This Commission was chartered by Congress in October 1994 to conduct a comprehensive review of American intelligence. The Cold War had ended, and it was prudent to reexamine a costly government activity closely tied to that era.

Legislative attempts in the early 1990s to restructure and reform intelligence had not been seen as producing significant change. Reform efforts within the Executive branch had proceeded by fits and starts. Intelligence agencies touted new forays into areas such as intelligence on the environment, leading many observers to conclude they had lost focus and were searching for reasons to justify their existence.

In addition, new questions arose about the competence and accountability of intelligence agencies. The Ames espionage case, in particular, raised concerns not only about the failure of the CIA to detect a rather clumsy spy in its midst, but also about the degree to which the agency holds accountable those responsible.

By the fall of 1994, Congress decided the time had come for a "credible, independent, and objective review of the Intelligence Community" and established this Commission to perform it. Nineteen separate areas were identified for assessment.

The Commission began operations on March 1, 1995 and conducted a rigorous inquiry during the following twelve months. It received formal testimony from 84 witnesses, and its staff interviewed over 200 other individuals. Members of the Commission visited several foreign countries with which the U.S. has cooperative relationships in the intelligence area, and the Commission reviewed a large amount of written opinion on intelligence issues. The results of its inquiry are reflected in the fourteen chapters that follow this summary.

**The Commission concludes that the United States needs to maintain
a strong intelligence capability. U.S. intelligence has made,
and continues to make, vital contributions to the nation's security,
informing its diplomacy and bolstering its defenses. While the
focus provided by the superpower struggle of the Cold War has
disappeared, there remain sound and important roles and missions
for American intelligence.**

**At the same time, the performance of U.S. intelligence can
be improved: **







**While each of these problems is challenging, none is insuperable.
This report reflects what, in the Commission's view, needs to
be done. The principal recommendations of the Commission are summarized
in the next section. (Additional recommendations are made in the
text of the report and are not reflected in this summary.)**

Without question, the United States needs information about the world outside its borders to protect its national interests and relative position in the world, whether as a Cold War "superpower" or a nation that remains heavily and inextricably engaged in world affairs. It needs information to avoid crises as well as respond to them, to calibrate its diplomacy, and to shape and deploy its defenses.

Much of that information is openly available, but much of it is not. Intelligence agencies attempt to fill the void. Their capabilities are costly. At times their activities are a source of embarrassment, even consternation. But they continue to provide information crucial to U.S. interests. Over the last five years, conflicts have been avoided, wars shortened, agreements reached, costs reduced, and lives saved as a result of information produced by U.S. intelligence agencies.

**The Commission concludes that the United States should continue
to maintain a strong intelligence capability. U.S. intelligence
has made, and continues to make, vital contributions to the nation's
security. Its performance can be improved. It can be made more
efficient. But it must be preserved. **

The roles and missions of intelligence are not static. They are affected by changes in the world, in technology, and in the Government's needs. Each President must decide where intelligence agencies should concentrate their efforts.

The Commission perceives four functional roles for intelligence agencies-collection, analysis, covert action, and counterintelligence-as well as a number of "missions" in terms of providing substantive support to particular governmental functions.

There are complexities in each of the functional roles, but covert
action (i.e., operations to influence conditions in other countries
without the involvement of the United States being acknowledged
or apparent) remains the most controversial.** The Commission
concludes that a capability to conduct covert actions should be
maintained to provide the President with an option short of military
action when diplomacy alone cannot do the job. The capability
must be utilized only where essential to accomplishing important
and identifiable foreign policy objectives and only where a compelling
reason exists why U.S. involvement cannot be disclosed.**

Support to U.S. diplomacy, military operations and defense planning should continue to constitute the principal missions of the Intelligence Community. Countering illicit activities abroad which threaten U.S. interests, including terrorism, narcotics trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international organized crime are also increasingly important missions.

The increase in the availability of publicly available information may permit some diminution in the current level of effort to analyze the economies of other countries. The Commission strongly supports the current policy prohibiting intelligence agencies from engaging in "industrial espionage," i.e., using clandestine means to obtain information from foreign commercial firms for the benefit of a U.S. competitor. It is appropriate, however, for intelligence agencies to report to cognizant officials at the Departments of State and/or Commerce evidence of unfair trade practices being undertaken by or with the knowledge of other governments to the disadvantage of U.S. firms.

Support to law enforcement and regulatory agencies is a legitimate mission but requests for such support must be rigorously evaluated to ensure that intelligence agencies are able to make a useful contribution. The Commission also sees the provision of support to U.S. agencies concerned with environmental and health problems outside the United States as a legitimate, albeit limited, mission.

By law, the principal source of external guidance for intelligence activities has been the National Security Council (NSC). In practice, however, the institutional functions of the NSC with respect to intelligence have varied from one Administration to another. Moreover, the organizational structures created to perform these functions often have foundered due to lack of involvement by senior officials. This has resulted in inconsistent, infrequent guidance, and sometimes no guidance at all, leaving intelligence agencies to fend for themselves.

The institutional role played by the NSC with respect to intelligence activities should not change from Administration to Administration. This role should include providing overall guidance on what intelligence agencies are expected to do (and not do); establishing priorities for intelligence collection and analysis to meet the ongoing needs of the Government; and assessing periodically the performance of intelligence agencies in meeting these needs. Whatever NSC structure may be created to accomplish these ends, it should remain clear that the Director of Central Intelligence reports directly to the President.

**The Commission recommends a two-tier structure to carry out
the institutional role of the National Security Council. A "Committee
on Foreign Intelligence" should be created, chaired by the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and
including the Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Secretary
of Defense, and the Deputy Secretary of State. This Committee
should meet at least semiannually and provide broad guidance on
major issues. A subordinate "Consumers Committee," comprising
representatives of the major consumers and producers of intelligence,
should meet more frequently to provide ongoing guidance for collection
and analysis and periodically to assess the performance of intelligence
agencies in meeting the needs of the Government.**

Global criminal activity carried out by foreign groups-e.g. terrorism, international drug trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international organized crime-is likely to pose increasing dangers to the American people in the years ahead, as perpetrators grow more sophisticated and take advantage of new technologies.

Law enforcement agencies historically have taken the lead in responding to these threats, but where U.S. security is threatened, strategies which employ diplomatic, economic, military, or intelligence measures may be required instead of, or in collaboration with, a law enforcement response. In the Commission's view, it is essential that there be overall direction and coordination of the U.S. response to global crime.

**The Commission recommends the establishment of a single element
of the National Security Council-a Committee on Global Crime-chaired
by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
and including, at a minimum, the Secretaries of State and Defense,
the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence,
to develop and coordinate appropriate strategies to counter such
threats to our national security.**

**For these strategies to be effective, the relationship between
intelligence and law enforcement also must be substantially improved.
In this regard, the Commission recommends: (1) the President should
designate the Attorney General to serve as the spokesperson and
coordinator of the law enforcement community for purposes of formulating
the nation's law enforcement response to global crime; (2) the
authority of intelligence agencies to collect information concerning
foreign persons abroad for law enforcement purposes should be
clarified by Executive Order; (3) the sharing of relevant information
between the two communities should be expanded; and (4) the coordination
of law enforcement and intelligence activities overseas should
be improved.**

The position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was created to pull together and assess relevant information collected by the intelligence elements of the Government. Over the past five decades, the number, size, and cost of those agencies grew. In 1971, President Nixon gave the DCI explicit authority to establish requirements and priorities for intelligence-gathering, and to consolidate the budgets of all "national" intelligence activities into a single budget. Succeeding Presidents issued orders reaffirming and, to a limited degree, expanding these authorities.

Nevertheless, over 85 percent of the intelligence budget is executed by agencies not under the DCI's control. He exercises no line authority over the personnel of agencies other than the CIA and has little recourse when these agencies choose to ignore his directives. He remains an advocate for "national" requirements, but his ability to influence other agencies is largely a function of his persuasiveness rather than his legal authorities. Partly because of their relatively weak position with respect to the Intelligence Community as a whole, most DCIs have devoted the bulk of their time to managing the CIA and serving as intelligence adviser to the President.

The Commission considered many options for dealing with this problem, from abandoning the concept of centralized management altogether to giving the DCI line authority over "national" intelligence agencies within the Department of Defense (DoD). In the end, the Commission concluded that a centralized framework should be retained and that it would be unwise and undesirable to alter the fundamental relationship between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense. The Commission concluded the preferable approach is to strengthen the DCI's ability to provide centralized management of the Intelligence Community.

**To give the DCI more time to manage, the Commission recommends
that the current position of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
should be replaced with two new deputies to the DCI: one for the
Intelligence Community and one with day-to-day responsibility
for managing the CIA. Both would be appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Senate. The deputy for the CIA would be appointed
for a fixed term. To give the DCI greater bureaucratic "weight"
within the Intelligence Community, the DCI would concur in the
appointment (or recommendation for appointment) of the heads of
"national" intelligence elements within the Department
of Defense, and would be consulted with respect to the appointment
of other senior officials within the Intelligence Community. The
heads of two of the "national" intelligence elements-
the Director of the National Security Agency and the Director
of the Central Imagery Office (or its successor agency)- would
be dual-hatted as Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence
for signals intelligence and imagery, respectively. Their performance
in those capacities would be evaluated by the DCI as part of their
rating by the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the DCI would
be given new tools to carry out his responsibilities with respect
to the intelligence budget and new authority over the intelligence
personnel systems. **

While the CIA has had too many operational and management failures, those failures do not represent the norm. Indeed, the Commission found that the CIA has had, and continues to have, important successes in what is a difficult and risky business. The Commission concludes that the functions of the CIA remain valid and are not likely to be performed better elsewhere in the Government. Substantial changes in the Agency's management and method of operation are needed, however, to reduce the likelihood of additional internal breakdowns and instances of poor performance.

**To provide greater continuity in the management of the CIA,
the Commission recommends that the Deputy DCI responsible for
the CIA be appointed to a fixed term with an overall length of
six years, renewable by the President at two-year intervals. To
improve the quality of management, the Commission recommends a
comprehensive approach to the selection, training, and career
progression of CIA managers. Separate career tracks with appropriate
opportunities for advancement ought to be provided for specialists
who are not selected as managers. Clear guidelines should be issued
regarding the types of information that should be brought to the
attention of senior Agency managers, including the DCI and Deputy
DCI.**

The DCI is responsible for approving the budget for "national intelligence," but 96 percent of the funding is contained in the budget of the Department of Defense. In addition, the DCI's budget is but one of three budgets or aggregations that make up the total funding for intelligence. The other two fund "defense-wide" and "tactical" intelligence activities of the Department of Defense.

Programs within the DCI's intelligence budget are not built around a consistent organizing principle. Activities of a similar nature are often funded in several different "programs," making it difficult to assess tradeoffs between programs or to know where best to take cuts, should cuts be necessary. Given that similar intelligence activities also may be funded outside the DCI's budget in either defense-wide or tactical intelligence aggregations, the potential for waste and duplication is exacerbated.

The DCI has had inadequate staff support, inadequate procedures, and inadequate tools to carry out effectively his budgetary responsibilities for "national" intelligence.

**The Commission recommends that the budget for national intelligence
be substantially realigned. Programs grouping similar kinds of
intelligence activities should be created under separate "discipline"
managers reporting to the DCI. For example, all signals intelligence
activities should be grouped under the "discipline management"
of the Director of the National Security Agency. These discipline
managers also should coordinate the funding of activities within
their respective disciplines in the defense-wide and tactical
aggregations of the Defense Department, thus bringing greater
consistency to all intelligence spending. The DCI should be provided
a sufficient staff capability to enable him to assess tradeoffs
between programs or program elements and should establish a uniform,
community-wide resource data base to serve as the principal information
tool for resource management across the Intelligence Community.
**

Unless intelligence is relevant to users and reaches them in time to affect their decisions, the effort to collect and produce it has been wasted. Consumers in policy agencies in particular express dissatisfaction with the intelligence support they receive. While consumers often are uncooperative and unresponsive, producers must attempt to engage them.

**The Commission recommends that intelligence producers take
a more systematic approach to building relationships with consumers
in policy agencies. Key consumers should be identified and consulted
individually with respect to the form of support they desire.
Producers should offer to place analysts directly on the staffs
of consumers at senior levels.**

Relationships with consumers cannot be sustained, however, unless intelligence producers can over time demonstrate they bring something of value to the table. While the Commission found that intelligence analysis consistently adds value to that which is available from public sources, improving the quality of such analysis and ensuring it reaches users in a timely manner are continuing concerns.

**The Commission recommends that the skills and expertise of
intelligence analysts be more consistently and extensively developed,
and that greater use be made of substantive experts outside the
Intelligence Community. A greater effort also should be made to
harness the vast universe of information now available from open
sources. The systems establishing electronic links between producers
and consumers currently being implemented should be given a higher
priority. **

Estimative, or long-term, intelligence came in for particular criticism from consumers.

**The Commission recommends that the existing organization that
prepares intelligence estimates, the National Intelligence Council,
be restructured to become a more broadly based "National
Assessment Center." It would remain under the purview of
the DCI but be located outside the CIA to take advantage of a
broader range of information and expertise.**

Although there have been substantial personnel reductions in virtually every intelligence agency since the end of the Cold War, personnel costs continue to crowd out investments in new technologies and operational initiatives. In some agencies, this phenomenon is beginning to reach crisis proportions. Agencies find themselves with workforces that are not well aligned with their needs but lack the legal authority to streamline and reorient their workforces to current and future requirements.

**The Commission recommends the enactment of new legislation
giving the most severely affected intelligence agencies a one-year
window to "rightsize" their workforces to the needs
of their organization. Such authority would be available only
to the CIA and to intelligence agencies within the Department
of Defense which determine that a reduction of 10 percent or more
of their civilian workforce beyond the present congressionally-mandated
level of reduction is desirable. Agencies which avail themselves
of this authority would identify positions no longer needed for
the health and viability of their organization. The incumbents
of such positions, if close to retirement, would be allowed to
retire with accelerated eligibility. If not close to retirement,
they would be provided generous pay and benefits to leave the
service of the agency concerned, or, with the concurrence of the
agency affected, exchange positions with an employee not in a
position identified for elimination who was close to retirement
and would be allowed to leave under the accelerated retirement
provisions. New employees would be hired to fill some, but not
all, of the vacancies created, providing the skills necessary
to satisfy the current and future needs of the agency involved.
**

Four separate civilian personnel systems exist within the Intelligence Community. These systems discourage rotation between intelligence agencies, which is key to functioning as a "community." In addition, many aspects of personnel and administration could be performed more efficiently if they were centralized.

**The Commission recommends the Director of Central Intelligence
consolidate such functions where possible or, if centralization
is not feasible, issue uniform standards governing such functions.
The Commission also recommends the creation of a single "senior
executive service" for the Intelligence Community under the
overall management of the DCI.**

Responsibility for military intelligence is dispersed among the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military departments, several defense agencies, and, to a lesser degree, the CIA. To provide coherence, a multitude of boards, committees, and working groups exist to develop policy and allocate resources. Although many witnesses suggested creating a single military official with overall responsibility for these activities, the Commission does not endorse this suggestion.

The Commission did find that progress had been made in reducing
duplication in military intelligence analysis and production,
but that the size and functions of the numerous organizations
performing these functions continued to raise concern. **The
Commission recommends that the Secretary of Defense undertake
a comprehensive examination of the size and missions of these
organizations. **

The Commission also found that the organizational arrangements
for providing intelligence support to joint warfighting and for
executing the functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as they pertain
to intelligence should be improved. **The Commission recommends
that the Director for Intelligence (J-2), who now is an officer
assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency, be constituted as
part of the Joint Staff and be made responsible for these functions.
**

The Commission also found that a problem continued to exist with
respect to how information produced by national and tactical intelligence
systems is communicated to commanders in the field. While such
information has become increasingly important for the targeting
of "smart" weapons and reconnaissance assets, it is
not always communicated in a timely way or in a form that can
readily be used. Many organizations and coordinating entities
within DoD are working on aspects of this problem, but no one,
short of the Secretary of Defense, appears to be in charge. **The
Commission recommends that a single focal point be established
on the staff of the Secretary of Defense to bring together all
of the relevant players and interests to solve these problems.
It considers the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence) to be the appropriate official
for this purpose.**

Finally, the Commission believes the costs and difficulties involved
in maintaining a separate infrastructure within DoD for the conduct
of clandestine HUMINT operations are no longer justified. **The
Commission recommends that the clandestine recruitment of human
sources, now carried out by active duty military officers assigned
to the Defense HUMINT Service, be transferred to the CIA, utilizing
military personnel on detail from the DoD as necessary.**

U.S. intelligence capabilities in space represent technological achievements of the highest order, and have, over time, served the nation's interests well. They are highly vulnerable to the failure of a single component system, however, and are very expensive.

**The Commission recommends greater international cooperation
in space reconnaissance through expanded government-to-government
arrangements as a means of dealing with both the vulnerability
and cost of U.S. space systems. In this regard, the Commission
proposes a two-tier approach as a model for such collaboration.
The Commission also recommends that the President reexamine certain
restrictions on the licensing of commercial imaging systems for
foreign sale in order to encourage greater investment by U.S.
firms in such systems.**

**The Commission endorses greater coordination between the space
programs of the Defense Department and Intelligence Community
in order to achieve economies of scale where possible, but recommends
the National Reconnaissance Office be preserved as a separate
organization.**

**The Commission endorses the creation of a National Imagery
and Mapping Agency as recently proposed by the DCI and Secretary
of Defense. **

The Commission found that the United States is deriving great benefit from its bilateral relationships in the intelligence area. While other countries do not have technical capabilities to match those of the United States, they do provide expertise, skills, and access which U.S. intelligence does not have, and, for the most part, appear to be contributing within the limits of their respective national resources. Cooperation in intelligence matters also provides a tangible means of maintaining the overall political relationship with the countries concerned.

Increasingly, the United States acts through multinational organizations or as a part of multinational coalitions. Often it will be in the interest of the United States to share information derived from intelligence with such organizations or coalitions to achieve mutual objectives. While the Intelligence Community, when called upon, does attempt to satisfy these kinds of requirements, a more systematic, comprehensive approach is called for.

**The Commission recommends that the DCI and the Secretaries
of State and Defense develop a strategy that will serve as the
normal basis for sharing information derived from intelligence
in a multinational environment. **

In this report, the Commission recommends a number of actions which it believes would, if implemented, reduce the cost of intelligence. In particular, the Commission believes that until the Intelligence Community reforms its budget structure and process, as recommended in Chapter 7, it will remain poorly positioned to identify potential cost reductions.

At the same time, the Intelligence Community may have needs that are not funded in the projected program, especially in the area of research and development and investments in new technology. Given that downward pressure on spending will continue for the foreseeable future, these needs are not apt to be funded unless savings can be found to finance them within the existing budget. The Commission believes it essential, therefore, that a concerted effort be made by the DCI and heads of agencies within the Intelligence Community to reduce the costs of their operations in order to maintain their overall health and vitality.

Intelligence agencies, compared to other institutions of the federal government, pose unique difficulties when it comes to public accountability. They cannot disclose what they are doing to the public without disclosing what they are doing to their targets. Yet they are institutions within a democracy, responsible to the President, the Congress, and, ultimately, the people. Where accountability can be strengthened without damaging national security, the Commission believes it should be.

**The Commission recommends that the President or his designee
disclose the total amount of money appropriated for intelligence
activities during the current fiscal year and the total amount
being requested for the next fiscal year. The disclosure of additional
detail should not be permitted**.

Because intelligence activities cannot be openly discussed, special oversight arrangements have been created for intelligence agencies in both the Legislative and Executive branches.

In Congress, principal day-to-day oversight is provided by special
committees in the House of Representatives and the Senate, whose
members serve on rotational assignments up to eight years in length.
By and large, these committees appear to provide effective oversight.
**The Commission believes, however, that their oversight would
be strengthened if appointments to the committees were treated
like appointments to other committees, with new members added
as a result of normal attrition. The choice of new members, however,
should continue to be made by the respective congressional leaders.
If this is not feasible, the maximum period of service ought to
be extended to at least ten years.**

In the Executive Branch, the Intelligence Oversight Board, a standing
committee of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,
has overall responsibility for oversight of intelligence agencies,
and each agency either has an Inspector General internal to its
own organization or is part of an organization with an Inspector
General. Only the CIA has an independent statutory Inspector General.
**The Commission recommends a comprehensive review of these arrangements
by the Intelligence Oversight Board to ensure effective performance
of the oversight function.**