylvania, which was one State suing another State, this lawsuit would not automatically be heard by the Supreme Court, so it should have been filed in a Federal district court months priorâif at allâto have any possibility of impacting the outcome of the election.236

When asked about it during his interview with the Select Committee, Engel described United States v. Pennsylvania as âa meritless lawsuitâ and said, âthere was never a questionâ about whether âthe Department was going to fileâ it.237 As senior DOJ officials had already explained to President Trump multiple times in November and December 2020, the Department of Justice was strictly limited in what election-related actions it could take. It could not oversee Statesâ actions in administering their elections, and it could not support litigation filed by President Trumpâs campaign.238 Nonetheless, President Trump continued to push DOJ to file this lawsuit over the following days and essentially act as an arm of his political campaign.

Even after the December 29th meeting, President Trump and those working on his behalf still wanted DOJ leadership to file United States v. Pennsylvania. On December 30th, Acting Attorney General Rosen had a phone call with President Trump that included a discussion about the lawsuit.239 During the call, Rosen clearly explained to the President that DOJ could not file the lawsuit.240 Rosen said, âThis doesnât work. Thereâs multiple problems with it. And the Department of Justice is not going to be able to do it.ââ241 According to Rosen, President Trump accepted what he said without argument.242 Yet President Trump and his allies continued pressuring the Department to file the lawsuit.

On December 31st, 2020, President Trump suddenly returned to Washington, DC, from Florida, where he had been celebrating Christmas. Shortly after Air Force One landed, Rosen and Donoghue were summoned to the Oval Office once again. They met with the President that afternoon. President Trump âwas a little more agitated than he had been in the meeting on the 15th,â according to Donoghue.243 The President remained âadamant that the election has been stolen, that he won, that the American people were being harmed by fraud, and that he believed the Justice Department should be doing something about it.ââ244

The President once again raised the prospect of naming Clark the Acting Attorney General.245 Donoghue and Rosen repeated what they had told the President previouslyâthat he âshould have the leaders thatâ he wanted, âbut itâs really not going to change anything.ââ246

President Trump again asked why DOJ would not file a complaint with the Supreme Court, alleging that the election was fraudulent. Rosen and Donoghue explained, once more, that the DOJ did not have standing.247 DOJ represents the Federal government, not the American people. President Trump was incredulous and became âvery animated.ââ248 The President kept repeating the same questions, âHow is that possible? How can that possibly be?ââ249

President Trump also floated the prospect of naming a special counsel, suggesting Ken Cuccinelli from the Department of Homeland Security as a possible candidate.250 âThis sounds like the kind of thing that would warrant appointment of a special counsel,â Donoghue recalled the President saying.251 The President did not order the DOJ to name a special counsel, but he was clearly still thinking about it. Donoghue and Rosen âdidnât say a lotâ in response, but simply pointed out that there was no evidence to support the many individual allegations that had been made, so there was âno evidence that would warrant appointing a special counsel.ââ252

President Trump again raised the Antrim County, Michigan allegations.253 As mentioned above, bipartisan election officials in Antrim County completed a hand recount of all ballots on December 17th.254 This should have resolved the matter once and for all. There was simply no evidence that Dominionâs machines had manipulated the result. But President Trump would not accept this reality.

During the December 31st meeting, the President also raised the prospect of seizing the voting machines. âWhy donât you guys seize machines?â he asked.255 âYou guys should seize machines because there will be evidence,â Donoghue recalled President Trump saying.256 Rosen pushed back, saying the DOJ had no basis to seize voting machines from the States. They needed a search warrant, but there was no evidence to justify one.257 Rosen explained to President Trump again that the DOJ has no responsibility for oversight, as the States conduct the elections. Rosen added that to the extent that any Federal agency is involved, it is the Department of Homeland Security, which ensures âsoftware selection and quality control.ââ258 At that point, the President called Ken Cuccinelli.259 Donoghue recalled the President saying something along the lines of, âKen, the Acting Attorney General is telling me itâs your job to seize machines.ââ260 Rosen had said nothing of the sort, but Cuccinelli quickly shot down the Presidentâs line of inquiry, making it clear that the Department of Homeland Security had no such authority.261 White House Counsel Pat Cipollone was also in attendance and supported the DOJ leadership throughout the meeting.262

When Rosen spoke to Clark by phone on December 31st or January 1st, Clark revealed that he had spoken to the President again, despite previously promising Rosen and Donoghue that he would inform them of any other contact that he received from the White House.263 Clark told Rosen that President Trump had offered Clark the position of Acting Attorney General and asked him to respond by Monday, January 4th. Clark, however, said that he needed to do some âdue diligenceâ related to claims of election fraud before deciding whether he would accept the Presidentâs offer.264

On Saturday, January 2nd, Rosen and Donoghue attempted, once again, to persuade Clark to stand down. The two reiterated that Clark should stop meeting with the President.265 Donoghue reprimanded Clark, emphasizing that he was the boss and that Clarkâs ongoing contacts with the President were a violation of DOJâs White House contact policy.266 Clark acknowledged that he had been briefed by the ODNI, as he had requested, and âthat there was nothing in that briefing that would have supported his earlier suspicion about foreign involvement.ââ267 Nevertheless, Clark still wanted to send his letter to Georgia and other contested States alleging voter fraud.268

During the conversation, Clark confirmed President Trump had offered him the position of Acting Attorney General.269 Clark told Rosen that he would decline the offerâif Rosen and Donoghue signed his dishonest letter to officials in Georgia.270 The two refused once again, making it clear âthat there was no way we were going to sign that letter.ââ271 Rosen reiterated his decision in an email on the night of January 2nd, writing: âI confirmed again today that I am not prepared to sign such a letter.ââ272

That same day, President Trump attempted to coerce Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger into manufacturing enough votes to steal the election in that State. That call is discussed in Chapter 2 of this report. But one part of it deserves mention here. During that same call, President Trump brought up BJay Pak, whom President Trump had appointed as the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia. President Trump referred to Pak as âyour never-Trumper U.S. attorney there.ââ273 The implication was that Pak was not doing enough to validate President Trumpâs fictitious claims of voter fraud. President Trumpâs mention of Pak proved to be ominous.

On January 3rd, Clark informed Rosen that he had decided to accept the Presidentâs offer to serve as the Acting Attorney General. Clark offered Rosen the position of his deputy.274 Rosen thought that Clarkâs offer was âpreposterousâ and ânonsensical.ââ275 Rosen told the Select Committee that âthere was no universe where I was going to do that to stay on and support someone else doing things that were not consistent with what I thought should be done.ââ276 Donoghue believed it was a done deal, and Clark would become the head of DOJ. But Pat Cipollone told Rosen that it was ânot a done deal and that we should fight this out at the White House.ââ277

White House call logs from January 3rd show that President Trump and Clark spoke four times that day starting at 6:59 a.m.278 The first three calls of the day, two in the morning and one in the early afternoon, show that the President spoke with âMr. Jeffrey Clark.ââ279 The final call between the two of them, from 4:19 to 4:22 p.m., however, shows that President Trump spoke to âActing Attorney General Jeffrey Clark,â suggesting that Clark had, in fact, accepted the Presidentâs offer.280

Acting Attorney General Rosen told the Select Committee that he would have felt comfortable being replaced by either Donoghue or Engel, but he did not âwant for the Department of Justice to be put in a posture where it would be doing things that were not consistent with the truth, were not consistent with its own appropriate role, or were not consistent with the Constitution.ââ281

As a result, Rosen took four immediate steps to try and prevent Clarkâs ascension to Attorney General. First, he called Meadows and asked him to set up a meeting for that evening with President Trump.282 Second, he spoke to Cipollone, who told Rosen that Clarkâs appointment was not inevitable and that he would also be at the meeting that evening to support Rosen and Donoghue.283 Third, Rosen called Engel and asked him to come to DOJ headquarters so he could attend the White House meeting.284 Finally, Rosen asked Donoghue and another senior Department attorney named Patrick Hovakimian to convene a meeting of the rest of the Departmentâs leadership to describe the situation to them and hear how they would react to Clarkâs appointment.285

Hovakimian set up a conference call. Although some of the Assistant Attorneys General were not able to participate in the call, all of those who did agreed that they would resign if Rosen were removed from office.286 Pat Hovakimian drafted a resignation letter that read:

This evening, after Acting Attorney General Jeff Rosen over the course of the last week repeatedly refused the Presidentâs direct instructions to utilize the Department of Justiceâs law enforcement powers for improper ends, the President removed Jeff from the Department. PADAG Rich Donoghue and I resign from the Department, effectively immediately.287

Hovakimian never sent the letter because the threat of mass resignations dissuaded President Trump from replacing Rosen. Regardless, the letter stated a plain truth: President Trump was trying to use DOJ for his own âimproper ends.â

At Rosenâs request, White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows arranged a meeting with the President at 6:15 p.m. that evening.288

We should pause to reflect on the timing and purpose of the meeting. Congress was set to meet in a joint session in less than 72 hours. The States had already certified their electors. Former Vice President Biden was going to be certified as the winner of the 2020 Presidential election. There was no material dispute over Bidenâs victory. Trump and his lawyers had not produced any evidence of significant fraud. Instead, they presented one nonsensical conspiracy theory after another. The DOJ and FBI were forced to debunk these claimsâand they did.

None of this stopped President Trumpâs effort to subvert DOJ. Quite the opposite. The President pushed forward with a plan to install Jeff Clark as the Acting Attorney General, apparently to attempt to interfere with the certification of the electoral college vote on January 6th. It is for this reason Rosen requested an emergency meeting on January 3rd.

Before heading into the Oval Office, Rosen and Donoghue discussed the possible leadership change with Cipollone and Pat Philbin. âThey were completely opposed to it,â Donoghue explained.289 In fact, no one who attended the Oval Office meeting supported the leadership changeâother than Jeff Clark.290 Donoghue didnât initially join the meeting, but the President soon called him in.291

During the meeting, Clark attempted to defend the last-minute move to make him Acting Attorney General. Clark said he would âconduct real investigations that would, in his view, uncover widespread fraud.ââ292 Clark declared that this was the âlast opportunity to sort of set things straight with this defective election,â and he had the âintelligence,â the âwill,â and âdesireâ to âpursue these matters in the way that the President thought most appropriate.ââ293 Everyone else quickly disagreed.294

President Trump asked Donoghue and Engel what they would do, and both confirmed they would resign.295 Donoghue added that theirs would not be the only resignations. âYou should understand that your entire Department leadership will resign,â Donoghue recalled saying.296 This included every Assistant Attorney General. âMr. President, these arenât bureaucratic leftovers from another administration,â Donoghue continued.297 âYou picked them. This is your leadership team. You sent every one of them to the Senate; you got them confirmed.ââ298 Donoghue argued that the President would look bad in the wake of the mass resignations. âWhat is that going to say about you, when we all walk out at the same time?ââ299 Donoghue recalled asking the President. âAnd what happens if, within 48 hours, we have hundreds of resignations from your Justice Department because of your actions? What does that say about your leadership?ââ300 Steve Engel reinforced Donoghueâs point, saying that Clark would be leading a âgraveyard.ââ301

White House Counsel Pat Cipollone threatened to resign as well, describing Clarkâs letter as a âmurder-suicide pact.ââ302 Cipollone warned that the letter would âdamage everyone who touches itâ and no one should have anything to do with it.303

Some of the participants in the meeting argued that Clark was the wrong person for the job of Attorney General. Clark attempted to defend his credentials, arguing that he had been involved in complicated civil and environmental litigation.304 âThatâs right. Youâre an environmental lawyer,â Donoghue fired back.305 âHow about you go back to your office, and weâll call you when thereâs an oil spill.ââ306

The meeting lasted approximately 3 hours.307 Only toward the end of the contentious affair did President Trump decide to reverse his earlier decision to make Clark the Acting Assistant Attorney General. Donoghue recalled President Trump addressing Clark along the following lines:

I appreciate your willingness to do it. I appreciate you being willing to suffer the abuse. But the reality is, youâre not going to get anything done. These guys are going to quit. Everyone else is going to resign. Itâs going to be a disaster. The bureaucracy will eat you alive. And no matter how you want to get things done in the next few weeks, you wonât be able to get it done, and itâs not going to be worth the breakage.308

Clark tried to change President Trumpâs mind, saying âhistory is calling, this our opportunityâ and âwe can get this done.ââ309 But the President was clearly rattled by the threat of mass defections and reiterated that the change would not happen. President Trump then wondered what would happen to Clark, and if Donoghue was going to fire him. Donoghue explained that only the President had that authority. That was the end of the matter. âAnd we all got up and walked out of the Oval Office,â Donoghue recalled.310

But for one DOJ employee, the matter was not entirely settled. During the January 3rd meeting in the Oval Office, President Trump complained bitterly about BJay Pak, the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia.311 Barr had tasked Pak with investigating the State Farm Arena video in early December 2020. Like the FBI and Georgia State officials, Pak concluded that nothing nefarious had occurred. President Trump was dissatisfied.312

âNo wonder nothingâs been found in Atlanta, because the U.S. attorney there is a Never Trumper,â Donoghue recalled the President saying.313 Donoghue objected, saying Pak had âbeen doing his job.ââ314 But the President insisted, pointing out that Pak criticized him years earlier. âThis guy is a Never Trumper,â the President reiterated.315 âHe should never have been in my administration to begin with. How did this guy end up in my administration?ââ316 The President threatened to fire Pak.317 When Donoghue pointed out that Pak was already planning to resign the next day, a Monday, President Trump insisted that it be Pakâs last day on the job.318 Pak later confirmed to Donoghue that he would be leaving the next day.319

President Trump asked if those in attendance at the Oval Office meeting knew Bobby Christine, who was the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Georgia.320 Even though Pak had a first assistant, who was next in line for Pakâs job upon his resignation, President Trump wanted Christine to take the role.321 Christine did take over for Pak, but he did not find any evidence of fraud either. It was Donoghueâs impression that Christine âconcluded that the election matters . . . were handled appropriately.ââ322

Later in the evening of January 3rd, President Trump called Donoghue to pass along yet another conspiracy theory.323 The President had heard that an ICE agent outside of Atlanta was in custody of a truck filled with shredded ballots.324 Donoghue explained that ICE agents are part of the Department of Homeland Security, so the matter would be under that Departmentâs purview. President Trump asked Donoghue to inform Ken Cuccinelli.325 That storyâlike all the othersâturned out to be fiction when DOJ investigators evaluated the claim. The truck was carrying shredded ballots, but they were from a previous election. The old ballots had been shredded to make room for storing ballots from the 2020 election.326

The most senior DOJ officials at the end of President Trumpâs term stopped him from co-opting Americaâs leading law enforcement agency for his own corrupt purposes. Recall that Attorney General Barr commented âyou canât live in a world where the incumbent administration stays in power based on its view, unsupported by specific evidence, that the electionâthat there was fraud in the election.327

Richard Donoghue concluded that Jeffrey Clarkâs letter âmay very well have spiraled us into a constitutional crisis.ââ328

Jeffrey Rosen summed up his short time as the Acting Attorney General like this:

[D]uring my tenure, we appointed no special prosecutors, we sent no letters to States or State legislators disputing the election outcome; we made no public statements saying the election was corrupt and should be overturned; we initiated no Supreme Court actions, nor filed or joined any other lawsuits calling into question the legitimacy of our election and institutions.329

President Trump attempted to get DOJ to do each of those things.

ENDNOTES

Â Â 1. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 8. The Select Committee recognizes and appreciates the investigation conducted by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the report it issued about this Chapterâs topic. See Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. 1st sess., Subverting Justice: How the Former President and His Allies Pressured DOJ to Overturn the 2020 Election, (Oct. 7, 2021), available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Interim%20Staff%20Report%20FINAL.pdf.

Â Â 2. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 8; See Margaret Talev, âExclusive: Dem Group Warns of Apparent Trump Election Day Landslide,â Axios, (Sept. 1, 2020), available at https://www.axios.com/2020/09/01/bloomberg-group-trump-election-night-scenarios.

Â Â 3. See Chapter 1.

Â Â 4. See Chapter 1.

Â Â 5. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 8â9.

Â Â 6. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 8â9.

Â Â 7. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 8â9.

Â Â 8. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 8â9.

Â Â 9. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 9.

Â 10. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 23.

Â 11. Richard C. Pilger, ed., âFederal Prosecution of Election Offenses: Eighth Edition,â Department of Justice (December 2017), p. 84, available at https://www.justice.gov/criminal/file/1029066/download.

Â 12. Richard C. Pilger, ed., âFederal Prosecution of Election Offenses: Eighth Edition,â Department of Justice (December 2017), p. 84 available at https://www.justice.gov/criminal/file/1029066/download. The DOJ further advises that âfederal law enforcement personnel should carefully evaluate whether an investigative step under consideration has the potential to affect the election itself.â The departmentâs concern is that â[s]tarting a public criminal investigation of alleged election fraud before the election to which the allegations pertain has been concluded runs the obvious risk of chilling legitimate voting and campaign activities.â Moreover, â[i]t also runs the significant risk of interjecting the investigation itself as an issue, both in the campaign and in the adjudication of any ensuing election contest.â Id.

Â 13. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HouseSelect-Jan6-PartII-01132022-000616-617 (November 9, 2020, memorandum from Attorney General Barr).

Â 14. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HouseSelect-Jan6-PartII-01132022-000616-617 (November 9, 2020, memorandum from Attorney General Barr).

Â 15. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HouseSelect-Jan6-PartII-01132022-000616-617 (November 9, 2020, memorandum from Attorney General Barr).

Â 16. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.

Â 17. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.

Â 18. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.

Â 19. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.

Â 20. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.

Â 21. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.

Â 22. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 18â19.

Â 23. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.

Â 24. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.

Â 25. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.

Â 26. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 19.

Â 27. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 19.

Â 28. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 19.

Â 29. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 19.

Â 30. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 19

Â 31. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 19.

Â 32. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 19â20.

Â 33. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 20.

Â 34. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 22.

Â 35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 22â23.

Â 36. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 22â23.

Â 37. Factba.se, âInterview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,â Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News, âTrump Asks, âWhereâs Durham?â During First Interview Since the Election,â YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis Benveniste, âFox Newsâ Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies,â CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.

Â 38. Factba.se, âInterview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,â Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News, âTrump Asks, âWhereâs Durham?â During First Interview Since the Election,â YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis Benveniste, âFox Newsâ Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies,â CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.

Â 39. Factba.se, âInterview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,â Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News, âTrump Asks, âWhereâs Durham?â During First Interview Since the Election,â YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis Benveniste, âFox Newsâ Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies,â CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.

Â 40. Factba.se, âInterview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,â Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News, âTrump Asks, âWhereâs Durham?â During First Interview Since the Election,â YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis Benveniste, âFox Newsâ Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies,â CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.

Â 41. Factba.se, âInterview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,â Vimeo, at 4:20, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News, âTrump Asks, âWhereâs Durham?â During First Interview Since the Election,â YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis Benveniste, âFox Newsâ Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies,â CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.

Â 42. âInterview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,â Vimeo, at 4:25, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News, âTrump Asks, âWhereâs Durham?â During First Interview Since the Election,â YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis Benveniste, âFox Newsâ Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies,â CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.

Â 43. Factba.se, âInterview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,â Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News, âTrump Asks, âWhereâs Durham?â During First Interview Since the Election,â YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis Benveniste, âFox Newsâ Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies,â CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.

Â 44. Factba.se, âInterview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,â Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News, âTrump Asks, âWhereâs Durham?â During First Interview Since the Election,â YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis Benveniste, âFox Newsâ Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies,â CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.

Â 45. Factba.se, âInterview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,â Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News, âTrump Asks, âWhereâs Durham?â During First Interview Since the Election,â YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis Benveniste, âFox Newsâ Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies,â CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.

Â 46. Factba.se, âInterview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,â Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News, âTrump Asks, âWhereâs Durham?â During First Interview Since the Election,â YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis Benveniste, âFox Newsâ Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies,â CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.

Â 47. Factba.se, âInterview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,â Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163; Fox News, âTrump Asks, âWhereâs Durham?â During First Interview Since the Election,â YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis Benveniste, âFox Newsâ Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies,â CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.

Â 48. Fox News, âTrump Asks, âWhereâs Durham?â During First Interview Since the Election,â YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; âInterview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November 29, 2020,â Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, available at ; Fox News, âTrump Asks, âWhereâs Durham?â During First Interview Since the Election,â YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szStcNBIL68; see also Alexis Benveniste, âFox Newsâ Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies,â CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.https://vimeo.com/485180163; see also Alexis Benveniste, âFox Newsâ Maria Bartiromo Gave Trump His First TV Interview Since the Election. It Was Filled with Lies,â CNN (Nov. 29, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/29/media/bartiromo-trump-interview.

Â 49. Michael Balsamo, âDisputing Trump, Barr Says No Widespread Election Fraud,â Associated Press, (Dec. 1, 2020, updated June 28, 2022), available at https://apnews.com/article/barr-no-widespread-election-fraud-b1f1488796c9a98c4b1a9061a6c7f49d.

Â 50. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 23â24. Also attending the meeting were Pat Cipollone (Chief White House Counsel to the President), Pat Philbin (Deputy White House Counsel to the President), Eric Herschmann, and Barrâs chief of staff, Will Levi. Id.

Â 51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 23â24.

Â 52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 23â24.

Â 53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 23â24.

Â 54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 23â24.

Â 55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 24â25.

Â 56. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 25â26.

Â 57. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 11, 25â26.

Â 58. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 25.

Â 59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 25.

Â 60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 25.

Â 61. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 25.

Â 62. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 25.

Â 63. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 25â26.

Â 64. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 25â26.

Â 65. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 26.

Â 66. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 26.

Â 67. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 26.

Â 68. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 26.

Â 69. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 26.

Â 70. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 26â28.

Â 71. âCampaign 2020: President Trump Statement on 2020 Election Results,â C-SPAN, Dec. 2, 2020, available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?506975-1/president-trump-statement-2020-election-results; âDonald Trump Speech on Election Fraud Claims Transcript December 2,â Rev, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-december-2.

Â 72. âCampaign 2020: President Trump Statement on 2020 Election Results,â C-SPAN, Dec. 2, 2020, available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?506975-1/president-trump-statement-2020-election-results; âDonald Trump Speech on Election Fraud Claims Transcript December 2,â Rev, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-december-2.

Â 73. âCampaign 2020: President Trump Statement on 2020 Election Results,â C-SPAN, Dec. 2, 2020, available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?506975-1/president-trump-statement-2020-election-results; âDonald Trump Speech on Election Fraud Claims Transcript December 2,â Rev, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-december-2. Trump said: âHereâs an example. This is Michigan. At 6:31 in the morning, a vote dump of 149,772 votes came in unexpectedly. We were winning by a lot. That batch was received in horror. We have a company thatâs very suspect. Its name is Dominion. With the turn of a dial or the change of a chip, you can press a button for Trump and the vote goes to Biden. What kind of a system is this?â Id.

Â 74. 11Alive, âSecond Georgia Senate Election Hearing,â YouTube, at 1:56:30 - 1:57:15, 5:29:20 - 5:32:45, Dec. 3, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRCXUNOwOjw.

Â 75. 11Alive, âSecond Georgia Senate Election Hearing,â YouTube, at 1:56:30 - 1:57:15, 5:29:20 - 5:32:45, Dec. 3, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRCXUNOwOjw.

Â 76. 11Alive, âSecond Georgia Senate Election Hearing,â YouTube, at 0:33:30 - 0:58:00, Dec. 3, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRCXUNOwOjw. The Trump campaign also shared the video online. Donald J Trump, âVideo from GA Shows Suitcases Filled with Ballots Pulled from Under a Table AFTER Poll Workers Left,â YouTube, Dec. 3, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nVP_60Hm4P8.

Â 77. Gabriel Sterling (@GabrielSterling), Twitter, Dec. 4, 2020 6:41 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/GabrielSterling/status/1334825233610633217?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1334825233610633217%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.gpb.org%2Fnews%2F2020%2F12%2F04%2Ffact-checking-rudy-giulianis-grandiose-georgia-election-fraud-claim. At the time, Gabe Sterling was the Chief Operating Officer in the Georgia Secretary of Stateâs Office.

Â 78. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â 79. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â 80. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Byung Jin Pak, (May 19, 2022), p. 19.

Â 81. âRead William Barrâs Resignation Letter to President Trump,â Washington Post, (Dec. 14, 2020), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/context/read-william-barr-s-resignation-letter-to-president-trump/2b0820cb-3890-498a-bd46-c1b248049c70/?itid=lk_inline_manual_4.

Â 82. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 65â66.

Â 83. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 28.

Â 84. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 28.

Â 85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 28â30.

Â 86. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 30.

Â 87. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 32.

Â 88. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 32.

Â 89. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 39â40.

Â 90. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000425, HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000426, HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000429 (December 14, 2020, email from Molly Michael to Jeffrey Rosen subject âFrom POTUSâ with two attachments).

Â 91. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000425, HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000426, HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000429 (December 14, 2020, email from Molly Michael to Jeffrey Rosen subject âFrom POTUSâ with two attachments).

Â 92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 32â33.

Â 93. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â 94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â 95. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â 96. U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Aug. 7, 2021), at p. 34, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rosen%20Transcript.pdf.

Â 97. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R001080 (December 21, 2020, WAVES visitor records).

Â 98. Mark Meadows (@MarkMeadows), Twitter, Dec. 21, 2020 6:03 pm, available at https://twitter.com/MarkMeadows/status/1341157317451124745.

Â 99. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R001080 (WAVES visitor records for December 21, 2020).

100. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Molly Michael, (March 24, 2022), pp. 205â06; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000009364_0001 (December 21 and 22, 2020 email chain between Molly Michael and Jeffrey Clark discussing a December 22, 2020 meeting at the White House); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000009365_0001 (December 22, 2020 email from Molly Michael to staff regarding a meeting at 6 p.m. in the Yellow Oval with Jeffrey Clark and another guest); Jonathan Tamari & Chris Brennan, âPa. Congressman Scott Perry Acknowledges Introducing Trump to Lawyer at the Center of Election Plot,â Philadelphia Inquirer, (Jan. 25, 2021), available at https://www.inquirer.com/politics/pennsylvania/scott-perry-trump-georgia-election-results-20210125.html.

101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 52â53.

102. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

103. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

104. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 117th sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

105. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 55â56, 78.

106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 55â56.

107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 53â55.

108. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

109. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

110. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000681 (May 11, 2009, memorandum laying out the policy for âCommunications with the White House and Congressâ).

112. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014099 (December 26, 2020, text message from Rep. Perry to Mark Meadows).

113. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM0140100 (December 26, 2020, text message from Rep. Perry to Mark Meadows).

114. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014101 (December 26, 2020, text message from Mark Meadows to Rep. Perry).

115. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014102-014103, MM014178.

116. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 47â48.

117. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000735.

118. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000735; Ryan Deto, âSen. Mastriano and Former State Rep. Saccone among Trump Supporters who Occupied U.S. Capitol,â Pittsburgh City Paper, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.pghcitypaper.com/pittsburgh/sen-mastriano-and-former-state-rep-saccone-among-trump-supporters-who-occupied-us-capitol/Content?oid=18690728; Erin Bamer, âMastriano Defends Protest Appearance; Other GOP Lawmakers Say Little,â York Dispatch, (Jan. 7, 2021), available at https://www.yorkdispatch.com/story/news/2021/01/07/mastriano-at-no-point-did-he-storm-us-capitol/6579049002/.

119. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 47-50; see also Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000735.

120. Dan Geiter, âRally to âStop the Stealâ of the 2020 Electionâ PennLive, (Nov. 5, 2020) available at https://www.pennlive.com/galleries/J3FJ24LCKVCT5OW3U2TJ6BV4RE/.

121. See, e.g., Scott Perry for Congress, â#StopTheSteal,â Facebook, November 6, 2020, available at https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=406418637058079.

122. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 47â48, 53.

123. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).

124. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).

125. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).

126. âHand Audit of All Presidential Election Votes in Antrim County Confirms Previously Certified Results, Voting Machines Were Accurate,â Michigan Secretary of State, (Dec. 17, 2020), available at https://www.michigan.gov/sos/resources/news/2020/12/17/hand-audit-of-all-presidential-election-votes-in-antrim-county-confirms-previously-certified-result.

127. âHand Audit of All Presidential Election Votes in Antrim County Confirms Previously Certified Results, Voting Machines Were Accurate,â Michigan Secretary of State, (Dec. 17, 2020), available at https://www.michigan.gov/sos/resources/news/2020/12/17/hand-audit-of-all-presidential-election-votes-in-antrim-county-confirms-previously-certified-result.

128. âHand Audit of All Presidential Election Votes in Antrim County Confirms Previously Certified Results, Voting Machines Were Accurate,â Michigan Secretary of State, (Dec. 17, 2020), available at https://www.michigan.gov/sos/resources/news/2020/12/17/hand-audit-of-all-presidential-election-votes-in-antrim-county-confirms-previously-certified-result.

129. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).

130. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/january6th.

131. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60.

132. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).

133. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 55; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000737 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).

134. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 55; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000737 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).

135. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 55.

136. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 55-56; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).

137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect.

138. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 54; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).

139. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 54; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).

140. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 54; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).

141. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 64; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000741 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).

142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60.

143. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60.

144. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 60â61.

145. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 60â61.

146. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 60â61.

147. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 54â55; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000737 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).

148. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 54, 58; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000737, HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000738 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).

149. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 54, 58; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000737, HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000738 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).

150. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 54, 58; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000737, HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000738 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).

151. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 58; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000738, HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).

152. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 58. Trump also mentioned the possibility of the DOJ saying the âelection is corrupt or suspect or not reliableâ during a public press conference. âWe told him we were not going to do that,â Donoghue explained. Id. at p. 59.

153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 62; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000740 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).

154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739, HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000740 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).

155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 61.

156. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect.

157. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect.

158. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect.

159. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect.

160. Donoghue testified before the Select Committee: âThere were isolated instances of fraud. None of them came close to calling into question the outcome of the election in any individual state.â Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect.

161. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 62; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000740 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).

162. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 62.

163. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 62.

164. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 65.

165. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 72-75.

166. Dan Gleiter, âRally to âStop the Stealâ of the 2020 Election,â Penn Live, (Nov. 5, 2020), available at https://www.pennlive.com/galleries/J3FJ24LCKVCT5OW3U2TJ6BV4RE/.

167. Letter from the Office of Rep. Lance Gooden and Signed by 26 other Members of Congress to the President of the United States, Dec. 9, 2020, available at https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000176-4701-d52c-ad7e-d7fdbfe50000.

168. Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief by U.S. Representative Mike Johnson and 125 other Members, Texas v. Pennsylvania, 592 U.S. ____ (Dec. 10, 2020) (No. 155, Orig.), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22O155/163550/20201211132250339_Texas%20v.%20Pennsylvania%20Amicus%20Brief%20of%20126%20Representatives%20--%20corrected.pdf.

169. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 72â73; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000705, HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000706, (Dec. 27, 2020, handwritten notes). Donoghueâs handwritten notes from the call are dated Dec. 28, 2020, but he confirmed the call took place on Dec. 27.

170. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 72â73; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000705, HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000706, (Dec. 27, 2020, handwritten notes).

171. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 72â73; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000705, HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000705, (Dec. 27, 2020, handwritten notes).

172. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 73; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000705, HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000706, (Dec. 27, 2020, handwritten notes).

173. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000001 - HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000018.

174. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000008.

175. RepScottPerry (@RepScotPerry), Twitter, Dec. 28, 2020 6:01 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/RepScottPerry/status/1343693703664308225.

176. See Chapter 1.

177. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 74â75.

178. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 75â76.

179. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 75â76.

180. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 75â76.

181. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 â HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.

182. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 â HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000200 (December 28, 2020, email from Richard Donoghue to Jeffrey Clark, ccâing Jeffrey Rosen, including Rosenâs reply to Donoghue; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

183. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

184. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 â HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.

185. See National Intelligence Council, Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections, (Mar. 10, 2021), available at https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2021/item/2192-intelligence-community-assessment-on-foreign-threats-to-the-2020-u-s-federal-elections (declassified version of a January 7, 2021, report to President Trump, senior Executive Branch officials, and Congressional leadership). The report concluded, among other things, âWe have no indications that any foreign actor attempted to alter any technical aspect of the voting process in the 2020 US elections, including voter registration, casting ballots, vote tabulation, or reporting results.â

186. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 â HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.

187. Zachary Cohen & Sara Murray, âNew Details Shed Light on Ways Mark Meadows Pushed Federal Agencies to Pursue Dubious Election Claims,â CNN, (Dec. 2, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/12/02/politics/mark-meadows-election-fraud-liaison/index.html; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022) at pp. 168â69.

188. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 113.

189. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 â HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.

190. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 â HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.

191. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 â HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.

192. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 â HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.

193. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 â HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.

194. See Chapters 2 and 3 regarding the Trump Campaignâs efforts to overturn the results of the election in contested states and have fake Electoral College electors submit fake votes to Congress.

195. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 â HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.

196. See Chapter 2 for additional information on these hearings.

197. See Chapter 2; see also Ga. Const., art. V, Â§ 2, Â¶ VII.

198. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697 â HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.

199. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000698 â HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000702.

200. See Chapter 2.

201. See Chapter 3.

202. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeffrey Clark, (Feb 2, 2022), pp. 24â27.

203. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 101â03.

204. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman production), Chapman061893 (January 1, 2021, emails between Jeffrey Clark and John Eastman); see Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Verizon Production, July 1, 2022) (showing five calls between John Eastman and Jeffrey Clark from January 1, 2021, through January 8, 2021).

205. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth Klukowski (Dec. 15, 2021), p. 182. The Select Committee questioned, and sought documents from, Klukowski about his interactions with Eastman and others related to the 2020 election and the January 6th joint session of Congress. Klukowski, however, objected to certain questions, and withheld a number of relevant communications, on the basis of attorney-client privilege, work product, or the First Amendment, including communications that he had with Eastman. For example, on December 9th, before Klukowski joined the Department of Justice, he sent an email to Eastman with an attachment of draft talking points arguing that state legislators in states where Biden won could disregard the election results and appoint electors for Trump. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman028219, Chapman028220 (December 9, 2020, email from Klukowski to Eastman, attaching memo). Those same talking points were circulated the same day among Ken Blackwell, Ed Meese, John Eastman, Jason Miller, Alan Dershowitz, and Chief of Staff Mark Meadows with Blackwellâs comment, âA constitutional road map to victory and DJTâs reelection! Itâs a matter of political will and courage to do the right thing.â See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman027943, Chapman027944 (Klukowski was not included on the email from Blackwell, but his talking points were attached). During his deposition with the Select Committee, Klukowski said that the document containing the talking points looked like a document he had drafted, but asserted attorney-client privilege when asked certain questions asked about the document. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Deposition of Kenneth Klukowski, (June 10, 2022), pp. 27-29. The Select Committee also obtained from a source other than Klukowski an email sent to him, Eastman, Rep. Louis Gohmertâs Chief of Staff, and others on December 28th with the subject line âVP Briefing on 1/6/21 Meetingâ and a message from Edward Corrigan that said, âI believe the VP and his staff would benefit greatly from a briefing by John and Kenâ but cautioned to âmake sure we donât overexpose Ken given his new position.â See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman056164 (December 28, 2020, email to Klukowski and others). Klukowski said he never participated in such a briefing, but Eastman did in the days leading up to January 6th and encouraged the Vice President to prevent or delay the certification of the presidential election during the joint session of Congress. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth Klukowski, (June 10, 2022), pp. 50â57; see also Chapter 5 about Eastman and his communications with the Vice President. As described here, Klukowski drafted the letter for Clark that included discussions about state legislatures, Electoral College electors, and the joint session of Congress.

206. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth Klukowski (Dec. 15, 2021), p. 17.

207. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), p. 23; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HouseSelect-Jan6-PartII-12142021-000104. Klukowskiâs first day on the job was December 15th. When asked why he would be willing to start a job on December 15th that would end by January 20th, Klukowski said that he had been trying to get to the Department of Justice for several months, he was âhopefulâ that he could âget as many medals on my chest as possible during that short period of time,â and âgiven that it was going to cross the New Yearâs dateline, [he] figured [his] resume would say Department of Justice 2020 and 2021,â enabling him to get into an interview for future jobs before a future employer âwould find out how few of days in each of those calendar years we were actually talking about.â Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 30, 41.

208. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 65â66.

209. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 71â73.

210. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 66, 75â76.

211. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000200 (December 28, 2020, email from Richard Donoghue to Jeffrey Clark, ccâing Jeffrey Rosen, including Rosenâs reply to Donoghue).

212. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000200 (December 28, 2020, email from Richard Donoghue to Jeffrey Clark, ccâing Jeffrey Rosen, including Rosenâs reply to Donoghue).

213. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000200 (December 28, 2020, email from Richard Donoghue to Jeffrey Clark, ccâing Jeffrey Rosen, including Rosenâs reply to Donoghue).

214. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000200 (December 28, 2020, email from Richard Donoghue to Jeffrey Clark, ccâing Jeffrey Rosen, including Rosenâs reply to Donoghue).

215. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 81â82.

216. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 82.

217. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 83.

218. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 82.

219. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000681 (Department of Justice policy), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000685 (White House policy).

220. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

221. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

222. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Engel, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 27â28.

223. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 86â87; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 79â80, 91â92, 132â33.

224. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 91â93, 132â33.

225. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 87; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 91â93, 132â33.

226. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 88â89; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000678 (January 1, 2021, email from Mark Meadows to Jeffrey Rosen with link to YouTube video); Brad Johnson, âRome, Satellites, Servers: an Update,â YouTube, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210102201919/https:/www.youtube.com/watch?v=YwtbK5XXAMk&feature=youtu.be (archived) (showing the conspiracy Meadows asked DOJ to investigate).

227. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 88-90.

228. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 89.

229. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 90-91.

230. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 87, 91-92; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000708 (December 31, 2020, email from Steven Engel to Richard Donoghue attaching âU.S. v. Penn OJ suitâ).

231. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000708 - HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000709 (December 31, 2020, email from Steven Engel to Richard Donoghue attaching âU.S. v. Penn OJ suitâ re: one pager, with document titled âEvaluation of Potential Original-Jurisdiction Suit in the Supreme Courtâ); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 91â92.

232. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000709 (Document titled âEvaluation of Potential Original-Jurisdiction Suit in the Supreme Courtâ).

233. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000709 (Document titled âEvaluation of Potential Original-Jurisdiction Suit in the Supreme Courtâ).

234. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000709 (Document titled âEvaluation of Potential Original-Jurisdiction Suit in the Supreme Courtâ).

235. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certificationevents-07262021-000709 (Document titled âEvaluation of Potential Original-Jurisdiction Suit in the Supreme Courtâ).

236. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certificationevents-07262021-000709 (Document titled âEvaluation of Potential Original-Jurisdiction Suit in the Supreme Courtâ). The memo cites âUnited States v. Texasâ although it likely refers to the case filed by Texas and rejected by the Supreme Court, Texas v. Pennsylvania. See Order Dismissing Bill of Complaint and Denying Certiorari,Â Texas v. Pennsylvania, 592 U.S. ___, (Dec. 11, 2020) (No. 155, Orig.), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/121120zr_p860.pdf.

237. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Engel, (Jan. 13, 2022), p. 33.

238. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 87, 91â92 (noting the Departmentâs limited authority relative to United States v. Pennsylvania); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th (summarizing the many times Department officials told the President about the limited authority to take actions related to the election).

239. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 96â97.

240. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 96â97.

241. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 96â97.

242. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 96â97.

243. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 106.

244. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 106.

245. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 107.

246. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 107.

247. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 107â08.

248. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 108.

249. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 108.

250. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 108.

251. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 108.

252. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 108â09.

253. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 108â09.

254. âHand Audit of All Presidential Election Votes in Antrim County Confirms Previously Certified Results, Voting Machines Were Accurate,â Michigan Secretary of State, (Dec. 17, 2020), available at https://www.michigan.gov/sos/resources/news/2020/12/17/hand-audit-of-all-presidential-election-votes-in-antrim-county-confirms-previously-certified-result.

255. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 109.

256. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 109.

257. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 109.

258. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 109â10.

259. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 110.

260. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 110.

261. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 109â10.

262. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 109â11.

263. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 72â73.

264. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 72â73.

265. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 114.

266. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 113â14.

267. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 113.

268. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 113.

269. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 111â15.

270. Rosen confirmed this during testimony before the Select Committee. âADAM KINZINGER: So in that meeting did Mr. Clark say he would turn down the Presidentâs offer if you reversed your position and signed the letter? JEFFREY A. ROSEN: Yes.â Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

271. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

272. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000200 (January 2, 2021, email from Jeffrey Rosen to Richard Donoghue re: Two Urgent Action Items).

273. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, âHereâs the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call between Trump and Raffensperger,â Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

274. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 117â18; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

275. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 117â18; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

276. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 117â18; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

277. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 118.

278. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007891_0001 - 076P-R000007891_0009 (January 3, 2021, White House Presidential Call Log).

279. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007891_0001 - 076P-R000007891_0009 (January 3, 2021, White House Presidential Call Log).

280. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007891_0001 â 076P-R000007891_0009 (January 3, 2021, White House Presidential Call Log).

281. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

282. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

283. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 118; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

284. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

285. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

286. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th (âAnd so it was unanimous; everyone was going to resign if Jeff Rosen was removed from the seat,â Donoghue explained). The only exception was John Demers, the Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division. Donohue encouraged Demers to stay on because he didnât want to further jeopardize national security. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 119â20.

287. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000729 (January 3, 2021, Resignation Letter by Patrick Hovakimian).

288. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 121â22; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

289. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 122.

290. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 127. âIt was definitely a consensus. We were all on the same page except for Jeff Clark,â Donoghue said. Id. The Oval Office meeting attendees include Jeffrey Rosen, Richard Donoghue, Pat Cipollone, Pat Philbin, Eric Herschmann, Steve Engel, Jeff Clark and President Trump. See id., at 123.

291. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 122.

292. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 124.

293. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 124.

294. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 124â25.

295. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.

296. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.

297. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.

298. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.

299. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.

300. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.

301. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.

302. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 126.

303. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 126â27.

304. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 126.

305. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 126.

306. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 126.

307. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 133.

308. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 131â32.

309. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 132.

310. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 132.

311. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 129â31.

312. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Byung Jin Pak, (May 19, 2022), pp. 11â19.

313. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 129.

314. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 129.

315. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 129.

316. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 129.

317. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 129.

318. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 129â30.

319. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 134â35.

320. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 130.

321. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 130.

322. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 135â36.

323. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 133â34.

324. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 133â34.

325. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 134.

326. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 134â37.

327. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 66.

328. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

329. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 8â9.

5

On the morning of January 6, 2021, Vice President Michael R. Pence gathered his staff to pray. Vice President Pence and his closest advisors knew the day ahead âwould be a challenging one.ââ1 They asked God for âguidance and wisdomâ in the hours to come.2 No Republican had been more loyal to President Donald J. Trump throughout his turbulent presidency than Vice President Pence. The Vice President rarely, if ever, criticized his boss. But as January 6th approached, President Trump turned on his own Vice President.

President Trump was desperate. As described in the previous chapters, the President was searching for a way to stay in power. He had lost the election to former Vice President Biden. He had run out of legal options to overturn the election weeks earlier, when his lawyers lost nearly every court challenge they filed.

The President pursued other means as well. President Trump and his lawyers tried to convince State and local officials to overturn the election, but they met resistance. Those same officials would not break the law or violate their oath to the Constitution. President Trump and his associates tried to convince State legislatures to replace the legitimate electors won by former Vice President Biden with Trump electors. The Trump Campaign even convened their own fake electors who submitted false electoral votes to Washington. But those efforts failed, too.

President Trump also attempted to use the Department of Justice (DOJ) for his own corrupt political purposes. President Trump offered the job of Acting Attorney General to a loyalist. He wanted this same DOJ official, Jeffrey Clark, to send a letter to several States suggesting that they should certify the fake electors convened by the Trump Campaign. President Trumpâs effort to subvert the DOJ came to a head on January 3rd, when the Departmentâs senior personnel and lawyers in the White House Counselâs Office threatened mass resignations if Clark was installed.

At that point, theories about a role the Vice President could play at the joint session had been circulating in certain corners of the internet and among Trump-supporting attorneys.3 President Trump focused his attention on the man who had loyally served by his side for four years.

On January 4, 2021, President Trump summoned Vice President Pence to a meeting in the Oval Office with John Eastman, a law professor representing President Trump in litigation challenging the election result. Eastman argued, on President Trumpâs behalf, that the Vice President could take matters into his own hands during the joint session on January 6th. Eastman offered Vice President Pence two options. First, the Vice President could unilaterally reject the certified electors from several States won by former Vice President Biden, thereby handing the presidency to President Trump. Or, according to Eastman, Vice President Pence could delay the joint session to give State legislatures the opportunity to certify new electors loyal to the President. Eastman admitted, in front of the president, that both options violated the Electoral Count Act of 1887, the statute that sets forth the process for counting and disputing electoral votes during the joint session.4 Eastman admitted as much in a subsequent conversation with the Vice Presidentâs staff as well.5

Therefore, President Trump knew, or should have known, that this scheme was illegalâin fact, it violated the Electoral Count Act and the U.S. Constitution. President Trump repeatedly demanded that Vice President Pence go through with it anyway.

Vice President Pence rejected President Trumpâs demands âmany timesâ on January 4th and in the days that followed.6 Vice President Pence correctly pointed out that he had no power to take any action other than counting the certified electoral votes. Americaâs founders could not possibly have contemplated a scenario in which the Vice President could unilaterally reject electoral votes and decide the outcome of a Presidential election. However, instead of backing down, President Trump ratcheted up the pressure even further, relentlessly harassing Vice President Pence both in public and in private.

President Trump used his bully pulpit, at rallies and on Twitter, to lie to his supporters. President Trump told them that Vice President Pence had the power to deliver another 4 years in the White House. It was not true. President Trumpâs campaign of coercion became so intense that Marc Short, Vice President Penceâs Chief of Staff, alerted the head of the Vice Presidentâs Secret Service detail to the impending danger. On January 5th, Short warned that as the âdisagreementsâ between President Trump and Vice President Pence âbecame more public, that the president would lash out in some way.ââ7

Indeed, President Trump did. And those around him recognized that his lashing out at the Vice President could have disastrous consequences. On the morning of January 6th, an agent in the Secret Serviceâs intelligence division was alerted to online chatter âregarding the VP being a dead man walking if he doesnât do the right thing.ââ8 A few minutes later, another agent made a comment that turned out to be an ominous prediction: âI saw several other alerts saying they will storm the [C]apitol if he [the Vice President] doesnât do the right thing etc.ââ9

During his speech at the Ellipse on January 6th, President Trump repeatedly pointed his finger at Vice President Pence. President Trump insisted that âif Mike Pence does the right thing, we win the election.ââ10 President Trump added: âAnd Mike Pence is going to have to come through for us, and if he doesnât, that will be a, a sad day for our country because youâre sworn to uphold our Constitution.ââ11

President Trumpâs scheme required Vice President Pence to break his oath to the Constitution, not uphold it. By the time President Trump spoke at the Ellipse, he also knew that Vice President Pence had no intention of overturning the election.

President Trump then sent a mob to the U.S. Capitol. He did so even after being informed by the Secret Service that people in the crowd possessed weapons. He wanted his supporters to intimidate Vice President Pence and any other Republican who refused his demands. The President told the crowd assembled before him to march down Pennsylvania Avenue, to âour Republicans, the weak onesâ at the U.S. Capitol, âto try and give them the kind of pride and boldness that they need to take back our country.ââ12

The mob overran the U.S. Capitol in short order. At 2:24 p.m., while the attack was well underway, President Trump tweeted:

Mike Pence didnât have the courage to do what should have been done to protect our Country and our Constitution, giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to previously certify. USA demands the truth!13

Again, the opposite was true. Vice President Pence showed courage on January 6th. The Vice President refused to be intimidated by President Trumpâs mob, even as chants of âHang Mike Pence!â echoed throughout the halls of the U.S. Capitol and a makeshift gallows was constructed on the Capitol grounds.14

It is no mystery why the mob turned on Vice President Pence. President Trump told his supporters that the election was stolen, and that Vice President Pence had the power, but lacked the courage, to fix it. None of this was true.

President Trump and Vice President Pence have both reflected on the events of January 6th in the months since then. Vice President Pence has described President Trumpâs demands as âun-American.ââ15 President Trump has since insisted that Vice President Pence âcould have overturned the Election!ââ16 Asked about the calls to hang the Vice President, President Trump said it was âcommon sense.ââ17

In early 2022, U.S. District Judge David Carter evaluated the Trump-Eastman scheme to pressure the Vice President. Judge Carter described it as âa campaign to overturn a democratic election, an action unprecedented in American history.ââ18 It was âa coup in search of a legal theory,â Judge Carter found, that likely violated at least two Federal laws.19 The Trump-Eastman scheme was not a feature of the U.S. Constitution, as President Trump told his supporters. Instead, it âwould have permanently ended the peaceful transition of power, undermining American democracy and the Constitution.ââ20

And it all began because President Trump refused to accept the result of the election, expressed through the votes of 81 million Americans.

When the electoral college met to cast votes for the certified winner in each State on December 14, 2020, any possibility of President Trump reversing his defeat came to an end. The contest was decided well before then, but December 14th marked what should have been the formal end of the Trump campaign. Former Vice President Biden had won the election and his victory was cemented by the Statesâ electoral votes. Instead of bowing to this reality, some pro-Trump lawyers had already begun scheming ways to deny the inevitable. Over the course of the post-election period, as their other plans each failed, the importance of January 6th and the need to pressure Vice President Pence increased. These same lawyers concluded that the Vice President could help President Trump subvert the election on January 6th, but they would need Vice President Pence to set aside history and the law to do so. Theyâd need him to violate the Electoral Count Act of 1887 (âthe ECAâ). The ECA had governed the joint session for 130 years, but it was an inconvenient barrier for President Trumpâs plan to stay in office.

On December 13, 2020, Kenneth Chesebro, a pro-Trump lawyer, sent a memo to Rudolph Giuliani, the Presidentâs lead outside counsel, upon request from Trump Campaign official Boris Epshteyn.21 Chesebro laid out a ââPresident of the Senateâ strategy,â arguing that the âPresident of the Senateâ (âhe, and he aloneâ) is charged with âmaking judgments about what to do if there are conflicting votes.ââ22 Chesebro argued that when the joint session met on January 6th, the President of the Senate should not count Arizonaâs electoral college votes for former Vice President Biden, â[b]ecause there are two slates of votes.ââ23 Of course, there were not two legitimate âslates of votesâ from Arizona. There were the official electors, certified by the State, and a group of fake electors convened by the Trump campaign.

Chesebroâs memo set President Trumpâs pressure campaign on a course to target the Vice President on January 6.24 Judge Carter found that the âdraft memo pushed a strategy that knowingly violated the Electoral Count Actâ and âis both intimately related to and clearly advanced the plan to obstruct the Joint Session of Congress on January 6, 2021.ââ25 That plan was also advanced by John Eastman.26

On December 23, 2020, Eastman wrote a two-page memo summarizing ways to ensure that âPresident Trump is re-elected.ââ27 Eastman suggested that Vice President Pence could refuse to count the electoral college votes from seven States: Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. According to Eastman, Vice President Pence could simply reject these Statesâ electoral college votes. At that point, President Trump would have 232 electoral college votes compared to former Vice President Bidenâs 222. This was sufficient, in Eastmanâs view, to guarantee President Trumpâs victory, because he would have a majority of the electoral college votes. âPence then gavels President Trump as re-elected,â Eastman wrote.

Eastman considered the possibility that Democrats in Congress would object, stating the plain truth that 270 electoral college votes are necessary to win. In that event, according to Eastman, the election could be sent to the House of Representatives.28 The Republican-majority of delegations in the House would then re-elect Trump as president. Eastman concluded: âThe main thing here is that Pence should do this without asking for permissionâeither from a vote of the joint session or from the Court. . . . The fact is that the Constitution assigns this power to the Vice President as the ultimate arbiter. We should take all of our actions with that in mind.ââ29

From the start, President Trump was looped in on Eastmanâs proposal. The same day Eastman started preparing the memo, he sent an email to President Trumpâs assistant Molly Michael, at 1:32 p.m.: âIs the President available for a very quick call today at some point? Just want to update him on our overall strategic thinking.ââ30 Only five minutes later, Eastman received a call from the White House switchboard; according to his phone records, the conversation lasted for almost 23 minutes.31

In Eastmanâs theory, which was the foundation of President Trumpâs January 6th plot, the Vice President of the United States is the âultimate arbiterâ and could unilaterally decide the victor of the 2020 Presidential election.32 However, just before the 2020 presidential election, Eastman had acknowledged in writing that the Vice President had no such expansive power.

In the course of a lengthy exchange of ideas and emails throughout the pre- and post-election period with an individual named Bruce Colbert, Eastman provided comments on a letter Colbert was drafting to President Trump.33 The draft letter purported to provide recommendations of âcrucial legal actionsâ for the Trump Campaign to take âto help secure your election victory as President of the United States.ââ34 One of the draft letterâs recommendations was that âthe President of the Senate decides authoritatively what âcertificatesâ from the states to âopen.ââ In response, Eastman wrote on October 17, 2020, âI donât agree with thisâ and continued, â[t]he 12th Amendment only says that the President of the Senate opens the ballots in the joint session and then, in the passive voice, that the votes shall then be counted. 3 USC Â§ 12 says merely that he is the presiding officer, and then it spells out specific procedures, presumptions, and default rules for which slates will be counted. Nowhere does it suggest that the President of the Senate gets to make the determination on his own. Â§ 15 doesnât, either.ââ35

By the first week of December, Eastmanâs correspondence with this same individual illustrates that he was open to advocating for the very point he had rejected before the electionâthat is, that âthe 12th Amendment confers dispositive authority on the President of the Senate to decide which slate to count.ââ36 And on December 5, 2020, Eastman wrote to Colbert, âI have spoken directly with folks at the top of the chain of command on this. They are now aware of the issues.ââ37

The emails also signaled another idea that Eastman would continue to repeat in the coming weeks: that the Vice President could act without getting permission from a court. Specifically, he argued that they could take the position that the Vice Presidentâs authority was a ânon-justiciable political questionââin other words, that Vice President Pence could just act, and no court would have jurisdiction to rule on the issue.38 As Eastmanâs emails later in the month make clear, he thought there was an important reason to keep this issue out of the courtsâthey would rule that the theory was unlawful.

There are other parts of Eastmanâs two-page December 23rd memo worthy of attention. Eastman wrote that Vice President Pence could recuse himself from presiding over the joint session of Congress on January 6th. In that event, the session would be overseen by the Senate President Pro Tempore, Senator Charles Grassley. Eastman was clearly arguing that Vice President Pence (or Senator Grassley) should violate the Electoral Count Act. âWhen he gets to Arizona, he announces that he has multiple slates of electors, and so is going to defer decision on that until finishing the other States,â Eastman wrote.39 âThis would be the first break with the procedure set out in the Act.ââ40 This âbreakâ with âprocedureâ that Eastmanâs memo was openly advocating for was in other words the Vice President breaking the law. When Chesebro read Eastmanâs memo, he commented favorably, declaring it â[r]eally awesome.ââ41

At this point, Eastman continued, Congress would likely follow the âprocessâ set forth in the Electoral Count Act, and âthe two houses [would] break into their separate chambersâ for debate.42 But Eastman advised âwe should not allow the Electoral Count Act constraint on debate to controlâ and the Trump team âshould demand normal rules (which includes the filibuster).ââ43 Eastman thought this would create a âstalemate,â giving âthe state legislatures more time to weigh in to formally support the alternate slate of electors, if they had not already done so.ââ44 As discussed previously in this report, at the time he drafted this memoâand throughout the post-election periodâEastman, Giuliani, President Trump and others were simultaneously working to replace certified electors for former Vice President Biden in certain States. Eastman, Giuliani, and President Trump all pressured State legislators to name their own separate electors or to certify the campaignâs fake electors.

Eric Herschmann, an attorney working for President Trump in the White House, met with Eastman to discuss his memo. Herschmann thought Eastmanâs plan was âcrazy.â Herschmann summarized the conversation to the Select Committee:

And I said to him, hold on a second, I want to understand what youâre saying. Youâre saying you believe the Vice President, acting as President of the Senate, can be the sole decisionmaker as to, under your theory, who becomes the next President of the United States? And he said, yes. And I said, are you out of your Fâing mind, right? And that was pretty blunt. I said, youâre completely crazy. Youâre going to turn around and tell 78 plus million people in this country that your theory is, this is how youâre going to invalidate their votes because you think the election was stolen? I said, theyâre not going to tolerate that. I said, youâre going to cause riots in the streets. And he said words to the effect of thereâs been violence in this history of our country to protect the democracy or to protect the [R]epublic.45

As recounted by Herschmann, Eastman was shockingly unconcerned with the prospect of violence should Vice President Pence follow his and President Trumpâs recommended course.

Herschmann asked a straightforward questionâif the States wanted to recertify their electors, then why werenât they doing it themselves? âWhy arenât they already coming into session and saying, we want to change the [S]tates, and why do you need the VP to go down this path[?]ââ46 Eastman had no response. In addition to being âcrazy,â Herschmann âdidnât think there was any chance in the worldâ that Eastmanâs plan âcould work.ââ47

Herschmann pressed Eastman further, asking if he had âany precedent at all for the VP or anyone acting in the capacity as the President of the Senate declaring some statute invalid.ââ48 Eastman replied âno,â but argued that âthese are unprecedented times.ââ49 Herschmann was unimpressed, calling this a âridiculousâ answer.50

White House Counsel Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone thought the Eastman plan was ânutty.ââ51 Trump Campaign official Jason Miller testified that the Campaignâs General Counsel, Matt Morgan, and Deputy Campaign Manager, Justin Clark, thought Eastman was âcrazy,â understood that there was âno validity to [his theory] in any way, shape, or form,â and shared their views with âanyone who would listen.ââ52

Vice President Penceâs counsel, Greg Jacob, was simultaneously researching the role of the Vice President during the joint session. The Office of the Vice President produced a preliminary staff memo on the subject on October 26, 2020.53 Jacob then discussed the matter with Marc Short on election day or the day before.

This wasnât the first time Jacob would be required to write a memo about the Vice Presidentâs role in the electoral process. Before the election, Short explained to him that some in the White House were encouraging President Trump to prematurely declare victory on election night.54 Of course, that is exactly what President Trump did. Jacob and Short wanted to avoid the Vice President getting drawn in to any such declarations, and Jacob pointed to his role in presiding over the counting of the electoral votes on January 6th as a reason not to. Jacob sent a memo to Short on election day reflecting this advice.55

Then, on December 7, 2020, the Lincoln Project aired a provocative ad taunting President Trump, saying that Vice President Pence âWill Put the Nail in Your Political Coffinâ during the joint session on January 6th.56 This prompted a discussion between Jacob and Vice President Pence.57 Jacob authored another memo, dated December 8, 2020.58 Jacob continued researching the Vice Presidentâs role during the joint session into early January. Jacob told the Select Committee that his view of the matter was not fully formed until then.59

Jacob did extensive research on and historical analysis of both the Electoral Count Act of 1887 and the 12th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.60 The 12th Amendment contains a single relevant line: âThe President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted.ââ61 Though Jacob concluded that this line was âinartfully drafted,â it said nothing about resolving disputes over electoral votes.62

Jacob concluded that the Vice President must adhere to the Electoral Count Act.63 The ECA has been followed for 130 years and âevery single time that there has been any objection to electors, it has been resolved in accordance with the Electoral Count Act procedures,â Jacob testified.64 After reviewing the history and relevant cases, Jacob found that â[t]here is no justifiable basis to conclude that the Vice President has that kind of authorityâ to affect the outcome of the presidential election.65 Jacob stated that his âreview of text, history, and, frankly, just common senseâ all confirmed that the Vice President had no such power.66

One of President Trumpâs congressional allies, Representative Louie Gohmert (RâTX), pushed a version of Eastmanâs theory in the courts. On December 27, 2020, Representative Gohmert and several of the Trump Campaignâs fake electors for the State of Arizona (including Republican Party Chair Kelli Ward) filed suit against Vice President Pence in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.67 As Ward explained to Marc Short in a phone call the day the suit was filed, President Trump was aware of the lawsuit and had signed off on it: âWe wouldnât have done that without the president telling us it was okay,â she told him.68

In the suit, the Plaintiffs alleged that there were âcompeting slatesâ of electors from five States.69 They asked the court to rule that portions of the Electoral Count Act of 1887 were unconstitutional and that âthe Twelfth Amendment contains the exclusive dispute resolution mechanismsâ for determining an objection raised by a Member of Congress to the electors submitted by any State.70 Essentially, Representative Gohmert was asking the court to tell Vice President Pence that he was prohibited from following the procedures set forth in the Electoral Count Act. Much like Eastmanâs theory, the Gohmert plaintiffs asserted that the Vice President has the âexclusive authority and sole discretionâ to determine which electoral votes to count.71

Although the Gohmert suit was premised on the same theory Eastman advocated, Eastman did not agree with the decision to file suit. Eastman argued that filing a suit against the Vice President had âclose[] to zeroâ chance of succeeding, and there was a âvery highâ risk that the court would issue an opinion stating that âPence has no authority to reject the Biden-certified ballots.ââ72 As highlighted by Judge Carter, Eastmanâs theory was that Vice President Pence should take this action âwithout asking for permissionâ from Congress or the courts.73 Another attorney, Bill Olson, stated that getting a judicial determination âthat Pence is constrained by [the Electoral Count Act]â could âcompletely tank the January 6 strategy.ââ74 Those who were advocating to press on with the Eastman scheme did not want to bring it before a Federal judge because of the high risk that a courtâs determination that the scheme was illegal would stop the plan to overturn the election dead in its tracks.

Eastman himself pushed this cavalier attitude towards the courts and compliance with the law during a call with Arizona House Speaker Rusty Bowers on January 4th. During this call, just two days before the joint session, Eastman pressed Speaker Bowers to bring the Arizona House into session to certify Trump electors or decertify the Biden electors.75 Speaker Bowers responded as he had previously responded to similar entreaties by Giuliani and President Trump: by explaining that doing so would require him to violate his oaths to the U.S. and Arizona Constitutions and that he âwasnât going to take such an action.ââ76 Undeterred, Eastman still pushed Speaker Bowers to âjust do it and let the courts sort it through.ââ77

Ultimately, Representative Gohmertâs legal gambit failed; a U.S. district judge dismissed the case quickly.78 The judgeâs ruling was upheld by the Supreme Court, which rejected Gohmertâs appeal without further consideration.79

Other individuals inside and outside the White House also advanced versions of the theory that the Vice President had agency in the joint session. The issue of Vice President Penceâs role came up during a December meeting in the Oval Office. Either President Trump or his chief of staff, Mark Meadows, tasked John McEntee, the director of the Presidential Personnel Office, with researching the matter further.80 Though McEntee was one of President Trumpâs close advisors, he was not a lawyer and had no relevant experience. Yet, he wrote a one-page memo claiming that âthe VP has substantial discretion to address issues with the electoral process.ââ81

This wasnât the only one-page analysis drafted by McEntee before January 6th.82 He later proposed a âmiddle pathâ in which he envisioned the Vice President accepting only half the electoral votes from six disputed States (specifically, Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Arizona and Nevada).83 McEntee portrayed this as a way to avoid âdisenfranchis[ing]â States while still achieving the desired result: delivering a second term to President Trump. McEntee conveyed this memo to the President with a cover note reading, âThis is probably our only realistic option because it would give Pence an out.ââ84 McEntee told the Select Committee that this judgment was based on his assessment that âit was, like, pretty obvious [the Vice President] wasnât going to just reject . . . the electors or whatever was being asked of him at that time.ââ85

Another advocate of a plan for the Vice President to play a role in the joint session was Jenna Ellis, a lawyer working for the Trump Campaign. She argued in two memos that Vice President Pence had the power to delay the counting of certified electoral votes. In the first memo, addressed to President Trump and dated December 31, 2020, Ellis advised that Vice President Pence should ânot open any of the votesâ from six States that âcurrently have electoral delegates in dispute.ââ86 Ellis asserted that this âdisputeâ provided âsufficient rational and legal basis to question whether the [S]tate law and Constitution was followed.â Ellis proposed a delay of ten days, as the Vice President and Congress awaited a âresponse from the [S]tate legislatures, which would then need to meet in an emergency electoral session.â If any of the State legislatures âfails to provide a timely response, no electoral votes can be opened and counted from that [S]tate.â Ellis claimed that Vice President Pence would not be âexercising discretion nor establishing new precedent,â but instead âsimply asking for clarification from the constitutionally appointed authority.ââ87

Ellis sent the substance of this memorandum in an email to Fox News host Jeanine Pirro on January 1, 2021, under the subject line âConstitutional option.ââ88 And, on January 4, 2021, she sent the same substance to Fox News contributor John Solomon under the subject line âPence option.ââ89

Ellis addressed a second memo, dated January 5, 2021, to Jay Sekulow, an outside attorney who represented President Trump during his first impeachment proceedings and in other litigation.90 Ellis again claimed that Vice President Pence had the power to delay the certification of the vote. Ellis recommended that the Vice President should, when he arrived at the first contested State (Arizona), âsimply stop the countâ on the basis that the States had not made a âfinal determination of ascertainment of electors.â âThe [S]tates would therefore have to act.ââ91

Sekulow clearly disagreed. âSome have speculated that the Vice President could simply say, âIâm not going to accept these electors,â that he has the authority to do that under the Constitution,â Sekulow said during an episode of his radio show.92 âI actually donât think thatâs what the Constitution has in mind.â Sekulow added that the Vice President serves a merely âministerial, procedural function.ââ93

In addition, Herschmann discussed this memo with Sekulow. They agreed that Ellis did not have the âqualifications or the experience to be giving advice on thisâ or to be âlitigating the challengesâ that President Trumpâs team was filing in court.94 Herschmann did not think that Sekulow shared the memo with the President.95

On January 2, 2021, Vice President Pence met with his counsel Greg Jacob, Chief of Staff Marc Short, and Matt Morgan to discuss the joint session.96 Morgan was the Trump Campaignâs General Counsel and had previously served as counsel to Vice President Pence. At this point, the Vice President already had a clear understanding of what his role would be in the electoral count.97 Vice President Pence was concerned that most people did not understand how the certification of the electoral votes worked. So Jacob began drafting a statement for the Vice President to issue on January 6th. The statement was intended to provide a âcivic educationâ on the joint session, explaining to the American people his actions, including why the Vice President âdidnât have the authorities that others had suggested that he might.ââ98

The men discussed the various points of pressure being applied to the Vice President, including Eastmanâs theories, the Gohmert suit, Ellisâs arguments, as well as how the electoral count process should work. They also discussed allegations of irregularities and maladministration of the election, concluding that none of the allegations raised was sufficient to reverse President Trumpâs defeat.99

While Vice President Pence recognized Congressâs authority under the Electoral Count Act to raise objections to the certification, neither he nor his staff were aware of any evidence of fraud that would have had a material effect on the outcome of the election in any State.100 Because of President Trumpâs repetition of election fraud allegations, Jacob and the Vice Presidentâs staff conducted their own evaluation of these claims. Jacob asked Morgan to send the campaignâs best evidence of election âfraud, maladministration, irregularities, [and] abuses in the system.ââ101 The Vice Presidentâs legal staff memorialized the review they conducted of these materials in a memo to Vice President Pence, which concluded: âmost allegations of substantive voter fraudâdefined to mean the casting of illegal ballots in violation of prevailing election lawsâare either relatively small in number, or cannot be verified.ââ102

Vice President Pence also discussed the Trump Campaignâs fake electors with his advisors. Both Jacob and Morgan assured Vice President Pence that there were not dual slates of electors. The electors organized by the Trump Campaign were not valid.103 Morgan had already written a memo on the topic in December, concluding that the âalternateâ electorsâthat is, fakeâlacked a certificate of ascertainment issued by the State.104 Without such an ascertainment, the Trump Campaignâs fake electors had no standing during the joint session. Jacob had also prepared a âflow chartâ memo outlining each of the legal provisions implicated in the joint session on January 6th.105 Jacob advised Vice President Pence that ânone of the slates that had been sent in would qualify as an alternate slate within the meaning of the Electoral Count Act.ââ106 Vice President Pence was still worried that the fake elector issue was sowing confusion, so he wanted his statement on January 6th to be as transparent as possible.107

That same day, January 2nd, Marc Short released a brief statement on behalf of the Vice President. âVice President Pence shares the concerns of millions of Americans about voter fraud and irregularities in the last election,â the statement read. âThe vice president welcomes the efforts of members of the House and Senate to use the authority they have under the law to raise objections and bring forward evidence before the Congress and the American people on January 6th.ââ108 Short testified that the statement was consistent with the Vice Presidentâs view that he did not have the power to reject electors.109 Short issued this statement because of the âswirlâ regarding the question of âwhere [Vice President Pence] stood.ââ110

Steve Bannonâs podcast, War Room: Pandemic, was one of the primary sources of this swirl.

Steve Bannonâs podcast, War Room: Pandemic, was one of the primary sources of this swirl. Eastman was a guest on a January 2nd episode of Bannonâs show. Much of their conversation focused on Vice President Pence, and the belief that he had the power to overturn the election.

â[W]e are entering into one of the most, um, important constitutional crisis [sic] the countryâs ever had,â Bannon said.111 Bannon complained that Vice President Pence had âspit the bit,â meaning he had given up on efforts to keep President Trump in power.112 Eastman claimed that the election had been âillegally conducted,â and so the certified votes now âdevolved back to the [S]tate legislature[s], and the only other place where it devolved back to is to Congress and particularly the Vice President, who will sit in presiding over a Joint Session of Congress beginning on January 6 to count the ballots.ââ113 Eastman claimed that the Vice President (and Congress) had the power to reject the certified electors from several States out-of-hand. â[T]heyâve got multiple slates of ballots from seven states,â Eastman said. âAnd theyâve gotta decide [] which is the valid slate to count . . . I think they have that authority to make that determination on their own.ââ114

Bannon claimed the Vice President of the United States is âhardwired in,â and an âactual decisionmaker.ââ115 The Vice Presidentâs role is not âministerial,â Bannon declared.116 Eastman agreed.117 âAre we to assume that this is going to be a climactic battle thatâs going to take place this week about the very question of the constitutionality of the Electoral Count Act of 1887?â Bannon asked.118

Eastman replied, âI think a lot of that depends on the courage and the spine of the individuals involved.â Bannon asked Eastman if he meant Vice President Mike Pence. âYes,â Eastman answered.119

The next day, January 3, 2021, Eastman drafted a six-page memo that imagined several scenarios for January 6th, only some of which led to President Trumpâs victory.120 In a section titled, âWar Gaming the Alternatives,â Eastman set forth the ways he thought President Trump could remain in power.121 Importantly, Eastman concluded that President Trump could remain president ifâand only ifâVice President Pence followed Eastmanâs illegal advice and determined which electoral college ballots were âvalid.ââ122 In another scenario, Eastman imagined that President Trump may somehow win re-election in January 2021 if Vice President Pence remanded the electoral votes to State legislatures, such that they could have ten days to investigate President Trumpâs baseless claims of fraud. In that case, Eastman allowed that former Vice President Biden may still win, should the State legislatures determine that the evidence was âinsufficient to alter the results of the election.ââ123

In his six-page memo, consistent with the earlier two-page memo, Eastman states that âthe Trump electorsâ met and transmitted votes, finding that â[t]here are thus dual slates of electors from 7 [S]tates.ââ124 Even since January 6th, Eastman has continued to affirm and defend his assertion that there were dual slates of electors, writing: âTrump electors from seven [S]tates in which election challenges were still pending met (albeit of their own accord) on the date designated by Congress, cast their votes, and transmitted those votes to Congress.ââ125

Eastman used these slates as a premise for his argument that the result of the election was disputed. However, Eastman acknowledged on multiple occasionsâboth before and after January 6thâthat these âdual slatesâ had no legal significance. In an email sent on December 19, 2020, Eastman wrote that the seven Trump/Pence slates of electors âwill be dead on arrival in Congressâ âunless those electors get a certification from their State Legislators.ââ126 Of course, this certification never came and there was no basis for any action on the âdual slates.ââ127

Nevertheless, on December 23, 2020, Eastman used the existence of these slates as a justification for the Vice President to act, in an email to Boris Epshteyn, a Trump Campaign lawyer. âThe fact that we have multiple slates of electors demonstrates the uncertainty of either. That should be enough.ââ128

Again after January 6th, Eastman acknowledged in an email that the fake electorsâ documents were invalid and irrelevant.129 âAlas,â he said, â[T]hey had no authorityâ because â[n]o legislature certified them.ââ130

Eastman concluded his memo by asserting that his plan was âBOLD, Certainly,â but he attempted to justify it, arguing that âthis Election was Stolen by a strategic Democrat plan to systematically flout existing election laws for partisan advantage; weâre no longer playing by Queensbury Rules, therefore.ââ131

Eastman repeated what he wrote in his earlier, shorter memo, claiming that Vice President Pence should act âwithout asking for permissionâeither from a vote of the joint session or from the Court.ââ132 Eastman claimed âthat the Constitution assigns this power to the Vice President as the ultimate arbiter.ââ133 Eastman ended on an especially hyperbolic note. If the electionâs results were not upended, âthen the sovereign people no longer control the direction of their government, and we will have ceased to be a self-governing people. The stakes could not be higher.ââ134

Late in the afternoon of January 4, 2021, President Trump summoned Vice President Pence to the Oval Office for a showdown.135 President Trump and Eastman sought to convince the Vice President that he had the power to refuse to count the certified electors from several States won by former Vice President Biden.

Short and Jacob attended with the Vice President.136 Trumpâs chief of staff, Mark Meadows, was only briefly present, leaving as the meeting started.137

One key lawyer was conspicuously absent: Pat Cipollone, the White House Counsel. Cipollone and his deputy, Pat Philbin, were shooting down a series of âterribleâ proposals at the time.138 Philbin told the Select Committee that he considered resigning every day from approximately November 15 until the end of the administration.139 Philbin had researched the Vice Presidentâs role in the January 6th joint session and concluded that Vice President Pence had no power to affect the outcome.140 Cipollone agreed and informed Short and Jacob that this was the opinion of White House Counselâs Office.141

Mark Meadows invited Cipollone to speak with Eastman prior to the Oval Office meeting.142 Cipollone told Eastman that his scheme was ânot something that is consistent with the appropriate reading of the law.ââ143 After delivering this assessment directly to Eastman in Meadowsâ office, Cipollone walked to the Oval Office with the intent to attend the meeting. However, by the time the Vice President and his staff arrived, Cipollone was gone.144

Cipollone declined to testify as to what he told President Trump or why he did not attend the Oval Office meeting, but he was clear that he didnât end up attending the meeting because of something that happened after he walked into the Oval Office.145 Whatever happened, Cipollone maintained, was protected by executive privilege, suggesting that he was asked to leave by the President.146 What is clear, however, is that Cipollone had already shared his view directly with Meadows and Eastman, i.e., that the proposal President Trump and Eastman were about to advocate to the Vice President was illegal.147

During the Oval Office meeting, Eastman claimed that there were two legally viable options.148 First, Vice President Pence could reject outright the certified electors submitted by several States, and second, he could suspend the joint session and send the âdisputedâ electoral votes back to the States.149 Eastman advised that the Vice President had the âraw authority to determine objections himself,â according to Jacob.150 However, by the end of the meeting Eastman was emphasizing the second option that he argued would be âmore politically palatableâ than the âmore aggressiveâ option of the Vice President rejecting electoral votes outright.151 If Vice President Pence did not want to reject the electors, Eastman claimed, then the Vice President could send the certified electoral votes back to the States for further deliberation.

Eastman later conceded that both actions were based on the same underlying legal theory of the Vice Presidentâs power.152 Eastman also admittedâduring this meeting with the President and Vice Presidentâthat his proposal violated the Electoral Count Act.153 Moreover, Eastman eventually acknowledged that the concept of the Vice President unilaterally rejecting electors was not supported by precedent and that the Supreme Court would never endorse it.154

Jacob recorded his reflections on the January 4th meeting in a contemporaneous memo to the Vice President.155 Jacobâs memo confirms that Eastman admitted that his proposal violated the law in the presence of President Trump.

First, Jacob wrote, Eastman acknowledged that âhis proposal violates several provisions of statutory lawâânamely, the Electoral Count Act of 1887.156 Jacobâs memo explains that the Electoral Count Act calls for all vote certificates to be âacted upon,â and any objections to a Stateâs certificates be âfinally disposed of.â However, as Jacob wrote, Eastman was proposing instead that âno action be takenâ on the certificates from the States Eastman asserted were âcontested.â And, according to the Electoral Count Act, the Vice President (as President of the Senate) is to âcall for objections.â But Eastman did not want the Vice President to âcall for objectionsâ for these States. As Jacob noted, this would have deprived Congress of the ability under the Act to make, debate, and vote on objections.157

Additionally, the Electoral Count Act contains a provision that requires any âcompeting slates of electorsâ to be âsubmitted to the Senate and House for debate and disposition.â As Jacob noted, Eastman conceded that the âalternateâ (fake) electorsâ votes were not proper. But Eastmanâs proposal still would have refused to count the real electorsâ votes from those States and instead referred both the real and fake electorsâ votes to State legislatures âfor disposition.â Finally, in order for State legislatures to take action to determine which of the slates should be counted, Eastmanâs proposal called for âan extended recess of the joint session.â But this too would have violated the Electoral Count Act, which provides only for very short delays.158

There was another foundational problem with Eastmanâs plan. There were no legitimate âcompetingâ or âalternateâ slates of electors. President Trump, Eastman and others had manufactured the conditions they needed in order to claim that the election result was âdisputedâ by convening fake electors who sent fake documents to Washington before January 6th. And their efforts to convince State legislatures to certify Trump electors had already failed.

Jacob noted in his memo that in the Oval Office meeting, Eastman conceded âno legislature has appointed or certified any alternate slate of electorsâ and that the purported âalternate slatesâ (fake electors) were illegitimate without what Jacob described as âthe imprimatur of approval by a State legislature.ââ159 Moreover, Eastman acknowledged that âno Republican-controlled legislative majority in any disputed States has expressed an intention to designate an alternate slate of electors.ââ160 In other words, Eastman acknowledged that the fake votes were invalid, that no State legislature had approved them, and no State legislature would approve them.161 But President Trump and Eastman still pressed this unlawful scheme on the Vice President. Although Eastman started the January 4th Oval Office meeting maintaining that Vice President Pence had unilateral authority to reject electors, by the end of the meeting he conceded that he would ânot recommend that the Vice President assert that he has the authority unilaterally to decide which of the competing slates of electors should be counted.ââ162

Jacob ended his memo with a scathing summary. âIf the Vice President implemented Professor Eastmanâs proposal, he would likely lose in court,â Jacob wrote. âIn a best-case scenario in which the courts refused to get involved, the Vice President would likely find himself in an isolated standoff against both houses of Congress, as well as most or all of the applicable State legislatures, with no neutral arbiter to break the impasse.ââ163

Following the Oval Office meeting, during the evening of January 4, 2021, Jacob invited Eastman to send along âany written materials on electoral vote counting issues,â including a law review article by Laurence Tribe that Eastman had cited in the Oval Office meeting that day, for Jacob to review on the Vice Presidentâs behalf.164 Jacob reviewed everything that Eastman submitted; nothing changed the analysis he had already done for the Vice President, indeed much of it did not even support Eastmanâs own arguments.165

Pence did not relent on January 4th, or at any point during the harrowing two days that followed. â[F]rom my very first conversation with the Vice President on the subject, his immediate instinct was that there is no way that one person could be entrusted by the Framers to exercise that authority,â Jacob testified. âAnd never once did I see him budge from that view, and the legal advice that I provided him merely reinforced it. So, everything that he said or did during [the January 4th meeting in the Oval Office] was consistent with his first instincts on this question.ââ166

President Trump did not relent either. His instinct was to increase public pressure on Vice President Pence, despite the Vice Presidentâs consistent message to President Trump about the limits of his authority. That evening, during a Senate campaign rally in Dalton, Georgia, President Trump made it seem as if the Presidential election hadnât already been decided and projected his unhinged ambitions onto his opponents.167 President Trump claimed that âthereâs nothing the radical Democrats will not do to get power that they so desperately crave,â including âthe outright stealing of elections, like theyâre trying to do with us.ââ168

âWeâre not going to let it happen,â President Trump said, adding, âI hope Mike Pence comes through for us, I have to tell you.â President Trump called Vice President Pence a âgreat vice president,â a âgreat guy,â as well as a âwonderfulâ and âsmart man.â But he alluded to the Vice Presidentâs role, âheâs going to have a lot to say about it,â and added an ominous note. âOf course, if he doesnât come through, I wonât like him quite as much,â President Trump said.169

Eastman met with Jacob and Short again the following day.170 During the Oval Office meeting the Vice President had made clear that he would not unilaterally reject electors, and, by pivoting to recommend the Vice President send the electors back to the States, Eastman seemed to recognize this. But the following morning, Eastman returned to pressing for the more âaggressiveâ path.171

Jacob recorded Eastmanâs request on January 5, 2021, in a handwritten note: âRequesting VP reject.ââ172 Jacob later summarized Eastmanâs remarks as follows: âIâm here asking you to reject the electors.ââ173 This overnight reversal surprised Jacob because Eastman was returning to the more aggressive position he had seemed to abandon in the Oval Office meeting the day before.174 President Trumpâs tweets that morning may explain Eastmanâs reversal. While Eastman was meeting with the Vice Presidentâs staff, his client, President Trump, was pressing the argument publicly.

At 11:06 a.m. on the morning of January 5th, President Trump tweeted: âThe Vice President has the power to reject fraudulently chosen electors.â As his tweet made clear, President Trump would not be persuaded by reasonâor the law. The President made this public statement despite the Vice Presidentâs clear and consistent rejection of this theory including during an in-person meeting the day before. During that same meeting, Eastman conceded that this âaggressiveâ path of rejecting electors was not advisable.

Herschmann briefly participated in the January 5th meeting, seeing it as âan opportunity . . . to just chew [Eastman] out.ââ175 Herschmann had already pushed back âbrutal[ly]â on Eastmanâs theory regarding the Vice President. In this conversation, he emphasized the need to fact check dubious claims of election fraud.176 Herschmann told Eastman that âsomeone better make sureâ that the allegations Eastman provided to members of Congress were accurate before they objected to the certification of the vote the next day.177 â[N]othing should come out of someoneâs mouth that [isnât] independently verified and [] reliable.ââ178

Jacob then had his own âSocraticâ debate with Eastman over the legal merits of his position. According to Jacob, Eastman conceded much ground by the end of the session. Eastman âall but admitted that it [his plan] didnât work.ââ179

For example, Eastman had previously claimed to have found historical support in the actions of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, who both presided over the counting of electoral votes when they were Vice President. Not so. Jacob told the Select Committee that Eastman conceded in private that the cases of Jefferson and Adams did not serve âas examples for the proposition that he was trying to support of a Vice Presidential assertion of authority to decide disputes[,] because no dispute was raised in either case during the joint session.â Jacob added: âAnd, moreover, there was no [question] as to the outcomes in those States.ââ180

Eastman conceded that there was no historical support for the role that he and President Trump were pushing Vice President Pence to play. No Vice Presidentâbefore or after the adoption of the Electoral Count Actâhad ever exercised such authority. This included then-Vice President Richard Nixonâs handling of the electoral votes of Hawaii following the 1960 election. Though Eastman and other Trump lawyers used this Hawaii example to justify the theory that the Vice President could unilaterally choose which electors to count, Eastman admitted to Jacob that Vice President Nixon had not in fact done what Eastman was recommending Vice President Pence do.181

Eastman also admitted that he would not grant the expansive powers he advocated for Vice President Pence to any other Vice President. Eastman did not think that Vice President Kamala Harris should have such power in 2025, nor did he think that Vice President Al Gore should have had such authority in 2001.182 He also acknowledged that his theory would lose 9-0 at the Supreme Court.183

According to Jacob, Eastman âacknowledged by the end that, first of all, no reasonable person would actually want that clause [of the 12th Amendment] read that way because if indeed it did mean that the Vice President had such authority, you could never have a party switch thereafter.â If politicians followed Eastmanâs advice, â[y]ou would just have the same party win continuously if indeed a Vice President had the authority to just declare the winner of every State.ââ184

The Vice Presidentâs office was unmoved by Eastmanâs specious reasoning. As he left Marc Shortâs office, Eastman was thinking of his clientâs reaction. âTheyâre going to be really disappointed that I wasnât able to persuade you,â Eastman said.185

As President Trumpâs pressure campaign intensified, the Vice Presidentâs outside counsel, Richard Cullen, turned for support to John Michael Luttig, a conservative former judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.186 Eastman had clerked for Luttigâa man with impeccable legal and conservative credentialsâmore than two decades prior. Luttig rejected Eastmanâs so-called legal analysis of the Vice Presidentâs role in no uncertain terms. In a series of tweets, posted at 9:53 a.m. on January 5th, Luttig set forth his legal conclusions.

âThe only responsibility and power of the Vice President under the Constitution is to faithfully count the electoral college votes as they have been cast,â Judge Luttig wrote. âThe Constitution does not empower the Vice President to alter in any way the votes that have been cast, either by rejecting certain of them or otherwise.ââ187

Confusion in the media about where the Vice President stood on this issue prompted former Speaker of the House Paul Ryan to reach out to the Vice President to share his belief that the Vice President had no unilateral authority.188 Short also spoke with former Speaker Ryan and as he testified to the Select Committee, âI said to him, Mr. Speaker, you know Mike . . . you know he recognizes that. And we sort of laughed about it, and he said, I get it.ââ189

The Vice President also consulted with former Vice President Dan Quayle, who reinforced and affirmed Vice President Penceâs consistent understanding of his role.190

President Trump demanded to see Vice President Pence again that same day. Vice President Pence had canceled a planned lunch with President Trump, intending to work on the statement he planned to issue on January 6th to explain publicly why he wouldnât bow to the Presidentâs pressure.191 But Pence couldnât avoid Trump. Vice President Pence had to delay a Coronavirus Task Force meeting later that same day when he was called to the Oval Office to meet with the President.192

The two men met alone, without staff present. While we have not developed direct evidence of what was discussed during this one-on-one meeting between the President and Vice President, it did not change the fundamental disagreement between them about the limits of the Vice Presidentâs authority during the joint session. Jacob said the Vice President left the meeting âdetermined.ââ193 Vice President Pence did tell Marc Short what transpired during the meeting, but Short refused to tell the Select Committee what was said.194 Short described Vice President Penceâs demeanor as âsteady.ââ195 Short testified that the below excerpt from the book Peril may have been sensationalized but was generally consistent with Shortâs understanding of the discussion:

âIf these people say you have the power, wouldnât you want to?â Trump asked.

âI wouldnât want any one person to have that authority,â Pence said.

âBut wouldnât it almost be cool to have that power?â Trump asked.

âNo,â Pence said. âLook, Iâve read this, and I donât see a way to do it. Weâve exhausted every option. Iâve done everything I could and then some to find a way around this. Itâs simply not possible. My interpretation is: No. . . .

âNo, no, no!â Trump shouted. âYou donât understand, Mike. You can do this. I donât want to be your friend anymore if you donât do this.ââ196

Later that day, Jacob and Short were both present for a call between President Trump and Vice President Pence.197 Eastman and at least one other lawyer were with President Trump on the call as well.198

Eastman recognized that Vice President Pence was not going to change his mind on rejecting electors outright, but he still asked if the Vice President would consider sending the electors back to the States.199 âI donât see it,â Vice President Pence responded, âbut my counsel will hear out whatever Mr. Eastman has to say.ââ200

Jacob received other calls from Eastman on January 5th.201 Jacob told the Select Committee that he had a detailed discussion with Eastman concerning the ways his proposal would violate the Electoral Count Act.202 Eastman resorted to a ridiculous argumentâcomparing their current situation to the crisis that faced President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War. Eastman invoked President Lincolnâs suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.203 He also told Jacob to âstay tunedâ because âweâ were trying to get some letters from State legislators indicating that they were interested in the Vice President sending the electors back to the States.204

On the evening of January 5th, The New York Times published an article titled, âPence Said to Have Told Trump He Lacks Power to Change Election Result.ââ205 The Times reported on the tension brewing within the White House, citing âpeople briefed on the conversationâ between President Trump and Vice President Pence that had taken place in the Oval Office the previous day. âVice President Mike Pence told President Trump on Tuesday [January 4th] that he did not believe he had the power to block congressional certification of Joseph R. Biden, Jr.âs victory in the presidential election despite Mr. Trumpâs baseless insistence that he did,â the Times reported.206

The Timesâ report was published at approximately 7:36 that evening.207 Jason Miller called President Trump to make sure he had seen it.208 President Trump spoke to Miller at least twice, once at 8:18 p.m. and a second time at 9:22 p.m.209 Immediately after concluding his second call with Jason Miller, President Trump asked to speak to the Vice President; President Trump and Vice President Pence spoke from 9:33 to 9:41 p.m.210 President Trump also spoke with Steve Bannon and Eastman, among others.211

At 9:58 p.m. on January 5th, President Trump issued a statement that he had dictated to Jason Miller disputing the Timesâ account.212 President Trump liedârepeatedlyâin his short statement.213 The President claimed the article was âfake news.â It wasnât. President Trump claimed he and Vice President Pence were âin total agreement that the Vice President has the power to act.â They werenât. President Trump claimed the election âwas illegal.â It wasnât. President Trump then laid out Vice President Penceâs options for the next day, summarizing Eastmanâs theory:

Our Vice President has several options under the U.S. Constitution. He can decertify the results or send them back to the [S]tates for change and certification. He can also decertify the illegal and corrupt results and send them to the House of Representatives for the one vote for one [S]tate tabulation.214

This was also a blatant attempt to mischaracterize the Vice Presidentâs position in the hope that public opinion would somehow sway the resolute Vice President. President Trump knew full well at the time that he and Vice President Pence were not âin total agreement.â The Vice Presidentâs counsel, Greg Jacob, was shocked by the statement.215 â[T]he Vice President was not in agreement that the Vice President had the power to take the actions that were being asked of him that day,â Jacob later told the Select Committee.216 Marc Short was furious as well and called Jason Miller to forcefully âexpress [his] displeasure that a statement could have gone out that misrepresented the Vice Presidentâs viewpoint without consultation.ââ217

The Vice President was âobviously irritated that a statement putting words in his mouthâ was issued by the President and considered issuing his own statement contradicting President Trumpâs.218 Ultimately, Pence and Short concluded that it was not worthwhile since it was already late in the evening and they expected the question to be resolved by Vice President Penceâs âDear Colleagueâ letter the next day.219

While President Trump misrepresented the Vice Presidentâs agreement with Eastmanâs theory, his on-again, off-again political advisor, Steve Bannon, pressed President Trumpâs campaign against Vice President Pence in public. Bannon echoed the public pressure on Pence that the President continued to propagate by talking about his purported authority. The Select Committee learned from phone records that Bannon spoke to President Trump at least twice on January 5th.220

During a January 5, 2021, episode of War Room: Pandemic, Bannon and his guests openly berated Vice President Pence. Bannon cited an erroneous news report claiming that Senator Grassley would preside over the certification of the electoral college voteâinstead of Vice President Pence.221 Bannonâs cohost, Raheem Kassam, took credit for the public pressure placed on Vice President Pence. âI want to remind people who has been sitting here, saying âLight Pence Upâ for the last couple of weeks. Right? That would be Raheem Kassam.â They then discussed President Trumpâs speech in Georgia the previous evening. âI think the President of the United States took your advice last night, wrote a line in there,â Bannon said. To which Kasseem responded: â. . . and yours . . . hold the line.â

Jack Posobiec, an alt-right personality with a large Twitter following, chimed in quoting a member of their audience as saying that âPence will betray Donald Trump.ââ222 In response, Bannon stated: âCall the play. Run the play.ââ223

The âplayâ was Bannonâs version of the âGreen Bay Sweepââa plan to subvert the transfer of power on January 6th named for a brutally effective power running play developed in the National Football League (NFL) in the 1960âs. Steve Bannonâs political version of the sweep was intended to undermine the legitimate results of the 2020 presidential election.

One account of Bannonâs âGreen Bay Sweepâ comes from Peter Navarro, Director of the White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy. Navarro refused to cooperate with the Select Committee and was subsequently indicted for contempt of Congress. Although he doesnât fully explain in his book, In Trump Time: A Journal of Americaâs Plague Year, how Bannonâs sweep was intended to work, Navarro writes that Vice President Pence was envisioned as the âquarterbackâ who would âassert his constitutional powerâ to delay certification.224 Navarro writes that his own role was to âcarefully document the fraud and myriad election irregularities,â while Bannonâs ârole was to figure out how to use this informationâwhat he called the âreceipts.âââ225

Navarroâs account helps explain why Trump and his loyalists became so fixated on Vice President Pence. They saw Vice President Pence as their last hope for keeping President Trump in office. Navarro writes of Penceâs supposed âbetrayal.ââ226 In a telling sentence, Navarro likens Vice President Pence to Brutus, a Roman politician and the most famous assassin of Julius Caesar. Navarro writes:

On this cold, momentous day, I shiver as I think to myself, âJanuary 6 will be either Mike Penceâs finest hour or the traitorous âEt tu, Brute?â end of both his and Donald Trumpâs political careers.ââ227

The goal of these Trump allies was clear: to overturn the election result.228 Statements by participants in this effort indicate there were several different endgame strategies in mind. One was to get the Vice President to unilaterally reject the Electoral College votes of Arizona, Georgia, Pennsylvania, and other States, then simply declare that Trump had won a majority of the electors actually submitted. The other major possibility was to reject or âreturnâ the Electoral College votes of these States and then declare there was no majority in the Electoral College process, thereby triggering a so-called contingent election under the 12th Amendment.229 This would have meant that the House of Representatives had chosen the president not on the basis of one-member-one-vote, but on the basis of one-State-one-vote, pursuant to the 12th Amendment. Donald Trumpâs strategists emphasized repeatedly that the GOP had a 27-to-22 margin in control of the Statesâ Congressional delegations, with Pennsylvania being tied at 9-to-9, therefore presumably a non-factor.

Despite the public pressure initiated by the President and amplified by Bannon, Navarro and others, there was no ambiguity in the Vice Presidentâs decision. By January 6th, President Trump had been told multiple times that Vice President Pence was not going to reject the certified electors from any State. Nor was Vice President Pence going to move for a delay and send the electors back to the States. Either move would have been illegal, requiring Vice President Pence to break the law, violating his oath to the U.S. Constitution. Pence made his decision clear â[m]any timesâ to President Trump, and he was âvery consistentâ in rejecting the Presidentâs demands.230 President Trump continued to publicly pressure the Vice President anyway.

At 1:00 a.m. on January 6th, President Trump tweeted:

If Vice President @Mike_Pence comes through for us, we will win the Presidency. Many States want to decertify the mistake they made in certifying incorrect & even fraudulent numbers in a process NOT approved by their State Legislatures (which it must be). Mike can send it back!231

Later that morning, at 8:17 a.m., President Trump tweeted again:

States want to correct their votes, which they now know were based on irregularities and fraud, plus corrupt process never received legislative approval. All Mike Pence has to do is send them back to the States, AND WE WIN. Do it Mike, this is a time for extreme courage!232

And, at 8:22 a.m., President Trump tweeted again, making a pitch for Congress to choose him, as if peopleâs votes on election day and the electoral college didnât matter:

THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, OUR COUNTRY, NEEDS THE PRESIDENCY MORE THAN EVER BEFOREâTHE POWER OF THE VETO. STAY STRONG!233

President Trumpâs tweets made it clear that he thought the Republican State legislatures would simply deliver him victory. President Trump emphasized this point, writing twice that if Vice President Pence gave in, âwe win.â However, there was no sign of a change in the Vice Presidentâs position. A moment of truth was looming.

President Trump tried to reach Vice President Pence by phone early that morning.234 He finally talked to his Vice President at approximately 11:20 a.m.235 The exchange quickly became contentious.

Eric Herschmann, a lawyer in the White House Counselâs Office, overheard the conversation. Members of President Trumpâs family and other White House officials were present as well.236 Herschmann recalled that âit started off as a calmer tone, everything, and then it became heated.ââ237 Ivanka Trump also described the call as âpretty heated.ââ238 Ivanka Trump elaborated: âIt was a different tone than Iâd heard him take with the Vice President before.ââ239 Ivanka Trump told her Chief of Staff, Julie Radford, that âher dad had just had an upsetting conversation with the Vice President.ââ240 President Trump had even called Vice President Pence the âP Word.ââ241

Nick Luna, President Trumpâs personal assistant (commonly known as the âbody manâ), was also in the Oval Office during the conversation. Luna told the Select Committee that President Trump called Vice President Pence a âwimpâ on the call, with President Trump adding that he âmade the wrong decisionâ in choosing Pence as his running mate.242

Keith Kellogg, Vice President Penceâs National Security Advisor, also heard the conversation. President Trump âtold the Vice President that, you know, he has legal authority to send these folks [the electors] back to the respective States,â Kellogg told the Select Committee.243 President Trump insisted that Vice President Pence had the âconstitutional authority toâ reject certain electoral college votes.244 When Vice President Pence would not budge, President Trump told him âyouâre not tough enough to make the call.ââ245

But Vice President Pence would not be bullied. The Vice President, who was at his residence at the time, had been meeting with Greg Jacob to finalize the statement he would be releasing later that day. When the President called, Pence stepped away to answer the phone. According to Jacob, when Pence returned, he did not say anything about the callâbut he looked âsteely, determined, [and] grim,â as he reentered the room.246

Despite the Vice Presidentâs unwavering stance, the President and his outside counsel continued to turn up the heat of public pressure.

At President Trumpâs urging, thousands had gathered on the morning of January 6th to hear the President and others speak at a rally held at the Ellipse, a park just south of the White House. Before President Trump spoke, Eastman took the stage alongside Giuliani. Both would further amplify the Presidentâs public pressure on the Vice President, but when Giuliani spoke on the Ellipse, he already knew that what Eastman had outlined would never practically happen.

At 9:31 a.m. that morning, Giuliani called Eric Herschmann âout of the blueâ to ask him for his view and analysis of the practical implications of Eastmanâs theory.247 According to Herschmann, after an âintellectual discussion about . . . the VPâs role,â Giuliani agreed that the âpractical implication of [what Eastman had proposed] would be almost impossible.ââ248 Immediately after this 5Â½ minute conversation with Herschmann, Giuliani had two calls with the White House, at 9:41 a.m. and 9:53 a.m.249

Giuliani recognized Eastman who joined him on stage, claiming that he was âone of the preeminent constitutional scholars in the United States.ââ250

Giuliani said Vice President Pence could either âdecide on the validity of these crooked ballots, or he can send it back to the legislat[ures], give them five to 10 days to finally finish the work.ââ251 He added that that they had âletters from five legislat[ures] begging us to do that.ââ252 This was not true. At most, what Giuliani, Eastman and other allies of President Trump had managed to procure were letters from individual State legislators or groups of State legislators. None of the letters came from a majority of any Stateâs legislative chamber, let alone a majority of an entire State legislature.253

For instance, a letter that Eastman described to Jacob as a â[m]ajor new developmentâ on the evening of January 5th contained the signatures of 21 members of the Pennsylvania Senate.254 Eastman claimed that it ânow looks like PA Legislature will vote to recertify its electors if Vice President Pence implements the plan we discussed,â but the letter asked only for a âdelayâ in certification to âallow for due process.ââ255 The Select Committee learned from the most senior Pennsylvania Senate Republican that he signed the letter because of pressure he was feeling due to the voluminous post-election outreach from President Trump, Trump allies, and the public.256 And, he only agreed to sign a letter directed to Congressional leadersânot the Vice Presidentâafter raising in a conversation with Vice President Penceâs brother, Congressman Greg Pence, his desire to avoid pressuring the Vice President.257

Moreover, as Jacob explained, âwhat any of the State legislatures said they did or did not want to do had no impact on the legal analysis of what the Vice Presidentâs authorities were.ââ258 There was simply no legal path to send any votes back to the States on January 6th.

On the stage at the Presidentâs rally on the Ellipse, Giuliani repeated a conspiracy theory about the âcrooked Dominion machines . . . deliberatelyâ changing votes via an algorithm.259 He explained that the 10-day delay in the certification would be used âto see the machines that are crookedâ and âto find criminality thereââdemonstrating that his repeated assertions of a stolen election were not based on any real proof, or even evidence, of actual widespread fraud or criminality.260

âLetâs have trial by combat,â Giuliani told the crowd.261

Eastman came to the microphone following Giuliani, and he proceeded to repeat proven falsehoods regarding voting machines. He then issued his âdemandâ:

And all we are demanding of Vice President Pence is this afternoon, at 1:00, he let the legislatures of the state look into this so we get to the bottom of it, and the American people know whether we have control of the direction of our government, or not. We no longer live in a self-governing republic if we canât get the answer to this question. This is bigger than President Trump. It is a very essence of our republican form of government, and it has to be done. And anybody that is not willing to stand up to do it, does not deserve to be in the office. It is that simple.262

Eastman told the assembled crowd that nothing less than the fate of the American Republic was in Vice President Penceâs hands.

When President Trump later took the stage at the Ellipse, he heaped praise on Giuliani and Eastman. âHeâs got guts, unlike a lot of people in the Republican Party,â President Trump said of Giuliani. âHeâs got guts. He fights, he fights.ââ263 President Trump described Eastman as âone of the most brilliant lawyers in the country.ââ264 President Trump claimed that Eastman had looked at the election and said, âWhat an absolute disgrace that this can be happening to our Constitution.ââ265 Trump falsely argued that the keys to the election were in Vice President Penceâs hands, saying:

And he [Eastman] looked at Mike Pence, and I hope Mike is going to do the right thing. I hope so. I hope so. Because if Mike Pence does the right thing, we win the election. . . . [T]his is from the number one, or certainly one of the top, Constitutional lawyers in our country. He has the absolute right to do it.266

President Trump repeatedly lied, claiming that several States wanted to overturn former Vice President Bidenâs victory:

States want to revote. The States got defrauded. They were given false information. They voted on it. Now they want to recertify. They want it back. All Vice President Pence has to do is send it back to the States to recertify and we become president and you are the happiest people.267

Contrary to the statement President Trump dictated the night before, he all but admitted that Vice President Pence did not agree with him:

And I actually, I just spoke to Mike. I said: âMike, that doesnât take courage. What takes courage is to do nothing. That takes courage.â And then weâre stuck with a president who lost the election by a lot and we have to live with that for four more years. Weâre just not going to let that happen.268

Later in his speech at the Ellipse, President Trump repeated:

So, I hope Mike has the courage to do what he has to do. And I hope he doesnât listen to the RINOs and the stupid people that heâs listening to.269

This was nothing less than a direct appeal to the large angry crowd to pressure Vice President Mike Pence to change his settled and oft-repeated conclusion about the limits of his authority. It was a shocking attempt to use public opinion to change the Vice Presidentâs position. President Trump launched a mob toward the Capitol with the false hope that there was a scenario in which Vice President Pence would do what Eastman and President Trump had asked him to do, preventing the transfer of authority to President-elect Biden.

President Trumpâs speech began late and ran long. He didnât finish speaking until approximately 1:10 p.m.âafter the joint session had begun at 1:00 p.m. Minutes before he gaveled the joint session into order, Vice President Mike Pence released the âDear Colleagueâ letter he had been working on for days with his staff.270 There was never any ambiguity in Vice President Penceâs understanding of his role and authority, but he wanted to make it clear for everyone to see. âThis may be the most important thing I ever say,â Vice President Pence remarked.271

âToday it will be my duty to preside when the Congress convenes in Joint Session to count the votes of the Electoral College, and I will do so to the best of my ability,â Vice President Pence wrote. Vice President Pence explained that his ârole as presiding officer is largely ceremonialâ and dismissed the arguments that he could take unilateral action as contrary to his oath to support and defend the Constitution:

As a student of history who loves the Constitution and reveres its Framers, I do not believe that the Founders of our country intended to invest the Vice President with unilateral authority to decide which electoral votes should be counted during the Joint Session of Congress, and no Vice President in American history has ever asserted such authority. Instead, Vice Presidents presiding over Joint Sessions have uniformly followed the Electoral Count Act, conducting the proceedings in an orderly manner even where the count resulted in the defeat of their party or their own candidacy.272

When Vice President Pence gaveled the opening of the joint session, he knew that many of his Republican colleagues planned to challenge the electionâs results based on fictitious claims of fraud. The Vice President took steps to ensure that those objections adhered to the process set forth in the Electoral Count Act.

Every four years, on January 6th, vice presidents read from a script that remains essentially unchanged. Eastmanâs theory of the Vice Presidentâs power and the Trump Campaignâs scheme to convene and submit the slates of âalternateâ (fake) electors motivated Vice President Pence and his advisors to alter the script and to make sure they were prepared to respond to any unexpected actions in the joint session.273

Vice President Pence met with the Senate Parliamentarian on January 3rd to discuss the joint session and revised the joint session scripts in consultation with her office.274 Vice President Pence and the Parliamentarian agreed that the Vice Presidentâs role is ministerial.275

The Vice President knew that the fake slates of electors organized by the Trump Campaign were not certified by the States and thus were not valid; he revised the script for the joint session to be transparent with the American people about what the Vice President wouldâand wouldnâtâbe doing during the joint session.276

One of the most noticeable and important changes to the script was directed specifically at thwarting the fake electors scheme. The Vice President knew, informed by the research and analysis of his staff, that absent certification of the electoral votes by a State authority, the purported âalternateâ slates were ânot consequentialâ and would play no role in the certification of the Presidential election at the joint session.277 The Senate Parliamentarian confirmed this understanding.278

For decades, Vice Presidents read a similar simple passage concerning the ascertainment of the vote. Most recently, Vice President Joseph Biden read this passage aloud in 2017, as did his most recent predecessors:

After ascertainment has been had that the certificates are authentic and correct in form, the tellers will count and make a list of the votes cast by the electors of the several States.

On January 6, 2021, Vice President Pence read from a revised script (emphasis added):

After ascertaining that the certificates are regular in form and authentic, tellers will announce the votes cast by the electors for each state, beginning with Alabama, which the parliamentarians advise me is the only certificate of vote from that State and purports to be a return from the State that has annexed to it a certificate from an authority of that State purporting to appoint or ascertain electors.279

Vice President Pence used the same phrasing for each of the 50 States counted.

The Vice Presidentâs attention to this issue was warranted. Trumpâs allies pushed the fake electors scheme until the very end. Although the Trump Campaign had taken pains to direct the fake electors to send their documents to the appropriate authorities immediately after voting on December 14th, and though the Senate Parliamentarianâs and Vice Presidentâs offices had been tracking the receipt by mail of both the legitimate and fake certificates, the Trump Campaign apparently became concerned that two Statesâ documents had not been received before the joint session.280

On January 4th, the Trump campaign asked Republican Party officials in Wisconsin to fly their fake electorsâ documents to Washington, DC.281 Shortly after, staffers for Representative Mike Kelly (RâPA) and Senator Ron Johnson (RâWI) reached out to Vice President Penceâs Director of Legislative Affairs, apparently seeking to deliver the fake certificates.282 A message from Senator Johnsonâs staffer was sent just minutes before the beginning of the joint session. This staffer stated that Senator Johnson wished to hand-deliver to the Vice President the fake electorsâ certificates from Michigan and Wisconsin. The Vice Presidentâs aide unambiguously turned him away.283

Vice President Pence made certain to call for objections as well, in compliance with the Electoral Count Act. After the tellers read off the votes cast for each State, he asked: âAre there any objections to counting the certificate of vote of the state . . . that the teller has verified, appears to be regular in form and authentic?ââ284

For most States, there were no objections. Republicans only rose to object to the States that President Trump contested. The first such state was Arizona. At approximately 1:46 p.m., Congressman Paul Gosar (RâAZ) announced his objection.285 âI rise for myself and 60 of my colleagues to object to the counting of the electoral ballots from Arizona,â Gosar said.286

Vice President Pence then asked: âIs the objection in writing and Signed by a senator?â It was. Senator Ted Cruz endorsed the unfounded challenge to Arizonaâs electoral votes.287 Because the objections complied with the law, Vice President Pence directed the House and Senate to withdraw from the joint session so that the House and Senate could separately debate and vote on the objection.288

When the joint session finally resumed after the attack on the Capitol, the clerks announced the results of each chamberâs vote. Just six U.S. Senators voted for the objection to the counting of Arizonaâs electoral college votes. The objection was also defeated in the House, though 121 Republican Members voted to reject Arizonaâs legitimate electors.289 Pennsylvania was the only other State the chambers debated, after the Houseâs objection was signed by Senator Josh Hawley (RâMo.).290

As the debate over Arizonaâs legitimate electors took place on the Senate floor, the Vice Presidentâs staff could see trouble brewing outside.291 From inside the Vice Presidentâs ceremonial office, staffers witnessed the crowds swelling on the east side of the Capitol. Then, the rioters broke through security barriers.292 Jacob told young staffers that they should stand back from the windows, because the Vice Presidentâs office was not âthe most popular office on the block right now.ââ293

The Vice President was presiding over the Senate debate on the Arizona objection when the noise from the rioters became audible and those in the Senate Chamber realized the rioters had entered the Capitol.294 The Secret Service evacuated Vice President Pence from the Senate floor at 2:12 p.m.295 Twelve minutes later, at 2:24 p.m., President Trump tweeted that Vice President Pence âdidnât have the courage to do what should have been done to protect our country and our Constitution.ââ296 By that time, the Secret Service had moved the Vice President to his ceremonial office across the hall.297 But the situation was spiraling out of controlâand they wouldnât stay there long. As Sarah Matthews, the Deputy White House Press Secretary, later explained: President Trumpâs tweet was like âpouring gasoline on the fire.ââ298

Thirty seconds after President Trumpâs tweet, rioters who were already inside the Capitol opened the East Rotunda door just down the hall. A mere thirty seconds later, rioters breached the crypt one floor below the Vice President.

Though the Vice President refused the Secret Serviceâs first two attempts to evacuate him from his ceremonial office, the situation quickly became untenable and the Vice President was told that the Secret Service could no longer protect him in this office in the Capitol that was quickly being overrun.299 Marc Short recalls Tim Giebels, the head of the Vice Presidentâs Secret Service protective detail, saying, âAt this point, I canât protect you behind these glass doors, and so I need to move you.ââ300 This time, the third, the Secret Service was not asking the Vice President to move; they were stating the fact that the Vice President must be moved.301 At 2:20 p.m., NSC staff monitoring radio communications reported that the second floor of the Capitol and the door to the Senate Chamber âha[ve] now been breached.ââ302

At 2:25 p.m., the Secret Service rushed the Vice President, his family, and his senior staff down a flight of stairs, through a series of hallways and tunnels to a secure location.303 The Vice President and his team stayed in that same location for the next four and a half hours.

The angry mob had come within 40 feet of the Vice President as he was evacuated.304 President Trump never called to check on Vice President Penceâs safety, so Marc Short called Mark Meadows to tell him they were safe and secure.305 Short himself became persona non grata with President Trump. The President directed staff to revoke Shortâs access to the White House after Vice President Pence refused to betray his oath to the Constitution.306 Marc Short never spoke with President Trump again.307

After arriving at the secure location, the head of the Vice Presidentâs Secret Service detail wanted to move the Vice President away from the Capitol, and staff hurried into the waiting vehicles. But the Vice President refused to get in the car.308 As Greg Jacob explained in his testimony to the Select Committee:

The Vice President wouldnât get in his car. . . . [H]e was determined that unless there was imminent danger to bodily safety that he was not going to abandon the Capitol and let the rioters have a victory of having made the Vice President flee or made it difficult to restart the process later that day.309

It was an unprecedented scene in American history. The President of the United States had riled up a mob that hunted his own Vice President.

The Vice Presidentâs staff came to believe that the theory âpushed and soldâ to the public that the Vice President had a role to play in the joint session was a cause of the attack on the Capitol. âThe reason that the Capitol was assaulted was that the people who were breaching the Capitol believed that . . . the election [outcome] had not yet been determined, and, instead, there was some action that was supposed to take place in Washington, D.C., to determine it,â Jacob said.310 âI do think [the violence] was the result of that position being continuously pushed and sold to people who ended up believing that with all their hearts.ââ311 The people had been âtold that the Vice President had the authorityâ to determine the outcome of the election during the joint session.312

Of course, that was President Trumpâs and John Eastmanâs plan all alongâto convince people that the election had been stolen, and that Vice President Pence could take action to change the outcome during the joint session on January 6th.

Jacob was writing an email to Eastman when the Capitol was breached.313 At 2:14 p.m., just before being evacuated, Jacob hurriedly hit send on his email, but not before adding the following: âthanks to your bullshit, we are now under siege.ââ314

Eastman quickly replied to Jacobâs email and, incredibly, blamed Vice President Pence and Jacob for the attack. âThe âsiegeâ is because YOU and your boss did not do what was necessary to allow this to be aired in a public way so the American people can see for themselves what happened,â Eastman wrote.315 Naturally, Jacob was âsomewhere between aghast and livid.ââ316 It was âridiculousâ to blame Vice President Pence for the attack, when he simply followed the law.317

The Senate reconvened at approximately 8:06 p.m.318 Congressional leadership and the Vice President insisted on finishing the work of the people. âToday was a dark day in the history of the United States Capitol,â Vice President Pence said. âBut thanks to the swift efforts of U.S. Capitol Police, federal, state and local law enforcement, the violence was quelled. The Capitol is secured, and the peopleâs work continues.â The Vice President addressed âthose who wreaked havoc in our Capitol today,â saying âyou did not win.â Vice President Pence continued:

Violence never wins. Freedom wins. And this is still the peopleâs house. And as we reconvene in this chamber, the world will again witness the resilience and strength of our democracy, for even in the wake of unprecedented violence and vandalism at this Capitol, the elected representatives of the people of the United States have assembled again on the very same day to support and defend the Constitution of the United States.

âLetâs get back to work,â Vice President Pence concluded.319

Despite the violence that had unfolded at the Capitol, Eastman kept agitating for further delay. At 11:44 p.m. on January 6th, Eastman sent yet another email to Greg Jacob.320 In a shockingly tone-deaf manner, Eastman claimed that the Electoral Count Act had been violated already, by allowing debate beyond two hours, soâhe arguedâVice President Pence should no longer be concerned that what President Trump and Eastman had pressured him to do also would violate it.321 âOf course,â as Jacob pointed out, the debate couldnât have been completed in two hours due to the âintervening riot of several hours.ââ322

Eastman argued that Vice President Pence should âadjourn for 10 days to allow the legislatures to finish their investigations, as well as to allow a full forensic audit of the massive amount of illegal activity that has occurred here.ââ323 Eastman described thisâa delay in the certification of the vote and the peaceful transfer of power with no legal or historical precedent or support, based on entirely specious and disproven allegations of election fraud, following on a violent attack on the seat of American democracyâas a ârelatively minor violation.ââ324

Vice President Pence later described Eastmanâs email as ârubber room stuff,â meaning it was certifiably crazy.325

Eastman called Herschmann on January 7th to discuss litigation on behalf of the Trump Campaign in Georgia.326 This gave Herschmann another opportunity to lay into Eastman. â[Are] you out of your Fâing mind?â Herschmann asked. âI only want to hear two words coming out of your mouth from now on: orderly transition.â Herschmann said. After some berating, Eastman repeated after Herschmann: âOrderly transition.â âNow Iâm going to give you the best free legal advice youâre ever getting in your life,â Herschmann said. âGet a great Fâing criminal defense lawyer, youâre going to need it.ââ327 Days afterward, Eastman sent an email to Giuliani, making a request that tacitly acknowledged just how much trouble he was in: âIâve decided that I should be on the pardon list, if that is still in the works.ââ328

Vice President Pence and his team never bowed to President Trumpâs relentless pressure. They began January 6, 2021, with a prayer. The attack on the U.S. Capitol delayed the peaceful transfer of power. The joint session did not end until early in the morning on January 7th.

At 3:50 a.m. that morning, Short texted Vice President Pence a passage from Second Timothy, chapter 4, verse 7: âI fought the good fight. I finished the race. I have kept the faith.ââ329

ENDNOTES

Â Â 1. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 10-11.

Â Â 2. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 10-11.

Â Â 3. See, e.g., Ivan E. Raiklin (Former Green Beret Commander) (@Raiklin), Twitter, Dec. 22, 2020, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20201222232155/https://twitter.com/Raiklin/status/1341520753984942081 (archived) (âAmerica, @VP @Mike_Pence MUST do this, tomorrow!â); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 23, 2020 7:40:30 p.m. ET, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20201224033528/http://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump (archived).

Â Â 4. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 95, (â[T]he Vice President mostly asked a series of questions in that meeting of Mr. Eastmanâ), 130 (Q: âDid John Eastman ever admit, as far as you know, in front of the President that his proposal would violate the Electoral Count Act?â A: âI believe he did on the 4th.â Q: âOkay. And can you tell us what the Presidentâs reaction was?â A: âA I canât.â); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107 (Greg Jacob memo to Vice President Pence, titled âAnalysis of Professor Eastmanâs Proposalsâ).

Â Â 5. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 96 (Eastman acknowledging that the legal basis for his proposed paths was the same and, as recounted by Greg Jacob, â[y]ou couldnât get there either way unless you .Â .Â . set aside a number of the positions of the Electoral Count Actâ).

Â Â 6. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 26-27 (âBut just to pick up on that, Mr. Short, was it your impression that the Vice President had directly conveyed his position on these issues to the President, not just to the world through a Dear Colleague Letter, but directly to President Trump?â A: âMany times.â Q: âAnd had been consistent in conveying his position to the President?â A: âVery consistent.â).

Â Â 7. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 18-20.

Â Â 8. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (U.S. Secret Service Production), CTRL0000092958 (January 6, 2021, message at 10:39 a.m. ET).

Â Â 9. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (US Secret Service Production), CTRL0000092978 (January 6, 2021, message at 10:43 a.m. ET).

Â 10. âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.

Â 11. âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.

Â 12. âTranscript of Trumpâs Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,â Associated Press, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.

Â 13. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210106192450/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1346900434540240897 (archived).

Â 14. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Rebecca Shabad, âNoose Appears Near Capitol; Protesters Seen Carrying Confederate Flags,â NBC News, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/live-blog/electoral-college-certification-updates-n1252864/ncrd1253129#blogHeader.

Â 15. See Quint Forgey, ââAlmost No Idea More Un-Americanâ: Pence Breaks with Trump on Jan. 6,â Politico, (June 25, 2021), available at https://www.politico.com/news/2021/06/25/pence-trump-jan-6-496237.

Â 16. Statement by Donald J. Trump, 45th President of the United States of America, Jan. 30, 2022, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20220131171840/https://www.donaldjtrump.com/news/news-8nkdvatd7g1481 (archived) (âIf the Vice President (Mike Pence) had âabsolutely no rightâ to change the Presidential Election results in the Senate, despite fraud and many other irregularities, how come the Democrats and RINO Republicans, like Wacky Susan Collins, are desperately trying to pass legislation that will not allow the Vice President to change the results of the election? Actually, what they are saying, is that Mike Pence did have the right to change the outcome, and they now want to take that right away. Unfortunately, he didnât exercise that power, he could have overturned the Election!â) (emphasis added).

Â 17. Mike Allen, âExclusive Audio: Trump Defends Threats to âHangâ Pence,â Axios, (Nov. 12, 2021), available at available at https://www.axios.com/2021/11/12/trump-hang-mike-pence-january-6-audio (âJonathan Karl: âWere you worried about him during that siege? Were you worried about his safety?â Trump: âNo, I thought he was well-rotected, and I had heard that he was in good shape. No. Because I had heard he was in very good shape. But, but, no, I thinkââ Karl: âBecause you heard those chantsâthat was terrible. I meanââ Trump: âHe could haveâwell, the people were very angry.â Karl: âThey were saying âhang Mike Pence.ââ Trump: âBecause itâs common sense, Jon. Itâs common sense that youâre supposed to protect. How can youâif you know a vote is fraudulent, right?âhow can you pass on a fraudulent vote to Congress? How can you do that?â) (emphasis added).

Â 18. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 44, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).

Â 19. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 36, 40, 44, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM) (âBased on the evidence, the Court finds that it is more likely than not that President Trump and Eastman dishonestly conspired to obstruct the Joint Session of Congress on January 6, 2021.â).

Â 20. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 44, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).

Â 21. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708. This document was ordered to be produced to the Select Committee by Judge Carter over Eastmanâs assertion of attorney-client privilege and upon a finding that the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege applied. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 41-42, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).

Â 22. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708.

Â 23. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman004708.

Â 24. Neither Eastman nor Chesebro provided substantive answers in response to the Select Committeeâs questions about the development of this strategy. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John Eastman, (Dec. 9, 2021); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth Chesebro, (Oct. 25, 2022). It is thus difficult to determine who first suggested this concept. Evidence obtained by the Select Committee suggests that key players like Eastman, Giuliani, and Epshteyn were starting to discuss the Vice Presidentâs role at the joint session in late November or early December. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 71â73 (discussing conversations involving Mark Meadows, Rudolph Giulianiâs legal team, and Members of Congress in late November or early December); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman023534 (December 5, 2020 email from John Eastman remarking that âfolks at the top of the chain of command on this .Â .Â . are now aware of the issuesâ). See also Michael Wolff, Landslide: The Final Days of the Trump Presidency (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2021), p. 135 (describing post-Thanksgiving outreach from Boris Epshteyn to the White House regarding the Vice President theory).

Â 25. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 41-42, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM) (âBecause the memo likely furthered the crimes of obstruction of an official proceeding and conspiracy to defraud the United States, it is subject to the crime-fraud exception and the Court ORDERS it to be disclosed.â).

Â 26. The Select Committeeâs investigation found that Eastman was communicating about the joint session with Kenneth Chesebro in December 2020. See e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053460, Chapman053475 (December 23, 2020, emails between John Eastman, Kenneth Chesebro, and Boris Epshteyn regarding procedural proposals for joint session).

Â 27. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976. This memo was originally obtained by the Washington Postâs Bob Woodward and Robert Costa and subsequently published by CNN. âREAD: Trump Lawyerâs Memo on Six-Step Plan for Pence to Overturn the Election,â CNN, (Sept. 21, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/21/politics/read-eastman-memo/index.html.

Â 28. Under the Constitution, if no candidate receives a majority of electoral college votes, this triggers a process where the House of Representatives decides the president. When that happens, each State gets one vote for President, chosen by the Representatives from that state. The candidate who receives a majority of the 50 State votes becomes the president. At the time, there were more Republicans than Democrats in 26 of the 50 State House delegations, leading Eastman to predict that âPresident Trump [would be] re-electedâ under that scenario. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976.

Â 29. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976. Note that Eastman has acknowledged the authenticity of a publicly disclosed version of this document, describing it as âa preliminary, incomplete draftâ of âthe legal memo [he] wrote in January.â John C. Eastman, âTrying to Prevent Illegal Conduct from Deciding an Election Is Not Endorsing a âCoupâ,â American Greatness, (Sept. 30, 2021), available at https://amgreatness.com/2021/09/30/trying-to-prevent-illegal-conduct-from-deciding-an-election-is-not-endorsing-a-coup/ (linking to two-page document titled âPRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL, January 6 scenario, available at http://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2021/images/09/20/eastman.memo.pdf).

Â 30. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053561 (December 23, 2020 email from John Eastman to Molly Michael).

Â 31. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Verizon Production, July 11, 2022) (Dec. 23, 2020 cellular data records from John Eastman). The morning that Eastman began preparing the memo, he received a call from Boris Epshteyn at 8:58 am. Eleven minutes later, Eastman called Chesebro, and the two spoke for over 41 minutes. Eastman continued to trade calls with Epshteyn and Chesebro throughout the day. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Verizon Production, July 11, 2022) (December 23, 2020, phone records for John Eastman).

Â 32. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976, p. 2 (Memo regarding January 6 scenario).

Â 33. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman003226.

Â 34. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman003228. Note that this letter refers to, and purports to supplement, the recommendations of what Eastman described in his correspondence with Mr. Colbert as âa major war game simulationâ that he claimedâon October 24, 2020âwas âalready before the President and his team.â Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman031983. The war game exercise in which Eastman participated is reflected in a report issued by the Claremont Institute and the Texas Public Policy Foundation. â79 Days Reportâ, (Oct. 20, 2020), available at https://www.texaspolicy.com/79-days-to-inauguration-taskforce-report/.

Â 35. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman003228 (emphasis added).

Â 36. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman031983.

Â 37. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman023534.

Â 38. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman031983.

Â 39. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976 (memo regarding January 6 scenarios).

Â 40. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976 (memo regarding January 6 scenarios).

Â 41. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052966 (December 23, 2020, email from Kenneth Chesebro).

Â 42. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976 (memo regarding January 6 scenarios).

Â 43. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976 (memo regarding January 6 scenarios).

Â 44. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976 (memo regarding January 6).

Â 45. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 26; see also id., at 36-377 (stating that he did not understand Eastmanâs statement to be suggesting that violence would be justified to keep President Trump in office).

Â 46. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 28.

Â 47. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 26, 28-29.

Â 48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 29.

Â 49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 29.

Â 50. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 29.

Â 51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 157.

Â 52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 142, 152.

Â 53. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 079P-R0000731. Neither this memo, nor a December 8, 2020, memo that followed, reflects the full advice that Greg Jacob ultimately gave to the Vice President regarding the joint session. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 10â11, 32. The OVP Legal Staff memo, dated October 26, 2020, is titled âThe Unconstitutionality of the Electoral Count Act.â This memo adopts certain legal academicsâ criticism of the Electoral Count Act and introduces several concepts that would later be cited by proponents of the theory of an expansive view of the Vice Presidentâs power. Greg Jacobâs legal memo to the Vice President, dated December 8, 2020, notes that the Electoral Count Act prescribes the process for counting electoral votes âto the extent it is constitutionalâ and seems to allow for the possibility of the Vice President âassert[ing] a constitutional privilege.â Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 079P-R0000785. Through his extensive research and analysis, Greg Jacobâs understanding developed both as to the legal and historical precedent for the joint session and ultimately led him to the unavoidable conclusions that, one, the Electoral Count Act governed the joint session and, two, its procedures had never been deviated from since it was passed.

Â 54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob Deposition, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 11â13, 25â26 (noting that Marc Short didnât âname namesâ of the people he was concerned would encourage the President to prematurely declare victory).

Â 55. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 079VP-R000011579_0001, 079VP-R000011579_0002 (November 3, 2020, Greg Jacob memo to Marc Short, titled âElectoral Vote Countâ). The Election Day memo identifies the 12th Amendment and the Electoral Count Act as the relevant legal framework, but leaves open âwhether it is the Vice President, or Congress, that has ultimate constitutional authority to decide electoral vote disputes.â It also represents an incomplete understanding of the factual precedents, describing then-Vice President Nixonâs conduct in January 1961 as âsingle-handedly resolv[ing] a dispute over competing slates of electors that were submitted by the State of Hawaii.â (In fact, after additional research Jacob concluded the opposite was true.) As addressed elsewhere in this chapter, this memo does not reflect Greg Jacobâs full legal analysis or ultimate advice, nor the Vice Presidentâs conclusion, about the authority of the Vice President at the joint session.

Â 56. Daniel Villarreal, âLincoln Project Ad Tells Trump That Pence âWill Put the Nail in Your Political Coffinâ,â Newsweek, (Dec. 8, 2020), available at https://www.newsweek.com/lincolnâproject-ad-tells-trump-that-pence-will-put-nail-your-political-coffin-1553331.

Â 57. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 13; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Jun. 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 135â36 (noting the ad buy was limited to âD.C. and Palm Beachâ).

Â 58. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 079P-R0000785_0001, 079P-R0000785_0002, 079P-R0000785_0003, 079P-R0000785_0004 (December 8, 2020, Greg Jacob memo to Vice President Pence, titled âJanuary 6 Process for Electoral Vote Countâ); see also, Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 32. This December 8, 2020, memo reflects Jacobâs more detailed understanding of the mechanics of âmodern practiceâ under the Electoral Count Act, including the process by which the House and Senate separate to debate a member of the Houseâs objection if it is signed by a Senator, but not the full analysis of the precedent that Jacob would ultimately do before January 6, 2021.

Â 59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 102.

Â 60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 33, 102.

Â 61. U.S. Const. art. II, Â§ 1, cl 3; U.S. Const., Amend. XII.

Â 62. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â 63. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 14â16.

Â 64. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 14â16.

Â 65. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th. In testimony given at a Select Committee hearing, Judge Luttig disagreed with Jacobâs characterization of the sentence carried through from the Constitution to the 12th Amendment, describing it instead as âpristine[ly] clear,â but the witnesses were in agreement that there was âno basis in the Constitution or laws of the United States at all for the theory espoused by Mr. Eastman.â Id.; see Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th. (âI am in complete agreement with Judge Luttig; it is unambiguous that the Vice President does not have the authority to reject electors.â). Note that Vice President Pence apparently agreed with Jacob regarding the clarity of the Constitutional language, as Jacob testified that he joked, âI canât wait to go to heaven and meet the Framers and tell them, âThe work that you did in putting together our Constitution is a work of genius. Thank you. It was divinely inspired. There is one sentence that I would like to talk to you a little bit about.ââ Id.

Â 66. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â 67. Complaint, Gohmert et al. v. Pence, 510 F. Supp. 3d 435, (No. 6:20-cv-0660), (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2020), ECF No. 1.

Â 68. Mike Pence, So Help Me God (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2022), p. 443.

Â 69. Complaint, Gohmert et al. v. Pence, 510 F. Supp. 3d 435, (No. 6:20-cv-0660), (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2020), ECF No. 1.

Â 70. Complaint, Gohmert et al. v. Pence, 510 F. Supp. 3d 435, (No. 6:20-cv-0660), (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2020), ECF No. 1.

Â 71. Complaint, Gohmert et al. v. Pence, 510 F. Supp. 3d 435, (No. 6:20-cv-0660), (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2020), ECF No. 1.

Â 72. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman055337 (December 22, 2020, John Eastman email to William Olson, Larry Joseph, Mark Martin, Kurt Olson, Kris Kobach, Phillip Jauregui, Pat McSweeney, and Don Brown, titled âRe: Draft Complaintâ).

Â 73. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 6, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).

Â 74. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman055337 (December 22, 2020, William Olson email to Larry Joseph, Mark Martin, Kurt Olson, Kris Kobach, John Eastman, Phillip Jauregui, Pat McSweeney, and Don Brown, titled âRe: Draft Complaintâ).

Â 75. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Russell âRustyâ Bowers, (June 19, 2022), pp. 42â45; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman003584, (January 4, 2021, emails between John Eastman and Andrew Pappas, coordinating the call between Eastman and Speaker Bowers). Eastman also asked Speaker Bowers to sign a letter drafted by Arizona Rep. Mark Finchem directed to Vice President Pence asking him not to certify the election on January 6th; Bowers refused. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Russell âRustyâ Bowers, (June 19, 2022), at p. 45â46.

Â 76. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Russell âRustyâ Bowers, (June 19, 2022), at p. 46. Speaker Bowers had already addressed publicly both the pressure he was receiving to overturn the result of the election as well as his firm belief that doing so would violate his oath of office. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Rusty Bowers Production), CTRL0000062389 (Nov. 18, 2020, Dear Colleague letter with attached âPost-Election Frequently Asked Questionsâ), Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Rusty Bowers Production), CTRL0000071098_00069 (December 4, 2020, Press Release titled âSpeaker Bowers Addresses Calls for the Legislature to Overturn 2020 Certified Election Results).

Â 77. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Russell âRustyâ Bowers, (June 19, 2022), at p. 46. Speaker Bowers also received a call on the morning of January 6th from Representative Andy Biggs in which Rep. Biggs asked Speaker Bowers to sign a letter being sent by other Arizona legislators and/or to support decertification of Arizonaâs electors; Speaker Bowers again refused. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â 78. Gohmert et al. v. Pence, 510 F. Supp. 3d 435, 443 (E.D. Tx. 2021).

Â 79. Gohmert et al. v. Pence, 141 S. Ct. 972 (2021).

Â 80. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28, 2022), pp. 132â34.

Â 81. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (John McEntee Production), McEntee0001 (document titled âJEFFERSON USED HIS POSITION AS VP TO WINâ).

Â 82. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000236-000238 (John McEntee note and drafted analysis, titled âPENCE CAN LET THE STATES DECIDEâ). Note that the Select Committee received both documents from the National Archives in a format consistent with the documents having been torn apart and taped back together.

Â 83. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000236-237 (John McEntee note and drafted analysis, titled âPENCE CAN LET THE STATES DECIDEâ).

Â 84. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000237; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28, 2022), p. 147.

Â 85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28, 2022), pp. 147-48.

Â 86. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Short production), J6C-TSM-0001, J6C-TSM-0002. Note that the file name of the document (âMEMO_POTUS_January6VPAction.pdfâ) is visible in an email in which Marc Short forwards to Greg Jacob the memo received from Mark Meadows. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000033, VP-R0000034.

Â 87. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000034.

Â 88. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Jenna Ellis Production), J.007206Ellis.

Â 89. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Jenna Ellis Production), J.007472Ellis.

Â 90. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Jenna Ellis Production), CTRL0000916457_00002, (January 5, 2021, memo from Jenna Ellis to Jay Sekulow). This document was published by Politico on December 10, 2021. Betsy Woodruff Swan and Kyle Cheney, âTrump Campaign Lawyer Authored 2 Memos Claiming Pence Could Halt Bidenâs Victory,â Politico, (Dec. 10, 2021), available at https://www.politico.com/news/2021/12/10/trump-lawyer-pence-biden-524088. In response to a Select Committee subpoena, Ellis produced a privilege log reflecting several communications from Ellis to Sekulow on January 5 and 6, 2021, each of which was described as â[e]mail discussion of internal legal strategy for possible pending litigation.â

Â 91. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Jenna Ellis Production), CTRL0000916457_00002 (January 5, 2021, memo from Ellis to Jay Sekulow).

Â 92. Politico (@politico), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 2:31 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/politico/status/1346539955724681221 (ââI actually donât think thatâs what the Constitution has in mind,â Jay Sekulow, the chief counsel of the American Center for Law & Justice, says about the possibility of Pence rejecting the Electoral College resultsâ).

Â 93. Politico (@politico), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 2:31 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/politico/status/1346539955724681221.

Â 94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 208.

Â 95. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 208.

Â 96. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 68; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed of Matt Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 19, 113. Matt Morgan was at the time a lawyer with Elections, LLC serving as General Counsel of the Trump Campaign and also acting as counsel to Vice President Penceâs leadership PAC.

Â 97. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 117, 125 (âI had no question about what he was going to do on January 6th.â).

Â 98. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 68. See also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 179 (stating that the reasons why Vice President Pence wanted to issue a public statement included the public discourse, letters from State legislators, and reporting about communications between the President and Vice President).

Â 99. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 114, 116.

100. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 166-68 (âIâm not aware of any evidence that the campaign had, and Iâm not aware of any evidence the campaign shared with our office that would have again provided specific evidence of theft or fraud that would have had a material change in any of the States.â).

101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matt Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 99â00; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 36-37.

102. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 079P-R0000745; see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 38. Following the meeting on January 2, 2021, Greg Jacob shared the following memo with Matt Morgan. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack, (Matt Morgan Production), AGSC16-000103.

103. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 61-62.

104. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Matt Morgan Production), AGSC16-000066; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matt Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 74 (âMy view, for an electoral count vote to count, you need a certificate of ascertainment and then the vote of the elector itself, that the vote of an elector without a certificate of ascertainment would not be validly submitted.â).

105. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 079P-R0000698; see also Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production),00131; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 128 (stating that as of the date of this memo, January 2, 2021, âthere were no open questions at that point that Iâm aware of.â).

106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 52.

107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 68-69. Jacob shared a draft version of the statement with Matt Morgan. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matt Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 119-120. This draft version clearly set forth Vice President Penceâs position, âI Preside, Congress Decides.â The draft statement read: I cannot believe that the Framers, who above all else feared the concentrated power of a Caesar, intended to appoint a single individual, often directly interested in the outcome, to unilaterally determine the validity of electoral votes. In the wrong hands, such a power would be the undoing of the Republic.â Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Matt Morgan Production), AGSC16-000149.

108. Philip Rucker, Josh Dawsey, ââGrowing Number of Trump Loyalists in the Senate Vow to Challenge Bidenâs Victory,â Washington Post, (Jan. 2, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senators-challenge-election/2021/01/02/81a4e5c4-4c7d-11eb-a9d9-1e3ec4a928b9_story.html.

109. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 166â68.

110. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 165-66.

111. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082311, p. 7 (January 2, 2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).

112. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082311, p. 3 (January 2, 2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).

113. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082311, p. 6 (January 2, 2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).

114. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082311, p. 7 (January 2, 2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).

115. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082311, p. 7 (January 2, 2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).

116. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082311, p. 7 (January 2, 2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).

117. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082311, p. 8 (January 2, 2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).

118. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082311, p. 7 (January 2, 2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).

119. Andrew Kaczynski, Em Steck, âTrump Lawyer John Eastman Said âCourage and the Spineâ Would Help Pence Send Election to the House in Comments before January 6,â CNN, (Oct. 30, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/30/politics/kfile-john-eastman-said-pence-could-throw-election-to-house/index.html.

120. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Public Source), CTRL0000923171 (January 3, 2021, 6-page Eastman memo). Note that Eastman publicly disclosed this document, describing it as âthe final version of [his] memoâ and embedding it with a filename âJan 3 Memo on Jan 6 Scenario.â John C. Eastman, âTrying to Prevent Illegal Conduct From Deciding an Election Is Not Endorsing a âCoupâ,â American Greatness, (Sept. 30, 2021), available at https://amgreatness.com/2021/09/30/trying-to-prevent-illegal-conduct-from-deciding-an-election-is-not-endorsing-a-coup/. Eastman has also tried to rewrite history with regard to this memo, arguing that it noted that Congress has the power to make the final determination regarding electoral votes, even though the memo concludes, â[t]he fact is that the Constitution assigns this power to the Vice President as the ultimate arbiter. We should take all of our actions with that in mind.â See John McCormack, âJohn Eastman vs. the Eastman Memo,â National Review, (Oct. 22, 2021), available at https://www.nationalreview.com/2021/10/john-eastman-vs-the-eastman-memo (emphasis added).

121. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Public Source) CTRL0000923171, pp. 4-5 (January 3, 2021, 6-page Eastman memo) .

122. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Public Source) CTRL0000923171, (January 3, 2021, 6-page Eastman memo) (describing the majority of the âTRUMP WINSâ scenarios as resulting from the Vice President unilaterally determining âwhichâ electoral slate from a State is valid, after âasserting that the authority to make that determination under the 12th Amendment .Â .Â . is his alone (and anything in the Electoral Count Act to the contrary is therefore unconstitutional).â).

123. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Public Source) CTRL0000923171, (January 3, 2021, 6-page Eastman memo) p. 5.

124. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Public Source) CTRL0000923171, (January 3, 2021, 6-page Eastman memo) p. 2; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976 (December 23, 2020, 2-page Eastman memo).

125. John C. Eastman, âConstitutional Statesmanship,â Claremont Review of Books, (Fall 2021) available at https://claremontreviewofbooks.com/constitutional-statesmanship/.

126. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman043035 (December 19, 2020, email from John Eastman to Bruce Colbert, re: Latest draft). It is not clear what relationship or connection existed between John Eastman and Bruce Colbert before the election; documents produced to the Select Committee demonstrate that Eastman and Mr. Colbert exchanged dozens of emails during the time period covered by the Select Committeeâs subpoena to Chapman University (November 3, 2020, to January 20, 2021).

127. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Jun. 16, 2022), available at [https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.] (Judge Luttig testifying, â[T]here was no support whatsoever in either the Constitution of the United States nor the laws of the United States for the Vice President, frankly, ever to count alternative electoral slates from the States that had not been officially certified by the designated State official in the Electoral Count Act of 1887.â).

128. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053475, (December 23, 2020, email from John Eastman to Boris Epshteyn and Kenneth Chesebro, âFW: Draft 2, with editsâ); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman053476 (December 23, 2020, 2-page Eastman memo).

129. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman063984 (January 10, 2021, email from John Eastman to Valerie Moon, re: Tell us in laymanâs language, what the heck happened with the dual electors? Please?). This email appears to be a response by Eastman to an unsolicited email from a member of the public.

130. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman063984 (January 10, 2021, email from John Eastman to Valerie Moon, re: Tell us in laymanâs language, what the heck happened with the dual electors? Please?).

131. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Public Source) CTRL0000923171, p. 5 (January 3, 2021, 6-page Eastman memo).

132. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Public Source), CTRL0000923171, p. 5 (January 3, 2021, 6-page Eastman memo).

133. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Public Source), CTRL0000923171, p. 5 (January 3, 2021, 6-page Eastman memo).

134. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Public Source), CTRL0000923171, p. 5 (January 3, 2021, 6-page Eastman memo).

135. The pressure placed on the Vice President by the President was a âmultiweek campaignâ that reached a crescendo in the days before January 6th. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 33. The Vice Presidentâs Chief of Staff, Marc Short, saw the separation between the President and the Vice President building for weeks. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 34â35, 216-17.

136. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 191, 204-05; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 82; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 191, 204-05.

138. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Antony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 49 (regarding the declaration of martial law), 56 (regarding the appointment of Sidney Powell as special counsel), 58â59, 66 (regarding the seizure of voting machines), 110 (regarding the elevation of Jeff Clark to Acting Attorney General).

139. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Patrick Philbin, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 5. Philbin told the Select Committee that in the end he decided not to resign out of a sense of obligation: âAll of the pilots canât jump off the plane because thereâs still a lot of passengers in the back and we need to land the plane.â

140. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Patrick Philbin, (Apr. 13, 2022).

141. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Antony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 79 (âMy view was that the Vice President didnât have the legal authority to do anything except what he did.â), 81 (testifying that his views on the role of the Vice President were âextremely alignedâ with the Vice Presidentâs staff), 88 (âI thought that the Vice President did not have the authority to do what was being suggested under a proper reading of the law.â); See also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Patrick Philbin, (Apr. 13, 2022).

142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Antony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 85â86.

143. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Antony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 85.

144. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Antony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 94 (testifying that the privileged interaction that resulted in his exclusion from the meeting took place in the presence of Meadows and Eastman, but before the Vice President, Short, and Jacob arrived).

145. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Antony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 85â86 (âI did walk to that meeting and I did go into the Oval Office with the idea of attending that meeting, and then I ultimately did not attend the meeting.â).

146. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Antony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 86, 94. Cipollone refused to describe further why he didnât attend the meetingââ[t]he reasons for that are privilegedââand would not tell the Select Committee whether he voluntarily decided not to attend or was told not to.

147. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Antony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 85, 88.

148. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 88â89 (â[A]t the meeting on the 4th, Eastman expressed the view that both paths were legally viable.â).

149. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

150. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 89. See also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 90 (âI think that was threaded throughout, that, again, both were legally viable but that the preferred course would be to send it back to the States.â), 91 (â.Â .Â . he [Eastman] thought that the more prudent course was a procedural send it back to the States, rather than reject electors.â), 93 (âOn the 4th, I think that he said that both were legally viable options. But I do think that he said that he was not saying that that was the one that the Vice President should do.â).

151. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 89, 91 (â[H]e thought that the more prudent course was a procedural send it back to the states, rather than reject electorsâ), 96 (â[M]y impression was he was thinking more acceptance [by] the country of the action takenâ). See also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearings on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

152. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 96; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 95, 130 (Q: âDid John Eastman ever admit, as far as you know, in front of the President that his proposal would violate the Electoral Count Act?â A: âI believe he did on the 4th.â Q: âOkay. And can you tell us what the Presidentâs reaction was?â A: âA I canât.â); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107 (Greg Jacob writing after the Oval Office meeting on January 4th, âProfessor Eastman acknowledges that his proposal violates several provisions of statutory law.â).

154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 202â03.

155. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 127.

156. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107 (âProfessor Eastman acknowledges that his proposal violates several provisions of statutory lawâ); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 127â28.

157. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107.

158. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107. Jacob notes in his memo that Eastmanâs proposal also âcontradicted the opinion authored by Republican Supreme Court Justice Joseph Bradley as the decided vote on the Electoral Commission of 1877.â Whereas Eastman wanted the Vice President to refer the manufactured dispute over slates of electors back to the State legislatures, Justice Bradley wrote that the President of the Senate (the Vice President) âis not invested with any authority for making any investigation outside of the joint meeting of the two Houses.â

159. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107 (â[Professor Eastman] stated that in his view, the imprimatur of approval by a State legislature is important to the legitimacy of counting any slate of electors other than the one initially certified by the Stateâs executive.â).

160. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107.

161. When pressed by Eric Herschmann on whether states really wanted to certify an alternate slate, and why they hadnât taken steps to do so on their own, Eastman had no explanation or response. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 28â29.

162. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107 (âProfessor Eastman does not recommend that the Vice President assert that he has the authority unilaterally to decide which of the competing slates of electors should be countedâ); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 127.

163. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107.

164. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000085.

165. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000182, VP-R0000183, VP-R0000180, VP-R0000181; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 102â03 (â[I]n fact, there were no materials, new materials that were actually presented to me by Mr. Eastman .Â .Â . I was open to receiving anything that anybody wanted to give me that might bear on that question .Â .Â . But I also correctly was of the view that I had already looked at everything and that we knew [] where we stood.â).

166. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 95.

167. âDonald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia: Senate Runoff Election,â Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://perma.cc/VAD2-TWVQ (âHello, Georgia, by the way. Thereâs no way we lost Georgia. Thereâs no way. That was a rigged election, but weâre still fighting it and youâll see whatâs going to happen. Weâll talk about it.â).

168. âDonald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia: Senate Runoff Election,â Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://perma.cc/VAD2-TWVQ.

169. âDonald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia: Senate Runoff Election,â Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://perma.cc/VAD2-TWVQ.

170. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 96, 105; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 201; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000182.

171. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short Deposition (Jan. 26, 2022) p. 201; see also, Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob (Feb. 1, 2022) pp. 92, 94, 106; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Jun. 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

172. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Greg Jacobs Production), CTRL0000070421, p. 1 (Jan. 5, 2021, Greg Jacob handwritten notes).

173. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; See also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 92 (âHe, again, came into the meeting saying, âWhat Iâm here to ask you to do is to reject the electors.ââ).

174. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 93â95. Eastman acknowledged to Jacob that the previous dayâs discussions had included the âsend it back to the statesâ path, but he reaffirmed that the ask on the morning of January 5th was to reject electors outright. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 105; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th (âSo on the 4th, that had been the path that he had said, âI am not recommending that you do that,â but on the 5th, he came in and expressly requested that.â).

175. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 24-25.

176. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 26-27.

177. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 24.

178. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 24.

179. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 107, 117.

180. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 107â08. Jacob debated with Eastman all of the historical examples, concluding that in âthe 130 years of practiceâ the Electoral Count Act had been followed âevery single timeâ; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 109-10.

181. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 108. What Jacob found when he looked into the Nixon example is that first, there were no competing slates of electors from Hawaii. In fact, a Republican slate was originally certified by the outgoing Governor, but after a judicially ordered recount, it was clear that the Democratic candidate had won, and the incoming Governor certified a new slate consistent with the outcome of the election after the recount. Then-Vice President Nixon, when he arrived at Hawaii in the joint session, âmagnanimouslyâ acknowledged that it was clear that Hawaiiâs votes for Kennedy were the correct votes and called for objections (of which there were none). This precedent was therefore an example of the Vice President complying with the Electoral Count Actâs procedures regarding objections to electors. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 15-16.

182. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 110.

183. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 110 (â[H]e ultimately acknowledged that none of [the Justices] would actually back this position when you took into account the fact that what you have is a mildly ambiguous [constitutional provision], a nonsensical result that has all kinds of terrible policy implications, and uniform historical practice against itâ).

184. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 110.

185. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 111. Jacob told the Select Committee he did not know to whom Eastman was referring when he indicated âtheyâ would be disappointed that Vice President Pence had not been convinced it was appropriate to reject electors.

186. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 95â96, 210â11.

187. J. Michael Luttig (@judgeluttig), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 9:53 a.m. ET, et seq., available at https://twitter.com/judgeluttig/status/1346469787329646592 (âThe only responsibility and power of the Vice President under the Constitution is to faithfully count the electoral college votes as they have been cast,â).

188. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 151-52.

189. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 151-52.

190. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 152, 209; see also Tom Hamburger, Josh Dawsey, and Jacqueline Alemany, âJan. 6 Panel Grapples with How to Secure Testimony from Lawmakers, Pence,â Washington Post, (Jan. 15, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/01/15/jan-6-subpoenas-committee (ââI did not notice any hesitation on his part,â Quayle said of his conversation with Pence. âI interpreted his questions as looking for confirmation that what he was going to do was right and that he had no flexibility. Thatâs the way I read it. Given the pressure he was under, I thought it was perfectly normal, very smart on his part to call me.ââ).

191. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 157.

192. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 158; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 215-17.

193. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 157-58.

194. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 215.

195. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 216.

196. Bob Woodward and Robert Costa, Peril, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 229; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 215-16.

197. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 160.

198. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 220-22; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 116, 120. Note that Marc Short recalled that it was this afternoon phone call that led to the in-person meeting between Eastman and Jacob, however, documents received by the Select Committee and Jacobâs more detailed recollection of his interactions with Eastman establishes that the in-person meeting occurred in the morning of January 5, 2021.

199. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th. (describing the message on this phone call between the Vice President and President Trump with Eastmanâs participation as, âWell, we hear you loud and clear, you are not going to reject. But remember last night, I said that there was this more prudent course where you could just send it back to the States? Would you be willing to do that[?]â); see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 96-97, 120.

200. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 121.

201. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 121-22 (describing calls from Eastman and at least one other lawyer (likely either Kurt Olsen or Bill Olson)).

202. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 122-23.

203. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 123 (recounting Eastmanâs argument that election fraud was resulting in the Constitution being âshredded across all these different statesâ and comparing it to the Civil War).

204. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 122-24.

205. Maggie Haberman and Annie Karni, âPence Said to Have Told Trump He Lacks Power to Change Election Result,â New York Times, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210106003845/https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/05/us/politics/pence-trump-election-results.html. The same Times reporters had also published on January 4th an article again accurately reporting that President Trump âhad directly pressed Mr. Pence to find an alternative to certifying Mr. Bidenâs win.â Annie Karni and Maggie Haberman, âPenceâs Choice: Side with the Constitution or His Boss,â New York Times, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/04/us/politics/pence-trump.html.

206. Maggie Haberman and Annie Karni, âPence Said to Have Told Trump He Lacks Power to Change Election Result,â New York Times, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/05/us/politics/pence-trump-election-results.html.

207. Maggie Haberman and Anne Karni, âPence Said to Have Told Trump He Lacks Power to Change Election Result,â New York Times, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210106003845/https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/05/us/politics/pence-trump-election-results.html (archived version showing original publication date of Jan. 5, 2021, at 7:36 p.m. ET).

208. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 169-70.

209. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007439, (CTRL0000082597) (January 5, 2021, White House Presidential call log).

210. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007439, (CTRL0000082597) (January 5, 2021, White House Presidential call log).

211. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007439, (CTRL0000082597) (January 5, 2021, White House Presidential call log).

212. Meredith Lee (@meredithllee), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021, 9:58 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/meredithllee/status/1346652403605647367?lang=en (emphasis added); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 175 (â[T]ypically on these, I might have a couple of wording suggestions .Â .Â . ultimately the way this came out was the way he wanted [it] to.â); see id at 174-76.

213. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 224; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 184-85.

214. Meredith Lee (@meredithllee), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021, 9:58 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/meredithllee/status/1346652403605647367?lang=en.

215. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 161 (â[W]hoever drafted the statement it was not accurate.â).

216. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 161.

217. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 224; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 163.

218. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 223.

219. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 223.

220. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000082597, (reflecting calls with Mr. Stephen Bannon on Jan. 5, 2021, from 8:57 a.m. to 9:08 a.m. and from 9:46 p.m. to 9:52 p.m.).

221. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Select Committee Transcription), CTRL0000082317 (Jan. 5, 2021, Steve Bannon War Room Transcript) (Bannon: âAll hell is going to break loose tomorrow. Just understand this: All hell is going to break loose tomorrow. Itâs going to be quick .Â .Â . Itâs the fog of war.â Bannon discussed putting Sen. Grassleyâs number on the screen, and suggested they encourage users at TheDonald.win to contact the Senator. (At the time, users at TheDonald.win were openly planning for violence and to surround the U.S. Capitol on January 6. See Chapter 6.) Bannon told his audience. âIâll tell you this, itâs not going to happen like you think itâs going to happen, Ok? Itâs going to be quite extraordinarily different. And all I can say is strap in.â).

222. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Select Committee Transcription) CTRL0000082317, (Jan. 5, 2021) (Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).

223. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Select Committee Transcription) CTRL0000082317, (Jan. 5, 2021) (Steve Bannon War Room Transcript).

224. Peter Navarro, In Trump Time: A Journal of Americaâs Plague Year (St. Petersburg, FL: All Seasons Press, 2021), p. 252.

225. Peter Navarro, In Trump Time: A Journal of Americaâs Plague Year (St. Petersburg, FL: All Seasons Press, 2021), p. 263.

226. Peter Navarro, In Trump Time: A Journal of Americaâs Plague Year (St. Petersburg, FL: All Seasons Press, 2021), p. 271.

227. Peter Navarro, In Trump Time: A Journal of Americaâs Plague Year (St. Petersburg, FL: All Seasons Press, 2021), p. 252.

228. Peter Navarro, In Trump Time: A Journal of Americaâs Plague Year (St. Petersburg, FL: All Seasons Press, 2021), p. 263.

229. See e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976.

230. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 26-27 (âBut just to pick up on that, Mr. Short, was it your impression that the Vice President had directly conveyed his position on these issues to the President, not just to the world through a Dear Colleague Letter, but directly to President Trump?â A: âMany times.â Q: âAnd had been consistent in conveying his position to the President?â A: âVery consistent.â); see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 102 (â[T]hatâs where the Vice President started. Thatâs where he stayed the entire way.â); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 181 (âI believe that the Vice President was consistent in his understanding of the law and the precedent and his belief as to what his authority was and was not on January 6th.â).

231. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 1:00 a.m. ET, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210106072109/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1346698217304584192 (archived).

232. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 8:17 a.m. ET, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210106131747/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1346808075626426371 (archived).

233. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 8:22 a.m. ET, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210106132244/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1346809349214248962 (archived).

234. At 9:02 a.m., President Trump instructed the White House operator to call back with the Vice President; the operator instead informed the President at 9:15 a.m. that a message was left for the Vice President. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000261 (Presidential Call Log, White House Switchboard), P-R000255 (Daily Diary).

235. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000285 (â11:20 âc w/ VPOTUSâ); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (âThe President talked on a phone call to an unidentified personâ); see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 12 (stating that a military aide interrupted Penceâs meeting with staff to inform the Vice President that the President was holding to speak with him).

236. Present in the Oval Office during the call with the Vice President were Melania Trump, Donald Trump, Jr., Ivanka Trump, Eric Trump, Kimberly Guilfoyle, and Lara Trump, as well as Mark Meadows, Stephen Miller, Eric Herschmann, and Gen. Keith Kellogg. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 30-32, 37.

237. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 47.

238. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 39.

239. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 41.

240. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Julie Radford, (May 24, 2022), pp. 17-18.

241. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Julie Radford, (May 24, 2022), p. 19 (âAnd the word that she relayed to you that the President called the Vice Presidentâapologize for being impoliteâbut do you remember what she said her father called him?â âThe âPâword.â). See also Peter Baker, Maggie Haberman, and Annie Karni, âPence Reached His Limit with Trump. It Wasnât Pretty,â New York Times, (Jan. 12, 2021), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/us/politics/mike-pence-trump.html; Jonathan Karl, Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump Show, (New York: Dutton, 2021), at pp. 273â74 (â[Y]ou said, âYou can be a patriot or you can be a pussy.â Did you really say that or is that an incorrect report? ââI wouldnât dispute it,â [President Trump] answered.â).

242. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 127.

243. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg, (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 90; see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Donald J. Trump, Jr., (May 3, 2022), p. 84 (âI know the line of questioning was about sending it back to the States, but thatâs about the extent of my recollection.â).

244. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg, (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 91 (âQ: [Y]ou said he told the Vice President that he has the legal authority to reject certain votes. Is that what you said? A: That he had the constitutional authority to do that, yes.â); see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 48 (describing it as âa general discussion about the legal and constitutional authority of the VPâ).

245. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg, (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 92.

246. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 169.

247. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 40; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).

248. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 40â41.

249. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).

250. âRudy Giuliani Speech Transcript at Trumpâs Washington, D.C. Rally: Wants âTrial by Combat,ââ Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-speech-transcript-at-trumps-washington-d-c-rally-wants-trial-by-combat.

251. âRudy Giuliani Speech Transcript at Trumpâs Washington, D.C. Rally: Wants âTrial by Combat,ââ Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-speech-transcript-at-trumps-washington-d-c-rally-wants-trial-by-combat.

252. âRudy Giuliani Speech Transcript at Trumpâs Washington, D.C. Rally: Wants âTrial by Combat,ââ Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-speech-transcript-at-trumps-washington-d-c-rally-wants-trial-by-combat (âWe now have letters from five legislators begging us to do that. Theyâre asking us. Georgia, Pennsylvania, Arizona, Wisconsin, and one other coming in.â).

253. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Marc Short Production), J6C-TSM-0003, J6C-TSM-0004, (January 6, 2021, email from Molly Michael to March Short containing subject line â2057Rayburn_20210106_002040.pdfâ and an attached letter). The letter bore the signatures of 19 of the 60 members of the Arizona House and 4 of the 30 members of the Arizona Senate.

254. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman005235, Chapman005236, (January 5, 2021, email from John Eastman to Greg Jacob with an attached letter dated January 4, 2021). In an interview given after January 6th, Eastman argued that the Vice President still should have acted on the basis of the statement of a minority of the Pennsylvania legislature because âit was over Christmas, and they were having trouble getting ahold of people to sign the letter.â John McCormack, âJohn Eastman vs. the Eastman Memo,â National Review, (Oct. 22, 2021), available at https://www.nationalreview.com/2021/10/john-eastman-vs-the-eastman-memo/.

255. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman005235, Chapman005236.

256. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022).

257. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jake Corman, (Jan. 25, 2022). Corman told the Select Committee that he understood the Vice Presidentâs role at the joint session was not substantive.

258. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 167-68; see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 14; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 166-67.

259. âRudy Giuliani Speech Transcript at Trumpâs Washington, D.C. Rally: Wants âTrial by Combatâ,â Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-speech-transcript-at-trumps-washington-d-c-rally-wants-trial-by-combat.

260. âRudy Giuliani Speech Transcript at Trumpâs Washington, D.C. Rally: Wants âTrial by Combatâ,â Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-speech-transcript-at-trumps-washington-d-c-rally-wants-trial-by-combat.

261. âRudy Giuliani Speech Transcript at Trumpâs Washington, D.C. Rally: Wants âTrial by Combatâ,â Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-speech-transcript-at-trumps-washington-d-c-rally-wants-trial-by-combat.

262. âRudy Giuliani Speech Transcript at Trumpâs Washington, D.C. Rally: Wants âTrial by Combatâ,â Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-giuliani-speech-transcript-at-trumps-washington-d-c-rally-wants-trial-by-combat (emphasis added). Note in particular Eastmanâs assertions regarding voting machines, for example, âThey put those ballots in a secret folder in the machines. Sitting there waiting until they know how many they need.â Eastman would later describe what he was calling on the Vice President to do as merely âto pause the proceedings.â John C. Eastman, âSetting the Record Straight on the POTUS âAskâ,â The American Mind, (Jan. 18, 2021), available at https://americanmind.org/memo/setting-the-record-straight-on-the-potus-ask/.

263. Brian Naylor, âRead Trumpâs Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial,â NPR, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.

264. Brian Naylor, âRead Trumpâs Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial,â NPR, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.

265. Brian Naylor, âRead Trumpâs Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial,â NPR, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.

266. Brian Naylor, âRead Trumpâs Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial,â NPR, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.

267. Brian Naylor, âRead Trumpâs Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial,â NPR, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.

268. Brian Naylor, âRead Trumpâs Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial,â NPR, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.

269. Brian Naylor, âRead Trumpâs Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial,â NPR, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.

270. Mike Pence (@Mike_Pence), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 1:02 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/Mike_Pence/status/1346879811151605762. Between 12:45 and 1:00 p.m., Vice President Pence processed with the Senate to the House Chamber. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 202-03. The Vice Presidentâs statement was issued publicly and distributed on the House floor before the Vice President convened the joint session at approximately 1:05 p.m. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 173; see also Donna Cassata and Felicia Sonmez, âCongress Meets in Joint Session to Confirm Bidenâs Win, Over the Objections of Dozens of Republicans,â Washington Post, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/06/congress-electoral-college-vote-live-updates/#link-DUX3QUF3TVDNZDEGO7KIK2JSYE.

271. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 164.

272. Mike Pence (@Mike_Pence), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 1:02 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/Mike_Pence/status/1346879811151605762; see also Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000121, (January 6, 2021, Dear Colleague letter issued by Vice President Pence).

273. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 27-28 (testifying that, in consultation with the Senate Parliamentarian, the Vice President purposefully revised the standard language used by previous vice presidents at the joint session of Congress because of efforts by the Trump Campaign and allies to create the public perception that there were âother slates of electors that were being considered or [] being put forward.â).

274. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 186-88; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 53-54; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 50-51. The Senate Parliamentarian offers advice and guidance on compliance with the Senateâs rules. See CRS Report, The Office of the Parliamentarian in the House and Senate, (Nov. 28, 2018) RS20544. The Office of the Secretary of the Senate, on behalf of the Senate Parliamentarian and her staff, declined requests for information about this topic, as well as other January 6-related topics, from the Select Committee citing the independent relationship of the Senate and House as well as âhistorical congressional norms.â

275. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 64; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 54-56 (testifying that the Vice Presidentâs understanding of his role as explained in the Dear Colleague letter he released on January 6th was set as of his meeting with the Parliamentarian on January 3rd).

276. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 68-70; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 2728; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), 00163, (Vice President Superscript for Joint Session to Count Electoral Ballots January 6, 2021), 00181, (Response to Submissions NOT Certified by a State); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000103_0001 (Pence joint session scripted responses).

277. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 42. Jacob learned through the media that Trump electors had met and purported to cast electoral votes but, seeing no indication that any of the groups that met had âan imprimatur of State authority,â he concluded that they would not qualify as competing slates under the Electoral Count Act. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 51; see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 54 (âIâm sure I, either in my oral conversation with Elizabeth [MacDonough] or in looking at this spreadsheet, confirmed my conclusion that none of these had the requisite State authority.â).

278. The Senate Parliamentarian and her staff tracked the receipt of legitimate electoral votes from the states as well as the private citizen submissions (including the fake slates submitted by Trump electors) and identified the many deficiencies of the fake documents. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP R0000323_0001 (Jan. 3, 2021 email exchange with Senate Parliamentarian), VP R0000417_0001 (Jan. 2 and 3, 2021 email exchange with Senate Parliamentarian), VP R0000418_0001 (list of deficiencies in alternate elector slates); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), 00094, (list of deficiencies in alternate elector slates). The Senate Parliamentarian reviewed each purported slate of electoral votes to separate those in regular form and authorized by a State from those submitted by private citizensâthe Trump Campaignâs fake electors fell into this latter category. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 53- 54; see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 44-45.

279. âHouse Chamber During Joint Session,â C-SPAN, at 11:07â11:37, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?507748-1/house-chamber-joint-session (emphasis added).

280. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Andrew Hitt, (Feb. 28, 2022), pp. 94-95. See also Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000076, VP-R0000417, VP-R0000418, (January 3, 2021, emails and spreadsheet showing OVP staff tracking the arrival of fake electorsâ certificates).

281. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000090 (text messages exchanged between Republican officials in Wisconsin, including statement that â[f]reaking trump idiots want someone to fly original elector papers to the Senate President.â).

282. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), 00012, (message from Rep. Kellyâs Chief of Staff, Matt Stroia, to Chris Hodgson on Jan. 6, 2021, at 8:41 am), 00058, (messages from Senator Johnsonâs Chief of Staff, Sean Riley, to Chris Hodgson on Jan. 6, 2021, around 12:37 pm).

283. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production), 00058 (Chris Hodgson responding to Sean Riley, âDo not give that to him. Heâs about to walk over to preside over the joint session, those were supposed to come in through the mail[.]â And, âThe VP absolutely should not receive any mail that hasnât been screened.â).

284. See, e.g., âHouse Chamber During Joint Session,â C-SPAN, at 15:33â15:59, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?507748-1/house-chamber-joint-session.

285. Karoun Demirjian, âGOP Members Object to Arizonaâs Electoral Votes for Biden,â Washington Post, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/06/congress-electoral-college-vote-live-updates/#link-TSWL74F2SVHBHET7GQR5IEP6FI .

286. âHouse Chamber During Joint Session,â C-SPAN, at 15:59â17:16, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?507748-1/house-chamber-joint-session.

287. âHouse Chamber During Joint Session,â C-SPAN, at 17:16â18:01, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?507748-1/house-chamber-joint-session.

288. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 29.

289. House vote on Arizona (Roll No. 10): 167 Cong. Rec. H93 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021): 121-303; House vote on PA (Roll No. 11): 167 Cong. Rec. H112 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021): 138-282; Senate vote on Arizona (Rollcall Vote No. 1 Leg.): 167 Cong. Rec. S31-32 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021): 6-93; Senate vote on PA (Rollcall Vote. No. 2 Leg.): 167 Cong. Rec. S38 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021): 7-92.

290. Katie Meyer, âCongress Certifies Pa. Results, Bidenâs Victory After Chaotic Day of Violent Insurrection,â WHYY, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://whyy.org/articles/casey-fitzpatrick-condemn-violent-insurrection-as-congress-moves-toward-certifying-biden/.

291. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 173-74.

292. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 173-75.

293. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 193.

294. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 208-09.

295. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 208-10; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R001019 â P-R001020 (Jan. 6, 2021, NSC Chat Log).

296. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210106192450/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1346900434540240897.

297. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R001019 â P-R001020 (NSC Chat Log).

298. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 37-38.

299. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 30-31.

300. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 30-31.

301. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 30-31.

302. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R001019 â P-R001020 (NSC Chat Log).

303. See Chapter 8; see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 31-32.

304. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available atÂ https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

305. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 63-65.

306. On the evening of January 6, 2021, the Presidentâs Military Aide told the Vice Presidentâs Military Aide (who relayed it to the Secret Service) that Marc Shortâs access to the White House complex had been cancelled. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000513149 (January 6-7, 2021 emails), CTRL0000673145, (January 6, 2021 emails). Several people relayed to Marc Short that âsome who instigated the Presidentââpossibly Peter Navarroâsuggested to the President that âMarc was responsible for leading the Vice President on the path he took,â which resulted in the President exclaiming that Mr. Short should be locked out of the White House. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 236-37; see also Biba Adams, âPenceâs Chief of Staff Denied Entry into WH: Trump âBlaming Meâ,â Yahoo News, (Jan. 7, 2021), available at https://www.yahoo.com/video/pence-chief-staff-denied-entry-173848235.html.

307. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 238.

308. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 31, 45 (âThe reason was he felt like, for the worldâs greatest democracy, to see a motorcade, a 15-car motorcade fleeing the Capitol would send all the wrong signals. So he was adamant to say: I want to stay here in the Capitol.â); see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available atÂ https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

309. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 29-31, 44-45; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 176-77; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available atÂ https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

310. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 198.

311. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 198-99.

312. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 198-99.

313. Jacob told the Select Committee that he recognized that January 6 was going to be âan historically important dayâ and he wanted to memorialize exactly what he thought of the arguments made by Eastman on January 5th, to supplement the memo he wrote to Vice President Pence reflecting the arguments Eastman made on January 4th. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 200-01.

314. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman005370 (January 6, 2021, emails between Greg Jacob and John Eastman).

315. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman005379 (January 6, 2021, emails between Greg Jacob and John Eastman).

316. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 200.

317. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 200.

318. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 246-47.

319. âREAD: Mike Penceâs Statement to the Senate on the Storming of the Capitol,â U.S. News, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.usnews.com/news/elections/articles/2021-01-06/read-mike-pences-statement-to-the-senate-on-the-storming-of-the-capitol; see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 246 (testifying that the Vice President wrote his remarks himself in his ceremonial office after the Capitol was cleared).

320. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000155, (January 6, 2021, emails between Greg Jacob and John Eastman).

321. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), VP-R0000155, p. 1, (January 6, 2021, emails between Greg Jacob and John Eastman).

322. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

323. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000155, (January 6, 2021, emails between Greg Jacob and John Eastman). Note that Greg Jacobâs testimony establishes that this email was likely received on January 6, 2021, at 11:44 p.m., not at 4:44 a.m. the following morning as shown on the face of this document as produced. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 205. As noted in the Executive Summary, the Select Committee also received certain documents in UTC time, which is five hours ahead of EST.

324. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman005479 (January 6, 2021, emails between Greg Jacob and John Eastman). This email represents John Eastman again encouraging, in writing and just after the violent attack on the Capitol had been quelled, that the Vice President use this as a justification for a further and much more serious violation of the lawâdelaying the certification. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available atÂ https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th. Eastman attempted to minimize what he was doing by calling the Electoral Count Act a âminor procedural statute.â Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 133. In an email sent at 1:33 p.m., just before the Capitol was breached, Eastman wrote, âIâm sorry Greg, but this is small minded. Youâre sticking with minor procedural statutes while the Constitution is being shredded.â Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), VP-R0000166.

325. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available atÂ https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

326. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 43-44.

327. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 43-44.

328. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman0064047, (January 11, 2021, email from John Eastman to Rudy Giuliani).

329. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 35-36.

6

On December 14, 2020, electors around the country met to cast their Electoral College votes. Their vote ensured former Vice President Joe Bidenâs victory and cemented President Donald J. Trumpâs defeat. The people, and the States, had spoken. Members of President Trumpâs own Cabinet knew the election was over. Attorney General William Barr viewed it as âthe end of the matter.ââ1 Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Secretary of Labor Eugene Scalia concurred.2 That same day, Scalia told President Trump directly that he should concede defeat.3

President Trump had no intention of conceding. As he plotted ways to stay in power, the President summoned a mob for help.

At 1:42 a.m., on December 19th, President Trump tweeted: âBig protest in D.C. on January 6th. Be there, will be wild!ââ4

The Presidentâs tweet galvanized tens of thousands of his supporters around the country. President Trump had been lying to them since election day, claiming he won, and that the Democrats had stolen victory from him. Now, with a single tweet, the President focused his supportersâ anger on the joint session of Congress in Washington, DC on January 6th.

Anika Navaroli, the longest-tenured member of Twitterâs Trust and Safety Policy team, monitored the reaction to President Trumpâs âbe wildâ tweet. She told the Select Committee that the President was âessentially staking a flag in DC .â .â . for his supporters to come and rally.ââ5 The tweet created a âfire hoseâ of calls to overthrow the U.S. Government. President Trumpâs supporters had a new sense of urgency because they felt âas if their Commander in Chiefâ had summoned them.6

For many extremists and conspiracy theorists, the Presidentâs announcement was a call to arms.7

For the Proud Boysâdescribed in more detail belowâand their leader, Henry âEnriqueâ Tarrio, President Trumpâs tweet set in motion a chain of events that led directly to the attack on the U.S. Capitol. In the days that followed, the Proud Boys reorganized their hierarchy, imposed a stricter chain-of-command, and instructed followers to go âincognitoâ on January 6th.8 The Proud Boys had made their presence known at previous pro-Trump events, including âStop the Stealâ rallies, where they brandished their black and yellow apparel and engaged in street brawls.9 Suddenly, they did not want to stand out from the crowd. They wanted to blend in. They were planning something big.10

Tarrio allegedly used encrypted messages to plot the January 6, 2021, attack. On January 4, 2021, Tarrio told his men that they should âstorm the Capitol.ââ11 While the attack was underway, Tarrio claimed credit in a private chat, writing: âWe did this.ââ12 And on the evening of January 6th, Tarrio released a video of a man, presumably Tarrio himself, dressed in an odd costume standing in front of the U.S. Capitol. The eerie production had been recorded prior to the events of that day. Tarrioâwho was not in Washington, DC on January 6th13âtitled it, âPremonition.ââ14

The Oath Keepers, a far-right, anti-government militia movementâalso described in more detail belowâbegan planning for January 6th after the Presidentâs tweet as well. Stewart Rhodes, the groupâs leader, had agitated against the U.S. Government for years.15 Immediately following the 2020 presidential election, Rhodes and others schemed to stop the peaceful transfer of power. They stored weapons outside of Washington, DC,16 hoping that President Trump would deputize them as his own militia.17 An Oath Keeper leader, Kelly Meggs, read President Trumpâs December 19th tweet and commented in a Facebook message: âHe called us all to the Capitol and wants us to make it wild!!! Sir Yes Sir!!!ââ18 The Oath Keepers formed two military âstacksâ and marched up the steps of the U.S. Capitol on January 6th. Meggs led one of them.19

Members of both the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers have been charged with âseditious conspiracyâ and other serious crimes, including conspiracy to interfere with a Federal proceeding; some, including Stewart Rhodes, have been convicted.20 U.S. law defines seditious conspiracy as plotting âto overthrow,â or âto oppose by force,â or to use âforce to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States.ââ21 Some of the two groupsâ members have already admitted that this is what they intended to do.22

Other extremists and conspiracy theorists mobilized after President Trumpâs tweet as well. These movements are described in more detail in subsequent sections. Three Percenter militiasâanother far-right, anti-government movementâshared â#OccupyCongressâ memes23 and planned for violence at the U.S. Capitol.24 Nick Fuentes, leader of the white nationalist âGroypers,â rallied his followers for January 6th.25 Fuentes bragged afterwards that the âCapitol siege was fucking awesome.ââ26 Users on TheDonald.win, a website populated by some of President Trumpâs most ardent fans, openly discussed surrounding and occupying the U.S. Capitol.27

Adherents of QAnon, a bizarre and dangerous conspiracy cult, believed January 6th would bring the prophesied âStormâ â a violent purge of Democrats and government officials promised by the mysterious online personality known only as âQ.ââ28 QAnonâs devotees flocked to Washington, DC because of the Presidentâs tweet and subsequent rhetoric. They shared a digital banner, âOperation Occupy the Capitol,â which depicted the U.S. Capitol being torn in two.29

One especially notorious conspiracy theorist, Alex Jones, repeatedly told his InfoWarsâ viewers that January 6th would be a day of reckoning.30 Jones is known for his outlandish conspiracy-mongering, including his baseless claim that the massacre of school children at Sandy Hook Elementary School was really a âfalse flagâ operation staged by the U.S. Government. Of course, his vicious lie was disproven in court, but Jones is obsessed with âdeep stateâ conspiracy theories and often propagates them.31 After the 2020 presidential election, Jones argued that President Trump should use the power of the Government to impose martial law on American citizens.32 Along with his InfoWars co-hosts, Jones amplified President Trumpâs âBig Lieâ and relentlessly promoted President Trumpâs âwildâ protest. One of Jonesâ co-hosts floated the idea of âstorming right into the Capitol.ââ33 Jones himself marched to the Capitol January 6th.34

Jonesâs influence helped shape the planning for January 6th behind the scenes as well. The Select Committee investigated how event organizers and the White House staff planned President Trumpâs rally at the Ellipse, a park south of the White House. This event was intended to rile up the Presidentâs supporters just prior to the joint session of Congress. A wealthy heiress paid for the event after listening to Jonesâ InfoWars rant about the importance of President Trumpâs tweet. She spent $3 million with the goal to âget as many people there as possible.ââ35 It worked â Americans who believed the election was stolen flocked to the Nationâs capital.

By January 5th, President Trumpâs supportersâa large, angry crowd ready for instructionsâhad assembled in Washington. That evening, he could hear his raucous supporters at a rally not far from the White House. The President knew his supporters were âangry,ââ36 and he planned to call on them to march on the U.S. Capitol.37 He even wanted to join them on the march.38 It was all part of President Trumpâs plan to intimidate officials and obstruct the joint session of Congress.

âWe fight like hell,â President Trump told the crowd assembled at the Ellipse on January 6, 2021. âAnd if you donât fight like hell, youâre not going to have a country anymore.ââ39 Some of those in attendance, as well as elsewhere in Washington that day, were already prepared to fight. They had begun preparing two and a half weeks earlier â when President Trump told them it would âbe wild!â

President Trumpâs âbe wildâ tweet immediately mobilized extremists and conspiracy theorists in the âStop the Stealâ coalition. The phrase âStop the Stealâ was originally coined in early 2016 by President Trumpâs longtime political advisor, Roger Stone.40 At the time, Stone alleged first that Candidate Trumpâs Republican rivals were attempting to steal Candidate Trumpâs nomination.41 After Trump became the nominee, Stone repurposed the saying to claim that former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would steal the presidency. 42 When President Trump won the 2016 election, âStop the Stealâ was rendered mootâand did not become a significant political movement until President Trumpâs defeat on election night in 2020.43 As early as November 5, 2020, Stone advised associates that he intended to reconstitute âStop the Stealâ by building an army of lawyers and suing âlike thereâs no tomorrow.ââ44

Ali Alexander, a rightwing provocateur who has worked closely with Stone,45 quickly organized a new âStop the Stealâ campaign. On November 10, 2020, Alexander established âStop the Stealâ as an entity incorporated in Alabama.46 Alexander added a bank account and various websites.47

One of Alexanderâs key allies in the âStop the Stealâ movement was Alex Jones. Prior to January 6th, Jones riled up crowds both in-person and online with incendiary rhetoric about the election. Jonesâ InfoWars was also a platform for others in the election-denial coalition. For instance, both Enrique Tarrio and Stewart Rhodes made multiple appearances on InfoWars, including between election day 2020 and January 6, 2021.48

Another frequent guest on InfoWars was Roger Stone â a nexus character in the âStop the Stealâ coalition.49 Stone recommended that then Presidential Candidate Donald Trump appear on Jonesâs show in December 2015.50 Trump accepted the invitation and praised Jones at length during his appearance.51 The significance of Trumpâs interview with Jones should not be underestimated. Donald Trump was a leading presidential contender at the time and would go on to win the election. His appearance with Jones normalized InfoWars, welcoming its conspiracy-minded audience into Trumpâs base.52 Trump did not appear on InfoWars again. However, Stone continued to make regular guest appearances.53

After election day 2020, Alexander Jones, and other âStop the Stealâ organizers, held rallies around the country to protest fictional claims of voter fraud. These events provided an opportunity for radicals and extremists to coalesce. The Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, and Three Percenters were all attendees. QAnon adherents were well-represented. So, too, were the white nationalist Groypers and their leader, Nick Fuentes.

âStop the Stealâ events and other protests throughout 2020 helped build the momentum for January 6th. The Select Committee collected data on 85 right-wing events between January 1, 2020, and January 20, 2021, which were inspired by opposition to COVID-19 lockdown measures, racial justice protests, and, later, the perceived theft of President Trumpâs victory.54 Far-right extremists protested at or inside State capitols, or at other government buildings, in at least 68 instances.55 Of those, 49 occurred during the period after the election through January 6th.56 In the year leading up to January 6th, there were at least nine events at which far-right actors entered State capitols.57At least four of these capitol incursionsâin Michigan,58 Idaho,59 Arizona,60 and Oregon61âinvolved identifiable individuals who later participated in the attack on the U.S. Capitol.

Consider, for example, the protests held in Atlanta between November 18 and 21, 2020. Leaders and rank-and-file members of the Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, and Groypers, gathered outside the State capitol and the governorâs mansion for nonstop events, including armed protests. Enrique Tarrio62 and Stewart Rhodes63 personally led contingents of the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers, respectively.

Jones first announced the Atlanta events on InfoWars on November 16th. In his announcement, Jones teased that he would be joined by Roger Stone and also called on listeners to âsurround the governorâs mansionâ in order to prevent the election results from being certified.64 Fuentes advertised that he would be speaking at the capitol every day at noon.65 In fiery speeches across Atlanta, Fuentes spread election lies as well as wink-and-nod hints at intimidation and violence.66

Alexander, standing alongside Jones and Fuentes outside the State capitol on November 18th, exhorted the crowd to âstorm the capitolâ with them.67 The three men led a crowd into the State capitol building. On November 20th, Roger Stone gave a speech outside the Georgia capitol. Speaking through a telephone held up by Alexander, Stone advanced election lies, and finished with a provocative rallying cry: âVictory or death!ââ68 That same day, Fuentes told the crowd, âLook, weâve been in front of the State capitol, maybe weâve been trying the wrong approach.ââ69 Days earlier, at a nighttime event outside the governorâs mansion, Alexander, again flanked by Jones and Fuentes, goaded the crowd: âWeâll light the whole shit on fire.ââ70

While the crowd did not turn violent, the âStop the Stealâ protests in Atlanta, Georgia, prefigured January 6th in important respects. âStop the Stealâ organizers tried to use the mob they had assembled â including extremists from the Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, Three Percenters and Groypers â to intimidate lawmakers and overturn the election results in Georgia, which was required to certify former Vice President Bidenâs victory in the State by the end of that week.71 They implored their followers to âstorm the capitol.ââ72 As discussed in Chapter 8, this same coalition of radicals did just that on January 6, 2021.

Other âStop the Stealâ events helped pave the way for the events of January 6th. Two rallies in Washington D.C. â on November 14 and December 12, 2020 â were critically important. Alexanderâs âStop the Stealâ was not the only protest organization present at these events. Both were called âMillion MAGA Marchesâ and drew in other rally organizers. One of these other protests was called the âJericho Marchâ prayer rally.73 Regardless, the same constellation of actors that appeared in Atlanta also incited Trump supporters in Washington.

For instance, during the Jericho March rally on December 12th, Stewart Rhodes called on President Trump to invoke the Insurrection Act as part of a desperate gambit to remain in power. In Rhodesâ vision, he would lead militiamen on behalf of President Trump when others tried to remove him from office.74 If President Trump did not invoke the Insurrection Act, Rhodes warned the crowd, then they would be forced to wage a âmuch more desperate [and] much more bloody war.â Alex Jones also gave an incendiary speech at the Jericho March event, declaring: âI donât know who is going to the White House in 38 days, but I sure know this, Joe Biden is a globalist, and Joe Biden will be removed, one way or another!ââ75

As the crowds gathered in Washington on December 12th, President Trump was publicly lobbying the Supreme Court to hear his fictious claims of election fraud. The President assailed the Supreme Court on Twitter throughout the day.76 The âStop the Stealâ coalition was eager to help. After the Jericho March event ended, Jones, his InfoWars co-host Owen Shroyer, and Ali Alexander led a march on the Supreme Court. Once there, the crowd chanted slogans such as âStop the Steal!â; â1776!!â; âOur revolution!â; and âThe fight has just begun!!ââ77

President Trump made sure to let the protesters in Washington know that he personally approved of their mission. During the November rally, President Trump waved to the crowd from his presidential motorcade.78 Then, on the morning of December 12th, President Trump tweeted: âWow! Thousands of people forming in Washington (D.C.) for Stop the Steal. Didnât know about this, but Iâll be seeing them! #MAGA.ââ79 Later that day, President Trump flew over the protesters in Marine One.80

When President Trump tweeted one week later that there would be a âwildâ protest in Washington on January 6th, the âStop the Stealâ coalition immediately began to mobilize. Jones posted an article on the InfoWars website asking readers if they would âanswer President Trumpâs call to defend the Republic?ââ81 The next day, December 20th, Jones devoted much of his InfoWars show to the Presidentâs announcement. Jones told his audience several times that if 10 million Americans came to Washington, DC on January 6th, Congress would have to listen to them.82 He repeated this idea over the course of the episode, saying things such as, âHeâs calling you, he needs your help, we need your help, we need 10 million people there,â â[w]e need martial law and have to prevent the police state of foreigners from taking over.â Jones added: âItâs literally in our hands. Itâs literally up to us.ââ83

Other InfoWars hosts promoted the âwildâ protest as well. In late December, Matt Bracken told InfoWars viewers that it may be necessary to storm the U.S. Capitol. âWeâre going to only be saved by millions of Americans moving to Washington, occupying the entire area, if â if necessary storming right into the Capitol,â Bracken said. âYou know, theyâre â we know the rules of engagement. If you have enough people, you can push down any kind of a fence or a wall.ââ84

Far-right extremists planned to do just that.

From the Proud Boysâ founding in 2016, violence was intrinsic to their mission. âWe will kill you. Thatâs the Proud Boys in a nutshell,â their founder said.85 New recruits pledge an oath, established in the groupâs bylaws, identifying themselves as unapologetic âWestern chauvinists,ââ86 promoting an exclusionary, hyper-masculine interpretation of Western culture.87 They find common ground in an embrace of misogyny and hate for their perceived enemies.88 The group is somewhat ethnically diverse, but their public and private messages fester with toxic white supremacist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic slurs.89

The Proud Boys have participated in, or instigated, protests since their founding.90 Theyâve long been known as street brawlers looking for a fight.91 But 2020 was a watershed year for the group. As protests spread around the country, the Proud Boys deputized themselves as agents of law and orderâvigilantes against perceived threats.92 More often, they played the role of instigators.93 They portrayed themselves as counter-protesters and identified their targets as Black Lives Matter and Antifaâthough they were hard-pressed to define their organizational enemies.94

During the presidential debate on September 29, 2020, President Trump was asked to disavow far-right extremists, including the Proud Boys. The President did not explicitly condemn the group. Instead, he seemingly endorsed their mission. âStand back and stand by,â President Trump told the Proud Boys, before adding, âbut Iâll tell you what .â .â . somebodyâs got to do something about Antifa and the left.ââ95 The Presidentâs words electrified the group, injecting new life into their recruitment and activities. According to Nick Quested, a filmmaker who spent significant time with the group and testified before the Select Committee, the Proud Boys had found their âsaviorâ in President Trump.96

Joseph Biggs, a senior Proud Boy, immediately trumpeted President Trumpâs debate statement on Parler,97 a fringe social media platform. Biggs made it clear that the Proud Boys were ready to fight Antifa.98 The groupâs size âtripledâ in response to President Trumpâs apparent endorsement, according to Jeremy Bertino, a Proud Boys leader who has pleaded guilty to seditious conspiracy in relation to January 6th.99 Similarly, Enrique Tarrio and another Proud Boys member, George Meza, testified to the Select Committee that the Presidentâs comment was a pivotal, energizing moment.100 The group started selling merchandise with their new âstand back and stand byâ slogan the very same night.101

As the presidential votes were tallied, the Proud Boys became agitated at the prospect that President Trump would lose. On November 5, 2020, Biggs posted on social media, âItâs time for fucking war if they steal this shit.ââ102 As former Vice President Joe Bidenâs victory became apparent, Proud Boys leaders directed their ire toward others in the Government. Biggs, speaking on a Proud Boys livestream show with Tarrio and others, warned that government officials are âevil scum, and they all deserve to die a traitorâs death.â Ethan Nordeanâanother Proud Boys leader who allegedly helped lead the attack at the Capitolâresponded, âYup, Day of the Rope,ââ103 referring to a day of mass lynching of ârace traitorsâ in the white supremacist novel The Turner Diaries.104

Within days of the election, dozens of âStop the Stealâ protests were organized around the country.105 The Proud Boys participated alongside other right-wing extremist groups in some of them, including a November 7, 2020, protest outside of the Pennsylvania State capitol in Harrisburg.106 The two events in Washington, DC â on November 14, 2020, and the other on December 12, 2020 â proved to be especially important for the groupâs evolution.

The daytime events on both dates passed by without violence or major unrest, but as the sun set, bouts of violence erupted,107 driven by clashes between far-right extremist groupsâchiefly the Proud Boysâand counter-protesters.108 Among far-right extremists, the Proud Boys had the largest showing in both November and December,109 with roughly 200 to 300 Proud Boys at the November 14th rally, and the same number or more in December.110 As discussed in Chapter 8, they mustered about the same contingent for the attack on the U.S. Capitol.

The gathering on November 14th provided a chance for Tarrio to socialize with rally leaders and far-right celebrities. In fact, his travel to DC by private jet appears to have been paid for by Patrick Byrne, a businessman who had President Trumpâs ear in the last weeks of his presidency and encouraged the President to authorize the seizure of voting machines in a December 18th meeting.111 Tarrioâs testimony and photographs from the day show that he met with âStop the Stealâ organizer Ali Alexander that evening, and the pair toasted each other.112 Tarrio described the event as a âhistoricâ meeting of Trump supporters and celebrated the opportunity to share that platform with Alexander, Jones, and Jonesâ InfoWars co-host, Owen Shroyer.113 Shroyer would later be charged with crimes committed during the January 6th attack.114

A month later, the Proud Boys returned to the Nationâs capital. On the evening of December 11th, hundreds of Proud Boys and friends gathered in downtown Washington, DC to listen to an impromptu bullhorn speech by Tarrio and Nordean, along with Roger Stone and Shroyer.115 Stone implored the crowd to âfight to the bitter end.ââ116

The next day, as the Proud Boys marched in force on the streets, Tarrio teased in a social media post that he had a meeting in the White House.117 The visit, which was only a public White House tour, appears to have been facilitated by a friend, Bianca Gracia, the head of Latinos for Trump.118 As the rallies concluded the next day, the Proud Boys took to the streets again. Two key events occurred that evening.

First, members of the Proud Boys tore down a Black Lives Matter banner from a historically Black church in downtown Washington, DC.119 They filmed themselves burning it.120 Tarrio was eventually charged with destruction of property.121 He was arrested on January 4, 2021, and banned from Washington, DC, barring him from joining the group at the Capitol.122 As explained in Chapter 8, however, Tarrioâs arrest did not stop him from conspiring with his men on January 6th.

Minutes after the flag burning, a man wearing black clothes walked into a crowd of Proud Boys.123 Assuming he was associated with Antifa, they began pushing and harassing him, and he drew a knife in response.124 In the ensuing melee, four Proud Boys suffered stab wounds, including Bertino, a confidant to Tarrio.125 Bertinoâs wounds were severe and life-threatening, preventing him from joining the group on January 6th. 126

The Proud Boys began to reorient and formalize their operations to focus on January 6th after President Trumpâs December 19th tweet. Inspired, in part, by Bertinoâs stabbing, the Proud Boys centered their new hierarchy in group chats that used terms such as âMinistry of Self Defenseâ (MOSD).127 However, the words âSelf Defenseâ were misleading: Enrique Tarrio and others would soon go on the offense. And the MOSD served as their organizational scaffolding for the January 6, 2021, attack.

On December 20, 2020, Tarrio established a ânational rally planning committeeâ and created an encrypted MOSD chat to organize their activities.128 Tarrio added Proud Boys leaders from across the country, including several who played lead roles in the violence on January 6th.129 In the ensuing weeks, the Proud Boys traded equipment recommendations, shared maps marked with law enforcement positions, and established command and control structures.130 A separate encrypted chat, named âBoots on the Ground,â was established for foot soldiers who would be in Washington, DC on January 6th.131

The Proud Boysâ planning for January 6th was a significant step in the groupâs evolution. Previously, they were loosely organized. The MOSD was created to enforce a âtop down structureâ with a defined leadership.132 Tarrio stressed the command structure by telling members that they needed to â[f]it in [] or fuck off.ââ133

From the start, it was clear that MOSD chat members were intensely interested in disrupting the electoral count on January 6th. On December 20, 2020, one MOSD leader stated, âI assume most of the protest will be at the capital [sic] building given whatâs going on inside.ââ134 On December 29, 2020, in a group message to the MOSD, a member wrote, âI know most of the events will be centered around freedom plaza.â Tarrio responded, âNegative. Theyâre centered around the Capitol.ââ135

On December 30, 2020, Tarrio received an intriguing document titled, â1776 Returns.ââ136 The document was apparently sent to him by cryptocurrency investors in South Florida.137 The fileâs author(s) divided their plan into five parts, âInfiltrate, Execution, Distract, Occupy and Sit-In,â with the goal of overrunning several Federal buildings around the U.S. Capitol. The plan specifically mentioned House and Senate office buildings, setting forth steps for occupying them. The author(s) called for âthe masses to rush the building[s],â distract law enforcement in the area by pulling fire alarms around the city, target specific Senatorsâ offices, and disguise participantsâ identities with COVID masks.138

One proposal mentioned in the document is titled, âStorm the Winter Palace.ââ139 This is a reference to a dramatic reenactment of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, during which Vladimir Lenin ordered his forces to take over the Romanovsâ residence in Petrograd. The âWinter Palaceâ was the seat of the provisional government, which had held out against the Bolshevik revolutionaries. The Proud Boys would frame their actions on January 6th as part of the American Revolution. But the â1776 Returnsâ document shows their inspiration came at least in part from the Communist Revolution, which led to 70-plus years of totalitarian rule. No historical event has been less American.

The Proud Boys did not adopt the â1776 Returnsâ plan in full. Several Proud Boys testified that they were unaware of the document before it became public.140 But the document does appear to have been significantly edited while in the Proud Boysâ hands.141 The person who sent it to Tarrioâhis ex-girlfriend, Eryka Gemma Floresâcommented, âThe revolution is [more] important than anything.â To which Tarrio responded: âThatâs what every waking moment consists of .â .â . Iâm not playing games.ââ142

On January 3rd, Tarrio posted a conspicuous question on Telegram: âWhat if we invade it?â The first response to his post read: âJanuary 6th is D day [sic] in America.ââ143 In private, on the Proud Boysâ leadership group message, planning continued. One MOSD leader, John Stewart, floated a plan that centered around âthe front entrance to the Capitol building.ââ144 At 7:10 p.m. on January 3rd, Stewart wrote to the MOSD leaders:

I mean the main operating theater should be out in front of the house of representatives. It should be out in front of the Capitol building. Thatâs where the vote is taking place and all of the objections. So, we can ignore the rest of these stages and all that shit and plan the operations based around the front entrance to the Capitol building. I strongly recommend you use the national mall and not Pennsylvania avenue though. Itâs wide-open space, you can see everything coming from all angles.145

Early the next morning, on January 4th, Tarrio sent a voice memo to the same group of MOSD leaders stating, âI didnât hear this voice until now, you want to storm the Capitol.ââ146

One of Tarrioâs comrades in the Proud Boysâ leadership, Charles Donohoeâwho pleaded guilty to conspiracy to obstruct an official proceeding and assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers147âlater told authorities that by January 4th he âwas aware that members of MOSD leadership were discussing the possibility of storming the Capitol.ââ148 Donohoe âbelieved that storming the Capitol would achieve the groupâs goal of stopping the government from carrying out the transfer of presidential powerâ and âunderstood that storming the Capitol would be illegal.â 149 By the following evening, January 5th, Tarrio was discussing with other Proud Boy leaders a âtactical planâ for the following day. Their âobjectiveâ was âto obstruct, impede, or interfere with the certification of the Electoral College vote.ââ150 Moreover, Donohoe understood that the Proud Boys âwould pursue this through the use of force and violence, in order to show Congress that âwe the peopleâ were in charge.ââ151 On January 6th, Charles Donohoe understood that two of his fellow Proud Boysâ leaders â Ethan Nordean and Joe Biggs â âwere searching for an opportunity to storm the Capitol.ââ152

Jeremy Bertino, the Proud Boys leader who was stabbed on the night of December 12th, later told authorities that his fellow extremists plotted to stop the peaceful transfer of power. In October 2022, Bertino pleaded guilty to âseditious conspiracyâ and other crimes.153 Bertino admitted that the Proud Boys traveled to Washington, DC on January 6, 2021, âto stop the certification of the Electoral College Vote.â They âwere willing to do whatever it would take, including using force against police and others, to achieve that objective.ââ154

In testimony before the Select Committee, Bertino recalled a telling text exchange with Tarrio on the evening of January 6th. âI was like, âholy shit,â or something like that I said to him,â Bertino recalled. âAnd I was like, âI canât believe this is happening,â or something like that, and â1776.ââ ââ155

Tarrio replied to Bertino: âWinter Palace.ââ156

The Oath Keepers, founded in 2009 by Elmer Stewart Rhodes, is a far-right anti-government organization. The group targets former and current military and law enforcement for recruitment. Their name refers to the oath taken by public servants to support and defend the U.S. Constitution. The Oath Keepersâ claimed fealty to the U.S. Constitution is belied by their obsession with conspiracy theories about alleged evil-intentioned elites in the Government.157 Rhodes has often spouted these conspiracy theories on InfoWars.158

Over the summer of 2020, the Oath Keepers organized armed groups, ostensibly to serve as volunteer, self-appointed security at protests around the country. The Oath Keepers used the protests to draw in new recruits.159 They also built muscle memory by coordinating for these events. For example, the Oath Keepers hired Michael Greene, who later coordinated Oath Keepersâ activities on January 5th and 6th, to lead security operations in multiple cities around the country.160 In the early part of 2020, protests against COVID-related lockdowns served as additional growth and networking opportunities. Kellye SoRelle, a lawyer for the Oath Keepers, met the Oath Keepers at a lockdown protest in Austin, Texas in early 2020. SoRelle saw these COVID events as a âcoalescing momentâ for different far-right groups.161

The âStop the Stealâ movement created another opportunity for the Oath Keepers to grow their influence. Rhodes repeatedly amplified the stolen election conspiracy theory. On November 10, 2020, he posted a âCall to Action!â on the Oath Keepers website, alleging the election was âstolenâ and exhorting his followers to ârefuse to EVER recognize this as a legitimate election, and refuse to recognize Biden as a legitimate winner.ââ162 Under a section entitled âWhat We the People Must Do,â Rhodes quoted a âpatriot from Serbia, who also loves America.â The Serbian author described how his fellow countrymen fomented a political revolution. Parts of the statement presaged the attack on the U.S. Capitol:

.â .â . Millions gathered in our capital [sic]. There were no barricades strong enough to stop them, nor the police determined enough to stop them. Police and Military aligned with the people after few hours of fist-fight [sic]. We stormed the Parliament. And burned down fake state Television! WE WON!163

The Oath Keepers were obsessed with the Insurrection Act â seeing it as a way for President Trump to cling to power. Rhodes believed that the President could empower militias like the Oath Keepers to enforce law and order after other Americans refused to accept President Trumpâs rule.164 Indeed, President Trump had been intensely interested in the Insurrection Act as a potential tool to quell the protests in summer 2020.165 Rhodes wished the Act had been invoked then, but he did not give up on the fantasy.166 As mentioned above, Rhodes called for President Trump to invoke the Insurrection Act during his speech in Washington on December 12, 2020.167

That day, Rhodes also coordinated with Jericho March organizers to provide security.168 He coordinated with a paramilitary group known as 1st Amendment Praetorian (1AP), to guard VIPs, including retired Lieutenant General Michael Flynn and Patrick Byrne.169 Rhodes indicated that the Oath Keepers would be âworking closelyâ with them for the event.170

The Oath Keepers continued to call for President Trump to invoke the Insurrection Act throughout December 2020, arguing that the President needed to do so to âStop the Steal.ââ171 This fantasy reflected a warped sense of reality. Rhodes testified that President Trump could have mobilized âunorganized militia,â including the Oath Keepers, to suppress an insurrection if he attempted to stay in power after losing the election.172 But the Oath Keepers themselves were the ones contemplating insurrection. On December 10, 2020, Rhodes messaged others: âEither Trump gets off his ass and uses the Insurrection Act to defeat the Chicom puppet coup or we will have to rise up in insurrection (rebellion) against the ChiCom puppet Biden. Take your pick.â 173 Rhodes was blunt in other messages to the Oath Keepers, writing: âWe need to push Tump [sic] to do his duty. If he doesnât, we will do ours. Declare Independence. Defy[,] Resist[,] Defend[,] Conquer or Die. This needs to be our attitude.ââ174

As the Proud Boys began their plans for January 6th, Kelly Meggs, the leader of the Florida chapter of the Oath Keepers, reached out. In the past, the Proud Boys and the Oath Keepers had their differences, deriding each otherâs tactics and ethos during the summer 2020 protests.175 But President Trumpâs tweet on December 19th conveyed a sense of urgency which provided the two extremist rivals the opportunity to work together for a common goal.

After President Trumpâs tweet, Meggs called Enrique Tarrio. They spoke for 3 minutes and 26 seconds.176 Meggs also sent a message on Facebook, bragging about an alliance he had formed among the Oath Keepers, the Florida Three Percenters, and the Proud Boys: âWe have decided to work together and shut this shit down.ââ177 The Oath Keepers were making plans of their own, too.

âOath Keepers president [Rhodes] is pretty disheartened,â Roberto Minuta, one of Rhodesâ men, messaged someone on December 19th. âHe feels like itâs go time, the time for peaceful protest is over in his eyes. I was talking with him last night.ââ178 Minuta has been charged with âseditious conspiracyâ and other crimes.179

In the days that followed, the Oath Keepers planned for violence. They used encrypted chats on Signal to discuss travel plans, trade tips on tactical equipment to bring, and develop their plans for once they were on the ground in the DC area.180 On December 21st, 2020, Joshua James messaged the group, stating, âSE region is creating a NATIONAL CALL TO ACTION FOR DC JAN 6TH. .â .â . 4 states are mobilizing[.]ââ181 Meggs, Rhodes, and others created several different chat groups to coordinate for January 6th.182

On December 22nd, Meggs echoed President Trumpâs tweet in a Facebook message to someone else:

Trump said Itâs gonna be wild!!!!!!! Itâs gonna be wild!!!!!!! He wants us to make it WILD thatâs what heâs saying. He called us all to the Capitol and wants us to make it wild!!! Sir Yes Sir!!! Gentlemen we are heading to DC pack your shit!!ââ183

Meggs also wrote that the Oath Keepers would have 50â100 members in Washington, DC on January 6th.184

The Oath Keepers hosted periodic group video meetings to discuss plans for January 6th. Richard Dockery, a former Oath Keepers member, testified to the Select Committee about a video call that took place around December 31st, and related specifically to planning for January 6th.185 During the call, Oath Keepersâ leadership announced plans to provide security for far-right celebrities like Roger Stone.186 If there were any problems while they were providing security, âthere was a quick reaction force in Virginia that would come help them out .â .â . and that they would have firearms.ââ187

Rhodes announced during an episode of InfoWars in November 2020 that the Oath Keepers had established a âQuick Reaction Forceâ (QRF) outside of Washington, DC.188 After President Trump announced the âwildâ protest, the groupâs advanced coordination largely focused on planning related to their QRF, as well as the various security details for VIPs and stage areas on January 5th and 6th.189 Oath Keepers from North Carolina, Florida, South Carolina, and Arizona converged on the Comfort Inn in Ballston, Virginia, and used the location to store their cache of weapons for January 6th.190 Oath Keepers leaders communicated actively about the QRF for January 6th.191 Rhodes and another contingent of Oath Keepers stayed at the Hilton Garden Inn in Vienna, Virginia, and stored weapons there as well.192

Rhodes amassed an arsenal of military-grade assault weapons and equipment in the days leading up to January 6th. On December 30th, Rhodes spent approximately $7,000 on two night-vision devices and a weapon sight and shipped them to Marsha Lessard, a rally organizer who lived near Washington, DC and who had previously been in contact with the organizers of the Ellipse rally.193 On January 1st and 2nd, Rhodes purchased additional weapons and accessories at a cost of approximately $5,000.194 The following day, January 3rd, Rhodes and Kellye SoRelle departed Texas for Washington, DC. While traveling, Rhodes spent an additional $6,000 on an AR-style rifle and firearms attachments.195 Making one final shopping trip in Mississippi, Rhodes purchased $4,500 of firearms equipment including more sights, magazines, and weapons parts on January 4th.196

On the morning of January 6th, with weapons stockpiled, Rhodes messaged the Signal group of Oath Keepers leaders:

We have several well equipped [sic] QRFs outside DC. And there are many, many others, from other groups, who will be watching and waiting on the outside in case of worst case [sic] scenarios.197

Stewart Rhodesâs and Oath Keepersâ lawyer Kellye SoRelle arrived in Washington on the afternoon of January 5th.198 They immediately went to Freedom Plaza, where President Trump had instructed rally organizers to give some of his most extreme supporters time to speak.199 As a small group of Oath Keepers patrolled Freedom Plaza, they were able to see the results of President Trumpâs call to mobilize. 200 SoRelle testified that there were Oath Keepers, Proud Boys, and âAlex Jones peopleâ mingling together in the crowd, with âjust a small distinction between them.ââ201

The Oath Keepers later found themselves at the Phoenix Park Hotel,202 where they ate and drank with a motley coalition of far-right political activists who were united in their shared belief in President Trumpâs Big Lie. 203 Among them were: Proud Boys-linked Bianca Gracia of Latinos for Trump; Joshua Macias, leader of Vets for Trump;204 and Amanda Chase, a Virginia State senator.205 In a livestream discussion moderated by Chase, they promoted false election fraud claims. Macias and Rhodes encouraged President Trump to invoke the Insurrection Act and call up combat veterans who are âready to step in and do what is needed.ââ206

SoRelle later told the Select Committee that there was discussion of going to âstorm the Capitol,â although she claimed that this was ânormalâ discussion and supposedly did not indicate violence or âany of that type of stuff.ââ207

That same evening, Gracia asked SoRelle and Rhodes to follow her to a garage where she was supposed to meet Proud Boys leader Enrique Tarrio,208 who had just been released from custody and ordered to leave the DC area.209 Instead of immediately leaving Washington, DC, Tarrio instead made his way to a garage near the hotel where the others gathered. 210 Portions of the ensuing meeting were captured on video by documentary filmmaker Nick Quested and his camera crew. SoRelle claims that she was asked to attend to discuss Tarrioâs legal woes, 211 but there is evidence indicating that the conversation turned tactical.

Tarrio discussed the courtâs order, informing the group he was going north to Maryland, so he could âstay close just to make sure my guys are ok.ââ212 Tarrio discussed his confiscated phone with Gracia. He told her that âthey couldnât get in there,â apparently referencing the two-factor authentication enabled on his phone.213 Tarrio also appeared familiar with another attendee, Vets for Trump leader Macias, who rested his hand on Tarrioâs shoulder at various points.214 Rhodes and Tarrio shook hands.215

Much of the substantive conversation between Rhodes, Tarrio, and the others cannot be heard because Tarrio asked Questedâs camera crew to stop recording.216 However, some of the conversation is audible from afar and Rhodes can be heard telling Tarrio that he âhas three groups in Tysonâs Corner,ââ217 a reference to the QRFs that he had mustered in the event that President Trump called the Oath Keepers into service.

Tarrio later expressed appreciation for Rhodesâs presence at the garage meeting and underscored that their two organizations needed to stand together on January 6th. Tarrio explained that the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers are âjust two different groupsâ and that he and Rhodes âdonât get along,â but said that âfor situations like this where there is a need to unite regardless of our differences .â .â . what he did today was commendable.â 218 Tarrio added that Rhodesâs presence at the garage meeting was âthoughtfulâ because Rhodes had âquickly provided securityâ for the meeting and âseemed concernedâ about Tarrioâs legal situation.219 In a likely nod to prior coordination between Proud Boys and Oath Keepers at other post-election events, Tarrio further explained that âmy guys have helped him [Rhodes] out in the past,â and that he and Rhodes have âmutual respectâ for one another. 220 Tarrio then traveled north to a hotel near Baltimore, Maryland, where he stayed through the events of the next day.221

As explained above, a constellation of far-right characters came together in late 2020 as part of the âStop the Stealâ cause. Among them was Roger Stone, a right-wing political operative whose career as a self-trumpeted dirty trickster stretched back decades. Stone is arguably President Trumpâs oldest political advisor.222 For example, he worked for Donald Trumpâs independent presidential bid during the 2000 campaign.223 In addition to his political connections, Stone cultivated relationships with far-right extremists, including the two groups charged with seditious conspiracy: the Oath Keepers and the Proud Boys.

The Select Committee found that at least seven members of the Oath Keepers provided security for Stone, or were seen with him, in the weeks immediately preceding the attack on the U.S. Capitol.224 Text messages released by Edward Vallejo, an Oath Keeper charged with seditious conspiracy and other crimes, show that Stewart Rhodes and Kelly Meggs discussed providing security for Stone.225 Some of these Oath Keepers guarded Stone during an event at Freedom Plaza in Washington, DC on the night of January 5th.226 Stone was also flanked by Oath Keepers outside of the Willard Hotel on the morning of January 6th.227 One of the Oath Keepers who provided security for Stone was Joshua James, who pleaded guilty to seditious conspiracy, obstruction of Congress and other charges in March 2022.228 James was also reportedly seen in Stoneâs hotel room at the Willard hours before the attack on the U.S. Capitol.229

Stone has a longstanding, close relationship with the Proud Boys. Stone has taken the Proud Boys oath230 and repeatedly defended the group.231 Danish documentarians filmed him working with Proud Boys for years.232 In one scene, filmed in 2019, Stone warmly greets Joe Biggs, a Proud Boys leader central to the Capitol violence. Stone says of Biggs: âMy guy, right here.ââ233 In a 2019 court case, Stone identified Enrique Tarrio as one of his volunteers, explaining that Tarrio had access to his phone and could post to Stoneâs Instagram account from it.234

As mentioned above, Stone, Tarrio and another Proud Boy leader, Ethan Nordean, addressed an impromptu rally in Washington, DC on the night of December 11, 2020. Owen Shroyer, an InfoWars host, was also with them.235 âWe will fight to the bitter end for an honest count of the 2020 election,â Stone told the crowd. âNever give up, never quit, never surrender, and fight for America!ââ236 A few weeks later, on January 2, 2021, Tarrio led a Proud Boys protest outside of Senator Marco Rubioâs home in Florida. The Proud Boys wanted to convince Rubio to vote against certification of the vote on January 6th.237 Stone reportedly called into the event to speak to Tarrioâs crowd.238

One way in which Stone maintained these contacts was through a Signal chat group named âF.O.S.â â or Friends of Stone. 239 Two days after the election, Stone sent a text: âWe provide information several times a day. So please monitor the F.O.S. feed so you can act in a timely fashion.ââ240 Ali Alexander and Stone continued to coordinate about Stop the Steal strategy and events between the election and January 6th.241 In addition to Alexander, Stoneâs âFriendsâ on the Signal chat included Rhodes and Tarrio.242

In July 2020, President Trump granted Stone clemency after he was convicted of lying to Congress and other charges.243 Then, on December 23rd, President Trump pardoned Stone.244 Several days later, at a dinner on the evening of December 27th, Stone thanked President Trump. In a post on Parler, Stone wrote that he âthanked President Trump in person tonight for pardoning meâ and also recommended to the President that he âappoint a special counselâ to stop âthose who are attempting to steal the 2020 election through voter fraud.â Stone also wrote that he wanted âto ensure that Donald Trump continues as our president.ââ245 Finally, he added: â#StopTheStealâ and â#rogerstonedidnothingwrong.ââ246 The Select Committee has learned that Stone discussed the January 6th event with the President, likely at this same dinner on December 27th.247 The President told Stone he âwas thinking of speaking.ââ248

The Select Committee sought to question Roger Stone about his relationships with President Trump and far-right extremists, as well as other issues. During his deposition, Stone invoked his Fifth Amendment right nearly 90 times.249 Stone has publicly stated that he committed no wrongdoing and that he encouraged a peaceful protest.250

Nick Fuentes is an online provocateur who leads a white nationalist movement known as âAmerica First,â or the âGroypers.â Fuentes immediately responded to President Trumpâs âbe wildâ tweet. On December 19, 2020, Fuentes wrote on Twitter: âI will return to Washington DC to rally for President Trump on January 6th!ââ251 Fuentes and his Groypers did return to Washington, DC for the joint session. As the attack was underway, Fuentes incited followers from his perch immediately outside of the U.S. Capitol. Some of his followers joined the attack inside, with one even sitting in Vice President Penceâs seat on the Senate dais.252

Fuentes and a fellow Groyper leader, Patrick Casey, rose to prominence in 2017 after rallying at the Charlottesville âUnite the Rightâ event.253 For years, the Groypers have repeatedly promoted white supremacist and Christian nationalist beliefs, often cloaked in wink-and-nod humor, puns, or religion, and they regularly gin up public opposition to other right-wing organizations or politicians whom they deem insufficiently conservative.254

Fuentes was a key voice for âStop the Stealâ conspiracy theories leading up to January 6th. He spent 2 months leading rallies in State capitals across the country,255 spreading the Big Lie and livestreaming coded calls to violence.256 He also used his livestream to raise significant funds between November 2020 and January 2021.257

On November 9, 2020, Fuentes promised, âGROYPERS ARE GOING TO STOP THIS COUP!ââ258 Two days later, Fuentes organized a âStop the Stealâ rally at the Michigan State Capitol. He told the crowd that they should be âmore feralâ in their tactics to overturn the election, suggesting that they target lawmakers in their homes.259 On November 14th, Fuentes rallied a crowd of his followers at the Million MAGA March in Washington, DC, pushing âStop the Stealâ conspiracies, calling for President Trump to rule for life, and exhorting his followers to âstorm every State capitol until January 20, 2021, until President Trump is inaugurated for 4 more years.ââ260

As discussed above, Fuentes was a prominent figure at the âStop the Stealâ rally in Atlanta, Georgia, in November 2020.261 He promoted election conspiracies, criticized the Republican Party, joked about the Holocaust, and denounced former Vice President Biden as illegitimate.262 Fuentes also suggested his followers intimidate politicians in their homes.263

On December 12th, Fuentes again rallied a crowd of supporters at the âStop the Stealâ events in Washington, DC, calling for the destruction of the Republican Party because it had failed to overturn the election.264 As others spoke at the Jericho March rally, Fuentes headlined a âStop the Stealâ protest just a few blocks away.265

On January 4th, Fuentes suggested that his followers kill State legislators who donât support efforts to overturn the 2020 election. As discussed in Chapter 2, President Trump and his surrogates were pressuring State legislators at the time to do just that. Fuentes complained that his side âhad no leverage.â Fuentes then asked: âWhat can you and I do to a state legislator, besides kill them?â He then quickly added: âAlthough we should not do that. I am not advising that, but I mean, what else can you do, right?266

On January 5th, Casey advertised the marches in Washington, DC on his Telegram channel and provided repeated updates on the logistics of getting into the city. Casey also spoke to his followers about the next dayâs rally on a livestream on DLive.267 As discussed in Chapter 8, the Groypers clearly played a role in the January 6th attack. They even planted their flag in the inner chambers of the U.S. Capitol.268 Fuentes crowed about the attack the day after, tweeting: âThe Capitol Siege was fucking awesome and Iâm not going to pretend it wasnât.ââ269 In another tweet on January 7th, Fuentes wrote: âFor a brief time yesterday the US Capital [sic] was once again occupied by The American People, before the regime wrested back control.ââ270

Despite his boasts on Twitter, Fuentes exercised his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to provide information about his organizing activities to the Select Committee.271

The Oath Keepers were not the only anti-government extremists who viewed President Trumpâs December 19th tweet as a call to arms. Militias around the country were similarly inspired to act. âPeople were retweeting it right and left. .â .â . I saw people retweeting it, talking about, yeah, itâs going to be crazy, going to be a huge crowd,â Michael Lee Wells, a militia leader in North Carolina, told the Select Committee.272 Members of militias known as the âThree Percentersâ were electrified.

The Three Percenters believe that three percent of American colonists successfully overthrew the British during the American Revolution.273 This is not true. Far more than a tiny fraction of the colonial population fought in or supported the Revolutionary War.274 Regardless, this ahistorical belief has become an organizing myth for militias around modern-day America.

As with the Oath Keepers, many Three Percenters have turned against the U.S. Government, such that they equate it with the British monarchy and believe it should be overthrown.275 The movement does not have one, centralized hierarchy. Instead, semi-autonomous branches organize and run themselves.276 The Three Percenter cause was growing prior to the attack on the U.S. Capitol. Jeremy Liggett, a militia leader in Florida, told the Select Committee it was âtrendyâ in far-right circles to identify with the Three Percenter movement in the months leading up to January 6th.277

President Trump tapped into this well of anti-government extremism. The Presidentâs repeated insistence that the election had been stolen resonated with militia members who were already inclined to believe in shady political conspiracies. The Presidentâs December 19th tweet mobilized Three Percenters around the country. Suddenly, they had a focal point for their anti-government beliefs: the joint session of Congress on January 6th. Court filings and other evidence reveal that Three Percenters immediately began planning for violence after President Trumpâs âbe wildâ announcement.

For example, Lucas Denney and Donald Hazard led a militia affiliated with the Three Percenter movement called the âPatriot Boys of North Texas.â Both Denney and Hazard were charged with assaulting officers on January 6th.278 Denney pleaded guilty and has been sentenced to 52 months in prison.279 After President Trumpâs tweet, they discussed travel plans, as well as the need to procure body armor, helmets, knuckle gloves and pepper spray.280 But they did not plan to act alone. Instead, they saw themselves as part of a coalition. In multiple messages, both Denney and Hazard claimed they were also affiliated with Proud Boys and intended to work with them on or before January 6th.281

Denney repeatedly cited President Trumpâs tweet. âTrump himself is calling for a big protest in DC on January 6th. Iâm not going to miss this one,â Denney told Hazard on December 21st.282 On December 30th, Denney wrote in a Facebook message:

Trump has called this himself. For everyone to come. Itâs the day the electoral college is suppose to be certified by congress to officially elect Biden. But, Pence is in charge of this and heâs going to throw out all the votes from States that were proved to have fraud. Thereâs so much more going on behind the scenes though. Thatâs why heâs called this rally for support. .â .â . Trump will stay President .â .â .283

As this message indicates, Denney was well-aware of President Trumpâs multi-part plan to disrupt the transfer of power. He thought that Vice President Pence had the power to âthrow outâ electoral votes, just as the President demanded. In other messages, Denney claimed that President Trump wanted militias to descend on Washington, DC so they could serve as a security force against a perceived threat from Antifa and Black Lives Matter on January 6th. 284

Additional messages between the two reveal their intent to march on the U.S. Capitol. For instance, Denney attempted to post two banners on Facebook that advertised events on January 6th.285 Both banners contained the hashtag â#OccupyCongress.â The pictures contained images of the U.S. Capitol and referenced âThe Great Betrayal.â One of them read âIf They Wonât Hear Usâ and âThey Will Fear Us.â In another post, Denney wrote: âI canât wait to be in the middle of it on the front line on the 6th.â 286

Curiously, Denney had also heard a ârumorâ that President Trump would march with them. On January 4, 2021, he stated in a Facebook message:

Things are going to be happening here. Trump is going to be speaking to everyone Wed [January 6] before everyone marches to the capital [sic]. Rumour [sic] has it that he may march with us. Iâll tell you more when you get here on where to be wed and what time so you have the best seats. 287

On or about January 6th, Denney sent another message via Facebook, writing: âTrump speaking to us around 11 am then we march to the capital and after that we have special plans that I canât say right now over Facebook. But keep an eye out for live feed tomorrow from me. Tomorrow will be historic.ââ288 Later on January 6th, during the attack, Hazard was captured on video bragging: âWe have stormed our nationâs capitol.ââ289

The Patriot Boys of North Texas were not the only Three Percenter group that mobilized after President Trumpâs tweet. The Department of Justice has alleged that multiple other cadres of Three Percenter militiamen prepared for violence on January 6th and then took part in the attack on the U.S. Capitol.

In Florida, a Three Percenter organization known as the âGuardians of Freedomâ established a âB-squadâ for January 6th because they allegedly wanted to avoid being called a âmilitia.ââ290 These men were led by Jeremy Liggett, mentioned above.291

On December 24, 2020, the B-squad sent out a flyer, âCALLING ALL PATRIOTS!â to Washington, D.C.292 The flyer read: âThe Guardians of Freedom III% are responding to the call from President Donald J. Trump to assist in the security, protection, and support of the people as we all protest the fraudulent election and re-establish liberty for our nation. JOIN US & Thousands of other Patriots!ââ293 The B-Squad claimed it was the âright & duty of the people to alter or to abolishâ the Government.294 Its members discussed bringing tactical gear to Washington, DC.295

On December 30th, Liggett posted a meme to Facebook stating that â3% Will Show In Record Numbers In DC.ââ296 When the Select Committee asked about this post, Liggett downplayed its significance or disclaimed any knowledge about other Three Percenter groups that might âshow in record numbers.ââ297 However, on January 3, 2021, Liggett posted a âsafety videoâ on Facebook in which he and others dressed in military gear. Liggett instructed listeners about self-defense and the tools they (like him) could bring to Washington, DC, including âan expandable metal baton, a walking cane and a folding knife.ââ298 He advised âall of you Patriots going to Washington, D.C. .â .â . to support Trump,â and to âkeep up the fight.ââ299 Several âB-squadâ members have been charged with civil disorder and disorderly and disruptive conduct, which took place while rioters nearby were assaulting officers in the tunnel area of the Capitolâs Lower West Terrace on January 6th.300

In California, another group of men associated with the Three Percenter movement quickly began plotting their next moves after President Trumpâs tweet. Alan Hostetter and Russell Taylor ran a non-profit known as the American Phoenix Project, which protested COVID-19 lockdowns and the 2020 election results, while also promoting violence ahead of January 6th.301 Ahead of the joint session, Hostetter and Taylor organized a small group in an encrypted chat they named âThe California Patriots â DC Brigade.ââ302

On December 19th, Taylor linked to President Trumpâs âwill be wildâ tweet and asked members of the chat âWho is going?ââ303 The same day, Hostetter posted a message to his Instagram account, explaining he was traveling to Washington, DC on January 6th because President Trump âtweeted that all patriots should descend on Washington DCâ and that day âis the date of the Joint Session of Congress in which they will either accept or reject the fake/phony/stolen electoral college votes.ââ304 The next day, Taylor renamed the Telegram chat as âThe California Patriots-Answer the Call Jan 6.ââ305 On December 29th, Taylor posted to that chat: âI personally want to be on the front steps and be one of the first ones to breach the doors!ââ306

Between December 19th and January 6th, Hostetter, Taylor and their alleged co-conspirators exchanged messages about bringing weapons, such as hatchets, bats, or large metal flashlights, as well as possibly firearms, with them to Washington, DC. 307 They were âready and willing to fight.ââ308 In one message, Hostetter predicted that January 6th would be similar to the âWar of Independenceâ because â[t]here will likely be 3% of us again that will commit fully to this battle, but just as in 1776 patriots will prevail.ââ309

There are additional examples of how President Trumpâs âbe wildâ tweet led Three Percenters to descend on the U.S. Capitol. One Three Percenter group issued an open letter on December 16, 2020, announcing that they âstand ready and are standing by to answer the call from our President should the need arise that We The People are needed to take back our country from the pure evil that is conspiring to steal our country away from the American people. .â .â . We will not act unless we are told to.â 310 In late December, after the Presidentâs tweet, The Three Percenters Original (TTPO) issued a letter to its members announcing that âthis organization will be answering that call!â 311

There is also additional evidence showing that militia groups like the Three Percenters coordinated with other groups both before and on January 6th. Josh Ellis, the owner of the MyMilitia website, testified that he used Zello (a walkie-talkie app) when he was in Washington, DC on January 6th. The Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, other militia members, and âregular patriotsâ all used these Zello channels in the leadup to January 6th and in response to President Trumpâs December 19th tweet. They used these channels to share intelligence.312

Shortly after the January 6th attack, a video of a bearded man in a âQâ shirt chasing U.S. Capitol Police Officer Ryan Goodman through the halls of the U.S. Capitol went viral.313 That man was Doug Jensen, a QAnon believer.314 After Jensenâs arrest, FBI agents asked him why he traveled from Iowa to Washington, DC in the first place. âTrump posted make sure youâre there, January 6 for the rally in Washington, D.C.,â Jensen responded. 315

Jensen was not the only QAnon believer to attack the U.S. Capitol on January 6th. The letter âQâ and related slogans, such as âWhere We Go One, We Go All,â were ubiquitous among the rioters. They were visible on shirts, signs, and flags throughout the crowd. What was once a marginal digital movement had become a bricks-and-mortar force powerful enough to help obstruct a joint session of Congress.

QAnon is a bizarre and dangerous cult that gained popularity in 2017, when a person known only as âQâ began posting on 4chan, an anonymous message board.316 The poster supposedly held a âQâ security clearance at the Department of Energy. QAnon adherents believe that President Trump is a messianic figure battling the forces of the âdeep stateâ and a Satanic pedophile ring operated by leading Democrats and the American elite.317 Qâs first post in October 2017 predicted that former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would be arrested in short order.318 Although that prophecy did not come to pass, the conspiracy theory evolved and grew over time, spreading across social media platforms and eventually finding a home in 8kun, another anonymous message board known for trafficking in conspiracy theories and hate.319

President Trump was given multiple opportunities to disavow QAnon. Instead, he essentially endorsed its core tenets. During an August 19, 2020, press briefing, President Trump was asked what he thought about the QAnon belief that he was fighting a Satanic cabal. âI mean, you know, if I can help save the world from problems, Iâm willing to do it. Iâm willing to put myself out there,â he replied.320 During a townhall on NBC News two weeks prior to the election, President Trump first claimed he âknew nothingâ about QAnon, but he then praised its believers for being âvery strongly against pedophilia.â The President emphasized: âAnd I agree with that. I mean, I do agree with that.ââ321

In 2020, QAnon played a significant role in spreading various election conspiracy theories. After the election, QAnon accounts amplified the claim that Dominion Voting Systemâs software had altered votes.322 On November 19th, President Trump tweeted and retweeted a link to a segment on One America News Network (OAN) that was captioned, âDominion-izing the Vote.ââ323 The segment claimed that Dominion had switched votes from President Trump to former Vice President Biden. OAN featured a supposed cyber expert, Ron Watkins, a key figure in the QAnon conspiracy movement.324 Watkinsâs father, Jim, owned the 8kun site that âQâ called home, and Ron helped oversee its message boards.325

After promoting the OAN segment, President Trump retweeted Ron Watkinsâs account on several other occasions. On December 15, 2020, President Trump retweeted a post in which Watkins spread false claims of foreign influence in the election.326 Then, on January 3rd, President Trump retweeted Ron Watkinsâs account four more times.327

QAnonâs adherents were clearly paying attention to President Trumpâs words â and tweets. The Presidentâs âbe wildâ tweet was widely heard as a clarion call. Jim Watkins told the Select Committee that âthousands and thousands of people probablyâ agreed that the Presidentâs December 19th tweet was a call for them to come to Washington, DC.328 Jim Watkins himself marched in Washington, DC on January 6th because of the Presidentâs call, but he has not been charged with any crime.329

Other QAnon adherents flocked to Washington, DC in response to the Presidentâs call to action. âPOTUS HAS REQUESTED YOUR ATTENDANCE Washington DC JANUARY 6TH 2021,â Thomas Munn, a QAnon believer, posted on Facebook. Munn added: âOur President has only asked two things from us, so farâ¦#1 Vote #2 January 6, 2021.ââ330 Jacob Chansley, better known as the QAnon Shaman, told the FBI that he traveled from Arizona because President Trump had requested that all âpatriotsâ come to Washington, DC on January 6th.331

During the investigation, the Select Committee learned that the QAnon conspiracy theory often overlaps with other extremist beliefs. Stewart Rhodes of the Oath Keepers testified to the Select Committee that heâs ânot a Q-tardâ and ânot a follower of Q at all.ââ332 However, Rhodes cynically exploited QAnon for his own purposes. The Oath Keepersâ website and text messages were littered with QAnon phrases.333 Nick Quested, a filmmaker who shadowed the Proud Boys, often heard QAnon themes in the Proud Boysâ private discussions.334

As January 6th drew closer, multiple posts on the QAnon-linked website 8kun indicated that violence was imminent. âYou can go to Washington on Jan 6 and help storm the Capitol,â one user wrote. This same user continued: âAs many Patriots as can be. We will storm the government buildings, kill cops, kill security guards, kill federal employees and agents, and demand a recount.ââ335 Other posts on 8kun debated the politicians that users should target once they got inside the Capitol.336

A QAnon-inspired banner was also widely shared by groups planning events for January 5th and 6th. The top of the image read: âOperation Occupy the Capitol.â The central image showed the U.S. Capitol being torn in two. In the lower left corner, there appeared a QAnon phrase: â#WeAreTheStorm.ââ337

Within three minutes of President Trumpâs tweet, a user on TheDonald.win message board posted: âTrump Tweet. Daddy Says Be In DC on Jan. 6th.ââ338 Moderators pinned the post to the top of the board from December 19th until January 6th. It garnered nearly 6,000 comments and more than 24,000 upvotes during that time.339 Many of the siteâs users quickly interpreted President Trumpâs tweet as a call for violence. For example, one user wrote, â[Trump] canât exactly openly tell you to revolt. This is the closest heâll ever get.ââ340 Jody Williams, the siteâs then-owner, testified that while users had been talking about traveling to Washington, DC since the election, after the tweet âanything else was kind of shut out, and it just was going to be the 6th.ââ341

In the days that followed, users on TheDonald.win discussed: surrounding and occupying the U.S. Capitol; cutting off access tunnels used by Members of Congress; the types of weapons they should bring; and even how to build a hangmanâs gallows.342 The parallels to what transpired on January 6th are obvious.

TheDonald.win and its predecessor site was a website for some of its namesakeâs most ardent fans. Even before President Trump was elected, his social media team monitored and interacted with the siteâs users. In the summer of 2016, then-candidate Trump himself engaged in a written question and answer session on TheDonald, which at the time was a forum on Reddit.343 This online community, which had upwards of 790,000 users, was banned by Reddit in mid-2020.344 However, the siteâs users migrated to another online location, becoming TheDonald.win.345

Dan Scavino, the Presidentâs social media guru, amplified content from this website. During the 2016 presidential campaign, âa team in the war room at Trump Tower was monitoring social media trends, including TheDonald subreddit .â .â . and privately communicating with the most active users to seed new trends.ââ346 âCampaign staffers monitored Twitter and TheDonald subreddit, and pushed any promising trends up to social media director Dan Scavino, who might give them a boost with a tweet.â 347 In 2017, President Trump tweeted a video of himself attacking CNN.348 The video had appeared on The Donald four days earlier.349 In 2019, Politico reported that Scavino âregularly monitors Reddit, with a particular focus on the pro-Trump /r/The_Donald channel.â 350

The Select Committee sought to question Scavino about how he and others on President Trumpâs social media team interacted with The Donald subreddit and then TheDonald.win. But Scavino refused to cooperate with the committeeâs subpoena.351

After President Trumpâs December 19th tweet, users on the site posted simple maps of the U.S. Capitol and telegraphed their intent to invade the building.352 âIf we occupy the capitol building, there will be no vote,â one user wrote.353 âThe media will call us evil if we have to occupy the Capitol Building on January 6th. Let them,â another post read.354 One user argued the goal should be to âsurround the enemyâ and âcreate [a] perimeterâ around the Capitol on January 6th, such that no one was allowed to leave until President Trump was âre-admitted for another 4 years.ââ355 This same user posted a diagram of the U.S. Capitolâs perimeter with arrows indicating where the âCapitol Access Tunnelsâ were located.

On January 5th, another user on TheDonald.win encouraged President Trumpâs supporters to âbe prepared to secure the capitol building,â claiming that âthere will be plenty of ex military to guide you.â 356 Multiple other posts made it clear that the U.S. Capitol was the target on January 6th, with one poster writing that people should bring âhandcuffs and zip ties to DC,â so they could enact âcitizenâs arrestsâ of those officials who certified the electionâs results.357 Another post highlighted the âmost important map for January 6th. Form a TRUE LINE around the Capitol and the tunnels.ââ358 That âpost included a detailed schematic of Capitol Hill with the tunnels surrounding the complex highlighted.â 359

Other posts on TheDonald.win included specific plans to build gallows outside the U.S. Capitol. âGallows are simpler and more cost effective, plus theyâre an American old west tradition too,â one user wrote on December 22, 2020.360 A week later, another wrote: âLetâs construct a Gallows outside the Capitol building next Wednesday so the Congressmen watching from their office windows shit their pants.ââ361 Another said that âbuilding a hanging platform in front of Congress on the 6 should send a strong message.ââ362 The site hosted a diagram showing how to tie a hangmanâs knot,363 with one site member writing that they should build gallows âso the traitors know the stakes.ââ364 On January 5, 2021, hours before the attack began, a user posted an image of gallows and titled it, âElection Fraud Repair Kit.ââ365

Text messages between Trump Campaign Senior Advisor Jason Miller and White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows show that these kinds of posts reached deep into the Presidentâs inner circle. Miller sent Meadows a text on December 30th, declaring, âI got the base FIRED UP.â 366 The thread contained a link to a TheDonald.win comment thread filled with reactions to a post by Miller promoting January 6th.367 Users in the thread made comments such as âgallows donât require electricity,â and that millions will âbust in through the doors if they try to stop Pence from declaring Trump the winner,â all in response to Miller.368

On December 19, 2020, the same day President Trump posted his inflammatory âbe wildâ tweet, he also tweeted a noteworthy video. The short clip was titled, âFIGHT FOR TRUMP! - SAVE AMERICA - SAVE THE WORLD.ââ369 The video reportedly appeared on TheDonald.win two days earlier.370 As with so much else on TheDonald.win, this refrain featured prominently on the day of the attack on the Capitol. During his speech at the Ellipse south of the White House on January 6th, the crowd broke out into a chant of âFight for Trump! Fight for Trump!â President Trump thanked those in attendance.371

In the two and a half weeks since he first announced the January 6th âprotest,â extremists and conspiracy theorists plotted to make the unprecedented, presidentially announced protest against the peaceful transfer of power âwildâ indeed. Meanwhile, event organizers and White House staffers prepared for the final rally of President Trumpâs term.

In the days following President Trumpâs tweet, rally organizers secured permits for about one dozen events in Washington, DC on January 5th and 6th.372 At 7:12 a.m., not even 6 hours after President Trumpâs tweet, Cindy Chafian, an executive at Women for America First (WFAF), emailed the National Park Service (NPS) about an event that had been planned to coincide with President-elect Bidenâs inauguration on January 20, 2021.373 Chafianâs ask was simple: âCan I change the date to January 6th?ââ374

WFAF was founded in 2019 by Amy and Kylie Kremer, a mother-daughter pair who were longtime supporters of the President.375 WFAF became a significant player in the âStop the Stealâ movement.376 The Kremers started a âStop the Stealâ Facebook group that gathered some 365,000 members in less than 24 hours.377 Their online organizing coincided with their on-the-ground mobilization activities. The Kremers organized a bus tour to promote the Big Lie, in addition to events in Washington, DC on November 14, 2020, and December 12, 2020.378 After President Trumpâs December 19th tweet, the Kremers focused on January 6th. Kylie Kremer proudly declared their support on Twitter: âThe calvary [sic] is coming, President! JANUARY 6th | Washington, DC TrumpMarch.com #MarchForTrump #StopTheSteal.ââ379 After the date of their permit was revised, WFAF ultimately provided President Trump the stage on the Ellipse where he would direct the crowd to march on the Capitol.380

The Kremers were not alone in responding quickly to the Presidentâs tweet. Ali Alexander, the founder of Stop the Steal, LLC,381 was eager to get ahead of other organizers. On the morning of December 19th, Alexander told his event planner, âEveryone is trying to get the jump on us so Iâd like to get the court side of the capitol (lawn) and Iâd like to get capitol steps and court.ââ382 Alexander told his event planner to âgrab whatever we can. All of it.ââ383 Alexanderâs team did just that: they registered and launched a new website, WildProtest.com,384 which advertised planned events for January 6th under a banner that read: âPresident Trump Wants You in DC January 6.ââ385

Still other organizers were quick to seize on the Presidentâs tweet. Arina Grossu and Robert Weaver, co-founders of the self-proclaimed âJudeo-Christianâ Jericho March organization,386 held a rally in Washington, DC on December 12, 2020. Oath Keepers leader Stewart Rhodes, Flynn, Jones, Alexander, and others shared a stage at that event.387 Grossu and Weaver exchanged emails just a few hours after President Trumpâs first mention of January 6th. In an email on the morning of December 19th, Weaver told Grossu to âenjoy the peace before the stormâ and said, âTrump has called for a protest on 1/6, FYI.ââ388 The Jericho Marchâs website used President Trumpâs âBe there, will be wild!â language to advertise additional events between January 2nd and January 6, 2021.389

Marsha Lessard, the leader of a vaccine-skeptic group, Virginia Freedom Keepers, worked to stage an event with Bianca Gracia, the leader of Latinos for Trump on January 6th.390 The women had ties to the Oath Keepers391 and Proud Boys,392 respectivelyâtwo groups central to the violence on January 6. Latinos for Trump reportedly advertised their January 6th event with the same QAnon-inspired banner, âOperation Occupy the Capitol.ââ393 Another conservative group, Moms for America, worked with Alexander before securing a permit for an event on January 5th.394

As discussed above, Alex Jones was one of the loudest supporters of the âStop the Stealâ movement. Jones dedicated much of the December 20th episode of his InfoWars show to President Trumpâs âbe wildâ tweet, telling his listeners that nothing less than the fate of the American Republic was at stake. âHeâs calling you, he needs your help, we need your help,â Jones told his audience.395 The Select Committee has learned that, between the time of the Presidentâs tweet and Jonesâs December 20th show, Jonesâs staff had several calls with Chafian, who had just procured a new permit for WFAFâs event on the Ellipse.396 The two parties apparently discussed whether this newly hatched January 6th event was an opportunity to work together.397

Jonesâs broadcast also led to an influx of funds for the January 6th event at the Ellipse. Julie Fancelli is the billionaire heiress to the Publix supermarket fortune and a longtime supporter of President Trump.398 Fancelli had recently become a donor to Jonesâs InfoWars site.399 She listened to Jonesâs December 20th show,400 and decided she wanted to back the cause.

Inspired by Jones and the fervor that continued to surround the Presidentâs tweet, Fancelli called Caroline Wren, a Republican fundraiser linked to the Trump Campaign, the next day.401 According to Wren, Fancelli said that âshe wanted to see a lot of people there in DC, so how much would that cost?ââ402 Fancelli spoke with Jonesâs staff and they recommended that she connect with Chafian, who was organizing the Ellipse rally.403 In the waning days of 2020, Fancelli and Jones spoke several times.404

Fancelli worked with Wren to create a multimillion-dollar budget to convene as many supporters of President Trump as possible.405 To ensure that Fancelliâs dollars made maximum impact, Wren contacted some of the major players who were rallying supporters for January 6th. Wren emailed Kylie Kremer406 and exchanged texts with Jones407 and Chafian.408 Fancelliâs goal was clear: she wanted to spend $3 million to âget as many people there as possible.ââ409 The resulting budget allocated $500,000 to a busing program and a centralized ad campaign by the Tea Party Express to promote the event.410 Another $500,000 went to assisting WFAF and Jones in their organizational efforts.411

Caroline Wren also connected with Ali Alexander. On December 29th, Wren told the Stop the Steal leader, âI can pay for the buses and I have my team looking for available companies, so let me know what cities you need them in!ââ412 Wrenâs offer came in response to a tweet from Alexander earlier that day: âCoalition of us working on 25 new charter buses to bring people FOR FREE to #JAN6 #STOPTHESTEAL for President Trump. If you have money for more buses or have a company, let me know. We will list our buses sometime in the next 72 hours. STAND BACK & STAND BY!ââ413

The final words of Alexanderâs tweet directly echoed President Trumpâs command to the Proud Boys during the September 29, 2020, presidential debate.414 Alexanderâs word choice was apt. The Proud Boys were already planning to show up in force, and to ensure that the crowd would be âwild.â

On the evening of December 27th, President Trump boosted the upcoming event on Twitter: âSee you in Washington, DC, on January 6th. Donât miss it. Information to follow!ââ415 The Select Committee learned that this tweet came after the White House spoke with a former Trump staffer, Justin Caporale, who was asked to help produce the Ellipse rally.416 That same evening, the President had dinner with Donald Trump, Jr., and his girlfriend Kimberly Guilfoyle,417 who spoke with rally organizer Caroline Wren during the meal.418 Wren also texted Guilfoyle talking points that described her ambitions for the event, saying that âbuses of people are coming in from all over the country to support you. Itâs going to be huge, we are also adding in programming the night of January 5th.ââ419

After Guilfoyleâs call with Wren, there was a series of calls among the senior White House staff,420 likely underscoring the seriousness of the White Houseâs interest in the event.

Within a few days, the White House began to take a more direct role in coordinating the rally at the Ellipse.421 In a December 29th text to Wren, Caporale wrote that after the Presidentâs planned speech there âmaybe [sic] a call to action to march to the [C]apitol and make noise.ââ422

This is the earliest indication uncovered by the Select Committee that the President planned to call on his supporters to march on the U.S. Capitol. But it wasnât the last. On January 2nd, rally organizer Katrina Pierson informed Wren that President Trumpâs Chief of Staff, Mark Meadows, had said the President was going to âcall on everyone to march to the [C]apitol.ââ423

Inside the White House, the Presidentâs intent was well-known. Cassidy Hutchinson, an aide to Meadows, recalled in her testimony that she overheard discussions to this effect toward the end of December or early January. One such discussion included an exchange between Meadows and Rudolph Giuliani that occurred on January 2nd.424 Hutchinson understood that President Trump wanted to have a crowd at the Capitol in connection with what was happening insideâthe certification of the electoral count.425 Hutchinson also recalled that President Trumpâs allies in Congress were aware of the plan. During a call with members of the House Freedom Caucus, the idea of telling people to go to the Capitol was discussed as a way to encourage Congress to delay the electoral college certification and send it back to the States.426

On January 4th, WFAFâs Kylie Kremer informed Mike Lindell, the CEO of MyPillow and an ally of President Trump, that âPOTUS is going to have us march there [the Supreme Court]/the Capitolâ but emphasized that the plan âstays only between us.ââ427

The âStop the Stealâ coalition was aware of the Presidentâs intent. On January 5th, Ali Alexander sent a text to a journalist saying: âEllipse then US capitol [sic]. Trump is supposed to order us to the capitol [sic] at the end of his speech but we will see.ââ428

President Trump wanted to personally accompany his supporters on the march from the Ellipse to the U.S. Capitol. During a January 4th meeting with staffers and event organizer Katrina Pierson, President Trump emphasized his desire to march with his supporters.429 âWell, I should walk with the people,â Pierson recalled President Trump saying.430 Though Pierson said that she did not take him âseriously,â she knew that âhe would absolutely want to be with the people.ââ431 Pierson pointed out that President Trump âdid the drive-by the first time and the flyover the second timeâ â a reference to the November and December 2020 protests in Washington, DC.432 During these previous events, President Trump made cameo appearances to fire up his supporters. Now, as January 6th approached, the President again wanted to be there, on the ground, as his supporters marched on the U.S. Capitol.

The Presidentâs advisors tried to talk him out of it. White House Senior Advisor Max Miller âshot it down immediatelyâ because of concerns about the Presidentâs safety.433 Pierson agreed.434 But President Trump was persistent, and he floated the idea of having 10,000 National Guardsmen deployed to protect him and his supporters from any supposed threats by leftwing counter-protestors.435 Miller again rejected the Presidentâs idea, saying that the National Guard was not necessary for the event. Miller testified that there was no further conversation on the matter.436 After the meeting, Miller texted Pierson, âJust glad we killed the national guard and a procession.ââ437 That is, President Trump briefly considered having the National Guard oversee his procession to the U.S. Capitol. The President did not order the National Guard to protect the U.S. Capitol, or to secure the joint session proceedings.

Although his advisors tried to talk the President out of personally going, they understood that his supporters would be marching.438 Piersonâs agenda for the meeting reflected the Presidentâs plan for protestors to go to the U.S. Capitol after the rally.439 But President Trump did not give up on the idea of personally joining his supporters on their march, as discussed further in Chapter 7.

As Katrina Pierson helped plan the Ellipse rally, she faced another complication. The âStop the Stealâ movement played an outsized role in promoting January 6th. And now, as the day approached, its leading voices wanted prime speaking gigs â perhaps even on the same stage as President Trump. Roger Stone, Alex Jones and Ali Alexander were all angling for significant stage time. Pierson knew they were trouble.

In her testimony before the Select Committee, Pierson cited several concerns, including that Jones and Alexander had played a prominent role in the November 2020 protest in Atlanta, Georgia. This was no ordinary protest. Jones and Alexander âhad gone into the Georgia Capitol with some inflammatory rhetoric,â Pierson explained.440 When Pierson was asked if Jones and Alexander âsurrounding the governorâs mansionâ and âgoing into the Capitolâ were the âkind of thingâ that gave her pause, she responded: âAbsolutely.â 441 After the Georgia protest, Pierson explained, the Kremers â who had helped organize âStop the Stealâ activities â distanced themselves from Jones and Alexander.442

But there was an additional problem. President Trump wanted to include the âStop the Stealâ leaders in the January 6th event. As Pierson put it in a text message to Kylie Kremer: âPOTUS .â .â . likes the crazies.ââ443 Pierson said that she believed this was the case because President Trump âloved people who viciously defended him in public.ââ444 But their âviciousâ defenses of the President clearly troubled Pierson.

Pierson tried to trim the speaker lineup â which still included the âStop the Stealâ trio of Stone, Jones, and Alexander. She was initially vetoed by the White House after Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications Dan Scavino,445 who had approved the âoriginal psycho list.ââ446 At one point, she texted Scavinoâs boss, Mark Meadows, saying: âThings have gotten crazy and I desperately need some direction.ââ447 She was concerned by the possibility of âcrazy peopleâ being included in the event, their incendiary role in Georgia, and the fact that people coming to Washington, DC were planning to protest at the U.S. Capitol.448

Meadows told Pierson that she should take control of the situation and remove the possibility of controversial speakers.449 Pierson agreed to do so.450 But the President remained an obstacle. During their January 4th meeting, Pierson tried to convince President Trump to minimize the role of these potentially explosive figures at the Ellipse. She offered to place them at a planned event the night before in Freedom Plaza or on other stages in DC on January 6th. She told the President to â[k]eep the fringe on the fringeâ 451 and advised him to â[e]liminate convicted felons that could damage other speakers.ââ452

President Trump was still unwilling to remove them from the lineup entirely. The President instructed Pierson to give Stone a speaking slot on January 5th and asked for more information about Ali Alexander.453 After discussing the matter with Scavino, President Trump also requested that Alexander be given a speaking slot. President Trump âbrought up Ali [Alexander] .â .â . just keep him on stage not associated with POTUS or main event,â Scavino wrote.454

In the end, the âStop the Stealâ leaders â Stone, Jones and Alexander â did not appear on the stage at the Ellipse on January 6th, although they did speak at other planned events, consistent with the Presidentâs request about Alexander. âPOTUS expectations are [to have something] intimate and then send everyone over to the Capitol,â Pierson explained in a text message to Justin Caporale and Taylor Budowich.455 Caporale redacted this text and others in his early production of documents to the Select Committee, and he only revealed them after they had already been produced by other witnesses.456

However, other incendiary voices â in addition to President Trumpâs â were given time on the Ellipse stage. The Select Committee learned that President Trumpâs aides warned him against the inclusion of figures like John Eastman457 and Rudolph Giuliani,458 given their false claims about election fraud.459 Both men, of course, ended up sharing a stage with him on January 6th.460 Meadows himself directed that they be allowed to speak.461

While the âStop the Stealâ coalition was not given speaking slots on the Ellipse stage on January 6th, its leaders had plenty of opportunities to speak the day before. And they used their platforms to rile up the crowd in Washington, DC in advance of the joint session.

Ali Alexander spoke at an event sponsored by Moms for America in front of the U.S. Capitol. Alexander claimed that he was honored to be sharing the same stage with President Trump the following day, even though behind the scenes his appearance had been nixed.462

âWe must rebel,â Alexander told rallygoers. âIâm not even sure if Iâm going to leave D.C. We might make this âFort Trump,â right?â Alexander said, while standing in front of the U.S. Capitol. âWeâre going to keep fighting for you, Mr. President.ââ463 On his Twitter account, Alexander also spread the idea that President Trumpâs supporters should occupy areas of Washington, DC, using the phrases and hashtags such as âFort Trumpâ and â#OccupyDCâ.464

Alex Jones and Roger Stone spoke at a separate event hosted by Virginia Women for Trump in front of the Supreme Court.465 The event, named the âOne Nation Under Godâ prayer rally, was cohosted by the American Phoenix Project â the Three Percenter-linked group run by Alan Hostetter and Russel Taylor, discussed above, which is charged with conspiracy to obstruct an official proceeding. 466

Jones repeated his claims about the election being stolen, claiming that those in attendance stood against a âSatanic world government.â 467 Stone led a âStop the Stealâ chant, claiming the âevidence of election fraud is not only growing, it is overwhelming, and it is compelling.â President Trump âwon the majority of the legal votes castâ and President Trump âwon this election,â Stone said. Nothing less than the fate of Western Civilization was at stake, according to Stone:

Letâs be very clear. This is not fight between Republicans and Democrats. This is not a fight between liberals and conservatives. This is a fight for the future the United States of America. It is a fight for the future of Western Civilization as we know it. Itâs a fight between dark and light. Itâs a fight between the godly and the godless. Itâs a fight between good and evil. And we dare not fail, or we will step out into one thousand years of darkness. 468

Stone claimed that they ârenounce violenceâ and those on âthe left .â .â . are the violent ones.â But he insisted that ânothing is over until we say it is,â and âVictory will be ours.â 469

Both Taylor and Hostetter spoke as well. Hostetter told the crowd, âWe are at war.ââ470 Taylor promised to âfightâ and âbleed,â vowing that âPatriot[s]â would ânot return to our peaceful way of life until this election is made right.ââ471

A long rally was also hosted at Freedom Plaza, an open-air space on Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, DC. It is a symbolic protest site, standing in the direct line between the White House and the U.S. Capitol. Stone, Jones and Alexander all appeared at Freedom Plaza on the evening of January 5th. Their remarks were incendiary.

Stone repeated his apocalyptic language from earlier in the day, claiming that rallygoers were embroiled in âan epic struggle for the future of this country between dark and light.ââ472 âI want them to know that 1776 is always an option,â Ali Alexander said. âThese degenerates in the deep state are going to give us what we want, or we are going to shut this country down.ââ473 When Alex Jones took to the stage, he screamed at the crowd: âItâs 1776!ââ474

Another speaker that evening was Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn (ret.). âTomorrow, tomorrow, trust me, the American people that are standing on the soil that we are standing on tonight, and theyâre going to be standing on this soil tomorrow, this is soil that we have fought over, fought for, and we will fight for in the future,â Flynn also told the crowd. Flynn addressed Members of Congress, saying âthose of you who are feeling weak tonight, those of you that donât have the moral fiber in your body, get some tonight because tomorrow, we the people are going to be here, and we want you to know that we will not stand for a lie. We will not stand for a lie.ââ475

On the evening of January 5th, the President edited the speech he would deliver the next day at the Ellipse. The Presidentâs speechwriting team had only started working on his remarks the day before.476 Despite concerns from the speechwriting team, unfounded claims coming from Giuliani and others made their way into the draft. 477

The initial draft circulated on January 5th emphasized that the crowd would march to the U.S. Capitol.478 Based on what they had heard from others in the White House, the speechwriting team expected President Trump to use his address to tell people to go to the Capitol.479

That evening, President Trump convened an impromptu gathering in the Oval Office with members of his staff, primarily his press team480 and White House Deputy Chief of Staff Dan Scavino, who was in charge of President Trumpâs personal Twitter account.481 Despite the bitter cold, the President ordered his staff to keep the door to the Rose Garden open so he could hear the music and cheering from his supporters at Freedom Plaza.482 The music playing at Freedom Plaza was so loud âyou could feel it shaking in the Oval.ââ483

As President Trump listened, he was tweeting, at one point telling his supporters he could hear them from the Oval Office.484 His speechwriters incorporated those tweets into a second draft of the speech that was circulated later that evening.485 The following appeared in both tweet form486 and was adapted into the speech:

âAll of us here today do not want to see our election victory stolen by emboldened Radical Left Democrats. Our Country has had enough, they wonât take it anymore! Together, we will STOP THE STEAL.ââ487

In speaking with staff, he still seemed optimistic that âCongress would take some sort of action in his favor.ââ488 The White House photographer, who was also in attendance, recalled that President Trump again remarked that he should go to the Capitol the next day, and even asked about the best route to get there.489 The President peppered staff for ideas concerning how âwe could make the RINOs do the right thingâ and make the next day âbig.ââ490 Deputy Press Secretary Sarah Matthews, who was present in the Oval Office that evening, understood that President Trump wanted to get Republican Members of Congress to send the electoral votes back to the States, rather than certify the election.491 Matthews recalled that initially no one spoke up in response, since they were trying to âprocessâ what he had said.492

Eventually, Deere suggested that President Trump should focus his speech on his administrationâs accomplishments, rather than on his claim that the election had been stolen.493 But the President told Deere that while they had accomplished a lot, the crowd was going to be âfired upâ and âangryâ the next day because they believed the election had been stolen and was rigged.494 President Trump knew the crowd was angry because he could hear them.495 Of course, President Trump was responsible, more than any other party, for ginning up their anger.

President Trump ended the evening by asking an aide how many people were going to be at the rally. The aide responded that he was not sure but told President Trump that he saw videos on Twitter of âpro-trump people chanting on planes heading to DC,â which he asked to be shared with Scavino.496

âWe will not let them silence your voices,â the President told the crowd from the podium at the Ellipse. âWeâre not going to let it happen, Iâm not going to let it happen.â 497 His supporters started chanting, âfight for Trump!â The President thanked them.498

President Trump knew not only that his supporters were angry, but also that some of them were armed.499 At times, he ad-libbed, deliberately stoking their rage even more. At one point he said: âAnd we fight. We fight like hell. And if you donât fight like hell, youâre not going to have a country anymore.ââ500 The word âfight,â or a variation thereof, appeared only twice in the prepared text.501 President Trump would go on to utter the word twenty times during his speech at the Ellipse.502

President Trump had summoned a mob, including armed extremists and conspiracy theorists, to Washington, DC on the day the joint session of Congress was to meet. He then told that same mob to march on the U.S. Capitol and âfight.â They clearly got the message.

ENDNOTES

Â Â 1. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 62.

Â Â 2. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 27,62; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Pompeo, (Aug. 9, 2022), p. 30; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eugene Scalia, (June 30, 2022), p. 11.

Â Â 3. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eugene Scalia, (June 30, 2022), p. 11. Others throughout the White House similarly recognized that December 14 was a milestone in Americaâs constitutional process, and it was time for the President to move on. But it was not just members of President Trumpâs Cabinet who viewed that the election was over, and that President Trump had lost by December 14âPresident Trumpâs top advisors at the White House came to similar conclusions. For example, White House Counsel Pat Cipollone agreed with Senator McConnellâs December 15th comments on the Senate floor and viewed the process for challenging the election as âdone.â See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 73. White House Deputy Press Secretary and Deputy Assistant to the President Judd Deere also recognized the significance of the electoral college vote in determining the president and vice president and conveyed this to President Trump. He also advised him to concede. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 23-25. White House Advisor Ivanka Trump viewed the electoral college vote as important and had already started planning for leaving the administration prior to then. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 193. White House Advisor Jared Kushner similarly viewed that day as âsignificant.â Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), p. 107.

Â Â 4. President Trumpâs full tweet read: âPeter Navarro releases 36-page report alleging election fraud âmore than sufficientâ to swing victory to Trump https://t.co/D8KrMHnFdK. A great report by Peter. Statistically impossible to have lost the 2020 Election. Big protest in D.C. on January 6th. Be there, will be wild!â President Donald J. Trump: Tweets of December 19, 2020, The American Presidency Project, available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/tweets-december-19-2020.

Â Â 5. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Smith, (May 9, 2022), p. 79. Navaroli appeared for two deposition session with the Select Committee, the first of which was conducted anonymously to protect her identity. In this deposition session, she was called âJ. Smith.â She later agreed to put her name in the record and sat for another round of questioning. Testimony from that second session is referred to as âDeposition of Anika Navaroli.â

Â Â 6. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Anika Navaroli, (Sept. 1, 2022), pp. 66-67. She went on to characterize the tweet as an âRSVP cardâ that became a ârallying pointâ for the Presidentâs supporters, one that prompted violent responses from users that were highly suggestive of the coming violence targeting DC on January 6th. Id., at p. 64. Another former Twitter employee, whose deposition was also conducted anonymously, testified that the tweet âin many ways kind of crystallized the plansâ for violence and that, after that point, supporters of President Trump began tweeting about movements to D.C. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Johnson, (Sept. 7, 2022), p. 55.

Â Â 7. The Presidentâs call to action quickly reverberated beyond Twitter and spread across the internet. On one social networking site, Discord, a forum called âDonaldsArmy.USâ erupted in the hours after the tweet, with users seeing it as a âcall to actionâ and beginning to organize travel plans to D.C., including by discussing how and whether to evade DC gun restrictions and bring firearms into the city. See Summary Memorandum from Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol. Briefing with Discord, (July 29, 2022); see also Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Discord Production), JAN6C_DIS_000269 (Memo from Discord titled âDonaldsArmy.US and BASEDMedia.â).

Â Â 8. Second Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 28, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305.

Â Â 9. See, e.g., Ian Ward, âHow a D.C. Bar Became the âHavenâ for the Proud Boys,â Politico, (Dec. 14, 2020), available at https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/12/14/harrys-bar-proud-boys-washington-dc-445015.

Â 10. Second Superseding Indictment at Â¶37, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305 (citing Tarrioâs message to the Proud Boys on December 29, 2020, that they would "not be wearing our traditional Black and Yellow" on January 6th; they would "be incognito.").

Â 11. Second Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 50, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305.

Â 12. Second Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 100, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305.

Â 13. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Henry Tarrio, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 83-84.

Â 14. Second Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 107, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305.

Â 15. See, e.g., Mike Levine, âHow A Standoff in Nevada Years Ago Set The Militia Movement on A Crash Course with The US Capitol,â ABC News, (Jan. 5, 2022), available at https://abcnews.go.com/US/standoff-nevada-years-ago-set-militia-movement-crash/story?id=82051940.

Â 16. Indictment at Â¶Â¶ 67, 68, United States v. Rhodes, III, et al., No. 22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167.

Â 17. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Elmer Stewart Rhodes, (Feb. 22, 2022), pp. 132,134; Stewart Rhodes and Kellye SoRelle, âOpen Letter to President Trump: You Must Use the Insurrection Act to âStop the Stealâ and Defeat the Coup,â Oathkeepers.org, (Dec. 14, 2020), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210123133022/https:/oathkeepers.org/2020/12/open-letter-to-president-trump-you-must-use-insurrection-act-to-stop-the-steal-and-defeat-the-coup/ (archived). Jason Van Tatenhove, the former spokesman of the Oath Keepers described how he suspected that Rhodes saw the Insurrection Act as a blank check: âHe could pretty much do whatever he wanted, and [President Trump] could install Stewart and the Oath Keepers as some sort of security force that would bring them real legitimacy and political power.â Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jason Van Tatenhove, (Mar. 9, 2022), p. 73.

Â 18. Third Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 37, United States v. Crowl et al., No. 1:21-cr-28 (D.D.C., Mar. 31, 2021), ECF No. 127.

Â 19. Third Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 95-99, United States v. Crowl et al., No. 1:21-cr-28 (D.D.C., Mar. 31, 2021), ECF No. 127.

Â 20. Trial Transcript at 10502-508, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2022); Alan Feuer and Zach Montague, âOath Keepers Leader Convicted of Sedition in Landmark Jan. 6 Case,â New York Times, (Nov. 29, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/29/us/politics/oath-keepers-trial-verdict-jan-6.html.

Â 21. 18 U.S.C. Â§ 2384.

Â 22. For example, one Proud Boy, Jeremy Bertino, pleaded guilty to âseditious conspiracyâ and other crimes in October 2022. Bertino admitted to authorities that the Proud Boys traveled to Washington on January 6, 2021, âto stop the certification of the Electoral College Vote.â They âwere willing to do whatever it would take, including using force against police and others, to achieve that objective.â See âFormer Leader of Proud Boys Pleads Guilty to Seditious Conspiracy for Efforts to Stop Transfer of Power Following 2020 Presidential Election,â Department of Justice, (Oct. 6, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-leader-proud-boys-pleads-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-efforts-stop-transfer-power.

Â 23. Criminal Complaint at 10-11, United States v. Hazard, No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1.

Â 24. See, e.g., Indictment at Â¶Â¶ 34-37, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.

Â 25. Malachi Barrett, âFar-Right Activist Who Encouraged U.S. Capitol Occupation Also Organized âStop the Stealâ Rally in Michigan,â Mlive, (Jan. 7, 2021), available at https://www.mlive.com/politics/2021/01/far-right-activist-who-encouraged-us-capitol-occupation-also-organized-stop-the-steal-rally-in-michigan.html.

Â 26. Nicholas J. Fuentes (@NickJFuentes), Twitter, Jan. 7, 2021 10:56 p.m. ET, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210107185745/https://twitter.com/NickJFuentes/status/1347255833516765185 (archived).

Â 27. Ken Dilanian and Ben Collins, âThere Are Hundreds of Posts About Plans to Attack the Capitol. Why Hasnât This Evidence Been Used in Court?,â NBC News, (Apr. 20, 2021), available at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/we-found-hundreds-posts-about-plans-attack-capitol-why-aren-n1264291.

Â 28. Statement of Mike Rothschild, (Mar. 23, 2022), at pp. 3-6.

Â 29. See, âNCRI Assessment of The Capitol Riots,â Rutgers Miller Center for Community Protection and Resilience,â Network Contagion Research Institute, (Jan. 9, 2021) available at https://millercenter.rutgers.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/NCRI-Assessment-of-the-Capitol-Riots-1.pdf.

Â 30. âBreaking: Trump Calls for Americans to March on DC January 6 to Stop Foreign Takeover,â InfoWars, (Dec. 19, 2020), (archived) available at https://web.archive.org/web/20201219175757/https://www.infowars.com/posts/breaking-trump-calls-for-americans-to-march-on-dc-january-6-to-stop-foreign-takeover/.

Â 31. Jacob Knutson, âJury Orders Alex Jones to Pay Nearly $1 Billion in Sandy Hook Defamation Trial,â Axios, (Oct. 12, 2022), available at https://www.axios.com/2022/10/12/alex-jones-sandy-hook-defamation-trial.

Â 32. âThe Alex Jones Show,â Prison Planet TV, at 21:53, Dec. 20, 2020, available at http://tv.infowars.com/index/display/id/11151.

Â 33. Jonesâs promotion of the January 6th event began almost immediately after the Presidentâs tweet. See The Alex Jones Show, âJanuary 6th Will Be a Turning Point in American History,â Banned.Video, at 16:29, Dec. 31, 2020, available at https://banned.video/watch?id=5fee715284a7b6210e12a2f7.

Â 34. See, Lena V. Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed, and Maya Eliahou, âWhat Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,â Pro Publica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=5OCkdwJRD0a3 (showing Alex Jones marching down Pennsylvania Avenue at 1:10 p.m.).

Â 35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Caroline Wren, (Dec. 17, 2021), pp. 50, 70-71.

Â 36. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), p. 86.

Â 37. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 32-33, 41; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 107-108, 135.

Â 38. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 70-71.

Â 39. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Committee on Rules and Administration, 117th Congress, âExamining the U.S. Capitol Attack: A Review of the Security, Planning, and Response Failures on January 6â (Staff Report), (June 8, 2021), p. B-22.

Â 40. Rob Kuznia, Curt Devine, Nelli Black, and Drew Grin, âStop the Stealâs Massive Disinformation Campaign Connected to Roger Stone and Steve Bannon,â CNN Business, (Nov. 14, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/13/business/stop-the-steal-disinformation-campaign-invs/index.html.

Â 41. Charles Homans, âHow âStop the Stealâ Captured the American Right,â New York Times, (July 19, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/19/magazine/stop-the-steal.html. (âDuring his time as a Trump campaign adviser, Stone urged the candidate to run on immigration, and now he linked these views to the plots that he claimed were afoot to deny Trump the nomination. In the Republican primaries, Trump was âa nationalist in a field of globalists,â Stone said in an interview that April with Stefan Molyneux, a Canadian alt-right podcaster. If the globalists failed to steal the primaries outright, there would be a ânaked attempt to steal this from Donald Trumpâ at the Republican National Convention in Cleveland, Stone declared. âThe fix is in.ââ â)

Â 42. Rob Kuznia, Curt Devine, Nelli Black, and Drew Grin, âStop the Stealâs Massive Disinformation Campaign Connected to Roger Stone and Steve Bannon,â CNN Business, (Nov. 14, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/13/business/stop-the-steal-disinformation-campaign-invs/index.html.

Â 43. Rob Kuznia, Curt Devine, Nelli Black, and Drew Grin, âStop the Stealâs Massive Disinformation Campaign Connected to Roger Stone and Steve Bannon,â CNN Business, (Nov. 14, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/13/business/stop-the-steal-disinformation-campaign-invs/index.html.

Â 44. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Christoffer Guldbrandsen Production), Video file 201105.

Â 45. See, Hugo Lowell, âFilm Offers Inside Look at Roger Stoneâs âStop the Stealâ Efforts before January 6,â The Guardian, (July 8, 2022), available at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/jul/07/roger-stone-ali-alexander-film-jan-6-stop-the-steal.

Â 46. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ali Alexander, (Jan. 9, 2021), p. 18.

Â 47. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ali Alexander, (Dec. 9, 2021), pp. 199-200.

Â 48. See, e.g., WillfulWarrior, âHispanic Proud Boys Leader: âWe Fought Off Antifa Terrorists for 12 Hrsâ,â BitChute, Nov. 19, 2020, available at https://www.bitchute.com/video/if5u7EuD7NU3/; Infowars: War Room, âEnrique Tarrio Spat on While Flying to Austin Texas,â BitChute, Dec. 2, 2020, available at https://www.bitchute.com/video/yKijHk6m25RL/; BNN, âFull Show: Witnesses Testify on Michigan Voter Fraud; Thousands of Illegal Votes Counted for Biden,â BitChute, Dec. 2, 2020, available at https://www.bitchute.com/video/74N0WNHOjiRy/; Jan 6th Protest and Save America March (2020-2H), âPatriots Plot Their Recapture of America in D.C. This Weekend,â Banned.Video, Nov. 9, 2020, available at https://archive.org/details/banned.video_-_jan_6th_protest_and_save_america_march_2020-2h/2020-11-11T02%3A07.148Z+-+Patriots+Plot+Their+Recapture+Of+America+In+D.C.+This+Weekend/2020-11-11T02%3A19%3A07.148Z+-+%20Patriots+Plot+Their+Recapture+Of+America+In+D.C.+This+Weekend.mp4 (archived); The Alex Jones Show, âOathkeepers Founder: Americans Need to Overcome Their Fears And Join The March on DC,â Banned.Video, Nov. 10, 2020, available at https://freeworldnews.tv/watch?id=5fab1b880ad7422090a8242f.

Â 49. Kellye SoRelle, a lawyer for the Oath Keepers, described Stone (along with Alexander) as among the key players who were the âmidpoint,â âthe ones who tr[ied] to orchestrateâ joint efforts in the post-election period. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 60-66.

Â 50. Frontline, âAlex Jones and Donald Trump: How the Candidate Echoed the Conspiracy Theorist on the Campaign Trail,â PBS, (July 28, 2020), available at https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/alex-jones-and-donald-trump-how-the-candidate-echoed-the-conspiracy-theorist-on-the-campaign-trail/.

Â 51. Eric Bradner, âTrump Praises 9/11 Trutherâs âAmazingâ Reputation,â CNN, (Dec. 2, 2015), available at https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/02/politics/donald-trump-praises-9-11-truther-alex-jones.

Â 52. See Elizabeth Williamson, âAlex Jones and Donald Trump: A Fateful Alliance Draws Scrutiny,â New York Times, (Mar. 7, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/07/us/politics/alex-jones-jan-6-trump.html (âInfowars grossed more than $50 million annually during the Trump presidency by selling diet supplements, body armor, and other products on its website.â).

Â 53. See, e.g., Joshua Zitser, âRoger Stone Makes Donation Plea for Alex Jones After Verdict Says He Must Pay $49m for Sandy Hook âHoaxâ Claims,â Business Insider, (Aug. 7, 2022), available at https://www.businessinsider.com/video-roger-stone-asks-donations-infowars-alex-jones-sandy-hook-2022-8.

Â 54. See AirTable Collection from Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, âImages of State Protests before January 6, 2021.â

Â 55. See AirTable Collection from Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, âImages of State Protests before January 6, 2021.â

Â 56. See AirTable Collection from Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, âImages of State Protests before January 6, 2021.â

Â 57. See AirTable Collection from Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, âImages of State Protests before January 6, 2021.â

Â 58. Jonathan Oosting, âFBI arrests Ryan Kelley, Michigan GOP Governor Candidate, over Capitol Riots,â Bridge Michigan, (June 9, 2022), available at https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-government/fbi-arrests-ryan-kelley-michigan-gop-governor-candidate-over-capitol-riots.

Â 59. James Dawson, âUnmasked Protesters Push Past Police into Idaho Lawmakersâ Session,â NPR, (Apr. 25, 2022), available at https://www.npr.org/2020/08/25/905785548/unmasked-protesters-push-past-police-into-idaho-lawmakers-session; Jeremy Stiles, âBoise Woman Sentenced for Role in U.S. Capitol Riot,â KTVB, (May 24, 2022), available at https://www.ktvb.com/article/news/crime/boise-woman-sentenced-for-role-in-us-capitol-riot-pamela-hemphill-january-6-2021/277-3aa12194-5a54-4abe-88a2-d644cf5043aa.

Â 60. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Sergeant at Arms for the Arizona House of Representatives Production), CTRL0000930907, CTRL0000930908 (December 4, 2020, surveillance footage from the Arizona House of Representatives). available at https://house.app.box.com/folder/183317506767.

Â 61. Sergio Olmos and Conrad Wilson, âAt Least 3 Men from Oregon Protest Appear to Have Joined Insurrection at U.S. Capitol,â Oregon Public Broadcasting, (Jan. 10, 2021), available at https://www.opb.org/article/2021/01/10/oregon-washington-protest-insurrection-david-anthony-medina-tim-davis/.

Â 62. Brendan Guttenschwager (@BGOnTheScene), Twitter, Nov. 19, 2020 1:03 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/BGOnTheScene/status/1329485442165706752.

Â 63. Justwanna Grill, âOathkeepers leader GROYPED in Atlanta,â YouTube, Nov. 4, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V_rDOm5oKu0.

Â 64. Timothy Johnson, âAlex Jones Calls on Supporters to âSurroundâ the Georgia Governorâs Mansion to Prevent Election Results from Being Certified,â Media Matters, (Nov. 17, 2020), available at https://www.mediamatters.org/alex-jones/alex-jones-calls-supporters-surround-georgia-governors-mansion-prevent-election-results.

Â 65. Nicholas J. Fuentes (@NickJFuentes), Twitter, Nov. 17, 2020, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20201120061341/https://twitter.com/NickJFuentes (archived).

Â 66. See, e.g., Aquarium Groyper, âNick Fuentes Georgia State Capitol 11/20/2020,â YouTube, Nov. 20, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OS1f--Tkn1M.

Â 67. Jacqueline Alemany et al., âRed Flags,â Washington Post, (Oct. 31, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/interactive/2021/warnings-jan-6-insurrection/.

Â 68. Derrick Mullins, ââStop the Stealâ Connected 2 Roger Stone-Roger Stone Calls Ali Anderson in Front of Atlanta GA Crowd,â YouTube Nov. 24, 2020, available at https://perma.cc/MWS3-HNGD.

Â 69. Brendan Gutenschwager (@BGOnTheScene), Twitter, Nov. 20, 2022 12:38 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/BGOnTheScene/status/1329841457377800198.

Â 70. Zach D. Roberts (@zdroberts), Twitter, Jan. 14, 2022 11:38 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/zdroberts/status/1482210446769807360.

Â 71. Alexandra Hurtzler, âAlex Jones Leads âStop the Stealâ Rally at Georgiaâs Capitol to Protest Election Results,â Newsweek, (Nov. 18, 2020), available at https://www.newsweek.com/alex-jones-leads-stop-steal-rally-georgias-capitol-protest-election-results-1548533.

Â 72. Jacqueline Alemany et al., âRed Flags,â Washington Post, (Oct. 31, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/interactive/2021/warnings-jan-6-insurrection/.

Â 73. Statement of Andrew Seidel, (Mar. 18, 2022), at p. 9.

Â 74. Mike Giglio, âThe Oath Keepersâ Radical Legal Defense of January 6th,â New Yorker, (Oct. 1, 2022), available at https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-oath-keepers-radical-legal-defense-of-january-6th.

Â 75. âPro-Trump Rallies in DC Attract Extremists & Erupt into Violence,â Anti-Defamation League, (Dec. 13, 2020), available at https://www.adl.org/blog/pro-trump-rallies-in-dc-attract-extremists-erupt-into-violence. Despite this, one of the organizers of the Jericho March maintained that the âtoneâ of the rally was supposed to be âprayerful, spirit-filled, peaceful, joyful, and vibrant, a unified celebration.â See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Arina Grossu, (Apr. 29, 2022), p. 40.

Â 76. See President Donald J. Trump: Tweets of December 12, 2020, The American Presidency Project, available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/tweets-december-19-2020.

Â 77. âPro-Trump Rallies in DC Attract Extremists & Erupt into Violence,â Anti-Defamation League, (Dec. 13, 2020), available at http://www.adl.org/blog/pro-trump-rallies-in-DC-attract-extremists-erupt-into-violence.

Â 78. Grace Segers, âTrumpâs Motorcade Passes Supporters Gathered for âMillion MAGA Marchâ,â CBS News, (Nov. 14, 2020), available at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/million-maga-march-washington-dc-trumps-motorcade-passes-supporters/.

Â 79. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Dec. 12, 2020 9:59 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22Wow%21+Thousands+of+people+forming%22 (archived).

Â 80. Ashraf Khalil, âMarine One Buzzes Trump Supporters Rallying for Presidentâs Bid to Stay in Office in Washington,â Chicago Tribune, (Dec. 12, 2020), available at https://www.chicagotribune.com/election-2020/ct-trump-election-20201212-z4zwtovupzhsppphzrlfhj3i3a-story.html.

Â 81. âBreaking: Trump Calls for Americans to March on DC January 6 to Stop Foreign Takeover,â InfoWars, (Dec. 19, 2020), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20201219175757/https://www.infowars.com/posts/breaking-trump-calls-for-americans-to-march-on-dc-january-6-to-stop-foreign-takeover/ (archived).

Â 82. âThe Alex Jones Show,â Prison Planet TV, Dec. 20, 2020, available at http://tv.infowars.com/index/display/id/11151.

Â 83. âThe Alex Jones Show,â Prison Planet TV, Dec. 20, 2020, at 1:27:13, available at http://tv.infowars.com/index/display/id/11151.

Â 84. The Alex Jones Show, âJanuary 6th Will Be a Turning Point in American History,â Banned.Video, at 16:29, Dec. 31, 2020, available at https://banned.video/watch?id=5fee715284a7b6210e12a2f7.

Â 85. âProud Boys,â Anti-Defamation League, (Jan. 23, 2020), available at https://www.adl.org/proudboys.

Â 86. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Proud Boys International Production), PBI 12 (The Constitution and Bylaws of Proud Boys International L.L.C., revised November 24, 2018).

Â 87. âProud Boys,â Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation, (January 2022), available at https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/proud-boys.

Â 88. âProud Boys,â Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation, (January 2022), available at https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/proud-boys.

Â 89. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Jay Thaxton Production), CTRL0000055644, (December 27-28, 2020, âMinistry of Self Defense,â Telegram messages from 7:43 p.m.-1:53 a.m.); âProud Boys,â Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation, (January 2022), available at https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/proud-boys.

Â 90. See, e.g., Jason Wilson, âPortland Rally: Proud Boys Vow to March Each Month after Biggest Protest of Trump Era,â The Guardian, (Aug. 17, 2019), available at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/aug/17/portland-oregon-far-right-rally-proud-boys-antifa.

Â 91. See Statement of Heidi L. Beirich, Ph.D., (Mar. 22, 2022), at p.1.

Â 92. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of George Meza, (Mar. 16, 2022), p. 155.

Â 93. See, e.g., Cleve R. Wootson Jr., âThousands of Proud Boys Plan to Rally in Portland, Setting Up Another Clash in a Combustible City,â Washington Post, (Sept. 25, 2020), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/09/25/portland-oregon-proud-boys-rally/; see also, Aaron Wolfson and Hampton Stall, âActor Profile: Proud Boys,â Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, (Apr. 22, 2021), available at https://acleddata.com/2021/04/22/actor-profile-proud-boys/ (noting the âpercentage of events with counter-demonstrators in which Proud Boys members participated was more than 10 times the rate at which others engaged with counter-demonstrators.â).

Â 94. Nick Quested, a filmmaker who followed the Proud Boys through January 6th, described how Proud Boys couldnât define Black Lives Matter or Antifaâand that, in person, Proud Boys simply identified them as âpeople of color and people with progressive values.â Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nick Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 78.

Â 95. Kathleen Ronayne and Michael Kunzelman, âTrump to Far-Right Extremists: âStand Back and Stand Byâ,â Associated Press, (Sept. 30, 2020), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-race-and-ethnicity-donald-trump-chris-wallace-0b32339da25fbc9e8b7c7c7066a1db0f.

Â 96. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nick Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 117.

Â 97. Emails obtained by the Select Committee show that Parler featured alarmingly violent and specific posts that in some cases advocated for civil war. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Parler Production), PARLER_00000006 (December 24, 2020, email forwarded to the FBI, âWe need to mass an armed force of American Patriots 150,000 on the Virginia side of the Potomac prepared to react to the congressional events of January 6thâ). In a January 2, 2021, email, a Parler employee wrote that they were âconcerned about Wednesday,â which would be January 6th. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Parler Production), PARLER_00000009 (January 2, 2021, email forwarded to the FBI, âOne more from same account. More where came from. Concerned about Wednesday...â).

Â 98. Atlantic Councilâs DFRLab, â#StopTheSteal: Timeline of Social Media and Extremist Activities Leading to 1/6 Insurrection,â Just Security, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/74622/stopthesteal-timeline-of-social-media-and-extremist-activities-leading-to-1-6-insurrection/.

Â 99. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Bertino, (Apr. 26, 2022), p. 38; see also âFormer Leader of Proud Boys Pleads Guilty to Seditious Conspiracy for Efforts to Stop Transfer of Power Following 2020 Presidential Election,â Department of Justice, (Oct. 6, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-leader-proud-boys-pleads-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-efforts-stop-transfer-power.mer-leader-proud-boys-pleads-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-efforts-stop-transfer-power.

100. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Henry Tarrio, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 50-51, 221-22; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of George Meza, (Mar. 16, 2022), pp. 21-22.

101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Henry Tarrio, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 221.

102. Tom Dreisbach, âConspiracy Charges Bring Proud Boysâ History Of Violence into Spotlight,â NPR, (Apr. 9, 2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/04/09/985104612/conspiracy-charges-bring-proud-boys-history-of-violence-into-spotlight.

103. Tom Dreisbach, âConspiracy Charges Bring Proud Boysâ History Of Violence into Spotlight,â NPR, (Apr. 9, 2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/04/09/985104612/conspiracy-charges-bring-proud-boys-history-of-violence-into-spotlight.

104. âDay of the Rope,â Anti-Defamation League, available at https://www.adl.org/resources/hate-symbol/day-rope.

105. âContested States,â #StopTheSteal, (Nov. 7, 2020), available at http://archive.ph/C9lwN (archived).

106. Christopher Mathias, âAfter Trumpâs Defeat, His Supporters Held a Heavily Armed Pity Party,â Huff Post, (Nov. 7, 2020), available at https://www.huffpost.com/entry/harrisburg-trump-rally-defeat-extremists-proud-boys-armed-militias_n_5fa756ddc5b67c3259afbc42.

107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 10.

108. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 10.

109. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Michael Simmons, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 71; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of George Douglas Smith, Jr., (Apr. 28, 2022), p. 47.

110. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Bertino, (Apr. 26, 2022), pp. 81-82; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 19; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nick Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 26.

111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Patrick Byrne, (July 15, 2022), pp. 151-52.

112. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Henry Tarrio, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 107-09; Luke OâBrien, âHow Republican Politics (And Twitter) Created Ali Alexander, The Man Behind âStop the Stealâ,â Huff Post, (Mar. 7, 2021), available at https://www.huffpost.com/entry/republicans-twitter-ali-alexander-stop-the-steal_n_6026fb26c5b6f88289fbab57.

113. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Henry Tarrio, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 107-09.

114. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Shroyer, No. 1:21-mj-572 (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2021), ECF No. 1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1428181/download.

115. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nick Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 17-19; Ryan Goodman, Justin Hendrix, Just Security, âExclusive: New Video of Roger Stone with Proud Boys Leaders Who May Have Planned for Capitol Attack,â (Feb. 6, 2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/74579/exclusive-new-video-of-roger-stone-with-proud-boys-leaders-who-may-have-planned-for-capitol-attack/.

116. Ryan Goodman & Justin Hendrix, âEXCLUSIVE: New Video of Roger Stone with Proud Boys Leaders Who May Have Planned for Capitol Attack,â Just Security, (Feb. 6, 2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/74579/exclusive-new-video-of-roger-stone-with-proud-boys-leaders-who-may-have-planned-for-capitol-attack/.

117. Will Carless, âHow a Trump Booster Group Helped the Head of Extremist Proud Boys Gain Access to the White House,â USA Today, (Dec. 19, 2020), available at https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/12/19/latinos-trump-group-tied-proud-boys-leader-enrique-tarrio/3931868001/.

118. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Henry Tarrio, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 117.

119. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Bertino, (Apr. 26, 2022), pp. 125-27; Affidavit in Support of Arrest Warrant, United States v. Tarrio, No. 2020 CRWSLD 5553, (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 2020).

120. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Bertino, (Apr. 26, 2022), p. 127.

121. Affidavit in Support of Arrest Warrant, United States v. Tarrio, No. 2020 CRWSLD 5553, (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 2020).

122. Peter Herman and Martin Weil, âProud Boys Leader Arrested in the Burning of Churchâs Black Lives Matter Banner, D.C. Police Say,â Washington Post, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/proud-boys-enrique-tarrio-arrest/2021/01/04/8642a76a-4edf-11eb-b96e-0e54447b23a1_story.html; Laura Wamsley, âProud Boys Leader Released from Police Custody and Ordered to Leave D.C.,â NPR, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/01/05/953685035/proud-boys-leader-released-from-police-custody-and-ordered-to-leave-d-c.

123. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 16.

124. Elizabeth Elizalde, âProud Boys Surround Man with Knife at Violent DC Trump Rally,â New York Post, (Dec. 13, 2020), available at https://nypost.com/2020/12/13/one-person-stabbed-during-massive-proud-boys-brawl-in-dc/.

125. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Bertino, (Apr. 26, 2022), pp. 128-29.

126. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Bertino, (Apr. 26, 2022), p. 129.

127. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Bertino, (Apr. 26, 2022), pp. 130-131.

128. Second Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 30, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305.

129. Second Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 32, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305; see also Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Jay Thaxton Production), CTRL0000055644, (December 27-28, 2020, âMinistry of Self Defense,â Telegram messages from 7:43 p.m.-1:53 a.m.).

130. See, Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Jay Thaxton Production), CTRL0000055644, (December 27-28, 2020, âMinistry of Self Defense,â Telegram messages from 7:43 p.m.-1:53 a.m.).

131. Second Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 55, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305.

132. Third Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 38, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Jay Thaxton Production), CTRL0000055644, (December 27-28, 2020, âMinistry of Self Defense,â Telegram messages from 7:43 p.m.-1:53 a.m.).

133. Second Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 33, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305.

134. Second Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 31, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305; see also Carter Walker, âCarlisle Proud Boy Member Targeted in Search Warrant Tied to Jan. 6 Plot,â Lancaster Online (Mar. 12, 2022), available at https://lancasteronline.com/news/politics/carlisle-proud-boy-member-targeted-in-search-warrant-tied-to-jan-6-plot/article_c2596928-a258-11ec-a6bb-c79ff2e0e8a7.html (identifying John Stewart as Person-3 in Second Superseding Indictment).

135. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Jay Thaxton Production), CTRL0000055644, (December 29, 2020, âMinistry of Self Defense,â Telegram message at 11:09 a.m.).

136. Second Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 41, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022) ECF No. 305.

137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Samuel Armes, (July 18, 2022), p. 10-14 (describing Armesâ role in drafting a prior version of the document, which he then shared with Eryka Gemma Flores, another cryptocurrency investor who shared the document with Tarrio); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Eryka Gemma Flores, (July 1, 2022).

138. Zachary Rehlâs Motion to Reopen Detention Hearing and Request for a Hearing, Exhibit 1: â1776 Returns,â United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 15, 2022) ECF No. 401-1, available at https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/22060615/1776-returns.pdf.

139. Zachary Rehlâs Motion to Reopen Detention Hearing and Request for a Hearing, Exhibit 1: â1776 Returns,â United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 15, 2022) ECF No. 401-1, available at https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/22060615/1776-returns.pdf.

140. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Matthew Thomas Walter, (Mar. 9, 2022), pp. 70-71; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Christopher Barcenas, (Mar. 10, 2022), p. 98; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of George Meza, (Mar. 16, 2022), p. 118; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Bertino, (Apr. 26, 2022), p. 23.

141. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Samuel Armes, (July 18, 2022), p. 14.

142. Second Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 41, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305.

143. Georgia Wells, Rebecca Ballhaus, and Keach Hagey, âProud Boys, Seizing Trumpâs Call to Washington, Helped Lead Capitol Attack,â Wall Street Journal, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/proud-boys-seizing-trumps-call-to-washington-helped-lead-capitol-attack-11610911596.

144. Second Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 49, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305; Carter Walker, âCarlisle Proud Boy Member Targeted in Search Warrant Tied to Jan. 6 Plot,â Lancaster Online (Mar. 12, 2022), available at https://lancasteronline.com/news/politics/carlisle-proud-boy-member-targeted-in-search-warrant-tied-to-jan-6-plot/article_c2596928-a258-11ec-a6bb-c79ff2e0e8a7.html (identifying John Stewart as Person-3 in Second Superseding Indictment).

145. Second Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 49, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305; Carter Walker, âCarlisle Proud Boy Member Targeted in Search Warrant Tied to Jan. 6 Plot,â Lancaster Online (Mar. 12, 2022), available at https://lancasteronline.com/news/politics/carlisle-proud-boy-member-targeted-in-search-warrant-tied-to-jan-6-plot/article_c2596928-a258-11ec-a6bb-c79ff2e0e8a7.html (identifying John Stewart as Person-3 in Second Superseding Indictment).

146. Second Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 50, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022) ECF No. 305.

147. Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Donohoe, No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2022), ECF No. 335.

148. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Donohoe, No. 1:21-cr-00175-4-TJK (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2022).

149. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Donohoe, No. 1:21-cr-00175-4-TJK (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2022).

150. Statement of Offense at 6, United States v. Donohoe, No. 1:21-cr-00175-4-TJK (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2022).

151. Statement of Offense at 6, United States v. Donohoe, No. 1:21-cr-00175-4-TJK (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2022).

152. Statement of Offense at 8, United States v. Donohoe, No. 1:21-cr-00175-4-TJK (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2022).

153. âFormer Leader of Proud Boys Pleads Guilty to Seditious Conspiracy for Efforts to Stop Transfer of Power Following 2020 Presidential Election,â Department of Justice, (Oct. 6, 2022), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-leader-proud-boys-pleads-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-efforts-stop-transfer-power.

154. âFormer Leader of Proud Boys Pleads Guilty to Seditious Conspiracy for Efforts to Stop Transfer of Power Following 2020 Presidential Election,â Department of Justice, (Oct. 22, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-leader-proud-boys-pleads-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-efforts-stop-transfer-power.

155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Bertino, (Apr. 26, 2022), p. 156.

156. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Bertino, (Apr. 26, 2022), p. 156.

157. Statement of Sam Jackson, Ph.D., (Mar. 30, 2022), at p. 2.

158. Zachary Cohen, âOath Keepers Leader Spewed Anti-government Hate for More than a Decade. Alex Jones Gave Him the Audience,â CNN, (Jan. 14, 2022), available at https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/14/politics/oath-keepers-stewart-rhodes-alex-jones-invs/index.html.

159. The Select Committee found that the idea that violence loomed from the left was a powerful draw for people to join the Oath Keepers. Richard Dockery, a former Oath Keepers member from Florida, decried âall the riots and stuff I was seeing on the news all over the countryâ and expressed concern about Antifa and Black Lives Matter activity in his area of Florida, a prospect that he called ânerve-wracking.â Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Richard Dockery, (Feb. 2, 2022), pp. 10, 31. Because of this, he said that the Oath Keepers âseemed like a really good organization to supportâ in order to keep communities safe. Id., at p. 9. Similarly, Jeff Morelock told the Select Committee that joining the Oath Keepers âwould give me a chance to do something to help instead of just sitting on the couch,â referring to watching protests on television. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeffrey Lawrence Morelock, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 87-88. Jason Van Tatenhove, a former spokesman for the Oath Keepers and confidant to Rhodes who has since publicly denounced the group, described how the Oath Keepers tried to deliberately leverage this dynamic to increase their clout. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jason Van Tatenhove, (Mar. 9, 2022), pp. 54-55.

160. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Elmer Stewart Rhodes, (Feb. 2, 2022), pp. 103-104.

161. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 9-10.

162. Stewart Rhodes, âCall to Action! March on DC, Stop the Steal, Defend the President, & Defeat the Deep State,â Oath Keepers, (Nov. 10, 2020), available at https://oathkeepers.org/2020/11/call-to-action-march-on-dc-stop-the-steal-defend-the-president-defeat-the-deep-state/.

163. Stewart Rhodes, âCall to Action! March on DC, Stop the Steal, Defend the President, & Defeat the Deep State,â Oath Keepers, (Nov. 10, 2020), available at https://oathkeepers.org/2020/11/call-to-action-march-on-dc-stop-the-steal-defend-the-president-defeat-the-deep-state/.

164. Stewart Rhodes and Kellye SoRelle, âOpen Letter to President Trump: You Must Use the Insurrection Act to âStop the Stealâ and Defeat the Coup,â Oath Keepers, (Dec. 14, 2020), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210123133022/https:/oathkeepers.org/2020/12/open-letter-to-president-trump-you-must-use-insurrection-act-to-stop-the-steal-and-defeat-the-coup/.

165. Michael S. Schmidt and Maggie Haberman, âTrump Aides Prepared Insurrection Act Order During Debate Over Protests,â New York Times, (June 25, 2021), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/25/us/politics/trump-insurrection-act-protests.html.

166. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Elmer Stewart Rhodes, (Feb. 2, 2022), p. 131.

167. âPro-Trump Rallies in DC Attract Extremists & Erupt into Violence,â Anti-Defamation League, (Dec. 13, 2020), available at https://www.adl.org/blog/pro-trump-rallies-in-dc-attract-extremists-erupt-into-violence.

168. In texts between Rhodes and Rob Weaver, one of the organizers of the Jericho March, Weaver instructed his associate to work with Rhodes âon extra security.â Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Robert Weaver Production), Weaver J6 Prod. (S. Rhodes)0001 (December 11, 2020, text from Rob Weaver at 1:39 p.m.).

169. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Thomas Speciale Production), CTRL0000050180, pp. 1-6, 26-28 (Signal Chat Titled Dec 12 DC Security/Leadership); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Robert Weaver Production), Weaver J6 Production) Prod. (S. Rhodes)0039 (Signal Chat Titled Dec 12 DC Security/Leadership).; Superseding Indictment at 12, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167 (noting that on December 11, 2020, Rhodes âsent a message to an invitation-only Signal group chat titled, âDec 12 DC Security/Leadership,â which included James, MINUTA, and others. RHODES stated that if President-Elect Biden were to assume the presidency, âIt will be a bloody and desperate fight. We are going to have a fight. That canât be avoided.ââ â).

170. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Robert Weaver Production), Weaver J6 Prod. (S. Rhodes) 0045 (December 10, 2020, Stewart Rhodes chat with Dec. 12 DC Security/Leadership at 10:17p.m.).

171. Stewart Rhodes and Kellye SoRelle, âOpen Letter to President Trump: You Must Use the Insurrection Act to âStop the Stealâ and Defeat the Coup,â Oath Keepers, (Dec. 14, 2020), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210123133022/https:/oathkeepers.org/2020/12/open-letter-to-president-trump-you-must-use-insurrection-act-to-stop-the-steal-and-defeat-the-coup/.

172. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Elmer Stewart Rhodes, (Feb. 2, 2022), pp. 132, 134.

173. Trial Exhibit 6748, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022); Kyle Cheney, âProsecutors Detail Oath Keepersâ Mounting Frustration with Trump as Jan. 6 Approached,â Politico, (Oct. 20, 2022), available at https://www.politico.com/news/2022/10/20/oath-keepers-trump-jan-6-00062779.

174. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Alondra Propes Production), CTRL0000029585, p.1 (Stewart Rhodes writing in âOKFL Hangoutâ chat).

175. Stewart Rhodes and Alondra Propes characterized the Proud Boys as street brawlers in contrast to the Oath Keepersâ discipline. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Elmer Stewart Rhodes, (Feb. 22, 2022), pp. 40, 43; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alondra Propes, (Jan. 31, 2022), pp. 42-43, 136. Kellye SoRelle described the Proud Boys as extreme white supremacists. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 63-64. Enrique Tarrio characterized the Oath Keepers as âoath breakersâ and embarrassing. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Henry Tarrio, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 77, 193-94.

176. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Google Voice Production, Feb. 25, 2022).

177. Governmentâs Opposition to Defendantâs Renewed Request for Pretrial Release at 7, United States v. Meggs, No. 1:21-cr-28 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2021). Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Henry Tarrio, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 125.

178. Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 28, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-25 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167.

179. âLeader of Oath Keepers and 10 Other Individuals Indicted in Federal Court for Seditious Conspiracy and Other Offenses Related to U.S. Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (Jan. 13, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/leader-oath-keepers-and-10-other-individuals-indicted-federal-court-seditious-conspiracy.

180. See Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 17, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-25 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Landon Bentley, (May 12, 2022), p. 11 (discussing use of Signal as an encrypted chat).

181. Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 29, United States v. Rhodes, et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167.

182. Superseding Indictment at Â¶Â¶ 38, 39, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167.

183. Third Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 37, United States v. Crowl et al., No. 1:21-cr-28 (D.D.C., Mar. 31, 2021), ECF No. 127.

184. Third Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 37, United States v. Crowl et al., No. 1:21-cr-28 (D.D.C., Mar. 31, 2021), ECF No. 127.

185. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Richard Dockery, (Feb. 2, 2022), pp. 48-52.

186. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Richard Dockery, (Feb. 2, 2022), p. 49.

187. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Richard Dockery, (Feb. 2, 2022), p. 51.

188. Infowars Army, âAlex Jones Show â DOJ Launches National Probe of Election Fraud,â BitChute, Nov. 10, 2020, available at https://www.bitchute.com/video/NoELuXs06RzX/.

189. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Robert Weaver Production), Weaver J6 Prod. (S. Rhodes) 0011 (January 1, 2021, Stewart Rhodes chat with Jan 5/6 DC OK Security/VIP Chat at 7:58-8:00 pm).

190. Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 45, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Frank Marchisella, (Apr. 29, 2022), p. 34.

191. Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 44, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167.

192. Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 68, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167. Documents filed with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Hilton Garden Inn Production), MHG000049-103 (January 2-8, 2021, Hilton Garden Inn invoices).

193. Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 37, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 180.

194. Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 47, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022) ECF No. 167.

195. Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 57, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167.

196. Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 61, United States v. Rhodes, et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167.

197. Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 70, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022), ECF No. 167.

198. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Frank Marchisella, (Apr. 29, 2022), p. 39.

199. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 196.

200. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Frank Marchisella, (Apr. 29, 2022), p. 40.

201. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 196.

202. Select Comittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Frank Marchisella, (Apr. 29, 2022), pp. 40-42.

203. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Frank Marchisella, (Apr. 29, 2022), pp. 45-47.

204. Macias had traveled to DC after his arrest for bringing weapons to a vote-counting center in Philadelphia while votes were being counted in November 2020. Claudia Lauer, âPhilly DA Seeks Contempt Charge for Vets for Trump Cofounder,â AP News, (June 13, 2022), available at https://apnews.com/article/capitol-siege-pennsylvania-riots-philadelphia-virginia-d74b05c01aebde1ca26a9c080a5022d8.

205. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Frank Marchisealla Production), CTRL0000040442 (January 5, 2021, Frank Marchisella video of Facebook live stream).

206. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Frank Marchisealla Production), CTRL0000040442, (January 5, 2021, Frank Marchisella video of Facebook live stream) at 0:36.

207. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 207-08.

208. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 197.

209. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 197.

210. Second Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 23, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2022), ECF No. 305.

211. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 197.

212. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Nick Quested Production), Video file ML_DC_20210105_Sony_FS7-GC_1859.mov, at 0:50 (Jan. 5, 2021).

213. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Nick Quested Production), Video file ML_DC_20210105_Sony_FS7-GC_1859.mov, at 1:31 (Jan. 5, 2021).

214. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Nick Quested Production), Video file ML_DC_20210105_Sony_FS7-GC_1859.mov, at 1:00 (Jan. 5, 2021).

215. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 202.

216. Spencer S. Hsu, âVideo Released of Garage Meeting of Proud Boys, Oath Keepers Leaders,â Washington Post, embedded video at 3:20, (May 24, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/05/24/tarrio-rhodes-video/.

217. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file ML_DC_20210105_Sony_FS7-GC_1864.mov, at 0:14 (Jan. 5, 2021).

218. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file ML_DC_20210105_Sony_FS5_Clip0042.mov, at 2:32-3:38 (Jan. 5, 2021).

219. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file ML_DC_20210105_Sony_FS5_Clip0042.mov, at 2:32-3:38 (Jan. 5, 2021).

220. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file ML_DC_20210105_Sony_FS5_Clip0042.mov, at 2:32-3:38 (Jan. 5, 2021).

221. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Henry Tarrio, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 83-84.

222. See In re Stone, 940 F.3d 1332, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2019); United States v. Stone, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7-8 (D.D.C. 2019).

223. David Freedlander, âAn Oral History of Donald Trumpâs Almost-Run for President in 2000,â Intelligencer, (Oct. 11, 2018), available at https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/10/trumps-almost-run-for-president-in-2000-an-oral-history.html.

224. See Trial Transcript at 3806, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 2022) (testimony and exhibits showing Kelly Meggs and Jessica Watkins discussed providing security for Roger Stone); Dalton Bennett and Jon Swaine, âThe Roger Stone Tapes,â Washington Post, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/roger-stone-documentary-capitol-riot-trump-election/; Matthew Mosk, Olivia Rubin, Ali Dukakis, and Fergal Gallagher, âVideo Surfaces Showing Trump Ally Roger Stone Flanked by Oath Keepers on Morning of Jan. 6,â ABC News, (Feb. 5, 2021), available at https://abcnews.go.com/US/video-surfaces-showing-trump-ally-roger-stone-flanked/story?id=75706765; Christiaan Triebert (@trbrtc), Twitter, Feb. 19, 2021 4:35 p.m., available at https://twitter.com/trbrtc/status/1362878609334165505 (Kelly Meggs with Roger Stone); Spencer S. Hsu, Manuel Roig-Franzia, and Devlin Barrett, âRoger Stone Keeps Appearing in Capitol Breach Investigation Court Filings,â Washington Post, (Mar. 22, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/roger-stone-court-filings-capitol-riot/2021/03/22/c689a77c-87f8-11eb-82bc-e58213caa38e_story.html (Mark Grods with Roger Stone); Andrew Smrecek (@combat_art_training), Instagram, Dec. 15, 2020, available at https://www.instagram.com/p/CI0g8dlhEyG/ (Connie Meggs and Jason Dolan with Roger Stone) (last accessed Dec. 11, 2022).

225. Motion for Bond, Exhibit 1 at 76, 90, 96, 98, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Jan. 12, 2022), ECF No. 102-1.

226. Christiaan Triebert, Ben Decker, Derek Watkins, Arielle Ray, and Stella Cooper, âFirst They Guarded Roger Stone. Then They Joined the Capitol Attack,â New York Times, (Feb. 14, 2021), available at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/02/14/us/roger-stone-capitol-riot.html.

227. Matthew Mosk, Olivia Rubin, Ali Dukakis, and Fergal Gallagher, âVideo Surfaces Showing Trump Ally Roger Stone Flanked by Oath Keepers on Morning of Jan. 6,â ABC News, (Feb. 5, 2021), available at https://abcnews.go.com/US/video-surfaces-showing-trump-ally-roger-stone-flanked/story?id=75706765.

228. âLeader of Alabama Chapter of Oath Keepers Pleads Guilty to Seditious Conspiracy and Obstruction of Congress for Efforts to Stop Transfer of Power Following 2020 Presidential Election,â Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, (Mar. 2, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-alabama-chapter-oath-keepers-pleads-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-and-obstruction.

229. Dalton Bennett and Jon Swaine, âThe Roger Stone Tapes,â Washington Post, (Mar. 4, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/roger-stone-documentary-capitol-riot-trump-election/.

230. Kelly Weill, âHow the Proud Boys Became Roger Stoneâs Personal Army,â Daily Beast, (Jan. 29, 2019), available at https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-proud-boys-became-roger-stones-personal-army-6.

231. See, e.g., Andy Campbell, âEXCLUSIVE: Roger Stone Admits Heâs Been Advising The Proud Boys For Years,â Huff Post, (Sept. 22, 2022), available at https://www.huffpost.com/entry/roger-stone-we-are-proud-boys_n_632c57ebe4b09d8701bd02e2.

232. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Christoffer Guldbrandsen Production), Video files 190926 I bil + fondraiser, 191003 Stone dag 3 backstage fundraiser 2 onstage, 200220.

233. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Christoffer Guldbrandsen Production), Video file 190926 i bil + fondraiser.

234. Ryan Goodman and Justin Hendrix, âEXCLUSIVE: New Video of Roger Stone with Proud Boys Leaders Who May Have Planned for Capitol Attack,â Just Security, (Feb. 6, 2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/74579/exclusive-new-video-of-roger-stone-with-proud-boys-leaders-who-may-have-planned-for-capitol-attack/.

235. Ryan Goodman and Justin Hendrix, âEXCLUSIVE: New Video of Roger Stone with Proud Boys Leaders Who May Have Planned for Capitol Attack,â Just Security, (Feb. 6, 2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/74579/exclusive-new-video-of-roger-stone-with-proud-boys-leaders-who-may-have-planned-for-capitol-attack/.

236. Ryan Goodman and Justin Hendrix, âEXCLUSIVE: New Video of Roger Stone with Proud Boys Leaders Who May Have Planned for Capitol Attack,â Just Security, (Feb. 6, 2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/74579/exclusive-new-video-of-roger-stone-with-proud-boys-leaders-who-may-have-planned-for-capitol-attack/.

237. Georgia Wells, Rebecca Ballhaus, and Keach Hagey, â Proud Boys, Seizing Trumpâs Call to Washington, Helped Lead Capitol Attack,â Wall Street Journal, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/proud-boys-seizing-trumps-call-to-washington-helped-lead-capitol-attack-11610911596.

238. Georgia Wells, Rebecca Ballhaus, and Keach Hagey, â Proud Boys, Seizing Trumpâs Call to Washington, Helped Lead Capitol Attack,â Wall Street Journal, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/proud-boys-seizing-trumps-call-to-washington-helped-lead-capitol-attack-11610911596.

239. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Kellye SoRelle Production), CTRL0000060762 - CTRL0000060858 (screenshotting messages in the Friends of Stone chat); Dalton Bennett and Jon Swaine, âThe Roger Stone Tapes,â Washington Post, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/roger-stone-documentary-capitol-riot-trump-election/; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Christoffer Guldbrandsen Production), Video file 200705.

240. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Christoffer Guldbrandsen Production), Video file 201105.

241. Hugo Lowell, âFilm Offers Inside Look at Roger Stoneâs âStop the Stealâ Efforts Before January 6,â The Guardian, (July 8, 2022), available at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/jul/07/roger-stone-ali-alexander-film-jan-6-stop-the-steal.

242. Document on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Kellye SoRelle Production), CTRL0000060802, CTRL0000060798 (screenshots from the Friends of Stone chat).

243. âExecutive Grant of Clemency for Roger Jason Stone, Jr.,â Department of Justice, (July 10, 2020), available at https://www.justice.gov/pardon/page/file/1293796/download.

244. Amita Kelly, Ryan Lucas, and Vanessa Romo, âTrump Pardons Roger Stone, Paul Manafort And Charles Kushner,â NPR, (Dec. 23, 2020), available at https://www.npr.org/2020/12/23/949820820/trump-pardons-roger-stone-paul-manafort-and-charles-kushner.

245. PatriotTakes[American flag] (@PatriotTakes), Twitter, Dec. 28, 2020 3:50 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/patriottakes/status/1343479434376974336.

246. PatriotTakes[American flag] (@PatriotTakes), Twitter, Dec. 28, 2020 3:50 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/patriottakes/status/1343479434376974336; See also Ali Dukakis, âRoger Stone Thanks President Trump for Pardon in Person,â ABC News, (Dec. 28, 2020), available at https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/roger-stone-president-trump-pardon-person/story?id=74940512.

247. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kristin Davis, (August 2, 2022), p. 41; Documents on file with Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Kristin Davis Production), CTRL0000928609, p. 7 (December 30, 2020, text message from Kristin Davis to Chris Lippe at 6:05 p.m.).

248. Documents on file with Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Kristin Davis Production), CTRL0000928609, p. 7 (December 30, 2020, text message from Kristin Davis to Chris Lippe at 6:05 p.m.).

249. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Roger Stone, (Dec. 17, 2021).

250. Will Steakin, Matthew Mosk, James Gordon Meek, and Ali Dukakis, âLongtime Trump Advisers Connected to Groups Behind Rally that Led to Capitol Attack,â ABC News, (Jan. 15, 2021), available at https://abcnews.go.com/US/longtime-trump-advisers-connected-groups-rally-led-capitol/story?id=75261028.

251. âNicholas J. Fuentes: Five Things to Know,â Anti-Defamation League, (July 9, 2021, updated Nov. 30, 2022), available at https://www.adl.org/resources/blog/nicholas-j-fuentes-five-things-know?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI4ITXgYH6-wIVaUpyCh08sgxaEAAYASAAEgLGNPD_BwE; Nicholas J. Fuentes (@NickJFuentes), Twitter, Dec. 18, 2020 11:26 p.m. ET, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20201219072617/https:/twitter.com/NickJFuentes/status/1340196694571540490 (archived). As noted in the Executive Summary, this tweet, like others, was likely sent from or archived in a separate time zone, which explains why it shows a sent date of December 18, 2020, while President Trump issued his tweet at 1:42 a.m. on December 19, 2020.

252. âCalifornia Man Sentenced to 42 Months in Prison for Actions During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (Oct. 19, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/california-man-sentenced-prison-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach; Tom Dreisbach, Allison Mollenkamp, âA Former UCLA Student Was Sentenced to over Three Years in Prison for Capitol Riot,â NPR, (Oct. 19, 2022), available at https://www.npr.org/2022/10/19/1129912913/a-former-ucla-student-was-sentenced-to-over-three-years-in-prison-for-capitol-ri.

253. âStudent Who Attended Charlottesville White Supremacist Rally Leaves Boston University After Backlash,â Time, (Aug. 17, 2017), https://time.com/4905939/nicholas-fuentes-white-supremacist-rally-charlottesville/; âNeo-Nazi Hipsters Identity Evropa Exposed In Discord Chat Leak,â Unicorn Riot, (Mar. 6, 2019), https://unicornriot.ninja/2019/neo-nazi-hipsters-identity-evropa-exposed-in-discord-chat-leak/.

254. See Statement of Oren Segal, Marilyn Mayo and Morgan Moon, (Mar. 31, 2022); âGroypers Army and âAmerica Firstâ,â Anti-Defamation League, (Mar. 17, 2020), available at https://www.adl.org/reources/backgrounders/groyper-army-and-america-first.

255. See, e.g., Malachi Barrett, âFar-right Activist Who Encouraged U.S. Capitol Occupation also Organized âStop the Stealâ Rally in Michigan,â MLive, (Jan. 7, 2021), available at https://www.mlive.com/politics/2021/01/far-right-activist-who-encouraged-us-capitol-occupation-also-organized-stop-the-steal-rally-in-michigan.html; Studio IKN, âNick Fuentes at Stop the Steal Phoenix,â YouTube, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U_vjzjMDenk.

256. Megan Squire (@MeganSquire0), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 10:27 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/MeganSquire0/status/1346478478523125767?s=20.

257. Fuentes personally earned $50,000 from his livestreams between November 3, 2020, and January 19, 2021. He raised his highest-ever total the day after the 2020 election, and he raised similarly high figures on January 5, 2021. Some of Fuentesâ proceeds were refunded to customers following Fuentesâ ban from DLive. See Statement of Michael Edison Hayden, Megan Squire, Ph.D., Hannah Gais, and Susan Corke, (Apr. 7, 2022), at 6-7.

258. See, Statement of Oren Segal, Marilyn Mayo, and Morgan Moon, (Mar. 31, 2022), at 12.

259. Malachi Barrett, âFar-Right Activist Who Encouraged U.S. Capitol Occupation Also Organized âStop the Stealâ Rally in Michigan,â MLive, (Jan. 7, 2021), available at https://www.mlive.com/politics/2021/01/far-right-activist-who-encouraged-us-capitol-occupation-also-organized-stop-the-steal-rally-in-michigan.html.

260. Chuck Tanner, âDeciphering Nick Fuentesâ âStop the Stealâ Speeches,â Institute for Research and Education on Human Rights, (Nov. 24, 2020), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/74622/stopthesteal-timeline-of-social-media-and-extremist-activities-leading-to-1-6-insurrection/.

261. â#StopTheSteal: Timeline of Social Media and Extremist Activities Leading to 1/6 Insurrection,â Just Security (Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/74622/stopthesteal-timeline-of-social-media-and-extremist-activities-leading-to-1-6-insurrection/.

262. Chuck Tanner, âWhite Nationalists Prominent at âStop the Stealâ Mobilization in Georgia,â Institute for Research and Education on Human Rights,â (Nov. 24, 2020), available at https://www.irehr.org/2020/11/24/white-nationalists-prominent-at-stop-the-steal-mobilization-in-georgia/.

263. Aquarium Groyper, âNick Fuentes Georgia State Capitol 11/20/2020,â YouTube, at 1:38, Nov. 20, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OS1f--Tkn1M.

264. Peter White, âMAGA Protestors Chant âDestroy the GOPâ at Pro-Trump Rally,â Rolling Stone, (Dec. 12, 2020), available at https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/protesters-chant-destroy-the-gop-at-pro-trump-rally-1102967/.

265. âPro-Trump Rallies in DC Attract Extremists & Erupt into Violence,â Anti-Defamation League, (Dec. 13, 2020), available at https://www.adl.org/blog/pro-trump-rallies-in-dc-attract-extremists-erupt-into-violence.

266. Megan Squire (@MeganSquire0), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 10:27 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/MeganSquire0/status/1346478478523125767?s=20.

267. Patrick Casey (@Patrickcaseyusa), Telegram, Jan. 5, 2021 6:20 p.m.; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Public Source), CTRL0000930909 - CTRL0000930912 (collection of Patrick Casey telegram posts).

268. Mallory Simon and Sara Sidner, âDecoding the Extremist Symbols and Groups at the Capitol Hill Insurrection,â CNN, (Jan. 11, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/09/us/capitol-hill-insurrection-extremist-flags-soh/index.html.

269. Nicholas J. Fuentes (@NickJFuentes), Twitter, Jan. 7, 2021 10:56 a.m. ET, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210107185745/https://twitter.com/NickJFuentes/status/1347255833516765185 (archived).

270. Nicholas J. Fuentes (@NickJFuentes), Twitter, Jan. 7, 2021 1:03 p.m. ET, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210107210736/https://twitter.com/NickJFuentes/status/1347287851629764610 (archived).

271. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas J. Fuentes, (Feb. 16, 2022).

272. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Michael Lee Wells, (Apr. 14, 2022), p. 72.

273. Alejandro J. Beutel, Daryl Johnson, âThe Three Percenters: A Look Inside an Anti-Government Militia,â Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, (Feb. 2021), at 8, available at https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/20210225-Three-Percenter-PR-NISAP-rev051021.pdf; âThree Percenters,â Southern Poverty Law Center, available at https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/three-percenters.

274. Statement of Oren Segal, Marilyn Mayo, and Morgan Moon, (Mar. 31, 2022), at 12-13.

275. Statement of Oren Segal, Marilyn Mayo, and Morgan Moon, (Mar. 31, 2022), at 13.

276. Statement of Oren Segal, Marilyn Mayo, and Morgan Moon, (Mar. 31, 2022), at 13.

277. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Liggett, (May 17, 2022), pp. 6-7.

278. âTwo Texas Men Charged with Assault on Law Enforcement During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (Dec. 14, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/two-texas-men-charged-assault-law-enforcement-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.

279. âTexas Man Sentenced to 52 Months in Prison For Assaulting Law Enforcement Officers During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (Sept. 28, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/texas-man-sentenced-prison-assaulting-law-enforcement-officers-during-jan-6-capitol.

280. Criminal Complaint at 9, 13, United States v. Hazard, No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1.

281. Criminal Complaint at 8-12, United States. v. Hazard, No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1. For example, Denney told Hazard that they âwill need linking up with the proud boys.â Id., at 8. Denney described the hotel he booked as âthe same place everyone else is getting in the Proud Boys crew and other militiaâs until it gets full.â Id., at 9. In a separate post on Facebook, Denney stated that the Patriot Boys of North Texas were âallied with the Patriot Prayer and the Proud Boys.â Id., at 9. In another Facebook message on December 29, Denney wrote: âWe are linking up with thousands of Proud Boys and other militia that will be there. This is going to be huge. And itâs going to be a fight.â Id., at 10. Similarly, Hazard wrote on Facebook: âI belong to a militia group thatâs affiliated with the proud boysâ and âWeâre affiliated with the proud boys which have folks of all races as thereâs several thousand members.â Id., at 12.

282. Criminal Complaint at 8, United States. v. Hazard, No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1.

283. Criminal Complaint at 10, United States. v. Hazard, No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1.

284. Criminal Complaint at 11, United States. v. Hazard, No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1. Hazard also echoed this idea. Id., at 14.

285. Criminal Complaint at 10-11, United States. v. Hazard, No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1.

286. Criminal Complaint at 10, United States. v. Hazard, No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1.

287. Criminal Complaint at 12, United States. v. Hazard, No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1.

288. Criminal Complaint at 12, United States. v. Hazard, No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1.

289. Criminal Complaint at 16, United States. v. Hazard, No. 1:21-mj-868 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1.

290. Statement of Facts at 2, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184-RMM (D.D.C. Aug, 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1.

291. Statement of Facts at 2, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1.

292. Statement of Facts at 4, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1.

293. Statement of Facts at 4, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1.

294. Statement of Facts at 4, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1.

295. Statement of Facts at 28, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1.

296. Statement of Facts at 5, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1.

297. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Liggett, (May 17, 2022), pp. 50-51.

298. Statement of Facts at 28, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1; #SeditionHunters (@SeditionHunters), Twitter, June 7, 2021 2:11 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/SeditionHunters/status/1401965056980627458.

299. Statement of Facts at 5-6, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022), ECF No. 5-1; #SeditionHunters (@SeditionHunters), Twitter, June 7, 2021 2:11 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/SeditionHunters/status/1401965056980627458.

300. âFive Florida Men Arrested on Charges for Actions During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,â United States Department of Justice, (Aug. 24, 2022) available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/five-florida-men-arrested-charges-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.

301. Indictment Dated June 9, 2021 at 1, United States v. Hostetter et. al., No. 1:1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021); Michael Kunzelman, âCapitol Rioter Used Charity to Promote Violence, Feds Say,â Associated Press, (June 16, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-joe-biden-riots-health-coronavirus-pandemic-71a7b8121b6f70016f7cab601021a989.

302. Indictment at Â¶ 38, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.

303. Indictment at 7, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.

304. Indictment at 7, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.

305. Indictment at 8, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.

306. Indictment at 9, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.

307. Indictment at 8-11, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.

308. Indictment at 8-11, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.

309. Indictment at 12, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.

310. The National Council and The Three Percenters - Original, âTTPO Stance on Election Fraud,â Dec. 16, 2020, available at http://archive.ph/YemCC (archived).

311. See post by username @hatdonuts2, patriots.win, December 29, 2020, 7:56 p.m. ET, available at https://patriots.win/p/11RO2hdyR2/x/c/4DrwV8RcV1s; Statement of Facts at 7-8, United States v. Buxton, No. 1:21-cr-739 (D.D.C. Dec. 8, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.

312. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Josh Ellis, (May 19, 2022), p. 38.

313. âLone Capitol Police Officer Eugene Goodman Diverts Capitol Rioters,â Washington Post, (Jan. 11, 2021). available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/national/lone-capitol-police-officer-eugene-goodman-diverts-capitol-rioters/2021/01/11/ba67a5e8-5f9b-4a9a-a7b7-93549f6a81b3_video.html.

314. Scott MacFarlane and Gillian Morley, âQAnon Follower Doug Jensen Convicted on All Jan. 6 Charges,â CBS News, (Sept. 23, 2022), available at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/qanon-follower-doug-jensen-convicted-on-all-jan-6-charges/.

315. Interview of: Douglas Austin Jensen Dated Jan. 8, 2021 at 19, United States v. Jensen, No. 1:21-cr-6 (D.D.C., Apr. 8, 2022), ECF No. 69-1.

316. Statement of Mike Rothschild, (Mar. 23, 2022), at 12.

317. Statement of Mike Rothschild, (Mar. 23, 2022), at 2-3.

318. âQAnon,â Anti-Defamation League, (May 4, 2020), available at https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/qanon.

319. Kelly Weill, âQAnonâs Home 8kun is Imploding - and Q Has Gone Silent,â Daily Beast, (Nov. 13, 2020), available at https://www.thedailybeast.com/qanons-home-8kun-is-implodingand-q-has-gone-silent?ref=scroll.

320. âRemarks by President Trump in Press Briefing,â White House, (Aug. 19, 2020), available at https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-briefing-august-19-2020/.

321. NBC News, âTrump Denounces White Supremacy, Sidesteps Question on QAnon,â YouTube, at 1:32, 2:34, Oct. 15, 2020, available at https://youtu.be/3hybkzCWb_w.

322. Ben Collins, âQAnonâs Dominion Voter Fraud Conspiracy Theory Reaches the President,â NBC News, (Nov. 13, 2020), available at https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/q-fades-qanon-s-dominion-voter-fraud-conspiracy-theory-reaches-n1247780; National Contagion Research Institute, âThe QAnon Conspiracy: Destroying Families, Dividing Communities, Undermining Democracy,â p. 20, available at https://networkcontagion.us/wp-content/uploads/NCRI-%E2%80%93-The-QAnon-Conspiracy-FINAL.pdf.

323. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Nov. 19, 2020 12:41 a.m. ET and 3:47 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22Dominion-izing+the+Vote%22 (archived).

324. One America News Network, âCyber Analyst on Dominion Voting: Shocking Vulnerabilities,â YouTube, at 0:45, Nov. 15, 2020, available at https://youtu.be/eKcPoCNW8AA.

325. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of James Watkins, (June 6, 2022), p. 11. Watkins denied under oath that either he or his son Ron are âQ.â Id., at 38, 122.

326. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Dec. 15, 2020 12:32 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22Soon-to-be+AG+Rosen+recently+wrote+an+essay+on+foreign+influence+in+US+elections.+foreign+actors+are+covertly+trying+to%22 (archived).

327. President Donald J. Trump, âTweets of January 3, 2021,â The American Presidency Project, available at, available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/tweets-january-3-2021 (archived).

328. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of James Watkins, (June 6, 2022), p. 77; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jody Williams, (June 7, 2022), p. 67 (noting, as the then-owner of TheDonald.win, that President Trumpâs December 19th tweet was âeverywhere,â including with âQ people.â).

329. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of James Watkins, (June 6, 2022), pp. 74, 76.

330. Statement of Offense at 3, United States v. Munn, No. 1:21-cr-474 (D.D.C. May 13, 2022), ECF No. 78.

331. Statement of Facts at 3, United States v. Chansley, No. 1:21-cr-3 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.

332. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Elmer Stewart Rhodes, (Feb. 2, 2022), p. 162.

333. See, e.g., Trial Exhibit 6860 (1.S.656.9257), United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 2022) (Rhodes messaging an Oath Keepers chat that âLetâs adopt the Q slogan of WWG1WGA. Where We Go One, We Go All. We nullify TOGETHER We defy TOGETHER. We resist TOGETHER We defend TOGETHER. They come for one of us, they come for all of us. When they come for us, we go for them. When they strike at our leaders, we strike at their leaders. This is the path of the Founders. Itâs what they did.â); Trial Exhibit 4064, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022) (printout of December 23, 2020, open letter to President Trump posted by Stewart Rhodes on the Oath Keeper website, imploring the President to invoke the Insurrection Act to prevent a communist takeover of the United States through the inauguration of Joe Biden).

334. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nick Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 53.

335. Ben Collins and Brandy Zadrozny, âExtremists Made Little Secret of Ambitions to âOccupyâ Capitol in Weeks Before Attack,â NBC News, (Jan. 8, 2021), available at https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/extremists-made-little-secret-ambitions-occupy-capital-weeks-attack-n1253499.

336. Kari Paul, Luke Harding and Severin Carrell, âFar-Right Website 8kun Again Loses Internet Service Protection Following Capitol Attack,â The Guardian, (Jan. 15, 2021), available at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jan/15/8kun-8chan-capitol-breach-violence-isp.

337. Ben Collins and Brandy Zadrozny, âExtremists Made Little Secret of Ambitions to âOccupyâ Capitol in Weeks Before Attack,â NBC News, (Jan. 8, 2021), available at https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/extremists-made-little-secret-ambitions-occupy-capital-weeks-attack-n1253499.

338. Post by username r3deleven, âTrump Tweet. Daddy Says Be In DC On Jan. 6th,â Patriots.Win, Dec. 19, 2020, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210105024826/https://thedonald.win/p/11R4q2aptJ/trump-tweet-daddy-says-be-in-dc-/c/ (archived).

339. âHow a Trump Tweet Sparked Plots, Strategizing to âStorm and Occupyâ Capitol with âHandcuffs and Zip Tiesâ,â SITE Intelligence Group, (Jan. 9, 2021), available at https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Far-Right-/-Far-Left-Threat/how-a-trump-tweet-sparked-plots-strategizing-to-storm-and-occupy-capitol-with-handcuffs-and-zip-ties.html.

340. âHow a Trump Tweet Sparked Plots, Strategizing to âStorm and Occupyâ Capitol with âHandcuffs and Zip Tiesâ,â SITE Intelligence Group, (Jan. 9, 2021), available at https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Far-Right-/-Far-Left-Threat/how-a-trump-tweet-sparked-plots-strategizing-to-storm-and-occupy-capitol-with-handcuffs-and-zip-ties.html.

341. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jody Williams, (June 7, 2022), p. 72.

342. Ryan Goodman and Justin Hendrix, âThe Absence of âThe Donaldâ,â Just Security, (Dec. 6, 2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/79446/the-absence-of-the-donald/.

343. Amrita Khalid, âDonald Trump Participated in a Reddit AMA, but not Much of Anything was Revealed,â Daily Dot, (July 27, 2016), available at https://www.dailydot.com/debug/donald-trump-reddit-ama-fail/.

344. Memorandum from Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Briefing with Reddit, (May 19, 2022); Mike Isaac, âReddit, Acting Against Hate Speech, Bans âThe_Donaldâ Subreddit,â New York Times, (Jan. 29, 2020, Updated Jan. 27, 2021), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/29/technology/reddit-hate-speech.html.

345. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jody Williams, (June 7, 2022), pp. 31-32. In fact, Williams testified that he and other moderators had the opportunity to advertise the new website on Reddit for months. See id., at 32-33. This gave TheDonald.win âimmediateâ access to âhundreds of thousands of peopleâ who used the Reddit forum. See id., at 33.

346. Ben Schreckinger, âWorld War Meme: How a Group of Anonymous Keyboard Commandos Conquered the Internet for Donald Trump and Plans to Deliver Europe to the Far Right,â Politico Magazine, (Mar./Apr. 2017), available at https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/memes-4chan-trump-supporters-trolls-internet-214856/.

347. Ben Schreckinger, âWorld War Meme: How a Group of Anonymous Keyboard Commandos Conquered the Internet for Donald Trump and Plans to Deliver Europe to the Far Right,â Politico Magazine, (Mar./Apr. 2017), available at https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/memes-4chan-trump-supporters-trolls-internet-214856/.

348. Daniella Silva, âPresident Trump Tweets Wrestling Video of Himself Attacking âCNNâ,â NBC News, (July 2, 2017), available at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/president-trump-tweets-wwe-video-himself-attacking-cnn-n779031.

349. Justin Hendrix, âTheDonald.win and President Trumpâs Foreknowledge of the Attack on the Capitol,â Just Security, (Jan. 12, 2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/79813/thedonald-win-and-president-trumps-foreknowledge-of-the-attack-on-the-capitol/.

350. Andrew Restuccia, Daniel Lippman, and Eliana Johnson, ââGet Scavino in Hereâ: Trumpâs Twitter Guru is the Ultimate Insider,â Politico, (May 16, 2019), available at https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/16/trump-scavino-1327921.

351. H. Rept. 117-284, Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives Find Peter K. Navarro and Daniel Scavino, Jr., in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 2d Sess. (2022), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt284/CRPT-117hrpt284.pdf.

352. Justin Hendrix, âTheDonald.win and President Trumpâs Foreknowledge of the Attack on the Capitol,â Just Security, (Jan. 12, 2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/79813/thedonald-win-and-president-trumps-foreknowledge-of-the-attack-on-the-capitol/.

353. Post, âIf we occupy the capitol building, there will be no vote,â Patriots.Win, available at https://patriots.win/p/11Rh1RiP9l/if-we-occupy-the-capitol-buildin/.

354. Post by username REDMARAUDER, âThe media will call us evil if we have to occupy the Capitol Building on January 6th. Let them,â Patriots.Win, Jan. 2, 2021, available at https://patriots.win/p/11ROC9U7EM/the-media-will-call-us-evil-if-w/.

355. Post by username Sharker, âTHIS IS NOT A RALLY OR PROTEST. We are all here for the sole purpose of correcting this ILLEGAL election. Surround the enemy and do NOT LET THEM LEAVE until this mess is cleaned up with Trump being re-admitted for 4 more years. SACK UP PATRIOTS.â Patriots.Win, Jan. 5, 2021, available at https://patriots.win/p/11Rh1WGo3K/this-is-not-a-rally-or-protest-w/c/.

356. Ben Schreckinger, âWorld War Meme: How a Group of Anonymous Keyboard Commandos Conquered the Internet for Donald Trump â and Plans to Deliver Europe to the Far Right,â Politico Magazine, (March/April 2017) available at https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/memes-4chan-trump-supporters-trolls-internet-214856.

357. âHow a Trump Tweet Sparked Plots, Strategizing to âStorm and Occupyâ Capitol with âHandcuffs and Zip Tiesâ,â SITE Intelligence Group, (Jan. 9, 2021), available at https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Far-Right-/-Far-Left-Threat/how-a-trump-tweet-sparked-plots-strategizing-to-storm-and-occupy-capitol-with-handcuffs-and-zip-ties.html.

358. Alex Thomas, âTeam Trump Was in Bed With Online Insurrectionists before He Was Even Elected,â Daily Dot, (Jan. 15, 2021), available at https://www.dailydot.com/debug/dan-scavino-reddit-donald-trump-disinformation/.

359. Alex Jones, âTeam Trump Was in Bed With Online Insurrectionists before He Was Even Elected,â Daily Dot, (Jan. 15, 2021), available at https://www.dailydot.com/debug/dan-scavino-reddit-donald-trump-disinformation/.

360. Post by username wartooth6, âGallows are simpler and more cost effective, plus theyâre an American old west tradition too,â Patriots.Win, Dec. 22, 2020, available at https://patriots.win/p/11RNfN5v3p/gallows-are-simpler-and-more-cos/c/.

361. Post by username psybrnaut, âBuilder Pedes...Letâs construct a Gallows outside the Capitol Building next Wednesday so the Congressmen watching from their office windows shit their Pants...,â Patriots.Win, Dec. 30, 2020, available at https://patriots.win/p/11RO2pYG2P/builder-pedes-lets-construct-a-g/c/.

362. Post by username TacticalGeorge, âBuilding a hanging platform in front of Congress on the 6 should send a strong message,â Patriots.Win, Dec. 30, 2020, available at https://patriots.win/p/11RO2oQy77/building-a-hanging-platform-in-f/.

363. Post by username Krunchi, âThe One Thing You Must Know Before Going To DC on The 6th...,â Patriots.Win, Jan. 3, 2021, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210105080829/https://thedonald.win/p/11ROGmlHG5/the-one-thing-you-must-know-befo/ (archived).

364. Post by username Badradness, âWe will be building a gallows right in front of the Capitol so the traitors know the stakes. Iâm driving up in a sedan but if a patriot with a pickup will assist Iâm down to spend from my credit line at Home Depot for all of the supplies needed for this. Driving up Monday night or early Tuesday.,â Patriots.Win, Jan. 3, 2021, available at https://patriots.win/p/11ROGrJPVQ/we-will-be-building-a-gallows-ri/c/.

365. Post by username AFLP, âGallows on the Capitol Lawn,â Patriots.Win, Jan. 5, 2021, available at https://patriots.win/p/11RhArKEQ3/gallows-on-the-capitol-lawn/.

366. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Mark Meadows Production), MM014441; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 209.

367. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), Exhibit 45, pp. 4, 13. In his testimony to the Select Committee, Miller denied reading such comments and claimed not to recall whether Meadows had followed up with him about the thread. However, Miller did say that âsometimesâ he would âclick and see what people are sayingâ on sites like TheDonald.win, if he received a Google alert about himself. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 209, 212, 214.

368. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 209, Exhibit 47.

369. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 19, 2020 1:24 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1340362336390004737.

370. Justin Hendrix, âTheDonald.win and President Trumps Foreknowledge of the Attack on the Capitol,â Just Security, (Jan. 12, 2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/79813/thedonald-win-and-president-trumps-foreknowledge-of-the-attack-on-the-capitol/.

371. Lena V. Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed, and Maya Eliahou, âWhat Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,â Pro Publica, at 12:05 p.m. ET at 0:30, Jan. 17, 2021, available, https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/; Statement of Catherine A. Sanderson, Ph.D., (June 3, 2022), at 5.

372. Through review of public records, the Select Committee identified organizers for about a dozen events scheduled for January 5th or 6th secured permits from either the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) or National Park Service (NPS). Except for two eventsâone unrelated to January 6th and the other put on by a group that regularly held demonstrations around D.C.âall of the applications were submitted after President Trumpâs December 19th tweet. The three most important events were: Cindy Chafianâs January 5th event at Freedom Plaza (using the group name âThe Eighty Percent Coalitionâ); WFAFâs January 6th event at the Ellipse; and Ali Alexanderâs January 6th event on the Capitol grounds (under the âOne Nation Under Godâ moniker). In addition to the permits issued to WFAF, Cindy Chafian, and Ali Alexander (under the âOne Nation Under Godâ moniker), at least nine additional permits were issued by USCP or NPS for events in Washington, D.C., on January 5, 2021 or January 6, 2021.

373. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of the Interior Production), DOI_46000428_00005162 (Dec. 19, 2020, Cindy Chafian email Re: Status of application - Women for America First at 7:12 AM).

374. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of the Interior Production), DOI_46000428_00005162 (Dec. 19, 2020, Cindy Chafian email Re: Status of application - Women for America First at 7:12 AM).

375. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kylie Kremer, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 5.

376. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Amy Kremer, (Feb. 18, 2022), pp. 8-10.

377. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Amy Kremer, (Feb. 18, 2022), pp. 8-10.

378. Women for America First, âMarch for Trump Bus Tour,â trumpmarch.com, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20201226001527/https://trumpmarch.com/.

379. Kylie Jane Kremer (@KylieJaneKremer), Twitter, Dec. 19, 2020 3:50 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/kyliejanekremer/status/1340399063875895296?lang=en.

380. Women For America First Ellipse Public Gathering Permit, National Park Service, available at https://www.nps.gov/aboutus/foia/upload/21-0278-Women-for-America-First-Ellispse-permit_REDACTED.pdf.

381. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ali Alexander, (Dec. 9, 2021), p. 15.

382. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Resource Group Production), CTRL0000010113 (Dec. 19, 2020, Ali Alexandra text message to Stephen Brown at 10:49 a.m.).

383. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Resource Group Production), CTRL0000010113 (Dec. 19, 2020, Ali Alexandra text message to Stephen Brown at 10:49 a.m.).

384. âValuation and Analysis,â WildProtest.com, (Jan. 14, 2021 (last updated)), available at https://wildprotest.com.siteindices.com/.

385. âPresident Trump Wants You in DC January 6,â WildProtest.com, (Dec 19.2020), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20201223062953/http://wildprotest.com/ (archived).

386. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Arina Grossu, (Apr. 29, 2022), p. 40.

387. Statement of Andrew J. Seidel, (Mar. 18, 2022), at 11, 13.

388. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Arina Grossu Production), Grossu_01_002721 (Dec. 19, 2020, Rob Weaver email message to Arina Grossu at 8:20 a.m. CT).

389. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Arina Grossu Production), Arina Grossu Exhibit 20 (Jericho March Rally registration page).

390. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Marsha Lessard, (Dec. 10, 2021); see also Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001834 (Permit Relating to Demonstration Activities on United States Capitol Grounds for Virginia Freedom Keepers, No. 20-12-25).

391. See Superseding Indictment at Â¶ 37, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22, 2022) (noting that Stewart Rhodes, President of the Oath Keepers, shipped weapons to Lessardâs home in Virginia before his arrival in DC for January 6th); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kellye SoRelle, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 180.

392. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Henry Tarrio, (Feb. 4, 2021), p. 117 (testifying that Gracia arranged a White House tour for him in December 2020).

393. Latinos for Trump (@Officiallft2021), Twitter, Dec. 27, 2020 7:58 p.m., available at https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1343360740313321474.

394. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Nathan Martin Production), NMartin0318 (December 30, 2020, email from Kimberly Fletcher of Moms for America to Ali Alexander and Nathan Martin re: MFA VIP list for White House); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Resource Group Production), CTRL0000010100 (December 27, 2020, text messages between Nathan Martin, Stephen Martin, Kimberly Fletcher, and Ali Alexander discussing permitting); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000086, CTRL0000000086.0001 (December 23, 2020, Special Event Assessment identifying Fletcher as a speaker at the âWild Protestâ event during the same time as MFAâs permitted event in a different area).

395. âThe Alex Jones Show,â Prison Planet TV, at 10:07, Dec. 20, 2020, available at http://tv.infowars.com/index/display/id/11151.

396. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (T-Mobile Production, Nov. 19, 2021).

397. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Cynthia âCindyâ Chafian (Nov. 1-2, 2021).

398. See, Beth Reinhard, Jaqueline Alemany, and Josh Dawsey, âLow-Profile Heiress Who âPlayed a Strong Roleâ in Financing Jan. 6 Rally is Thrust Into Spotlight,â Washington Post, (Dec. 8, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/publix-heiress-capitol-insurrection-fancelli/2021/12/08/5144fe1c-5219-11ec-8ad5-b5c50c1fb4d9_story.html.

399. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Julia Fancelli Production), REL0000000994, (Bank Statements for Julia Fancelli at the Bank of Central Florida from December 10, 2020, to January 10, 2021).

400. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Caroline Wren, (Dec. 17, 2021), p. 58.

401. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Verizon Production, Feb. 9, 2022).

402. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Caroline Wren, (Dec. 17, 2021), pp. 45-46.

403. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Caroline Wren, (Dec. 17, 2021), p. 71.

404. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Verizon Production, Feb. 9, 2022).

405. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000014 (January 4 - 6, 2021, Fancelli Budget & Trip Plan).

406. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000005 (December 27, 2020, Kylie Kremer e-mail to Caroline Wren at 11:25 am).

407. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000468 (December 27, 2020, Caroline Wren text message thread with Alex Jones).

408. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000550 (Dec. 27, 2020, Caroline Wren text messages with Cindy Chafian).

409. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Caroline Wren, (Dec. 17, 2021), pp. 50, 70-71.

410. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000014 (January 4 - 6, 2021, Fancelli Budget & Trip Plan.

411. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000014 (January 4 - 6, 2021, Fancelli Budget & Trip Plan.

412. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000482 (December 29, 2020, Caroline Wren text message to Ali Alexander at 4:19 p.m.).

413. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000482 (December 29, 2020, Caroline Wren text message to Ali Alexander at 4:19 pm).

414. Kathleen Ronayne and Michael Kunzelman, âTrump to Far-Right Extremists: `Stand Back and Stand By,ââ â Associated Press, (Sept. 30, 2020), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-race-and-ethnicity-donald-trump-chris-wallace-0b32339da25fbc9e8b7c7c7066a1db0f.

415. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 27, 2020 5:51 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com (archived).

416. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Justin Caporale, (Mar. 1, 2022), pp. 20-21.

417. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., (May 3, 2022), p.30; Anthony Man, âAt Trump Golf Club in West Palm Beach, Roger Stone Thanks President for Pardon,â Orlando Sun Sentinel, (Dec. 28, 2020), available at https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/elections/fl-ne-roger-stone-thanks-trump-pardon-20201228-2ejqzv6e7vhyvf26cxz6e6jysa-story.html.

418. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (AT&T Production, Dec. 17, 2021).

419. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000444, pp. 1-3 (December 27, 2020, text message from Caroline Wren to Kimberly Guilfoyle at 7:10 p.m.).

420. As revealed in the phone records for the personal cell phones of Max Miller and Anthony Ornato. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Verizon Production, Dec. 17, 2021); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Verizon Production, Sep. 23, 2022). The Select Committee also subpoenaed the phone records for the personal cell phones of Robert Peede, Mark Meadows, Dan Scavino, and Justin Caporale. They each filed lawsuits to block the respective phone companiesâ production of the phone records, which were still pending at the time of writing. Thus, there may have been additional relevant phone calls among or involving these four of which the Select Committee is not aware.

421. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Max Miller, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 36-37.

422. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Justin Caporale, (Mar. 1, 2020), p. 44; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_0644 (December 29, 2020, text messages with Justin Caporale).

423. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 79-82; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_0181 (January 2nd email from Katrina Pierson to Caroline Wren and Taylor Budowich).

424. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 32-33, 41; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 107-08, 135.

425. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 42.

426. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 44-45, 47, 52-54; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 87.

427. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Kylie Kremer Production), KKremer5447, p. 3 (January 4, 2021, text message from Kylie Kremer to Mike Lindell at 9:32 a.m.).

428. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Ali Alexander Production), CTRL0000017718, p. 41 (January 5, 2021 text message with Liz Willis at 7:19 a.m.).

429. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 120-21.

430. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 121.

431. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 121.

432. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 121.

433. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Max Miller, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 91-92.

434. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 123.

435. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 121-26.

436. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Max Miller, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 98-99.

437. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Max Miller Production) Miller Production 0001, p. 1 (January 4, 2021, text message from Max Miller to Katrina Pierson).

438. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 121.

439. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 95; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0180, at 180, 196-97 (January 4, 2021, President Trump Meeting Agenda).

440. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 41.

441. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 42.

442. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 42-43.

443. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0374 (December 30, 2020, Katrina Pierson text message to Kylie Kremer); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 4.

444. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 86.

445. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 62-63.

446. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 84; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0924 (January 2, 2021, Katrina Pierson text message to Mark Meadows at 1:39 p.m. and 1:40 p.m.)

447. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (March 25, 2022), p. 74; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0921, (January 2, 2021, Katrina Pierson text message to Mark Meadows at 5:16 p.m.).

448. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 76-77, 80-81.

449. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 75-77.

450. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0924 (January 2, 2021 Katrina Pierson text message to Mark Meadows at 5:49 p.m.).

451. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 108; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson180 (January 4, 2021, agenda for meeting with President Trump at 1:21 p.m.).

452. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 107-08; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0196 (Document titled: âMeeting w/ POTUS - January 4th 2021 at 3:30pm ETâ).

453. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 116-18.

454. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0906 (January 5, 2021, text message from Dan Scavino to Katrina Pierson at 4:23 a.m.).

455. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Justin Caporale Production), Caporale_05_003987, (Jan. 3, 2021, Katrina Pierson text message to Justin Caporale and Taylor Budowich); see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 79; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Taylor Budowich Production), Budo-00714 (January 2, 2021, Katrina Pierson email to Caroline Wren and Taylor Budowich at 10:49 p.m.).

456. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Justin Caporale Production), Caporale_02_000673-88, (Jan. 3, 2021, Justin Caporale text message to Katrina Pierson, redacted).

457. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Max Miller, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 81-83. Miller testified that he had not been involved in or paying attention to the conversation until the President directly addressed him about Giuliani. Millerâs testimony was not credible on this point. Miller said he did not take notes, yet in communications with people after the fact he recounted details about the Presidentâs decision regarding speakers other than Giuliani, Eastman, Powell, Wood, and Flynn. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Max Miller, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 85 (stating that neither he nor Peede took notes); id. at p. 107 (confirming that he told Megan Powers on January 5th that President Trump cut Paxton from the list).

458. In the January 4 meeting with Pierson and Miller, President Trump initially indicated that Giuliani would not be able to speak at the Ellipse because he needed to be working on lobbying Members of Congress to block certification of the electoral college vote, yet another sign that the President intended January 6th to be a full-fledged effort to stay in power. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), p. 117.

459. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Max Miller, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 81-83, 129-30.

460. User-Generated Clip, âJohn Eastman at January 6 Rally,â CSPAN, Mar. 24, 2021, available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4953961/user-clip-john-eastman-january-6-rally.

461. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Max Miller, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 115-116.

462. It appears that Alexander was given front row seating for the Ellipse rally. He tweeted a picture in front of the Ellipse stage, writing: âNice seats! Thank you @realdonaldtrump!â Ali [Orange Square] #StopTheSteal (@Ali), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210107094927/https:/twitter.com/ali (archived).

463. Moms for America, âSave the Republic: Ali Alexander,â Rumble, at 2:24, Jan. 29, 2021, available at https://rumble.com/vdepmx-save-the-republic-ali-alexander.html.

464. Ali [Orange Square] #StopTheSteal (@Ali), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210107094927/https:/twitter.com/ali (archived).

465. NTD Television, ââVirginia Women for Trumpâ Rally at Supreme Court,â Facebook Live, Jan. 5, 2021, available at https://www.facebook.com/NTDTelevision/videos/220171109588984.

466. Radley Balko, âMeet the Police Chief Turned Yoga Instructor Prodding Wealthy Suburbanites to Civil War,â Washington Post, (Jan. 27, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/01/27/alan-hostetter-capitol-riot-police-chief-yoga-instructor/.

467. NTD Television, ââVirginia Women for Trumpâ Rally at Supreme Court,â Facebook Live, at 20:10, Jan. 5, 2021, available at https://www.facebook.com/NTDTelevision/videos/220171109588984.

468. NTD Television, ââVirginia Women for Trumpâ Rally at Supreme Court,â Facebook Live, at 1:44:14 -1:45:54, Jan. 5, 2021, available at https://www.facebook.com/NTDTelevision/videos/220171109588984.

469. NTD Television, ââVirginia Women for Trumpâ Rally at Supreme Court,â Facebook Live, at1:46:04 â 1:49:40, Jan. 5, 2021, available at https://www.facebook.com/NTDTelevision/videos/220171109588984.

470. Radley Balko, âMeet the Police Chief Turned Yoga Instructor Prodding Wealthy Suburbanites to Civil War,â Washington Post, (Jan. 27, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/01/27/alan-hostetter-capitol-riot-police-chief-yoga-instructor/.

471. Indictment at Â¶ 56, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C., June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.

472. EpiqEpoch, âRoger Stone January 5, 2021 Freedom Plaza,â Rumble, at 8:09, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://rumble.com/vchgtl-roger-stone-january-5-2021-freedom-plaza.html.

473. Project Truth Beam, âJan 5th Freedom Plaza: Ali Alexander,â Rumble, at 1:58-2:21, Jan.16, 2021, available at https://rumble.com/vcx1mt-jan-5th-freedom-plaza-ali-alexander.html.

474. EpiqEpoch, âAlex Jones January 5, 2021 Freedom Plaza,â Rumble, at 1:24, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://rumble.com/vchguz-alex-jones-january-5-2021-freedom-plaza.html.

475. EpiqEpoch, âGen. Michael Flynn, January 5, 2021 Freedom Plaza,â Rumble, at 5:28, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://rumble.com/vchisz-gen.-michael-flynn-january-5-2021-freedom-plaza.html.

476. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ross Worthington, (Feb. 15, 2022), p. 112.

477. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Bock IV, (Apr. 15, 2022), pp. 23, 32; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attacks on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000002884_00001, (January 5, 2021, email from Worthington to Staff Secretary at 7:46 p.m., attaching a draft speech). In the final hours before the speech, White House lawyers would insist that the speech needed fact-checking and were most worried about the claims about Dominion Voting. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives Production) 076P-R000007308_0001 (January 5, 2021, email from Worthington to Staff Secretary at 7:46 p.m.). But President Trump would deliver the speech with the allegations intact. See Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Committee on Rules and Administration, 117th Congress, âExamining the U.S. Capitol Attack: A Review of the Security, Planning, and Response Failures on January 6â (Staff Report), p. B-18, (June 8, 2021).

478. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00002701-02 (Draft Speech, âStop the Steal Rallyâ).

479. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Stephen Miller (Apr. 14, 2022), p. 125-26; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ross Worthington (Feb. 15, 2022), p. 124.

480. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 15-16.

481. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), p. 16; see also Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), Photo files 69c1_x032_555c_7, 0d9d_x039_557d_7 (January 5, 2021, photos of the meeting).

482. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), pp. 76-77; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 17, 19-20; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), p. 84; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Madison Fox Porter, (May 5, 2022), p. 19.

483. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 16-17; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 83-84.

484. Donald J. Trump (@RealDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 5:05 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22Washington+is+being+inundated%22 (archived). (âWashington is being inundated with people who donât want to see an election victory stolen by emboldened Radical Left Democrats. Our Country has had enough, they wonât take it anymore! We hear you (and love you) from the Oval Office. MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!â).

485. The Select Committee has obtained two drafts of the speech from January 5th, one of which was circulated at approximately 3:30 p.m. and another at 7:40 p.m. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Vincent Haley Production), VMH-00002700, VMH-00002708 (January 5, 2021, email from Ross Worthington to Stephen Miller circulating draft speech at 3:30 p.m.); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), 076P-R000002878_00001, 076P-R000002879_00001, (January 5, 2021, email from Ross Worthington to Stephen Miller circulating draft speech at 7:40 p.m.).

486. Donald J. Trump (@RealDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 5:05 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com (archived). (âWashington is being inundated with people who donât want to see an election victory stolen by emboldened Radical Left Democrats. Our Country has had enough, they wonât take it anymore! We hear you (and love you) from the Oval Office. MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!â).

487. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), 076P-R000002879_00001 (Draft of Jan. 6, 2021 speech by President Donald Trump).

488. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 91-92.

489. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Shealah Craighead, (June 8, 2022), pp. 32-33. Craighead believed that she later shared this with Ornato. See id., at 33.

490. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), p. 17; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), p. 99.

491. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), p. 17. Deere did not recall this specific question nor responding to it, but did remember advising President Trump that he should focus on his administrationâs accomplishments during his January 6th Ellipse rally speech rather than his stolen election claims. Deere recalled President Trump asking about which Members of Congress would be with him the next day and vote against certifying the election. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 88-90, 92, 99-100.

492. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), p. 17.

493. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), p. 17; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 85-86.

494. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 86-87, 99.

495. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), p. 86.

496. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 076P-R000007361_0001 (January 5, 2021, email from Austin Ferrer to Dan Scavino at 10:16 p.m.).

497. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Committee on Rules and Administration, 117th Congress, âExamining the U.S. Capitol Attack: A Review of the Security, Planning, and Response Failures on January 6â (Staff Report), p. B-2, (June 8, 2021); Statement of Catherine A. Sanderson, Ph.D., (June 3, 2022), at 5.

498. Lena V. Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed, and Maya Eliahou, âWhat Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,â Pro Publica, at 12:05 p.m. ET at 0:30, Jan. 17, 2021, available, https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/; Statement of Catherine A. Sanderson, Ph.D., (June 3, 2022), at 5.

499. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 11-19.

500. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Committee on Rules and Administration, 117th Congress, âExamining the U.S. Capitol Attack: A Review of the Security, Planning, and Response Failures on January 6â (Staff Report), pp. B-22, 23, (June 8, 2021).

501. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000002911_00001, 076P-R000002912_00001 (January 6, 2021, email from Robert Gabriel Jr. to Dan Scavino at 1:25 p.m. re: Final draft attached with attachment â210106 Save America March.docâ); Statement of Jennifer Mercieca, (Mar. 31, 2022), at 18.

502. Statement of Jennifer Mercieca, (Mar. 31, 2022), at 18.

7

At 1:10 p.m. on January 6th, President Trump concluded his speech at the Ellipse. By that time, the attack on the U.S. Capitol had already begun. But it was about to get much worse. The President told thousands of people in attendance to march down Pennsylvania Avenue to the Capitol. He told them to âfight like hellâ because if they didnât, they were ânot going to have a country anymore.â Not everyone who left the Ellipse did as the Commander-in-Chief ordered, but many of them did. The fighting intensified during the hours that followed.1

By 1:21 p.m., President Trump was informed that the Capitol was under attack. He could have interceded immediately. But the President chose not to do so. It was not until 4:17 p.m. that President Trump finally tweeted a video in which he told the rioters to go home.

The 187 minutes between the end of President Trumpâs speech and when he finally told the mob to leave the U.S. Capitol was a dereliction of duty. In the U.S. military, a service member is deemed to be âderelict in the performance of duties when that person willfully or negligently fails to perform that personâs duties or when that person performs them in a culpably inefficient manner.ââ2 As Commander-in-Chief, President Trump had the powerâmore than any other Americanâto muster the U.S. Governmentâs resources and end the attack on the U.S. Capitol. He willfully remained idle even as others, including his own Vice President, acted.

President Trump could have called top officials at the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the F.B.I., the Capitol Police Department, or the DC Mayorâs Office to ensure that they quelled the violence. He made no such calls. Instead, President Trump reached out to Rudolph Giuliani and friendly Members of Congress, seeking their assistance in delaying the joint session of Congress. And the President tweeted at 2:24 p.m., at the height of the violence, that his own Vice President lacked the âcourageâ to actâa statement that could only further enrage the mob. Meanwhile, Vice President Michael Pence assumed the duties of the President, requesting the assistance of top officials, even though he was not in the chain of command and had no constitutional power to issue orders.

In testimony before the Select Committee, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley explained that President Trump did â[n]othing,â â[z]eroâ to marshal the Governmentâs resources during the assault on the U.S. Capitol.3 In contrast, Vice President Pence had âtwo or three callsâ with General Milley and other military officialsâeven as the mob hunted him. During those calls, Vice President Pence was âvery animatedâ and âissued very explicit, very direct, unambiguous orders.â The Vice President told Acting Secretary of Defense Chris Miller to âget the military down here, get the [National] [G]uard down here,â and âput down this situation.ââ4 President Trump could have made those same demands. He chose not to do soâa damning fact that President Trumpâs own Chief of Staff, Mark Meadows, quickly tried to cover up.

âWe have to kill the narrative that the Vice President is making all the decisions,â General Milley recalled Meadows as saying. âWe need to establish the narrative, you know, that the President is still in charge and that things are steady or stable,â Meadows said, which General Milley described as a â[r]ed flag.ââ5 In his testimony, General Milley also reflected on what it meant for a President not to be taking action in a time of crisis:

You know, youâre the Commander in Chief. Youâve got an assault going on on the Capitol of the United States of America, and thereâs nothing? No call? Nothing? Zero? And itâs not my place to, you know, pass judgment orâIâm the, you knowâbut no attempt to call the Secretary of Defense? No attempt to call the Vice President of the United States of America, whoâs down on the scene? To my knowledge, it wasnâtâI just noted it.6

President Trumpâs closest advisorsâboth inside and out of the White Houseâimplored him to act sooner. Earlier in the week, two of the Presidentâs most trusted aides, Eric Herschmann and Hope Hicks, both wanted President Trump to emphasize that January 6th would be a peaceful protest. President Trump refused.7

On the 6th, as the riot began to escalate, a colleague texted Hicks and wrote, âHey, I know youâre seeing this. But he really should tweet something about Being NON-violent.ââ8 âIâm not there,â Hicks replied. âI suggested it several times Monday and Tuesday and he refused.ââ9

Once the attack was underway, President Trump initially ignored the counsel of his own family, members of his administration, Republican elected officials, and friendly Fox News personalities. Both Ivanka Trump and Donald Trump, Jr. wanted their father to tell the rioters to go home sooner. The President delayed. At 2:38 p.m., President Trump sent this tweet: âPlease support our Capitol Police and Law Enforcement. They are truly on the side of our Country. Stay peaceful!ââ10 Sarah Matthews, the White House Deputy Press Secretary, told the Select Committee that President Trump resisted using the word âpeaceful.â The President added the words âStay peaceful!â only after Ivanka Trump suggested the phrase.11 Trump, Jr. quickly recognized that his fatherâs tweet was insufficient. âHeâs got to condem [sic] this shit. Asap. The captiol [sic] police tweet is not enough,â Trump, Jr. wrote in a text to White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows.12 President Trump did not tell the rioters to disperse in either his 2:38 p.m. tweet, or another tweet at 3:13 p.m.13

Multiple witnesses told the Select Committee that Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy contacted the President and others around him, desperately trying to get him to act. McCarthyâs entreaties led nowhere. âI guess theyâre just more upset about the election theft than you are,â President Trump told McCarthy.14 Top lawyers in the White House Counselâs Office attempted to intercede. Two Fox News primetime personalities, always so obsequious, begged those around the President to get him to do more. But President Trump was unmoved.

Thereâs no question that President Trump had the power to end the insurrection. He was not only the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. military, but also of the rioters.

One member of the mob, Stephen Ayres, told the Select Committee that he and others quickly complied as soon as President Trump finally told them to go home. â[W]e literally left right after [President Trumpâs 4:17 p.m. video] come out. You know, to me if he would have done that earlier in the day, 1:30 [p.m.] . . . maybe we wouldnât be in this bad of a situation or something,â Ayres said.15 Another rioter, Jacob Chansley, commonly referred to as the âQAnon Shaman,â was one of the first 30 rioters to enter the U.S. Capitol. Chansley told a reporter that he left the building because âTrump asked everybody to go home.ââ16 At 4:25 p.m., just eight minutes after President Trump tweeted his video, an Oath Keeper named Ed Vallejo messaged other members of his group, a fair number of whom were at the Capitol: âGentleman [sic], Our Commander-in-Chief has just ordered us to go home. Comments?ââ17

Even then, President Trump did not disavow the rioters. He endorsed their cause, openly sympathized with them, and repeated his Big Lie once again. âI know your pain, I know youâre hurt. We had an election that was stolen from us,â President Trump said at the beginning of his 4:17 p.m. video. âIt was a landslide election, and everyone knows it, especially the other side. But you have to go home now. We have to have peace. We have to have law and order. We have to respect our great people in law and order. We donât want anybody hurt.â The President portrayed the violence as something his political foes would use against him, saying: âThis was a fraudulent election, but we canât play into the hands of these people.ââ18

The President concluded his short video by again praising the men and women who had overrun the U.S. Capitol. âWe have to have peace. So go home. We love you. Youâre very special,â President Trump said. âYouâve seen what happens. You see the way others are treated that are so bad and so evil. I know how you feel, but go home, and go home in peace.ââ19

Just after 6:00 p.m. on January 6th, President Trump issued his final tweet of the day, again lauding the rioters and justifying their cause. President Trump made excuses for the riot, saying this is what happens âwhen a sacred landslide election victory is so unceremoniously & viciously stripped away from great patriots who have been badly & unfairly treated for so long.â The President added: âGo home with love & in peace. Remember this day forever!ââ20

The following day, President Trumpâs advisors encouraged him to deliver a short speech denouncing the attack on the U.S. Capitol. The President struggled to deliver his prepared remarks. According to Cassidy Hutchinson, President Trump wanted to say that he would pardon the rioters. Lawyers in the White House Counselâs Office objected, so this language was not included.21 John McEntee, the Director of the White House Presidential Personnel Office, also testified that in the days following the attack, he heard President Trump mention the possibility of a âblanket pardonâ for all those involved in the events of January 6th.22

President Trump never did give up on the prospect. Since leaving office, the now former President has said he would consider âfull pardons with an apology to manyâ of the January 6th defendants if he is reelected.23

President Trump tweeted three times on the morning of January 6th, repeating a false claim of election fraud at 8:06 a.m.,24 pressuring Vice President Pence to delay the electoral count at 8:17 a.m.,25 and urging Republican party officials to do the same at 8:22 a.m.26 He made calls to his Republican allies in Congress, many of whom were already committed to objecting to the electoral count.27 And he dialed his lawyers and advisorsâincluding Steve Bannon and Rudolph Giuliani (twice), both of whom had been counseling the President on how to stay in power.28

There was one personâcritical to his planâwhom President Trump tried to reach but couldnât. At 9:02 a.m., he asked the switchboard operator to call his Vice President. Vice President Pence did not answer the call.29

Instead, between 9:52 a.m. and 10:18 a.m., the President spoke with his speechwriter, Stephen Miller, about the words he would deliver at the Save America Rally just hours later.30 The former Presidentâs speech had come together over the course of 36 hours, going from a screed aimed at encouraging congressional objections to one that would ultimately incite mob violence.31

Only four minutes after the call concluded, at 10:22 a.m., Miller emailed revisions to the speechwriters, instructing them to â[s]tart inputting these changes asapâ that included âred highlights marking POTUS edits.ââ32 The President had made some cosmetic additions, like peppering in the word âcorruptâ throughout,33 but there was one substantive editâa new targetâthat would focus the crowdâs anger on one man.

None of the preceding drafts mentioned Vice President Pence whatsoever. But now, at the very last minute, President Trump slipped in the following sentences calling the Vice President out by name:

Today, we will see whether Republicans stand strong for the integrity of our elections. And we will see whether Mike Pence enters history as a truly great and courageous leader. All he has to do is refer the illegally-submitted electoral votes back to the states that were given false and fraudulent information where they want to recertify. With only 3 of the 7 states in question we win and become President and have the power of the veto.34

No one on the speechwriting team could explain why President Trump added these lines just 30 minutes before he was originally scheduled to speak at 11:00 a.m.35 But by 10:49 a.m., Vincent Haley, a speechwriter who was helping load the teleprompter at the Ellipse, was told to hold off and delete the mention of the Vice Presidentâfor now.36 Miller said that Eric Herschmann, a lawyer who was one of the Presidentâs senior advisors, asked him in a âbrief sidebarâ that morning to omit reference to the Vice President and his role in the certification process because he âdidnât concur with the legal analysisâ and that it âwouldnât advance the ballâ but would be âcounterproductiveâ instead.37 As detailed in Chapter 5, Herschmann and others in the White House were vocal critics of Dr. John Eastmanâs theory, which claimed that the Vice President had the unilateral power to reject electors during the joint session of Congress. President Trump repeatedly pressured Pence to either reject certified electors, or delay the electoral count based on Eastmanâs unconstitutional and illegal theory. Vice President Pence would not budge. The Vice President consistently rejected President Trumpâs demands.

After tweeting four more times that morningâall of them spreading lies about the election38âthe President apparently thought he had one last chance to convince his number two to overrule the will of the American people.

As recounted in Chapter 5, President Trump called Vice President Pence at 11:17 a.m.39 The call between the two menâduring which the President soon grew âfrustrat[ed] or heated,ââ40 visibly upset,41 and âangryââ42âlasted nearly 20 minutes.43 And President Trump insulted Vice President Pence when he refused to obstruct or delay the joint session.

After that call, General Keith Kellogg said that the people in the room immediately went back to editing the Ellipse speech.44 At 11:30 a.m., Miller emailed his assistant, Robert Gabriel, with no text in the body but the subject line: âinsertâstand by for phone call.ââ45 At 11:33 a.m., Gabriel emailed the speechwriting team: âREINSERT THE MIKE PENCE LINES. Confirm receipt.ââ46 One minute later, speechwriter Ross Worthington confirmed that he had reached Vincent Haley by phone.47 Haley corroborated that he added one âtough sentence about the Vice Presidentâ while he was at the teleprompter.48

The final written draft had the following Pence reference: âAnd we will see whether Mike Pence enters history as a truly great and courageous leader.ââ49 Haley wasnât confident that line was what he reinserted, but email traffic and teleprompter drafts produced by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) indicate that he was mistaken.50

After defying President Trumpâs pressure, Vice President Penceâand the ire of the President he inspiredâwas back in the speech.

After the heated call, President Trumpâs personal assistant Nicholas Luna handed him a message on White House card stock and the President departed for the Ellipse to give his speech.51 Preserved by NARA, the message read: âTHEY ARE READY FOR YOU WHEN YOU ARE.ââ52 When it finally came time for him to speak, President Trump repeatedly directed his anger at Vice President Penceâoften ad-libbing lines that were not included in the draft text.

From a tent backstage at the Ellipse, President Trump looked out at the crowd of approximately 53,000 supporters and became enraged. Just under half of those gatheredâa sizeable stretch of about 25,000 people53ârefused to walk through the magnetometers and be screened for weapons,54 leaving the venue looking half-empty to the television audience at home.

According to testimony received by the Committee, earlier that morning at the White House, the President was told that the onlookers were unwilling to pass through the magnetometers because they were armed. âWe have enough space, sir. They donât want to come in right now,â Deputy Chief of Staff Tony Ornato reportedly told President Trump. âThey have weapons that they donât want confiscated by the Secret Service.ââ55

So, when President Trump got to the rally site and could see the crowd for himself, â[h]e was fucking furious,â as Cassidy Hutchinson later texted Ornato.56 Hutchinson testified that just minutes before addressing the crowd, President Trump shouted to his advance team: âI donât [fucking] care that they have weapons. Theyâre not here to hurt me. Take the [fucking] mags away. Let my people in. They can march to the Capitol from here. Take the [fucking] mags away.ââ57

By noon, President Trump took to the stage at the Ellipse.58 The President wanted all of those in attendance, including those who hadnât passed through the magnetometers, to come closer to the stage. âAnd Iâd love to have if those tens of thousands of people would be allowed,â President Trump said. âBut Iâd love it if they could be allowed to come up here with us. Is that possible? Can you just let [them] come up, please?ââ59

President Trump repeatedly made it clear to those around him in the days before January 6th that he wanted to march to the Capitol alongside his supporters. That is, President Trump wanted to join his supporters in what the Secret Service refers to as an âoff-the-recordâ movement (OTR).

While the President spoke, Hutchinson texted Ornato, âHe also kept mentioning OTR to Capitol before he took the stage.ââ60 Minutes before the President stepped out, Chief of Staff Mark Meadows assured the President he was working on it.61

President Trumpâs plan to march appeared once in an early draft of the script, then a later revision was made to add the word âbuildingâ after âCapitol,â making it clear exactly where the crowd should go.62 And the President repeatedly told the crowd that he would join them.

â[A]fter this, weâre going to walk down, and Iâll be there with you, weâre going to walk down, weâre going to walk down,â he said to the crowd. â[W]eâre going to walk down to the Capitol, and weâre going to cheer on our brave senators and congressmen and women, and weâre probably not going to be cheering so much for some of them.ââ63

President Trump used the phrase scripted for him by his White House speechwriters, âpeacefully and patrioticallyâ once, about 20 minutes into his speech.64 Then he spent the next 50-or-so minutes amping up his crowd with lies about the election, attacking his own Vice President and Republican Members of Congress, and exhorting the crowd to fight. âAnd we fight. We fight like hellâ the President said to a crowd that had already spent the day chanting, âFight for Trump! Fight for Trump!,â and that would keep up the chorus when storming the Capitol.65

Finally, he told the crowd where to go to âtake back our countryâ: âSo weâre going to, weâre going to walk down Pennsylvania Avenue. I love Pennsylvania Avenue. And weâre going to the Capitol, and weâre going to try and give . . . weâre going to try and give our Republicans, the weak ones because the strong ones donât need any of our help. Weâre going to try and give them the kind of pride and boldness that they need to take back our country. So letâs walk down Pennsylvania Avenue.ââ66

When the President announced his intentions from the microphone, people listened.

House Republican Leader Representative. Kevin McCarthy called Hutchinson mid-speech:67

âDo you guys think youâre coming to my office[?]â he asked her.68 She assured him that they werenât coming at all.69

âFigure it out. Donât come up here,â he replied.70

The announcement from the stage put the Secret Service on alert, prompting agents to designate over email a last-minute response team âto filter in with the crowdsâ on the Presidentâs âwalk/motorcade overâ to the Capitol and establish an emergency plan âif things go south.ââ71 White House security officials were monitoring the situation in real time, remarking that President Trump was âgoing to the Capitolâ and that âthey are finding the best route now.ââ72 Nonetheless, these staffers were in âa state of shock,ââ73 because they knewâparticularly if the President joinedâthis would âno longer [be] a rally.ââ74

â[W]e all knew . . . that this was going to move to something else if he physically walked to the Capitol,â an employee said. âI donât know if you want to use the word âinsurrection,â âcoup,â whatever. We all knew that this would move from a normal democratic . . . public event into something else.ââ75

But the logistics made the move all but impossible.

It was complicated for the Secret Service to coordinate a presidential movement even on a normal day. But today was not a normal day. Tens of thousands of President Trumpâs supporters had flooded into downtown DC in the days before the rally, and the Secret Service would have to account for that unpredictability. By the end of the Presidentâs speech, it was clear that the crowd at the Capitol was growing violent.

At 1:19 p.m., a Secret Service agent wrote to Bobby Engel, the head of President Trumpâs Secret Service detail: âFYSA . . . [Capitol Police] having serious challenges securing [the Capitol]. Nine priority breach attempts at this time. OTR to anywhere near there is not advisable. Give me a call when free. Front Office concerned about OTR to [the Capitol].ââ76

President Trump concluded his remarks at 1:10 p.m. Luna heard the President mention his intention to join the march to the Capitol âafter he finished his remarks.ââ77 Just before the President got into his vehicle, Meadows told him, âWeâre going to work on it, sir.ââ78 President Trump was seated in his motorcade vehicle by 1:17 p.m.79

The Committee received information informally from current and former members of the Secret Service and former White House staff relevant to what happened nextâwhat a number of witnesses have described as an âangry,â âirate,â or âfuriousâ interaction in the Presidential vehicle between the President and the Secret Service.80 That initial information, received informally, shaped the Committeeâs questioning of witnesses. The Committeeâs principal concern was that the President actually intended to participate personally in the January 6th efforts at the Capitol, leading the effort to overturn the election either from inside the Chamber or from a stage outside the Capitol. The Committee regarded those facts as important because they are relevant to President Trumpâs intent on January 6th. But a book published by Mark Meadows in November 2021 made the categorical claim that the President never intended to travel to the Capitol that day.81 Because the Meadows book conflicted sharply with information that was being received by the Committee, the Committee became increasingly wary that witnesses might intentionally conceal what happened.

In our initial informal discussion with the lead of the Presidentâs detail, Robert Engel confirmed that President Trump did wish to travel to the Capitol from the Ellipse, but stated that he did not recall many other details.82 But the Committee also received information from Kayleigh McEnany and Cassidy Hutchinson which also directly contradicted Mark Meadowsâs book and provided considerably more detail. McEnany testified that President Trump did indeed wish to travel to the Capitol on January 6th, and continued to have that goal even after returning from the Ellipse to the White House.83 McEnany, who spoke with President Trump shortly after he returned to the White House, recalls him expressing a desire to go to the Capitol: âI recall him . . . saying that he wanted to physically walk and be a part of the march and then saying that he would ride the Beast if he needed to, ride in the Presidential limo.ââ84 When asked, McEnany confirmed that âyes, he did seem sincere about wanting to do that.ââ85 Hutchinsonâs testimony was generally consistent with the information the Select Committee was receiving informally. Like McEnany, Hutchinson confirmed that the President did ask to be transported to Capitol Hill.86 Many other White House witnesses would ultimately confirm that President Trump wished to travel to the Capitol on January 6th, comprehensively rebutting the false statements in Meadowsâs book.87

Part of Hutchinsonâs account was a secondhand description of what occurred in the Presidential vehicle, which built upon and was consistent with information the Committee has received informally.

Hutchinson testified that, when she returned from the Ellipse, Ornato was standing outside his office door when he âwaved me down,â Hutchinson said. The two of them walked into Ornatoâs office, and he shut the door behind them.88 Engel was already there, sitting in a chair âlooking down, kind of looking a little lost and kind of discombobulated.ââ89

According to Hutchinson, Ornato then recounted a struggle in the Presidentâs car.90 At no point during Ornatoâs tellingâor at any point thereafterâdid Engel indicate that what Ornato relayed was untrue.91

Another witness, a White House employee with national security responsibilities, provided the Committee with a similar description: Ornato related the âirateâ interaction in the presidential vehicle to this individual in Ornatoâs White House office with Engel present.92 And just as Hutchinson testified, this employee told the Select Committee that Engel listened to Ornatoâs retelling of the episode and did not dispute it: âI donât remember his specific body language, but . . . [h]e did not deny the fact that the President was irate.ââ93 Engel testified that he does not recall either the conversation with Hutchinson or the similar conversation with the White House employee with national security responsibilities.94

The Committee regarded both Hutchinson and the corroborating testimony by the White House employee with national security responsibilities national security official as earnest and has no reason to conclude that either had a reason to invent their accounts. A different Secret Service agent, who served on a protective detail at the White House and was present in the presidential motorcade at the Ellipse, provided this view:

Committee Staff: Just a couple of additional questions. Ms. Hutchinson has suggested to the Committee that you sympathized with her after her testimony, and believed her account. Is that accurate?

Witness: I have noâyeah, thatâs accurate. I have no reasonâI mean, weâwe became friends. We workedâI worked every day with her for 6 months. Yeah, she became a friend of mine. We had a good working relationship. I have no reasonâsheâs never done me wrong. Sheâs never lied that I know of. I donât have any reasonâI donâtâI donât distrust Ms. Hutchinson.95

Also, the White House employee with national security responsibilities indicated that knowledge of the angry altercation in the Presidential vehicle was known within the White Houseâand was â[water] cooler talk.ââ96 In addition, Hutchinson has provided testimony to the Committee about efforts by her prior counsel, who was apparently paid by a Trump-funded organization, to suggest that Hutchinson did not need to testify about the issue in the presidential vehicle, could suggest that she âdid not recallâ it, or should downplay it.97

To further corroborate the accounts received of President Trumpâs intent to travel to the Capitol, the Committee interviewed a member of the Metropolitan Police who was also present in the motorcade, Officer Mark Robinson. Officer Robinson confirmed that he was aware contemporaneously of the âheated discussionâ that took place in the Presidential vehicle:

Committee Staff: And was there any description of what was occurring in the car?

Mr. Robinson: No. Only thatâthe only description I received was that the President was upset and that he was adamant about going to the Capitol, and there was a heated discussion about that.

Committee Staff: When you say âheated,â is that your word, or is that the word that was described by the TS agent?

Mr. Robinson: No. The word described by the TS agent meaning that the President was upset, and he was saying there was a heated argument or discussion about going to the Capitol.

. . . .

Mr. Schiff: So about how many times would you say youâve been part of that motorcade with the President?

Mr. Robinson: Probably over a hundred times.

Mr. Schiff: And, in that hundred times, have you ever witnessed another discussion of an argument or a heated discussion with the President where the President was contradicting where he was supposed to go or what the Secret Service believed was safe?

Mr. Robinson: No.98

The Committee also interviewed the Secret Service agent who was in the same car as Officer Robinson. That person shared a similar account, and confirmed that he did not take issue with Officer Robinsonâs testimony: â[The driver of the Presidential car] said something to the effect of, âThe President is pretty adamant that he wants to go to the Capitol,ââ the agent said, recalling what he had heard on the 6th.99

In addition, the Committee interviewed the USSS Press Secretary, who communicated with both Engel and with the driver in the presidential vehicle after Hutchinson appeared publicly. That witness indicated that Engelâs account of the events confirmed that the President was indeed angry, or furious.100 In fact, when asked about a reporterâs tweet indicating that sources within the Secret Service confirmed that âTrump was furious about not being [able] to go to [the] Capitol with his supporters,â the Press Secretary said he âcertainly corroborated itâ with the reporter because âthatâs what I had been told, you know, that [the President] was upset, he was agitated, about not being able to go[.]ââ101

In addition to the testimony above, the Committee has reviewed hundreds of thousands of new Secret Service documents, including many demonstrating that the Secret Service had been informed of potential violence at the Capitol before the Ellipse rally on January 6th. (These documents were critical to our understanding of what the Secret Service and White House knew about the threat to the Capitol on January 6th.) The Committee has also more recently conducted additional interviews with Engel and Ornato, and has also interviewed the driver of the Presidential vehicle.

Both Engel and the driver102 testified that, within 30 seconds of getting into the vehicle, the President asked if he could travel to the Capitol.103 This again is directly inconsistent with the account of events in Meadowsâs book. According to Engel, he told the President immediately that the move wasnât happening.104 The President was unhappy with Engelâs response and began âpushing pretty hard to go.ââ105 The President repeatedly asked why he could not go to the Capitol.106 Engel replied that the Secret Service âdidnât have any people at the Capitolâ to provide the President with appropriate security.107 The President responded angrily, telling Engel and the driver âIâm the President and Iâll decide where I get to go.ââ108 He reassured Engel that âit would essentially be fine and that the people there [meaning the people who were marching from the Ellipse to the Capitol at President Trumpâs instruction] were [Trump] supporters or something to that effect,ââ109 According to the Secret Service agent driving the vehicle, the President was âanimated and irritatedâ about not going to the Capitol.110

According to Mr. Engel, he ultimately told the President that they would âassess what our options were and wait until we can get a plan in place before we went down there.ââ111 We note that the driverâs account acknowledged President Trumpâs anger to a greater degree than either Engelâs initial account in Spring 2022, or his more recent account in November 2022. Engel did not characterize the exchange in the vehicle the way Hutchinson described the account she heard from Ornato, and indicated that he did not recall President Trump gesturing toward him.112 Engel did not recall being present when Ornato gave either Hutchinson or the White House employee with national security responsibilities an accounting of the events.113 The driver testified that he did not recall seeing what President Trump was doing and did not recall whether there was movement.114

The Select Committee has great respect for the men and women of the Secret Service. That said, it is difficult to fully reconcile the accounts of several of the witnesses who provided information with what we heard from Engel and Ornato.115 But the principal factual point here is clear and undisputed: President Trump specifically and repeatedly requested to be taken to the Capitol. He was insistent and angry, and continued to push to travel to the Capitol even after returning to the White House.

The motorcade didnât disband upon arriving to the White House, as they usually do. Instead, they were instructed to stand by in case the Presidentâs move to the Capitol did indeed happen.116 The Select Committee received a document from the Secret Service that reflects that at 1:25 p.m., âPPD IS ADVISING THAT [THE PRESIDENT] IS PLANNING ON HOLDING AT THE WHITE HOUSE FOR THE NEXT APPROXIMATE TWO HOURS, THEN MOVING TO THE CAPITOL.ââ117 âThey had not made a decision whether or not we were going to transport the President to the Capitol,â Robinson was told.118

Engel testified that he went to Ornatoâs office when he returned to the West Wing in order to discuss a possible move to the Capitol by President Trump.119 Given the deteriorating security conditions at the Capitol, it was quickly determined that they could not safely transport the President there.120 The motorcade waited on West Executive Drive approximately 40 minutes before finally receiving word from the Secret Service that the move had been officially nixed. Internal Secret Service communications bear this out: Not until 1:55 p.m. did Engel notify other agents via email that â[w]e are not doing an OTR to [the Capitol].ââ121

Minutes after arriving back at the White House, the President ran into a member of the White House staff and asked whether he or she watched his speech on television.122

âSir, they cut it off because theyâre rioting down at the Capitol,â the employee said.

The President asked what he or she meant by that.

â[T]heyâre rioting down there at the Capitol,â the employee repeated.

âOh really?â the President asked. âAll right, letâs go see.ââ123

A photograph taken by the White House photographerâthe last one permitted until later in the dayâcaptures the moment the President heard the news from the employee at 1:21 p.m.124 By that time, if not sooner, he had been made aware of the violent riot at the Capitol.

President Trump walked through the corridor from the Oval Office into the Presidential Dining Room and sat down at the table with the television remote and a Diet Coke close at hand.125 For the rest of the afternoonâas his country faced an hours-long attackâhe hunkered down in or around the dining room, watching television.126 He left only for a few minutesâfrom 4:03 p.m. to 4:07 p.m.âto film a video in the Rose Garden, only a few steps away, after hours of arm-twisting.127 But otherwise, the President remained in the dining room until 6:27 p.m., when he returned to his private residence.128

What happened during the 187 minutes from 1:10 p.m. to 4:17 p.m., when President Trump finally told the rioters to go home, isâfrom an official standpointâundocumented.

For instance, the Presidential Daily Diaryâthe schedule that tracks every meeting and phone call in which the President partakesâis inexplicably blank between 1:21 p.m. and 4:03 p.m.129 When asked to explain the gap in record-keeping on and around January 6th, White House officials in charge of its maintenance provided no credible explanation, including: âI donât recall a specific reason.ââ130

The men who spent most of the afternoon in that room with the President, Mark Meadows and Dan Scavino, both refused to comply with lawful subpoenas from the Select Committee.131 Others in the dining room appeared before the Select Committee but cited executive privilege to avoid answering questions about their direct communications with President Trump.132 Others who worked just outside of the Oval Office, like the Presidentâs personal secretaries Molly Michael and Austin Ferrer Piran Basauldo, claimed not to remember nearly anything from one of the most memorable days in recent American history.133

The White House photographer, Shealah Craighead, had been granted access to photograph the President during his January 6th speech, but once she got to the White Houseâand it became clear that an attack was unfolding on the Capitolâs stepsâshe was turned away.134

âThe President [didnât] want any photos,â she was told.135

Hereâs what President Trump did during the 187 minutes between the end of his speech and when he finally told rioters to go home: For hours, he watched the attack from his TV screen.136 His channel of choice was Fox News.137 He issued a few tweets, some on his own inclination and some only at the repeated behest of his daughter and other trusted advisors.138 He made several phone calls, some to his personal lawyer Rudolph Giuliani, some to Members of Congress about continuing their objections to the electoral certification, even though the attack was well underway.139

Hereâs what President Trump did not do: He did not call any relevant law enforcement agency to ensure they were working to quell the violence. He did not call the Secretary of Defense; he did not call the Attorney General; he did not call the Secretary of Homeland Security.140 And for hours on end, he refused the repeated requestsâfrom nearly everyone who talked to himâto simply tell the mob to go home.141

Throughout the afternoon, senior staff regularly entered the room to give him updates on what was happening at the Capitol.142 And, of course, President Trump used Twitter, where information is shared on an instantaneous basis.

Shortly after President Trump entered the dining room, White House Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany swung by to âcheck in with himâ about the letter Vice President Pence released around 1:00 p.m. announcing that he would not, in fact, overturn the will of the voters.

The President, once again, brought up going to the Capitol.143 McEnany recorded what he said in her notes, certain of which she later produced to the Select Committee: âPOTUS wanted to walk to [sic] capital. Physically walk. He said fine ride beast,â referring to the nickname for the presidential vehicle. âMeadows said not safe enough[.]ââ144

Meadows told Hutchinson at some point in the day that âthe President wasnât happy that Bobby [Engel] didnât pull it off for him,â meaning the trip to the Capitol, âand that Mark didnât work hard enough to get the movement on the books.ââ145

Despite the turmoil just outside its walls, the proceedings in the joint sessionâwhich had begun at 1:00 p.m.âwere still ongoing, and the President was watching them on the television.146 He was eager to know which senators were lodging objections on his behalf.147 âBack there and he wants list of senators,â McEnanyâs notes read. âWho [sic] objecting to what. Heâs calling them one by one.ââ148

The Select Committee subpoenaed several Members of Congress who reportedly spoke with President Trump during the afternoon.149 None of them complied.150

Cellular records obtained by the Select Committee suggest that President Trump was on the phone with his lawyer Rudolph Giuliani at least twice during this period. Giulianiâs phone connected with the White House switchboard for 3 minutes and 53 seconds at 1:39 p.m. and again for more than 8 minutes at 2:03 p.m.151 Between the two calls, at 1:49 p.m., President Trump tweeted a link to a video of his speech from the Ellipse.152

Before 1:57 p.m., Herschmann phoned Senior Advisor to the President Jared Kushnerâwho was on a plane travelling home from overseasâadvising him that âpeople are trying to break into the Capitolâ and that âthis is getting pretty ugly.ââ153

âWeâre going to see what we can do here,â Herschmann said. âWeâre going to try to get the President to put out a statement.ââ154

Throughout the afternoon, the Presidentâs advisors tried to get him to tell the mob to leave the Capitol, but to no avail.

Ben Williamson, the White House Acting Director of Communications, watched on the news as officers and rioters pepper sprayed each other and crowds used bicycle barricades to push against officers holding the line.155 He and Sarah Matthews, the Deputy Press Secretary, devised a plan: He would go to Meadows and she would go to McEnany to urge that the President issue a statement.156 Williamson first texted Meadows:

âWould recommend POTUS put out a tweet about respecting the police over at the Capitol.ââ157

Minutes later, around 2:05 p.m., Hutchinson found Meadows seated in his office on the couch, absorbed by his cell phone screen.158

âAre you watching the TV, chief?â she asked. He indicated he was.

âHave you talked to the President?â she asked.

âNo,â he replied. âHe wants to be alone right now.ââ159

Rioters broke into the west side of the Capitol building around 2:13 p.m.160 Just a few minutes later, Hutchinson saw Cipollone âbarreling down the hallwayâ andâafter looking at Hutchinson and shaking his headâopened the door to Meadowsâs office unannounced.161 Meadows was right where she left him, âstill sitting on his phone.ââ162

âThe rioters have gotten to the Capitol, Mark. We need to go down and see the President now,â she heard Cipollone say.163 Cipollone would not confirm or deny any of this exchange, citing executive privilege.164

âHe doesnât want to do anything, Pat,â Meadows said, peering up from his phone.165

âMark something needs to be done, or people are going to die and the bloodâs gonna be on your [fucking] hands,â Cipollone said. âThis is getting out of control. Iâm going down there.ââ166

Meadows finally stood up from the couch and walked with Cipollone toward the dining room to meet with the President.167

At exactly 2:24 p.m., President Trump made his first public statement during the attack on the Capitol by tweet. It read nothing like the statement his advisors had envisioned. It read:

Mike Pence didnât have the courage to do what should have been done to protect our Country and our Constitution, giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to previously certify. USA demands the truth!168

Minutes later, Meadows and Cipollone returned from their talk with the President.169 No statement was forthcoming.

âMark, we need to do something more. Theyâre literally calling for the Vice President to be [fucking] hung,â Hutchinson heard Cipollone say.170

âYou heard him, Pat,â Meadows replied. âHe thinks Mike deserves it. He doesnât think theyâre doing anything wrong.ââ171

âThis is [fucking] crazy. We need to be doing something more,â Cipollone said.172

Cipollone told the Select Committee that âthere needed to be an immediate and forceful response, statement, public statement, that people need to leave the Capitol now.ââ173 He said he was âpretty clearâ about his view in the White House that day, and he made that view known as soon as he became aware of the unrest.174 He would not comment on how the President responded, or on this conversation with Meadows, citing executive privilege.175 He did indicate that everyone in the White Houseâexcept President Trumpâagreed that people needed to leave the Capitol:

Vice Chair Cheney: And who on the staff did not want people to leave the Capitol?

Mr. Cipollone: On the staff?

Vice Chair Cheney: In the White House.

Mr. Cipollone: I canât think of anybody on that day who didnât want people to get out of the Capitol once theâparticularly once the violence started. No. I meanâ

Mr. Schiff: What about the President?

Vice Chair Cheney: Yeah.

Mr. Cipollone: Well, she said the staff. So I answered.

Vice Chair Cheney: No. I said in the White House.

Mr. Cipollone: Oh, Iâm sorry. I apologize. I thought you said who else on the staff. [Pauses to confer with counsel] Yeah. I canât reveal communications. But obviously I think, you knowâyeah.176

What the President did tweetâa broadside at his Vice Presidentâenlarged the target on Vice President Penceâs back. A Secret Service agent in the Protective Intelligence Division, tasked with monitoring threats against protectees in part by scouring social media, told his colleagues the tweet was âprobably not going to be good for Pence.ââ177

A second agent in reply noted that it had garnered â[o]ver 24K likes in under 2 mins.ââ178

Minutes after drawing increased attention to his besieged Vice President, the President called newly elected Senator Tommy Tuberville of Alabama at 2:26 p.m.179 He misdialed, calling Senator Mike Lee of Utah instead, but one passed the phone to the other in short order.180

President Trump wanted to talk objections to the electoral count. But Senator Tubervilleâalong with every other elected official trapped and surrounded in the buildingâhad other things on his mind.181

âI said, âMr. President, theyâve taken the Vice President out. They want me to get off the phone, I gotta go,ââ Senator Tuberville told reporters.182 ââ[W]eâre not doing much work here right now.âââ183

In the next half hour, between 2:26 p.m. and 3:06 p.m., President Trump spoke with House Leader Kevin McCarthy.184

Leader McCarthy told the public in a live interview with CBS News, while he and his colleagues were sheltering at a secure location,185 that he was âvery clearâ in telling President Trump âto talk to the nation to tell them to stop this.ââ186

Leader McCarthy later recounted his conversation to a number of people, including Representative Jaime Herrera Beutler, a Republican congresswoman from Washington State.187 âYou have got to get on TV, youâve got to get on Twitter, youâve got to call these people off,â he said he told the President.188

â[These] arenât my people, you know, these areâthese are Antifa,â President Trump insisted, against all evidence.189 âTheyâre your people. They literally just came through my office windows, and my staff are running for cover. I mean, theyâre running for their lives. You need to call them off,â Leader McCarthy told him.190

What President Trump said next was âchilling,â in Representative Herrera Beutlerâs words.191

âWell, Kevin, I guess theyâre just more upset about the election theft than you are,â the President said.192

The call then devolved into a swearing match.193

Mick Mulvaney, former Chief of Staff to President Trump, had a similar call with Leader McCarthy in the days after the attack. McCarthy told Mulvaney that he urged the President to get the rioters to stop, and the President replied, âKevin, maybe these people are just more angry about this than you are.ââ194

Marc Short, the Vice Presidentâs Chief of Staff, spoke with Leader McCarthy later that afternoon.195 Leader McCarthy told Short that he had spoken with President Trump and that he was âfrustrat[ed]â that the White House was ânot taking the circumstance as seriously as they should at that moment.ââ196 The administration was demonstrating a âlack of response or lack of responsibility,â Leader McCarthy told Short.197

At 2:49 p.m.âas the violence escalatedâPresident Trumpâs speechwriter Gabriel Robert texted someone: âPotus im sure is loving this.ââ198

No one was getting through to the President.

So Herschmann went to Ivanka Trumpâs office, hoping she would come to the dining room and be âa calming influenceâ on her father.199 Herschmann âjust sort of barged inâ and told her to turn on the television.200 After taking in a few of the violent scenes together, Herschmann and Ivanka Trump left the room and walked to the dining room, where her father was holed up.201

At 2:38 p.m., the President issued a tweet:202

Please support our Capitol Police and Law Enforcement. They are truly on the side of our Country. Stay peaceful!203

Ivanka Trump told the Select Committee that the President âdid not push back on [her] suggestionâ to issue the tweet, and that it was either she or President Trump himself who suggested the last line, âStay peaceful!ââ204 She confirmed there may have been some tweaking of the wording.205 McEnany, who was in the room at the time, wrote in her notes that âI say add âwe support PEACEFUL protest.â Ivanka add stay peaceful! Instead.ââ206 To the Select Committee, McEnany echoed Ivanka Trump that the President wasnât resistant in any way to putting out the message.207

But in private, McEnany told a different story to her deputy Sarah Matthews.

Back in the White House press office, Matthews told McEnany that the tweet did not go far enough in condemning the violence.208 McEnanyânoting that other staffers in the room were distractedâsaid âin a hushed tone . . . that the President did not want to include any sort of mention of peace in that tweet.ââ209

That took âsome convincing on their part,â McEnany said, and âit wasnât until Ivanka Trump suggested the phrase âStay peaceful!â that he finally agreed to include it.ââ210

Ivanka Trump repeatedly returned to the dining room to counsel her father throughout the day. It has been reported that each time Ivanka Trump âthought she had made headwayâ with her father, Meadows would call her âto say the [P]resident still needed more persuadingââa cycle that repeated itself over âseveral hoursâ that afternoon.211 After one such trip, Ivanka Trump told the Select Committee she went to her husbandâs office next door because she needed to âregroupâ and collect herself.212

Several witnesses corroborated pieces of this account. General Kellogg said he saw Ivanka Trump coming and going from the dining room at least twice that afternoon.213 Hutchinson said that it was âseveral times.ââ214 Once, Ivanka Trump reportedly left her father with a look on her face as if â[s]he had just had a tough conversation.ââ215 Radford, Ivanka Trumpâs Chief of Staff, saw that she was â[v]isibly upsetâ but continued going âdown there when people were asking her to be down there and trying to get action taken.ââ216

Radford told the Select Committee that Ivanka Trump believed that â[s]omething should be said or put out that was even stronger.ââ217

Hutchinson, too, recalled Ivanka Trump dropping by Meadowsâs office alongside Cipollone and talking about trying to convince her father to say something âmore direct than he had wanted to at that time and throughout the afternoon.ââ218

âI remember her saying at various points,â Hutchinson said, âshe wanted her dad to send them home. She wanted her dad to tell them to go home peacefully, and she wanted to include language that he necessarily wasnât on board with at the time.ââ219

President Trumpâs 2:38 p.m. tweet did not condemn the violence at the Capitol. It did not tell rioters to leave the building.

In the minutes before the tweet, Fox Newsâon the Presidentâs screenârelayed that the Capitol was on lockdown;220 that Capitol police officers were injured; that rioters were in the building and âjust feet from the House chamber.ââ221 In the minutes afterward, networks would report there was tear gas in the Capitol, forcing Members of Congress to evacuate in protective masks.222 At 2:39 p.m., Secret Service agents reported that â[m]ore just got in.ââ223

âI donât know how theyâre gonna retake the Capitol building back at this point,â one agent wrote to others two minutes later.224

At 2:44 p.m., a Capitol police officer shot a rioter named Ashli Babbitt.225 A handwritten noteâdashed off onto a White House pocket card and preserved by the National Archivesâread: â1x civilian gunshot wound to chest @ door of House cha[m]ber.ââ226 One White House employee saw the note on the dining table in front of President Trump.227

A barrage of text messages inundated Meadowsâs phone with a consistent plea.228 Everyone from conservative media personalities to Republican allies in Congressâand even the Presidentâs own familyâurged the President to do more:

Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene, 2:28 p.m.: âMark I was just told there is an active shooter on the first floor of the Capitol Please tell the President to calm people[.] This isnât the way to solve anything.ââ229

Laura Ingraham, 2:32 p.m.: âHey Mark, The [sic] president needs to tell people in the Capitol to go home.â âThis is hurting all of us.â âHe is destroying his legacy and playing into every stereotype . . . we lose all credibility against the BLM/Antifa crowd if things go South.â âYou can tell him I said this.ââ230

Mick Mulvaney, 2:35 p.m.: âMark: he needs to stop this, now. Can I do anything to help?ââ231

Representative Barry Loudermilk, 2:44 p.m.: âItâs really bad up here on the hill.â âThey have breached the Capitol.ââ232 At 2:48 p.m., Meadows responded: âPOTUS is engaging.ââ233 At 2:49 p.m., Loudermilk responded: âThanks. This doesnât help our cause.ââ234

Representative William Timmons, 2:46 p.m.: âThe president needs to stop this ASAP.ââ235 At 2:49 p.m., Meadows responded: âWe are doing it.ââ236

Donald Trump, Jr., 2:53 p.m.: âHeâs got to condem [sic] this shit. Asap. The captiol [sic] police tweet is not enough.ââ237 Meadows responded: âI am pushing it hard. I agree.ââ238 Later, Trump, Jr., continued: âThis his [sic] one you go to the mattresses on. They will try to fuck his entire legacy on this if it gets worse.ââ239

White House staff discussed issuing yet another, stronger statement to address the ongoingâand escalatingâviolence. Around 3:00 p.m., one proposal was written in block capital letters on a pocket card from the chief of staffâs office:

ANYONE WHO ENTERED THE CAPITOL ILLEGALLY WITHOUT PROPER AUTHORITY SHOULD LEAVE IMMEDIATELY[.]240

The handwriting appears to have been scrawled quickly and somewhat messily. Hutchinson recalled Meadows returning from the dining room with the note in hand and placing it on her desk.241 The word âillegallyâ had been newly crossed out.242

But there would be no further action, Meadows told her.243

At 3:13 p.m., 35 minutes after his last tweet, the President issued another tweet. Rather than coming out with a stronger statement, the 3:13 p.m. tweet largely parroted the one preceding it:

I am asking for everyone at the U.S. Capitol to remain peaceful. No violence! Remember, WE are the Party of Law & Orderârespect the Law and our great men and women in Blue. Thank you!244

Ivanka Trumpâwho was in the room when her father published the messageâtold the Select Committee that âthe gravity of the situationâ made her feel âthat it would be helpful to tweet again.ââ245 âThe [earlier] tweet didnât stop the violence,â Herschmann said.246

This tweetâlike the last oneâdidnât tell the rioters to go home. It suggested that they âremainâ at the Capitol, albeit peacefully.

The Presidentâs tweets were not tamping down on the violence, and White House staff knew it.247 By 3:17 p.m., Fox News was reporting gunshots on Capitol Hill. Law enforcement officers could be seen in the House chamber, pointing guns over the barricaded door: The chyron blared âGuns Drawn on House Floor.ââ248 Between 3:29 p.m. and 3:42 p.m., the network was flashing images of a protestor in the presiding officerâs chair, right where Vice President Pence had been sitting 90 minutes earlier.249 Other images showed Members of Congress trapped in the House gallery, crouching below the balcony for cover.250

Allies continued to text Meadows, begging the President to order the mob to go home and indicating that it was time the American people hear from the President directly:

Unknown, 3:04 p.m.: âAre you with potus right now? Hearing he is in the dining room watching this on TV . . .â âIs he going to say anything to de-escalate apart from that Tweet?ââ251

Reince Priebus, 3:09 p.m.: âTELL THEM TO GO HOME !!!ââ252

Unknown, 3:13 p.m.: âPOTUS should go on air and defuse this. Extremely important.ââ253

Alyssa Farah, 3:13 p.m.: âPotus has to come out firmly and tell protestors to dissipate. Someone is going to get killed . . .ââ254

Representative Chip Roy, 3:25 p.m.: âFix this now.ââ255 Meadows responded: âWe are.ââ256

Sean Hannity (Fox News), 3:31 p.m.: âCan he make a statement. I saw the tweet. Ask people to peacefully leave the capital [sic].ââ257 Meadows responded: âOn it.ââ258

Katrina Pierson, 3:40 p.m.: âNote: I was able to keep the crazies off the stage. I stripped all branding of those nutty groups and removed videos of all of the psychos. Glad it [sic] fought it.ââ259

Unknown, 3:42 p.m.: âPls have POTUS call this off at the Capitol. Urge rioters to disperse. I pray to you.ââ260

Unknown, 3:57 p.m.: âIs he coming out?â âHe has to right?ââ261

Brian Kilmeade, 3:58 p.m. (Fox News): âPlease get him on tv. Destroying every thing you guys have accomplished.ââ262

Donald Trump, Jr., 4:05 p.m.: âWe need an oval address. He has to lead now. Itâs gone too far and gotten out of hand.ââ263

At any moment in the afternoon, it would have been easy for President Trump to get before cameras and call off the attack. The White House Press Briefing Room is just down the hallway from the Oval Office, past the Cabinet Room and around the corner to the right. It would have taken less than 60 seconds for the President to get there.264 The space, moreover, is outfitted with cameras that are constantly âhot,â meaning that they are on and ready to go live at a momentâs notice.265 The White House press corps is also situated in the West Wing, right by the briefing room.266 The whole affair could have been assembled in minutes.267

However, it was not until nearly 3 hours after the violence began that President Trump finally agreed to tell the mob to go home.268

The Presidential Daily Diary notes that President Trump left the dining room to shoot the video at 4:03 p.m.269 By this pointâper Fox News coverage playing continually in the dining roomâmore law enforcement officers had arrived at the Capitol to resist the violent mob.270

The video shoot took place in the Rose Garden, the outdoor space that borders the Oval Office and the West Wing.271 The setup was not ornate, just a camera and a microphone. Luna made sure that the background and lighting looked good, and that President Trumpâs hair and tie were in place.272 President Trump delivered his remarks in one take, more or less, although he stopped and restarted at one point.273 In all, the video took less than 4 minutes to shoot, and the President was back in the dining room by 4:07 p.m.274

âI would stick to this script . . . ,â McEnany told President Trump before he stepped out to film.275

He didnât.

Kushner and others had drafted a statement, but President Trump spoke entirely off the cuff.276 Hereâs what he said:

I know your pain. I know youâre hurt. We had an election that was stolen from us. It was a landslide election and everyone knows it, especially the other side. But you have to go home now. We have to have peace. We have to have law and order. We have to respect our great people in law and order. We donât want anybody hurt. Itâs a very tough period of time. Thereâs never been a time like this where such a thing happened where they could take it away from all of us, from me, from you, from our country. This was a fraudulent election. But we canât play into the hands of these people. We have to have peace. So go home, we love you. Youâre very special. Youâve seen what happens. You see the way others are treated that are so bad and so evil. I know how you feel, but go home and go home in peace.277

A photo obtained from the National Archives shows President Trump and Herschmann huddled next to each other, watching a completed take through the monitor on the video camera.278

âThere needs to be a more direct statementâ telling the rioters to leave the Capitol, Luna heard Herschmannâyet againâtell the President.279 Herschmann testified that he did not recall this exchange.280

But according to Luna, President Trump rejected the note.

âThese people are in pain,â he said in reply.281

Down at the Capitol, the video began streaming onto riotersâ phones, and by all accounts including video footage taken by other rioters, they listened to President Trumpâs command.

âDonald Trump has asked everybody to go home,â one rioter shouted as he âdeliver[ed] the Presidentâs message.â âThatâs our order,â another rioter responded. Others watching the video responded: âHe says, go home.ââ282

The crowd afterward began to disperse.283 The video made clear what had been evident to many, including those closest to him: The President could have called off the rioters far earlier and at any point that day.284 But he chose not to do so.285

It was not until it was obvious that the riot would fail to stop the certification of the vote that the President finally relented and released a video statement made public at 4:17 p.m.286

After leaving the Rose Garden, the President returned to the dining room. At 6:01 p.m., he issued another tweet, the last of the day:

These are the things and events that happen when a sacred landslide election victory is so unceremoniously & viciously stripped away from great patriots who have been badly & unfairly treated for so long. Go home with love & in peace. Remember this day forever!287

He retired to his residence for the evening at 6:27 p.m.288 A White House photographer captured the President walking back to the residence with an employee in tow, carrying personal items President Trump wished to bring home with him for the night.289 In the employeeâs hands are the gloves the President was wearing while addressing the crowd at the Ellipse.290

The President had one parting comment to the employeeâthe thing that was evidently occupying his mind even after an afternoon of violenceâbefore he retired to his home.

âMike Pence let me down,â the President concluded.291

Even after President Trump finally told the rioters to go home, he and his lead attorney, Rudolph Giuliani, continued to seek to delay the joint session of Congress.

Giuliani began frantically calling the White House line the very minute that the Presidentâs video went up on Twitter.292 Failing to get through, he called back, once every minuteâ4:17 p.m., 4:18 p.m., 4:19 p.m., 4:20 p.m.293 He managed to get through, briefly, to Mark Meadows at 4:21 p.m., and then kept calling the White House line: at 4:22 p.m., three times on two different phones at 4:23 p.m., 4:24 p.m., and once more at 5:05 p.m.294 He finally managed to speak with President Trump at 5:07 p.m., and the two spoke for almost 12 minutes.295

After he spoke with President Trump, Giulianiâs phone calls went nearly without fail to Members of Congress: Senator Marsha Blackburn, and then Senator Mike Lee.296 He made three calls to Senator Bill Hagerty, then two to Representative Jim Jordan.297 He called Senator Lindsey Graham,298 Senator Josh Hawley,299 and Senator Ted Cruz.300 Giuliani had two calls with Senator Dan Sullivan over the course of the evening.301 There were another three calls to Representative Jordan, none of which connected.302 After 8:06 p.m., when the joint session resumed, the calls to Members of Congress finally stopped.303 Shortly afterward, at 8:39 p.m., Giuliani had one final call of 9 minutes with the President.304

When asked about these calls during his deposition before the Select Committee, Giuliani initially refused to answer. Giuliani insisted his calls to Members of Congressânone of whom were his clientâwere all attorney-client privileged.305 But Giuliani eventually relented.

âI was probably calling to see anyâif anything could be done,â he said. âAbout the voteâthe vote.ââ306

We know definitively what Giuliani was up to because he left a voice message for Senator Tubervilleâinadvertently on Senator Leeâs phoneârecording his request.307 He wanted for âyou, our Republican friends to try to just slow it down,â referring to the electoral count, and delay the joint session.308 Here are his own words:

The only strategy we can follow is to object to numerous States and raise issues so that we get ourselves into tomorrowâideally until the end of tomorrow. So if you could object to every State and, along with a congressman, get a hearing for every State, I know we would delay you a lot, but it would give us the opportunity to get the legislators who are very, very close to pulling their vote.309

The President, too, was at home, but he remained focused on his goal. Between 6:54 p.m. and 11:23 p.m., he spoke with 13 people, some more than once.310 Of the 13, six ignored or expressly refused to comply with Select Committee requests for their testimony.311 Two agreed to appear but refused to answer questions about their phone calls with the President, citing executive privilege.312 Two more refused to answer questions, claiming attorney-client privilege.313

Of the 13, five were President Trumpâs attorneys or lawyers who worked with him on efforts to reverse the outcome of the election. With one exception, each of these calls took place before 8:06 p.m., when Vice President Pence reopened the joint session of Congress and resumed counting the electoral votes.314 The President spoke with White House Counsel Pat Cipollone for 7 minutes at 7:01 p.m.315 He spoke with Kurt Olsen and Mark Martin, lawyers who both advised him on the Vice Presidentâs role in the joint session:316 He spoke with Martin for 9 minutes at 7:30 p.m., and Olsen twice, for 11 minutes at 7:17 p.m. and for another 10 minutes at 7:40 p.m.317 He spoke with Cleta Mitchell, the lawyer leading his election challenges in Georgia, for 2 minutes at 7:53 p.m.318 The President spoke with Herschmann for 5 minutes at 10:50 p.m.319

Another five of the people who spoke with President Trump that night were employees or outside advisors who counseled him on communications issues. These calls, by contrast, predominantly took place after the joint session resumed.320 He spoke with his communications director, Scavino, twice: for 7 minutes at 7:08 p.m. and for 15 minutes at 9:55 p.m.321 He spoke with McEnany for 11 minutes at 9:42 p.m.322 He took calls from Steve Bannon, for 7 minutes at 10:19 p.m., and Sean Hannity, for 8 minutes at 11:08 p.m.323

At 9:23 p.m., President Trump spoke with Jason Miller, his Campaign Communications Director, for 18 minutes.324

Of his own initiative, Miller had drafted a statement for the President assuring the nation that the transfer of powerâdespite the dayâs eventsâwould, indeed, take place.325 On their call, the President pushed back on the phrasing.

The President wanted the statement to promise a âpeaceful transitionâ of power, rather than just an âorderlyâ one.326

Miller rejected the change and told him why rather bluntly.

â[T]hat shipâs kind of already sailed,â he said, âso weâre going to say âorderly transition.âââ327

The President did not, by any account, express grief or regret for what happened at the Capitol. Neither did he appear to grasp the gravity of what he had set in motion.

In his last phone call of the night, the President spoke with Johnny McEntee, his Director of Personnel.328

â[T]his is a crazy day,â the President told him. McEntee said his tone was one of â[l]ike, wow, can you believe this shit . . .?ââ329

Did he express sadness over the violence visited upon the Capitol?

âNo,â McEntee said. âI mean, I think he was shocked by, you know, it getting a little out of control, but I donât remember sadness, specifically.ââ330

President Trump didnât make any other phone calls for the rest of the night.331 The President didnât call Vice President Pence. In fact, President Trump never called to check on his Vice Presidentâs safety that day. He didnât call the heads of any of the Federal law enforcement agencies. He didnât call the leadershipâneither Republican nor Democratâof the legislative branch of government that had just been overrun by a mob.332

Only two days after the riot, by January 8th, the President was over the whole thing.

He âjust didnât want to talk about it anymore,â he told his press aides. â[H]e was tired of talking about it.ââ333

Ivanka Trump claimed to the Select Committee that her father was âdisappointed and surprisedâ by the attack, but she could not name a specific instance of him expressly saying it.

âHeâI just felt that,â she said. âI know him really well.ââ334

Hereâs what she could definitively say:

Committee Staff: Has he ever expressed to you any sentiment that he did or did not do the right thing in how he responded on the day of the 6th?

Ms. Trump: No.

Committee Staff: Has he ever expressed any sentiment about something that he wished he had done on the day of the 6th?

Ms. Trump: No.

Committee Staff: Has he ever said anything to you about the people who were injured or who died that day?

Ms. Trump: No.

Committee Staff: Has he ever said anything to you about whether he should or should not continue to talk about the 2020 Presidential election after the events on the 6th?

Ms. Trump: No.335

The President may not have expressed regret over his behavior, but some of his most loyal supporters made the connection between his words and the violence.

A member of the speechwriting team, Patrick MacDonnell, conceded the next day in a text that âmaybe the rhetoric could have been better.ââ336 As the riot was in full throttle, even steadfast supporter Ali Alexander of âStop the Stealâ texted, âPOTUS is not ignorant of what his words will do.ââ337

âWe all look like domestic terrorists now,â Hope Hicks texted Julie Radford.338

Separately, Hicks texted Herschmann, âSo predictable and so sad.â

âI know,â he replied. âTragic.â

âIâm so upset. Everything we worked for wiped away,â she continued.

âI agree. Totally self-inflicted,â he wrote.339

Brad Parscale, Trumpâs Former Campaign Manager, texted Katrina Pierson at 7:21 p.m. on January 6th, saying the dayâs events were the result of a âsitting president asking for civil war.ââ340

âThis week I feel guilty for helping him win . . . a woman is dead,â Parscale added.

âYou do realize this was going to happen,â Pierson answered.

âYeah. If I was trump [sic] and knew my rhetoric killed someone,â he said.

âIt wasnât the rhetoric,â she said.

Parscaleâs reply: âYes it was.ââ341

ENDNOTES

Â Â 1. As explained in Chapter 8, the Proud Boys and other extremists initiated the attack shortly before the joint session of Congress was set to begin at 1:00 p.m. The rioters who streamed down Pennsylvania to the U.S. Capitol from the Ellipse then provided crucial momentum for the attack.

Â Â 2. âManual for Courts-Martial United States,â Department of Defense, (2019), at 334, available at https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/Documents/2019%20MCM%20(Final)%20(20190108).pdf?ver=2019-01-11-115724-610.

Â Â 3. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark. A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 268.

Â Â 4. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark. A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 83.

Â Â 5. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark. A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 296.

Â Â 6. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark. A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 268.

Â Â 7. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hope Hicks, (October 25, 2022), pp. 108-110; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC_HH_033 (Jan. 6, 2021, Hogan Gidley text message to Hope Hicks at 2:19 p.m. EST).

Â Â 8. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC_HH_033 (Jan. 6, 2021, Hogan Gidley text message to Hope Hicks at 2:19 p.m. EST).

Â Â 9. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC_HH_033 (Jan. 6, 2021, Hogan Gidley text message to Hope Hicks at 2:19 p.m. EST).

Â 10. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:38 p.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1346904110969315332.jpg (archived).

Â 11. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah Matthews (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 39â41.

Â 12. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014925 (January 6, 2021, Donald Trump Jr. text message to Mark Meadows at 2:53 p.m. ET).

Â 13. At 3:13 p.m., President Trump tweeted: âI am asking for everyone at the U.S. Capitol to remain peaceful. No violence! Remember, WE are the Party of Law & Orderârespect the Law and our great men and women in Blue. Thank you!â Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 3:13 p.m. ET, available at https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1346912780700577792.jpg (archived).

Â 14. Tommy Christopher, âWATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of Trumpâs Bombshell Call with McCarthy Refusing to Call off Capitol Rioters,â Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at https://www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/.

Â 15. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â 16. âNew Video of Capitol Rioter: âTrump is Still Our President,ââ CNN Business, at 0:37, Feb. 6, 2021, available at https://www.cnn.com/videos/media/2021/02/06/qanon-capitol-rioter-video-trump-still-president-sot-nr-vpx.cnn.

Â 17. Trial Exhibit 6732 (1.S.159.1165-67, 84), United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C Nov. 1, 2022). Vallejo was manning the quick reaction force at a hotel in Arlington, Virginia, awaiting word to bring in a cache of weaponry; he was not at the Capitol on January 6th. Trial Exhibit 6731, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022) (Vallejo messaged his group in the afternoon âQRF standing by at hotel. Just say the wordâ); Trial Transcript at 2728, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 2022) (Oath Keeper Terry Cummings testified that âI had not seen that many weapons in one location since I was in the militaryâ when he arrived at the Arlington hotel).

Â 18. âTrump Video Telling Protesters at Capitol Building to Go Home: Transcript,â Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/trump-video-telling-protesters-at-capitol-building-to-go-home-transcript.

Â 19. âTrump Video Telling Protesters at Capitol Building to Go Home: Transcript,â Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/trump-video-telling-protesters-at-capitol-building-to-go-home-transcript.

Â 20. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 6:01 ET, available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/tweets-january-6-2021 (archived).

Â 21. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 125.

Â 22. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28, 2022), p. 157.

Â 23. Mariana Alfaro, âTrump Vows Pardon, Government Apology to Capitol Rioters if Elected,â Washington Post, (Sept. 1, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/01/trump-jan-6-rioters-pardon/.

Â 24. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 8:06 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22Sleepy+Eyes+Chuck+Todd+is+so+happy%22 (archived).

Â 25. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 8:17 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22All+Mike+Pence+has+to+do+is%22 (archived).

Â 26. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 8:22 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1 (archived).

Â 27. Documents with file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (January 6, 2021, The Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump at 8:23 a.m. ET).

Â 28. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (January 6, 2021, The Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump at 8:23 a.m. ET). The Select Committee issued subpoenas to Bannon, Olson, and Giuliani in order to learn more about these telephone conversations, among other things. Bannon refused to comply with his subpoena, leading to his referral and ultimate conviction for criminal contempt of Congress. Olson sued to block the Select Committee from enforcing his subpoena. Giuliani spoke with the Select Committee but asserted attorney-client privilege with respect to all of his telephone conversations with President Trump on January 6th. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 198.

Â 29. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (January 6, 2021, The Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump at 9:02 a.m. ET); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 12.

Â 30. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Stephen Miller, (Apr. 14, 2022), p. 145.

Â 31. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ross Worthington, (Feb. 15, 2022), p. 112; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Ross Worthington Production), RW_0002633 (Jan. 4, 2021, email at 10:00 p.m. from Ross Worthington to Patrick MacDonnell asking for research related to the January 6th speech).

Â 32. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Ross Worthington Production), RW_0002341âRW_0002351 (Jan. 6, 2021, Stephen Miller emails to Ross Worthington, Vincent Haley and Robert Gabriel, Jr. at 10:22 and 10:23 a.m. ET, attaching draft speech).

Â 33. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attacks on the United States Capitol (Ross Worthington Production), RW_0002341â2344 (Jan. 6, 2021, email from Stephen Miller to Ross Worthington, Vincent Haley, and Robert Gabriel, re: EDITS, attaching draft Save America March speech with edits and comments).

Â 34. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attacks on the United States Capitol (Ross Worthington Production), RW_0002341â2343 (Jan. 6, 2021, email from Stephen Miller to Ross Worthington, Vincent Haley, and Robert Gabriel, re: EDITS, attaching draft Save America March speech with edits and comments).

Â 35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ross Worthington, (Feb. 15, 2022), p. 164. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Vincent Haley, (April 12, 2022), pp. 88â89; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah Miller, (April 14, 2022), p. 148.

Â 36. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007430_0001 (Jan. 6, 2021, Ross Worthington email to Vincent M. Haley at 10:49 a.m. ET).

Â 37. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Stephen Miller, (Apr. 14, 2022), p. 154.

Â 38. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 9:00 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22they+just+happened+to+find%22 (archived); Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 9:15 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22they+states+want+to+redo%22 (archived); Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 9:16 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22even+Mexico%22 (archived); Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 10:44 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22these+scoundrels+are+only+toying%22 (archived).

Â 39. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the Capitol, (National Archives Production), P-R000285 (January 6, 2021, Schedule marked private with handwritten notes at 11:22 a.m. ET); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021) pp. 90â93; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2021), p. 126.

Â 40. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 48â49; see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 22 (âI could just tell in his voice when he was talking to the Vice President that he was disappointed and frustrated.â).

Â 41. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 4.

Â 42. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Julie Radford, (May 24, 2020), p. 18.

Â 43. Compare Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000285 (January 6, 2021, schedule with handwritten notes about the meeting); with Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000100198 (communication noting âMogulâ en route to the Ellipse at 11:39 a.m.).

Â 44. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 93.

Â 45. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P_R000007558_0001 (Jan. 6, 2021, Stephen Miller email to Robert Gabriel Jr.).

Â 46. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007531_0001 (Jan. 6, 2021, Robert Gabriel Jr. email to Ross Worthington at 11:33 a.m. ET).

Â 47. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P_R000007531_0001 (Jan. 6, 2021, Ross Worthington email to Robert Gabriel Jr. at 11:34 a.m. ET).

Â 48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Vincent Haley, (Apr. 12, 2022), p. 95.

Â 49. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attacks on the United States Capitol (Ross Worthington Production), RW_0002341â2343 (January 6, 2021, email from Stephen Miller to Ross Worthington, Vincent Haley, and Robert Gabriel, re: EDITS, attaching draft Save America March speech with edits and comments).

Â 50. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Vincent Haley, (Apr. 12, 2022), p. 95; Document on file with the Select Committee (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007557_0001, 076P-R000007557_0034, 076P-R000002896_00001, 076P-R000002896_00025, 076P-R000002984_0001, 076P-R000002984_00304 (various drafts, including teleprompter inputs, of the speech).

Â 51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 126.

Â 52. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000286 (January 6, 2021, note from Nicholas Luna to President Trump).

Â 53. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000111236 (January. 6, 2021, Email Re: CSD Activity Log #2 at 2:49 p.m. ET).

Â 54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 87â88; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), 076P-R000005179_0001â0002 (January 6, 2021 email reporting on the status of people going through the magnetometers and noting â[s]everal thousand on the mall watching but not in line.â).

Â 55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 12â13.

Â 56. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Cassidy Hutchinson Production), CH-0000000069, (January 6, 2021, Cassidy Hutchinson text message to Tony Ornato at 12:45 p.m. ET).

Â 57. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 15â16; see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th (â[W]e were standing towards the front of the tent with the TVs really close to where he would walk out to go on to the stage. Theâthese conversations happened two to three minutes before he took the stage that morningâ).

Â 58. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump at 11:55 a.m. ET).

Â 59. âDonald Trump Speech âSave Americaâ Rally Transcript January 6,â Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-transcript-january-6 (time-stamping the speech).

Â 60. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Cassidy Hutchinson Production), CH-0000000069 (January 6, 2021, Cassidy Hutchinson text message to Tony Ornato at 12:45 p.m. ET).

Â 61. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 8.

Â 62. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000002879_00001 (âSave America Marchâ speech early draft); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ross Worthington, (Feb. 15, 2022), p. 157.

Â 63. Brian Naylor, âRead Trumpâs Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial,â NPR, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.

Â 64. âDonald Trump Speech âSave Americaâ Rally Transcript January 6,â Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-transcript-january-6 (timestamping the speech).

Â 65. âDonald Trump Speech âSave Americaâ Rally Transcript January 6,â Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-transcript-january-6 (time-stamping the speech); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Alex Holder Production) Video file Clip 45DAY32CAMB0050.mov at 3:10â3:40 (capturing âfight for Trumpâ chants during Donald Trump, Jr.âs speech); Lena V. Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed, and Maya Eliahou, âWhat Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,â ProPublica, at 12:01 pm at 3:33 and at 12:05 pm at 0:30 (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/ (capturing âfight for Trumpâ chants droning out the President after he told the crowd âwe will not let them silence your voicesâ); FORMER WAGIE, âFULL FOOTAGE: Patriots STORM U.S. Capitol,â YouTube, at 59:00, Jan. 6, 2021, posted Jan. 8, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iNFcdpZdkh0.

Â 66. Brian Naylor, âRead Trumpâs Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial,â NPR, (Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.

Â 67. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th. But see Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 129 (âIt wasnâtâhe didnât give me an impressions that he was frustrated or angry at the prospect of what the President had said on the stage. It was more of him trying to rush to get insight on what our plans were and wanted to have insight and be read in on that in case we had been planning to go up to the Capitol.â).

Â 68. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Cassidy Hutchinson Production), CH-0000000069.

Â 69. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp.128â29; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th .

Â 70. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â 71. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000176702.

Â 72. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R001005-1026 (January 6, 2021, National Security Council staff chat logs); See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview White House Security Official, (July 11, 2022), p. 47 (discussing clearing a route to the Capitol for âMogulâ).

Â 73. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Security Official, (July 11, 2022), p. 45.

Â 74. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Security Official, (July 11, 2022), p. 45.

Â 75. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Security Official , (July 11, 2022), p. 45.

Â 76. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000208061 (January 6, 2021, email to Robert Engel at 1:19 p.m. ET). Despite the fact that the prospect of an OTR to the Capitol was raised at the highest levels within the Secret Service, some of its highest-ranking agents insisted to the Select Committee that they did not recall any such discussions on the day of January 6th. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert Engel, (Mar. 4. 2022), p. 77. When presented with his text messages with Cassidy Hutchinson in which she referred to an âOTR to Capitol,â Tony Ornato insisted that he didnât ârecall ever talking about this with her.â Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Mar. 29, 2022), p. 62.

Â 77. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 117.

Â 78. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 8.

Â 79. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000257 (January 6, 2021, Presidential Daily Diary).

Â 80. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee âPress Secretary,â (October 31, 2022), pp. 49â51 (the word âfuriousâ was âconsistent with what was described to me that occurredâyou know, agitated, furious, upset, angry, whatever adjectiveâ).

Â 81. Mark Meadows, The Chiefâs Chief, (St. Petersburg: All Seasons Press, 2021), at p. 250 (âWhen he got offstage, President Trump let me know that he had been speaking metaphorically about the walk to the Capitol.Â .Â .Â . It was clear the whole time that he didnât actually intent to walk down Pennsylvania Avenue with the crowd.â).

Â 82. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Robert Engel, (Mar. 4, 2022).

Â 83. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 158â62.

Â 84. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 159.

Â 85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 160.

Â 86. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 5â8.

Â 87. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Max Miller, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 90; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), p. 71; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022) p. 118; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Security Official, (July 11, 2022) pp. 35â36.

Â 88. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 5.

Â 89. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 5.

Â 90. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

Â 91. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 6â7.

Â 92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee with National Security Responsibilities, (July 19, 2022), pp. 69â71.

Â 93. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee with National Security Responsibilities, (July 19, 2022), p. 71.

Â 94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), pp. 143â44, 147â48.

Â 95. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee, (Nov. 21, 2022), pp. 92â93.

Â 96. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee with National Security Responsibilities (July 19, 2022), p. 73 (âIn the days following that, I do remember, you know, again, hearing again how angry the President was when, you know, they were in the limo.â)

Â 97. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Sep. 14, 2022), pp. 34, 36, 37â38, 55.

Â 98. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark Robinson, (July 7, 2022), pp. 18, 23.

Â 99. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee, (Nov. 4, 2022), pp. 99â100.

100. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee âPress Secretary,â (Oct. 31, 2022), pp. 46, 50.

101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee âPress Secretary,â (Oct. 31, 2022), p. 50; see also Carol Leonnig (@CarolLeonnig), Twitter, June 28, 2022 7:46 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/CarolLeonnig/status/1541931078184845312. The press secretary confirmed that he or she confirmed this information to the reporter because âthatâs what I had been told.â â[Engel] did indicateâyou know, kind of outlined .Â .Â . that the President did want to go to the Capitol, and Mr. Engel advised that we cannot go,â the press secretary testified. âAnd you know, [President Trump] was agitated, but Mr. Engel advised thatâyou know, it was kind of a non-issue. It was agitated verbally, and they proceeded to the White House.â Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee âPress Secretary,â (Oct. 31, 2022), pp. 46, 50.

102. The Select Committee has agreed not to name the Secret Service agent who was driving the vehicle to protect his privacy. We will refer to him in this report as âthe driver.â

103. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Secret Service Employee âDriver,â (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 77; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), pp. 100â01.

104. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), pp. 100â01.

105. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Secret Service Employee âDriver,â (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 77.

106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Secret Service Employee âDriver,â (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 77.

107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Secret Service Employee âDriver,â (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 78.

108. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Secret Service Employee âDriver,â (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 79.

109. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Secret Service Employee âDriver,â (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 78. This recollection of the Presidentâs phrasing seems very similar to Hutchinsonâs testimony about President Trumpâs statement before he took the stage at the Ellipse: âIâm the President. Take the Fâing mags away. Theyâre not here to hurt me.â Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 11â12.

110. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee, (Nov. 7, 2022), pp. 78, 92.

111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee, (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 78.

112. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 102. Mr. Engel also did not recall another occasion where testimony indicates that the incident in the presidential vehicle was mentioned. Mr. Engelâs counsel has asked the Committee not to make certain evidence relating to that occasion public.

113. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), pp. 143â44, 147â48.

114. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Secret Service Employee âDriver,â (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 80.

115. The Justice Department will have all of the relevant information and can make decisions about whether and how to proceed based upon this evidence.

116. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 121.

117. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478 at p. 4 (January 6, 2021, PID update at 1:25 p.m.).

118. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark Robinson, (July 7, 2022), pp. 18â19.

119. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 121.

120. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 125.

121. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000208061 (January 6 2021, email from Robert Engel at 1:55 p.m.).

122. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 27.

123. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 27.

124. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), Photo file 40a8_hi_j0087_0bea.

125. Select Committee Interview Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), pp. 27â28.

126. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).

127. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).

128. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).

129. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump). See also Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000028 (Memorandum from White House Diarist confirming that â[t]he Oval Log for January 6, 2021 was not receivedâ).

130. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Molly Michael, (Mar. 24, 2022), p 29 (âWhy did that change, that you were not taking any records?â âI donât recall a specific reason.â); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 111â12 (attributing the lack of recordkeeping to Michaelâs absence in the White House, though she was present in the Outer Oval during the afternoon); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Austin Ferrer Piran Basualdo, (Apr. 8, 2022), p. 86.

131. H. Rept. 117-216, Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives Find Mark Randall Meadows in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 1st Ssess. (2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt216/CRPT-117hrpt216.pdf; H. Rept. 117-284, Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives Find Peter K. Navarro and Daniel Scavino, Jr., in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 2d sess. (2022), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt284/CRPT-117hrpt284.pdf.

132. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 118; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 155â57.

133. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Molly Michael, (Mar. 24, 2022), p. 136 (âThe phones were ringing. A lot was happening. I donât recall.â); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Austin Ferrer Piran Basualdo, (Apr. 8, 2022), pp. 109â10 (âI donât remember where I was that afternoon.â âDo you remember being at the White House that afternoon, even if you donât remember where exactly you were in the White House?â âNo, I do not.â âDo you remember being home, wherever home is for you, on the afternoon of January 6th, as opposed to being at the White House?â âNo, I donât.â âSo you donât remember whether you were at home or at the White House in the afternoon of January 6th, 2021?â âAgain, that day was very blurry.â).

134. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Shealah Craighead, (June 8, 2022), p. 46.

135. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Shealah Craighead, (June 8, 2022), p. 46. It is the standard practice of the White House photographers to cover the President from the moment he steps out of the residence until he returns there at the end of the day. Id. at 7. Craighead pushed back, telling Michael that the White House would want to document the day for historical purposes, but Michael did not relent. Id. at p. 28.

136. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 115 (âWell, I saw the President watching TV.â).

137. Select Committee Interview Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 23.

138. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 64 (âI recall walking in and saying, âYou have to put out a strong statement condemning violence and asking for peace to be restored.â).

139. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022); See also Jonathan Karl, Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump Show, (New York: Dutton, 2021), p. 287.

140. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 174; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), pp. 126â27.

141. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 129.

142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 169â70.

143. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 159â60.

144. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Kayleigh McEnany Production), KMC_000000724 (Jan. 6, 2021, Kayleigh McEnany notes).

145. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 8.

146. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 164.

147. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 164.

148. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Kayleigh McEnany Production), KMC_000000724 (Jan. 6, 2021, Kayleigh McEnany notes).

149. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Subpoena to Honorable Kevin McCarthy, (May 12, 2022), available at https://january6th.house.gov/sites/democrats.january6th.house.gov/files/2022-05-12-Subpoena-for%20OGC-McCarthy%20Kevin%20%28002%29.pdf; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Subpoena to Representative Jim Jordan, (May 12, 2022), available at https://january6th.house.gov/sites/democrats.january6th.house.gov/files/2022-05-12-Subpoena-for%20OGC-Jordan%20Jim%20%28002%29.pdf.

150. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Subpoena to Honorable Kevin McCarthy, (May 12, 2022), available at https://january6th.house.gov/sites/democrats.january6th.house.gov/files/2022-05-12-Subpoena-for%20OGC-McCarthy%20Kevin%20%28002%29.pdf; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Subpoena to Representative Jim Jordan, (May 12, 2022), available at https://january6th.house.gov/sites/democrats.january6th.house.gov/files/2022-05-12-Subpoena-for%20OGC-Jordan%20Jim%20%28002%29.pdf.

151. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).

152. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2020 1:49 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2FizItBeFE6G%22 (archived).

153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), p. 144.

154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), p. 145.

155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Benjamin Williamson, (Jan. 25, 2022) p. 60. Live feeds of the Capitol began showing pepper spray exchanges between officers and rioters around 1:29 p.m. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000094153; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000094192; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 40:00, available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

156. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 36â37.

157. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Benjamin Williamson Production), CTRL0000034784 (Jan. 6, 2021, Benjamin Williamson text message to Mark Meadows at 2:02 p.m. EST); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Benjamin Williamson (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 64.

158. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 24 (âI saw that he was sitting on his couch on his cell phone, same as the morning, where he was just kind of scrolling and typing.â).

159. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 24.

160. The Select Committeeâs review of U.S. Capitol Police surveillance footage showed that Proud Boy Dominic Pezzola smashed a Senate Wing window at 2:13 p.m. and rioters entered through that window, as well as an adjacent door, shortly thereafter. See also Third Superseding Indictment at 21, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380 (noting that Dominic Pezzola âused [a] riot shield â¦ to break a window of the Capitolâ at â2:13 p.m.â and that â[t]he first members of the mob entered the Capitol through this broken windowâ); 167 Cong. Rec. S634 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf.

161. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 25. Cipollone confirmed that he first went to the dining room when he saw that âpeople had breached the Capitol, they had gotten into the Capitol.â Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 149.

162. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 26.

163. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 26.

164. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 150.

165. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 26.

166. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 26. Cipollone did not elaborate but testified generally that he was âvery upset about what was happeningâ at the Capitol and wanted âaction to be taken related to that.â Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 149.

167. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 26.

168. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22Mike+Pence+didn%E2%80%99t+have+%22 (archived).

169. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 27.

170. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 27.

171. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 27. President Trump himself has defended publicly the rioters who chanted âHang Mike Pence!â In an interview, journalist Jonathan Karl asked President Trump about the chants. âWell, the people were very angry,â he responded. The President continued: âBecause itâs common senseÂ .Â .Â .Â . How can youâif you know a vote is fraudulent, how can you pass a fraudulent vote to Congress? How can you do it?â Jonathan Karl, Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump Show, (New York: Dutton, 2021), p. 340.

172. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 27. Hutchinson recalled one other thing that Meadows said, referring to the tweet attacking Vice President Pence: â[T]his is the best weâre going to get for now.â Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (May 17, 2022), p. 17. Hutchinson believes that this conversation took place after the 2:24 p.m. tweet, but the context suggests that it may have taken place after the 2:38 p.m. or 3:13 p.m. tweets.

173. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 150.

174. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 150.

175. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 161.

176. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 161; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:29:45â1:31:50, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo.

177. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000095185.

178. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000095247.

179. Lauren Fox and Clare Foran, âGOP Sen. Mike Lee Hands Over Phone Records to House Impeachment Managers,â CNN, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/13/politics/mike-lee-phone-records-impeachment-trial/index.html.

180. Mike Lillis, âTuberville Defends Account of Trump Call During Capitol Riot,â The Hill, (Feb. 12, 2021), available at https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/538704-tuberville-defends-account-of-trump-call-during-capitol-riot/. Sen. Tuberville stated publicly that the originating number was identified as âWhite Houseâ on Sen. Leeâs phone, suggesting that the call came through the White House Switchboard. Id.

181. Jonathan Karl, Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump Show, (New York: Dutton, 2021), at p. 287.

182. Jonathan Karl, Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump Show, (New York: Dutton, 2021), at p. 287.

183. Eddie Burkhalter, âTuberville Says He Attended Jan. 5 Fundraiser at Trumpâs Washington Hotel,â Alabama Political Reporter, (Feb. 19, 2021), available at https://www.alreporter.com/2021/02/19/tuberville-says-he-attended-jan-5-fundraiser-at-trumps-washington-hotel/.

184. The call likely happened after the evacuation of the House chamber starting at approximately 2:38 p.m., and Rep. McCarthy spoke about it to CBS Newsâs Norah OâDonnell by phone between approximately 3:00 to 3:15 p.m. CBS News, âHouse Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy: I Completely Condemn the Violence in the Capitol,â YouTube, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MpBbpqO5qgU. Molly Michael testified that she recalls receiving the incoming call from Leader McCarthy on Dan Scavinoâs landline and transferring it to a landline in the dining room. She does not recall when the call took place, nor did she hear anything about what was discussed. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Molly Michael, (Mar. 24, 2022), pp. 131â32.

185. âHouse Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy: âI Completely Condemn the Violence in the Capitol,ââ CBS News, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.cbsnews.com/video/house-minority-leader-kevin-mccarthy-condemn-the-violence/#x.

186. âHouse Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy: âI Completely Condemn the Violence in the Capitol,ââ CBS News, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.cbsnews.com/video/house-minority-leader-kevin-mccarthy-condemn-the-violence/#x.

187. Tommy Christopher, âWATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of Trumpâs Bombshell Call with McCarthy Refusing to Call off Capitol Rioters,â Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at https://www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/.

188. Tommy Christopher, âWATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of Trumpâs Bombshell Call with McCarthy Refusing to Call off Capitol Rioters,â Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at https://www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/.

189. Tommy Christopher, âWATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of Trumpâs Bombshell Call with McCarthy Refusing to Call off Capitol Rioters,â Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at https://www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/.

190. Tommy Christopher, âWATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of Trumpâs Bombshell Call with McCarthy Refusing to Call off Capitol Rioters,â Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at https://www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/.

191. Tommy Christopher, âWATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of Trumpâs Bombshell Call with McCarthy Refusing to Call off Capitol Rioters,â Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at https://www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/.

192. Tommy Christopher, âWATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of Trumpâs Bombshell Call with McCarthy Refusing to Call off Capitol Rioters,â Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at https://www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/.

193. Tommy Christopher, âWATCH: GOP Rep Reveals Details of Trumpâs Bombshell Call with McCarthy Refusing to Call off Capitol Rioters,â Mediaite, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at https://www.mediaite.com/news/watch-gop-rep-reveals-details-of-trumps-bombshell-call-with-mccarthy-refusing-to-call-off-capitol-rioters/.

194. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of John Michael âMickâ Mulvaney, (July 28, 2022), p. 43.

195. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 46.

196. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 46.

197. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 47.

198. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Ross Worthington Production), RW_0002307 (Jan. 6, 2021, Gabriel Roberts text message at 2:49 p.m.).

199. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 72.

200. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 68; see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 68â69.

201. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 70.

202. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 69 (âAnd she was in there for a few minutes, and then came out and he had issued a tweet.â); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 64 (âWithin, I believe, a few minutes he had issued thatâhe put out that tweet, a version of that tweet.â).

203. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:38 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22please+support+our%22 (archived).

204. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 87â89.

205. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 88.

206. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Kayleigh McEnany Production), KMC_000000724, (January 6, 2021, Kayleigh McEnany Notes); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 185.

207. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 88â89; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 185.

208. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

209. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

210. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

211. Carol Leonnig and Philip Rucker, I Alone Can Fix It: Donald J. Trumpâs Catastrophic Final Year (New York: Penguin, 2021), p. 474.

212. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 91.

213. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), p 141.

214. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 170.

215. Bob Woodward and Robert Costa, Peril, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 248.

216. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Julie Radford, (May 24, 2022), p. 32.

217. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Julie Radford, (May 24, 2022), p. 30.

218. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 37; Hutchinson recalls that Meadows, Herschmann, Ivanka Trump, and others would come and go from the Chief of Staffâs office at intervals throughout the afternoon. âI donât know if it was for a breather or to have a conversation away from the dining room,â she said. Id., at 31.

219. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 38.

220. Fox News, âU.S. Capitol on Lockdown as Protests Threaten Security,â YouTube, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFWGBnJ0rQA.

221. Fox News, âBreaking News: Protestors Now inside U.S. Capitol,â YouTube, at 2:40, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://www.fox29.com/video/887421.

222. Fox News, âPro-Trump Protestors Storm U.S. Capitol,â YouTube, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tVPSYr-xG6s.

223. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000095389.

224. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000095393 (Jan. 6, 2021, text between Secret Service agents at 2:41 p.m. EST).

225. Marshall Cohen and Avery Lotz, âThe January 6 Insurrection: Minute-by-Minute,â CNN, (July 29, 2022), available at https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/10/politics/jan-6-us-capitol-riot-timeline/index.html.

226. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000241 (Jan. 6, 2021, note to President Trump).

227. Select Committee Interview Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), pp. 46â47.

228. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014921, MM014923, MM014926.

229. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014906. Recently, Representative Greene has qualified her stance on armed rioters at the Capitol. At a Young Republicans event in New York, she said: âI got to tell you something, if Steve Bannon and I had oganized [January 6th], we would have won. Not to mention, it wouldâve been armed.â She claims she was joking. Aaron Blake, âAnalysis: Marjorie Taylor Greeneâs Jan. 6 âJokeâ Has Been Building for a Long Time,â Washington Post, (Dec. 12, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/12/12/greene-january-6-punchline/.

230. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014907, MM014908, MM014909, (Jan. 6, 2021, Laura Ingraham text message to Mark Meadows at 2:32 pm); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014911 (Jan. 6, 2021, Laura Ingraham text message to Mark Meadows at 2:32 p.m.).

231. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014912.

232. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014914, MM014915.

233. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014921.

234. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014922.

235. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014919.

236. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014923.

237. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014925.

238. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014926.

239. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014928.

240. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000240 (January 6, 2021 proposed statement).

241. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

242. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

243. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

244. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 3:13 p.m. EST, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22remain+peaceful%22 (archived).

245. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 119.

246. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack at the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 88.

247. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 88; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 172; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 155.

248. âPergram: Most Significant Breach of Government Institution Since 1814,â Fox News, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://www.foxnews.com/video/6220760122001#sp=show-clips.

249. Fox News, âIndividual Shot in U.S. Capitol,â YouTube, at 1:59, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oL-M0LuE3Hk.

250. âAndy McCarthy Blasts Pro-Trump Protesters after Breach at Capitol,â Fox News, at 1:28, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://www.foxnews.com/video/6220757649001#sp=show-clips.

251. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014932, MM014934.

252. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014935. This was sent from a phone number associated with Priebusâs family member.

253. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014936.

254. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014937.

255. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014939.

256. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014943.

257. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014944.

258. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014947.

259. Documents on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014948.

260. Document on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014949.

261. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014956, MM014957.

262. Document on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014961.

263. Document on File with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014964.

264. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

265. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; see also CBS News, âHouse Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy: âI completely condemn the violence in the Capitol,ââ YouTube, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MpBbpqO5qgU.

266. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

267. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 22, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 163.

268. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 4:17 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2FPm2PKV0Fp3%22 (archived).

269. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).

270. âBill Hemmer Reports,â Fox News, at 3:56 p.m. ET, available at https://archive.org/details/FOXNEWSW_20210106_200000_Bill_Hemmer_Reports/start/3360/end/3420 (archived).

271. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), pp. 162â63.

272. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 162.

273. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), Video file 40983.

274. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).

275. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 234. President Trump did not react to her suggestion, McEnany said. See id.

276. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 161; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 97â99.

277. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 4:17 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2FPm2PKV0Fp3%22 (archived).

278. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), Photo file 4243_hi_j0233_61ae.

279. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 182. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), pp. 49â50 (remembering that someone in the Rose Garden told the President something along the lines âthat he needed to use stronger, more forcefulâ language in the video).

280. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 99.

281. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 181.

282. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:58:30, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo.

283. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th. (â[A]s soon as that come out, everybody started talking about it and thatâsâit seemed like it started to disperse.â).

284. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6h Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th (âBasically, when President Trump put his tweet out. We literally left right after that [had] come out.â).

285. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th. (â[I]f he would have done that earlier in the day, 1:30, Iâyou know, we wouldnât be in thisâmaybe we wouldnât be in this bad of a situation or something.â).

286. âBill Hemmer Reports,â Fox News, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://archive.org/details/FOXNEWSW_20210106_200000_Bill_Hemmer_Reports/start/780/end/840.

287. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2020 6:01 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22these+are+the+things+and+events%22 (archived).

288.

289. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 53.

290. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives production), Photo file 364c_hi_j0246_2fa8.

291. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 53.

292. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).

293. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).

294. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).

295. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).

296. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022).

297. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).

298. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).

299. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022).

300. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022).

301. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022).

302. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).

303. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).

304. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).

305. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 206. (âYou were leaving messages or having phone calls with United States Senators about the joint session of Congress. How could that possibly be [a] privileged conversation?â âBecause the conversation is about the theory of the case, and my representation of the client.â).

306. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 207.

307. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 206; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Robert OâBrien Production), NSA 0040 (January 6, 2021, text message from Sen. Mike Lee to Robert OâBrien at 10:55 p.m. EST reading, âYou canât make this up. I just got this voice message [from] Rudy Giuliani, who apparently thought he was calling Senator Tuberville.â âYouâve got to listen to that message. Rudy is walking malpractice.â).

308. Steve Hayes, âGiuliani to Senator: âTry to Just Slow it Down,ââ The Dispatch, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://thedispatch.com/p/giuliani-to-senator-try-to-just-slow.

309. Steve Hayes, âGiuliani to Senator: âTry to Just Slow it Down,ââ The Dispatch, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://thedispatch.com/p/giuliani-to-senator-try-to-just-slow.

310. Those 13 people are Pat Cipollone, Dan Scavino, Kurt Olsen, Mark Martin, Cleta Mitchell, Rudy Giuliani, Kayleigh McEnany, Jason Miller, Mark Meadows, Steve Bannon, Eric Herschmann, Sean Hannity, and John McEntee. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000261 (Jan. 6, 2021, the Presidential Call Log).

311. H. Rept. 117-152, Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives Find Stephen K. Bannon in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 1st sess. (2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt152/CRPT-117hrpt152.pdf; H. Rept. 117-216, Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives Find Mark Randall Meadows in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 1st sess. (2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt216/CRPT-117hrpt216.pdf; H. Rept. 117â284, Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives Find Peter K. Navarro and Daniel Scavino, Jr., in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 2d sess. (2022), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt284/CRPT-117hrpt284.pdf; Erik Larson, âLawyer Who Talked to Trump on Day of Capitol Riot Sues over Subpoena,â Bloomberg, (Mar. 25, 2022), available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-25/lawyer-who-talked-to-trump-on-day-of-mob-riot-sues-over-subpoena (discussing Kurt Olsen); Caleb Ecarma, âSean Hannity Wants the January 6 Committee to Believe Heâs a Journalist,â Vanity Fair, (Jan. 5, 2022), available at https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2022/01/sean-hannity-january-6-committee-journalist.

312. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 118; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony âPatâ Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 195.

313. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Cleta Mitchell, (May 18, 2022), p. 131; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 211.

314. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump); âWATCH: âLetâs Get Back to Work,â Pence Urges Senate,â PBS, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/watch-lets-get-back-to-work-pence-urges-senate.

315. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).

316. Olsen authored a memo urging Vice President Pence to adjourn the joint session of Congress without counting electoral votes. See Documents on file with the Select Committee on the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production) Chapman004979 (Jan. 2, 2021, Kurt Olsen Draft Memorandum Entitled, âThe Role of the Vice President in Receiving Votes from the Electoral College.â) Martin advised President Trump that Vice President Pence possessed the constitutional authority to impede the electoral count. See Nicholas Fandos, Peter Baker, and Maggie Haberman, âHouse Moves to Force Trump Out, Vowing Impeachment if Pence Wonât Act,â New York Times, (Jan. 10, 2021), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/10/us/politics/trump-impeachment.html. Both corresponded with John Eastman and others regarding plans to convene alternate electors in states won by Joe Biden. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman023998 (Dec. 6, 2020, Michael Farris email forwarding an email concerning the âImportance of Republican Electors in AZ, GA, MI, NV, PA and WI Voting on Dec 14â at 1:54 p.m. ET). President Trump asked to speak with Mr. Olsen and Mr. Martin before he left the dining room. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007401_00001 (Jan. 6, 2021, Molly Michael email to MBX WHO MA Joint White House Switchboard at 11:28 p.m. ET).

317. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).

318. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump). Mitchell declined to discuss her conversations with President Trump on attorney-client privilege grounds. She did, however, acknowledge that following the phone call, she took steps to dismiss the Presidentâs pending election suit in Georgia. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Cleta Mitchell, (May 18, 2022), p. 131.

319. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of the President Donald J. Trump); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 118 (Herschmann refused to answer questions about the phone call, citing executive privilege).

320. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255âP-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).

321. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255âP-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).

322. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255âP-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).

323. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255âP-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).

324. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255âP-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).

325. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 258â59.

326. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 258.

327. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 258.

328. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee (Mar. 28, 2022), pp. 160â61; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of the President Donald J. Trump).

329. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28, 2022), p. 161.

330. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28, 2022), p. 161.

331. Insert: Documents on file with the Select Committee (National Archives Production), P-R000259 (Jan. 6, 2021, Daily Diary of the President Donald J. Trump).

332. Documents with file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255 (Jan. 6, 2021, The Daily Diary of President Donald J. Trump).

333. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 42â43.

334. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 179â80.

335. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 180.

336. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Patrick MacDonnell Production), PM000158 (Jan. 7, 2021, Patrick MacDonnell text message to personal contact at 9:46 p.m. EST).

337. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Ali Alexander Production), CTRL0000017719, p. 3; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ali Alexander, (Dec. 9, 2021), p. 57.

338. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC_HH_042.

339. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC_HH_040.

340. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0717 (Jan. 6, 2021, Brad Parscale text message to Katrina Pierson at 7:14 p.m. ET).

341. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Katrina Pierson Production), KPierson0718âKPierson20 (Jan. 6, 2021, Brad Parscale text message to Katrina Pierson at 7:22 p.m. ET).

8

Late in the evening on January 6, 2021, Henry âEnriqueâ Tarrio, the head of the Proud Boys, posted a video on his Parler account. The brief footage showed a masked man, wearing a black cape, standing in front of the U.S. Capitol Building. Tarrio titled the 18-second video, set to ominous music, âPremonition.â He offered no further explanation. The clear implication of the brief footage, recorded sometime prior to January 6th, was that Tarrio had foreknowledge of the events that transpired earlier that same day.1

Indeed, Tarrio cheered on his fellow Proud Boys as they attacked the U.S. Capitol. He had been arrested and ordered to leave Washington, DC two days earlier. Although Tarrio was not physically present, he continued to monitor and communicate with his men via encrypted chats and social media. At 2:36 p.m. on January 6th, Tarrio wrote on Parler that he was âenjoying the show,â adding: âDo what must be doneâ and â#WeThePeople.ââ2 Two minutes later, Tarrio wrote: âDonât fucking leave.â Several minutes after that, Tarrio messaged his Proud Boys: âMake no mistakeâ¦â and âWe did thisâ¦ââ3

Law enforcement officials subsequently uncovered significant evidence showing that Tarrio and his lieutenants planned to storm the U.S. Capitol. In June 2022, Tarrio and four other Proud Boys were charged with seditious conspiracy and other crimes related to their alleged responsibility for the assault.4 The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has alleged that they âconspired to prevent, hinder and delay the certification of the Electoral College vote, and to oppose by force the authority of the government of the United States.ââ5 On January 6, 2021, the Proud Boys âdirected, mobilized and led members of the crowd onto the Capitol grounds and into the Capitol, leading to dismantling of metal barricades, destruction of property, breaching of the Capitol building, and assaults on law enforcement.ââ6

The Select Committeeâs analysis corroborates the DOJâs findings and allegations. The Select Committee reviewed extensive footage of the attack, including that recorded by the U.S. Capitol Policeâs (USCP) surveillance cameras, the Metropolitan Police Departmentâs (MPD) body-worn cameras, publicly available videos, as well as on-the-ground film produced by an embedded documentarian. The Select Committee interviewed rioters, law enforcement officers, and witnesses that were present on January 6th, while also consulting thousands of court filings. Using these sources of information, the Select Committee developed a timeline of events to understand how the unprecedented attack on the U.S. Capitol unfolded.

As explained below, the Proud Boys marched from the Washington Monument to the U.S. Capitol on the morning of January 6th. While tens of thousands of President Trumpâs supporters gathered at a rally at the Ellipse near the White House, the Proud Boys prepared to attack. Shortly before the joint session of Congress was set to begin at 1:00 p.m., the Proud Boys instigated an assault on outmanned law enforcement at the Peace Circle, a key location. They quickly overran security barriers and made their way onto the U.S. Capitolâs restricted grounds. Throughout the next several hours, members of the Proud Boys led the attack at key breach points, preventing law enforcement from gaining crowd control and inciting others to press forward.

President Trump finished his speech at the Ellipse at approximately 1:10 p.m. Toward the end of his remarks, the President directed his supporters to march down Pennsylvania Avenue to the Capitol. Their natural path took them through the Peace Circle, which had already been cleared out by the Proud Boys and their associates. Thousands of rioters and protestors streamed onto the Capitolâs restricted grounds in short order.

The Proud Boys were not solely responsible for attacking the U.S. Capitol. As explained in Chapter 6, other far-right extremists and conspiracy theorists prepared for violence after President Trump summoned them to Washington for a âwildâ protest on January 6th. And they joined in the assault as well. Three Percenters, QAnon adherents, and other radicals were on the frontlines, pressing the charge. The Oath Keepers attacked the Capitol, forming two military-style âstacksâ to push their way into the building. The white nationalist Groypers were present as their leader gave an inflammatory speech from the same Peace Circle where the attack was launched. Like members of the Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, and Three Percenters, some of the Groypers have been charged for their actions on January 6th.

Unaffiliated Americans enraged by President Trumpâs lies rioted as well. The January 6th, attack has often been described as a riotâand that is partly true. Some of those who trespassed on the Capitolâs grounds or entered the building did not plan to do so beforehand. But it is also true that extremists, conspiracy theorists and others were prepared to fight. That is an insurrection. They answered President Trumpâs call to action. Some, like the Proud Boys, deliberately harnessed the mobâs anger to overrun the Capitol.

During the early morning hours of January 6th, tens of thousands of Americans from around the country began to gather at the Ellipse and the Washington Monument. They had come to hear President Trump speak and, more importantly, for his âwildâ protest.

Nick Quested, a documentary filmmaker, captured the mood that morning. Jacob Chansley (a.k.a. the QAnon Shaman) proclaimed âthis is our 1776,â vowing âJoe Biden is never getting in.ââ7 An unnamed woman from Georgia, who said she hosted a podcast dedicated to a new so-called Patriot Party, also proclaimed January 6th to be the new 1776. She added an ominous warning. âIâm not allowed to say whatâs going to happen today because everyoneâs just going to have to watch. Somethingâs gonna happen, one way or the other.ââ8

The Secret Service set up magnetometers to screen for weapons and other contraband, but many rally-goers chose to avoid the screening altogether.

At 6:29 a.m., Stewart Rhodes, the leader of the Oath Keepers, reminded his groupâs members that DC prohibited blades over â3 inchesâ and encouraged them to â[k]eep [the knives] low profile.ââ9 Others were thinking along the same lines. At 7:25 a.m., the National Park Service reported that a significant number of attendees ditched their bags in trees, rather than have them inspected.10 Cassidy Hutchinson told the Select Committee she heard that thousands of people refused to walk through magnetometers to enter the Ellipse because they did not want to be screened for weapons.11 According to Hutchinson, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations whose responsibilities included security-related issues, Tony Ornato, told the President that the onlookers âdonât want to come in right now. Theyâthey have weapons that they donât want confiscated by the Secret Service.ââ12 When he arrived at the Ellipse that morning, President Trump angrily said: âI donât [fucking] care that they have weapons. Theyâre not here to hurt me. They can march to the Capitol from here.ââ13

Approximately 28,000 rally-goers did pass through the magnetometers. The Secret Service confiscated a significant number of prohibited items from these people, including: 269 knives or blades, 242 cannisters of pepper spray, 18 brass knuckles, 18 tasers, 6 pieces of body armor, 3 gas masks, 30 batons or blunt instruments, and 17 miscellaneous items like scissors, needles, or screwdrivers.14

At 8:07 a.m., Secret Service countersurveillance agents reported that âmembers of the crowd are wearing ballistic helmets, body armor and carrying radio equipment and military grade backpacks.ââ15 By 9:45 a.m., the Secret Service noted people openly carrying pepper spray as they strolled the streets.16

President Trumpâs mob was itching for a fight. National Park Service officers arrested a man who had entered the restricted area around the Washington Monument. Immediately, about 100 people started forming a circle around the officer, âthreaten[ing] law enforcement,â as the officer later recounted.17 The officer retreated into the Washington Monument with the man in custody.18 The crowd responded angrily, punching the Monumentâs glass windows and continuing to threaten officers.19 Law enforcement around the Washington Monument felt so unsafe that they âlocked themselves in a security box by the mall.ââ20 Rioters nevertheless âscaled the sides of the security box and climbed on top of the structure.ââ21 It was a harbinger of things to come.

MPD monitored and responded to a stream of threats that morning. Three men in fatigues from Broward County, Florida brandished AR-15s in front of MPD officers on 14th Street and Independence Avenue.22 MPD advised over the radio that one individual was possibly armed with a âGlockâ at Fourteenth Street and Constitution Avenue, and another was possibly armed with a ârifleâ at Fifteenth Street and Constitution Avenue around 11:23 a.m.23 The National Park Service detained an individual with a rifle between 12:00 and 1:00 p.m.24

Far-right extremists brought guns into Washington or the surrounding area. Christopher Kuehne, a member of the Proud Boys, met up with friends on January 5th to discuss their plans for the following day. One person in attendance said he did not travel to Washington just to âmarch aroundâ and asked, âdo we have patriots here willing to take it by force?ââ25 Kuehne told them he had guns, and he was ready to go.26 During the attack, Kuehne helped prop open Capitol blast doors as besieged law enforcement retreated inside.27 Guy Reffitt, a Three Percenter from Texas, attended the rally at the Ellipse, and then carried a loaded firearm onto Capitol grounds.28 Jerod Thomas Bargar lost his gunâthat heâd carried from the Ellipse in a âWe the Peopleâ holster29âwhile scuffling with police on the west side of the Capitol around 2:30 p.m.30 Bargar wanted to be armed, he said, when he went into the âbelly of the beast.ââ31

Mark Andre Mazza drove from Indiana, bringing a Taurus revolver, a .45-caliber weapon that he loaded with both shotgun and hollow-point rounds.32 After assaulting a police officer, he lost the weapon,33 dropping it or losing it on the steps of the lower West Plaza leading to the Capitolâs West Front Terrace.34 The Select Committee reviewed Mazzaâs social media accounts before they were taken down, finding that he shared multiple conspiracy theories, including QAnon material.35 Mazza later indicated that he intended to target House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, telling authorities that âyouâd be here for another reasonâ if he had found the Speaker inside the Capitol.36

Lonnie Leroy Coffman from Falkville, Alabama, parked by the Capitol building before walking nearly 2 miles to the Ellipse to hear the President speak.37 In his car, he had stocked a handgun, a rifle, a shotgun, hundreds of rounds of ammunition, large-capacity ammunition-feeding devices, machetes, camouflage smoke devices, a bow and arrow, and 11 Mason jars filled with gasoline and styrofoam, as well as rags and a lighter (tools needed to make Molotov cocktails).38 Police found two more handguns on Coffman when he was arrested later that day.39

Many in attendance were aware of Washingtonâs prohibition on carrying a concealed weapon and made plans accordingly. The Oath Keepers left their guns stowed away in their cars or across State lines for easy access should they be needed.40 The group staged a âquick reaction forceâ across the river in Virginia, amassing an arsenal to come to DC âby landâ or âby sea,â as Florida State-chapter leadâand defendant convicted of seditious conspiracyâKelly Meggs said.41 Oath Keeper Jason Dolan testified at the seditious conspiracy trial that the âquick reaction force [was] ready to go get our firearms in order to stop the election from being certified within Congress.ââ42 Dolan further testified that the Oath Keepers came to Washington, DC âto stop the certification of the election. . . . [b]y any means necessary. Thatâs why we brought our firearms.ââ43

Garret Millerâa January 6th defendant who traveled from Richardson, Texasâposted on Facebook that âhe was bringing guns with him but âmight just keep 1 hidden one and store the rest in Virginiaââ after learning about the DC law.44 He also threatened to assassinate Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and predicted a âcivil war could start.ââ45

Many members of the crowd decided against bringing firearms into the nationâs capital, and armed themselves in other ways. Alex Kirk Harkrider from Carthage, Texas, and his co-defendant, Ryan Nichols, left guns in a parked car just outside the district before attending the rally.46 Harkrider still brought a tomahawk axe.47 During the march to the Capitol, he yelled â[c]ut their fucking heads off!ââ48 One rioter told the Select Committee he saw another carrying a âpitchfork.ââ49

Members of the mob carried flags and turned the flagpoles into weapons. Michael Foy, from Wixom, Michigan, carried a hockey stick to the Ellipseâhe draped a Trump flag over it.50 Just hours later, Foy used that hockey stick to repeatedly beat police officers at the inaugural tunnel.51 Former New York City police officer Thomas Webster carried a Marine flag, which he later used to attack an officer holding the rioters back at the lower West Plaza.52 Another individual, Danny Hamilton, carried a flag with a sharpened tip, which he said was âfor a certain person,â to which Trevor Hallgren (who had traveled with Hamilton to Washington, DC) responded: âit has begun.â Later, Hallgren commented that â[t]hereâs no escape Pelosi, Schumer, Nadler. Weâre coming for you. . . . Even you AOC. Weâre coming to take you out. To pull you out by your hairs.â On January 5th, Hallgren took a tour of the Capitol with Representative Barry Loudermilk, during which he took pictures of hallways and staircases.53

The mob President Trump summoned to Washington, DC, on January 6th, was prepared to fight.

While tens of thousands of President Trumpâs supporters attended the rally at the Ellipse, the Proud Boys had other plans. On the morning of January 6th, they gathered at the Washington Monument. At 10:30 a.m., the Proud Boys started their march down the National Mall towards the U.S. Capitol. In total, there were approximately 200â300 Proud Boys, as well as their associates, in the group.54

Enrique Tarrio, the chairman of the Proud Boys, was not in attendance. As explained in Chapter 6, Tarrio had been arrested two days earlier and ordered to leave Washington. However, Tarrio continued to monitor events remotely from Baltimore, communicating with his men throughout the day. With Tarrio offsite, the Proud Boys were led by three other senior members of the group: Ethan Nordean, Joseph Biggs, and Zachary Rehl.

Ethan Nordean (a.k.a. âRufio Panmanâ) was a member of the Proud Boysâ Elders chapter and president of his local chapter in Seattle, Washington.55 Nordean was regarded as the leader for January 6th after Tarrio was arrested.56 In the days leading up to January 6th, Nordean made ominous comments on social media. In conversations with his fellow Proud Boys, he argued that the Presidential election was tainted by fraud and violence was a necessary remedy. For example, on January 4th, Nordean posted a video on social media with the title: âLet them remember the day they decided to make war with us.ââ57 In another social media post on January 5th, Nordean warned âwe are coming for them.ââ58 He added a telling line: âYouâve chosen your side, black and yellow teamed with red, white and blue against everyone else.ââ 59 The âblack and yellowâ is a reference to the Proud Boys. And when Nordean wrote the âred, white and blue,â he likely meant the Trump supporters who would be in attendance for January 6th.

Joseph Biggs (a.k.a. âSergeant Biggsâ) was a senior Proud Boys member and served as an event âorganizerâ for the group.60 Biggs previously worked with Alex Jones and InfoWars.61 In late December 2020, Biggs posted a message on Parler in which he explained that the Proud Boys âwill not be attending DC in colors.ââ62 That is, unlike at previous events, the Proud Boys would not wear their branded, black and yellow clothing, but instead seek to be inconspicuous. Biggs continued:

We will be blending in as one of you. You wonât see us. Youâll even think we are you . . .We are going to smell like you, move like you, and look like you. The only thing weâll do thatâs us is think like us! Jan 6th is gonna be epic.63

Tarrio posted a similar message, saying the Proud Boys would go âincognitoâ on January 6th. 64 Consistent with this decision, Biggs was dressed in a plaid shirt, glasses, and dark hat as he led the march from the Washington Monument.65 Other Proud Boys dressed in a similar fashion.

Zachary Rehl (a.k.a. âCaptain Trumpâ) was president of the local Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Proud Boys chapter.66 Like his comrades, Rehl believed President Trumpâs Big Lie about the 2020 Presidential election.67 He raised more than $5,500 in funds for January 6th. Like Nordean, Biggs and others, Rehl was dressed âincognitoâ as he helped lead the group from the Washington Monument.68

Shortly after 11:00 a.m., the Proud Boys arrived at the west side of the Capitol, near a reflecting pool. From there, they marched to the east front of the Capitol. Surveillance footage shows the Proud Boys passing Garfield Circle on the southwest corner of the Capitol at 11:15 a.m.69 They walked north towards the Peace Circle next, and surveillance cameras captured them on video there at approximately 11:21 a.m.70 There was just one USCP officer standing guard at the Peace Circle fence at the time.71

As the Proud Boys paraded around the Capitol grounds, Nick Quested, a documentary filmmaker who spent time with the group, recalled them taunting USCP officers. One Proud Boy told the officers to â[r]emember your oath,â â[c]hoose a side,â and â[b]e on the right side of history.ââ72 By 11:41 a.m., the Proud Boys made their way around to the east side of the Capitol, crossing along Constitution Avenue.73 While on the east front, they posed for pictures with members of their Arizona delegation, who were clearly identifiable by their orange caps.74 They then walked back across the north side of the Capitol towards the National Mall, where they stopped to eat at food trucks.75 The Proud Boys stayed by the food trucks until they returned to the Peace Circle at approximately 12:49 p.m.76

Within minutes of arriving at the Peace Circle, the Proud Boys and their associates launched the attack on the U.S. Capitol. The circle is the site of the Peace Monument, a statue erected from 1877 to 1878 to commemorate naval deaths at sea during the Civil War with âtwo classically robedâ womenâone woman representing âgrief,â covering her face, and the other woman representing âhistory.â The woman standing in for âhistoryâ holds a tablet that reads, âThey died that their country might live.ââ77

The Peace Circleâs geographical location is crucially important for understanding how the January 6th, attack unfolded. It sits at the end of Pennsylvania Avenue, just in front of the U.S. Capitol. At the conclusion of his speech at the Ellipse, President Trump directed rally attendees to march down Pennsylvania Avenue to the U.S. Capitol. Their shortest natural path would lead them right to the Peace Circle and to the northwest side of the Capitol grounds, also known as the West Plaza. By the time rally-goers arrived, the Proud Boys and their allies had already removed the fencing that stood in the crowdâs way. As a result, thousands of people streamed into the restricted Capitol grounds with relative ease.

When the Proud Boys arrived back at the Peace Circle at 12:49 p.m., they still had about 200 to 300 members and many other protestors had joined them.78 Shortly after arriving, the Proud Boys incited the crowd with antagonistic chants such as â1776.ââ79 Officer Caroline Edwards, who was standing guard, explained to the Select Committee that the Proud Boys asked her and the other USCP officers if they could walk past the fencing and talk to the officers. âNo,â she replied. The Proud Boys and others immediately turned on Edwards and her fellow officers, referring to them as âNancy Pelosiâs dogsâ and shouting.80

At approximately 12:51 p.m., Quested captured a rioter named Ryan Samsel with his arm around Proud Boys leader Joe Biggs, who led the chants.81 Samsel subsequently claimed that Biggs encouraged him to push through the barricades and, when Samsel hesitated to follow through, Biggs âflashed a gun, questioned his manhood and repeated his demandâ to move to the front and âchallenge the police.ââ82 Biggs has contested Samselâs version of events.83 After speaking with Biggs, Samsel breached the outer fencing of the Peace Circle at 12:53 p.m.84 The first set of fencing at the Peace Circle was staged on 1st Street Northwest, with the second set of fencing not far behind. Once Samsel breached the outer fencing, USCP officers, including Officer Edwards, moved from their posts to meet Samsel and other rioters.85

In less than a minute, at 12:54 p.m., the rioters pushed USCP officers to the ground, removed the fencing, and quickly stormed east towards the U.S. Capitol building.86 Officer Edwards was thrown to the ground, causing her to hit her head on concrete steps.87

Two Proud Boys from New York, Dominic Pezzola and William Pepe, were among those leading the march to the next line of security barriers.88 Pepe, an employee of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority in upstate New York, took sick leave to travel to Washington for the January 6th events.89 Pepe dragged part of the fence away at the next security barrier, ensuring that USCP officers were left defenseless.90 The Proud Boysâ actions were not spontaneous. Jeffrey Finley, a Proud Boys leader from West Virginia, later admitted âthere appeared to be a coordinated effort to pull the barricades apart.ââ91 Proud Boy Jeremy Bertino admitted to similar facts when pleading guilty to seditious conspiracy, stating stated that he âbelieved . . . that the purpose of traveling to Washington, DC, on January 6, 2021, was to stop the certification of the Electoral College Vote, and that the MOSD leaders were willing to do whatever it would take, including using force against police and others, to achieve that objective.â Based on discussions he and other Proud Boys leaders had in the leadup to January 6th, he âbelieved that storming the Capitol would achieve the groupâs goal of stopping Congress from certifying the Electoral College Vote. Bertino understood that storming the Capitol or its grounds would be illegal and would require using force against police or other government officials.ââ92

Parallel to the Peace Circle, at the Garfield Circle walkway located at the southeast corner of the Capitol grounds, rioters breached the fencing at 12:55 p.m. and began rushing the West Plaza where they would converge with others from the Peace Circle.93

By 12:58 p.m., the crowd filled the lower West Plaza of the Capitol just below the inauguration stage that had been built for the ceremony scheduled two weeks later. After the initial breaches, the USCP was able to deploy enough officers to stop the rioters from advancing past the base of the inauguration stage. More importantly, rioter momentum was further halted when the first group of MPD officers arrived on scene at 1:11 p.m.,94 almost precisely as President Trump finished his Ellipse speech. The MPD officers initially pushed back the rioters on the West Plaza, slowing them down before they would later breach the Capitol.95

A stalemate ensued on the West Plaza before rioters were able to make any further progress. Rally-goers arriving from the Ellipse provided crucial momentum.

Toward the end of his speech at the Ellipse, President Trump made sure an already angry crowd of his supporters stayed enraged. âWe fight like hell[,] and if you donât fight like hell, youâre not going to have a country anymore,â the President told the tens of thousands of people who had assembled at the Ellipse, or in the vicinity. About one minute later, President Trump directed those in attendance âto walk down Pennsylvania Avenue . . . to the Capitol.â The President told the people they were âgoing to try and giveâ Republicans, including his own Vice President, âthe kind of pride and boldness that they need to take back our country.ââ96

âThereâs enough people here to storm the Capitol,â a member of the crowd said at 1:06 p.m., just as the President was concluding his remarks.97 Ronald Sandlin, who pleaded guilty to and has been sentenced for felonies committed on January 6th, including telling officers in the Capitol that â[y]ouâre going to die,â watched the Presidentâs speech from a nearby restaurant and live-streamed a video in which he encouraged âother patriotsâ to âtake the Capitol.ââ98 Sandlin repeated the phrase âfreedom is paid for with bloodâ several times during his video.99

âWeâre getting ready to go march on Capitol Hill. Weâre gonna go fuck some shit up,â Cody Mattice, another January 6th defendant who pleaded guilty and has been sentenced,100 said while walking to the Capitol. Mattice later added: âWeâre getting up front, and weâre taking this shit.ââ101 Ryan Nichols, who was charged with eight felonies, livestreamed a diatribe as he marched towards the Capitol at 1:40 p.m. Nichols echoed the Presidentâs unconstitutional claim that Vice President Pence had the power to decide the election himself. âIâm hearing that Pence just caved . . . Iâm telling you if Pence caved, weâre gonna drag motherfuckers through the streets,â Nichols said.102 âCut their heads off!â Nichols yelled with his codefendant Harkrider, before encouraging others to join âRepublican protestors [who] are trying to enter the House right now.ââ103

On the way to the Capitol, Oath Keeper Jessica Watkins chatted with others in a Zello group named âStop the Steal J6.â Watkins said that â100%â of the Ellipse crowd was âmarching on the Capitol,â because âit has spread like wildfire that Pence has betrayed us.ââ104 As she approached the Capitol with a contingent of Oath Keepers, Watkins said: âIâm probably gonna go silent when I get there âcause Iâm a be a little busy.105 Donald Hazard, a Three Percenter from Texas who claimed to be allied with Proud Boys on January 6th, told a Washington Post reporter that he wanted his face recorded on video as he marched to the Capitol. âI want the enemy to know exactly who is coming after them,â Hazard explained.106

Leaders of the âStop the Stealâ movement continued to incite the crowd during the march as well. Alex Jones of InfoWars arrived at the Ellipse shortly before 9:00 a.m. on the morning of January 6th.107 After some initial difficulty gaining access to the event area, Jones was seated in the VIP section.108 While Jones stayed to listen to a portion of President Trumpâs speech, planning for the crowdâs march to the Capitol was already underway and Jones intended to leave the Ellipse early to lead the march. The origins of the plan to have Jones lead the march are unclear. Jones has publicly stated that âthe White House told me three days before, we are going to have you lead the March.ââ109 Stop the Stealâs Ali Alexander also believed âthe White Houseâ wanted him to lead a march to the Capitol.110 It is likely that both got that idea from Caroline Wren, a Republican fundraiser who helped organize the Ellipse event.111 Jones texted Wren at 12:27 p.m., asking when he should leave the Ellipse and begin the march.112

While Wren originally expected Jones, Roger Stone, and retired Lt. Gen. Flynn to march to the Capitol, Stone did not attend the Ellipse rally and so he was not present to accompany Jones on the march as planned.113 Additionally, while President Trump was delivering his speech, Wren asked Flynn if he was going to march with Jones. Flynn responded, âHell, no. Itâs freezing.ââ114

While Stone and Flynn did not march, Jones and Alexander led others to the Capitol, though it is not clear how many people followed them.115 Jones and Alexander gathered with Jonesâs camera and security crew just outside the event perimeter, near Freedom Plaza, to discuss their plans.116 The discussion, recorded by Alex Jonesâs film crew, sheds some light on what Jones and Alexander knew about the Presidentâs plans and what they intended for the march. The group, which included InfoWars host Owen Shroyer, huddled outside the Ellipse security perimeter to discuss how best to proceed. They tried to predict the Presidential motorcadeâs route to the Capitol. The video shows Alex Jones telling his crew, âI think the Wren lady, whereâs she at? She knows what they said they were going to do. Everything sheâs said has been accurate, so we need to call her real quick.ââ117 They then decided to walk down Pennsylvania Avenue, as the President had directed in his speech.

Shroyer recommended the group wait for President Trump to finish speaking, and they agreed to at least delay their departure from Freedom Plaza to allow Jones to gather a crowd. 118 Jones began speaking from his bullhorn, imploring people to gather and walk down Pennsylvania Avenue.119 While using the bullhorn, Jones told the crowd that they were experiencing âthe second American revolution,ââ 120 and stated, â[l]etâs go take our country back. Trump is only minutes away. Letâs start marching to the Capitol, peacefully.ââ121

Proud Boys were among the crowd Jones gathered during his march. Matthew Walter, president of a Tennessee chapter of the organization,122 was near the National Mall with two other Proud Boys from Tennessee and decided to join Jones.123 Other, more prominent members of the Proud Boys appear to have been in contact with Jones and Shroyer about the events of January 6th and on that day. Records for Enrique Tarrioâs phone show that while the attack on the Capitol was ongoing, he texted with Jones three times and Shroyer five times.124 Ethan Nordeanâs phone records reflect that he exchanged 23 text messages with Shroyer between January 4th and 5th, and that he had one call with him on each of those days.125 Records of Joseph Biggsâs communications show that he texted with Shroyer eight times on January 4th and called him at approximately 11:15 a.m. on January 6th, while Biggs and his fellow Proud Boys were marching at and around the Capitol.126

Once they had marched the length of Pennsylvania Avenue and reached the west side of the Capitol, Jones and Alexander used a bullhorn to continue directing those around them to the east side, making further references to President Trumpâs alleged imminent arrival. A video recorded by a rallygoer at 1:51 p.m. shows Jones and Alexander standing together as Jones encourages the crowd to proceed to the east side of the Capitol. He tells those listening that âweâve got a permit on the other side, itâs great that this happened, but Trumpâs not going to come when weâve taken this over. We are not Antifa, we are not BLM.ââ127

Jones has repeatedly claimed that he tried to calm the crowd, but his actions also coincided with two police line breaches and one breach of the Capitol building itself. At 1:57 p.m., minutes after Jones encouraged rally goers to move east, newly arrived protestors breached the bike rack fencing used to keep the crowd away from the east side steps.128 After the breach, police retreated to the base of the large set of steps behind them and the crowd moved forward to meet the newly established police line.129

Jones followed shortly behind the crowd that led the initial east fence breach, and his arrival coincided with the next breach up the east stairs. Publicly available video shows Jones already departed from the west side, rounding the north side of the Capitol on the way to the east side at 2:00 p.m.130 As he was walking, Jones told his group, âthose fucking cops need to fucking back off man.ââ131 He was then asked about Vice President Pence, to which Jones responded: âhe floundered and was neutral, he passed the ball.ââ132 At the conclusion of the video, one of Jonesâs camera crew can be heard saying, âletâs take a break here. Let me talk to this cop to see if I can get Alex up there to deescalate the situation.â Other video released by Jones shows one of his camera crew interacting with USCP officers and asking how Jones can help deescalate the situation.133 The Select Committeeâs review of the evidence showed that Jones simultaneously called on the crowd to âfightâ and start a ârevolution,â while occasionally peppering his rhetoric with the word âpeacefully.â

Minutes after Jonesâs arrival on the scene, at approximately 2:06 p.m., rioters breached the new police line and stormed up the stairs towards the Columbus Doors (also known as the Rotunda Doors).134 The crowdâs cheers and celebration as they move up the steps can be heard while Jonesâs camera crew negotiates with USCP officers nearby. 135 As explained below, the rioters broke through another key breach point with Jones and Alexander on the scene just minutes later.

Far-right extremists continued to lead the charge as protestors streamed onto the U.S. Capitolâs restricted grounds. On the north side of the West Plaza, there was a scaffold with stairs used by construction workers to build the inauguration stage. Law enforcement officers were stationed at the base of the stairs, preventing rioters from climbing to the upper West Plaza, where doors to the Capitol building itself were located. At 1:49 p.m., MPD declared a riot at the Capitol.136

Shortly before 1:50 p.m., rioters gathered in front of this scaffold on the northwest corner of the Capitol. The rioters included Proud Boys and other extremists. One rioter, Guy Reffitt, belonged to a Three Percenter group from Texas.137 By approximately 1:50 p.m., he stood at the front of the pack near the scaffold, carrying a pistol and flexicuffs.138 He wore body armor under a blue jacket and a helmet with a mounted body camera.139

Reffitt advanced on the police line, absorbing rubber bullets and pushing through chemical spray.140 As he recounted shortly after the attack, Reffitt got âeverything started moving forward.ââ141 He âstarted the fireâ and the presence of law enforcement was not going to prevent Reffittâs advance.142 According to Reffitt:

[T]here was no reason for me to give up because I had come so far to do what I wanted, what we wanted and needed to do. And I had a mindset. I didnât mean to actually be the first guy up there. I didnât even mean to do that. I just, the adrenaline and knowing that I canât let my country fall.143

Reffitt had indeed planned for violence on January 6th, noting on December 28, 2020, that he would âbe in full battle rattle.ââ144 While driving to Washington, DC on January 5th, Reffitt expressed his desire to âdrag[] those people out of the Capitol by their anklesâ and âinstall[] a new government.ââ145 On the morning of January 6th, Reffitt clarified the target, telling âother members of his militia group and those gathered around himâ at the Ellipse that âIâm taking the Capitol with everybody fucking elseâ and that â[w]eâre all going to drag them mother fuckers out kicking and screaming . . . . I just want to see Pelosiâs head hit every fucking stair on the way out . . . And Mitch McConnell too. Fuck âem all.ââ146 Reffitt was convicted and ultimately sentenced to 7 years in prison for his conduct.147

A member of the Proud Boys, Daniel Scott, helped lead the charge up the scaffolding stairs.148 Scott, also known as Milkshake, had marched with the Proud Boys from the Washington Monument to the Capitol. During the march, Scott was recorded in a video yelling, âLetâs take the fucking Capitol!ââ149 Someone else responded, âLetâs not fucking yell that, alright?â And then Nordean added: âIt was Milkshake, man, you know . . . idiot.â Scott had apparently blurted out the Proud Boysâ plan. At the scaffolding, Scott then helped others âtakeâ the U.S. Capitol. While wearing a blue cap with white lettering that read, âGods, Guns & Trump,â he pushed police officers backwards, clearing a path for the rioters. Another Proud Boy, Chris Worrell, was also nearby.150 As rioters massed under the scaffold, Worrell sprayed officers with OC (or pepper) spray. 151 Other Proud Boys were present at the scaffold, including Micajah Jackson152 and Matthew Greene.153

The attack at and in the vicinity of the scaffolding cleared a path for a wave of rioters who forced their way up the stairs and to the U.S. Capitol building itself.154 As the rioters rushed up the stairs, another January 6th defendant, Ryan Kelley, climbed up the scaffolding around 1:51 p.m.155 In the ensuing minutes he waved people on, encouraging them to follow.156 Kelleyâwho ran in the Republican primary to be the governor of Michigan in 2022âdenied to the Select Committee that he had climbed the scaffolding to wave people on.157 The FBI arrested Kelley a few months after his deposition.158

By 2:00 p.m., rioters at the top of the scaffolding stairs were only feet away from Capitol building doors and windows.

Incited by President Trump, over the course of the next hour, extremists, conspiracy theorists and others breached the U.S. Capitol building at several locations. They probed for weaknesses in the buildingâs defenses, battling law enforcement personnel who stood in their way. Once again, the Proud Boys and other extremists played conspicuous roles.

At 2:13 p.m., Dominic Pezzola, a Proud Boy from New York, smashed a window on the Senate wing.159 This was the first breach of the Capitol building. Pezzola used a riot shield he stole from a law enforcement officer to break through the window. After climbing through, rioters were able to easily open a nearby Senate wing door from the insideâgiving them unfettered passage into the building at 2:14 p.m. Two minutes later, at approximately 2:16 p.m., rioters pushed opened a second door, the Senate fire door, from the inside.160 Just as the building was being breached, Vice President Pence and Speaker Pelosi were ushered off the Senate and House floors, respectively.161

The first person to enter the Capitol building was a Kentucky native named Michael Sparks. Sparks had expressed his desire to kill people after watching protests in the summer of 2020.162 Following one of President Trumpâs calls to Washington, DC on December 30, 2020, Sparks answered that he would âbe there.ââ163

As Pezzola entered the building, he was joined by other noteworthy extremists and conspiracy theorists. Robert Gieswein, an individual from Colorado affiliated with Three Percenters who espoused conspiracy beliefs, climbed through the Senate wing window.164 Doug Jensen, a QAnon adherent, was part of this first cadre of people to enter the Capitol as well.165 Jensen wore a brazen âQâ shirt. Jensen later told authorities that he âintentionally positioned himself to be among the first people inside the United States Capitol because . . . he wanted to have his t-shirt seen on video so that âQâ could âget the credit.âââ166 Another prominent QAnon believer, Jacob Chansley (a.k.a. the âQAnon Shamanâ), also entered through the Senate wing door at approximately 2:14 p.m.167

White supremacists and Confederate sympathizers were among the first rioters to enter the U.S. Capitol. Kevin Seefried and his son, Hunter, entered the building at approximately 2:13 p.m. through the Senate wing window smashed by Proud Boy Dominic Pezzola.168 Kevin Seefried carried a Confederate Battle Flag with him and unfurled it inside the building. According to some historians, while the Confederate Flag has appeared in the building before, it was the first time that an insurrectionist ever carried the banner inside the U.S. Capitol.169 According to court filings, Hunter Seefried helped punch out the Senate wing window and then clear the broken glass before he, his father and others entered the Capitol.170 Kevin Seefried was found guilty of obstructing an official proceeding, which is a felony offense, as well as four misdemeanors.171 The Department of Justice has alleged that at 2:16 p.m., just 3 minutes after the Senate wing was first breached, five individuals associated with the Nick Fuentesâs white nationalist âAmerica Firstâ movement entered the U.S. Capitol.172 The five, all of whom are in their 20s, have been identified as: Joseph Brody, Thomas Carey, Gabriel Chase, Jon Lizak, and Paul Lovley.173 Four of the five âinitially met at an America First event and attended subsequent events together.ââ174 Nick Fuentes and other America First leaders espouse âa belief that they are defending against the demographic and cultural changes in America.ââ175 Online researchers say that Brody is the masked man seen in a photo wearing a MAGA hat and holding a rifle in front of a Nazi flag.176 (The photo was not taken on January 6th.) As discussed in Chapter 6, members of the America First movement, commonly known as âGroypers,â were well-represented at âStop the Stealâ events in late 2020 and these rallies helped pave the road to January 6th. Indeed, at least three members of the groupâLovley, Lizak and Chaseâattended the âStop the Steal, March for Trumpâ rally in Washington, DC on November 14, 2020.177

On January 6th, Brody and his America First associates made their way to various points inside and outside of the Capitol after the initial breach, including House Speaker Nancy Pelosiâs conference room and office, as well as the U.S. Senate Chamber. 178 After exiting the Capitol, the group went to the north side of the building. One of the five, Brody, and another rioter allegedly used a âmetal barricadeâ to assault a law enforcement officer who was defending the North Door.179 (The attack on the North Door is discussed below.) Brody and Chase also allegedly helped others destroy media equipment.180 Still another America First associate, Riley Williams, directed rioters up a staircase to Speaker Pelosiâs office and was accused of aiding and abetting the theft of a laptop found there.181Other white supremacists were among the first rioters to enter the U.S. Capitol. Timothy Hale-Cusanelli, an Army Reservist from New Jersey who was identified by a confidential source to law enforcement as an âan avowed white supremacist and Nazi sympathizer,â entered through the Senate wing breach around 2:14 p.m.182 Hale-Cusanelli â[u]sed tactical hand signalsâ to direct other members of the mob, and he commanded them to ââadvanceâ on the Capitol.ââ183 Afterwards, he bragged to a friend that January 6th was âexhilarating,â that he hoped âfor a âcivil war,â and that the âtree of liberty must be refreshed with the blood of patriots and tyrants.âââ184 Robert Packer was also among the first rioters to enter the Capitol, and he made his way into the Crypt by 2:25 p.m.185 Packer was wearing a âCamp Auschwitzâ sweatshirt, a âsymbol of Nazi hate ideology,â at the time.186

After breaking in, some of the first rioters headed north toward the Senate chambers.187 Officer Eugene Goodman, a USCP officer, intercepted them before they headed up the stairs leading to the chambers. Immediately after entering, a rioter asked Officer Goodman, âWhere are the [M]embers at?â and âwhere are they counting the votes?ââ188 Jensen, Gieswein, Sparks, and others stalked Officer Goodman through the halls of the Senate.189 Jensen demanded that Officer Goodman and other USCP officers arrest Vice President Pence.190 Sparks chanted, âThis is our America!ââ191 Other rioters who entered through the Senate wing door clashed with police offices at the Senate carriage door located on the northeast side of the Capitol.192 When the rioters followed Officer Goodman up the stairs to the Senate Chamber, they were stopped by a line of USCP officers outside the Ohio Clock Tower.193

Joe Biggs of the Proud Boys entered the Capitol shortly after the first breach. At 2:14 p.m., Biggs walked through the senate wing door and moved north. Part of his route was captured in videos posted on Parler, a right-wing social media site.194 Someone recorded the Proud Boys leader shortly after he entered the Capitol and asked him, âHey Biggs what do you gotta say?ââ195 Smiling, Biggs replied: âthis is awesome!ââ196 Other Proud Boys were seen with Biggs, or near him, as he entered the Capitol. One of them is Paul Rae, a Proud Boys member from Florida, who appears to have communicated directly with Biggs after they entered through the door.197 Another Proud Boy from Florida, Arthur Jackman, was seen with his hand on Biggsâs right shoulder. Jackman âbecame involved in the Proud Boys to support Donald Trump,â was in Washington on January 6th âto support President Trump and to stop the stealâ and âbelieve[d] the election was stolen.â195 Still another, Joshua Pruitt, who was clad in a Punisher shirt, entered the Capitol through the Senate wing door around this time.198 At approximately 2:17 p.m., 3 minutes after entering the U.S. Capitol for the first time, Biggs exited through another door.199

At 2:43 p.m., law enforcement was able to regain control of the Senate wing door, forcing all the rioters out. But their success lasted for only 5 minutes. At 2:48 p.m., rioters again breached the Senate wing door, pushing law enforcement out of the way.200 The second breach was one of the more violent breaches of the day, with the mob forcefully pushing law enforcement backwards until the pathway was clear for them to enter.

While the Proud Boys and other extremists were overwhelming law enforcement at the West Plaza scaffolding, another group led the attack on security barriers on the East Plaza. At 2:06 p.m., a crowd broke through security barriers and charged a set of doors just outside the Rotunda.201 The mobâs surge occurred just minutes after Alex Jones arrived on the scene.202 The crowdâs cheers and celebration as they move up the steps can be heard while Jonesâs camera crew negotiates with USCP officers nearby.203

Once rioters had filled the Rotunda stairs, Jones and his team, along with the Proud Boy Walter, ascended the stairs. They moved into the thick of the crowd at the top of the stairs, where Jones began calling for peace but also revolution, leading the crowd in chants of â1776â and other bellicose rhetoric.204 Publicly available video shows that Jones reached the top of the stairs at 2:18 p.m.205 Walter told the Select Committee that he thought Jones was successful in getting some people down, âbut I also think that may have created enough space for people to be able to move, whereas before you couldnât move.ââ206 Apparently, Jonesâs security team also realized he was not successfully controlling the crowd, as one of his security guards reportedly told him, âAlex, theyâre going to blame this all on you, we got to get out of here as fast as possible.ââ207 By approximately 2:21 p.m., Jones began descending the stairs.208 Despite claiming to make attempts to calm the crowd, Jones further incited the mob as he departed, loudly proclaiming âwe will never submit to the new world orderâ and then leading the crowd in the chant âfight for Trump.ââ209

At 2:24 p.m., rioters gained entrance to the Capitol through the doors leading into the Rotunda,210 an entrance that was only a few feet directly behind Jones as he was speaking. As the Rotunda was breached by rioters, Jones and Alexander left the area and decided to leave the Capitol complex area altogether.211

Law enforcement officials were able to thwart the initial breach of the doors leading into the Rotunda. By 2:28 p.m., they temporarily regained control and stopped rioters from entering.212 But their success was short-lived. Within ten minutes, the doors were breached once again.213 And two members of the Proud BoysâRonald Loehrke and James Haffnerâhelped lead the attack.214

Loehrke was allegedly recruited by Nordean, the Proud Boys leader, for January 6th. In late December 2020, Nordean asked Loehrke via text message if he was coming to âDC.ââ215 After Loehrke indicated he was, Nordean said he wanted Loehrke âon the front lineâ with him.216 Loehrke replied, âSounds good man.ââ 217 Loehrke and Haffner marched with the Proud Boys from the Washington Monument to the Capitol grounds and were present during the breach at the Peace Circle.218 The pair made their way to the east side of the Capitol, where they began removing the security barriers and resisting USCP officers. 219 Other members of the crowd joined. Eventually, the rioters breached these barriers too, allowing them to reach the doors of the Rotunda.

When the rioters reached the Columbus Doors, they were again stopped by USCP officers. But as the officers explained to the Select Committee, the rioters pushed them against the doors and sprayed them with OC spray (commonly known as pepper spray), making it impossible to defend the Capitol. 220 James Haffner was one of the rioters who allegedly sprayed the officers.221

Shortly after Haffner and others assaulted the USCP officers, they were able to breach the Columbus Doors at approximately 2:38 p.m. A Proud Boys contingentâincluding Haffner, Loehrke, and Joe Biggsâthen entered the Capitol.222 It was the second time that Biggs entered the U.S. Capitol that day.

A military-style âstackâ of Oath Keepers entered through the Columbus Doors as well. The Oath Keeper members attended the Ellipse rally, where they were provided personal security details for VIPs in attendance.223 Afterwards, they marched to the Capitol, as directed by President Trump.

Stewart Rhodes, the leader of the Oath Keepers, monitored the attack on the Capitol from just outside, including during the assault on the Columbus Doors. At 2:28 p.m., Rhodes texted members of the F.O.S., or Friends of Stone, (FOS) Signal chatâwhich included Roger Stone, the Proud Boysâ Enrique Tarrio, Ali Alexander, Alex Jones, and others224âthat he was at the âBack door of the US Capitol.ââ225 Rhodes followed up at 2:30 p.m. by texting members of another chat that there was âPounding on the doorsâ of the Capitol.226

At 2:32 p.m., Rhodes held a three-way call with two other Oath Keepers, Kelly Meggs and Michael Green.227 Three minutes later, Meggsâs group (âStack 1â) started pushing through the rioters amassed on the East Plaza steps in a military-stack formation, with each person placing a hand on the shoulder of the person in front.228 This stack entered the Capitol around 2:40 p.m.229

One minute later, Rhodes was caught on camera on the Upper West Terrace responding to a rioter who said the Members of Congress must be âshitting their pants inside.â Rhodes replied: âAmen They need to shit their fucking pants. Sic semper tyrannis.ââ230

Once inside, Stack 1 moved through the Rotunda. At 2:44 p.m., Stack 1 pushed into the Senate hallway, which was filled with officers blocking the way. âPush, push, push. Get in there. They canât hold us,â Watkins implored the others. However, the officers repelled their attack, pushing them back into the Rotunda.231

Other Oath Keepers made their way to the Capitol as Stack 1 tried to advance. Joshua James and another group of Oath Keepers (âStack 2â) pushed through the Columbus Doors at approximately 3:15 p.m. 232 âThis is my fucking Capitol. This is not yours. This is my building,â James shouted at officers inside the Rotunda who were trying to push the rioters out of the Capitol.233

In addition to the breaches discussed above, rioters opened other entry points into the U.S. Capitol. The Upper West Terrace door, which leads directly into the Rotunda, was breached at 2:33 p.m. when rioters opened it from the inside.234

Inside the Capitol, rioters broke through the police lines, such as in the Crypt, a space located directly underneath the Rotunda. The Crypt is anchored by a marble âcompass stone,â marking the center of the building, and is lined with 13 statues representing the original American colonies.235 The rioters quickly moved towards the House Chambers and, by 2:40 p.m., started to crowd the main doors outside the Chambers, moving to the east side near the Speakerâs lobby. As they moved to the east side, rioters opened the east House doors from the inside at 2:41 p.m., allowing rioters from the northeast side of the Capitol to enter.236

The north doors were the last Capitol doors breached. At 3:10 p.m., rioters entered through the north doors where they were quickly met by USCP.237 Within a minute, the hallway just inside the doors was filled with rioters. At 3:12 p.m., a combination of USCP and MPD officers forcefully pushed the rioters out of the doors.238 However, rioters continued to attack just outside the north doors throughout the afternoon and evening.

The north doors have an outer entranceway that is separated by a vestibule from a set of inner doors that lead directly into the Capitol. Rioters threw bricks at the doors and forcefully tried to stop police officers from clearing the area.239 Law enforcement officers briefly opened the inner doors to spray a chemical irritant that was intended to disperse the mob.240 But the rioters continued to fight. For instance, as the crowd held the outer doors open, John Thomas Gordon of West Virginia repeatedly threw a heavy projectile at the inner doors, while swearing at the officers.241 Another rioter gave Gordon, who came to Washington to attend the âStop the Stealâ rally, a pair of goggles so he would withstand the chemical spray. Gordon kicked the inner doors as he and others desperately tried to enter the Capitol. 242 Law enforcement held the doors, withstanding the mobâs best efforts to break in.

As law enforcement officers started to clear the building, rioters continued to fight police officers at the tunnel on the West Plaza. Rioters violently struck officers, including MPD Officer Daniel Hodges, and sprayed them with OC spray. Although rioters did not break through the police line at the tunnel, they were able to successfully break a window just north of it. There is no surveillance coverage for this area, so Select Committee staff was unable to determine the precise time of the breach. According to open-source videos, however, the breach appears to occur at approximately 4:15 p.m.243

After Dominic Pezzola and others breached the Capitol at 2:13 p.m., a mob quickly entered and headed towards the Senate and House Chambers, where Members were meeting.244 As the crowd moved through the Capitol, they chanted âFight for Trumpâ and âStop the Steal!â They also chanted âNancy, Nancyâ as they searched for Speaker Pelosi.245 At 2:18 p.m., the House went into recess as hundreds of rioters confronted USCP officers inside the Crypt, which is a short distance from the first breach point.246

USCP officers formed a line across the Crypt in an attempt to stop the mobâs advance.247 By 2:21 p.m., the rioters had tried to break through police lines, but they were temporarily unsuccessful.248

As USCP officers held the line inside the Crypt, President Trump poured fuel on the fire, tweeting at 2:24 p.m.:

âMike Pence didnât have the courage to do what should have been done to protect our Country and our Constitution, giving states a chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to previously certify. USA demands the truth!ââ249

One minute later, the mob violently pushed through the USCP officers in the Crypt and continued moving south towards the House Chamber.250 Joshua Pruitt, the Proud Boy dressed in a Punisher shirt, was at the front of the line as rioters broke through in the Crypt.251 Officer David Millard told the Select Committee that rioters in the Crypt claimed they were in the Capitol because their âbossâ told them to be thereâmeaning President Trump.252 Officer Millard also recalled members of the mob telling him they were there to stop the steal.253

After breaking through the police line in the Crypt, the mob pursued USCP officers as they retreated to the U.S. Capitol Visitorâs Center (CVC). Pruitt was among the rioters who advanced into the CVC, where he came close to Senator Chuck Schumer.254 When the USCP officers attempted to lower metal barriers to halt the crowdâs momentum, another small group of Proud Boys immediately interceded to prevent the barricades from coming down.255 The Proud Boy contingent included three men from the Kansas City, Kansas area: William Chrestman,256 Chris Kuehne,257 and Louis Colon.258 Felicia Konold and Cory Konold, two Proud Boy associates from Arizona, joined the Kansas City group while marching from the Washington Monument to the Capitol earlier in the day and were on the scene.259 Two other Proud Boys, Nicholas Ochs and Nicholas DeCarlo, filmed the incident.260

Surveillance footage shows Chrestman using a wooden club, or modified axe handle, to prevent the barrier from being lowered to the floor.261 Colon later admitted to authorities that he purchased and modified an axe handle âto be used as both a walking stick and an improvised weaponâ on January 6th.262 Colon also told authorities that he attended a meeting with Chrestman and others on the night of January 5th, during which someone asked, âdo we have patriots here willing to take it by force?â Colon understood that the individual meant that they should use âforce against the government.â This same individual commented that they should âgo in there and take over.ââ263

At 2:36 p.m., the mob pushed through a line of USCP officers guarding the House Chamber.264 Rioters also entered the Senate Chamber.265 Within minutes, Jacob Chansley (a.k.a. the QAnon Shaman) entered the Senate Chamber, making his way to the Senate dais, where Vice President Pence had been presiding over the joint session. An officer asked Chansley to vacate the dais, but instead he shouted, âMike Pence is a fucking traitor.â Chansley also left a note that read: âItâs Only a Matter of Time. Justice is Coming!ââ266 Surrounded by others, Chansley held a conspiracy-laden prayer session, saying: âThank you for allowing the United States of America to be reborn. Thank you for allowing us to get rid of the communists, the globalists, and the traitors within our government.ââ267 Other extremists, including at least one associate of the white nationalist âAmerica Firstâ movement, also sat in the Vice Presidentâs seat.268

While law enforcement fought to contain the mob inside the Capitol, the fighting raged outside as well. Key agitators continued to fire up the crowd. Nick Fuentes, the leader of the âAmerica Firstâ movement, amplified President Trumpâs rhetoric aimed at Vice President Pence, including the Presidentâs 2:24 p.m. tweet.269 Speaking through a bullhorn while standing on the Peace Monument, Fuentes shouted:

We just heard that Mike Pence is not going to reject any fraudulent elector votes! Thatâs right, you heard it here first: Mike Pence has betrayed the United States of America. Mike Pence has betrayed the President and he has betrayed the people of the United States of Americaâand we will never ever forget!270

As rioters flowed through the halls and offices inside the Capitol, others broke through the defensive lines of USCP and MPD officers on the lower West Plaza at 2:28 p.m., allowing them to take over the inauguration stage.271 According to MPD Officer Michael Fanone, MPD officers were then forced to conduct the âfirst fighting withdrawalâ in the history of the force, with law enforcement seeking to âreestablish defensive linesâ to prevent the âcrowd that had swelled to approximately 20,000 from storming the U.S. Capitol.ââ272

After surging through the West Plaza, rioters quickly headed towards the West Plaza tunnel. The violence that escalated at 2:28 p.m. on the lower West Plaza continued as rioters reached the tunnel. By 2:41 p.m., law enforcement retreated inside the tunnel, allowing rioters to slowly fill in.273 Just ten minutes later, the mob jammed the tunnel, desperately trying to break through the police lines.274 The fighting in and immediately outside of the tunnel raged for over two hours.275

Throughout the afternoon, members of the mob struck officers with weapons, shot them with OC (or pepper) spray, and dragged officers from the tunnel into the crowd. Lucas Denney, a Three Percenter from Texas who carried a baton on January 6th, pushed a riot shield into and on top of police officers at the tunnel. The crowd chanted âheave-ho!â as Denney did so.276 Jeffrey Scott Brown sprayed a chemical or pepper spray at officers and pushed the front of the line in the tunnel.277 Kyle Young, a January 6th defendant with a long prior criminal history, participated in multiple assaults and violence at the tunnel, including using a pole to jab at police officers.

Youngâs 16-year-old son was present during the fighting.278 Robert Morss, a former Army Ranger who wore a military-style vest, participated in a heave-ho effort in the tunnel where he and rioters had created a shield wall.279 Peter Schwartz and another rioter passed a large cannister of spray back and forth before Schwartzâs companion sprayed officers and then the two joined in the heave-ho.280

One of the most brutal attacks of the day occurred outside the tunnel when rioters dragged MPD Officer Michael Fanone into the crowd, and then tased, beat, and robbed him while a Blue Lives Matter flag fluttered above him. Albuquerque Head, a rioter from Tennessee, grabbed Officer Fanone around the neck and pulled him into the mob.281 âI got one!â Head shouted.282 Lucas Denney, the Three Percenter, âswung his arm and fistâ at Officer Fanone, grabbed him, and pulled him down the stairs.283 Daniel Rodriguez then tased him in the neck. Kyle Young lunged towards Officer Fanone, restraining the officerâs wrist.284 While Young held him, still another rioter, Thomas Sibick, reached towards him and forcibly removed his police badge and radio.285 Officer Fanone feared they were after his gun. Members of the crowd yelled: âKill him!,â âGet his gun!â and âKill him with his own gun!ââ286

In an interview with FBI agents, Daniel Rodriguez admitted his role in the attack on Officer Fanone.287 During that same interview, Rodriguez discussed the influences that led him down the path to January 6th. Rodriguez was a fan of Alex Jonesâs InfoWars and told FBI agents that he became active at rallies after watching the conspiracy show.288 Rodriguez was motivated by Jonesâs decision to support then candidate Trump in 2015. 289 He also began to affiliate himself with the Three Percenter movement, which he learned about by watching InfoWars.290 And when President Trump called for a âwildâ protest in Washington on January 6th, Rodriguez thought it was necessary to respond. âTrump called us. Trump called us to DC,â Rodriguez told interviewing agents.291 âIf heâs the commander in chief and the leader of our country, and heâs calling for help âI thought he was calling for help,â Rodriguez explained. âI thought he wasâI thought we were doing the right thing.ââ292

Rodriguez and another January 6th defendant, Edward Badalian, began preparing for violence after President Trumpâs December 19th tweet. They gathered weapons and tactical gear293 and discussed their plans in a Signal chat named, âPatriots 45 MAGA Gang.â

âCongress can hang. Iâll do it,â Rodriguez posted to the chat. Please let us get these people dear God.â 294

Badalian also posted a flyer titled âMAGA_CAVALRY,â which showed rally points for âpatriot caravansâ to connect with the âStop The Stealâ movement in DC.295 The same flyer was popular among Three Percenters and other self-described âpatriotâ groups. It also garnered the attention of law enforcement. The FBIâs Norfolk, Virginia division noted in a January 5th intelligence assessment that the flyer was accompanied by another image, titled âCreate Perimeter,â which depicted the U.S. Capitol and other buildings being surrounded by the same caravans.296

When rioters surrounded the perimeter of the Capitol, and reached the Senate and House Chambers, Members were forced to evacuate for safety. USCP officers responded to both Chambers and served as escorts. By the time the Capitol was breached, the Senate and House had split from the joint session, with Senators returning to their Chamber to debate the objection to Arizonaâs electoral vote. The House remained in its Chamber to debate the objection.297

Starting in the Senate, Vice President Pence was escorted off the floor at 2:12 p.m. and was taken to his Senate office. Between 2:12 p.m. and 2:25 p.m., Secret Service agents worked to identify potential threats and a route that could be used to transport Vice President Pence.298 One of the issues for Vice President Penceâs evacuation was that the rioters were outside the Ohio Clock Tower, which was just feet away from the staircase that Vice President Pence could descend to evacuate.299 Eventually, after the mob started filling the entire Capitol, the Secret Service made the decision to move Vice President Pence, and he was escorted from the Senate at 2:25 p.m.300 By 2:27 p.m., the Vice President can be seen moving toward a secure location connected to the Capitol. The Vice President arrived at the secure location at 2:29 p.m.301 Following the Vice Presidentâs evacuation, Senators were evacuated at 2:30 p.m.302

On the House side, Speaker Pelosi, House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, and House Majority Whip James Clyburn were removed from the House floor at the same time as Vice President Pence. By 2:18 p.m., USCP surveillance showed Speaker Pelosi in the basement hallway headed towards the garage.303 The surveillance footage also showed Leader Hoyer and Whip Clyburn in the same basement as Speaker Pelosi. At 2:23 p.m., Speaker Pelosi and Whip Clyburn were moved to an undisclosed location.304

Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy was evacuated just after Speaker Pelosi left the Capitol. At 2:25 p.m., as rioters were moving through the Crypt and breaking through the east Rotunda door, Leader McCarthy and his staff hurriedly evacuated his office.305 At approximately 2:38 p.m., the Members of Congress on the House floor began their evacuation.306 Members of Congress can be seen evacuating through the Speakerâs Lobby when a USCP officer fatally shot Ashli Babbitt at 2:44 p.m. 307 Members and staffers were just feet away when Babbitt attempted to climb through a shattered glass door. USCP officers had barricaded the door with furniture to prevent the rioters from gaining direct access to elected officials.

The congressional Members in the House Gallery were evacuated after the Members on the House floor. Congressional Members in the Gallery had to wait to be evacuated because rioters were still roaming the hallways right outside the Chamber. At 2:49 p.m., as Members were trying to evacuate the House Gallery, the USCP emergency response team cleared the hallways with long rifles so that the Members could be escorted to safety.308 USCP surveillance footage shows several rioters lying on the ground, with long rifles pointed at them, as Members evacuate in the background.309 By 3:00 p.m., the area had been cleared and Members were evacuated from the House gallery to a secure location. 310

Shortly after law enforcement officers evacuated the House and Senate Members, they started to clear rioters out of the Capitol and off the grounds. Starting before 3:00 p.m., law enforcement spent approximately three hours pushing rioters out of the Capitol building and off the East and West Plazas. In general, law enforcement cleared rioters out of the Capitol through three doors: (1) the House side door located on the northeast side of the Capitol; (2) the Columbus Doors (East Rotunda Doors); and (3) the Senate wing door, which was next to the first breach point. As discussed above, the Proud Boys and other extremists led the charge at the latter two locations during the early stages of the attack.

Outside the Capitol, law enforcement pushed the mob from the upper West Plaza towards the East Plaza, crossing the north doors. Eventually, these rioters were forced to exit the Capitol grounds on the east side. The last point where rioters were removed was the lower West Plazaâthe scene of some of the most intense hand-to-hand fighting that day. After law enforcement cleared the tunnel, where violence had raged for hours, police officers corralled rioters to the west and away from the Capitol building.311

After rioters first breached the Senate wing door on the first floor, they immediately moved south towards the House Chamber. This route took them to the Cryptâwith the mob filling this room by 2:24 p.m. This was also one of the first rooms that law enforcement cleared as they started to secure the building. By 2:49 p.m., law enforcement officers cleared the Crypt by pushing towards the Senate wing door and up the stairs to the Rotunda.312

Around the same time that police officers cleared the Crypt, they also removed rioters from hallways immediately adjacent to the House and Senate Chambers. On the House side, rioters were pushed out shortly before 3:00 p.m. The House hallway immediately in front of the House Chamberâs door was cleared at 2:56 p.m.313 The mob outside of the Speakerâs lobby was pushed out of the House side door at 2:57 p.m.314

USCP officers were able to quickly clear out the Senate Chamber, which was initially breached at 2:42 p.m.315 Rioters were cleared from the hallways outside the Senate by 3:09 p.m.316 Surveillance shows officers checking the Senate Gallery and hallways for rioters; there are no people on camera by this time.317

The Rotunda served as a key point where the mob settled during the Capitol attack. For example, at 2:45 p.m., hundreds of people can be seen standing in the Rotunda.318 It appears law enforcement officers funneled rioters from other parts of the Capitol into the Rotunda. Once they had President Trumpâs supporters herded there, law enforcement started to push them towards the east doors shortly after 3:00 p.m. At 3:25 p.m., law enforcement successfully pushed rioters out of the Rotunda and closed the doors so that the room could remain secure.319 By 3:43 p.m., just 18 minutes after the Rotunda doors were closed, law enforcement successfully pushed the rioters out of the east doors of the Capitol.320

The last rioters in the Capitol building were cleared out of the Senate wing doorâthe same location where rioters first breached the building at 2:13 p.m. Like the other locations inside the Capitol, law enforcement began forcing rioters out of the Senate wing door after 3:00 p.m. By 3:40 p.m., law enforcement had successfully pushed many of the rioters out of the door and onto the upper West Plaza.321 However, officers were unable to close the doors because some rioters remained in the doorway and attempted to re-enter the building. At 4:23 p.m., a combination of USCP and MPD officers forced these people out of the doorway and successfully secured the door.322

After clearing the inside of the Capitol, law enforcement officers proceeded to sweep the perimeter adjacent to the building, starting with the upper West Plaza. After pushing the last rioter out of the Senate wing door, officers started to clear the upper West Plaza, which is located just outside this same doorway. Law enforcement officers in riot gear formed a line and marshalled the crowd north from the upper West Plaza. By 4:31 p.m., 8 minutes after closing the Senate wing door, rioters were cleared from the upper West Plaza.323

Many of these same officers started to secure the north side of the Capitol as they pushed rioters from the upper West Plaza towards the East Plaza. By approximately 4:32 p.m., law enforcement officers walked out of the North Doors, forming additional lines to push rioters eastward. As discussed earlier, the North Doors had been the location of violent fighting throughout much of the afternoon. By 4:46 p.m., law enforcement had successfully pushed the rioters from the north side of the Capitol to the East Plaza.324

Law enforcement cleared the East Plaza next. By 4:59 p.m., officers had swept all the remaining rioters from the east stairs of the Capitol.325 At this point, the mob that had overrun the upper West Plaza, the north side of the Capitol, and the East Plaza had been moved off the grounds adjacent to the Capitol.

The last areas of the Capitol grounds to get cleared were the tunnel and the lower West Plaza. Thousands of rioters had packed into the West Plaza just after the initial invasion, led by the Proud Boys and their associates. The tunnel was the location of the dayâs most violent fighting and the conflict extended until late in the day.

After 5:00 p.m., it appears that law enforcement directed their attention to clearing the lower West Plaza, including the tunnel. At 5:04 p.m., police officers in the tunnel shot smoke bombs to get the remaining rioters to back away from the doors.326 By 5:05 p.m., the rioters had all retreated and the police officers inside the tunnel moved out and started clearing out the area.327

At 5:13 p.m., on the opposite side of the lower West Plaza, officers pushed the mob down the scaffold stairs and to the lower West Plaza.328 These are the same stairs that rioters, led by the Proud Boys and other extremists, had previously climbed before reaching the Senate wing door.

Once the rioters from the tunnel and the scaffold were all situated on the lower West Plaza, officers formed another line and started walking the mob back towards the grassâwhich was away from the actual Capitol building. The line appears to have been fully formed at 5:19 p.m., and the officers started their sweep at 5:30 p.m.329 By 5:37 p.m., police officers pushed rioters back to the grassy area away from the Capitol. It was at this time that no rioters appeared to be in or around the Capitol building.330 At 6:56 p.m., a little more than an hour after the Capitol grounds were cleared, Vice President Pence returned to the Capitol from the loading dock.331 Vice President Pence walked up the stairs in the basement of the Capitol to his office in the Senate at 7:00 p.m.332

Shortly after 8:00 p.m., the joint session of Congress resumed, with Vice President Pence saying: âLetâs get back to work.ââ333 At 3:32 a.m., the Congress completed the counting of the votes and certified the election of Joseph R. Biden, Jr. as the 46th President of the United States.

ENDNOTES

Â Â 1. Enrique Tarrio (@NobleLead), Parler, Jan. 6, 2021 11:16 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/ryanjreilly/status/1533921251743391745 (Ryan J. Reilly (@ryanjreilly), Twitter, June 6, 2022 5:18 p.m. ET (retweeting the Premonition video)).

Â Â 2. Third Superseding Indictment at 22, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380.

Â Â 3. Third Superseding Indictment at 22, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380.

Â Â 4. âLeader of Proud Boys and Four Other Members Indicted in Federal Court for Seditious Conspiracy and Other Offenses Related to U.S. Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (June 6, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-proud-boys-and-four-other-members-indicted-federal-court-seditious-conspiracy-and.

Â Â 5. âLeader of Proud Boys and Four Other Members Indicted in Federal Court for Seditious Conspiracy and Other Offenses Related to U.S. Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (June 6, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-proud-boys-and-four-other-members-indicted-federal-court-seditious-conspiracy-and.

Â Â 6. âLeader of Proud Boys and Four Other Members Indicted in Federal Court for Seditious Conspiracy and Other Offenses Related to U.S. Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (June 6, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-proud-boys-and-four-other-members-indicted-federal-court-seditious-conspiracy-and.

Â Â 7. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file ML_DC_20210106_Sony_FS5_Clip0065_1, at 0:04 and 1:14 (Jacob Chansley being interviewed the morning of the 6th).

Â Â 8. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file ML_DC_20210106_Sony_FS5_Clip0067_1, at 11:43 (an unnamed woman being interviewed the morning of the 6th).

Â Â 9. Trial Transcript at 4542 and Trial Exhibit No. 6370, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022).

Â 10. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478, p. 1 (event summary of January 6th rally).

Â 11. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 87â88; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 12â13.

Â 12. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 12â13.

Â 13. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 11â12.

Â 14. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000086772, (Coordinated Response to a Request for Information from the Select Committee, Nov. 18, 2021).

Â 15. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478 (Event summary of January 6th rally).

Â 16. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478 (Event summary of January 6th rally).

Â 17. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Interior Production), DOI_46003146_00005053, (general arrest report at the Washington Monument on the morning of January 6th).

Â 18. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Interior Production), DOI_46003146_00005053, (general arrest report at the Washington Monument on the morning of January 6th).

Â 19. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Interior Production), DOI_46003146_00005053, (general arrest report at the Washington Monument on the morning of January 6th).

Â 20. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of National Parks Service Staff, (Oct. 27â28, 2021), p. 6.

Â 21. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of National Parks Service Staff, (Oct. 27â28, 2021), p. 6.

Â 22. Tom Jackman, Rachel Weiner, and Spencer S. Hsu, âEvidence of Firearms in Jan. 6 Crowd Grows as Arrests and Trials Mount,â Washington Post, (July 8, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/07/08/jan6-defendants-guns/.

Â 23. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478 (event summary of Jan 6 rally).

Â 24. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (District of Columbia Production), MPD 73â78 (District of Columbia, Metropolitan Police Department, Transcript of Radio Calls, January 6, 2021); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (District of Columbia Production), CTRL0000070375, at 3:40 (District of Columbia, Metropolitan Police Department, audio file of radio traffic from Jan. 6, 2021, from 12:00â13:00).

Â 25. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Colon, No. 1:21-cr-160, (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2022), ECF 143.

Â 26. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Colon, No. 1:21-cr-160, (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2022), ECF 143.

Â 27. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant at 21â23, United States v. Kuehne, No. 1:21-cr-160, (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1366446/download.

Â 28. See Spencer S. Hsu and Tom Jackman, âFirst Jan. 6 Defendant Convicted at Trial Receives Longest Sentence of 7 Years,â Washington Post, (Aug. 1, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/08/01/reffitt-sentence-jan6/.

Â 29. Statement of Facts at 3, 5, United States v. Bargar, No. 1:22-mj-169, (D.D.C. July 29, 2022), ECF No. 1-1. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (District of Columbia Production, Axon Body 3 X6039BLAL, at 14:30:03 (MPD body camera footage).

Â 30. Statement of Facts at 5, United States v. Bargar, No. 1:22-mj-169, (D.D.C. July 29, 2022), ECF No. 1-1.

Â 31. Statement of Facts at 5, United States v. Bargar, No. 1:22-mj-169, (D.D.C. July 29, 2022), ECF No. 1-1.

Â 32. Statement of Offense at 3, United States v. Mazza, No. 1:21-cr-736, (D.D.C. June 17, 2022), ECF No. 25.

Â 33. Statement of Offense at 3-4, United States v. Mazza, No. 1:21-cr-736, (D.D.C. June 17, 2022), ECF No. 25; Statement of Facts at 2, United States v. Mazza, No. 1:21-cr-736, (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.

Â 34. Governmentâs Sentencing Memorandum at 9â10, United States v. Mazza, No. 1:21-cr-736 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2022), ECF No. 30.

Â 35. For example, on November 13, 2020, Mazza (@MarkNunzios64) tweeted at President Trump: âCan you unseal obamaâs birth certificate and college transcripts?â On Facebook, Mazza shared a Q âdropâ titled âThe Armor of God,â a 9/11 Truther video, and multiple posts dedicated to lies about the 2020 Presidential election. Screenshots on file with the Select Committee.

Â 36. Hannah Rabinowitz and Holmes Lybrand, âArmed US Capitol Rioter Tells Investigators if He Had Found Pelosi, âYouâd be Here for Another Reason,ââ CNN, (Nov. 23, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/22/politics/loaded-firearm-january-6-charged-mark-mazza/index.html.

Â 37. Governmentâs Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing at 3, United States v. Coffman, No. 1:21-cr-4, (Mar. 2, 2022), ECF 28.

Â 38. Governmentâs Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing at 3, United States v. Coffman, No. 1:21-cr-4, (Mar. 2, 2022), ECF 28.

Â 39. Governmentâs Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing at 4, United States v. Coffman, No. 1:21-cr-4, (Mar. 2, 2022), ECF 28.

Â 40. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeffrey Lawrence Morelock, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 81.

Â 41. Trial Exhibit 1.S.159.524, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15, (D.D.C Oct. 4, 2022); Trial Transcript at 10502-08, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2022).

Â 42. Trial Transcript at 4109, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15, (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2022).

Â 43. Trial Transcript at 4106-08, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2022).

Â 44. Governmentâs Opposition to Defendantâs Motion to Revoke Magistrate Judgeâs Detention Order at 4, United States v. Miller, No. 1:21-cr-119, (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2021), ECF No. 16.

Â 45. Statement of Facts at 2, 9, United States v. Miller, No. 1:21-cr-119 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.

Â 46. Governmentâs Opposition to Defendantâs Motion to Modify Release Conditions at 3, United States v. Harkrider, No. 1:21-cr-117, (D.D.C. July 8, 2021), ECF No. 40.

Â 47. Governmentâs Opposition to Defendantâs Motion to Modify Release Conditions at 3, United States v. Harkrider, No. 1:21-cr-117, (D.D.C. July 8, 2021), ECF No. 40.

Â 48. Dylan Stableford, âNew Video Shows Alleged Jan. 6 Capitol Rioters Threatening Pence,â Yahoo! News (Feb. 7, 2022), available at https://news.yahoo.com/new-video-jan-6-capitol-riot-pence-threat-drag-through-streets-195249884.html.

Â 49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Barber, (Mar. 16, 2022), p. 41.

Â 50. Statement of Facts at 3â4, United States v. Foy, No. 1:21-cr-108 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.

Â 51. Statement of Facts at 3â4, United States v. Foy, No. 1:21-cr-108 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2021), ECF No. 1-1; Governmentâs Opposition to Defendantâs Emergency Bond Review Motion at 5 n.3, United States v. Foy, No. 1:21-cr-108 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2021), ECF No. 11.

Â 52. Statement of Facts at 2â4, United States v. Webster, No. 1:21-cr-208 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 2021), ECF No. 1-1. See also Holmes Lybrand, âFormer NYPD Officer Sentenced to 10 Years in Prison for Assaulting a Police Officer on January 6,â CNN (Sept. 1, 2022), available at https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/01/politics/nypd-officer-january-6-sentencing/index.html.

Â 53. January 6th Committee, âLoudermilk Footage,â YouTube, June 5, 2022, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G9RNJ1tx4zw.

Â 54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nick Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 123â25.

Â 55. First Superseding Indictment at 3, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2021), ECF No. 26; âAuburn, Washington Member of Proud Boys Charged with Obstructing an Official Proceeding, Other Charges Related to the Jan. 6 Riots,â Department of Justice, (Feb. 3, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/auburn-washington-member-proud-boys-charged-obstructing-official-proceeding-other.

Â 56. Third Superseding Indictment at 16, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 21-cr-175 (TJK) (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1510971/download; Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Finley, No. 1:21-cr-526 (D.D.C. March 8, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1492396/download.

Â 57. âAuburn, Washington Member of Proud Boys Charged with Obstructing an Official Proceeding, Other Charges Related to the Jan. 6 Riots,â Department of Justice, (Feb. 3, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/auburn-washington-member-proud-boys-charged-obstructing-official-proceeding-other.

Â 58. âAuburn, Washington Member of Proud Boys Charged with Obstructing an Official Proceeding, Other Charges Related to the Jan. 6 Riots,â Department of Justice, (Feb. 3, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/auburn-washington-member-proud-boys-charged-obstructing-official-proceeding-other.

Â 59. âAuburn, Washington Member of Proud Boys Charged with Obstructing an Official Proceeding, Other Charges Related to the Jan. 6 Riots,â Department of Justice, (Feb. 3, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/auburn-washington-member-proud-boys-charged-obstructing-official-proceeding-other.

Â 60. Third Superseding Indictment at 16, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1510971/download.

Â 61. See âWar Room - 2019-AUG 09, Friday - Joe Biggs and Owen Shroyer Talk Internet Censorship and Democrat Party Terrorism,â Spreaker.com, (Aug. 9, 2019), available at https://www.spreaker.com/user/realalexjones/08-09-19-warroom; Alexandra Garrett, âJoe Biggs, Proud Boys Leader and Former Infowars Staffer, Arrested Over Capitol Riot,â Newsweek, (Jan. 20, 2021), available at https://www.newsweek.com/joe-biggs-proud-boys-leader-former-infowars-staffer-arrested-over-capitol-riot-1563181.

Â 62. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint at 4, United States v. Biggs, No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1357251/download.

Â 63. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint at 4, United States v. Biggs, No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1357251/download.

Â 64. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint at 4, United States v. Biggs, No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1357251/download.

Â 65. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint at 4, United States v. Biggs, No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1357251/download.

Â 66. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Finley, No. 1:21-cr-526 (D.D.C. Apr. 6, 2022), ECF No. 38, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1492396/download; First Superseding Indictment at 3, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2021), ECF No. 26, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1377586/download.

Â 67. First Superseding Indictment at 3, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2021), ECF No. 26, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1377586/download.

Â 68. First Superseding Indictment at 8â9, 12, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2021), ECF No. 26, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1377586/download.

Â 69. U.S. Capitol Police Camera U.S. Capitol Police Camera 9004.

Â 70. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 3187.

Â 71. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file Iphone_Nick_DC_20210106_IMG_1081_1_1.mov, at 0:14; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nick Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 139â40.

Â 72. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nick Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 138.

Â 73. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nick Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 130â31.

Â 74. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nick Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 134; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file M_DC_20210106_Sony_GC280A_0486.mov.

Â 75. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Nick Quested, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 132, 143.

Â 76. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 946.

Â 77. âPeace Monument,â Architect of the Capitol, available at https://www.aoc.gov/explore-capitol-campus/art/peace-monument.

Â 78. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 946, 3187.

Â 79. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file ML_DC_20210106_Sony_GC280A_0498.mov, at 0:00â0:30.

Â 80. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Caroline Elizabeth Edwards, (Apr. 18, 2022), pp. 33â38; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file ML_DC_20210106_Sony_GC280A_0498 2022-05-15 15.00.38 at 1:15.

Â 81. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file Iphone_Nick_DC_20210106_IMG_1116_1.mov.

Â 82. Alan Feuer, âDispute over Claim that Proud Boys Leader Urged Attack at Capitol,â New York Times, (Oct. 7, 2021), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/07/us/politics/proud-boys-capitol-riot.html.

Â 83. Alan Feuer, âDispute over Claim that Proud Boys Leader Urged Attack at Capitol,â New York Times, (Oct. 7, 2021), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/07/us/politics/proud-boys-capitol-riot.html.

Â 84. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 946.

Â 85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Caroline Elizabeth Edwards, (Apr. 18, 2022), pp. 41â42.

Â 86. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 945, 946, and 3187; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video files Iphone_Nick_DC_20210106_IMG_1127_1.mov, Iphone_Nick_DC_20210106_IMG_1127 2_1.mov; Elijah Schaffer (@ElijahSchaffer), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 6:46 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/ElijahSchaffer/status/1346966514990149639.

Â 87. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Caroline Elizabeth Edwards, (Apr. 18, 2022), pp. 44; Video files Iphone_Nick_DC_20210106_IMG_1127_1.mov, Iphone_Nick_DC_20210106_IMG_1127 2_1.mov; Elijah Schaffer (@ElijahSchaffer), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 6:46 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/ElijahSchaffer/status/1346966514990149639.

Â 88. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant at 6â8, United States v. Jackman, No. 1:21-cr-378 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.

Â 89. Statement of Facts at 1â2, United States v. Pepe, No. 1:21-cr-52 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.

Â 90. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant at 7, United States v. Jackman, No. 1:21-cr-378 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.

Â 91. Statement of Offense at 5, United States v. Finley, No. 1:21-cr-526 (D.D.C. Apr. 6, 2022), ECF No. 38.

Â 92. Statement of Offense at 2â5,Â United States v. Bertino, No. 1:22-cr-329 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022), ECF No. 5.

Â 93. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 908.

Â 94. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 944.

Â 95. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 944; Trial Exhibit 1515.1, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2022); Trial Exhibit 6757, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2022) (showing timelapse of security footage outside the Capitol).

Â 96. âDonald Trump Speech âSave Americaâ Rally Transcript January 6,â Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-transcript-january-6.

Â 97. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Alex Holder Production), Video file 45DAY32CAMB0059.mov, at 2:11 (using audio track 4 to hear the statement clearly from someone off camera).

Â 98. âTennessee Man Pleads Guilty to Felony Charges for Actions During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (Sep. 30, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/tennessee-man-pleads-guilty-felony-charges-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.

Â 99. âTennessee Man Pleads Guilty to Felony Charges for Actions During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (Sep. 30, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/tennessee-man-pleads-guilty-felony-charges-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.

100. âTwo Men Sentenced to 44 Months in Prison for Assaulting Law Enforcement Officers During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (July 15, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/two-men-sentenced-prison-assaulting-law-enforcement-officers-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.

101. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Mattice, No. 1:21-cr-657 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2022), ECF No. 44.

102. Governmentâs Opposition to Defendantâs Motion for Release from Pretrial Detention at 10â11, United States v. Nichols, No. 1:21-cr-117 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2021), ECF No. 61; Tom Dreisbach (@TomDreisbach), Twitter, Feb. 4, 2022, 7:40 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/TomDreisbach/status/1489763508459687937?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1489763508459687937%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Public Hearing, (June 16, 2022), at 0:14:11â0:15:00, https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851; Hearing on Motion to Modify Conditions of Release, Exhibit 07 at 7:43â8:00, United States v. Nichols, No. 1:21-cr-117 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2021). Nichols had made similarly violent statements since the November 2020 election, with increasing references to fighting on January 6th following President Trumpâs December 19th tweet. See Governmentâs Opposition to Defendantâs Motion for Release from Pretrial Detention at 4-8, United States v. Nichols, No. 1:21-cr-117 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2021), ECF No. 61 (documenting the many communications Nichols had with his codefendant planning for violence).

103. Governmentâs Opposition to Defendantâs Motion for Release from Pretrial Detention at 10â11, United States v. Nichols, No. 1:21-cr-117 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2021), ECF No. 61; Tom Dreisbach (@TomDreisbach), Twitter, Feb. 4, 2022, 7:40 p.m. ET, available at: https://twitter.com/TomDreisbach/status/1489763508459687937?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1489763508459687937%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Public Hearing, (June 16, 2022), at 0:14:11â0:15:00, https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851; Hearing on Motion to Modify Conditions of Release, Exhibit 07 at 7:43â8:00, United States v. Nichols, No. 1:21-cr-117 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2021).

104. On the Media, âJessica Watkins on âStop The Steal J6â Zello Channel (Unedited),â SoundCloud, at 4:00â4:12, Mar. 8, 2021, available at https://soundcloud.com/user-403747081/jessica-watkins-on-stop-the-steal-j6-zello-channel-unedited.

105. On the Media, âJessica Watkins on âStop The Steal J6â Zello Channel (Unedited),â SoundCloud, at 5:30â5:34, Mar. 8, 2021, available at https://soundcloud.com/user-403747081/jessica-watkins-on-stop-the-steal-j6-zello-channel-unedited.

106. Statement of Facts at 13, United States v. Hazard, No. 1:22-cr-70 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1-1; Joy Sharon Yi and Kate Woodsome, âHow the Capitol Attack Unfolded, from Inside Trumpâs Rally to the Riot | Opinion,â The Washington Post, at 1:32â1:42, (Jan. 12, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/opinions/how-the-capitol-attack-unfolded-from-inside-trumps-rally-to-the-riot-opinion/2021/01/12/a7146251-b076-426e-a2e3-8b503692c89d_video.html.

107. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000474 (Jan. 6, 2021, Alex Jones text message to Caroline Wren).

108. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000474 (Jan. 6, 2021, Alex Jones text message to Caroline Wren).

109. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Alexander Jones, (Jan. 24, 2022), Exhibit 13 at 0:29 (excerpt from The Alex Jones Show on Jan. 7, 2022).

110. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Caroline Wren, (Dec. 17, 2021), pp. 260â61.

111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Caroline Wren, (Dec. 17, 2021), pp. 260â61; See generally The Alex Jones Show, âHumanity is Carrying Out its Own Great Reset Against Planetâs Corrupt Elite - FULL SHOW 1/24/22,â Banned.Video, at 37:00, Jan. 24, 2022, available at https://banned.video/watch?id=61ef3e9d186875155e97ece8&list=5d81058ce2ea200013c01580.

112. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Alexander Jones, (Jan. 24, 2022), Ex. 13 at 0:29 (Excerpt from The Alex Jones Show on Jan. 7, 2022); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000475 (Jan. 6, 2021, Alex Jones text message to Caroline Wren); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000484 (Jan. 5, 2021, Tim Enlow text message to Caroline Wren).

113. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Caroline Wren, (Dec. 17, 2021), p. 244.

114. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Caroline Wren, (Dec. 17, 2021), p. 244.

115. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Caroline Wren, (Dec. 17, 2021), p. 244.

116. The Alex Jones Show, âHumanity is Carrying Out its Own Great Reset Against Planetâs Corrupt Elite - FULL SHOW 1/24/22,â Banned.Video, at 37:00, Jan. 24, 2022, available at https://banned.video/watch?id=61ef3e9d186875155e97ece8&list=5d81058ce2ea200013c01580.

117. The Alex Jones Show, âHumanity is Carrying Out its Own Great Reset Against Planetâs Corrupt Elite - FULL SHOW 1/24/22,â Banned.Video, at 37:44, Jan. 24, 2022, available at https://banned.video/watch?id=61ef3e9d186875155e97ece8&list=5d81058ce2ea200013c01580.

118. The Alex Jones Show, âHumanity is Carrying Out its Own Great Reset Against Planetâs Corrupt Elite - FULL SHOW 1/24/22,â Banned.Video, at 37:26, Jan. 24, 2022, available at https://banned.video/watch?id=61ef3e9d186875155e97ece8&list=5d81058ce2ea200013c01580.

119. The Alex Jones Show, âHumanity is Carrying Out its Own Great Reset Against Planetâs Corrupt Elite - FULL SHOW 1/24/22,â Banned.Video, at 37:58, Jan. 24, 2022, available at https://banned.video/watch?id=61ef3e9d186875155e97ece8&list=5d81058ce2ea200013c01580.

120. The Alex Jones Show, âHumanity is Carrying Out its Own Great Reset Against Planetâs Corrupt Elite - FULL SHOW 1/24/22,â Banned.Video, at 38:00, Jan. 24, 2022, available at https://banned.video/watch?id=61ef3e9d186875155e97ece8&list=5d81058ce2ea200013c01580.

121. The Alex Jones Show, âHumanity is Carrying Out its Own Great Reset Against Planetâs Corrupt Elite - FULL SHOW 1/24/22,â Banned.Video, at 38:16, Jan. 24, 2022, available at https://banned.video/watch?id=61ef3e9d186875155e97ece8&list=5d81058ce2ea200013c01580 .

122. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Matthew Walter, (Mar. 9, 2022), p. 78.

123. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Matthew Walter, (Mar. 9, 2022), p. 75.

124. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Google Voice Production, Feb. 25, 2022).

125. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Verizon Production, Nov. 19, 2021).

126. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Nov. 24, 2021).

127. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Alexander Jones, (Jan. 24, 2022), Exhibit 12 at 0:20.

128. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya Eliahou, âWhat Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,â ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=HS34fpbzqg2b.

129. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya Eliahou, âWhat Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,â ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=Qo3hom0Qb1at.

130. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya Eliahou, âWhat Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,â ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=QgPXUnbdhx3q.

131. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya Eliahou, âWhat Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,â ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=QgPXUnbdhx3q.

132. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya Eliahou, âWhat Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,â ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=QgPXUnbdhx3q.

133. Jan. 6th Protest and Save America March, âRaw BodyCam: Watch As Alex Jones Works With Capitol Police To Try And Quell The Riot,â Banned.Video, at 8:45, Jan. 12, 2021, available at https://banned.video/watch?id=5ffe25bc0d763c3dca0c4da1.

134. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya Eliahou, âWhat Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,â ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=a8lp9oooOT3m.

135. Jan. 6th Protest and Save America March, âRaw BodyCam: Watch as Alex Jones Works with Capitol Police To Try And Quell The Riot,â Banned.Video, at 15:10, Jan. 12, 2021, available at https://Banned.Video/watch?id=5ffe25bc0d763c3dca0c4da1.

136. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (District of Columbia Production), MPD 125âMPD 126 (District of Columbia, Metropolitan Police Department, Transcript of Radio Calls, January 6, 2021).

137. Governmentâs Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley Reffitt at 4, United States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-32 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021), ECF No. 10.

138. See Governmentâs Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley Reffitt at 4â5, United States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-00032 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021), ECF No. 10.

139. See Governmentâs Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley Reffitt at 4â5, United States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-00032 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021), ECF No. 10.

140. See Governmentâs Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley Reffitt at 5, United States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-00032 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021), ECF No. 10.

141. See Governmentâs Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley Reffitt at 5, United States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-00032 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021), ECF No. 10.

142. See Governmentâs Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley Reffitt at 5, United States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-00032 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021), ECF No. 10.

143. See Governmentâs Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley Reffitt at 6, United States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-00032 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021), ECF No. 10.

144. See Governmentâs Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley Reffitt at 12, United States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-00032 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021), ECF No. 10.

145. See Governmentâs Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Detention of Defendant Guy Wesley Reffitt at 4, United States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-32 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2021), ECF No. 10.

146. Governmentâs Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Reffitt, No. 1:21-cr-32 (D.D.C. July 15, 2022), ECF No. 158.

147. See Spencer S. Hsu and Tom Jackman, âFirst Jan. 6 Defendant Convicted at Trial Receives Longest Sentence of 7 Years,â Washington Post, (Aug. 1, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/08/01/reffitt-sentence-jan6/.

148. See Statement of Facts at Â¶Â¶ 14, 20, United States v. Scott, No. 1:21-mj-411 (D.D.C. April 29, 2021), ECF No. 1-1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1395876/download.

149. See Statement of Facts at Â¶ 16, United States v. Scott, No. 1:21-mj-411 (D.D.C. April 29, 2021), ECF No. 1-1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1395876/download.

150. Statement of Facts at 9, United States v. Worrell, No. 1:21-mj-296 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2021), ECF No. 1-1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1379556/download.

151. Statement of Facts at 10â11, United States v. Worrell, No. 1:21-mj-296 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2021), ECF No. 1-1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1379556/download.

152. Statement of Offense at Â¶ 9, United States v. Jackson, No. 1:21-cr-484 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 2021), ECF No. 19, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1452291/download.

153. Statement of Offense at Â¶Â¶ 1, 25, United States v. Greene, No. 1:21-cr-52-33 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2021), ECF No. 105, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1458266/download.

154. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya Eliahou, âWhat Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,â ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=zOZ8CgfNU1SY.

155. Statement of Facts at 5, United States v. Kelley, No. 1:22-cr-222 (D.D.C. June 8, 2022), ECF No. 1.

156. Statement of Facts at 6, United States v. Kelley, No. 1:22-cr-222 (D.D.C. June 8, 2022), ECF No. 1.

157. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ryan Kelley, (Apr. 21, 2022), pp. 7, 70â71, 79â80, and Exhibit 15.

158. Arrest Warrant at 1, United States v. Kelley, No. 1:22-cr-222 (D.D.C. June 9, 2022), ECF No. 5.

159. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 102; Third Superseding Indictment at 21, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380 (noting that Dominic Pezzola âused [a] riot shield . . . to break a window of the Capitolâ at â2:13 p.m.â and that â[t]he first members of the mob entered the Capitol through this broken windowâ); 167 Cong. Rec. S634 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf.

160. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 689; Third Superseding Indictment at 21, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380 (noting that Dominic Pezzola âused [a] riot shield . . . to break a window of the Capitolâ at â2:13 p.m.â and that â[t]he first members of the mob entered the Capitol through this broken window.â); 167 Cong. Rec. S634 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf.

161. Third Superseding Indictment at 21, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380 (noting that Dominic Pezzola âused [a] riot shield . . . to break a window of the Capitolâ at â2:13 p.m.â and that â[t]he first members of the mob entered the Capitol through this broken windowâ); 167 Cong. Rec. S634 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf. See also Ashley Parker, Carol D. Leonnig, Paul Kane, and Emma Brown, âHow the Rioters Who Stormed the Capitol Came Dangerously Close to Pence,â Washington Post, (Jan. 15, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/pence-rioters-capitol-attack/2021/01/15/ab62e434-567c-11eb-a08b-f1381ef3d207_story.html; Kat Lonsdorf, Courtney Dorning, Amy Isackson, Mary Louise Kelly, and Aeilsa Chang, âA Timeline of How The Jan. 6 Attack UnfoldedâIncluding Who Said What and When,â NPR, (June 9, 2022), available at https://www.npr.org/2022/01/05/1069977469/a-timeline-of-how-the-jan-6-attack-unfolded-including-who-said-what-and-when.

162. Peter Manseau, âHis Pastors Tried to Steer Him Away from Social Media Rage. He Stormed the Capitol Anyway,â Washington Post, (Feb. 19, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2021/02/19/michael-sparks-capitol-siege-jan-6-christian/.

163. Statement of Facts at 9, United States v. Sparks, No. 1:21-cr-87 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2021), ECF No. 1.

164. Complaint and Affidavit at 9â10, United States v. Gieswein, No. 1:21-cr-24 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2021), ECF No. 1. As an example of his conspiracy beliefs, Gieswein claimed that American politicians âhave completely destroyed our country and sold them to the Rothschilds and Rockefellers.â This is a standard anti-Semitic trope. See Complaint and Affidavit at 11, United States v. Gieswein, No. 1:21-cr-24 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2021), ECF No. 1. Gieswein also denied that he was a Three Percenter as of January 6, 2021, even though he affiliated with an apparent Three Percenter group at previous times. See Mr. Giesweinâs Motion for Hearing & Revocation of Detention Order at 2â3, 18â19, 25, United States v. Gieswein, No. 1:21-cr-24 (D.D.C. June 8, 2021), ECF No. 18. When the FBI arrested Gieswein, the criminal complaint noted that he âappears to be affiliated with the radical militia group known as the Three Percenters.â Criminal Complaint at 5, United States v. Gieswein, No. 1:21-cr-24 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1360831/download. See also Adam Rawnsley (@arawnsley), Twitter, Jan. 17, 2021 9:13 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/arawnsley/status/1350989535954530315 (highlighting photos of Gieswein flashing a Three Percenter symbol).

165. Statement of Facts at 1â2, United States v. Jensen, No. 1:21-cr-6 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2021), ECF No. 1.

166. Statement of Facts at 2, United States v. Jensen, No. 1:21-cr-6 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2021), ECF No. 1.

167. âArizona Man Sentenced to 41 Months in Prison On Felony Charge in Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (Nov. 17, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/arizona-man-sentenced-41-months-prison-felony-charge-jan-6-capitol-breach.

168. Statement of Facts at 2, United States v. Seefried, No. 1:21-mj-46 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1354306/download.

169. Statement of Facts at 2, United States v. Seefried, No. 1:21-mj-46 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1354306/download; Maria Cramer, âConfederate Flag an Unnerving Sight in the Capitol,â New York Times, (Jan. 9, 2021), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/us/politics/confederate-flag-capitol.html.

170. Statement of Facts at 2, 5, United States v. Seefried, No. 1:21-mj-46 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1354306/download.

171. âDelaware Man Sentenced to 24 Months in Prison for Actions Related to Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (Oct. 24, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/delaware-man-sentenced-24-months-prison-actions-related-capitol-breach.

172. âVirginia Man Arrested on Felony and Misdemeanor Charges for Actions During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (Sep. 20, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/virginia-man-arrested-felony-and-misdemeanor-charges-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach; Statement of Facts at 44, United States v. Brody, et al., No. 1:22-mj-203 (D.D.C. Sep. 12, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1536736/download.

173. âVirginia Man Arrested on Felony and Misdemeanor Charges for Actions During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (Sep. 20, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/virginia-man-arrested-felony-and-misdemeanor-charges-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.

174. Statement of Facts at 44, United States v. Brody, et al., No. 1:22-mj-203 (D.D.C. Sep. 12, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1536736/download.

175. Statement of Facts at 44, United States v. Brody, et al., No. 1:22-mj-203 (D.D.C. Sep. 12, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1536736/download.

176. Neil Vigdor and Alan Feuer, âA Jan. 6 Defendant Coordinated Volunteers to Help Youngkinâs Campaign,â New York Times, (Oct. 6, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/06/us/politics/joseph-brody-jan-6-youngkin.html.

177. Statement of Facts at 43, United States v. Brody, et al., No. 1:22-mj-203 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1536736/download.

178. âVirginia Man Arrested on Felony and Misdemeanor Charges for Actions During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (Sep. 20, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/virginia-man-arrested-felony-and-misdemeanor-charges-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.

179. âVirginia Man Arrested on Felony and Misdemeanor Charges for Actions During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (Sep. 20, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/virginia-man-arrested-felony-and-misdemeanor-charges-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.

180. âVirginia Man Arrested on Felony and Misdemeanor Charges for Actions During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice (Sep. 20, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/virginia-man-arrested-felony-and-misdemeanor-charges-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach; Statement of Facts at 40â43, United States v. Brody, et al., No. 1:22-mj-203 (D.D.C. Sep. 12, 2022), available a: https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1536736/download.

181. Statement of Facts at 2â3, 6â7, United States v. Williams, No. 1:21-cr-618 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1357051/download. A jury found Williams guilty of certain felony and misdemeanor charges, but could not reach a verdict on other charges, including the aiding and abetting charge. See âPennsylvania Woman Found Guilty of Felony and Misdemeanor Charges Related to Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (Nov. 21, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/pennsylvania-woman-found-guilty-felony-and-misdemeanor-charges-related-capitol-breach.

182. Governmentâs Sentencing Memorandum at 12, United States v. Hale-Cusanelli, No. 1:21-cr-37 (D.D.C. Sep. 15, 2022), ECF No. 110; âNew Jersey Man Sentenced to 48 Months in Prison for Actions Related to Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (Sep. 22, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/new-jersey-man-sentenced-prison-actions-related-capitol-breach; Statement of Facts at 2, United States v. Hale-Cusanelli, No. 1:21-cr-37, (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1356066/download. Pictures available online depict Hale-Cusanelli with a Hitler-style mustache. See Holmes Lybrand and Andrew Millman, âU.S. Capitol Rioter and Alleged Nazi Sympathizer Sentenced to 4 Years in Prison,â CNN, (Sep. 22, 2022), available at https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/22/politics/timothy-hale-cusanelli-stephen-ayres-capitol-riot/index.html.

183. âNew Jersey Man Sentenced to 48 Months in Prison for Actions Related to Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (Sep. 22, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/new-jersey-man-sentenced-prison-actions-related-capitol-breach.

184. âNew Jersey Man Sentenced to 48 Months in Prison for Actions Related to Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (Sep. 22, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/new-jersey-man-sentenced-prison-actions-related-capitol-breach.

185. Statement of Offense at 3, United States v. Packer, No. 1:21-cr-103 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1469561/download.

186. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant at 4â5, United States v. Packer, No. 1:21-cr-103, (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1353201/download.

187. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 102, 123.

188. Igor Bobic (@igorbobic), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 3:09 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/igorbobic/status/1346911809274478594; Spencer S. Hsu, âOfficer Describes How Jan. 6 Rioters Pursued Him through Capitol,â Washington Post, (June 15, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/06/13/eugene-goodman-capitol-police-testimony/.

189. Igor Bobic (@igorbobic), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 3:09 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/igorbobic/status/1346911809274478594; Peter Manseau, âHis Pastors Tried to Steer Him Away from Social Media Rage. He Stormed the Capitol Anyway,â Washington Post, (Feb. 19, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2021/02/19/michael-sparks-capitol-siege-jan-6-christian/; Governmentâs Opposition to Defendantâs Motion for Hearing & Revocation of Detention Order at 8, United States v. Robert Gieswein, No. 1:21-cr-24 (EGS) (D.D.C. June 15, 2021), available at https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Robert%20Gieswein%20Government%20Opposition%20to%20Motion%20for%20Hearing%20and%20Revocation%20of%20Detention%20Order.pdf.

190. âIowa Man Found Guilty of Felony and Misdemeanor Charges Related to Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (Sep. 23, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/iowa-man-found-guilty-felony-and-misdemeanor-charges-related-capitol-breach.

191. Peter Manseau, âHis Pastors Tried to Steer Him Away from Social Media Rage. He Stormed the Capitol Anyway,â Washington Post, (Feb. 19, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2021/02/19/michael-sparks-capitol-siege-jan-6-christian/.

192. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 113, 114.

193. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 213; Igor Bobic (@igorbobic), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 3:09 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/igorbobic/status/1346911809274478594.

194. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya Eliahou, âWhat Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,â ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=s8XNlAskWNvi.

195. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya Eliahou, âWhat Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,â ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=s8XNlAskWNvi.

196. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya Eliahou, âWhat Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,â ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=s8XNlAskWNvi.

197. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant at 12, United States v. Rae, No. 1:21-cr-378 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2021), ECF No. 1.

198. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Pruitt, No. 1:21-cr-23 (D.D.C. June 3, 2022), ECF No. 61, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1510401/download.

199. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 113, 114.

200. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 102.

201. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 932, 933.

202. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya Eliahou, âWhat Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,â ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=a8lp9oooOT3m.

203. Jan. 6th Protest and Save America March, âRaw BodyCam: Watch as Alex Jones Works with Capitol Police to Try and Quell the Riot,â Banned.Video, at 15:10, posted Jan. 12, 2021, available at https://banned.video/watch?id=5ffe25bc0d763c3dca0c4da1.

204. CNN Business, âAlex Jonesâ Influence on January 6,â CNN, Feb. 26, 2022, available at https://www.cnn.com/videos/media/2022/02/26/alex-jones-influence-january-6-documentary.cnnbusiness.

205. Hunting Insurrectionists, âEast Main âColumbusâ Doors 1:45-4:45pm - 56 video sync - Jan 6th Capitol Attack Footage,â YouTube, at 31:53, Mar. 12, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z1gODZvbhqs&t=1901s.

206. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Matthew Thomas Walter, (Mar. 9, 2022), p. 79.

207. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Matthew Thomas Walter, (Mar. 9, 2022), p. 79.

208. Hunting Insurrectionists, âEast Main âColumbusâ Doors 1:45-4:45pm - 56 video sync - Jan 6th Capitol Attack Footage,â YouTube, at 36:15, Mar. 12, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z1gODZvbhqs&t=1901s.

209. CNN Business, âAlex Jonesâ Influence on January 6,â CNN, at 2:20â2:28, Feb. 26, 2022, available at https://www.cnn.com/videos/media/2022/02/26/alex-jones-influence-january-6-documentary.cnnbusiness.

210. Hunting Insurrectionists, âEast Main âColumbusâ Doors 1:45-4:45pm - 56 video sync - Jan 6th Capitol Attack Footage,â YouTube, at 39:19, Mar. 12, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z1gODZvbhqs&t=1901s.

211. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ali Alexander, (Dec. 9, 2021), pp. 64â66.

212. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 7029, 7216.

213. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 7029.

214. Complaint with Arrest Warrant at 16â19, United States v. Loehrke, No. 1:21-mj-672 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2021), ECF No. 1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1459171/download.

215. Complaint with Arrest Warrant at 12, United States v. Loehrke, No. 1:21-mj-672 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2021), ECF No. 1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1459171/download.

216. Complaint with Arrest Warrant at 12, United States v. Loehrke, No. 1:21-mj-672 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2021), ECF No. 1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1459171/download.

217. Complaint with Arrest Warrant at 12, United States v. Loehrke, No. 1:21-mj-672 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2021), ECF No. 1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1459171/download.

218. Complaint with Arrest Warrant at 14â19, United States v. Loehrke, No. 1:21-mj-672 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2021), ECF No. 1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1459171/download; âTwo Men Charged with Obstructing Law Enforcement During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (Dec. 3, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/two-men-charged-obstructing-law-enforcement-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.

219. Complaint with Arrest Warrant at 24â29, United States v. Loehrke, No. 1:21-mj-672 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2021), ECF No. 1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1459171/download.

220. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Brian Adams and Marc Carrion, (Apr. 20, 2022).

221. âTwo Men Charged with Obstructing Law Enforcement During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (Dec. 3, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/two-men-charged-obstructing-law-enforcement-during-jan-6-capitol-breach.

222. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 7029.

223. See Chapter 6.

224. Trial Transcript at 4532:20â4534:9, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022).

225. Trial Transcript at 4642:24â4643:6 and Trial Exhibit 6731, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022).

226. Trial Transcript at 4643:22â4644:4 and Trial Exhibit 6731, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022).

227. Trial Transcript at 4520:9â4521:5, 4744:20â4745:21, Trial Exhibits 1503, 6740, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022).

228. Seventh Superseding Indictment at 21â22, United States v. Crowl et al., No. 21-cr-28 (D.D.C. Jan. 12, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1462476/download.

229. Seventh Superseding Indictment at 22, United States v. Crowl et al., No. 21-cr-28 (D.D.C. Jan. 12, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1462476/download.

230. Trial Transcript at 4724:8â15 and Trial Exhibit 1500 at 13:02â13:25, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022).

231. Trial Transcript at 4779:1â4790:3 and Trial Exhibit 1505, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022).

232. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 7029; âLeader of Alabama Chapter of Oath Keepers Pleads Guilty to Seditious Conspiracy and Obstruction of Congress for Efforts to Stop Transfer of Power Following 2020 Presidential Election,â Department of Justice, (Mar. 2, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-alabama-chapter-oath-keepers-pleads-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-and-obstruction#:~:text=Joshua%20James%2C%2034%2C%20of%20Arab,with%20the%20government's%20ongoing%20investigation; Statement of Offense at 8, United States v. James, No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2022), ECF No. 60, available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1479551/download.

233. Trial Transcript at 4803:10â4804:23 and Trial Exhibit 1089.1, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022).

234. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 912.

235. âCrypt,â Architect of the Capitol, available at https://www.aoc.gov/explore-capitol-campus/buildings-grounds/capitol-building/crypt.

236. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 267.

237. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 123, 124.

238. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 123, 124.

239. Watchers Guild, âRioters Fight with Police at Capitol Building - Washington D.C. - JAN/6/2020,â YouTube, Jan. 6, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U7DiLh2Pbl4; News2Share, âJanuary 6 United States Capitol Attack,â YouTube, June 4, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9TshRdxXi9c.

240. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Gordon, No. 1:22-cr-343 (D.D.C. Oct. 28, 2022), ECF No. 26, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1547751/download.

241. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Gordon, No. 1:22-cr-343 (D.D.C. Oct. 28, 2022), ECF No. 26, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1547751/download.

242. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Gordon, No. 1:22-cr-343 (D.D.C. Oct. 28, 2022), ECF No. 26, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1547751/download.

243. Hunting Insurrectionists, âWest Terrace âTunnelâ - 3:50 - 4:21 pm - Jan 6th,â YouTube, Mar. 12, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yil1JemYMM0&t=1405s.

244. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 102.

245. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file Inside Capitol.mov at 23:01â23:35.

246. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 178, 402.

247. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file Inside Capitol.mov at 13:10â15:47.

248. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 178, 402.

249. Jake Tapper (@jaketapper), Twitter, Feb. 10, 2021 5:50 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/jaketapper/status/1359635955389509638 (screenshotting Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22usa+demands+the+truth%22).

250. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 178, 402.

251. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 178, 402.

252. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of David Millard, (Apr. 18, 2022), p. 28.

253. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of David Millard, (Apr. 18, 2022), p. 28.

254. Plea Agreement at 5, United States v. Pruitt, No. 1:21-cr-23 (D.D.C. June 3, 2022), ECF No. 61.

255. Complaint at 34â38, United States v. Chrestman, No. 1:21-cr-160 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1366441/download; Ryan J. Reilly (@ryanjreilly), Twitter, Nov. 26, 2022 1:00 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/ryanjreilly/status/1596564571371749378 (showing video Proud Boy Nicholas DeCarlo filmed while inside the Capitol).

256. Complaint at 34â38, United States v. Chrestman, No. 1:21-cr-160, (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1366441/download.

257. Indictment at 5, 8â9, United States v. Kuehne et al., No. 1:21-cr-160 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2021), ECF No. 29.

258. Statement of Offense at 3, United States v. Colon, No. 1:21-cr-160 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2022), ECF No. 143.

259. Indictment at 5, 8â9, United States v. Kuehne et al., No. 1:21-cr-160 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2021), ECF No. 29.

260. Complaint at 36, United States v. Chrestman, No. 1:21-cr-160, (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1366441/download; Ryan J. Reilly (@ryanjreilly), Twitter, Nov. 26, 2022 1:00 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/ryanjreilly/status/1596564571371749378 (showing video Proud Boy Nicholas DeCarlo filmed while inside the Capitol).

261. Complaint at 36, United States v. Chrestman, No. 1:21-cr-160, (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1366441/download.

262. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Colon, No. 1:21-cr-160, (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2022), ECF No. 143.

263. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Colon, No. 1:21-cr-160, (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2022), ECF No. 143.

264. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 251.

265. Lena Groeger, Jeff Kao, Al Shaw, Moiz Syed and Maya Eliahou, âWhat Parler Saw During the Attack on the Capitol,â ProPublica, (Jan. 17, 2021), available at https://projects.propublica.org/parler-capitol-videos/?id=sbGOy4rN0ue4.

266. Statement of Offense at 12â14, United States v. Chansley, No. 1:21-cr-3 (D.D.C. Sep. 3, 2021), ECF No. 70.

267. Statement of Offense at 15, United States v. Chansley, No. 1:21-cr-3 (D.D.C. Sep. 3, 2021), ECF No. 70.

268. Christian Secor, a young Groyper, sat in the Vice Presidentâs seat. See âCalifornia Man Sentenced to 42 Months in Prison for Actions During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (Oct. 19, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/california-man-sentenced-prison-actions-during-jan-6-capitol-breach; Complaint at 6, 14â15, United States v. Secor, No. 1:21-mj-232 (D.D.C. Feb 13, 2021), ECF No. 1.

269. Other agitators, such as Vets 4 Trump founder Joshua Macias (who was with Stewart Rhodes and Enrique Tarrio on January 5th), also attacked Vice President Pence outside the Capitol. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Joshua Macias, (May 2, 2022), pp. 27â28, and Exhibit 14; capitolhunters (@capitolhunters), Twitter, May 27, 2021 8:36 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/capitolhunters/status/1398075750482337792 (video of Macias calling Vice President Pence a âBenedict Arnoldâ outside of the Capitol on January 6th).

270. Reagan Battalion (@ReaganBattalion), Twitter, Jan. 7, 2021 5:03 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/ReaganBattalion/status/1347121703823044608.

271. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 944.

272. Sentencing Transcript at 19, United States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Sep. 27, 2022), ECF No. 170.

273. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 74.

274. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 74.

275. Governmentâs Sentencing Memorandum at 4â8, United States v. Head, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2022), ECF No. 159.

276. Statement of Facts at 5, 29â31, 39, United States v. Denney, No. 1:22-cr-70 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1-1; Status Coup News, âUNBELIEVABLE Footage | Trump Supporters Battle Cops Inside the Capitol,â YouTube, at 24:09, Jan. 7, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJOgGsC0G9U.

277. Statement of Facts at 2, 6â7, United States v. Brown, No. 1:21-cr-178 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2021), ECF No. 1-1; Storyful Viral, âScenes of Chaos Captures Inside US Capitol as Crowd Challenges Police,â YouTube, at 20:05, 21:03, Jan. 7, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qc0U755-uiM.

278. Governmentâs Sentencing Memorandum at 25â28, 55, United States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Sep. 13, 2022), ECF No. 140; Status Coup News, âUNBELIEVABLE Footage | Trump Supporters Battle Cops Inside the Capitol,â YouTube, at 9:45â9:56, Jan. 7, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJOgGsC0G9U.

279. Statement of Facts for Stipulated Trial at 6â9, United States v. Morss, No. 1:21-cr-40 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2022), ECF No. 430; Torsten Ove, âFormer Army Ranger Charged with Assaulting Cops during Capitol Riot Faces DC Bench Trial,â Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, (Aug. 17, 2022), available at: https://www.post-gazette.com/news/crime-courts/2022/08/17/robert-morss-pittsburgh-glenshaw-army-ranger-charged-assaulting-police-capitol-riot-insurrection-january-6-bench-trial/stories/202208170094.

280. Governmentâs Opposition to Defendantâs Motion to Set Bond and Conditions of Release at 6â7, United States v. Schwartz, No. 1:21-cr-178 (D.D.C. June 15, 2021), ECF No. 26.

281. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Head, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. May 6, 2022), ECF No. 124; Governmentâs Sentencing Memorandum at 1â4, 18, 25, United States v. Head, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2022), ECF No. 159; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (District of Columbia Production), Axon Body 3 No. X6039B9N0, at 15:17â15:20 (MPD body camera footage); âTennessee Man Sentenced to 90 Months in Prison for Assaulting Law Enforcement Officer During Capitol Breach,â Department of Justice, (Oct. 27, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/tennessee-man-sentenced-prison-assaulting-law-enforcement-officer-during-capitol-breach.

282. Governmentâs Sentencing Memorandum at 1â4, 18, 25, United States v. Head, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2022).

283. Statement of Facts at 33â34, United States v. Denney, No. 1:22-cr-70 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.

284. Governmentâs Sentencing Memorandum at 2, 30â31, United States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2022), ECF No. 140.

285. Statement of Facts at 4â11, United States v. Sibick, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2021), ECF No. 1-1 (noting that Sibick told the FBI he was trying to help Officer Fanone while other rioters attempted to get the officerâs gun).

286. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (District of Columbia Production), (Axon Body 3 No. X6039B9N0), at 15:18:51â15:21:12 (MPD body camera footage); Governmentâs Sentencing Memorandum at 27-28, United States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2022), ECF No. 140.

287. Motion to Suppress by Daniel Rodriguez, Exhibit A at 38â39, 43â45, 70â71, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2021), ECF No. 38-1.

288. Motion to Suppress by Daniel Rodriguez, Exhibit A at 17â18, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2021), ECF No. 38-1.

289. Motion to Suppress by Daniel Rodriguez, Exhibit A at 118, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2021), ECF No. 38-1 (quoting Rodriguez saying: âAnd I was alreadyâTrump was already, likeâthis is 2015, and I was already into InfoWars and Alex Jones, and heâs backing up Trump. And Iâm like, all right, man. This is it. Iâm going toâthis isâIâm going to fight for this. Iâm going to doâI want to do this.â).

290. Motion to Suppress by Daniel Rodriguez, Exhibit A at 131, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2021), ECF No. 38-1.

291. Motion to Suppress by Daniel Rodriguez, Exhibit A at 34, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2021), ECF No. 38-1.

292. Motion to Suppress by Daniel Rodriguez, Exhibit A at 34, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2021), ECF No. 38-1.

293. Indictment at 2, 5â7, United States v. Rodriguez et al., No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2021), ECF No. 65.

294. Indictment at 2, 5â7, United States v. Rodriguez et al., No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2021), ECF No. 65.

295. Indictment at 2, 5â7, United States v. Rodriguez et al., No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2021), ECF No. 65.

296. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001532.0001 (Jan. 5, 2021, FBI Situational Information Report); see also Statement of Facts at 11, 39, United States v. Denney, No. 1:22-cr-70 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021), ECF No. 1-1 (noting that Denney, a Three Percenter, posted similar messages about occupying Congress on Facebook).

297. See 167 Cong. Rec. S633-38 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf; Marshall Cohen and Avery Lotz, âThe January 6 Insurrection: Minute-by-Minute,â CNN, (July 29, 2022), available at https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/10/politics/jan-6-us-capitol-riot-timeline/index.html.

298. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Frequency at 14:14â14:25. Select Committee staff reviewed recordings of this radio frequency. See also U.S. Capitol Police Camera 462.

299. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 961.

300. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Frequency at 14:14â14:25. Select Committee staff reviewed recordings of this radio frequency. See also U.S. Capitol Police Camera 462.

301. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 7023.

302. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 461.

303. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 077.

304. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 3062, 6059, 6146.

305. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 269.

306. Select Committee staff analyzed thousands of hours of surveillance footage from the United States Capitol. There is no camera that captured the evacuation because CSPAN cameras focus on the dais (so they miss the activity on the floor), and there are no CCTV cameras around the floor. The staff first identified Members appearing in the basement of the Capitol at exactly 2:40 p.m. ET. Based on knowledge of the Capitol and judging the distance traveled, staff have estimated that it took Members approximately 2 minutes from leaving the floor to getting to the basement, which puts the evacuation at approximately 2:38 p.m. This time is consistent with informal contemporaneous accounts provided by Members and law enforcement officers who were there. See U.S. Capitol Police Camera 0077.

307. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 0077.

308. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 360.

309. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 360.

310. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 360.

311. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 944.

312. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 403.

313. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 251.

314. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 267.

315. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 304.

316. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 202, 303, 461, 462.

317. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 202, 303, 461, 462.

318. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 960.

319. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 960.

320. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 7029.

321. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 102.

322. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 102.

323. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 926.

324. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 927, 928, 929.

325. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 933.

326. U.S. Capitol Police Cameras 074, 944.

327. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 074.

328. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 924.

329. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 944.

330. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 944.

331. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 7032.

332. U.S. Capitol Police Camera 011.

333. âWATCH: âLetâs Get Back to Work,â Pence Urges Senate,â PBS, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/watch-lets-get-back-to-work-pence-urges-senate.

1. Electoral Count Act.

As our Report describes, Donald J. Trump, John Eastman, and others corruptly attempted to violate the Electoral Count Act of 1887 in an effort to overturn the 2020 Presidential Election. To deter other future attempts to overturn Presidential Elections, the House of Representatives has passed H.R. 8873, âThe Presidential Election Reform Act, â and the Senate should act promptly to send a bill with these principles to the President. H.R. 8873 reaffirms that a Vice President has no authority or discretion to reject an official electoral slate submitted by the Governor of a state. It also reforms Congressâs counting rules to help ensure that objections in the joint session conform to Congressâs narrow constitutional role under Article II and the Twelfth Amendment. It provides that presidential candidates may sue in federal court to ensure that Congress receives the stateâs lawful certification, and leaves no doubt that the manner for selecting presidential electors cannot be changed retroactively after the election is over.

2. Accountability.

The Select Committee has made criminal referrals to the Department of Justice, and both the Department of Justice and other prosecutorial authorities will now make their determinations on whether to prosecute individuals involved in the events resulting in an attack on the United States Congress on January 6, 2021. Additional steps may also be appropriate to ensure criminal or civil accountability for anyone engaging in misconduct described in this Report. Those courts and bar disciplinary bodies responsible for overseeing the legal profession in the states and the District of Columbia should continue to evaluate the conduct of attorneys described in this Report. Attorneys should not have the discretion to use their law licenses to undermine the constitutional and statutory process for peacefully transferring power in our government. The Department of Justice should also take appropriate action to prevent its attorneys from participating in campaign-related activities, or (as described in this report) activities aimed at subverting the rule of law and overturning a lawful election. This report also identifies specific attorney conflicts of interest for the Department to evaluate.

3. Violent Extremism.

Federal Agencies with intelligence and security missions, including the Secret Service, should (a) move forward on whole-of-government strategies to combat the threat of violent activity posed by all extremist groups, including white nationalist groups and violent anti-government groups while respecting the civil rights and First Amendment civil liberties of all citizens; and (b) review their intelligence sharing protocols to ensure that threat intelligence is properly prioritized and shared with other responsible intelligence and security agencies on a timely basis in order to combat the threat of violent activity targeting legislative institutions, government operations, and minority groups.

4. Fourteenth Amendment, Section 3.

Under Section 3 of the Constitutionâs Fourteenth Amendment, an individual who previously took an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, but who has âengaged in an insurrectionâ against the same, or given âaid or comfort to the enemies of the Constitutionâ can be disqualified from holding future federal or state office. The Select Committee has referred Donald Trump and others for possible prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 2383, including for assisting and providing aid and comfort to an insurrection. The Committee also notes that Donald J. Trump was impeached by a majority of the House of Representatives for Incitement of an Insurrection, and there were 57 votes in the Senate for his conviction. Congressional committees of jurisdiction should consider creating a formal mechanism for evaluating whether to bar those individuals identified in this Report under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment from holding future federal or state office. The Committee believes that those who took an oath to protect and defend the Constitution and then, on January 6th, engaged in insurrection can appropriately be disqualified and barred from holding government officeâwhether federal or state, civilian or military--absent at least two-thirds of Congress acting to remove the disability pursuant to Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Committee notes that Ms. Wasserman Schultz and Mr. Raskin have introduced H. Con. Res. 93 to declare the January 6 assault an insurrection and H.R. 7906 to establish specific procedures and standards for disqualification under section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment in the United States district court for the District of Columbia.

5. National Special Security Event.

Until January 6th, 2021, the joint session of Congress for counting electoral votes was not understood to pose the same types of security risks as other major events on Capitol Hill. Both the inaugural and the State of the Union have long been designated as National Special Security Events, requiring specific security measures and significant advance planning and preparation. Given what occurred in 2021, Congress and the Executive Branch should work together to designate the joint session of Congress occurring on January 6th as a National Special Security Event.

6. To the extent needed, consider reforming certain criminal statutes, including to add more severe penalites.

As indicated in the Report, the Committee believes that 18 U.S.C. Â§ 1512(c)2 and other existing provisions of law can be applied to efforts to obstruct, influence, or impede the joint session on January 6th, including to related planning efforts to overturn the lawful election results on that date. To the extent that any court or any other prosecutorial authorities ultimately reach any differing conclusion, Congress should amend those statutes to cover such conduct. Congress should also consider whether the severity of penalties under those statutes is sufficient to deter unlawful conduct threatening the peaceful transfer of power.

7. House of Representatives Civil Subpoena Enforcement Authority.

The current authority of the House of Representatives to enforce its subpoenas through civil litigation is unclear. Congressional committees of jurisdiction should develop legislation to create a cause of action for the House of Representatives to enforce its subpoenas in federal court, either following the statutory authority that exists for the Senate in 2 U.S.C. Â§ 288d and 28 U.S.C. Â§ 1365 or adopting a broad approach to facilitate timely oversight of the executive branch.

8. Threats to Election Workers.

Congressional committees of jurisdiction should consider enhancing federal penalties for certain types of threats against persons involved in the election process and expanding protections for personally identifiable information of election workers.

9. Capitol Police Oversight.

Congressional committees of jurisdiction should continue regular and rigorous oversight of the United States Capitol Police as it improves its planning, training, equipping, and intelligence processes and practices its critical incident response protocols, both internally and with law enforcement partners. Joint hearings with testimony from the Capitol Police Board should take place. Full funding for critical security measures should be assured.1

10. Role of the Media.

The Committeeâs investigation has identified many individuals involved in January 6th who were provoked to act by false information about the 2020 election repeatedly reinforced by legacy and social media. The Committee agrees that individuals remain responsible for their own actions, including their own criminal actions. But congressional committees of jurisdiction should continue to evaluate policies of media companies that have had the effect of radicalizing their consumers, including by provoking people to attack their own country.

11. Discussion of the Insurrection Act.

The Committee has been troubled by evidence that President Trumpâs possible use of the Insurrection Act was discussed by individuals identified in this Report. Congressional Committees of jurisdiction should further evaluate all such evidence, and consider risks posed for future elections.

ENDNOTE

Â Â 1. The Select Committee has shared concerns about two specific areas of security with the Committee on House Administration.

The Select Committee investigated the facts relating to law enforcement entitiesâ preparation for, and response to, the January 6th events at the Capitol, including the character of the intelligence prior to the insurrection. This appendix does not address the cause of the attack, which resulted from then President Trumpâs multi-pronged effort to overturn the 2020 presidential election.

Prior to January 6th, numerous government agencies received intelligence that those descending on The Mall for a rally organized by the President were armed and that their target may be the Capitol. The intelligence community and law enforcement agencies detected the planning for potential violence directed at the joint session of Congress.

That intelligence included information about specific planning by the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers militia group who ultimately led the attack on the Capitol. By contrast, the intelligence did not support a conclusion that Antifa or other left-wing groups would likely engage in a violent counterdemonstration, or attack President Trumpâs supporters on January 6th. Indeed, intelligence from January 5th indicated that some left-wing groups were instructing their members to âstay at homeâ and not attend on January 6th.1

As January 6th approached, some of the intelligence about the potential for violence was shared within the executive branch, including the Secret Service and the Presidentâs National Security Council. That intelligence should have been sufficient for President Trump, or others at the White House, to cancel the Ellipse speech, and for President Trump to cancel plans to instruct his supporters to march to the Capitol. Few in law enforcement predicted the full extent of the violence at the Capitol, or that the President of the United States would incite a mob attack on the Capitol, that he would send them to stop the joint session knowing they were armed and dangerous, that he would further incite them against his own vice President while the attack was underway, or that he would do nothing to stop the assault for hours.

Nevertheless, as explained below, and in multiple hearings by the Committee on House Administration, there are additional steps that should have been taken to address the potential for violence on that day.

On December 19, 2020, President Trump tweeted: âBig protest in D.C. on January 6th. Be there, will be wild!ââ2 Following President Trumpâs tweet, an analyst at the National Capital Region Threat Intelligence Consortium (NTIC) noticed a tenfold uptick in violent online rhetoric targeting Congress and law enforcement.3 The analyst also noticed that violent right-wing groups that had not previously been aligned had begun coordinating their efforts.4 These indications reached the head of the D.C. Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency (HSEMA), Christopher Rodriguez, as well as incoming Chief of D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) Robert Contee.5 Chief Contee remembered that the information prompted the DC Police to âchange the way that we were going to deploy for January the 6th.ââ6

Following President Trumpâs âbe there, will be wild!â tweet, Director Rodriguez arranged a briefing to provide the DC Mayor Muriel Bowser the latest threat intelligence about January 6th, outline the potential for violence, and âmake operational recommendations,â including that the Mayor request assistance from the DC National Guard.7 During the briefing, the Mayor was told that âthere is greater negative sentiment motivating conversation than the last two events in November and December of 2020,â and that âothers are calling to âpeacefullyâ storm the Capitol and occupy the building to halt the vote.ââ8

As early as December 30th, in its intelligence briefing entitled, âMarch for Trump,â the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) highlighted the Presidentâs âwill be wild!â tweet alongside hashtags #WeAreTheStorm, #1776Rebel, and #OccupyCapitols, and wrote, âPresident Trump supporters have proposed a movement to occupy Capitol Hill.ââ9 It added that promoters of the January 6th rally on social media had borrowed the Presidentâs phrase and were marketing the January 6th rally as the âWildProtest.ââ10

Other law enforcement entities were receiving similar indications from both government and private entities. By December 21st, the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) had learned of a surge in viewers of online maps of the Capitol complexâs underground tunnels, which were attracting increased attention on www.thedonald.win, alongside violent rhetoric supporting the President.11 By the late afternoon of January 5, 2021, Capitol Police Assistant Chief for Intelligence Yogananda Pittman urged Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund to convene a âbrief callâ to discuss âa significant uptick in groups wanting to block perimeter access to the Capitol tomorrow starting as early as 0600 hours.ââ12 Chief Sund remembered discussing those indications and the preparations Capitol Police already had âin place, and [that] everybody seemed fine with utilizing the resources we had.ââ13 Chief Sund added that, by that time, he had already deployed âall the available resources.ââ14

The Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI) and the U.S. Department of Homeland Securityâs Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A) were also aware of the increased online interest in the Capitol tunnels. The FBIâs special agent in charge of the intelligence division at the Washington Field Office, Jennifer Moore, pointed out that there was nothing illegal about discussing the tunnels. Without a very specific discussion of violence, it was a matter of ensuring that the appropriate law enforcement partner agencies were aware of the uptick, ensuring that the Capitol Police were aware.15 âPeopleâs First Amendment rights, obviously, are protected. We cannot trollâcan[ât] just troll the internet looking for things thatâs out there,â Moore said.16 âSo it would have to be with such specificity and such planning and such detail that we would be able to open a case, immediately seek authority for an undercover, have enough probable cause for that undercover off of one tip would be tough.ââ17

Other agencies were also surfacing indications and receiving tips. On December 26, 2020, the Secret Service received a tip about the Proud Boys detailing plans of having âa large enough group to march into DC armed and will outnumber the police so they canât be stopped.ââ18 It stressed, âTheir plan is to literally kill people . . . . Please please take this tip seriously and investigate further.ââ19 On December 24th, the Secret Service received a compilation of social media posts from âSITE,â a private intelligence group. One of them urged that protesters âmarch into the chambers.ââ20 Another, referring to President Trumpâs December 19th âwill be wild!â post, wrote that Trump âcanât exactly openly tell you to revolt,â so the December 19th post was âthe closest heâll ever get.ââ21 Another understood the Presidentâs tweet to be urging his supporters to come to Washington âarmed.ââ22 Others were to the same effect (âthere is not enough cops in DC to stop what is coming,ââ23 âmake sure they know who to fear,ââ24 and âwaiting for Trump to say the wordââ25).

By December 28th, that compilation had reached the newly installed head of the Capitol Police intelligence unit, Jack Donohue.26 The same day, a self-styled âinternet expertâ who had been âtracking online far right extremism for yearsâ sent an email to the Capitol Police public information inbox warning of âcountless tweets from Trump supporters saying they will be armed,â and of tweets âfrom people organizing to âstorm the Capitolâ on January 6th.ââ27 She added, âJanuary 6th will be the day most of these people realize thereâs no chance left for Trump. Theyâll be pushed to what they feel is the edge,â noting that many would be armed and that she was, for the first time, âtruly worried.ââ28 Other senior Capitol Police officers do not recall seeing that email before the January 6th attack.29 The next day, Secret Service agents forwarded to Capitol Police warnings that pro-Trump demonstrators were being urged to âoccupy federal building[s],â âmarch into the capital building [sic] and make them quake in their shoes by our mere presence.ââ30

In addition, on January 1, 2021, a lieutenant in the intelligence branch of the MPD forwarded to the Capitol Police intelligence unit a tipâlater forwarded to USCP Deputy Chief Sean Gallagherâthat he had âfound a website planning terroristic behavior on Jan 6th, during the rally.ââ31 The source included a link to www.thedonald.win site, describing a âdetailed plan on [s]torming the capitol in DC on Jan 6th.ââ32 On January 2, 2021, the FBI saved in its system a social media post stating, âThis is not a rally and itâs no longer a protest. This is a final stand . . . many are ready to die to take back #USA . . . . And donât be surprised if we take the #capital building[sic].ââ33 On January 3rd, FBI and Capitol Police received a Parler post that âafter weds we are going to need a new congress,â and âJan 6 may actually be their last day in Congress.ââ34

On January 4th, Jack Donoghue, head of USCPâs intelligence unit, and his assistant director, Julie Farnam, briefed Capitol Police leadership, including Chief Gallagher and Chief Pittman (but not Chief Sund), about the January 3rd Threat Assessment, which highlighted that Congress itself was the target of potential violence on January 6th. Assistant Director Farnam explicitly warned the group:

Supporters see this as the last opportunity to overturn the election. There was disappointment and desperation amongst the protestors, and this could be an incentive to become violent, because they have nothing left to lose. The targets are not the counter protestors; the target is Congress. The protests are heavily publicized. Stop the Steal has a propensity for attracting White supremacists, militia groups, groups like the Proud Boys. There are multiple social media posts saying that people are going to be coming armed, and it's potentially a very dangerous situation.35

On January 5, 2021, at 12:19 p.m., the Architect of the Capitol head of security, Valerie Hasberry, forwarded an alert to Capitol Police incident command that an individual was calling on thousands to âgo to Washington Jan 6 and help storm the Capital [sic],â adding âwe will storm the government buildings, kill cops, kill security guards, kill federal employees and agents.ââ36 âThere is now chatter on Parler about storming the Capitol,â Ms. Hasberry wrote to her AOC employee working at the USCP.37 âPlease let me know if there are any updates to credible threats.ââ38 Within an hour, she was advised by her staff that â[t]here is no talk about any credible threats or storming the Capitol.â That same day, representatives from DHS, FBI, HSEMA, Secret Service, DC Police, and Capitol Police shared notice of a website, Red State Secession, that urged its visitors to post the home and work addresses of Democratic Members of Congress and âpolitical enemiesâ under the title, âWhy the Second American Revolution Starts Jan 6.ââ39 It asked for their routes to and from the January 6th congressional certification because âthe crowd will be looking for enemies.ââ40

The FBI was uploading to, and tagging in, its system incoming information from all FBI field offices about January 6th under the label, âCERTUNREST2021.â While the incoming information was reviewed on a regular basis by the Washington Field Office, âunified monitoringâ of the items in the aggregate didnât begin until January 5th.41 That same day, the FBI captured a January 6th-related threat that warned a âQuick Reaction Forceâ of Trump supporters was preparing for January 6th in Virginia with weapons and prepared âto respond to âcalls for helpââ in the event that âprotesters believed the police were not doing their job,â and a âSituation Incident Reportâ from FBIâs Norfolk Field Office warned of a âwarâ on January 6th.42 While Capitol Police leadership received neither warning until after the attack,43 Assistant Director Farnam, USCP intelligence unit, warned that Congress would be the target on January 6th. She noted that a âsense of desperation and disappointment may lead to more of an incentive to become violent. Unlike previous post-election protests, Congress itself is the target on the 6th.â 44 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, remembers Deputy Secretary of Defense David Norquist expressing a similar view based on the social media traffic in early January 2021: âNorquist says . . . [t]he greatest threat is a direct assault on the Capitol. Iâll never forget it.ââ45

Federal and local agencies agreed that there was a potential for violence on January 6th. As noted above, the intelligence leading up to January 6th did not support a conclusion that Antifa or other left-wing groups would likely engage in a violent counter-demonstration, or attack President Trumpâs supporters on January 6th. In fact, none of these groups was involved to any material extent with the attack on the Capitol on January 6th.

That said, certain witnesses testified that they believed that there would be violence with Antifa or similar counter protest groups. President Trumpâs National Security Advisor, Robert OâBrien, said the White House saw a risk of violence from counter-protesters.46 Then Acting DHS Secretary Chad Wolfe said that his âmain concern [. . .] at the time was what we had seen throughout the summer and throughout the fall, which was you were going to have groups on either side, and so you were going to have counterprotests. And usually where those counterprotests interacted was where you had the violence.ââ47

General Milley said the potential for violence was clear to all: âEveryone knew. I can't imagine anybody in those calls that didn't realize that on the 6th was going to be the certification of an intensely contested election, and there were large crowds coming into town, and they were coming into protest. And everybody knew there was a probability, more than a possibility, a probability of violence.ââ48 He expected âstreet fights when the sun went down,â while [Deputy Secretary] Norquist said the most dangerous thing was assault on the Capitol.49 Director of DHS Special Operations Christopher Tomney remembered, â[T]here was broad discussion/acknowledgment that folks were calling for bringing weapons into the city on that day, so there was no surprise, there was noâyou know, no one disagreed that there was going to be the high likelihood that there could be some violence on January 6.ââ50

Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue described the discussion about the threat landscape as âgenerally about left-wing, right wing, or Pro-Trump, anti-Trump groups coming to the Capitol. It didn't really matter what they called themselves. It was a matter of they're upset, they're coming to the Capitol, and there's a potential for violence.ââ51 Donoghue added: âEveryone knew what everyone else was doing. Everyone knew that there was a danger of violence. Everyone knew that the Capitol and other facilities were potential targets. And I think we all felt comfortable that we were aware what the situation was, and we had the resources in place to address it.ââ52

Preparing for January 6th required coordination among the several local and Federal law enforcement agencies that have distinct authorities and jurisdiction over adjacent areas in the Washington, DC, area. These range from the MPD, United States Park Police (USPP), and USSS to the USCP.

Following the DC HSEMAâs December 30th intelligence briefing, Mayor Bowser, anticipating that President Trumpâs December 19th âwill be wild!â tweet would have a big effect on the number of people coming into the District,53 agreed with HSEMA Director Rodriguez, who thought âthe intelligence was showing that we needed to posture ourselves, we needed to brace ourselves, and we needed additional resources in the city particularly the DC National Guard.ââ54 MPD Chief Contee, who attended the December 30th briefing and was seeing similar intelligence, concurred with the request for the DC National Guard.55

In light of the upcoming holiday weekend, HSEMA Director Rodriguez wanted to expedite the DC request for National Guard assistance.56 On December 31st, Mayor Bowser requested the assistance of the DC National Guard to assist the MPD at traffic points within the city.57 Mayor Bowserâs request explicitly limited National Guard assistance to ânon-law enforcement activitiesâ so that the MPD could focus on the civil protests and specified that Guard troops should not be armed.58Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy approved Mayor Bowserâs request.59 By this time, DC HSEMA Director Rodriguez had fully activated HSEMA and coordinated with Federal, State and local partners, to deal with âconsequence management.ââ60

On January 4th, Mayor Bowser held a press conference and invited the MPD, USCP, and USPP.61 Mayor Bowser announced that she had activated the DC Fire and Emergency Management Services (DC FEMS) in preparation of the January 6th event and that the DC National Guard would assist MPD at traffic points and with crowd control. Mayor Bowser urged DC residents to stay out of downtown on January 5th and 6th, acknowledging the possibility of violence. She stated that, while â[p]eople are allowed to come into our city to participate in First Amendment activities,â DC officials would ânot allow people to incite violence, intimidate our residents, or cause destruction in our city.ââ62

The next day, Mayor Bowser sent a letter requesting that Federal agencies coordinate with the Mayorâs office and the MPD in their response on January 6th.63 The letter plainly stated that it was intended to ensure coordination among the agencies involved. DC HSEMA Director Rodriguez testified that there was a concern, in light of the Federal response to the previous summerâs civil justice protests, âthat in the event that activities on the street escalated, the city could once again become . . . militarized and that armed military and Federal law enforcement personnel could be brought into the District,â perhaps intimidating residents.64

Mayor Bowser also activated DC FEMS (Fire and Emergency Medical Service Department), several days before January 6th.65 DC FEMS focused most of its attention on the event at the Ellipse since the permits indicated it would be the largest event of the day, with an estimated 5,000 people attending. Other DC and Federal agencies believed the number would likely be closer to 35,000. This led DC FEMS to establish an area command for the Ellipse, including a Mobile Command Unit, six ambulances, four engine companies, and a first aid tent staffed by George Washington University medical staff.66

After the DC HSEMAâs December 30th intelligence briefing, MPD Chief Contee ordered full deployment of the Department, cancelling previously scheduled days off, fully deploying the Civil Disturbance Unit, and contacting police departments in Montgomery and Prince Georgeâs Counties in Maryland so that their forces would be pre-staged at certain locations. Chief Contee also staged police at the White House and Lafayette Park. Chief Contee said that although the MPD âare normally not fully deployed for civil disturbance for counting votes at the U.S. Capitol,ââ67 âobviously, as we got closer from the time of the initial [December 19th Trump] tweet leading up, with all of the rhetoric that's out there on social media, you know, people were going to bring guns, were going to do this and that and so forth, that caused us obviously to change the way that we were going to deploy for January the 6th.ââ68 Because of the numerous social media posts about guns, MPD also posted signs on the National Mall indicating that possession of firearms in Washington, D.C., was illegal and would be prosecuted.69

On January 3rd, the same day Capitol Policeâs Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division (IICD) issued a threat assessment indicating that âCongress itself is a target,â Chief Sund called House Sergeant-at-Arms Paul D. Irving to discuss requesting the DC National Guard to assist in policing the Capitolâs perimeter.70 Chief Sund needed approval from the Capitol Police Board, which consisted of Irving, Senate Sergeant-at-Arms Michael C. Stenger, and the Architect of the Capitol J. Brett Blanton. Chief Sund remembers that Irving responded immediately that he did not âlike the opticsâ and that the intelligence did not support the request.71 Irving, however, remembers Chief Sund calling him to say the DC National Guard had offered 125 unarmed National Guardsmen to the USCP and MPD.72 He also remembered that, during a conference call, Chief Sund told Stenger and him that the National Guard would be utilized in similar fashion to the assistance provided to the DC police, namely, staffing intersections, and for traffic control to free up officers, but then could be used for crowd control, although he acknowledged that the Capitol campus does not have many intersections in need of staffing.73

The Capitol Police Board, including Chief Sund, later agreed that a request for the DC National Guard would not be necessary, particularly if the USCP was in an âall hands on deckâ posture.74 Chief Sund agreed with Stenger and Irving that the intelligence did not support a request for DC National Guard assistance.75 According to Irving, Chief Sund did not believe the National Guard would add much to the USCP security plan for January 6th.76 Chief Sund briefed the Capitol Police Board on the USCPâs enhanced security plan, and âall hands on deck postureââincluding 1,200-plus officers, added Civil Disturbance Units (CDU), an enhanced Containment Emergency Response Team (âCERTâ), and an expanded perimeter.77 Chief Sund did not believe, based on the intelligence he had, that it was then necessary to cancel officersâ days off.78

USCP leadership did not create a department-wide plan for the January 6th event.79 In retrospect Chief Sund believed âthere should have been a plan for the joint session of Congress inside the Capitol to reflect all the planning and all the coordination that goes on inside the Capitol.ââ80

In the appendix on Deployment of the National Guard, we describe certain reasons why the deployment of the National Guard was delayed, highlighting the activity of Secretary of the Army McCarthy and how he understood an order given by Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller. In our interviews with Department of Defense (DoD) officials, they testified that they had asked the Department of Justice to serve the role of âlead Federal agency,â meaning to lead the coordination and the response on January 6th. The Justice Department does not command National Guard units. Department of Defense, Department of Justice (DOJ), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials testified from each agencyâs perspective about the discussions concerning which department would serve as a lead Federal agency. Notably, these discussions occurred at the same time President Trump was offering the Acting Attorney General position to Jeffrey Clark, replacing then Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen. Had Clark ultimately been appointed, and had he been placed in charge of the Federal security response to the violence on January 6th, the situation could have been materially worse.

Realizing that there had not yet been a coordination call among the Federal agencies engaged in planning for the January 6th events and related contingencies, Acting Secretary Miller convened one for January 3rd, because ânobody else was doing it.ââ81 In addition to DoD officials including General Milley, DOJ, DHS, Department of the Interior (DOI) officials participated. Acting Secretary Millerâs objectives were to ensure that âeveryone had the same perception of the threat and then figure out how to synchronize, coordinate.â He also wanted to make sure that DoD was prepared for any additional requests for support.82

Director of DHS Special Operations Tomney remembered that participants discussed the threat outlook and estimated crowd83 of up to 30,000ânot large for the District.84 The consensus was that 8,000 to 10,000 police officers would be available on January 6th, a force regarded as appropriate for up to a million protesters. General Milley asked the police participants on the call whether they needed any other assistance from the Department of Defense.85 General Milley and Secretary Miller expressed concern about the number of groups requesting permits and the attendance of groups like the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers who, as Secretary Miller explained, had âconducted acts of violence in the past.ââ86 General Milley asked whether requests for permits could be declined, canceled, or permits revoked.87 Participants from the Department of the Interior responded that âthat wasn't an option.ââ88

According to Director Tomney, DHS felt confident in the United States Secret Serviceâs ability to protect the White House and Vice President, the Federal Protective Serviceâs (FPS) ability to protect potentially affected Federal buildings, as well as the Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protectionâs ability to augment FPS, if needed.89 General Milley and the other DoD participants left the call reassured that the law enforcement agencies involved were prepared for January 6th.90

During the January 3rd call, the DoD also raised the issue of a lead Federal agency. General Milley noted the desirability of a law enforcement lead for coordinating the interagency planning and response effort, given the âpotpourri of jurisdictionsâ and diversity of agency authorities.91 Secretary Miller testified that he believed he and Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen were in agreement that the DOJ should lead interagency coordination for January 6th,92 although when asked during the call, Rosen did not confirm that the DOJ would play that role.93 The question of a lead Federal agency remained âan open, unanswered questionâ at the end of the January 3rd call.94 The same day, Rosen was attempting to secure a White House meeting with President Trump regarding the imminent appointment of Clark in his stead.95

On a January 4th inter-agency call with the same group, Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue made the DOJâs role clear: it would take the lead in certain areas of responsibility, although he stressed that the DOJ was never designated lead Federal agency and could not serve in that capacity.96 On the evening of January 4th, the FBI established a Strategic Information Operations Center (âSIOCâ) at FBI headquarters, which became operational on January 5th.97 Unlike the previous summerâs civil protests, DoD did not have a representative at the SIOC. All the DoD officials who were interviewed by the Select Committee, however, believe that the DOJ agreed to takeâand may have been assigned by the White Houseâthe lead coordinating role.98 Director Tomney, however, remembered that the DOJ participants neither agreed to, nor explicitly declined, the lead agency role.99

During the January 3rd and 4th calls, General Milley, according to Donoghue, noted that â[t]here should be plenty of police forces available without using Federal military troops,â so he was adamant that no active-duty troops would be deployed on January 6th.100 During this call, participants also discussed whether there was a need for a police-based quick reaction force and concluded that the size of the MPD and USCP police forces made that unnecessary.101

According to Donoghue, at the end of the January 4th call, â[i]t was clear that everyone understood what everyone else's responsibility was, and everyone understood what was available to them if they needed more resources to meet their responsibilities.ââ102 The calls had also given local and Federal law enforcement entities the chance to âvoice any issues, concerns, or requests for Department of Defense support if they felt that they were incapable of handling at their level. So, institutionally, there was agreement on the threat assessment and the plan going forward.ââ103 The DoDâs leading role during the January 3rd and 4th calls had, in fact, left Acting DHS Secretary Chad Wolf with the impression that DoD was the lead agency, as they were âcoordinating phone calls, they were setting agendas for phone calls, and they were calling out different people, okay, what do you need. . . So they were quarterbacking the situation and the response.ââ104

Three organizations in the National Capitol Region handle permits for organized activities depending on where the planned activity is to occur. The USSS issues permits for the Ellipse, while the DC MPD issues permits for the area around the Ellipse. The USCP handles permitting for activities on the Capitol campus. All three entities, as well as other law enforcement agencies, communicate about applications for permits and the expected number of attendees. They are reluctant to deny permits for what appear to be First Amendment-protected protests.105 The USCP received, evaluated, and approved six group permit requests for January 5th and 6th activity on Capitol Grounds.106

On December 19th, the day of President Trumpâs âwill be wild!â tweet, Cindy Chafian, spokesperson from the âEighty Percent Coalition,â applied to the MPD and USCP for a permit to hold a rally.107 On December 29th, Chafian applied to USPP for a permit for a January 5th rally in Freedom Plaza.108 The next day, Kylie Kremer filed for a permit for âWomen for America Firstâ to hold a rally for up to 5,000 people on the Ellipse.109 On December 31st, the National Park Service (NPS) held two meetings with Chafian as well as the MPD and USCP.110 Then, on January 1st, the USSS confirmed that President Trump would attend the January 6th rally at the Ellipse, prompting USPP to provide additional support for the rally.111

On January 4th, âWomen for America Firstâ requested that the NPS increase the authorized attendance at its rally to 20,000 from the 5,000 in the original application. The same day, reacting to the USPP briefing that 5,000 people were expected, Joseph Roth, the USSS site lead, commented that he found it âfunny that this permit says 5,000 people when they have said 30k repeatedly.ââ112 On January 5th, the NPS issued a permit for 30,000 participants for the Ellipse event.113 At no point was any permit granted for a march from the Ellipse to the Capitol. The President planned to announce that march âspontaneously.ââ114

At the White House, the increased crowd estimate concerned Bobby Peede, Director of Presidential Advance, who emailed White House Deputy Chief of Operations Anthony Ornato, noting that the USSS was planning on using only 12 magnetometers. Peede added that âthe mag issue is a pretty major problem if the expected crowd shows up.â Secret Service documents reveal internal discussion of an initial USSS assessment that 17 magnetometers would be needed. On January 6th, only 10 magnetometers were initially assigned to the Ellipse.115

On January 5th, Chief Sund briefed the Chairperson of the Committee on House Administration (CHA), Representative Zoe Lofgren, along with numerous staff, as well as House Sergeant-at-Arms Paul Irving. Given CHA's oversight of the Capitol Police, this was âan opportunity for the chair of the committee to hear from the security professionals on the security plan.ââ116 Chair Lofgrenâs staff director described it as a âtoplineâ briefing that covered various aspects of the security plan, including Chief Sundâs direction of âall hands on deck,â his focus on the prospect of counter protesters, as well as Chair Lofgrenâs concern that Members of Congress speaking at the Ellipse that day could incite protesters.117 After the briefing, the CHA staff director specifically asked about the availability of the National Guard in case it was needed. âChief Sund said that the Guard could be activated with an emergency declaration from the [Capitol Police] board, but they are here. They are a phone call away, and if we need them, they are ready to go.ââ118

Speaker Pelosi did not receive a similar briefing, but her chief of staff was given a readout of Chief Sundâs briefing to Chairperson Lofgren. On that basis, as well as the assurances Chief Sund provided, the Speakerâs chief of staff said, âSo I believed and the Speaker believed the security professionals were in charge of the security and they were prepared. We were told that there was a plan.ââ119

Although intelligence was available suggesting potential violence at the Capitol, it was not apparent exactly what President Trump would do to provoke the crowd at the January 6th Ellipse rally. Chief Sund, for example, drove into work on January 6th believing that preparations for the dayâs events were sound and that there was no extraordinary risk or threat. âYou know, on my way in, I called Inspector Glover with MPD just to get a read. He said he was actually parked over by the Ellipse. Asked him, Hey, how are things going over there? He said, there's big crowds, lots of people in line, but right now he wasn't seeing any concern with the folks that we had. So that was my initial take,â Sund told the Select Committee.120

Throughout the morning, Robert Engel, the special agent in charge of the Presidentâs Secret Service detail, received updates from the event at the Ellipse. At 10:35 a.m., an update informed Engel that 20,000 attendees had been processed and outside of the magnetometers, but that there were âseveral thousand on the mall watching but not in line.ââ121 An hour later, Engel forwarded an update to White House Deputy Chief of Operations Ornato, informing him that 30,000 attendees had been processed.122

Acting Attorney General Rosen met with FBI leadership for a briefing that morning.123 He remembered this briefing, unlike previous ones, as âmore of a situational update,â adding that the DOJ was âgoing to hope for the best, prepare for the worst.ââ124 At 10:43 a.m., Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue received an email from Matt Blue, Acting Chief of the Counterterrorism Section, stating â[t]here are no credible threats as of the 10:00 brief.ââ125 Twelve minutes later, Rosen spoke to White House Counsel Pat Cipollone via phone.126 Acting Attorney General Rosen admits that âin hindsightâ no one at the Department contemplated âhow bad that afternoon turned out to be.ââ127 Nobody in the DOJ leadership could have predicted President Trumpâs actions that day.

The Presidentâs speech at the Ellipse began just before noon. David Torres,128 head of the USSSâs Protective Intelligence Division (PID), insisted that the Secret Service was not listening to the Presidentâs speech, however PID agents monitored the speech throughout.129 At 12:20 p.m., Faron Paramore, assistant director of Strategic Intel & Information (SII), sent an email to USSS leadership that âPOTUS just said that he is going up to the U.S. Capitol to âwatchâ the voteâ and asked whether this is true. Secret Service executive Kimberly Cheatle responded â[h]e said it, but not going, to our knowledge.ââ130 Minutes later, the USSS PIOC warned that âMogul just mentioned in his speech that he would accompany the protesters to the Capitol,â with a note that âDAD Torres requested this be sent for awareness.ââ131 At 1:14 p.m., the USSS Joint Operations Center (JOC) sent an email designating a response team to accompany the President in his march to the Capitol, âper [his] announcementâ at the Ellipse. The JOC notes: âMultiple reports of armed individuals with various weapons and malicious intent. Be on your guard.ââ132

At 12:24 p.m., while the President was speaking, the Vice President, with his USSS detail, departed the Vice Presidentâs Residence for the Capitol.133 After being routed to the Senate side due to the protests, the Vice Presidentâs detail arrived at the Capitol at 12:38 p.m. and was inside the Senate Chamber at 12:54 p.m.134

Around 1 p.m., Chief Contee notified Mayor Bowser about the discovery of a pipe bomb at the Republican National Committee and of the Capitol perimeter breach.135 Within minutes, Mayor Bowser was at the Joint Operations Center with Chief Contee.136 They tried to contact Chief Sund and sent command officials to Capitol Police headquarters.137 At approximately 12:59 p.m., once the violence had begun, Chief Sund first called Deputy Chief Jeff Carroll of the MPD, which provided almost immediate reinforcements.138 Approximately 10 minutes later, MPD officers arrived at the West Front balcony to assist the USCP officers. Chief Sundâs next call was to the House and Senate Sergeants-at-Arms to request National Guard resources.139

As the violence at the Capitol escalated, DC FEMS realized that they were facing an âexpanding incident with the potential for mass casualties, fires, active shooter, and hazardous materials incidents that would exceed the resources at hand.ââ140 As violence escalated at the West Front, non-lethal grenadiers began launching chemical munitions at the crowd.141 Around the same time, the USCP discovered a nearby truck containing firearms and Molotov cocktails,142 as well as a second explosive device at the Democratic National Headquarters at 1:07 p.m., while Vice President-elect Kamala Harris was inside. Responding to these incidents required a commitment of significant USCP resources for mitigation and to evacuate nearby buildings, preventing their deployment to the Capitol to help secure the building.

Chief Gallagher recalled that âit started to really unfold into an investigativeâheavy on the investigation of let's pull up the cameras. Let's try to get an image of the pipe bombs. Let's get the images to our law enforcement partners. Let's try to play back the cameras and see if we can identify anybody that placed these pipe bombs. Let's get the owner of the vehicle, run the vehicle information for that suspicious vehicle. So we were coordinating all of that type of response that was from our Investigations Division . . . .We also had our IICD team trying to run down as much information, working with our Investigations Division as they could, on the suspicious vehicle, the tags of the vehicle, stuff of that nature.ââ143 Not including those in the command center, the incidents would require the response of 34 USCP personnel, with additional assistance provided by the FBI and ATF. USCPâs senior leadership at the Command Center and in the intelligence division also divided their time between the escalating threat to their officers at the Capitol and the explosive devices elsewhere on campus.

The next update to the DOJ was at 1:17 p.m., after President Trump had finished speaking at the Ellipse. After several attempts, Acting Attorney General Rosen got in touch with Acting U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Michael Sherwin, who was at the Ellipse. Rosen admits he was not very concerned with the situation at the time, because â[i]t was early, but at least the initial report was: Crowd size doesn't appear to be unexpected, and the conduct so far is okay.ââ144 He had only watched the end of the Presidentâs speech.145 It was early afternoon before the DOJâs senior leadership began to realize the extent of what was occurring. Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue remembered hearing protesters outside the Department of Justice âmarching down Constitution, going from the Ellipse toward the Capitolâ in the late morning, early afternoon, but wasnât specifically monitoring the protests as âthere were a million things going on.ââ146

At the same time, the President was pressing his request to go to the Capitol. According to Robert Engel, the head of his Secret Service detail, President Trump asked to go to the Capitol once they had gotten into the Presidential SUV.147 Engel denied the Presidentâs request and returned to the White House.148 The Committee has significant evidence regarding this period of time.149

President Trump, nevertheless, persisted in his request to go to the Capitol. A 1:35 p.m. entry in the USSS Civil Disturbance Unitâs time log shows that the plan was to hold at the White House for the next 2 hours and then move the President to the Capitol.150 Soon after, Engel emailed USSS leadership from the West Wing to say they were âdiscussing options and setting expectations.ââ151 Minutes later, after receiving an email from USSS leadership saying that it would not be advisable for the President to go âanywhere nearâ the Capitol, Engel responded, â[w]e are not doing an OTR to Punch Bowl.ââ152

Mayor Bowser also spoke directly with Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy who informed her that they had not gotten a request for National Guard assistance from the USCP. Mayor Bowser informed Secretary McCarthy that she did not have the authority to re-direct the 340 DC National Guard troops at traffic points across the city, but that she had already deployed the DC MPD and FEMs to the Capitol. Because she and Chief Sund had not connected, Mayor Bowser concluded that the security of the Capitol was ânow our responsibilityâ and requested National Guard assistance. At the end of this call, Mayor Bowser believed that Secretary McCarthy was ârunning [her request] up his chain of command.ââ153

USCP Chief Sund was concerned when the explosive device was discovered near RNC Headquarters but did not then believe there was a need to change the USCPâs operational posture. Minutes later, when a large group of rioters approached the outer west perimeter of the Capitol, Chief Sund raised the alarm and began to reposition his officers: âWhen we looked up, and I saw them approaching the officers that were standing, you know, right there on the barrier, I looked over to Chief Thomas and I said, Chad, where's ourâwhere's CDU? Get CDU down there now.ââ154

The USCP timeline shows that at 12:55 p.m. all available officers were directed to the West Front of the Capitol. Then, at approximately 1:25 p.m., FBI Deputy Director David Bowdich received a report about the pipe bombs at the RNC and DNC.155 Bowdich testified that the FBI considered the possibility that the DNC and RNC bombs were possible distractions.156 At 1:28 p.m., USCP requested the AOC deliver 400 additional bike racks to the East Front to serve as protective barriers, even though rioters were using bike racks as weapons. The pipe bomb discovery at the DNC prevented the AOC from delivering them.157

Chief Gallagher was surprised that the violence had escalated so fast. âThe amount of violence that immediately took place when that crowd of 30,000, 35,000, whatever the number that was estimated to come was, that did catch, I think, caught Capitol Police and all of our partners a little off guard with how violent they were and how quick they were.ââ158 At 1:49 p.m., DC MPD Commander Glover declared a riot on the West Front of the Capitol. âCruiser 50, weâre going to give riot warnings. Weâre going to give riot warnings. Going to try to get compliance, but this is now effectively a riot,â Commander Glover yelled into his radio. â1349 hours. Declaring it a riot,â the dispatcher responded, which allowed a change in the type of equipment the MPD could use in responding to the violence.159

While the violence continued to escalate at the Capitol, the USCP leadership focused on three things: (1) requesting support from local and Federal law enforcement agencies nearby; (2) planning for and coordinating with arriving reinforcements; and (3) protecting congressional leadership and other Members of Congress. Chief Sund was âstill making other calls to other agencies for supportâATF, FBI, you name it, Secret Service.ââ160

Yogananda Pittman, Gallagherâs direct supervisor, told the Select Committee that she took roles that day beyond her responsibility as Assistant Chief of Police for Protective and Intelligence Operations. âSo we startedâso I started to take Protective Services Bureau resources, as well as the chief's staff, to set up operations adjacent to headquarters building, specifically lot 16, so that we could have a check-in procedure for those units so they could stage vehicles,â Pittman said.161 âBecause like we know now, there were breaches on both sides of the buildings and these folks are inside of the Capitol. So you have to deploy them with your officers. They don't know the layout of the land. We're telling them to respond to north barricade. They don't know the north from the south.â 162

Just after 2 p.m., when the Capitol was breached, Assistant Chief Pittman turned her full attention to the protection of congressional leadership.163 Meanwhile, the USCP officers at the West Front were overwhelmed. Commander Glover praised the actions of his fellow law enforcement officers that day but also noted a lack of leadership.164 He observed that the USCP officers he encountered when walking toward the Capitolâs West Front seemed to be âvery hectic and scattered, with no clear direction, . . . fighting for every inch on the line,â capable, but âwithout a whole lot of command and control.ââ165

When it became clear to him that securing the Capitol would require additional resources, Chief Sund requested the assistance of the DC National Guard.166 During a 2:30 p.m. call set up by HSEMA Director Rodriguez, the USCP specified the support they needed from the Guard.167 Mayor Bowser also made âtwo urgent requests of the Presidentâ that she communicated to Chief of Staff Mark Meadows.168 One was for the National Guardâs assistance.169 The other was that the President make a statement asking âpeople to leave, to leave the building and to get out of the city, to stop.ââ170 At 2:56 p.m., Meadows told Mayor Bowser that the President âhad approved the requestâ and was âgoing to make a statement.ââ171

At the Justice Department, it had become clear by early afternoon that the situation was rapidly deteriorating. Donoghue first became aware of the Capitol breach when he walked into Rosenâs office and saw on television that the rioters were in the Rotunda.172 Rosen turned to him and said, â[D]o you see this, do you see what's going on, can you believe this?ââ173

At 2:14 p.m., the Vice Presidentâs detail had alerted Secret Service over their radio channel that the Capitol Building had been breached and that they were holding the Vice President in his Senate office.174 About 5 minutes later, the detail reported that the rioters had gained access to the second floor and that they would need to relocate the Vice President,175 despite the Vice Presidentâs objection.176 Five to 7 minutes later, after confirming that the route was safe, the lead agent on the Vice Presidentâs Secret Service detail reasserted the need for the Vice President to leave his Senate office.177 (At 2:24 p.m. President Trump tweeted, âMike Pence didnât have the courage to do what should have been done.â) At 2:25 p.m., the Vice President and his detail left for a secure location.178 Vice President Pence refused to leave the Capitol for his residence and remained in the secure Capitol location until the Senate and House floors were cleared around 7 that evening.179

At 2:29 p.m., DC MPD Commander Glover transmitted an emergency radio message: âCruiser 50. We lost the line. We've lost the line. All MPD, pull back. All MPD, pull back up to the upper deck ASAP. All MPD, pull back to the upper deck ASAP. All MPD, come back to the upper deck. Upper deck. Cruiser 50. We've been flanked. 10-33. I repeat, 10-33 West Front of the Capitol. We have been flanked, and we've lost the line.ââ180 Commander Glover later told the Select Committee that a â10-33â indicates an immediate need for âemergency assistance for any officer, life or death at that moment in time. That's when that line on the north side finally just broke and we just lost it, and we kind of got overrun behind us . . . [W]hen you hear that in general daily activity, it's like the radio stops and you're focused on getting to that officer, wherever they are, because you know it's that bad, that they're fighting for their life; something they're perceiving or seeing or realizing is that their life is in immediate danger.ââ181

Donoghue left Rosenâs office to go to the FBIâs Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) across the street at the FBIâs Hoover Building.182 Before he left, Donoghue remembers someone at SIOC telling him âCapitol Police say they don't need help at this point, they've got it covered.ââ183 When Donoghue arrived at the Washington Field Office, he found FBI Deputy Director Bowdich in a conference room by himself on the phone with a senior FBI official.184 After a brief discussion, Donoghue and Bowdich agreed that they should both go to the Capitol to evaluate the situation firsthand.185 Donoghue remembered that they arrived at the assembly area on D Street.186 Donoghue called Rosen to say that he and Bowdich were going to the Capitol.187

Around this time, Bowdich says that he received a call from Senator Mark Warner, who said â[t]his is a mess, and we now have the vast majority of the Senate in one room.ââ188 Bowdich recalls the number being about 87 senators,189 and that he directed the FBIâs Baltimore team to âprotect that room, recognizing you have almost the entire Senate in one room.ââ190 Bowdich also directed a SWAT team to Senator Mitch McConnellâs office, in response to a call from McConnellâs staff informing him that rioters were kicking in their door. On arriving, the SWAT team found that McConnellâs staff had reached safety.191

At 3:25 p.m., Rosen spoke to Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senator Chuck Schumer about the ongoing crisis. A video of the call shows Senator Schumer imploring Rosen, âget the President to tell them to leave the Capitol, Mr. Attorney General, in your law enforcement responsibility. A public statement that they should all leave.â 192

As the dayâs crisis unfolded, Mayor Bowser activated the DC mutual assistance compact with neighboring jurisdictions for law assistance support and spoke to the Governors of Maryland and Virginia to solicit additional National Guard support. At about 3:30 p.m., Mayor Bowser spoke to congressional leadership, including Speaker Pelosi and House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer.193 Then, around 4 p.m., Mayor Bowser, MPD Chief Contee and Army Secretary McCarthy met in the Joint Operations Center at MPD headquarters.194 At 4:30 p.m., Mayor Bowser held a press conference with DC HSEMA Director Rodriguez as well as Secretary McCarthy.195 Mayor Bowser also declared a 6 p.m. curfew for the District.196

Vice President Pence, who remained inside the Capitol, called Acting Attorney General Rosen at 4:34 p.m. to ask what the DOJ was doing and what more the Department could do to help.197 Vice President Pence told Rosen that the situation at the Capitol seemed then to be âimproving.ââ198 The head of his USSS security detail recalls overhearing the Vice President asking USCP Chief Sund, over the phone, whether it would be possible to âgo back to finish the business of the government this evening.ââ199 At 4:42 p.m., the head of the Vice Presidentâs detail emailed the USSS Office of Protective Operations that the Vice President was confirming with Chief Sund that it would âtake days to sweep and reopenâ the Capitol.200

Congressional leadership continued to push to return to the Capitol to continue certifying the electoral votes. Senior DOJ and FBI officialsâincluding Rosen, Bowdich, and Donoghueâheld two conference calls. Donoghue remembered that the first, at 6 p.m., was a âlaw enforcement-level callâ with General Daniel R. Hokansen, chief of the National Guard Bureau, and focused on the role of the DC National Guard.201 The second call, at approximately 7 p.m., included Speaker Pelosi, Leader McConnell, Leader Schumer, the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, and General Milley, as well as other congressional leaders.202 During that call, FBI and other law enforcement officials on the ground provided an updated timeline for clearing the Capitol to âhopefully get in an hour later.ââ203

At 8:05 p.m., the U.S. Capitol Police announced that the Capitol Building was clear and that Congress could resume counting electoral votes.204 Shortly after Members returned, Donoghue left the Capitol.205

DC FEMS statistics help describe the scope of the January 6th riot at the Capitol. Over the course of the day, DC FEMS reported 22 EMS responses, 14 EMS transports, including two cardiac arrests and two critical injury transports. There were an estimated 250 injured law enforcement officers from numerous agencies.206 One hundred-fourteen USCP officers reported injuries.207 Five police officers who were at the Capitol on January 6th died in the days following the riot.

Federal and local law enforcement authorities were in possession of multiple streams of intelligence predicting violence directed at the Capitol prior to January 6th. Although some of that intelligence was fragmentary, it should have been sufficient to warrant far more vigorous preparations for the security of the joint session. The failure to sufficiently share and act upon that intelligence jeopardized the lives of the police officers defending the Capitol and everyone in it.

While the danger to the Capitol posed by an armed and angry crowd was foreseeable, the fact that the President of the United States would be the catalyst of their fury and facilitate the attack was unprecedented in American history. If we lacked the imagination to suppose that a President would incite an attack on his own Government, urging his supporters to âfight like hell,â we lack that insight no more. And the best defense against that danger will not come from law enforcement, but from an informed and active citizenry.

ENDNOTES

Â Â 1. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000091086 (United States Secret Service Protective Intelligence Division communication noting left-wing groups telling members to âstay at homeâ on January 6th).

Â Â 2. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 19, 2020 1:42 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22Be+there+will+be+wild%22.

Â Â 3. See Select Committee Interview of Donell Harvin on January 24, 2022 at p. 14:9â12 (âHarvin Interview (January 24, 2022)â); see also Select Committee Informal Interview of Donell Harvin on November 12, 2021.

Â Â 4. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Donell Harvin, (Jan. 24, 2022), p. 12; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Donell Harvin, (Nov. 12, 2021).

Â Â 5. 4 Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 22; see also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Donell Harvin, (Jan. 24, 2022), p. 22; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Dr. Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p.16.

Â Â 6. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 22.

Â Â 7. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 20.

Â Â 8. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 44.

Â Â 9. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000101135.0001 (December 30, 2020, Protective Intelligence Brief titled âMarch for Trumpâ).

Â 10. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001473 (December 29, 2020, email from PIOC-ONDUTY to THREAT ASSESSMENT re: FW: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Neo-Nazi Calls on D.C. Pro-Trump Protesters to Occupy Federal Building).

Â 11. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000436, CTRL0000000436.0001, CTRL0000000436.0002, CTRL0000000436.0003. CTRL0000000436.0004, CTRL0000000436.0005 (December 21, 2020, email re: Part II: FYSA - thread in OSINT research, attaching Donald.Win screenshots).

Â 12. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000091, CTRL0000000091,0001, CTRL0000000091,0002, CTRL0000000091,0003, CTRL0000000091,0004, CTRL0000000091,0005, CTRL0000000091,0006, CTRL0000000091,0007, CTRL0000000091,0008, CTRL0000000091,0009 (January 5, 2021, Yogananda Pittman email to Steven Sund at 4:55 p.m. re: FW: Interest in Tunnels Leading to the US Capitol , attaching screenshots of theDonald.win posts).

Â 13. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 60â61.

Â 14. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 60â61.

Â 15. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jennifer Moore, (July 26, 2022), pp. 55, 57, 62.

Â 16. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jennifer Moore, (July 26, 2022), p. 95.

Â 17. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jennifer Moore, (July 26, 2022), p. 24.

Â 18. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000236995 (December 26, 2021, email to PIOC, PIOC-ONDUTY re: (U//FOUO) Disruptions to DC Metro Area 01/06/2021 (Online Tip)).

Â 19. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000236995 (December 26, 2021, email to PIOC, PIOC-ONDUTY re: (U//FOUO) Disruptions to DC Metro Area 01/06/2021 (Online Tip)).

Â 20. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001509 (December 25, 2020, email to John Donohue re: Fwd: âArmed and Ready, Mr. Presidentâ: Demonstrators Urged to Bring Guns, Prepare for Violence at January 6 âStop the Stealâ Protest in DC, with attachments).

Â 21. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001509 (December 25, 2020, email to John Donohue re: Fwd: âArmed and Ready, Mr. Presidentâ: Demonstrators Urged to Bring Guns, Prepare for Violence at January 6 âStop the Stealâ Protest in DC, with attachments).

Â 22. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001509 (December 25, 2020, email to John Donohue re: Fwd: âArmed and Ready, Mr. Presidentâ: Demonstrators Urged to Bring Guns, Prepare for Violence at January 6 âStop the Stealâ Protest in DC, with attachments).

Â 23. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001509 (December 25, 2020, email to John Donohue re: Fwd: âArmed and Ready, Mr. Presidentâ: Demonstrators Urged to Bring Guns, Prepare for Violence at January 6 âStop the Stealâ Protest in DC, with attachments).

Â 24. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001509 (December 25, 2020, email to John Donohue re: Fwd: âArmed and Ready, Mr. Presidentâ: Demonstrators Urged to Bring Guns, Prepare for Violence at January 6 âStop the Stealâ Protest in DC, with attachments).

Â 25. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001509 (December 25, 2020, email to John Donohue re: Fwd: âArmed and Ready, Mr. Presidentâ: Demonstrators Urged to Bring Guns, Prepare for Violence at January 6 âStop the Stealâ Protest in DC, with attachments).

Â 26. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001509 (December 25, 2020, email to John Donohue re: Fwd: âArmed and Ready, Mr. Presidentâ: Demonstrators Urged to Bring Guns, Prepare for Violence at January 6 âStop the Stealâ Protest in DC, with attachments).

Â 27. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000087 (December 28, 2020, email re: 1/6 warning.).

Â 28. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000087 (December 28, 2020, email re: 1/6 warning.).

Â 29. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of John K. Donohue, (Jan. 31, 2022), p. 54; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Yogananda Pittman, (Jan. 13, 2022), p. 47; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Julie Farnam, (Dec. 15, 2021), p. 42; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sean Gallagher (Jan. 11, 2022), pp. 37, 57.

Â 30. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001473 (December 29, 2020, email from PIOC-ONDUTY to THREAT ASSESSMENT re: FW: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Neo-Nazi Calls on D.C. Pro-Trump Protesters to Occupy Federal Building.)

Â 31. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001527 (Email from Shane Lamond to Julie Farnam re: Fwd: MPD MMS Text Tip.).

Â 32. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001527 (Email from Shane Lamond to Julie Farnam re: Fwd: MPD MMS Text Tip.).

Â 33. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (FBI Production, Jan. 31, 2022). This document is not being released due to national security concerns.

Â 34. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Parler Production), PARLER_00000011 - PARLER_00000013 (January 2, 2021 email from Parler to FBI re: Another to check out).

Â 35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Julie Farnam, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 33â36.

Â 36. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Architect of the Capitol Production), CTRL0000000002, p. 2 (January 5, 2021, email from AOC Command Center re: Individual says âgo to Washington Jan 6 and help storm the Capitalâ adds âwe will storm the government buildings, kill cops, kill security guards, kill federal employees and agentsâ: Blog via 8kun).

Â 37. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Architect of the Capitol Production), CTRL0000000002, p. 2 (January 5, 2021, email from AOC Command Center re: Individual says âgo to Washington Jan 6 and help storm the Capitalâ adds âwe will storm the government buildings, kill cops, kill security guards, kill federal employees and agentsâ: Blog via 8kun).

Â 38. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Architect of the Capitol Production), CTRL0000000002, p. 2 (January 5, 2021, email from AOC Command Center re: Individual says âgo to Washington Jan 6 and help storm the Capitalâ adds âwe will storm the government buildings, kill cops, kill security guards, kill federal employees and agentsâ: Blog via 8kun).

Â 39. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000083 (January 5, 2021, email re: (U//FOUO//LES) OSINT Post of Concern).

Â 40. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000083 (January 5, 2021, email re: (U//FOUO//LES) OSINT Post of Concern).

Â 41. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Briefing by Steve Jensen, (Nov. 18, 2021). In an email sent by the FBI to the Select Committee on November 8, 2021, the FBI stated that on December 27, the FBI created a system to collect threats related to the âelection certificationâ on January 6 by using a tag, âCERTUNREST.â Despite making multiple requests for the number of guardians that were tagged prior to January 6, the FBI did not provide a precise number. The FBI identified several dozen guardians opened in advance of January 6th that included a reference to January 6, Washington D.C., and either the U.S. Capitol or a specific threat of violence.

Â 42. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (FBI Production), CTRL0000930224 p. 23, (noting âCommunication and Establishment of a Quick Reaction Force by USPERs Related to an Identified Protest in Washington, District of Columbia, on 6 January 2021â).

Â 43. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Yogananda Pittman, (Nov. 12, 2021).

Â 44. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001766, CTRL0000001766.0001 (Document from January 3, 2021, titled: âSpecial Event Assessment: Joint Session of CongressâElectoral College Vote Certificationâ); see also, Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Julie Farnam, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp 51â52.

Â 45. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 236.

Â 46. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert O'Brien, (Aug. 23, 2022), p. 19.

Â 47. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), p. 31.

Â 48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 235.

Â 49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 236.

Â 50. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Tomney, (Apr. 14, 2022), p. 40.

Â 51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2022), pp. 169â70.

Â 52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2022), pp. 169â70.

Â 53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 45.

Â 54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 18.

Â 55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 26.

Â 56. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 24.

Â 57. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (District of Columbia Production), CTRL0000007104 (December 31, 2020, letter from Mayor Bowser to General William Walker).

Â 58. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 30.

Â 59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 78-79.

Â 60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 63.

Â 61. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 50.

Â 62. See DC Mayorâs Office, âMayor Bowers Provides Situational Update, 1/4/21,â YouTube, Jan. 4, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UbZ07wdnQ-s; Julie Zauzmer Weil, Marissa J. Lang, and Dan Lamothe, âNational Guard Activated for D.C. Protests, with More Restraints than in June, Officials Say,â Washington Post, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-national-guard-protests-bowser/2021/01/04/220ced16-4e8d-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.

Â 63. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 27â28.

Â 64. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Dr. Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 28.

Â 65. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Dr. Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p.66.

Â 66. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (District of Columbia production), CTRL0000930981 (Memo: Final January 6th After Action Quick Look Report, Government of the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department. May 19, 2022).

Â 67. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 14.

Â 68. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 15 (emphasis added).

Â 69. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), pp. 14â15.

Â 70. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 114.

Â 71. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 116.

Â 72. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), pp. 9. 21â23.

Â 73. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 116.

Â 74. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 10.

Â 75. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p.125.

Â 76. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p.12.

Â 77. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), pp. 12â13. The result was an estimated 923 Capitol Police officers on the Capitol campus at 7 a.m. on January 6 (50% of strength), 1,214 officers at 2 p.m. (66%), and a total of 1,457 at some point during the day (79% of a total of 1,840 officers).

Â 78. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 76.

Â 79. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 138.

Â 80. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 138.

Â 81. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 86. 85 Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 87.

Â 82.

Â 83. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 90.

Â 84. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher J. Tomney, (Apr. 14, 2022), pp. 39, 43â44.

Â 85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 237; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), Exhibit 38.

Â 86. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 82â83; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 194, 281.

Â 87. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 81-82; See also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 236â37.

Â 88. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 81â82.

Â 89. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher J. Tomney, (Apr. 14, 2022), pp. 39, 43â44.

Â 90. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 90.

Â 91. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 202â04.

Â 92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 88.

Â 93. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 206.

Â 94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher J. Tomney, (Apr. 14, 2022), pp. 41, 45â46.

Â 95. See Chapter 4.

Â 96. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 157, 165â67.

Â 97. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of David Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), pp. 97â98; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 162.

Â 98. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), PRODUCTION 1 - 000017 (âOn January 3, 2021, during an interagency meeting hosted by the White House, the Department of Justice was designated as the lead Federal agency for the planned First Amendment demonstrations on January 5â6.â).

Â 99. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Tomney, (April 14, 2022), p. 45; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Tomney, (April 14, 2022), p. 46.

100. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 168.

101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 169.

102. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 169.

103. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 83.

104. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad Wolfe, (Jan 29, 2022), pp. 48â49

105. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Julie Farnam, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 58â59.

106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Julie Farnam, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 58â59.

107. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of the Interior Production), DOI_46000428_00005162 (Dec. 19, 2020, Cindy Chafian email Re: Status of application - Women for America First at 7:12 AM).

108. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Interior), DOI_46000114_00000246.

109. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Interior), DOI_46000114_00000246.

110. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Interior Response to questions), DOI_46000114_00000246.

111. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Interior Response to questions), DOI_46000114_00000246.

112. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Interior Response to questions), DOI_46000114_00000246.

113. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Interior), DOI_46000114_00000246.

114. See Executive Summary and Chapter 7.

115. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000481288 ( January 6, 2021 email at 8:17 AM referencing 2 magnetometers being surged); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000495699 (January 6, 2021, email at 10:46 a.m re: Mags Update referencing 12 magnetometers, which means there were 10 earlier in the day).

116. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jamie Fleet, (Mar. 10, 2022), p. 24.

117. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jamie Fleet, (Mar. 10, 2022), pp. 25â26, 30.

118. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jamie Fleet, (Mar. 10, 2022), p. 28.

119. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Terri McCullough, (Apr. 18, 2022).

120. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 146.

121. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service production), CTRL0000481790 (January 6, 2021, email to Robert Engel at 10:35 am).

122. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service production), CTRL0000536285 (January 6, 2021, email forwarded by Robert Engel to Anthony Ornato at 11:32 am).

123. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 168.

124. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 169.

125. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Jan6-07222021-000587 (January 6, 2021, email to Richard Donoghue at 10:43 am).

126. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Jan6-07222021-000621 (January 6, 2021, Jeffrey Rosen call list).

127. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 169.

128. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of David Torres, (Mar. 2, 2020), p. 80.

129. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000093384 (January 6, 2021, message to PID agents at 12:00 p.m.).

130. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000152321 (January 6, 2021, emails at 12:20 p.m. and 1:34 p.m.).

131. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000542477 (January 6, 2021, internal email at 12:26 p.m.).

132. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000087742 (January 6, 2021, Joint Operations Center (JOC) email designating a response team at 1:14 pm).

133. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Channel, Jan. 6, 2021. Select Committee staff reviewed recordings of this radio frequency.

134. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Channel, Jan. 6, 2021. Select Committee staff reviewed recordings of this radio frequency.

135. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 6â7.

136. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 7â8.

137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 8â9.

138. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 147.

139. This call, and subsequent coordination for National Guard assistance between various entities is detailed in the National Guard appendix.

140. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (District of Columbia production), CTRL0000930981 (Memo: Final January 6th After Action Quick Look Report, Government of the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department. May 19, 2022).

141. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000056 (noting the event at 1:06 p.m.).

142. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000056 (marking the event at 1:03 p.m.).

143. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sean Gallagher, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 19.

144. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 171.

145. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 169.

146. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 176.

147. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Robert Engel, (Mar. 4, 2022).

148. For further details of the SUV incident, see Chapter 7.

149. See Executive Summary and Chapter 7.

150. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478.

151. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000496064.

152. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000208061.

153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 6â7.

154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 147.

155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of David Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), pp. 111â12.

156. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of David Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), pp. 111â12.

157. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Valerie Hasberry, (Apr. 14, 2022), pp. 59â61.

158. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Sean Gallagher, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 15.

159. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of David Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), pp. 8, 9, 22â25.

160. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 155.

161. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Yogananda Pittman, (Jan. 13, 2022), p. 72.

162. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Yogananda Pittman, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 73â74.

163. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Yogananda Pittman, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 73â74.

164. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 80.

165. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 77.

166. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 154.

167. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 64.

168. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 17.

169. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 17.

170. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 17.

171. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 16-17.

172. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 176.

173. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 176.

174. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Channel, Jan. 6, 2021. Select Committee staff reviewed recordings of this radio frequency.

175. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Channel, Jan. 6, 2021. Select Committee staff reviewed recordings of this radio frequency.

176. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Timothy Giebels, (Apr. 8, 2022), p. 54.

177. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Timothy Giebels, (Apr. 8, 2022), p. 54.

178. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Channel, Jan. 6, 2021. Select Committee staff reviewed recordings of this radio frequency.

179. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Timothy Giebels, (Apr. 8, 2022), pp. 72â73.

180. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (District of Columbia Production), CTRL0000070377 (recording of Metropolitan Police Department, Radio Transmission, from 1400â1500 hours).

181. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), pp. 61â62.

182. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 179â80.

183. 171 Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 180.

184. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 180â81.

185. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of David Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), p. 111; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 181.

186. 178 Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 182.

187. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey A. Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 176.

188. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of David Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), pp. 113â14.

189. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of David Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), pp. 113â14.

190. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of David Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), p. 114.

191. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of David Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), p. 114.

192. âVideo Shows Pelosi Trying to Secure the Capitol,â New York Times, (Oct. 13, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/100000008581029/jan-6-pelosi-video.html.

193. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 15.

194. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), PRODUCTION 1 - 000017.

195. âD.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser Press Conference on Capitol Protests Transcript January 6,â Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/d-c-mayor-muriel-bowser-press-conference-on-capitol-protests-transcript-january-6.

196. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 7.

197. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 182.

198. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 182â83.

199. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Timothy Giebels, (Apr. 8, 2022), p. 82.

200. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000512238 (January 6, 2021, email at 4:42 p.m. noting âHoosier going to call chief of Capital [sic] Policeâ).

201. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 190. Donoghue memorialized this call in handwritten notes. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Jan6-07222021-000614 (January 6, 2021, handwritten notes by Richard Donoghue, 7:00 p.m.).

202. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Jan6-07222021-000614 (January 6, 2021, handwritten notes by Richard Donoghue, 7:00 pm.).

203. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of David Bowdich, (Dec. 16, 2021), p. 116.

204. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Jan6-07222021-000614 (January 6, 2021, handwritten notes by Richard Donoghue, 7:00 pm.)

205. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 191.

206. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (District of Columbia production), CTRL0000930981 (Memo: Final January 6th After Action Quick Look Report, Government of the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department. May 19, 2022).

207. United States Government Accountability Office, CAPITOL ATTACK: Additional Actions Needed to Better Prepare Capitol Police Officers for Violent Demonstrations, 117th Cong., 2d sess. (March 2022), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104829.pdf.

H. Res. 503 Section 4(a) directs the Select Committee to examine the âfacts, circumstances, and causes relating to the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol,â including the âactivities of intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, and the Armed Forces, including with respect to intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination and information sharing among the branches and other instrumentalities of government.â This appendix focuses on the activities of the DC National Guard in the days leading up to and on January 6, 2021.

In contrast to the National Guard units in 50 States and three territories, where deployment authority lies with the governor of those respective jurisdictions, the DC Guard falls directly under the command of the United States President. In the discussion section below, this appendix provides a narrative of the preparations for and eventual deployment of the DC Guard on January 6th, and the interaction between then-President Trump and the DC Guard in the relevant time period. It is based on the Select Committeeâs interviews of 24 witnesses and review of over 37,000 pages of documents.

The approval process for the deployment of the DC National Guard is unique, unlike any of the 50 States or three territories across the country where ultimate authority rests in the hands of the governor.1 In the nationâs capital, where no governorship exists, the Guard is ultimately under the command of the President of the United States when acting in its militia capacity to support civil authorities.2 By executive order, however, President Richard Nixon delegated the Presidentâs day-to-day control of the DC Guard to the Secretary of Defense and specified that its Commanding General should report to the Secretary of Defense or the Secretaryâs designee.3 By memorandum, the Secretary of Defense, in turn, delegated day-to-day control of the DC Guard to the Secretary of the Army.4 The commander of the DC Guard reported directly to the Secretary of the Army on January 6, 2021.5

During the 2020 summer protests in response to the murder of George Floyd,6 the approval process for Guard deployment ran smoothly. âVery, very proactive,â then-Commanding General of the DC Guard William Walker said.7 Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy âreally wanted us out there.â8 Secretary McCarthy, with all his authorities, was physically beside Major General Walker throughout that summer. â[H]e was with me for all of it,â Major General Walker said.9 âHe came to the [A]rmory every day. He brought his staff with him.â10 As has been widely reported, a number of President Trumpâs senior advisors, including Attorney General Bill Barr, resisted President Trumpâs requests to deploy the Guard or other troops in various states and cities where violence had occurred or was underway.11

In the summer of 2020, nothing was being written down; it âwas just all verbal back and forth.â12 That approach sped up response times. But as the DC Guard footprint grew and controversies began plaguing the operation, Secretary McCarthy came away with the lesson that deliberative and by written order beat fast and by oral command.13

âWhat we learned in the process was we were not capturing a lot of the information in writing in the orders process, which is fundamental, foundational because of the stress of the situation and the speed of the situation,â Secretary McCarthy said.14

While a concept of operations (âcon-opâ) was developed at the lower level during the summer 2020 operations, it did not require approval or input at the secretary level.15 That approach came to be seen as a mistake that should not be replicated the next time there was a civil disturbance crisis in the nationâs capital. General Walter Piatt, director of the Army staff, explained: âThatâs where Secretary McCarthy put that restriction to say, I want a concept of the operation before we just send a force to do something.â16

One of the most visible and highly criticized of the summer 2020 operations was the use of low-flying helicopters that appeared to be bearing down on protesters with the aim of dispersing them. On June 1st, as Guard presence tripled overnight, the use of helicopters meant for aerial surveillance17 âsomehow got translated to a very competent Army officer that âI am to fly low and loud to deter looters,ââ General Piatt said.18 â[W]hat the investigation revealed was that we did not have good procedures in place to provide military support to a very serious civil disturbance ongoing. Theâbecauseâthe pilot of that aircraft believed that was his mission.â19

The âembarrass[ment]â20 of the low-flying helicopter affected Secretary McCarthy. General Charles Flynn, then- deputy chief of staff for operations, plans, and training, told the Select Committee, âI know the Secretary was concerned.â21 He further explained: âIâm sure that affected his thinking.â22

Secretary McCarthy became convinced that a concept of operations needed to be âexplicit, tailoredâ23 andâmost importantlyâthat it needed to âcome from [the] top down.â24 Secretary McCarthy told his staff, â[W]hen we get a request next time, we have to be absolutely certain that we understand the mission clearly,â25 and that âno other civil authority could re-mission off that support without the approval of either the Secretary of the Army or, in certain circumstances, the Secretary of Defense.â26

In mid-June 2020, then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, Secretary McCarthy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, and Major General Walker huddled to talk about what went wrong in the preceding weeks. Senior defense officials then decided they would take a âmore activeâ role in directing the force.27 â[A]s a result, we all took a more active interest in what was happening down to the tactical level to make sure that we were, again, abiding by kind of the core principles of civil-military relations,â former Secretary Esper said.28

Major General Walker said he was not told about that shift in perspective: â[I]f the Army thought different of how we respond to civil unrest, civil disturbance, I would hope . . . they would communicate that with the guyâwith the person who is going to execute that change.â29

In the words of General Milley, the summer of 2020 had been âa pretty gut-wrenching experience.â30 The Department of Defense was still recovering when it was faced with the decision of the manner and degree to which the DC Guard should provide assistance to law enforcement authorities planning, just seven months later, for the events anticipated in connection with Congressional certification of the electoral votes on January 6, 2021.

On December 19, 2020, President Trump tweeted, âBig protest in DC on January 6th. Be there! Will be wild!â From that day forward, a rookie DC intelligence analyst saw a tenfold uptick in violent rhetoric targeting Congress and law enforcement.31 Right-wing groups were sharing histories of violence and some not traditionally aligned had begun coordinating their efforts. 32 The analystâs report reached more senior DC leadership, including, eleven days later, Mayor Bowser.33 In the course of the Committeeâs investigation, it received and reviewed a significant number of documents indicating that certain intelligence and law enforcement agencies understood that violence was possible or even likely on January 6th. The Committee received many of those materials from the U.S. Secret Service, but also from other agencies as well.

On Thursday, December 31, 2020, the day after the briefing, Mayor Bowser sent a letter to Major General Walker requesting Guard assistance for January 5 and 6, 2021.34 A second letter specified the Districtâs request as limited to two forms of assistance: crowd management at Metro stations and blocking vehicles at traffic posts. It did not request help with potential civil disturbance.35

General Piatt viewed the âlimited requestâ36 as a âpretty good, tailored mission,â that was ânot vague.â37 General James McConville, chief of staff of the Army, called the request appropriately ârestrictedâ38 with âa very low military signature.â39

According to testimony by Defense Department witnesses, after a summer of perceived overreach, military leadership was grateful for the delineated parameters set by the city itself.

The substance of the requestâlimited to traffic and crowd control âso they could have more police officers to do police functionsâ40âwas not seen as narrow by District officials. âI would say itâs a specific request,â Chief of DC Police (Metropolitan Police Department (âMPDâ)) Robert Contee said.41 â[L]eave the unlawful stuff, leave that to the police to deal with.â42 Mayor Bowser said: âI donât know any law enforcement person who would suggest that urban disturbances arenât best handled by the police.â43

âCivil disturbance was not something we requested at that time. Mostly also because the vast majority of the, if not all, of the permitted protests were taking place on Federal lands,â said Director of the DC Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency Christopher Rodriguez.44 The District had no jurisdiction. âMayor Bowser cannot make a request on behalf of the White House or on behalf of the Capitol for U.S. Capitolâfor . . . DC National Guardsmen to deploy to those two entities. She canât,â Chief Contee said.45 At this time, it was well known that President Trump had planned a speech and rally on âFederal landsââon the Ellipse south of the White House. It was not widely known that President Trump intended to âspontaneouslyâ instruct the tens of thousands of supporters at that Ellipse rally to march down Pennsylvania Avenue to the Capitol.46

At first, Secretary McCarthy was not sold on involving the Guard at all. Major General Walker called Secretary McCarthy âinstantly when I got the lettersâ from the District on Thursday, December 31st, and âinitially I felt I must have caught him at a bad time.â47 Secretary McCarthy recalls it being a short conversation. âI said, âokay, got it. Thank you.â You want to immediately flip it so that Secretary of Defense knows that we alerted his office,â he said.48

According to Major General Walkerâs account of this call, the Secretary initially stated ââWeâre not doing it,ââ 49 and then left the door open for further discussion. Major General Walker explained: ââI said, âWell, sir, I think you should look at it.â And then he told me, âWell, weâll talk about it, but we donât really want to do this, because the look it would give, the military out there interfering.â . . . He says, âWell, weâll discuss it on Monday.ââ50

On Sunday, January 3rd, Secretary McCarthy called Chief Contee, who had formally assumed the role of acting head of MPD just the day before.51

âI thought initially that . . . he is just calling me basically as a rubber stamp to say, . . . âYou asked for it, you got it.â . . . It didnât go that way,â Chief Contee said.52 â[H]e had concerns about deploying National Guard for this event. He talked about the optics of the event, having boots on the ground. . . . And I pushed back on that.â53

In his interview with the Select Committee, Secretary McCarthy described evaluating the request on the evening of January 3rd. âI sat at home. I chewed on it,â he said.54 âYou know, Iâm not particularly inclined to support it, because my concern was really we didnât have a command-and-control architecture in place. We didnât really have all of the mechanisms to be successful, you know. . . . So it was a very tough decision for me.â55

Over five days, from December 31st to January 4th, District officials faced what Major General Walker called âtremendous resistance.â56

Both Chief Contee and Director Rodriguez recalled that five-day period on January 6th, when Chief Steven Sund, of the U.S. Capitol Police, was pleading for reinforcements.57 Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller, âheard through the grapevine that [Secretary McCarthy] was inclinedâI donât want to say inclined to disapprove, but, you know, looking at it carefully or whatever. Soâbut thatâs fine. He can do whatever he wants. I knew that I was going to honor [the mayorâs] request . . . .â58

How close those Guard assets could go to the Capitol became a sticking point. Colonel Craig Hunter, the highest-ranking commander on the ground on January 6th, said the Army âreally want[ed] to go through the concept of operations to see, okay, exactlyâbasically Metro stop by Metro stop, intersection by intersection, to see where will Guardsmen be exactly, you know, how close are you to the Capitol . . . .â59 He said an initial request by MPD to post Guard troops at the South Capitol Metro stationâlike all other Metro stationsâwas denied.60 In conference calls that âwent back and forth,â61 Major General Walker was told, âThere was a concern about being too close, military uniforms too close to the Capitol.â62

Major General Walker had a different perspective. He saw his people as âcitizen soldiers,â âyour neighbors that are going to come to your aid and rescue when you need us,â63ânot traditional boots on the ground. â[T]hatâs where, to me, the vest came in. This was the National Guard, not the Army,â he said.64

Military authorities determined that a geographical boundary would have to be established as a condition of approving the Guardâs deployment to assist MPD. No servicemember could go east of Ninth Street. It wasnât made explicit to District officials, but they all knew what lay east. â[T]he Capitol is east,â Chief Contee said.65 â[I]f you move them anywhere east of Ninth Street, they will be close to the Capitol. That was certainly the way I understood it.â66

Director Rodriguez worried âthat it constrained our ability to react quickly if the situation got out of hand.â67 Without the limitation, the District fully intended to post its resources farther east: â[W]e couldnât get as close to the Capitol as could have been helpful,â Mayor Bowser said.68 â[W]e would have had a broader traffic box.â69

Both Acting Secretary Miller and Secretary McCarthy were sensitive to the sight of troops near the site of the Congressional certification of electoral votes, because of President Trumpâs previous expression of interest in using Federal troops in civilian situations. Again, Attorney General Barr and other members of the Trump Administration had resisted President Trumpâs desire to deploy such troops. Secretary Esper said it âtended to be the case . . . that the President was inclined to use the military,â contrary to longstanding principles of reserving the armed forces as a last resort.70

According to his testimony, Acting Secretary Millerâs express first priorityâafter being installed with just two months left in the Trump administrationâwas âto make every effort to return the Department of Defense to a nonpoliticized entity,â because previously, âthe Department was being showcased too much.â71 In testimony to the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Reform on May 12, 2021, he cited âfears that the President would invoke the Insurrection Act to politicize the military in an antidemocratic mannerâ as shaping his thinking.72 âNo such thing was going to occur on my watch,â he wrote,73 later adding that âif I would have put troops on Capitol Hillâ before the attack and without a request from civil authorities, âthat would have been seen as extremely provocative, if not supporting this crazy narrative that the military was going to try to overturn the election.â74

Secretary McCarthy felt similar pressure. He had been taken aback whenâas he was walking down the Pentagonâs hallwaysââone of the most seasoned reportersâ asked him whether the Army was planning to seize ballot boxes.75 It was âan incredibly tense period,â according to Secretary McCarthy.76 As our investigation has demonstrated, President Trump had considered proposals from Lt. General (ret.) Michael Flynn, Sidney Powell, and others that troops be utilized to seize ballot boxes in certain parts of the country.

On December 18, 2020âthe same day as the contentious White House meeting with Flynn and others,âSecretary McCarthy issued a statement, âmirror[ing] what General Milley said about a month before,â77 reiterating that âThere is no role for the U.S. military in determining the outcome of an American election.â78 Given the heat of the rhetoric, he thought, â[I]f we donât say anything, itâs going to scare people.â79 Secretary McCarthy told the Select Committee he thought he would be fired after publicly stating that the military would not assist in a coup.80 General McConville, who signed the statement alongside Secretary McCarthyâs signature,81 linked their words directly to the Ninth Street limitation: â[T]here was no plan to put any military anywhere near the Capitol because of what we had said, the military has no role in determining the outcome of elections.â82

On January 1st, Executive Officer to Secretary McCarthy Colonel John Lubas wrote in an internal email that the Secretary âwants to clearly communicate that this request is NOT from the White House.â83 The email noted that the Secretary wanted to âaggressively messageâ that the request had come from District officials, not the President.84

âWe wanted everybody to know that, because it would create confusion and even more tension of having soldiers on the street without a request and that they be near the Capitol with certification of an election, a contested election,â Secretary McCarthy said.85

On January 3, 2021, 10 former Secretaries of Defense, including the recently fired, former Secretary Esper, published a joint op-ed warning that â[i]nvolving the military in election disputes would cross into dangerous territory.â86 Secretary McCarthy had himself worked for five of the 10 secretaries.87 âI know all these [men],â he said.88 â[T]hey wereâeveryone was telling us, be very conscious of your actions and how youâyou know, what youâre going to do that day. So we wanted to know where every soldier was by street corner.â89

Was Secretary McCarthy concerned that President Trump might use the military to cling to power? âThere was a lot of talk in the lead-up about martial law . . . and the employment of forces, and you know, that was something that we were all, you know, conscious of.â90 Our investigation suggests that those civilian and military officials who had considerable experience working directly with President Trump had genuine concerns about whether he would attempt to use the military to change the election results. Again, at this time, there is no evidence the Department of Defense understood exactly what President Trump and his associates planned for January 6th.

By Monday, January 4th, with Secretary McCarthy now backing the operation, Acting Secretary Miller was briefed. He told the Select Committee that he âmade the decision right there to honor the request.â91 That approval came with strings attached. The role of the DC Guard would be spelled out and tightly circumscribed in a memorandum that, as characterized by General Milley, was âvery strict on the use of the military.â92 It decreed that without the Acting Secretaryâs âsubsequent, personal authorization,â the Guard would not be issued batons, helmets, or body armor; could not interact physically with protestors, except in self-defense; and that the Quick Reaction Force (QRF)â40 servicemembers staged in case of an emergency at Joint Base Andrews in Prince Georgeâs County, Marylandâcould be deployed only as a last resort.93

Above the tactical level, changes in the mission of the Guard had to be approved by the Secretary of the Army and, in some casesâin order to âinteract physically with protestorsâ or be issued batonsârequired running further up the chain to the Secretary of Defense.94

To District officials, that seemed newâand unnecessary. â[The Secretary told us,] if you send them to any other kind of mission, that has to get approval from me. And I just think that those were unnecessary restrictions . . .â Chief Contee said.95

What the QRF would be called upon to do, even in the case of an emergency, is a matter of debate. The letter and memorandum do not expressly note whether the QRF could be used to support the original mission of the Guardâtraffic and crowd controlâor a new mission helping contain sudden and out-of-hand civil disturbance.96 The DC Guard official put in charge of the QRF for January 5th and 6th, Lieutenant Colonel David Reinke, said he had not been given much guidance as to their role.97

The Army and the DC Guard appear to have had different understandings. â[T]he intent of the quick reaction force was really to send these troops over to help if they had a problem at one of the traffic command posts,â General McConville said.98 âThere never was an intent for a quick reaction force to go to the Capitol . . . . â99 According to Army officials, without a con-op and a formal change in mission, the QRF could do traffic control and no more.

That was not how others imagined an emergency unit would or should operate. According to Major General Walker, âa quick reaction force, somethingâs happening; do I have time to find you and call you and ask you?â100 He called the preapproval language âhighly unusual,â101 particularly as their name âalready implied that itâs a last resort,â102 their intended purpose was if â[u]nexpectedly, you have a spontaneous unrest,â103 and if âI need to write a concept of operations for a quick reaction force? Theyâre no longer quick. Itâs just a reaction force.â104

It wasnât clear to everyone involved in planning for the events anticipated on January 6th that all agencies, including the Capitol Police, were deploying all their resources ahead of that day. âWe had had issues understanding, getting the full picture of U.S. Capitol Policeâs operational posture and what their planning was,â Director Rodriguez said.105

Mayor Bowser was struck whenâright before the press briefing that Monday, January 4thâthe mayor asked the Capitol Police representative, â[W]here does your perimeter start? [And h]e gets up out of the room, calls somebody. And the next thing I know he canât participate in the conference.â106 She elaborated: â[T]hat should have been like a trigger to me. Like these people, they donât want to answer questions about their preparation.â107

On the morning of January 3rd, Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund approached two of the members of the Capitol Police Board and purportedly requestedâbut concededly did not push forâGuard resources for the Capitol.108 According to Chief Sund, in a minutes long meeting in the office of House Sergeant at Arms Paul Irving, Irving told Chief Sund he did not like the optics of asking for the Guard in advance and that the intelligence did not support it.109 Chief Sund said he did not push back on either point.110 In fact, he agreed that his reading of the intelligenceâdespite a forewarning put out by his own intelligence unit that âCongress was itself the targetâ on January 6th111âdid not call for Guard support,112 only that having more personnel on his perimeter would make him âmore comfortable.â113 Irving suggested he talk to the Senate Sergeant at Arms, and then-chairman of the Capitol Police Board, Michael Stenger.114 According to Irving, Stenger, in a meeting in his office, asked Chief Sund to reach out to the Guard and find out, if an emergency called for it, âhow many people can [the commanding general] give us and how quickly can he give us those people?â115 Chief Sund said he took their responses to mean âno,â despite conceding that he was never told âyou cannot have the National Guardâ or anything to that effect.116 âIt was 100 percent a denial,â he maintained.117

Irving recalled the matter coming up on a three-way phone conference during which âthe consensus was that we didnât needâ the Guard.118 He did not consider it a request.119 On the call, Chief Sund noted that the District planned to use the servicemembers to staff intersections, but the Capitol grounds had few of those, and it would not relieve many officers if they were used in a similar fashion.120 âIt was a combination of operationally the chief didnât feel that they would add much to his plan, and the intelligence really didnât speak for anything that we felt would justify the need for them,â Irving said.121 Irving doesnât recall taking the âopticsâ into consideration.122 According to Irving, the conversation ended the same way Chief Sund said it had: âWhy donât you just tell them to be on standby?â Stenger suggested.123 It was never brought up again.124

The discussion about the use of the Guard remained within the Capitol Police Board and did not reach congressional leadership, including the Speaker of the House. That was normal. â[F]rom a tactical perspective, we would make decisions without the input from congressional leadership,â Irving said.125 âI always felt that I had full authority to implement security decisions as I deemed appropriate.â126 In fact, when the three men briefed congressional leaders on January 5th, Chief Sund conveyed the same optimistic outlook as he had with Major General Walker: â[We told them] we felt we were prepared based on the information we had, yes,â he said.127

To keep these exchanges in perspective, we note again that we are aware of no evidence that these individuals were privy to President Trumpâs plans to instruct tens of thousands of his supporters to walk down Pennsylvania Avenue to the Capitol to help âtake backâ their country. Nor were they aware of how President Trump would suggest to his followers that Vice President Pence had the authority to change the outcome of the election, or how President Trump would behave in the hours that followed. Certain members of Congress, including those who met at the White House on December 21, 2020, may have had considerably more insight into President Trumpâs planning, but the Committee has no information suggesting that any of those members alerted the Capitol Police or other authorities of President Trumpâs plans.

Guard reinforcements could draw from a pool of three groups already activated for the day: (1) the 40 members making up the QRF, staged in Maryland;128 (2) the 90 members at the traffic control points, 24 at the Metro stations, and four as part of the command staff distributed throughout the cityâbut no farther east than Ninth Streetâfor a total of 118 representing the first shift;129 and (3) the second shift of another 118 members,130 preparing at the Armory in Southeast Washington, D.C, for a 3:00 p.m. shift takeover.131 The Armory also housed a command-and-control squad that handled logistics at about 52 members strong, in addition to a Civil Support Team of about 20 members.132 That gave Colonel Hunter a maximum limit of 348 activated servicemembers, eight more than the allotted 340ânearly all of whom reported directly to him on January 6th.133

The QRF was most prepared for responding to sudden and escalating civil unrest. At Joint Base Andrews, they were provisioned with full riot-control kits,134 including a helmet with a face shield already attached, protective vest, shin guards, knee guards, shield, and baton.135 The head of the QRFâhimself provided little guidance on the contours of his missionâhad his squad train for civil disturbance on January 5th and the morning of the 6th as they waited.136 Not only had they trained, but they trained together, as a unitâa benefit military officials all agreed is ideal. Army leadership, all the way up to Secretary McCarthy,137 had no idea that Lt. Col. Reinke had taken these initiatives. Secretary McCarthy agreed that had he known of their civil disturbance preparation, âit could haveâ affected the speed with which approval was ultimately given for their deployment.138

As to the second group of available resourcesâthe servicemembers stationed at traffic control points since the early morning of January 6thâArmy leadership held misconceptions about what equipment was available to them. Secretary McCarthy had agreed that some gearâexpressly not batonsâcould remain stowed away in vehicle trunks.139 Colonel Hunter had his troops put the gear into a white box truck instead and designated a rally point for the truck that would be central to all traffic control points.140 On the night of January 5th, in anticipation of January 6th, Colonel Hunter had his troops move the civil disturbance gearâincluding the prohibited batonsâinto the individual vehicles themselves.141 Captain Tarp, the head of the second shift, agreed that they were told to load the equipment into their vehicles âon the down low. Done so it wasnât visible, so it wouldnât look like we were escalating [our] role.â142

The commanding general of the DC Guard was aware that the troops had all they needed in their trunks andâin the case of an emergencyâwould not need to return to the Armory to get it: âThey already had it,â Major General Walker said.143

But Army leadership did not know that. Although General Piatt said âWe never asked, like, what was actuallyâI have no knowledge of what they [actually] had inâ the vehicles,144 the guidance from Secretary McCarthyâs letter led him to believe that âweapons, ammunition, batons, shields, kneepads, other protection that we may be asked to do for civil disturbance, that was not [there]âbecause they were specifically told they would not participate in that mission . . . .â145 Secretary McCarthy said, âThe only thing I authorized General Walker to do was their ballistic helmets and body armor in the vehicle, not their shields or their riot batons.â146 He figured his orders had been followed.147 When asked why he was not aware of the moves the Guard had made, Secretary McCarthy said, âI mean, I made a mistake. I think a local unit commander was anticipating more than what potentially we were prepared for.â148

DC Guard leadership understood that loading this equipment flouted direct orders. âI wasnât going to have my soldiers unprepared,â Major General Walker said.149 The prohibition on batons, in particular, had been sent 54 minutes after the Guard had already begun their traffic control shifts on the morning of January 5th.150

The third group of available resourcesâthe servicemembers awaiting at the Armory to take over as the second shift at the traffic control pointsâhad equipment accessible to them at headquarters. Captain Tarp did note that it took time to ensure that the Armory equipment was in working order: repairing straps that were broken, wiping off dirt on the shields because âthey were the same from the George Floyd protests,â and affixing the helmet to the shields, which took upwards of 20 to 30 minutes.151 In the three different locations where the Guard was stationed as the Capitol was being breached, all servicemembers had access to full civil disturbance gear right there with them.

Outside of the QRF, which had recently returned from two days of training together, there is debate as to how ready the rest of the Guard was to engage in civil disturbance response on January 6th. The notion that the military is not primed or naturally skilled to deal with civil disturbance appears to stand in tension with National Guard traditions, training, and doctrine. âThey were not missioned, tasked, organized, equipped to do civil disturbance operations,â General Flynn said.152 Although General Piatt conceded that â[a]ll soldiers are trained in civil disturbance,â he maintained that on âthat day we were not postured to do civil disturbance operations.â153

Major General Walkerâwho pointed out that the DC Guard shield, on Guard troop uniforms, features the Capitol building itself: âProtect the Capitol. Thatâs why Thomas Jefferson created itâ154âcalled civil disturbance âfoundationalâ to what they do.155

On January 5th, as he led his forces in traffic control, Colonel Hunter did not observe activity that raised concerns.156 But by the next morningâas thousands of out-of-towners invited by President Trump descended on the nationâs capitalâthat all changed. âI could see like the Proud Boys,â he said.157 âI could see different people with Kevlars on, with bulletproof vests on. You know, theyâre all kitted up and theyâre wearing different patches and colors. And I said, âWell, this crowd is definitely different . . . .ââ158 This, of course, was an indication of the potential for violence in the hours that followed.

Colonel Hunter, sitting at the intersection of 15th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, saw crowds flowing past him and his soldiers toward the Capitolâwalking as one, chanting as one. âHey, is it that way to the Capitol? Whereâs the Capitol?â some asked.159 Colonel Hunter got in his car and began writing an update report.160

He was interrupted by a soldier who had been watching CNN on his phone: âHey, sir, I think thereâs been shots fired at the Capitol.â161 It was then that Colonel Hunter began to put a plan in place for the redeployment of the Guard. âSo at that point in my mind I said, âOkay, then they will be requesting the DC National Guard now, so we have to move.â162 The time was 2:12 p.m.163

The first thing he did was designate a rally point for DC Guard reinforcements.164 Over the radio, he relayed the rally point to all 118 members currently spread across the city doing traffic control, and one by one, in order by their points, they called in to acknowledge where they would go once approval came down.165 At 2:17 p.m., he called Lt. Col. Reinke, the head of the 40-strong QRF, and ordered his subordinate to âhave all of your guys put their gear on and get on the bus.â166 âIn my mind, this is about to happen really fast,â he said.167 âAs soon as I make one call, I will get clearance to go and support. The United States Capitol was breached. I mean, this is unheard of.â168 Accordingly, he advised Lt. Col. Reinke that, â[W]e will be getting a call soon.â169

He next tried to find the incident command post. He ran into the Assistant MPD Chief Jeffery Carroll, piled into a car and, sirens flipped on, sped off to U.S. Capitol Police headquarters.170

Once there, they got into the elevator, and âbefore the doors even closed,â Assistant Chief Carroll asked him, âHow many do you have coming right now?â171 Colonel Hunter said, âIâm working on it. I need to make some calls, but we areâweâre coming . . . . And I said, as soon as I start making these calls, Iâm going to have so many National Guardsmen just flooding this way. I just need to have the location, have the plan set, be ready to receive them.â172

No later than 2:50 p.m., Colonel Hunter had confirmed with Lt. Col. Reinke that the QRF was on the bus and ready.173 The highest-ranking Guard official on the ground had sorted out all of the details and linked up with the law enforcement agencies that would lead them in support. At least 135 National Guard servicemembersâthe 40 QRF members already in gear and on the bus and the 90 at traffic control posts awaiting word, with gear in their trunks to be donned at the rally point, along with four command staff plus Colonel Hunter himselfâwere ready to go. At 3:10 p.m., Colonel Hunter felt it was time to tell his superiors all that he had done and hopefully get fast approval.174

At the Capitol, MPD Chief Contee was on the West Front, himself inhaling chemical agentsââyou can smell it before you see it, felt it in my throatâ175âas officers tried to resist rioters beating back the perimeter, having reached the stage built for the Inauguration set for two weeks later. â[T]he gas stuff and the spray, the mist thatâs in the air, I mean, itâs real,â he said.176 âIâm trying to talk to the Mayor to give her a situational update, and the city administratorâIâve got them both on the line. Iâm coughing, trying to explain whatâs going on.â177 Chief Contee cut through the crowds of people around the Capitol to meet the mayor at MPD headquarters.178

Chief Sund said he reached out to House Sergeant at Arms Irving at 12:57 or 12:58 p.m., and told him, âWe are getting overrun on the West Front by thousands. We need the National Guard now.â179 Irving recalled the call coming before a break in the electoral certification session just short of 1:30 p.m. and that the Chief said âthat conditions were deteriorating outside and he might be making a request for the National Guard.â180 Although Irving was firm in his stance that only the Capitol Police Board had the authority to request National Guard assistance, he nonetheless sought out the chief of staff to the Speaker to inform her of the impending request.181 He did not need her to sign off, but â[a]ny change in security posture, given the time, I would give them a heads-up.â182

The Speakerâs chief of staff âimmediately scribbled down a noteâ and went over to inform the Speakerâwho was in the chair presiding over the floor debate on the Arizona objectionsâabout the request for the National Guard.183 âAbsolutely. Go,â Speaker Nancy Pelosi said.184 Later, as they were evacuating the floor to an undisclosed location, the Speaker asked her, âIs the National Guard coming?â185 The Speakerâs chief of staff said, âYes, we asked them.â186

Irving said the formal request for Guard assistance came in a call after 2 p.m. from Chief Sund âand, of course, we said absolutely.â187 Chief Sund said he had made the request in that earlier 12:57 or 12:58 call and had been waiting for 71 minutes.188 âI hung up the phone. I yelled across the command center, [âM]ark the time, 2:10, I finally got approval from the Capitol Police Board for the use of the National Guard,ââ Chief Sund said.189

At around 2:30 p.m., Director Rodriguez patched Chief Conteeâand a largely silent Mayor Bowser listening in190âinto the conference call with Chief Sund and Major General Walker, who brought in General Piatt.191 Major General Walker ordered his aide-de-camp on his second day on the job, Lt. Timothy Nick, to take handwritten notes of the call and the rest of the day.192

On the line at the Pentagonâgathered around the speaker of the Secretary of the Armyâs desk phoneâwere General Piatt, General McConville, and Secretary McCarthy.193 According to Secretary McCarthy, it was during the call that he learned the Capitol had been breached,194 watching it unfold in real time on television.195 He didnât recall hearing Chief Sundâs voice on the call, but said âwe were trying to get . . . what we call the operational sight picture. What is going on? How big is the crowd? How violent is the crowd? . . . They started laying out really theâjust how bad it was.â196 Secretary McCarthy resolved to run to the office of Acting Secretary of Defense Miller, leaving behind instructions to General Piatt to âfind out the requirements,â as he was âgoing to get the authority.â197 â[W]e go zipping down there,â General McConville said.198 As they were leaving, General Flynn showed up.199

General Flynn said, âwhen I came by the phone,â he âheard voices screaming on the end.â200 He called the tones of their voices as âchaoticâ201 and that â[y]ou couldnât tell who was talking sometimes.â202 Chief Sund was pleading for help. âI want to say he even used the word, like, âI am pleading,ââ Chief Contee said.203 Col. Matthews, listening in beside Major General Walker, said of Chief Sund: âHis voice was cracking. He was almost crying.â204

According to Chief Contee, the reaction to his pleas was âtepid.â205 âIt was a very sluggish response,â Chief Contee said.206 âI remember just, you know, with all that was going on, not hearing a âyes,â you know, just . . . what I would in my mind qualify as, like, excuses and not decisive action. . . I was hearing, like, all the reasons, you know, why we shouldnât be doing this.â207 Director Rodriguez called it a âkind of bureaucraticâ response in the midst of âa rapidly evolving situation where literally the Capitol was being overrun.â208 He added: âI donât want to use the word disinterested, but more just, âletâs just hold on. Letâs just wait. Letâs just kind of calm down for a second while literally Rome is burning.ââ209

For his part, General Flynn depicted General Piattâthe main interlocutorâas âthe calming voice in an otherwise chaotic situation.â210 General McConville agreed: âI talked to some of my staff, and they said that General Piatt did an incredible job. He was like theâyou know, in a very calm [voice], just saying, âletâs just settle . . . .ââ211

But Major General Walker said he âjust couldnât believe nobody was saying: âHey, go.ââ212 He asked the generals on the other line, ââArenât you watching the news? Canât you see whatâs going on? We need to get there.â And [I was] cognizant of the fact that Iâm talking to senior . . . people, but I could see what was happening . . . .â213 Chief Sund was âperplexedâ and âdumbfounded.â214 âIt wasnât what I expected of, yeah, the cavalryâs coming. It was a bunch of, round-the-house, oh, hey, letâs do this, letâs do that,â he said.215 âI was borderline getting pretty pissed off.â216

Many participants on the call say General Piattâs stated concern was the optics of sending troops to the site of a democratic process.

â[T]he infamous talk about optics. That came up again. There was talk about boots on the ground again. You know, thatâs not good optics, having boots on the ground,â Chief Contee said.217 He recalled how Secretary McCarthy had vocalized the same hesitance during the five-day deliberation preceding January 6th.218

Director Rodriguez believed General Piatt replied to the request by saying, â[W]e donât like the optics of having military personnel at the Capitol against peaceful protesters.â219

He recalls Chief Contee replying bluntly, â[W]ell, theyâre not peaceful anymore.â220

Major General Walker heard one of the Army generals say it âwouldnât be their best military advice or guidance to suggest to the Secretary that we have uniformed presence at the Capitol.â221 He added: âThey were concerned about how it would look, the optics.â222 Chief Sund heard the general use the word twice.223 âGeneral Piatt saidâand I will never forget thisââYeah, I donât know. Iâm concerned about the optics of the National Guard standing a line with the Capitol in the background,ââ Chief Sund said.224 â[M]y officers are getting beaten, and theyâre worried about the optics of the National Guard.â225

Although General Piatt denies explicitly using the word âopticsâââI donât recall ever saying that word on that phone call, because at the time it just wasnât importantâ226âhe agreed that he said use of the Guard was ânot my best military judgment or my best military advice.â227 He said he âmade a couple of suggestions that were not well-received,â228 including âif there was any other facility where we could go and relieve police. . . I think they took that as I was saying no, because they immediately came back and said, youâre denying our request.â229

General McConvilleâwho wasnât present at the timeâsaid he talked to people in the room about the use of the word âoptics,â and âsome people said, âNo, it wasnât said.â And then some people said it was said.â230 Nonetheless, the sentiment behind it should not be a particularly controversial one, according to General McConville. âPeople like to use opticsâIâm going to stay away because thatâs a political term in my eyes. But what type of signature do you want on the streets in Washington, DC? Do you want a police signature? Do you want a military signature? Do you want a Federal signature?â he said.231 â[T]hat creates a reaction from the American people, and we need to think our way through that . . .â232

On the call, talk of needing a planâthe so-called con-op that had been a lesson learned from the summerâemerged. â[A]fter the optics, . . . then it was, you know, they wanted, like, specific information. There was something they were talking about, like, mission and . . . what exactly theyâre going to be doing when they get there,â Chief Contee said.233 Before running off, Secretary McCarthy had instructed General McConville to put together a plan: âMy charter, my direction from him is to get a plan. Weâre gonna support; I just wanted to get something to support with.â234 But he acknowledged the impression nonetheless remained that he was âdenying or pushing back.â235

That impression was made explicit: âThey said three times to me clearly, âYouâre denying my request,ââ General Piatt said.236

Chief Contee interrupted âChief Sund mid-sentenceâ and said, âWait a minute. Hold up. Let me make sure that I understand this correctly . . . [A]re you asking for support from the National Guard at the U.S. Capitol?â237

Chief Sund said, âYes.â238

Chief Contee then addressed the Army generals: ââAre you guys honoring his request?â I asked them that. And they didnât say âno,â but they also didnât say âyes.ââ239 Chief Sund recalled it the same way.240

General Piatt said he was âclear in my response, âI donât have any authority to deny or approve. The Secretary is getting approval.ââ241

â[T]he third time when they said, âYouâre denying our request,â they also said, âAnd weâre going to go to the media,ââ General Piatt said.242 â[W]e were desperate. Everyone was desperate. So Iâm not angry at that, but I just knew it wasnât helpful, so we told that to Secretary McCarthy.â243

As for the threat to go public, Major General Walker said, âI remember that very clearly.â244 According to him, after the generals would not say yes or no, âChief Contee says: âIâm going to call the mayor and ask her to have a press conference saying that the Army is not going to allow the DC Guard to come and support.ââ245 General Piatt reportedly replied, âPlease donât do that. I donât have the authority to authorize the National Guard to go. So please donât do that. Please donât hold the press conference.â246 Chief Contee doesnât recall saying that.247 Mayor Bowser doesnât know if she was still on the line when the remark was made, but âit was certainly going to be something that I would do.â248

In the end, âthe call sort of ended very abruptly, . . . .â249 The DC head of homeland security and emergency management left the call thinking âthat help was not coming, andâat least [not] from the National Guard.â250 That was Chief Sundâs belief, too. â[I]f a general says his troops are not coming, his troops arenât coming,â he said.251

Before the call ended, General Flynn set up a video-conferencing bridge. General Piatt explained to the Select Committee that this was meant âto get the principals and the team together to start making a plan.â252 But Major General Walkerâunder whom âit was actually written . . . would maintain control of National Guard forcesâ253âsaid he was not privy to any planning while on the call.

âWe were just told to hold,â he said.254

How long did Major General Walker hold?

âThree hours and 19 minutes,â he said.255

Major General Walker told the Select Committee regarding what occurred during this time. â[W]e all thought, itâs in a minute, weâre going to be told to go, in a minute. Then 5 minutes, then 10 minutes, then 15 minutes. We kept thinking, any minute now, somebody is going to say âgo,ââ he said.256 âAnd then an hour went by, then more time went by . . . . But we never thought it would take that long.â257 Col. Matthews confirmed that there were periods on the call when no one was talking.258 At times, there was talk of securing buildings other than the Capitol.259 He called the open channel essentially âa general officer chat line.â260

What did Major General Walker think was happening in those 3 hours and 19 minutes?

âDelay.â261

Vice President Mike Pence called several times to check in on the delayed response of the Guard. President Trump did not.

Vice President Pence called Acting Secretary Miller at least two times.262 âHe was very animated, and he issued very explicit, very direct, unambiguous orders. There was no question about that,â General Milley said.263 âAnd he said, âGet the National Guard down here. Get them down here now, and clear the Capitol.â You know, and this is the Vice President of the United States. And there was other forceful language.ââ264

Acting Secretary Miller clarified that âhe did not order me,â as âheâs not in the chain of command,â but he considered the talk with the Vice President â[h]yper professionalâ and â[v]ery focused,â in which the secretary âhighlighted that District of Columbia National Guard . . . was activated, and we were throwing every asset we could marshal to support law enforcement.â265

In contrast, according to General Milley, Chief of Staff Meadows called and said, ââWe have to kill the narrative that the Vice President is making all the decisions. We need to establish the narrative, you know, that the President is still in charge and that things are steady or stable,â or words to that effect. I immediately interpreted that as politics, politics, politics.â266

President Trump himself did not call. As reports of Departments of Defense denials and delay were echoing in the media, no high-level Defense officialâincluding Secretaries Miller267 and McCarthy268âreceived a call from him that day.269 At the time, General Milley thought that was âabsolutely . . . highly unusual.â270

â[Y]ouâre the Commander in Chief. Youâve got an assault going on on the Capitol of the United States of America, and thereâs nothing? No call? Nothing? Zero?â he said.271 âI grew up in an organization where commanders are responsible and take charge and they see situations unfolding and they issue orders and take charge.â272

On January 3rd, at the end of a national security meeting concerning a foreign threat, the President asked âin passingâ about January 6th preparations.273 Acting Secretary Miller informed him they would be fulfilling Mayor Bowserâs request for DC Guard support.274 From then on, if not earlier, the secretary âfelt like I had all the authorities I needed and did not need to discuss anything with the President regarding authorities.â275 The conversation lasted all of 30 seconds to a minute.276 Secretary Miller testified that he never received any order at any time from President Trump to deploy the National Guard on January 6th. âThere was no directâthere was no order from the President,â he said.277

On January 5th, as demonstrators rallied in support of the President, Acting Secretary Miller received a call from the commander-in-chief.278 The President asked him if he was watching the events on television.279 The secretary told him he had caught some of the coverage.280

Unprompted, President Trump then said, âYouâre going to need 10,000 peopleâ the following day, as in troops.281 An email sent by Chief of Staff Meadows on January 5th explicitly noted that the DC Guard would be on hand to âprotect pro Trump people.â282 The President and his staff appeared to be aware of the likelihood of violence on the day the election certification of his loss was slated to transpire. This communication from President Trump contemplated that the Guard could support and secure the safety of Trump supporters, not protect the Capitol. At that time, Secretary Miller apparently had no information on what President Trump planned for January 6th.

Acting Secretary Miller thought the 10,000 number was astronomicalââwe expected 35,000 protesters . . . [and] even if there were more protesters than expected, [we thought] that local law enforcement could handle itâ283âbut, again, this was âno order from the President,â just âPresident Trump banter that you all are familiar with.â284

While the Army and the District engaged in the âheatedâ285 2:30 p.m. phone call, Secretary McCarthy was hurrying down the Pentagon hallways to Acting Secretary Millerâs office. General Milley had been summoned there before Secretary McCarthy arrived with General McConville in tow,286 ârunning down the hall, and he was actually winded when he showed up . . . â287

The next half hour was spent in âa quick, rapid fire meeting, [with] lots of quick questions.â288 Secretary McCarthyâout of breathâsaid he started by saying, âWeâve got to go. Weâve got to get somethingâweâve got to put every capability we can up there.â289 The response he received was, âThey were all kind of, like, âSlow down. Whatâs going on?â They wanted to get a sense of the situation.â290 Secretary McCarthy said it took about 15 to 20 minutes to ârelay this,â âlaying out what I thought we needed to do.â291

By 3:04 p.m., Acting Secretary Miller said he approved deployment of the DC Guard to assist law enforcement at the Capitol at that time.292 Acting Secretary Miller did not understand why Major General Walkerâif he felt the exigency demanded itâdid not deploy troops as soon as his 3 p.m. order allowed it. âWhy didnât he launch them? Iâd love to know,â he said.293

Secretary McCarthy agreed âthatâs where we may have talked past each other in his office,â because Secretary McCarthy thought he âhad the authority as the Secretary of the Armyâ to conduct a mission analysis and send troops at his discretion, not that of Major General Walker.294

Major General Walker himself understood he had to wait for approval from Secretary McCarthy to deploy his forces. But as he waited on that video call for hours, he did strongly consider sending them anyway. He turned to his lawyer and said, âHey, you know what? You know, weâre going to go, and Iâm just going to shoulder the responsibility.â295 According to Major General Walker, his lawyer responded, âWhat if you get sued?â296 Colonel Mathews, that lawyer, âtold him not to do that. Just hold on.â297 The Guard officials located with Major General Walker at the Armory all say he seriously contemplated aloud the possibility of breaking with the chain of command.

âShould we just deploy now and resign tomorrow?â was how Lieutenant Nick recalled Major General Walker bluntly putting it.298

âI would have done just that,â Major General Walker said, âbut not for those two lettersâ299 from his superiors curtailing Guard redeployment.300

The man who signed one of the letters, howeverâhimself a former member of the DC Guard301ânow says Major General Walker should have moved forward regardless of whether he had proper authorization.

âIâve launched QRF without approval more than once,â Acting Secretary Miller said.302 âIf youâre the person on the ground in the Army, and you realize that thereâs something that is unpredictable or unexpected and you have the ability to influence it, the culture, the training, the education, the expectation of you, the American people, is that you will execute and do what you can, even if it costs you your job.â303

After authorization at 3:04 p.m., Secretary McCarthy said he gave Major General Walker a call. He told him to â[m]obilize the entire Guard, bring everybody in. . . . And I said, you know, move the QRF to the armory and get as many people as you can to the armory and configure them in a minimum of riot gear and batons. And then weâre going to do a mission analysis of what we need to do with the police . . . .â304 Major General Walker âcategorically deniesâ that any such call took place.305 In fact, Major General Walker said the two men did not talk at all until much later that night.306 âHereâs the bottom line. The Secretary was unavailable to me, and he never called me,â Major General Walker said.307

Beginning around 3:00 p.m., 25 minutes of Secretary McCarthyâs time was spent reassuring members of Congress that the Guard was indeed coming,308 although he had not yet conveyed the order. That was time unspent on facilitating their actual coming. In addition to the alleged threat on the 2:30 p.m. call, a media tweet had gone out at 2:55 p.m. declaring that the Department of Defense had denied requests for Guard support.309

By 3:45 p.m., Secretary McCarthy was done with his calls andâafter picking up some things from his officeâheaded down to the MPD headquarters to draft a con-op beside law enforcement.310 Acting Secretary Miller arrived at 4:10 p.m.311

While he was waiting, Colonel Hunter decided he would keep the first shift handling traffic control out at their posts in case they were needed for re-mission by the MPD, relying instead only on the QRF and the second shift at the Armory to respond to the Capitol.312 Those servicemembers ended up manning their traffic control posts up to 20 hours straight.313 Army leadership never found out that the servicemembers at the traffic control posts didnât end up responding to the Capitol that night, incorrectly crediting some of the Guardâs delay that day to their travel time.314

By 3:50 p.m., the QRF had arrived at the Armory, bringing their own equipment, given no new information upon making the extra pit stop there instead of the Capitol.315 They were ready to go, steeped in âa lot of nerves.â316 The second shift of servicemembers originally missioned for traffic control had been told as early as 2:30 p.m. to expect a switch in mission to handling civil disturbance.317 They rushed to gear up and prepare, but it was a lot of âhurry up and wait.â318 Not long afterward, âweâre all ready. Now weâre all donned. So go sit on the bleachers and wait. . . We were in a tight holding pattern until the time to deploy.â319

At around the same time, at 3:49 p.m., Speaker Pelosi is heard in video footage from that day urging Acting Secretary Miller to hurry.

âJust pretend for a moment this was the Pentagon or the White House or some other entity that was under siege,â she told him over the phone while sheâand the rest of the Congressional leadershipâwere huddled in a secure location.320 âJust get them there!â321

When Secretary McCarthy arrived at MPD headquarters, he joined Chief Contee, his Army Operations Director Brigadier General Chris LaNeve, and Assistant Chief Carroll by phone.322

In the next 20 minutes, Secretary McCarthy developed a con-op.

As Secretary McCarthy had decided after the summer, crafting a strategy was his jobââI was doing it with the Mayor, the police chief, and the deputy director of the FBI, my counterparts, and then ultimately wanted to understand what our role would be, the conditionsââand afterward, âwe turned to [Major General Walker] to work the tactical details for that.â323

But Major General Walker said, âIf I need you to tell me how to execute a civil disturbance mission,â he â[s]hould relieve me. Should fire me.â324

It wasnât until later, post-January 6th, that Major General Walker said he found out that Secretary McCarthy, his boss, had been putting together a con-opâwithout him. âThen later they said they had to put together a plan for me to execute . . . which I found kind of disturbing,â Major General Walker said.325 âYouâre coming up with a plan without me being involved in the plan?â326

General McConville agreed that âusually[,] the Secretary of Army is not developing concepts for the employment, but because of the situation that wasnât done,â so the secretary had to fill in the gap.327 That, of courseâgiven the preparations Colonel Hunter had laid out hours earlierâwas not true. But Secretary McCarthy did not know that.328

He said Major General Walker never told him about how Colonel Hunter had prepared and that it was his responsibility to tell him.329 âI donât talk to troop lead commanders, no,â he said.330

Ultimately, no plan from Army leadersâstrategic or tacticalâmade it to the troops.

â[I]f they came up with a plan, they never shared it with us,â Major General Walker said.331 âThey claim they were putting a plan together. Thatâs what took so long. I never saw a plan from the Department of Defense or the Department of the Army.â332

Colonel Hunter agreed that â[n]o one ever told me, because I already had the plan there, and no one ever informed me that there was a different plan or a different [con-op].â333 He said to the extent a âhasty planâ was put into action on January 6th, it was his: âI created the concept of operation.â334 He added: âThe [plan] that was actually used as far as which lot they would come into, who would meet them at the lot, and then who would lead them over to the Capitol. That was between myself and MPD and Capitol Police.â335

After hours of wait, Major General Walker said, âThe plan was executed just like we said it would be [from the start], get to the Capitol, take direction from the ranking police officers there . . . to help restore order.â336 Colonel Hunter passed the details of his hasty plan onto Lt. Col. Reinkeâthe highest ranking officer at the rally pointâletting him know, âHey, when you pull into this lot, they will meet you there. This is who isâyou know, youâre going with these personnel,â exactly what Secretary McCarthy had just spent 20 minutes putting together.337

Although Lt. Col. Reinke said his QRF servicemembers were given rules of engagement before arriving at the rally point, he was not told more than report to Capitol Police and supplement and assist them.338

Captain Tarp, outranked by Lt. Col. Reinke but in charge of the second shift, was merely told by Brigadier General Ryan: ââYou need to act like thereâs a fire now. Youâre going to [the] Capitol.â Those were his directions.â339

After an hour and a half spent in calls, travel, and making plans, Secretary McCarthy was prepared to green light the deployment of the Guard at 4:35 p.m. But miscommunication led to another half-hour delay.

Secretary McCarthy relayed the âgoâ order to Major General Walkerâwith his subordinate Brigadier General LaNeve serving as the intermediaryâin a conversation Major General Walker said never happened.

According to Secretary McCarthy, Brigadier General LaNeve âwasnât a junior aide.â340 In his role, âhe can speak, once given the authority, delegated authority to speak as the Sec Army . . . â341 He said that the first-star officer âwas standing next to me,â342 and General Piatt said that it was generally ânot uncommonâ for him to ask his staff to âtransmit [the] communication from the Secretary to General Walker.â343

For his part, Brigadier General LaNeve denies that he himself conveyed the âgoâ order.344 He said he spoke with Major General Walker first at 4:25 p.m. to tell him that his forces should, âGet on the bus, do not leave.â345 On a second call at 4:35 p.m., Brigadier General LaNeve said he overheard Secretary McCarthy himself convey the âgoâ order to Major General Walker: He said something âto the effect of âYouâre approved to provide support.ââ346 Secretary McCarthy, on his part, said he never spoke a word.347

Brigadier General LaNeve said the secretary then again handed him the phone to convey the details of âwhere to go and what officer to meet up with.â348 Those two details would be the full extent of the âcon-opâ allegedly communicated to Major General Walker.349 He even recalled Major General Walker saying, âRoger,â to acknowledge the plan.350 But, Brigadier General LaNeve said, there was âmass confusion in that room,â and he agreed that â[t]here were huge communications problems.â351

Major General Walker said there was no such call, nor any like it.352 He said he remained on the video conference line the whole time âwith everybody else,â he said.353 He said he would not have taken an order from Brigadier General LaNeve anyhow. â[W]hy would I ever take directions from General LaNeve? Anybody? Brigadier General LaNeve, one-star,â Major General Walker said.354 âI mean, heâs not a peer, it wouldnât be somebody that would convey that type of message to me. . . So my thinking wouldnât have been that he would have been speaking on behalf of the Secretary.â355

Although his staff confirms they didnât see him field a call from Secretary McCarthy or Brigadier General LaNeve,356 including never seeing him leave their conference room,357 Major General Walkerâs own note taker appears to have jotted down at 4:37 p.m. the following: âadvised to sent [sic] 150 to establish D st / 1st outer perimeter, General LaNeve,â beside what appears to be his phone number.358 That address is the rally point Secretary McCarthy had asked General LaNeve to convey, the same one Colonel Hunter and law enforcement had already chosen earlier. Major General Walker said, âthe only way [Lt. Nick] could have got it was listening to the VTC, which I was on.â359 He further said, âI never saw General LaNeve on the [video teleconference] . . . I didnât hear General LaNeveâs voice.â360 Lt. Nick said he had it penned at much laterâat 5:09 p.m.ââas the time they received the ordersâ to deploy.361

Major General Walker certainly did not act as if he had been given authority until, fortuitously, General McConvilleâwho had heard about the 4:35 p.m. callâwalked by the teleconference screen and was âsurprisedâ to see the commanding general sitting idly at 5:09 p.m.362

Major General Walker agreed the first time he heard he had the authority was from the lips of the general: âGeneral McConville came back into the call and said, Hey, youâre a go.â363

Lt. Col. Reinkeâs QRF and Captain Tarpâs second shift got on the bus at 5:10 p.m.364 They left at 5:15 p.m.365 Lt. Col. Reinke said they didnât arrive at the Capitol Police parking lot until 5:55 p.m.,366 although official timing from the Army and Department of Defense put their arrival time at 5:40 p.m. and from the DC Guard at 5:20 p.m.367 At the earliest, the troops arrived in the vicinity of the Capitol grounds at 5:29 p.m., when Lt. Col. Reinke texted Colonel Hunter: âApparently we pulled into the wrong lot, trying to reroute to LOT 16 now.â368 He said they sat around for 20 minutes once they arrived, and then were sworn in, before relieving an entire line of officers.369 Captain Tarp said they remained idle for 45 minutes waiting for Capitol Police to come âbus by bus to swear-in the officers. It was a long wait. Frustratingâweâre sitting a mile from where we[âre] going.â370

Captain Tarp said, âBy the time we got there, we were just holding back the people who remained past the curfew.â371 The height of the riot had passed.

Colonel Hunter estimated thatâhad his preparations been approvedâthe DC Guard could have arrived as early as an hour and a half earlier than they did.

âWithin one hour, Iâd say I couldâve had 135. So the [about 40] coming from Joint Base Andrews, if they wouldâve headed directly to me at the Capitol, and then the 90 I had on the street and the 4 that wereâincluding myself,â he said.372 â[S]o I arrived at the Capitol at 3:10. So, if I wouldâve recalled everyone by 3:30, 3:40, we couldâve beenâhad gear on and walking towards the Capitol.â373

He further stated: âI would give them another hour. So by 4:40 I shouldâve had at least 250 coming from the Armory . . . That includes the second shift as well as full-timers.â374

Presented with the plans Colonel Hunter had set in motion and the easy accessibility of their equipment, neither of which he had known about at the time, Secretary McCarthy conceded âyou could have shaved minutes,â375 and the speed of deployment âcould haveâ been pushed up, but â[i]t depends.â376

When the Guard finally arrived at the Capitol, âpretty much all the other fighting, per se, had stopped on the Capitol complex,â according to Robert Glover, head of the MPD Special Operations Division.377 Then-Inspector Glover received the Guard troops when they arrived.378 â[T]he bus just kind of showed up. It was my decision at that point, looking at their numbers and their capabilities at that moment in time and what was the most pressing activityâand that was to make the arrests,â he said.379 He had them create a secure âprisoner cordonâ where they could stand guard as arrested individuals waited transport to jail.380 âThey were the freshest personnel that we had at that moment in time. And, again, they didnât have any significant numbers to really do much else at that moment in time either,â he said.381 â[T]heir orders were basically, support us in whatever we told them to do . . . â382

Secretary McCarthy said that it was possible that DOD and DC National Guard leaders had simply not been coordinating their planning.383 He acknowledged that âa lot of things were probably missed. It was tremendously confusing,â384 and âthat makes for a messy response.â385

No one within the Department of Defense, Army, or Guard leveled accusations of an intentional delay. âI didnât see anybody trying to throw sand in the gearbox and slow things down,â General Milley said.386

Major General Walker said the Armyâs reluctance to approve National Guard assistance to the Mayor during the planning for the anticipated January 6th events continued through January 6th itself.387 âI donât know where the decision paralysis came from, but it was clearly there. The decision paralysis, decision avoidance,â he said.388

Former President Trumpâs eagerness to engage the U.S. military to play a visible role in addressing domestic unrest during the late spring and summer of 2020 does appear to have prompted senior military leadership to take precautions, in preparing for the joint session, against the possibility that the DC Guard might be ordered to deploy for an improper purpose. Those precautions seem to have been prudential as much as legal in nature.

What that entailed in the unprecedented circumstances of the January 6th attack on the Capitol is, however, harder to accept: a 3 hour and 19 minute lag-time in making a relatively small, but riot-trained and highly capable military unit available to conduct one of its statutory support missions.

While the delay seems unnecessary and unacceptable, it was the byproduct of military processes, institutional caution, and a revised deployment approval process. We have no evidence that the delay was intentional. Likewise, it appears that none of the individuals involved understood what President Trump planned for January 6th, and how he would behave during the violence. Imperfect inter-government and intra-military communications as the January 6th rally morphed, with President Trumpâs active encouragement, into a full-blown riot at the Capitol also help explain the time it took to deploy Guard troops to the Capitol after their assistance there was requested and approved. Post-hoc evaluation of real-time communications during an unprecedented and evolving crisis and limited tactical intelligence, nevertheless, carries the risk of a precision that was unrealistic at the time. It is also clear from testimony provided to the Select Committee that DoD and DC National Guard leaders have differing perspectives that are not reconcilable regarding the timing of deployment authorization.

Where the DC Guardâs deployment on January 6th is concerned, then, the âlessons learnedâ at this juncture include: careful evaluation on the basis of limited information may take time; statutorily constrained intergovernmental requests for assistance and multi-level approval processes are complex and may be time-consuming; any visible military presence in the domestic setting is circumscribed by law and triggers considerable, constitutionally-driven sensitivities; and crisis communications are often imperfect, especially in unforeseen and rapidly evolving situations.

ENDNOTES

Â Â 1. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 8.

Â Â 2. DC Code Â§ 49-409, (âThe President of the United States shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the militia of the District of Columbia.â), available at https://code.dccouncil.gov/us/dc/council/code/sections/49-409 (The DC National Guard is the âorganized militiaâ of the District of Columbia. DC Code Â§ 49-406, available at https://code.dccouncil.gov/us/dc/council/code/sections/49-406). Subject to that top-level command distinction, the DC National Guard is, when acting in its civil support or militia capacity, comparable to the National Guard of the various States, which act as those Statesâ militias. 32 U.S.C. Â§101(4) (âArmy National Guardâ statutorily defined as âthat part of the organized militia of the several States . . . and the District of Columbia . . .â). The Department of Justiceâs Office of Legal Counsel has interpreted the DC Code provisions authorizing the DC National Guardâs use as a militia in support of DC law enforcement activities as within the exemptions from the Posse Comitatus Actâs prohibitions on use of the military for domestic law enforcement (18 U.S.C. Â§ 1385 (âWhoever, except in cases and under conditions expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . .â)). See Memorandum Opinion, âUse of the National Guard to Support Drug Interdiction Efforts in the District of Columbia,â 13 Op. O.L.C. 91, 92, 93, 97 (Apr. 4, 1989), available at https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinions-volume (Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. Â§ 1385, does not prohibit use of DC National Guard as a militia in support of DC Metropolitan Police Department). The President also has authority to mobilize the National Guard, which is a reserve component of the U.S. armed forces, to active duty (10 U.S.C. Â§12301 et seq.), and may âfederalizeâ any National Guard unit to assist in addressing insurrection (10 U.S.C. Â§Â§251-253), invasion, or rebellion and to give effect to Federal law (10 U.S.C. Â§12406). The President did not exercise those authorities on January 6, 2021. The DC National Guard operated that day as the DC militia, in its civil support and law enforcement assistance capacity under the separate authorities noted above. See also, Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 8.

Â Â 3. Executive Order 11485, 34 F.R. 15411, Â§ 1, (Oct. 1, 1969), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/search?conditions%5Bterm%5D=34+f.r.15411# (âThe Commanding General of the [DC] National Guard shall report to the Secretary of Defense or to an official of the Department of Defense designated by the Secretary . . .â). The Secretary of Defense exercises command authority over the âmilitary operations, including training, parades and other dutyâ of the DC National Guard while in its non-federalized militia status, through the Commanding General of the DC National Guard. Id. Executive Order 11485 reserves appointment of the Commanding General of the DC National Guard to the President (i.e., does not delegate that authority to the Secretary of Defense or the Secretaryâs designee). Id., at Â§Â§ 1, 3. That Executive Order also specifies that, â[s]ubject to the direction of the President as Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary [of Defense] may order out the [DC] National Guard . . . to aid the civil authorities . . . of the District of Columbia.â Id., at Â§ 1. Under a longstanding Congressional authorization, the Mayor of the District of Columbia may request that the Commander-in-Chief (now, by the Presidentâs delegation, the Secretary of Defense), direct the National Guard to assist in suppressing âviolence to persons or propertyâ or âforce or violence to break and resist the laws,â including when âtumult, riot or mob is threatened.â DC Code Â§49-103 (âSuppression of riotsâ), available at https://code.dccouncil.gov/us/dc/council/code/sections/49-103. See also, Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 104.

Â Â 4. Memorandum, Secretary of Defense to Secretary of the Army and Secretary of the Air Force, âSupervision and Control of the National Guard of the District of Columbia,â (Oct. 10, 1969), Â¶ 3. That memorandum is available as an attachment to the Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austinâs December 30, 2021 memorandum modifying that 1969 delegation: âEffective immediately, the Secretary of Defense is the approval authority for DC Government requests for the DCNG to provide law enforcement supportâ to the District of Columbia if the support is to be provided within 48 hours of the request or if acceding to the request would require the DC National Guard to engage directly in civilian law enforcement activities, including âcrowd control, traffic control, search, seizure, arrest, or temporary detention.â Memorandum, Secretary of Defense for Secretary of the Army, âAuthority to Approve District of Columbia Government Requests for District of Columbia National Guard Support Assistance,â (Dec. 30, 2021), available at https://www.airandspaceforces.com/austin-streamlines-authority-to-deploy-dc-national-guard. See also, Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 104.

Â Â 5. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 10.

Â Â 6. George Floyd was murdered on Monday, May 25, 2020. See Catherine Thorbecke, âDerek Chauvin Had His Knee on George Floydâs Neck for Nearly 9 Minutes, Complaint Says,â ABC News, (May 29, 2020)), available at https://abcnews.go.com/US/derek-chauvin-knee-george-floyds-neck-minutes-complaint/story?id=70961042. Over the ensuing days, weeks, and months, Americans demonstrated in cities across the country. See Major Cities Chiefs Association Intelligence Commanders Group, Report on the 2020 Protests & Civil Unrest (Oct. 2020) at p. 8, Fig. 6, https://majorcitieschiefs.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/MCCA-Report-on-the-2020-Protest-and-Civil-Unrest.pdf.

Â Â 7. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 5.

Â Â 8. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 8.

Â Â 9. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 66.

Â 10. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 66.

Â 11. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2021), pp. 67-68 (â[Trump] was very upset at the news that had come out that he had been taken down to the bunker in the preceding days, you know, when some of the rioting right by the White House was at its worst. He was very upset by this, and, as I recall, he bellowed at everyone sitting in front of him in a semicircle and he waved his finger around the semicircle saying we were losers, we were losers, we were all fucking losers,â Barr said. â[H]e then raisedâyou know, he talked about whether he should invoke the Insurrection Act . . . And, you know, my position was that the Insurrection Act should only be invoked when you really need to invoke it as a last resort, when you donât really have other assets that can deal with civil unrest.â).

Â 12. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 86.

Â 13. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 20.

Â 14. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 20.

Â 15. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), pp. 47-48.

Â 16. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 47.

Â 17. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 38.

Â 18. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 18.

Â 19. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), pp. 17-18. âBrigadier General Robert Kenneth Ryan was the joint task force commander [who] authorized theâthe helicopters to fly over the crowd to observe and report, and the Secretary of the Army approved that,â Major General Walker said. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 55. âNow, the pilots came a little too close to the civilians on the ground.â Id., at 57.

Â 20. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 27.

Â 21. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2022), p. 14.

Â 22. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2022), p. 14.

Â 23. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 19.

Â 24. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 18.

Â 25. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 19.

Â 26. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 19.

Â 27. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark Esper, (Apr. 1, 2022), pp. 47-48.

Â 28. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark Esper, (Apr. 1, 2022), pp. 47-48.

Â 29. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Apr. 1, 2022), p. 25.

Â 30. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 242â43.

Â 31. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Donell Harvin, (Jan. 24, 2022), p. 14; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Donell Harvin, (Nov. 12, 2021).

Â 32. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Donell Harvin, (Jan. 24, 2022), pp. 22-23.

Â 33. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 24; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Donell Harvin, (Jan. 24, 2022), p. 24.

Â 34. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00001680 (December 31, 2020, Letter from Mayor Bowser to Major General Walker re: DCNG).

Â 35. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00001679 (December 31, 2020, Letter from Dr. Christopher Rodriguez to Major General Walker re: DCNG).

Â 36. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 20.

Â 37. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 26.

Â 38. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 14.

Â 39. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 38.

Â 40. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 75.

Â 41. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 47.

Â 42. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 44.

Â 43. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 50.

Â 44. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 47.

Â 45. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 49.

Â 46. See Chapter 7.

Â 47. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), pp. 79, 85.

Â 48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 56.

Â 49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), pp. 78-79, 80.

Â 50. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), pp. 78-79, 80.

Â 51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 6.

Â 52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 53-54.

Â 53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 54.

Â 54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 75.

Â 55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 75-76.

Â 56. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 10.

Â 57. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 63; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), pp. 32-33.

Â 58. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 84.

Â 59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 11.

Â 60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 11-12.

Â 61. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 98.

Â 62. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 97.

Â 63. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 103.

Â 64. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 99.

Â 65. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 57.

Â 66. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 57.

Â 67. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 49.

Â 68. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 27.

Â 69. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 27.

Â 70. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Mark Esper, (Apr. 14, 2022), pp. 22-23.

Â 71. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 12-13, 15.

Â 72. U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Hearing on Unexplained Delays and Unanswered Questions, 117th Cong., 1st sess., (May 12, 2021), Statement of Christopher C. Miller, p. 4.

Â 73. U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Hearing on Unexplained Delays and Unanswered Questions, 117th Cong., 1st sess., (May 12, 2021), Statement of Christopher C. Miller, p. 4.

Â 74. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 133.

Â 75. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 73.

Â 76. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 73.

Â 77. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 51.

Â 78. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00005855âDoD 00005886 (December 18, 2021, email from General James C. McConville to Curtis Kellogg re: HOT MEDIA FOX NEWS & POLITICO MEDIA QUERY: Response to MG (R) Flynnâs remarks.).

Â 79. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 51.

Â 80. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 54-55 (âQ: Were you ever told you would be fired if you ever made such a statement again? A: It was implied. It was implied that I was, you know, not to do that again, . . . .â).

Â 81. Lara Seligman (@laraseligman), Twitter, Dec. 18, 2021 11:27 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/laraseligman/status/1339985580785086466.

Â 82. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 68.

Â 83. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00003488.

Â 84. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00003488.

Â 85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 73.

Â 86. Ashton Carter, Dick Cheney, William Cohen, Mark Esper, Robert Gates, Chuck Hagel, James Mattis, Leon Panetta, William Perry, and Donald Rumsfeld, âAll 10 living former defense secretaries: Involving the military in election disputes would cross into dangerous territory,â Washington Post, (Jan. 3, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/10-former-defense-secretaries-military-peaceful-transfer-of-power/2021/01/03/2a23d52e-4c4d-11eb-a9f4-0e668b9772ba_story.html.

Â 87. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 71.

Â 88. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 71.

Â 89. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 71.

Â 90. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 148.

Â 91. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 84.

Â 92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 247.

Â 93. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00000006 (January 4, 2021, Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller to the Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy).

Â 94. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00000006 (January 4, 2021, Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller to the Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 56.

Â 95. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 56.

Â 96. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00000006 (January 4, 2021, Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller to the Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD #2/000633, (January 5, 2021, Colonel John Lubas email to Major General William Walker with the subject, âFinal Signed Memo to DCNG,â at 7:54 a.m. ET).

Â 97. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Lt. Col. David Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).

Â 98. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 68.

Â 99. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 68.

100. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 89.

101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 92.

102. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 93.

103. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 90.

104. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), pp. 93â94.

105. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 42.

106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 50.

107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 50.

108. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 133 (âQ: It doesnât sound to me, like, really, youâre pushing for it when you raised the National Guard with Sergeant At Arms Irving or Stenger? It would have been nice, but not essential for you to be ready. Is that a fair characterization of your personal position on that? A: Yes.â).

109. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 116-17.

110. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 124.

111. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001766, CTRL0000001766.0001 (Document from January 3, 2021, titled: âSpecial Event Assessment: Joint Session of CongressâElectoral College Vote Certificationâ); see also, Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Julie Farnam, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 51-52.

112. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 125.

113. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 114.

114. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 116.

115. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 119.

116. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 128.

117. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 128.

118. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), pp. 9-10.

119. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 35.

120. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 10.

121. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 12.

122. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 35.

123. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 10.

124. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 41.

125. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), pp. 7-8, 45.

126. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), pp. 52-53.

127. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 131-32.

128. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 19, 26.

129. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 19, 26.

130. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 19, 26.

131. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Stewart Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).

132. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 26.

133. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 26.

134. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Robert Ryan, (Dec. 9, 2022).

135. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of David Reinke, (Dec. 9, 2022).

136. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of David Reinke, (Dec. 9, 2022).

137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 116.

138. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 117.

139. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2022), p. 31.

140. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 23.

141. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 25, 27-28.

142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Stewart Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).

143. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 130.

144. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 26.

145. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 45.

146. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 107.

147. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 107.

148. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 109.

149. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 29.

150. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00003050 (January 5, 2021, email from John Lubas to William Walker and Earl Matthews re: Final Signed Memo to DCNG).

151. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Stewart Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).

152. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2022), p. 33.

153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 49.

154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 65.

155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 22.

156. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 26.

157. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 31.

158. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 31.

159. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 31-32.

160. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 31-32.

161. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 32.

162. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 32.

163. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 34.

164. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 32.

165. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 35.

166. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 34.

167. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 34.

168. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 37.

169. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 34.

170. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 41.

171. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 41.

172. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 41-42.

173. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 38-39. Text messages show that Lieutenant Colonel Reinke texted Colonel Hunter, âLoading buses now. Meeting police escort. Do you have destination. Contact info?â at 2:43 PM. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Davie Reinke Production), CTRL0000930918 (January 6, 2021, text messages).

174. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 44-45. (He called his direct supervisor, Brigadier General Robert Ryan: âThe first conversation with him, I first informed him, hey, sir, this is where I am, this is who Iâve talked to, and they both asked for assistance. And I asked for release of the QRF now. And I asked for, basically send all the additional forces, you know, that you have now. And his response to me was, we are working on it. So he said he was going to coordinate with General Dean and Major General Walker, but they were working on it.â).

175. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Dec. 16, 2021).

176. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 78.

177. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 78.

178. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), pp. 75-76.

179. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 148.

180. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 18.

181. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), pp. 7-8, 19.

182. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), pp. 19, 53 (â[Q: T]he Speakerâs office isnât part of that process in terms of requesting the National Guard, correct? A[:] Correct. It would just be on the notification side.â).

183. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Terri McCullough, (Apr. 18, 2022).

184. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Terri McCullough, (Apr. 18, 2022).

185. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Terri McCullough, (Apr. 18, 2022).

186. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Terri McCullough, (Apr. 18, 2022).

187. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Paul Irving, (Mar. 4, 2022), p. 21.

188. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 148-50.

189. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 152.

190. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 57 (âI wasnât speaking, but I was there.â).

191. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 64.

192. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Timothy Nick, (Dec. 8, 2021).

193. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 99.

194. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 98-99.

195. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2022), p. 54.

196. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 99.

197. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 99; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2022), p. 56 (âAnd he immediately says, âIâm going to get approval. Get me a plan,â is what he tells meâ).

198. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 84.

199. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 99. The Army at first denied that General Flynn was present for the call at all. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 98 (âI think there was just confusionâI know some people are trying, you know, to make it something else, but I think there was just confusion. There were a whole bunch of meetings going on because, you know, I didnât think he was there, because when I was there, he wasnât there.â). General McConville said: âAnd there was no intent to deceive anybody, or thereâs no conspiracy because of who Charlie Flynnâs brother is,â General Michael Flynn. Id., at 99. General Flynn said he did not speak on the call. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2021), p. 41 (âA [:] I did not speak on that call. Q [:] Did you identify yourself as being on the call? A [:] I did not. Now, if I said anything, if Iâmy recollection, if I said anything, I may have tugged on General Piattâs sleeve and asked and said, âWhatâs going on here?â like, âWhatâs the situation?â you know.â But others, like Colonel Matthews listening in from the National Guard end of the call, said both Generals Piatt and Flynn were the main interlocuters. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Earl Matthews, (Dec. 20, 2021). On Lt. Nickâs notes, at 2:35 p.m., General Flynnâs title is written down. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), CTRL0000930917 (January 6, 2021, handwritten notes taken by Lt. Timothy Nick). Lt Nick said, âI was just trying to jot down who was on the call.â See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Timothy Nick, (Dec. 8, 2021). General Flynn ultimately said he was there for a short time. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2021), pp. 40, 42 (âIt wasâI was literally thereâthe total time that Iâm talking about was about 4 to 5 minutes. I was really around that phone call, rough order of magnitude, for maybe a minute of that;â âit became clear to me that I was in the wrong place. And so I made the decision to leave because General Piatt had a handle on the situation.â).

200. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2021), p. 37.

201. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2021), p. 37.

202. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2021), p. 39.

203. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), pp. 79-80.

204. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Earl Matthews, (Dec. 20, 2021).

205. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 83.

206. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 81.

207. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 85.

208. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 70.

209. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 70.

210. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Charles Anthony Flynn, (Oct. 28, 2021), p. 40.

211. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), pp. 81-82.

212. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 113.

213. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 115.

214. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 162.

215. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 161.

216. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 160.

217. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 80.

218. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 80.

219. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 65.

220. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 65.

221. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 116.

222. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 116.

223. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 156-57.

224. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 156.

225. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 156.

226. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 61.

227. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 59.

228. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 57.

229. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 58.

230. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 99.

231. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 105.

232. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 105.

233. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), pp. 81-82.

234. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 59.

235. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 61.

236. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 59.

237. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 82.

238. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 82.

239. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 82.

240. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 157.

241. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 59.

242. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 63.

243. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 63.

244. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 116.

245. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 116.

246. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), pp. 116-17.

247. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee, III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 85.

248. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 59.

249. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 65.

250. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Rodriguez, (Jan. 25, 2022), p. 65.

251. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 160.

252. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 60.

253. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 39.

254. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 118.

255. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 118.

256. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 141.

257. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), pp. 141-42.

258. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Earl Matthews, (Dec. 20, 2021).

259. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Earl Matthews, (Dec. 20, 2021).

260. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Earl Matthews, (Dec. 20, 2021).

261. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 141.

262. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 83.

263. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 83.

264. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 288.

265. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 125.

266. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 296.

267. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 124.

268. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 143.

269. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 82 (âSo at no time did I and I am not aware of anyone in the Pentagon having a conversation with President Trump on the day of the 6th.â).

270. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 285.

271. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 268.

272. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 285.

273. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 95-96.

274. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 96.

275. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 96.

276. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 97-98.

277. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 100-01.

278. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 98.

279. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 98.

280. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 98.

281. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 102.

282. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM000789 (January 5, 2021, emails between Mark Meadows and John Aycoth, âRe: DC mayor activates National Guard ahead of pro-Trump demonstrations, The Hillâ).

283. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 99-100.

284. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 99-101. (Q: â[D]id you take that as a request for you or an order to you to deploy 10,000 troops? A[:] No, absolutely not. I interpreted it as a bit of presidential banter or President Trump banter that you all are familiar with, and in no way, shape, or form did I interpret that as an order or direction.â); (âQ[:] So I want to be clear here thatâsince then, in February 2021, Mark Meadows said on Fox News that, quote: Even in January, that was a given as many as 10,000 National Guard troops were told to be on the ready by the Secretary of Defense. Is there any accuracy to that statement? A[:] Iâm notânot from my perspective. I was never given any direction or order or knew of any plans of that nature.â); (Q: âTo be crystal clear, there was no direct order from President Trump to put 10,000 troops to be on the ready for January 6th, correct? A[:] No. Yeah. Thatâs correct. There was no directâthere was no order from the President.â).

285. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 13.

286. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 78-79.

287. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 252-53.

288. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 253.

289. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 102.

290. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 102.

291. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 102.

292. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 113 (âSo, at 3 oâclock, I gave the order to mobilize the entire District of Columbia National Guard, however, big they are . . . . everybody show up at the [Armory and], . . . move them to the Capitol immediately to support local law enforcement.â).

293. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 122.

294. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 124. (emphasis added).

295. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 120.

296. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 120.

297. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Earl Matthews, (Dec. 20, 2021).

298. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Timothy Nick, (Dec. 8, 2021).

299. The two letters referenced include Secretary Millerâs January 4 memorandum setting restrictions on the Guard and a follow-up letter from Secretary McCarthy on January 5 expounding on those limitations. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00000006 (January 4, 2021, memorandum), DoD Production DoD 00003493 (January 5, 2021 follow-up letter).

300. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 45.

301. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 104.

302. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 122.

303. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christopher Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), p. 123.

304. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 104.

305. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 47; Earl Matthews, âThe Harder Right: An Analysis of a Recent DoD Inspector General Investigation and Other Matters,â (Dec. 1, 2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/january-6-clearinghouse-Colonel-Earl-G.-Matthews-An-Analysis-of-a-Recent-DoD-Inspector-General-Investigation-and-Other-Matters-December-1-2021.pdf.

306. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 55.

307. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 52.

308. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 125.

309. Aaron C. Davis (@byaaroncdavis), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:55 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/byaaroncdavis/status/1346908166030766080.

310. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4 2022), p. 109, 127, 129.

311. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4 2022), p. 130.

312. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 49. (âI mentioned that to Chief Carroll. I said, hey, Chief, you know, I may just pull everyone back. And he told me, he said, well, right now I may need your Guardsmen who are on the traffic control points, because all of my officers are here at the Capitol, so I donât have officers out there in the city right now, so I may need to re-mission those guys for other things. Can you just send me the personnel from the Armory here? You know, so it was almost like we were talking about splitting. Weâll use that 90 to support MPD on anything they needed in the city, but I can still get, you know, another 200, 250 from the Armory to come to the Capitol now.â). But Assistant Chief Carroll didnât recall such a conversation. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jeffrey Carroll, (Nov. 18, 2022) (âI donât think it happened. It doesnât sound like something that wouldâve happened.â) Sergeant Major Brooks said it was him who made the recommendation to hold the first shift at their posts. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Michael F. Brooks, (Dec. 13, 2021).

313. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Stewart Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).

314. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ken Ryan, (Dec. 9, 2021) (âThose that were on the TCPs on the 6th did not go to the Capitol on the night of the 6th.â); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 81; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), pp.88-89 (âWell, what I would think was happening during that hour and a half is theyâre . . . leaving their check points, the traffic control points, the 30 traffic control points so that all of those vehicles, theyâre hopping in their cars and theyâre driving back in traffic through the [A]rmory and getting set.â); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 50 (âThey were out on traffic control points. They were doing another job. The QRF was across the river. We brought them over to the Armory. But they had to reconfigure, reorganize now to go into a civil disturbance operation.â).

315. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of David Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).

316. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of David Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).

317. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Stewart Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).

318. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Stewart Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).

319. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Stewart Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).

320. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Business Meeting on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

321. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Business Meeting on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.

322. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 109; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert J. Contee III, (Jan. 11, 2022), p. 86.

323. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 129.

324. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), pp. 121-22.

325. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 108.

326. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 108.

327. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), pp. 91-92.

328. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 107.

329. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 123.

330. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 141.

331. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 121.

332. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 122. (emphasis added).

333. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 67.

334. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 65, 70.

335. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 65.

336. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 121.

337. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 66.

338. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of David Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).

339. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Stewart Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of David Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).

340. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 134.

341. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 131.

342. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 131.

343. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Walter Piatt, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 15.

344. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Chris LaNeve, (Feb. 25, 2022).

345. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Chris LaNeve, (Feb. 25, 2022).

346. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Chris LaNeve, (Feb. 25, 2022).

347. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 133.

348. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Chris LaNeve, (Feb. 25, 2022).

349. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Chris LaNeve, (Feb. 25, 2022); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), p. 91 (âGeneral LaNeve provided the link up location and the lead.â).

350. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Chris LaNeve, (Feb. 25, 2022).

351. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Chris LaNeve, (Feb. 25, 2022).

352. Earl Matthews, âThe Harder Right: An Analysis of a Recent DoD Inspector General Investigation and Other Matters,â (Dec. 1, 2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/january-6-clearinghouse-Colonel-Earl-G.-Matthews-An-Analysis-of-a-Recent-DoD-Inspector-General-Investigation-and-Other-Matters-December-1-2021.pdf (âMG Walker denies that LaNeve called him at 4:25PM, or that he spoke to LaNeve at anytime between the phone call from Chief Sund at 1:49PM and the eventual DCNG deployment to the Capitol at 5:08PM.â).

353. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 139.

354. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 60.

355. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 65-66.

356. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Earl Matthews, (Dec. 20, 2021) (âOne reason I know that there is no 4:30 callâis that I was sitting next to Gen. Walkerâ).

357. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Michael F. Brooks, (Dec. 13, 2021).

358. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), CTRL0000930917 (January 6, 2021, handwritten notes taken by Lt. Timothy Nick).

359. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 60.

360. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), pp. 60-61.

361. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Timothy Nick, (Dec. 8, 2021).

362. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of James Charles McConville, (Nov. 4, 2021), pp. 90-92.

363. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Walker, (Dec. 13, 2021), p. 140.

364. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of David Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).

365. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of David Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).

366. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of David Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).

367. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Defense Production), DoD 00001196 (January 8, 2021, Memorandum for Record from Office of the Secretary of Defense re: Timeline for December 31, 2020âJanuary 6, 2021), DoD 00001090 (January 7, 2021, Memorandum for Record from the Secretary of the Army re: Timeline For 31 Decemberâ7 January 2021), 00000490 (January 7, 2021, Memorandum for Record from Joint Force Headquarters re: Timeline for Request for Assistance during Civil Unrest on 6 January 2021 and DC National Guard Authorization to Respond).

368. Text message from David Reinke to Colonel Hunter on January 6, 2021.

369. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of David Reinke, (Jan. 6, 2022).

370. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Stewart Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).

371. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Stewart Tarp, (Jan. 6, 2022).

372. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 50-51.

373. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 51.

374. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Craig Hunter, (Jan. 20, 2022), p. 53.

375. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 120.

376. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), pp. 111-12.

377. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 72.

378. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 72.

379. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 72.

380. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), pp. 67-68.

381. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 72.

382. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Robert Glover, (May 2, 2022), p. 73.

383. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 144.

384. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 111.

385. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Ryan McCarthy, (Feb. 4, 2022), p. 130.

386. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 83.

387. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p.71.

388. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of William Walker, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 72.

This appendix will consider the extent to which President Trumpâs Campaign and related entities raised an unprecedented amount of political donations using inflammatory messaging alleging that the 2020 U.S. Presidential election was fraudulent or stolen. It will review what tools and methods were used to produce, transmit and optimize these fundraising solicitations; who drafted and approved the messaging and what they knew about the accuracy of the messaging; who ultimately benefitted from these donations; and the impact of these messages on their recipients.

The Select Committeeâs investigation demonstrates that President Trumpâs baseless claims of election fraudâthe Big Lieâserved a dual purpose, forming the foundation of his attempts to overturn the 2020 Presidential election and launching a fundraising effort to fund the former Presidentâs other endeavors and to enrich his associatesâthe Big Rip-off.

The false election fraud narrative embedded in fundraising emails and text messages amplified the Big Lie by perpetuating a belief that the 2020 election was stolen from President Trump and effectuated the Big Rip-off by misleading donors into thinking their donations could alter the election results.

At the same time, the Big Lie helped President Trump and the Republican National Committee (RNC) raise more than $250 million after the election, much of it from small-dollar donors who were promised their money would âStop the Steal.â

Despite what they told their supporters, however, most of their money was not used to stop any purported stealâit was diverted to accomplish the Big Rip-off. Millions of dollars that were raised ostensibly for âelection defenseâ and âfighting voter fraudâ were not spent that way at all.

Moreover, the Select Committeeâs investigation shows that the RNC knew that President Trumpâs claims about winning the election were baseless and that post-election donations would not help him secure an additional term in office. Yet, both the Trump Campaign and the RNC decided to continue fundraising after the election, a decision that would have come from President Trump himself.

In short, President Trump and his Campaign ripped off supporters by raising more than $250 million by claiming they wanted to fight fraud they knew did not exist and to challenge an election they knew he lost.

As detailed below, the Trump Campaign misled the American public and President Trumpâs donors on how they planned to use, and did use, the donated funds while bombarding supporters with hundreds of emails, as many as twenty-five emails per day, stating the election had been stolen. In those emails, they used inflammatory language accusing Democrats of trying to âsteal the election,â encouraged supporters to join the âTrump armyâ; âDefendâ the election: and to âfight backâ over, and over, and over again.1 They sent these emails out because they knew they were effective at raising money.2 This was made possible by the creation of a fundraising machine powered jointly by the Trump Campaign and the RNC.

During the 2020 election cycle, President Trump operated a structure under which the Trump reelection campaign and the RNC merged programs and raised money jointly through the Trump Make America Great Again Committee (internally referred to by its acronym TMAGAC, which RNC officials pronounced âT-Magicâ).3 TMAGAC was focused on raising money online through small-dollar donations.4 Tim Murtaugh, the Trump Campaignâs communications director, described the TMAGAC fundraising operation as âan entity unto itself within the campaign.ââ5

The individual charged with leading the digital operation in 2020 was Gary Coby.6 Coby first started working with the RNC in 2016 even before President Trump became the nominee.7 Coby explained that, as digital director, his role during the 2020 Presidential election cycle was to âoversee the digital operation.ââ8 Similarly, senior staffers at the Trump Campaign and the RNC all made clear that Coby was the individual in charge of the TMAGAC digital team.9 Both high-level staffers at the Trump Campaign and at the RNC confirmed that Coby had the trust of Jared Kushner, the Presidentâs son-in-law.10

Coby explained that during the 2020 Presidential election cycle, the TMAGAC digital team was a âbig team with multiple organizations and vendor teams all working together as one, that include[d] RNC staff, [Donald J. Trump for President] staff, [and] maybe a half dozen vendor teams.ââ11 The RNC digital team, a subset of the TMAGAC digital team, was led operationally by Kevin Zambrano, Chief Digital Officer at the RNC. In 2020, members of the digital staff of both the RNC and Trump Campaign merged in an office building in Arlington, Virginia, with some suites jointly hosting RNC and Trump Campaign staff on the digital team, and other suites hosting third-party companies, such as Opn Sesame and Direct Persuasion.12 Thereafter, Zambrano assisted Coby in managing the TMAGAC digital team.13 Zambrano explained, âThe majority of the staff was at the RNC doing both RNC and TMAGAC work.ââ14 This work was focused squarely on fundraising.15

The RNC digital team included Austin Boedigheimer, who, starting in January 2019, was the RNCâs digital deputy director16 and technically served as Zambranoâs deputy.17 In reality, Boedigheimer reported to both Zambrano and Coby.18 Boedigheimer also led the TMAGAC digital fundraising team, which was comprised of all online fundraising efforts, including fundraising emails and text messages.19 At the end of the 2020 cycle, that team had 20 or 30 people within smaller teams, such as the copy team, the text message team, the data team, the advertising team, and the graphics team.20

The RNC digital team also included a team of copywriters, who were responsible for writing the fundraising emails and text messages to solicit small-dollar donations through TMAGAC.21 These copywriters reported to Hanna Allred, the RNCâs Chief Copywriter.22 By mid-2020, there were three copywriters who reported to Allred: Alex Murglin,23 Ethan Katz,24 and Alex Blinkoff.25 Blinkoff and Katz worked in that role from June 2020 until they were fired approximately three weeks after the 2020 election, while Murglin remains a copywriter at the RNC.

Although the TMAGAC team consisted of both Trump Campaign and RNC staffers, TMAGAC operated as one entity working towards one goal â raising as much money as possible.26

The copywriting process worked like an assembly line, where different individuals performed a task and passed on the work product to someone else, including for internal approval.27 To generate content for fundraising communications, Allred explained, the copywriting fundraising team was âwatching the messaging coming out of the committee [RNC] and the campaign and from the President himself and what his family was talking about.ââ28 For example, in a November 2020 email, Boedigheimer stated to Allred, âGood to include lines like [â]we need the resources to make sure they donât try to steal this election. We saw what happened on election night, we canât let them take the senate too.[â]ââ29

It was evident that the copywriters âwould draft a lot of the content based on . . . what the President was saying.ââ30 And there was no mistaking it, President Trump âwas providing us [the copywriters] with a lot of content online.ââ31 Allred said Boedigheimer was encouraging her to use this language because it would cause President Trumpâs supporters to donate by âgiving a purpose to their donationââ32 and that they used this repeatedly because it worked.33 Boedigheimer did not dispute this, and reaffirmed that such language had been successful at fundraising.34

Further, the emails that were signed by President Trump or âTeam Trumpâ were intentionally drafted to capture President Trumpâs voice, tone and messaging.35 Boedigheimer explained, â[President Trump] obviously has a very aggressive[,] excitable tone, and we would try to incorporate that in our messaging as well.ââ36 The goal was to make the millions of recipients of aggressive, hyperbolic fundraising emails believe that the emails were coming from President Trump himself. In Zambranoâs words, the purpose was to give recipients âred meat.â 37

Draft emails were submitted for approval to a designated group that handled approvals of all TMAGAC fundraising copy (the âApprovals Groupâ).38 Boedigheimer retained responsibility for ensuring that TMAGACâs fundraising copy was approved before being sent to the public.39

The Approvals Group consisted of three sets of stakeholders from the RNC and the Trump Campaign,40 and included a variety of other interested staffers, including Zambrano, Boedigheimer, and Allred.41 TMAGACâs fundraising copy could not be sent without approval from the legal, communications and research departments.42

After election day, a small group of staffers in the Approvals Group actively reviewed and approved the numerous fundraising emails and text messages that spread false election fraud claims. These staffers included:

Boedigheimer, as head of the fundraising team handling the drafting and propagation of fundraising messaging, told the Select Committee his understanding of the role the three components of the Approvals Group (legal, communications, and research) performed when reviewing emails and text messages.

Regarding legal, Boedigheimer explained that he understood Alex Cannonâs role, as the Trump Campaignâs Deputy General Counsel, was to review the emails from a âlegal perspectiveâ by âessentially making sure that thereâs no legal issues with the content.ââ49

Regarding communications, Boedigheimer stated that the communications staffers in the Approvals Group were reviewing the content and â[m]aking sure that itâs on message and good from a comms perspective.ââ50

Lastly, Boedigheimer explained that the research team was âlooking for . . . things that are inaccurate.ââ51

Although Boedigheimer provided only a vague explanation of the role of the Approvals Group, he emphasized that he had to âtrust that the research, the comms, and the legal team are going to do their processes to make sure itâs [the TMAGAC fundraising copy was] accurate.ââ52 He further noted, â[I]t was the approval chain[â]s job to see what the accuracy of the email is and whether itâs true or not. . . . We were sending information and then leaning on our approval chain to make sure that itâs accurate.ââ53

The Select Committeeâs investigation revealed that the Approvals Group did not operate that way, however. The Select Committee interviewed members of the Approvals Group handling the communications, research, and legal functions and confirmed that members of the Approvals Group typically engaged only in cursory reviews of the fundraising messages and did not review substantive claims of election fraud for accuracy.

Zach Parkinson, the Trump Campaignâs Deputy Director of Communications and Research Director, represented the Trump Campaignâs communications and research functions in the Approvals Group. Parkinson made clear, âGenerally, our role when it came to fundraising emails and texts was to approve them for the communications team.ââ54 Parkinson noted that that he was typically the person who weighed in on behalf of the Trump Campaignâs communications and research team.55 He added, âwe would review them for messaging consistency, sometimes we would review them for factual accuracy, and then we would provide the communications approval for those.ââ56

Parkinson clarified that the scope of review for âfactual accuracyâ was limited. Specifically, his review of fundraising emails and text messages for accuracy was limited to questions concerning items such as time and location.57

Critically, Parkinson did not review statements regarding election fraud in the fundraising copy for accuracy because âmost political text messages and fundraising emails are political rhetoric, and so a lot of them donât necessarily require fact checking.ââ58 He added that âpolitical rhetoric,â such as âDemocrats are trying to steal the election,â was not something he and his team were ânecessarily tasked to say no to.ââ59 Parkinson made clear that he thought the legal department, namely Alex Cannon, would handle reviewing for accuracy, noting âI deferred to the legal team on the legitimacy and the ability to substantiate claims that were made that were put through these approvals and whether or not we could, again, substantiate them or they were in line with our legal efforts.ââ60 Parkinson, as the head of the research team, the very campaign team meant to fact-check and ensure accuracy in the Trump Campaignâs statements, said he was âsimply looking for messaging consistency.ââ61 Whether Democrats were engaged in fraud to steal the election was a âpolitical argumentâ to Parkinson, which he did not review for accuracy.62

Like Parkinson, Michael Reed, then the RNCâs Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications, was not reviewing the TMAGAC emails about election fraud for broader accuracy. Notably, Reed could not recall a single email that he researched to do a fact-check or follow up on to see if claims contained in the email were, in fact, true.63

Boedigheimer and the copywriters believed the research staffers were looking for messages that they believed were inaccurate, but they were doing no such thing.

Alex Cannon, the Trump Campaignâs legal representative in the Approvals Group, was no differentâthe TMAGAC fundraisers thought he was doing far more than he was in fact doing. The Select Committee received a November 4, 2020, email from Nathan Groth, counsel for the Trump Campaign, to Alex Cannon. This email reflected that Cannon was not tasked with substantively reviewing fundraising emails like Boedigheimer thought. Groth wrote to Cannon, âMatt [Morgan, Trump Campaignâs General Counsel] has instructed me to hand off all compliance matters, including approvals, to you.ââ64 Cannon confirmed, âI saw myself as doing exactly what I was instructed to do here, which is do what Nathan had previously been doing. So itâs this. Itâs compliance issues like disclaimers and typos.ââ65 Therefore, when Cannon received emails that included claims such as âthe Democrats are trying to steal the election,â he viewed reviewing the veracity of this statement as âoutside the purview of what [he] was tasked.ââ66 When asked, Cannon stated that he did not know who was tasked with ensuring that fundraising emails were true and accurate.67

Boedigheimer, and other members of the digital fundraising team he led, claimed to see the Approvals Group as a guardrail of sorts in the fundraising effort to protect from the dissemination of false messaging about the election, but the Approvals Group served no such role. The very staffers in the Approvals Group repeatedly told the Select Committee that they did not review the claims about election fraud to confirm whether they were even true.

When all was said and done, no one in the Trump Campaign claimed to be responsible for confirming the accuracy of President Trumpâs words, or other allegations of election fraud, before they were blasted to millions of Americans.68

Thus, after the election, the TMAGAC team drafted emails filled with inflammatory and unfounded claims, and the members of the Approvals Group tasked with fact checking these claims did no such thingâeffectively, President Trumpâs claims were treated as true and blasted to millions of people with little to no scrutiny by those tasked with ensuring accuracy. This process was a fertile ground for the Big Lie to spread through hundreds of emails and text messages.

Boedigheimer spoke with Coby and Zambrano often about how much money TMAGAC was raising, and they provided feedback regarding fundraising goals.69 Trump Campaign leadership was fully aware of post-election fundraising totals. According to Coby, President Trumpâs son-in-law and senior advisor Jared Kushner âhad the most interest in the digital programâ and âwould just check in on [fundraising] results,â and routinely received updates regarding fundraising from Coby.70 Coby also made clear that Kushner was heavily involved in the Campaignâs budget process71 and that he updated Kushner on TMAGACâs post-election fundraising totals.72

The Select Committee received documents confirming Kushnerâs involvement. For example, on November 8, 2020, Kushner requested that a daily tracker be created showing the Trump Campaignâs financial position from election day forward.73 In an email, Kushner noted that the tracker would allow the Campaign to consider its cash flow ahead of the creation of âa new entity for POTUS[âs] other political activities.ââ74 Just days after the election, and after the Campaign had three of its four best fundraising days ever on November 4th, 5th, and 6th,75 Kushner was preparing for the launch of President Trumpâs new leadership PAC, Save America. Kushner stated that he needed this new daily tracker because the Trump Campaign was going to continue fundraising post-election.76 Kushner continued to receive these detailed daily trackers, which included Save Americaâs fundraising hauls, through at least December 2020.77

Heading into election night of the 2020 Presidential race, as Americans across the country waited in line to vote on election day, the Trump Campaign and the RNC were planning what they would tell the American public about the results in the upcoming days. On election day, Boedigheimer and Darren Centinello, a Trump Campaign staffer, discussed the three message options that the Trump Campaign had on the table.78

The first option was to send out copy claiming President Trump had won the 2020 election. But the Campaign knew this message was false, and Boedigheimer told Centinello that he could not get this messaging approved yet.79 The Trump Campaignâs second option was an email stating they were still waiting on the election results. This message would have been the truth. The Campaign rejected this option.

Instead, the Trump Campaign chose a third option. Boedigheimer confirmed that TMAGAC fundraisers had received approval for copy claiming that the Democrats are going to âtry to steal the electionâ before election night.80

Zambrano confirmed that it would not surprise him that TMAGAC was immediately claiming that Democrats were trying to steal the election, because President Trump has been pushing that message.81 Zambrano added, âThat was the Presidentâs phrasing in the messaging that the team was sourcing from.ââ82 Importantly, Boedigheimer confirmed that the TMAGAC copywriting team did not base its use of the âtrying to stealâ language on any awareness of actual fraud.83

Both the Trump Campaign and the RNC directed TMAGAC to continue fundraising after the election.84 Justin Clark, the deputy campaign manager, explained that the decision to continue fundraising after the election would have come from President Trump himself.85

Starting after the election and until January 6th, the Trump Campaign, along with the RNC, sent millions of emails to their supporters, with messaging such as claiming that the election was âRIGGED.ââ86 The Trump Campaign viewed the TMAGAC emails as another avenue to get out President Trumpâs post-election messaging about the alleged fraud.87 These emails used false claims of voter fraud to create a sense of urgency that the election was being stolen. The Trump Campaign and the RNC told their supporters that their donations could stop Democrats from âtrying to steal the election.â They consistently encouraged donors to give money to continue âuncoveringâ fraud that had not occurred. These emails were sent out after being reviewed and approved by the Approvals Group.88

The TMAGAC fundraisers used inflammatory language and false election fraud claims after the election because it was both effective at fundraising and accurately captured President Trumpâs ongoing tone and messaging.89 When the digital fundraising team drafted emails claiming, for example, that âDemocrats are trying to steal the election,â they did not bother to confirm whether or not those inflammatory statements were true, and instead they merely took President Trumpâs words and made an effective fundraising email.90 As Zambrano stated, âthe President issuing statements or tweets would be the genesis of the copy that would then go into the approval process for edits, for checks. That is why the approval process worked.ââ91 President Trump was the source of the lies. Not only was President Trumpâs fundraising driven by his daily deluge of lies about the election, but these lies were also able to go unchallenged before being spread because TMAGAC had an ineffective process when it came to scrutinizing and correcting those lies.

The TMAGAC fundraising machine continued to churn out hundreds of fundraising emails and text messages regardless of external developments. For example, Zambrano said that, after former Vice President Biden was widely declared the winner of the election, TMAGACâs fundraising efforts moved ahead the same way they had previously,92 even though he âwould say it wasnât looking goodâ as soon as one week after the election.93

A number of individuals and entities associated with the TMAGAC fundraising campaign raised concerns about the dangerous and inflammatory language used in the emails issued for this campaign.

Evidence obtained by the Select Committee shows that the RNC knew that President Trumpâs claims about winning the election were baseless and that additional donations would not help him secure an additional term in office. They walked as close to the line as they daredâmaking several changes to fundraising copy that seemingly protected the RNC from legal exposure while still spreading and relying on President Trumpâs known lies and misrepresentations.

The Select Committee did not interview a member of the RNC legal team due to concerns surrounding attorney-client privilege, but the Select Committee nonetheless got insight into their role from documents produced by Campaign and RNC staff, as well as interviews with staffers. As detailed below, the RNC lawyers were the only individuals who even attempted to walk back the fundraising emails.

Allred and Katz both received direction from the RNCâs lawyers shortly after the election to not say âsteal the electionâ and instead were told to use âtry to steal the election.ââ94 Allred also recalled that, at some point, the RNC legal team directed the copywriters not to use the term ârigged.ââ95

After the media called the election for former Vice President Joe Biden on Saturday, November 7, 2020, the RNC began to quietly pull back from definitive language about President Trump having won the election and instead used language of insinuation. For example, on November 10, 2020, Justin Reimer, RNCâs then-chief counsel, revised a fundraising email sent to the Approvals Group to remove the sentence that âJoe Biden should not wrongfully claim the office of the President.ââ96 Instead, Reimer indicated the email should read, âJoe Biden does not get to decide when this election ends. Only LEGAL ballots must be counted and verified.ââ97 Both Alex Cannon and Zach Parkinson signed off on Reimerâs edits.98

On November 11, 2020, Reimer again revised a fundraising email sent to the Approvals Group. This time, he revised a claim that âPresident Trump won this election by a lotâ to instead state that âPresident Trump got 71 MILLION LEGAL votes.ââ99 Once again Cannon and Parkinson signed off on Reimerâs edits.100

Also on November 11, 2020, Jenna Kirsch, associate counsel at the RNC, revised a fundraising email sent to the Approvals Group to, among other things, remove the request âto step up and contribute to our critical Election Defense Fund so that we can DEFEND the Election and secure FOUR MORE YEARS.ââ101 Instead of âsecure FOUR MORE YEARS,â Kirschâs revised version stated a contribution would âfinish the fight.ââ102 Once again Cannon and Parkinson signed off on these edits for the Trump Campaign.103 Regarding the change to finish the fight, Zambrano conceded, âI would say this a substantive change from the legal department.ââ104 Kirsch made numerous edits like this, in which she removed assertions about âfour more years.ââ105 Such edits continued into late November 2020.

Further, Boedigheimer stated that he took questions to RNC legal in the post-election period about TMAGAC fundraisers using the âsteal the electionâ language.106 The RNC was clearly aware that President Trumpâs claims regarding the election were not true and tried to have it both ways.

The private split between the RNC and the Trump Campaign became even more pronounced when President Trump decided to double down on his false election fraud claims and chose Rudolph Giuliani to lead his legal efforts to overturn the election.107 On November 19, 2020, Giuliani held a press conference at the RNCâs headquarters in which he falsely suggested that the Biden Campaign orchestrated an elaborate nationwide voter-fraud scheme.108 Cassie Docksey, a senior RNC staffer at the time, recalled that she spoke that day with Michael Ahrens, then the RNCâs communications director, about the diverging from the Trump Campaign.109 Ahrens told her that the RNC would no longer automatically amplify or replicate statements from the Trump Campaign or President Trumpâs legal team.110 Docksey understood Ahrens to be relaying a decision made at the most senior levels of the RNC.111

Ahrens asserted that the RNC was unwilling to adopt the wide-ranging, baseless assertions President Trumpâs legal team was making and quietly decided to focus its communication strategy elsewhere.112 Distancing the RNC from President Trumpâs false statements was a âregular course of the job before the election,â and it âcarried through after the electionâ in relation to President Trumpâs false claims about the election.113 Starting at or before the November 19, 2020, press conference, the RNC senior leadership was in agreement that they would not claim that President Trump had won the election,114 although the RNC âfrequentlyâ had to have internal discussions about President Trumpâs false statements about the election.115

According to Michael Reed, then the RNCâs deputy chief of staff for communications, âthere were conversations amongst [RNC] legal and comms and digital to ensure that anything that was being written by the digital team based off of something President Trump or the Campaign said was something we all were more comfortable with.ââ116 RNC Chairwoman McDaniel was a part of these conversations.117

RNC leadership knew that President Trump was lying to the American people. Yet, they did nothing to publicly distance themselves from his efforts to overturn the election. The RNCâs response was merely to tinker around the edges of the fundraising copy but never to fundamentally challenge the one message that remained present in TMAGACâs post-election fundraising copyâPresident Trumpâs Big Lie.

In the end, multiple senior RNC staffers approved fundraising emails raising questions about the election results even though they did not know of any evidence about fraud impacting the winner of the 2020 Presidential election. For example, Cassie Docksey stated that she was not aware of any fraud that impacted the results of the Presidential election.118 Ahrens conceded that âthere was not evidence that we [the RNC] had seen that he [President Trump] won the election, that Biden had not won the election.ââ119

Similarly, Justin Clark was ânot aware of [fraudulent activity . . . to like defraud voters] by an individual or an entity that would have [changed the outcome of an election].ââ120 Alex Cannon âdid not find or see, in [his] limited ability as one individual . . . evidence that would be sufficient within the time period to change any sort of election results in any of the States.ââ121

Nonetheless, the RNC and the Trump Campaign continued to send out hundreds of emails, spreading the Big Lie to and fundraising off of millions of supporters. Even though the RNC had closely held reservations about repeating the most extreme and unsupportable claims of fraud, the RNC stayed the course with a coordinated, single fundraising plan with the Trump Campaign. The RNC privately and quietly softened the most blatantly egregious claims written by its own copywriters but publicly stood shoulder to shoulder with President Trump and his Big Lie.

This is clearly evidenced by multiple TMAGAC emails in late December 2020 that asserted that former Vice President Joe Biden would be an âillegitimate Presidentâ when he took office.122 These emails came after December 14, 2020, the day electors from each State met to cast their votes for President and Vice President. These emails came after Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell made it clear that he accepted the electoral collegeâs certification of Bidenâs victory. These emails came after President Trump and his allies had lost all but one lawsuit challenging the election.123 None of this made a difference to TMAGAC. When asked why TMAGAC would repeatedly send these emails stating that former Vice President Biden would be an illegitimate President, Hanna Allred, the chief copywriter, stated that it would be because the emails were âeffectiveâ for fundraising.124

Alex Cannon was so bothered by the emails he was reviewing as a member of the Approvals Group that he took his concerns to Justin Clark, the campaignâs deputy campaign manager. Cannon explained that he had discussions with Clark about the problematic tone of the post-election TMAGAC emails and noted to Clark that the emails âseemed a little over the top to [him].ââ125 Cannon raised those concerns because, after spending weeks researching which fraud claims were verifiable and which were not, Cannon saw that the TMAGAC emails were inconsistent with the fact that systemic fraud did not exist.126 Cannon also recalled that he may have expressed concern to Matt Morgan, the campaignâs general counsel, regarding the difference between claims of election fraud made in the TMAGAC fundraising emails and his conclusion that there was not fraud that impacted the election results.127 Cannon was not aware of any actions taken to address the concerns he had with this inconsistency.128

Justin Clark could not recall whether he looked at any fundraising emails after Cannon raised these concerns or whether Cannon spoke to Gary Coby about the substance of the fundraising emails.129

In the days after the election, one junior copywriter presented senior Campaign staffers with a template for a more honest approach. Shortly after election night, Coby led a meeting of the entire Trump digital team, which included individuals from the Campaign, the RNC, Opn Sesame, Direct Persuasion, and others. In that meeting, as Coby addressed the staff and expressed that the digital team would continue to work, Ethan Katz, an RNC staffer in his early twenties, rose to ask a question:130 How were staffers supposed to tell voters that the Trump Campaign wanted to keep counting votes in Arizona but stop counting votes in other States (like Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Michigan)?131

Katz said that Coby provided an answer without substance, which caused Katz to reiterate his question. His question made clear that the Campaignâs position was wildly inconsistent.132 Allred and Boedigheimer corroborated that Katz confronted leadership.133

Katz also recalled that, shortly after the election, Allred directed him to write an email declaring that President Trump had won the State of Pennsylvania before anyone had called Pennsylvania for either party.134 Katz believed the Trump Campaign wanted to send this email out to preempt a potential call that was likely to be in former Vice President Bidenâs favor.135 He refused to write the email. Allred was stunned, and instead assigned it to another copywriter.136 Allred confirmed that Katz expressed discomfort at writing such an email and that she relied on another copywriter.137 On November 4, 2020, the Trump Campaign sent out an email preemptively and falsely declaring that President Trump won Pennsylvania.138

Katz was fired approximately three weeks after the election.139 In an interview with the Select Committee, when Allred was asked why Katz, her direct report, was fired, she explained that she was not sure why because TMAGAC was raising more money than ever after the election, but that the decision was not hers to make.140

The Trump Campaign knew that emails that the Approvals Group had blessed were being rejected by another email service provider. After the election, the Trump Campaign attempted to expand the reach of their false voter fraud emails. The Trump Campaign formed a company named DataPier, owned by Cannon and Sean Dollman.141 DataPier hired an outside company named Iterable to deliver its emails.142 Cannon tried to send âtoned-down RNC emails,â through Iterable, but they still had to be âfurther toned [] down through [an] iterative process[.]ââ143 For example, on November 7, 2020, Seth Charles, who was then Iterableâs principal email deliverability and industry relations manager, said that there was an issue with the TMAGAC copy and offered line edits.144 Two days later, Charles recommended to the Trump Campaign staffers that they look for âmodified copy there [from TMAGAC emails] to be a little less threatening.ââ145 Charles claimed that some TMAGAC copy âobviously insinuates the so far unsubstantiated theory of voter fraud, as well as contributions and legal actions will result in some sort of different outcome.ââ146

But Salesforce, TMAGACâs original email service provider, continued sending millions of Trump Campaign emails up until January 6th.

The Trump Campaign knew that emails that the Approvals Group had blessed were being rejected by Iterable. However, the RNC continued to send millions of Trump Campaign emails through Salesforce, TMAGACâs original email service provider, up until January 6th. Evidence uncovered by the Select Committee shows that there were internal concerns at Salesforce regarding the content of the TMAGAC emails.

The Select Committee interviewed an individual (âJ. Doeâ) who worked at Salesforce during the post-election period during which TMAGAC was sending out the fundraising emails concerning false election fraud claims.147 Doe worked for Salesforceâs privacy and abuse management team, colloquially known as the abuse desk.148 An abuse desk is responsible for preventing fraud and abuse emanating from the providerâs user or subscriber network.

Doe indicated to the Select Committee that, as soon as early 2020, they recalled issues arising with the RNCâs use of Salesforceâs services and that a âdeluge of abuse wouldâve started in June-ish.ââ149 Doe noted that Salesforce received a high number of complaints regarding the RNCâs actions, which would have been primarily the fundraising efforts of TMAGAC.150 In the latter half of 2020, Doe noticed that the emails coming from the RNCâs account included more and more violent and inflammatory rhetoric in violation of Salesforceâs Master Service Agreement (âMSAâ) with the RNC, which prohibited the use of violent content.151 Doe stated that, near the time of the election, they contacted senior individuals at Salesforce to highlight the âincreasingly concerningâ emails coming from the RNCâs account.152 Doe explained that senior individuals at Salesforce effectively ignored their emails about TMAGACâs inflammatory emails153 and Salesforce ignored the terms of the MSA and permitted the RNC to continue to use its account in this problematic manner.154 Doe said, âSalesforce very obviously didnât care about anti-abuse.ââ155

Ultimately, the Trump Campaign and the RNC let the Big Lie spread because they were making hundreds of millions of dollars from President Trumpâs supporters who believed that lie. The Big Rip-off needed the Big Lie to motivate unsuspecting individuals to donate their money to a lost cause, and it worked.

The Trump Campaign and the RNC had three of their largest fundraising days of the 2020 election cycle immediately after the election.156 Together, the Trump Campaign and the RNC raised more than one hundred million dollars in three days, telling people they were raising the money for the âOfficial Election Defense Fund.â According to the TMAGAC fundraising pitches, the Trump Campaign and RNC team had created a so-called âOfficial Election Defense Fundâ to help pay for legal challenges to the election results.157 But there was no âOfficial Election Defense Fundâ â it was simply âa marketing tactic.ââ158 The TMAGAC fundraisers did not know where the donated money was actually going.159 The TMAGAC copywriting team simply took the lies that President Trump told them about the need to raise money to overturn the election results and put them into emails to his supporters.

The false claims of election fraud and the âOfficial Election Defense Fundâ were so successful President Trump and his allies raised more than $250 million after the election.160 However, the Trump Campaign was raising too much money to spend solely on their legal efforts to overturn the results of the 2020 election. The Trump Campaign continued to publicly state the election had been stolen by âthe Left,â while behind closed doors they prepared a new plan to spend their supportersâ money.

On November 9, 2020, President Trump created a separate leadership PAC called Save America that allowed him to keep millions of dollars raised after the election and spend it with very few restrictions in the future. Jared Kushner worked with Alex Cannon, Deputy General Counsel for the Trump Campaign, in creating the entity.161 Prior to the formation of Save America, any money raised by the Trump Campaign could effectively only be spent on recount and election-contest related expenses, and to pay off campaign debt.162 But now the money raised into Save America could allow President Trump to pay for his personal expenses, such as travel or hotel stays. After Save America was formed, it was added to the TMAGAC joint fundraising agreement with the RNC, and the percentage of the proceeds allocated to the Trump Campaign began to flow to Save America.163

Importantly, Save America, as a leadership PAC, was not even legally permitted to pay for recount and election-contest related expenses in excess of the Federal Election Campaign Act (âFECAâ) limit of $5,000.164 Save America never hit that limit in 2020, as it spent no money on recount and election-contest related expenses.165

Several reporters noticed the switch and contacted the Campaign asking about the âbait and switchâ and the âmisleadingâ nature of the emails. One reporter said directly: âitâs misleading to raise money for a committee marked on the website as an âelection defense fundâ if itâs going to a leadership PAC.ââ166 Another reporter asked, âWhy is the campaign telling its supporters they are contributing toward an âElection Defense Fundâ if only a small percentage of those funds are actually going toward funding legal efforts?â and âHow can the campaign justify directing 75% of contributions intended for a 2020 legal fund toward the Presidentâs political action committee?ââ167

The Trump Campaign came up with a messaging plan about this tactic, which President Trump personally approved.168 Tim Murtaugh, the Trump Campaignâs communications director, repeatedly asked Justin Clark, the deputy campaign manager, whether they should respond to the reporters.169 When Murtaugh flagged that the communications team was not responding to the reporters, Justin Clark said, âGood. Donât.ââ170

The Trump Campaign spent the money on President Trump, giving donations to his associates, and keeping it for himself in Save America. Hundreds of millions of dollars that were raised to go towards âelection defenseâ and âfighting voter fraudâ were not spent that way at all. To the contrary, most of the funds remain unspent, and millions have been paid to companies that are known affiliates of President Trump, or payments to entities associated with former Trump administration officials. Since the election, former Trump officials who are still working for President Trumpâs PACs, and are publicly receiving salaries as FEC-reported âpayroll,â are also associated with these companies.

For example, from July 2021 to the present, Save America has been paying approximately $9,700 per month to Dan Scavino,171 a political adviser who served in the Trump administration as White House Deputy Chief of Staff.172 Save America was also paying $20,000 per month to an entity called Hudson Digital LLC. Hudson Digital LLC was registered in Delaware twenty days after the attack on the Capitol, on January 26, 2021,173 and began receiving payments from Save America on the day it was registered.174 Hudson Digital LLC has received payments totaling over $420,000, all described as âDigital consulting.ââ175 No website or any other information or mention of Hudson Digital LLC could be found online.176 Though Hudson Digital LLC is registered as a Delaware company, the FEC Schedule B listing traces back to an address belonging to Dan and Catherine Scavino.177

Nick Luna, President Trumpâs former personal assistant and âbody man,â was being paid from April 2021 to December 2021 approximately $12,000 per month by Save America for âpayroll.ââ178 The Make America Great Again PAC (MAGA PAC) â formerly the authorized committee of President Trumpâs reelection campaign, Donald J. Trump for President â paid $20,000 per month to a limited liability corporation called Red State Partners LLC from April 2021 through October 2021, and Save America paid Red State Partners LLC $20,000 in February 2022.179 The company was registered in Delaware on March 11, 2021180 and has received a total of $170,000.181 Though it is registered in Delaware, disclosures filed with the Federal Election Committee (FEC) list Red State Partners at an address in Miami, Florida, that is an address for Nick Luna and his wife, Cassidy Dumbauld.182

Further, Vince Haley, Taylor Swindle, and Ross Worthington are corporate officers of a company known as Pericles LLC.183 Haley is a former policy advisor to President Trump,184 Swindle is the Chief Financial Officer for Gingrich 360185, and Ross Worthington is the former White House speechwriter186 who wrote the speech President Trump delivered on the Ellipse on January 6th.187 Pericles LLC was registered on January 27, 2021,188 the day after Scavinoâs Hudson Digital LLC, and, since then, has received payments from Save America totaling at least $352,700.189

Another former speechwriter for President Trump, Robert Gabriel, Jr., has also been receiving payments from Save America. Gabriel was involved in writing the speech President Trump delivered on the White House Ellipse on January 6th, and specifically told the speechwriters, including Worthington, to reinsert previously removed incendiary lines about Vice President Pence into the speech.190 This direction came after Vice President Pence told President Trump that he would not try to change the outcome of the election.191 In September 2021, Gabriel formed called Gabriel Strategies LLC,192 which began receiving payments from Save America the following month.193 Since October 2021, Save America has paid Gabriel Strategies LLC at least $167,674.00.194 For both Pericles and Gabriel Strategies, the description of the payments is always for âconsultingâ in political strategy or communications, and some payments are purported to include travel expenses.

Through October 2022, Save America has paid nearly $100,000 in âstrategy consultingâ payments to Herve Pierre Braillard,195 a fashion designer who has been dressing Melania Trump for years.196

From January 2021 to June 2022, Save America has also reported over $2.1 million in âlegal consulting.â Many firms perform different kinds of practice, but more than 67% of those funds went to law firms that are representing witnesses involved in the Select Committeeâs investigation who were subpoenaed or invited to testify.

Additionally, Save America has reported other expenditures, like:

As described above, the Trump Campaign, after paying off its general election debt, raised millions of dollars that flowed into a segregated recount account (âRecount Accountâ) by encouraging donors to help pay for legal challenges to the election results. Pursuant to the FECA, the Trump Campaign could only spend these funds on a few limited purposes (e.g., for actual recounts and election-contest expenses or, in the case of surplus funds, donations to charitable organizations or transferring the funds to a national party committeeâs separate, segregated account for election recounts).206

Justin Clark told the Select Committee that he understood that, â[a]fter election day, . . . you can raise money for a recount and to pay off debt,ââ207 and that â[t]he money going into the campaign, principal campaign committee, at that point, [after the election] was dead money. It couldnât be spent on things.ââ208 Alex Cannon agreed.209 Thatâs why, after the election, the Trump Campaign set up the Recount Accountââa segregated restricted account [held] by the campaignââ210âand raised money for the Recount Account through TMAGAC.211

In February 2021, the Trump Campaign was converted into MAGA PAC.212 In March 2021, MAGA PAC began disclosing on required FEC forms that it was paying millions of dollars to an eDiscovery vendor called 2M Document Management & Imaging LLC (â2M Managementâ) for what MAGA PAC described as ârecountâ and âRecount: Research Consulting.ââ213

Although the MAGA PAC reported that 2M Management was being paid for recount-related expenses, 2M Management was primarily processing and reviewing documents slated to be produced by the National Archives and Records Administration in response to subpoenas from (1) the House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (âCovid Subcommitteeâ) and (2) the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack.214

From just March 2021 to May 2021, MAGA PAC paid 2M Management almost $1 million from the Recount Account to review documents related solely to the Covid Subcommittee.215 Alex Cannon confirmed that he understood these payments to 2M Management came from the Recount Account.216 Federal campaign finance law requires committees to accurately report information related to expenditures, including the purpose of payments. FEC regulations provide that the âpurposeâ be described in relevant reports through a brief statement of why the disbursement was made and must be sufficiently specific to make the purpose of the disbursement clear.217

Between the election and January 6th, the Trump Campaign sent out hundreds of emails urging President Trumpâs supporters to âfight the Liberal MOBâ and âjoin the Trump army.â Users on the same extreme social media platforms used to plan the attack on the Capitol, repeatedly shared the âOfficial Election Defense Fundâ donation links in the week following election day.218 Links to donate were often accompanied by mentions of voter fraud and calls to save the country, mirroring the language of the fundraising emails and the countless discussions being held by the Presidentâs supporters of coming to Washington, DC, on January 6th to âStop the steal.ââ219

On January 6th, while President Trump was speaking at the Ellipse rally and directing his supporters to march to the Capitol, his Campaign was also sending fundraising emails inflaming people to âfight back.â One email stated, â100 Members of Congress . . . Join them in the FIGHT to DEFEND the Election . . . This is our last line of defense.ââ220 Another email stated, âTODAY will be a historic day in our Nationâs history. Congress will either certify, or object to, the Election results. Every single Patriot from across the Country must step up RIGHT NOW if weâre going to successfully DEFEND the integrity of this Election.ââ221 A third email stated, âTODAY. This is our LAST CHANCE . . . The stakes have NEVER been higher. President Trump needs YOU to make a statement and publicly stand with him and FIGHT BACK.ââ222

Thirty minutes after the last fundraising email was sent, the Capitol was breached. It was then and only then that TMAGAC fundraisers decided to stop sending emails containing baseless claims of election fraud.223 Boedigheimer explained, âAnd at some point during that time, I donât know if it was right then, if it was a little after, maybe a little before, but either Gary or Kevin kind of directed us to stop sending fundraising messages out.ââ224 Cannon stated, â[O]n January 6th, Gary called me and said, [â]are you seeing whatâs happening? Iâm obviously turning everything off.[â]ââ225

After raising $250 million dollars on false voter fraud claims, mostly from small-dollar donors, President Trump did not spend it on fighting an election he knew he lost. Instead, a significant portion of the money was deposited into the Save America account and not used for the purposes the Campaign claimed it would be. President Trump got a war chest with millions of dollars, and the American people were left with the U.S. Capitol under attack.

There is evidence suggesting that numerous defendants charged with violations related to the January 6th attack on the U.S. Capitol and others present on the Capitol grounds that day were motivated by false claims about the election.226

Further, J. Doe, the Salesforce employee interviewed by the Select Committee, provided insight into the action that Salesforce took after the attack. Doe explained that after they became aware of the ongoing attack, they (Doe) took unilateral action to block the RNCâs ability to send emails through Salesforceâs platform.227 Doe noted that the shutdown lasted until January 11, 2021, when senior Salesforce leadership directed Doe to remove the block from RNCâs Salesforce account.228 Doe stated that Salesforce leadership told Doe that Salesforce would now begin reviewing RNCâs email campaigns to âmake sure this doesnât happen again.ââ229

In the weeks after the 2020 election leading up to January 6, 2021, President Trumpâs Campaign and his allies sent his supporters a barrage of emails and text messages pushing lies about a stolen election and asking for contributions to challenge the outcome of the election. In reality, the funds raised went primarily towards paying down the Trump Campaignâs outstanding 2020 debt, financing President Trumpâs newly created Save America PAC, and raising money for the RNC.

Overall, only a small amount of the contributions ever went to President Trumpâs recount account or were otherwise obviously used in connection with post-election recounts or litigation. As President Trump used the Big Lie as a weapon to attack the legitimacy of the 2020 election, his Campaign used that same Big Lie to raise millions of dollars based on false claims and unkept promises.

Not only did President Trump lie to his supporters about the election, but he also ripped them off.

ENDNOTES

Â Â 1. Trump Fundraising Emails (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Nov. 21, 2020, 5:30 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1330277503160741888 (âDemocrats are attempting to STEAL this Election and the White House. This Election is far from over as long as we have YOU on our team to FIGHT BACK.â); Trump Fundraising Emails (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Nov. 21, 2020, 7:16 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1330122927958859777 (âWith your help, we will DEFEND the Election and keep America America.â).

Â Â 2. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 104 (âI do think those words are effective, because people were upset and they wanted their donation to go towards an effort to â the legal effort.â).

Â Â 3. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Walters, (May 25, 2022), pp. 15-16; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 9.

Â Â 4. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 28; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 13.

Â Â 5. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Timothy Murtaugh, (May 19, 2022), p. 95.

Â Â 6. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 10. (noting that as digital director he oversaw the digital operation).

Â Â 7. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 6-7; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 11.

Â Â 8. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 10.

Â Â 9. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 187 (naming Coby as person controlling fundraising operation); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 9 (âAnd then Gary Colby would have been the kind of the lead of the entire digital team for the Joint Fundraising Committeeâ); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 81 (âGary ran the campaignâs digital teamâ).

Â 10. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Dec. 16, 2021), p. 3 (Zambrano stated that Coby expressed that he spoke with âthe family,â meaning the Trumps, and Zambrano believed that Kushner was the family member to whom Coby spoke most frequently.); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 190; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Cole Blocker, (Dec. 29, 2021), p. 2 (Blocker stated that he knew Coby talked to Jared Kushner a lot, and that their relationship was common knowledge.).

Â 11. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 13.

Â 12. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 11; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 12; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 9.

Â 13. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), pp. 11-13.

Â 14. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 11.

Â 15. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 15.

Â 16. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 7.

Â 17. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 10 (âI think thatâs fair to say. I think my direct report was Kevin but then we also viewed Gary as a leader of kind of the digital JFC teamâ); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2 (indicating Boedigheimer reported to Coby but that there may have been additional people between Boedigheimer and Coby).

Â 18. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 10.

Â 19. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 7; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 9; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 16-17 (âAustin led the fundraising team . . [and] [o]versaw the variety of fundraising channels and led that team.â).

Â 20. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 9-10.

Â 21. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 14 (Committee Staff: âNow, the emails that Austin and Hannah and folks were working on, those are primarily drafting emails for TMAGAC, correct?â Zambrano: âYes, I believe so.â).

Â 22. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 12; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Jan. 21, 2022), p. 2; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Alex Murglin, (Mar. 17, 2022), p. 2; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Alex Blinkoff, (Feb. 7, 2022), p. 2; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 10.

Â 23. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 11 (âAlex Murglin joined I believe in March of 2020 . . . That summer, Ethan Katz and Alex Blinkoff both joined.â); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Alex Murglin (Mar. 17, 2022), p. 2.

Â 24. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2.

Â 25. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 12.

Â 26. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 9 (âSo, we, as in the RNC digital employees and then Campaign employees and vendors as well, came to work together on the JFC. And the general structure was all working together on that goal.â); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Hanna Allred, (Dec. 1, 2021), p. 3 (âALLRED said that on the 5th floor, the RNC and Campaign employees all worked together for joint fundraising committee, and exactly who worked for which entity kind of didnât matter. . . . Rather, everyone just referred to everything as TMAGAC.â).

Â 27. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2 (âHe explained that the copywriting process worked like a Henry Ford style assembly line, where different individuals performed a task and passed on the work product to someone else.â).

Â 28. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 15-16.

Â 29. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Austin Boedigheimer Production), BA-0003821, (Nov. 30, 2020 email from Austin Boedigheimer to Hanna Allred, âFwd: Itâs happening again, Austin.â).

Â 30. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 20.

Â 31. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 30.

Â 32. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 103-104.

Â 33. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 112-113 (âOn average, yes, you repeat things that do well.â); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 21 (â[I]f you were sending it repeatedly[,] itâs the understanding that itâs doing well so you want to keep sending e-mails like that.â).

Â 34. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 107-108 (âPresident Trumpâs saying it, surrogates are saying it, everybodyâs saying it. So my, you know, I donât remember exactly this but it seems like it was, you know, we should do something like that since itâs been working.â).

Â 35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 23; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 28; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Reed, (July 20, 2022), p. 8 (agreeing that copywriters sought to capture the voice and tone of President Trump in its messaging); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Reed, (July 20, 2022), p. 9 (agreeing that President Trump was focused on a particular issue, copywriters they would also tend to focus on similar issues).

Â 36. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 12; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 45 (âI think weâve determined that itâs aggressive language. We would want to use that for this.â).

Â 37. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), pp. 25-29.

Â 38. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 23-24.

Â 39. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), pp. 14, 49 (âAustin would have reviewed all the content before it would go up to the approval chains or Hannah.â). Zambrano stated that, on a day-to-day basis, he was not very involved in overseeing Boedigheimerâs handling of the copywriting process. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 16.

Â 40. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 43.

Â 41. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 44.

Â 42. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), pp. 63-64.

Â 43. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassie Docksey, (Aug. 25, 2022), p. 10; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), pp. 9-10.

Â 44. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassie Docksey, (Aug. 25, 2022), p. 10.

Â 45. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassie Docksey, (Aug. 25, 2022), p. 6 (âAnd then thatâs also where I started doing some of the approval for the fundraising emails, the small-dollar fundraising emails.â); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), p. 8 (âTo the best of my recollection, that was primarily Cassie Docksey, Mike Reed, who handled approvals on that content.â).

Â 46. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Reed, (July 20, 2022), p. 7 (âI had a role in approv[ing] them [the TMAGAC fundraising emails], yes.â).

Â 47. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 138.

Â 48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 80 (âThere would beâI donât know if my team members were routinely getting those emails as well or if they were just being directed to me, but we were participants in them.â); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 45-46 (âI know from the Trump Campaign, I remember Zach Parkinson was someone who responded. I was never sure if he was from research or comms, or maybe he did both, Iâm not entirely sure, but he would typically, if something was wrong, like, inaccurate, he would flag it.â).

Â 49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 51.

Â 50. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 51.

Â 51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 51.

Â 52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 58.

Â 53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 60, 75-76 (âI think what I said earlier was, at the time the election wasnât over, President Trump was saying those things. I didnât have a reason to believe it was false. So as far as the accuracy of that in the approval chain, that was up to them to decide.â).

Â 54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 77.

Â 55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 78.

Â 56. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 77.

Â 57. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), pp. 77-78.

Â 58. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 77.

Â 59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), pp. 86-87.

Â 60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), pp. 88-89 (âI, as best I recall, that is who I assumed would be doing that type of review [about whether it was true that Democrats were trying to steal the election].â).

Â 61. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 91.

Â 62. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 96.

Â 63. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Reed, (July 20, 2022), pp. 54-55.

Â 64. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Alexander Cannon production), AC-0001631, (Nov. 4, 2020, âRe: Hand-off on Compliance Reviewâ).

Â 65. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 138.

Â 66. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 140.

Â 67. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 140.

Â 68. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 89.

Â 69. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 17.

Â 70. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 19-20.

Â 71. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 26.

Â 72. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 116.

Â 73. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00367, (Nov. 8, 2020, email from Jared Kushner to Sean Dollman, Gary Coby, Bill Stepien, Justin Clark, and Eric Trump, at 5:51 pm, and Nov. 7, 2020 email from Sean Dollman to Jared Kushner at 2:54 pm).

Â 74. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00367, (Nov. 8, 2020, email from Jared Kushner to Sean Dollman, Gary Coby, Bill Stepien, Justin Clark, and Eric Trump, at 5:51 pm, and Nov. 7, 2020 email from Sean Dollman to Jared Kushner at 2:54 pm).

Â 75. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00416, (Nov. 7, 2020, text messages between Jared Kushner and Gary Coby).

Â 76. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), p. 200.

Â 77. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Sean Dollman Production), DOLLMAN-0003821, (Dec. 23. 2020, emails between Jared Kushner, Sean Dolman, Gary Coby, Justin Clark, and Cassie Dumbauld âRe: [EXTERNAL]Re: 12/22/20 Cash Position Updateâ). Despite email communications showing his involvement in the Campaignâs finances through late December 2020, Kushner claimed that, from around November 13 onward, he was only ânominally involvedâ with the Campaignâs budgeting and fundraising. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), p. 205.

Â 78. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Austin Boedigheimer Production), BA-0006823, (Nov. 3, 2020, Signal chat between Austin Boedigheimer and Darren Centinello); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 54 (âAustin could have. Iâm not sure if people on the campaign instructed anyone else on the campaign or anything, but I wouldnât be surprised if there were a couple different scenarios floating around most peopleâs heads on that.â); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 54 (âI donât recall specificâI donât recall conversations around it, other than there may have just been general [â]we need to be ready for whatever may come[â].â).

Â 79. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Austin Boedigheimer Production), BA-0006823, (Nov. 3, 2020, Signal chat between Austin Boedigheimer and Darren Centinello).

Â 80. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Austin Boedigheimer Production), BA-0006823 (Nov. 3, 2020, Signal chat between Austin Boedigheimer and Darren Centinello); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 39 (âIâm basically saying on the victory topic, which is the first one that he covered. Weâre waiting until closer to election results are coming in to be able to get that approved and then Iâm giving him some copy about how they are trying to steal the election that has already been approved.â).

Â 81. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 55.

Â 82. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 55; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 56 (âBut, again, this was the Presidentâs messaging and his phrasingâ).

Â 83. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 44 (âI didnât have a great understanding of what was going to happen or what happened on the ground. I wouldnât have really any knowledge into that.â).

Â 84. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), pp. 52-53; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 55; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 66 (â. . . reported to Austin, so I wouldâve received direction from himâ); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 52-54.

Â 85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May. 17, 2022), p. 146 (âWell, it would have been approval by the principal. So Mr. Trump would have had to do that.â).

Â 86. Trump Fundraising Emails (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Nov. 20, 2020 7:24 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1329762574494298112.

Â 87. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 104 (âYeah, I think they [the Trump Campaign] viewed that as helping to get the message out, especially, you know, thatâs the base, right?â).

Â 88. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 57.

Â 89. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), pp. 56-57.

Â 90. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 57.

Â 91. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 67.

Â 92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 86.

Â 93. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), pp. 86-87.

Â 94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Hanna Allred, (Dec. 1, 2021), p. 4 (âSimilarly, they could say the Democrats were trying or tried to steal the election, but not state that they were or had.â); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2 (âKATZ recalled that Allred told him to say the Democrats were âtrying toâ steal the elections. He added that he did not have any discussions about why âtrying toâ was important, but his impression was that it was used to give some legal wiggle room and make the statement about stealing the election to be âless false.ââ).

Â 95. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 75, (âI do remember at some point we were told we could no longer use the word ârigged.ââ).

Â 96. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013714, (Nov. 3, 2020, Fundraising email approval chain, âRe: FOR APPROVAL: Pennsylvania & Election Pollâ).

Â 97. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013714 (Nov. 3, 2020, Fundraising email approval chain, âRe: FOR APPROVAL: Pennsylvania & Election Pollâ).

Â 98. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013714 (Nov. 3, 2020, Fundraising email approval chain, âRe: FOR APPROVAL: Pennsylvania & Election Pollâ).

Â 99. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013757 (Nov. 10, 2020, Fundraising email approval chain, âRe: [External]Re: FOR APPROVAL: Defend the Election & Vaccineâ); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 106 (Zambrano concedes that the revision âcreates a new sentenceâ that means something different.); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of A. Zachary Parkinson, (May 18, 2022), p. 109 (In response to whether fair to say that that this was a substantive change, Parkinson states, âYou could characterize it as that, I guess, yeah.â).

100. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013757 (Nov. 10, 2020, Fundraising email approval chain, âRe: [External]Re: FOR APPROVAL: Defend the Election & Vaccineâ).

101. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013863 (Nov. 11, 2020, Fundraising email approval chain, âRe: [External]Re: FOR APPROVAL: Alaska & Election Defenseâ) (emphasis in original).

102. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013863 (Nov. 11, 2020, Fundraising email approval chain, âRe: [External]Re: FOR APPROVAL: Alaska & Election Defenseâ).

103. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013863 (Nov. 11, 2020, Fundraising email approval chain, âRe: [External]Re: FOR APPROVAL: Alaska & Election Defenseâ).

104. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kevin Zambrano, (Apr. 27, 2022), p. 101.

105. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013891 (Nov. 12, 2020, Fundraising email approval chain, âRe: FOR APPROVAL: NC, GA Election Defenseâ at 3:08 a.m.); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013928 (Nov. 12, 2020, Fundraising email approval chain, âRe: FOR APPROVAL: NC, GA Election Defenseâ at 4:49 a.m.); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0014006 (Nov. 13, 2020, Fundraising email approval chain, âRe: [External]Re: FOR APPROVAL: Defense Fund & GA/NC Victoryâ).

106. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 84, 137.

107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), pp. 14-15.

108. Jane C. Timm, âRudy Giuliani baselessly alleges âcentralizedâ voter fraud at free-wheeling news conference,â NBC News (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/rudy-giuliani-baselessly-alleges-centralized-voter-fraud-free-wheeling-news-n1248273.

109. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassie Docksey, (Aug. 25, 2022), p. 37.

110. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassie Docksey, (Aug. 25, 2022), p. 37 (âSo on that press conference day, which I think is November 19th, Michael and I talked after that where he was generally telling me, âHey, we donât need to be out there. Itâs not automatic that weâre just going to go out there and parallel or mimic what the campaign or what Rudy Giuliani or that legal team might be saying. Donât feel the need to put that through on the GOP social channels.ââ).

111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassie Docksey, (Aug. 25, 2022), p. 38.

112. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), pp. 15-16. Ahrens thought this press conference was âembarrassingâ and that other members of the RNC leadership team shared his view. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), pp. 28-29.

113. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), pp. 19-20.

114. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), pp. 21-22.

115. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), pp. 25-27.

116. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Reed, (July 20, 2022), pp. 56, 58 (â[T]here was a conversation at some point in November, December with either colleagues of mine or the legal team at the RNCâ about the messaging that was coming out of TMAGAC.â); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Reed, (July 20, 2022), p. 65, Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Reed, (July 20, 2022), p. 66 (recalling âthat there were conversations at some point that the RNC was more comfortable with more toned-down emailsâ).

117. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Reed, (July 20, 2022), pp. 85, 86 (âI generally remember in regards to these emails in the post-election period conversations to make sure that the legal team and the chairmanâs office or whatever else was comfortable with the language that was going out of the JFC.â).

118. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassie Docksey, (Aug. 25, 2022), p. 45.

119. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Michael Ahrens, (Sep. 1, 2022), p. 22.

120. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 202.

121. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 183.

122. Trump Fundraising Emails (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Dec. 20, 2020 12:20 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1341433522331017217; Trump Fundraising Emails (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Dec. 27, 2020 3:23 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1343291529943781378.

123. William Cummings, Joey Garrison and Jim Sergent, âBy the numbers: President Donald Trumpâs failed efforts to overturn the election,â USA Today, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/01/06/trumps-failed-efforts-overturn-election-numbers/4130307001/.

124. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 117-118.

125. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 144; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May. 17, 2022), pp. 177-178 (â[I]n terms of people raising concerns about it, Alexander Cannon, at one point, came into my office and said something to the effectâand he was just doing legal reviews. It was like, I canât believe weâre sending this stuff out, or something to that effect. I saidâI told him he should go talk to Gary and speak to him about it, and I told him you donât need to do legal reviews on these anymore. . . It was just about information that he knew wasnât correct.â).

126. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 178.

127. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 180.

128. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 180.

129. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May. 17, 2022), p. 178.

130. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Jan. 21, 2022), p. 1.

131. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Jan. 21, 2022), p. 1.

132. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Jan. 21, 2022), p. 1.

133. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 69; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 89.

134. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Jan. 21, 2022), p. 1.

135. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 2; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Jan. 21, 2022), p. 1.

136. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021).

137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 83-86. (Allred confirmed that Boedigheimer would have given the directive to draft this email); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 86.

138. Trump Fundraising Emails (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Nov. 4, 2020, 9:42 a.m. available at https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1324180321676546050.

139. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Ethan Katz, (Nov. 3, 2021), p. 3.

140. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Hanna Allred, (Dec. 1, 2021), p. 7.

141. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 176.

142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 116-117.

143. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 137. Similarly, on January 6th, DataPier stopped sending emails, and the list went cold, and, therefore, DataPier is now defunct; see Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 122.

144. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0002048 (Nov. 7, 2020, email from Seth Charles to Darren Centinello, Alexander Cannon, Sean Dollman, and Sarah Grounder, âFW: [PROOF] Michael â increase your impact NOWâ). (âAgain this comes in chorus with less inflammatory language that could be misleading as accusatory or assuming intent upon a particular population.â).

145. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0004724 (Nov. 9, 2020, email from Seth Charles to Darren Centinello, Alexander Cannon, Sean Dollman, and Sarah Grounder, âRe: FW: [PROOF] Hanna â I need you.â).

146. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013741 (Nov. 11, 2020, email from Seth Charles to Darren Centinello, Alexander Cannon, Sean Dollman, and Sarah Grounder, âRe: FW: [PROOF] BIG NEWSâ).

147. J. Doe expressed safety concerns and a fear of retaliation for cooperating with the Select Committee. Accordingly, the Select Committee has not revealed their identity.

148. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Doe, (May 20, 2022), pp. 7-8.

149. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Doe, (May 20, 2022), p. 30.

150. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Doe, (May 20, 2022), pp. 30-31.

151. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Doe, (May 20, 2022), pp. 42-43.

152. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Doe, (May 20, 2022), p. 46.

153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Doe, (May 20, 2022), p. 47.

154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Doe, (May 20, 2022), pp. 49-50.

155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Doe, (May 20, 2022), p. 25.

156. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 49 (noting that the Trump Campaign had âthree of our best four fundraising days occur immediately after the electionâ).

157. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 86.

158. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 86 (âWe frequently use funds as a marketing tactic. . . So I donât believe there is actually a fund called the âElection Defense Fund,â not that Iâm aware of.â); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 91-92.

159. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 87; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 96-97 (Allred noting that she only became aware of Save America in February 2021); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 92 (âFrom my understanding, the money was going towards, I believe this is a TMAGAC e-mail. So it was going to TMAGAC. And then how the money was spent from there, you know, thatâs not something that I would do or have knowledge to.â); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 94 (âIâm not sure how the funds went or how they were allocated. I donât know precisely.â).

160. Shane Goldmacher and Rachel Shorey, âTrump Raised $255.4 Million in 8 Weeks as He Sought to overturn Election Result,â New York Times, (Jan. 31, 2021), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/31/us/politics/trump-voter-fraud-fundraising.html (âPresident Donald J. Trump and the Republican Party raised $255.4 million in the eight-plus weeks following the Nov. 3 election, new federal filings show, as he sought to undermine and overturn the results with unfounded accusations of fraud.â).

161. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 153.

162. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May. 17, 2022), p. 143 (âAfter election day . . . you can raise money for a recount and to pay off debt.â).

163. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Gary Coby, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 125; Jarrett Renshaw and Joseph Tanfani, âDonations under $8K to Trump âelection defenseâ instead go to president, RNC,â Reuters, (Nov. 11, 2020), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-fundraising-insigh/donations-under-8k-to-trump-election-defense-instead-go-to-president-rnc-idUSKBN27R309 (âThe emailed solicitations send supporters to an âOfficial Election Defense Fundâ website that asks them to sign up for recurring donations to âprotect the results and keep fighting even after Election Day.â The fine print makes clear most of the money will go to other priorities. A large portion of the money goes to âSave America,â a Trump leadership PAC, or political action committee, set up on Monday, and the Republican National Committee (RNC).â).

164. Federal Election Commission, Advisory Opinion 2006-24, (Oct. 5, 2006), p. 6, available atÂ https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/2006-24/2006-24.pdf (The Act âprohibits Federal officeholders and candidates, their agents, and entities directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained or controlled by or acting on behalf of one or more Federal officeholders or candidates, from soliciting, receiving, directing, transferring, or spending funds for expenses related to a recount of the votes cast in a Federal election, including the recount activities described above, unless those funds are subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of the Act. . . . [A] Federal candidateâs recount fund must not receive or solicit donations in excess of the Actâs amount limitations . . . [A]ny recount fund established by a Federal candidate may not receive donations that in the aggregate exceed . . . $5,000 per multicandidate political committee.â).

165. FEC Reported DisbursementsÂ in 2020 by Save America, (last accessed on Nov. 18, 2022), available atÂ https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?committee_id=C00762591&two_year_transaction_period=2020&data_type=processed.

166. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Timothy Murtaugh Production), XXM-0011244, (Nov. 11, 2020, emails between Timothy Murtaugh and Justin Clark, âRe: [EXTERNAL]Trump legal defense and leadership PACâ).

167. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Timothy Murtaugh Production), XXM-0013276, (Nov. 24, 2020, emails between Timothy Murtaugh and Justin Clark, âRe: [EXTERNAL]Re: Fundraising questionsâ).

168. When the Trump Campaign learned that reporters were going to write about their misleading fundraising, Murtaugh advised further comment from the Campaign would âserve to highlight the argument that the fundraising pitch is misleading.â Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Timothy Murtaugh Production), XXM-0018627, (Dec. 1, 2020, emails between Timothy Murtaugh, Jason Miller, Sean Dollman, Justin Clark, and Bill Stepien, âRe: [EXTERNAL ]$$$$$$â). Murtaugh further noted that âPOTUS is on board with how it will be described.â Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Timothy Murtaugh Production), XXM-0018627, (Dec. 1, 2020, emails between Timothy Murtaugh, Jason Miller, Sean Dollman, Justin Clark, and Bill Stepien, âRe: [EXTERNAL ]$$$$$$â).

169. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Timothy Murtaugh Production), XXM-0011244, (Nov. 11, 2020, emails between Timothy Murtaugh and Justin Clark, âRe: [EXTERNAL]Trump legal defense and leadership PACâ), (Murtaugh asking Justin Clark, âStill ignoring?â); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Timothy Murtaugh Production), XXM-0013276, (Nov. 24, 2020, emails between Timothy Murtaugh and Justin Clark, âRe: [EXTERNAL]Re: Fundraising questionsâ), (Murtaugh telling Justin Clark, âFYI â Still not answering.â).

170. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Timothy Murtaugh Production), XXM-0013276, (Nov. 24, 2020, emails between Timothy Murtaugh and Justin Clark, âRe: [EXTERNAL]Re: Fundraising questionsâ).

171. FEC Reported Disbursements to Daniel Scavino by Save America, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022), available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C00762591&recipient_name=scavino%2C+dan.

172. Katelyn Polantz and Ryan Nobles, âTrumpâs former deputy chief of staff, Dan Scavino, not ready to cooperate with January 6 committee, attorney says,â CNN, (Oct. 21, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/20/politics/dan-scavino-january-6-committee/index.html.

173. âHudson Digital LLC,â State of Delaware Division of Corporations, (last accessed on Dec. 9, 2022), available at https://icis.corp.delaware.gov/Ecorp/EntitySearch/NameSearch.aspx (search âHudson Digital LLCâ in the âEntity Nameâ field).

174. Schedule B (FEC Form 3x) Itemized Disbursements by Save America, (July 31, 2021), available at https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?202107319465699743.

175. FEC Reported Disbursements to Hudson Digital LLC, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022) available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&recipient_name=hudson+digital+llc.

176. An unrelated company, Hudson Digital, has operated for approximately 10 years in Hudson, NY, over 80 miles from the addresses associated with Hudson Digital LLC.

177. Schedule B (FEC Form 3x) Itemized Disbursements by Save America, (July 31, 2021), available at https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?202107319465699743.

178. FEC Reported Disbursements to Nicholas Luna by Save America, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022), available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C00762591&recipient_name=luna%2C+nicholas.

179. FEC Reported Disbursements to Red State Partners LLC, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022) available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&recipient_name=red+state+partners.

180. âRed State Partners LLC,â State of Delaware Division of Corporations, (last accessed on Dec. 9, 2022), available at https://icis.corp.delaware.gov/Ecorp/EntitySearch/NameSearch.aspx (search âRed State Partners LLCâ in the âEntity Nameâ field).

181. FEC Reported Disbursements to Red State Partners LLC, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022) available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&recipient_name=red+state+partners.

182. Schedule B (FEC Form 3x) Itemized Disbursements by Make America Great Again PAC, (Dec. 2, 2021), available at https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?202112029469645374.

183. âPericles, LLC,â District of Columbia Department of Business Licensing Division, (last accessed on Dec. 9, 2022), available at https://corponline.dcra.dc.gov/BizEntity.aspx/ViewEntityData?entityId=4292880.

184. âVincent M. Haley,â ProPublica: Trump Town, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022), available at https://projects.propublica.org/trump-town/staffers/vincent-m-haley.

185. âTaylor Swindle,â Gingrich360, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022), available at https://www.gingrich360.com/about/gingrich-360-team/taylor-swindle/.

186. âRoss Worthington,â ProPublica: Trump Town, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022), available at https://projects.propublica.org/trump-town/staffers/ross-worthington.

187. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007531_0001, (January 6, 2021, emails between Ross Worthington, Robert Gabriel, Jr., Vincent Haley, and others).

188. âPericles, LLC,â District of Columbia Department of Business Licensing Division, (last accessed on Dec. 9, 2022), available at https://corponline.dcra.dc.gov/BizEntity.aspx/ViewEntityData?entityId=4292880.

189. FEC Reported Disbursements to Pericles LLC by Save America, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022) available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C00762591&recipient_name=pericles+llc.

190. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007531_0001, (January 6, 2021, emails between Ross Worthington, Robert Gabriel, Jr., Vincent Haley, and others).

191. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), 076P-R000007531_0001, (January 6, 2021, emails between Ross Worthington, Robert Gabriel, Jr., Vincent Haley, and others).

192. The organization was originally formed as Believe in America LLC, then changed its name the following day to Gabriel Strategies LLC. See âGabriel Strategies LLCâ, State of New Jersey Division of Revenue and Enterprise Search, (last accessed on Dec. 9, 2022), available at https://www.njportal.com/DOR/BusinessNameSearch/Search/BusinessName (search âGabriel Strategies LLCâ in the âBusiness Nameâ field).

193. Schedule B (FEC Form 3x) Itemized Disbursements by Save America, (May 5, 2022), available at https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?202205059502664518.

194. FEC Reported Disbursements to Red State Partners LLC by Save America, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022) available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C00762591&recipient_name=gabriel+strategies.

195. FEC Reported Disbursements to Herve Pierre Braillard by Save America, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022) available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C00762591&recipient_name=Herve+Pierre+Braillard.

196. Suzy Menkes, âHerve Pierre: Dressing the First Lady,â Vogue, (Apr. 12, 2017), available at https://www.vogue.pt/herve-pierre-dressing-the-first-lady; Rosemary Feitelberg, âMelania Trumpâs Former Stylist Addresses $60,000 Save America Payment,â Womenâs Wear Daily, (Aug. 8. 2022), available at https://wwd.com/fashion-news/designer-luxury/melania-trump-herve-pierre-60000-save-america-payment-1235294733/.

197. Schedule B (FEC Form 3x) Itemized Disbursements by Save America, (July 31, 2021), available at https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?202107319465699856.

198. Schedule B (FEC Form 3x) Itemized Disbursements by Save America, (May 5, 2022), available at https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?202205059502664847.

199. FEC Reported Disbursements to Event Strategies Inc by Save America, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022) available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C00762591&recipient_name=event+strategies+inc.

200. FEC Reported Disbursements to Trump Hotel and Mar-A-Lago by Save America, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022) available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C00762591&recipient_name=mar-a-lago&recipient_name=trump+hotel.

201. Schedule B (FEC Form 3x) Itemized Disbursements by Save America, (June 15, 2022), available at https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?202206159514906341.

202. FEC Reported Disbursements to National Public Affairs by Save America, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022) available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C00762591&recipient_name=National+Public+Affairs.

203. âMeet Our Team,â National Public Affairs, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022), available at https://natpublicaffairs.com/.

204. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 174.

205. FEC disclosures show that other than Save America, National Public Affairs LLC received payments from only three other organizations since 2021. All three are campaigns for election deniers, Kelly Tshibaka (AK-Senate), Jason Smith (MO-08), and Harriett Hageman (WY-AL). See FEC Reported Disbursements to National Public Affairs LLC since 2021, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022), available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&recipient_name=national+public+affairs+llc&min_date=01%2F01%2F2021.

206. Federal Election Commission, Advisory Opinion 2019-02, (Mar. 28, 2019), available at https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/2019-02/2019-02.pdf.

207. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May. 17, 2022), p. 143.

208. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May. 17, 2022), p. 145.

209. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 156 (â[G]enerally after an election, you can raise money for debt retirement, and you can raise money for recount.â).

210. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013889 (Nov. 12, 2020, emails between Alexander Cannon and Cleta Mitchell, âRe: [External]Legal defense fundâ).

211. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Alexander Cannon Production), AC-0013889 (Nov. 12, 2020, emails between Alexander Cannon and Cleta Mitchell, âRe: [External]Legal defense fundâ).

212. Statement of Organization FEC Form 1, filed by Make America Great Again PAC, (Feb. 27, 2021), available at https://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/093/202102279429078093/202102279429078093.pdf#navpanes=0.

213. FEC Reported Disbursements to 2M Document Management and Imaging, LLC by Make America Great Again PAC, (last accessed on Nov. 10, 2022) available at https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C00580100&recipient_name=2m+document&two_year_transaction_period=2022.

214. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Clarke (Aug. 4, 2022), p. 28 (agreeing that âthe vast majority of the work that 2M has done to date that has been paid for by MAGA PAC relates to January 6th documents or COVID-related documents coming from NARAâ); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Aug. 18, 2022), p. 31 (âThere was a House Oversight investigation into the administrationâs COVID response, and there were a large number of documents that were coming through that needed to be processed.â).

215. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Clarke, (Aug. 4, 2022), pp. 31-32 (âDuring that time, I believe all we were doing was work related to the White House â the Trump administrationâs response to COVID.â).

216. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Aug. 18, 2022), pp. 15-16 (noting his understanding that âif the funds were raised to DJTFP and they were not spent on debt retirement, any remaining funds that were not spent on debt retirement would have gone to this segregated, restricted account for recounts for MAGA PA?â); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Aug. 18, 2022), p. 16; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Aug. 18, 2022), pp. 37-38 (agreeing that if funds paid to 2M are labeled recount then he would assume they came from Recount Account).

217. See Statement of Policy: âPurpose of Disbursementâ Entries for Filings with the Commission, 72 Fed. Reg. 887 (Jan. 9, 2007) (citing 11 C.F.R. Â§ Â§ 104.3(b)(3)(i)(b), (4)(i)(A)).

218. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Aug. 21, 2022, Memorandum regarding Fundraising communication rhetoricâs influence on social media).

219. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Aug. 21, 2022, Memorandum regarding Fundraising communication rhetoricâs influence on social media).

220. Trump Fundraising Emails (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021, 12:20 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1346794824591093763.

221. Trump Fundraising Emails, (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021, 1:31 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1346887173438636032.

222. Trump Fundraising Emails (@TrumpEmail), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021, 11:29 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/TrumpEmail/status/1346856536338030601.

223. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 42 (noting âyes, we stopped sending emails on January 6â); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Hanna Allred, (Mar. 30, 2022), p. 128 (âI believe we got some sort of message, either on Microsoft Teams or Signal from Austin, saying pause everything.â).

224. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Austin Boedigheimer, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 140.

225. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Alexander Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), p. 124.

226. See Criminal Complaint, United States v. Grayson, No. 1:21-mj-00163 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2021); Criminal Complaint, United States v. Fitzsimmons, No. 1:21-cr-00158-RC (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 2021); (noting that the defendant in that case âbelieved voter fraud occurredâ and that â[c]onvinced that the election results had been fraudulently reported, he was moved by the words of then-President Trump to travel to the District of Columbia for the âSave America Rally.ââ).

227. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Doe, (May 20, 2022), pp. 64-65.

228. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Doe, (May 20, 2022), pp. 68-69.

229. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of J. Doe, (May 20, 2022), p. 72.

In the wake of the 2020 U.S. Presidential election, President Donald J. Trump and his apologists attempted to blame his loss on foreign interference. They falsely claimed that foreign-manufactured voting machines had been manipulated so that votes cast for Trump were instead recorded as votes for Joseph R. Biden, Jr.1 No one has ever, either at the time or since, offered any evidence to support Trumpâs assertion. On the contrary, ample evidence collected by the Intelligence Community (IC) and reviewed by the Select Committee disproves those claims.

That is not to say foreign actors made no attempt to influence the American political climate during and after the 2020 Presidential election. This appendix evaluates the role foreign influence played in the circumstances surrounding the insurrection.2

In its postmortem assessment of the 2020 U.S. Presidential election, the Intelligence Community comprehensively examined two types of foreign meddling: interference and influence. The distinction between the two is critical in evaluating President Trumpâs repeated public assertions that there had been massive and widespread âfraudâ that had the effect of âstealingâ the election for then-candidate Biden.

For its analytic purposes, the Intelligence Community defines election interference as âa subset of election influence activities targeted at the technical aspects of the election, including voter registration, casting and counting ballots, or reporting results.ââ3 That definition notes that election interference is a subset of election influence, which the Intelligence Community defines to include âovert and covert efforts by foreign governments or actors acting as agents of, or on behalf of, foreign governments intended to affect directly or indirectly a US electionâincluding candidates, political parties, voters or their preferences, or political processes.ââ4

The Intelligence Communityâs Assessment (ICA) found no factual basis for any allegation of technical interference with the 2020 U.S. election: âWe have no indications that any foreign actor attempted to interfere in the 2020 US elections by altering any technical aspect of the voting process, including voter registration, ballot casting, vote tabulation, or reporting results.ââ5 Put simply, allegations that foreign powers rigged voting machines and swapped ballots were false and unsupported.

Although there is no evidence of foreign technical interference in the 2020 election, there is evidence of foreign influence. Specifically, the Intelligence Communityâs Assessment concluded that âRussian President Putin authorized, and a range of Russian government organizations conducted, influence operations aimed at denigrating President Bidenâs candidacy and the Democratic Party, supporting former President Trump, undermining public confidence in the electoral process, and exacerbating sociopolitical divisions in the US.ââ6 The two Intelligence Community analytic conclusions about the 2020 U.S. Presidential electionâthat there was evidence of foreign influence, but not foreign interferenceâare completely consistent.

The 2020 U.S. elections saw an increase in the number of foreign state and non-state entities that attempted to influence the U.S. electorate. The U.S. Intelligence Community suggests, as a possible explanation, that more such foreign entities âmay view influence operations as important tools for projecting power abroad.ââ7 More ascertainably, â[t]he growth of internet and social media use means foreign actors are more able to reach US audiences directly, while the tools for doing so are becoming more accessible.ââ8

The United Statesâ principal foreign adversariesâRussia, China, and Iranâall of them autocracies, engage, to varying degrees, in disguised efforts to influence U.S. public opinion.9 In the context of these overarching efforts,10 U.S. elections offer special opportunities.

For Russia, â[e]lections â¦ often serve as an opportune target. But attacks on elections are typically just one part of ongoing, multi-pronged operations.ââ11 The U.S. Intelligence Communityâs definitive post-election assessment of foreign influence activities during the 2020 Presidential election concluded that Russia was deeply engaged in disinformation activities intended to influence the outcome by supporting President Trump while disparaging then-candidate Biden; Iran also engaged in efforts to influence the electionâs outcome, but unlike Russia, did not actively promote any candidate; and that China considered opportunities to influence the electionâs outcome, but ultimately decided that potential costs outweighed any foreseeable benefits.12 Both Russia and Iran worked to undermine the American publicâs confidence in U.S. democratic processes and to deepen socio-political divisions in the United States.13

Russian malign disinformation efforts are both strategic in scope and opportunistic in nature. They aim to corrode the power and appeal of the U.S. democratic processes, worsen U.S. domestic divisions, and weaken America at home and abroad. The Intelligence Communityâs February 2022 unclassified âAnnual Threat Assessmentâ puts this sustained Russian threat in a nutshell:

Russia presents one of the most serious foreign influence threats to the United States, using its intelligence services, proxies, and wide-ranging influence tools to try to divide Western alliances, and increase its sway around the world, while attempting to undermine U.S. global standing, amplify discord inside the United States, and influence U.S. voters and decisionmaking.14

Foreign adversariesâ influence campaigns routinely push disinformation to U.S. audiences. Elections offer an important forum for Russia and other U.S. adversaries to seek to deepen divisions within American society through disinformation campaigns.15 The Intelligence Community projects that both Russia and China will, for the foreseeable future, continue to press their disinformation campaigns attempting to undermine the U.S. populationâs confidence in their government and society.16 Russia certainly did so in the period following the election and preceding the January 6th attack.

The disinformation spread by Russia and its messengers during that time was not, however, entirely original. The Intelligence Community Assessment found that Russiaâs disinformation engine borrowed President Trumpâs own words to achieve its goals:

Russian online influence actors generally promoted former President Trump and his commentary, including repeating his political messaging on the election results; the presidential campaign; debates; the impeachment inquiry; and, as the election neared, US domestic crises.17

Indeed, President Trumpâs messaging during and after the 2020 election was reflected in Russian influence efforts at the time. In September of 2020, the Department of Homeland Securityâs Office of Intelligence and Analysis warned that Russia was engaged in pre-election activity targeting the U.S. democratic process.18 The bulletin advised that âRussia is likely to continue amplifying criticisms of vote-by-mail and shifting voting processes amidst the COVIDâ19 pandemic to undermine public trust in the electoral process.ââ19

Deliberately spreading disinformation to discredit a U.S. election was not new to Russiaâs influence arsenal. In the judgment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, it is a tactic Russia was prepared to deploy after the 2016 U.S. Presidential election:

Even after the [2020] election, Russian online influence actors continued to promote narratives questioning the election results and disparaging President Biden and the Democratic Party. These efforts parallel plans Moscow had in place in 2016 to discredit a potential incoming Clinton administration, but which it scrapped after former President Trumpâs victory.20

Russian influence efforts in the 2016 and 2020 elections, while distinct in their particulars, shared some similarities. Historically, Russia has engaged in near-industrial scale online influence efforts.21 The Intelligence Community Assessment states that in 2020, Russia again relied on internet trolls to amplify divisive content aimed at American audiences:

The Kremlin-linked influence organization Project Lakhta and its Lakhta Internet Research (LIR) troll farmâcommonly referred to by its former moniker Internet Research Agency (IRA)âamplified controversial domestic issues. LIR used social media personas, news websites, and US persons to deliver tailored content to subsets of the US population. LIR established short-lived troll farms that used unwitting third-country nationals in Ghana, Mexico, and Nigeria to propagate these US-focused narratives. . . .22

The threats posed by Russiaâs influence efforts are not new, nor are they diminishing. The latest unclassified Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment throws this into sharp relief:

Moscow has conducted influence operations against U.S. elections for decades, including as recently as the 2020 presidential election. We assess that it probably will try to strengthen ties to U.S. persons in the media and politics in hopes of developing vectors for future influence operations.23

Tech-enabled or not, if ever there was a âpeople business,â foreign influence is it. People working on behalf of a foreign governmentâforeign government officials, their agents, and proxiesâwork to influence, directly or indirectly, a target audience in another countryâits officials and citizens at large. Most who are engaged in those efforts act overtly: ambassadors, consuls general, government delegations and so forth. Their foreign influence efforts are not, however, focused on philanthropy or foreign aid. Moreover, the perspectives they seek to embed in their target audiences may be intentionally and materially inaccurate, propagandistic, or driven by unstated motives. In such instances, foreign influence may amount to injecting foreign disinformation into the U.S. media ecosystem for re-branding and onward transmission to an American audience.24

Foreign state adversaries of the United States generally disguise their efforts to influence U.S. audiences, particularly when they seek to influence U.S. votersâ views in the run-up to an election. Among the many ways of concealing the foreign-state origin or sponsorship of such a message is to use unattributable proxiesââcut-outsââor fully independent ideological allies in the United States as messaging organs. A cooperative American messengerâa proxy for the foreign government itselfâmay be needed to make the foreign-origin message congenial to the target American audience.

Malign foreign influencers, including foreign governments, used an additional such masking tool during the Trump administration: amplifying U.S.-originated messages so that they reached a broader audience. These influencers often took advantage of the algorithms by which social media platforms bring congenial messages and other information to users whose views are likely to be similar or compatible.

Shortly after the January 6th attack, the National Intelligence Council summarized the scope and significance of Russiaâs use of proxies in the 2020 U.S. Presidential election:

A key element of Moscowâs strategy this election cycle was its use of proxies linked to Russian intelligence to push influence narrativesâincluding misleading or unsubstantiated allegations against President Bidenâto US media organizations, US officials, and prominent US individuals, including some close to former President Trump and his administration.25

The success of the proxy depends on shielding its foreign sponsorship. For that reason, it can be difficult or impossible to determine conclusively whether someone parroting a foreign government adversaryâs point of view to a U.S. audience is that governmentâs controlled proxy or a volunteer taking full advantage of U.S. First Amendment freedoms.

U.S. adversaries use anti-American propaganda and disinformation to advance their strategic foreign policy objectives. They aim to corrode U.S. influence abroad while diluting U.S. citizensâ trust in their democratic institutions and processes. They hope to deepen and sharpen the sociopolitical divisions in American society.26 In doing so, foreign adversaries hope not only to limit U.S. ability to influence the policy choices of other foreign states, but also to help immunize their own populations against the attractions of American-style democracy.

That matters, as Russia and other adversaries of the United States well know. If the United States has long demonstrated such a globally effective cultural power to attract, its corrosion must be a primary strategic objective of Russia or any other of the United Statesâ principal adversaries. Accordingly, over the next 20 years, the Intelligence Community expects that âChina and Russia probably will try to continue targeting domestic audiences in the United States and Europe, promoting narratives about Western decline and overreach.ââ27 The January 6th attack played into their hands.

With President Trump in the White House, Russia benefited from a powerful American messenger creating and spreading damaging disinformation it could amplify. The Intelligence Communityâs comprehensive March 2021 assessment noted that throughout the 2020 Federal election cycle, âRussian online influence actors generally promoted former President Trump and his commentary. . . .ââ28

President Trumpâs relentless propagation of the Big Lie damaged American democracy from within and made it more vulnerable to attack from abroad. His actions did not go unnoticed by Americaâs adversaries, who seized on the opportunity to damage the United States. According to the Intelligence Communityâs March 2021 assessment, â[e]ven after the election, Russian online influence actors continued to promote narratives questioning the election results. . . .ââ29 What President Trump was saying was, in sum, exactly what the Russian government wanted saidâbut he was doing it on his own initiative and from the trappings of the Oval Office.

ENDNOTES

Â Â 1. Taking the Trump conspiracy theory of manipulated Venezuelan voting machines head-on in an overarching assessment, the Intelligence Communityâs definitive post-election assessment stated: âWe have no information suggesting that the current or former Venezuelan regimes were involved in attempts to compromise US election infrastructure.â National Intelligence Council, âIntelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,â ICA 2020â00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 8, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived).

Â Â 2. For case studies illustrating how such efforts may have manifested at the Capitol on January 6th, see Staff Memo, âCase Studies on Malign Foreign Influence,â (Dec. 19, 2022).

Â Â 3. National Intelligence Council, âIntelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,â ICA 2020â00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), Definitions, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived).

Â Â 4. National Intelligence Council, âIntelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,â ICA 2020â00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), Definitions, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived).

Â Â 5. National Intelligence Council, âIntelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,â ICA 2020â00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), pp. i, 1, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived) (emphasis removed).

Â Â 6. National Intelligence Council, âIntelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,â ICA 2020â00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. i, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived) (emphasis removed).

Â Â 7. National Intelligence Council, âIntelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,â ICA 2020â00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 1, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived).

Â Â 8. National Intelligence Council, âIntelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,â ICA 2020â00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 1, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived).

Â Â 9. The U.S. Intelligence Community is well aware of these foreign influence campaigns, including in the context of elections. See, e.g., National Intelligence Council, âIntelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,â ICA 2020â00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), pp. 4â5, 7, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived) (âRussian state media, trolls, and online proxies, including those directed by Russian intelligence, published disparaging content about President Biden, his family, and the Democratic Party, and heavily amplified related content circulating in US mediaâ¦â, p. 4; âIranâs election influence efforts were primarily focused on sowing discord in the United States and exacerbating societal tensionsâ¦â, p. 5; âChina has long sought to influence US policies by shaping political and social environments to press US officials to support Chinaâs positions and perspectives.â p. 7). Over the next 20 years, the Intelligence Community assesses that âChina and Russia probably will try to continue targeting domestic audiences in the United States and Europe, promoting narratives about Western decline and overreach.â National Intelligence Council, âGlobal Trends 2040: A More Contested World,â (March 2021), p. 94, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/images/globalTrends/GT2040/GlobalTrends_2040_for_web1.pdf (archived).

Â 10. The National Intelligence Council notes that âsome foreign actors may perceive influence activities around US elections as continuations of broad, ongoing efforts rather than specially demarcated campaigns.â National Intelligence Council, âIntelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,â ICA 2020â00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 1, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived).

Â 11. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the Environment, Hearing on Undermining Democracy: Kremlin Tools of Malign Political Influence, Testimony of Laura Rosenberger, 116th Cong., 1st sess., (May 21, 2019), p. 1, available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20190521/109537/HHRG-116-FA14-Wstate-RosenbergerL-20190521.pdf. Ms. Rosenberger was, at the time, Director of the Alliance for Securing Democracy and Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. In an August 2018 briefing for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Dr. John Kelly, the chief executive officer of Graphika, an analytics firm that studies online information flows, stated: âThe data now available make it clear that Russian efforts are not directed against one election, one party, or even one country. We are facing a sustained campaign of organized manipulation, a coordinated attack on the trust we place in our institutions and in our mediaâboth social and traditional.â Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Open Hearing on Foreign Influence Operationsâ Use of Social Media Platforms, Statement of Dr. John W. Kelly, 115th Cong., 2d sess., (Aug. 1, 2018), p. 1, available at https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/17963-john-w-kelly-chief-executive-officer-graphika.

Â 12. National Intelligence Council, âIntelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,â ICA 2020â00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. i, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived). But see, John Ratcliffe, Director of National Intelligence, âViews on Intelligence Community Election Security Analysis,â (Jan. 7, 2021), available at https://context-cdn.washingtonpost.com/notes/prod/default/documents/6d274110-a84b-4694-96cd-6a902207d2bd/note/733364cf-0afb-412d-a5b4-ab797a8ba154. (archived). In this memorandum, DNI Ratcliffe, who had been in office seven months and lacked any prior intelligence experience, said he felt the need to âlead by example and offer my analytic assessment.â He argued that the ICA majorityâs âhigh confidenceâ view that âChina considered but did not deploy influence efforts intended to change the outcome of the US presidential electionâ did not âfully and accurately reflect[] the scope of the Chinese governmentâs efforts to influence the 2020 U.S. federal elections.â Aside from the DNIâs very willingness to conclude, in conformity with then-President Trumpâs contention but without reference to any supporting data, that the ICâs combined analytic judgment on China was wrong, this seems a very odd document for the DNI to have chosen to issue the day after the January 6th attack on the U.S. Capitol.

Â 13. National Intelligence Council, âIntelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,â ICA 2020â00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. i, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived).

Â 14. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, âAnnual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,â (Feb. 2022), at p. 12, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf (emphasis removed).

Â 15. The National Intelligence Councilâs comprehensive post-election assessment covers the spectrum, including not only Russia, but also China, Iran, and others, as well as certain non-state actors. See generally, National Intelligence Council, âIntelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,â ICA 2020â00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (archived). See also, âDual U.S. / Russian National Charged With Acting Illegally As A Russian Agent In The United States,â Department of Justice, U.S. Attorneyâs Office, S. Dist. N.Y., (Mar. 8, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/dual-us-russian-national-charged-acting-illegally-russian-agent-united-states (archived); âRussian National Charged with Conspiring to Have U.S. Citizens Act as Illegal Agents of the Russian Government,â Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, (July 29, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/russian-national-charged-conspiring-have-us-citizens-act-illegal-agents-russian-government (archived).

Â 16. National Intelligence Council, âIntelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,â ICA 2020â00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. i, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.

Â 17. National Intelligence Council, âIntelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,â ICA 2020â00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 4, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.

Â 18. Department of Homeland Security, âRussia Likely to Continue to Undermine Faith in U.S. Electoral Process,â Intelligence in Focus, (Sept. 3, 2020), at p. 1, available at https://publicintelligence.net/dhs-russia-undermining-election/.

Â 19. Department of Homeland Security, âRussia Likely to Continue to Undermine Faith in U.S. Electoral Process,â Intelligence in Focus, (Sept. 3, 2020), at p. 1, available at https://publicintelligence.net/dhs-russia-undermining-election/ (emphasis removed).

Â 20. National Intelligence Council, âIntelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,â ICA 2020â00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), pp. 4â5, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.

Â 21. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, âRussian Active Measures Campaigns And Interference In The 2016 U.S. Election,â Volume 2, (Nov. 10, 2020), pp. 18â19, available at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/publications/report-select-committee-intelligence-united-states-senate-russian-active-measures.

Â 22. National Intelligence Council, âIntelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,â ICA 2020â00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 4, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.

Â 23. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, âAnnual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,â p. 12, (Feb. 7, 2022), available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf.

Â 24. National Intelligence Council, âIntelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,â ICA 2020â00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), at p. 1, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.

Â 25. National Intelligence Council, âIntelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,â ICA 2020â00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), at p. i, Key Judgment 2, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (emphasis removed).

Â 26. National Intelligence Council, âEmerging Dynamics â International: More Contested, Uncertain, and Conflict Prone â Contested and Transforming International Order â Increasing Ideological Competition,â Global Trends 2040, 7th ed., (Mar. 2021), p. 95, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/images/globalTrends/GT2040/GlobalTrends_2040_for_web1.pdf.

Â 27. National Intelligence Council, âEmerging Dynamics â International: More Contested, Uncertain, and Conflict Prone â Contested and Transforming International Order â Increasing Ideological Competition,â Global Trends 2040, 7th ed., (Mar. 2021) , p. 94, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/images/globalTrends/GT2040/GlobalTrends_2040_for_web1.pdf.

Â 28. National Intelligence Council, âIntelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,â ICA 2020-00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 4, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.

Â 29. National Intelligence Council, âIntelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,â ICA 2020-00078D, (Mar. 10, 2021), p. 4, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf.