Executive Summary


Findings

     The Intelligence Community, with all its components and
disciplines, needs an overarching concept for coordinating
Community requirements, especially when faced with declining
resources and increasingly diverse requirements. 

The Needs Process

     With its focus on Presidential Decision Directive - 35 (PDD-35),
the National Needs Process is an important step towards
dealing effectively with near-term, high-priority customer
requirements, but it may be inadequate for meeting long-term,
worldwide intelligence needs, primarily because PDD-35 has begun to
drive collection and analysis at the expense of lower tier issues.

Defining Future Intelligence Needs

     The Intelligence Community has, correctly, changed its focus
and targeting since the end of the Cold War, but it cannot link
long-term resource planning to future needs until it defines what
its future intelligence needs will likely be. 

     The Intelligence Community cannot base its long-range planning
primarily on high-level policy maker-defined requirements because
policy makers, by their very nature, tend to concentrate on
immediate problems and do not think long-term.

Focus on Top Tier Issues--Creating Intelligence Gaps?

     We are concerned that, with declining resources, collectors
and analysts will continue to focus most resources on top PDD-35
priorities and assume that "someone else," (i.e., State Department,
FBIS, etc.), has the resources to keep a minimal level of coverage
on lower tier issues. 

Losing our Intelligence Base

     The Intelligence Community's ability to maintain an
intelligence "base" on many lower tier issues is threatened not
only because of PDD-35's unintended effect on collection and
production, but also because the Intelligence Community currently
has no mechanism to ensure that a basic level of coverage for all
issues is maintained.  

Support to Military Operations (SMO)

     The demand for intelligence support to military operations
(SMO) threatens to consume an increasing amount of Community
resources at the expense of national intelligence needs.  

Level of Engagement with Policy Makers

     In order to best meet its customers' requirements, the
Intelligence Community must work actively with policy makers to
disaggregate their intelligence needs into smaller, actionable
parts.  Policy makers, in turn, must strive to articulate policy
strategies and objectives more clearly to the Intelligence
Community.  

     Analysts and managers at lower levels must maintain informal
contacts with their customers, because often, mid-level policy
makers can provide in-depth knowledge and further detail for a
particular policy need.    

Budgetary Authority

     Program managers have a disproportionate level of power over
resource and programming issues vis-a-vis Issue Coordinators, many
of whom have little knowledge about the budget process and
collection resource issues.  Thus, Intelligence Community budgeting
tends to meet systems requirements rather than information needs.

"Cross-INT" Coordination

     The Intelligence Community does not manage all-source
collection well, leading to inefficiencies and sometimes
unnecessary duplication in meeting customer needs.  The
establishment of an enhanced Community Management Staff (CMS) (see
Intelligence Community Management staff study) with requirements,
resource, and collection management authority would enable the
Intelligence Community to more efficiently meet Community-wide
requirements. 

Requirements Committees

     There is no formal, ongoing dialogue among the various
requirements committees, and as a result, no overarching, corporate
view of the Community collection process against requirements
targets.  

Recommendations

Community-Wide Approach

     The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), in coordination
with the CMS requirements office, should devise a strategic plan,
that could be updated yearly, if necessary, outlining national
security issues and gaps which the Intelligence Community will
likely face 10 to 15 years into the future. 

Basic Worldwide Coverage  

     The Intelligence Community should fulfill PDD-35 requirements,
but also maintain a basic level of worldwide coverage.  In order to
ascertain the Community's current level of overall coverage, the
DCI should direct the National Intelligence Evaluations Council
(NIEC) to expand the "Comprehensive Capabilities Review" to
evaluate collection and analytical capabilities and gaps against
all tier issues. The review should be updated continuously, taking
the DCI's strategic plan into account.  

     Based on the capabilities review process, the Intelligence
Community, under the auspices of an enhanced CMS should assign
specific collection and analytical components responsibility for
some basic level of coverage of lower-tier countries and issues.  

Cross-INT Coordination

     The establishment of a new Technical Collection Agency (see
Intelligence Community Management staff study) would facilitate
coordination among the various collection disciplines and improve
efficiency in meeting intelligence requirements.  

Requirements Vision for the 21st Century

     The Intelligence Community should implement a "virtual
analytic environment" linking collectors, exploiters, analysts, and
customers electronically, as appropriate, to improve the
Community's responsiveness to customer needs.  

     As a model for achieving electronic connectivity, the
Intelligence Community should look to the military's test-bed
programs for creating a 21st century intelligence operating
environment.  This operating environment, known as JIVA (Joint
Intelligence Virtual Architecture), focuses on creating a virtual
work environment that transcends organizational and stovepipe
boundaries.  A virtual architecture will allow analysts and
collectors to more efficiently work requirements and maintain
continuous contact with policy makers.  This will also allow the
policy and intelligence communities to constantly refine
requirements and refocus resources on those issues of paramount
importance.  

     Managers should function less as intermediaries who control
the information flow to and from policy makers and more as
facilitators who monitor the dialogue between policy makers and
substantive experts.  Managers also should ensure that intelligence
does not become politicized as a result of the close analyst-policy
maker working relationship.  

                INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS PROCESS

Scope of Paper

     This paper takes a macro look at the Intelligence Community
requirements process, specifically, the current structure and
future applicability of the National Intelligence Needs Process. 
The requirements study examines the overall process of formulating
requirements, rather than the specifics of how the specific
collection disciplines, or "INTs," should be used to meet these
requirements in the future.  This study provides guidelines to the
Intelligence Community on how the requirements process should be
structured to ensure that the Community can meet national security
needs of the 21st century.

Introduction

     The principal mission of the Intelligence Community is to
supply policy makers with timely information and analysis that
allows for informed, knowledgeable decisionmaking.  In order to
fulfill this mission, the Intelligence Community must understand
the prioritized intelligence requirements of policy makers.  These
requirements should not only play a central role in defining the
mission, functions, and structure of the Intelligence Community,
they also should drive the Community's collection, analysis, and
budget.  In an ideal world, the Community would be able to fulfill
all actual and potential policy maker requirements in a timely,
comprehensive manner.  Unfortunately, the requirements process is
complicated by the fact that it is often difficult for senior
policy makers to focus on long-term intelligence requirements
because they usually are occupied with more immediate, pressing
issues and because, in many cases, they do not know what
information they want until they actually need it.  In addition to
the difficulty of eliciting policy maker needs, there are
political, bureaucratic, and resource realities that hinder the
Community's ability to anticipate and satisfy all intelligence
needs.  

     The United States has lacked a strategic vision defining its
role in the world since the end of the Cold War.  The requirements
process, in fact, has been made even more difficult by the absence
of any current political consensus on national security issues and
their importance.  As policymakers have struggled to define core
national interests, they have turned to the Intelligence Community
for increased coverage of diverse issues.  Because of the changing--
but not clearly defined--nature of threats and intelligence needs
since the end of the Cold War, the Intelligence Community itself
has been forced to reexamine its roles and missions.  There is
considerable disagreement among experts about whether the
Intelligence Community should focus primarily on supporting
national security policy makers or whether it should support other
customers, such as law enforcement agencies, economic/trade
officials, or environmental agencies.  Still others argue that
intelligence support to military operations (SMO) should be the
primary function of intelligence.  These debates over national
security priorities and the Community's mission, requirements, and
customer base are not easily resolved.  Nonetheless, the
Intelligence Community's function in aiding the national security
decisionmaking process must be defined so that it can properly
target its resources against the most important foreign policy
challenges.  

     Ideally, requirements should reflect policy makers'
prioritized intelligence needs and help the Community devise long-term
planning and investment strategies.  However, without a
strategic national security policy vision to guide it, the
Intelligence Community often is forced to prioritize requirements
itself.  In addition, because policy makers often do not know what
intelligence they need or want until they actually need it, the
Intelligence Community must try to anticipate policy maker needs. 
This can only be achieved if the Community, through an ongoing
requirements dialogue with senior policy makers, sets the minimum
collection and analysis parameters not only for the most important,
immediate strategic needs, but also for long-term needs.
Experienced mid-level analysts also should be allowed to formulate
requirements based on their expertise and through constant dialogue
with policy makers at various levels, as well as with intelligence
collectors and other analysts.  Unfortunately, the Community's
bureaucratic structure often impedes this type of free-flowing
dialogue and interaction at the working level.

     In addition to political and bureaucratic issues, resource
concerns also have an effect on the Community's ability to meet
policy maker requirements.  In the post-Cold War era, requirements
have become increasingly diverse; at the same time, the Community
has been forced to downsize considerably.  Despite fewer resources,
the Intelligence Community is expected to have at least basic
worldwide coverage of most countries and issues while maintaining
in-depth knowledge of high-priority issues.  In order to achieve
this level of coverage, the Intelligence Community may have to
pursue a dual requirements strategy to deal with increasing
requirements -- a day-to-day one with good breadth, but little
depth, to cover usual areas of interest, and a second one with
narrow focus and great depth for crises or issues of ongoing,
intense interest.  

     Maintaining an effective requirements process has been a
continuous struggle for the Intelligence Community.  During the
Cold War, when a majority of Community resources were targeted
against the Soviet Union, having an effective requirements process
was less important than it is now.  Since the end of the Cold War,
the growing tangle of new requirements, some of which are of the
"highest priority" for only a short time, has left the Intelligence
Community without clear guidance on which to base its resource
allocation and planning.  Lacking a cohesive foreign policy
strategy to guide it and faced with declining resources and
increasingly diverse customer demands, the Intelligence Community
needs a flexible, dynamic requirements process to help it fulfill
its principal mission -- to provide policy makers with timely,
useful, objective intelligence.

Background:  The Requirements System Today -- The National Needs
Process, PDD-35 and Strategic Intelligence Reviews

     The current system for intelligence requirements, known as the
"Needs Process," is derived from Presidential Decision Directive-35
(PDD-35), signed by the President in March 1995, and the "Strategic
Intelligence Reviews" (SIRs), first published by the National
Intelligence Council (NIC) in May 1994.  The SIRs identify core
near-term (12-18 months) intelligence issues, priorities, and gaps
for various geographic regions and transnational issues and assess
the value of current collector contributions against those issues. 
The SIRs also identify "enduring" intelligence needs  (i.e., of
concern for the next three to seven years) to help program managers
do long-term budgeting.  PDD-35, which outlines a tiered structure
of the President's prioritized intelligence needs, provides
collection and analysis guidance to the Intelligence Community. 
After PDD-35 was signed, an interagency task force made
recommendations on how to align "enduring" intelligence challenges
with the PDD-35 tier structure.

     The responsibility for writing the SIRs belongs to 18 Issue
Coordinators who meet frequently with high-level policy makers./1/
The function of Issue Coordinators is to understand key customer
needs, develop a prioritized statement of those needs, evaluate the
current collection and analytical activities related to those
needs, assess the intelligence value of future programs, and
facilitate community responses to critical shortfalls.  In the
process of writing the most recent set of SIRs (November 1995),
Issue Coordinators met with over 100 high-level intelligence
consumers/2/ in order to get an understanding of their most important
needs.

Findings

The Needs Process

     The Intelligence Community, with all its components and
disciplines, needs an overarching concept for coordinating
Community requirements, especially when faced with declining
resources and increasingly diverse requirements.  Leadership from
the highest levels of the Intelligence Community is necessary to
ensure that policy makers' most important needs are being met and
that the Community is poised to cope with the intelligence
challenges of the 21st century.  With its focus on PDD-35, the
National Needs Process is an important step towards dealing
effectively with near-term, high-priority customer requirements,
but it may be inadequate for meeting long-term, worldwide
intelligence needs.  In fact, if the Intelligence Community focuses
primarily on policy maker-defined requirements, it cannot
adequately prepare for the needs of the future because policy
makers, by their very nature, tend to concentrate on immediate
problems and do not think long-term.  

Defining Future Intelligence Needs

     The Intelligence Community has, correctly, changed its focus
and targeting since the end of the Cold War.  It cannot however,
hope to link long-term resource planning to future needs until it
has a corporate understanding of what future intelligence needs
will likely be and how its resources currently are used to meet
intelligence requirements.  Although there is disagreement about
what will constitute a threat to U.S. national security in the
future, the Community must, at a minimum, be capable of dealing
with issues such as foreign denial and deception, proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, ethnic and regional
conflict, and economic competitiveness.  Throughout the Cold War,
the Intelligence Community could design systems aimed at
country-specific targets, (i.e., "denied areas"), but the national
security needs of the future do not allow us to look at resources on a
strictly nation-state basis.  Indeed, the Community must still plan
for meeting requirements on "enduring" hard targets, such as North
Korea.  However, the Community also must design, invest, and plan
its future systems and capabilities around "types" of threats, such
as proliferation, rather than around specific threats necessarily
tied to a particular country or region. 

Focus on Top Tier Issues -- Creating Intelligence Gaps?

     Under any system that prioritizes requirements, collectors and
analysts will naturally put most resources towards the highest
priority issues.  While PDD-35 has focused the IC on important
near-term, high priority requirements, it has begun to drive
intelligence collection and production at the expense of lower tier
issues.  In response to PDD-35, many intelligence agencies and
components are rushing out to fulfill PDD-35 requirements while
ignoring other, less pressing requirements, even when they are
better equipped to address the lower tier requirements.  If PDD-35
continues to drive the intelligence process, the Community may face
another Rwanda or Somalia situation -- that is, a country that had
little, if any, intelligence coverage suddenly becoming a top tier
priority.  

     Although PDD-35 explicitly states that it is not meant to be
an exhaustive requirements list, we are concerned that, with
declining resources, collectors and analysts will continue to focus
most resources on top tier issues and assume that "someone else,"
(i.e., State Department, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service
(FBIS), etc.), has the resources to keep a minimal level of
coverage on lower tier issues. The Intelligence Community cannot
necessarily rely on other government agencies to fill its own
collection gaps because the State Department, like the Intelligence
Community, is being downsized and seeing reductions in its
diplomatic reporting capabilities.  In addition, in many of these
lower-tier countries, particularly those in the Third World, open
sources are often inadequate and inaccurate sources of information. 
Furthermore, FBIS has not been spared from downsizing and is also
concentrating its efforts on top tier issues.  

Losing our Intelligence Base

     The Intelligence Community's ability to maintain an
intelligence "base" on many lower tier issues is threatened not
only because of PDD-35's unintended effect on collection and
production, but also because the Intelligence Community currently
has no mechanism to ensure a basic level of coverage for all tiers. 
In addition, the demand for SMO threatens to consume an increasing
amount of intelligence resources at the expense of national
intelligence needs.  With the erosion of our intelligence "base,"
(i.e., the ability to monitor political, military, economic, and
social developments around the world), comes serious consequences
for the Intelligence Community's ability to "surge" and do long-term
analysis.  Under the current Needs Process, there is no
corporate view of collection and production management that is
necessary to ensure that collectors maintain databases of lower
tier information and that enough analysts are available to monitor
lower-tier issues and potentially important long-term trends. 
Maintaining an intelligence base is particularly critical when, as
we have experienced several times in the recent past, lower tier
countries rapidly and unexpectedly become top priority issues for
policy makers.

Support to Military Operations

     In addition to fulfilling numerous top priority requirements,
collectors and analysts are expected to develop and/or update data
for lower-tier countries where U.S. forces may have to operate in
the future.  SMO certainly is an extremely important mission for
the Intelligence Community.  However, the effort required to obtain
detailed information sufficient to support short-notice military
operations in scores of countries would strain the Community's
ability to stay abreast of more pressing issues.  In addition, the
proposal that the military define the "essential elements of
information" it needs for potential operations in these countries
raises the specter of an endless list of requirements being levied
on the Intelligence Community.  In order for the Community to be
able to cope with SMO requirements, the level of detail needed for
SMO in lower-tier countries must be strictly defined.  Furthermore,
SMO requirements should not stand alone, apart from the other
intelligence requirements.  Currently, the Needs Process demands,
in some cases, that the Community spend more time gathering
intelligence for potential SMO than for monitoring other
developments that might help policy makers avert the need to ever
have to deploy forces.  If a country is important enough to have
SMO requirements assigned to it, then national intelligence
consumers also should have enough information to assess the
country's general economic, political, and social situation.  

Level of Engagement with Policy Makers

     Under the current system, most Issue Coordinators have ongoing
communication with high-level policy makers about strategic policy
goals, which are then formulated into overall Community-wide
requirements.  Issue Coordinators attend National Security Council
(NSC) meetings frequently and typically meet with intelligence
customers at the Undersecretary or Deputy Secretary level at the
State Department and the command level in the Department of Defense
(DoD).  While high-level contact is vital to the requirements
process, analysts and managers at lower levels must maintain
informal contacts with their customers because, often, mid-level
policy makers can provide in-depth knowledge and further detail for
a particular policy need.  This type of informal dialogue also must
exist between collectors and analysts and among analysts in
different Community components.  

Policy Detail

     Just as important as the need for constant Intelligence
Community dialogue with customers is the need for the Community to
understand the details of policy makers' goals. The Community must
work actively with policy makers to disaggregate their intelligence
needs into smaller, actionable parts and should understand how
policy makers plan to use the intelligence they receive so it can
devise the most appropriate collection strategy to satisfy that
need.  With an issue such as proliferation, for example, different
collection assets might be used depending on whether the policy
goal is to intercept weapons shipments, influence key foreign 
leaders to not proliferate, apply sanctions against a proliferator,
or simply to monitor developments in a country's weapons industry.

Budgetary Authority

     We are concerned that program managers--whose interests focus
more on their share of the budget than on fulfilling policy maker
requirements--have a disproportionate level of power over resource
and programming issues.  Many Issue Coordinators, particularly the
NIOs, are not knowledgeable about the budget process and collection
resource issues and lack sufficient staffs capable of handling
these issues.  As a result, they have to rely on program managers
more extensively to reprogram resources in surge situations and to
set future systems requirements.  This power imbalance has resulted
in the Community budgeting to meet systems requirements rather than
information needs, which may adversely affect the Community's
ability to fulfill policy maker requirements.  

"Cross-INT" Coordination

     Another concern about the Needs Process is the issue of cross-INT
coordination.  (This issue is dealt with in detail in the
Collection Synergy staff study, but merits some attention here as
well.)   The Intelligence Community does not manage all-source
collection well, leading to inefficiencies and sometimes
unnecessary duplication in meeting customer needs.  Management by
"stovepipes", rather than across disciplines (i.e., corporately),
makes it difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate collection
tradeoffs, not only within collection disciplines, but among them
as well.  Cross-INT coordination would be especially helpful for
dealing with "hard targets," which often require coordinated,
multi-disciplinary attacks.  

Requirements Committees

     A related issue of concern is the level of communication and
coordination among the various committees that handle requirements
for each of the collection disciplines.  The requirements
committees meet with each other informally three to four times a
year to discuss how various collectors are approaching a particular
intelligence need, but there is no formal, ongoing dialogue and, as
a result, no overarching view of the Community collection process
against requirements targets.  Further complicating coordination
efforts is the fact that the requirements committees have different
missions and authorities; some committees have the authority to
task collectors while others only have the authority to request
reporting on various topics.  

Recommendations

Community-Wide Approach

     The Intelligence Community must define the nature of its
future strategic requirements, beyond looking just at intelligence
gaps, in order to determine what platforms will be needed to meet
those requirements.  The DCI, in coordination with the CMS
requirements office, should devise a strategic plan, that could be
updated yearly, if necessary, outlining national security issues
and gaps that the Intelligence Community will likely face 10 to 15
years into the future.  It should include, but not be limited to,
hard targets and transnational issues.  In addition to looking at
traditional adversarial threats (i.e., states and organizations
with the ability and will to harm U.S. interests), the Community
must focus on how to collect against systemic threats (i.e., those
which derive from anomalies or instabilities in economic, political
or social systems) and against new vulnerabilities, such as
information warfare.  Based on this strategic plan, the CMS
requirements office, with input from senior intelligence customers
and all-source analysts, should formulate Community-wide
requirements and devise a collection strategy to meet those needs. 
By preparing a strategic plan for the future, the Intelligence
Community can assist policy makers in prioritizing their own needs. 

Basic Worldwide Coverage

     The Intelligence Community must maintain its intelligence base
and its ability to surge.  We are well aware of the fact that many
Intelligence Community components already are stretched to the
limit in handling top-tier issues and that the situation will
likely get worse in some agencies because of restricted hiring
practices.  At the same time, however, many in the policy community
still expect the Intelligence Community to have at least basic
worldwide coverage and the ability to surge at a moment's notice
during crises.  In order to ascertain the Community's current level
of overall coverage, the DCI should direct the National
Intelligence Evaluations Council (NIEC)/3/ to expand the
"Comprehensive Capabilities Review" to evaluate collection and
analytical capabilities and gaps against all tier issues. The
review should be updated continuously, taking the DCI's strategic
plan into account.  Assessing intelligence capabilities on an
ongoing basis will help bring policy maker expectations into line
with Community capabilities and will serve as a mechanism for
facilitating cross-INT tradeoffs to ensure that the most important
areas are covered by collectors and analysts.  A dynamic
capabilities review process also would be extremely helpful for the
Committee in dealing with budgetary issues and for other
congressional committees with jurisdiction over national security
and international relations issues.  

     Based on the capabilities review process, the Intelligence
Community, under the auspices of an enhanced CMS,/4/ should assign
specific collection and analytical components responsibility for
some basic level of coverage of lower-tier countries and issues. 
Because open source information may be the most accessible, least
expensive tool for obtaining worldwide coverage, the Community
should work with the State Department to coordinate diplomatic and
open source collection.   FBIS's ability to collect and analyze
adequate information for lower-tier countries also should be
evaluated so that the Intelligence Community and Congress can
determine what additional resources FBIS will need in the future to
meet this important mission. A healthy FBIS is needed to rebuild
some of the Community's lost capabilities resulting from the
cutbacks in the CIA and State Department's overseas presence.

Cross-INT Coordination

     In order to encourage efficiency in meeting intelligence
requirements, the "catwalks" among the collection disciplines must
be strengthened.  The establishment of a new Technical Collection
Agency (TCA)/5/ would facilitate coordination among the various
collection disciplines and improve the Community's responsiveness
to policy maker needs.  An enhanced CMS, through coordination among
its proposed requirements, collection management, and resource
management offices, would serve as the forum for ensuring that
synergistic, cross-INT coordination is utilized to best meet
requirements.

Requirements Vision for the 21st Century

     The above recommendations are important for effecting
immediate change in the current requirements system.  However, the
Community must go even further to prepare for challenges it will
face 10 to 15 years into the future.  The Community probably will
still need a high-level body to formulate and monitor macro
community-wide requirements that provide important guidance to
program and agency managers.  However, mid-level analysts, working
in close and continuous contact with policy makers, collectors, and
other analysts should be allowed to work detailed requirements.  In
order to empower analysts to help develop these detailed
requirements, analysts must be connected electronically at all
levels with both policy makers and intelligence collectors. 
(Analysts should serve as the middleman between policy makers
and collectors; collectors and policy makers working
non-military issues should not be connected electronically.)

     As a model for achieving electronic connectivity, the
Intelligence Community should look to the military's test-bed
programs for creating a 21st century intelligence operating
environment.  This operating environment, known as JIVA (Joint
Intelligence Virtual Architecture), focuses on creating a virtual
work environment that transcends organizational and stovepipe
boundaries.  A virtual architecture, that eliminates the need for
physically co-locating analysts, will allow analysts and collectors
to more efficiently work requirements and maintain continuous
contact with policymakers.  Breaking down these barriers will help
synergy in all areas -- collection, analysis, production, and
requirements formulation and vetting.  By providing more
flexibility and less bureaucratic rigidity, electronic connectivity
will allow the policy and intelligence communities to continually
reevaluate requirements and refocus resources on those issues of
paramount importance.  At the same time, by co-locating analysts
with policy makers, either virtually or physically, analysts will
better be able to understand detailed policy needs and anticipate
what kind of intelligence policy makers may need in the future.

     In such a future construct, managers will function less as
intermediaries who control the information flow to and from policy
makers.  Instead, they will become facilitators who monitor the
dialogue between policy makers and substantive experts to ensure
that Community resources are appropriately allocated to priority
tasks and to help say "no" to requests when resources are not
available.  Managers also would perform the vital function of
ensuring that intelligence does not become politicized as a result
of the close analyst-policy maker working relationship.  Indeed, if
the system functions correctly, analysts and collectors, with some
guidance from upper management, should be able to respond quickly
and objectively to policy maker needs and be able to anticipate
future needs that  policy makers have not yet articulated. 
However, if the Intelligence Community does not take advantage of
technological developments and reduce bureaucratic barriers, it
will fail to meet its basic mission of providing policy makers with
timely, objective, and useful intelligence.





                    ------------------------------

                               FOOTNOTES

     /1/The Issues Coordinators are the National Intelligence
Officers (NIOs) from the NIC, the Center Chiefs (ACIS, CNC,
NACIC, and CTC), and "key officers" from the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

     /2/Throughout the paper, the terms customer, consumer, and
policy maker are used interchangeably to refer to those U.S.
Government officials who use intelligence products in the course
of their work.

     /3/See the Intelligence Community Management staff study.

     /4/See the Intelligence Community Management staff study.

     /5/See the Intelligence Community Management staff study.