[Precedents of the U.S. House of Representatives (2017 series), Volume 3, Chapters 7 - 9]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

115th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document No. 115-62


 
                                       PRECEDENTS
                                       
                                         OF THE

                                     United States   
                                    
                                 House of Representatives
                                 
                                 

                                         By                                            
                                         
                                  CHARLES W. JOHNSON, III, J.D.
                                  
                              Parliamentarian of the House, 1994-2004
                              

                               JOHN V. SULLIVAN, J.D.
                               
                         Parliamentarian of the House,
                         
                                  2004-2012
                                  

                           THOMAS J. WICKHAM, Jr., J.D.
                           
                         Parliamentarian of the House, 2012-2020

                              JASON A. SMITH, J.D.
                              
                            Parliamentarian of the House,
                            
                                 2020-



                                 VOLUME 3


                  COVERING PRECEDENTS THROUGH THE  
                     END OF THE FIRST SESSION  OF  THE 
                   117TH  CONGRESS  AND  EMPLOYING 
                 CITATIONS TO THE RULES AND TO THE 
                 HOUSE RULES AND MANUAL OF THAT CONGRESS





  
                            ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS                                    


                            Acknowledgements

    Acknowledgment is made with appreciation to current and former 
staff of the Office of Compilation of Precedents, including Allison 
Torres-Cherry, Timothy Abel, Andrew Neal, Catherine Moran, and 
Parliamentarians Emeriti Charles W. Johnson and Thomas J. Wickham, 
Jr.--and all the staff at the Office of the Parliamentarian--Anne 
Gooch, Julia Cook, Benjamin Osheroff, Christina Reid, Norma Volkmer, 
Lloyd Jenkins, Kristen Donahue, and Matthew Kowalewski for their 
diligent annotation and documentation of the precedents, and their 
editorial contributions to this volume. Significant assistance to this 
work was provided by Denise Altland, detail from the Government 
Publishing Office, and by interns Victoria Murphy, Brigid Harrington, 
Alexander Lopez-Hernandez, Freddy Castillo, Elizabeth McCarthy, and 
Matthew Novack.
    We would also like to regretfully acknowledge the passing within 
the last year of two colleagues who contributed significantly to this 
publication and to the House of Representatives as an institution--
former Parliamentarian John V. Sullivan and former staff member of the 
Office of Compilation of Precedents Bryan Feldblum. John was a 
wonderful Parliamentarian whose imprint on the precedents of the House 
is clear throughout this and other volumes in this series. Bryan's 
innovative approach to technological change spearheaded advancements in 
the process for annotating and documenting the precedents. They will be 
greatly missed by their colleagues.

                                                        Jason A. Smith
                                                        Max A. Spitzer

  December 2022
  
  
                               iii
  


      Citation Notes for Precedents of the United States House of 
                            Representatives

    For Precedents of the United States House of Representatives, cite 
to Parliamentarian last name, chapter, section number:
    Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 1 Sec. 1.1; Precedents (Smith) Ch. 8 
Sec. 7.1
    (Note: references to future volumes of this series will be denoted 
with underscores (e.g., Precedents (____) Ch. 35.))

    For Hinds' and Cannon's Precedents, cite to volume, series, section 
number:
    1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 101; 7 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 3900

    For Deschler's Precedents, Deschler-Brown Precedents, Deschler-
Brown-Johnson Precedents, and Deschler-Brown-Johnson-Sullivan 
Precedents, cite to Deschler's Precedents, chapter, section number:
    Deschler's Precedents Ch. 11 Sec. 1.1
    
    
    
    
                                          V
                                          
                                          
                                          
                       TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS
                                   
                                          


      A. (or A.2d)              Atlantic Reporter                  
      ad hoc                    For a particular purpose or end    
      A.L.R.                    American Law Reports Annotated     
      Am Jur                    American Jurisprudence             
      amend.                    Amendment to the Constitution      
      Annals of Cong.           Annals of Congress (1789ï¿½091824)     
      App. D.C.                 Appeal Cases, District of Columbia 
      App. Div.                 Appellate Division                 
      art.                      Article of the Constitution        
      C.A.                      Court of Appeals                   
      Cert.                     Certiorari                         
      cf.                       Compare with                       
      CFR                       Code of Federal Regulations        
      Ch.                       Chapter                            
      Cir.                      Circuit Court of Appeals (federal) 
      Cir. Ct. App.             Circuit Court of Appeals (state)   
      cl.                       clause                             
      Comm.                     Committee                          
      Cong.                     Congress                           
      Cong. Deb.                Congressional Debates (1824ï¿½091837)  
      Cong. Globe               Congressional Globe (1833ï¿½091873)    
      Cong. Rec.                Congressional Record               
      contra                    Contradictory authority            
      Crim. App.                Court of Criminal Appeals          
      Ct. Cl.                   Court of Claims                    
      D.                        District Court (federal)           
      daily ed.                 Daily edition of Record            
      e.g.                      For example                        
      et al.                    Omission of party in case name     
      et seq.                   And the following                  
      ex rel.                   On the relation of. . .            
      Exec. Comm.               Executive Communication            
      F (or F2d)                Federal Reporter                   
      FCA                       Federal Code Annotated             
      Fed. Reg.                 Federal Register                   
      FRD                       Federal Rules Decisions            
      F Supp                    Federal Supplement                 
      H. Con. Res.              House Concurrent Resolution        
      H. Doc.                   House Document                     
      H.J. Res.                 House Joint Resolution             
      H. Jour.                  House Journal                      
      H.R.                      House Bill                         
      H. Rept.                  House Report                       
      H. Res.                   House Resolution    
      
      
                                         vii
      
      
      
      
      Id.                       Citation to same authority as in immedi- 
                                  ately preceding citation               
      i.e.                      That is                                  
      In re                     In the matter of . . .                   
      infra                     Subsequent section or chapter            
      inter alia                Among others                             
      L.Ed (or L.Ed2d)          Lawyers' Edition, U.S. Supreme Court     
                                  Reports                                  
      L.J.                      Law Journal                              
      L. Rev.                   Law Review                               
      Mem.                      Disposition of case without opinion      
      N.E. (or N.E.2d)          North Eastern Reporter                   
      N.W. (or N.W.2d)          North Western Reporter                   
      Op. Att'y Gen.            Attorney General's Opinions              
      P. (or P.2d)              Pacific Reporter                         
      Per Curiam                Disposition of case with short opinion   
      Priv. L.                  Private Law                              
      Pub. L.                   Uncodified Statute or Session Law        
      S.                        Senate Bill                              
      S. Con. Res.              Senate Concurrent Resolution             
      S. Ct.                    Supreme Court Reporter                   
      S. Doc.                   Senate Document                          
      S.E. (or S.E.2d)          South Eastern Reporter                   
      Sess.                     Session                                  
      Sic                       Mistake in original of quoted material   
      S.J. Res.                 Senate Joint Resolution                  
      S. Jour.                  Senate Journal                           
      S. Rept.                  Senate Report                            
      S. Res.                   Senate Resolution                        
      So. (or So.2d)            Southern Reporter                        
      Stat.                     Statutes at large                        
      Sup. Ct.                  Supreme Court                            
      supra                     Prior section or chapter                 
      S.W. (or S.W.2d)          South Western Reporter                   
      U.S.                      United States Supreme Court  Reports     
      USC (or USCA)             United States Code (or United States     
                                  Code Annotated)                        
      U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.     United States Code Congressional and     
        News                      Administrative News                    
      U.S. Const.               United States Constitution
      U.S.L.W.                  United States Law Week        
      
      
      
                                    viii
         
  


                                Contents




                           Chapter 7. The Members

A. Membership of the House

   Sec.  1. In General; Scope of Chapter
   Sec.  2. Delegates and Resident Commissioners

B. Qualifications and Disqualifications

   Sec.  3. Qualifications
   Sec.  4. Incompatible Offices

C. Salary and Benefits

   Sec.  5. Salary and Benefits; Compensation
   Sec.  6. Other Benefits; Office and Staff

D. Immunities

   Sec.  7. Immunities of Members Generally; Service of Process
   Sec.  8. Speech or Debate Immunity
   Sec.  9. Immunity from Arrest



Chapter 8. Elections and Election Campaigns

A. Apportionment; Voting Districts

   Sec.  1. Constitutional and Statutory Requirements
   Sec.  2. Districting and Redistricting

B. Time, Place, and Regulation of Elections

   Sec.  3. State and Federal Jurisdiction over House Elections
   Sec.  4. Vacancies; Continuity of Operations

C. Campaign Practices

   Sec.  5. Election Campaigns and Campaign Financing Regulation
   Sec.  6. The Federal Election Commission
   Sec.  7. House Ethics Rules



Chapter 9. Election Contests

A. Jurisdiction and Authority

   Sec.  1. Constitutional Provisions; Historical Background
   Sec.  2. Statutory Provisions; Former Statutory Provisions
   Sec.  3. State and Local Election Procedures
   Sec.  4. Jurisdiction: House, Committees, and Courts

B. Grounds and Defenses

   Sec.  5. Grounds for Initiating a Contest
   Sec.  6. Defenses to a Contest

C. Procedure

   Sec.  7. Standing; Parties
   Sec.  8. Notice of Contest
   Sec.  9. Other Pleadings
   Sec. 10. Taking Testimony; Depositions

D. Committee and House Consideration

   Sec. 11. Burden of Proof; Presumptions
   Sec. 12. Ballot Issues; Recounts
   Sec. 13. Disposition of Contests

E. Summaries of Election Contests, 1973-2020

   Sec. 14. Ninety-third Congress, 1973-1974
   Sec. 15. Ninety-fourth Congress, 1975-1976
   Sec. 16. Ninety-fifth Congress, 1977-1978
   Sec. 17. Ninety-sixth Congress, 1979-1980
   Sec. 18. Ninety-seventh Congress, 1981-1982
   Sec. 19. Ninety-eighth Congress, 1983-1984
   Sec. 20. Ninety-ninth Congress, 1985-1986
   Sec. 21. One Hundredth Congress, 1987-1988
   Sec. 22. One Hundred First Congress, 1989-1990
   Sec. 23. One Hundred Second Congress, 1991-1992
   Sec. 24. One Hundred Third Congress, 1993-1994
   Sec. 25. One Hundred Fourth Congress, 1995-1996
   Sec. 26. One Hundred Fifth Congress, 1997-1998
   Sec. 27. One Hundred Sixth Congress, 1999-2000
   Sec. 28. One Hundred Seventh Congress, 2001-2002
   Sec. 29. One Hundred Eighth Congress, 2003-2004
   Sec. 30. One Hundred Ninth Congress, 2005-2006
   Sec. 31. One Hundred Tenth Congress, 2007-2008
   Sec. 32. One Hundred Eleventh Congress, 2009-2010
   Sec. 33. One Hundred Twelfth Congress, 2011-2012
   Sec. 34. One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, 2013-2014
   Sec. 35. One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, 2015-2016
   Sec. 36. One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, 2017-2018
   Sec. 37. One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, 2019-2020
   Sec. 38. One Hundred Seventeenth Congress, 2021-2022








                               CHAPTER 7

                              The Members
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commentary and editing by Max Spitzer, J.D., LL.M.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                A. Membership of the House

                  Sec.  1. In General; Scope of Chapter

                  Sec.  2. Delegates and Resident Commissioners

                B. Qualifications and Disqualifications

                  Sec.  3. Qualifications

                  Sec.  4. Incompatible Offices

                C. Salary and Benefits

                  Sec.  5. Salary and Benefits; Compensation

                  Sec.  6. Other Benefits; Office and Staff

                D. Immunities

                  Sec.  7. Immunities of Members Generally; Service of 
                    Process

                  Sec.  8. Speech or Debate Immunity

                  Sec.  9. Immunity from Arrest



                       A. Membership of the House



Sec. 1. In General; Scope of Chapter

    Membership in the House of Representatives affords certain rights 
and privileges not conferred on ordinary citizens and other non-
Members. Many of these privileges derive from constitutional 
provisions. Others can be found in statute, while still others have 
evolved from the standing rules, precedents, and customs of the House. 
This chapter explores the concept of membership in the House and its 
attendant privileges and prerogatives. Other chapters may contain 
related material, as described below.
    As early as the 18th century, the House recognized the status of 
certain nonvoting representatives from United States territory that had 
not been admitted to statehood. These individuals, styled ``Delegates'' 
or ``Resident Commissioners,'' while not Members of the House, do enjoy 
many of the same rights and privileges as Members. The differences 
between Delegates, Resident Commissioners, and Members are discussed in 
Section 2 of this chapter.
    Before becoming a Member of the House, an individual must first 
campaign for the office and win election in their district. The conduct 
of election campaigns, including legal and ethical requirements, state 
and Federal jurisdiction over elections, and the filling of vacancies 
by special election, are discussed in Chapter 8 of this 
series.(1) This chapter examines the qualifications 
necessary to become a Member, and the conditions that may exist for an 
individual to be disqualified from holding a seat in the 
House.(2) It also explores the concept of other offices that 
are constitutionally incompatible with service in the 
House.(3) Unsuccessful candidates for seats in the House may 
choose to challenge the election, on the basis that the election was 
invalid due to mistake, fraud, or other irregularities. Such election 
contests are discussed in Chapter 9 of this series.(4)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. Chapter 8 also explores the constitutional and statutory 
        requirements for creating congressional districts and adjusting 
        those districts following the decennial census.
 2. See Sec. 3, infra.
 3. See Sec. 4, infra.
 4. Chapter 9 contains descriptions of election contests initiated 
        between the 93d and 117th Congresses. For election contests in 
        earlier Congresses, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 (and the 
        appendix thereto); 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. Sec. 90-189; 1 
        Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 634-844; and 2 Hinds' Precedents 
        Sec. Sec. 845-1135.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An individual does not assume all of the privileges and 
prerogatives of membership until they take the oath of office, as 
required by the Constitution. Oath-taking procedures, including the 
composition of the Clerk's roll of Members-elect and the process for 
challenging the right to be sworn, are discussed in Chapter 2 of this 
series.
    In addition to constitutional privileges (such as Speech or Debate 
immunity(5) and Immunity from Arrest),(6) this 
chapter also reviews statutory privileges such as the franking 
privilege.(7) It further examines how Members supervise and 
direct their congressional offices,(8) and how they are 
compensated for their public service.(9) The House's 
disciplinary procedures and ethics requirements sometimes intersect 
with those topics. For example, allegations of misuse of official 
resources may give rise to an investigation conducted by the Committee 
on Ethics.(10)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. See Sec. 8, infra.
 6. See Sec. 9, infra.
 7. See Sec. 6, infra.
 8. Id.
 9. See Sec. 5, infra.
10. Violations of campaign practices may also be investigated by the 
        Committee on Ethics. For more on the House's disciplinary 
        procedures generally, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 12; and 
        Precedents (____) Ch. 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The privileges and prerogatives of Members (and the House itself) 
are defended via formal House action, which usually takes the form of a 
simple resolution. Such resolutions may be considered under special 
procedures pursuant to rule IX,(11) which relate to all 
questions of the privileges of the House.(12) Resolutions 
raised as questions of privilege may be used to defend individual 
Member privileges (e.g., permitting a particular Member to respond to 
judicial process)(13) or privileges of the House more 
generally (e.g., the House's constitutional prerogative to originate 
revenue legislation).(14)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. See House Rules and Manual Sec. Sec. 698-713 (2021).
12. For more on questions of privilege generally, see Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 11; and Precedents (____) Ch. 11.
13. For more on service of process on Members, see Sec. 7, infra.
14. For more on the House's institutional prerogatives, see Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 13; and Precedents (____) Ch. 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the major party organizations in the House (the Democratic 
Caucus and the Republican Conference) have long played a role in the 
House's institutional structure.(15) Many aspects of Member 
activity are thus regulated not by formal House rule but by internal 
Caucus or Conference rules. The extent to which Member seniority is 
taken into account is now largely a matter of internal party caucus 
procedures. Such procedures may provide for particular committee 
rankings on the basis of seniority in the House.(16) House 
rules and precedents are largely silent on the issue of seniority, 
though certain longstanding traditions continue to be observed. For 
instance, the Member with the longest continuous service (called the 
Dean of the House) is the Member traditionally called upon to 
administer the oath of office to a newly-elected 
Speaker.(17) Ceremonial committees (such as escort 
committees or funereal committees) are often named in order of 
seniority.(18) The most senior Member of a state's 
delegation will typically make announcements to the House regarding the 
status of that delegation (for example, announcing the death of a 
Member from that state).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. For more on party organization generally, see Deschler's Precedents 
        Ch. 3; and Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 3.
16. See, e.g., Rules Committee Print 115-37, Democratic Caucus, 115th 
        Cong., Rule 19(F). See also Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 3 
        Sec. 8.3.
17. See Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 1 Sec. 4. See also Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 1 Sec. Sec. 6, 6.4; and Deschler's Precedents 
        Ch. 7 Sec. 2.20. For earlier precedents noting inconsistencies 
        in prior practice, see 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. Sec. 6, 7; 
        and 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 81, 131-133.
18. See, e.g., Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 2; and Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 38 Sec. 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



Sec. 2. Delegates and Resident Commissioners

    Although only duly-sworn Members of the House enjoy the full 
spectrum of privileges and prerogatives of membership, Congress has 
chosen to invest others with the ability to participate in House 
proceedings as nonvoting representatives.(1) Such 
individuals have been styled ``Delegates'' or ``Resident 
Commissioners''(2) and represent nonstate areas of the 
United States, such as territories, commonwealths, or the Federal 
district.(3) The positions of nonvoting Delegate or Resident 
Commissioner are not constitutional offices, but have instead been 
created by statute.(4) This section discusses the history of 
these officers, the authorities they exercise, and limitations or 
restrictions on those authorities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. Parliamentarian's Note: Although nonvoting Delegates have a long 
        history in the House, the Senate has never accepted 
        participation in its proceedings by nonvoting representatives. 
        For an instance where an amendment to add a nonvoting 
        representative to the Senate was held germane to a bill 
        creating a similar position in the House, see 119 Cong. Rec. 
        33656-57, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. (Oct. 10, 1973).
 2. Parliamentarian's Note: The law establishing the Office of Delegate 
        for the Northern Mariana Islands uses the term ``Resident 
        Representative'' (as well as the term ``Delegate'') in its 
        statutory language describing the position, but the term 
        ``Resident Representative'' is not used in the House. See 48 
        U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1751, 1757.
 3. United States territory that has not been admitted as a state may 
        be classified in a variety of different ways. Throughout the 
        19th century, the U.S. established ``territories'' to 
        administer Federal land that had not been admitted to 
        statehood. If Congress passed an organic act to structure how 
        the territory would be governed, the territory would be 
        considered ``organized.'' Territories that had no organic act 
        were termed ``unorganized.'' Following the Spanish-American War 
        in 1898, former Spanish territory acquired by the United States 
        obtained the legal status of ``unincorporated'' territory. The 
        categories of ``organized/unorganized'' and ``incorporated/
        unincorporated'' continue to be used to define the nonstate 
        areas over which the United States exercises sovereignty.
 4. The qualifications for office have been provided in statute and 
        mirror the qualifications for Members of the House. See 2 
        U.S.C. Sec. 25a; and 48 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 892, 1713, 1733, and 
        1753. Such statutes may impose qualifications not applicable to 
        Members, such as the requirement that the Resident Commissioner 
        from Puerto Rico be able to ``read and write the English 
        language'' (48 U.S.C. Sec. 892) and that the Delegate from the 
        District of Columbia shall hold ``no other paid public office'' 
        (2 U.S.C. Sec. 25a). For more on qualifications of Members, see 
        Sec. 3, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

History

    The Constitution does not mention Delegates to Congress, but the 
concept of a nonvoting representative from territories of the United 
States in fact predates the ratification of the Constitution. The act 
of the Continental Congress establishing the Northwest Territory in 
1787 further provided for a nonvoting Delegate to that 
Congress.(5) Over the course of the history of the United 
States, many states passed from territorial status to statehood, 
sometimes with representation in the House in the form of a nonvoting 
Delegate during the former period.(6)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. See 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 421.
 6. Parliamentarian's Note: In 1794, a Delegate arrived with 
        credentials from the Ohio Territory, and the House had first 
        occasion to pass on the question of the rights and privileges 
        of such Delegates. The matter was referred to a select 
        committee, which recommended that he be seated in the House 
        with the right to debate but not to vote. A proposal to have 
        the oath administered to the Delegate was not carried. See 1 
        Hinds' Precedents Sec. 400. For an 1862 statute declaring that 
        ``[e]very Territory shall have the right to send a Delegate to 
        the House of Representatives of the United States,'' see 2 
        Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1290.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Delegates were initially thought of as special representatives 
concerned solely with parochial issues; namely, the issues directly 
affecting the territory represented by each Delegate.(7) 
Thus, committee and floor prerogatives were more limited than they 
would become in the 20th century. Over time, Delegates accrued greater 
rights to participate in House business, including floor privileges, 
the right to debate, the right to vote in committee, and ultimately the 
right to vote on the floor of the House when the House is operating as 
the Committee of the Whole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. For example, a 1904 House rule automatically assigned the Resident 
        Commissioner for Puerto Rico to a single committee: the 
        Committee on Insular Affairs. 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1306. 
        For an earlier rule assigning Delegates to specified 
        committees, see 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1297.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Spanish-American War of 1898 concluded with the United States 
exercising sovereignty over areas that had formerly been Spanish 
territory. Such territory included the Philippine Islands and the 
island of Puerto Rico. By statute, the Philippines was granted 
authority to send first two ``resident commissioners'' to the House, 
and later, one.(8) These Resident Commissioners were treated 
by the House the same as the nonvoting Delegates.(9) In 
1900, the position of Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico was 
created by statute.(10) By House rule (first adopted in 
1904), the Resident Commissioner was given the same status as Delegates 
to the House, and permitted to serve on the Committee on Insular 
Affairs.(11) A subsequent statute, enacted in 1917, changed 
the Resident Commissioner's term from a two-year term to a four-year 
term, and provided the Resident Commissioner with certain House 
benefits, such as access to stationery and mileage accounts and the 
franking privilege.(12)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 39 Stat. 552. Amendments made by the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 
        reduced the number of Resident Commissioners from two to one. 
        See P.L. 73-127, 48 Stat. 456. This statutory authority to send 
        a Resident Commissioner became obsolete when the Philippines 
        gained independence in 1946. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 
        Sec. 3.3.
 9. Parliamentarian's Note: As ``unincorporated'' territory of the 
        United States, the Philippines and Puerto Rico were regarded by 
        some as unlikely candidates for eventual statehood. As such, it 
        was considered more proper for such territories to be 
        represented by a Commissioner rather than a Delegate. See 33 
        Cong. Rec. 3632, 56th Cong. 1st Sess. (Apr. 2, 1900) (Sen. 
        Spooner's remarks indicating that, ``No Congress gives a 
        Delegate to a people except upon the theory that the time is to 
        come when they shall be admitted to statehood and entitled to 
        participate as one of the States of the Union . . . I will not 
        vote to give Puerto Rico at this time a Delegate in Congress. I 
        willingly vote for the proposition in this bill to give them, 
        at the expense of the United States, a commissioner, whose 
        status shall enable him to represent their necessities and 
        their wants to the Congress.'').
10. 31 Stat. 86.
11. See 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1306.
12. 39 Stat. 963.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 1959, Alaska and Hawaii were admitted as states and the Delegate 
positions that had been created under their former territorial status 
were eliminated.(13) Between 1959 and 1970, no Delegates 
were sent to the House, and the only nonvoting representative was the 
Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico. In the early 1970s, laws 
creating the offices of Delegate from the District of 
Columbia,(14) Guam,(15) and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands(16) were enacted. Amendments to House rules brought 
the Delegates and the Resident Commissioner further under the 
jurisdiction of House authority (for example, by specifying that they 
are subject to the Code of Official Conduct).(17) Additional 
Delegate positions were created in 1978 for American 
Samoa,(18) and in 2008 for the Northern Mariana 
Islands.(19) Thus, since 2008, there are six nonvoting 
Delegates and Resident Commissioners in the House of Representatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. Sec. 3.4, 3.5.
14. See 2 U.S.C. Sec. 25a. See also Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 
        Sec. 3.1.
15. See 48 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1711-1715. See also Deschler's Precedents 
        Ch. 7 Sec. 3.2
16. Id.
17. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. Sec. 3.8-3.10.
18. See 48 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1731-1735.
19. See 48 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1751-1757.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All current Delegates are elected for the same term as Members: one 
(two-year) Congress, commencing on January 3 of an odd-numbered 
year.(20) The Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico is 
elected for a four-year term, beginning on January 3 following the 
general election.(21) Delegates and the Resident 
Commissioner may resign their offices,(22) and vacancies are 
typically filled by special election.(23) The statute 
establishing the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico contains 
special procedures by which the Governor of Puerto Rico (with the 
consent of the Senate of Puerto Rico) may appoint an individual to fill 
a vacancy in the office.(24) Delegates and Resident 
Commissioners are administered the oath of office upon their 
election(25) or appointment.(26)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 48 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1712, 1732, and 1752. The statute regarding the 
        Delegate from the District of Columbia simply states that the 
        Delegate ``shall be elected to serve during each Congress.'' 2 
        U.S.C. Sec. 25a. For an earlier discussion of terms of office 
        for Delegates, see 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 403.
21. 48 U.S.C. Sec. 891.
22. Parliamentarian's Note: Members of Congress typically address their 
        letters of resignation to the appropriate official of the state 
        from which the Member was elected, a copy of which is forwarded 
        to the Speaker and laid before the House for the information of 
        Members. Delegates and Resident Commissioners, however, have 
        addressed their resignation letters directly to the Speaker. 
        See 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1304; and Deschler's Precedents 
        Ch. 37 Sec. 3.8. For resignations generally, see Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 37; and Precedents (____) Ch. 37.
23. The statutes establishing the Delegate for Guam, the U.S. Virgin 
        Islands, American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands all 
        provide that vacancies in the position be filled by special 
        election. See 48 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1712, 1732, and 1752. 
        Election procedures for the Delegate from the District of 
        Columbia follow the District of Columbia Elections Act. See 2 
        U.S.C. Sec. 25a.
24. See 48 U.S.C. Sec. 892. See also Deschler's Precedents Ch. 37 
        Sec. 3.8.
25. Parliamentarian's Note: On opening day of a new Congress, Members-
        elect, Delegates-elect, and the Resident Commissioner-elect are 
        sworn in en masse. Under early practice, Delegates were not 
        always administered the oath. For a 1794 instance where a 
        proposal to administer the oath of office to a Delegate was 
        rejected by the House, see 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 400. But 
        see 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 401 (1801 instance of the oath 
        being administered to a Delegate at organization of a new 
        Congress).
26. Parliamentarian's Note: When, pursuant to statute, the Governor of 
        Puerto Rico appoints an individual to fill a vacancy in the 
        Office of Resident Commissioner, such individual is 
        administered the oath of office. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 
        37 Sec. 3.8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With regard to the administrative functions of the House, House 
rules do not typically distinguish between Members, Delegates, and 
Resident Commissioners. Rules changes in the 92d and 93d Congresses 
extended to Delegates and Resident Commissioners the same privileges as 
Members with respect to services of the Clerk and Sergeant-at-Arms of 
the House.(27) Such changes also brought Delegates and 
Resident Commissioners under the jurisdiction of the Code of Official 
Conduct (now rule XXIII).(28) Salary and benefits for 
Delegates and Resident Commissioners are regulated by 
statute.(29)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
27. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 3.8.
28. Id. See also House Rules and Manual Sec. 1095 (2021).
29. See, e.g., 48 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 893, 894, 1715, 1735, and 1755.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authorities and Limitations

    The primary prerogative enjoyed by Delegates and Resident 
Commissioners to the House is the ability to be recognized by the 
presiding officer to debate. The original language from the 1787 act 
establishing the Northwest Territory specified that Delegates enjoyed 
``the right of debating, but not of voting''(30) and such 
language was carried forward in statutes throughout the 19th century. 
Thus, the parliamentary rights of Delegates and Resident Commissioners 
have always encompassed the right to debate.(31) Pursuant to 
clause 2(a)(1) of rule IV, Delegates, Delegates-elect, the Resident 
Commissioner, and the Resident Commissioner-elect are granted the 
privileges of the floor.(32)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
30. See 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1290.
31. Parliamentarian's Note: Under original House practice regarding the 
        Resident Commissioners from the Philippines, the House would 
        typically adopt a simple resolution each Congress extending 
        floor privileges to the Commissioners and specifically 
        authorizing their participation in debate. See 6 Cannon's 
        Precedents Sec. Sec. 244, 245. The practice fell into disuse 
        after 1911, and the House thereafter did not question the 
        inherent authority of Resident Commissioners to debate. See 6 
        Cannon's Precedents Sec. 246.
32. House Rules and Manual Sec. 678 (2021). The rule on floor 
        privileges was amended in the 116th Congress to specify that 
        Delegates-elect and the Resident Commissioner-elect are 
        entitled to the floor. For an 1854 instance where the House 
        declined to permit the Delegate from New Mexico to bring a 
        translator onto the floor of the House, see 2 Hinds' Precedents 
        Sec. 1296.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The normal rules regarding parliamentary speech apply to Delegates 
and Resident Commissioners in the same manner as they apply to Members 
of the House. Thus, Delegates and Resident Commissioners who transgress 
the standards for proper debate in the House may be called to 
order.(33) Delegates and Resident Commissioners may likewise 
demand that others recognized in debate abide by the rules of 
decorum.(34)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
33. For an example of a Delegate being censured by the House for 
        unparliamentary language, see 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1305. 
        For decorum issues generally, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 29 
        Sec. Sec. 40-66; and Precedents (____) Ch. 29.
34. See 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1295.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Delegates and Resident Commissioners enjoy many of the same 
parliamentary prerogatives as Members. With respect to the regular 
parliamentary motions recognized by the House (the motion to lay on the 
table, the motion for the previous question, etc.), Delegates and 
Resident Commissioners may make any such motions as Members 
would.(35) The one exception is the motion to reconsider, 
which requires the individual making the motion to have voted on the 
prevailing side of the question on which reconsideration is 
moved.(36) As Delegates and Resident Commissioners are not 
eligible to vote in the full House, they are consequently unable to 
meet this prerequisite condition. For this same reason, Delegates and 
Resident Commissioners are unable to vote on motions that they 
themselves propose.(37) A Delegate has offered the motion to 
refer with respect to the resolution establishing the rules of the 
House at the beginning of a Congress.(38)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
35. See 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 1291, 1292; and 6 Cannon's 
        Precedents Sec. 240. For motions generally, see Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 23; and Precedents (____) Ch. 23.
36. See 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1292. For more on the motion to 
        reconsider, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 23 Sec. Sec. 33-41; 
        and Precedents (____) Ch. 23.
37. See, e.g., Sec. 2.1, infra.
38. Parliamentarian's Note: The new majority in the 112th Congress had 
        offered a rules package that eliminated the ability of 
        Delegates and Resident Commissioners to vote in the Committee 
        of the Whole. The Delegate from the District of Columbia moved 
        to refer the resolution to a select committee to consider 
        reinstating that provision. See Sec. 2.2, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The House recognizes a variety of points of order that may be 
raised with regard to the offering of propositions, the content of 
those proposals, or other aspects of House business.(39) 
Delegates and Resident Commissioners are empowered under the rules and 
precedents of the House to raise any such points of order in the same 
manner as Members.(40) Many items of business in the House 
are transacted pursuant to a unanimous-consent request offered by a 
Member.(41) Under the precedents of the 
House,(42) Delegates and Resident Commissioners may offer 
such requests, and are likewise permitted to object to such 
requests.(43)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
39. For points of order generally, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 31 
        Sec. Sec. 1-13; and Precedents (____) Ch. 31.
40. See 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 240.
41. For more on unanimous-consent requests generally, see Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 23 Sec. Sec. 42-48; and Precedents (____) Ch. 
        23.
42. Parliamentarian's Note: Early precedents did not recognize the 
        ability of Delegates and Resident Commissioners to object to 
        unanimous-consent requests. See 2 Hinds' Precedents 
        Sec. Sec. 1293, 1294. However, these precedents were 
        essentially overturned by a 1930 ruling permitting the Delegate 
        from Alaska to object to the consideration of a bill under 
        procedures for the Consent Calendar. See 6 Cannon's Precedents 
        Sec. 240. For a similar instance involving Delegates and 
        Private Calendar procedures, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 
        Sec. 3.7.
43. See Sec. 2.4, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The most consequential restriction on the ability of Delegates and 
Resident Commissioners to participate in House proceedings is the 
inability to vote in the House.(44) This principle has been 
consistently applied throughout the House's history, and the District 
of Columbia Circuit Court has held that casting a vote in the full 
House constitutes an exercise of legislative power reserved to Members 
only.(45) Delegates and Resident Commissioners are 
ineligible to vote in the election for Speaker of the 
House.(46)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
44. Statutes creating the different Delegate and Resident Commissioner 
        positions may specify that the individual does not have voting 
        rights. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. Sec. 25a (the District of Columbia 
        Delegate shall have ``the right of debate, but not of 
        voting''). However, a statutory prohibition on voting, as an 
        extension of the House's constitutional rulemaking authority, 
        could be modified by subsequent House rules. See Precedents 
        (Wickham) Ch. 5 Sec. 7. The prohibition on voting in the House 
        instead derives from the Constitution, which permits only 
        Members to vote in the House. See Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 
        623, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Although Delegates and Resident 
        Commissioners have never been allowed to vote in the House, a 
        Delegate has been appointed as a teller when the House used 
        that method of voting. 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1302.
45. Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (``[I]t would 
        be unconstitutional to permit anyone but members of the House 
        to vote in the full House under any circumstances.'').
46. See Sec. 2.5, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although Delegates and Resident Commissioners may offer resolutions 
of impeachment,(47) Delegates and Resident Commissioners may 
not vote on impeachment articles. In the 105th Congress, a resolution 
proposing to grant the Delegate from the District of Columbia the right 
to vote on articles of impeachment against the President or Vice 
President was determined not to constitute a question of the privileges 
of the House.(48)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
47. See, e.g., 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1303 (1808 instance where the 
        Delegate from Mississippi moved to impeach a Federal judge and 
        was subsequently appointed chair of the investigatory 
        committee).
48. See Sec. 2.6, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It has been held that ``a majority of the total membership of the 
House'' in clause 2(b) of rule XV (the discharge rule) means 218 
Members, and therefore a discharge petition may only be signed by 
Members of the House.(49) A Delegate or Resident 
Commissioner may not sign a discharge petition, even by unanimous 
consent.(50)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
49. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 18 Sec. 1.2.
50. See Sec. 2.7, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Committees

    In recent decades, Delegates and Resident Commissioners have joined 
one of the two major party caucuses in the House: the Democratic Caucus 
or the Republican Conference.(51) Committee assignments for 
Delegates and Resident Commissioners therefore follow the same 
procedure as that for Members: nomination by a party caucus and the 
adoption of a simple House resolution electing the Delegate or Resident 
Commissioner to the committee.(52) Seniority and rank on a 
committee are matters within the purview of the party 
caucuses.(53)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
51. For party organization generally, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 3; 
        and Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 3.
52. Changes to House rules in the 92d and 93d Congresses specifically 
        provided that the Delegates and Resident Commissioners be 
        elected to serve on committees ``in the same manner as 
        Members.'' Rule XII, clauses 1 and 2; House Rules and Manual 
        Sec. 740 (1973). Prior to this time, committee assignments for 
        Delegates and Resident Commissioners were provided in the rule 
        itself. The current rule on committee assignments may be found 
        at Rule III, clause 3(a); House Rules and Manual Sec. 675 
        (2021).
53. For an announcement regarding Democratic Caucus seniority as 
        applied to Delegates and Resident Commissioners, see Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 3.11. For a resolution adjusting the rank 
        of a Delegate on a committee, see Sec. 2.8, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Committee participation by Delegates was originally limited to 
committees whose jurisdiction covered U.S. territories and the Federal 
district.(54) Gradually, the rule was expanded to permit one 
Delegate to be assigned to each of several committees specified by 
rule.(55) Ultimately, Delegates and Resident Commissioners 
attained their committee assignments in the same manner as Members 
following the rules changes of 1910: election via the individual party 
caucuses.(56) Rules changes in the 93d, 96th, 103d, and 
116th Congresses expanded the Speaker's appointment authority to permit 
the appointment of Delegates and Resident Commissioners to select, 
joint, and conference committees.(57) Prior to these 
changes, such appointments could only be made by unanimous 
consent.(58)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
54. See 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1297.
55. See 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1297; and 6 Cannon's Precedents 
        Sec. 242. Occasionally, the House would acquiesce to a Delegate 
        being placed on a committee not mentioned in the rule. See, 
        e.g., 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1298.
56. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 3.9. See also Precedents 
        (Wickham) Ch. 3 Sec. 8.
57. Rule III, clause 3(b); House Rules and Manual Sec. 676 (2021). When 
        the House recodified its rules in the 106th Congress, 
        corresponding amendments were made to clause 11 of rule I 
        (House Rules and Manual Sec. 637 (2021)) delineating the 
        Speaker's appointment authority. See 145 Cong. Rec. 87, 106th 
        Cong. 1st Sess. (Jan. 6, 1999). For a historical instance of a 
        Delegate being appointed to a select committee (as chair) in 
        1811, see 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1299. See also 2 Hinds' 
        Precedents Sec. 1303 (Delegate appointed chair of a special 
        impeachment investigation committee).
58. See, e.g., Sec. 2.10, infra. For an instance of the Speaker 
        inadvertently appointing a Delegate to a conference committee 
        (and the House subsequently vacating that action by unanimous 
        consent), see Sec. 2.9, infra. See also 119 Cong. Rec. 25201, 
        93d Cong. 1st Sess. (July 20, 1973) (remarks in debate 
        expressing ``surprise and dismay'' that the Resident 
        Commissioner could not be appointed to a conference committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although early House practice was not consistent with respect to 
the ability of Delegates and Resident Commissioners to vote in 
committee,(59) it has now been well established that 
Delegates and Resident Commissioners have voting rights in committees 
of the House. In the 92d and 93d Congresses, clause 1 of rule XII (now 
clause 3(a) of rule III) was substantially revised to specifically 
provide that Delegates and Resident Commissioners elected to committees 
of the House ``shall possess in such committees the same powers and 
privileges as the other members of the committee.''(60)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
59. Parliamentarian's Note: A report from 1841 suggested that Delegates 
        had been voting in the standing committees of the House for 
        some time (2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1301) and an 1884 instance 
        indicated that the issue was being studied by the Committee on 
        Rules (2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1300). However, as late as 
        1932, a committee reported to the House its finding that 
        Delegates were not competent to vote in committees of the 
        House. See 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 243.
60. House Rules and Manual Sec. 675 (2021). See also Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 3.10. Statutory authority creating the 
        different Delegate and Resident Commissioner positions may also 
        reference voting rights in committee. See, e.g., 48 U.S.C. 
        Sec. 1715 (``. . . the right to vote in committee shall be as 
        provided by the Rules of the House of Representatives.''). It 
        should be noted that the House's ability to provide for 
        Delegate and Resident Commissioner voting in committees or in 
        the Committee of the Whole does not depend on statutory 
        authority, but is instead part of the House's inherent 
        constitutional authority to make its own rules of proceeding. 
        For more on the interaction between statutory rulemaking and 
        the House's standing rules, see Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 5 
        Sec. 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Committee of the Whole

    In the 103d Congress, the House adopted rules that for the first 
time permitted Delegates and Resident Commissioners to vote on the 
floor of the House when the House is operating as the Committee of the 
Whole.(61) The Committee of the Whole is a very old 
parliamentary device derived from British practice, with special 
procedures for the consideration of legislative 
measures.(62) Certain constitutional provisions do not apply 
in the Committee of the Whole.(63) A key feature of the 
Committee of the Whole is that it cannot take final action on a 
measure, but merely recommends action to the House.(64) The 
Committee of the Whole may be thought of as similar to any of the 
committees of the House: a separate forum for preliminary action on a 
measure, with the ability to report its recommendations to the House 
for final disposition. As Delegates and Resident Commissioners had been 
granted the privilege of voting in the committees of the House, it was 
thought appropriate to extend that privilege to the Committee of the 
Whole.(65)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
61. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 30 Sec. 59.1.
62. For more on the Committee of the Whole generally, see Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 19; and Precedents (____) Ch. 19.
63. For example, quorum requirements in the Committee of the Whole are 
        lower than those in the full House, and Members may not demand 
        the constitutional yeas and nays in the Committee of the Whole. 
        See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 19 Sec. 1.
64. Parliamentarian's Note: Committees of the House do not take final 
        action on any measure, and it has been said that the Committee 
        of the Whole is ``but a committee of the House, though a large 
        one.'' 4 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 4706.
65. ``The Delegates and the Resident Commissioners represent 4.6 
        million Americans who now have no voting representation in the 
        House other than in the standing committees . . . [t]his 
        amendment would allow these Americans to be represented in the 
        preliminary decisions of the House through votes in the 
        Committee of the Whole.'' (remarks of Rep. Louise Slaughter of 
        New York). See 139 Cong. Rec. 54, 103d Cong. 1st Sess. (Jan. 5, 
        1993).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An additional feature of the Delegate voting rule provided for an 
automatic revote in the full House should the votes of the Delegates 
and Resident Commissioners prove decisive in the Committee of the 
Whole.(66) In other words, but for the votes of the 
Delegates and Resident Commissioners, the vote in the Committee of the 
Whole would have been reversed. In such circumstances, the rule 
provided that the Committee of the Whole rise, and that the same vote 
be taken again in the full House (where Delegates and Resident 
Commissioners are ineligible to vote).(67)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
66. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 30 Sec. 59.1.
67. For an example of such a revote being taken in the House, see 
        Sec. Sec. 2.12, 2.13, infra. For parliamentary inquiries 
        regarding the operation of the rule, see Sec. Sec. 2.14, 2.15, 
        infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This feature of the rule was raised in subsequent litigation 
commenced by the minority party in an attempt to have the rule declared 
unconstitutional.(68) The District Court for the District of 
Columbia held that because of the revote provision, the votes of the 
Delegates and Resident Commissioners could not affect the ultimate 
result, and thus could not be an exercise of legislative power in 
violation of the Constitution.(69) On appeal, the District 
of Columbia Circuit Court was less concerned with the revote provision, 
but ultimately agreed that the rule provided authority that was 
``largely symbolic''(70) and thus free of constitutional 
defects.(71)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
68. See Michel v. Anderson, 817 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1993) and Michel 
        v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1994). See also Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 30 Sec. 59.2.
69. See Michel v. Anderson, 817 F. Supp. 126, 147-48 (D.D.C. 1993), 
        (``In a democratic system, the right to vote is genuine and 
        effective only when, under the governing rules, there is a 
        chance, large or small, that, sooner or later, the vote will 
        affect the ultimate result. The votes of the Delegates in the 
        Committee of the Whole cannot achieve that.'').
70. Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
71. Id. (``[W]e do not think this minor addition to the office of 
        delegates has constitutional significance.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Between the 103d Congress and the 116th Congress, the Delegate 
voting rule would be repealed and reinstated multiple 
times.(72) The Delegate voting rule has been accompanied by 
a related provision permitting Delegates and Resident Commissioners to 
serve as chair of the Committee of the Whole.(73) This 
provision was likewise revoked and reinstated in subsequent Congresses, 
and was most recently reinstated in the 115th Congress.(74) 
In the 116th Congress, clause 6(a) of rule XVIII(75) was 
amended to clarify that the Delegates and the Resident Commissioner 
count for purposes of establishing a quorum in the Committee of the 
Whole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
72. The Delegate voting rule was first introduced by the Democratic 
        Caucus when the Democratic Party was in the majority in 1993. 
        When the Republican Party became the majority party in the 
        following Congress, the rule was repealed. See Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 30 Sec. 59.3. The rule was reinstated in the 
        110th Congress, repealed in the 112th Congress, and reinstated 
        again in the 116th Congress. See House Rules and Manual 
        Sec. 675 (2021).
73. Rule XVIII, clause 1; House Rules and Manual Sec. 970 (2021). For 
        the inaugural instance of a Delegate presiding over the 
        Committee of the Whole, see Sec. 2.16, infra.
74. House Rules and Manual Sec. 970 (2021).
75. House Rules and Manual Sec. 982 (2021). Amendments to clause 6(e) 
        of rule XVIII also clarified that Delegates and the Resident 
        Commissioner may be counted to support a request for a recorded 
        vote in the Committee of the Whole. See House Rules and Manual 
        Sec. 983a (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 2.1 Delegates and the Resident Commissioner may make any of the 
    ordinary motions(76) in the House (such as a motion to 
    adjourn), but may not vote on such motions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
76. Parliamentarian's Note: The one exception to this principle is that 
        Delegates and the Resident Commissioner may not move 
        reconsideration, as they are unable to meet the requirement 
        that the individual offering the motion to reconsider must have 
        voted on the prevailing side of the question. See 2 Hinds' 
        Precedents Sec. 1292.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On January 9, 1981,(77) the Delegate from American Samoa 
offered the motion to adjourn, as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
77. 127 Cong. Rec. 248, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. See also Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 29 Sec. 23.65.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                  ADJOURNMENT

        Mr. [Fofo] SUNIA [of American Samoa]. Mr. Speaker, I move that 
    the House do now adjourn.
        The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 12 o'clock and 25 
    minutes p.m.), under its previous order, the House adjourned until 
    Tuesday, January 13, 1981, at 12 o'clock noon.

Sec. 2.2 Delegates and the Resident Commissioner may make any of the 
    ordinary motions(78) in the House (such as the motion to 
    refer), but may not vote on such motions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
78. Parliamentarian's Note: The one exception to this principle is that 
        Delegates and the Resident Commissioner may not move 
        reconsideration, as they are unable to meet the requirement 
        that the individual offering the motion to reconsider must have 
        voted on the prevailing side of the question. See 2 Hinds' 
        Precedents Sec. 1292.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On January 5, 2011,(79) the Delegate from the District 
of Columbia offered a motion to refer the resolution adopting the rules 
of the House to a select committee:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
79. 157 Cong. Rec. 83-84, 112th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                motion to refer

        Ms. [Eleanor] NORTON [of District of Columbia]. Mr. Speaker, I 
    rise to offer a motion that is at the desk.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(80) The Clerk will report 
    the motion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
80. Steven LaTourette (OH).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

  Ms. Norton moves to refer the resolution to a select committee of five 
members, to be appointed by the Speaker, not more than three of whom shall 
be from the same political party, with instructions not to report back the 
same until it has conducted a full and complete study of, and made a 
determination on, the constitutionality of the provision that would be 
eliminated from the Rules that granted voting rights in the Committee of 
the Whole to the Delegates from the District of Columbia, American Samoa, 
Guam, the Virgin Islands and the Northern Mariana Islands and the Resident 
Commissioner from Puerto Rico, including the decision of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Michel v. Anderson (14 
F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1994)), which upheld the constitutionality of these 
voting rights.

                                motion to table

        Mr. [Eric] CANTOR [of Virginia]. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion.
        The Clerk read as follows:

  Mr. Cantor moves to lay on the table the motion to refer.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to 
    table.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it.
        Ms. NORTON. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    223, nays 188, not voting 20, as follows:

                               [Roll No. 3] . . .

        Messrs. LEVIN, BRADY of Pennsylvania, HINOJOSA, ALTMIRE, 
    CARDOZA, and Mrs. MALONEY changed their vote from ``yea'' to 
    ``nay.''
        Mr. JONES, Mrs. MYRICK, Mrs. BACHMANN, and Ms. HAYWORTH changed 
    their vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
        So the motion was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 2.3 Delegates and the Resident Commissioner may make any of the 
    ordinary motions in the House (such as the motion to 
    recommit),(81) but may not vote on such motions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
81. Parliamentarian's Note: Delegates and the Resident Commissioner may 
        make any motion not contingent on the right to vote. Motions to 
        recommit a measure back to committee are not contingent on the 
        right to vote. Rather, the requisite qualification for offering 
        such motion is an averment that the offeror is opposed to the 
        underlying measure. See rule XIX, clause 2(a); House Rules and 
        Manual Sec. 1001 (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On October 27, 2015,(82) the Delegate from the District 
of Columbia offered a motion to recommit a bill to the committee of 
jurisdiction:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
82. 161 Cong. Rec. 16588-89, 114th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(83) All time for debate has 
    expired.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
83. Rodney Davis (IL).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Pursuant to House Resolution 450, the previous question is 
    ordered on the bill, as amended.
        The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the 
    bill.
        The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and 
    was read the third time.

                               motion to recommit

        Ms. [Eleanor] NORTON [of District of Columbia]. Mr. Speaker, I 
    have a motion to recommit at the desk.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentlewoman opposed to the 
    bill?
        Ms. NORTON. I am.
        Mr. [Jeb] HENSARLING [of Texas]. Mr. Speaker, I reserve a point 
    of order.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. A point of order is reserved.
        The Clerk will report the motion to recommit.
        The Clerk read as follows:

        Ms. Norton moves to recommit the bill H.R. 597 to the Committee 
    on Financial Services.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from the District of 
    Columbia is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. NORTON. I yield back the balance of my time.
        Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of a 
    point of order.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The reservation of the point of order 
    is withdrawn.
        Mr. [Frank] LUCAS [of Oklahoma]. Mr. Speaker, I wish to claim 
    time in opposition to the motion to recommit.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman from Texas seek 
    recognition?
        Mr. HENSARLING. Yes, I wish to seek time in opposition.

                                 point of order

        Mr. LUCAS. Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Oklahoma will state 
    his point of order.
        Mr. LUCAS. Mr. Speaker, in order to seek time in opposition, 
    wouldn't the gentleman or gentlewoman have to be opposed to the 
    motion to recommit?
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Time in opposition is reserved for an 
    opponent.
        Mr. LUCAS. So, Mr. Speaker, would it be in order to reaffirm 
    that whoever ultimately claims the time is, indeed, in opposition 
    to the motion to recommit?
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair would ascertain that before 
    granting recognition.
        Does the gentleman from Texas seek recognition in opposition to 
    the motion to recommit?
        Mr. HENSARLING. Yes, I have sought time in opposition to the 
    motion to recommit.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas is recognized 
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman from Oklahoma, 
    another valuable member of the House Financial Services Committee, 
    who I know we are on opposite sides of this issue, if the gentleman 
    would like time to speak, I would be happy to yield to the 
    gentleman.
        Mr. LUCAS. Will the gentleman yield for a brief response?
        Mr. HENSARLING. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.
        Mr. LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate the opportunity 
    to respond. I think that probably it is better that you finish the 
    discussion.
        Mr. HENSARLING. Okay. The gentleman declines.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman wish to yield back?

                            parliamentary inquiries

        Mr. [Mick] MULVANEY [of South Carolina]. Parliamentary inquiry, 
    Mr. Speaker.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman from Texas yield to 
    the gentleman from South Carolina?
        Mr. HENSARLING. Yes, I yield to the gentleman from South 
    Carolina for his parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. MULVANEY. If this is not dilatory, what is the effect of 
    passing this motion to recommit?
        I so often hear the preface, ``This doesn't send it back to 
    committee; it doesn't kill the bill.''
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. If adopted, the motion would recommit 
    the bill back to committee.
        Mr. MULVANEY. So passing this motion to recommit would send 
    this bill back to committee?
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. That is correct.
        Mr. MULVANEY. For how long?
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The motion does not put a time limit 
    on the committee to consider the bill.
        Mr. MULVANEY. Fair enough.
        Further parliamentary inquiry.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. MULVANEY. Does the person offering this motion represent to 
    this body that they are in favor of this motion in order to 
    qualify?
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman qualified by stating 
    her opposition to the bill.
        Mr. MULVANEY. Fair enough.
        Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas may continue.
        Mr. HENSARLING. Again, Mr. Speaker, I would say we are having a 
    debate on the underlying bill that has been vigorously debated on 
    both sides.
        The motion to recommit, if people are genuinely interested in 
    looking for an opportunity for an amendment process that was denied 
    as the discharge petition came to the floor.
        I have served under many committee chairmen on the Financial 
    Services Committee. I have never known one to bring a bill through 
    committee that was not supported by a majority of their members, 
    and I did not bring this bill because it was not supported by a 
    majority of Republican members.
        I understand the ability to use this discharge petition; and if 
    people are looking for opportunities to amend, I wish it would have 
    been done in the discharge petition.
        But if it is the will of the House to send this to committee, 
    the committee has had three different hearings on the Ex-Im Bank 
    already--a couple of them in conjunction with the Oversight and 
    Government Reform Committee--and I would be happy to have even more 
    hearings on the subject and listen to the new points that have been 
    brought about by this debate.
        I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Mulvaney).

                             parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. MULVANEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise for the purpose of making 
    another parliamentary inquiry.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. MULVANEY. The reason I am confused is, I do so often hear 
    that introduction, the MTRs won't kill; it won't send it to 
    committee; it will proceed immediately forthwith to the House for a 
    vote.
        So here is my question on a parliamentary inquiry basis. If the 
    MTR is passed, I understand from your previous ruling that the bill 
    goes back to committee. Is it amendable in committee? Or does it 
    immediately return forthwith to the House for a vote?
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill would return to the committee 
    for its consideration.
        Mr. MULVANEY. And the committee has full control over that 
    piece of legislation?
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The committee would have the bill 
    before it again.
        Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, again, I appreciate the gentleman 
    from South Carolina making his parliamentary inquiries. I think it 
    has helped clarify the matter.
        At this point, if it is the will of the House to send this back 
    to committee, I look forward to the vote and would be very happy to 
    reconsider this in committee.
        I yield back the balance of my time.

                             parliamentary inquiry

        Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California. Mr. Speaker, parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        I wish the Chair would clarify that there will be a vote taken 
    on the motion to recommit and that, should that fail, this will not 
    go back to the committee under any circumstances. Is that correct?
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. If the motion is not adopted, the bill 
    will not return to committee.
        Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California. Well, if I may, you just said 
    what I said in reverse. And I just wanted it to be clear.
        As the chairman of the committee tried to state that he would 
    be willing to hold hearings and do what he has not done as we have 
    tried to consider this, that if, in fact, this body does not 
    support it going back to committee, he has no opportunity to try to 
    do what he has not done in the process. Is that correct?
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. If the motion is not adopted, the 
    Chair plans to proceed. The next step would be the question of 
    passage of the bill.
        Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous 
    question is on the motion to recommit.
        There was no objection.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to 
    recommit.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the noes appeared to have it.
        Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and 
    nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and 
    the order of the House of today, further proceedings on this 
    question will be postponed.

            vacating demand for yeas and nays on motion to recommit

        Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to 
    withdraw my request for the yeas and nays on the motion to recommit 
    to the end that the motion stand disposed of by the voice vote 
    thereon.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the ordering of the 
    yeas and nays is vacated, and pursuant to the earlier vote by 
    voice, the motion is not adopted.
        There was no objection.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the 
    bill.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the noes appeared to have it.
        Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand 
    the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, 
    further proceedings on this question will be postponed.

                             parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, parliamentary inquiry.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. HENSARLING. Since I withdrew the request for the yeas and 
    nays on the motion to recommit, then would it be possible for the 
    ranking member, the gentlewoman from California, to withdraw her 
    request for the yeas and nays on the underlying bill, should she so 
    choose?
        Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California. Mr. Speaker, that is wishful 
    thinking on the part of the chairman. I will not.

Sec. 2.4 In response to a parliamentary inquiry, the Speaker confirmed 
    that Delegates and the Resident Commissioner have the right to 
    object to unanimous-consent requests.

    On June 29, 1984,(84) the Resident Commissioner from 
Puerto Rico objected to a unanimous-consent request (an action which 
was the subject of subsequent parliamentary inquiries):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
84. 130 Cong. Rec. 20259-67, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. See also 6 Cannon's 
        Precedents Sec. 241.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        CORRECTING TECHNICAL ERRORS IN THE ENROLLMENT OF H.R. 4170, TAX 
                            REFORM ACT OF 1983      

        Mr. [Sam] GIBBONS [of Florida]. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous 
    consent to take from the Speaker's table the concurrent resolution 
    (H. Con. Res. 328) entitled ``Concurrent resolution to correct 
    technical errors in the enrollment of the bill H.R. 4170,'' with a 
    Senate amendment thereto, and concur in the Senate amendment.
        The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution. . . .
        The SPEAKER.(85) Is there objection to the initial 
    request of the gentleman from Florida?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
85. Thomas O'Neill (MA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Baltasar] CORRADA [of Puerto Rico]. Mr. Speaker, reserving 
    the right to object, I would like to know if in this technical 
    amendment a clarification was made to reflect the true intent of 
    the conferees that the $75 million provided through December 31, 
    1984, under the redistillation program for Puerto Rico, rebates of 
    excise taxes, would also allow the cane neutral spirits program to 
    be included under those provisions?
        Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, no 
    changes were made by the Senate to accomplish that end.
        Mr. CORRADA. Then, Mr. Speaker, I object.
        The SPEAKER. Objection is heard.
        Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to speak for 
    1 minute.
        The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
    from Florida?
        There was no objection.

                             parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [William] FRENZEL [of Minnesota]. Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, does the Delegate have the right to 
    object?
        The SPEAKER. A Delegate does have the right to object to a 
    unanimous-consent request.

Sec. 2.5 In response to parliamentary inquiries, the Clerk (as 
    presiding officer on opening day of a new Congress) confirmed that 
    Delegates-elect and the Resident Commissioner-elect are ineligible 
    to vote in the election of the Speaker of the House.

    On January 6, 1999,(86) in response to parliamentary 
inquiries, the Clerk confirmed that only Members-elect may vote in the 
election of the Speaker:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
86. 145 Cong. Rec. 43, 106th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk.(87) The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert, a 
    Representative-elect from the State of Illinois, and the Honorable 
    Richard A. Gephardt, a Representative-elect from the State of 
    Missouri, have been placed in nomination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
87. Jeffrey J. Trandahl.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Are there further nominations?
        There being no further nominations, the Clerk will appoint 
    tellers.
        The Clerk appoints the gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas), 
    the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), the gentlewoman 
    from New Jersey (Mrs. Roukema), and the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. 
    Kaptur).
        The tellers will come forward and take their seats at the desk 
    in front of the Speaker's rostrum.
        The roll will now be called, and those responding to their 
    names will indicate by surname the nominee of their choice.
        The reading clerk will now call the roll.
        The tellers having taken their places, the House proceeded to 
    vote for the Speaker.

                             parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [Carlos] ROMERO-BARCELO [of Puerto Rico] (during the vote). 
    Have we been eliminated already? Have we been eliminated from the 
    voting procedure?
        The Clerk. Delegates and the Resident Commissioners are not 
    qualified to vote.
        Mr. ROMERO-BARCELO. We have always been qualified to vote.
        The Clerk. That is not the case.
        Mr. ROMERO-BARCELO. What is that?
        The Clerk. That is not the case.
        Mr. ROMERO-BARCELO. Yes. We voted the last time.(88)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
88. Parliamentarian's Note: Contrary to the assertion made here, 
        Delegates-elect and the Resident Commissioner-elect did not 
        vote in the election of Speaker in the 105th Congress. See 143 
        Cong. Rec. 117, 105th Cong. 1st Sess. (Jan. 7, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [Patrick] KENNEDY of Rhode Island. Mr. Clerk, would the 
    Clerk respond to a parliamentary inquiry?
        The Clerk. The gentleman will state his inquiry.
        Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island. The parliamentary inquiry for the 
    Clerk is for the delegates who represent American citizens. Where 
    does that vote come today? Will they not be allowed to vote for 
    Speaker of this House? The Member from Puerto Rico represents 4 
    million American citizens.
        The Clerk. Representatives-elect are the only individuals 
    qualified to vote in the election of the Speaker.

Sec. 2.6 A resolution proposing to permit the Delegate from the 
    District of Columbia to cast votes in the full House on articles of 
    impeachment directed at the President was held to constitute a 
    change in House rules, and thus did not qualify as a question of 
    the privileges of the House.

    On December 18, 1998,(89) the Delegate from the District 
of Columbia offered House Resolution 613, which was determined by the 
Speaker pro tempore not to constitute a valid question of privilege:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
89. 144 Cong. Rec. 27825-27, 105th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          PRIVILEGES OF THE HOUSE--PROVIDING VOTE FOR THE DELEGATE TO 
          CONGRESS FROM THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA IN CONSIDERATION OF 
                   PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT RESOLUTIONS      

        Ms. [Eleanor] NORTON [of District of Columbia]. Mr. Speaker, I 
    rise to offer a privileged resolution that is at the desk.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 613

  Whereas rule IX of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides 
that questions of privilege shall arise whenever the rights of the House 
collectively or the Members individually in their representative capacity 
are affected;

  Whereas under the precedents, customs, and traditions of the House 
pursuant to rule IX, a question of privilege has arisen in cases involving 
the constitutional prerogatives of the House and of Members of the House; 
and

  Whereas the House is prepared to consider a resolution impeaching the 
President, and the Delegate to the Congress from the District of Columbia 
seeks to assert the constitutional prerogative to cast a vote in the 
consideration of the resolution: Now, therefore, be it

  Resolved,

SECTION 1. PROVIDING VOTE FOR DELEGATE FROM THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA IN 
CONSIDERATION OF PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT RESOLUTIONS.

  Pursuant to section 2 of article I of the Constitution and the twenty-
third article of amendment thereto granting the people of the District of 
Columbia the right to vote in presidential elections, the Delegate to the 
Congress from the District of Columbia shall be permitted to cast a vote in 
the House of Representatives in the same manner as a member of the House in 
the consideration by the House of any resolution impeaching the President 
or Vice President of the United States.

SEC. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE.

  Section 1 shall apply with respect to any resolution impeaching the 
President or Vice President of the United States that is considered by the 
House of Representatives after the adoption of this resolution.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(90) Does any Member wish to 
    be heard on whether the resolution constitutes a question of the 
    privileges of the House?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
90. Ray LaHood (IL).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Ms. NORTON. I ask to be heard, Mr. Speaker.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from the District of 
    Columbia is recognized.
        Ms. NORTON. Mr. Speaker, most Americans do not know and most 
    people in the world are unaware that the residents of the Nation's 
    Capitol do not have any representation in the Senate and cannot 
    vote on this floor.
        But the Constitution of the United States, in its 23rd 
    amendment, does give to the residents of the District the right to 
    vote for President and Vice President of the United States. The 
    same Constitution that gives the District the right to vote for 
    President must recognize the right of District residents to 
    representation for a vote on removal of the President.
        I have submitted a narrowly-tailored resolution, along with a 
    legal memorandum, for a narrowly-tailored right. I am not here 
    asking for the delegate vote in the Committee of the Whole at this 
    time. I am not asking for a House vote. I am asking to vote only on 
    impeachment, in order to perfect the rights of District residents 
    under the 23rd amendment. The House has abundant authority to grant 
    me this right at this time.
        Clause 2 of the 23rd amendment gives the House the power to 
    enforce the amendment through legislation. My resolution is that 
    legislation. The District clause, as this body so often reminds us, 
    gives Members full authority over the District of Columbia, and the 
    impeachment clause gives Members unilateral authority, or the sole 
    power of impeachment.
        The 23rd amendment explicitly treats the District as a State 
    for purposes of electing the President and the Vice President.
        I ask for this right in the name of half a million people, the 
    only Americans who pay Federal income taxes who do not have full 
    representation in the Congress. They are a third per capita in 
    Federal income taxes. Their one right that is explicitly mentioned 
    in the Constitution is the right to vote for President and Vice 
    President.
        The decision to expel a President from office is as important 
    as the decision to elect the President to office. Indeed, the 
    decision to expel him is more momentous. There are no partial 
    rights in the Constitution. It is unconstitutional and irrational 
    to interpret the 23rd amendment to afford a vote for President, but 
    no vote on whether to impeach a President.
        Let this process begin on a high note of fairness. In the name 
    of the half million American citizens who happen to live in the 
    Nation's Capital, I ask for the vote in these impeachment 
    proceedings, Mr. Speaker.

        Mr. Speaker, today I introduce a resolution affording the 
    District of Columbia Delegate a vote in impeachment proceedings. 
    The House is fully empowered to enact my resolution under Article 
    I, Sec. 2, clause 5 of the Constitution (stating that the ``House 
    of Representatives . . . shall have the sole Power of 
    Impeachment''); the Twenty-Third Amendment affording the people of 
    the District of Columbia the right to vote for President of the 
    United States; and Article I, Sec. 8, clause 17 of the Constitution 
    affording Congress plenary power over the District of Columbia.
        I am seeking to protect the constitutional right of District 
    residents to vote for President by securing a vote in the 
    impeachment proceedings only. My resolution is narrowly tailored 
    and would not be a grant of voting privileges to the Delegate in 
    other proceedings of the House.
        American citizens living in the District of Columbia 
    participated in the last two presidential elections by choosing as 
    their electors three citizens pledged to President Clinton. Unless 
    Congress acts to remedy the situation under the Twenty-Third 
    Amendment, the District population will be the only community of 
    American citizens who participated in the Presidential elections of 
    1992 and 1996 who will have no vote at all on impeachment or 
    conviction.
        This constitutional asymmetry not only violates the rights of 
    more than half a million voters; it is unnecessary. Congress has 
    sufficient authority under the District Clause and under the 
    enforcement clause of the Twenty-Third Amendment to grant the 
    District of Columbia Delegate to the House of Representatives a 
    vote in the House impeachment process on the House floor. The 
    Supreme Court has liberally construed enforcement clauses in all of 
    the suffrage amendments to vindicate the broad and central 
    constitutional purpose of securing equal voting and participation 
    rights for all Americans.
        The Twenty-Third Amendment put the District of Columbia 
    essentially on the same level as the states for purposes of 
    presidential elections.
        The purpose of Twenty-Third Amendment was to give Congress the 
    power to provide the residents of the District an equal role in 
    selecting the President and the Vice President. The Amendment 
    allows District residents to participate in presidential elections 
    on an equal footing with the states.
        Today, this right can be fully vindicated only by reading the 
    Twenty-Third Amendment to permit Congress to grant the District of 
    Columbia Delegate a vote on the Resolution Impeaching William 
    Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States. Otherwise, the 
    political will and sovereignty of residents of the District of 
    Columbia in the selection of the president will be lost in 
    violation of the Twenty-Third Amendment.
        The legislative history of the Twenty-Third Amendment does not 
    contradict this conclusion. Apparently because impeachment has been 
    so rare, there was no discussion of this problem at the time. This 
    is the first occasion that articles of presidential impeachment 
    will go to the floor of the House since the Twenty-Third Amendment 
    was added to the Constitution in 1961. This is a case of first 
    impression.
        The Twenty-Third Amendment is part of our Constitution's 
    progressive inclusion of all ``the governed'' in the processes of 
    government. The Fifteenth Amendment secured the right of African-
    Americans to vote. The Nineteenth Amendment extended the right to 
    vote to women. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment abolished the poll tax. 
    The Twenty-Sixth Amendment gave the right to vote to 18-year olds. 
    All of these suffrage amendments have been interpreted liberally to 
    secure the inclusion of once disenfrachised Americans. As the 
    Supreme Court stated in Reynolds v. Sims in 1964: ``history has 
    seen a continuing expansion of the scope of the right of suffrage 
    in this country. The right to vote freely for the candidate of 
    one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any 
    restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative 
    government.'' 337 U.S. 533 (1964).
        This reasoning applies equally to the Twenty-Third Amendment 
    and American citizens who happen to live in the nation's capital.
        The case for the Delegate's vote on impeachment would be harder 
    put if such participation had to be self-executing. But section 2 
    provides that, ``the Congress shall have power to enforce this 
    article by appropriate legislation.'' Since Congress is given the 
    instrumental role in activating and enforcing the Twenty-Third 
    Amendment, it may interpret that amendment to give the Delegate the 
    right to cast her vote along with the representatives of all the 
    other states that participated in the presidential electoral 
    college.
        The Supreme Court has clearly treated impeachment as a 
    political question solely within legislative competence and 
    control. In Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993), the Court 
    rejected an impeached judge's attack on Senate Impeachment Rule XI, 
    under which the presiding officer appoints a committee of Senators 
    to ``receive evidence and take testimony.'' The Court found that 
    this process of delegating to a committee was wholly within the 
    Senate's powers because the Senate has ``the sole power to try all 
    Impeachments.'' Article I, Section 3, Clause 6. The Court found 
    that the ``common sense meaning of the word `sole' is that the 
    Senate alone shall have authority to determine whether an 
    individual should be acquitted or convicted. . . . If the courts 
    may review actions of the Senate in order to determine whether that 
    body `tried' an impeached official, it is difficult to see how the 
    Senate would be `functioning . . . independently and without 
    assistance or interference.'''
        Just as the Senate has the ``sole power'' to shape and control 
    the trial process, the House of Representatives has the ``sole 
    power of Impeachment'' in the first instance. Article I, Section 2, 
    Clause 5. As the Nixon Court itself pointed out in discussing the 
    nonreviewability of the Senate trail, ``the word `sole' appears 
    only one other time in the Constitution--with respect to the House 
    of Representatives' sole Power of Impeachment.'' Thus, like the 
    Senate, the House of Representatives is free to structure the 
    impeachment proceeding consistent with its own judgment of 
    constitutional requirements.
        The Delegate's participation on the impeachment articles can 
    thus be accomplished by way of a House rule. Article 1, Section 5 
    of the Constitution generally makes ``Each House'' both ``the Judge 
    of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members'' 
    and the sole body to ``determine the Rules of its proceedings.'' As 
    precedent, the House unilaterally granted the Delegate from the 
    District of Columbia and other Delegates full power to vote in 
    Committee of the Whole deliberations, a decision upheld against 
    constitutional attack in Michel v. Anderson. This case, too, 
    presents little constitutional difficulty because the House is not 
    acting in its bicameral legislative capacity but rather in its 
    unilateral capacity to ``have the sole power of Impeachment'' under 
    Article 1, Section 2. Thus, the House must be able to design and 
    enforce its own rules for conducting the impeachment process.
        The Supreme Court has recognized an extremely broad degree of 
    interpretive powers under congressional enforcement clauses found 
    in the Constitution's suffrage amendments. In Katzenbach versus 
    Morgan it upheld the power of Congress, under Section 5 of the 
    Fourteenth Amendment, to override a New York law and grant the 
    right to vote to all persons who had completed the sixth grade in 
    Puerto Rican schools regardless of their inability to read or write 
    English. The Court rejected the argument that Congress' powers 
    under the enforcement clause were limited only to what the 
    Fourteenth Amendment itself required, stating rather that: ``It is 
    the power of Congress which has been enlarged. Congress is 
    authorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legislation. 
    Some legislation is contemplated to make the amendments fully 
    effective.''
        The Court emphasized that Congress was acting to protect voting 
    rights and expressed reluctance to interfere with congressional 
    judgement in this field. The Court said: ``It was well within 
    congressional authority to say that this need of the Puerto Rican 
    minority for the vote warranted federal intrusion upon any state 
    interests served by the English literacy requirement. It was for 
    Congress, as the branch that made this judgement, to assess and 
    weigh the various conflicting considerations . . .''
        The Court concluded that any legislation enacted under the 
    enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was permissible so 
    long as the enactment ```is plainly adapted to [the] end''' of 
    enforcing Equal Protection and ``is not prohibited by but is 
    consistent with `the letter and spirit of the Constitution,''' 
    regardless of whether Equal Protection itself dictates such a 
    result.
        Elsewhere, the Court has also found that enforcement clauses 
    give the Congress the power to act to vindicate voting interests 
    even where a particular statutory result is not constitutionally 
    required. In South Carolina versus Katzenbach, the Court upheld 
    Congress' power under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment to enact 
    the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which included a ban on literacy 
    tests, the requirement that new voting rules must be precleared, 
    and the use of federal voting examiners. The Court stated that 
    ``Congress has full remedial powers to effectuate the 
    constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in 
    voting.'' These powers are defined in these terms: ``Whatever 
    legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the 
    objects the [Reconstruction] amendments have in view, whatever 
    tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and 
    to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil 
    rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or 
    invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of 
    congressional power.''
        In Oregon versus Mitchell, the Court unanimously upheld the 
    Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, which banned literacy tests 
    for five years. Using a mere rationality test, the court found that 
    Congress could rationally have found that these measures were 
    needed to attack the perpetuation of racial discrimination. In City 
    of Rome versus United States, the Court upheld Congress' Section 2 
    power to ban electoral changes that are discriminatory in effect 
    intentional discrimination in voting. Thus, the Court found that 
    Congress' enforcement authority under Section 2 went beyond the 
    strict requirements of Section 1. The Court stated that it ``is 
    clear . . . that under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment 
    Congress may prohibit practices that in and of themselves do not 
    violate Section 1 of the Amendment, so long as the prohibitions 
    attacking racial discrimination in voting are `appropriate.'''
        Because the Twenty-Third Amendment is an attempt to bring 
    voting rights to a historically disenfranchised population, its 
    enforcement clause should be read in a very broad way consistent 
    with the Court's deference to congressional enforcement of suffrage 
    rights. It is also relevant that the District Clause, contained in 
    Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution, provides that 
    Congress shall exercise ``exclusive Legislation in all cases 
    whatsoever over ``the District.'' This ``plenary power'' has been 
    interpreted by the Supreme Court to give Congress complete 
    authority over the District. There is thus ample constitutional 
    basis for Congress having the final authority to define the meaning 
    of the Twenty-third amendment, given that this is a ``case'' 
    involving the District. The courts, at any rate, would, in all 
    likelihood, treat this matter as a political question solely within 
    the legislative competence, as impeachment is clearly a political 
    question, as determined by the Supreme Court in Nixon versus United 
    States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).

        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Are there other Members who wish to be 
    heard?
        The Chair is prepared to rule. The resolution offered by the 
    gentlewoman from the District of Columbia seeks to provide the 
    Delegate from the District of Columbia the right to vote in the 
    House on a resolution of impeachment.
        Pursuant to Title II, section 25(a) of the United States Code, 
    the Delegate to the House of Representatives from the District of 
    Columbia is accorded a seat in the House, with the right of debate 
    but not of voting.
        Under rule XII of the rules of the House, the right of a 
    Delegate to vote is confined to committee. The Chair will state a 
    basic principle on proper questions of privilege as recorded on 
    page 366 of the House Rules and Manual.
        A question of the privileges of the House may not be invoked to 
    affect a change in the rules or standing orders of the House. 
    Altering the right to vote of a delegate is tantamount to a change 
    in the rules of the House and is not a proper question of 
    privilege.

Sec. 2.7 In response to parliamentary inquiries, the Speaker confirmed 
    that, under the precedents of the House,(91) Delegates 
    and the Resident Commissioner are ineligible to sign discharge 
    petitions, and the Chair declines to entertain a unanimous-consent 
    request to that effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
91. Parliamentarian's Note: On April 15, 1936, Speaker Joseph Byrns of 
        Tennessee held that the discharge rule required ``the exact 
        number of 218 Members . . . irrespective of temporary vacancies 
        dues to death, resignation, or other causes.'' (emphasis 
        added). Deschler's Precedents Ch. 18 Sec. 1.2. As Delegates and 
        Resident Commissioners are not counted as part of the ``total 
        membership of the House'' under the rule (Rule XV, clause 2(b); 
        House Rules and Manual Sec. 892 (2021)), they are unable to 
        sign discharge petitions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On October 1, 2003,(92) the Chair entertained 
parliamentary inquiries regarding the inability of Delegates and the 
Resident Commissioner to sign discharge petitions:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
92. 149 Cong. Rec. 23853, 108th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               CONCURRENT RECEIPT

        The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. [Candice] Miller of Michigan). 
    Under a previous order of the House, the gentlewoman from Guam (Ms. 
    Bordallo) is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. [Madeleine] BORDALLO [of Guam]. . . .
        Madam Speaker, the people of Guam are shy people. It takes a 
    lot of courage for them to stand up in public and to speak out 
    their mind. So when Victor spoke to me about concurrent receipt, I 
    listened. He served our country with duty and honor and pride, and 
    now it is time for us to step up and do the same. If just one of my 
    colleagues will sign that discharge petition today, they will have 
    the deepest thanks from the people of Guam and a very grateful 
    Delegate who cannot sign the petition.
        Mr. [Bob] FILNER [of California]. Madam Speaker, will the 
    gentlewoman yield?
        Ms. BORDALLO. I yield to the gentleman from California.

                             parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. FILNER. Madam Speaker, would it be in order to ask 
    unanimous consent to request to allow the gentlewoman to sign the 
    discharge petition?
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. No, the Chair will not entertain that 
    request.
        Mr. FILNER. Why is that?
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The respective rights and privileges 
    of the Members and Delegates are established by rules and by law; 
    so that unanimous consent request will not be entertained.
        Mr. FILNER. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for bringing 
    this up because this is an insult to her constituents, it is an 
    insult to her. I will say if the Democrats get control of the 
    House, the right to vote and sign discharge petitions, we hope, 
    will get back to the delegates.
        Ms. BORDALLO. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his 
    interest and concern.

Sec. 2.8 The rank of a Delegate or Resident Commissioner on a committee 
    of the House may be adjusted by privileged resolution in the same 
    manner that the rank of a Member may be so adjusted.

    On August 11, 1992,(93) the following privileged 
resolution was offered to adjust the ranks of the Delegate from 
American Samoa and the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico on the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
93. 138 Cong. Rec. 23030, 102d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        ESTABLISHING RANK OF MEMBERSHIP ON COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
                                          

        Mr. [Steny] HOYER [of Maryland]. Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    privileged resolution (H. Res. 550) and ask for its immediate 
    consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 550

  Resolved, That Antonio J. Colorado, of Puerto Rico, elected to the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 17, 1992, pursuant to H. Res. 400, 
shall rank after Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, of American Samoa, thereon.

        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 2.9 Under former practice,(94) Delegates and Resident 
    Commissioners were not eligible to be appointed to conference 
    committees, and where a Delegate was inadvertently appointed, the 
    House vacated the appointment by unanimous consent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
94. Parliamentarian's Note: At the time of this precedent, the Speaker 
        had no authority to appoint Delegates or Resident Commissioners 
        to conference committees. In the 96th Congress, the Speaker was 
        given authority to appoint Delegates and the Resident 
        Commissioner to conferences where such individuals served on 
        the relevant committees of jurisdiction. In the 103d Congress, 
        this authority was expanded to encompass any conference. See 
        House Rules and Manual Sec. 676 (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On September 18, 1973,(95) the Speaker made the 
following conferee appointments:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
95. 119 Cong. Rec. 30144, 93d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          APPOINTMENT OF CONFEREES ON S. 1141, TO PROVIDE NEW COINAGE 
            DESIGN FOR BECENTENNIAL OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION      

        Mr. [John] PATMAN [of Texas]. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous 
    consent to take from the Speaker's table the bill (S. 1141) an act 
    to provide a new coinage design and date emblematic of the 
    Bicentennial of the American Revolution for dollars, half dollars, 
    and quarter dollars, to authorize the issuance of special gold and 
    silver coins commemorating the Bicentennial of the American 
    Revolution, and for other purposes, and agree to the conference 
    asked by the Senate.
        The SPEAKER.(96) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Texas?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
96. Carl Albert (OK).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John] ROUSSELOT [of California]. Mr. Speaker, reserving 
    the right to object, is this just permission to go to conference?
        Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, it is.
        Mr. ROUSSELOT. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of 
    objection.
        The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
    from Texas? The Chair hears none, and appoints the following 
    conferees: Mr. Patman, Mrs. Sullivan, Messrs. Fauntroy, Mitchell of 
    Maryland, Barrett, Gonzalez, Young of Georgia, Stark, Moakley, 
    Widnall, Wylie, Mrs. Heckler of Massachusetts, Messrs. McKinney, 
    Rinaldo, and Roncallo of New York.

    Later that day,(97) a Member asked unanimous consent to 
authorize the Speaker to appoint a Member in lieu of the Delegate from 
the District of Columbia (who was ineligible to serve as a conferee 
under the rules of the House at that time):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
97. 119 Cong. Rec. 30144, 93d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           WITHDRAWAL OF APPOINTMENT AS CONFEREE AND APPOINTMENT AS 
          CONFEREE ON S. 1141 TO PROVIDE NEW COINAGE DESIGN AND DATE 
             COMMEMORATING BICENTENNIAL OF AMERICAN REVOLUTON      

        Mr. PATMAN. Mr Speaker, prior to the Speaker's appointment of 
    conferees on the bill S. 1141 today I had inadvertently recommended 
    that the Delegate from the District of Columbia (Mr. Fauntroy) be 
    named as a conferee.
        I therefore ask unanimous consent that the Speaker designate a 
    Member as a conferee in lieu of the Delegate from the District of 
    Columbia.
        The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
    from Texas? The Chair hears none and appoints the gentleman from 
    New York (Mr. Koch) as a conferee.

Sec. 2.10 Under former practice, Delegates and Resident Commissioners 
    were not eligible to be appointed to select committees, and 
    unanimous consent was required to permit the Speaker to make such 
    an appointment.

    Although the standing rules of the House have allowed the Speaker 
to appoint Delegates and Resident Commissioners to select committees 
since the 96th Congress, prior to this time unanimous consent was 
required to authorize the Speaker to make such appointments (as was 
done on September 21, 1976):(98)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
98. 122 Cong. Rec. 31673, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. For a similar instance 
        involving the Resident Commissioner form Puerto Rico, see 123 
        Cong. Rec. 33763-64, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (Oct. 14, 1977).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           AUTHORIZING THE SPEAKER TO APPOINT THE DELEGATE FROM THE 
           DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AS ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SELECT 
              COMMITTEE AUTHORIZED BY HOUSE RESOLUTION 1540      

        Mr. [Richard] BOLLING [of Missouri]. Mr. Speaker. I ask 
    unanimous consent that the Speaker be authorized to appoint the 
    delegate from the District of Columbia as one of the members of the 
    select committee authorized by House Resolution 1540.
        The SPEAKER.(99) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Missouri?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
99. Carl Albert (OK).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.

Sec. 2.11 Inaugural instance of Delegates and the Resident Commissioner 
    voting in the Committee of the Whole pursuant to clause 2 of rule 
    XII (now clause 3(a) of rule III).(100)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
100. House Rules and Manual Sec. 675 (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On February 3, 1993,(101) Delegates and the Resident 
Commissioner voted on an amendment in the Committee of the Whole:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
101. 139 Cong. Rec. 2035-36, 2038, 2041, 103d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 
    187, noes 244, not voting 4, as follows:

                               [Roll No. 15]    


                         AYES--187
 
Allard                   Goodling                 Neal (NC)
Archer                   Goss                     Nussle
Armey                    Grams                    Orton
Bachus (AL)              Grandy                   Oxley
Baker (CA)               Greenwood                Packard
Baker (LA)               Gunderson                Paxon
Ballenger                Hall (TX)                Payne (VA)
Barcia                   Hamilton                 Penny
Barrett (NE)             Hancock                  Peterson (MN)
Bartlett                 Hansen                   Petri
Barton                   Hastert                  Pickett
Bateman                  Hayes                    Pickle
Bentley                  Hefley                   Pombo
Bereuter                 Herger                   Porter
Bilirakis                Hobson                   Pryce (OH)
Bliley                   Hoekstra                 Quillen
Blute                    Hoke                     Quinn
Boehner                  Horn                     Ramstad
Bonilla                  Houghton                 Regula
Brewster                 Huffington               Ridge
Bunning                  Hunter                   Roberts
Burton                   Hutchinson               Rogers
Buyer                    Hyde                     Rohrabacher
Callahan                 Inglis                   Roth
Calvert                  Inhofe                   Rowland
Camp                     Istook                   Royce
Canady                   Johnson (CT)             Santorum
Carr                     Johnson, Sam             Schaefer
Castle                   Kasich                   Schiff
Clinger                  Kim                      Sensenbrenner
Coble                    King                     Shaw
Collins (GA)             Kingston                 Shuster
Combest                  Knollenberg              Sisisky
Condit                   Kolbe                    Skeen
Cox                      Kopetski                 Slattery
Crane                    Kyl                      Smith (MI)
Crapo                    Lancaster                Smith (OR)
Cunningham               Lazio                    Smith (TX)
de la Garza              Leach                    Solomon
Deal                     Levy                     Spence
DeLay                    Lewis (CA)               Stearns
Dickey                   Lewis (FL)               Stenholm
Doolittle                Lightfoot                Stump
Dornan                   Linder                   Sundquist
Dreier                   Livingston               Talent
Duncan                   Lloyd                    Tauzin
Dunn                     Manzullo                 Taylor (MS)
Edwards (TX)             McCandless               Taylor (NC)
Emerson                  McCollum                 Thomas (CA)
Everett                  McCrery                  Thomas (WY)
Ewing                    McDade                   Torkildsen
Fawell                   McHugh                   Upton
Fields (TX)              McInnis                  Valentine
Fowler                   McKeon                   Vucanovich
Franks (CT)              McMillan                 Walker
Gallegly                 Meyers                   Walsh
Gallo                    Mica                     Weldon
Gekas                    Michel                   Whitten
Geren                    Miller (FL)              Wolf
Gilchrest                Molinari                 Young (FL)
Gillmor                  Montgomery               Zeliff
Gingrich                 Moorhead
Goodlatte                Myers
 
                         NOES--244
 
Abercrombie              Gonzalez                 Owens
Ackerman                 Gordon                   Pallone
Andrews (ME)             Green                    Parker
Andrews (NJ)             Gutierrez                Pastor
Andrews (TX)             Hall (OH)                Payne (NJ)
Applegate                Hamburg                  Pelosi
Bacchus (FL)             Harman                   Peterson (FL)
Baesler                  Hastings                 Pomeroy
Barlow                   Hefner                   Poshard
Barrett (WI)             Hilliard                 Price (NC)
Becerra                  Hinchey                  Rahall
Beilenson                Hoagland                 Rangel
Berman                   Hochbrueckner            Ravenel
Bevill                   Holden                   Reed
Bilbray                  Hoyer                    Reynolds
Bishop                   Hughes                   Richardson
Blackwell                Hutto                    Roemer
Boehlert                 Inslee                   Romero-Barcelo (PR)
Bonior                   Jacobs                   Ros-Lehtinen
Borski                   Jefferson                Rose
Boucher                  Johnson (GA)             Rostenkowski
Brooks                   Johnson (SD)             Roukema
Browder                  Johnson, E. B.           Roybal-Allard
Brown (CA)               Johnston                 Rush
Brown (FL)               Kanjorski                Sabo
Brown (OH)               Kaptur                   Sanders
Bryant                   Kennedy                  Sangmeister
Byrne                    Kennelly                 Sarpalius
Cantwell                 Kildee                   Sawyer
Cardin                   Kleczka                  Saxton
Chapman                  Klein                    Schenk
Clay                     Klink                    Schroeder
Clayton                  Klug                     Schumer
Clement                  Kreidler                 Scott
Clyburn                  LaFalce                  Serrano
Coleman                  Lambert                  Sharp
Collins (IL)             Lantos                   Shays
Collins (MI)             LaRocco                  Shepherd
Conyers                  Laughlin                 Skaggs
Cooper                   Lehman                   Skelton
Coppersmith              Levin                    Slaughter
Costello                 Lewis (GA)               Smith (IA)
Coyne                    Lipinski                 Smith (NJ)
Cramer                   Long                     Snowe
Danner                   Lowey                    Spratt
Darden                   Machtley                 Stark
de Lugo (VI)             Maloney                  Stokes
DeFazio                  Mann                     Strickland
DeLauro                  Manton                   Studds
Dellums                  Margolies-Mezvinsky      Stupak
Derrick                  Markey                   Swett
Deutsch                  Martinez                 Swift
Diaz-Balart              Matsui                   Synar
Dicks                    Mazzoli                  Tanner
Dingell                  McCloskey                Tejeda
Dixon                    McCurdy                  Thornton
Dooley                   McDermott                Thurman
Durbin                   McHale                   Torres
Edwards (CA)             McKinney                 Torricelli
Engel                    McNulty                  Towns
English (AZ)             Meehan                   Traficant
English (OK)             Meek                     Tucker
Eshoo                    Menendez                 Underwood (GU)
Evans                    Mfume                    Unsoeld
Faleomavaega (AS)        Miller (CA)              Velazquez
Fazio                    Mineta                   Vento
Fields (LA)              Minge                    Visclosky
Filner                   Mink                     Volkmer
Fingerhut                Moakley                  Waters
Fish                     Mollohan                 Watt
Flake                    Moran                    Waxman
Foglietta                Morella                  Wheat
Ford (MI)                Murphy                   Williams
Frank (MA)               Murtha                   Wilson
Franks (NJ)              Nadler                   Wise
Frost                    Natcher                  Woolsey
Furse                    Neal (MA)                Wyden
Gejdenson                Norton (DC)              Wynn
Gephardt                 Oberstar                 Yates
Gibbons                  Obey                     Zimmer
Gilman                   Olver
Glickman                 Ortiz
 
                         NOT VOTING--4
 
Ford (TN)                Washington
Henry                    Young (AK)
 
 

                             parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [Newt] GINGRICH [of Georgia]. Madam Chairman, it is 8:10. I 
    simply want to clarify, on a parliamentary inquiry, whether or not 
    on the last vote, if we count only the States which have been 
    admitted to the Union, the vote was 187 to 239, and that in fact 
    the additional 5 votes include four Delegates whose territories do 
    not pay taxes to the U.S. Treasury and one Delegate, so that all 
    five are Delegates, not currently States, but the vote among the 
    States, those Representatives representing the State, was actually 
    187 to 239. I simply want to clarify for the Record that that was 
    the vote among Representatives.
        The CHAIRMAN.(102) The gentleman's statement which 
    is not a parliamentary inquiry will appear in the Record.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
102. Barbara Kennelly (CT).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Under the rule, it is now in order for the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania [Mr. Goodling] to offer his second amendment.

                       amendment offered by mr. goodling

        Mr. [William] GOODLING [of Pennsylvania]. Madam Chairman, I 
    offer an amendment.
        The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
        The text of the amendment is as follows:

  Amendment offered by Mr. Goodling: Amend section 101(2)(B) to add a new 
clause as follows:

  (iii) any employee of an employer whose absence during leave would 
clearly result in substantial and grievous economic injury to the 
operations of the employer or substantial endangerment to the health and 
safety of other employees of the employer or the public. . . .

        Mr. GINGRICH. Madam Chairman, I want to make certain that at 
    this point the Record would show that among those Representatives--
    --
        The CHAIRMAN. May the Chair ask: Is the gentleman making a 
    parliamentary inquiry?

                             parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. GINGRICH. Madam Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. GINGRICH. Madam Chairman, I inquire whether it would be 
    accurate to state that on the last vote among those Representatives 
    representing States, the vote was 184 to 233 against, and among 
    those delegates not representing States, the vote was 0 in favor 
    and 5 against.
        The CHAIRMAN. The vote in the Record will indicate that, and 
    the Chair feels that this is not a parliamentary inquiry but rather 
    a statement of fact.
        Mr. GINGRICH. Madam Chairman, I was just inquiring of the Chair 
    if that is how it would show in the Record.
        The CHAIRMAN. The vote will appear in the Record, sir.
        Mr. GINGRICH. I thank the chairman. . . .
        So the amendment was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment in the nature of 
    a substitute, as modified, as amended.

                             parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. GINGRICH. Madam Chairman, I was going to make a 
    parliamentary inquiry. I am not sure what the Chair is doing, and I 
    think we need order before we rush through whatever the next phase 
    is.
        The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman was on his feet, and the gentleman 
    will state his parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. GINGRICH. Madam Chairman, my parliamentary inquiry was, 
    were there any votes cast on that amendment which were in violation 
    of article I, section 2 of the Constitution?
        The CHAIRMAN. That is not a parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. GINGRICH. I would ask the Chair, it is not a legitimate 
    inquiry to ask the nature of the votes which were just cast? At 
    what point is it appropriate to ask the nature of the votes which 
    were just cast, I would ask the Chair?
        The CHAIRMAN. The Chair replies that the votes were cast in 
    accordance with the rules as adopted by this House.
        Mr. GINGRICH. That was not my question, Madam Chairman. I would 
    ask the Chair, all I am seeking, article I, section 2, simply 
    mentions Representatives of the States.
        I would make my inquiry differently, Madam Chairman. I would 
    inquire of the Chair, were there any votes cast on the last 
    amendment which were cast by people not Representatives of the 
    States?
        The CHAIRMAN. The Chair responded when the question was asked 
    in another manner previously. The vote was announced. The vote will 
    appear in the Record as was taken and was announced.
        Mr. GINGRICH. I misunderstood the Chair. The Chair, I thought, 
    reassured me on the two previous occasions that in the Record it 
    would show both the votes by State Representatives and the votes by 
    delegates as clearly separate. Maybe I did not hear in the 
    confusion, but did the Chair announce the votes? I must have 
    misunderstood.
        The CHAIRMAN. The Chair announced that the votes would appear 
    in the Record tomorrow as cast under the rules.
        Mr. GINGRICH. I would ask the Chair, meaning lumped together, 
    so that the Representatives and delegates would be lumped together 
    in one vote?
        The CHAIRMAN. It would be alphabetical; the ayes and then the 
    noes.
        Mr. GINGRICH. I thank the Chair for allowing me to ask that.

Sec. 2.12 When a vote is taken in the Committee of the Whole, and the 
    votes of the Delegates and the Resident Commissioner are found to 
    be determinative of the outcome,(103) the Committee of 
    the Whole rises automatically, the vote is recapitulated in the 
    House (where the Delegates and the Resident Commissioner are 
    ineligible to vote), and the decision of the Committee of the Whole 
    may be reversed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
103. Parliamentarian's Note: The House essentially utilizes a ``but 
        for'' test to determine whether the votes of the Delegates and 
        the Resident Commissioner were decisive (i.e., but for the 
        votes of the Delegates and the Resident Commissioner, the 
        outcome of the vote would have been different).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On March 17, 1994,(104) an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute was considered in the Committee of the Whole and rejected. 
Pursuant to clause 2(d) of rule XXIII (now clause 6(h) of rule 
XVIII),(105) the Committee rose automatically and the chair 
of the Committee of the Whole reported to the House that the votes of 
the Delegates and the Resident Commissioner had been decisive in 
rejecting the amendment. Thus, pursuant to the rule, the vote was taken 
again in the House, and the amendment in the nature of a substitute was 
adopted:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
104. 140 Cong Rec. 5341, 5351-52, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. For a similar 
        instance later in the same Congress, see 140 Cong. Rec. 14382-
        84, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. (June 24, 1994).
105. House Rules and Manual Sec. 985 (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by mr. barton 
                                    of texas

        Mr. [Joe] BARTON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment 
    in the nature of a substitute.
        The CHAIRMAN.(106) The Clerk will report the 
    amendment in the nature of a substitute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
106. David Skaggs (CO).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

  Amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr. Barton of Texas: 
Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the following:

That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as 
part of the Constitution if ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths 
of the several States within seven years after its submission to the States 
for ratification:

                                  ``Article--

  ``Section 1. Prior to each fiscal year, Congress shall adopt a statement 
of receipts and outlays for such fiscal year in which total outlays are not 
greater than total receipts . . .

                                 recorded vote

        Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
        A recorded vote was ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 
    213, noes 215, not voting 10, as follows:

                              [Roll No. 62] . . .

        So the amendment in the nature of a substitute was rejected.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 2(d) of rule XXIII the 
    Committee rises.
        Pursuant to clause 2(d) of rule XXIII the Committee rose; and 
    the Speaker pro tempore [Mr. Bonior] having assumed the chair, Mr. 
    Skaggs, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State 
    of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under 
    consideration the joint resolution (House Joint Resolution 103) 
    proposing an amendment to the Constitution to provide for a 
    balanced budget for the Government and for greater accountability 
    in the enactment of tax legislation, directs him to report that on 
    a recorded vote on an amendment the votes of the delegates and of 
    the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico were decisive.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(107) The Clerk will report 
    the amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
107. David Bonior (MI).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

  Amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr. Barton of Texas: 
Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the following:

  That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and 
purposes as part of the Constitution if ratified by the legislatures of 
three-fourths of the several States within seven years after its submission 
to the States for ratification:

                                  ``Article--

  ``Section 1. Prior to each fiscal year, Congress shall adopt a statement 
of receipts and outlays for such fiscal year in which total outlays are not 
greater than total receipts. . . .

        Mr. [Robert] WALKER [of Pennsylvania] (during the reading). Mr. 
    Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered 
    as read and printed in the Record.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Pennsylvania?
        There was no objection.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 2 of rule XXIII, 
    the Chair will now put the question de novo on the amendment in the 
    nature of a substitute offered by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. 
    Barton].
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it.

                                 recorded vote

        Mr. [David] PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I demand a 
    recorded vote.
        A recorded vote was ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 
    211, noes 204, not voting 18, as follows:

                              [Roll No. 63] . . .

        So the amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to.

Sec. 2.13 When a vote is taken in the Committee of the Whole, and the 
    votes of the Delegates and the Resident Commissioner are found to 
    be determinative of the outcome,(108) the Committee of 
    the Whole rises automatically, the vote is recapitulated in the 
    full House (where the Delegates and the Resident Commissioner are 
    ineligible to vote), and the decision of the Committee of the Whole 
    may be affirmed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
108. Parliamentarian's Note: The House essentially utilizes a ``but 
        for'' test to determine whether the votes of the Delegates and 
        Resident Commissioners were decisive (i.e., but for the votes 
        of the Delegates and the Resident Commissioner, the outcome of 
        the vote would have been reversed).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On June 18, 2009,(109) an amendment was considered in 
the Committee of the Whole and rejected. Pursuant to clause 6(h) of 
rule XVIII,(110) the Committee rose automatically and the 
chair of the Committee of the Whole reported to the House that the 
votes of the Delegates and the Resident Commissioner had been decisive 
in rejecting the amendment. Thus, pursuant to the rule, the vote was 
taken in the full House, and the amendment was again rejected:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
109. 155 Cong. Rec. 15624-26, 111th Cong. 1st Sess.
110. House Rules and Manual Sec. 985 (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              amendment no. 118 offered by mr. lewis of california

        The CHAIR.(111) The unfinished business is the 
    demand for a recorded vote on the amendment offered by the 
    gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis) on which further proceedings 
    were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by voice vote.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
111. Jason Altmire (PA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
        The text of the amendment is as follows:

        Amendment No. 118 offered by Mr. Lewis of California:

  At the end of the bill (before the short title), insert the following:

  ``Sec. None of the funds made available in this Act may be used to 
implement Executive Order 13492, issued January 22, 2009, titled ``Review 
and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base 
and Closure of Detention Facilities''.''

                                 recorded vote

        The CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
        A recorded vote was ordered.
        The CHAIR. This is a 5-minute vote.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 
    212, noes 216, not voting 11, as follows:

                              [Roll No. 360] . . .

                           announcement by the chair

        The CHAIR (during the vote). There are 2 minutes remaining in 
    the vote.
        Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ changed her vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
        So the amendment was rejected.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        The CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6(h) of rule XVIII, the Committee 
    rises.
        Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore 
    (Mr. Holden) having assumed the chair, Mr. Altmire, Chair of the 
    Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported to 
    the House that during consideration of the bill (H.R. 2847) making 
    appropriations for the Departments of Commerce and Justice, and 
    Science, and Related Agencies for the fiscal year ending September 
    30, 2010, and for other purposes, pursuant to Resolution 552, the 
    votes cast by the Delegates and the Resident Commissioner were 
    decisive on a recorded vote on the amendment offered by the 
    gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis).

                             parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [Tom] PRICE of Georgia. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(112) The gentleman will 
    state his inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
112. Thomas Holden (PA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. PRICE of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, my understanding is that 
    because the vote in the Committee of the Whole was within the 
    margin of the number of Delegates that there are in the House, the 
    Committee has now risen and we're in the Whole House and the vote 
    that we are about to have will be the same amendment; is that 
    correct?
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is correct.
        Mr. PRICE of Georgia. I thank the Speaker.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the 
    amendment.
        The Clerk designated the amendment.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6(h) of rule XVIII, 
    the Chair will put the question to the House de novo.
        The question is on the amendment.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the noes appeared to have it.
        Mr. PRICE of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas 
    and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    212, nays 213, not voting 9, as follows:

                              [Roll No. 361] . . .

        So the amendment was rejected.
        The result of the vote was an announced as above recorded.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6(h) of rule XVIII, 
    the Committee will resume its sitting.

                         in the committee of the whole

        Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of 
    the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further 
    consideration of the bill (H.R. 2847) making appropriations for the 
    Departments of Commerce and Justice, and Science, and Related 
    Agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2010, and for 
    other purposes, with Mr. Altmire in the chair.
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.
        The CHAIR. When the Committee of the Whole rose earlier today, 
    the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis) 
    had been rejected on a recorded vote on which the votes cast by the 
    Delegates and the Resident Commissioner were decisive.
        That result has since been affirmed by the House.

Sec. 2.14 In response to parliamentary inquiries, the chair of the 
    Committee of the Whole confirmed that the votes of the Delegates 
    and the Resident Commissioner were not decisive of the outcome, and 
    thus no revote in the House was required under the rule.

    On April 20, 1994,(113) the House rejected an amendment 
in the Committee of the Whole by a vote of 212 ayes to 217 noes (with 
nine Members not voting). In response to parliamentary inquiries, the 
chair of the Committee of the Whole confirmed that the votes of the 
Delegates and the Resident Commissioner (all voting in the negative) 
were not decisive of the outcome as, absent their votes, the amendment 
would still have been rejected on a tie vote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
113. 140 Cong. Rec. 7936-37, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. For a similar instance 
        where, in response to parliamentary inquiries, the Chair 
        confirmed that the votes of the Delegates and Resident 
        Commissioners were not decisive of the outcome, see 139 Cong. 
        Rec. 10408-409, 103d Cong. 1st Sess. (May 19, 1993).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The CHAIRMAN.(114) All time has expired. The 
    question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida 
    [Mr. McCollum].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
114. Robert Torricelli (NJ).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the 
    noes appeared to have it.

                                 recorded vote

        Mr. [Ira] McCOLLUM [of Florida]. Mr. Chairman, on that I demand 
    a recorded vote.
        A recorded vote was ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 
    212, noes 217, not voting 9, as follows:

                              [Roll No. 131] . . .

                            parliamentary inquiries

        Mr. [Thomas] DeLAY [of Texas]. Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I think I know the answer to this 
    inquiry, but for the record, Mr. Chairman, the Delegates number 5.
        Is it true that the delegates voting, if we voted again, would 
    cause a tie, and the amendment would fail because of a tie?
        The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman correctly states that the votes 
    cast by delegates were not decisive.
        Had the Delegates not voted, it would have been a tie. On a tie 
    vote, the amendment fails.
        Mr. DeLAY. So actually one could say it is a tie, so each vote 
    to the negative on the amendment is a very crucial vote?
        The CHAIRMAN. That is not a parliamentary inquiry. The Chair 
    answered the inquiry as it was stated.
        Mr. [Newt] GINGRICH [of Georgia]. Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Georgia will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Chairman, I just want to clarify, because I 
    do not think, given the way the House currently counts votes, that 
    a normal citizen would realize that the real vote among the elected 
    Members was 212 to 212.
        The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman must state a parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. GINGRICH. In the record, among Members, not counting 
    Delegates, is it correct, first, that the vote was 212 to 212?
        The CHAIRMAN. If the gentleman's inquiry is whether or not the 
    delegates were decisive in the outcome, they were not. Had they not 
    voted, it would have been a tie vote, and the amendment would have 
    failed. If that is the gentleman's inquiry, the Chair has answered 
    it.
        Mr. GINGRICH. And therefore, each of the 212 was the decisive 
    vote?
        The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is not stating a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. McCOLLUM. Do not the rules state that when a vote is 
    decided by five or fewer votes and the Delegates have voted, the 
    five Delegates, that a revote is in order regardless of what the 
    outcome might or might not be, hypothetically?
        The CHAIRMAN. That is not correct. The rule operates where they 
    are decisive, which means where there would have been a different 
    outcome, had they not voted.
        Mr. McCOLLUM. But since there were, in fact, nine Members, the 
    inquiry is this, Mr. Chairman: Where there were Members not voting, 
    in this case there were nine Members not voting, would not the 
    possibility of a revote be that five or fewer votes could change 
    the outcome in a situation like we have before us today on this 
    previous vote?
        The CHAIRMAN. A motion to reconsider is not in order in the 
    Committee of the Whole.
        Mr. [Barney] FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Is there some procedure by which 
    you can explain the rules to them elsewhere so we can get on with 
    the business?
        The CHAIRMAN. That is also not a parliamentary inquiry.

Sec. 2.15 In response to parliamentary inquiries, the Speaker pro 
    tempore affirmed that, because of the votes of the Delegates and 
    the Resident Commissioner, the number of total possible votes 
    permitted in the Committee of the Whole differs from the total 
    number of possible votes permitted in the House.

    On May 2, 2007,(115) the Speaker pro tempore answered 
parliamentary inquiries regarding the Delegate voting rule as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
115. 153 Cong. Rec. 11081, 110th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore 
    (Mr. Weiner) having assumed the chair, Mr. Kind, Acting Chairman of 
    the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, 
    reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the 
    bill (H.R. 1429) to reauthorize the Head Start Act, to improve 
    program quality, to expand access, and for other purposes, pursuant 
    to House Resolution 348, he reported the bill back to the House 
    with an amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(116) Under the rule, the 
    previous question is ordered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
116. Anthony Weiner (NY).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the amendment 
    reported from the Committee of the Whole?

                             parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [Tom] PRICE of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. PRICE of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, isn't it true that under the 
    rules adopted by this House, the number of votes allowed in the 
    Committee of the Whole is different than the number of votes 
    allowed when the House sits?
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is correct.
        Mr. PRICE of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, further parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state his inquiry.
        Mr. PRICE of Georgia. Isn't it further true, Mr. Speaker, that 
    because of the rules, any re-vote in the House on an amendment that 
    passed in the Committee of the Whole with full participation, the 
    total votes cast would be different?
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. That is correct.
        Mr. PRICE of Georgia. I thank the Speaker.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. If not, the question is on the 
    amendment.
        The amendment was agreed to.

Sec. 2.16 Inaugural instance of the Speaker appointing a Delegate to 
    serve as chair of the Committee of the Whole.(117)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
117. Parliamentarian's Note: The rule permitting Delegates and the 
        Resident Commissioner to preside over the Committee of the 
        Whole was adopted for the first time in the 103d Congress. This 
        rule was repealed in the 104th Congress, reinstated in the 
        110th Congress, repealed in the 112th Congress, and reinstated 
        in the 115th Congress. See House Rules and Manual Sec. 970 
        (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On October 6, 1994,(118) the Delegate from the U.S. 
Virgin Islands served as chair pro tempore of the Committee of the 
Whole:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
118. 140 Cong. Rec. 28529, 28533, 103d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         in the committee of the whole

        Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of 
    the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further 
    consideration of the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 416) providing 
    limited authorization for the participation of United States Armed 
    Forces in the multinational force in Haiti and providing for the 
    prompt withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from Haiti, with 
    Mr. Derrick, Chairman pro tempore, in the chair.
        The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution. . . .
        Mr. [Benjamin] GILMAN [of New York]. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased 
    to yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York [Ms. Molinari].
        The Chairman pro tempore (Mr. [Ron] de Lugo [of Virgin 
    Islands]) took the chair.
        Ms. [Guy] MOLINARI [of New York]. Mr. Chairman, I thank the 
    gentleman for yielding.

Sec. 2.17 The House adopted a resolution amending the standing rules of 
    the House to reinstate the Delegate voting rule following its 
    repeal in a prior Congress.(119)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
119. Parliamentarian's Note: The Delegate voting rule was initially 
        adopted by the House in the 103d Congress. It was repealed in 
        the following Congress after a switch in party majorities. The 
        rule was reinstated in the 110th Congress, as described in the 
        proceedings below. The rule would be subsequently repealed 
        again in the 112th Congress, but reinstated in the 116th 
        Congress. See House Rules and Manual Sec. 675 (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On January 24, 2007,(120) the House considered House 
Resolution 86 (proposing to reinstate the Delegate voting rule) on 
which the question of consideration was demanded. The question of 
consideration was decided in the affirmative, and the House (following 
debate) adopted the resolution as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
120. 153 Cong. Rec. 2140-41, 2150-51, 110th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          PERMITTING DELEGATES AND THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER TO CAST 
                   VOTES IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE      

        Mr. [Alcee] HASTINGS of Florida. Madam Speaker, pursuant to 
    House Resolution 86, I call up the resolution (H. Res. 78) amending 
    the Rules of the House of Representatives to permit Delegates and 
    the Resident Commissioner to the Congress to cast votes in the 
    Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, and ask for 
    its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the title of the resolution.
        Mr. [Patrick] McHENRY [of North Carolina]. Madam Speaker, I 
    demand the question of consideration.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. [Ellen] Tauscher [of 
    California]). The gentleman from North Carolina demands the 
    question of consideration. The question is: Will the House consider 
    the resolution?
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it.

                                 recorded vote

        Mr. McHENRY. Madam Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
        A recorded vote was ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 
    224, noes 186, not voting 24, as follows:

                              [Roll No. 56] . . .

        So the question of consideration was decided in the 
    affirmative.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table. . . .
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will re-report the title.
        The Clerk read the title of the resolution.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 86, the 
    resolution is considered read.
        The text of the resolution is as follows:

H. Res. 78

    Resolved,

SECTION 1. VOTING BY DELEGATES AND RESIDENT COMMISSIONER IN COMMITTEE OF 
THE WHOLE.

  (a) Permitting Votes To Be Cast.--Clause 3(a) of rule III of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives is amended to read as follows:

  ``3. (a) In a Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, 
each Delegate and the Resident Commissioner shall possess the same powers 
and privileges as Members of the House. Each Delegate and the Resident 
Commissioner shall be elected to serve on standing committees in the same 
manner as Members of the House and shall possess in such committees the 
same powers and privileges as the other members of the committee.''.

  (b) Appointment of Chair.--The first sentence of clause 1 of rule XVIII 
of the Rules of the House of Representatives is amended by striking ``a 
Chairman'' and inserting ``a Member, Delegate, or the Resident Commissioner 
as Chairman''.

  (c) Repeating of Certain Votes.--Clause 6 of rule XVIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives is amended by adding at the end the following 
new paragraph:

  ``(h) Whenever a recorded vote on any question has been decided by a 
margin within which the votes cast by the Delegates and the Resident 
Commissioner have been decisive, the Committee of the Whole shall rise and 
the Speaker shall put such question de novo without intervening motion. 
Upon the announcement of the vote on that question, the Committee of the 
Whole shall resume its sitting without intervening motion.''. . . .

        Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Madam Speaker, I yield back the 
    balance of my time.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 86, the 
    previous question is ordered on the resolution.
        The question is on the resolution.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the noes appeared to have it.
        Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Madam Speaker, I object to the vote on 
    the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order 
    that a quorum is not present.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
        The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    226, nays 191, not voting 18, as follows:

                              [Roll No. 57] . . .

        Mr. CLEAVER changed his vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
        So the resolution was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 2.18 The daily prayer has been delivered by a guest chaplain 
    sponsored by a Delegate.

    On June 26, 1991,(121) the daily prayer was offered by a 
guest chaplain(122) (the Reverend Kirk D. Monroe) who had 
been sponsored by the Delegate from the District of Columbia:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
121. 137 Cong. Rec. 16359, 102d Cong. 1st Sess.
122. For more on guest chaplains, see Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 6 
        Sec. 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The House met at 10 a.m.
        The Reverend Kirk D. Monroe, Sr., pastor, Mount Zion United 
    Methodist Church, Washington, DC, offered the following prayer:
        Good morning God; we come to You seeking harmony and peace. We 
    ask for Your sovereign protection over the limits and boundaries of 
    our Nation. As You have called us to mark the paths of history we 
    ask for Your wisdom and Your goodness to intern us toward mercy.
        We pray for America, for all of her children. Please help us to 
    let justice roll down like waters and righteousness like an 
    everflowing stream. Please guide us and kindle us for fine heroic 
    living; please humble us when the ordinary is transformed into some 
    mountaintop experience for Your people.
        So as the rose tells its secret in its perfume, so as the Sun 
    tells its secret in light and heat, may we who serve America tell 
    of its secret in our benevolence and our compassion.
        Hear our prayer O God. 
    Amen.                          -------------------

                                  THE JOURNAL

        The SPEAKER.(123) The Chair has examined the Journal 
    of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his 
    approval thereof.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
123. Tom Foley (WA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Journal stands approved. . . 
    .                          -------------------

                            THE REVEREND KIRK MONROE

        (Ms. NORTON asked and was given permission to address the House 
    for 1 minute, and to revise and extend her remarks.)
        Ms. [Eleanor] NORTON [of District of Columbia]. Mr. Speaker, it 
    is a personal pleasure to welcome Rev. Kirk Monroe, pastor of Mount 
    Zion United Methodist Church, at 175 years old this year, the 
    oldest black congregation in Washington. Located in Georgetown, 
    Mount Zion United Methodist Church is among a treasure of historic 
    churches located in the Nation's Capital.
        It is only fitting that one of our most distinguished and 
    historic churches would have as its minister a distinguished and 
    able young man, a graduate of Howard University Divinity School, 
    who has been cited in the Afro-American newspaper as one of the 
    District's top 25 preachers.
        Mr. Speaker, we in the District are grateful for Mount Zion's 
    spiritual and civic influence and for the energetic and excellent 
    contributions of Rev. Kirk Monroe.



                B. Qualifications and Disqualifications



Sec. 3. Qualifications

    The Constitution imposes certain qualifications on individuals 
seeking to become a Member of the House of 
Representatives.(1) The first such qualification is age: an 
individual must be at least 25 years of age in order to become a 
Member.(2) The second qualification is citizenship: an 
individual must have been a citizen of the United States for seven 
years.(3) The third qualification is inhabitancy: an 
individual must have been an inhabitant of the state in which they were 
elected at the time of the election.(4)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 2, cl. 2 (``No Person shall be a 
        Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty 
        five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United 
        States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of 
        that State in which he shall be chosen.''). See also House 
        Rules and Manual Sec. Sec. 9-13 (2021).
 2. U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 2, cl. 2.
 3. U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 2, cl. 2. The Constitution further defines 
        citizenship as follows: ``All persons born or naturalized in 
        the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
        citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
        reside.'' U.S. Const. amend. XIV, Sec. 1.
 4. U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 2, cl. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the first two qualifications, the Constitution does 
not specify the point at which the requirements must be met. However, 
it has been the practice of both Houses of Congress to admit 
individuals who meet those qualifications at the time at which the oath 
of office is administered and they formally assume all the rights and 
privileges of Members of Congress. Thus, where a Member-elect had not 
yet reached the required age at the opening of the Congress to which he 
was elected, the administration of the oath was delayed until the 
constitutional requirement had been met.(5) Similarly, where 
a Member-elect was a U.S. citizen, but not for the required seven 
years, the administration of the oath was delayed until the full seven-
year period had elapsed.(6) With respect to the third 
qualification (inhabitancy), the Constitution does specify that the 
qualification must be met at the time of election.(7)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. See 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 418. For a similar case in the Senate, 
        see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 10.2.
 6. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. Sec. 9.2, 10.1.
 7. U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 2, cl. 2 (Representatives must inhabit the 
        state ``when elected.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It has been held that the constitutional qualifications are 
``exclusive of others.''(8) In other words, neither the 
states (which administer the election of Members), nor the House (which 
determines who is entitled to seats in the House) has the authority, 
under the Constitution, to impose additional qualifications on those 
seeking to become Members. With respect to states, early precedents 
demonstrate a clear reluctance on the part of the House to refuse to 
seat individuals who had not met state-mandated requirements for 
eligibility.(9) With respect to the House itself, in 1967, 
the House voted to exclude a Member-elect (Adam Clayton Powell of New 
York) based on alleged corrupt activities occurring in the prior 
Congress.(10) This action was challenged in Federal 
court,(11) and eventually led to a Supreme Court ruling in 
Powell's favor.(12) The Court held that, ``Congress is 
limited to the standing qualifications prescribed in the Constitution . 
. . since Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., was duly elected by the voters of 
the 18th Congressional District of New York and was not ineligible to 
serve under any provision of the Constitution, the House was without 
power to exclude him from its membership.''(13) Similar 
questions regarding the Senate's ability to exclude qualified 
individuals from the Senate for campaign violations were raised in the 
1940s, though without definitive conclusions.(14)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 414.
 9. See, e.g., 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 414-417. It should be 
        noted that, with respect to vacancies that occur in the Senate, 
        the Constitution provides that ``any State may empower the 
        executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the 
        people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may 
        direct.'' U.S. Const. amend. XVII. This authorization would 
        seem to allow state legislatures to impose additional 
        qualifications on those appointed to the Senate to fill a 
        vacancy. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 9.7 (fn. 17) 
        (``[a] state legislature may empower the state executive to 
        make temporary appointments to the Senate in the event of a 
        vacancy, with the legislature setting qualifications for 
        appointees.'').
10. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. Sec. 9.1, 11.1. The issue of 
        the final right to the seat in question was investigated by a 
        committee, which recommended seating Powell but subjecting him 
        to fines and other disciplinary actions. This proposition was 
        rejected by the House. Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 9.3.
11. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 9.4.
12. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 489 (``. . . petitioner Powell 
        is entitled to a declaratory judgment that he was unlawfully 
        excluded from the 90th Congress.'').
13. Id. at 550. For the Court's analysis of constitutional provisions 
        beyond age, habitancy, and citizenship that may be regarded as 
        qualifications of the office, see id. at 520 (fn. 41).
14. Parliamentarian's Note: In 1941, Senator William Langer of North 
        Dakota was accused of ``campaign fraud and conduct involving 
        moral turpitude.'' Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 9.5. As 
        Sen. Langer had already been sworn in at the time of the 
        challenge, the Senate considered the matter as an expulsion 
        rather than an exclusion, and the expulsion vote failed to 
        achieve the necessary two-thirds majority. Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 11.3. In 1947, Senator Theodore Bilbo of 
        Mississippi was accused of ``fraudulent campaign practices'' 
        and conspiracy ``to prevent the exercise of voting rights of 
        certain citizens.'' Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 9.6. The 
        issue was postponed due to Sen. Bilbo's ill health, and he died 
        prior to any decision by the Senate. Deschler's Precedents Ch. 
        7 Sec. 11.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The House (and Senate) have debated the extent to which loyalty to 
the United States should be considered as a relevant factor in 
determining whether an individual is qualified to serve in Congress. 
During the Civil War, Congress enacted the so-called ``test oath'' (or 
``ironclad oath'') for civil servants and other government 
employees.(15) The oath required takers to affirm that they 
had never ``voluntarily borne arms against the United 
States''(16) --which had the intended effect of barring most 
ex-Confederates from government service. Congress eventually applied 
the ``test oath'' to its own Members, and used it to exclude from 
membership those who could not or would not take the 
oath.(17) The 14th Amendment to the Constitution, ratified 
in 1868, provided that anyone who had ``engaged in insurrection or 
rebellion'' or who had ``given aid or comfort to the enemies'' of the 
United States, was barred from membership in the House or 
Senate.(18) Congress, by a two-thirds vote of each House, 
could ``remove such disability.''(19)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 20 Stat. 502.
16. Id.
17. See 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 442-453.
18. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, Sec. 3. For election cases involving this 
        provision, see 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 454-463.
19. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, Sec. 3. Statutes enacted in 1872 (17 Stat. 
        142) and 1898 (30 Stat. 432) removed such disability for 
        certain groups.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the aftermath of World War I, another loyalty case came to the 
House with the election of Victor L. Berger, who had been convicted by 
a Federal court under a wartime espionage act for distributing antiwar 
materials.(20) There was no question that Berger had been 
validly elected, but the House nevertheless chose to exclude Berger on 
the basis of disloyalty under the 14th Amendment. In the special 
election to fill the vacancy caused by Berger's exclusion, Berger was 
again elected, and the House again adopted a resolution to exclude him 
from membership.(21)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. For descriptions of the Berger cases in the 66th Congress, see 6 
        Cannon's Precedents Sec. Sec. 56-59.
21. See 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 59. In the 68th Congress, Victor 
        Berger was again elected, and the House chose to seat him 
        without challenge. Berger also served in the 69th and 70th 
        Congresses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The House has, on occasion, investigated the citizenship status of 
a Member-elect in order to determine whether the individual has 
properly met the constitutional requirement.(22) The very 
first election contest to reach the House in the First Congress 
involved questions as to the citizenship of the Member-
elect.(23) Naturalized citizens meet the constitutional 
requirement, and there have been historical instances of the House 
investigating the date of naturalization in order to confirm 
eligibility.(24) In a 20th century case, the citizenship 
status of a Member-elect was challenged, and the House resolved the 
question by seating the Member-elect and referring the issue of the 
final right to the seat to a committee.(25)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
22. See, e.g., 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 424-427. For similar 
        citizenship qualification issues in the Senate, see 1 Hinds' 
        Precedents Sec. Sec. 428-430.
23. See 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 420.
24. See 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 424, 425.
25. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 10.3. No further action was 
        taken in the case and the Member served his full term. See 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 11.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The constitutional requirement of inhabitancy has also been the 
basis for challenges of, and investigations into, the qualifications of 
individuals elected to the House.(26) Typically, such cases 
involve individuals who maintain two residences, and the dispute is 
centered on which should be considered their primary place of 
habitation.(27) A distinction has been made between 
``actual'' and ``legal'' residence for purposes of interpreting this 
constitutional mandate.(28) The House has generally declined 
to accept challenges where the individual was engaged in government 
service at some location (e.g., a foreign country, or the District of 
Columbia) that was not their primary residence.(29) A 
contestant in an election contest has been found to be ineligible to 
pursue his claim due to lack of inhabitancy in the relevant 
jurisdiction.(30)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
26. For Senate cases involving the question of inhabitancy, see 1 
        Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 437-440.
27. See, e.g., 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 432.
28. See 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 55 (newspaper correspondent living 
        in D.C. nevertheless maintained his legal residence in Indiana, 
        where he paid taxes and voted).
29. See, e.g., 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 433, 435. But see 1 Hinds' 
        Precedents Sec. 434 (State Department clerk disqualified due to 
        lengthy habitation in D.C. and the abandonment of any true 
        residence in his home state).
30. See 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 436.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The positions of Delegate and Resident Commissioner are not 
constitutional offices, and therefore the qualifications for Members do 
not apply.(31) Instead, the qualifications for such 
positions are laid out in the statutes that create those 
offices.(32) Nevertheless, these qualifications typically 
mirror the constitutional qualifications for Members, including the 
three attributes of age, citizenship, and inhabitancy.(33)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
31. For more on Delegates and Resident Commissioners generally, see 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 3; and Sec. 2, supra.
32. See 2 U.S.C. Sec. 25a; and 48 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 892, 1713, 1733, and 
        1753. In the 27th Congress, the House investigated the 
        qualifications of a Delegate from the Florida Territory, and a 
        committee concluded: ``While not strictly or technically a 
        Representative, yet, considering the dignity and importance of 
        the office, the strongest reasons of public policy would 
        require that he should possess qualifications similar to those 
        required by a Representative.'' 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 423.
33. For an earlier statute requiring Delegates from certain territories 
        to be citizens of the United States, see 1 Hinds' Precedents 
        Sec. 431.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Procedure; Distinguishing Other Requirements

    A challenge to the seating of a Member-elect on the basis of 
qualifications is typically made on opening day of a new 
Congress.(34) If a Member-elect believes that another 
Member-elect lacks the requisite qualifications, an objection may be 
raised to administering the oath of office to the challenged Member-
elect. The House may then resolve the issue by: not seating the 
challenged Member-elect; seating the Member-elect despite the 
challenge; or seating the challenged Member-elect, but referring the 
issue of the final right to the seat to a committee.(35) If 
the House determines that a Member-elect does not meet the 
constitutional qualifications, the oath of office is not administered, 
and the Member-elect is termed ``excluded'' from the 
House.(36)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
34. Parliamentarian's Note: If an individual were to be elected to a 
        seat in the House via special election (to fill a vacancy), a 
        qualifications challenge would be made when the Member-elect 
        arrives to take the oath.
35. For more on challenges to seating Members-elect at the organization 
        of a new Congress, see Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 2 Sec. 4.
36. For an earlier treatment of exclusion from the House, see 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 12 Sec. 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An exclusion from the House should be distinguished from an 
expulsion from the House.(37) In an expulsion proceeding, 
the individual is already a sworn Member and there is no question as to 
the individual's right to the seat. Therefore, the constitutional 
requirement of a two-thirds vote in favor of expulsion 
applies.(38) By contrast, a proposition to exclude a Member-
elect from the House may be adopted by a simple majority vote. This is 
the case even where the individual has been sworn, but the question as 
to the final right to the seat is still pending before the 
House.(39)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
37. For expulsion generally, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 12 Sec. 13; 
        and Precedents (____) Ch. 12.
38. U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 5, cl. 2.
39. Deschler's Precedents Ch. 12 Sec. 14 (``[A]lthough a two-thirds 
        vote is required to expel a Member, only a majority is required 
        to exclude a Member who has been permitted to take the oath of 
        office pending a final determination by the House of his right 
        to the seat.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An exclusion from the House should also be distinguished from 
proceedings in the nature of an election contest.(40) 
Election contests occur when there is a dispute as to whether the 
individual in question was properly elected--not whether the individual 
meets the constitutional requirements for membership. However, the 
procedure is effectively the same: an individual determined by the 
House not to have been properly elected will be barred from taking a 
seat (i.e., the administration of the oath of office will not be 
authorized). In cases where the contestant in an election contest bases 
their challenge on the claim that the contestee is ineligible to serve 
for lack of qualification, the House may treat the issue as one of 
exclusion rather than a contested election.(41) If a Member-
elect is excluded from the House for failing to meet the constitutional 
requirements for eligibility, the candidate receiving the next highest 
number of votes cast is not entitled to the seat.(42)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
40. For election contests generally, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9; 
        and Precedents (Smith) Ch. 9.
41. For examples of the House addressing issues of qualification in the 
        context of an election contest, see, e.g., Precedents (Smith) 
        Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 15.4, 29.2, 30.1, and 31.5.
42. Parliamentarian's Note: Under early British practice, the opposite 
        rule prevailed: where a candidate for a seat in the House of 
        Commons was determined to be ineligible to serve, the candidate 
        receiving the next highest number of votes would be entitled to 
        the seat. However, in the United States, both Houses of 
        Congress have declared that the determination that an 
        individual elected to Congress is ineligible to serve results 
        in the nullification of the election and a vacancy in the seat 
        in question. See, e.g., 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 323, 326, 
        417, 424, 435, 450, 463, and 469; 6 Cannon's Precedents 
        Sec. Sec. 58, 59; and Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the Constitution mandates other requirements (apart from 
qualifications) that individuals must meet in order to be admitted to 
membership in the House. For example, the individual must agree to take 
the oath of office, as required by article VI of the 
Constitution.(43) Further, the individual must not hold an 
``incompatible office''(44) at the time the oath of office 
is taken.(45) Lastly, if an individual is impeached by the 
House and convicted by the Senate, they may be subject to 
``disqualification'' from ``any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under 
the United States . . .''(46) Thus, such individuals may be 
precluded from membership in the House as a consequence of their prior 
impeachment and conviction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
43. ``The Senators and Representatives . . . shall be bound by Oath or 
        Affirmation, to support this Constitution . . .'' U.S. Const. 
        art. VI, cl. 3. The form of the oath is provided by statute. 
        See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 3331. As the oath requires individuals to 
        swear or affirm that they will support and defend the 
        Constitution, and ``bear true faith and allegiance to the 
        same,'' the taking of the oath necessarily involves issues of 
        loyalty to the United States. However, the ``House has not 
        reached the question whether an express disavowal of the oath'' 
        could serve as a bar to membership. Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 
        Sec. 12. For earlier precedents regarding the relationship 
        between the oath and qualifications, see 1 Hinds' Precedents 
        Sec. Sec. 441-463. The Senate (though not the House) has 
        debated the question of whether competency to take the oath 
        (i.e., whether the individual is mentally capable of taking a 
        meaningful oath) should be used as a factor in determining 
        qualifications. See 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 441.
44. ``No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he 
        was elected, be appointed to any Civil Office under the 
        Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, 
        or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such 
        time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States 
        shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in 
        Office.'' U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 6, cl. 2.
45. For more on incompatible offices generally, see Sec. 4, infra. See 
        also Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. Sec. 13, 14.
46. U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 3, cl. 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



Sec. 4. Incompatible Offices

    The separation of powers principle inherent in the structure of the 
Federal government is manifested in a variety of constitutional 
provisions. One such provision is found in section 6 of article 
I,(1) and delineates restrictions on Members of Congress 
serving simultaneously in other government positions: ``No Senator or 
Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be 
appointed to any Civil Office under the Authority of the United States, 
which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have 
been encreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under 
the United States shall be a Member of either House during his 
Continuance in Office.'' This provision ensures that powers delegated 
to the different branches of government are not commingled by being 
exercised by the same person.(2)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 6, cl. 2; and House Rules and Manual 
        Sec. Sec. 96, 97 (2021).
 2. In referring to this constitutional provision, an 1864 committee 
        report evinced the view that ``[t]he House has ever been awake 
        to this constitutional guaranty of its independence.'' 1 Hinds' 
        Precedents Sec. 492. Even earlier, in 1816, Rep. John Randolph 
        of Virginia ``urged that the House should be very jealous of 
        any invasion of these guaranties of the Constitution.'' 1 
        Hinds' Precedents Sec. 506.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The prohibition described in this constitutional provision is two-
fold. First, a Member of the House may not simultaneously serve in an 
``office'' under the United States, such concurrent service being 
considered incompatible with service as a Member. Second, a Member may 
not be appointed to any office that was either created during the time 
the Member was serving in Congress, or whose compensation was increased 
during such time. This section discusses both prohibitions.

Definitions; Application

    The Constitution does not precisely define an ``office'' for 
purposes of determining whether service in Congress is incompatible. 
Subsequent practice by the House (as well as case law laid down by the 
courts) has established certain guidelines for determining whether or 
not a Member may accept an additional office during their term. There 
has been broad consensus that the primary offices within other branches 
of the Federal government are incompatible with congressional 
service.(3) So, for example, Members of Congress may not be 
appointed to Cabinet positions in the executive,(4) or to 
open seats in the judicial branch,(5) and may not be seated 
in the Senate,(6) without first resigning their House seats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. Similarly, simultaneous service in both Houses of Congress is 
        impermissible. See fn. 6, infra.
 4. For examples of Members of the House resigning to take positions 
        within the executive branch, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 37 
        Sec. 4.2.
 5. For examples of Members of the House resigning to assume judicial 
        positions, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 37 Sec. Sec. 4.8, 4.9.
 6. For examples of Members resigning their House seats in order to 
        serve in the Senate, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 37 
        Sec. Sec. 4.3, 4.4. See also 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 502 
        (where a Member had accepted a seat in the Senate, the House 
        adopted a resolution declaring his House seat vacant).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An 1867 Supreme Court case(7) articulated certain 
principles regarding what constitutes a ``public office.'' 
Specifically, the Court held that: ``An office is a public station, or 
employment, conferred by the appointment of government. The term 
embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and 
duties.''(8) In 1899, the Committee on the Judiciary 
reported to the House the results of its investigation into whether 
certain Members had accepted incompatible offices.(9) The 
committee report relied heavily on the Hartwell analysis, including the 
four elements of tenure, duration, compensation (emoluments), and 
duties.(10) Additionally, the committee report cited other 
authorities for the proposition that the office must confer upon the 
individual ``legislative, executive, or judicial 
powers''(11) or ``some of the sovereign functions of 
government, to be exercised . . . for the benefit of the 
public.''(12)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385 (1867).
 8. Id. at 393.
 9. See 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 493.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The issues of tenure and duration may be reframed as an inquiry 
into the temporal nature of the position at issue. Where the position 
is merely ``transient, occasional, or incidental''(13) the 
office may be deemed to be compatible with service as a Member of the 
House. For example, early practice showed that Members of Congress 
would occasionally be appointed by the executive to undertake certain 
temporary offices--inspector of post roads, examiner of land offices, 
treaty negotiator, etc.--and a House committee concluded that such 
temporary service (even if compensated) did not violate the 
Constitution.(14) By contrast, an examination into 
concurrent service in Congress and the National Guard led one House 
committee to report that, ``it is apparent that a commissioned officer 
in the National Guard clearly meets the definition in United States v. 
Hartwell of an officer of the United States; that is, that his office 
embraces the idea of tenure, duration, emoluments, and duties, and that 
his duties are continuing and permanent, not occasional and 
temporary.''(15)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. Id.
14. See 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 495. In 1806, the House considered a 
        resolution declaring ``That a contractor under the Government 
        of the United States is an office within the purview and 
        meaning of the Constitution, and, as such, is incapable of 
        holding a seat in this House.'' However, the House rejected 
        this resolution. See 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 496.
15. See 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 60.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The issue of compensation (or emoluments) has been raised on 
several occasions in the context of determining whether the office 
under consideration is incompatible with congressional service. As 
early as 1816, the House debated whether providing compensation to the 
delegation negotiating the Treaty of Ghent violated the constitutional 
prohibition.(16) Another war commission (the World War 
Foreign Debt Commission) was the subject of similar deliberation in the 
Senate in 1922.(17) There, the majority opinion of a 
committee report concluded that the offices were incompatible, but 
minority views, as well as the opinion of the Attorney General, 
concluded otherwise, and the Senate voted to confirm the 
appointments.(18) Under the Attorney General's reasoning, 
the positions were compatible because ``[t]he commissioners receive no 
compensation.''(19) In 1945, Congress passed a law providing 
for U.S. participation in the United Nations. An amendment offered in 
the House provided that no compensation would be paid to the U.S. 
representative to the U.N. should such person be a Member of 
Congress.(20) The legislative history of this amendment 
reveals that Members believed this provision was necessary to cure 
possible incompatibility under the Constitution.(21)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. See 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 506.
17. See 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 64.
18. Id.
19. Id. See also 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 63 (service on the board of 
        a soldier's home was compatible as ``the members of the Board 
        of Managers receive no compensation.'').
20. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 13.2.
21. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to duties, it has been held that some offices require 
affirmative duties that are inherently in conflict with service in 
Congress. Although the office of Governor of a state is, by definition, 
not an office ``under the United States,'' House precedents state that 
there is ``an absolute inconsistency in the functions of the two 
offices, Member of Congress and governor.''(22) But where an 
office has no duties to perform, acceptance of the office by a Member 
may be permitted. In one instance, a Member retained an office (Federal 
tax assessor) beyond the beginning of his congressional term, but the 
House concluded that the assessments had already occurred and that 
therefore ``no official duty remained to be performed'' by the 
Member.(23)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
22. See 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 65. For an example of a Member 
        resigning her seat in the House in order to accept the office 
        of state Governor, see Sec. 4.4, infra. For an example of the 
        House adopting a privileged resolution to authorize the 
        administration of the oath to a Member-elect following 
        completion of his service as Governor, see Sec. 4.2, infra. For 
        a 1792 example of a Member assuming that acceptance of a state 
        judicial position rendered him ineligible for further service 
        in the House, see 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 501. For proceedings 
        involving concurrent service as a Member and as an elected 
        municipal officer (city council), see Sec. 4.3, infra. It 
        should be noted that any action by the House in response to a 
        Member or Member-elect holding a state or local office must be 
        carefully considered in light of the Supreme Court's holding in 
        Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). See Sec. 3, supra.
23. 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 497.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Military Service

    The issue of military service has long been a concern of Congress 
with regard to the constitutional prohibition on incompatible offices. 
The earliest precedents indicate that the House considered acceptance 
of a military commission as being fundamentally incompatible with 
congressional service.(24) In 1803, a Member of the House 
was appointed by President Thomas Jefferson to a position in the 
militia of the District of Columbia.(25) The House 
subsequently voted unanimously for a resolution declaring the Member as 
having forfeited his seat by this action.(26) Similar cases 
in the pre-Civil War period stand for the general principle that 
acceptance of a military commission automatically creates a vacancy in 
the seat held by the accepting Member.(27)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
24. Parliamentarian's Note: In an 1862 case, the Committee on Elections 
        had occasion to discuss the distinction between service in the 
        Army of the United States and service in a state militia. For 
        purposes of determining constitutional incompatibility, the 
        committee found such distinction ``of little importance. If 
        [the Member] was actually mustered into service of the United 
        States, he was, by that act, placed in an office totally 
        incompatible with that of Representative in Congress.'' 1 
        Hinds' Precedents Sec. 490.
25. See 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 486.
26. Id. Rep. John Randolph of Virginia ``asked the House, in the 
        important precedent which it was about to establish, to vote 
        unanimously to exclude even the shadow of executive 
        influence.''
27. See 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 487-489.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The issue of concurrent military and congressional service again 
came before the House in the late 19th century, during both the Civil 
War(28) and the Spanish-American War.(29) In the 
context of the latter, the Committee on the Judiciary reported 
(consistent with earlier cases) that ``the office of Member of Congress 
and an officer in the Army of the United States are incompatible and 
can not be held at the same time.''(30)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
28. See, e.g., 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 490-492.
29. See, e.g., 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 493, 494.
30. 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 494.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    During World War I, several Members of the House took leaves of 
absence in order to attend military training exercises for possible 
mobilization. In 1916, the Committee on the Judiciary was tasked with 
investigating whether service in the National Guard was compatible with 
congressional service. Relying on the Hartwell decision,(31) 
it concluded once again that ``the seats of those Members of the House 
of Representatives who shall accept commissions in the National Guard . 
. . will at once become vacant.''(32) Subsequently, the 
House did adopt a resolution providing for salary and clerk allowances 
for such Members during their leaves of absence, subtracting any 
compensation received for their Army service.(33)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
31. United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385 (1867).
32. 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 60.
33. See 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    During World War II, the executive played a greater role policing 
the appropriate boundary between congressional service and military 
service. As with previous military conflicts, Members began requesting 
leaves of absence so that they could attend military training 
exercises.(34) In response, the Secretary of War and the 
Secretary of the Navy informed the Speaker that activation of Members 
with reserve commissions would be discouraged, and that new 
applications for enlistment by Members would not be 
approved.(35) The President subsequently recalled Members 
who had been in active military service back to 
Congress.(36) Faced with the choice of serving either in the 
House or in the military, some Members chose to resign their House 
seats.(37) Others chose to delay their taking of the oath of 
office in order to complete military service before assuming their 
seats in the House.(38) Unlike in World War I, Members who 
took leaves of absence for military service during World War II were 
not provided congressional salary during that period.(39)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
34. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 14.4.
35. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 14.3.
36. Id.
37. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 14.6.
38. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 14.5.
39. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 14.7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An 1899 report noted that ``it is settled law that persons on the 
retired list of the Army do not hold office under the United States in 
the constitutional sense.''(40) However, in 1921, a Member 
who was commissioned in the Army reserves requested a leave of absence 
to attend military training--a request that drew objection on grounds 
of possible incompatibility.(41) A statute originally 
enacted in 1956 specifically provides that: ``A Reserve of the armed 
forces who is not on active duty or who is on active duty for training 
is deemed not an employee or an individual holding an office of trust 
or profit or discharging an official function under or in connection 
with the United States because of his appointment, oath, or status, or 
any duties or functions performed or pay or allowances received in that 
capacity.''(42) In 2003, a Member requested an indefinite 
leave of absence in the expectation that he would be called up from the 
Army reserves to active duty.(43)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
40. 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 494.
41. See 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 62.
42. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 2105(d).
43. See Sec. 4.1, infra. Although the request was granted without 
        objection, the Member was never called up to active service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Procedure; Timing

    Under modern practice, issues involving incompatible offices are 
typically resolved before the potential for conflict arises--either via 
the resignation of the Member from the House prior to the assumption of 
the other office,(44) or the resignation of a Member-elect 
from a potentially incompatible position prior to taking a seat in the 
House. Thus, the House often takes no cognizance of the potential 
conflict beyond acknowledging the vacancy created by a Member's 
resignation. In the 19th century, Members would sometimes inform the 
House that they were accepting an incompatible office (with or without 
explicitly resigning their House seats), and the House would pass a 
resolution declaring the affected seat vacant.(45) In one 
instance, the issue arose whether the adoption of such a resolution 
constituted, in effect, an expulsion from the House, and would 
therefore require the constitutionally-mandated two-thirds 
vote.(46) However, the House sustained the Speaker's ruling 
that the resolution merely declaring the vacancy should not be 
construed as an expulsion from the House.(47)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
44. See, e.g., Sec. 4.4, infra.
45. See, e.g., 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 487. Some older proceedings 
        suggested that the acceptance of an incompatible office 
        automatically creates a vacancy in the affected seat, without 
        further action by either the Member or the House. For example, 
        a committee report in 1898 stated that when Members accept Army 
        commissions, their seats ``are vacant, and have been since they 
        accepted their commission in the Army. The only action 
        necessary to so declare by resolution, as a matter of 
        convenience and to aid the Speaker and others in discharging 
        their public duties. No act or resolution of Congress can 
        change the legal effect of their acts.'' 1 Hinds' Precedents 
        Sec. 494. A 1909 committee report likewise stated that ``[W]hen 
        a person, while occupying one position accepts another 
        incompatible with the first he, ipso facto, absolutely vacates 
        the office and his title thereto is terminated without any 
        further act or proceeding.'' 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 65. 
        However, it should be noted that this theory is not in 
        consonance with modern practice, and issues involving possible 
        disqualification from service in the House should be viewed in 
        light of the Supreme Court's holding in Powell v. McCormack, 
        395 U.S. 486 (1969).
46. U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 5, cl. 2 (``Each House may . . . punish 
        its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence 
        of two thirds, expel a Member.'').
47. 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 490, 504.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because the constitutional prohibition on incompatible offices 
applies only to simultaneous service, a relevant factor is timing, 
i.e., whether the individual actually held both offices at the same 
time. An individual elected to the House does not become a Member until 
the term of office begins and the oath of office is 
taken.(48) Thus, during the period between the certification 
of the election results and the beginning of the new Congress (when the 
individual is merely a ``Member-elect''), simultaneous service in an 
otherwise incompatible office is permissible. A Member-elect holding an 
incompatible office has until the beginning of the Congress to decide 
whether to accept the House seat and resign the incompatible office, or 
retain the incompatible office and decline the seat in the 
House.(49) There have been numerous instances of Members of 
the House(50) (and Senators)(51) retaining their 
additional office beyond the start of the new Congress, and delaying 
the administration of the oath of office until they had resigned the 
other office.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
48. For more on the oath of office, see Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 2.
49. ``The House has manifestly leaned to the idea that a contestant 
        holding an incompatible office need not make his election until 
        the House has declared him entitled to the seat.'' 1 Hinds' 
        Precedents Sec. 505. See also 1 Hinds' Precedents 
        Sec. Sec. 492, 498, and 499 (examples of Members resigning 
        incompatible offices prior to the beginning of a new Congress); 
        1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 500 (example of an Army officer 
        elected to Congress but declining to take his seat); and 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 14.6 (examples of Members 
        resigning their House seats to serve in the military in World 
        War II).
50. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 14.5. See also Sec. 4.2, 
        infra.
51. See 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 503; and Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 
        Sec. 13.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Creating Offices; Increasing Emoluments

    The other prohibition contained in section 6 of article I of the 
Constitution prevents the appointment of Members of Congress to civil 
offices of the United States whose ``emoluments'' were increased by law 
during the time that the individual served in Congress. The rationale 
for this constitutional provision is to prohibit Members of Congress 
from voting to increase the compensation of positions to which said 
Members may then later be appointed.(52) The same clause of 
the Constitution prohibits the appointment of Members to newly-created 
positions as well, for the same concerns over possible conflicts of 
interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
52. Parliamentarian's Note: Although the presumed purpose of the clause 
        is to prevent Members of Congress from participating in the 
        design of government positions that they may later fill 
        themselves, the language of the clause speaks only to the 
        temporal issue: the position cannot have been created (or the 
        emoluments thereof increased) ``during the Time for which [the 
        Member of Congress] was elected.'' U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 6, 
        cl. 2. Thus, some sources have argued that the resignation of a 
        Member of Congress does not cure the ineligibility, so long as 
        the relevant law was passed at some point during the term to 
        which such Member elected. See, e.g., 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 365 
        (1882). Indeed, in the very first controversy over a possible 
        violation of this constitutional provision, President George 
        Washington withdrew his appointment of a Senator to the Supreme 
        Court so that it could be resubmitted following the expiration 
        of the Senator's term (notwithstanding the fact that the 
        Senator had previously resigned his Senate seat). See The 
        Emoluments Clause: History, Law, and Precedents, CRS Report 
        R40124 (Jan. 7, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It has been held that where an increase in compensation is merely 
speculative, and not a certainty, the constitutional proscription does 
not apply.(53) For example, where a Member was nominated to 
become Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General opined that the 
procedures under the newly-enacted Federal Salary Act for increasing 
the compensation of Cabinet officials did not provide a guarantee that 
such an increase would actually occur.(54) Similarly, in 
1937, the Senate confirmed a Senator to the Supreme Court, overriding 
concerns that the new justice might eventually receive retirement 
benefits that had been increased during his term in the 
Senate.(55)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
53. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 13.6.
54. Id.
55. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 13.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In order to avoid any possible controversy under this 
constitutional provision, Members of Congress may choose to resign 
their seats to assume the new office before the increase in 
compensation becomes effective.(56) Alternatively, Congress 
has on occasion passed legislation to specifically reduce or roll back 
the salary of the public office at issue, so that an otherwise 
ineligible Member of Congress may be appointed to that office. This 
method of achieving constitutional compliance has been called the 
``Saxbe fix,''(57) after Senator William Saxbe of Ohio, who 
was nominated by President Richard Nixon to become Attorney General. 
Congress passed a law to roll back the salary of the Attorney General 
to what it had been prior to Senator Saxbe's term.(58) In 
subsequent decades, the ``Saxbe fix'' would be utilized on several 
occasions to reduce the compensation of executive officers in 
expectation that a Member of Congress would be chosen to fill a 
vacancy.(59)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
56. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 13.5. See also Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 37 Sec. 4.8.
57. Parliamentarian's Note: Although the term ``Saxbe fix'' is often 
        used to describe this legislative maneuver, the method did not 
        originate at that time. In 1909, President William Taft 
        nominated Senator Philander Knox of Pennsylvania to become 
        Secretary of State. Because Congress had increased the 
        compensation for the Secretary of State during Knox's 
        congressional term, he was thought to be ineligible under the 
        Constitution. In response, Congress enacted legislation to 
        revert the salary back to its prior level. See The Emoluments 
        Clause: History, Law, and Precedents, CRS Report R40124 (Jan. 
        7, 2009).
58. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 13.7. See also P.L. 93-178, 87 
        Stat. 697.
59. Parliamentarian's Note: Since the Saxbe case in 1973, the following 
        additional cases have arisen: Robert Casey (a Member of the 
        House) was appointed to the Federal Maritime Commission, and 
        the salary of the commissioner position reduced by P.L. 94-195, 
        89 Stat. 1108; Edmund Muskie (a Senator) was appointed as 
        Secretary of State, and the office's salary reduced by P.L. 96-
        241, 94 Stat. 343; Lloyd Bentsen (a Senator) was appointed as 
        Secretary of the Treasury, and the office's salary reduced by 
        P.L. 103-2, 107 Stat. 4; Hillary Clinton (a Senator) was 
        appointed as Secretary of State, and the office's salary 
        reduced by P.L. 110-455, 122 Stat. 5036; and Ken Salazar (a 
        Senator) was appointed as Secretary of the Interior, and the 
        office's salary reduced by P.L. 111-1, 123 Stat. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 4.1 A Member has requested an indefinite leave of absence after 
    informing the Speaker that he expected to be called up from the 
    Army reserves to active duty.(60)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
60. Parliamentarian's Note: Although Rep. Steve Buyer's leave of 
        absence was granted, he was never in fact called up to active 
        military service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On March 20, 2003,(61) the Speaker made the following 
remarks, after which Rep. Steve Buyer of Indiana's request for an 
indefinite leave of absence was granted:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
61. 149 Cong. Rec. 6958, 108th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        HOPES AND PRAYERS FOR STEVE BUYER, MEMBER OF CONGRESS, AND HIS 
                  FAMILY AS HE DEPARTS FOR MILITARY DUTY      

        (Mr. HASTERT asked and was given permission to address the 
    House for 1 minute.)
        Mr. [Dennis] HASTERT [of Illinois]. Mr. Speaker, I would like 
    to read into the Record a letter that I received today.
        ``Dear Mr. Speaker: I have been called to active duty in the 
    United States Army. Pending further orders, I request immediate 
    indefinite leave of the United States House of Representatives to 
    accommodate my military duties.
        ``Respectfully, Steve Buyer, Member of Congress''
        Mr. Speaker and my colleagues, the resolution we are 
    considering affects one of our own today and may affect others in 
    the near future. Our hopes and prayers are with Steve and his 
    family as he prepares to depart for 
    Iraq.                          -------------------

                          OUR DUTY TO PROTECT AMERICA

        Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address 
    the House for 1 minute.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. [Michael] Simpson [of Idaho]). 
    Without objection, the gentleman from Illinois is recognized?
        There was no objection.
        Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Speaker, we will be considering a very 
    important resolution before us this evening. I rise in strong 
    support of that resolution, and I expect that all of my colleagues 
    would vote for it.
        Our men and women in uniform are now engaged in an important 
    conflict in the country of Iraq. We are engaged with 30-some other 
    nations, and it involves certainly a tyrant who has defined himself 
    over the last 20 years.
        Like my colleagues, I remember the day of September 11, 2001. I 
    remember standing in the front of my office waiting to get a call 
    from the Vice President and looking and watching an unfamiliar 
    phenomenon, a roll of black smoke going across the mall that I can 
    look down from my window and see. And I asked one of my staff, I 
    said, find out; that black smoke is not supposed to be there. A 
    minute and a half later they came in and said, well, the third 
    plane had gone into the Pentagon.
        Little beknownst to me and the rest of us at that time, there 
    was a fourth plane involved, and 9 or 10 or 11 brave young men and 
    women brought that plane down into an empty field in southern 
    Pennsylvania. We know now that if it had not been for the actions 
    of those people, that plane would have been in the west front of 
    the Capitol.
        That being said, many of us visited right after the World Trade 
    Center. We had walked the halls of the Pentagon and visited those 
    folks who helped pull their comrades out, some to safety, some 
    beyond help. We talked to the families who lost their folks in the 
    Pentagon, the World Trade Towers; we passed some extraordinary 
    legislation.
        But this country suffered a huge loss that day. I think I speak 
    for all of us when I say that that is something that we do not want 
    to see visited upon this Nation again. We know that in Iraq Saddam 
    Hussein has weapons of mass destruction. We know that he has a 
    nexus to al Qaeda, and we know that that training has been going on 
    over an extended period of time. I believe that it is our duty, 
    this Nation's duty, to protect our Nation and to make sure that 
    that is not visited upon this Nation ever again.
        The men and women whom we are about to salute and wish well 
    tonight and send our best thoughts and prayers to are doing a job 
    that nobody wants to do. Nobody wishes this to have to happen. But 
    in the tradition of this Nation, in the tradition of keeping this 
    country free, and in the tradition of trying to stabilize the 
    Middle East, we are doing this job. We are doing it with 30 other 
    nations who have decided this is the right thing to do.
        Mr. Speaker, as we go through this very sober debate tonight, I 
    would ask for your positive consideration and positive 
    vote.                          -------------------

            COMMUNICATION FROM THE HONORABLE STEVE BUYER, MEMBER OF 
                                 CONGRESS      

        The SPEAKER laid before the House the following communication 
    from the Honorable Steve Buyer, Member of Congress:

                                         house of Representatives,
                                                   March 20, 2003.
                                                Hon. Dennis Hastert,
             Speaker, House of Representatives, H-232, The Capitol, 
                                                     Washington, DC.

        Dear Mr. Speaker: I have been called to active duty in the 
    United States Army. Pending further orders, I request immediate 
    indefinite leave of the House of Representatives to accommodate my 
    military duties.

            Respectfully,
                                                      Steve Buyer,
   Member of Congress                          -------------------

                        LEAVE OF ABSENCE(62)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
62. Parliamentarian's Note: Rep. Buyer's leave of absence request was 
        inadvertently omitted from the Congressional Record of March 
        20, 2003. A note on the omission, and the request itself (as 
        excerpted here) was printed in a subsequent edition of the 
        Congressional Record. See 149 Cong. Rec. 7307, 108th Cong. 1st 
        Sess. (Mar. 24, 2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:
        Mr. Buyer (at the request of Mr. Hastert) for an indefinite 
    period of time on account of military service.

Sec. 4.2 The House has adopted a privileged resolution authorizing the 
    administration of the oath to a Member-elect serving as a state 
    Governor on a specified date following the expiration of their 
    state office term.

    On January 6, 1987,(63) the House adopted the following 
privileged resolution:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
63. 133 Cong. Rec. 19, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. For a similar case where 
        the administration of the oath of office was delayed to 
        accommodate continued service in an incompatible office, see 
        Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 2 Sec. 1.7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          AUTHORIZING THE SPEAKER OR HIS DEPUTY TO ADMINISTER OATH OF 
        OFFICE TO THE HONORABLE JOSEPH E. BRENNAN AT PORTLAND, ME      

        Mr. [Thomas] FOLEY [of Washington]. Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    resolution (H. Res. 8) and I ask unanimous consent for its 
    immediate consideration.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(64) Is there objection to 
    the request of the gentleman from Washington.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
64. Richard Gephardt (MO).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 8

  Whereas Joseph E. Brennan, a Representative-elect from the State of 
Maine, from the First District thereof, has been unable to appear in person 
to be sworn as a Member of the House, and there being no contest or 
question as to his election: Therefore be it

  Resolved, That the Speaker, or deputy named by him, be. and he is hereby, 
authorized to administer the oath of office to the Honorable Joseph E. 
Brennan at Portland, Maine, on or after January 9, 1987, and that the said 
oath be accepted and received by the House as the oath of office of the 
said Joseph E. Brennan.

        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 4.3 The House has adopted a resolution authorizing the 
    administration of the oath to a Member-elect, notwithstanding her 
    continued service as an elected municipal official.

    On November 29, 2018,(65) the House adopted the 
following privileged resolution:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
65. 164 Cong. Rec. H9700 [Daily Ed.], 115th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         DIRECTING THE SPEAKER TO ADMINISTER THE OATH OF OFFICE TO THE 
         REPRESENTATIVE-ELECT FROM THE 13TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF 
                                MICHIGAN        

        Mr. [Sander] LEVIN [of Michigan]. Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    privileged resolution (H. Res. 1161) and ask for its immediate 
    consideration in the House.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 1161

  Resolved, That the Speaker is hereby authorized and directed to 
administer the oath of office to Ms. Brenda Jones, a representative-elect 
from the 13th Congressional District of Michigan.

        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the 
    table.                          -------------------

         SWEARING IN OF THE HONORABLE BRENDA JONES, OF MICHIGAN, AS A 
                          MEMBER OF THE HOUSE        

        The SPEAKER.(66) Will the Representative-elect and 
    the members of the Michigan delegation present themselves in the 
    well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
66. Paul Ryan (WI).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        All Members will rise and the Representative-elect will please 
    raise her right hand.
        Ms. JONES of Michigan appeared at the bar of the House and took 
    the oath of office, as follows:

  Do you solemnly swear that you will support and defend the Constitution 
of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that you 
will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that you take this 
obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; 
and that you will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on 
which you are about to enter, so help you God.

        The SPEAKER. Congratulations, you are now a Member of the 115th 
    Congress.

    On December 6, 2018,(67) the Speaker inserted the 
following extension of remarks into the Congressional Record:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
67. 164 Cong. Rec. E1601 [Daily Ed.], 115th Cong. 2d Sess. The 
        Speaker's clarification that a question of constitutional 
        incompatibility was not presented by these circumstances is 
        consistent with the statement recorded in Deschler's Precedents 
        Ch. 7 Sec. 13 that while, ``high state office is incompatible 
        with congressional membership,'' the ``Constitution does not 
        prohibit Members of Congress from holding state elective or 
        appointive offices.'' As noted (see fn. 22, supra), any action 
        taken by the House in response to a Member or Member-elect 
        holding state or municipal office should be carefully 
        considered in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Powell v. 
        McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). See also Sec. 3, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        H. RES. 1161, RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE OATH TO THE 
            MEMBER ELECT FROM THE 13TH DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN        



                               HON. PAUL D. RYAN

                                  of wisconsin

                      IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           Thursday, December 6, 2018

        Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, on November 29, 2018, the 
    House by unanimous consent adopted House Resolution 1161 in advance 
    of the administration of the oath of office to Representative 
    Brenda Jones of Michigan. Representative Jones was elected on 
    November 6, 2018 to fill a vacancy in the 13th Congressional 
    District of Michigan for the remainder of the 115th Congress. Her 
    certificate of election was received by the House on November 29, 
    2018. Representative Jones also currently serves as the President 
    of the Detroit City Council. Representative Jones has indicated 
    that she will abide by guidance from the House Committee on Ethics 
    to minimize the conflicts that may exist with her duties as 
    President of the City Council during this short tenure in the 
    House.
        The Speaker, with the concurrence of the Democratic Leader, 
    finds that this resolution (1) represents a narrow exception to the 
    restriction established by the House on January 20, 1909, that the 
    duties of a Member of the House and the Governor of a State are 
    ``absolutely inconsistent'' and may not be ``simultaneously 
    discharged'' by the same Member and (2) does not address the 
    Constitutional qualifications of a Member.

Sec. 4.4 A Member submitted her resignation effective immediately prior 
    to taking the oath as Governor of a state.

    On December 27, 2018,(68) the Chair laid before the 
House the following communication from Rep. Lujan Grisham of New 
Mexico:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
68.  164 Cong. Rec. H10597 [Daily Ed.], 115th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

               RESIGNATION FROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES    

        The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following 
    resignation from the House of Representatives:
                                         House of Representatives,
                                Washington, DC, December 21, 2018.
  Speaker Paul Ryan,
  The Capitol,
  Washington, DC.

        Dear Speaker Paul Ryan, Serving as the Congresswoman from New 
    Mexico's First Congressional District has been one of the greatest 
    honors of my life. However, I will be sworn into office as the 
    Governor of New Mexico on January 1, 2019 at 12:01 a.m.
        Therefore, I am resigning my Congressional seat effective 
    December 31, 2018 at 11:59 p.m.

            Sincerely,
                                           Michelle Lujan Grisham,
                                               Member of Congress.



                                         House of Representatives,
                                Washington, DC, December 21, 2018.
  Governor Susana Martinez,
  Office of the Governor,
  Sante Fe, NM.

        Dear Governor Martinez, Serving as the Congresswoman from New 
    Mexico's First Congressional District has been one of the greatest 
    honors of my life. However, I will be sworn into office as the 
    Governor of New Mexico on January 1, 2019 at 12:01 a.m.
        Therefore, I am resigning my Congressional seat effective 
    December 31, 2018 at 11:59 p.m.

            Sincerely,
                                           Michelle Lujan Grisham,
                                               Member of Congress.



                         C. Salary and Benefits



Sec. 5. Salary and Benefits; Compensation

    Pursuant to article I, section 6 of the Constitution, ``Senators 
and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to 
be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United 
States.''(1) Although virtually all funding for legislative 
branch operations is provided in the annual Legislative Branch 
Appropriations bill, the salaries of Members of Congress (including 
Delegates and Resident Commissioners) are funded through a permanent 
appropriation in law.(2) Under the 27th Amendment, no law 
``varying the compensation'' of Members of Congress may take effect 
until after an election of Representatives has 
intervened.(3) This amendment ensures that Members cannot 
vote to increase (or decrease) their own salaries directly, but only 
the salaries of those elected to a subsequent Congress.(4)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 6, cl. 1. See also House Rules and Manual 
        Sec. 85 (2021).
 2. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 4501. For more on the distinction between annual 
        ``discretionary'' spending, and permanent ``mandatory'' or 
        ``direct'' spending, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 25; 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 41; Precedents (____) Ch. 25; and 
        Precedents (____) Ch. 41. Although Members' salaries are not 
        funded through the annual appropriations process, such bills 
        (most often the Legislative Branch Appropriations bill) have 
        often been used as vehicles for amendments dealing indirectly 
        with Members' compensation. See, e.g., Salaries of Members of 
        Congress: Recent Actions and Historical Tables, CRS Report 97-
        1011 (Aug. 8, 2022).
 3. U.S. Const. amend. XXVII. For House consideration of a concurrent 
        resolution acknowledging the successful ratification of the 
        27th Amendment, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 34 Sec. 12.4.
 4. For litigation involving the interaction between automatic cost-of-
        living pay increases and the 27th Amendment, see Boehner v. 
        Anderson, 809 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1992), aff'd, 30 F.3d 156 
        (D.C. Cir. 1994); and Schaffer v. Clinton, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1014 
        (D. Colo. 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Pursuant to law, Members' salaries are paid on a monthly 
basis.(5) Following their election, Members-elect who have 
filed the appropriate credentials with the Clerk of the House are 
entitled to compensation from the constitutionally-defined beginning of 
their term (January 3) until the House formally assembles for its first 
session.(6) After the first session begins, Members-elect 
must take the oath of office and be sworn in before receiving their 
salary.(7) If a Member-elect holds an incompatible office at 
the time the House assembles, such individual may defer taking the oath 
of office (in order to complete service in the other office), and is 
entitled to salary back to the beginning of the term.(8) In 
cases where the right to a seat is contested,(9) the House 
may provide that both the contestant and the contestee receive salary 
during the pendency of the contest (without regard to whether either 
was permitted to take the oath).(10) In one instance, where 
a Member-elect fell into a coma and was unable to take the oath of 
office on opening day, the House adopted a resolution providing for 
compensation in lieu of salary.(11)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 5301, 5302.
 6. Id.
 7. Parliamentarian's Note: Although the statute contemplates separate 
        time periods that define who is entitled to compensation (e.g., 
        the period between January 3 and the formal assembly of the new 
        Congress, the period between assembly and the swearing-in of 
        Members-elect, etc.), in practice these periods typically occur 
        in rapid sequence. For example, the opening of the 117th 
        Congress occurred on January 3 itself and Members were 
        administered the oath on that date. However, in some cases the 
        House has not assembled until several weeks after the beginning 
        of the term of office on January 3. See House Rules and Manual 
        Sec. 243 (2021). Similarly, while most Members-elect are sworn 
        in on the date that the House first assembles, there have been 
        innumerable instances of Members-elect failing to appear and 
        instead taking the oath of office at a later date. For a rare 
        instance of an individual elected to one Congress (but never 
        sworn) becoming eligible for salary upon his swearing-in at the 
        beginning of the next Congress, see Sec. 5.1, infra. For the 
        administration of the oath of office generally, see Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 2; and Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 2.
 8. For more on incompatible offices, see Sec. 4, supra.
 9. For election contests generally, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9; 
        and Precedents (Smith) Ch. 9.
10. See, e.g., Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 4.5; and Precedents 
        (Smith) Ch. 9 Sec. 20.1. See also 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1148 
        (``When a Member is unseated in a contest he retains the 
        compensation already received and is paid his salary to the day 
        on which his case is decided.'').
11. See Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 2 Sec. 1.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If an individual is elected to the House via a special election to 
fill a vacancy, such person is entitled to salary as of the date of the 
election.(12) When Members resign their seats in the House, 
they are no longer entitled to salary as of the effective date of their 
resignation.(13) A Member-elect excluded from the House 
(i.e., not permitted to take a seat despite valid 
credentials)(14) does not become a Member of the House at 
that time, and is thus not entitled to salary. However, the House may 
choose to authorize the payment of salary to an excluded Member-elect 
pending a determination as to the final right to the 
seat.(15) When a Member of the House dies, statutory 
provisions describe the potential beneficiaries who would be entitled 
to the deceased Members' unpaid balance of salary.(16) By 
tradition, the spouse (or other close relative) of a deceased Member 
typically receives a gratuity from the House equal to one year's salary 
of a Member.(17)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 5304. See also 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 202. Under 
        earlier statutes, an individual elected to the House via 
        special election would receive salary commencing at the point 
        at which the previous occupant of that seat ceased receiving 
        salary. See, e.g., 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 1148, 1155.
13. It was formerly the case that Members who resigned prior to the 
        adjournment of the Congress forfeited any mileage allowance for 
        their return to their districts. See 2 Hinds' Precedents 
        Sec. 1149. For resignations generally, see Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 37; and Precedents (____) Ch. 37.
14. For more on exclusion generally, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 
        Sec. 12; and Deschler's Precedents Ch. 12 Sec. 14.
15. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 4.3. For an example of the 
        House authorizing salary payments to both claimants in 
        contested election case pending a resolution to the contest, 
        see Precedents (Smith) Ch. 9 Sec. 20.1.
16. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 5305.
17. See Sec. 5.2, infra. See also P.L. 117-31, 135 Stat. 309; 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 4; Deschler's Precedents Ch. 
        38 Sec. 3.4; and 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 204. By law, such 
        payments are considered gifts only. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 4506.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some Members holding leadership offices are entitled to higher 
salary as compared to other Members. For example, the Speaker of the 
House, the Majority Leader, and the Minority Leader, are all 
compensated at a higher rate, pursuant to statute.(18)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 4501. See also Executive Order 13866. For a bill 
        addressing civil service annuity benefits for Members in 
        leadership positions, see Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 3 Sec. 5.4; 
        and Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 6 Sec. 29.2. For leadership 
        positions generally, see Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 3 
        Sec. Sec. 5-7; and Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 6 Sec. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The House officer with the responsibility to disburse salaries to 
Members is the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO).(19) The 
CAO assumed this duty when the office was created in the 104th 
Congress.(20) Previously, the Sergeant-at-Arms handled 
salary disbursement to Members.(21) The Clerk and the 
Speaker both have administrative roles in certifying payroll documents, 
including salary and mileage accounts.(22) Although Members 
may not waive their salaries, any salary received by a Member may be 
donated as a gift.(23)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 5309.
20. For more on the role of the CAO, see Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 6 
        Sec. 17.
21. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 6 Sec. 19; and Deschler's Precedents 
        Ch. 7 Sec. 4. See also 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1148.
22. 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 5301, 5307, 5308, and 5310.
23. See 31 U.S.C. Sec. 3113 and GAO Decision B-206396.2 (Nov. 15, 
        1988). See also Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. Sec. 4.8, 4.9, 
        and 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 203.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Members of the House are required to pay both Federal and state 
taxes on the income they receive from Congress. Such taxes are 
typically withheld from the monthly disbursement of salary (similar to 
tax withholding practices in the private sector).(24) 
Members are eligible for a variety of additional benefits (such as 
health insurance and retirement benefits), and payroll deductions are 
often used to finance those programs.(25)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
24. For the origins of state income tax withholding practices, see 
        Sec. 5.3, infra.
25. See Sec. 6, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although Members' salaries are not funded through the regular 
annual appropriations process, Members nevertheless have often used 
such bills to address Members' compensation in various 
ways.(26) For example, automatic cost-of-living increases in 
Members' salaries have often been declined by Congress via language in 
an appropriation bill or continuing resolution.(27) In 
recent years, there have been legislative proposals to tie Members' 
salaries to certain legislative actions. For instance, the ``No Budget, 
No Pay Act'' (enacted in the 113th Congress)(28) provided 
that the salaries of Members of Congress would be held in escrow and 
not paid to Members until Congress adopted a concurrent resolution on 
the budget (or at the end of the Congress if no budget resolution were 
adopted).(29)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
26. See Salaries of Members of Congress: Recent Actions and Historical 
        Tables, CRS Report 97-1011 (Aug. 8, 2022). For examples of 
        germaneness rulings on amendments addressing Members' salaries, 
        see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 28 Sec. Sec. 13.9, 15.32, 15.33, 
        and 35.66.
27. See Salaries of Members of Congress: Recent Actions and Historical 
        Tables, CRS Report 97-1011 (Aug. 8, 2022).
28. P.L. 113-3, 127 Stat. 51. See Sec. 5.4, infra.
29. Parliamentarian's Note: The rationale for holding Members' salaries 
        in escrow concerned the operation of the 27th Amendment, which 
        delays the effect of laws ``varying'' the compensation of 
        Members of Congress until an election has intervened (i.e., 
        until the following Congress). Thus, the salaries of Members of 
        Congress in the 113th Congress could not be permanently 
        withheld, but, as the statute prescribed, could be temporarily 
        held in escrow and disbursed before the end of the Congress. It 
        should also be noted that these budgetary provisions applied 
        only to the 113th Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Travel

    Travel reimbursements for Members has long been part of House 
practice, dating back to 1789. During the First Congress, the first 
statute on Members' compensation specifically provided that part of the 
compensation would take the form of reimbursements for travel expenses 
associated with travelling to and from Members' 
districts.(30) Mileage expenses were a common feature of 
Members' compensation throughout the 19th and 20th 
centuries.(31)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
30. See 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1148 (fn. 2).
31. For older precedents on 19th century practice with regard to 
        mileage expenses, see 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 1156-1158. 
        For mileage expenses related to special sessions of Congress, 
        see 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 1159, 1160.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the 92d Congress in 1971, the Committee on House Administration 
was given authority to make adjustments in various allowance accounts 
for Members, including travel and mileage accounts.(32) But 
under modern practice, Members are allocated a single allowance (known 
as the Member's Representational Allowance) and such allowance may be 
used for travel expenses.
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32. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. Sec. 6.1-6.3.
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    Members often travel on official business, either domestically or 
internationally. The House may reimburse such official travel expenses 
either with funds allocated to committees or other applicable accounts 
of the House.(33) For overseas official travel (known as 
``CODELs'' or ``Congressional Delegations'') reimbursements may be made 
by the House itself, or through the use of ``counterpart'' funds (i.e., 
foreign currency funds credited to the United States which can only be 
spent in the foreign country).(34) By statute, Members are 
reimbursed from House accounts for travel expenses associated with 
attending the funeral of a deceased Member.(35)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
33. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 6.
34. 22 U.S.C. Sec. 1754.
35. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 5606. For more on funeral committees established by 
        the House, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 38 Sec. 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Travel expenses reimbursed by others raises the issue of potential 
conflicts of interest or corruption, and House rules regulate such 
travel reimbursements in the same manner as other gifts to Members. 
Clause 5(a)(2)(A) of rule XXV provides the definition of a ``gift'' 
under the House's ethics rules, and that definition includes ``gifts of 
services, training, transportation, lodging, and 
meals.''(36)
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36. House Rules and Manual Sec. 1100 (2021). Clauses 5(b)-(d) of rule 
        XXV provide further limitations on what types of travel 
        reimbursements are permissible, exceptions for certain types of 
        charitable or educational events, and additional disclosure 
        requirements. For more on ethics rules relating to travel, see 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 12; and Precedents (____) Ch. 12.
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Deductions; Absences

    Under certain circumstances, amounts may be deducted from Members' 
salaries as monetary fines, under the House's constitutional authority 
to ``punish its Members.''(37) In the 91st Congress in 1969, 
the House by resolution authorized the administration of the oath of 
office to a challenged Member-elect,(38) but also provided 
that the Member-elect be required to pay a fine (deducted from his 
salary) for past improper conduct.(39) Beginning in the 
115th Congress, the Sergeant-at-Arms was authorized to levy fines on 
Members for the improper use of electronic devices for photography or 
audio-visual broadcasting on the floor of the House. Such fines would 
be deducted from Member's salaries by the CAO.(40) In the 
117th Congress, Members were required to wear masks or other face-
coverings during the pendency of a designated pandemic emergency and 
failure to abide by this requirement would result in fines to be 
deducted from the Members' salaries.(41) Also in the 117th 
Congress, the House adopted a rule requiring security screening to 
enter the House Chamber, and imposing fines on Members who do not 
undergo such screening.(42) Members who have had fines 
deducted pursuant to the provisions above may avail themselves of an 
appeals process overseen by the Committee on Ethics.(43)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
37. U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 5, cl. 2. See also House Rules and Manual 
        Sec. Sec. 62-67 (2021). For the House's use of fines as a 
        disciplinary measure, see Precedents (____) Ch. 12.
38. For challenges to the seating of Members-elect, see Precedents 
        (Wickham) Ch. 2 Sec. 4.
39. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 4.4.
40. H. Res. 5, 163 Cong. Rec. 36, 115th Cong. 1st Sess. (Jan. 3, 2017).
41. H. Res. 38, 167 Cong. Rec. H126 [Daily Ed.], 117th Cong. 1st Sess. 
        (Jan. 12, 2021).
42. See H. Res. 73, 167 Cong. Rec. H274-H275 [Daily Ed.], 117th Cong. 
        1st Sess. (Feb. 2, 2021). A Capitol Police regulation dating 
        back to the 1960s had already prohibited the carrying of 
        firearms into the House Chamber. Violations of such policy did 
        not, however, result in fines deducted from Members' salaries.
43. For examples of notifications from the Committee on Ethics that 
        certain Members had filed appeals regarding rule violations 
        that had resulted in salary deductions, see 167 Cong. Rec. 
        H1715 [Daily Ed.], 117th Cong. 1st Sess. (Apr. 8, 2021) 
        (security screening); and 167 Cong. Rec. H3164 [Daily Ed.], 
        117th Cong. 1st Sess. (June 28, 2021) (masks).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Pursuant to law,(44) certain absences from the House may 
also result in deductions from Members' salaries, though this provision 
has no applicability in modern practice. Pursuant to clause 1 of rule 
III,(45) Members ``shall be present within the Hall of the 
House during its sittings, unless excused or necessarily prevented.'' A 
statute authorizes the CAO to deduct the amount of salary for each day 
that the Member is absent from the House, unless the Member is absent 
due to sickness (or sickness within the Member's 
family).(46) This provision of law has a long history and 
can be traced back to a statute first enacted in 1856.(47) 
However, for virtually its entire history, this provision of law has 
not been enforced in the House. In 1894, the Committee on the Judiciary 
undertook an inquiry into whether or not the statute had been repealed 
(indicating that the House had not enforced the provision in many 
years).(48) A similar instance occurred in 1914, when the 
House agreed to a resolution revoking all leaves of absence, and 
requiring the Sergeant-at-Arms (the officer who at that time made 
salary disbursements) to enforce the law mandating 
deductions.(49) However, this resolution was repealed by the 
House less than two months later.(50) The 1914 proceedings 
appear to be the last time that the statute was enforced in the 
House.(51)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
44. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 5306.
45. House Rules and Manual Sec. 671 (2021).
46. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 5306. A separate statute authorizes the forfeiture of 
        mileage expenses should a Member resign from the House prior to 
        the adjournment of the Congress. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 4522.
47. See 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1154. For an 1872 version of the law, 
        see 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1150.
48. See 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1153. For a resolution regarding this 
        issue raised as a question of privilege (but ruled invalid), 
        see 3 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 2690.
49. See 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 198.
50. Id.
51. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 5 (``Not since 1914, however, 
        have those provisions been enforced. Due to the number of 
        Members, and to the proliferation of their official duties in 
        Congress, committee field work, and in their home states, 
        enforcement is no longer feasible.''). See also 2 Hinds' 
        Precedents Sec. 1148 (In 1907 ``[t]he statutes also provide for 
        deductions from the pay of Member who are absent . . . but this 
        penalty is rarely enforced.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Despite the fact that no Members have had salary involuntarily 
deducted for an absence in more than a century, requests for leaves of 
absence remain a routine part of House business. Such requests are made 
via written requests submitted to the party cloakrooms, and are 
transacted by unanimous consent typically at the end of each 
legislative day.(52) Although penalties for failing to 
attend House sessions have not been imposed since the early 20th 
century, Members have traditionally used requests for leaves of absence 
to inform the House of the reasons for the absence,(53) and 
have sometimes accompanied such requests with statements regarding how 
the Member would have voted on questions put before the House during 
the absence. Although requests for leaves of absence may be refused by 
the House, this has not occurred in many decades.(54) A 
Member-elect who has not yet been sworn need not submit a request for a 
leave of absence for any absences occurring before the oath of office 
is administered.(55)
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52. Parliamentarian's Note: Requests for leaves of absence were once 
        considered privileged business in the House (2 Hinds' 
        Precedents Sec. 1146), but today they no longer enjoy any 
        special status under the rules. Although under modern practice 
        requests for leaves of absence are transacted by unanimous 
        consent, a motion to that effect may also be made. See 2 Hinds' 
        Precedents Sec. 1142. In order to expedite the processing of 
        these requests, the Speaker has requested that Members submit 
        their leaves of absence requests in writing through the 
        cloakrooms rather than orally on the floor. See 6 Cannon's 
        Precedents Sec. 199. But see Sec. 5.5, infra. Leaves of absence 
        requests should be made by the individual requesting leave and 
        not by others. 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 200. For a rare 
        instance of an en bloc leave of absence request (for a group of 
        Members to travel on official business), see Sec. 5.7, infra.
53. The reasons stated may be as simple as ``on account of illness'' or 
        ``official business'' though Members may provide more details 
        if they choose. See, e.g., Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 5.
54. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 5.5 (``The good faith of a 
        Member in requesting a leave of absence is not customarily 
        questioned by other Members of the House.''). For historical 
        examples of requests for leaves of absence being challenged or 
        rejected, see 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 1143-1145.
55. See 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1154. For a modern example of a leave 
        of absence request submitted by Members on behalf of a Member-
        elect (and therefore unnecessary, as the statute only applies 
        to sworn Members), see 159 Cong. Rec. 47, 113th Cong. 1st Sess. 
        (Jan. 3, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the 116th and 117th Congresses, the House instituted a method of 
proxy voting for Members necessarily absent due to pandemic disease. 
Members who attested that they were unable to physically attend a 
session of the House due to the ongoing pandemic could designate other 
Members to cast votes on their behalf during the pendency of such 
pandemic (specifying the type of vote to be cast on each 
question).(56)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
56. See H. Res. 965, 166 Cong. Rec. H2019, H2021 [Daily Ed.], 116th 
        Cong. 2d Sess. (May 15, 2020); and H. Res. 8, 167 Cong. Rec. 
        H17 [Daily Ed.], 117th Cong. 1st Sess. (Jan. 4, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ethics Rules, conflicts of interest, and Other Sources of Income

    The issue of Members' compensation has long been the subject of 
congressional ethics rules and statutory provisions aimed at preventing 
bribery, conflicts of interest, and other corrupt practices. Federal 
law makes it a crime to bribe or attempt to bribe Members of 
Congress.(57) The same statute addresses possible conflicts 
of interest, barring Members of Congress from receiving compensation 
for representing others before government agencies in which the United 
States has a substantial interest.(58) The Federal 
government routinely contracts with private entities to undertake 
diverse projects, and Federal law prohibits Members of Congress from 
having interests in said contracts.(59)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
57. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 201.
58. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 203.
59. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 431; and 41 U.S.C. Sec. 6306. See also 2 Hinds' 
        Precedents Sec. Sec. 1164-1166; and 6 Cannon's Precedents 
        Sec. 225.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A House rule dating back to the First Congress in 1789 states that 
``Every Member shall . . . vote on each question put, unless having a 
direct personal or pecuniary interest in the event of such 
question.''(60) This rule is not enforced by the presiding 
officer, or even the House itself, but rather it is considered the 
responsibility of each Member to judge whether the circumstances of the 
vote require withdrawal.(61) Under the precedents, the 
disqualifying interest must be one that involves the Members directly 
and not merely one that affects a class to which the Member 
belongs.(62)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
60. Rule III, clause 1; House Rules and Manual Sec. Sec. 671, 673 
        (2021). The form of the rule as originally adopted was as 
        follows: ``No Member shall vote on any question, in the event 
        of which he is immediately and particularly interested.'' 1 
        Annals of Cong. 104, 1st Cong. 1st Sess. (Apr. 7, 1789). Thomas 
        Jefferson, in his Manual of Parliamentary Practice, states 
        that, ``Where the private interests of a Member are concerned 
        in a bill or question he is to withdraw . . . it is for the 
        honor of the House that this rule of immemorial observance 
        should be strictly adhered to.'' House Rules and Manual 
        Sec. 376 (2021). See also 5 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 5949.
61. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 30 Sec. Sec. 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4-3.8. 
        See also 5 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 5941, 5949-5951, 5956-
        5958, and 5960-5962; and 8 Cannon's Precedents Sec. Sec. 3071, 
        3072.
62. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 30 Sec. 3.9. See also 5 Hinds' 
        Precedents Sec. Sec. 5952-5955; and 8 Cannon's Precedents 
        Sec. Sec. 3071, 3072.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the 18th and 19th centuries, Congress did not generally meet 
continuously through the year, and it was expected that Members might 
retain other sources of income in addition to their congressional 
salaries.(63) By the 20th century, as the workload of 
Congress increased and sessions became longer, the work of a Member 
became more and more a full-time occupation. Thus, scrutiny was 
increasingly applied to outside income earned by Members and the 
potential conflicts with legislative duties such remuneration may 
present. Towards the end of the 20th century, statutory enactments and 
House ethics rules were used both to enhance transparency with respect 
to Members' financial holdings and to create limits on what outside 
earned income could be accepted by Members.(64)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
63. See Congressional Careers: Service Tenure and Patterns of Member 
        Service, 1789-2021, CRS Report R41545 (Jan. 5, 2021) (``Many 
        lawmakers in the 18th and 19th centuries might be characterized 
        as ``citizen legislators,'' holding full-time nonpolitical 
        employment and serving in Congress on a part-time basis for a 
        short number of years. During the 20th century, congressional 
        careers lengthened as turnover decreased and Congress became 
        more professionalized.'').
64. Parliamentarian's Note: This chapter addresses the subject of 
        Members' financial disclosures and limits on outside income in 
        the context of Members' compensation generally. For a more 
        detailed analysis of specific ethics rules and their evolution, 
        see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 12; and Precedents (____) Ch. 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the 95th Congress in 1977, the House amended its rules to 
provide the first limit on the amount of outside income that could be 
earned by Members (as well as officers and employees of the 
House).(65) The precise limit has been adjusted several 
times, and is currently defined as a yearly amount of no more than ``15 
percent of the annual rate of basic pay for level II of the Executive 
Schedule under section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, as of 
January 1 of that calendar year.''(66) In the 110th 
Congress, the House adopted rule XXVII,(67) which prohibits 
Members from directly negotiating for future employment opportunities 
unless they first file a statement with the Committee on Ethics 
detailing the nature of the negotiations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
65. House Rules and Manual Sec. 1099 (2021).
66. Rule XXV, clause 1(a)(1); House Rules and Manual Sec. 1099 (2021).
67. House Rules and Manual Sec. 1100 (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Members of Congress are often invited to give speeches, make 
appearances, or write articles for private organizations. For such 
activities, Members have often been encouraged by such organizations to 
accept compensation, known as ``honoraria,'' from the organization. In 
the 95th Congress in 1977, the House put in place the first 
restrictions on honoraria, limiting Members to $750 per 
honorarium.(68) These limits and restrictions were adjusted 
several times over the next decade,(69) until the enactment 
of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989. That act imposed an outright ban on 
honoraria, with certain limited exceptions for charitable donations. 
The current House rule addressing outside income, honoraria, and 
copyright royalties is rule XXV (clauses 1-4).(70)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
68. House Rules and Manual Sec. 1099 (2021).
69. For an example of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct 
        (now the Committee on Ethics) submitting an interpretation of 
        the House's honoraria rule in 1979, see Sec. 5.8, infra. For 
        examples of the House adjusting the amount of outside earned 
        income and honoraria that could be accepted by Members, see 
        Sec. Sec. 5.11-5.13, infra.
70. House Rules and Manual Sec. 1099 (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The House's ``gift rule'' is another mechanism designed to reduce 
improper influence in the legislative process. In the 90th Congress in 
1968, the House adopted its first prohibition on the acceptance of 
gifts by Members from persons with a direct interest in 
legislation.(71) The modern form of the rule was adopted in 
the 104th Congress in 1995, and operates as a ban on most gifts from 
any source, subject to limited exceptions.(72) Subsequent 
amendments to the rule have modified the exceptions and increased 
disclosure requirements.(73) The House's gift rule is 
supplemented by statutory prohibitions against receiving gifts in 
exchange for official acts.(74) The Constitution also 
prohibits Members from receiving any type of gifts or ``emoluments'' 
from foreign entities.(75)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
71. House Rules and Manual Sec. 1095 (2021).
72. House Rules and Manual Sec. 1100 (2021). See also House Ethics 
        Manual, 110th Cong. 2d Sess. (2008 ed.), pp. 23-86.
73. Id.
74. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7353. This statutory rule was put in place as part of 
        the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 and applies to Members of 
        Congress as well as executive branch and judicial branch 
        officials.
75. U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 8 (``[N]o Person holding any Office 
        of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of 
        the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or 
        Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign 
        State.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, Members are subject to financial disclosure requirements 
contained both in statute and in House rules. The earliest financial 
disclosure rules were adopted as House rules, as part of the ethics 
reforms that occurred in the late 1960s.(76) The categories 
of required disclosures were revised and refined over the course of the 
1970s through subsequent changes to House rules.(77) In the 
95th Congress, the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 was 
enacted,(78) and title I of that act was formally 
incorporated into the House rules.(79) That act further 
defined the types of financial information required to be reported, and 
the House rule requires all such financial reports to be filed with the 
Clerk of the House (who then submits the reports to the Committee on 
Ethics). The Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 
requires the Clerk to make these financial disclosure reports available 
to the public in electronic form.(80)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
76. See H. Res. 1099, 114 Cong. Rec. 8803, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. (Apr. 3, 
        1968).
77. See House Rules and Manual Sec. 1103 (2021). For campaign financial 
        reporting requirements, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 8; 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 12; Precedents (Smith) Ch. 8; and 
        Precedents (____) Ch. 12.
78. P.L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824.
79. House Rules and Manual Sec. 1103 (2021). Because title I of the 
        Ethics in Government Act of 1978 is formally incorporated into 
        the standing rules of the House, statutory amendments to that 
        title necessarily result in changes to House rules. For 
        example, the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 amended the 
        financial disclosure reporting requirements of the Ethics in 
        Government Act of 1978, thus resulting in a change in House 
        rules. See P.L. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691.
80. P.L. 113-7, 127 Stat. 438.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rate of Compensation: History and Practice

    A statute enacted in the First Congress in 1789 provided that 
Members of the House would be compensated for their service at a rate 
of $6 for every day that the House was in session, plus mileage 
expenses associated with travelling to and from Washington, 
D.C.(81) In the mid-19th century, daily allowances were 
replaced with fixed salaries that covered the entire Congress (or 
sessions thereof).(82) For most of the 20th century, salary 
increases would periodically be effectuated by statute (either stand-
alone legislation or incorporated into a larger reform effort, such as 
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
81. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 4 (fn. 6).
82. An 1856 statute set the rate of pay for Members of the House at 
        $6,000 per Congress, minus deductions for absences. An 1866 
        statute revised this compensation scheme to provide $5,000 per 
        session of Congress (each Congress typically consisting of two 
        sessions). An increase to this amount was enacted in 1873, but 
        repealed the following year. See 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1148. 
        A statute of 1907 increased Members' salaries to $7,500 per 
        session, and similar increases were made by statute prior to 
        1968. See Salaries of Members of Congress: Recent Actions and 
        Historical Tables,  CRS Report 97-1011 (Aug. 8, 2022). For a 
        catalog of laws establishing the salaries of Members from 1789 
        to 1977, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 4 (fn. 6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 1967, Congress created the Commission on Executive, Legislative, 
and Judicial Salaries as an alternate mechanism for adjusting the 
salaries of Members of Congress.(83) The Commission was 
authorized to make recommendations with respect to the compensation of 
various Federal officeholders. The President would then submit such 
recommendations to Congress, and Congress would have a set period of 
time in which to formally disapprove of such 
recommendations.(84) If no disapproval resolution were 
enacted, the recommended salary adjustments would take effect. Between 
1969 and 1989, Congress accepted three salary increases via this 
method, and rejected three.(85)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
83. Parliamentarian's Note: The rate of Members' compensation has often 
        been a fraught political question, due to public perceptions of 
        Members voting to increase their own salaries. Thus, Congress 
        has experimented with different mechanisms to provide 
        adjustments in Members' salaries that require fewer votes in 
        Congress--methods such as recommendations by independent 
        commissions, or automatic adjustments pursuant to statutory 
        formulas. The adoption of the 27th Amendment to the 
        Constitution (requiring an election to intervene before any law 
        ``varying the compensation'' of Members can take effect) 
        partially mitigated the concerns about Members' salaries, but 
        the issue remains salient to this day. For an example of a 
        special order of business resolution specifically prohibiting 
        the issue of Members' salaries being addressed by amendment, 
        see Sec. 5.9, infra.
84. Parliamentarian's Note: This process for formally disapproving 
        salary adjustment recommendations by the commission was 
        challenged in court by a Member of the House (Rep. Larry 
        Pressler of South Dakota). Although the U.S. District Court for 
        the District of Columbia found that the Member did have 
        standing, it further held that the procedure for adjusting 
        Members' salaries contained in the Federal Salary Act of 1967 
        and the Executive Salary Cost-of-Living Adjustment Act of 1975 
        did not violate the Constitution. See Pressler v. Simon, 428 F. 
        Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd mem. sub nom. Pressler v. 
        Blumenthal, 434 U.S. 1028 (1978). For a notice from the 
        Sergeant-at-Arms that he had been served in the litigation 
        described above, see Sec. 5.10, infra.
85. See Salaries of Members of Congress: Recent Actions and Historical 
        Tables, CRS Report 97-1011 (Aug. 8, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 1975, Congress enacted another statute(86) that 
provided for automatic annual ``cost of living'' adjustments to the 
salaries of certain public officials, including Members of Congress. 
Such adjustments would be formally submitted to Congress by the 
President for approval or disapproval. Between 1975 and 1989, Congress 
used this system to accept several increases to Members' salaries, and 
reject several others.(87)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
86. P.L. 94-82, 89 Stat. 419. Title II of this law is known as the 
        Executive Salary Cost-of-Living Adjustment Act.
87. During this period, there were five increases in Members' salaries 
        that were accepted by Congress, and ten that were declined. See 
        Salaries of Members of Congress: Recent Actions and Historical 
        Tables, CRS Report 97-1011 (Aug. 8, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 1983, the Supreme Court invalidated the practice of 
``congressional vetoes'' (simple or concurrent resolutions to ratify 
(or not) executive branch decisions) of the type employed in the 
statutes described above.(88) In response, Congress amended 
the Federal Salary Act in 1989 to provide that the salary adjustment 
recommendations would not go into effect unless Congress passed a bill 
or joint resolution approving the adjustment.(89)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
88. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 
        (1983). See also Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC, 
        673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
89. See P.L. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716. For an example of a joint 
        resolution considered by the House (and later enacted into law) 
        to disapprove of an increase under the Federal Salary Act, see 
        H. J. Res. 129, 135 Cong. Rec. 1708-26, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. 
        (Feb. 7, 1989).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Ethics Reform Act of 1989(90) significantly altered 
both the Federal Salary Act of 1967 and the annual automatic adjustment 
process created in 1975. With respect to the former, the Ethics Reform 
Act redesignated the Commission on Executive, Legislative and Judicial 
Salaries as the Citizens' Commission on Public Service and 
Compensation. Legislation to address the proposed salary 
recommendations was made ``a matter of highest privilege in each 
House''(91) in order to facilitate its consideration. 
However, the quadrennial review of salaries contemplated by the statute 
was not adhered to, and since 1993 no such review has taken 
place.(92) Although the Commission and the procedures to 
effectuate its recommendations remain in law,(93) Congress 
has not used this method of adjusting the salaries of Members in almost 
three decades.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
90. P.L. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716.
91. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 359.
92. See House Rules and Manual Sec. 1130(12) (2021).
93. Authority for the commission is codified at 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 351-
        360.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the statutory method for automatically increasing 
Members' salaries, the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 tied these annual 
adjustments to private sector wage data, as measured by the Employment 
Cost Index.(94) Thus, the salaries of Members would increase 
annually pursuant to a statutory formula linked to private sector wage 
growth, unless Congress affirmatively rejected or modified such 
increases.(95) Since the advent of this method for adjusting 
Members' salaries, Congress has allowed increases to take effect in 
approximately 50% of cases.(96) The last adjustment that was 
not declined occurred in 2009 and increased Members' salaries to 
$174,000 per year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
94. The Employment Cost Index is compiled by the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
        Statistics on a quarterly basis, and tracks private sector 
        wages across numerous industries and occupational categories.
95. Parliamentarian's Note: In 1992, Members of the House challenged 
        these provisions in court as a violation of the 27th Amendment. 
        However, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
        held that the ``methodology for automatic annual adjustments to 
        Congressional salaries meets both the language and the spirit 
        of the 27th amendment.'' See Boehner v. Anderson, 809 F. Supp. 
        138 (D.D.C. 1992), aff'd, 30 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1994). For a 
        similar case (also unsuccessful) brought in 1999, see Schaffer 
        v. Clinton, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Colo. 1999).
96. Between 1991 and 2021, Congress accepted 13 adjustments in salary 
        and declined 18 adjustments. See Salaries of Members of 
        Congress: Recent Actions and Historical Tables, CRS Report 97-
        1011 (Aug. 8, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 5.1 Where an individual is elected to the House for the next 
    Congress, but also (pursuant to state law) to fill a vacancy in the 
    current Congress, such individual is entitled to salary for service 
    in the current Congress when sworn.(97)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
97. Parliamentarian's Note: Under Kansas law, an election to a seat in 
        the House for the next Congress is deemed an election to the 
        same seat in the current Congress should said seat become 
        vacant. Mr. Jim Ryun was elected to a seat in the 105th 
        Congress on November 5, 1996. The occupant of that seat in the 
        104th Congress (Rep. Sam Brownback) resigned on November 27, 
        1996, in order to take a seat in the Senate. Thus, under Kansas 
        law, Mr. Ryun was considered elected to fill the vacancy caused 
        by Rep. Brownback's resignation. Although Mr. Ryun would be 
        entitled to salary for his service in the 104th Congress at the 
        time of his swearing-in, he did not come to Washington, D.C., 
        to be administered the oath of office until the commencement of 
        the new Congress. Therefore, Rep. Ryun was entitled to his 
        salary for service in the 104th Congress when the oath was 
        administered on January 7, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On January 7, 1997,(98) the following letters were laid 
before the House:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
98. 143 Cong. Rec. 188, 105th Cong. 1st Sess. For similar examples, see 
        156 Cong. Rec. 17626-27, 111th Cong. 2d Sess. (Nov. 16, 2010) 
        (Rep. Marlin Stutzman of Indiana); 164 Cong. Rec. H9498-H9499 
        [Daily Ed.], 115th Cong. 2d Sess. (Nov. 13, 2018) (Rep. Kevin 
        Hern of Oklahoma); and Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 2 Sec. 3.9 
        (Rep. Steve Largent of Oklahoma).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         RESIGNATION FROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AFTER SINE DIE 
                                ADJOURNMENT    

        Mr. BROWNBACK submitted the following resignation from the 
    House of Representatives:

                                    Congress of the United States,
                                         House of Representatives,
                                Washington, DC, November 26, 1996.
                                                 Hon. Newt Gingrich,
                                                      Speaker of the
                                           House of Representatives,
                                        The Capitol, Washington, DC.

        Dear Newt: Attached please find a copy of the letter I have 
    sent to Kansas Governor Bill Graves informing him that I am 
    resigning from the House of Representatives effective at 12:00 p.m. 
    central time on Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
        It has been an honor and a privilege to serve with you in the 
    House of Representatives. We enacted reforms during the 104th 
    Congress that has moved this country in the right direction. I look 
    forward to continuing to work with you to balance the federal 
    budget, reduce the size, scope, and intrusiveness of the federal 
    government, and restore the American Dream.

            Sincerely,
                                                    Sam Brownback,
                                               Member of Congress.



                                    Congress of the United States,
                                         House of Representatives,
                                Washington, DC, November 25, 1996.
                                                   Gov. Bill Graves,
                                          State Capitol, Topeka, KS.

        Dear Governor Graves: For the past two years, it has been my 
    privilege to serve the people of Kansas' Second District as their 
    elected Representative in the U.S. Congress. It has been an 
    eventful tenure.
        These are remarkable times, and public servants have a 
    tremendous opportunity and responsibility for making America a 
    better place.
        There is much work to be done, and the people rightly expect 
    that we will begin it in earnest. Toward that end, I am scheduled 
    to be sworn in as a U.S. Senator for Kansas at 2:00 p.m. central 
    time, Wednesday, November 27, 1996. Accordingly, I am resigning my 
    seat in the U.S. House of Representatives effective at 12:00 p.m. 
    central time, Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
        The work of renewing America is unfinished. I see cause for 
    great hope as I believe we are now clearly focused on those very 
    problems which most confound us. There has never been a challenge 
    which the American nation recognized clearly and approached 
    resolutely which we did not overcome. We have cause for great 
    Thanksgiving.

            Sincerely,
       Sam Brownback.                          -------------------

           COMMUNICATION FROM THE CLERK OF THE HOUSE AFTER SINE DIE 
                                ADJOURNMENT    
                                               Offic of the Clerk,
                                    U.S. House of Representatives,
                                 Washington, DC, December 2, 1996.
                                                 Hon. Newt Gingrich,
                                                        The Speaker,
                                      U.S. House of Representatives,
                                                     Washington, DC.

        Dear Mr. Speaker: I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy 
    of the original Certificate of Election received from the Honorable 
    Ron Thornburgh, Secretary of State, State of Kansas. indicating 
    that, according to the results of the General Election held on 
    November 5, 1996, and pursuant to K.S.A. 25-3503(d), which states, 
    ``In the event that any vacancy occurs . . . on or after the date 
    of any general election of state officers and before the term of 
    office in which the vacancy has occurred expires, votes cast for 
    the office of congressman in the district in which such vacancy 
    occurs shall be deemed to have been cast to fill such vacancy for 
    the unexpired term, as well as for election for the next regular 
    term,'' the Honorable Jim Ryun was elected to the office of 
    Representative in Congress, from the Second Congressional District, 
    State of Kansas.

            With warm regards,
                                                   Robin H. Carle.

Sec. 5.2 By tradition, when a Member of the House dies in office, the 
    surviving spouse (or other close relative) is typically provided a 
    gratuity in an amount equal to the annual compensation for a 
    Member.

    On January 6, 1973,(99) the House adopted the following 
resolution providing a gratuity to the widow of a deceased Member-
elect:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
99. 119 Cong. Rec. 379, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. For similar examples, see 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 38 Sec. 3.4; and 6 Cannon's 
        Precedents Sec. 204.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Thomas] O'NEILL [of Massachusetts]. Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    resolution (H. Res. 93) and ask unanimous consent for its immediate 
    consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 93

  Resolved, That there shall be paid out of the contingent fund of the 
House a sum equal to the annual compensation of a Representative In 
Congress as a gratuity to Cardiss R. Collins, widow of George W. Collins, 
late a Representative-elect from the State of Illinois.

  Resolved, That there shall be paid from the contingent fund of the House, 
until otherwise provided by law, such sums as may be necessary to 
compensate the clerical assistants designated by former Representative 
George W. Collins in the 92d Congress and borne upon the clerk hire pay 
rolls of the House of Representatives at the close of the 92d Congress at 
the rates of compensation then payable to said clerical assistants, until a 
successor is elected to fill the vacancy in the 7th Congressional District 
of the State of Illinois caused by the death of the late George W. Collins: 
Provided, That the Clerk is authorized to make, from time to time, such 
salary adjustments as he deems advisable with respect to the aforementioned 
employees.

        The SPEAKER.(100) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Massachusetts?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
100. Carl Albert (OK).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

    On July 29, 2021,(101) the House suspended the rules and 
concurred in a Senate amendment to an emergency supplemental 
appropriation bill that contained the following provision regarding 
widow gratuities:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
101. 167 Cong. Rec. H4265 [Daily Ed.], 117th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          EMERGENCY SECURITY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2021    

        Ms. [Rosa] DeLAURO [of Connecticut]. Mr. Speaker, I move to 
    suspend the rules and concur in the Senate amendment to the bill 
    (H.R. 3237) making emergency supplemental appropriations for the 
    fiscal year ending September 30, 2021, and for other purposes.
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.
        The text of the Senate amendment is as follows:
        Senate amendment:

  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

  The following sums are hereby appropriated, out of any money in the 
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the fiscal year ending September 
30, 2021, and for other purposes, namely: . . . 

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

          Payments to Widows and Heirs of Deceased Members of Congress

  For payment to Susan M. Wright, widow of Ronald Wright, late a 
Representative from the State of Texas, $174,000.

  For payment to the heirs at law of Alcee Hastings, late a Representative 
from the State of Florida, $174,000.

Sec. 5.3 The House has adopted a resolution (subsequently made 
    permanent law)(102) authorizing the salary disbursement 
    officers of the House to enter into agreements with state 
    governments to provide for the voluntary withholding of state 
    income taxes from the salary of Members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
102. Later in the 94th Congress, this resolution was enacted into 
        permanent law by P.L. 94-440, 90 Stat. 1439, now codified at 2 
        U.S.C. Sec. 4555.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On November 4, 1975,(103) the House adopted the 
following resolution, authorizing the Sergeant-at-Arms and the 
Clerk(104) to enter into agreements with state authorities 
to withhold state income tax from the salary of Members:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
103. 121 Cong. Rec. 34915, 34939-40, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
104. Parliamentarian's Note: At the time of this proceeding, the Clerk 
        and Sergeant-at-Arms were responsible for different aspects of 
        salary disbursement to Members. These functions were taken over 
        by the CAO when that position was created in the 104th 
        Congress. The underlying statute was also amended to reflect 
        this change in House administration. See P.L. 104-186, 110 
        Stat. 1718. For more on the role of the CAO, see Precedents 
        (Wickham) Ch. 6 Sec. 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Frank] THOMPSON [of New Jersey]. Mr. Speaker, I move to 
    suspend the rules and agree to the resolution (H. Res. 732) to 
    authorize voluntary withholding of State income taxes in the case 
    of Members and congressional employees, as amended.
        The Clerk read as follows:

H. Res. 732

  Resolved, That (a) until otherwise provided by law, the Clerk of the 
House of Representatives (hereinafter in this resolution referred to as the 
``Clerk'') and the Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives 
(hereafter in this resolution referred to as the ``Sergeant at Arms'') 
shall, in accordance with the provisions of subsections (b), (c), and (d) 
enter into an agreement with any State, at the request for agreement from 
the proper State official. The agreement shall provide that--

  (1) the Clerk, in the case of employees whose compensation is disbursed 
by the Clerk; and

  (2) the Sergeant at Arms, in the case of Members of the House of 
Representatives; shall withhold State income tax in the case of each Member 
and employee who is subject to such income tax and who voluntarily requests 
such withholding.

  (b) Any agreement entered into under subsection (a) shall not require the 
Clerk or the Sergeant at Arms to remit sums withheld pursuant to any such 
agreement more often than once each calendar quarter.

  (c)(1) The Clerk and the Sergeant at Arms shall, before entering into any 
agreement under subsection (a), transmit a statement with respect to the 
proposed agreement to the Committee on House Administration of the House of 
Representatives (hereinafter in this resolution referred to as the 
``committee''). Such statement shall set forth a detailed description of 
the proposed agreement, together with any other information which the 
committee may require.

  (2) If the committee does not disapprove, through appropriate action, any 
proposed agreement transmitted to the committee under paragraph (1) no 
later than ten legislative days after receiving such proposed agreement, 
then the Clerk or the Sergeant at Arms, as the case may be, may enter into 
such proposed agreement. The Clerk or the Sergeant at Arms, as the case may 
be, may not enter into any proposed agreement if such proposed agreement is 
disapproved by the committee under this paragraph.

  (d)(1) A Member or employee may have in effect at any time only one 
request for withholding under subsection (a), and such Member or employee 
may not have more than two such requests in effect with respect to 
different States during any one calendar year. The request for withholding 
is effective on the first day of the month in which the request is 
processed by the Clerk or the Sergeant at Arms, but in no event later than 
on the first day of the first month beginning after the day on which such 
request is received by the Clerk or the Sergeant at Arms, except that--

  (A) when the Clerk or the Sergeant at Arms first enters into an agreement 
with a State under subsection (a), a request for withholding shall be 
effective on such date as the Clerk or the Sergeant at Arms may determine;

  (B) when an individual first receives an appointment as an employee, the 
request shall be effective on the day of appointment, if the individual 
makes the request at the time of appointment; and

  (C) when an individual first becomes a Member, the request shall be 
effective on the day such individual takes the oath of office as a Member, 
if the individual makes the request at such time.

  (2) A Member or employee may change the State designated by such Member 
or employee for purposes of having withholdings made, and may request that 
the withholdings be remitted in accordance with such change. A Member or 
employee also may revoke any request of such Member or employee for 
withholding. Any change in the State designated or revocation is effective 
on the first day of the month in which the request or the revocation is 
processed by the Clerk or the Sergeant at Arms, but in no event later than 
on the first day of the first month beginning after the day on which such 
request or revocation is received by the Clerk or the Sergeant at Arms.

  (e) This resolution imposes no duty, burden, or requirement upon the 
United States, the House of Representatives, or any officer or employee of 
the United States, except as specifically provided in this resolution. 
Nothing in this resolution shall be deemed to consent to the application of 
any provision of law which has the effect of subjecting the United States, 
the House of Representatives, or any officer or employee of the United 
States to any penalty or liability by reason of the provisions of this 
resolution. Any paper, form, document, or any other item filed with, or 
submitted to, the Clerk or the Sergeant at Arms under this resolution is 
considered to be a paper of the House of Representatives within the 
provisions of the Rules of the House of Representatives.

  Sec. 2. For purposes of this resolution--

  (1) the terms ``State'' means any of the several States, the District of 
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any other territory or 
possession of the United States;

  (2) the term ``Member'' means a Member of the House of Representatives, 
the Delegates from the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, 
and the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico; and

  (3) the term ``legislative days'' does not include any calendar day on 
which the House of Representatives is not in session. . . . 

        AUTHORIZING VOLUNTARY WITHHOLDING OF STATE INCOME TAXES IN THE 
               CASE OF MEMBERS AND CONGRESSIONAL EMPLOYEES      

        The SPEAKER.(105) The unfinished business is the 
    question of suspending the rules and agreeing to the resolution (H. 
    Res. 732), as amended.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
105. Carl Albert (OK).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read the title of the resolution.
        The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion offered by the 
    gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Thompson) that the House suspend the 
    rules and agree to the resolution, House Resolution 732, as 
    amended, on which the yeas and nays are ordered.
        The question was taken.
        Mr. [John] ASHBROOK [of Ohio]. Mr. Speaker, I object to the 
    vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point 
    of order that a quorum is not present.
        The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.
        The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were-yeas 
    394, nays 7, not voting 32, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 663] . . . 

        Mr. FORSYTHE and Mr. McDONALD of Georgia changed their vote 
    from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
        So (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof), the rules were 
    suspended and the resolution, as amended, was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 5.4 The House has considered a bill (subsequently enacted into 
    law) that, inter alia, made the timely receipt of salary by Members 
    of Congress contingent upon the adoption of a concurrent resolution 
    on the budget.

    On January 23, 2013,(106) the House considered the 
following bill:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
106. 159 Cong. Rec. 485-86, 492-93, 498-99, 113th Cong. 1st Sess. For 
        the special order governing consideration of this measure, see 
        159 Cong. Rec. 475-83, 113th Cong. 1st Sess. (Jan. 23, 2013). 
        For remarks in the Senate concerning the severability of the 
        salary provision from the remainder of the bill, see 159 Cong. 
        Rec. 826, 113th Cong. 1st Sess. (Jan. 31, 2013). It should also 
        be noted that these budgetary provisions applied only to the 
        113th Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         NO BUDGET, NO PAY ACT OF 2013

        Mr. [David] CAMP [of Michigan]. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House 
    Resolution 39, I call up the bill (H.R. 325) to ensure the complete 
    and timely payment of the obligations of the United States 
    Government until May 19, 2013, and for other purposes, and ask for 
    its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(107) Pursuant to House 
    Resolution 39, the amendment printed in House Report 113-2 is 
    considered adopted, and the bill, as amended, is considered read.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
107. Raymond Terry (NE).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

                                    H.R. 325

  Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

  This Act may be cited as the ``No Budget, No Pay Act of 2013''.

SEC. 2. TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEBT CEILING.

  (a) Suspension.--Section 3101(b) of title 31, United States Code, shall 
not apply for the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act 
and ending on May 18, 2013.

  (b) Special Rule Relating to Obligations Issued During Suspension 
Period.--Effective May 19, 2013, the limitation in section 3101(b) of title 
31, United States Code, as increased by section 3101A of such title, is 
increased to the extent that--

  (1) the face amount of obligations issued under chapter 31 of such title 
and the face amount of obligations whose principal and interest are 
guaranteed by the United States Government (except guaranteed obligations 
held by the Secretary of the Treasury) outstanding on May 19, 2013, exceeds

  (2) the face amount of such obligations outstanding on the date of the 
enactment of this Act.

  An obligation shall not be taken into account under paragraph (1) unless 
the issuance of such obligation was necessary to fund a commitment incurred 
by the Federal Government that required payment before May 19, 2013.

SEC. 3. HOLDING SALARIES OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS IN ESCROW UPON FAILURE TO 
AGREE TO BUDGET RESOLUTION.

  (a) Holding Salaries in Escrow.--

  (1) In general.--If by April 15, 2013, a House of Congress has not agreed 
to a concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2014 pursuant to 
section 301 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, during the period 
described in paragraph (2) the payroll administrator of that House of 
Congress shall deposit in an escrow account all payments otherwise required 
to be made during such period for the compensation of Members of Congress 
who serve in that House of Congress, and shall release such payments to 
such Members only upon the expiration of such period.

  (2) Period described.--With respect to a House of Congress, the period 
described in this paragraph is the period which begins on April 16, 2013, 
and ends on the earlier of--

  (A) the day on which the House of Congress agrees to a concurrent 
resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2014 pursuant to section 301 of 
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974; or

  (B) the last day of the One Hundred Thirteenth Congress.

  (3) Withholding and remittance of amounts from payments held in escrow.--
The payroll administrator shall provide for the same withholding and 
remittance with respect to a payment deposited in an escrow account under 
paragraph (1) that would apply to the payment if the payment were not 
subject to paragraph (1).

  (4) Release of amounts at end of the congress.--In order to ensure that 
this section is carried out in a manner that shall not vary the 
compensation of Senators or Representatives in violation of the twenty-
seventh article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the 
payroll administrator of a House of Congress shall release for payments to 
Members of that House of Congress any amounts remaining in any escrow 
account under this section on the last day of the One Hundred Thirteenth 
Congress.

  (5) Role of secretary of the treasury.--The Secretary of the Treasury 
shall provide the payroll administrators of the Houses of Congress with 
such assistance as may be necessary to enable the payroll administrators to 
carry out this section.

  (b) Treatment of Delegates as Members.--In this section, the term 
``Member'' includes a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to the Congress.

  (c) Payroll Administrator Defined.--In this section, the ``payroll 
administrator'' of a House of Congress means--

  (1) in the case of the House of Representatives, the Chief Administrative 
Officer of the House of Representatives, or an employee of the Office of 
the Chief Administrative Officer who is designated by the Chief 
Administrative Officer to carry out this section; and

  (2) in the case of the Senate, the Secretary of the Senate, or an 
employee of the Office of the Secretary of the Senate who is designated by 
the Secretary to carry out this section.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Debate shall not exceed 1 hour with 40 
    minutes equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking 
    minority member of the Committee on Ways and Means and 20 minutes 
    equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority 
    member of the Committee on House Administration.
        The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Camp) and the gentleman from 
    Michigan (Mr. Levin) each will control 20 minutes. The gentlewoman 
    from Michigan (Mrs. Miller) and the gentleman from Pennsylvania 
    (Mr. Brady) each will control 10 minutes.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Camp).

                                 general leave

        Mr. CAMP. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
    have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks 
    and to include extraneous material on H.R. 325.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Michigan?
        There was no objection.
        Mr. CAMP. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
    consume.
        Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 325, the No 
    Budget, No Pay Act of 2013. This legislation directs Members of the 
    House and Senate to adopt a budget resolution by April 15, 2013. If 
    either body does not adopt a budget resolution by April 15, 2013, 
    Members of that body will have their pay withheld until they pass a 
    budget. It's simple: no budget, no pay. The American people 
    understand that they don't get paid if they don't do their job, and 
    neither should Members of Congress.
        In addition, to ensure the complete and timely payment of the 
    obligations of the U.S. Government, this legislation allows 
    Treasury to issue debt between the date of enactment and May 18, 
    2013. However, Treasury may only issue enough debt necessary to pay 
    bills coming due before May 18. I want to be perfectly clear on 
    this point: this bill does not allow Treasury to run up an 
    unlimited amount of debt between now and May 18.
        The debt authorized under this bill must be tied to bills 
    coming due during that timeframe. Further, on May 19, a new debt 
    limit is automatically established.
        So that's what this bill does. The larger question is, why are 
    we even talking about the debt and debt limit? Our Nation's debt is 
    not just some abstract number. It has a direct impact on American 
    families. During the President's fiscal commission, the Simpson-
    Bowles Commission, we heard nonpartisan testimony that when the 
    debt is this large in comparison to the economy, it costs the 
    country the equivalent of about 1 million jobs. Think about that. 
    If Washington got its debt and spending under control, then 1 
    million more Americans would be working today.
        And if that wasn't sobering enough, Fitch Ratings recently 
    warned that the failure to come up with a plan for reducing our 
    debt would likely still result in a downgrade of the U.S. credit 
    rating. A lower credit rating is sure to mean higher interest 
    rates. That means higher credit card payments, higher car payments, 
    higher student loans, and certainly higher mortgage payments.
        Despite these nonpartisan warnings, the Democrat-controlled 
    Senate has not produced a budget in more than 1,300 days. That's 4 
    years without a budget. How can we begin to get our debt under 
    control when Democrats won't even produce a budget? This bill is 
    the first step in forcing Democrats to put forward a budget so we 
    can start holding Washington accountable for its out-of-control 
    spending.
        Every day, American families have to make decisions about their 
    household finances. They have to adjust their spending to cover a 
    whole host of things: groceries, student loan payments, braces for 
    children, and a replacement for that aging refrigerator. Of course, 
    they can't buy everything they want. Every day, they have to make 
    tough choices.
        It's time for Congress--the House and the Senate--to make some 
    tough choices. To be honest, Mr. Speaker, this isn't a tough choice 
    where I come from. Where I grew up, if you didn't do your job, you 
    didn't get paid. It's time for Congress to start living with the 
    same facts of life everyone else in America has to live with. I 
    support the No Budget, No Pay Act because it brings back a bit of 
    accountability and common sense to Washington. I urge my colleagues 
    to join me in passing this bill.
        Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
        Mr. [Sander] LEVIN [of Michigan]. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 
    such time as I shall consume.
        This Republican bill is not a change in policy. It's a change 
    in tactics. House Republicans continue to play with economic fire. 
    They're playing political games with the debt ceiling, and that 
    undermines certainty.
        Yesterday, economist Simon Johnson of MIT testified before our 
    committee saying that a short-term increase would only extend 
    uncertainty. He said:

  You will continue to undermine the private sector. You will continue to 
delay investment and to reduce employment relative to what it would be 
otherwise.

        Let's, for a second, remember history, the last time the House 
    Republicans played political games with the debt ceiling. In August 
    2011, our economy produced the lowest job growth in 3 years. During 
    that 2-month period, the Dow Jones plummeted 2,000 points, 
    including one of its worst single-day drops in history--635 points 
    on August 8. S&P downgraded the U.S. credit rating for the first 
    time in history.
        Leading Republicans in June, 2011, criticized the notion of a 
    short-term debt ceiling increase as providing a lack of certainty. 
    The majority leader said:

  We feel very strongly that one of the reasons why we continue to see an 
ailing economy is that people have very little confidence, have very little 
certainty in terms of where we are headed.

        Our Ways and Means chairman echoed that feeling only days later 
    saying about the prospect of a short-term debt ceiling increase, It 
    does not give you certainty.
        This bill does not give certainty, but uncertainty.
        The action we took New Year's Day to avoid the fiscal cliff 
    brought our total deficit reduction over the past 2 years to $2.5 
    trillion. What's more, it set the stage for future further balanced 
    agreements that include both spending cuts and new revenue. We 
    should proceed with that effort, not plunge into further 
    uncertainty.
        I reserve the balance of my time. . . . 
        Mrs. [Candice] MILLER of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I yield 
    myself such time as I may consume.
        I rise today in strong support of H.R. 325, the No Budget, No 
    Pay Act.
        The Budget Act of 1974 requires each House of Congress to pass 
    a budget each year by April 15. This is important, of course, 
    because the budget that we pass is our blueprint, literally, for 
    how we're going to spend the hard-earned tax dollars that the 
    American people send here to Washington to run our Nation.
        Today, we are in a situation where the United States Senate has 
    not passed a budget in nearly 4 full years, leaving the American 
    people with no idea of how the Senate intends to deal with the 
    fiscal crisis that is facing our Federal Government. In the time 
    since the Senate last passed a budget, the Federal Government has 
    experienced deficits of over $1 trillion each and every year, and 
    we have added more than $5 trillion to our national debt. 
    Obviously, this is a very serious fiscal crisis, and the American 
    people are demanding answers.
        This legislation will allow us room to begin working on a 
    solution that will put our Nation on a much more sound financial 
    footing. This bill will extend our Nation's borrowing authority for 
    90 days to give each House of Congress, the House and the Senate, 
    the needed time to do what they are legally required to do, which 
    is to pass a budget to show the American people how we intend to 
    deal with the many challenges that we face. But while giving 
    Congress time to do its work, it also has a very important caveat 
    associated with it that says, if we don't do what we are required 
    to do by law, that we will not be paid. Simply put: no budget, no 
    pay.
        This idea actually came, Madam Speaker, from previous 
    bipartisan efforts to bring fiscal responsibility to Washington. 
    And now the President has indicated that if it reaches his desk, he 
    will sign it, that he does not oppose it.
        As well, there have been very promising indications coming out 
    of the United States Senate from many Democratic Members that they 
    will also step up, after 4 long years of inaction, and put forward 
    a budget.
        I believe that this can be the impetus today for us to begin 
    working together to make the difficult decisions to finally address 
    our fiscal challenges. Today, we can send that very strong message 
    to the American people with a bipartisan vote to show that we are 
    willing to put our paychecks on the line to meet these challenges.
        Now, some are concerned about whether or not this legislation 
    is constitutional because of the 27th Amendment's restriction that 
    the pay of Members of Congress cannot be varied--that is really the 
    operative phrase of that amendment, ``varied''--that it can neither 
    be raised nor reduced until another election has taken place. This 
    bill, Madam Speaker, was carefully crafted to comply with the 
    requirements of the 27th Amendment.
        So this is how it will work:
        If either the House or the Senate does not pass a budget by 
    April 15, the deadline, then beginning on April 16, the pay for 
    Members of that Chamber will be placed into an escrow account and 
    will only be paid when that Chamber--either the House or the 
    Senate--has passed a budget or when we reach the end of the 113th 
    Congress. The amount that Members are paid will not be reduced nor 
    will it be raised, so we stay in strict compliance with the terms 
    of the 27th Amendment.
        There is no requirement in the 27th Amendment which states that 
    Members have to be paid weekly, biweekly, monthly, or bimonthly or 
    what have you, only that the pay that they receive will not vary.
        Now, some have suggested that the escrow account into which the 
    Member pay would be deposited should bear interest so that that 
    could then, as well, be paid to the Members. This cannot happen 
    because that would actually cause Member pay to increase, of 
    course. It would then vary their pay, which would not be in 
    compliance with the strict terms of the 27th Amendment.
        So I am extremely hopeful, Madam Speaker, that we will 
    successfully conclude our work in a timely basis here in the House, 
    and I hope that this additional provision, as well, encourages the 
    Senate to also complete our important work and pass a budget.
        What we are suggesting certainly is not unreasonable. I'll tell 
    you, I come from southeast Michigan, and one thing I can tell you 
    that is true about the people that I am honored to serve is that 
    they get up every single day, every morning and work hard all day, 
    every day. They simply do not understand how Congress can fail to 
    do our job for almost 4 years--no budget out of the Senate for 
    almost 4 years--and yet suffer no consequences.
        The American people are demanding that their Members of 
    Congress deal effectively with the challenges we face. Our problems 
    are real, and it's time for real solutions or real consequences.
        The concept, again, very simple: no budget, no pay. When times 
    are tight, you balance your checkbook. When you run out of money, 
    you stop spending. When your credit card is maxed out, you cut it 
    up or get a plan together to pay it off. And if you don't do your 
    job, you don't get paid. These are the principles, Madam Speaker, 
    that Americans live by, and we certainly should be no exception.
        So I would urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this 
    bill.
        I reserve the balance of my time.
        Mr. [Robert] BRADY of Pennsylvania. Madam Speaker, I yield 
    myself such time as I may consume.
        This bill is not a serious or viable attempt to address the 
    debt ceiling issue and is merely another way to avoid dealing with 
    the difficult choices we need to make.
        We have been here before. We know what happens when we govern 
    with this kick-the-can-down-the-road mentality. The most troubling 
    effect, again, is the constitutionality of this bill is also 
    dangerously unclear.
        I was not on the floor last week when my colleagues read the 
    Constitution. Maybe they didn't reach the 27th Amendment. I am not 
    a constitutional attorney. I am not an attorney in any way, and I 
    make no apologies for that. But it's real easy:

  No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators or 
Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of the 
Representatives shall have intervened.

        ``Varying'' is the, again, as my friend did say, operative 
    word. If you aren't getting a paycheck in a month and you're going 
    to wait for 18 months, that's varying. So it could be--and, in my 
    opinion, it is--a constitutional problem.
        But be that as it may, I do commend the majority for 
    recognizing that Congress must pay its bills, that raising the debt 
    ceiling isn't about spending more money, it's about paying for 
    bills we already incurred.
        There is widespread, bipartisan acknowledgement of how 
    difficult and serious the fiscal challenges before us have become. 
    However, this proposal is just another attempt to yet again put the 
    discussion off for another day.
        Madam Speaker, I came here and I saw the sign, ``No Budget, No 
    Pay.'' It probably should say, ``No Budget, Delayed Pay,'' but it 
    sounds better when you say ``No Budget, No Pay.'' That means we may 
    not be getting paid, but we're going to get paid; it will be 
    delayed, but we're going to get paid.
        Every year in this house we do pass a budget; although, it's a 
    budget that I can't vote for. It's a budget that hurts the middle 
    class, the working class, the want-to-be-working class, and it also 
    hurts the American people's safety net. We know again this year we 
    will pass that budget. So our friends on the other side of the 
    aisle are putting up a No Budget, No Pay quite well knowing that 
    they will probably pass their budget and we probably will get paid.
        On another thought, as my good friend, Mr. Doyle, from 
    Pittsburgh has said to me, why not no gun control, no pay? Why not 
    no immigration reform, no pay? Why not no DISCLOSE Act, no pay?
        So, Madam Speaker, in my opinion--and I think in a lot of my 
    colleagues' opinion--it's a gimmick bill. No Budget, No Pay has no 
    teeth.
        With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
        Mrs. MILLER of Michigan. Madam Speaker, before I yield time to 
    my good colleague here, a couple of comments in regards to what my 
    ranking member has said from the committee, why not no gun control, 
    no pay, or using some other examples. I would just point out that 
    none of those are required by law, as passing a budget is required 
    by law.
        Also, there was some comment again about the significance of 
    the 27th Amendment. I would just add quickly a statement from David 
    Rivkin, Jr., and Lee Casey. These are two constitutional attorneys 
    that served in former administrations who say the bill passes 
    muster. Their comment:

  It does not vary Members' compensation instead holding it in escrow until 
such time that a budget is passed or, at the latest, this Congress comes to 
an end. It is attentive to the text and structure of the Constitution.

        And just one other quote. This is from another constitutional 
    attorney, a Greg Watson--actually, a gentleman who rallied the 
    support to pass the 27th Amendment. I will proudly point out, in 
    1992 it was my State of Michigan that put it over the three-fourths 
    threshold. But at any rate, he said:

  Nowhere in such a proposal do I see any violation of the terms and 
provisions of the 27th Amendment. Such a proposal does not vary the dollar 
amount of compensation to Members of Congress. The proposal merely delays 
the disbursement of that dollar amount.

              Statement of David B. Rivkin, Jr., and Lee A. Casey

  Members of Congress are accountable not just to serve their constituents 
but also to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. The 
House of Representatives' debt ceiling extension furthers both. The 
American people expect that their elected representatives in Congress will 
work together to enact a budget resolution, and the House bill's approach 
holds them personally accountable for doing so. It honors both Article I 
and the Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because it does 
not vary Members' compensation, instead holding it in escrow until such 
time that a budget is passed or, at the latest, this Congress comes to an 
end. This mechanism is a model for the way that Congress ought to work: it 
is creative, it is fiscally responsible, and it is attentive to the text 
and structure of the Constitution.

        Madam Speaker, at this time I am very honored and privileged to 
    yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Harper), who 
    is a distinguished member of the Committee on House Administration.
        Mr. [Gregg] HARPER [of Mississippi]. Madam Speaker, the No 
    Budget, No Pay portion of this bill was written specifically to 
    ensure that it complies with the 27th Amendment to the 
    Constitution. The bill does not vary the amount of compensation and 
    is, therefore, constitutional. It only changes when Representatives 
    and Senators are paid if they fail to adopt a budget resolution, as 
    required by law.
        Currently, Representatives are paid monthly and Senators are 
    paid twice a month. This bill simply says, if the House does not 
    adopt a budget resolution, the Members of that House, instead, get 
    paid at the end of that term of Congress.
        In 1789, James Madison, when he introduced the 27th Amendment, 
    spoke of preventing changes in compensation from being for the 
    benefit of those determining them. The clear purpose of the 
    amendment--which, as we know, was not ratified until 1992--was to 
    prevent Members from drawing higher salaries from the public 
    treasury without giving voters an opportunity to speak on that 
    decision. This bill does not benefit Members at the expense of 
    taxpayers, and it is consistent with the provisions of the 27th 
    Amendment. . . . 
        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(108) The question is on the 
    passage of the bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
108. Virginia Foxx (NC)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it.

                                 recorded vote

        Mr. BRADY of Pennsylvania. Madam Speaker, I demand a recorded 
    vote.
        A recorded vote was ordered.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. This is a 5-minute vote.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 
    285, noes 144, not voting 3, as follows:

                              [Roll No. 30] . . .

        Messrs. BROOKS of Alabama, DUNCAN of Tennessee and GUTIERREZ 
    changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
        So the bill was passed.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
        Stated for:

        Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Madam Speaker, on rollcall No. 30, had 
    I been present, I would have voted ``aye.''

Leaves of Absence

Sec. 5.5 Although leaves of absence are typically submitted to the 
    respective party cloakrooms and granted by unanimous consent at the 
    end of each legislative day, a Member may personally submit the 
    leave of absence request (which must be in writing) to the Chair.

    On March 7, 2001,(109) a Member made a personal request 
for a leave of absence from the floor as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
109. 147 Cong. Rec. 3023-24, 107th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        PERMISSION FOR LEAVE OF ABSENCE

        Mr. [Isaac] SKELTON [of Missouri]. Mr. Speaker, I have at the 
    desk a personal request.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(110) The Clerk will report 
    the leave of absence request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
110. Henry Bonilla (TX).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows: Leave of absence requested for Mr. 
    Skelton of Missouri for tomorrow.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman's 
    written request will be granted.
        There was no objection.

Sec. 5.6 Members may request that their salary be reduced on account of 
    absences from the House, pursuant to statutory 
    authority(111) permitting such deductions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
111. Parliamentarian's Note: This statutory authority is now codified 
        at 2 U.S.C. Sec. 5306.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On October 24, 1979,(112) a Member made the following 
request:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
112. 125 Cong. Rec. 29379, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN REQUESTS REDUCTION IN PAY    

        (Mr. MARTIN asked and was given permission to address the House 
    for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)
        Mr. [James] MARTIN [of North Carolina]. Mr. Speaker, I know not 
    what course Exxon may take, but as for me, in accordance with title 
    2, United States Code, section 39, I make a unanimous-consent 
    request that my pay be reduced for the 3 days during which I was 
    not in attendance at sessions of the House on October 9, 11, and 
    12.
        The SPEAKER.(113) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from North Carolina?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
113. Thomas O'Neill (MA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.

Sec. 5.7 The House has granted a leave-of-absence request by a Member 
    on behalf of a group of Members travelling internationally on 
    official business.

    On September 14, 1988,(114) the following en bloc 
request for leaves of absence was made:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
114. 134 Cong. Rec. 23820, 23852, 100th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          ANNOUNCEMENT OF ATTENDANCE BY MEMBERS AT INTERPARLIAMENTARY 
                               UNION MEETING    

        Mr. [Claude] PEPPER [of Florida]. Mr. Speaker, tomorrow 
    afternoon I, as chairman of the United States delegation of the 
    Interparliamentary Union meeting in Sofia, Bulgaria, leave for that 
    conference.
        The Speaker has appointed me as chairman of the delegation, and 
    the gentleman from California [Mr. Brown], the gentleman from New 
    York [Mr. Scheuer], the gentleman from New York [Mr. Wortley], and 
    the gentleman from Guam [Mr. Blaz] as delegates from the House of 
    Representatives to attend this conference.
        This is an organization of 108 nations embracing all the 
    nations that are our closest friends in the world.
        Mr. Speaker, I ask that the gentleman appointed by the Speaker 
    to attend this conference be granted a leave of absence during the 
    time they are attending this conference by the House of 
    Representatives.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. [James] Clarke [of North 
    Carolina]). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
    Florida?
        There was no objection. . . 
    .                          -------------------

                                LEAVE OF ABSENCE

        By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:
        Mr. Brown of California (at the request of Mr. Pepper), for 
    September 15-24, 1988, on account of official business.
        Mr. Scheuer (at the request of Mr. Pepper), for September 15-
    24, 1988, on account of official business.
        Mr. Blaz (at the request of Mr. Pepper), for September 15-24, 
    1988, on account of official business.
        Mr. Wortley (at the request of Mr. Michel), for today through 
    September 28, 1988, on account of official business.
        Mr. Barnard (at the request of Mr. Foley), for today and the 
    balance of the week, on account of illness.

Sec. 5.8 The chair of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct 
    (now the Committee on Ethics)(115) inserted into the 
    Congressional Record the committee's interpretation of the House's 
    former rule regarding honoraria.(116)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
115. The Committee on Standards of Official Conduct was redesignated as 
        the Committee on Ethics at the beginning of the 112th Congress. 
        House Rules and Manual Sec. 721b (2021).
116. Parliamentarian's Note: The guidance provided by the committee 
        here relates to the form of the rule as it existed in the 96th 
        Congress. For more recent interpretations of the House's ethics 
        rules (included rules regarding honoraria) by the Committee on 
        Ethics, see the House Ethics Manual, 110th Cong. 2d Sess. (2008 
        Ed.), pp. 189-196.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On October 19, 1979,(117) the chair of the Committee on 
Standards of Official Conduct made the following statement regarding 
the House's rule on Members receiving honoraria:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
117. 125 Cong. Rec. 28917, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            EARNED INCOME LIMITATION

        (Mr. BENNETT asked and was given permission to address the 
    House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)
        Mr. [Robert] BENNETT [of Utah]. Mr. Speaker, the Committee on 
    Standards of Official Conduct has received several inquiries 
    concerning the effect of the cost-of-living salary increase on the 
    earned income limit in House rule XLVII, as well as the application 
    of that rule to the assignment of income to charity. The following 
    response to these questions is provided for the information of my 
    colleagues.
        House rule XLVII limits a Member's outside earned income in a 
    calendar year to 15 percent of the aggregate salary paid to the 
    Member during such calendar year. The cost-of-living adjustment 
    effective October 1 will increase the aggregate salary paid to a 
    Member in 1979 to $58,290.62. Thus, the limit on outside earned 
    income for personal services rendered is $8,743.60, for calendar 
    year 1979. The limit in 1980, based on a salary level of $60,662.50 
    will be $9,099.38.
        Rule XLVII also limits to $1,000 the amount a Member may accept 
    as an honorarium for an single speech or article. Honoraria 
    assigned to a tax-exempt charity is not treated as earned income 
    subject to the limitations in the rule. If a Member chooses to have 
    an honorarium donated to a specific tax-exempt charity selected by 
    the Member, he should direct the paying organization to make the 
    payment directly to the charity. In addition, any honorarium 
    returned by the Member to the payor before the close of the 
    calendar year will not be counted against the earned income 
    limitation.
        Any honoraria assigned to a charitable organization should be 
    reported in the Member's annual financial disclosure statement 
    required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, with the notation 
    that the income was assigned to charity. It should also be noted 
    that honoraria assigned to charity must be reported by the Member 
    as gross income for tax purposes, and may be deducted as a 
    charitable contribution (see Revenue ruling 79-121).

Sec. 5.9 The House has adopted a special order of business resolution 
    providing for the consideration of a legislative branch 
    appropriation bill and restricting the offering of amendments to a 
    section addressing salary adjustments for Members of 
    Congress.(118)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
118. Parliamentarian's Note: The special order of business prohibited 
        amendments (including those contained in a motion to recommit) 
        to section 305 of the bill concerning adjustments to Members' 
        salaries. The special order did permit a single amendment to 
        reduce the amount of the adjustment from 7% to 5.5%. The House 
        rejected the motion for the previous question and subsequently 
        amended the special order to provide for consideration of a 
        substitute amendment striking the adjustment altogether. 125 
        Cong. Rec. 14650-51, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (June 13, 1979). That 
        substitute was rejected and the original amendment merely 
        reducing the adjustment was adopted. 125 Cong. Rec., 14663, 
        96th Cong. 1st Sess. (June 13, 1979). However, on final 
        passage, the House ultimately rejected the bill containing the 
        salary adjustment. 125 Cong. Rec. 14674, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 
        (June 13, 1979). For the House's rejection of a similar bill 
        later in the same Congress (a continuing resolution also 
        providing for an increase in Members' salaries), see 125 Cong. 
        Rec. 25345-54, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (Sept. 13, 1979).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On June 13, 1979,(119) the House considered the 
following special order of business resolution:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
119. 125 Cong. Rec. 14642-45, 14650-51, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            MAKING IN ORDER CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 4390, LEGISLATIVE 
                            APPROPRIATIONS, 1980    

        Mr. [John] MOAKLEY [of Massachusetts]. Mr. Speaker, by 
    direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 312 
    and ask for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 312

  Resolved, That during the consideration of the bill (H.R. 4390) making 
appropriations for the legislative branch for the fiscal year ending 
September 30, 1980, and for other purposes, all points of order against 
sections 303 and 305 of said bill for failure to comply with the provisions 
of clause 2, rule XXI are hereby waived. No amendment to section 305 of 
said bill shall be in order except an amendment in the following form: ``On 
page 30, strike out `7 percent' and insert `5.5 percent''', and said 
amendment shall not be subject to amendment but shall be debatable by the 
offering of pro forma amendments. No other amendments to and no motion to 
recommit said bill having the effect of changing or modifying section 305 
of said bill shall be in order.

        The SPEAKER.(120) The gentleman from Massachusetts 
    (Mr. Moakley) is recognized for 1 hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
120. Thomas O'Neill (MA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield the customary 30 minutes to 
    the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Latta). Pending that, I yield myself 
    such time as I may consume.
        Mr. Speaker, the resolution provides certain procedures during 
    the consideration of the legislative branch appropriation --H.R. 
    4390.
        The rule waives points of order against section 303, relating 
    to terms of service for pages, and section 305, which places a 
    limit on the pay raises which would otherwise go to Congressmen, 
    Senators, judges, and other high level Federal employees. Both 
    sections would otherwise be subject to points of order as 
    legislation in an appropriations bill.
        The rule would also permit an amendment to further reduce the 
    limitation on pay raises which would otherwise be granted to 
    persons covered by section 305. . . .
        Mr. [Robert] BAUMAN [of Maryland]. The motion to recommit is 
    also restricted. That motion is permitted, but it is restricted in 
    the sense that no motion to recommit can amend the section dealing 
    with the pay raise; so that there is no opportunity under this rule 
    to strike out the pay raise or to do anything but vote on an 
    amendment reducing it from 7 percent to 5.5 percent. No other 
    amendment and no other motion to recommit is permitted. . . .
        Mr. [Adam] BENJAMIN [of Indiana]. Speaker, House Resolution 
    312, the rule proposed for the legislative branch appropriations 
    bill, fiscal year 1980, appears to be considerably more provocative 
    than that which was formally requested by the Committee on 
    Appropriations.
        Section 305, providing a 7-percent restriction, was added to 
    H.R. 4390 by the committee to limit an automatic salary adjustment 
    for Members of Congress, Federal judges, and other top Government 
    officials which could have amounted to 11.3 percent or more. The 
    Rules Committee, in its wisdom, invoked an alternate limitation of 
    a maximum of 5.5 percent, presumably that which will be proposed by 
    the President under the Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970.
        Mr. Speaker, I support the rule. I take this time to explain 
    the dilemma invoked by using the legislative branch appropriations 
    bill to vent disagreement with the salary structure.
        In 1975, the Congress adopted the Executive Salary Adjustment 
    Act which provided that top Government officials, including Members 
    of Congress, would automatically receive the same Governmentwide 
    percentage pay increase granted to Civil Service workers under the 
    Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970. Under this law, adjustments 
    are recommended to keep Federal employee pay scales comparable to 
    the private sector. The President must issue an Executive order 
    putting the recommendation or an alternate proposal, subject to 
    one-House congressional veto, into effect by October 1.
        Under the Executive Salary Adjustment Act, Members of Congress 
    and other top Government officials did receive an adjustment in 
    1975. However, in 1976, the legislative branch appropriations bill 
    was used to deny payment of the adjustment in fiscal year 1977.
        In 1977, the increase recommended under the Federal Salary Act 
    of 1967 took effect. In the same year, Public Law 95-66 was adopted 
    providing that the salaries of Members of Congress and other top 
    Government officials that were increased by the Quadrennial 
    Commission would not be increased again in the same year by the 
    comparability pay adjustment. This effectively denied a 7-percent 
    increase.
        In 1978, and again this year, the legislative branch 
    appropriations bill, is being used to deny payment of adjustments 
    under the Executive Salary Adjustment Act--not to deny increases as 
    Public Law 95-66 did in 1977.
        Please distinguish this carefully. The use of the legislative 
    branch appropriations bills in 1976, 1978, and 1979 are not erasing 
    adjustments which occur automatically as entitlements pursuant to 
    the Executive Salary Adjustment Act--you are merely abating payment 
    while the adjustments continue to increase the salaries.
        If it is the intent of the Congress to deny payment pursuant to 
    or separate itself from the provisions of the Executive Salary 
    Adjustment Act, then the proper approach is that found in Public 
    Law 95-66 and the proper committee of jurisdiction is the House 
    Post Office and Civil Service Committee.
        I urge my colleagues to familiarize themselves with the General 
    Accounting Office report of May 17, 1979, which urged that annual 
    adjustments under the Executive Salary Adjustment Act be allowed to 
    take effect and that Congress unlink itself to executive level II 
    salaries because of its political propensity to abate payments 
    thereby compressing the schedule.
        Quite frankly, our collective zeal to castigate ourselves has 
    developed a precarious situation which could lead to an increase 
    that the opponents of this rule assert that they do not want.
        I urge the adoption of the rule and a vote on the preferred 
    adjustment. Then, I urge passage of the bill which has great merit 
    beyond the question of salaries. Finally, I urge that the matter of 
    comparability pay be addressed to the proper committee and that 
    future legislative branch appropriations bills not be used for the 
    annual salary fight.
        I include the following explanation of section 305:

Explanation of Section 305 of H.R. 4390    

  This amendment provides for a 7 percent increase for those individuals in 
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches or in the government of 
the District of Columbia, whose rate of pay was either directly or 
indirectly increased as a result of the March 1977 pay increases which went 
into effect under the Quadrennial Commission mechanism and whose pay, as a 
result of various legislative actions, has been frozen since that time.

  The first sentence of the amendment provides that the rate of pay may not 
be increased by more than 7 percent of the rate in effect on September 30, 
1978, which is the last day before the 1978 comparability adjustment would 
have taken effect. It also defines in clauses (1) and (2) the individuals 
who are subject to the limitation. Under clause (1) any individual whose 
rate of pay is $47,500 or more (that is equal to or greater than level V of 
the Executive Schedule) is covered. This covers those individuals whose 
rate of pay was directly affected by the 1977 Quadrennial increase (such as 
Members, Senators, judges, heads and assistant heads of cabinet 
departments), as well as individuals whose rate of pay is administratively 
set at rates above $47,500 (such as certain high level positions in the 
Postal Service).

  Clause (2) covers those individuals whose rates of pay were not directly 
affected by the 1977 Quadrennial increase, but whose rates of pay 
nevertheless increased because the Quadrennial increase raised the 
statutory (or other) salary ceiling on their rates of pay.

  For example, the published rate for a GS-18 is $61,449, but pay payable 
is only $47,500 because of the statutory level V ceiling (5 U.S.C. 
Sec. 5308) which has been frozen since March 1977. Under the amendment the 
$47,500 ceiling is increased by 7 percent to $50,825. The amendment also 
makes comparable adjustments for ceilings on rates of pay for committee 
staffs, other officers and employees of the House and Senate, and for 
administrative assistants whose maximum rate of pay is limited by 
congressional resolution.

  The amendment applies to individuals in all three branches, and thus 
includes individuals in the Postal Service, and the military service. The 
Office of Personnel Management has informally estimated that the amendment 
will affect 15,046 individuals broken down as follows:


Executive Branch:
  Currently at level V or above..............................        742
  Additional affected by frozen ceiling......................     12,807
Legislative Branch...........................................        584
Judicial Branch..............................................        913
 


  Most of these individuals have had no adjustment since March 1977. The 
1978 adjustment was denied pursuant to a limitation on the use of funds 
contained in the FY1979 Legislative Branch Appropriations Act (P.L. 95-
391). The 1977 comparability adjustment for these individuals was 
eliminated by Public Law 95-66. During the period when comparability 
adjustments have been denied (March 1977 through April 1979) the Consumer 
Price Index has increased by 18.8 percent.

  Under the amendment the 7 percent limitation will be in effect only for 
FY1980. If a limitation is to continue beyond Fiscal Year 1980, it will be 
necessary for Congress to enact a similar limitation on funds again next 
year.

  If no limitation is enacted this year, and assuming that the President 
submits an alternative plan to limit the October 1979 comparability 
adjustment to 5.5 percent, the pay of individuals covered by this amendment 
would increase by approximately 11.3 percent since both the FY1979 
adjustment (5.5 percent) and the FY1980 adjustment (assumed to be 5.5 
percent) would go into effect simultaneously (See Attachment).

  Subsection (b) of the amendment provides a special rule to cover 
positions created after September 30, 1978, and requires the appropriate 
officials in each branch to promulgate regulations to ensure that the pay 
for such positions will be set at a rate equivalent to that for comparable 
positions which were in existence on September 30, 1978.

  This provision ensures that individuals in positions which are 
transferred to the new Senior Executive Service (SES), which was created by 
the Civil Service Reform Act, will not receive pay increases of more than 7 
percent during FY1980. Although the maximum rate of pay for the SES is set 
at level IV of the Executive Schedule, those positions transferred into the 
SES which on September 30, 1978, were subject to the level V ceiling will 
continue to be subject to the adjusted level V ceiling. The amendment, 
however, pertains only to increases in basic pay. Performance awards and 
other lump-sum payments which are in addition to basic pay are not limited 
by the amendment.

  Subsection (c) provides that the salary or pay actually paid to an 
employee, as a result of the application of the amendment, will serve as 
the basis for computing life insurance, retirement, and other benefits, 
rather than the higher statutory rate.


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                          March     Oct.
                                                         1977\1\   1977\2\   Oct. 1, 1978\3\    Oct. 1, 1979\4\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Speaker, Vice President, Chief Justice................   75,000    75,000    75,000 (79,100)    80,250 (83,500)
Cabinet heads (Executive Level I).....................   66,000    66,000    66,000 (69,600)    70,620 (73,400)
Members, circuit court justices (Executive Level II)..   57,500    57,500    57,500 (60,700)    61,525 (64,000)
Executive Level III...................................   52,500    52,500    52,500 (55,400)    56,175 (58,400)
Executive Level IV (SES maximum)......................   50,000    50,000    50,000 (52,800)    53,500 (55,700)
Executive Level V (GS maximum)........................   47,500    47,500    47,500 (50,100)    50,825 (52,900)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Rate established pursuant to Quadrennial Commission recommendations.
\2\Comparability adjustment denied pursuant to Public Law 95-66.
\3\Limitation on use of funds (Public Law 95-391) limits rates payable to those in effect on Sept. 30, 1978.
  Legal rates, reflecting the 5.5-percent increase, are shown in parentheses.
\4\Rates payable if 7-percent limitation is adopted. Legal rates are shown in parentheses (assumes President
  limits this year's comparability adjustment to 5.5 percent).

         . . .
        The SPEAKER. The question is on ordering the previous question.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes 
    appear to have it.
        Mr. BAUMAN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The question was taken; and there were_yeas 126, nays 292, not 
    voting 16, as follows:

                              [Roll No. 223] . . .

        The Clerk announced the following pairs:
        On this vote:

  Mr. Conyers for, with Mrs. Schroeder against.

        Until further notice:

  Mr. Biaggi with Mr. Brown of Ohio.

  Mr. Flood with Mr. Dixon.

  Mr. Derrick with Mr. Kemp.

  Mr. Smith of Iowa with Mr. Forsythe.

  Mr. Treen with Mr. Walgren.

  Mr. John L. Burton with Mr. Bob Wilson.

        Messrs. BONKER, TRAXLER, LENT, GUDGER, MADIGAN, GUARINI, DICKS, 
    IRELAND, PURSELL, VANDER JAGT, and ROBERTS changed their vote from 
    ``yea'' to ``nay.''
        So the previous question was not ordered.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

          AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE OFFERED BY MR. LATTA

        Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I offer an amendment in the nature of a 
    substitute.
        The Clerk read as follows:

  Amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr. Latta: Strike all 
after the resolving clause and insert in lieu thereof the following:

  ``That during the consideration of the bill (H.R. 4390) making 
appropriations for the legislative branch for the fiscal year ending 
September 30, 1980, and for other purposes, all points of order against 
sections 303 and 305 of said bill for failure to comply with the provisions 
of clause 2, rule XXI are hereby waived. No amendment to section 305 of 
said bill shall be in order except amendments in the following form: (1) 
``on page 30, strike out `7 percent' and insert `5.5 percent''', and (2) a 
substitute amendment for said amendment striking out the words `by more 
than 7 percent', and said amendments shall not be subject to further 
amendment but shall be debatable by the offering of pro forma amendments. 
No other amendment to and no motion to recommit said bill having the effect 
of changing or modifying section 305 shall be in order.''

        The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Latta) is recognized 
    for 1 hour.
        Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
    consume.
        Mr. Speaker, this is exactly the amendment I referred to 
    earlier in the well of the House. I have been informed by the 
    Parliamentarian that the vote, should this be adopted, would occur 
    first on the substitute for the 5.5-percent amendment. By adopting 
    the substitute for the 5.5-percent amendment, you would strike out 
    the words ``by more than 7 percent,'' which would mean there would 
    be no_and I emphasize the word ``no''_cost-of-living increase for 
    Members of Congress and the other Federal employees I mentioned 
    earlier. There are a total of 13,500 employees involved. I shall 
    vote for the substitute and ``no'' on the cost-of-living increases 
    as I am not voting_and have not ever voted_for any increase in 
    salary or other benefits for myself and do not intend to do so now.
        Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from 
    Massachusetts (Mr. Moakley) for the purposes of debate only.
        Mr. MOAKLEY. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
        Mr. Speaker, I think the position of the House in this matter 
    has been made clear and I see no reason to extend debate any 
    further.
        The amendment in the nature of a substitute proposed by the 
    gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Latta) is fair and reasonable. It gives us 
    a clear and structured procedure for accomplishing the will of the 
    House in this matter.
        For the majority on the committee, we have no objection to the 
    amendment and I urge its adoption.
        Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the 
    amendment and on the resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The SPEAKER. The question is on the amendment in the nature of 
    a substitute offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Latta).
        The amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to.
        The SPEAKER. The question is on the resolution, as amended.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes 
    appeared to have it.
        Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. Mr. Speaker, on that I 
    demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were refused.
        So the resolution, as amended, was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 5.10 The Sergeant-at-Arms of the House, having been served in 
    litigation concerning the process for adjusting Members' salaries 
    under the Federal Salary Act, notified the House of such service of 
    process, and the communications (including the subpoena and the 
    underlying complaint) were printed in the Congressional 
    Record.(121)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
121. Parliamentarian's Note: When officers of the House receive 
        subpoenas or summons as part of a judicial process, such 
        documents are not typically printed in full in the 
        Congressional Record (so as to not give undue publicity to the 
        plaintiff's claims). However, in this instance, because the 
        litigation was initiated by a Member of the House, and because 
        the underlying issue involve Members' salaries, the full text 
        of the documents was included for the information of Members. 
        For more on service of process issues regarding officers of the 
        House (including current rule VIII procedures), see Precedents 
        (Wickham) Ch. 6 Sec. Sec. 26, 27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On May 20, 1976,(122) the following communications were 
printed in the Congressional Record for the information of Members:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
122. 122 Cong. Rec. 14926-28, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. For a privileged 
        resolution reported by the Committee on House Administration 
        authorizing the Sergeant-at-Arms to retain counsel in this 
        case, see H. Res. 1497, 122 Cong. Rec. 28937, 94th Cong. 2d 
        Sess. (Sept. 2, 1976). The U.S. District Court for the District 
        of Columbia ultimately held that the provisions of the Federal 
        Salary Act of 1967 and the Executive Salary Cost-of-Living 
        Adjustment Act of 1975 did not violate the Constitution. See 
        Pressler v. Simon, 428 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd mem. 
        sub nom. Pressler v. Blumenthal, 434 U.S. 1028 (1978).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          COMMUNICATION FROM THE SERGEANT AT ARMS--SUBPOENA SERVED ON 
        SERGEANT AT ARMS KENNETH R. HARDING IN CASE OF PRESSLER AGAINST 
                         SIMON, VALEO, AND HARDING    

        The SPEAKER laid before the House the following communication 
    from the Sergeant at Arms:

                                   Office of the Sergeant at Arms,
                                    U.S. House of Representatives,
                                     Washington, DC, May 20, 1976.
                                                    Hon Carl Albert,
                             Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives,
                                                     Washington, DC.

        Dear Mr. Speaker: I have in my official capacity as Sergeant at 
    Arms of the House of Representatives been served in a civil action 
    in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
    (Civil Action File No. 76-0782). Having in mind that the privileges 
    of the House of Representatives may be involved, I am bringing this 
    matter to your attention.
        Today I addressed a letter to the Honorable Earl J. Silbert, 
    United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, requesting 
    assignment of counsel to represent the Sergeant at Arms, as 
    provided for in 2 United States Code 118. A copy of that letter is 
    attached hereto.

            Sincerely,
                                               Kenneth R. Harding,
                                                 Sergeant at Arms.



          [United States District Court for the District of Columbia]

                                    Summons

        Larry Pressler, Plaintiff v. William E. Simon, Secretary of the 
    Treasury; Francis R. Valeo, Secretary of the U.S. Senate; Kenneth 
    R. Harding, Sergeant at Arms of the U.S. House of Representatives, 
    Defendant.
        To the above named Defendant: Kenneth R. Harding.
        You are hereby summoned and required to serve upon Larry 
    Pressler, bringing suit pro se, whose address is 1238 Longworth 
    House Office Building, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, 
    DC 20515, an answer to the complaint which is herewith served upon 
    you, within 60 days after service of this summons upon you, 
    exclusive of the day of service. If you fail to do so, judgment by 
    default will be taken against you for the relief demanded in the 
    complaint.
                                                   James F. Davey,
                                                   Clerk of Court.

        May 7, 1976.



                                   Office of the Sergeant at Arms,
                                    U.S. House of Representatives,
                                     Washington, DC, May 20, 1976.
                                               Hon. Earl J. Silbert,
        U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, U.S. Courthouse, 
                                                     Washington, DC.

        Dear Mr. Silbert: I respectfully request that you assign 
    counsel to represent the Sergeant at Arms of the House of 
    Representatives, Kenneth R. Harding, in a civil action in the 
    United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Civil 
    Action File Number 76-0782), pursuant to 2 United States Code 118. 
    I was served in my official capacity on May 7, 1976, with 
    instructions to answer the complaint within sixty days after 
    service.
        I am enclosing herewith a copy of the summons and complaint 
    which was served on me. I may add that I will be available at any 
    time to confer with any counsel that you may assign to this case.

            Very truly yours,
                                               Kenneth R. Harding,
                                                 Sergeant at Arms.



                                   Office of the Sergeant at Arms,
                                    U.S. House of Representatives,
                                      Washington, DC, May 7, 1976.
                                                Hon. Edward H. Levi,
               Attorney General of the United States, Department of 
                                            Justice, Washington, DC.

        Dear Mr. Levi: I am sending you a copy of summons and 
    complaint, which I received by mail from the Department of Justice 
    on May 6, 1976, in Civil Action No. 76-0782 in the United States 
    District Court for the District of Columbia, filed against me in my 
    official capacity as Sergeant at Arms of the House of 
    Representatives.
        In accordance with the provisions of 2 U.S.C. Sec. 118, I have 
    sent a copy of the summons and complaint in this action to the 
    United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, requesting 
    that he take appropriate action under the supervision and direction 
    of the Attorney General. A copy of my letter to the United States 
    Attorney for the District of Columbia is enclosed.
        With kind regards, I am

            Sincerely yours,
                                               Kenneth R. Harding.
                                                 Sergeant at Arms.

        The SPEAKER. The Clerk will read the subpena.
        The Clerk read as follows:

        [In the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil 
                                    Action]

        Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Application 
                             for Three-Judge Court

  Larry Pressler, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, Plaintiff, 
v. William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury, Department of the Treasury, 
Washington, DC; Francis R. Valeo, Secretary of The U.S. Senate, United 
States Senate, Washington, DC; Kenneth R. Harding, Sergeant at Arms of the 
U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, 
DC, Defendants.

  This Memorandum is submitted in support of plaintiff's Application for 
Three-Judge Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2282. Section 2282 provides 
that

  ``[a]n interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, 
operation or execution of any Act of Congress for repugnance to the 
Constitution of the United States shall not be granted by any district 
court or judge thereof unless the application therefor is heard and 
determined by a district court of three judges under Section 2284 of this 
title.''

  Provided that a substantial constitutional question has been presented, a 
three-judge court must be empaneled for hearing and determining the 
question of the constitutionality of the statute which is attacked by the 
complaint. California Water Service Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U.S. 252 
(1938); Telephone News System, Inc. v. Ill. Bell. Tel. Co., 210 F. Supp. 
471 (D.C. Ill. 1962), aff'd 376 U.S. 782.

  The instant case falls squarely within the ambit of the foregoing rule. 
Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the enforcement, operation and execution of 
provisions of the Federal Salary Act of 1967 (2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 351-361) 
and of the Executive Salary Cost-of-Living Adjustment Act (2 U.S.C. 
Sec. 31, as amended) on the ground of their repugnance to Article I, 
Section 1 and Article I, Section 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the 
United States. That the constitutional questions presented by the complaint 
are substantial is most convincingly established by the fact that a three-
judge court which did not reach the merits of the case was convened 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2282 in 1970 to determine the very question 
presented by Count I of the instant complaint. Richardson v. Kennedy, 313 
F.Supp. 1282 (W.D. Pa. 1970). aff'd, 401 U.S. 901 (1971).

  The substantiality of the constitutional questions presented by the 
instant complaint is further demonstrated when those questions are tested 
against traditional standards for determining when a substantial 
constitutional question has not been presented. Such standards were laid 
down by the Supreme Court in California Water Service Co. v. City of 
Redding, supra:

  ``The lack of substantiality in a federal question may appear either 
because it is obviously without merit or because its unsoundness so clearly 
results from the previous decisions of this court as to foreclose the 
subject.'' 304 U.S. at 255.

  See also, e.g., Jasper v. Sawyer, 100 F. Supp. 421 (D.C.D.C. 1951); Acret 
v. Harwood, 41 F. Supp. 492 (D.C. Cal. 1942).

  The constitutional questions presented by the instant complaint are 
neither ``obviously without merit'' nor have they been foreclosed by 
frequent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States with respect 
to them. Indeed, the questions presented by the instant complaint have 
never been determined by any court, much less the Supreme Court of the 
United States. It is noteworthy in this regard that the challenged statutes 
are not of long standing, having been enacted in December, 1967 and August, 
1975, respectively. Accordingly, they do not have a long history of 
construction by the courts.

  For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully submitted that a three-judge 
court must be empaneled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2282 to hear and 
determine the constitutional questions presented by the instant complaint.

                                           Larry Pressler, Pro se.

        Dated: May 7, 1976.



                                               U.S. District Court
                                     for the District of Columbia,
                                     Washington, DC, May 14, 1976.
                                                 Kenneth R. Harding,
        Sergeant at Arms of the U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. 
                           House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Larry Pressler vs. William E. Simon, et al

        Dear Mr. Harding: Attached hereto is a copy of the designation 
    of judges to serve on a three-judge panel in the above-entitled 
    case.
        Kindly furnish this office with two copies of all papers filed 
    by you to date and three copies of all papers filed in the future.

            Very truly yours,
                                                   James F. Davey,
                                                            Clerk.

                                              By Ethel B. Johnson,
                                                     Deputy Clerk.



         [U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 
                            Civil Action No. 76-782]

          Designation of Judges to Serve on Three-Judge District Court

  Larry Pressler, Plaintiff v. William E. Simon, et al., Defendants.

  The Honorable Gerhard A. Gesell, United States District Judge, having 
notified me that a complaint has been filed in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia seeking to enjoin the enforcement, 
operation and execution of provisions of the Federal Salary Act of 1967 (2 
U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 351-361) and of the Executive Salary Cost-of-Living 
Adjustment Act (2 U.S.C. Sec. 31, as amended) on the ground of their 
repugnance to Article I, Section 1 and Article I, Section 6, Clause 1 of 
the Constitution of the United States, it is

  Ordered pursuant to Section 2284 of Title 28, United States Code, that 
The Honorable Carl McGowan, United States Circuit Judge, and The Honorable 
William B. Jones, Chief Judge, United States District Court, are hereby 
designated to serve with The Honorable Gerhard A. Gesell, United States 
District Judge, as members of the Court to hear and determine this action.

                                                 David L. Bazelon,
                                               Chief Judge for the
                                     District of Columbia Circuit.

        Dated: May 13, 1976.



        [In the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil 
                              Action No. 76-0782]

                Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

  Larry Pressler, United States House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 
Plaintiff, v. William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury, Department of 
the Treasury, Washington, DC; Francis R. Valeo, Secretary of the United 
States Senate, United States Senate, Washington, DC; Kenneth R. Harding, 
Sergeant at Arms of the United States House of Representatives, United 
States House of Representatives, Washington, DC, Defendants.

                                  jurisdiction

  1. This action seeks a declaratory judgment that provisions of the 
Federal Salary Act of 1967 and of the Executive Salary Cost-of-Living 
Adjustment Act which set forth procedures to establish new rates of 
compensation for Members of Congress are void in that they are violative of 
Article I, Section 1, and Article I, Section 6, Clause 1 of the 
Constitution of the United States. This action also seeks a permanent 
injunction to prohibit defendants, who are Secretary of the Treasury, 
Secretary of the United States Senate and Sergeant at Arms of the United 
States House of Representatives, from requisitioning, authorizing payment 
of or disbursing increases in congressional salaries effected pursuant to 
the Federal Salary Act of 1967 or the Executive Salary Cost-of-Living 
Adjustment Act.

  2. This action arises under Article I, Section 1, and Article I, Section 
6, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States, under Section 
225(f)(A) of the Federal Salary Act of 1967, 2 U.S.C. Sec. 356(A) (Pub. L. 
90-206, Title II; 81 Stat. 642) and under Section 204(a) of the Executive 
Salary Cost-of-Living Adjustment Act, 2 U.S.C. Sec. 31, as amended (Pub. L. 
94-82, Title II; 89 Stat. 419), as hereinafter more fully appears. 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331, 28 U.S.C. 
Sec. Sec. 2201-2202. Venue is properly laid in this Court pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. Sec. 1391(e). There exists between the parties an actual 
controversy, justiciable in character, in respect of which plaintiff 
requests a declaration of his rights by this Court. The matter in 
controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum of ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000).

                                    parties

  3. Plaintiff Larry Pressler is a citizen of the United States and a 
taxpayer of the United States. Plaintiff is also a Member of the House of 
Representatives from the First Congressional District of the State of South 
Dakota.

  4. Defendant William E. Simon is an officer of the United States. He is 
sued in his official capacity as Secretary of the Treasury of the United 
States, with official residence in Washington, DC. It is his duty, pursuant 
to 31 U.S.C. Sec. 1002, to issue warrants authorizing the payment of monies 
out of the Treasury of the United States.

  5. Defendant Francis R. Valeo is an officer or employee of the United 
States. He is sued in his official capacity as Secretary of the United 
States Senate, with official residence in Washington, DC. It is his duty, 
pursuant to 2 U.S.C. Sec. 64, to requisition monies for the payment of 
congressional salaries and to disburse such salaries to the Members of the 
United States Senate.

  6. Defendant Kenneth R. Harding is an officer or employee of the United 
States. He is sued in his official capacity as Sergeant at Arms of the 
United States House of Representatives, with official residence in 
Washington, DC. It is his duty, pursuant to 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 78 and 80, 
to requisition monies for the payment of congressional salaries and to 
disburse such salaries to the Members of the United States House of 
Representatives.

                               three-judge court

  7. As appears more fully in the Application for Three-Judge Court and the 
supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted herewith pursuant 
to Local Rule 1-11, this is a proper case for determination by a three-
judge court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2282 inasmuch as plaintiff seeks an 
injunction to restrain the enforcement, operation and execution of 2 U.S.C. 
Sec. 356(A) and 2 U.S.C. Sec. 31, as amended, on the ground that such 
statutory provisions are violative of Article I, Section 1 and Article I, 
Section 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States.

                                    count i

  8. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each of the allegations contained in 
paragraph 1 through 7 above.

  9. The Federal Salary Act of 1967 became law December 16, 1967 (the 
``1967 Act''). Pub. L. 90-206, Title II; 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 351-361. The 
1967 Act established a Commission on Executive, Legislative and Judicial 
Salaries (the ``Commission''). The Commission is required to make 
recommendations to the President, at four-year intervals, on the rates of 
pay for Senators, Representatives, Federal judges, cabinet officers and 
other agency heads, and certain other officials in the executive, 
legislative and judicial branches. The law requires that the President, in 
the budget next submitted by him after receipt of a report of the 
Commission, set forth his recommendations with respect to the exact rates 
of pay he deems advisable for those offices and positions covered by the 
1967 Act. The President's recommendations become effective 30 days 
following transmittal of the budget, unless in the meantime other rates 
have been enacted by law or at least one House of Congress has enacted 
legislation which specifically disapproves of all or part of the 
recommendations. A copy of the 1967 Act is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

  10. The first Commission was appointed in July, 1968 and made its 
recommendations to the President in December, 1968. The President's pay 
recommendations took effect in March, 1969, and congressional salaries were 
increased from $30,000 to $42,500 per annum. The United States, through the 
Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of the United States Senate, and 
the Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives authorized the payment 
of increases in congressional compensation and disbursed said increases to 
Members of Congress.

  11. The second Commission was appointed in December 1972, too late to 
report to the President by January 1, 1973. As a result, the President's 
pay recommendations based on the second Commission's report were submitted 
to Congress on February 4, 1974. The Committee on Post Office and Civil 
Service reported a resolution (S. Res. 293) on February 28, 1974, which 
would have permitted all provisions of the President's proposal to take 
effect, except those providing adjustments in the pay of Members of 
Congress. The Senate, however, amended the Resolution to disapprove all of 
the President's recommendations and rejected the entire proposal on March 
6, 1974.

  12. According to the statutory scheme, the next Commission is scheduled 
to be appointed in 1976 and to report its recommendations to the President 
no later than January 1, 1977.

  13. Insofar as they provide a mechanism for adjusting salaries of Members 
of Congress, the foregoing procedures authorized by the 1967 Act are 
repugnant to Article I, Section 1 and Article I, Section 6, Clause 1 of the 
Constitution of the United States. Article I, Section 1 provides that 
``[a]ll Legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of 
the United States.'' Article I, Section 6, Clause 1 provides that ``[t]he 
Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their 
Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the 
United States.'' Properly interpreted in light of the intentions of the 
draftsmen of the Constitution, those constitutional provisions require that 
congressional salaries be determined by the legislative branch by specific 
enactment in each instance. Under the 1967 Act, however, congressional 
salaries are ascertained by Presidential recommendation.

  14. The acts of defendants in disbursing the increased salary to Members 
of Congress have injured and will continue to injure the plaintiff as a 
United States citizen in that they deprive him of his right as a citizen to 
have Members of Congress accountable for increases authorized in their 
compensation.

  15. The acts of the defendants have injured and will continue to injure 
the plaintiff as a United States taxpayer in that they deprive him of his 
right as a taxpayer to have tax monies received by the Federal Government 
expended pursuant to laws enacted in accordance with the Constitution of 
the United States.

  16. The acts of the defendants have injured and will continue to injure 
the plaintiff as a Member of the United States House of Representatives by 
interfering with the performance of his constitutional responsibilities and 
congressional duties and by depriving him of his constitutional right to 
vote on each adjustment proposed in congressional salaries.

  17. Unless defendants are enjoined by this Court from requisitioning, 
authorizing the payment of increases, and disbursing the increases in 
congressional salaries, defendants will disburse increased congressional 
salaries adjusted in contravention of constitutional requirements, 
violating the rights of plaintiff described herein and working upon 
plaintiff an unusual hardship or an irreparable injury and damage for which 
there exists no adequate remedy at law.

                                    count ii

  18. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each of the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 7 above.

  19. The Executive Salary-Cost-of-Living Adjustment Act became law August 
9, 1975 (the ``1975 Act''). Pub. L. 94-82. The 1975 Act provides for an 
automatic annual cost-of-living adjustment in the salaries of certain 
executive, legislative and judicial officers and employees of the United 
States, including Members of Congress. Section 204(a) of the 1975 Act 
amended 2 U.S.C. Sec. 31, the statutory provision relating to compensation 
for Members of Congress, to provide that the annual rate of pay for Members 
of Congress would be the rate established pursuant to Presidential 
recommendation under the 1967 Act, as annually and automatically increased 
by a cost-of-living adjustment. Such automatic annual cost-of-living 
adjustment in all of the salaries covered by the 1975 Act, including the 
salaries of Members of Congress, is equal in amount to the overall 
percentage of increase made in the rates of pay of federal employees 
covered by the General Schedule, which increase is made pursuant to 
Presidential recommendation authorized by 5 U.S.C. Sec. 5305. The 
adjustment in salaries covered by the 1975 Act becomes effective at the 
beginning of the first pay period starting on or after the first day of the 
month in which the adjustment in General Schedule salaries under 5 U.S.C. 
Sec. 5305 takes place. A copy of the 1975 Act is attached hereto as Exhibit 
B.

  20. On October 6, 1975, Executive Order No. 11883, 40 F.R. 47091, ordered 
that the General Schedule salaries be adjusted and that the salaries 
covered by the 1975 Act be adjusted accordingly. As a result, salaries of 
Members of Congress were increased from $42,500 to $44,600 per annum. A 
copy of Executive Order No. 11883 is attached hereto as Exhibit C.

  21. Pursuant to the provisions of said Executive Order, the United 
States, through the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of the United 
States Senate, and the Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives 
authorized the payment of increases in the congressional compensation and 
disbursed said increases to the Members of Congress.

  22. Insofar as they provide a mechanism for adjusting the salaries of 
Members of Congress, the foregoing procedures authorized by the 1975 Act 
repugnant to Article I, Section 1 and Article I, Section 6, Clause 1 of the 
Constitution of the United States. Article I, Section 1 provides that 
``[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of 
the United States.'' Article I, Section 6, Clause 1 provides that ``[t]he 
Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their 
Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the 
United States.'' Properly interpreted in light of the intentions of the 
draftsmen of the Constitution, those constitutional provisions require that 
congressional salaries be determined by the legislative branch by specific 
enactment in each instance. Under the 1975 Act, however, Congressional 
salaries are automatically increased in an amount based upon Presidential 
recommendations with respect to General Schedule salaries.

  23. The acts of defendants in disbursing the increased salary to Members 
of Congress have injured and will continue to injure plaintiff as a United 
States citizen in that they deprive him of his right as a citizen to have 
Members of Congress accountable for increases authorized in their 
compensation.

  24. The acts of the defendants have injured and will continue to injure 
the plaintiff as a United States taxpayer in that they deprive him of his 
right as a taxpayer to have tax monies received by the Federal Government 
expended pursuant to laws enacted in accordance with the Constitution of 
the United States.

  25. The acts of the defendants have injured and will continue to injure 
the plaintiff as a Member of the United States House of Representatives by 
interfering with the performance of his constitutional responsibilities and 
congressional duties and by depriving him of his constitutional right to 
vote on each adjustment proposed in congressional salaries.

  26. Unless defendants are enjoined by this Court from requisitioning, 
authorizing the payment of increases, and disbursing the increases in 
congressional salaries, defendants will disburse increased congressional 
salaries adjusted in contravention of constitutional requirements, 
violating the rights of plaintiff described herein and working upon 
plaintiff an unusual hardship or an irreparable injury and damage for which 
there exists no adequate remedy at law.

  Wherefore, plaintiff prays:

  1. That plaintiff have a judgment and decree of this Court declaring his 
rights and status, and more particularly adjudicating:

  (a) That the 1967 Act is void and unconstitutional insofar as it 
establishes procedures for adjusting congressional rates of pay and 
salaries; and

  (b) That the 1975 Act is void and unconstitutional insofar as it 
establishes procedures for adjusting congressional rates of pay and 
salaries.

  2. That this Court issue a permanent injunction restraining defendants, 
and each of them and their agents, servants, employees and attorneys, and 
all persons in active concert or participation with them, from 
requisitioning, authorizing the payment of, or disbursing any future 
increases in congressional salaries effected pursuant to the 1967 Act or 
the 1975 Act.

  3. That this Court accord de facto validity to the past acts of 
defendants, their agents, servants, employees and attorneys, and all 
persons in active concert or participation with them, in requisitioning, 
authorizing the payment of, and disbursing past increases in congressional 
salaries effected pursuant to the 1967 Act and the 1975 Act.

  4. That this Court stay, for such period as the Court believes reasonably 
adequate for Congress, if it so desires, to further ascertain congressional 
salaries ``by Law'', the Court's judgment insofar as it affects the 
authority of defendants to requisition, authorize the payment of, and 
disburse congressional salaries at the current rate of pay, in order to 
afford Congress an opportunity to ascertain congressional salaries ``by 
Law'', in accord with the requirements of the Constitution of the United 
States.

  5. That this Court grant plaintiff such other and further relief as may 
be just and proper.

                                           Larry Pressler, Pro se.

        Dated: May 7, 1976.

Sec. 5.11 The House by resolution amended its standing rules to adjust 
    the amount of outside earned income and honoraria that Members may 
    receive under the House's ethics rules (following the rejection of 
    a similar resolution earlier in the Congress).(123)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
123. Parliamentarian's Note: The modern form of the House's rule on 
        outside income, honoraria, and copyright royalties is Rule XXV 
        (clauses 1-4). See House Rules and Manual Sec. 1099 (2021). The 
        proceedings here reflect the form of the rule prior to 
        revisions made by the Ethics in Government Act of 1989. See 
        P.L. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On October 28, 1981,(124) the House had considered (and 
ultimately rejected) a resolution amending the House rules to revise 
the limits on outside earned income and honoraria that Members could 
receive:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
124. 127 Cong. Rec. 25670, 25686, 25688-89, 97th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Richard] BOLLING [of Missouri]. Mr. Speaker, by direction 
    of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 258 and ask 
    for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 258

  Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order 
to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the consideration of the resolution (H. Res. 
251) amending the Rules of the House of Representatives to increase the 
amount of outside earned income which a Member may have in 1981, 1982, and 
1983, and to increase the amount of the maximum honorarium which a Member 
may accept. After general debate, which shall be confined to the resolution 
and shall continue not to exceed two hours, to be equally divided and 
controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on 
Rules, the resolution shall be read for amendment under the five-minute 
rule. At the conclusion of the consideration of the resolution for 
amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the resolution to the House 
with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question 
shall be considered as ordered on the resolution and amendments thereto to 
final adoption without intervening motion except one motion to recommit.

        The SPEAKER.(125) The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. 
    Bolling) is recognized for 1 hour. . . .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
125. Thomas O'Neill (MA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Trent] LOTT [of Mississippi]. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 
    such time as I may consume.
        Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule. It is a completely 
    open and straightforward means of allowing the House to work its 
    will on the question of outside earned income limitations.
        This rule will make in order House Resolution 251, which was 
    reported yesterday from the Committee on Rules as a matter of 
    original jurisdiction. The resolution would amend the rules of the 
    House to raise the outside earned income limit for Members from 15 
    to 40 percent of their salaries during the calendar years 1981-83. 
    In addition, the proposed resolution raises the limit on a single 
    honorarium from $1,000 to $2,000. . . .
        The CHAIRMAN.(126) All time has expired.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
126. William Natcher (KY).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk will read.
        The Clerk read as follows:

H. Res. 251

  Resolved, That clause 1 of rule XLVII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives is amended--

  (1) by striking out ``Except as provided by paragraph (b)'' in paragraph 
(a) and inserting in lieu thereof ``Except as provided by paragraphs (b) 
and (c)'';

  (2) by striking out ``In the case of any individual'' in paragraph (b) 
and inserting in lieu thereof ``Except as provided by paragraph (c), in the 
case of any individual''; and

  (3) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

  ``(c) With respect to any calendar year beginning on or after January 1, 
1981, and ending on or before December 31, 1983, the term `15 per centum' 
in paragraphs (a) and (b) shall be deemed to read `40 per centum'.''.

  Sec. 2. Clause 2 of rule XLVII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives is amended by striking out ``$1,000'' and inserting in lieu 
thereof ``$2,000''.

  Sec. 3. The amendments made by this resolution shall take effect on the 
date of its adoption. . . .

        The SPEAKER. Without objection, the previous question is 
    ordered on the resolution.
        There was no objection.
        The SPEAKER. The question is on the resolution.

                                 recorded vote

        Mr. [David] OBEY [of Wisconsin]. Mr. Speaker, I demand a 
    recorded vote.
        A recorded vote was ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 
    147, noes 271, not voting 15, as follows:

                              [Roll No. 282] . . .

        So the resolution was rejected.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

    However, on December 15, 1981,(127) the House adopted a 
similar resolution by unanimous consent:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
127. 127 Cong. Rec. 31529, 31546, 97th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          AMENDING RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO INCREASE 
                           OUTSIDE EARNED INCOME    

        Mr. [John] MURTHA [of Pennsylvania]. Mr. Speaker, I have at the 
    desk a resolution and I ask for its immediate consideration.
        The SPEAKER.(128) The Clerk will report the 
    resolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
128. Thomas O'Neill (MA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 305

  Resolved, That clause 1 of Rule XLVII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives is amended by striking out ``15'' both times it appears 
therein and by inserting in lieu thereof ``30''.

  Sec. 2. Clause 2 of Rule XLVII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives is amended to read as follows:

  ``2. For purposes of clause 1, honoraria shall be attributable to the 
calendar year in which payment is received.''.

  Sec. 3. The amendments made by this resolution shall take effect on 
January 1, 1981.

        Mr. MURTHA (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous 
    consent that the resolution be considered as read and printed in 
    the Record.
        The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
    from Pennsylvania?
        There was no objection.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table. . . 
    .                          -------------------

        REQUEST TO VACATE PROCEEDINGS WHEREBY HOUSE RESOLUTION 305 WAS 
                                 AGREED TO    

        Mr. [Robert] WALKER [of Pennsylvania]. Mr. Speaker, I ask 
    unanimous consent to vacate proceedings whereby House Resolution 
    305 was agreed to.
        The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
    from Pennsylvania?
        Mr. [John] ROUSSELOT [of California]. Mr. Speaker, I object.
        The SPEAKER. Objection is heard.

Sec. 5.12 Following the House's adoption (by unanimous consent) of a 
    resolution revising the limitation on outside earned income that 
    Members may receive, the House subsequently considered another 
    resolution vacating the adoption of the earlier resolution, and 
    thus returning the rules on outside earned income to their prior 
    form.

    On April 22, 1986,(129) the House by unanimous consent 
adopted the following resolution regarding outside earned income by 
Members:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
129. 132 Cong. Rec. 8328, 99th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         AMENDING THE RULES OF THE HOUSE TO INCREASE AMOUNT OF OUTSIDE 
                  EARNED INCOME WHICH A MEMBER MAY ACCEPT    

        Mr. [John] MURTHA [of Pennsylvania]. Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    resolution (H. Res. 427) amending the Rules of the House of 
    Representatives to increase the amount of outside earned income 
    which a Member may accept, and I ask unanimous consent for its 
    immediate consideration.
        The SPEAKER.(130) The Clerk will report the 
    resolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
130. Thomas O'Neill (MA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 427

  Resolved, That clause 1 of rule XLVII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives is amended by striking out ``which is in excess'' and all 
that follows in both paragraph (a) and paragraph (b) and inserting in lieu 
thereof in each instance ``in excess of the percentage of the aggregate 
salary as a Member, paid to the Member during such calendar year, to which 
such outside earned income is limited by law.''.

  Sec. 2. The amendments made by the first section of this resolution shall 
take effect on January 1, 1986.

        The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
    from Pennsylvania?
        Mr. [Patrick] HILER [of Indiana]. Mr. Speaker, reserving the 
    right to object, could we be enlightened as to what the gentleman's 
    resolution is about?
        Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. HILER. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
        Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Speaker, this has been cleared by the 
    leadership on both sides. It just changes the rules to bring them 
    into closer compliance with the Senate rules.
        The intent of this amendment to the House rule is to change the 
    current 30-percent limitation to 40 percent.
        Mr. HILER. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
        The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
    from Pennsylvania?
        There was no objection.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

    On April 23, 1986,(131) a Member asked unanimous consent 
to consider a resolution that would have restored the rule to its prior 
form, effectively nullifying the resolution of the day before, but that 
request drew objection:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
131. 132 Cong. Rec. 8443, 99th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Richard] DURBIN [of Illinois]. Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    resolution (H. Res. 431) amending clause 1, rule XLVII of the Rules 
    of the House, and ask unanimous consent for its immediate 
    consideration.
        The SPEAKER.(132) The Clerk will report the 
    resolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
132. Thomas O'Neill (MA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 431

  Resolved, That clause 1 of rule XLVII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives be amended to read as follows:

  1. (a) Except as provided by paragraph (b), no Member may, in any 
calendar year beginning after December 31, 1978, have outside earned income 
attributable to such calendar year which is in excess of 30 per centum of 
the aggregate salary as a Member paid to the Member during such calendar 
year.

  (b) In the case of any individual who becomes a Member during any 
calendar year beginning after December 31, 1978, such Member may not have 
outside earned income attributable to the portion of that calendar year 
which occurs after such individual becomes a Member which is in excess of 
30 per centum of the aggregate salary as a Member paid to the Member during 
such calendar year.

        The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
    from Illinois?
        Mr. [Robert] WALKER [of Pennsylvania]. Mr. Speaker, I object.
        Mr. [Trent] LOTT [of Mississippi]. Mr. Speaker, I object.
        The SPEAKER. Will the gentleman who offered the objection 
    stand?
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Speaker, I object.
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman objects. Objection is heard.

                             parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, is there any procedure presently 
    available before the House to consider this resolution which would 
    restore the language of rule XLVII to exactly the same language as 
    it was?
        The SPEAKER. The matter may be referred to the Rules Committee, 
    and if there is a report, a two-thirds vote will bring it to the 
    floor today, and if there is approval on the minority side we will 
    bring the matter to the floor this afternoon.
        Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, will it be brought to the floor this 
    afternoon?
        The SPEAKER. It is the intention to refer the matter to the 
    Rules Committee. The Chair cannot dictate what the Rules Committee 
    is going to do, but it will recommend to the Rules Committee.
        Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Speaker.

    Later on April 23, 1986,(133) the House considered a 
resolution reported by the Committee on Rules(134) vacating 
the adoption of the original resolution and laying said resolution on 
the table:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
133. 132 Cong. Rec. 8474-75, 99th Cong. 2d Sess
134. Parliamentarian's Note: Resolutions reported by the Committee on 
        Rules may not be considered by the House on the same 
        legislative day on which they are reported, unless the House, 
        by a two-thirds vote on the question of consideration, waives 
        that requirement. Rule XIII, clause 6(a); House Rules and 
        Manual Sec. 857 (2021). In this case, the vote on the question 
        of consideration achieved the required two-thirds vote.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          VACATING THE PROCEEDINGS BY WHICH HOUSE RESOLUTION 427 WAS 
        ADOPTED BY THE HOUSE ON APRIL 22, 1986 AND PROVIDING THAT SAID 
        RESOLUTION SHALL BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN LAID ON THE TABLE    


        Mr. PEPPER, from the Committee on Rules, reported the following 
    privileged resolution (H. Res. 432, Rept. 99-553) which was 
    referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed:

H. Res. 432

  Resolved, That the proceedings by which H. Res. 427 was adopted by the 
House on April 22, 1986 are hereby vacated, and said resolution shall be 
considered to have been laid on the table.

        Mr. [Claude] PEPPER [of Florida]. Mr. Speaker, by direction of 
    the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 432 and ask for 
    its immediate consideration.
        The SPEAKER.(135) The Clerk will report the 
    resolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
135. Thomas O'Neill (MA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read the resolution.
        The SPEAKER. The question is, Will the House now consider House 
    resolution 432?
        The question was taken.
        Mr. [John] MURTHA [of Pennsylvania]. Mr. Speaker, I object to 
    the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the 
    point of order that a quorum is not present.
        The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present. The resolution 
    requires a two-thirds vote for passage.
        The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    333, nays 68, not voting 32, as follows: . . .
        So (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the House agreed 
    to consider House Resolution 432.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        The SPEAKER. Does the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Pepper) 
    desire time?

        Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 432 vacates the 
    proceedings by which House Resolution 427 was adopted yesterday and 
    lays the resolution on the table. As my colleagues are aware, 
    yesterday a resolution passed this House that had the effect of 
    lifting the limitation on outside earned income for Members. The 
    resolution now before the Members would restore the limitations 
    that were in place before yesterday's action. In other words, House 
    Resolution 432 would reimpose the 30-percent limitation on outside 
    earned income for Members by vitiating the action taken by the 
    House.
        Mr. Speaker, it is clear that Members are concerned about the 
    absence of full legislative scrutiny of the amendment to the rules 
    of the House adopted yesterday. There is a general consensus that 
    the sensitive issues of Members' compensation and outside income 
    should be addressed through careful study and deliberation.
        The committee wishes to make the legislative intent in this 
    matter clear. The committee's action in reporting this resolution 
    should not be viewed as an endorsement of the previous rule setting 
    a ceiling on outside income of 30 percent of a Members' pay. Nor 
    should it be viewed as a rejection of the 40-percent limit adopted 
    by the House yesterday, or of any other higher or lower limit which 
    might be proposed in any subsequent legislation, subject to the 
    normal procedure. The resolution presented today simply responds to 
    the concerns I have discussed, by restoring the status quo. The 
    committee views it as important to do so promptly, to avoid 
    arousing passions about matters which should be reviewed with care 
    and sensitivity.
        The controversy surrounding the previous resolution, and the 
    pending matter, make it clear that the current limit on outside 
    income, and the disparate practices of the two Houses, are issues 
    of some importance, which deserve to be addressed through 
    subsequent hearings and study in appropriate legislative fora.
        The Committee on Rules, and other committees of appropriate 
    jurisdiction, will continue their legislative and oversight reviews 
    of the issues of Members' pay and allowances, limitations and 
    standards governing honoraria and other outside income, and 
    comparability of these matters between the two Chambers.

        The SPEAKER. The question is on the resolution.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 5.13 In the 104th Congress, the House adopted a resolution 
    amending its rules regarding limits on outside earned income and 
    copyright royalties.

    On December 22, 1995,(136) the House adopted the 
following resolution:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
136. 141 Cong. Rec. 38488, 38493, 104th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Gerald] SOLOMON [of New York]. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to 
    House Resolution 322, I call up House Resolution 299 and ask for 
    its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 299

  Resolved,

SECTION 1. AMENDMENT TO HOUSE RULES.

  (a) Clause 3(e) of rule XLVII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives is amended to read as follows:

  ``(e) The term `outside earned income' means, with respect to a Member, 
officer, or employee, wages, salaries, fees, and copyright royalties earned 
while a Member, officer or employee of the House, and other amounts 
received or to be received as compensation for personal services actually 
rendered but does not include--

  ``(1) the salary of such individual as a Member, officer, or employee;

  ``(2) any compensation derived by such individual for personal services 
actually rendered prior to the effective date of this rule or becoming such 
a Member, officer, or employee, whichever occurs later;

  ``(3) any amount paid by, or on behalf of, a Member, officer, or 
employee, to a tax-qualified pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plan 
and received by such individual from such a plan;

  ``(4) in the case of a Member, officer, or employee engaged in a trade or 
business in which the individual or his family holds a controlling interest 
and in which both personal services and capital are income-producing 
factors, any amount received by such individual so long as the personal 
services actually rendered by the individual in the trade or business do 
not generate a significant amount of income; and

  ``(5) copyright royalties for works published before becoming a Member, 
officer, or employee of the House.''.

  (b) Clause 3 of rule XLVII of the Rules of the House of Representatives 
is further amended by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:

  ``(g) A Member, officer, or employee of the House may not--

  ``(1) receive any copyright royalties pursuant to a contract entered into 
after becoming a Member, officer, or employee--

  ``(A) unless the royalty is received from an established publisher 
pursuant to usual and customary contractual terms; and

  ``(B) without the prior approval of the contract by the Committee on 
Standards of Official Conduct; or

  ``(2) receive any advance payment for any such work. However, the rule 
does not prohibit literary agents, research staff, and other persons 
working on behalf of the Member, officer, or employee, from receiving 
advance payments directly from the publisher.

  ``(h) The Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, subject to such 
exceptions as it deems appropriate, shall not approve any contract which 
permits the deferral of royalty payments beyond the year in which 
earned.''.

SEC. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE.

  The amendments made by this resolution shall apply to copyright royalties 
earned by a Member, officer, or employee of the House of Representatives 
after December 31, 1995.

        amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by mr. solomon  
                                         

        Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I offer an amendment in the nature of 
    a substitute.
        The Clerk read as follows:

  Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. Solomon:

SECTION 1. AMENDMENT TO HOUSE RULE XLVII (LIMITATIONS ON OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT 
AND EARNED INCOME).

  Rule XLVII of the rules of the House of Representatives is amended by 
redesignating clause 3 as clause 4 and by inserting after clause 2 the 
following new clause:

  ``3. A Member, officer, or employee of the House may not--

  ``(1) receive any advance payment on copyright royalties, but this 
paragraph does not prohibit any literary agent, researcher, or other 
individual (other than an individual employed by the House or a relative of 
that Member, officer, or employee) working on behalf of that Member, 
officer, or employee with respect to a publication from receiving an 
advance payment of a copyright royalty directly from a publisher and solely 
for the benefit of that literary agent, researcher, or other individual; or

  ``(2) receive any copyright royalties pursuant to a contract entered into 
on or after January 1, 1996, unless that contract is first approved by the 
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct as complying with the 
requirement of clause 4(e)(5) (that royalties are received from an 
established publisher pursuant to usual and customary contractual 
terms).''.

SEC. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE.

  The amendment made by section 1 shall take effect on January 1, 1996. . . 
 

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(137) Pursuant to House 
    Resolution 322, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] and the 
    gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Moakley] will each be recognized 
    for 15 minutes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
137. Douglas Bereuter (NE).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon].
        Mr. [John] MOAKLEY [of Massachusetts]. Mr. Speaker, I ask 
    unanimous consent that my 15 minutes of general debate be 
    controlled by the gentleman from Washington [Mr. McDermott].
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Massachusetts?
        There was no objection.
        Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
    consume. . . .
        The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bereuter). Pursuant to the House 
    Resolution 322, the previous question is ordered on the amendment 
    and on the resolution.
        The question is on the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
    offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon].
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the noes appeared to have it.
        Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were yeas 
    219, nays 174, answered ``present'' 2, not voting 38, as follows:

                              [Roll No. 882] . . .

        Mr. MFUME changed his vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
        So the amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bereuter). The question is on the 
    resolution, as amended.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it

                                 recorded vote

        Mr. [James] McDERMOTT [of Washington]. Mr. Speaker, I demand a 
    recorded vote.
        A recorded vote was ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 
    259, noes 128, answered ``present'' 2, not voting 44, as follows:

                              [Roll No. 883] . . .



Sec. 6. Other Benefits; Office and Staff

    Members of the House have the responsibility to administer their 
congressional offices, both in Washington, D.C., and in their home 
districts. On Capitol Hill, Members are provided with office space in 
one of the three House office buildings named after former Speakers 
Cannon, Longworth, and Rayburn.(1) Pursuant to 
statute,(2) Members reelected to a subsequent Congress are 
generally permitted to keep the same office in the new 
Congress.(3) For freshman Members, a lottery system overseen 
by the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and Architect of the Capitol 
determines which Members receive which offices.(4) Members 
typically maintain an office (or multiple offices) in their home 
districts to facilitate constituent communications and 
services.(5)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. The House has additional office space in the O'Neill and Ford 
        office buildings, used mostly for committee staff and other 
        House support offices. For more on the Capitol complex 
        generally, including House office buildings, see Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 4 and Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 4.
 2. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 2004.
 3. Statutory provisions also regulate the exchange of office space 
        between Members, the Architect of the Capitol's authority to 
        assign unused office space, and other matters relating to the 
        use of House facilities. See 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2001-2013.
 4. Parliamentarian's Note: For much of the House's early history, 
        Members did not have individual offices but instead kept their 
        files and papers at their desks on the House floor. In 1845, 
        the House adopted its first lottery system for desk 
        assignments. In 1913, the individual desks in the Chamber were 
        replaced by benches, and Members were forced to relinquish 
        their desks and move their papers to their offices in the 
        newly-completed House office building (now known as the Cannon 
        House Office Building). For earlier descriptions of the process 
        for assigning office space to Members, see Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 4 Sec. 6; and 8 Cannon's Precedents 
        Sec. Sec. 3648-3655. For 19th century proposals to remove 
        individual Member desks, see 5 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 7282.
 5. It was formerly the case that Members could be allocated office 
        space in Federal buildings located in their district. See 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 8.6. However, this statutory 
        authority was repealed in the 95th Congress. See P.L. 95-391, 
        92 Stat. 763. Under modern practice, Members are responsible 
        for arranging their own office space, with rent and utilities 
        to be paid for out of the Members' Representational Allowance 
        (MRA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Members are also tasked with hiring staff to assist them in their 
legislative duties. In modern practice, Members often retain large 
staffs who fill a variety of positions within the office. Legislative 
assistants and correspondents (overseen by a legislative director) are 
most directly involved in advancing Members' legislative priorities. 
Press secretaries and communications directors oversee Members' public 
communications and announcements, while schedulers manage Members' time 
commitments (i.e., floor votes, committee work, constituent services, 
etc.) Additional staff are typically employed to assist with 
constituent services and district work, information technology support, 
and other administrative tasks. All of these positions are supervised 
by a chief of staff, often assisted by a deputy chief of staff.
    Although Members enjoy a great deal of freedom in making hiring 
decisions, the House is subject to a variety of workplace rights, anti-
discrimination, and other employment laws.(6) The primary 
statutory source for such rules is the Congressional Accountability Act 
(CAA),(7) originally enacted in the 104th Congress in 
1995.(8) The CAA applied a variety of Federal labor and 
civil rights laws (such as the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Family 
and Medical Leave Act) to the legislative branch.(9) It also 
created the Office of Congressional Workplace Rights (originally titled 
the Office of Compliance),(10) which is tasked with ensuring 
that Members' offices comply with the terms of the CAA (through 
education, dispute resolution, and other enforcement mechanisms). In 
the 115th Congress, the House created an Office of Employee Advocacy to 
provide legal advice and representation to congressional employees, 
including Members' staff.(11) In the 116th Congress, the 
House created the Office of Diversity and Inclusion to assist Members 
in recruiting and retaining a diverse staff.(12) 
Additionally, the House has required Members' offices to adopt anti-
discrimination and anti-harassment policies and to display a statement 
of workplace rights at each office location.(13) Finally, 
House rule XXIII (the Official Code of Conduct)(14) contains 
provisions prohibiting Members from: engaging in discriminatory hiring 
practices (clause 9); employing individuals who do not perform duties 
``commensurate with the compensation'' such individuals receive (clause 
8); and engaging in sexual activity with employees under the 
supervision of the Member (clause 18). In several instances, Members 
have been reprimanded or censured for improper hiring 
practices.(15)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. For a discussion of employment practices of the House generally, 
        see Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 6 Sec. 28.
 7. 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1301 et seq. See also Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 6 
        Sec. 28.3.
 8. Parliamentarian's Note: Several earlier attempts by the House to 
        apply private-sector employment laws to House hiring practices 
        were ultimately overtaken by the CAA. For example, in the 100th 
        Congress in 1988, the House adopted the Fair Employment 
        Practices Resolution (focused on nondiscrimination in hiring 
        practices and dispute resolution), which was incorporated into 
        the standing rules in the following Congress. See Precedents 
        (Wickham) Ch. 6 Sec. 28.1. In the 103d Congress in 1994, the 
        so-called ``Application of Certain Laws'' Resolution applied a 
        variety of Federal workplace laws to the House in a similar 
        manner as the CAA. See Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 6 Sec. 28.2. 
        These House rules were rendered moot by the passage of the CAA 
        in the 104th Congress in 1995. See Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 6 
        Sec. 28.3.
 9. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1302.
10. In the 115th Congress, the Office of Compliance was redesignated as 
        the Office of Congressional Workplace Rights. See P.L. 115-397, 
        132 Stat. 5297.
11. The Office of Employee Advocacy was initially created by simple 
        House resolution. See H. Res. 724, 164 Cong. Rec. H813-H814 
        [Daily Ed.], 115th Cong. 2d Sess. (Feb. 6, 2018).
12. The Office of Diversity and Inclusion was created by a separate 
        order contained in the resolution adopting the rules for the 
        116th Congress. See H. Res. 6, 165 Cong. Rec. H22 [Daily Ed.], 
        116th Cong. 1st Sess. (Jan. 3, 2019). It was made part of the 
        standing rules (clause 9 of rule II) in the 117th Congress. See 
        H. Res. 8, 167 Cong. Rec. H13-H14 [Daily Ed.], 117th Cong. 1st 
        Sess. (Jan. 4, 2021). See also House Rules and Manual Sec. 670c 
        (2021).
13. This requirement was originally contained in House Resolution 724 
        of the 115th Congress. See 164 Cong. Rec. H813-H814 [Daily 
        Ed.], 115th Cong. 2d Sess. (Feb. 6, 2018). It was reiterated 
        via separate order in the resolution adopting rules for the 
        116th Congress (see H. Res. 6, 165 Cong. Rec. H21 [Daily Ed.], 
        116th Cong. 1st Sess. (Jan. 3, 2019)), and by the same method 
        in the 117th Congress (see H. Res. 8, 167 Cong. Rec. H15-H16 
        [Daily Ed.], 117th Cong. 1st Sess. (Jan. 4, 2021)).
14. House Rules and Manual Sec. 1095 (2021).
15. See, e.g., Sec. 6.10, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If a Member ceases to become a Member (by death, resignation, or 
expulsion), the Clerk is required pursuant to clause 2(i) of rule 
II(16) to ``supervise the staff and manage the office'' of 
the Member who is no longer in office. Staff members continue to 
receive salary and are overseen by the Clerk, who may terminate 
existing employees or (with the approval of the Committee on House 
Administration) appoint new employees.(17) These authorities 
continue until a new Member is elected.(18) If a seat in the 
House is vacant due to a state not issuing a certificate of election to 
any individual for that seat, the Clerk will likewise supervise that 
office until a special election can be held to fill the 
vacancy.(19) In one instance, where a Member-elect had 
fallen into a coma and was determined not to be able to take a seat in 
the House, the House declared the seat vacant and provided authority 
for the Clerk to administer the office until the vacancy had been 
filled.(20) In another instance, the House adopted a 
resolution on opening day seating neither claimant to a contested seat 
and instructing the Clerk to administer the vacant office until the 
election contest had been resolved.(21)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. House Rules and Manual Sec. 653 (2021).
17. Id.
18. For more on the management of Member offices following the death of 
        the Member, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 38 Sec. 4. For older 
        practice regarding clerk-hires following the death of a Member, 
        see 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. Sec. 208, 209. It was formerly 
        the case that, pursuant to law, former Speakers were provided 
        with staff assistance ``in connection with the administration, 
        settlement, and conclusion'' of matters relating to their 
        service as Speaker. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 5128 (now repealed). Under 
        former clause 2(i)(2) of rule II, the Clerk would supervise 
        such staff for 60 days following the death of a former Speaker. 
        House Rules and Manual Sec. 653 (2021). However, this provision 
        of law was repealed in the 115th Congress (P.L. 115-244, 132 
        Stat. 2897) and the House rule eliminated at the outset of the 
        117th Congress (H. Res. 8, 167 Cong. Rec. H13 [Daily Ed.], 
        117th Cong. 1st Sess. (Jan. 4, 2021)).
19. Parliamentarian's Note: At the beginning of the 116th Congress, no 
        certificate of election from the Ninth District of North 
        Carolina had been received by the Clerk, and the Clerk 
        supervised the office until the seat was filled via special 
        election. See House Rules and Manual Sec. 653 (2021).
20. See Sec. 6.8, infra. See also Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 2 Sec. 1.6.
21. See Precedents (Smith) Ch. 9 Sec. 20.1. See also Precedents 
        (Wickham) Ch. 2 Sec. 4.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Pursuant to law,(22) Members are provided with an 
allowance to fund all aspects of their congressional office. This lump-
sum amount is known as the Members' Representational Allowance (MRA), 
``which shall be available to support the conduct of the official and 
representational duties of a Member of the House of 
Representatives.''(23) Members use this allowance to fund: 
the salaries of staff; office and administrative expenses; official 
mail and communications; rent and utilities (for district office 
space); and travel.(24) The use of MRAs is regulated by 
several different entities. Under House rule, the Committee on House 
Administration retains jurisdiction over Members' ``allowance and 
expenses''(25) and under statute, the committee has the 
authority to prescribe regulations on the use of the 
MRA.(26) The House Communications Standards 
Commission(27) issues regulations regarding the proper use 
of the franking privilege (a privilege now funded through the 
MRA).(28) Finally, the House Committee on Ethics may issue 
advisory opinions or otherwise provide information to Members regarding 
permissible and impermissible uses of the MRA.(29) There are 
strict prohibitions in place against using the MRA for personal 
expenses, or for campaign purposes.(30) Disbursements from 
each Members' MRA account are published by the CAO.(31)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
22. 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 5341 et seq.
23. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 5341(a).
24. The MRA is formally divided into three categories of spending: 
        personnel, office expenses, and official mail (franking). The 
        amount for office expenses varies from Member to Member based 
        on the characteristics of the district, but personnel amounts 
        are the same for every Member. Approximately 70% of the MRA is 
        allocated for personnel expenses. See Members' Representational 
        Allowance: History and Usage, CRS Report R40962 (Mar. 24, 
        2022).
25. Rule X, clause 1(k)(1); House Rules and Manual Sec. 724 (2021).
26. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 5341(d).
27. The House Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards was 
        redesignated as the House Communications Standards Commission 
        in the 116th Congress. See P.L. 116-260, 134 Stat. 1182.
28. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 501. The Official Mail Allowance was merged into the 
        MRA in the 104th Congress. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 5341(b).
29. See House Ethics Manual (2008 Edition), Committee on Standards of 
        Official Conduct, 110th Cong. 2d Sess., pp. 323-333.
30. Members' Congressional Handbook, Committee on House Administration, 
        117th Cong. 2d Sess. (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 2.
31. These statements of disbursements have been required by statute 
        since 1964. See P.L. 88-454, 79 Stat. 535. These provisions of 
        law have been codified at 2 U.S.C. Sec. 4108.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Office and Staff--Historical Practices

    For much of the House's early history, Members generally did not 
hire large staffs to assist them with their congressional duties as 
under modern practice. The House Page program began in the 19th 
century,(32) and pages would attend to Members on the House 
floor, but there was no system to provide individual Members with 
clerks, secretaries, or other assistants. It was only in 1893 that the 
House first instituted a clerk-hire program, whereby Members would 
certify the hiring of personal clerks whose salaries would then be 
reimbursed by the House.(33) In 1907, Members were given a 
lump sum amount to hire any clerks they wished,(34) subject 
to certain limitations regarding the number of clerks and the total 
compensation any one clerk could receive.(35) Subsequent 
statutory enactments(36) in 1923, 1939, 1955, and 1956, made 
further adjustments to these limitations (generally increasing both the 
maximum number of permitted clerks and their compensation).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
32. For more on the House Page program, see Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 6 
        Sec. 24.
33. See 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 1151, 1152.
34. See 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1151; and 6 Cannon's Precedents 
        Sec. 206.
35. See 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. Sec. 206, 207. Older precedents also 
        describe opinions of the Comptroller General regarding the 
        status of clerks upon the death of a Member (6 Cannon's 
        Precedents Sec. Sec. 208, 209), the hiring of clerks by 
        multiple Members (6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 210), and the 
        timing of clerks' compensation (6 Cannon's Precedents 
        Sec. Sec. 211, 212). Special rules also regulated the hiring of 
        clerks by committees. See 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1152.
36. See 42 Stat. 1217; 53 Stat. 1080; 69 Stat. 509; and 70 Stat. 990.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Beginning in the 92d Congress in 1971, the House empowered the 
Committee on House Administration to make adjustments to a variety of 
House administrative accounts, including Members' clerk-hire 
accounts.(37) Such adjustments would take place via orders 
issued by the committee and typically published in the Congressional 
Record. The clerk-hire account was increased on several occasions 
during the period in which the Committee on House Administration 
retained this authority.(38)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
37. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 8.
38. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. Sec. 8.1, 8.2, and 8.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A similar evolution occurred with respect to other aspects of 
Members' office operations. Beginning in the late 19th century, the 
Clerk was tasked with maintaining a stationery room, and Members were 
given a lump sum amount to purchase stationery from the 
Clerk.(39) In 1920, Congress enacted statutory 
authority(40) for Members to purchase stationery from the 
Public Printer.(41) These stationery accounts were 
transferred to the jurisdiction of the Committee on House 
Administration in the 92d Congress, when the committee was authorized 
to make unilateral adjustments in all such office 
accounts.(42) Allowances for postage stamps, electronic 
equipment, telephone service, and other office furnishings were all 
subject to periodic adjustments by the Committee on House 
Administration, funded through the contingent fund for House 
operations. The committee would typically provide notice to Members of 
such adjustments via publication in the Congressional 
Record.(43)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
39. See 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 1161, 1162. A statute from 1923 
        prohibited using the stationery allowance to purchase 
        nonstationery items. See 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 213.
40. See 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 214.
41. Parliamentarian's Note: The position of Public Printer of the 
        United States was formally established in 1876 to be head of 
        the Government Printing Office. In 2014, the office was 
        redesignated as the Government Publishing Office (GPO), and the 
        title of Public Printer was changed to Director of GPO. See 
        P.L. 113-235, 128 Stat. 2130. At the time of this writing, the 
        Director of GPO is Mr. Hugh Halpern (a former staff director 
        for the House Committee on Rules).
42. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 8.3. The original authority 
        was provided by House Resolution 457 of the 92d Congress, made 
        permanent law by P.L. 92-184, 85 Stat. 627. For an example of a 
        periodic adjustment to one of these accounts, see Sec. 6.1, 
        infra. See also 120 Cong. Rec. 40960, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. (Dec. 
        18, 1974); 121 Cong. Rec. 5556, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. (Mar. 6, 
        1975); 121 Cong. Rec. 15483, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. (May 20, 
        1975); 122 Cong. Rec. 21623-24, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. (June 30, 
        1976); and Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. Sec. 8.4-8.7. For 
        an example of a modification to an existing committee order 
        under this former authority, see Sec. 6.2, infra.
43. For parliamentary inquiries regarding this practice, see Sec. 6.3, 
        infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the 95th Congress in 1976, the authority to make overall 
adjustments to these accounts was significantly 
restricted,(44) though separate accounts were still 
maintained for different aspects of Members' staffing and office 
needs.(45) Between 1976 and 1995, these individual accounts 
were gradually consolidated until the House ultimately established a 
single account to address all aspects of Members' representational and 
legislative duties.(46) This single account is known as the 
Members' Representational Allowance (MRA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
44. See Sec. 6.4, infra. The restrictions on authority were made 
        permanent by P.L. 94-440, 90 Stat. 1443.
45. For examples of adjustments made within a single account, see 
        Sec. Sec. 6.5, 6.6, infra.
46. See Sec. 6.7, infra. See also 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 5341 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Other Benefits

    Members of the House receive additional benefits similar to those 
routinely provided in the private sector and the other branches of 
government. The two most significant benefits are health insurance and 
retirement benefits.
    With respect to health insurance, the Affordable Care Act (ACA), 
enacted in 2010, requires all Members with government health insurance 
to obtain it through the District of Columbia Health Benefit Exchange 
Authority.(47) Members make contributions to their health 
insurance payments via salary deductions, and the Federal government 
acts as Members' ``employer'' for purposes of employer 
contributions.(48)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
47. This provision is found in section 1312 of the ACA. See P.L. 111-
        148, 124 Stat. 119; and D.C. Code Sec. 31-3171.
48. See Health Benefits for Members of Congress and Designated 
        Congressional Staff: In Brief, CRS Report R43194 (Jan. 13, 
        2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Prior to the advent of the ACA, Members could obtain health 
insurance through the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program 
(FEHBP).(49) This program, originally created in 
1959,(50) offers health insurance to all Federal employees, 
including those in the executive and judicial branches, and certain 
legislative branch employees.(51)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
49. See Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) Program: An Overview, 
        CRS Report R43922 (Feb. 3, 2016).
50. P.L. 86-382, 73 Stat. 708.
51. The ACA requires Members and certain designated staff to obtain 
        health insurance through the District of Columbia. However, 
        many congressional staff remain within the FEHB system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, Members are eligible for certain Federal health 
programs that provide other kinds of medical coverage. These include 
the Federal Flexible Spending Account Program (FSAFEDS) (which allows 
Members to contribute pre-tax dollars to health savings accounts), and 
the Federal Employees Dental and Vision Insurance Program (FEDVIP) 
(which provides supplementary vision and dental 
insurance).(52) Members are also eligible to participate in 
the Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program (FLTCIP).(53) 
Members pay a tax on their wages to fund the Medicare (Part A) program, 
and Members over 65 years of age are eligible to take Medicare 
benefits.(54)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
52. See Health Benefits for Members of Congress and Designated 
        Congressional Staff: In Brief, CRS Report R43194 (Jan. 13, 
        2017).
53. Id.
54. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The House first provided Members with retirement benefits in 
1946(55) (following the advent of the Social Security system 
in the 1930s). Members were initially placed in the Civil Service 
Retirement System that had been created in 1920 for Federal 
employees.(56) In the 1980s, Federal employees were brought 
into the Social Security system, and a new Federal retirement program 
(called the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS)) was created to 
integrate contributions and benefits and avoid 
duplication.(57) For a time, Members could choose from among 
several different retirement programs, until the older Civil Service 
Retirement System was gradually phased out. In the 108th Congress in 
2003, Members began to be automatically enrolled in the FERS system, in 
addition to Social Security.(58) FERS and Social Security 
contributions are deducted from Members' salaries. The FERS system 
allows Members to take an annuity (pension) based on years of service, 
and also provides a voluntary contribution system (with employer 
matching) to a separate retirement account.(59)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
55. These benefits were provided as part of the Legislative 
        Reorganization Act of 1946. See P.L. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812.
56. See P.L. 66-215, 41 Stat. 614.
57. See Retirement Benefits for Members of Congress, CRS Report RL30631 
        (Aug. 8, 2019).
58. P.L. 108-83, 117 Stat. 1007.
59. See Retirement Benefits for Members of Congress, CRS Report RL30631 
        (Aug. 8, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Members are entitled to receive certain government documents as 
part of their congressional service, including copies of the 
Congressional Record,(60) the House Journal,(61) 
and the United States Code.(62) The House Rules and Manual 
is published each Congress pursuant to House resolution,(63) 
and distributed to Members by the House Parliamentarian. Similarly, 
volumes of House precedents are published pursuant to 
law,(64) and ``printed in sufficient quantity to be 
available to every Member''(65) of the House.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
60. 44 U.S.C. Sec. 906.
61. Rule II, clause 2(c)(3); House Rules and Manual Sec. 647 (2021).
62. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 5345. The statute specifies that Members must request 
        the U.S. Code from the Clerk, and that it shall be paid for out 
        of the MRA.
63. See Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 5 Sec. 2.1.
64. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 28.
65. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 28a. A similar provision of law authorizes the 
        printing and distribution to Members of a condensed and up-to-
        date version of the House's parliamentary precedents (known as 
        House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents, and 
        Procedures of the House). See 2 U.S.C. Sec. 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Franking Privilege

    The ``franking privilege'' refers to the ability of Members of 
Congress to use the U.S. postal system free of charge to communicate 
with their constituents.(66) While other Member privileges 
are constitutional in origin, the franking privilege is a statutory 
privilege only--albeit one with a longstanding history in American 
legislative practice.(67) Although the advent of electronic 
communication has provided Members with many efficient methods of 
communicating with their constituents, the franking privilege remains 
an important part of modern House practice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
66. Parliamentarian's Note: Although the franking privilege is 
        exercised primarily by Members of Congress, others (such as 
        executive branch officials and military personnel) have 
        exercised similar prerogatives with respect to the postal 
        system. For more information, see Franking Privilege: 
        Historical Development and Options for Change, CRS Report 
        RL34274 (May 3, 2016).
67. Parliamentarian's Note: The franking privilege in fact predates the 
        Constitution. Derived from British practice in the House of 
        Commons, this privilege was exercised by officials in the 
        colonial period, and the First Continental Congress enacted 
        legislation to extend this privilege to its members. A variety 
        of government officials under the Articles of Confederation 
        were afforded the same privilege to use the postal system 
        without charge, including members of its Congress, heads of 
        departments, and certain military officers. See Franking 
        Privilege: Historical Development and Options for Change, CRS 
        Report RL34274 (May 3, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Members' use of franked mail has evolved considerably since the 
first franking statute was enacted in 1789.(68) Initially, 
there were few restrictions on what Members could send under their 
frank, and early practice allowed constituents to send material to 
Members free of charge as well.(69) Perceived abuse of this 
system led to numerous accounting reforms in the 19th century, aimed at 
controlling costs and reducing burdens on the postal system. The 
franking privilege was even temporarily abolished in 1873 but fully 
restored in 1895. Its restoration was accompanied by various new 
regulations involving weight limits and restrictions on when franked 
mail could be sent.(70) Government documents of various 
kinds (including excerpts of the Congressional Record)(71) 
could be sent under the frank, as well as agricultural seeds provided 
by the Department of Agriculture.(72) However, the inclusion 
of unfrankable matter (such as personal communications) destroyed the 
privilege.(73) Former Members were also allowed to exercise 
the franking privilege, until December 1 following the expiration of 
their term (a privilege eliminated in 1975).(74)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
68. 1 Stat. 70.
69. The privilege of receiving franked mail from constituents was 
        eliminated in 1895. For a 1930 opinion of an Assistant 
        Postmaster General indicating that no provision of law 
        permitted using the frank for return reply, see 6 Cannon's 
        Precedents Sec. 219.
70. For a description of franking practices in the early 20th century, 
        see 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1163.
71. See, e.g., Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 7.4.
72. For a description of special packing boxes provided to Members for 
        franked mail (including the transmission of seeds and plants), 
        see 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 215. For a description of the 
        use of the frank to send telegrams or cablegrams, see 6 
        Cannon's Precedents Sec. Sec. 217, 220.
73. See, e.g., 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 221.
74. See 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 217. This provision was later 
        changed to move the expiration of the privilege back to April 
        1. See P.L. 93-191, 87 Stat. 737. See also Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 7. The privilege for former Members was 
        eliminated in the 94th Congress. See P.L. 94-177, 89 Stat. 
        1032. Nothing may be mailed under the frank of a deceased 
        Member. See 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 224.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The mid-20th century saw increased scrutiny of the practice of 
franking, and for the first time Congress began to reimburse the Post 
Office for the cost of franked mail.(75) Lawsuits 
challenging the constitutionality of the franking privilege were also 
initiated during this time.(76) Consequently, the 1970s saw 
a number of substantial reforms to the franking privilege, including a 
comprehensive new franking statute enacted in the 93d Congress in 
1973.(77) This statute created the House Commission on 
Congressional Mailing Standards (now the House Communications Standards 
Commission) to regulate the use of the frank by House 
Members.(78) Membership on the commission is determined by 
the Speaker of the House, who (pursuant to statute) must appoint three 
Members each from the majority and minority parties in the House, and 
designate as chair a Member who serves on the Committee on House 
Administration.(79) The Commission issues advisory opinions 
and regulations to enforce statutory provisions regarding proper use of 
the frank. The Commission may also undertake investigations of alleged 
violations, which may be subject to judicial review or a referral to 
the House Committee on Ethics.(80) The rules and practices 
of the Commission have been published in the Congressional Record for 
the information of Members.(81)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
75. See Franking Privilege: Historical Development and Options for 
        Change, CRS Report RL34274 (May 3, 2016).
76. See Common Cause v. Bolger, 574 F. Supp. 672 (D.D.C. 1982). The 
        advocacy group Common Cause had argued that the franking 
        privilege violated the First and Fifth amendments to the 
        Constitution by providing an indirect, government-funded 
        subsidy for incumbent Members of Congress (i.e., that free use 
        of the mail gave incumbents an unfair advantage in their 
        reelection campaigns). The United States District Court for the 
        District of Columbia upheld the constitutionality of the 
        franking privilege, stating that, while the potential for abuse 
        did exist, the statute was designed to restrict the frank to 
        legitimate, official government communications (rather than 
        campaign communications), and that any impact on electoral 
        processes was speculative. For resolutions authorizing 
        compliance with subpoenas issued in this case, and subsequently 
        authorizing the House Commission on Congressional Mailing 
        Standards (now the House Communications Standards Commission) 
        to intervene, see Sec. Sec. 6.15, 6.16, infra. In 1992, a 
        similar case was brought, challenging the constitutionality of 
        a provision that allowed franked mail to be sent to persons not 
        in the Member's district, but who may become part of the 
        district due to decennial redistricting. There, the D.C. 
        Circuit Court did find a direct connection between the mailings 
        and electoral processes, applied a ``heightened scrutiny'' 
        analysis to the provision, and found it to be constitutionally 
        impermissible. See Coalition to End the Permanent Congress v. 
        Martin T. Runyon et al., 979 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The 
        provision was formally repealed in the 102d Congress. See P.L. 
        102-392, 106 Stat. 1703.
77. P.L. 93-191, 87 Stat. 737.
78. In the Senate, use of the frank by Senators is regulated by the 
        Senate Select Committee on Ethics. Senate Select Committee on 
        Ethics: A Brief History of Its Evolution and Jurisdiction, CRS 
        Report RL30650 (Mar. 22, 2021).
79. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 501. The statute refers to the Committee on Post 
        Office and Civil Service, but that committee was eliminated in 
        the 104th Congress and its jurisdiction over the franking 
        privilege transferred to the Committee on House Oversight. The 
        Committee on House Oversight was redesignated as the Committee 
        on House Administration in the 106th Congress. House Rules and 
        Manual Sec. 724 (2021).
80. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 501. The Committee on Standards of Official Conduct 
        was redesignated as the Committee on Ethics at the beginning of 
        the 112th Congress. House Rules and Manual Sec. 721b (2021).
81. See Sec. 6.12, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 1977, further changes were made to the franking privilege in the 
House via amendments to the House rules. As part of a larger package of 
ethics reforms, the House amended its rules to provide further 
limitations on the use of the frank, including restrictions on the 
number of mass mailings per year and an expansion of the time period 
prior to an election in which mass mailings are 
prohibited.(82) Many of these provisions were codified in 
statute in the 97th Congress.(83)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
82. See H. Res. 287, 123 Cong. Rec. 5933-53, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (Mar. 
        2, 1977).
83. See P.L. 97-69, 95 Stat. 1041.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Subsequent reforms to the practice of franking generally addressed 
issues of cost and transparency. In the 101st Congress in 1990, the 
House established a separate official mail allowance for House Members, 
subject to regulations issued by the Committee on House 
Administration.(84) Thus, for the first time, Members were 
subject to an overall limit on franked mail expenditures, with monthly 
updates from the Postmaster General as to the rate of expenditure. In 
the 104th Congress in 1995, the separate official mail allowance was 
eliminated when all remaining Member allowances were consolidated into 
the MRA, although it remained one of the three subcategories of 
permissible expenses.(85) In the 105th Congress in 1996, 
official mail expenses of Members were required to be included in the 
Statement of Disbursements published by the CAO.(86) In the 
110th Congress in 2008, the Committee on House Administration required 
Members to disclose the cost of mass communications on a quarterly 
basis.(87) In the 116th Congress, new statutory provisions 
were enacted that redesignated the House Commission on Congressional 
Mailing Standards as the House Communications Standards Commission, and 
expanded the commission's jurisdiction to cover any official mass 
communications (including digital communications).(88)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
84. P.L. 101-520, 104 Stat. 2254.
85. See fn. 24, supra.
86. P.L. 104-197, 110 Stat. 2394. This law also required all franked 
        mail to include a notice stating that ``This mailing was 
        prepared, published, and mailed at taxpayer expense.''
87. See Franking Privilege: Historical Development and Options for 
        Change, CRS Report RL34274 (May 3, 2016).
88. P.L. 116-260, 134 Stat. 1182.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although an allegation that a Member has misused the franking 
privilege may be raised as a question of privilege as an ethics 
matter,(89) a resolution that constitutes a change in House 
rules regarding the franking privilege does not qualify as a question 
of privilege under rule IX.(90) A resolution disapproving of 
the actions of certain members of the House Commission on Congressional 
Mailing Standards (now the House Communications Standards Commission) 
constitutes a valid question of the privileges of the 
House.(91)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
89. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 12 Sec. 5. For an example of a Member 
        rising to a point of personal privilege in response to an 
        accusation that he had misused the franking privilege, see 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 7.5.
90. See Sec. 6.13, infra. For more on questions of privilege generally, 
        see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 11; and Precedents (____) Ch. 11.
91. See Sec. 6.14, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Former Practice: Committee on House Administration Orders

Sec. 6.1 During the 92d through 94th Congresses,(92) the 
    Committee on House Administration was authorized to issue committee 
    orders making adjustments to a variety of House accounts used by 
    Members for staffing and office management.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
92. Parliamentarian's Note: This authority was significantly restricted 
        in the 94th Congress. See Sec. 6.4, infra. The committee 
        retained the ability to make adjustments within individual 
        accounts even after the authority to adjust overall levels was 
        restricted. See Sec. Sec. 6.5, 6.6, infra. Under current 
        practice, the committee retains the authority to make 
        adjustments in the single remaining account: the MRA. 2 U.S.C. 
        Sec. 4313.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Prior to the advent of the MRA, Members' staffing and office 
expenses were funded through a variety of separate accounts, each of 
which could be adjusted by the Committee on House Administration via 
the issuance of committee orders. The following order of August 20, 
1974,(93) was published in the Congressional Record for the 
information of Members:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
93. 120 Cong. Rec. 29407, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. For examples of similar 
        committee orders published in the Congressional Record, see 120 
        Cong. Rec. 40960, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. (Dec. 18, 1974); 121 Cong. 
        Rec. 5556, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. (Mar. 6, 1975); 121 Cong. Rec. 
        15483, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. (May 20, 1975); and 122 Cong. Rec. 
        21623-24, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. (June 30, 1976). See also 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 8.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       CHANGES IN ALLOWANCES FOR MEMBERS

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(94) Under a previous order 
    of the House, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Thompson) is 
    recognized for 5 minutes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
94. John McFall (CA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Frank] THOMPSON of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, House 
    Resolution 457, 92d Congress, provided the Committee on House 
    Administration the authority to fix and adjust from time to time 
    various allowances of Members of the House of Representatives. 
    Pursuant to this authority the committee has issued order Nos. 13 
    and 14 as follows:

committee order no. 13

  Resolved, That in addition to postage stamps authorized to be furnished 
under any other provision of law, until otherwise provided by order of the 
Committee on House Administration, the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives shall for each regular session of Congress procure and 
furnish United States postage stamps to each Representative, the Resident 
Commissioner of Puerto Rico, and the Delegates from the District of 
Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands in an amount not exceeding $230, and 
to each standing committee of the House of Representatives upon request of 
the chairman thereof, in an amount not exceeding $140. In addition to 
postage stamps authorized under any other provision of law, until otherwise 
provided by order of the Committee on House Administration, the Speaker, 
the majority and minority leaders, and the majority and minority whips of 
the House of Representatives shall each be allowed United States postage 
stamps in an amount not exceeding $205.

committee order no. 14

  Resolved, that until otherwise provided by order of the Committee on 
House Administration; the allowance for Stationery for each Member of the 
House of Representatives, Delegate, and Resident Commissioner, shall be 
$6,500 per regular session. Such payment shall be made to each Member, 
Delegate, and the Resident Commissioner serving as such on or after the 
date of adoption of this resolution.

Sec. 6.2 During the 92d through 94th Congresses, the Committee on House 
    Administration's authority to issue committee orders adjusting the 
    level of Members' office accounts encompassed the authority to 
    modify an existing committee order.

    On October 30, 1975,(95) the Committee on House 
Administration issued a committee order making a modification to a 
prior order adjusting the amount available for leasing office 
equipment:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
95. 121 Cong. Rec. 34463, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  HOUSE ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE ORDER NO. 24

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(96) Under a previous order 
    of the House, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Hays) is recognized for 
    5 minutes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
96. John McFall (CA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Wayne] HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 457, 
    92d Congress, enacted by Public Law 92-184 into permanent law on 
    December 15, 1971, provides the Committee on House Administration 
    the authority to fix and adjust from time to time various 
    allowances of members, the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico 
    or a delegate to the House of Representatives. Pursuant to this 
    authority the committee has issued order No. 24 which is effective 
    October 1, 1975.
        Committee Order No. 24 incorporates and supersedes committee 
    order No. 18, and increases from $650 to $750 the amount authorized 
    to lease equipment utilized in connection with official duties as 
    prescribed by the regulations of the Committee on House 
    Administration. This increase is merely to cover the rise in the 
    monthly rental rates that have occurred since the leasing program 
    was instituted.
        The order follows:

committee order no. 24

  Resolved, That effective October 1, 1975, until otherwise provided by 
order of the Committee on House Administration, each Member, the Resident 
Commissioner from Puerto Rico or a Delegate to the House of Representatives 
is authorized a $750 per month allowance to lease office equipment, and 
upon written request to the Committee on House Administration, a Member, 
the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico or a Delegate to the House of 
Representatives may allocate an amount not to exceed $250 a month of any 
unused portion of his or her clerk hire allowance for the leasing of 
equipment necessary for the conduct of his or her office in connection with 
his or her official duties. The said monthly allowances are not cumulative.

Sec. 6.3 In response to a parliamentary inquiry, the Speaker affirmed 
    that committee orders issued by the Committee on House 
    Administration regarding adjustments to Members' office accounts 
    took effect upon final action by the committee, and not at the time 
    such orders were published in the Congressional 
    Record.(97)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
97. Parliamentarian's Note: Under former practice described here, the 
        Committee on House Administration could effectuate adjustments 
        in various individual accounts used by Members to manage their 
        offices. Under current practice, Members receive a single 
        account (the MRA). The committee retains the authority to make 
        adjustments to the MRA via committee order, and although such 
        orders are typically published in the Congressional Record, 
        such publication is not required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On June 29, 1976,(98) the Speaker addressed the 
following parliamentary inquiries regarding committee orders issued by 
the Committee on House Administration:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
98. 122 Cong. Rec. 21146, 21150, and 21168, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      REQUEST TO INSERT MATERIAL IN RECORD

        Mr. [Frank] THOMPSON [of New Jersey]. Mr. Speaker, I ask 
    unanimous consent that I may be permitted to insert some statements 
    at this point in the Record.
        The SPEAKER.(99) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from New Jersey?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
99. Carl Albert (OK).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Robert] BAUMAN [of Maryland]. Reserving the right to 
    object, Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman from New Jersey tell us 
    whether these are the orders of the Committee on House 
    Administration that were adopted Monday?
        Mr. THOMPSON. If the gentleman will yield, they are.
        Mr. BAUMAN. Mr. Speaker, I object.
        The SPEAKER. Objection is heard. . . . 

                             parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. BAUMAN. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. BAUMAN. Mr. Speaker, is it not a fact that under the terms 
    of House Resolution 475, adopted in 1971, if the gentleman enters 
    these statements into the Record, then they have the force and 
    effect of law and the allowances are effective without letting the 
    full House work its will? That is what I object to strongly.
        The SPEAKER. The Chair will state that the Chair is not aware 
    of that requirement for printing in the Record. . . 
    .                          -------------------

        EXPLANATION OF REQUEST TO INSERT IN RECORD ORDERS OF COMMITTEE 
                          ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION    

        (Mr. BOLLING asked and was given permission to address the 
    House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)
        Mr. [Richard] BOLLING [of Missouri]. Mr. Speaker, I asked for 
    this time in order to clarify some facts, but not to engage in 
    controversy, with respect to the content of the orders that the 
    Committee on House Administration has issued, which will be worked 
    out in detail, I am sure, by the various members of the committee, 
    minority and majority.
        However, Mr. Speaker, I think it is important for the Members 
    not to have the misconception that in order for those orders to 
    have the force of law, they must be published in the Record.
        Mr. Speaker, I would like to read from the law simply so that 
    all Members will understand the facts. I read as follows:
        Until otherwise provided by law, the Committee on House 
    Administration, may, as the Committee considers appropriate, fix 
    and adjust from time to time, by order of the Committee, the 
    amounts of allowances (including the terms, conditions, and other 
    provisions pertaining to those allowances) within the following 
    categories . . .
        Then, Mr. Speaker, it goes on at length.
        The matter of the unanimous-consent request was merely an 
    attempt to comply, as I understand it, with the spirit of the 
    debate which took place on July 21, 1971, when that law was passed 
    by the House. In effect, it said that the committee would take care 
    to assure the Members of the content of any action. Therefore, the 
    unanimous-consent request to put the orders in the Record would not 
    have any effect on their having the force of law; and it was merely 
    an attempt to comply with the spirit of the debate when the law was 
    enacted.
        Mr. Speaker, I started out by saying that I have no intention 
    of getting involved in the controversy over the content of the 
    orders, and I do not. . . 
    .                          -------------------

                        REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF REMARKS

        Mr. [Philip] SHARP [of Indiana]. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous 
    consent that the following Members be permitted to extend their 
    remarks and to include additional matter in that section of the 
    Record entitled ``Extensions of Remarks'':
        Mr. Gonzalez in three instances. . . .
        Mr. Brademas in three instances.
        Mr. Thompson in three instances.
        Mr. BAUMAN. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the right to object to the 
    request regarding the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Thompson).
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Maryland reserves the right to 
    object to the inclusion of the name of the gentleman from New 
    Jersey (Mr. Thompson). . . .
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. BAUMAN. Mr. Speaker, my parliamentary inquiry is this: Is 
    the opinion expressed by the distinguished gentleman from Missouri 
    (Mr. Bolling), earlier today that these orders take effect upon the 
    date the committee finally acts upon them, rather than upon any 
    printing in the Record at a subsequent time, correct?
        The SPEAKER. The Chair will state that the statement the 
    gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Bolling) made was accurate.
        Mr. BAUMAN. So that no objection to a request to insert them in 
    the Record from any Member would prevent them from taking effect?
        The SPEAKER. They would take effect immediately upon the final 
    action of the Committee on House Administration. If thereafter 
    either placed in the Record or sent out by other means such as a 
    Dear Colleague letter, that is simply for the convenience of the 
    Members.
        Mr. BAUMAN. Further inquiring of the Chair, may I also 
    understand that such committee orders take effect at a time when 
    the Committee on House Administration finally acts on language that 
    all Members understand to be the form agreed upon.
        The SPEAKER. The Chair is of the opinion that when they take 
    effect should be reflected by the minutes of the committee, which 
    should show exactly what they did and when.
        Mr. BAUMAN. I thank the Chair for his indulgence, and I 
    withdraw my reservation of objection. . . . 

Sec. 6.4 In the 94th Congress, the House significantly restricted the 
    authority for the Committee on House Administration to issue 
    committee orders adjusting the overall level of Members' staffing 
    and office accounts.(100)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
100. Parliamentarian's Note: Following this change to the rules of the 
        House, the Committee on House Administration retained the 
        ability to make adjustments within any single account. See, 
        e.g., Sec. Sec. 6.5, 6.6, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On July 1, 1976,(101) the House adopted the following 
resolution significantly restricting the authority for the Committee on 
House Administration to make overall adjustments to Members' office 
accounts via committee order:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
101. 122 Cong. Rec. 21815-16, 21823-25, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The SPEAKER.(102) The Clerk will report House 
    Resolution 1372.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
102. Carl Albert (OK).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

H. Res. 1372

  Resolved, That, (a) until otherwise provided by law, any allowance 
specified in subsection (a)(1) of the first section of H. Res. 457, Ninety-
second Congress, relating to expenditures of funds from the contingent fund 
of the House of Representatives for certain allowances to Members, 
officers, and standing committees of the House (2 U.S.C. 57), adopted July 
21, 1971, and enacted as permanent law by the Supplemental Appropriations 
Act, 1972 (Public Law 92-184; 85 Stat. 627), hereinafter in this section 
referred to as ``H. Res. 457, Ninety-second Congress'', may be fixed or 
adjusted only through the adoption of a resolution by the House of 
Representatives, except that the Committee on House Administration may fix 
or adjust such allowance in any case in which such action by such committee 
is made necessary by--

  (1) any change in the price of materials, services, or office space;

  (2) any technological change or other improvement in electrical or 
mechanical equipment; or

  (3) any increase in the cost of living which results in action under the 
Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1971.

  (b) Upon the date of the adoption of this resolution, the authority of 
the Committee . . . on House Administration under H. Res. 457, Ninety-
second Congress, shall be subject to the provisions of this resolution.

        The SPEAKER. Pursuant to the rule, on this resolution the 
    gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Thompson) and the gentleman from 
    Alabama (Mr. Dickinson) will each be recognized for 30 minutes.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. 
    Thompson).
        Mr. [Frank] THOMPSON [of New Jersey]. Mr. Speaker, I yield 
    myself 10 minutes. . . .
        The committee met all day on last Thursday and again on last 
    Friday, except during the times when because we could not get 
    unanimous consent, we could not sit during the 5-minute rule. One 
    of the results of that series of meetings--and the last meeting was 
    on this past Monday when the committee convened at 8 o'clock a.m. 
    and worked for many, many hours--was the adoption of nine items, 
    three of which are proposed regulations, the remainder of which are 
    committee orders, which under the 1971 act have the force of law. 
    Seven of the nine items adopted were adopted unanimously or by a 
    voice vote--seven of the nine. The other two were adopted by votes 
    of 14 to 8, in other words, along party lines. The result was the 
    prolongation of the orders and regulations which appeared in the 
    Record as referred to earlier.
        House Resolution 1372 by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. 
    Nedzi) was then considered. It was debated and was not reported, 
    because the result was an 11 to 11 tie vote. Earlier in an action 
    superseded by the subsequent adoption of the nine committee orders 
    and regulations, the committee reported House Resolution 900, the 
    first section of which is identical to the emasculation resolution 
    now before us.
        The Committee on Rules under its authority took up House 
    Resolution 1372 offered by my distinguished friend, the gentleman 
    from Michigan, and reported it on yesterday with the rule which has 
    been adopted.
        I would like to make some specific comments. I think that the 
    GAO matter needs only brief comment, and I think we discussed it 
    earlier. Having checked the law with the GAO and its lawyers as 
    well as consulting with the Parliamentarian and with the committee 
    staff lawyers, I requested formally that the GAO audit, beginning 
    with the Committee on House Administration, all of its vouchers and 
    records, and that it do so for all of the other committees which 
    must come before the Committee on House Administration for their 
    funds out of the Contingent Fund. That includes all committees 
    except the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on the 
    Budget. That procedure will start on Tuesday next. . . .
        With respect to the most controversial item, the so-called 
    consolidation item, it is not consolidation in the form which was 
    requested by the Obey committee. Rather it is in effect a lumping 
    together of the seven categories as they are now without even a 5-
    cent increase and making it possible in the Member's individual 
    discretion to use those monies in the same manner in which they are 
    now used but with the additional requirement of reporting and 
    vouchering on a standard form. Also at the Member's individual 
    discretion he may transfer moneys from one account  . . .  to the 
    other, except from the clerk hire account.
        If this resolution is adopted, the Committee on House 
    Administration will be emasculated of all of those powers except 
    its right on the basis of proofs of increased costs. to increase 
    the costs of living as they occur. With respect to the employees of 
    the House the committee would have the discretion to increase if 
    under the 1971 Pay Act they are granted a 4-percent increase, and 
    the Committee on House Administration by action of the full 
    committee can authorize an increase which would go to each Member. 
    That Member at his or her discretion may or may not grant his or 
    her employees a cost-of-living increase. It is entirely up to the 
    Member. . . .
        The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

                    motion to recommit offered by mr. rhodes

        Mr. [John] RHODES [of Arizona]. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion 
    to recommit.
        The SPEAKER. Is the gentleman opposed to the resolution?
        Mr. RHODES. I am, Mr. Speaker.
        The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the motion to recommit.
        The Clerk read as follows:

  Mr. Rhodes moves to recommit H. Res. 1372 to the Committee on House 
Administration with instructions to report back the same forthwith with the 
following amendments: Strike all after the resolving clause and insert in 
lieu thereof the following:

  ``That, (a) until otherwise provided by law, any allowance specified in 
subsection (a) (1) of the first section of H. Res. 457, Ninety-second 
Congress, relating to expenditures of funds from the contingent fund of the 
House of Representatives for certain allowances to Members, officers, and 
standing committees of the House (2 U.S.C. 57), adopted July 21, 1971, and 
enacted as permanent law by the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1972 
(Public Law 92-184; 85 Stat. 627), hereinafter in this section referred to 
as ``H. Res. 457, Ninety-second Congress'', may be fixed or adjusted only 
through the adoption of a resolution by the House of Representatives.

  ``(b) The authority of the Committee on House Administration under H. 
Res. 457, Ninety-second Congress, shall be subject to the provisions of 
this resolution effective June 23, 1976.''

        The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered 
    on the motion to recommit.
        The question is on the motion to recommit.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the noes 
    appeared to have it.
        Mr. RHODES. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground 
    that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a 
    quorum is not present.
        The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.
        The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    165, nays 236, not voting 31, as follows:

                              [Roll No. 502] . . .

        So the motion to recommit was rejected.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        The SPEAKER. The question is on the resolution.
        Mr. [William] FRENZEL [of Minnesota]. Mr. Speaker, on that I 
    demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were-yeas 
    311, nays 92, not voting 29, as follows:

                              [Roll No. 503] . . .

        Messrs. ANDERSON of Illinois, GUYER, KEMP, SKUBITZ, REGULA, 
    CONLAN, and HILLIS changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
        So the resolution was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 6.5 Although the authority for the Committee on House 
    Administration to issue committee orders adjusting the overall 
    level of Members' individual office accounts was significantly 
    restricted in the 94th Congress, the committee retained the ability 
    to make adjustments within any single account.

    On March 21, 1977,(103) the following committee order 
from the Committee on House Administration was published in the 
Congressional Record:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
103. 123 Cong. Rec. 8227, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  COMMITTEE ORDER NO. 31--CLERK-HIRE ALLOWANCE

        The SPEAKER.(104) Under a previous order of the 
    House, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Thompson) is recognized 
    for 5 minutes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
104. Thomas O'Neill (MA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Frank] THOMPSON [of New Jersey]. Mr. Speaker, the 
    committee on House Administration, pursuant to its authority under 
    Public Law 92-184 and Public Law 94-440, has issued committee order 
    No. 31 which is effective April 1, 1977.
        Committee order No. 31 ties the maximum annual rate of 
    compensation which may be paid from the clerk-hire allowance to 
    executive schedule level V.
        The order follows:

Committee Order No. 31

  Resolved, That effective April 1, 1977, until otherwise provided by order 
of the Committee on House Administration, each Member, Delegate or Resident 
Commissioner of the House of Representatives may compensate employees from 
the clerk-hire allowance at a per annum rate equivalent to, and not to 
exceed, the highest per annum rate of basic pay, as in effect from time to 
time, authorized for Level V of the Executive Schedule (6 U.S.C. 5316).

Sec. 6.6 Although the authority for the Committee on House 
    Administration to issue committee orders adjusting the overall 
    level of Members' individual office accounts was significantly 
    restricted in the 94th Congress, the committee retained the ability 
    to make adjustments within any single account.

    On April 21, 1983,(105) the following committee order 
from the Committee on House Administration was published in the 
Congressional Record:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
105. 129 Cong. Rec. 9339, 98th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         COMMITTEE ORDER NO. 35 ADJUSTMENT OF CLERK-HIRE ALLOWANCE AND 
                        OFFICIAL EXPENSES ALLOWANCE    

        (Mr. HAWKINS asked and was given permission to address the 
    House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include 
    extraneous matter.)
        Mr. [Augustus] HAWKINS [of California]. Mr. Speaker, at the 
    direction of the Committee on House Administration and under the 
    authority granted in Public Law 94-184 and Public Law 94-440, the 
    committee yesterday issued Committee Order No. 35, which will 
    become effective on May 1, 1983. I will be sending each Member a 
    ``dear colleague'' letter within the next few days describing the 
    limitations and administration of this change.
        I include at this point in the Record the text of Committee 
    Order No. 35:

Committee Order No. 35

  Resolved, That effective May 1, 1983, until otherwise provided by the 
Committee on House Administration, the Clerk-Hire Allowance and the 
Official Expenses Allowance are adjusted as follows:

  1. The base allowance for Official Expenses is increased by $15,000.

  2. Each session a Member may allocate not to exceed $30,000 from the 
basic Clerk-Hire Allowance which may be used to supplement the Official 
Expenses Allowance, and may allocate not to exceed $30,000 from the 
Official Expenses Allowance to supplement the basic Clerk-Hire Allowance, 
provided however that monthly Clerk-Hire disbursements may not exceed 10 
percent of the basic Clerk-Hire Allowance.

  All disbursements and allocations shall be made in accordance with rules 
and regulations established by the Committee on House Administration.

Sec. 6.7 In the 104th Congress, the House consolidated the remaining 
    individual accounts for Members' office support (clerk hire, 
    official expenses, and official mail) and created a new single 
    allowance known as the Members' Representational Allowance (MRA).

    On August 4, 1995,(106) the chair of the Committee on 
House Oversight (now the Committee on House 
Administration)(107) submitted for printing in the 
Congressional Record the following committee order consolidating 
Members' office accounts and creating the new MRA:(108)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
106. 141 Cong. Rec. 22085, 104th Cong. 1st Sess.
107. Parliamentarian's Note: During the 104th and 105th Congress, the 
        Committee on House Administration was redesignated as the 
        Committee on House Oversight. House Rules and Manual Sec. 724 
        (2021).
108. The MRA was made permanent law by P.L. 104-186, 110 Stat. 1718. 
        These provisions of law have now been codified at 2 U.S.C. 
        Sec. Sec. 5341 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        SUBMISSION OF COMMITTEE ORDER FROM COMMITTEE ON HOUSE OVERSIGHT  
                                         

        (Mr. THOMAS asked and was given permission to address the House 
    for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)
        Mr. [William] THOMAS [of California]. Mr. Speaker, I submit a 
    committee order from the Committee on House Oversight.
        At the direction of the Committee on House Oversight, in 
    accordance with the authority granted to the committee as reflected 
    in 2 U.S.C. 57, the committee issued Committee Order No. 41 on 
    August 3, 1995, which will become effective on September 1, 1995. 
    Members will receive information describing this change through a 
    dear colleague.
        I include at this point in the Record the text of Committee 
    Order No. 41.

  Resolved, That (a) effective September 1, 1995, and subject to subsection 
(b), the Clerk Hire Allowance, the Official Expenses Allowance, and the 
Official Mail Allowance shall cease to exist and the functions formerly 
carried out under such allowances shall be carried out under a single 
allowance, to be known as the ``Members' Representational Allowance''.

  (b) Under the Members' Representational Allowance, the amount that shall 
be available to a Member for franked mail with respect to a session of 
Congress shall be the amount allocated for that purpose by the Committee on 
House Oversight under paragraphs (1)(A) and (2)(B) of subsection (e) of 
section 311 of the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1991, plus an 
amount equal to the amount permitted to be transferred to the former 
Official Mail Allowance under paragraph (3) of that subsection.

  Sec. 2. The Committee on House Oversight shall have authority to 
prescribe regulations to carry out this resolution.

Clerk Supervision of Vacant Offices

Sec. 6.8 Where a Member-elect was incapacitated and unable to take the 
    oath of office, the House adopted a resolution: (1) providing such 
    Member-elect with compensation in lieu of salary; and (2) 
    authorizing the Clerk of the House to administer the Member-elect's 
    office.

    Member-elect Gladys Noon Spellman of Maryland fell into a coma 
prior to opening day of the 97th Congress, and was thus unable to take 
the oath of office. On January 27, 1981,(109) the House 
adopted the following resolution authorizing payment in lieu of salary 
and requiring the Clerk to administer the office until further action 
by the House:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
109. 127 Cong. Rec. 974-75, 97th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          COMPENSATION IN LIEU OF SALARY TO THE HONORABLE GLADYS NOON 
                                    SPELLMAN

        Mr. [Gillis] LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Speaker, I send to the desk 
    a resolution (H. Res. 41) relating to compensation in lieu of 
    salary to Gladys Noon Spellman, and ask unanimous consent for its 
    immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 41

  Resolved, That, from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives, 
the Clerk of the House of Representatives shall, at the end of each month 
pay as compensation in lieu of salary to Gladys Noon Spellman an amount 
equal to the compensation which would be payable in accordance with section 
39 of the Revised Statutes (2 U.S.C. 35) but for her inability to subscribe 
to the oath of office. The Clerk shall deduct from any such payment the 
amounts necessary to provide for continued (1) health and life insurance 
and retirement benefit coverage and (2) Federal and State income tax 
withholding.

  Sec. 2. (a) Until otherwise provided by law or by action of the House of 
Representatives, administrative support may be provided and clerical 
assistants for the office of Gladys Noon Spellman may be designated and 
adjusted by the Clerk of the House of Representatives (in accordance with 
any regulations prescribed under subsection (b)) and borne upon the clerk 
hire payrolls of the House of Representatives. The Clerk shall take such 
action as may be necessary to apply the principles of section 2 of the 
joint resolution entitled ``Joint resolution relating to the continuance on 
the payrolls of certain employees in cases of death or resignation of 
Members of the House of Representatives, Delegates, and Resident 
Commissioners.'', approved August 21, 1935 (2 U.S.C. 92c), to clerical 
assistants employed pursuant to the preceding sentence.

  (b) The Committee on House Administration shall have authority to 
prescribe regulations for the carrying out of this section.

  (c) Payments under this section shall be made on vouchers approved by the 
Committee on House Administration and signed by the chairman of such 
committee.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(110) Is there objection to 
    the request of the gentleman from Louisiana? . . .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
110. Thomas Foley (WA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Trent] LOTT [of Mississippi]. All right. Would this in any 
    way affect the proxy voting in subcommittees or committees, this 
    resolution?
        Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I am informed that because of the fact 
    that the Member has not been sworn in, there would be no voting 
    rights in this instance.
        Mr. LOTT. I thank the gentleman. . . .
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Louisiana?
        There was no objection.
        The resolution was agreed to.

    On February 24, 1981,(111) after it was determined that 
Ms. Spellman would not be able to take a seat in the House, the House 
adopted the following resolution to declare the seat vacant and to 
authorize the Clerk to continue supervising the vacant office until a 
successor could be chosen:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
111. 127 Cong. Rec. 2916-18, 97th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          DECLARING VACANCY IN 97TH CONGRESS FROM FIFTH CONGRESSIONAL 
                            DISTRICT OF MARYLAND    

        Mr. [James] WRIGHT [of Texas]. Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    privileged resolution (H. Res. 80) and ask for its immediate 
    consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

H. Res. 80

  Whereas a certificate of election has been received by the Clerk of this 
House showing the election of Gladys Noon Spellman as a Representative in 
the Ninety-seventh Congress from the Fifth Congressional District in the 
State of Maryland; and

  Whereas Representative-elect Gladys Noon Spellman has not appeared to 
take the oath of office as a Member of this House as required by article VI 
of the Constitution of the United States; and

  Whereas information has been provided to the Speaker that Representative-
elect Gladys Noon Spellman has been unable to take the oath of office due 
to an incapacitating illness; and

  Whereas the most recent medical information provided to the Speaker 
indicates that there is no likelihood that Representative-elect Gladys Noon 
Spellman will recover sufficiently to be able to take the oath of office 
and serve as a Member of this House, or to expressly resign the office in 
order to create a vacancy; Therefore, be it

  Resolved, That this House of Representatives hereby determines that there 
is a vacancy in the Ninety-seventh Congress from the Fifth Congressional 
District in the State of Maryland because of the absence and continuing 
incapacity of Representative-elect Gladys Noon Spellman.

  Sec. 2. That the Speaker of the House is hereby directed to notify the 
Governor of the State of Maryland of this action so that appropriate 
measures to fill the vacancy may be undertaken by the Governor pursuant to 
article I, section 2 of the Constitution of the United States.

  Sec. 3. The first section of House Resolution 41 of this Congress shall 
cease to be effective on the adoption of this resolution and section 2 of 
House Resolution 41 shall cease to be effective when a successor is elected 
to fill the vacancy.

        The SPEAKER.(112) The Chair recognizes the gentleman 
    from Texas (Mr. Wright).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
112. Thomas O'Neill (MA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, I think there is an understanding of 
    the intent and effect of this resolution. It would declare vacant a 
    seat which was held in the last Congress by the Honorable Gladys 
    Noon Spellman, she having been reelected to serve in this Congress.
        I know that all of us share the sadness with which Dr. Freeman 
    Cary, the attending physician for the Congress, after consultation 
    with her physicians at Walter Reed, and with his personal 
    observations, concluded that Mrs. Spellman had no real likelihood 
    of being able to serve out this term of office, and that in a 
    trancelike state of consciousness she would not be able to take the 
    oath of office. . . .
        Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the 
    letter addressed to the Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., by the 
    attending physician, Dr. Freeman Cary, be printed in the Record at 
    this point.
        The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
    from Texas?
        There was no objection.
        The letter referred to is as follows:

                                          The Attending Physician,
                                    Congress of the United States,
                                                February 20, 1981.
                                        Hon. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.,
            Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

        Dear Mr. Speaker: As you know Congresswoman Gladys Spellman 
    suffered cardiac arrest on October 31, 1980, while at a political 
    rally. Despite prompt by-stander cardiopulmonary resuscitation and 
    rescue squad response, there appeared to be a delay in restoring 
    effective blood flow to the brain.
        Since that time she has been hospitalized first in her district 
    and now at Walter Reed Army Medical Center Hospital, where 
    intensive rehabilitative care is being given. A trance-like state 
    of consciousness persists.
        After consultation with her physicians at Walter Reed and with 
    my personal observations, there is no likelihood that she will be 
    able to serve out her term of office.

            Yours sincerely,
                                             Freeman H. Cary, M.D.

         . . .

        Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the 
    resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Floor Privileges for Members' Staff

Sec. 6.9 Pursuant to clause 2(a)(8) of rule IV,(113) 
    Members' personal staff may exercise floor privileges, but Members 
    are limited to not more than one personal staff at a time, and only 
    when that Member has an amendment under 
    consideration.(114)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
113. House Rules and Manual Sec. 678 (2021).
114. Parliamentarian's Note: Members' staff on the floor are prohibited 
        from attempting to influence Members with regard to legislation 
        under consideration, pursuant to clause 5 of rule IV. House 
        Rules and Manual Sec. 681 (2021). For announcements by the 
        Chair regarding improper activities on the floor by Members' 
        personal staff, see Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 4 Sec. Sec. 5.9, 
        5.10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On August 18, 1982,(115) the Speaker made the following 
announcement regarding the presence of Members' personal staff on the 
floor:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
115. 128 Cong. Rec. 21934-35, 97th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER

        The SPEAKER.(116) The Chair desires to make the 
    following announcement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
116. Thomas O'Neill (MA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Last evening the Chair received many complaints from Members 
    that too many staff people were on the floor, and the Members of 
    the House would bring their personal staff people on the floor 
    although they had no prerogative to do that.
        So the Chair cautions and warns the Members not to bring their 
    personal staff members on the floor. The rules prohibit it, and the 
    Chair's announced policy requires committee staff who are permitted 
    to be on the floor when business from their committees is under 
    consideration to remain by the committee tables unobtrusively.

Improper Use of Official Funds

Sec. 6.10 Misuse of official funds may be investigated by the Committee 
    on Ethics, and a Member has been censured and fined for, inter 
    alia, improper use of the clerk-hire account.

    On July 19, 1979,(117) the chair of the Committee on 
Standards of Official Conduct (now the Committee on 
Ethics)(118) filed a privileged report recommending censure 
of Rep. Charles Diggs of Michigan for improper use of the clerk-hire 
account:(119)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
117. 125 Cong. Rec. 19580, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
118. The Committee on Standards of Official Conduct was redesignated as 
        the Committee on Ethics at the outset of the 112th Congress. 
        House Rules and Manual Sec. 721b (2021).
119. Parliamentarian's Note: In its committee report, the Committee on 
        Standards of Official Conduct noted that Rep. Charles Diggs of 
        Michigan had been convicted of mail fraud and making false 
        statements in a United States district court, and that the 
        ``gravamen of the charges against Representatives Diggs was 
        that he inflated several of his employees' salaries in order to 
        enable them to pay certain of his personal and congressional 
        expenses.'' H. Rept. 96-351, 96th Cong. 1st Sess., p. 1. For a 
        similar case later in the same Congress, where a Member (Rep. 
        Charles H. Wilson of California) was censured for, inter alia, 
        retaining a clerk with knowledge that said clerk did not 
        perform duties commensurate with his compensation, see H. Rept. 
        96-930, 96th Cong. 2d Sess., p. 20. See also Precedents 
        (Wickham) Ch. 3 Sec. 3.1; Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 5 
        Sec. 20.15; and Precedents (____) Ch. 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        REPORT ON RESOLUTION IN THE MATTER OF REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES C. 
                                 DIGGS, JR.    

        Mr. BENNETT, from the Committee on Standards of Official 
    Conduct, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 96-351), on the 
    resolution (H. Res. 378) in the matter of Representative Charles C. 
    Diggs, Jr., which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to 
    be printed.                          -------------------

              PRINTING OF HOUSE RESOLUTION 378, IN THE MATTER OF 
                  REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR.        

        Mr. [Charles] BENNETT [of Florida]. Mr. Speaker, I ask 
    unanimous consent that the report on the resolution (H. Res. 378) 
    in the matter of Representative Charles C. Diggs, Jr., be printed 
    in two volumes, and that volume 2 be limited to 600 copies.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(120) Is there objection to 
    the request of the gentleman from Florida?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
120. Joseph Minish (NJ).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John] ROUSSELOT [of California]. Mr. Speaker, reserving 
    the right to object, could the gentleman tell us why he is limiting 
    the second volume? Is there something special in there?
        Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, the 
    reason is purely to save money. It is many hundreds of pages thick. 
    It is the transcript of the trial and the report refers to it, but 
    it is really not necessary to print thousands of copies of the 
    transcript of the trial, which is available to Members otherwise. 
    It is just purely to save money.
        Mr. ROUSSELOT. Members can pick it up from the court?
        Mr. BENNETT. That is correct.
        Mr. ROUSSELOT. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman's 
    explanation, and I withdraw my reservation of objection.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Florida?
        Mr. [William] DANNEMEYER [of California]. Mr. Speaker, 
    reserving the right to object, did the distinguished gentleman from 
    Florida plan to take up this resolution today?
        Mr. BENNETT. No. It would have to be scheduled by the Speaker.
        Mr. DANNEMEYER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman, and I 
    withdraw my reservation of objection.

    On July 31, 1979,(121) the House agreed to a privileged 
resolution adopting the committee's report and formally censuring Rep. 
Diggs:(122)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
121. 125 Cong. Rec. 21584-85, 21591-92, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
122. Parliamentarian's Note: Rep. Charles Diggs of Michigan resigned 
        later in the Congress. See 126 Cong. Rec. 13005, 96th Cong. 2d 
        Sess. (June 3, 1980).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           IN THE MATTER OF REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR.    

        Mr. [Charles] BENNETT [of Florida]. Mr. Speaker, I call up a 
    privileged resolution (H. Res. 378) in the matter of Representative 
    Charles C. Diggs, Jr., and ask for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 378

  Resolved,

  (1) that Representative Charles C. Diggs, Junior, be censured;

  (2) that Representative Charles C. Diggs, Junior, forthwith present 
himself in the well of the House for the pronouncement of censure;

  (3) that Representative Charles C. Diggs, Junior, be censured with the 
public reading of this resolution by the Speaker;

  (4) that Representative Charles C. Diggs. Junior, is ordered to execute 
and deliver to the House an interest-bearing demand promissory note for 
$40,031.66, made payable to the Treasury of the United States;

  (5) that Representative Charles C. Diggs, Junior, is ordered, for the 
remainder of the Ninety-sixth Congress, to require his employees to certify 
to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct that the funds he or she 
receives from clerk-hire funds are received in full compliance with current 
House rules; and

  (6) that the House of Representatives adopt the report of the Committee 
on Standards of Official Conduct dated July 19, 1979, In The Matter of 
Representative Charles C. Diggs, Junior.

                          announcement by the speaker

        The SPEAKER.(123) The Chair wishes to make a 
    statement after which the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Bennett) will 
    be recognized for 1 hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
123. Thomas O'Neill (MA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chair must acknowledge the gravity of the pending 
    resolution insofar as the House will be called up to discipline one 
    of its Members. While there should of course, be an opportunity to 
    debate all aspects of this matter, the Chair wishes to remind 
    Members of the restrictions imposed by clause I, rule XIV, and by 
    the precedents relating to references to Members in debate. These 
    restrictions indicate that Members should refrain from using 
    language which is personally abusive. While a wide range of 
    discussion relating to conduct of the Member in question will be 
    permitted, it is the duty of the Chair to maintain proper decorum 
    in debate. It is the intention of the Chair to enforce the rules.
        The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Bennett) is recognized for 1 
    hour.

                                 general leave

        Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all 
    Members may have 5 legislative days within which to extend their 
    remarks in the extension of remarks section of the Record, and that 
    this not include any revisions of remarks delivered in the House 
    today.
        The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
    from Florida?
        There was no objection.
        Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Speaker, for the purposes of debate only I 
    yield 20 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spence); 
    and for the purposes of debate only I yield 20 minutes to the 
    gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Diggs), pending which I yield myself 
    such time as I may consume.
        Mr. Speaker, on February 1 of this year, as chairman of the 
    Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, I communicated to the 
    other members of the committee my intention, subject to their 
    approval, to appoint a subcommittee of two to inquire into the 
    conviction of Representative Diggs. At the organizational meeting 
    of the committee on February 7, the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. 
    Hamilton) and the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Hollenbeck) were 
    so appointed.
        On February 2, the gentleman from Georgia, Representative 
    Gingrich, and 18 other Members filed a sworn complaint charging 
    that Representative Diggs had violated House Rule XLIII, clause 1, 
    Code of Official Conduct, by reason of his misuse of clerk-hire 
    allowances-essentially the same conduct which had led in 1978 to 
    his indictment and conviction in the U.S. District Court.
        On March 21, a formal resolution to conduct an inquiry into the 
    official conduct of Representative Diggs was adopted by the 
    committee. These initiatives, and the investigation that ensued, 
    culminated in the recommendation of the committee that the House 
    adopt the resolution now under discussion.
        During the preceding Congress, Representative Diggs was the 
    subject of an investigation by the Department of Justice into 
    alleged violations of Federal law concerning the use of his clerk-
    hire allowance. On March 23, 1978, a grand jury sitting in the 
    District of Columbia indicted Representative Diggs on 14 counts of 
    violating 18 U.S.C. 1341 (mail fraud) and 21 counts of violating 18 
    U.S.C. 1001 (false statement). All counts were related to an 
    alleged scheme by Representative Diggs to defraud the Government by 
    either: First, inflating employees' salaries so that they could use 
    the increase to pay his personal and congressional expenses; or 
    second, adding individuals to his congressional payroll to 
    compensate them for providing him with personal services.
        On October 7, 1978, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on 
    the 29 counts that were prosecuted. On November 21, 1978, 
    Representative Diggs was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment on each 
    of these counts, the sentences to run concurrently. Between the 
    time of the conviction and sentencing, on November 7, 1978, 
    Representative Diggs was reelected to Congress. Representative 
    Diggs has this conviction under appeal at this time; and a decision 
    by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is anticipated 
    some time during the next few months.
        Special counsel appointed by the committee undertook a thorough 
    analysis of the transcript of evidence from the trial of 
    Representative Diggs and interviewed various potential witnesses, 
    following which the committee unanimously approved and served upon 
    Representative Diggs a statement of alleged violations, charging 
    violations of clauses 1 and 8, of the Code of Official Conduct. 
    Clause 1 imposes an obligation on every Member ``to conduct himself 
    at all times in a manner which shall reflect creditably on the 
    House.'' Clause 8 prohibits a Member from retaining a staff 
    employee ``who does not perform duties commensurate with the 
    compensation he receives.''
        The summary of the trial testimony appears in the committee 
    report, pages 9-16; and the statement of alleged violations appears 
    as part of appendix A (pages 28-37).
        Appendix F to the report (pages 148-177) contains various 
    exhibits introduced during the trial of Representative Diggs which 
    record the changes in salary of various staff members and 
    disbursements by them to pay personal and office related expenses 
    of the Member.
        After the statement of alleged violations was served, counsel 
    for Representative Diggs filed various motions, including a motion 
    to defer all committee action pending the outcome of the judicial 
    proceedings and a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
        The motion to defer was based upon the argument that any 
    proceedings the committee might undertake would generate publicity 
    that might prejudice the Member's criminal court proceedings. The 
    motion was denied by an 8-3 vote, the majority being of the opinion 
    that the possibility, that any publicity of the committee 
    proceedings adversely affecting the rights of Representative Diggs 
    in the ongoing judicial proceedings, was remote and insubstantial.
        The motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was based on the 
    argument that the power of the House to punish for misconduct was 
    terminated by the Member's reelection, at least where the alleged 
    misconduct was known to his constituency prior to his reelection. 
    Counsel for Representative Diggs maintained that the power to 
    expel, conferred by article I, section 5 of the Constitution, 
    conflicted with the right of his constituency under article I, 
    section 2 to elect, and have him serve as their representative, 
    even following his conviction; and that the conflict had to be 
    resolved in favor of the Member's constituency.
        Special counsel to the committee argued that any question about 
    the power to expel was premature since the precedents were: That 
    the House has jurisdiction under article I, section 5 to inquire 
    into the misconduct of a Member occurring prior to his last 
    election; and, under appropriate circumstances, to impose at least 
    those disciplinary sanctions that fall short of expulsion. The 
    motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was unanimously denied, 
    following which Representative Diggs filed a general denial to all 
    counts in the statement of alleged violations.
        The committee then ordered a disciplinary hearing, but before 
    the date set for its commencement. Special Counsel for the 
    committee and counsel for the Member engaged in discussions which 
    led to the committee's recommended disposition of the proceedings.
        The discussions between counsel culminated in an admission of 
    guilt by Representative Diggs with respect to certain violations of 
    House rules; and a further admission that he had personally 
    benefited from the employment of some members of his staff: and an 
    agreement to: First, make restitution of amounts . . . from which 
    he derived personal benefit; second, to apologize to the House for 
    his wrongdoing; and third, to accept censure therefor. This was 
    formally presented to the committee in open session by 
    Representative Diggs' counsel; and Representative Diggs signed the 
    letter and orally before the committee acknowledged it to be his--
    which letter appears at page 16 of the report.
        On recommendation of the committee's Special Counsel, 
    Representatives Diggs' letter of admissions was accepted and the 
    committee recommended that Representative Diggs be found guilty of 
    violating rule XLII, clauses 1 and 8, an the basis of his 
    admissions; and that Representative Diggs be censured and required 
    to make restitution by execution of an interest--bearing demand 
    promissory note for the full amount of his personal benefit from 
    the use of clerk-hire funds as disclosed in the evidence. 
    Representative Hamilton moved the resolution, the full text of 
    which appears in the report (pages 17-19). Representative 
    Hamilton's resolution was unanimously adopted.
        The committee did not proceed to conduct the evidentiary 
    hearing originally contemplated because Representative Diggs' 
    letter of admission of guilt, plus the evidence taken from the 
    criminal proceedings, constituted a more than adequate record on 
    which to judge the case. An evidentiary hearing--which would have 
    been largely repetitious of trial proceeding--would not have 
    resulted in a different committee recommendation regarding 
    punishment.
        As to the punishment recommended, the committee concluded, 
    after research of precedents, that expulsion, the most extreme 
    penalty possible under the Constitution, would be inappropriate. 
    More serious offenses have in the past not received this penalty; 
    and in fact on only three occasions in the history of our country 
    has this penalty been imposed. They were in the Civil War period 
    when elected Members joined the Confederacy, which was an action 
    viewed by some as treason. Further, Representative Diggs as all 
    Congressmen--is answerable also in the criminal and civil courts, 
    in addition to proceedings in the House; and he may eventually lose 
    his freedom if he loses his appeal in the criminal proceedings. 
    Some feel that in that event he should be expelled; but the present 
    proceedings do not address that question, which is at this time 
    premature, since it is not now a certainty that he will not succeed 
    in his appeal of the judicial proceedings.
        The committee rejected recommending expulsion in this case as 
    too severe and inappropriate for the offenses involved, serious as 
    they are. We considered, among other things, the admission by this 
    Member of violations of House rules and his apology therefor; and 
    the respect owed his constituency which reelected him following his 
    conviction. In sum, we believe that censure, together with the 
    other obligations imposed on the Member by the resolution before 
    you represents a just conclusion of these proceedings. This was the 
    unanimous recommendation of the committee, following the unanimous 
    recommendation of its subcommittee.
        I reserve the balance of my time. . . .
        Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, 
    and I move the previous question on the resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The SPEAKER. The question is on the resolution.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes 
    appeared to have it.
        Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    414, nays 0, answered ``present'' 4, not voting 16, as follows:

                              [Roll No. 404] . . .

        So the resolution was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the 
    table.                          -------------------

                CENSURE OF REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR.

        The SPEAKER. Will the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Diggs) 
    kindly appear in the well?
        Mr. DIGGS presented himself at the bar of the House.
        The Speaker read House Resolution 378, as follows:

H. Res. 378

  Resolved,

  (1) that Representative Charles C. Diggs, Junior, be censured;

  (2) that Representative Charles C. Diggs, Junior, forthwith present 
himself in the well of the House for the pronouncement of censure;

  (3) that Representative Charles C. Diggs, Junior, be censured with the 
public reading of this resolution by the Speaker;

  (4) that Representative Charles C. Diggs, Junior, is ordered to execute 
and deliver to the House an interest-bearing demand promissory note for 
$40,031.68, made payable to the Treasury of the United States;

  (5) that Representative Charles C. Diggs, Junior, is ordered, for the 
remainder of the Ninety-sixth Congress, to require his employees to certify 
to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct that the funds he or she 
receives from clerk-hire funds are received in full compliance with current 
House rules; and

  (6) that the House of Representatives adopt the report of the Committee 
on Standards of Official Conduct dated July 19, 1979, In The Matter of 
Representative Charles C. Diggs, Junior.

        The SPEAKER. The matter is closed.

Sec. 6.11 When a Member of the House is expelled, a vacancy is created 
    in that congressional seat, and, under former 
    practice,(124) the House could provide authorization for 
    staff of the former Member to continue in their employment under 
    the supervision of the Clerk until the vacancy could be filled 
    (authorization that is now provided under clause 2(i) of rule 
    II).(125)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
124. Parliamentarian's Note: At the time of this precedent, the Clerk 
        did not have standing authority to supervise the office of a 
        Member who had died, resigned, or been expelled. Such authority 
        was added to the standing rules at the outset of the 98th 
        Congress in 1983, and is currently provided by clause 2(i) of 
        rule II. See House Rules and Manual Sec. 653 (2021).
125. House Rules and Manual Sec. 653 (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On October 2, 1980,(126) following the expulsion of Rep. 
Michael Myers of Pennsylvania, the House adopted the following 
resolution concerning the former Member's staff:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
126. 126 Cong. Rec. 28978, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. For more information on 
        the expulsion case of Rep. Michael Myers of Pennsylvania, see 
        Precedents (____) Ch. 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

             PROVIDING FOR LIMITED CONTINUATION OF PAY OF CLERICAL 
           ASSISTANCE TO MEMBERS IN CERTAIN CASES OF TERMINATION OF 
                                SERVICE        

        Mr. [Lucien] NEDZI [of Michigan]. Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    resolution (H. Res. 804), and I ask unanimous consent for its 
    immediate consideration.
        The SPEAKER.(127) The Clerk will report the 
    resolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
127. Thomas O'Neill (MA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 804

  Resolved, That (a) until otherwise provided by law, for purposes of the 
joint resolution entitled ``Joint resolution relating to the continuance on 
the payrolls of certain employees in cases of death or resignation of 
Members of the House of Representatives, Delegates, and Resident 
Commissioners.'', approved August 21, 1935 (2 U.S.C. 92b, 92c, and 92d), 
any termination of service during a term of office of a Member of the House 
that is not described in the first section of such joint resolution shall 
be treated as if such termination were described in such section.

  (b) The Clerk of the House shall take such action as nay be necessary to 
apply the principles of section 2 of the joint resolution referred to in 
subsection (a) (2 U.S.C. 92c) in the carrying out of this resolution.

  Sec. 2. The Committee on House Administration shall have authority to 
prescribe regulations for the carrying out of this resolution.

  Sec. 3. Payments under this resolution shall be made on vouchers approved 
by the Committee on House Administration and signed by the chairman of such 
committee.

        The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
    from Michigan? . . .
        Mr. [William] FRENZEL [of Minnesota]. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw 
    my reservation of objection.
        Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the 
    resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

The Franking Privilege

Sec. 6.12 Shortly after the creation of the House Commission on 
    Congressional Mailing Standards (now the House Communications 
    Standards Commission), the rules and practices of the commission 
    were inserted into Congressional Record for the information of 
    Members.

    On February 19, 1974,(128) the following insertion was 
made to the Congressional Record:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
128. 120 Cong. Rec. 3298, 93d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMISSION ON CONGRESSIONAL 
                           MAILING STANDARDS        

        (Mr. UDALL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks 
    at this point in the Record.)
        Mr. [Morris] UDALL [of Arizona]. Mr. Speaker, I submit for 
    printing in the Record at this point the Rules of Practice in 
    Proceedings before the House Commission on Congressional Mailing 
    Standards.
        Mr. Speaker, notice is hereby given that, pursuant to section 5 
    of the act of December 18, 1973 (87 Stat. 742; Public Law 93-191), 
    the Rules of Practice in Proceedings before the House Commission on 
    Congressional Mailing Standards, as hereinafter set forth, have 
    been prescribed and established by the House Commission on 
    Congressional Mailing Standards at its organizational meeting held 
    on February 4, 1974.
        Subsection (e) of section 5 provides in part that the 
    Commission ``shall prescribe regulations for the holding of 
    investigations and hearings, the conduct of proceedings, and the 
    rendering of decisions under this subsection providing for 
    equitable procedures and the protection of individual, public, and 
    Government interests. The regulations shall, insofar as 
    practicable, contain the substance of the administrative procedure 
    provisions of sections 551-559, and 701-706, of title 5, United 
    States Code. These regulations shall govern matters under this 
    subsection subject to judicial review thereof.''
        In view of the fact that a commission of the legislative branch 
    is not authorized to publish documents, such as these rules of 
    practice, in the Federal Register (44 U.S.C. 1501), the commission 
    has determined to provide public notice thereof by printing them in 
    the Congressional Record. In addition to the notice hereby given, 
    copies of the rules will be made available to any person upon 
    request to the commission.
        Due to the fact that the only remedy now available to persons 
    who may wish to commence a proceeding on a violation of the 
    franking privilege as it relates to the House of Representatives, 
    is the filing of a complaint and proceedings before the commission 
    under section 5 of the act of December 18, 1973 (87 Stat. 742; 
    Public Law 93-191), the commission has determined that these rules 
    shall take effect immediately.
        Although the commission does not anticipate any specific future 
    changes in these regulations, the commission would appreciate, and 
    therefore invites comments or suggestions which might assist in 
    future revision of the rules. Comments should be submitted with at 
    least 10 copies and may be mailed to the commission at 207 Cannon 
    House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515.
        In consideration of the foregoing, the Rules of Practice in 
    Proceedings before the House Commission on Congressional Mailing 
    Standards as hereinafter set forth are made effective immediately.
        The rules, issued in Washington, DC, on February 19, 1974, are 
    as follows: . . . 

Sec. 6.13 A resolution directing the Committee on House Administration 
    to prohibit certain payments for Members' official mailing 
    expenses, and further providing that the provisions of a bill that 
    had not been considered by the House be implemented immediately, 
    constitutes a change to House rules and as such does not qualify as 
    a question of the privileges of the House under rule 
    IX.(129)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
129. House Rules and Manual Sec. Sec. 698, 699 (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On July 30, 1992,(130) the following resolution was 
determined by the Chair not to qualify as a valid question of the 
privileges of the House, as it constituted a change in House rules:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
130. 138 Cong. Rec. 20339, 102d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            PRIVILEGES OF THE HOUSE--RESOLUTION REQUIRING IMMEDIATE 
         IMPLEMENTATION OF H.R. 4104 AND DIRECTING COMMITTEE ON HOUSE 
         ADMINISTRATION TO PROHIBIT PAYMENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF CERTAIN 
                            MASS MAILINGS          

        Mr. [William] THOMAS of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise to a 
    question of privileges of the House, and I offer a privileged 
    resolution (H. Res. 533).
        The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. [Kweisi] Mfume [of Maryland]). The 
    Clerk will report the resolution.
        The Clerk read as follows:

H. Res. 533

  Whereas, the House of Representatives acted on April 8, 1992, and passed 
by a vote of 408-8 a motion to recommit the conference report on the bill 
S. 3 instructing conferees to include the provisions of the bill H.R. 4104 
and;

  Whereas, the House voted on June 24, 1992, by a margin of 417-2 to 
include H.R. 4104 in the Legislative Branch appropriations for FY1993 and;

  Whereas the U.S. Court of Appeals has on July 30, 1992, declared section 
3210(d)(1)(B) of Title 39 of the U.S. Code unconstitutional under the First 
and Fifth Amendments thereby removing the authority of members of Congress 
to frank mass mailings to areas outside the district from which the member 
was elected, and;

  Whereas, members of the House have engaged in activities now declared by 
the courts as unconstitutional and;

  Whereas such activities impugn the integrity of the proceedings of the 
House now therefore be it resolved:

  Resolved, That the House of Representatives directs the Committee on 
House Administration to prohibit payment from any account for the purpose 
of mass mailings franked outside the district from which the member was 
elected and further that the provisions of H.R. 4104 be implemented 
immediately.

                             parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [Harold] VOLKMER [of Missouri]. Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. VOLKMER. Mr. Speaker, listening to the resolution, as I 
    understand, the gentleman is offering this as a privileged 
    resolution.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. That is correct. The Chair is 
    examining the resolution.
        Mr. VOLKMER. As a privileged resolution?
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will suspend while the 
    resolution is examined. The gentleman's parliamentary inquiry will 
    be addressed.
        Mr. VOLKMER. Because I raise a question whether it is a 
    privileged resolution of a Member of the House; not appropriate.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair will rule. The Chair's 
    understanding is that the resolution essentially directs a rules 
    change by immediate implementation of an introduced bill which then 
    is not a question of privilege. The resolution does not constitute 
    a question of privilege.
        The gentleman may proceed.

Sec. 6.14 A resolution alleging improper conduct by Members appointed 
    to the House Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards (now the 
    House Communications Standards Commission), and expressing the 
    disapproval of the House as to that conduct, constitutes a valid 
    question of the privileges of the House under rule 
    IX.(131)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
131. House Rules and Manual Sec. Sec. 698, 699 (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On July 29, 2009,(132) the following resolution was 
raised as a question of the privileges of the House, and subsequently 
laid on the table:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
132. 155 Cong. Rec. 19687-89, 111th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

             RAISING A QUESTION OF THE PRIVILEGES OF THE HOUSE    

        Mr. [John] BOEHNER [of Ohio]. Mr. Speaker, I have a privileged 
    resolution at the desk.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(133) The Clerk will report 
    the resolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
133. Jason Altmire (PA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

H. Res. 690

  Whereas page 5 of the ``Regulations on the Use of the CONGRESSIONAL FRANK 
By Members of the House of Representatives'' states, ``It is the policy of 
the Congress that the privilege of sending mail as franked mail shall be 
established under this section in order to assist and expedite the conduct 
of the official business, activities and duties of the Congress of the 
United States. It is the intent of the Congress that such official 
business, activities and duties cover all matters which directly or 
indirectly pertain to the legislative process or to any congressional 
representative functions generally, or to the functioning, working, or 
operating of the Congress and the performance of official duties in 
connection therewith, and shall include, but not be limited to, the 
conveying of information to the public, the requesting of the views of the 
public, or the views and information of other authority of government, as a 
guide or a means of assistance in the performance of those functions.'';

  Whereas clause 5 of rule XXIV of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives provides, ``Before making a mass mailing, a Member, 
Delegate, or Resident Commissioner shall submit a sample or description of 
the mail matter involved to the House Commission on Congressional Mailing 
Standards for an advisory opinion as to whether the proposed mailing is in 
compliance with applicable provisions of law, rule, or regulation.'';

  Whereas the House Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards, 
authorized in Public Law 91-191, is commonly referred to as the ``Franking 
Commission'';

  Whereas the Democratic staff director and Republican staff director of 
the Franking Commission have served in their respective positions for more 
than a decade and report to the Democratic and Republican members of the 
Franking Commission, respectively;

  Whereas during the 111th Congress the members of the Franking Commission 
are Representatives Susan Davis (D-CA), chairwoman; Rep. Dan Lungren (R-
CA), ranking Republican member; Rep. Donna Edwards (D-MD), Rep. Kevin 
McCarthy (R-CA), Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA) and Rep. Tom Price (R-GA);

  Whereas the aforementioned Franking Commission advisory opinions required 
for Members seeking approval to send mass mailings, or their electronic 
equivalents, are routinely signed on behalf of the Commission by its 
Democratic and Republican staff directors or their designees;

  Whereas no Member may receive Franking Commission approval without 
signatures from both majority and minority staff;

  Whereas the Commission's Democratic staff director has been permitted by 
the Commission's Democratic Members to abuse her position during the 
current Congress by willfully and knowingly applying different standards to 
material submitted for Franking Commission approval by Republican Members 
than she applies to material submitted by Democratic Members;

  Whereas on July 27, 2009, the Commission's Democratic staff director 
refused to approve a mailing proposed by Representative Joe Barton of Texas 
which included the words ``Democrat majority'', but indicated she would 
approve the mailing if Representative Barton instead substituted the words 
``congressional majority'', yet on August 3, 2006, the same Democratic 
staff director signed a Franking Commission approval document for a mailing 
issued by then-Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi that included the following 
sentence, ``But too many here and across our nation are paying the price 
for the Republican Congressional majority's special interest agenda . . .''

  Whereas the Democratic staff director has refused to grant permission to 
Republican Members wishing to provide their constituents with copies of a 
chart intended to illustrate in graphic form many of the provisions of the 
Democrats' proposed health care legislation;

  Whereas charts similar in form and general purpose have for many years 
been approved routinely by the Commission's Democratic staff director in 
mailings produced by Members on both sides of the aisle;

  Whereas on December 12, 1993, the Franking Commission granted approval to 
Rep. David Levy of New York to disseminate a similar chart, intended to 
illustrate graphically the provisions of comprehensive health care 
legislation proposed by the Clinton Administration;

  Whereas the Commission's Democratic staff director has refused to approve 
requests by Republican Members to informally characterize certain features 
of the Democrats' pending health care proposal as ``government run health 
care'' but has approved requests by Democratic Members to informally 
characterize the same aspects of the bill as ``the public option'';

  Whereas the Commission's Democratic staff director has refused to approve 
more than twenty requests by Republican Members to use the phrase ``cap and 
tax'' to describe a Democratic proposal to reduce carbon emissions by 
imposing new fees, taxes and higher costs on American consumers and 
businesses;

  Whereas a search for the term ``cap and tax'' on the Google internet 
search engine yielded at least 4,478,000 appearances of this commonly used 
phrase;

  Whereas an article in the April 27, 2009 edition of ``Politico'' 
newspaper quoted the most senior Member of the House, Democratic 
Representative John Dingell of Michigan, the former chairman of the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, as saying, ``Nobody in this country 
realizes that cap and trade is a tax, and it's a great big one.'';

  Whereas the Commission's Democratic staff director has dismissed the 
proposed descriptive term, ``cap and tax'' as an informal and inappropriate 
characterization of the legislation, while at the same time granting 
approval to Democratic Members seeking to use the phrase ``cap and trade'' 
to informally and inappropriately characterize the same bill;

  Whereas the Commission's Democratic staff director has refused to approve 
material submitted by Republican Members seeking to convey to the public 
those Members' concern about substantial job losses expected to result if 
the Democrats' proposed national energy tax is enacted, while at the same 
time approving mailings submitted by Democratic Members informing the 
public about large numbers of new jobs the Democrats claim will be created 
by the same legislation;

  Whereas the Democratic staff director's actions have prompted a steady 
stream of media reports describing a climate of partisan censorship imposed 
on the House by the Democratic majority;

  Whereas an article in the July 23, 2009, edition of Roll Call newspaper 
stated, ``A dispute over the right of House Republicans to use the 
chamber's official franking service to send a mailer critical of Democratic 
health care plans has escalated beyond the Franking Commission to `high 
levels on the Democratic side,' Franking Commission member Rep. Dan Lungren 
(R-CA) said at a Thursday press conference. Asked whether he believed the 
matter had been referred to Rep. Pelosis (D-CA) office, Lungren, the 
ranking member of the House Administration Committee, said, `All I've been 
told is that its above the Franking Commission and that it appears to be 
above our committee, so I don't know where you go after that'.'';

  Whereas by permitting the Commission's Democratic staff director to carry 
out her duties in a partisan and unfair manner, the Democratic Members of 
the Franking Commission have brought discredit on the House; and,

  Whereas clause 1 of rule XXIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives, also known as the Code of Official Conduct, provides ``A 
Member, Delegate, Resident Commissioner, officer, or employee of the House 
shall behave at all times in a manner that shall reflect creditably on the 
House'': Now, therefore, be it

  Resolved, That the House views with disapproval the failure of the 
Democratic Members of the Franking Commission to ensure that the 
Commission's Democratic staff carries out its important responsibilities in 
a professional, fair, and impartial manner.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The resolution presents a question of 
    privilege.

                                motion to table

        Mr. [Steny] HOYER [of Maryland]. Mr. Speaker, I move that the 
    resolution be laid on the table.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to 
    table.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it.
        Mr. BOEHNER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, this 
    15-minute vote on the motion to table will be followed by a 5-
    minute vote on the motion to suspend the rules on S. 1513.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    244, nays 173, answered ``present'' 11, not voting 5, as follows:

                              [Roll No. 656] . . .

        So the motion to table was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 6.15 The House has adopted a privileged resolution permitting 
    House employees to respond to subpoenas duces tecum requesting 
    documents and other material relevant to ongoing litigation 
    concerning the constitutionality of the franking 
    privilege.(134)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
134. Parliamentarian's Note: At the time of this proceeding, House 
        officers and employees did not have the ability to respond to 
        subpoenas absent specific authorization by the House. Standing 
        authorization to respond to various types of judicial process 
        is now included as part of rule VIII. See House Rules and 
        Manual Sec. 697 (2021). For more on the history of rule VIII 
        and its precursors, see Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 6 
        Sec. Sec. 26, 27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On March 9, 1976,(135) the House adopted the following 
resolution permitting House employees to respond to subpoenas:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
135. 122 Cong. Rec. 5829-32, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        COMMUNICATION FROM MAJORITY LEADER--COMMON CAUSE ET AL. AGAINST 
           BAILER ET AL. IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF 
                                COLUMBIA        

        The SPEAKER laid before the House the following communication 
    from the majority leader of the House of Representatives, which was 
    read and ordered to be printed:

                                                     Washington, DC,

                                                      March 4, 1976.

Hon. Carl Albert,
The Speaker, House of Representatives,
      Washington, DC.

        Dear Mr. Speaker: I am forwarding herewith a copy of a legal 
    stipulation and protectiveorder dated February 24, 1976, as amended 
    and approved by order of the United States District Court for the 
    District of Columbia on March 1, 1976, in the case of Common Cause 
    v. Bailer (Civil Action No. 1887-73).
        This order involves the production of documents in the 
    possession of certain employees of the House, including the 
    Superintendent of the House Majority Room and others, which 
    documents cannot be produced without the consent of the House.
        I am, therefore, referring the matter to you so that it may be 
    laid before the House.
        With best wishes,

            Sincerely,
                                              Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.

        The court order reads as follows:

                    [U.S. District Court for the District of

                      Columbia--Civil Action No. 1887-73]

                                     Order

                      (Common Cause et al., plaintiffs, v.

                      Benjamin Bailer et al., defendants)

        The above matter came before the Court at a status call on 
    February 2, 1976, to receive a report concerning the progress of 
    discovery and to resolve any outstanding issues.
        (1) With respect to the discovery sought of employees of the 
    House of Representatives, it was represented that a stipulation and 
    consent order were in the process of being worked out between 
    counsel for the respective parties. Said stipulation and order 
    dated February 24, 1976, were subsequently filed. Accordingly, it 
    is by the Court, Ordered, that said stipulation and consent order 
    dated February 24, 1976, as amended to include the paragraph 
    described in (4) below, be and are hereby approved.
        (2) With respect to the discovery sought of U.S. Senate 
    employees Estep and Needham, a stipulation under date of January 7, 
    1976, has been entered into between counsel for the respective 
    parties. Accordingly, it is by the Court,
        Ordered, that said stipulation be approved and accepted for 
    filing with the understanding that it be read to include the 
    provisions of the proposed order described in (4) below.
        (3) With respect to the matter of subpoenas being directed to 
    one hundred administrative assistants or aides of U.S. Senators, it 
    is understood that counsel are endeavoring to work out a solution 
    which will include the directing of one subpoena to a single staff 
    employee who will represent all one hundred Senators in the 
    furnishing of documents under the protection of anonymity. 
    Accordingly, it is by the Court,
        Ordered, that the proposed procedure be and hereby is approved, 
    the Court to be notified as to the precise procedure agreed upon.
        (4) With respect to defendants' request that they be assured of 
    the full opportunity to participate in any discovery proceedings 
    conducted in this cause, it is by the Court, Ordered, that any 
    order, or agreement or stipulation approved by the Court regarding 
    the production of information or documents in the above-captioned 
    action shall be subject to the following terms:
        That, in addition to the procedures required by the Federal 
    Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants shall be entitled to every 
    right accorded plaintiffs herein and shall be provided with a copy 
    of all materials obtained by plaintiffs hereunder; and plaintiffs 
    shall notify defendants in advance of any interview, by deposition 
    or otherwise, provided for herein and be given the opportunity to 
    participate fully in such interview.
        (5) With respect to Senate employee Fern, plaintiffs seek 
    production of the following internal documents of the Senate Select 
    Committee on Standards and Conduct:
        (A) The actual text of (a) all complaints to the Select 
    Committee concerning the use of the frank by Members of the Senate 
    and the disposition thereof, (b) all written requests from Members 
    of the Senate to the Select Committee for advice concerning the use 
    of the frank and the written responses thereto and (c) deponent 
    Fern's notes or other memoranda concerning oral requests for advice 
    and oral responses, or, in lieu of the actual text of the 
    documents, a summary of each such document with the full document 
    made available to plaintiffs' counsel to verify the accuracy of the 
    summaries; and
        (B) All internal memoranda of the Committee concerning the use 
    of the frank which have been approved by the Select Committee or 
    used as the basis for rendering advice to Members of the Senate.
        Actual text was defined by plaintiffs' counsel as a copy of the 
    full text of the document or the original document itself, with 
    only the identification of the Senator deleted.
        In a ``Memorandum of Deponent Fern in Explanation of 
    Position,'' Mr. Fern's counsel indicated that after a decision by 
    the Select Committee not to produce the documents, the Senate on 
    December 17, 1975, itself considered the matter and adopted a 
    resolution reaffirming a previous Senate resolution prohibiting 
    ``the disclosure of the internal records of the Senate Select 
    Committee on Standards and Conduct'' for reasons of 
    confidentiality. On January 27, 1976, the Select Committee again 
    considered the matter and determined that under the order of the 
    Senate it could make no change in its position that said documents 
    could not be produced. At the February 2, 1976, status call, 
    counsel for Mr. Fern reiterated the Select Committee's position 
    that Fern would not be permitted to hand over physical possession 
    of the documents, but, as an alternative, indicated that he would 
    supply summaries of the documents described in subparagraph (A) 
    above. Plaintiff insists on an actual inspection of the original 
    documents to ensure the accuracy of the summaries. The Select 
    Committee has declined to permit inspection of the documents 
    themselves and has rejected plaintiffs' proposal. This particular 
    matter is therefore in the same posture as it was on January 12, 
    1976, the time of the previous status call.
        We have given careful thought to the contentions of the 
    parties. It is conceded that the documents themselves are relevant 
    to the issues in this case. Whether the documents are privileged 
    may be determined by whether they relate to the business of 
    Senators or the business of candidates for the Senate. This 
    approaches a capsule description of the ultimate issue in this 
    case. We can agree that a privilege for Senatorial documents 
    exists, without deciding that these documents are Senatorial and 
    therefore privileged.
        At this stage in the lawsuit we think it better to act as if 
    the documents were Senatorial and privileged, with the ultimate 
    decision reserved. Inspection by plaintiffs' counsel, even with all 
    safeguards, would in some sense defeat the privilege, if in 
    ultimate analysis these documents were found to be properly 
    entitled to protection. However, there is no doubt that the 
    privilege claimed, if it exists, is not absolute but is defeasible 
    upon a showing of proper need. As the recent Watergate experience 
    has taught us, a President's claim of absolute privilege on the 
    grounds of confidentiality must yield when a proper showing is made 
    that the overriding considerations of the public interest require 
    disclosure. The body to make such a determination is the judiciary 
    after an in camera inspection of the material. United States v. 
    Nixon U.S. (1974).
        It is our judgment that plaintiffs have up to this point failed 
    to demonstrate the showing of particular need to overcome the 
    Select Committee's claim of privilege. It may well be that the 
    summaries themselves plus additional discovery in other areas will 
    satisfy the plaintiffs' evidentiary problems and will make it 
    unnecessary for us to order at this time the production of the 
    documents themselves. On the other hand, we see no reason why Mr. 
    Fern should not be required also to supply summaries of ``all 
    internal memoranda'' described in subparagraph (B) above. It is 
    understood that the entire file of original documents is quite 
    limited in size. Accordingly, it is by the Court,
        Ordered, that plaintiffs' motion to compel production of 
    original documents by the witness Fern be and is hereby denied 
    without prejudice; and it is
        Further ordered, that the witness Fern be and is hereby ordered 
    to produce summaries of all documents covered in subparagraphs (A) 
    and (B) above.
                                                  Malcolm R. Wilkey.

                                                 U.S. Circuit Judge.

                                                   William B. Jones,

                                                U.S. District Judge.

                                                      John H. Pratt,

                                                U.S. District Judge.

    March 1, 1976.

                    [U.S. District Court for the District of

                      Columbia--Civil Action No. 1887-73]

           Stipulation and Protective Order Regarding Production of 
        Information and Documents by Certain Employees of the House of 
                                Representatives

                  Common Cause, et al., plaintiffs, v. Bailer,

                               et al., defendants

                             introductory statement

        The following production of information and documents shall 
    constitute a satisfactory return to all subpoenas previously issued 
    by Plaintiffs to Thomas Lankford, David Ramage, Ell Bjellos and 
    Victor Smiroldo. The materials to be provided to Plaintiffs will 
    not publicly identify individual Members of Congress by name. 
    Further, these materials shall not be disclosed publicly except to 
    the extent that, consistently with this Stipulation, they become a 
    part of the public record in this litigation. Further discovery 
    will not be sought by Plaintiffs from these four individuals nor 
    from other employees of or personnel associated with the House 
    Majority and/or Minority Rooms, the Publications Distribution 
    Service and the House Commission on Congressional Mailing 
    Standards.

                        I. Thomas Lankford-David Ramage

        Messrs. Lankford and Ramage are, respectively, the Minority and 
    Majority Clerks of the House of Representatives. As such, each has 
    responsibilities connected with the printing of franked materials. 
    Messrs. Lankford and Ramage agree to provide such information as is 
    available in their files disclosing the sources of funds used to 
    defray printing costs for mass-mailed franked materials. This 
    information will be provided on a per seat basis. However, in lieu 
    of actual identification of individual Members, Members will be 
    referred to in accordance with the procedures described in Part V, 
    infra, of this Stipulation.
        For each seat, the dollar amount of funds will be broken down 
    into the following categories:
        a. Stationery account.
        b. Personal check from a Member.
        c. Personal check from someone other than a Member.
        d. House office account.
        e. Political committee.
        f. Unknown.
        This information is to be provided by Messrs. Lankford and 
    Ramage on an annual basis extending from January 1, 1973, through 
    November 30, 1975, inclusive.
        In addition, Messrs. Lankford and Ramage will identify the 
    banks and bank accounts by number in which the proceeds of their 
    printing operations are deposited.
        Finally, Messrs. Lankford and Ramage will not be deposed.

                                II. Eli Bjellos

        Mr. Bjellos is Chief, House Publications Distribution Service 
    (PDS). As such, he supervises the handling of franked materials 
    preparatory to delivery to the U.S. Postal Service.
        Mr. Bjellos will make such of his files, for the period 1967-
    present, as pertain to the handling of franked materials by the PDS 
    directly available to members of the legal staff (including 
    volunteers) working under the direct supervision of the undersigned 
    counsel for Plaintiff Common Cause for the sole purpose of 
    preparing compilations of the per seat volume and timing of franked 
    mail sent by individual Members of Congress. At any one time, not 
    more than five such members of Plaintiff's legal staff, previously 
    designated to the Court and deponents' counsel, shall have access 
    to these files of the PDS. All persons having such access shall not 
    disclose, during discovery or at trial or thereafter, to any other 
    persons the identity of any individual Members of Congress either 
    in connection with their use of information obtained from Mr. 
    Bjellos' files or for any other purpose resulting from or made 
    possible by their prior access to Mr. Bjellos' files; nor shall any 
    Information derived from the inspection of the files be used for 
    any purpose other than the aforesaid compilations. The undersigned 
    counsel for Plaintiffs shall ensure that, before they obtain access 
    to PDS files, all such members of the legal staff of Plaintiff 
    Common Cause shall acknowledge in writing to the Court that they 
    have been informed of the terms of this Stipulation and Protective 
    Order and are bound thereby.
        The PDS files and the worksheets of the members of Plaintiffs' 
    legal staff shall at all times remain in the offices of the PDS. 
    After the final compilation of the PDS data is completed by 
    Plaintiffs' legal staff, the data will be processed and provided to 
    Plaintiffs' counsel as described in Part V, infra. Deponents' 
    counsel, by coding the processed final compilation of PDS data, 
    shall not be deemed to have conceded the accuracy or validity of 
    the data or compilation thereof supplied by Plaintiffs, and shall 
    be free thereafter to contest the accuracy and/or validity thereof 
    should Plaintiffs seek to rely on the data for any purpose during 
    this litigation.
        In the alternative, Plaintiffs may request that information be 
    compiled by Mr. Bjeilos' staff, reflecting the per seat volume and 
    timing of franked mail sent by Individual Members, on a daily basis 
    for the period 1967 to the present. Such compilations will be 
    processed as described in Part V, infra, and will be provided 
    subject to the following conditions:
        (a) that Plaintiffs bear the full costs of compilation efforts, 
    including the compensation of personnel involved; and (b) that such 
    compilation efforts as Plaintiffs may specify will not, in Mr. 
    Bjellos' reasonable opinion, result in significant interference 
    with the regular operations of the Publications Distribution 
    Service.
        Deponents' counsel shall retain a copy of the final compilation 
    and the originals of all worksheets, for any purpose which the 
    House deems appropriate. Upon reasonable notice, Plaintiffs' 
    counsel may inspect the worksheets to insure the accuracy of the 
    final compilation.
        Mr. Bjellos will not be deposed. However, Mr. Bjellos will make 
    himself available, upon notice to his counsel, for an informal 
    interview to answer questions agreed upon between counsel for 
    Plaintiffs and Mr. Bjellos in advance of the entry of this 
    Stipulation and Protective Order. Also, Mr. Bjellos will, upon 
    reasonable notice to himself and his counsel, make himself 
    available informally to answer such questions as are necessary to 
    decipher notations or similarly clarify information contained in 
    the materials provided to Plaintiffs' counsel under this Part.

                              III. Victor Smiroldo

        Mr. Smiroldo Is Staff Director and Counsel, House Commission on 
    Congressional Mailing Standards. On behalf of the House Commission, 
    Mr. Smiroldo will provide Plaintiffs, at their expense, with copies 
    of all documents and other writings pertaining to all formal 
    Complaint proceedings, pending or completed. In addition, 
    Plaintiffs will receive copies of all documents in the files of the 
    Commission that embody (a) formal or informal advice rendered by 
    the Commission and/or its staff to Members of Congress regarding 
    their use of the franking privilege; or (b) policy statements or 
    regulations of general applicability adopted by the Commission 
    regarding permissible uses of the franking privilege by Members of 
    Congress; or (c) communications of the Commission or its staff with 
    third parties outside the House of Representatives that relate to 
    the franking privilege. The only omissions from these materials 
    will be such details as identify a particular Congressman.
        This voluntarily offered material includes:
        a. Correspondence and other communications from the Commission 
    to Members of Congress or their staffs, advising a Member with 
    respect to the frankability of a proposed mailing.
        b. Correspondence and other communications from Members of the 
    House Commission staff to Members of Congress or their staffs that 
    provide such advice.
        c. Correspondence and other communications relating to the 
    franking privilege, between, on the one hand, the House Commission 
    or its staff and, on the other hand, individuals other than Members 
    of Congress or their staff.
        d. Internal staff memoranda addressed to the Commission in 
    cases where staff memoranda have been adopted by the Commission as 
    the basis for its final action in (i) rendering advice on the 
    frankability of a proposed mailing, or (ii) adopting policies or 
    regulations of general application with respect to permissible uses 
    of the franking privilege by Members of Congress.
        Where available, a copy of the actual proposed mailing under 
    consideration by the House Commission or its staff (with details 
    identifying individual Members omitted) will be attached to the 
    above-described materials.
        Also, where necessary to understand the advice rendered by the 
    Commission or its staff, portions of the requests for advisory 
    opinions will be provided.
        Mr. Smiroldo will not be deposed. However, Mr. Smiroldo will 
    make himself available for an informal interview, and submit an 
    affidavit answering the questions propounded by Plaintiff's 
    counsel, if necessary, to clarify the materials provided to 
    Plaintiff's counsel it is specifically understood and agreed that 
    Mr. Smiroldo will not provide Plaintiffs with information or access 
    to other materials consisting of (a) internal memoranda that were 
    not adopted by the Commission as the basis for advice or policy 
    decisions by the Staff or the Commission (b) requests for advice by 
    members, except as otherwise provided for above, and (c) either the 
    identity or the code number for the members involved. See Part V, 
    infra.
        A unique multi-digit code number shall be assigned each 
    document provided under this Part and lodged with the Court 
    together with a unique ``key'' which shall correlate each code 
    number with the code numbers separately and uniquely assigned to 
    each Member's list of attributes as provided for in Part V. The 
    code assigned the documents shall differ from all other codes 
    herein provided for and the ``key'' shall differ from the ``keys'' 
    provided for in Part V. Plaintiff's counsel may move, upon 
    reasonable notice to Deponents' counsel and upon a showing of 
    particularized need therefor, for access to the code for the 
    documents and the ``key'' correlating the documents to the list of 
    attributes. The terms of access to the key and code shall be 
    Identical to those in Part V.

         IV. Descriptive information with respect to individual Members

        Plaintiffs will prepare and provide Deponents' counsel with a 
    list of current Members of Congress, associating each Member with 
    the following descriptive information:
        a. Primary and general election vote percentages for each 
    Member and challenger for each election held in the years 1966 
    through 1974, rounded off to the nearest percent.
        b. Month of each primary election for each Member who sought 
    reelection in the years 1972 through 1974.
        c. The seniority by number of terms for those presently Members 
    and the numbers of terms served by those not presently Members, 
    reported as freshmen, two terms, three to five years, and more than 
    five terms.
        d. Where applicable, whether the Member did not seek 
    renomination or reelection.
        e. General region of the country; e.g., South or non-South.
        f. The percentage of urban population for each Member's 
    district reported in categories of ten percent; except that 
    categories 0 and 100% shall be reported separately.
        g. The primary and general election campaign spending totals 
    for each incumbent seeking reelection and for each challenger 
    reported in categories of $25,000; except that expenditures in 
    excess of $200,000 shall be reported as one category.
        h. The general election vote percentage which the Presidential 
    candidate of the Member's political party won in 1968 and 1972, 
    reported in categories of five percent.
        i. Month and year of reapportionment since 1966.
        Deponents' counsel will then process the data for each seat in 
    accordance with Part V, infra, and provide the Court and 
    Plaintiffs' counsel with the coded list of attributes. Deponents 
    shall not be deemed to have conceded the accuracy or validity of 
    the attributes supplied by Plaintiffs, and shall be free thereafter 
    to contest its accuracy and/or validity should Plaintiffs seek to 
    rely on the data for any purpose during this litigation. The coded 
    list of attributes processed in accordance with Part V will be 
    subject to the seal of the Court, and will not, in whole or in 
    part, be disclosed to any other person or introduced in this 
    action, except under seal, at any time during discovery or at trial 
    or thereafter with the following exceptions:
        1. The coded list of attributes may be provided to other 
    persons, solely in connection with this litigation, for the purpose 
    of preparing aggregate statistical analyses by certain categories 
    of Members of Congress.
        2. The coded list of attributes may be provided to expert 
    witnesses, solely in connection with this litigation, in order to 
    obtain an affidavit or testimony, which affidavit or testimony may 
    be publicly disclosed or filed with the court only if they do not 
    disclose, directly or indirectly, the coded list of attributes or 
    any portion thereof.
        3. Aggregate statistical analyses by certain categories of 
    Members of Congress may be introduced publicly in this action so 
    long as such statistical analyses do not consist of any category 
    that contains less than 10 Members of Congress.
        Persons having access to the coded list of attributes or 
    portions thereof or information derived therefrom shall not further 
    disclose the coded list of attributes or portions thereof of 
    information derived therefrom to any other persons. The undersigned 
    counsel for Plaintiffs shall ensure that, before obtaining access 
    to the coded list of attributes, persons to be provided access 
    shall acknowledge in writing to the Court that they have been 
    informed of the terms of this Stipulation and Protective Order and 
    are bound thereby.

                     V. Compilation and processing of data

        Counsel for Deponents Ramage, Lankford and Bjellos will prepare 
    a coded version of the per seat list of attributes described in 
    Part IV, supra, by substituting a unique multidigit number for the 
    name of each Member. In addition, Deponents' counsel will file a 
    ``key,'' assigning a number to each individual Member of the House, 
    to this coded version with the Court in camera, to be kept in the 
    chambers of one of the three judges assigned to this case. This 
    ``key'' will not be provided or otherwise made available to 
    Plaintiffs or their counsel, except that Plaintiffs may seek access 
    to particular portions of the ``key'' by motion, served on 
    Deponents' counsel, demonstrating a particularized need for access 
    to such particular portions that clearly outweigh the interests 
    supporting the confidentiality of the code. Plaintiffs' counsel 
    will receive a copy of the coded version of the per seat lists of 
    attributes.
        The data from Messrs. Ramage, Lankford and Bjellos for each 
    Member of the House will be separately compiled. After compilation, 
    the name of each Member will be deleted and a unique multi-digit 
    identifying code number will be substituted by Deponents' counsel.
        The unique multi-digit code numbers for the list of attributes 
    will not be identical to the unique multi-digit code numbers for 
    the compilation of data from the files of Messrs. Ramage, Lankford 
    and Bjellos. Instead, Deponents' counsel will prepare a second 
    ``key,'' to permit the separately coded data compilation for each 
    Member to be coordinated with pertinent coded list of attributes 
    applicable to that Member. This second ``key'' will be available to 
    Plaintiffs and their counsel as follows: Plaintiffs' undersigned 
    counsel will receive a single copy of this ``key,'' to be retained 
    solely by him, except that the key may be made available to Karen 
    Paget, a computer expert, or such other qualified single individual 
    selected by Plaintiffs' counsel as a replacement, where a 
    replacement is necessary and Deponents' counsel is so notified, to 
    enable her to assist counsel in processing the data for purposes of 
    this litigation and for no other purpose. Karen Paget, or her 
    qualified replacement, shall not disclose this key, or portions 
    thereof, to any other person. Further, counsel for Plaintiffs shall 
    ensure that, before obtaining access to this key, or portions 
    thereof, Karen Paget, or her qualified replacement, shall 
    acknowledge in writing to the Court that she has been informed of 
    the terms of this Stipulation and Protective Order and is bound 
    thereby.

                       VI. Record of computer processing

        Plaintiffs' counsel shall maintain or supervise the maintenance 
    of a complete record of all computer input and output generated in 
    the course of Plaintiffs' processing of data to be supplied in 
    accordance with this Stipulation and Protective Order. This record 
    of computer input and output shall be made available to counsel for 
    Deponents only upon motion, previously served upon counsel for 
    Plaintiffs, if it appears that public disclosure of use of the 
    frank by named individual Members of the House may have occurred in 
    possible violation of this Protective Order. This record shall not 
    be used by Deponents for any purpose other than in relation to such 
    a suspected violation.

                       VII. Discovery from other sources

        When other persons against whom discovery is sought provide 
    documents to Plaintiffs that identify or refer to a particular 
    Member, Plaintiffs will first have such persons submit such 
    documents to the Court and receive the code number associated with 
    the list of attributes. Plaintiffs' counsel will have the person 
    deposed prepare and provide Plaintiffs' counsel with copies of such 
    documents with details that identify a particular Member omitted. 
    In lieu of identification by name, Members will be referred to by 
    the code number assigned to that Member's descriptive 
    characteristics. Also, in lieu of identification by name, Members 
    shall be referred to by their coded number by any witnesses who may 
    actually testify either during discovery or during any trial that 
    may occur. Finally, Plaintiffs will refer to individual Members in 
    the course of discovery or trial or in any motion for summary 
    judgment or the like only by reference to their coded number.

             VIII. Defendants' access to data from House Employees

        The counsel for Defendants shall be provided with copies of all 
    materials furnished to Plaintiffs' counsel. Said counsel for 
    Defendants shall not further disclose the contents of such 
    information and materials, or any portions thereof, to any other 
    person or persons without prior approval of the Court, such 
    approval to be sought by motion previously served upon counsel for 
    Deponents.

                                IX. Verification

        The accuracy and authenticity of information described in Parts 
    I through III that is provided to Plaintiffs, Defendants and the 
    Court by Deponents will be verified by the Affidavits of Deponents.

                     Agree to the foregoing Stipulation and

                                Protective Order

        For Plaintiffs:
                                                   Kenneth J. Guido.

        For Messrs. Ramage, Lankford, Bjellos and Smiroldo:
                                                 Edwin M. Zimmerman.

        So Ordered:
                                                   Malcom R. Wilkey.

                                                   William B. Jones.

                                                      John R. Pratt.

                             certificate of service

        I hereby certify that I have, this 24th day of February 1976, 
    caused copies of the foregoing ``Stipulation and Protective Order 
    Regarding Production of Information and Documents by certain 
    Employees of the House of Representatives'' to be served by hand 
    delivery on--
        Cornelius Kennedy, Esq., Kennedy & Webster, 888 17th Street, 
    N.W., Washington, DC 20006
        Kenneth J. Guido, Jr., Esq., Common Cause, 2030 M Street, N.W., 
    Washington, DC 20036
        Bruce E. Titus Esq., Department of Justice, 10th and 
    Constitution Ave., N.W., Room 3337, Washington, DC 20530
                                                Arthur F. Fergenson.

        Mr. [Thomas] O'NEILL [of Massachusetts]. Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    privileged resolution (H. Res. 1082) and ask for its immediate 
    consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

H. Res. 1082

  Whereas in the case of Common Cause et al. against Bailar et al. 
(fromerly Common Cause et al. against E.T. Klassen et al.) (Civil Action 
Number 1887-73) pending in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia, subpoenas duces tecum were served upon various 
employees of the House of Representatives; and

  Whereas the House of Representatives on January 23, 1975, adopted House 
Resolution 85 and on December 4, 1975, adopted House Resolution 902 
asserting the privileges of the House against the production of documents 
and disclosure of information pursuant to the order of the ordinary courts 
of justice without the consent of the House, authorizing the Speaker to 
designate counsel to represent the interest of the House and of the 
aforementioned employees in any proceeding related to the disposition of 
the subpoenas or motions served thereon in this case, and further providing 
for the cooperation of the House consistent with its privileges upon a 
court determination of the materiality and relevancy of the material 
covered by subpoenas; and

  Whereas the Court on July 30, 1975, filed a memorandum and order granting 
Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery with respect to the House employees 
but committing to further negotiations between Plaintiffs and the House 
employees the exact nature and bulk of the materials to be produced; and

  Whereas said negotiations have resulted in an agreement which was filed 
with the Court on February 24, 1976, and which was amended and approved by 
the said Court on March 1, 1976; Therefore, be it

  Resolved, That by the privileges of this House no evidence of a 
documentary character under the control and in the possession of the House 
can, by the mandate of process of the ordinary courts of justice, be taken 
from such control or possession but by its permission, and no House 
employee may be compelled to disclose information obtained pursuant to his 
official duties as an employee of the House, without the consent of the 
House; be it further

  Resolved, That the consent of this House is hereby given to the 
subpoenaed employees to produce the information requested pursuant to the 
stipulation and protective order dated February 24, 1976, as amended and 
approved by order dated March 1, 1976, of the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia in the case of Common Cause v. Bailar (Civil 
Action 1887-73); and be it further

  Resolved, That legal and administrative expenses incurred in formulating 
and executing the stipulation and protective order are authorized to be 
paid from the contingent fund of the House pursuant to vouchers signed by 
the Speaker; and be it further

  Resolved, That a copy of these resolutions be submitted to the said Court 
by the Clerk of the House of Representatives or by his authorized 
representative.

        The SPEAKER.(136) The Chair recognizes the gentleman 
    from Massachusetts (Mr. O'Neill).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
136. Carl Albert (OK).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Speaker, this resolution relates to the case 
    of Common Cause against Bailar, in which the organization entitled 
    ``Common Cause'' is contesting the constitutionality of the laws 
    governing the congressional franking privilege. As stated in the 
    resolution, the House has previously passed several resolutions in 
    the 94th Congress protecting the files of the House of 
    Representatives from overly broad subpoenas directed to a number of 
    employees of the House.
        The intention of this resolution is to allow compliance by the 
    House employees with a stipulation and protective order which was 
    granted by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and 
    which after long and careful deliberations, was negotiated with the 
    concurrence of the leadership on both sides of the aisle, by the 
    counsel appointed by the Speaker pursuant to authority given him by 
    the House and by the counsel for Common Cause. The protective order 
    allows plaintiffs in the suit access to only such files and 
    information which are material and relevant to the constitutional 
    issue asserted by the plaintiffs, and prohibits their access to the 
    names and identities of individual Members.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 6.16 The House has, by privileged resolution, authorized the House 
    Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards (now the House 
    Communications Standards Commission) to intervene on behalf of the 
    House in a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the 
    franking privilege.

    On July 1, 1976,(137) the House adopted the following 
resolution:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
137. 122 Cong. Rec. 21852-53, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         AUTHORIZING INTERVENTION OF HOUSE COMMISSION ON CONGRESSIONAL 
        MAILING STANDARDS IN THE CASE OF COMMON CAUSE VERSUS BAILAR ET 
                                   AL.      

        Mr. [Richard] BOLLING [of Missouri]. Mr. Speaker, by direction 
    of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 1382 and ask 
    its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

H. Res. 1382

  Resolved, That the House Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards is 
authorized to seek to intervene in the pending action entitled ``Common 
Cause et al. v. Benjamin Bailar et al.'', Civil Action Numbered 1887-73, 
pending in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

        The SPEAKER.(138) The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. 
    Bolling) is recognized for 1 hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
138. Carl Albert (OK).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. BOLLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman 
    from Mississippi (Mr. Lott), pending which I yield myself such time 
    as I may consume.
        Mr. Speaker, this resolution was introduced by the majority 
    leader and the minority leader. It is an action recommended to the 
    Congress by the Justice Department. It will enable the House 
    Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards to seek to intervene 
    in the suit against the Department of the Treasury having to do 
    with the frank.
        It is, as far as I know, totally noncontroversial, and it is in 
    the interests of the House and the Members of the House that the 
    resolution be agreed to.
        Mr. [Trent] LOTT [of Mississippi]. Mr. Speaker, I thank the 
    gentleman for his explanation, and I yield myself such time as I 
    may consume.
        Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 1382 is designed to authorize the 
    House Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards to seek to 
    intervene in the action entitled ``Common Cause et al. v. Benjamin 
    Bailar et al.'' which presently is pending in the U.S. District 
    Court for the District of Columbia. This action arose in 1973 when 
    Common Cause filed suit against the Postmaster General and the 
    Secretary of the Treasury to prevent the expenditure of funds to 
    honor the congressional frank, alleging that the franking statute 
    was unconstitutional.
        Since the suit was filed, several employees of the House have 
    been issued subpenas. Private attorneys were retained by authority 
    of House Resolution 85 to assist these employees in responding to 
    the subpenas and to examine the alternatives available to the 
    House. Thereafter, a conclusion was reached that the best interests 
    of the House would be served by its intervening in the matter in 
    order to argue the constitutionality of the franking statute before 
    the court. Pursuant to this determination, House Resolution 1382 
    was introduced by the majority and minority leaders and referred to 
    the Committee on Rules. On June 30 the resolution was passed 
    unanimously by that committee and ordered reported to the House.
        Mr. Speaker, I favor this resolution and support its adoption.
        Mr. BOLLING. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the 
    resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 6.17 Pursuant to statute,(139) the House approves 
    certain adjustments to the Members' Representational Allowance via 
    the adoption of a simple House resolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
139. Parliamentarian's Note: Under 2 U.S.C. Sec. 4313, the Committee on 
        House Administration may make such adjustments via committee 
        order, but only for specified reasons (for example, an increase 
        in the cost of materials or services). Here, the increase in 
        the MRA was provided for additional security resources, and 
        thus could only be effectuated by House resolution. See 2 
        U.S.C. Sec. 4314(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On June 27, 2017,(140) the House adopted the following 
resolution authorizing a temporary increase in the MRA:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
140. 163 Cong. Rec. H5202 [Daily Ed.], 115th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        ADJUSTING THE AMOUNT OF THE MEMBERS' REPRESENTATIONAL ALLOWANCE  
                                         

        Mr. [Gregg] HARPER [of Mississippi]. Mr. Speaker, I send to the 
    desk a resolution, and I ask unanimous consent for its immediate 
    consideration in the House.
        The Clerk read the title of the resolution.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(141) Is there objection to 
    the request of the gentleman from Mississippi?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
141. Doug Collins (GA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        The text of the resolution is as follows:

H. Res. 411

  Whereas on June 14, 2017, an armed gunman opened fire at a practice for 
the annual Congressional Baseball Game for Charity, wounding five 
individuals;

  Whereas Members of the House are understandably concerned about the 
security of their staff and the constituents they serve, as well as their 
personal security;

  Whereas the Members' Representational Allowance (MRA) is available for 
ordinary and necessary expenses associated with security measures; and

  Whereas heightened security concerns necessitate an adjustment in the MRA 
to provide Members with additional resources: Now, therefore, be it

  Resolved, That pursuant to section 1(b) of House Resolution 1372, Ninety-
fourth Congress, agreed to July 1, 1976, as enacted into permanent law by 
section 101 of the Legislative Branch Appropriation Act, 1977 (2 U.S.C. 
4314), the Members' Representational Allowance applicable as of the date of 
the adoption of this resolution for each Member of the House of 
Representatives (including the Delegates and Resident Commissioner to the 
Congress) is increased by $25,000, to be available through January 2, 2018.

        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.



                             D. Immunities



Sec. 7. Immunities of Members Generally; Service of Process

    The Constitution specifies two types of immunities enjoyed by 
Members of Congress. Pursuant to article I, section 6, clause 1, 
Members ``shall . . . be privileged from Arrest during their 
attendance'' at sessions of Congress.(1) Pursuant to the 
same clause, ``for any Speech or Debate . . . they shall not be 
questioned in any other place.''(2)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. House Rules and Manual Sec. Sec. 90, 91 (2021). This privilege is 
        applicable ``in all Cases, except Treason, Bribery, and Breach 
        of the Peace.'' U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 6, cl. 1. The scope of 
        the exception has been interpreted ``to mean all indictable 
        crimes.'' 3 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 2673. For more on this 
        privilege, see Sec. 9, infra.
 2. House Rules and Manual Sec. Sec. 92-95 (2021). For more on this 
        privilege, see Sec. 8, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These two grants of immunity have a long history stretching back to 
earlier British and colonial practices.(3) Their purpose is 
to preserve the independence of the legislative branch in our Federal 
system of separated powers, and ensure that Members are not prevented 
by others from exercising their representational 
responsibilities.(4) To deny a Member the ability to attend 
sessions of Congress (by physically arresting said Member, or burdening 
said Member with judicial process)(5) is to deny 
representation to that Member's constituents. This is not to say that 
Members of Congress are above the law, or not subject to the same legal 
rules applicable to ordinary citizens.(6) Rather, it is a 
recognition that the representational duties of Members are central to 
our system of government, and that an appropriate balance must be 
struck between exercising such duties and responding to legal 
processes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. Following the violent conflicts between the king and Parliament in 
        17th-century England, Parliament asserted its privileges with 
        respect to the crown by adopting a ``Bill of Rights'' in 1689. 
        See Josh A. Chafetz, Democracy's Privileged Few: Legislative 
        Privilege and Democratic Norms in the British and American 
        Constitutions, (Yale University Press 2007), pp. 134-143. 
        Similar privileges were asserted by colonial assemblies at 
        various times before American independence, and the Articles of 
        Confederation included language nearly identical to that found 
        in the Constitution. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 
        169, 177 (1966). At the Constitutional Convention, relatively 
        little deliberation occurred on importing these privileges and 
        immunities into the new Constitution of the United States--
        potentially reflecting the noncontroversial nature of these 
        longstanding prerogatives of legislatures. See Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 16.
 4. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1966) 
        (``[I]t is apparent from the history of the clause that the 
        privilege was not born primarily of a desire to avoid private 
        suits . . . but rather to prevent intimidation by the executive 
        and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary.''); 
        United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972) (``The 
        immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause were not written into 
        the Constitution simply for the personal or private benefit of 
        Members of Congress, but to protect the integrity of the 
        legislative process by insuring the independence of individual 
        legislators.''); United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 491 
        (1979) (``The Speech or Debate Clause was designed neither to 
        assure fair trials nor to avoid coercion. Rather, its purpose 
        was to preserve the constitutional structure of separate, 
        coequal, and independent branches of government. The English 
        and American history of the privilege suggests that any lesser 
        standard would risk intrusion by the Executive and the 
        Judiciary into the sphere of protected legislative 
        activities.''); and Eastland v. United States Servicemen's 
        Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 511 (1975) (``This case illustrates vividly 
        the harm that judicial interference may cause . . . [t]he 
        Clause was written to prevent the need to be confronted by such 
        `questioning' and to forbid invocation of judicial power to 
        challenge the wisdom of Congress' use of its investigative 
        authority.'').
 5. The privilege from arrest in British practice ``extended to 
        protection against being sued during Parliament time because 
        responding to suits was so difficult that it would take a 
        Member away from his parliamentary duties, almost as certainly 
        as arresting him would.'' See Josh A. Chafetz, Democracy's 
        Privileged Few: Legislative Privilege and Democratic Norms in 
        the British And American Constitutions (Yale University Press 
        2007), pp. 111-133.
 6. The textual exceptions listed in the Constitution (fortified by 
        subsequent case law) make it clear that Members of Congress 
        cannot avoid criminal liability through an assertion of these 
        parliamentary privileges. In Brewster, the Supreme Court stated 
        unequivocally that the Speech or Debate Clause was not intended 
        ``to make Members of Congress super-citizens, immune from 
        criminal responsibility.'' United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 
        501, 516 (1972).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The constitutional privileges described above ``act as procedural 
defenses''(7) and are thus asserted almost exclusively in 
the context of judicial proceedings involving Members. Federal courts 
have therefore provided most of the analysis of these privileges and 
immunities--defining their scope and providing interpretations of the 
relevant constitutional language. In doing so, the courts have 
recognized a sphere of legitimate legislative activity that is 
protected from judicial process or inquiry. With respect to those 
protected legislative acts, Members: may not be held personally 
liable;(8) are shielded from most inquiries into those 
acts;(9) and may be relieved of the burden of defending 
themselves against judicial process aimed at those acts.(10) 
Further, Members may not be compelled to testify or produce documents 
when the privilege is invoked.(11)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 15.
 8. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
 9. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); and United States v. 
        Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
10. See Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967).
11. See Brown Williamson Tobacco v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408 (D.C. Cir. 
        1995); and U.S. v. Rayburn House, 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 
        2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When process is served on Members of the House, the Member (or the 
House itself) has the constitutional privilege of asserting one of 
these immunities to quash the inquiry. Over the course of its history, 
the House has chosen a variety of procedural methods for responding to 
subpoenas or other judicial orders served on its Members, officers, and 
employees.(12)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. For service of process on officers, officials, and employees of the 
        House, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 6 Sec. 23; Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 11 Sec. 16; and Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 6 
        Sec. Sec. 26, 27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It has been said that ``the privilege of the Member [is] the 
privilege of the House and that privilege [cannot] be waived except 
with the consent of the House.''(13) Thus, throughout the 
19th century, when Members became involved in litigation (for example, 
by being called to testify before a court), such Members would seek a 
decision of the House as to whether the appearance would be consistent 
with the rights and privileges of membership. A simple resolution of 
the House, denying(14) or authorizing(15) 
compliance with the court order, would then be presented as a question 
of the privileges of the House for a vote by the full 
body.(16) If no resolution authorizing compliance was 
adopted, the privilege would be retained.(17)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 3 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 2662. See also 6 Cannon's Precedents 
        Sec. 586 (Rep. Fiorello LaGuardia of New York stating that, ``I 
        can not obey that subpoena without the permission of this 
        House.'').
14. See, e.g., 3 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 2661.
15. See, e.g., 3 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 2662; Deschler's Precedents Ch. 
        7 Sec. 15.1; and Deschler's Precedents Ch. 11 Sec. Sec. 14.1, 
        14.3, 14.6, 14.7, 14.10, 15.1, and 15.2.
16. For more on questions of privilege generally, see Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 11; and Precedents (____) Ch. 11.
17. See 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 586 (subpoena duces tecum issued to 
        a Member but no resolution offered authorizing compliance). See 
        also Deschler's Precedents Ch. 11 Sec. Sec. 14.2, 14.4, 14.5, 
        14.8, and 14.9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    By the middle of the 20th century, this method of addressing court 
orders served on Members of the House was beginning to be seen as 
cumbersome and time-consuming. As questions of privilege, resolutions 
to authorize (or deny) compliance could be raised at any point during 
the House's legislative business, and thus had the potential to delay 
the consideration of even highly-privileged legislative 
measures.(18) This procedure also required the House to be 
in session to adopt the required resolutions, which could have the 
effect of creating delays in judicial proceedings if process was served 
on Members during periods of adjournment or recess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. For the precedence of questions of privilege as compared to other 
        items of House business, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 11 
        Sec. Sec. 4, 5; and Precedents (____) Ch. 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Between 1948 and 1979, there occurred a gradual shift in the 
methods the House utilized to defend the constitutional privileges of 
its Members. The intent of these efforts was to provide ongoing 
authority for Members themselves to make an initial determination as to 
whether or not compliance with judicial process was permissible--
effectively shifting the burden of asserting the privilege from the 
House itself to the Member. During this period, a variety of 
resolutions were adopted that provided this kind of 
authorization,(19) first to officers of the House and then 
to Members themselves.(20)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. For a list of such resolutions and brief description of the 
        authorities conveyed, see Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 6 Sec. 26 
        (fn. 13).
20. Parliamentarian's Note: Officers, officials, and employees of the 
        House have often been subject to judicial process, frequently 
        in their capacity as custodians of official documents relevant 
        to the case at issue. The procedures used by the House in 
        asserting its constitutional privileges as applied to such 
        officers and employees of the House have often mirrored the 
        procedures applicable to Members. Today, both are covered under 
        the rubric of rule VIII of the standing rules of the House. 
        House Rules and Manual Sec. 697 (2021). For a discussion of 
        issues involving the service of process on officers and 
        employees of the House, see Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 6 
        Sec. Sec. 26, 27. For an earlier treatment, see Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 6 Sec. 23; and Deschler's Precedents Ch. 11 
        Sec. 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Ultimately, the House adopted what is now rule VIII(21) 
of its standing rules to address subpoenas and other service of process 
issues. The rule grants standing authority for Members, Delegates, 
Resident Commissioners, officers, and employees of the House to comply 
with properly-served judicial subpoenas or orders, upon a determination 
by the affected individual that such compliance is consistent with 
``the privileges and rights of the House.''(22) The rule 
requires those who have been served to inform the Speaker of such 
service, and whether the proposed response is consistent with the 
privileges of the House. The Speaker in turn is required by the rule to 
inform the House of the proposed action to be taken. In doing so, the 
Speaker permits the House as a body to pass judgment on the proposed 
response, and potentially take steps to modify or prohibit the 
response. Thus, the House as an institution retains the ultimate 
authority in defending its constitutional privileges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
21. House Rules and Manual Sec. 697 (2021). The rule was originally 
        adopted as rule L in the 97th Congress in 1981.
22. Rule VIII, clause 1(a); House Rules and Manual Sec. 697 (2021). In 
        the 107th Congress, the rule was expanded to expressly include 
        administrative subpoenas as well as judicial subpoenas and 
        orders. However, that aspect of the rule was eliminated in the 
        115th Congress. See Sec. 7.9, infra. The rule was substantially 
        revised in the 115th Congress to consolidate and clarify the 
        notification aspects of the rule and to eliminate a former 
        requirement that the Clerk provide a copy of the rule to the 
        court.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 7.1 Pursuant to rule VIII,(23) (1) Members are required 
    to notify the Speaker if they have been served with judicial 
    process; (2) the Speaker is required to promptly lay such matters 
    before the House; and (3) Members themselves make the initial 
    determination as to whether compliance with the subpoena or order 
    is consistent with the privileges of the House.(24)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
23. House Rules and Manual Sec. 697 (2021).
24. Parliamentarian's Note: Although not required by the rule, most 
        Members avail themselves of the services of the Office of 
        General Counsel (or, occasionally, outside counsel) for legal 
        advice regarding the requirements of judicial process and the 
        House's constitutional prerogatives. For more on the Office of 
        General Counsel, see clause 8 of rule II. See also Precedents 
        (Wickham) Ch. 6 Sec. 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On January 30, 2017,(25) the following letters were laid 
before the House, indicating that Members of the House had been served 
with subpoenas, and that (after consultation with the Office of General 
Counsel), the Members had determined that compliance was consistent 
with the privileges of the House:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
25. 163 Cong. Rec. 1332, 115th Cong. 1st Sess. For similar examples of 
        Members indicating that they intended to comply with judicial 
        subpoenas, see 160 Cong. Rec. 15477-78, 113th Cong. 2d Sess. 
        (Nov. 12, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        COMMUNICATION FROM THE HONORABLE ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, MEMBER OF 
                                  CONGRESS    

        The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following 
    communication from the Honorable Elijah E. Cummings, Member of 
    Congress:

                                    Congress of the United States,
                                         House of Representatives,
                                 Washington, DC, January 30, 2017.
                                                  Hon. Paul D. Ryan,
                                  Speaker, House of Representatives,
                                                     Washington, DC.

        Dear Mr. Speaker: This is to notify you formally pursuant to 
    Rule VIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives that we have 
    been served with a subpoena for documents, issued by the District 
    Court for the District of Maryland in Benisek v Lamone.
        After consultation with the Office of General Counsel, we have 
    determined that compliance with the subpoena will be consistent 
    with the privileges and rights of the House.

            Sincerely,
                                               Elijah E. Cummings,
  Member of Congress.                          -------------------

          COMMUNICATION FROM THE HONORABLE STENY H. HOYER, MEMBER OF 
                                  CONGRESS    

        The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following 
    communication from the Honorable Steny H. Hoyer, Member of 
    Congress:

                                    Congress of the United States,
                                         House of Representatives,
                                 Washington, DC, January 30, 2017.
                                                  Hon. Paul D. Ryan,
                                  Speaker, House of Representatives,
                                                     Washington, DC.

        Dear Mr. Speaker: This is to notify you formally pursuant to 
    Rule VIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives that I have 
    been served with a witness subpoena for documents, issued by the 
    District Court for the District of Maryland in Benisek v Lamone.
        After consultation with the Office of General Counsel, I have 
    determined that compliance with the subpoena will be consistent 
    with the privileges and rights of the House.

            Sincerely,
      Steny H. Hoyer.                          -------------------

          COMMUNICATION FROM THE HONORABLE C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, 
                             MEMBER OF CONGRESS    

        The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following 
    communication from the Honorable C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger, Member 
    of Congress:

                                    Congress of the United States,
                                         House of Representatives,
                                 Washington, DC, January 30, 2017.
                                                  Hon. Paul D. Ryan,
                                  Speaker, House of Representatives,
                                                     Washington, DC.

        Dear Mr. Speaker: This is to notify you formally pursuant to 
    Rule VIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives that we have 
    been served with a subpoena for documents, issued by the District 
    Court for the District of Maryland in Benisek v Lamone.
        After consultation with the Office of General Counsel, we have 
    determined that compliance with the subpoena will be consistent 
    with the privileges and rights of the House.

            Sincerely,
                                         C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger,
  Member of Congress.                          -------------------

         COMMUNICATION FROM THE HONORABLE JOHN P. SARBANES, MEMBER OF 
                                  CONGRESS    

        The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following 
    communication from the Honorable John P. Sarbanes, Member of 
    Congress:

                                    Congress of the United States,
                                         House of Representatives,
                                 Washington, DC, January 30, 2017.
                                                  Hon. Paul D. Ryan,
                                  Speaker, House of Representatives,
                                                     Washington, DC.

        Dear Mr. Speaker: This is to notify you formally pursuant to 
    Rule VIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives that we have 
    been served with a subpoena for documents, issued by the District 
    Court for the District of Maryland in Benisek v Lamone.
        After consultation with the Office of General Counsel, we have 
    determined that compliance with the subpoena will be consistent 
    with the privileges and rights of the House.

            Sincerely,
                                                 John P. Sarbanes,
                                               Member of Congress.

Sec. 7.2 Pursuant to rule VIII,(26) Members are required to 
    notify the Speaker of the receipt of judicial subpoenas, and may 
    indicate in such correspondence that they have determined that 
    compliance with such subpoenas is inconsistent with the privileges 
    of the House.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
26. House Rules and Manual Sec. 697 (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On September 24, 2015,(27) the following communications 
were laid before the House, indicating that Members had be served with 
subpoenas and that (after consultation with the Office of General 
Counsel), they had determined that compliance with the subpoenas was 
inconsistent with the privileges of the House:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
27. 161 Cong. Rec. 14775-76, 114th Cong. 1st Sess. For similar examples 
        of Members indicating that they intended to move to quash 
        judicial subpoenas, see 159 Cong. Rec. 3377, 113th Cong. 1st 
        Sess. (Mar. 12, 2013); and 159 Cong. Rec. 3775, 113th Cong. 1st 
        Sess. (Mar. 15, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            COMMUNICATION FROM CHAIR OF COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 
                             GOVERNMENT REFORM    

        The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following 
    communication from the chair of the Committee on Oversight and 
    Government Reform:

                                         House of Representatives,
                     Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
                               Washington, DC, September 22, 2015.
                                               Hon. John A. Boehner,
                                  Speaker, House of Representatives,
                                                     Washington, DC.

        Dear Mr. Speaker: This is to notify you formally, pursuant to 
    Rule VIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, that I have 
    received a subpoena, issued by the Superior Court for the District 
    of Columbia, purporting to require that, in connection with a 
    particular criminal case, I produce certain official documents and 
    appear to testify at trial on official matters.
        After consultation with the Office of General Counsel, I have 
    determined, pursuant to Rule VIII, that the subpoena (i) is not a 
    ``proper exercise of jurisdiction by the court,'' (ii) seeks 
    information that is not ``material and relevant,'' and/or (iii) is 
    not ``consistent with the privileges and rights'' of the House, its 
    Members, its officers, or its employees. Accordingly, I intend to 
    move to quash the subpoena, or for other protective relief.

            Sincerely,
                                                   Jason Chaffetz,
            Chairman.                          -------------------

        COMMUNICATION FROM RANKING MEMBER OF COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 
                             GOVERNMENT REFORM    

        The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following 
    communication from the ranking member of the Committee on Oversight 
    and Government Reform:

                                         House of Representatives,
                     Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
                               Washington, DC, September 22, 2015.
                                               Hon. John A. Boehner,
                                  Speaker, House of Representatives,
                                                     Washington, DC.

        Dear Mr. Speaker: This is to notify you formally, pursuant to 
    Rule VIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, that I have 
    received a subpoena, issued by the Superior Court for the District 
    of Columbia, purporting to require that, in connection with a 
    particular criminal case, I produce certain official documents and 
    appear to testify at trial on official matters.
        After consultation with the Office of General Counsel, I have 
    determined, pursuant to Rule VIII, that the subpoena (i) is not a 
    ``proper exercise of jurisdiction by the court,'' (ii) seeks 
    information that is not ``material and relevant,'' and/or (iii) is 
    not ``consistent with the privileges and rights'' of the House, its 
    Members, its officers, or its employees. Accordingly, I intend to 
    move to quash the subpoena, or for other protective relief.

            Sincerely,
                                               Elijah E. Cummings,
                                                   Ranking Member.

Sec. 7.3 Pursuant to rule VIII,(28) Members are required to 
    notify the Speaker upon receipt of a subpoena or other judicial 
    order, and may supplement such correspondence to correct errors or 
    omissions in the initial notification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
28. House Rules and Manual Sec. 697 (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On March 11, 2011,(29) the following communication was 
laid before the House:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
29. 157 Cong. Rec. 3849-50, 112th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            COMMUNICATION FROM CHAIR OF COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 
                             GOVERNMENT REFORM    

        The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Harris) laid before the House the 
    following communication from the chair of the Committee on 
    Oversight and Government Reform:

                                         House of Representatives,
                     Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
                                   Washington, DC, March 11, 2011.
                                               Hon. John A. Boehner,
                                  Speaker, House of Representatives,
                                                     Washington, DC.

        Dear Mr. Speaker: My letter of March 3, 2011 notified you 
    formally, pursuant to Rule VIII of the Rules of the House of 
    Representatives, that the Committee on Oversight and Government 
    Reform has been served with a subpoena for documents issued by the 
    United States District Court for the District of Columbia in a case 
    now ending before that Court. That letter incorrectly referenced 
    the pending case as a civil case. In fact, it is a criminal case.

            Sincerely,
                                                  Darrell E. Issa,
                                  Chairman, Committee on Oversight
                                            and Government Reform.

Sec. 7.4 The procedural requirements of rule VIII(30) 
    regarding the receipt of subpoenas and judicial orders apply to 
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners in the same manner as they 
    apply to Members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
30. House Rules and Manual Sec. 697 (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On September 30, 2015,(31) the following communication 
from the Delegate from the District of Columbia was laid before the 
House pursuant to rule VIII:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
31. 161 Cong. Rec. 15497, 114th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         COMMUNICATION FROM THE HONORABLE ELEANOR H. NORTON, MEMBER OF 
                                  CONGRESS    

        The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Young of Iowa) laid before the 
    House the following communication from the Honorable Eleanor H. 
    Norton, Member of Congress:

                                    Congress of the United States,
                                         House of Representatives,
                               Washington, DC, September 30, 2015.
                                               Hon. John A. Boehner,
                  Speaker, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

        Dear Mr. Speaker: This is to notify you formally, pursuant to 
    Rule VIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, that I have 
    received a subpoena, issued by the Superior Court for the District 
    of Columbia, in connection with a particular criminal case, that I 
    produce certain official documents and appear to testify at trial 
    on official matters.
        After consultation with counsel, I will make the determination 
    required by Rule VIII.

            Sincerely,
                                                Eleanor H. Norton,
                                               Member of Congress.

Sec. 7.5 Pursuant to rule VIII, Members are permitted to make the 
    initial determination as to whether compliance with judicial 
    process is consistent with the privileges and prerogatives of the 
    House, but that ``[u]nder no circumstances may minutes or 
    transcripts of executive sessions, or evidence of witnesses in 
    respect thereto, be disclosed or copied.''(32)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
32. Rule VIII, clause 3(b); House Rules and Manual Sec. 697 (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule VIII, permitting Members to determine on an individual basis 
whether compliance with subpoenas or other judicial orders is 
consistent with the privileges of the House, does not extend to the 
production of executive session material.(33) On March 17, 
1998,(34) the following letter from a Member, indicating 
that the Office of General Counsel had advised him that compliance with 
subpoenas was not consistent with the privileges of the House, was laid 
before the House:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
33. Parliamentarian's Note: The Committee on Standards of Official 
        Conduct (now the Committee on Ethics) always meets in executive 
        session (pursuant to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XI) unless the 
        committee votes to open the session to the public. House Rules 
        and Manual Sec. 806 (2021). The documents sought here were of 
        executive session material, and therefore could not be produced 
        under rule VIII.
34. 144 Cong. Rec. 3838, 105th Cong. 2d Sess. For a similar case prior 
        to the advent of rule VIII (where the House took no action with 
        respect to a subpoena for executive session material, thus 
        precluding the production of said documents), see 120 Cong. 
        Rec. 16918, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. (May 30, 1974).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS 
                            OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT    

        The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House a communication 
    from the Chairman of the Committee on Standards of Official 
    Conduct:

                                            Committee on Standards
                                              of Official Conduct,
                                   Washington, DC, March 16, 1998.
                                                 Hon. Newt Gingrich,
                                  Speaker, House of Representatives,
                                                     Washington, DC.

        Dear Mr. Speaker: This is to formally notify you, pursuant to 
    Rule L (50) of the Rules of the House of Representatives, that the 
    Committee on Standards of Official Conduct (``Committee'') has been 
    served with a grand jury subpoena (for documents) issued by the 
    U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts and directed 
    to the Committee's ``Keeper of Records.''
        After the consultation with the Office of General Counsel, the 
    Committee has determined that compliance with the subpoena is not 
    consistent with the precedents and privileges of the House and, 
    therefore, that the subpoena should be resisted.

            Sincerely,
                                                  James V. Hansen,
                                                         Chairman.

Prior Practice

Sec. 7.6 Under prior practice, Members were not permitted to respond to 
    judicial process without the explicit consent of the House, which 
    could be granted via privileged resolution.(35)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
35. Parliamentarian's Note: Under modern procedures pursuant to rule 
        VIII, Members notify the House when they receive subpoenas or 
        other judicial orders, but are otherwise allowed to determine 
        for themselves whether a response is consistent with the rights 
        and privileges of the House. The adoption of a separate 
        resolution in each case is no longer required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As exemplified by these proceedings of January 22, 
1976,(36) prior to the advent of rule VIII,(37) 
Members needed specific authorization from the House (in the form of a 
privileged resolution) in order to comply with judicial subpoenas or 
orders:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
36. 122 Cong. Rec. 581, 94th Cong. 2d Session. For similar examples of 
        the House adopting privileged resolutions authorizing Members 
        to respond to subpoenas, see 119 Cong. Rec. 21180, 93d Cong. 
        1st Sess. (June 25, 1973); 121 Cong. Rec. 16860, 94th Cong. 1st 
        Sess. (June 4, 1975); 121 Cong. Rec. 37888-89, 94th Cong. 1st 
        Sess. (Dec. 1, 1975); and 122 Cong. Rec. 145, 94th Cong. 2d 
        Sess. (Jan. 19, 1976).
37. House Rules and Manual Sec. 697 (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        PRIVILEGES OF THE HOUSE--SUBPOENA IN CASE OF BOSTON PNEUMATICS, 
                      INC. AGAINST INGERSOLL-RAND CO.    

        Mr. [Joseph] McDADE [of Pennsylvania]. Mr. Speaker, I rise to a 
    question of the privileges of the House.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. [Thomas] O'Neill [of 
    Massachusetts]). The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. McDADE. Mr. Speaker, I have been subpoenaed by the U.S. 
    District Court for the District of Columbia to appear at the office 
    of Stassen, Kostos and Mason, 450 Federal Bar Building West, 
    Washington, DC, on January 26, 1976, at 10 a.m., to testify on 
    behalf of Boston Pneumatics, Inc., at the taking of a deposition in 
    the case of Boston Pneumatics, Inc. against Ingersoll-Rand Co., 
    civil action No. 72-1729, now pending in the U.S. District Court 
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
        Under the precedents of the House, I am unable to comply with 
    this subpoena without the consent of the House, the privileges of 
    the House being involved. I, therefore, submit the matter for the 
    consideration of this body.
        Mr. Speaker, I send the subpoena to the desk.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will read the subpoena.
        The Clerk read as follows:

        [In the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil 
          Action File, U.S.D.C. Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 72-
                              1729; FS. 76-0013.]

        Boston Pneumatics, Inc. vs. Ingersoll-Rand Company.

        To Joseph M. McDade, United States House of Representatives, 
    2202 Rayburn House Building, Washington, DC.
        You are commanded to appear at the office of Stassen Kostos and 
    Mason, 450 Federal Bar Building West in the city of Washington on 
    the 26th day January, 1976, at 10:00 o'clock A.M. to testify on 
    behalf of Plaintiff, Boston Pneumatics, Inc. at the taking of a 
    deposition in the above entitled action pending in the United 
    States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and 
    bring with you any written correspondence between your office and 
    the Ingersoll-Rand Company and between your office and the General 
    Services Administration, regarding allegations of violations of the 
    Buy-American Act by Boston Pneumatics during the period around July 
    1969 to July 1970.

            Dated January 16, 1976.
                                                   James F. Davey,
                                                            Clerk.

                                               By Mary B. Deavers,
                                                     Deputy Clerk.

        Any subpoenaed organization not a party to this suit is hereby 
    admonished pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil 
    Procedure, to file a designation with the court specifying one or 
    more officers, directors, or managing agents, or other persons who 
    consent to testify on its behalf, and shall set forth, for each 
    person designated, the matters on which he will testify or produce 
    documents or things. The persons so designated shall testify as to 
    matters known or reasonably available to the organization.

        Mr. [John] McFALL [of California]. Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    privileged resolution (H. Res. 971) and ask for its immediate 
    consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

H. Res. 971

  Whereas Representative Joseph M. McDade, a Member of this House, has been 
served with a subpoena issued by the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia to appear at the office of Stassen, Kostos and Mason, 
450 Federal Bar Building West, Washington, DC, on the 26th of January 1976, 
at 10:00 A.M. to testify on behalf of Boston Pneumatics, Inc., at the 
taking of a deposition in the case of Boston Pneumatics, Inc. against 
Ingersoll-Rand Company, civil action number 72-1729, now pending in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; and

  Whereas by the privileges of the House no Member is authorized to appear 
and testify but by the order of the House: Therefore, be it

  Resolved, That Representative Joseph M. McDade is authorized to appear in 
response to the subpoena of the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia to testify at the taking of deposition in the case of 
Boston Pneumatics, Inc. against Ingersoll-Rand Company at such time as when 
the House is not sitting in session; and be it further

  Resolved, That as a respectful answer to the subpoena a copy of this 
resolution be submitted to the said court.

        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 7.7 Under prior practice, Members were not permitted to respond to 
    judicial process without the specific authorization of the House, 
    and the House (via privileged resolution) could choose to assert 
    its privileges with respect to the release of documents under its 
    control.(38)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
38. Parliamentarian's Note: Under current rule VIII procedures, Members 
        must notify the House with respect to any subpoenas they 
        receive, but the determination whether or not to comply is left 
        to the judgment of the individual Member (typically after 
        consultation with the Office of General Counsel or, more 
        rarely, outside counsel).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proceedings of December 19, 1975,(39) demonstrate 
prior practice with respect to subpoenas issued for House documents. In 
this instance, the House adopted a resolution (raised as a question of 
the privileges of the House) asserting its privilege to deny the 
production of the requested documents:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
39. 121 Cong. Rec. 41972-73, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        PRIVILEGES OF THE HOUSE-BALTIMORE CONTRACTORS, INC. AGAINST THE 
                               UNITED STATES    

        The SPEAKER.(40) The Chair recognizes the gentleman 
    from Massachusetts (Mr. O'Neill).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
40. Carl Albert (OK).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Thomas] O'NEILL [of Massachusetts]. Mr. Speaker, I rise to 
    a question of the privileges of the House.
        Mr. Speaker, the U.S. Court of Claims, on June 17, 1975, 
    entered an order in the case of Baltimore Contractors, Inc., 
    against the United States (Ct. Cl. No. 272-70) requiring the 
    production of certain Government documents. Certain of those 
    documents covered by the said order of the court are documents of 
    the House Building Commission and as such they are documents which 
    are within the control and possession of the House of 
    Representatives. The order of the court requiring their production, 
    therefore, gives rise to a question of the privileges of the House.
        Mr. Speaker, as a member of the House Building Commission I 
    send to the desk a privileged resolution (H. Res. 947) in response 
    to the said order of the court.
        The SPEAKER. The Clerk will read the resolution.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 947

  Whereas in the case of Baltimore Contractors, Inc. against the United 
States (Case No. 272-70) pending in the United States Court of Claims, an 
order was issued by the said court on June 17, 1975 granting the 
plaintiff's motion for the production of certain documents in the 
possession and under the control of the House of Representatives: Therefore 
be it

  Resolved, That by the privileges of this House no evidence of a 
documentary character under the control and in the possession of the House 
of Representatives can, by the mandate of process of the ordinary courts of 
justice, be taken from such control or possession but by its permission; be 
It further

  Resolved, That a copy of this resolution be submitted to the said court 
as a respectful answer to the order aforementioned.

        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 7.8 Under prior practice, Members were not permitted to respond to 
    judicial process without the specific authorization of the House, 
    and when the House (by inaction) failed to provide such 
    authorization, compliance with the judicial order was not 
    permitted.(41)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
41. Parliamentarian's Note: The advent of rule VIII (and related 
        precursor resolutions) essentially reversed the burdens with 
        respect to judicial process. Under current rules, Members are 
        permitted to make the initial determination as to whether 
        compliance with the subpoena or other judicial order is 
        consistent with the rights and privileges of the House, and 
        inaction by the House constitutes acquiescence in the Members' 
        judgment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under prior practice of the House with regard to the receipt of 
subpoenas, authorization to respond to the subpoena could only be 
provided by the House itself via the adoption of a privileged 
resolution.(42) Failure to adopt such a resolution 
constituted the House's judgment that such authorization should not be 
provided, as occurred on December 11, 1979:(43)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
42. For an example of a resolution authorizing compliance with a 
        subpoena, see Sec. 7.6, supra. For an example of a resolution 
        prohibiting compliance, see Sec. 7.7, supra.
43. 125 Cong. Rec. 35469, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. For a similar occasion 
        where the House did not adopt a resolution authorizing a 
        response to a subpoena, see 126 Cong. Rec. 30050, 96th Cong. 2d 
        Sess. (Nov. 18, 1980).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         PRIVILEGES OF THE HOUSE--SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM IN THE CASE ON 
                               DONALD GASQUE    

        Mr. [Parren] MITCHELL of Maryland. Mr. Speaker, I rise to a 
    question of the privileges of the House.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(44) The gentleman will 
    state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
44. Robert Giaimo (CT).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. MITCHELL of Maryland. Mr. Speaker, I have been served with 
    subpoena duces tecum for the circuit court of Anne Arundel County, 
    MD, to appear Thursday, December 30, 1979, in the ease of Donald 
    Gasque.
        Under the precedents I am unable to respond without the 
    permission of the House and the privileges of the House being 
    involved.
        I send the subpoena to the desk for such action as the House 
    may take.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will read the subpoena.
        The Clerk read as follows:

Summons Duces Tecum

  Defendant: Donald Gasque.

  Case No. 22,854.

  State of Maryland, Anne Arundel County, Sct:

  To: Parren J. Mitchell, 1018 Federal Office Building, 31 Hopkins Plaza, 
Baltimore, Maryland 21201.

  You are hereby summonsed to appear before the Judges of the Circuit Court 
for Anne Arundel County, Court House, Church Circle, Annapolis, Maryland, 
on Thursday, the 13th day of December 1979, at 1:30 PM, to testify for the 
Defendant, and to bring with you a report which you have in your possession 
which outlines and discusses the conditions at the Maryland House of 
Corrections, Jessup, Maryland.

  Failure to attend, may result in your arrest.

  Witness the Honorable Judges of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel 
County, Maryland.

  W. Garrett Larrimore, Clerk.

  By Donna Heins, Deputy.

  Date issued: December 6, 1979.

  Requested by:

  Name: James D. McCarthy, Jr.

  Address: Assistant Public Defender, 60 West Street, Suite 203, Annapolis, 
Maryland 21401.

Sec. 7.9 Under a prior form of rule VIII,(45) administrative 
    subpoenas were treated in the same manner as judicial subpoenas, 
    and subject to the same procedural requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
45. House Rules and Manual Sec. 697 (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    During the 107th through 114th Congresses, rule VIII expressly 
applied both to judicial subpoenas and orders as well as administrative 
subpoenas issued by executive agencies. The current form of the rule 
(as well as the form of the rule prior to the 107th Congress) does not 
apply to administrative subpoenas, though the House retains the ability 
to respond to such subpoenas via the adoption of a privileged 
resolution.(46) The proceedings of May 3, 
1999,(47) provide an example of a Member notifying the House 
that an administrative subpoena had been received, and the House 
choosing not to authorize a response:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
46. See, e.g., Deschler's Precedents Ch. 11 Sec. 14.8.
47. 145 Cong. Rec. 8040, 106th Cong. 1st Sess. For a similar example, 
        see 144 Cong. Rec. 18298, 105th Cong. 2d Sess. (July 30, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          COMMUNICATION FROM CHAIRMAN, HOUSE REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE    

        The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House a communication 
    from the Honorable J.C. Watts, Jr., Chairman, House Republican 
    Conference:

                                      House Republican Conference,
                                         House of Representatives,
                                   Washington, DC, April 30, 1999.
                                             Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
                                  Speaker, House of Representatives,
                                                     Washington, DC.

        Dear Mr. Speaker: I write to notify you pursuant to L. 
    Deschler, 3 Deschler's Precedents of the United States House of 
    Representatives ch. 11, Sec. 14.8 (1963), that I have been served 
    with an administrative agency subpoena (in my capacity as Chairman 
    of the House Republican Conference) issued by the Federal Election 
    Commission. The subpoena seeks information and documents relating 
    to Conference activity from 1996.

            Sincerely,
                                                  J.C. Watts, Jr.,
            Chairman.                          -------------------

          COMMUNICATION FROM THE HONORABLE JOHN A. BOEHNER, MEMBER OF 
                                  CONGRESS    

        The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following 
    communication from the Honorable John A. Boehner, Member of 
    Congress:

                                    Congress of the United States,
                                         House of Representatives,
                                                   April 30, 1999.
                                             Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
                                  Speaker, House of Representatives,
                                                     Washington, DC.

        Dear Mr. Speaker: This is to notify you pursuant to L. 
    Deschler, 3 Deschler's Precedents of the United States House of 
    Representatives ch. 11 Sec. 14.8 (1963), that I have been served 
    with an administrative agency subpoena issued by the Federal 
    Election Commission.

            Sincerely,
     John A. Boehner.                          -------------------

           COMMUNICATION FROM STAFF MEMBER OF THE HONORABLE JOHN A. 
                        BOEHNER, MEMBER OF CONGRESS    

        The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following 
    communication from Barry Jackson, Chief of Staff to the Honorable 
    John A. Boehner, Member of Congress:

                                    Congress of the United States,
                                         House of Representatives,
                                                   April 30, 1999.
                                             Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
                             Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives,
                                                     Washington, DC.

        Dear Mr. Speaker: This is to notify you pursuant to L. 
    Deschler, 3 Deschler's Precedents of the United States House of 
    Representatives ch. 11, Sec. 14.8 (1963), that I have been served 
    with an administrative agency subpoena issued by the Federal 
    Election Commission.

            Sincerely,
                                                    Barry Jackson,
                                                   Chief of Staff.



Sec. 8. Speech or Debate Immunity

    ``[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and 
Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other place.'' This 
principle, articulated in article I, section 6, clause 1(1) 
of the Constitution, is derived directly from the English Bill of 
Rights of 1689, which provides ``That the freedom of speech, and 
debates or proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or 
questioned in any court or place out of Parliament.''(2) 
Although originally designed to prevent royal interference with 
parliamentary deliberations, this privilege in the American context 
plays a similar role in maintaining the independence of the legislative 
branch against encroachments by the executive or the 
judiciary.(3)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. House Rules and Manual Sec. Sec. 92-95 (2021).
 2. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 16. The Articles of 
        Confederation formulated the same immunity provision as 
        follows: ``Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not 
        be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of 
        Congress.'' See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177 
        (1966).
 3. See Sec. 7, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although textually limited to ``Speech or Debate''(4) 
this privilege has been interpreted more broadly to encompass all 
legislative acts.(5) Speeches or debates on the floor of the 
House during its sitting(6) are obviously covered as one of 
the most fundamental legislative acts in which a Member may 
engage.(7) Similarly, voting on measures (and introducing 
them for consideration) has been held entitled to protection under the 
Speech or Debate Clause.(8) In a recent circuit court case, 
the D.C. Circuit Court held that the system of proxy voting instituted 
by the House in response to the COVID-19 pandemic concerned ``core 
legislative acts'' that cannot be questioned due to Speech or Debate 
immunity.''(9) Related activities, such as participating in 
committee meetings and hearings,(10) producing committee 
reports,(11) conducting investigations and general 
information-gathering for legislative purposes,(12) have all 
been considered legislative acts covered by the grant of immunity. Even 
House and Senate regulations regarding admission to their respective 
press galleries (despite potential First Amendment concerns) have been 
held immune from challenge under the Speech or Debate 
Clause.(13)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. For examples of Speech or Debate immunity raised in the context of 
        defamation suits, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 
        Sec. Sec. 16.3, 16.4.
 5. See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). See also 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 17.
 6. Parliamentarian's Note: The clause applies not only to words 
        actually spoken in debate, but also remarks inserted into the 
        Congressional Record with the consent of the House. See 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 16.3.
 7. Parliamentarian's Note: It should be noted that the speech of 
        Members is protected from being subject to challenge outside of 
        the House, not within the House. The House is at liberty to 
        adopt rules of decorum that regulate the content of speeches 
        made during its legislative sessions. Such restrictions do not 
        run afoul of the constitutional principle discussed here. See 
        Sec. 8.1, infra. See also 3 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 2671. For 
        more on decorum in debate, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 29 
        Sec. Sec. 40-66; and Precedents (____) Ch. 29.
 8. See, e.g., Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
 9. See McCarthy v. Pelosi, No. 20-5240 slip op. at 8 (D.C. Cir. 2021) 
        (``Indeed, we are hard-pressed to conceive of matters more 
        integrally part of the legislative process than the rules 
        governing how Members can cast their votes on legislation and 
        mark their presence for purposes of establishing a legislative 
        quorum.'').
10. See, e.g., Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
11. See, e.g., Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1970).
12. See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 
        491 (1975).
13. See Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical 
        Correspondents' Association, 515 F.2d 1341, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 
        1975) (The Correspondents' Association ``was performing 
        delegated legislative functions; in fact these were an integral 
        part of the legislative machinery.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A seminal Supreme Court case interpreting the Speech or Debate 
Clause occurred in 1880.(14) The House had established a 
special committee to investigate certain real estate transactions, and 
empowered said committee with the authority to subpoena witnesses and 
documents. Hallett Kilbourn, a private citizen, was instructed to 
produce relevant documents, and upon his refusal to do so, the House 
Sergeant-at-Arms was directed to take Kilbourn into custody. Kilbourn 
sued both Members of the House and House officers for false 
imprisonment. The Court held that the Speech or Debate Clause provided 
the Member defendants with an affirmative defense: that their actions 
in facilitating the imprisonment of Kilbourn (reporting facts to the 
House, considering the resolution authorizing the imprisonment, voting 
in favor of said resolution, etc.) should all be considered activities 
protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the mid-20th century, a series of cases further defined the 
scope of the immunity in the context of criminal charges brought 
against Members. United States v. Johnson(15) and United 
States v. Brewster(16) both involved corruption schemes 
implicating sitting Members of Congress. In both cases, the Court held 
that the prosecutions were within the power of the government, but that 
the Speech or Debate Clause protected Members' legislative acts from 
being relied upon in that prosecution.(17) Inquiries into 
the motives or reasons behind a legislative act are similarly 
precluded.(18) Actions tangential or merely related to the 
legislative process, however, were not protected.(19) In a 
subsequent case, the Court held that a promise to undertake a 
legislative act (as opposed to the act itself) is not protected by 
Speech or Debate immunity.(20)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 383 U.S. 169 (1966). See also Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 
        Sec. 16.1.
16. 408 U.S. 501 (1972). See also Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 
        Sec. 16.2.
17. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 184-85 (1966) (``The 
        indictment itself focused with particularity upon motives 
        underlying the making of the speech and upon its contents . . . 
        [w]e hold that a prosecution under a general criminal statute 
        dependent on such inquiries necessarily contravenes the Speech 
        or Debate Clause.'').
18. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177 (1966) (``We see no 
        escape from the conclusion that such an intensive judicial 
        inquiry, made in the course of a prosecution by the Executive 
        Branch under a general conspiracy statute, violates the express 
        language of the Constitution and the policies which underlie 
        it.''). See also Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 
        524, 530 (9th Cir. 1983) (``Because Steiger's insertion of the 
        article into the Record was privileged, questions about it are 
        prohibited. This proscription includes questions about his 
        motive or legislative purpose.'').
19. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 528 (1972) (the 
        ``Speech or Debate Clause does not prohibit inquiry into 
        illegal conduct simply because it has some nexus to legislative 
        functions.'').
20. See United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 490 (1979) (``[I]t is 
        clear from the language of the Clause that protection extends 
        only to an act that has already been performed. A promise to 
        deliver a speech, to vote, or to solicit other votes at some 
        future date is not `speech or debate.' Likewise, a promise to 
        introduce a bill is not a legislative act.''). Private 
        discussions about potential future legislative acts are 
        similarly not protected. See U.S. v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1025 
        (9th Cir. 2011) (``[T]he fact that the Court permitted 
        Brewster's prosecution for his alleged purpose in negotiating 
        with private parties, solicitation of a bribe, demonstrates 
        that private negotiations between Members and private parties 
        are not protected `legislative acts . . .''').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In other criminal cases, courts have had to balance the immunity 
conferred on Members by the Constitution with the government's interest 
in investigating corruption and other illegal acts committed by 
Members.(21) A case occurred in 2006, when the FBI executed 
a search warrant at a Member's office in the Rayburn House Office 
Building. Paper and electronic documents were seized as part of an 
investigation into alleged acts of bribery, fraud, and other crimes. In 
the ensuing litigation, the court noted that this was ``the first time 
a sitting Member's congressional office has been searched by the 
Executive''(22) and that the case had obvious implications 
for the separation of powers. Ultimately, the court found that the 
Member was ``entitled to the return of all legislative materials 
(originals and copies) that are protected by the Speech or Debate 
Clause seized'' from his office, and further that the executive branch 
officials executing the seizure were barred from disclosure and from 
further involvement in the pending criminal matter.(23) In 
another case in 2015, the FBI sought a search warrant to inspect a 
Member's email accounts for evidence in a fraud, extortion and bribery 
investigation.(24) The Member attempted to quash the search 
warrant prior to its execution, claiming Speech or Debate immunity. The 
court found that the motion to quash was premature, and that the Speech 
or Debate Clause did not prevent the search: ``Permitting an 
interlocutory appeal of an order denying a motion to quash an 
unexecuted search warrant based on the Speech or Debate Clause would 
set bad precedent and insulate Members from criminal investigations and 
criminal process. This, of course, cannot and should not be the purpose 
of the Clause.''(25) In both cases described here, the 
courts stressed the importance of utilizing ``taint 
teams''(26) or ``filter teams''(27) to screen 
potentially privileged material before disclosure to executive 
authorities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
21. See U.S. v. Rayburn House Office Building, 497 F.3d 654, 664 (D.C. 
        Cir. 2007) (``[T]he remedy must give effect not only to the 
        separation of powers underlying the Speech or Debate Clause but 
        also to the sovereign's interest under Article II, Section 3 in 
        law enforcement.'').
22. See U.S. v. Rayburn House Office Building, 497 F.3d 654, 659 (D.C. 
        Cir. 2007).
23. Id. at 666.
24. See In re Search of Elec. Commc'ns, 802 F.3d 516 (3d Cir. 2015).
25. Id. at 531.
26. Id. at 530.
27. United States v. Rayburn House Office Building, 497 F.3d 654, 656-
        57 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Court in Brewster articulated a distinction between legislative 
acts and other acts (potentially also undertaken in an official or 
representative capacity) that are merely ``political'' in nature, and 
thus cannot take advantage of the protection afforded by the Speech or 
Debate Clause.(28) In Hutchinson v. Proxmire the Court held 
that press releases, newsletters, and similar constituent 
communications are not protected legislative acts.(29) 
Members often travel on official business, but courts have held that 
such activity does not constitute a legislative act that would prohibit 
inquiries into other (nonofficial) purposes of the 
travel.(30)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
28. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512-13 (1972) (``It is 
        well known, of course, that Members of the Congress engage in 
        many activities other than the purely legislative activities 
        protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. These include a wide 
        range of legitimate `errands' performed for constituents, the 
        making of appointments with Government agencies, assistance in 
        securing Government contracts, preparing so-called `news 
        letters' to constituents, news releases, and speeches delivered 
        outside the Congress. The range of these related activities has 
        grown over the years. They are performed in part because they 
        have come to be expected by constituents, and because they are 
        a means of developing continuing support for future elections. 
        Although these are entirely legitimate activities, they are 
        political in nature, rather than legislative, in the sense that 
        term has been used by the Court in prior cases. But it has 
        never been seriously contended that these political matters, 
        however appropriate, have the protection afforded by the Speech 
        or Debate Clause.''). See also Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 
        Sec. 16.2.
29. 443 U.S. 111, 133 (1979) (``Valuable and desirable as it may be in 
        broad terms, the transmittal of such information by individual 
        Members in order to inform the public and other Members is not 
        a part of the legislative function or the deliberations that 
        make up the legislative process . . . [a]s a result, 
        transmittal of such information by press releases and 
        newsletters is not protected by the Speech or Debate 
        Clause.''). For the formation of a Senate committee authorized 
        to file an amicus brief in the Hutchinson case, see 125 Cong. 
        Rec. 6080, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (Mar. 22, 1979).
30. See U.S. v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 1988) (``Travel 
        itself normally lacks the necessary legislative character to 
        trigger speech-or-debate protection.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The House's investigatory authorities permit the House and its 
committees to engage in a variety of actions that courts have held to 
be legislative acts protected by Speech or Debate 
immunity.(31) Issuing subpoenas and seeking judicial 
enforcement of those subpoenas are thus considered legislative acts 
protected under the Constitution.(32) Documents that come 
into the possession of the House or its committees become part of the 
legislative process, and the Speech or Debate Clause may preclude 
inquiries into those documents or their provenance.(33) 
Preparing, printing, and distributing committee reports have also been 
held protected legislative acts.(34)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
31. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 17.
32. See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 507 
        (1975) (``We conclude that the Speech or Debate Clause provides 
        complete immunity for the Members for issuance of this 
        subpoena.''). See also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 
        (1880).
33. See, e.g., Brown Williamson Tobacco v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 423 
        (D.C. Cir. 1995) (The claim ``is to a right to engage in a 
        broad scale discovery of documents in a congressional file that 
        comes from third parties. The Speech or Debate Clause bars that 
        claim.''); and Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
        v. Ferrer, 856 F.3d 1080, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (``. . . the 
        separation of powers, including the Speech or Debate Clause, 
        bars this court from ordering a congressional committee to 
        return, destroy, or refrain from publishing the subpoenaed 
        documents.'').
34. See, e.g., MINPECO, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 844 F.2d 
        856, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (``As the preparation of the 
        statement for publication in the subcommittee report was part 
        of the legislative process, that is the end of the matter. It 
        is the responsibility of Congress, not of the courts, to assure 
        the integrity of its reports.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 1972, the Supreme Court considered the case of a U.S. Senator 
who had entered the text of the classified ``Pentagon Papers'' into the 
record of a subcommittee hearing.(35) The Court held that 
this action was a legislative act protected by the Speech or Debate 
Clause. However, the Senator's attempt to publish the same material 
through a private publishing company was found to be not 
protected.(36) The Court defined a legislative act as an 
``integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by 
which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with 
respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed 
legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution 
places within the jurisdiction of either House.''(37)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
35. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). See also Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 17.4. For a resolution of the Senate 
        authorizing reimbursement for Senator Gravel's legal fees, see 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 17.5.
36. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972). Although 
        speeches contained in the Congressional Record are protected 
        under Speech or Debate immunity, courts have considered whether 
        circulating unofficial reprints of the Congressional Record is 
        itself a legislative act that would enjoy similar protection. 
        See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 16.3 (``. . . the absolute 
        privilege to inform fellow legislators becomes a qualified 
        privilege when portions of the Congressional Record are 
        republished and unofficially disseminated.''). Similarly, 
        dissemination of legislative correspondence (see Chastain v. 
        Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1987)) or committee reports 
        (see Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973)) may not be protected 
        by Speech or Debate immunity.
37. See Gravel at 625.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In a recent case involving the constitutionality of prayers 
delivered by the House Chaplain, a circuit court stated that 
``legislative prayer is not `an integral part of the deliberative and 
communicative process.'''(38) Thus, Speech or Debate 
immunity could not be invoked to terminate the litigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
38. Barker v. Conroy, 921 F.3d 1118, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The House's own internal disciplinary processes have sometimes come 
under scrutiny with respect to Speech or Debate considerations. In 
general, courts have found compliance with the House's ethics 
requirements to be nonlegislative actions. So, for example, neither 
reimbursement receipts nor financial disclosure forms have been found 
to be legislative documents protected under Speech or Debate 
immunity.(39) Likewise, testimony given before the House's 
Committee on Ethics has been held nonlegislative in character and 
therefore may become the subject of inquiries by the judicial 
branch.(40) However, actions taken by the House to impose 
disciplinary sanctions on its Members (filing reports by the Committee 
on Ethics, considering disciplinary resolutions on the floor of the 
House, voting to impose sanctions, etc.) have been treated as 
legislative acts, and Members are immune from any liability stemming 
from such actions.(41)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
39. See, e.g., United States v. Schock, 891 F.3d 334 (7th Cir. 2018); 
        and U.S. v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
40. See, e.g., U.S. v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (``. . . the 
        Supreme Court has never decided if the Speech or Debate Clause 
        protects a Member's testimony given in a personal capacity to a 
        congressional committee. We conclude that it does not . . .'').
41. See, e.g., Rangel v. Boehner, 785 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The courts have addressed whether personnel decisions by Members 
are ``legislative acts'' that may be protected by the Speech or Debate 
Clause. A circuit court in 1986(42) found that such 
decisions regarding the employment of staff are integral to the 
legislative process, and thus protected. However, in 2006, the same 
court (relying on Supreme Court decisions handed down in the interim) 
partially repudiated that analysis,(43) stating that Speech 
or Debate immunity should not be viewed as creating a bar to employment 
discrimination claims under the Congressional Accountability 
Act.(44) However, as with other types of claims, Speech or 
Debate immunity may present plaintiffs with evidentiary difficulties, 
as inquiries related to the claim may be barred by the 
privilege.(45)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
42. Browning v. Clerk, 789 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1986). But see Walker v. 
        Jones, 733 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (``For the reasons set out 
        below, however, we believe that personnel actions regarding the 
        management of congressional food services are too remote from 
        the business of legislating to rank `within the legislative 
        sphere.''').
43. Fields v. Office of Eddie Bernice Johnson, 459 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 
        2006).
44. P.L. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3.
45. Fields v. Office of Eddie Bernice Johnson, 459 F.3d 1, 14-15 (D.C. 
        Cir. 2006) (``The Speech or Debate Clause therefore may 
        preclude some relevant evidence in suits under the 
        Accountability Act.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Immunities of Officers and Staff

    Courts have also grappled with the question of whether 
congressional officers, staff, aides, or employees are themselves (at 
least in some circumstances) protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. 
The text of the Constitution mentions only Senators and 
Representatives, and early cases distinguished between protected acts 
performed by legislators themselves and unprotected acts performed by 
officers or employees of the House.(46) However, more recent 
cases have articulated rationales for deeming staff as protected by the 
constitutional immunity. Such ``aides and assistants . . . must be 
treated as the [Member's] alter ego'' if the purpose of the Clause is 
not to be frustrated.(47) Thus, when officers or employees 
of the House engage in duties to effectuate the legislative acts of 
Members of Congress, they are protected under the Speech or Debate 
Clause on the same basis as Members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
46. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 16 (``employees of the House 
        charged with the execution of the resolution could be held 
        personally liable for enforcing an unconstitutional 
        congressional act'' (citing Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 
        (1880)). See also Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967) 
        (``. . . the doctrine of legislative immunity is less absolute 
        when applied to officers or employees of legislative 
        bodies.''); and Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (``. . 
        . although an action against a Congressman may be barred by the 
        Speech or Debate Clause, legislative employees who participated 
        in the unconstitutional activity are responsible for their acts 
        . . .'').
47. Gravel at 616, 617. See also Eastland v. United States Servicemen's 
        Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 507 (1975) (``We conclude that the Speech 
        or Debate Clause provides complete immunity for the Members for 
        issuance of this subpoena. We draw no distinction between the 
        Members and the Chief Counsel.''); and Rangel v. Boehner, 785 
        F.3d 19, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (plaintiff's argument that two 
        congressional staffers did not enjoy immunity ``runs headlong 
        into Gravel. . . . [t]he key consideration, Supreme Court 
        decisions teach, is the act presented for examination, not the 
        actor.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Waivers

    As noted earlier, Speech or Debate immunity operates as a 
procedural defense to judicial process.(48) It is thus 
incumbent on the affected Member to assert that defense as litigation 
proceeds. Former voluntary compliance with investigatory authorities or 
judicial orders, or prior waivers of other constitutional protections, 
does not constitute a waiver of Speech or Debate 
immunity.(49) The Court in United States v. Helstoski 
further held that waivers of the immunity ``can be found only after 
explicit and unequivocal renunciation of the 
protection.''(50)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
48. For current procedures for responding to service of process under 
        rule VIII (and the ability of Members to waive applicable 
        constitutional protections under those procedures), see Sec. 7, 
        supra.
49. 442 U.S. 477, 492 (1979) (``The exchanges between Helstoski and the 
        various United States Attorneys indeed indicate a willingness 
        to waive the protection of the Fifth Amendment; but the Speech 
        or Debate Clause provides a separate, and distinct, protection 
        which calls for at least as clear and unambiguous an expression 
        of waiver.''). For an insertion into the Congressional Record 
        of the text of the Helstoski decision by the chair of the 
        Committee on House Administration, see 125 Cong. Rec. 15303-
        306, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (June 18, 1979).
50. Id. at 491.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 8.1 In response to parliamentary inquiries, the Chair confirmed 
    that the Constitution's Speech or Debate immunity granted to 
    Members of Congress does not prevent the House from enforcing 
    appropriate decorum standards with respect to debate on the floor 
    of the House.

    On May 25, 1995,(51) the Chair reiterated the House's 
decorum standards with respect to matters pending before the Committee 
on Standards of Official Conduct (now the Committee on Ethics) and 
further confirmed that the Constitution's grant of Speech or Debate 
immunity to Members of Congress does not bar the enforcement of such 
rules of decorum:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
51. 141 Cong. Rec. 14434-36, 104th Cong. 1st Sess. For the 
        parliamentary limits on Speech or Debate immunity described in 
        Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice, see 3 Hinds' 
        Precedents Sec. 2671. See also House Rules and Manual Sec. 302 
        (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   REGARDING THE ETHICS PROCESS IN THE HOUSE

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(52) Under the Speaker's 
    announced policy of May 12, 1995, the gentlewoman from Colorado 
    [Mrs. Schroeder] is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of 
    the minority leader.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
52. Danny Burton (IN).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mrs. [Patricia] SCHROEDER [of Colorado]. I thank the Speaker 
    very much for yielding to me. . . .
        This letter was addressed to both Nancy Johnson and Jim 
    McDermott, care of the Committee on Ethics, and it is about the 
    issue of the pending matters in front of the Committee on Ethics 
    that appear, according to news printed stores, to be in deadlock. . 
    . .
        Well, we still have not heard anything from the Committee on 
    Ethics that this has been approved, and yet today we saw 
    announcements that he was going off on a 35 city tour come August 
    break, sponsored, I assume, by the same company that is doing the 
    book. And there are an awful lot of issues around that. . . .
        We are also asking questions about, are there any conflicts of 
    interest? Who is paying for the tour and is there any conflict of 
    interest vis-a-vis legislation in front of this body, because we 
    understand, if it is Mr. Murdoch, Mr. Murdoch has some very, very 
    important interests in this body on the telecommunications issues 
    and many others. . . .

                            parliamentary inquiries

        Mr. [John] PORTER [of Illinois]. Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from 
    Illinois [Mr. Porter] for a parliamentary inquiry.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Burton of Indiana). The gentleman 
    will state it.
        Mr. PORTER. Mr. Speaker, I would inquire as to whether this 
    discussion is within the rules of the House or outside the rules of 
    the House?
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Members should not engage in debate 
    concerning matters that may be pending in the Committee on 
    Standards of Official Conduct.
        Mr. [Lloyd] DOGGETT [of Texas]. Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from 
    Texas [Mr. Doggett] for a parliamentary inquiry.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. DOGGETT. In March of this year, Speaker Gingrich announced 
    that under the speech and debate clause applying to this Congress 
    that Members were free to speak on any subject at any time. I am 
    wondering if that pronouncement does not control in a situation 
    that applies to the Speaker as well.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The ``Speech and debate'' clause does 
    not apply with respect to the subject of the parliamentary inquiry 
    just asked by the gentleman from Illinois.
        The Chair will again state that Members should not engage in 
    debate concerning matters that may be pending in the Committee on 
    Standards of Official Conduct.

Sec. 8.2 A resolution expressing the sense of the House with regard to 
    the scope of the Constitution's Speech or Debate immunity 
    provision, and further requesting that the United States Supreme 
    Court issue a writ of certiorari to review a circuit court decision 
    interpreting such provision, constitutes a valid question of the 
    privileges of the House.

    On May 12, 1988,(53) the Majority Leader (Rep. Tom Foley 
of Washington), on behalf of himself and the Minority Leader (Rep. Bob 
Michel of Illinois), offered the following resolution as a question of 
the privileges of the House:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
53. 134 Cong. Rec. 10574, 10576, 10579, 100th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        PRIVILEGES OF THE HOUSE--RELATING TO THE DUTIES AND PRIVILEGES 
                 OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES    

        Mr. [Thomas] FOLEY [of Washington]. Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    privileged resolution (H. Res. 446) and ask for its immediate 
    consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 446

  Whereas, consistent with the Constitution and the history of 
parliamentary bodies, the Members of the United States House of 
Representatives have always considered it to be an integral part of the 
official responsibilities of Members of Congress to inform the citizens 
they represent and the agencies of government regarding issues of public 
importance;

  Whereas, the judiciary of the United States has in a long series of 
decisions established the doctrine of official immunity pursuant to which 
all public officials are provided certain protections from civil liability 
when engaged in the good faith performance of their official functions;

  Whereas, in 1985 Representative Don Sundquist, a Member of this House, 
communicated with the Attorney General of the United States, the Federal 
Legal Services Corporation, and the citizens of the congressional district 
which he represents, informing them of an ongoing issue of public 
importance, a controversy relating to the expenditure of federal funds by 
the Memphis Area Legal Services in that federally funded organization's 
continuing dispute with the State of Tennessee's judicial branch;

  Whereas, Wayne Chastain an attorney with the Memphis Area Legal Services 
filed suit against Representative Sundquist seeking in excess of one 
million dollars in personal damages based on Representative Sundquist's 
official communications with the Attorney General of the United States, the 
Federal Legal Services Corporation, and the citizens of Tennessee;

  Whereas, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
dismissed the suit, holding that Representative Sundquist's actions were 
official and that for the good faith performance of their official duties 
Members of Congress, like all other public officials, are protected from 
civil liability;

  Whereas, on November 6, 1987, a divided panel of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, departed from the 
precedent of that Court and the Supreme Court and reversed the ruling of 
the District Court holding that the doctrine of official immunity, which 
provides certain protections from civil liability to all public officials 
engaged in the good faith performance of their official duties, was not 
applicable to the official actions of a Member of Congress;

  Whereas, despite the expressed desire of a majority of the participating 
judges of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to 
review the decision of the panel's majority by rehearing the case en banc, 
the en banc Court of Appeals declined to rehear the case;

  Whereas, Representative Sundquist, through the Office of General Counsel 
to the Clerk of the House, is presently seeking a writ of certiorari from 
the Supreme Court of the United States;

  Whereas, the decision of the divided panel of the Court of Appeals raises 
the most serious concerns for the doctrine of separation of powers provided 
in the Constitution and for the ancient and historic rights and privileges 
of the House; and

  Whereas, the decision of the divided panel of the Court of Appeals, if 
left standing, will have an adverse effect on the performance of important 
official duties by Members of the House and will deprive citizens of an 
irreplaceable source of information about the functioning of their 
government: Now, therefore, be it

  Resolved, That the House of Representatives considers the informing of 
citizens and executive branch agencies on matters of public importance to 
be a part of the official duties of a Member of the House; and be it 
further

  Resolved, That the House of Representatives considers it to be 
appropriate that Members of the House engaged in the performance of their 
official duties will be treated by the Courts with the same respect and 
protection presently afforded by the Courts to all other public officials; 
and be it further

  Resolved, That the House of Representatives views with deep concern the 
decision of the divided panel of the Court of Appeals of the District of 
Columbia Circuit in the case of Wayne Chastain v. The Honorable Don 
Sundquist because of its impact on the necessary and proper functioning of 
the House of Representatives as a coordinate branch of government and as 
the elected representatives of the American people; and be it further

  Resolved, That the House of Representatives respectfully requests the 
Supreme Court of the United States to grant a writ of certiorari, so that 
it may review this matter, and reach a just result; and be it further

  Resolved, That the Clerk of the House shall forthwith transmit a 
certified copy of this resolution to the Honorable Clerk of the Supreme 
Court.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. [Charles] Schumer [of New York]). 
    The resolution presents a question of privilege, and the Chair 
    recognizes the gentleman from Washington for 1 hour.
        Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield 30 
    minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Michel], 
    pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.
        Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, on behalf of the Republican leader, Mr. 
    Michel and myself, I have introduced this privileged resolution. 
    The resolution expresses, to the Supreme Court of the United 
    States, a respectful request of this House. By adopting this 
    resolution we will be asking that the Court grant a review of a 
    recent decision of the Federal Court of Appeals for the District of 
    Columbia Circuit which impacts on the day-to-day operation of the 
    House and its Members.
        The litigation at issue, Chastain versus Sundquist, is a civil 
    action which alleges that Congressman Sundquist, our colleague from 
    Tennessee, included defamatory material in a letter which he sent 
    to a Federal agency discussing an issue of public importance and 
    controversy in the Memphis area. Specifically, Representative 
    Sundquist, in his letters and in his discussions with his 
    constituents, expressed his concerns with respect to the operation 
    of a federally funded program, the Memphis Area Legal Services. . . 
    .
        Mr. Speaker, I would ask then to include with my remarks at the 
    conclusion of my opening remarks the text of our ``Dear Colleague'' 
    letter that the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Foley] and I jointly 
    signed to the membership.
        I will reserve the balance of my time.

                                         House of Representatives,
                                                   Washington, DC.

        Dear Colleague: On Wednesday, May 11, 1988, we will seek floor 
    consideration of a privileged resolution. The resolution requests 
    the Supreme Court to review a recent decision of the United States 
    Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Chastain 
    v. Sundquist. The Speaker and the Bipartisan Leadership of the 
    House believe that the opinion of the divided panel of the Court of 
    Appeals represents a significant departure from established 
    precedent and seriously threatens the proper functioning of Members 
    of the House as representatives of the American people.
        The Court of Appeals has held that Members of Congress do not 
    receive the protections provided to all other public officials 
    under the doctrine of official immunity. This ruling was issued, 
    and permitted to stand, by a sharply divided Court of Appeals in a 
    million dollar lawsuit brought against our colleague, Don 
    Sundquist.
        Congressman Sundquist had written letters to the appropriate 
    Executive Branch officials expressing his concern with the 
    allocation of resources, and the manner of operation, of the 
    Memphis Area Legal Services, a federally funded entity. He also 
    brought these concerns on this ongoing public controversy to the 
    attention of his constituents.
        A lawyer, who was mentioned in one of the letters, brought suit 
    against Congressman Sundquist alleging that the communications with 
    the Executive Branch and with the public had been defamatory. The 
    suit sought in excess of one million dollars in damages.
        Congressman Sundquist was represented by the General Counsel to 
    the Clerk of the House. The District Court dismissed the suit, 
    holding that Congressman Sundquist had been engaged in his official 
    duties and, therefore, was protected by the doctrine of official 
    immunity. Pursuant to that doctrine, all public officials who are 
    engaged in the discretionary performance of their official 
    functions can only be subjected to suit and liability for 
    violations of clearly established standards of statutory or 
    constitutional law. Since the Plaintiff had not alleged that 
    Congressman Sundquist had violated any statute or constitutional 
    provision, the District Court dismissed the case.
        On appeal a three-judge panel ruled, on a two-to-one vote, that 
    Members of Congress engaged in official, but not legislative 
    actions, receive no protection whatsoever. The justification for 
    this treatment, which differs from the treatment accorded every 
    other public official at all levels and in all branches of 
    government, was that the Constitution provides Members with an 
    absolute privilege for legislative actions under the Speech or 
    Debate Clause and that, therefore, no other privilege would apply.
        Judge Mikva, a former Member of the House, dissented and wrote 
    a strongly worded opinion which argued for the application of the 
    immunity and pointed out that the two-judge majority was departing 
    from the established precedent of the Court of Appeals.
        Congressman Sundquist sought to have the decision reviewed by 
    the full Court of Appeals, but despite the agreement of a six-judge 
    plurality that the panel's decision should be reviewed, the full 
    court declined to rehear the case. Congressman Sundquist is 
    presently seeking a review of the matter by the Supreme Court.
        Our resolution simply requests the Supreme Court to review the 
    case. Adoption of the resolution will not ask the Court to rule in 
    any particular fashion on the merits of Congressman Sundquist's 
    argument but will highlight for the Court the extreme importance of 
    this question to all Members of the House. Every one of us is 
    called upon on a daily basis to perform many official functions 
    which are not integral parts of the legislative process. The job of 
    a Congressman extends far beyond the confines of formulating, 
    debating and acting on legislative proposals. Each of us is in 
    daily contact with Executive agencies and with our constituents. 
    Part of our task is to bridge the gap between the federal 
    government and the citizens we represent. It is important that we 
    be able to attend to these responsibilities without unnecessary 
    fear or inconvenience from litigation. The same reasoning that has 
    led the Judicial Branch to provide a degree of protection to 
    Executive and Judicial Branch officials ranging from cabinet 
    officers to local dog catchers should lead the Court to review a 
    decision denying that protection to Members of Congress.
        We hope you will support our privileged resolution.
                                                  Thomas S. Foley,
                                                  Majority Leader.

                                                 Robert H. Michel,
                                                Republican Leader.

         . . .
        Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, 
    and I move the previous question on the resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. [Barton] Gordon [of Tennessee]). 
    The question is on the resolution.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it.
        Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    413, nays 0, answered ``present'' 2, not voting 16, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 128] . . . 



Sec. 9. Immunity from Arrest

    The Constitution grants Members of Congress ``privilege from 
arrest''(1) during their attendance at congressional 
sessions, and during travel to and from such sessions.(2) As 
with Speech or Debate immunity, this constitutional provision has its 
origins in English practice dating back centuries, and was originally 
devised as a means to counter royal interference with Members of 
Parliament. In the American context, it serves to insulate the 
legislative branch from the other branches of government in recognition 
of the principle of separation of powers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 6, cl. 1. The full passage reads: ``They 
        shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony or Breach of the 
        Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their attendance at the 
        Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and 
        returning from the same.'' See also House Rules and Manual 
        Sec. Sec. 90, 91 (2021).
 2. For an 1886 court case articulating a broad interpretation of 
        travel to and from congressional sessions, see 3 Hinds' 
        Precedents Sec. 2674. See also 3 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 2676 
        (House determination that a Member arrested on vacation could 
        not continue to be held after Congress assembled).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At the time of the Constitutional Convention, arrest and 
imprisonment for civil offenses was still common, and it was primarily 
towards these arrests that the provision was aimed.(3) The 
Constitution specifies that the immunity from arrest does not apply in 
cases of ``Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace.''(4) 
Subsequent court rulings have clarified the scope of this language as 
encompassing all criminal offenses.(5) Because arrest in 
civil cases is no longer generally part of the American legal system, 
this constitutional provision has been described as virtually 
obsolete.(6)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 18. For an example of a Member 
        being arrested in a civil debt case, and the House's subsequent 
        assertion of the constitutional privilege to secure his 
        release, see 3 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 2676.
 4. U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 6, cl. 1.
 5. See, e.g., Williamson v. U.S., 207 U.S. 425 (1908) (``. . . from 
        the foregoing it follows that the term `treason, felony, and 
        breach of the peace,' as used in the constitutional provision 
        relied upon, excepts from the operation of the privilege all 
        criminal offenses. . . .''). See also 6 Cannon's Precedents 
        Sec. 589. In 1878, the House Committee on the Judiciary studied 
        the issue and concluded that Members were not immune from state 
        criminal processes. See 3 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 2673.
 6. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 18 (fn. 18).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The immunity applies to Members, and had also been considered 
applicable to Delegates and Resident Commissioners.(7) 
Members-elect travelling to Washington, D.C., to be sworn at the 
assembly of a new Congress are also covered by this grant of 
immunity.(8)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 18 (fn. 10) (citing Doty v. 
        Strong, 1 Pinn. 84 (Sup. Ct. Wisc. Territ. 1840)).
 8. See House Rules and Manual Sec. 300 (2021) (statement in 
        Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice that ``Privilege 
        from arrest takes place by force of election.''). See also 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 18 (fn. 8) (citing Dunton & 
        Co. v. Halstead, 2 Clark 236 (Dist. Ct. Phil. 1840)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although this constitutional provision has virtually no modern 
applicability, the issue of how to balance Members' representational 
responsibilities with the requirements of judicial process remains 
salient. Court orders, summonses and subpoenas are routinely issued to 
Members of Congress in their capacity as private 
citizens.(9) Courts have ruled (and the House has 
acknowledged) that such requests are not ``arrests'' that would be 
prohibited under the Constitution's grant of immunity.(10) 
Nevertheless, such processes have the potential to interfere with 
legislative activity if Members are frequently called away to 
participate in judicial proceedings. Thus, courts have typically 
demonstrated a willingness to make accommodations to Members of 
Congress whose involvement in legal proceedings is required. Such 
accommodation has often taken the form of granting extensions or 
continuances until the House would no longer be in 
session.(11)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. For more on service of process on Members generally, see Sec. 7, 
        supra.
10. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 18 (fn. 19) (citing Long v. 
        Ansell, 293 U.S. 76 (1934)). In one instance in 1929, a Senator 
        indicated that he would ignore a grand jury summons issued to 
        him by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. 
        Subsequently, the court noted, ``Section 6, Article I, of the 
        Constitution of the United States, gives immunity to arrest to 
        the Members of Congress while that body is in session. It does 
        not say that they are privileged from subpoena, but if they do 
        not obey, the only step the court could take would be to issue 
        an attachment for their arrest. Since the Constitution provides 
        immunity from arrest, in my opinion they are not subject to 
        such action.'' See 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 588.
11. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 18 (fn. 3) (citing James v. 
        Powell, 274 N.Y.S. 2d 192, 26 App. Div. 2d 295 (1966) for the 
        proposition that ``where actual interference with the 
        legislative process is shown the courts will make suitable 
        provision by way of adjournment or fixing of a time and place 
        of examination which will obviate any real conflict.'').
                        PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE
Ch. 7


                          INDEX TO PRECEDENTS

Adjournment
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, motion to adjourn offered by, 
        Sec. Sec. 2, 2.1
    motion to adjourn, ability of Delegates and Resident Commissioners 
        to offer, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.1
American Samoa
    Delegates from, Sec. 2
Chaplain
    Delegate or Resident Commissioner sponsoring guest chaplain, 
        Sec. 2.18
    guest chaplain sponsored by Delegate or Resident Commissioner, 
        Sec. 2.18
Chief Administrative Officer (CAO)
    compensation of Members, role in disbursing, Sec. 5
    Members' Representational Allowance (MRA), publication of 
        disbursements, Sec. 6
    office space, role in assigning, Sec. 6
Clerk
    compensation, role in disbursement, Sec. 5
    vacancies, role in managing office, Sec. Sec. 6, 6.8, 6.11
Code of Official Conduct
    see Ethics
Committee of the Whole
    automatic revote provision, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.12, 2.13, 2.14
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, authority to preside over, 
        Sec. Sec. 2, 2.16
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, voting rights in, 
        Sec. Sec. 2, 2.11, 2.12, 2.13, 2.14, 2.15, 2.17
    presiding officer, Delegates and Resident Commissioners serving as, 
        Sec. Sec. 2, 2.16
    quorum rules, Sec. 2
    voting rights of Delegates and Resident Commissioners, Sec. Sec. 2, 
        2.11, 2.12, 2.13, 2.14, 2.15, 2.17
Committee on House Administration
    allowances, former authority to adjust, Sec. Sec. 5, 6, 6.1, 6.2, 
        6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6
    allowances, role in authorizing, Sec. Sec. 5, 6, 6.17
    Members' Representational Allowance (MRA), role regarding, 
        Sec. Sec. 5, 6, 6.17
    vacancies, role regarding, Sec. 6
Committees
    assignment of Delegates and Resident Commissioners to, Sec. Sec. 2, 
        2.8
    Committee of the Whole, see Committee of the Whole
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, voting rights in, Sec. 2
    rank of Delegates and Resident Commissioners on, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.8
    voting rights of Delegates and Resident Commissioners, Sec. 2
Compensation
    27th Amendment, operation of, Sec. 5
    appropriations process, relationship to, Sec. 5
    Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), role in disbursements, Sec. 5
    Citizens' Commission on Public Service and Compensation, Sec. 5
    Clerk, role in disbursements, Sec. 5
    Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries, Sec. 5
    Committee on House Administration, role regarding, Sec. 5
    conflicts of interest, Sec. 5
    constitutional provisions regarding, Sec. 5
    cost-of-living adjustments, Sec. 5
    death, effect of, Sec. 5
    death gratuities, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.2
    deductions for leaves of absence, Sec. 5
    deductions for rule violations, Sec. 5
    election contests, relationship to, Sec. 5
    Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Sec. 5
    Federal Salary Act of 1967, Sec. 5
    financial disclosure requirements, Sec. 5
    fines, Sec. 5
    generally, Sec. 5
    gift rules Sec. 5
    health benefits, Sec. 6
    history, Sec. 5
    honoraria, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.8, 5.11
    incompatible offices, relationship to, Sec. 4
    leaves of absence, deductions for, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.6
    mileage expenses, Sec. 5
    ``No Budget, No Pay'' bills, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.4
    oath, relationship to, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.1
    outside earned income, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.11, 5.12, 5.13
    party leaders, Sec. 5
    rate of compensation, Sec. 5
    resignation, effect of, Sec. 5
    retirement benefits, Sec. 6
    royalties, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.13
    ``Saxbe fix'', Sec. 4
    Sergeant-at-Arms, former role in disbursements, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.10
    Speaker, Sec. 5
    Speaker's administrative role regarding, Sec. 5
    statutory rulemaking related to, Sec. 5
    taxes, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.3
    term of office, relationship to, Sec. 5
    travel reimbursements, Sec. 5
    waiving salary, Sec. 5
Conferences
    conference committees, appointment of Delegates and Resident 
        Commissioners, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.9
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, appointment to conference 
        committees, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.9
Congressional Record
    allowances, adjustments published in, Sec. Sec. 6, 6.3
    copies provided to Members, Sec. 6
    franking privilege, ability to send copies via, Sec. 6
    franking privilege regulations published in, Sec. Sec. 6, 6.12
Constitution
    compensation of Members, provisions regarding, Sec. 5
    emoluments, provisions regarding, Sec. 4
    franking privilege, constitutionality of, Sec. Sec. 6, 6.15, 6.16
    immunities of Members generally, Sec. 7
    incompatible offices, provisions regarding, Sec. 4
    privilege from arrest, Sec. Sec. 7, 9
    qualifications of Members, provisions regarding, Sec. 3
    Speech or Debate immunity, Sec. Sec. 7, 8
Contested Elections
    see Election Contests
Death
    compensation of Members, effect of, Sec. 5
    gratuities, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.2
Debate
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, rights to, Sec. 2
Decorum
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, applicability to, Sec. 2
    Speech or Debate immunity, relationship to, Sec. Sec. 8, 8.1
Delegates and Resident Commissioners
    Chaplain, guest chaplains sponsored by, Sec. 2.18
    Code of Official Conduct, applicability, Sec. 2
    committee assignments, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.8
    Committee of the Whole, presiding over, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.16
    Committee of the Whole, voting in, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.11, 2.12, 2.13, 
        2.14, 2.15, 2.17
    compensation, Sec. 2
    conference committees, appointment to, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.9
    decorum rules, applicability, Sec. 2
    discharge petition, inability to sign, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.7
    election of Speaker, inability to vote in, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.5
    floor privileges, Sec. 2
    history, Sec. 2
    impeachment articles, ability to offer, Sec. 2
    impeachment articles, inability to vote on, Sec. 2
    impeachment articles, question of privilege regarding, Sec. Sec. 2, 
        2.6
    joint committees, appointment to, Sec. 2
    motion to adjourn, ability to offer, Sec. 2.1
    motion to recommit, ability to offer, Sec. 2.3
    motion to reconsider, inability to offer, Sec. 2
    motion to refer, ability to offer, Sec. 2.2
    motions, ability to offer generally, Sec. 2
    oaths, Sec. 2
    objections to unanimous-consent requests, authority to raise, 
        Sec. Sec. 2, 2.4
    party organization, relationship to, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.8
    points of order, authority to raise, Sec. 2
    privilege from arrest, Sec. 9
    privileges generally, Sec. 2
    qualifications, Sec. 3
    rank on committees, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.8
    salary and benefits, Sec. 2
    select committees, appointment to, Sec. 2
    seniority, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.8
    service of process on, Sec. 7.4
    Speaker election, inability to vote in, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.5
    statutory origin, Sec. 2
    term of office, Sec. 2
    unanimous-consent request to sign discharge petition not 
        entertained, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.7
    unanimous-consent requests, authority to propose, Sec. 2
    vacancies, Sec. 2
    voting rights in the Committee of the Whole, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.11, 
        2.12, 2.13, 2.14, 2.15, 2.17
Discharge Petitions
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners may not sign, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.7
    unanimous-consent request to allow Delegates and Resident 
        Commissioners to sign not entertained, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.7
District of Columbia
    Delegates from, Sec. 2
Election Contests
    compensation pending resolution of case, Sec. 5
    exclusion distinguished from, Sec. 3
    expulsion distinguished from, Sec. 3
Election of Speaker
    see Speaker of the House
Ethics
    censure, Sec. Sec. 6, 6.10
    Code of Official Conduct, applicability to Delegates and Resident 
        Commissioners, Sec. 2
    Code of Official Conduct, employment rules contained in, Sec. 6
    Committee on Ethics, Sec. Sec. 5, 6
    conflicts of interest, Sec. 5
    employment rules, Sec. 6
    Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Sec. 5
    expulsion, see Expulsion
    financial disclosure requirements, Sec. 5
    fines for rule violations, Sec. 5
    gift rules, Sec. 5
    honoraria rules, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.8, 5.11
    Members' Representational Allowance (MRA), ethics rules regarding, 
        Sec. 6
    outside earned income, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.11, 5.12, 5.13
    reprimand, Sec. 6
    Speech or Debate immunity, relationship to, Sec. 8
Exclusion
    compensation, effect on, Sec. 5
    election contests distinguished from, Sec. 3
    expulsion distinguished from, Sec. 3
    incompatible offices, relationship to, Sec. Sec. 3, 4
    Powell v. McCormack, Sec. 3
    qualifications, relationship to, Sec. 3
    vacancies created by, Sec. 3
Expulsion
    election contests distinguished from, Sec. 3
    exclusion distinguished from, Sec. 3
    vacancies created by, Sec. 6.11
Floor Privileges
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, Sec. 2
    staff of Members, Sec. 6.9
Franking Privilege
    Congressional Record, regulations published in, Sec. Sec. 6, 6.12
    constitutionality, Sec. Sec. 6, 6.15, 6.16
    generally, Sec. 6
    history, Sec. 6
    House Communications Standards Commission, Sec. Sec. 6, 6.12, 6.14, 
        6.16
    Members' Representational Allowance (MRA), relationship to, Sec. 6
    questions of privilege regarding, Sec. Sec. 6, 6.13, 6.14
Guam
    Delegates from, Sec. 2
House Administration
    see Committee on House Administration
Impeachment
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners may not vote on articles, 
        Sec. 2
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners may offer resolution of 
        impeachment, Sec. 2
    qualifications, relationship to, Sec. 3
    question of privilege regarding Delegate and Resident Commissioner 
        voting, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.6
    resolution of impeachment, offering by Delegates or Resident 
        Commissioners, Sec. 2
Incompatible Offices
    compensation, Sec. Sec. 4, 5
    declination, relationship to, Sec. 4
    duties, Sec. 4
    emoluments, prohibition on increasing, Sec. 4
    executive branch offices, Sec. 4
    generally, Sec. Sec. 3, 4
    judicial branch offices, Sec. 4
    leaves of absence, relationship to, Sec. Sec. 4, 4.1
    military service, relationship to, Sec. Sec. 4, 4.1
    oath, relationship to, Sec. Sec. 4, 4.2, 4.3
    resignation, relationship to, Sec. Sec. 4, 4.4
    ``Saxbe fix,'' Sec. 4
    Senate service, Sec. 4
    state offices, relationship to, Sec. Sec. 4, 4.3, 4.4
    temporary offices, Sec. 4
    term of office, relationship to, Sec. Sec. 4, 4.2
    vacancies created by, Sec. 4
Joint Committees
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, appointment to, Sec. 2
Journal
    copies provided to Members, Sec. 6
Leaves of Absence
    compensation, effect on, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.6
    incompatible offices, relationship to, Sec. Sec. 4, 4.1
    oath, relationship to, Sec. 5
    procedure, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7
    unanimous consent to obtain, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7
Members
    allowances, see Members' Representational Allowance (MRA)
    compensation, Sec. 5
    Congressional Record, copies provided to, Sec. 6
    death gratuities, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.2
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners distinguished, Sec. 2
    ethics rules, see Ethics
    franking privilege generally, Sec. 6
    incompatible offices, see Incompatible Offices
    Journal, copies provided to, Sec. 6
    leaves of absence generally, Sec. 5
    oath of office, see Oath of Office
    office and staff, see Members' Office and Staff
    privileges and immunities generally, Sec. Sec. 7, 8, 9
    qualifications, Sec. 3
    salary and benefits, Sec. 5
    service of process, Sec. Sec. 7, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3
    travel, Sec. 5
Members' Office and Staff
    allowances generally, Sec. Sec. 5, 6
    allowances, historical practices regarding, Sec. Sec. 6, 6.1, 6.2, 
        6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6
    Code of Official Conduct, applicability, Sec. 6
    district offices, Sec. 6
    ethics rules regarding, Sec. 6
    floor privileges for Members' staff, Sec. 6.9
    generally, Sec. 6
    House Page program, Sec. 6
    Members' Representational Allowance (MRA), Sec. Sec. 5, 6, 6.7, 
        6.17
    Office of Congressional Workplace Rights, Sec. 6
    Office of Diversity and Inclusion, Sec. 6
    Office of Employee Advocacy, Sec. 6
    office space, Sec. 6
    staff employment, rules regarding, Sec. 6
    vacancies, effect of, Sec. Sec. 6, 6.8, 6.11
Members' Representational Allowance (MRA)
    adjustments, Sec. Sec. 5, 6, 6.17
    allowances, former rules regarding, Sec. Sec. 5, 6, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 
        6.4, 6.5, 6.6
    Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), publication of disbursements 
        by, Sec. 6
    Committee on Ethics, role regarding, Sec. 6
    Committee on House Administration, role regarding, Sec. Sec. 5, 6, 
        6.7, 6.17
    franking privilege, relationship to, Sec. 6
    history, Sec. Sec. 5, 6, 6.7
    House Communications Standards Commission, regulations issued by, 
        Sec. Sec. 6, 6.12
Motion to Adjourn
    see Adjournment
Motion to Recommit
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, ability to offer, Sec. 2.3
Motion to Reconsider
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, inability to offer, Sec. 2
Motion to Refer
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, ability to offer, 
        Sec. Sec. 2, 2.1
Northern Mariana Islands
    Delegates from, Sec. 2
Oath of Office
    challenging the right to be sworn, Sec. 3
    compensation, relationship to, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.1
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, requirement to take, Sec. 2
    incompatible offices, relationship to, Sec. Sec. 4, 4.2, 4.3
    leaves of absence, relationship to, Sec. 5
    qualifications, relationship to, Sec. 3
Party Organization
    committee assignments, role regarding Delegates and Resident 
        Commissioners, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.8
    compensation of floor leaders, Sec. 5
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, membership in, Sec. 2
    floor leaders, compensation of, Sec. 5
    seniority of Delegates and Resident Commissioners, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.8
Philippine Islands
    Resident Commissioners from, Sec. 2
Points of Order
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, authority to raise, Sec. 2
Privilege from Arrest
    constitutional provisions, Sec. Sec. 7, 9
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, applicability, Sec. 9
    generally, Sec. Sec. 7, 9
    history, Sec. Sec. 7, 9
Puerto Rico
    Resident Commissioner from, Sec. 2
Qualifications
    age, Sec. 3
    citizenship, Sec. 3
    constitutional provisions regarding, Sec. 3
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, statutory requirements, 
        Sec. 3
    exclusion, relationship to, Sec. 3
    impeachment, relationship to, Sec. 3
    inhabitancy, Sec. 3
    loyalty, Sec. 3
    oath, relationship to, Sec. 3
    Powell v. McCormack, Sec. 3
Questions of Privilege
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners not permitted to vote on 
        articles of impeachment via, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.6
    franking privilege, resolutions regarding, Sec. Sec. 6, 6.13, 6.14
    Speech or Debate immunity, resolution regarding, Sec. 8.2
Quorums
    Committee of the Whole, Delegates and Resident Commissioners 
        counted, Sec. 2
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners counted in Committee of the 
        Whole, Sec. 2
Reconsideration
    see Motion to Reconsider
Resignation
    compensation, effect on, Sec. 5
    incompatible offices, relationship to, Sec. Sec. 4, 4.4
Rules of the House
    amendments to standing rules regarding compensation, Sec. Sec. 5, 
        5.11, 5.12, 5.13
    Federal Salary Act of 1967, Sec. 5
    House precedents, publication and distribution of, Sec. 6
    House Rules and Manual, publication and distribution of, Sec. 6
    statutory rulemaking related to Members' salaries, Sec. 5
Salary and Benefits of Members
    see Compensation
``Saxbe fix''
    see Incomptaible Offices
Select Committees
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, appointment to, Sec. Sec. 2, 
        2.10
Sergeant-at-Arms
    compensation of Members, former role regarding, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.10
    salary of Members, former role regarding, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.10
    salary of Members, litigation involving, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.10
Service of Process
    administrative subpoenas, Sec. 7.9
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, procedure, Sec. Sec. 7, 7.4
    executive session material, Sec. Sec. 7, 7.5
    former practice, Sec. Sec. 7.6, 7.7, 7.8, 7.9
    Members, procedure, Sec. Sec. 7, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3
    Rule VIII procedures, Sec. Sec. 7, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3
    Speaker of the House, role regarding, Sec. Sec. 7, 7.1
Speaker of the House
    compensation, Sec. 5
    compensation of Members, role regarding, Sec. 5
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners may not vote in election of, 
        Sec. Sec. 2, 2.5
    election, Delegates and Resident Commissioners may not vote in, 
        Sec. Sec. 2, 2.5
    service of process, role regarding, Sec. Sec. 7, 7.1
Speech or Debate Immunity
    constitutional provisions, Sec. 8
    decorum rules, relationship to, Sec. Sec. 8, 8.1
    ethics rules, applicability, Sec. 8
    generally, Sec. 8
    Hutchinson v. Proxmire, Sec. 8
    In re Search of Elec. Commc'ns, Sec. 8
    Kilbourn v. Thompson, Sec. 8
    legislative acts, definition, Sec. 8
    prayer, constitutionality challenged, Sec. 8
    questions of privilege involving, Sec. 8.2
    staff, applicability, Sec. 8
    United States v. Brewster, Sec. 8
    United States v. House Rayburn Office Building, Sec. 8
    United States v. Johnson, Sec. 8
    waivers, Sec. 8
Travel
    CODELs, Sec. 5
    mileage expenses, Sec. 5
    reimbursements, Sec. 5
Unanimous Consent
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, authority to object, 
        Sec. Sec. 2, 2.4
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, authority to propose 
        requests, Sec. 2
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners may not sign discharge 
        petitions via, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.7
    discharge petitions, request to allow Delegates and Resident 
        Commissioners to sign, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.7
    leaves of absence transacted via, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7
U.S. Virgin Islands
    Delegates from, Sec. 2
Virgin Islands
    see U.S. Virgin Islands
Voting
    Committee of the Whole, authority for Delegates and Resident 
        Commissioners to vote in, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.11, 2.12, 2.13, 2.14, 
        2.15, 2.17
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, authorities and limitations, 
        Sec. Sec. 2, 2.11, 2.12, 2.13, 2.14, 2.15, 2.17
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, prohibition on voting in 
        Speaker election, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.5
    disqualification for personal or pecuniary interest, Sec. 5
    leaves of absence, statements regarding missed votes, Sec. 5
    proxy voting, Sec. 5
    Speaker election, authority to vote in, Sec. Sec. 2, 2.5




                               CHAPTER 8

                    Elections and Election Campaigns
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Commentary and editing by Max Spitzer, J.D., LL.M.
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                A. Apportionment; Voting Districts

                  Sec.  1. Constitutional and Statutory Requirements

                  Sec.  2. Districting and Redistricting

                B. Time, Place, and Regulation of Elections

                  Sec.  3. State and Federal Jurisdiction over House 
                    Elections

                  Sec.  4. Vacancies; Continuity of Operations

                C. Campaign Practices

                  Sec.  5. Election Campaigns and Campaign Financing 
                    Regulation

                  Sec.  6. The Federal Election Commission

                  Sec.  7. House Ethics Rules



                   A. Apportionment; Voting Districts



Sec. 1. Constitutional and Statutory Requirements

    Pursuant to article I, section 2, clause 3, of the U.S. 
Constitution, Members of the House of Representatives are to be 
``apportioned among the several States . . . according to their 
respective numbers.''(1) This process of allocating 
Representatives to the states based on population can be described as 
proceeding in three distinct phases. First, information regarding the 
population of each state must be compiled via the taking of the 
decennial census. Then, Congress (by law) must make the formal 
allocation of Representatives to each state--a process known as 
``apportionment.''(2) Finally, each state must then decide 
how constituencies within the state are to elect each of its 
Representatives--a process known as ``districting'' (or 
``redistricting'').(3) Over the course of its history, the 
United States has chosen a variety of methods to effectuate each of 
these tasks, consistent with constitutional requirements.
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 1. House Rules and Manual Sec. 14 (2021).
 2. For earlier treatment of apportionment issues, see 1 Hinds' 
        Precedents Sec. Sec. 297-308; 6 Cannon's Precedents 
        Sec. Sec. 38-52; and Deschler's Precedents Ch. 8 Sec. Sec. 1, 
        2.
 3. For earlier treatment of issues relating to districting or 
        redistricting, see 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 309-319; 6 
        Cannon's Precedents Sec. Sec. 53, 54; and Deschler's Precedents 
        Ch. 8 Sec. Sec. 3, 4.
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The Census

    With respect to the taking of the census, the Constitution provides 
that, ``The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after 
the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within 
every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law 
direct.''(4) Pursuant to the same clause, each state is to 
receive at least one Representative, and there shall be no more than 
one Representative per 30,000 people.(5) The Constitution 
itself provided the initial allocation of 65 Representatives to the 
original 13 states.(6) The first census was taken in 1790, 
and has been taken every ten years since that time.(7)
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 4. U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 2, cl. 3; House Rules and Manual Sec. 15 
        (2021).
 5. Parliamentarian's Note: During the First Congress, the House and 
        Senate passed a series of 12 constitutional amendments, ten of 
        which would later be known as the Bill of Rights. The remaining 
        two amendments were not ratified by the requisite number of 
        states when initially proposed. One such amendment achieved 
        ratification in 1992 and became the 27th Amendment to the 
        Constitution. The remaining amendment has never been ratified. 
        That amendment, the so-called ``Congressional Apportionment 
        Amendment'' would have required one representative per 30,000 
        constituents until the size of the House reached 100 Members; 
        thereafter one Representative per 40,000 constituents until the 
        size of the House reached 200 Members; and thereafter one 
        Representative per 50,000 constituents. Had this amendment been 
        adopted, the current population of the United States would have 
        resulted in a House of Representatives of over 6,000 Members.
 6. The initial apportionment of Representatives was as follows: New 
        Hampshire, three Representatives; Massachusetts, eight; Rhode 
        Island, one; Connecticut, five; New York, six; New Jersey, 
        four; Pennsylvania, eight; Delaware, one; Maryland, six; 
        Virginia, ten; North Carolina, five; South Carolina, five; and 
        Georgia, three.
 7. House Rules and Manual Sec. 15 (2021).
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    Under the original terms of the Constitution, the census count 
included free persons, excluded ``Indians not taxed,'' and counted only 
three-fifths of enslaved persons.(8) The abolishment of 
slavery by the 13th Amendment to the Constitution(9) 
rendered moot the provision regarding enslaved persons, and section 2 
of the 14th Amendment affirmatively revised the apportionment 
requirements as follows: ``Representatives shall be apportioned among 
the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the 
whole number of persons in each state, excluding Indians not 
taxed.''(10) In 1924, Congress passed two laws regarding the 
status of Native Americans and their relationship to Federal taxation. 
The Indian Citizenship Act(11) conferred U.S. citizenship on 
all Native Americans born within the territorial limits of the United 
States. The Revenue Act of 1924(12) expanded the category of 
persons subject to Federal taxation to include Native Americans. Thus, 
following the enactment of these laws (and decisions of the Supreme 
Court relating to taxation of Native Americans),(13) there 
were no longer considered any individuals in the category ``Indians not 
taxed'' for census-taking purposes. The 1940 census message from the 
executive affirmatively noted that Native Americans had been included 
in the tabulation.(14)
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 8. U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 2, cl. 3; House Rules and Manual Sec. 15 
        (2021).
 9. House Rules and Manual Sec. 224 (2021).
10. House Rules and Manual Sec. 226 (2021).
11. P.L. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253.
12. P.L. 68-176, 43 Stat. 253.
13. See, e.g., Superintendent v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 418 (1935).
14. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 8 Sec. Sec. 1.1, 2.3.
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    Section 2 of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution also provides 
that a state's representation in the House may be proportionally 
reduced by Congress if the state denies otherwise qualified inhabitants 
the right to vote.(15) This authority, however, has never 
been used to reduce the number of Members to which a state is entitled 
under the most recent census.(16)
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15. House Rules and Manual Sec. 226 (2021).
16. For an attempt to offer an amendment to an apportionment bill to 
        require the President to reduce the representation of certain 
        states (held to be nongermane), see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 8 
        Sec. 2.7. See also Deschler's Precedents Ch. 8 Sec. 2.8 (an 
        amendment requiring a report on the number of citizens denied 
        the right to vote ruled not germane to a civil rights bill).
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    The executive branch is responsible for conducting the decennial 
census. During the early 19th century, the census was taken by U.S. 
Marshals under the auspices of the Department of State. In 1849, 
jurisdiction over the census was transferred to the Department of the 
Interior. In 1902, Congress established a permanent Census Bureau, 
which was moved the following year into the newly-created Department of 
Commerce and Labor. When the Departments of Commerce and Labor were 
separated in 1913, the Census Bureau was retained by the Department of 
Commerce, where it remains today.(17)
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17. For more on the history of the Census Bureau, see https://
www.census.gov/history/www/census--then--now/ (last visited Oct. 
        19, 2022).
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    Although originally designed as a simple count of population, the 
census now includes additional information and statistics to be used 
for purposes other than congressional apportionment.(18) The 
results of each decennial census are transmitted to the House via 
presidential message.(19)
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18. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 8 Sec. 2.1.
19. See, e.g., Deschler's Precedents Ch. 8 Sec. 2.2. For presidential 
        messages and communications generally, see Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 35; and Precedents (____) Ch. 35.
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    Pursuant to clause 1(n)(8) of rule X, the Committee on Oversight 
and Reform has jurisdiction over ``Population and demography generally, 
including the Census.''(20) Measures relating to the census 
are therefore referred by the Speaker to that committee. Under a former 
line of precedents involving matters of ``constitutional privilege,'' 
measures concerning the census were accorded high privilege and could 
be brought up on the floor at virtually any time.(21) 
However, in 1926, Speaker Nicholas Longworth of Ohio overturned those 
earlier precedents by ruling that reapportionment legislation was not 
privileged under House rules.(22) In so ruling, Speaker 
Longworth held that such constitutional matters are ``directory'' 
rather than ``mandatory'' and that the regular rules for the 
consideration of nonprivileged legislation should apply. Today, matters 
relating to the census, apportionment, or districting enjoy no special 
status within the House.
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20. House Rules and Manual Sec. 732 (2021).
21. See 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 305, 306. See also 6 Cannon's 
        Precedents Sec. Sec. 49, 50.
22. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 8 Sec. Sec. 1.2, 2.4. See also 6 
        Cannon's Precedents Sec. 48.
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Apportionment

    Following the transmittal of census data by the executive to 
Congress, Congress uses that data to allocate Representatives to each 
state consistent with constitutional(23) requirements--a 
process known as ``apportionment.''(24) Throughout the 19th 
century, Congress used a variety of mathematical models to determine 
how seats in the House should be allocated.(25) Until the 
1920 census, Congress would enact a new law apportioning seats to the 
several states. However, the 1920 census proved 
controversial(26) and Congress was unable to enact the 
required legislation. The election of Members to the House throughout 
the 1920s thus proceeded under the apportionment made pursuant to the 
prior census. In 1929, the impasse was finally resolved, and Congress 
passed the Reapportionment Act of 1929 (also known as the Permanent 
Apportionment Act of 1929).(27) That act for the first time 
established in law a mathematical formula that would be used to 
apportion Representatives to the House automatically after each 
decennial census. The particular mathematical method of apportionment 
was specified as the method of ``equal proportions.''(28) 
Under the law, the executive forwards the census results to Congress, 
and applies the method of equal proportions to indicate how many seats 
in the House each state shall receive. The Clerk of the House is then 
required, within 15 calendar days, to submit a formal certification of 
these numbers to the executive branch of each state.(29)
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23. Although the Constitution does not specify a particular method of 
        apportionment, it does require: (1) that the allocation of 
        Representatives to the states be based on population (i.e., 
        ``according to their respective numbers''); (2) that the number 
        of Representatives shall not exceed one per 30,000; and (3) 
        that, regardless of population, each state is entitled to at 
        least one Representative. U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 2, cl. 3; 
        U.S. Const. amend. XIV, Sec. 2.
24. Parliamentarian's Note: Following the first census of 1790, 
        Congress passed a law apportioning Members of the House to the 
        states in proportion to their population. However, the method 
        used to allocate Representatives was considered by President 
        George Washington to be constitutionally defective, thus 
        occasioning the first veto in American history. 3 Annals of 
        Cong. 539, 2d Cong. 1st Sess. (Apr. 5, 1792). A revised 
        apportionment bill was signed into law on April 14, 1792.
25. Parliamentarian's Note: Over the course of the 19th century, there 
        were three main competing methods of apportionment, known by 
        the names of their original advocates: Hamilton, Jefferson, and 
        Webster. Because of variations in population from state to 
        state, it was impossible to divide a finite set of Members 
        across the states such that each Member represented the same 
        number of people. Each method thus involved a slightly 
        different way of treating remainders and fractional seats. 
        Jefferson's method was generally used prior to 1840, after 
        which Webster's method was more common. In the latter part of 
        the 19th century, Hamilton's method (also known as Vinton's 
        method) gained prominence. In the 20th century, a new formula, 
        known as the method of ``equal proportions'' (also known as the 
        Huntington-Hill method), was established in law as the 
        mechanism to allocate seats in the House following a decennial 
        census. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 8 Sec. 2.6.
26. The results of the 1920 census revealed that, for the first time, a 
        majority of Americans lived in urban as opposed to rural areas. 
        Conflict between urban and rural interests in Congress 
        prevented the enactment of reapportionment legislation based on 
        the 1920 census numbers.
27. P.L. 71-13, 46 Stat. 21. These provisions of law have been codified 
        at 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2a et seq.
28. See Apportionment and Redistricting Process for the U.S. House of 
        Representatives, CRS Report R45951 (Oct. 10, 2019).
29. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 2a(c).
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    With respect to the total number of Representatives to be allocated 
to the states, ad hoc adjustments were replaced in the 20th century by 
a statutory cap. Throughout the 19th century, each census would 
typically be followed by a new apportionment law that increased the 
size of the membership of the House and divided the new total among the 
states.(30) Thus, the House grew from its original 65 
Members in 1789, to over 100 Members after the first census, to over 
200 Members in 1823, and over 300 Members in 1883.
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30. Parliamentarian's Note: In the 19th century, there were only two 
        instances of the size of the House being reduced following a 
        decennial census. Following the sixth decennial census in 1840, 
        the size of the House was reduced from 242 to 223 Members. 
        Between the seventh decennial census in 1850 and the eighth 
        decennial census in 1860, three new states were admitted and 
        California was apportioned two additional seats--increasing the 
        number of Representatives from 233 to 239. However, following 
        the eighth census, the original total number of seats from the 
        1850 apportionment law was retained, and those 233 seats 
        reapportioned accordingly.
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    The Apportionment Act of 1911(31) established the size 
of the House at 435 Members--a total number that has remained unchanged 
(with one exception) to this day.(32) Following the 
admission of Alaska and Hawaii as states in 1959, the size of the House 
was temporarily increased to 437.(33) However, following the 
18th decennial census in 1960, the size of the House was returned to 
435 Members.
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31. P.L. 62-5, 37 Stat. 13.
32. Parliamentarian's Note: The Apportionment Act of 1911 divided 433 
        seats among the existing states, and provided for one 
        Representative each for the territories of Arizona and New 
        Mexico should they be admitted as states before the next census 
        (which they were). The Reapportionment Act of 1929 reiterated 
        the 435-Member total and mandated automatic reapportionment 
        using the method of equal proportions.
33. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 8 Sec. 2.
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    The (constitutional) apportionment of Representatives to the House 
is an entirely separate process from the (statutory) allocation of 
nonvoting Delegates or Resident Commissioners. Over the course of its 
history, the United States has provided for nonvoting representation to 
the House from U.S. territories (such as the U.S. Virgin Islands or 
Guam), commonwealths (such as Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana 
Islands), and Federal districts (such as the District of 
Columbia).(34) The Representatives from such areas have been 
styled ``Delegates'' or ``Resident Commissioners.''(35) The 
number of such Delegates and Resident Commissioners depends on the 
statute authorizing such representation. For example, when the 
Philippines was a territorial possession of the United States, it was 
represented for a time by two Resident Commissioners. Currently, there 
is one nonvoting Delegate or Resident Commissioner per jurisdiction 
having such representation in the House.(36)
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34. For more on Delegates and Resident Commissioners generally, see 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. 3; and Precedents (Smith) Ch. 
        7 Sec. 2.
35. For an overview of the history of Delegates and Resident 
        Commissioners to the House, see Delegates to the U.S. Congress: 
        History and Current Status, CRS Report R40555 (Aug. 25, 2015).
36. Statutes authorizing nonvoting Delegates or Resident Commissioners 
        to the House have been codified as follows: 48 U.S.C. 
        Sec. Sec. 891-894 (Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico); 2 
        U.S.C. Sec. 25a (Delegate from the District of Columbia); 48 
        U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1711-1715 (Delegate from Guam); 48 U.S.C. 
        Sec. Sec. 1711-1715 (Delegate from the U.S. Virgin Islands); 48 
        U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1731-1735 (Delegate from American Samoa); and 
        48 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1751-1757 (Delegate from the Northern 
        Mariana Islands).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As with legislation related to the census, legislation relating to 
apportionment enjoys no special privilege in the House, and must be 
considered under the rules for ordinary (nonprivileged) 
measures.(37) Pursuant to clause 1(l)(3) of rule X, the 
Committee on the Judiciary has jurisdiction over ``Apportionment of 
Representatives.''(38) This same provision has been 
interpreted to encompass state redistricting standards as 
well.(39)
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37. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 8 Sec. Sec. 1.2, 2.4. See also 6 
        Cannon's Precedents Sec. 48.
38. House Rules and Manual Sec. 729 (2021).
39. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 8 Sec. 3.2.
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Sec. 2. Districting and Redistricting

    The process of apportioning Representatives to the states should be 
distinguished from the process of dividing the states into districts to 
elect those Representatives. As described above, the apportionment 
process occurs at the Federal level, via the gathering of census data 
and the use of statutory formulas to allocate Representatives. The 
states themselves have no role in apportionment. By contrast, the 
districting (or redistricting) process occurs primarily at the state 
level, via the enactment of state laws that divide the state into 
districts whose constituencies elect their Representatives.
    Although the states are primarily responsible for the districting 
process, the Constitution grants Congress the authority to enact laws 
that supersede state procedures.(1) Over the course of the 
19th century, Congress would periodically pass laws mandating that 
certain principles be adhered to when the states exercise their 
authority to create congressional districts. The first such Federal law 
was enacted in 1842,(2) and required states to use single-
Member districts only.(3) It further required that each 
district be composed of continuous territory.(4) In 1872, 
another law required that districts be created such that each district 
in the state would have approximately the same 
population.(5) Another law, enacted in 1901, required 
districts to be as compact as possible.(6) The 
Reapportionment Act of 1911 consolidated these three principles 
(compact, single-Member districts, of roughly equal population) into a 
single law articulating Federal standards for state 
districting.(7)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 4 (``The Times, Places, and Manner of 
        holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be 
        prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the 
        Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such 
        Regulations.'').
 2. 5 Stat. 491.
 3. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 8 Sec. 3. The single-Member district 
        requirement was repealed in 1850 (9 Stat. 428), but reinstated 
        in 1862 (12 Stat. 572).
 4. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 8 Sec. 3.
 5. 17 Stat. 28.
 6. 31 Stat. 733.
 7. Parliamentarian's Note: Although these Federal standards for state 
        districting were established in law, the House demonstrated 
        considerable reluctance to reject the seating of Members who 
        had been elected via procedures that did not meet these 
        standards. See, e.g., 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 310 (Member-
        elect from an at-large district allowed to take his seat). See 
        also Deschler's Precedents Ch. 8 Sec. Sec. 3, 3.7. For more on 
        election contests generally, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9; 
        and Precedents (Smith) Ch. 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Reapportionment Act of 1929 substantially revised the 1911 law, 
retaining the overall total of 435 Members, but instituting an 
automatic process for apportioning Representatives based on the method 
of ``equal proportions.'' In revising the apportionment laws, the act 
of 1929 failed to reiterate the earlier Federal standards for state 
redistricting processes. In a 1932 case,(8) the Supreme 
Court confirmed that these Federal standards were no longer applicable. 
Over the ensuring decades, the issue of authority over state 
districting standards was extensively litigated in the courts. In 1946, 
the Supreme Court declined to enter the ``political thicket'' of state 
districting, declaring that such issues were nonjusticiable political 
questions.(9) The seminal case of Baker v. Carr in 1962 
essentially reversed this analysis, articulating new standards for 
determining whether a nonjusticiable political question 
exists.(10) Relying on the Equal Protection Clause of the 
14th Amendment, the Court held that the malapportioned state 
legislative districts violated the principle of ``one person, one 
vote.'' Two years later, the issue of congressional districting came 
directly before the Court in the case Wesberry v. 
Sanders.(11) In that case, the Court held that a Georgia 
districting law that allowed for wide disparities in population among 
districts was unconstitutional (effectively reinstating the earlier 
statutory requirement that congressional districts within a state be 
roughly equal in population).(12) Subsequent case law 
articulated factors that a court may consider in determining whether a 
state's districting plan meets constitutional muster. Such factors 
include: the compactness of the districts, the contiguity of the 
districts (i.e., whether they are composed of continuous territory), 
and whether the districts cross geographic or political/municipal 
boundaries.(13)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932).
 9. Colegrove v. Greene, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
10. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
11. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
12. Parliamentarian's Note: Due to the mathematical impossibility of 
        creating districts exactly equal in population, the Supreme 
        Court has struggled with the degree to which a congressional 
        district map may deviate from the theoretical ideal. For 
        subsequent cases addressing those questions, see, e.g., 
        Kirkpatrick v. Preiser, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); Mahan v. Howell, 
        410 U.S. 315 (1973); and Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 
        (1983). The Court has also addressed the issue of which 
        individuals should be counted in determining the population of 
        a district. See Evenwel v. Abbott, 578 U.S.__ (2016).
13. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The courts have 
        also been responsive to claims that improper districting by 
        states has resulted in the denial or dilution of voting rights 
        of minority populations. See, e.g., United Jewish 
        Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); Thornburg v. 
        Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); 
        Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Easley v. Cromartie, 532 
        U.S. 234 (2001); and Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 
        (2013). The extent to which districts may be drawn to favor one 
        political party has also been the subject of litigation, though 
        majority opinions announcing clear standards have been rare. 
        See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); Vieth v. 
        Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 
        (2006); Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S.__ (2018); Lamone v. Benisek, 
        588 U.S.__ (2019); and Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S.__ 
        (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the issue of whether states could provide for at-
large or multi-Member districts, Congress affirmatively reinstated the 
requirement of single-Member districts only via the enactment of a new 
statute in 1967.(14) The law provides that states with more 
than one Representative must create ``a number of districts equal to 
the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled'' and 
that no district may elect more than one Representative.(15)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. P.L. 90-196, 81 Stat. 581. This law has been codified at 2 U.S.C. 
        Sec. 2c. See also Deschler's Precedents Ch. 8 Sec. 3.3
15. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 2c.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



              B. Time, Place, and Regulation of Elections



Sec. 3. State and Federal Jurisdiction over House Elections

    The U.S. Constitution divides jurisdiction over elections to the 
House between the House and the states. Article I, section 4, clause 1, 
provides: ``The Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the 
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or 
alter such Regulations.''(1) In practice, this concurrent 
jurisdiction over House elections has been resolved in favor of the 
states with respect to the administration of the elections themselves 
and the procedures for conducting them, while the House has maintained 
the authority to review (and in some cases override) actions by the 
states. Ultimately, the House has plenary authority, under the 
Constitution,(2) to judge which individuals have been 
properly elected to its membership.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. House Rules and Manual Sec. Sec. 42-44 (2021).
 2. U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 5 (``Each House shall be the Judge of the 
        Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members . . 
        .'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Supreme Court has held that Congress's power to prescribe 
regulations for the conduct of congressional elections is 
``comprehensive'' and that it is within the power of Congress to 
provide ``a complete code for congressional elections.''(3) 
Despite this vast authority to regulate elections to the House, the 
House has traditionally deferred to the states with respect to the 
administration of such elections (including the validity of ballots, 
recount procedures, and similar matters). Ultimately, the House has the 
ability to refuse to seat Members-elect where state election procedures 
are considered deficient.(4)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932).
 4. For more on election contests generally, see Deschler's Precedents 
        Ch. 9; and Precedents (Smith) Ch. 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the Constitution, voters in House elections must meet the 
qualifications that the state requires for elections to the ``most 
numerous branch'' of the state legislature.(5) In the 
earliest years of the republic, states would often mandate property 
requirements as a qualification for voting, but such conditions have 
long since been eliminated. Although courts have held that states may 
restrict the franchise in certain ways (for example, by requiring the 
absence of a criminal record to vote), states do not have unfettered 
discretion in this area, and must abide by other voter qualification 
provisions of the Constitution. For example, the 15th, 19th, 24th, and 
26th amendments to the Constitution each impose restrictions on the 
ability of states to limit the franchise.(6)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 2.
 6. The 15th Amendment states that the right to vote may not be denied 
        or abridged based on ``race, color, or previous condition of 
        servitude'' of the citizen. Similar language in the 19th 
        Amendment eliminated restrictions based on sex, while the 26th 
        Amendment expanded the franchise to anyone 18 years of age or 
        older. The 24th Amendment prohibited denying the right to vote 
        for failure to pay a poll tax.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to these constitutional protections regarding the right 
to vote, Congress has enacted a variety of civil rights laws designed 
to safeguard the ability of citizens to exercise the 
franchise.(7) These laws provide Federal remedies for 
individuals whose right to vote was impeded or denied by their state or 
local governments. For example, section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965(8) required covered jurisdictions to obtain 
preclearance from either the Attorney General or U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia before implementing any changes to state 
voting procedures, in order to ensure that such changes were not made 
to discriminate against particular groups of voters. In recent decades, 
laws such as the Help America Vote Act(9) have been enacted 
to provide states with Federal assistance in conducting their 
elections, particularly technical assistance with electronic voting 
equipment and other resources to help secure the integrity of the 
electoral process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. See, e.g., the Civil Rights Act of 1870 (16 Stat. 140); the Civil 
        Rights Act of 1957 (P.L. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634); the Civil 
        Rights Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241); and the Voting 
        Rights Act of 1965 (P.L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437).
 8. 52 U.S.C. Sec. 10304. In 2013, the Supreme Court held that the 
        coverage formula in section 4 of the Voting Rights Act was 
        unconstitutional, resulting in the inability to enforce the 
        preclearance requirements of section 5. Shelby County v. 
        Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
 9. 52 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 20901 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Virtually all states require eligible voters to first register and 
be placed on the voting rolls before being permitted to cast 
votes.(10) At the Federal level,(11) Congress 
enacted the National Voter Registration Act(12) in 1993 to 
require greater access to registration services (for example, by 
requiring states to provide voter registration materials at social 
service agencies). That act also permits registration via Federal form 
and prohibits removing voters from registration lists in certain 
circumstances.(13)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. North Dakota is the only state that does not require voters to 
        register for Federal or state elections. Many states provide 
        for automatic registration, and/or the ability to register on 
        the same day as the election.
11. For jurisdiction over voter registration in Federal elections, see 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 8 Sec. 6 (``congressional authority 
        to preempt state regulation extends to the registration 
        process'').
12. 52 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 20501 et seq.
13. See Federal Role in Voter Registration: the National Voter 
        Registration Act of 1993 and Subsequent Developments, CRS 
        Report R45030 (May 11, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Congress has also enacted statutes designed to improve 
accessibility, both in the registration process and at state polling 
places. The Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act, 
originally passed in 1984, requires states to provide accommodations at 
polling sites and registration locations for disabled or elderly 
voters.(14) Assistance and support for citizens overseas 
(particularly members of the military) to exercise their right to vote 
is provided by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act 
(most recently amended in 2009 by the Military and Overseas Voter 
Empowerment Act).(15)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 52 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 20101 et seq. The Americans with Disabilities 
        Act (42 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 12101 et seq.), while not directly 
        concerned with voting procedures, has been interpreted by 
        Justice Department regulations as encompassing accessibility 
        issues at polling places. The Justice Department routinely 
        publishes an ``ADA Checklist for Polling Places'' to assist 
        states with compliance.
15. 52 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 20301 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Federal regulation of state election procedures extends beyond 
general elections to encompass party primaries as well.(16) 
As with state laws regarding the general election, Congress typically 
defers to the states to establish appropriate procedures for the 
conduct of primary elections. However, Congress has the authority to 
make laws that supersede such procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 8 Sec. Sec. 7.2-7.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Where Congress has asserted its role in regulating elections 
administered by the states, it has typically been to ensure that states 
conduct elections in compliance with their own procedures or to 
standardize procedures across states where necessary.(17) 
Ultimately, the House's sole authority to judge who has been properly 
elected to its membership provides a mechanism by which a state's 
administration of an election may be reviewed. Election contests may be 
brought in the House, either pursuant to its inherent authority under 
the Constitution or pursuant to the procedures of the Federal Contested 
Elections Act.(18) Investigations made while evaluating a 
contested election may involve an examination of the conduct of state 
election administrators, state election statutes, and state judicial 
opinions interpreting such statutes.(19)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 8 Sec. 5 (``. . . congressional 
        regulation [of congressional elections] has been directed 
        largely towards the failure of the states to ensure the 
        regularity of elections under their own state laws.'').
18. See Precedents (Smith) Ch. 9.
19. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to nonvoting Delegates or Resident Commissioners who 
represent nonstate areas of the United States, the election of such 
individuals proceeds according to the statutes that create those 
positions.(20) There is no constitutional provision 
conferring jurisdiction over such elections to the territories, 
commonwealths, or districts themselves--only statutory provisions that 
may be altered by law at any time. As a result, Congress has a greater 
ability to impose specific requirements for the election of Delegates 
and Resident Commissioners than it does for the election of 
Members.(21)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. See 48 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 891-894 (Resident Commissioner from Puerto 
        Rico); 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 25a (Delegate from the District of 
        Columbia); 48 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1711-1715 (Delegate from Guam); 
        48 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1711-1715 (Delegate from the U.S. Virgin 
        Islands); 48 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1731-1735 (Delegate from American 
        Samoa); and 48 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1751-1757 (Delegate from the 
        Northern Mariana Islands).
21. Parliamentarian's Note: The statutes creating the different 
        Delegate and Resident Commissioner positions typically provide 
        some amount of discretion to the territory or commonwealth to 
        administer the election as it chooses. The House will generally 
        defer to such laws in judging election contests in the same 
        manner that it defers to state law. See, e.g., Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 8 Sec. 5.5. See also Precedents (Smith) Ch. 9 
        Sec. 20.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



Sec. 4. Vacancies; Continuity of Operations

    The resignation of a Member from the House causes a vacancy in that 
congressional seat.(1) The resigning Member submits their 
resignation to an appropriate state official (most often the Governor), 
and such correspondence is laid before the House for the information of 
other Members. Members have sometimes resigned prospectively, i.e., 
with a future effective date for the resignation, in which case the 
vacancy occurs when the resignation becomes effective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. For resignations generally, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 37; and 
        Precedents (____) Ch. 37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A vacancy in a House seat may also arise due to the death or 
incapacity of the Member,(2) a Member-elect declining to 
take the seat,(3) the exclusion of a Member-elect from the 
House,(4) or the expulsion of a Member.(5) 
Because only the House has the constitutional authority to decide who 
is entitled to its membership, the House is the ultimate arbiter of 
when a vacancy exists in any of its seats. The House has been informed 
of the presumptive death of a Member-elect, and responded by declaring 
a vacancy in his congressional seat.(6) Where a Member 
became incapacitated (falling into a coma following a heart attack) but 
was reelected to the next Congress, the House adopted a privileged 
resolution declaring the seat vacant.(7) A vacancy may also 
arise where the House does not receive a certificate of election from 
relevant state officials, and no individual claims a right to the 
seat.(8)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 38; and Precedents (____) Ch. 38. 
        There have been instances where a candidate died just prior to 
        the general election, but nevertheless succeeded in winning the 
        seat posthumously. For example, Rep. Patsy Mink of Hawaii died 
        before the general election for the 108th Congress, but was 
        nevertheless elected. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 38 
        Sec. Sec. 2.5, 5.7. The resulting vacancy was filled by special 
        election.
 3. See, e.g., 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 415 (Member-elect never took 
        his seat in the House, having been elected to the Senate). See 
        also 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 1230-1232, and 1234. There 
        have also been historical instances of vacancies being created 
        when a Member of the House accepts a constitutionally-
        incompatible office. See, e.g., 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 486. 
        For more on incompatible offices generally, see Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 7 Sec. Sec. 13, 14; and Precedents (Smith) Ch. 7 
        Sec. 4.
 4. For exclusion generally, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 12 Sec. 14; 
        and Precedents (____) Ch. 12.
 5. For expulsion generally, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 12 Sec. 13; 
        and Precedents (____) Ch. 12.
 6. Rep. Nick Begich of Alaska and Rep. Hale Boggs of Louisiana were 
        among the passengers of an airplane that disappeared between 
        Anchorage and Juneau, on October 16, 1972. Based on an Alaskan 
        judicial order declaring the presumptive death of Rep. Begich, 
        the Governor of Alaska declared a vacancy and scheduled a 
        special election to fill Begich's seat. Louisiana authorities 
        took no action with regard to the status of Boggs' seat. The 
        House subsequently adopted House Resolution 1, declaring a 
        vacancy and providing for a funeral delegation to attend 
        memorial services for the late Rep. Boggs. H. Res. 1, 119 Cong. 
        Rec. 15-16, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. (Jan. 3, 1973). See also 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 38 Sec. Sec. 2.15-2.17.
 7. See H. Res. 80, 127 Cong. Rec. 2916-17, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (Feb. 
        24, 1981). The Member-elect (Gladys Noon Spellman of Maryland) 
        never regained consciousness and passed away on June 19, 1988. 
        See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 38 Sec. 2.17.
 8. Parliamentarian's Note: At the beginning of the 116th Congress, no 
        certificate of election was issued to either of the candidates 
        from the Ninth District of North Carolina, due to alleged 
        ballot fraud. See 165 Cong. Rec. H1 [Daily Ed.], 116th Cong. 
        1st Sess. (Jan. 3, 2019). Later that Congress, state officials 
        communicated to the House that a special election would be held 
        to fill the vacancy. See 165 Cong. Rec. H2736 [Daily Ed.], 
        116th Cong. 1st Sess. (Mar. 14, 2019). At the beginning of the 
        117th Congress, no certificate of election had been received 
        for the 22nd District of New York (due to the closeness of the 
        election and ongoing, state-level recount procedures). 167 
        Cong. Rec. H1 [Daily Ed.], 117th Cong. 1st Sess. (Jan. 3, 
        2021). The election was finally certified on February 5, 2021, 
        and the Member-elect was sworn in on February 11, 2021. 167 
        Cong. Rec. H491-H492 [Daily Ed.], 117th Cong. 1st Sess. (Feb. 
        11, 2021). See also House Rules and Manual Sec. 22a (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When a vacancy occurs in a House seat, a new Member is elected via 
special election.(9) Special elections proceed according to 
the laws of the individual states. While the timing of general 
elections is a matter of Federal law, the timing of special elections 
is determined by relevant state laws. If the vacancy occurs within a 
certain numbers of days of the next regular election, state law may 
provide that the special election to fill the vacancy occur at the same 
time as the general election for the next Congress.(10)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. Parliamentarian's Note: This is to be contrasted with vacancies 
        that occur in Senate seats, which are filled by appointment by 
        the state's Governor. U.S. Const. amend. XVII.
10. Parliamentarian's Note: Some state laws have special rules for 
        conducting special elections that occur close to the next 
        regularly scheduled general election. For example, in 1994, 
        Oklahoma law provided that any vacancy that occurred after 
        March 1 of an election year would be filled by the winner of 
        the general election in November. An Oklahoma Member (Rep. 
        James M. Inhofe) resigned his seat on November 15, 1994, in 
        order to take a seat in the Senate. Mr. Steve Largent had 
        already won his election to the same seat for the upcoming 
        104th Congress. Under Oklahoma law, the Governor of Oklahoma 
        had the ministerial duty of ``appointing'' Mr. Largent to the 
        vacant seat for the 103d Congress, following the resignation of 
        Rep. Inhofe. Although state Governors do not have the authority 
        to appoint persons to vacant House seats, the House deferred to 
        state law and treated the Oklahoma procedures as a valid 
        election of Mr. Largent to a seat in the 103d Congress. A 
        privileged resolution was offered on November 29, 1994, to 
        authorize the Speaker to administer the oath of office to Mr. 
        Largent, and referring the question of final right to the seat 
        to the Committee on House Administration. See H. Res. 585, 140 
        Cong. Rec. 29585-86, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. (Nov. 29, 1994). See 
        also Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 2 Sec. 3.9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A special election proceeds in the same manner as a general 
election. The state certifies the winner of the election, and issues a 
certificate of election to the winning candidate.(11) The 
certificate is then forwarded to the Clerk of the House, and the 
Member-elect appears to take the oath of office. The oath is typically 
administered by the Speaker of the House, though a Speaker pro tempore 
may also perform this function.(12)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. See Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 2 Sec. Sec. 3.5, 3.6. Special 
        elections may also become the subject of election contests in 
        the same manner as general elections. See Deschler's Precedents 
        Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 10.17, 10.18.
12. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 6 Sec. 12.8; and Precedents (Wickham) 
        Ch. 6 Sec. Sec. 11, 12.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Pursuant to clause 5(d) of rule XX,(13) when a vacancy 
arises or is filled, the Chair announces to the House the new ``whole 
number'' of the House. The whole number of the House is the number of 
Members ``chosen, sworn, and living, and whose membership in the House 
has not been terminated by resignation or by action of the 
House.''(14)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. House Rules and Manual Sec. 1024b (2021).
14. Rule XX, clause 5(c)(7)(B); House Rules and Manual Sec. 1024a 
        (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the House 
undertook several studies aimed at developing procedures that would be 
used to ensure the continuity of House operations in the wake of a 
catastrophic event.(15) One of the overarching concerns was 
how the House should respond to a mass casualty event where a 
substantial portion of its membership had been either killed or 
incapacitated. The most significant parliamentary question with regard 
to such a circumstance was how to address the Constitution's quorum 
requirements in the event that a regular (majority) quorum could not be 
formed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. In May 2002, the House established a bipartisan Continuity of 
        Congress Working Group to investigate what changes should be 
        made to House rules to account for catastrophic circumstances. 
        For remarks by the cochair of the Working Group, see 148 Cong. 
        Rec. 22676-77, 107th Cong. 2d Sess. (Nov. 14, 2002). For 
        remarks by the chair of the Committee on Rules regarding these 
        continuity of operations issues, see 150 Cong. Rec. 19033-41, 
        108th Cong. 2d Sess. (Sept. 22, 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At the beginning of the 109th Congress, the House adopted a new 
rule to address these issues. Clause 5(c) of rule XX provides 
procedures should the House find itself without a quorum due to 
``catastrophic circumstances.'' This rule establishes the concept of a 
``provisional number of the House'' where a quorum based on the whole 
number of the House cannot be obtained. The provisional number of the 
House is determined on the basis of an extended call of the House 
(lasting multiple days) that reveals the inability to assemble a 
regular quorum. Members who are able to respond to said quorum call 
constitute the provisional number of the House, and the Constitution's 
quorum requirements are interpreted with reference to that provisional 
number.(16)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. Parliamentarian's Note: When the provisional quorum rule was first 
        adopted, some Members questioned whether the rule was 
        consistent with the Constitution's quorum requirements. Rep. 
        Brian Baird of Washington attempted to raise a ``constitutional 
        point of order'' against the resolution adopting rules for the 
        109th Congress, but the Speaker declined to entertain the point 
        of order. As an alternative, Rep. Baird raised the question of 
        consideration with respect to the resolution, which was agreed 
        to by the House. See 151 Cong. Rec. 44-46, 109th Cong. 1st 
        Sess. (Jan. 4, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A House resolution, adopted in 2002 and sent to the chief executive 
official of each state, encouraged each state to examine the policies 
and procedures for conducting special elections so that vacancies ``may 
be filled in a timely fashion.''(17) Some states in response 
reported information about their special election practices to the 
House via memorial.(18)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. H. Res. 559, 148 Cong. Rec. 18919-25, 107th Cong. 2d Sess. (Oct. 2, 
        2002).
18. See 148 Cong. Rec. 22946, 107th Cong. 2d Sess. (Nov. 17, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Congress also addressed the possibility of numerous vacancies in 
House seats though changes in the statutory law regarding special 
elections.(19) In ``extraordinary circumstances'' (defined 
as over 100 vacancies in the House), the statute authorizes expedited 
filling of such vacancies via special election.(20) Such 
special elections ``shall take place not later than 49 days'' after the 
Speaker of the House has announced the existence of the required 
vacancies.(21) A joint resolution proposing an amendment to 
the Constitution regarding the filling of House vacancies in 
extraordinary circumstances was considered in the House, but failed to 
reach the necessary two-thirds supermajority for 
passage.(22)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. See P.L. 109-55, 119 Stat. 588, codified at 2 U.S.C. Sec. 8.
20. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 8(b)(4)(A).
21. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 8(b)(2).
22. H.J. Res. 83, 150 Cong. Rec. 11287-305, 108th Cong. 2d Sess. (June 
        2, 2004). In 1960, the House considered a Senate measure 
        proposing to amend the Constitution to provide a mechanism for 
        state officials to fill vacancies in the House in certain 
        circumstances. However, the House amended the Senate measure to 
        remove that provision (the remaining text would later be 
        ratified as the 23rd Amendment). See S.J. Res. 39, 106 Cong. 
        Rec. 12571, 86th Cong. 2d Sess. (June 14, 1960). For an earlier 
        constitutional amendment passed by the Senate regarding filling 
        House vacancies (but not considered by the House), see S.J. 
        Res. 39, 100 Cong. Rec. 7658-69, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. (June 4, 
        1954).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



                         C. Campaign Practices



Sec. 5. Election Campaigns and Campaign Financing Regulation

    The constitutional authorities described in the preceding sections 
of this chapter allow Congress to regulate the time, place, and manner 
of elections to the House, and give the House the exclusive right to 
judge the elections and returns of its own Members. The Supreme Court 
has further clarified that these constitutional authorities over 
election processes extend to issues regarding voter registration, 
primary elections, and election campaign practices.(1) This 
last category is the subject of this section, with an emphasis on the 
regulation of campaign financing of House elections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although election campaigns have been a part of American democracy 
since its founding, it was not until the 20th century that the first 
Federal laws were passed regulating the financing of election 
campaigns.(2) One of the earliest of such laws was the 
Tillman Act of 1907,(3) which prohibited corporations from 
contributing to political campaigns. The National Publicity 
Act(4) followed in 1910, instituting financial disclosure 
requirements on political parties, and limiting the amount of money 
such parties could contribute to House elections. Amendments to these 
laws were consolidated into a revision of campaign finance laws with 
the passage of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925.(5)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. ``Prior to 1890 no law had been passed in the United States 
        regulating the use of money in elections. Indeed, until the 
        presidential election of 1904 the subject of campaign funds had 
        not received any serious public consideration.'' James K. 
        Pollock, Jr., Party Campaign Funds (A.A. Knopf 1926), p. 7.
 3. P.L. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864. A similar restriction on contributions 
        from unions was passed in 1947, over the veto of President 
        Harry Truman. See P.L. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136.
 4. P.L. 61-274, 36 Stat. 822. This act was also known as the Federal 
        Corrupt Practices Act of 1910.
 5. P.L. 68-506, 43 Stat. 1070. For earlier treatment of campaign laws 
        under this act, including relevant court cases and election 
        contests, see 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. Sec. 67-79.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 1928, the House established its first ``special committee'' to 
investigate campaign practices and campaign expenditures.(6) 
The committee was to report on ``the campaign expenditures of the 
various presidential candidates, vice presidential candidates, 
senatorial candidates, and candidates for the House of Representatives 
in both parties, the names of the persons, firms, or corporations 
subscribing, the amount contributed, the method of expenditure of said 
sums, and all facts in relation thereto, not only as to the 
subscriptions of money and expenditures thereof but as to the use of 
any other means or influence, including the promise or use of 
patronage, and all other facts in relation thereto that would not only 
be of public interest but would aid the Congress in any necessary 
remedial legislation.''(7) This committee was further 
provided with subpoena authority and other investigative powers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. H. Res. 232, 69 Cong. Rec. 10688, 70th Cong. 1st Sess. (May 29, 
        1928).
 7. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similar committees were formed by the House in each successive 
Congress for over 40 years.(8) Although the investigative 
scope of these committees varied over time, they were primarily focused 
on collecting data on campaign expenditures--the individuals, groups, 
and other entities contributing to election campaigns, the amounts of 
such contributions, the amount of spending by candidates for House 
seats, etc. These committees were also charged with investigating 
whether any Federal laws regarding campaign financing had been 
violated. On occasion, information from such special committees would 
be found to have bearing on an election contest pursued with regard to 
a particular House election.(9) Jurisdiction over the same 
campaign issues was formally given to the Committee on House 
Administration in the 94th Congress.(10)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 8 Sec. 14. See also ``Guide to the 
        Records of the United States House of Representatives at the 
        National Archives, 1789-1989: Bicentennial Edition,'' https://
www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/house/chapter-22.html (last 
        visited Aug. 25, 2022).
 9. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 8 Sec. Sec. 14.4-14.8.
10. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 8 Sec. 10.10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



Sec. 6. The Federal Election Commission

    Prior to 1971, campaign financial disclosures for House Members 
were required to be reported to the Clerk of the House. The Clerk, 
however, had no method to enforce this requirement, and over time 
compliance waned. Between 1971 and 1976, a series of statutory 
enactments on the part of the legislative branch and constitutional 
rulings on the part of the judicial branch laid the foundation for 
current Federal regulation of election campaigns. In 1971, Congress 
passed the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA),(1) 
repealing the earlier Federal Corrupt Practices Act. FECA initially 
divided its enforcement powers among the Clerk of the House (for House 
Members),(2) the Secretary of the Senate (for Senators), and 
the Comptroller General of the General Accounting Office(3) 
(for the presidential campaign). This structure was fundamentally 
changed by the FECA amendments of 1974(4)--the law that 
created the Federal Election Commission (FEC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. P.L. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3.
 2. For precedents relating to the Clerk's role in campaign finance 
        regulation under the original 1971 act, see Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 8 Sec. Sec. 10.6-10.10.
 3. Parliamentarian's Note: The General Accounting Office was 
        redesignated as the Government Accountability Office in 2004.
 4. P.L. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FEC was empowered with enforcing the disclosure and expenditure 
limits imposed by FECA. It was to be headed by six commissioners--two 
to be appointed by the President, two to be appointed by the President 
pro tempore of the Senate and two to be appointed by the Speaker of the 
House.(5) The Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the 
Senate were made ex officio, nonvoting members of the Commission. This 
structure for the commission was challenged as impermissibly mixing 
executive and legislative functions. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled 
that the commission's appointment structure violated the Constitution's 
principle of separation of powers.(6) Congress responded by 
passing the FECA amendments of 1976.(7) This act introduced 
a new organizational structure designed to pass constitutional 
scrutiny. The new FEC, still with six commissioners, would be appointed 
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The act 
further stipulated that no more than three commissioners may belong to 
the same political party, and that most decisions of the commission 
would require four votes to be adopted. This appointment and voting 
structure was intended to foster independence and bipartisan decision-
making.(8)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 8 Sec. 10.11.
 6. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
 7. P.L. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475.
 8. Parliamentarian's Note: Although the bipartisan nature of the 
        commission was designed to achieve fair and impartial 
        regulation of campaign laws, it often had the effect of 
        creating deadlock votes among the commissioners, where the 
        agreement of four commissioners could not be obtained and 
        action could not therefore be taken. Additionally, in recent 
        years, the FEC has sometimes lost its policymaking quorum due 
        to vacancies. This occurred in 2007, 2019, and 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The 1974 amendments to FECA contained contribution limits to 
Federal campaigns, which restricted the amount of money that could be 
given to candidates seeking Federal office. The Supreme Court, in the 
same ruling that declared unconstitutional the FEC's original 
appointment structure, held that such contribution limits violated the 
First Amendment's right to free speech. Thus, the contribution limits 
were also repealed in the 1976 amendment. Further amendments to the act 
in 1979 simplified some of the act's reporting requirements and 
prohibited the use of campaign funds for personal 
purposes.(9)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. P.L. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FEC may issue regulations to enforce campaign finance laws. 
Such regulations are subject to congressional disapproval via special 
procedures contained in statute.(10) Following the revisions 
to FECA made in 1979,(11) a disapproval resolution reported 
by a committee of the House has priority on the floor, and a motion to 
proceed to its consideration is deemed ``highly privileged'' under 
House rules.(12)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 52 U.S.C. Sec. 30111(d). Any ``rule, regulation, or form'' 
        promulgated by the Commission must first be submitted to 
        Congress for its review. Pursuant to the original form of the 
        statute, either House of Congress could then disapprove of the 
        proposal within a specified time period. However, in 1983, the 
        Supreme Court held that these types of ``congressional veto'' 
        procedures in statute were unconstitutional, thus prohibiting 
        the nullification of executive regulations by simple resolution 
        of one House of Congress or concurrent resolution of both 
        Houses. See Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 
        462 U.S. 919 (1983). Thus, for the disapproval mechanism in the 
        FECA to be effective, it must be done via a joint resolution of 
        both Houses that is signed by the President.
11. P.L. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339.
12. Parliamentarian's Note: Prior to the amendments of 1979, such 
        disapproval resolution had no special privilege in the House. 
        For an example of a disapproval resolution being considered 
        pursuant to a special order of business resolution prior to the 
        enactment of the 1979 amendments, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 
        8 Sec. 10.12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



Sec. 7. House Ethics Rules

    The statutes described above represent the primary mechanism by 
which the financing of congressional election campaigns is regulated. 
Thus, the enforcement of campaign financing rules is principally the 
role of executive branch entities, such as the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) and the Department of Justice. However, campaign-
related activities are, to a limited extent, also covered by House 
ethics rules. These rules have long provided guidelines and 
prohibitions regarding the use of campaign funds that are similar to 
the statutory provisions described in preceding sections.
    Although the Code of Official Conduct devotes comparatively little 
attention to the issue of campaign financing relative to other matters, 
several longstanding provisions do address the proper use of campaign 
funds by Members. When the House first adopted its Code of Official 
Conduct in the 90th Congress in 1968, it contained a provision 
requiring Members to keep ``campaign funds separate from personal 
funds.''(1) The same provision (with certain amendments) is 
retained in the current House rules as clause 6 of rule 
XXIII.(2) The Ethics Reform Act of 1989(3) made 
additional changes to the Code of Official Conduct, including a 
requirement that funds from campaign accounts may only be used for 
``bona fide campaign or political purposes.''(4) Although it 
is rare for campaign-related activity to become the subject of an 
inquiry by the Committee on Ethics, there have been instances where 
Members have been reprimanded,(5) or censured(6) 
for failure to abide by either statutory or House ethics rules 
regarding the disclosure of campaign financing and proper use of 
campaign funds.(7)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. H. Res. 1099, 114 Cong. Rec. 8802, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. (Apr. 3, 
        1968).
 2. House Rules and Manual Sec. 1095 (2021).
 3. P.L. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716.
 4. Rule XXIII, clause 6(c); House Rules and Manual Sec. 1095 (2021).
 5. See Sec. Sec. 7.1-7.3, infra.
 6. See Sec. 7.4, infra.
 7. Parliamentarian's Note: It was alleged that Speaker James Wright of 
        Texas used campaign funds to produce a book from which he 
        derived royalties. Although other aspects of the book's 
        production and financing resulted in the Committee on Standards 
        of Official Conduct concluding that House ethics rules had been 
        breached, the committee concluded that no campaign funds were 
        used to produce the book. For more on the ethics case against 
        Speaker Wright (and his subsequent resignation of the 
        speakership), see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 37 Sec. 9.1 and 
        Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 6 Sec. 7.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 7.1 A Member has been reprimanded for, inter alia, failure to 
    abide by campaign financing disclosure requirements, conversion of 
    campaign funds to personal use, and the misuse of official 
    resources for campaign purposes, in violation of House ethics rules 
    and applicable law.

    On July 31, 2020,(8) the House adopted a privileged 
report from the Committee on Ethics reprimanding a Member for filing 
false campaign financing reports, failing to properly disclosure 
campaign contributions, accepting impermissible campaign contributions, 
converting campaign funds for personal use, misusing official resources 
for campaign purposes, and pressuring official staff to perform 
campaign work:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 166 Cong. Rec. H4194-H4197 [Daily Ed.], 116th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        IN THE MATTER OF REPRESENTATIVE DAVID SCHWEIKERT OF ARIZONA    

        Mr. [Theodore] DEUTCH [of Florida]. Madam Speaker, by direction 
    of the Committee on Ethics, I offer a privileged resolution (H. 
    Res. 1074) in the matter of Representative David Schweikert, and 
    ask for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 1074

Resolved, (1) That the House adopt the Report of the Committee on Ethics 
dated July 30, 2020, In the Matter of Allegations Relating to 
Representative David Schweikert.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(9) The gentleman from 
    Florida is recognized for 1 hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. Diana DeGette (CO).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. DEUTCH. Madam Speaker, I yield an equal amount of time to 
    the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Marchant), the ranking member of the 
    Committee on Ethics, for purposes of debate only, and I ask 
    unanimous consent that he be permitted to control that time.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Florida?
        There was no objection.
        Mr. DEUTCH. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
    consume.
        Madam Speaker, as chairman of the Committee on Ethics, I rise 
    in support of a resolution for Representative David Schweikert of 
    Arizona to be reprimanded by the House of Representatives.
        One of our most basic obligations as Members of Congress is to 
    adhere to the principle that public office is a public trust. To 
    uphold that trust and to maintain civic confidence in the integrity 
    of the body, we, as Members, have bound ourselves by certain 
    standards of official conduct.
        Our Constitution vests the House with the responsibility for 
    self-discipline and self-accountability to those ethical standards. 
    The Committee on Ethics, whose membership is evenly divided between 
    Republicans and Democrats and whose work is supported by 
    nonpartisan staff, is charged with: enforcing the laws and rules 
    governing our official conduct; investigating allegations that 
    those laws and rules have been violated; and, where appropriate, 
    making recommendations to the House for the disposition of such 
    investigations. We are here today to fulfill that charge.
        Our committee began reviewing allegations involving 
    Representative Schweikert after public reports detailed potential 
    misconduct by him and his former chief of staff, who is no longer 
    employed by the House.
        In 2018, the Office of Congressional Ethics sent two separate 
    referrals regarding Representative Schweikert to the Ethics 
    Committee for further review. Those referrals included: troubling 
    allegations of systemic campaign finance violations and reporting 
    errors by Representative Schweikert's authorized campaign 
    committees; allegations of misuse of his Members' Representational 
    Allowance, or MRA, for unofficial purposes; and evidence that he 
    pressured his official staff to perform campaign work.
        During the 115th Congress, the committee impaneled an 
    investigative subcommittee to lead a bipartisan review of these 
    allegations. At the start of the 116th Congress, the committee 
    reestablished that evenly divided bipartisan panel and appointed 
    Representative Dean Phillips of Minnesota as its chair, along with 
    Representative Bill Flores of Texas, Representative Jamie Raskin of 
    Maryland, and Representative John Katko of New York.
        The subcommittee, which was capably supported by the 
    committee's professional, nonpartisan investigative staff, took 
    testimony from 18 witnesses and reviewed several hundred thousand 
    pages of documents. The investigative subcommittee also heard from 
    Representative Schweikert himself and considered his views and 
    interpretation of the evidence without prejudgment.
        Upon completing its exhaustive investigation, the subcommittee 
    unanimously concluded that there was substantial reason to believe 
    that Representative Schweikert's conduct violated various House 
    rules, the Code of Ethics for Government service, Federal laws, and 
    other applicable standards.
        On June 30, 2020, the investigative subcommittee unanimously 
    adopted a Statement of Alleged Violations, or SAV, detailing 11 
    separate violations and the facts giving rise to those violations.
        As set forth in counts 1 through 6 of the SAV, between 2010 and 
    2017, Representative Schweikert's campaign committees erroneously 
    disclosed or failed to disclose hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
    loans that were made or obtained for the benefit of his 
    congressional campaigns, including a fictional $100,000 loan that 
    purported to be sourced from personal funds. His campaign 
    committees also failed to report or falsely reported hundreds of 
    thousands of dollars in campaign disbursements and contributions.
        For those cumulative and sustained acts, Representative 
    Schweikert violated: Federal Election Commission Act reporting 
    requirements; clause 1 of the Code of Official Conduct of House 
    rule XXIII, which requires Members of this House to behave at all 
    times in a manner that reflects creditably on this House; and the 
    Code of Ethics for Government Service.
        Count 7 addresses conduct by Representative Schweikert's former 
    chief of staff, who made hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
    impermissible outlays on behalf of Representative Schweikert's 
    campaign committees over a 7-year period. Even though these outlays 
    were eventually reimbursed by the campaign, they amounted to 
    impermissible campaign contributions under Federal law.
        For knowing of this practice as it was ongoing but failing to 
    prevent it, Representative Schweikert violated clause 1 of House 
    rule XXIII and the Code of Ethics for Government Service.
        As detailed in count 8, between 2011 and 2018, Representative 
    Schweikert converted campaign funds for personal purposes, 
    primarily by accepting personal items from several staff members 
    that were later reimbursed using campaign funds.
        The conduct violated: Federal election law and regulations; 
    clause 6 of House rule XXIII, which states campaign funds must be 
    kept separate and cannot be converted to personal use; and the Code 
    of Ethics for Government Service.
        Count 9 addresses Representative Schweikert's misuse of 
    official resources--including official funds, staff time, and 
    congressional office space--for unofficial and campaign purposes 
    between 2011 and 2017.
        By misusing his MRA and failing to provide necessary oversight 
    over its use, Representative Schweikert violated 31 U.S. Code, 
    section 1301, clause 1 of House rule XXIII, and the Code of Ethics 
    for Government Service.
        As set forth in count 10, Representative Schweikert violated 
    clause 1 of House rule XXIII by pressuring his former chief of 
    staff to fundraise for his campaigns and fostering an office 
    environment in which congressional staff felt pressured to perform 
    campaign work.
        Finally, as detailed in count 11, Representative Schweikert 
    violated clause 1 of House rule XXIII by failing to exercise the 
    proper candor and due diligence necessary in responding to these 
    allegations, including a finding by this investigate subcommittee 
    that certain aspects of his testimony lacked credibility.
        Under House and committee rules, a Member confronted with a 
    Statement of Alleged Violations may either challenge the 
    allegations with a public hearing of an adjudicatory subcommittee 
    or, instead, reach a negotiated resolution with the investigative 
    subcommittee.
        In this instance, Representative Schweikert, with the 
    assistance of his counsel, negotiated a resolution in which he 
    admitted to all 11 counts in a Statement of Alleged Violations. He 
    also agreed to waive his rights to any additional process, 
    including his right to an adjudicatory hearing.
        For his misconduct, Representative Schweikert agreed to accept 
    a sanction of reprimand by the House as well as a $50,000 fine to 
    be paid to the United States Treasury.
        The investigative subcommittee carefully considered whether 
    censure, rather than a reprimand, befitted Representative 
    Schweikert's egregious conduct. Ultimately, the bipartisan 
    subcommittee agreed to this negotiated sanction of a monetary fine 
    and public reprimand by his colleagues, in large part because of 
    Representative Schweikert's willingness to accept responsibility 
    for his own misconduct.
        On July 29, our bipartisan Ethics Committee unanimously voted 
    to adopt the subcommittee's recommendations and transmit to the 
    House the resolution currently under consideration. Yesterday 
    morning, Ranking Member Marchant and I filed our committee's 
    report, together with the report of the investigative subcommittee, 
    accompanying exhibits, Representative Schweikert's responsive 
    views, and the materials provided to the committee by the Office of 
    Congressional Ethics in its referrals. I urge all of my colleagues, 
    if they have not done so already, to carefully read those 
    materials. . . .
        I encourage all Members of this House, all candidates and 
    Congressional staff, to avail themselves of our committee's 
    resources to help them satisfy their ethical obligations and to 
    avoid the mistakes like those by Representative Schweikert that 
    bring us to the floor of the House today.
        Madam Speaker, I urge by colleagues to vote ``aye'' as well, 
    and I yield back the balance of my time.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous 
    question is ordered.
        There was no objection.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 7.2 A Member has been reprimanded for, inter alia, misusing 
    official resources for campaign purposes, and pressuring official 
    staff to perform campaign work, in violation of House ethics rules 
    and applicable law.

    On August 2, 2012,(10) the House adopted a privileged 
report from the Committee on Ethics reprimanding a Member for, inter 
alia, converting campaign funds for personal use, and pressuring 
official staff to perform campaign work:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 158 Cong. Rec. 13191-93, 13195, 112th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        IN THE MATTER OF REPRESENTATIVE LAURA RICHARDSON OF CALIFORNIA  
                                         

        Mr. [Josiah] BONNER, Jr. [of Alabama]. Mr. Speaker, by 
    direction of the Committee on Ethics, I offer a privileged 
    resolution and ask for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 755

Resolved, That the House adopt the Report of the Committee on Ethics dated 
August 1, 2012, In the Matter of Representative Laura Richardson.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(11) The gentleman from 
    Alabama is recognized for 1 hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. Steve Womack (AR).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. BONNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield an equal amount of time in 
    this debate to a lady with whom I am honored to serve, the 
    gentlewoman from California (Ms. Sanchez), the ranking member of 
    the Committee on Ethics, for purposes of debate only, and I ask 
    unanimous consent that she be permitted to control that time.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Alabama?
        There was no objection.
        Mr. BONNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
    consume.
        As chairman of the Committee on Ethics, I rise in support of a 
    resolution before us today which calls for a reprimand for 
    Representative Laura Richardson of California. . . . 
        Mr. Speaker, while the full committee report, the investigative 
    subcommittee report, Representative Richardson's responsive views, 
    and all exhibits were filed by the ranking member and me yesterday 
    morning, and have been available to the House and to the American 
    people since that time, here now, in summary, are the seven counts 
    of violation:
        First, Representative Richardson violated the Purpose Law, 
    title 31, section 1301, United States Code, by using official 
    resources of the House for campaign, political, personal, and other 
    nonofficial purposes.
        Second, Representative Richardson violated House rule XXIII by 
    retaining a full-time employee in her district office who did not 
    perform duties commensurate with their compensation.
        Third, Representative Richardson violated House rule XXIII by 
    behaving in a manner that did not reflect credibly upon this House 
    when she unlawfully used House resources for nonofficial purposes.
        Fourth, Representative Richardson violated House rule XXIII by 
    behaving in a manner that did not reflect credibly upon the House 
    when she improperly compelled members of her official staff to do 
    campaign work by threatening, attempting to intimidate, directing 
    or otherwise pressuring them to do such work.
        Fifth, Representative Richardson violated House rule XXIII by 
    behaving in a manner that did not reflect credibly upon the House 
    when she obstructed and attempted to obstruct the investigation of 
    this committee into these allegations.
        Sixth, Representative Richardson violated clause 2 of the Code 
    of Ethics for Government Service by failing to uphold the laws and 
    legal regulations discussed above and being a party to their 
    evasion.
        Seventh, Representative Richardson violated House rule XXIII by 
    failing to abide by the letter and spirit of House and committee 
    rules.
        The record should note that anytime a Member is confronted with 
    a Statement of Alleged Violation, he or she has the option of 
    challenging those allegations with a public hearing of an 
    adjudicatory subcommittee or, in the case of Representative 
    Richardson, negotiating a resolution with the investigative 
    subcommittee.
        In this instance, Representative Richardson negotiated a 
    resolution in which she admitted to all seven counts in the 
    Statement of Alleged Violation and has waived her rights to any 
    additional process in this matter, including waiving her right to 
    an adjudicatory hearing. Representative Richardson has also agreed 
    to accept a reprimand by the House as well as a $10,000 fine to be 
    paid out of personal funds to the U.S. Treasury no later than 
    December 1, 2012.
        In the history of our country, five Members have been expelled 
    from Congress; 23 Members have been censured; and eight Members 
    have been reprimanded. Representative Richardson negotiated--and we 
    recommend--the sanction of reprimand.
        The investigative subcommittee unanimously adopted a report 
    recommending a resolution including these terms to the full 
    committee, and on July 31, 2012, the full committee adopted the 
    recommendations of the subcommittee. . . . 
        Mr. [Charles] DENT [of Pennsylvania]. I want to thank the 
    gentleman from Alabama and the gentlelady from California for their 
    leadership of the committee.
        As a member of the Committee on Ethics and as the chairman of 
    the investigative subcommittee, or ISC, in this matter, I do rise 
    in support of the resolution, which calls for the adoption of this 
    committee's report and will serve as a reprimand of Representative 
    Laura Richardson for her conduct and will impose upon her a $10,000 
    fine. . . . 
        Here is a summary of the findings of the report and why the 
    committee recommends that Representative Richardson be reprimanded 
    by the House for her conduct.
        As discussed fully in the investigative subcommittee report, 
    fundamentally, Representative Richardson failed to acknowledge the 
    boundaries between the official and political realms. On page 59 of 
    the ISC report, it reads in part:

  This case is about boundaries. The House entrusts Members with a great 
deal of discretion over a large amount of taxpayer resources . . . This 
constructive trust requires Members to delineate between the official, the 
political, and the personal in ways that are at times quite tidy and at 
others tangled . . . Representative Richardson did not acknowledge these 
boundaries. She acted to consume the resources endowed to her as a Member 
for whatever purpose suited her whims at the moment, be they official acts, 
her reelection, or her person needs . . . The ISC discovered significant 
evidence suggesting that her wrongdoing continued even after learning that 
the committee was investigating her.

  If the committee fails to exact a steep price for such conduct, the 
message is one of a set of rules with a toothless enforcement mechanism.

        Representative Richardson's misconduct included that, first, 
    she improperly compelled or coerced members of her staff to do 
    campaign work. Representative Richardson required the staff of her 
    district office in Long Beach, California, to perform campaign work 
    each weeknight from approximately 6:30 p.m. through 9 p.m. during 
    at least the 2 months prior to the 2010 primary and general 
    elections. This practice alone accounted for hundreds of hours of 
    conscripted campaign work by public servants who did not wish to 
    perform it and may not be forced to do so. She also required her 
    district staff to perform additional campaign work on the weekends. 
    Representative Richardson applied the same philosophy to her 
    Capitol Hill staff. This demonstrates a blatant disregard for the 
    boundaries between official events and campaign events.
        Second, Representative Richardson used official resources of 
    the House for campaign and nonofficial purposes. While the report 
    has a detailed exposition of many of the resources used by 
    Representative Richardson, some of the more significant improper 
    uses of resources included the use of staff time during the 
    official work day to conduct campaign activities, repeated use of 
    the House email system to conduct campaign business, use of the MRA 
    to lease a car, which she parked at her house and used as her only 
    mode of transportation in the district, regardless as to whether 
    her destination was official, campaign, or personal in nature.
        Third, Representative Richardson paid her deputy district 
    director as a full-time House employee, but for months before the 
    2010 elections she directed this employee to conduct campaign work 
    for a significant portion of each day. Additionally, in 2011, 
    nearly a year after Representative Richardson received notice of 
    the committee's investigation into misuse of House resources, 
    Representative Richardson hired a new district director, who, with 
    Representative Richardson's knowledge and approval, spent much of 
    his time performing campaign work.
        Taken together, a theme emerges. Representative Richardson used 
    her staff as she saw fit. The evidence does not demonstrate isolate 
    incidents of compelled campaign work. If that were, in fact, the 
    case, we would not likely be here today. It demonstrates a constant 
    effort by Representative Richardson to direct and pressure her 
    official employees to perform as much campaign work as possible, 
    regardless of whether or not they wanted to volunteer. . . . 
        Mr. BONNER. Mr. Speaker, in closing, I want to once again thank 
    members of the committee, as well as members of the pool, for their 
    tremendous service that they render to this institution. And on 
    behalf of the entire House, I want to again thank the nonpartisan, 
    professional committee staff for their extraordinary hard work and 
    commitment to the House of Representatives and to the American 
    people that we all serve. . . . 
        Mr. Speaker, while some might prefer a harsher sentence, 
    perhaps a few might even think a reprimand is too severe, I urge my 
    colleagues to support the unanimous recommendation of the only 
    evenly divided committee in this House of Representatives.
        And with that, I yield back the balance of my time.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous 
    question is ordered.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 7.3 A Member has been reprimanded by the House for failure to 
    disclose campaign contributions in violation of applicable law.

    On October 13, 1978,(12) the House considered a 
privileged resolution to adopt a report filed by the Committee on 
Standards of Official Conduct (now the Committee on Ethics) 
reprimanding Rep. John McFall of California for violations of Federal 
campaign laws:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 124 Cong. Rec. 37005-7006, 37020, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

               IN THE MATTER OF REPRESENTATIVE JOHN J. McFALL    

        Mr. [John] FLYNT [of Georgia]. Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    privileged resolution (H. Res. 1415) and ask for its immediate 
    consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 1415

  Resolved, That the House of Representatives adopt the Report by the 
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct dated October 6, 1978. In the 
Matter of Representative John J. McFall of California.

        The SPEAKER.(13) The gentleman from Georgia (Mr. 
    Flynt) is recognized for 1 hour.
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13. Thomas O'Neill (MA).
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        Mr. FLYNT. Mr. Speaker, for the purposes of debate only, I 
    yield 20 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spence) 
    and also for the purposes of debate only, I yield 20 minutes to the 
    gentleman from California (Mr. McFall) and pending that I yield 
    myself such time as I may consume.
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman is recognized.
        Mr. FLYNT. Mr. Speaker, this resolution relates to the matter 
    of Representative John J. McFall, a Representative from the State 
    of California.
        On the basis of evidence which has been gathered by the 
    committee, and which Is set forth in length in the committee report 
    accompanying this resolution, and which had been painstakingly 
    reviewed by the committee in open session, the committee filed a 
    Statement of Alleged Violation against Mr. McFall on July 12 of 
    this year. The Statement of Alleged Violation contained three 
    counts. After Mr. McFall's lawyer received full discovery of 
    materials relevant to his case, after hearing arguments from Mr. 
    McFall's attorney in support of a motion to dismiss the charges, 
    and after hearing from Mr. McFall himself, the committee voted to 
    hold a public hearing to resolve the charges. At the hearing, Mr. 
    McFall was ably represented by counsel, was permitted, through 
    counsel, to cross examine witnesses called by the staff and was 
    permitted to subpoena, and in fact did subpoena, witnesses to 
    testify on his behalf.
        After the close of the hearing, and after receiving both 
    written and oral arguments from counsel on both sides, the 
    committee determined, by a vote of 8 to 3, that one of the three 
    counts in the Statement of Alleged Violation had been sustained by 
    clear and convincing evidence. The committee decided, in its 
    findings of fact, that Mr. McFall did receive a $3,000 campaign 
    contribution from Mr. Tongsun Park in October 1974 which he did not 
    report as a campaign contribution as the law in existence at that 
    time required. The committee found that the other two charges were 
    not sustained.
        The committee then voted, 8 to 3, that Mr. McFall should be 
    reprimanded and that the adoption of this report shall constitute 
    such reprimand. The facts relating both to the count which was 
    sustained and the counts which were not sustained are clearly and 
    succinctly set forth in the report and in the sworn testimony. 
    Summaries of those facts prepared by the special staff and by the 
    attorneys for Representative McFall, are contained in appendices A 
    and B of this report.
        The testimony that this $3,000 was a campaign contribution is 
    made clear by the testimony of him who gave it and the testimony of 
    him who received it and by the testimony of him on whose behalf it 
    was received.
        Mr. Ray Barnes, at that time administrative assistant to Mr. 
    McFall, on one of his later appearances before the committee told 
    the committee that he had requested from the messenger of Mr. Park, 
    one John Gibbons, permission to change this from a contribution in 
    the nature of a campaign contribution and asked if it could be used 
    in Mr. McFall's then existing office account.
        Mr. John Gibbons of whom Mr. Ray Barnes testified he had asked 
    that question, testified that he had no recollection of Mr. Ray 
    Barnes or of anyone else, either directly or indirectly, asking him 
    for permission to change the nature of the campaign contribution.
        Mr. Ray Barnes then subsequently testified that perhaps he had 
    talked with somebody else in the office of Mr. Tongsun Park and of 
    Mr. John Gibbons, but no such person's name was ever given to the 
    committee, and no such person was ever brought to testify that this 
    was other than a campaign contribution, and that Mr. McFall and Mr. 
    Ray Barnes assumed that they had the right to change the nature of 
    the contribution from that which the donor intended, as clearly 
    expressed by a note in writing, saying, ``Good luck in your 
    campaign,'' or ``Good luck in the upcoming election,'' or words to 
    that effect.
        Let me say, Mr. Speaker, that the committee found that the 
    allegations in Count 1 had been sustained.
        Mr. Speaker, let me say that Jack McFall is a man with whom I 
    have served in this body for most of my service here and for all of 
    his service here. He is a man with whom I proudly served on the 
    Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and a 
    man next to whom I sat on the Subcommittee on Defense of the 
    Committee on Appropriations. Let me say that I consider Jack McFall 
    the same good friend of mine that he has always been during the 
    period of our service. I commend him for his services to his 
    district, to his State, and to our Nation, which we both love. 
    However, if campaign expenditure reporting acts of the United 
    States of America are going to mean anything, Mr. Speaker, I submit 
    that it is the responsibility of those who receive them to report 
    them, to turn them back, or to get clear and unmistakable authority 
    from him who gave them to change them from the nature of a campaign 
    contribution.
        In asking the House of Representatives to sustain the 
    recommendations of this committee, let me say clearly, as Mr. 
    McFall has said so many times, that he appreciates the fact that 
    the committee itself dismissed the two charges which would have 
    reflected adversely on his honor, his honesty, and his integrity. 
    The committee found, by a majority vote, that the last two charges 
    had not been sustained. The committee found, by a vote of 8 to 3, 
    that the charges contained in the statement of alleged violations 
    in count 1 had been sustained by clear and convincing evidence.
        Mr. Speaker, based upon the testimony which appears in the 
    report, which, if necessary, I could relate by chapter and verse, 
    paragraph and line here today, but for reasons of compassion I 
    choose not to do so, Mr. Speaker, I ask that the House of 
    Representatives sustain the Committee on Standards of Official 
    Conduct in the recommendation that Mr. McFall, the respondent in 
    this matter, be reprimanded and that by the adoption of this 
    resolution, the reprimand be considered as having been 
    administered.
        Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
        The SPEAKER. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South 
    Carolina (Mr. Spence).
        Mr. [Floyd] SPENCE [of South Carolina]. I yield myself 3 
    minutes.
        Mr. Speaker, as I have said before, this is not an easy task. 
    We did not ask for this job, but it has to be done. We spent months 
    and months and months compiling the evidence which is contained 
    within this publication. We did not expect today to come before the 
    Members and lay all of this out. We simply do not have the time, 
    and I doubt very seriously if many would be here to hear it. We 
    have had public hearings open for anyone to come and spend as much 
    time as he or she wanted to obtain the answers to any of these 
    questions that you may now have. The evidence is here in this 
    report for all of you to read.
        As I stated earlier, our decisions have been based on the facts 
    contained within these reports. I believe the facts compel the 
    conclusion reached by eight members of our committee that the 
    gentleman from California (Mr. McFall) received $3,000 as a cash 
    campaign contribution from Tongsun Park in October 1974, and he did 
    not report this as the law requires. We find that the gentleman 
    from California (Mr. McFall) has conducted himself in a manner 
    which did not reflect creditably on the House of Representatives 
    and is, therefore, guilty of a violation of rule 1 of the Code of 
    Conduct.
        The SPEAKER. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California 
    (Mr. McFall) for 20 minutes.
        Mr. [John] McFALL [of California]. Mr. Speaker, today the 
    Members of this House are asked to consider the recommendation of 
    the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct that I receive a 
    reprimand for failing to report a campaign contribution.
        The committee_after an investigation that began February 9, 
    1977_has made its determination that a $3,000 donation to me from 
    Tongsun Park constituted a campaign contribution for which I was 
    bound by the Federal Election Campaign Act to report_rather than a 
    donation to my office account, which I was not required to report.
        It is this finding of the committee that forms the basis for 
    its bringing a recommendation for reprimand.
        The violation of statute as cited by the committee is a civil 
    violation_one that heretofore has been adjudicated administratively 
    by the Federal Election Commission.
        Nevertheless, I am ready to accept the decision of the House.
        Each of us who serve in the Congress has been chosen by the 
    people to be the lawmakers for all.
        As you and every other individual in our country, I am required 
    to abide by the laws we make.
        Consequently, I accept full responsibility for any violation by 
    me of any law or rule of this House.
        Throughout the past 2 years that the news media, then the 
    Department of Justice, and subsequently the Committee on Standards 
    of Official Conduct have been investigating the Korean matter, I 
    have been forthright and candid with them and the people I am 
    privileged to serve. Voluntarily and readily, I have provided all 
    information, files and related documents, and answered any and all 
    questions that would assist in arriving at the truth.
        I know first hand the degree to which the committee has 
    diligently pursued its directive under House Resolution 252.
        As I stated to the committee In open hearing and to my 
    constituents many times, I welcomed the investigation and the 
    opportunity it provided me to place the record in full view for all 
    to examine and judge.
        Following its lengthy investigation, the committee has judged 
    me innocent of involvement in any situation of real or apparent 
    influence in the performance of my governmental duties.
        Furthermore, it has judged me innocent of misusing funds 
    donated to me for my office account.
        In this regard, the committee has affirmed my honesty and 
    integrity, and has rejected any allegation that I participated in 
    any situation involving improper influence.
        For this I am grateful.
        The committee, however, has decided that a $3,000 donation 
    should have been reported as a campaign contribution.
        It should be borne in mind that the $3,000 had been legally and 
    properly placed in my office account, whether or not it had been 
    reported as a campaign contribution.
        As the evidence showed, there was confusion in 1974 in the 
    interpretation of the campaign law on this point. Whether or not 
    the donation was in fact a reportable campaign contribution is a 
    question about which reasonable men and women can--and still do--
    disagree. However, after lengthy deliberations the committee 
    resolved this legal question against me.
        The committee decided that I made a mistake, even though I 
    believed at the time that my actions were in full compliance with 
    the law and rules of the House.
        I am thankful that in 1978, the Congress has clearer laws and 
    regulations to guide us all in the handling of contributions. These 
    rules will protect all candidates and help to assure confidence in 
    our electoral system.
        I accept their determination that I made a mistake, and say to 
    you and the people I represent that I am sincerely sorry for having 
    made it.
        I respect this House, and hold the trust of the people in me to 
    be the highest honor that can be bestowed by one person upon 
    another.
        I look to the future in the hope that I can continue to serve 
    the people and this House. . . .
        Mr. FLYNT. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time.
        Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time.
        Mr. McFALL. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time.
        Mr. FLYNT. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the 
    resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 7.4 A Member has been censured for, inter alia, converting 
    campaign funds for personal use in violation of House ethics rules.

    On June 10, 1980,(14) the House adopted a privileged 
resolution censuring Rep. Charlie H. Wilson of California for violating 
House rules regarding the use of campaign funds:
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14. 126 Cong. Rec. 13801-805, 13807-11, 13818-20, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
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             IN THE MATTER OF REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES H. WILSON    

        The SPEAKER.(15) The unfinished business is the 
    further consideration of the resolution(H. Res. 660) in the matter 
    of Representative Charles H. Wilson.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. Thomas O'Neill (MA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk will report the resolution.
        The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

  Resolved,

  (1) That Representative Charles H. Wilson be censured;

  (2) That Representative Charles H. Wilson be denied the chair on any 
committee or subcommittee of the House of Representatives for the remainder 
of the Ninety-sixth Congress;

  (3) That upon adoption of this resolution, Representative Charles H. 
Wilson forthwith present himself in the well of the House of 
Representatives for the public reading of this resolution by the Speaker; 
and

  (4) That the House of Representatives adopt the report of the Committee 
on Standards of Official Conduct dated May 3, 1980, in the matter of 
Representative Charles H. Wilson.

        The SPEAKER. Pursuant to the rules of the House and the 
    unanimous-consent agreement, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
    Bennett) has 12 minutes remaining; the gentleman from South 
    Carolina (Mr. Spence), has 8 minutes remaining; the gentleman from 
    California (Mr. Charles H. Wilson), or his designee, has 1 hour 
    remaining.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Bennett).
        Mr. [Charles] BENNETT [of Florida]. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 
    such time as I may consume.
        Mr. Speaker, on May 29, the House voted to postpone further 
    proceedings on House Resolution 660 until today, after my 
    assurances in the May 29 proceedings that the committee would 
    consider in an additional meeting of the committee any rebuttal to 
    the newly offered evidence that Representative Wilson might wish to 
    submit to the committee. I wrote Representative Wilson and his 
    lawyer on May 30 and offered to receive from them ``any objection, 
    comments, or additional proof on the new evidence submitted by 
    Representative William M. Thomas on the House floor May 29.'' The 
    committee met on June 5 and the proceedings of that meeting have 
    been printed and are available to each Member. The matter now 
    before the House is the original report of the committee dated May 
    8, which the committee has not changed in any respect.
        Based on the record of the disciplinary hearing, the 
    committee's findings and recommendations stand.
        In debate on disciplinary matters such as this, no rule 
    prohibits any Member at any later time from bringing up material 
    germane to the question whether or not the material had been before 
    the committee previously. This was the effect of the ruling by the 
    Speaker on May 29. Obviously it would be best to receive evidence 
    in the committee's proceedings, where rules govern its admission 
    and the witnesses are under oath, and cross examination is 
    possible. But then the Constitution states in (art. I, sec. 5) that 
    the House is granted the power to ``punish its Members for 
    disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel 
    a Member.'' Therefore, as unwieldly as it may be, these issues can 
    be raised and decided upon before the whole House and it is 
    doubtful that any statute or rule could change this. The House can 
    consider these additional materials in any way it wishes. But the 
    recommendation in this case as made on April 24, 1980, and the 
    committee's report filed on May 8, 1980, are the principal matters 
    before the House today.
        I reserve the balance of my time. . . . 
        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(16) The Chair recognizes 
    the gentleman from California (Mr. Charles H. Wilson).
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16. Paul Simon (IL).
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        Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 
    myself such time as I may consume.
        Mr. Speaker, first, I would like to emphasize most emphatically 
    that I am not guilty and have not been guilty of any disorderly 
    conduct insofar as this House of Representatives is concerned or 
    any of my activities in the House of Representatives. I mention 
    that because the chairman just mentioned that the Constitution 
    provides the Congress with the authority to punish its Members if 
    they are guilty of disorderly conduct. Further, I will state most 
    emphatically that I am not guilty of any of the charges which have 
    been brought against me by this committee. I make that statement 
    because in some of the ``Dear Colleague'' letters which we have 
    sent to you to try and educate you on my side of this problem, some 
    Members have been concerned that I stressed the fact that the 
    committee had not proven its case and I had not denied guilt at any 
    time. I am, therefore, at this time denying guilt absolutely of any 
    crime or any charge whatsoever that this committee has brought 
    against me.
        This is the second time that this resolution is before you. We 
    are here again because a member of the committee was unconvinced 
    that certain counts would be supported by the House. We had to have 
    additional evidence. As he said:

  In discussing the matter with Members on the floor, they were indicating 
that, although it was clear and convincing, that there were perhaps some 
gaps that made it less clear and convincing.

        Quoting further:

  I found that they were not going to agree with the committee based upon 
the arguments that were made about the gaps.

        So here we are again. We have no assurance that additional new 
    evidence may not be offered. But for the moment, the committee now 
    seems satisfied that they have plugged the gaps in their case.
        Twice now I have mentioned the committee's case. Many of you 
    may not realize that this particular case was one that the 
    committee initiated. No Member, no private individual or group 
    signed a complaint against me. The committee staff initiated this 
    case on their own in February of 1979. They investigated this case 
    for 9 months, including the issuing of subpenas before the 
    committee had its first majority vote in November. I was then asked 
    to appear before them and answer their questions. You may remember, 
    on page 2 of the committee report, it is mentioned that I declined 
    to testify in this executive session.
        Ladies and gentlemen, the committee had not voted at that time 
    to hold an official inquiry into the case. How was I going to 
    refute information in one executive session without knowing what 
    they had discovered in an investigation that spanned two 
    Congresses?
        The need to provide the House with an ethics system to protect 
    the institution of Congress is apparent to all of us. This 
    resolution, however, shows that how we go about protecting the 
    institution is still in need of refinement. The most glaring need 
    is to address the issue of the committee initiating, investigating, 
    and prosecuting its own complaint. When the committee proceeds, as 
    in this case, it writes its own script. Rather than objectively 
    viewing the facts, they must prejudiciously support the resolution. 
    The committee develops tunnel vision, seeing only that which proves 
    its own complaint it initiates. This is the process where, once it 
    begins, there can be no stopping it until it reaches the floor of 
    the House. It is natural, under the circumstances, but it must be 
    eliminated from proceedings such as this.
        I will wager that there will be major changes made in the 
    procedures of this committee as a result of the case against 
    Charles H. Wilson. If the arguments of my lawyers have had any 
    influence at all in any area at all, it will be that there have to 
    be major changes made in the proceedings.
        But what of the violations of House rule XLIII? There are two 
    points to keep in mind. First, these alleged violations took place 
    in 1971 and 1972. I think it is a statement of the committee's 
    efforts that six of the seven oldest counts are the ones presented 
    to you. The committee not only dropped the four most recent counts, 
    but they also found no evidence on the counts alleging criminal 
    violations of bribery, perjury, and payroll kickbacks. These last 
    counts are the allegations the press chose to highlight throughout 
    these last 6 months, even after they had been dropped by the 
    committee, and these are the allegations I was accused of during 
    the recent campaign in which I was defeated for renomination. These 
    are the allegations that were leaked the day before the committee 
    chose to vote an official inquiry into this matter.
        I have never acted in a criminal manner, I have not violated 
    the rules of the House.
        Second, the evidence must show that these violations were in 
    direct conflict with the standards and rules as enforced and 
    observed in 1971 and 1972.
        There can be no mixing of rule definitions and application from 
    year to year. The violations must have been those expressly 
    forbidden in 1971 and 1972.
        But once again, the committee confuses or counts on confusion 
    when it presents this resolution. It is not surprising that 60 
    percent of the committee is comprised of Members who are in their 
    second term or less. This is directly reflective of the fact that 
    60 percent of the Members of this Congress, today, did not even 
    serve their first day in office until after the alleged violations 
    I have been accused of took place. I supported the ethic reform 
    legislation in 1977. The House was right in its decision. But who 
    will argue that retroactive application of stricter rules and 
    enforcement mechanisms is what the House intended? The very fact 
    changes and refinements were made is indicative of the fact that 
    the 1971 and 1972 standards and procedures were far different from 
    the 1977 changes and what they are today. Members must, somehow, 
    reject all they know or understand now about the rules in force now 
    and learn and know the rules as they were in 1971 and 1972.
        The years after Watergate brought on a new era as far as this 
    institution is concerned. The committee knows, and I know, that for 
    you to ignore your reactions to that situation, to try to displace 
    that anger caused by Watergate, is beyond your, or my, ability. By 
    issuing this report, the committee is asking each Member to walk a 
    tight, impossible line of judging standards that are not only alien 
    but unacceptable to many of you. It is the specific purpose of 
    House rule 10 to protect Members under an ethics investigation from 
    being held in violation of House rules for changes in standards 
    from one period to another. It is a protection that prohibits the 
    committee either directly or indirectly to confuse a standard of 
    one era with that of another. House rule 10 is an ethical standard 
    of the House just as House rule 43 is. Unfortunately, House 
    Resolution 660 speaks to the literal reading of the rules. It 
    ignores the compliance and interpretation of those rules in effect 
    in 1971 and 1972 and the conflict that sitting Members have in 
    their post-Watergate experience.
        One last word on the background of these allegations. As many 
    of you know, the Obey commission provided the House with a major 
    overhaul of the ethics provisions in 1977. Among the commission's 
    changes were fuller financial disclosure requirements, unofficial 
    office account prohibitions, unearned income provisions, and the 
    prohibition of using campaign funds for personal use. In making 
    these changes, the commission stated that the 1971 and 1972 rules 
    and standards ``were essentially unenforceable because of the 
    totally subjective nature of their terms.'' Standards that were 
    ``neither defined nor discussed in the legislative history'' when 
    these rules were drafted.
        What is this resolution all about? It is a resolution to 
    censure a sitting Member of Congress for action of over 7 and 8 
    years ago. It is a resolution that asks you to censure a Member 
    because you did not anticipate what would happen to the ethics 
    rules 7 and 8 years later.
        This is a matter where the House will agree to be subjected to 
    the same open process and parameters the committee used in the 
    matter of Charles H. Wilson. It is the full House that rightly 
    determines its future and that of its Members. This resolution 
    gives the full House that opportunity.
        There is no dispute to the need of protecting this institution 
    from ethic abuses. But, the institution is made up of each 
    individual Member as a collective body. When divided into 
    individuals, they should be afforded the same protection the 
    institution deems necessary for itself.
        If there is one charge that a Member must refute it is that he 
    used his office for his own gain. I flatly deny these allegations 
    by the committee. No one can buy a piece of me. There is no 
    evidence that shows me selling out my profession. The facts do not 
    support these allegations. The committee has not carried the burden 
    of proof. It continually infers my guilt. It continually circles 
    around the accusation. But they have not proved it because no such 
    action on my part existed.
        What is it the committee wants you to believe? It is asking you 
    to take the testimony of an expert in postal legislation at face 
    value. George Gould began gaining experience in postal legislation 
    in 1973, not 1971 or 1972, when he became my staff director of the 
    subcommittee handling postal affairs. To his credit he has become 
    an expert in postal affairs. But the committee makes no note that 
    my postal subcommittee and George Gould's expertise were after 
    these alleged violations took place in 1971 and 1972. The committee 
    would have you believe that in 1971 and 1972 my simple little 
    Committee on Census and Statistics was enough of a position for me 
    to have a conflict of interest in the setting of postal rates. How 
    ridiculous.
        But, the committee also ignores two other points; 3 years 
    before my taking the chairmanship of the Postal Subcommittee, 
    postal rates were removed from the full committee and the House 
    when the independent Postal Rate Commission was created. No one on 
    the committee, no one in the House, could after that time change 
    postal rates. To do so would require the influencing of the Postal 
    Rate Commission, not a Member of Congress.
        Second, the committee points to specific legislation that 
    showed that I acted with a conflict of interest. This legislation 
    was referred to the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, not 
    the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, of which I was one of 
    26 Members. The committee would have you believe that my taking the 
    postal subcommittee for the first time in 1973 is clear and 
    convincing evidence of my unethical actions in 1971 and 1972 and 
    for legislation that was pending in the Interstate and Foreign 
    Commerce Committee of which I was not a member.
        The committee's own witness, Mr. Lee Rogers, is the one who 
    swore under penalty of perjury that the two $5,000 checks he gave 
    to me were loans. Loans were written on them and in response to 
    questions by members of the committee, he said this was not an 
    unusual procedure for him and he off the top of his head named half 
    a dozen other people who he had made similar loans to under similar 
    circumstances, without notes, without interest or anything of the 
    sort, and yet the committee would tell you that because I did not 
    report in 1977 these two $5,000 checks as unsecured notes on my 
    financial disclosure report that I did not consider them as loans.
        Well, let me tell you that in California there is a 4-year 
    statute of limitations on unpaid loans and those loans were not 
    collectible at that time and did not have to be reported in 1977.
        Now, Mr. Cheney the other day went through a list of the years 
    prior to 1977 when I did not include these checks as unpaid loans. 
    The law at that time said unsecured loans in excess of $10,000. I 
    was not required to report those on the financial disclosure forms 
    at that time. It was 1977 when the law became effective that 
    required loans of $10,000 or more be reported.
        Now, the committee bypasses Mr. Rogers' testimony completely. 
    He swore under penalty of perjury, he had immunity, that was the 
    only thing that he could be caught on was to lie to the committee, 
    and they accepted that testimony without any question at the time 
    and I do not know whether they are going to bring perjury charges 
    against Mr. Rogers at the present time or not, because they are 
    ignoring completely the testimony which he presented to the 
    committee and they are now calling these $5,000 checks gifts, 
    instead of loans which they rightly were. I was not bought by Lee 
    Rogers. I have not been bought by anyone.
        The committee has erred to excess in trying to put these 
    charges over on the House. It is disgusting that the committee 
    would attempt such juggling of dates and facts and come up with 
    these allegations, but it is not surprising. This resolution is the 
    end product of the committee's own initiated investigation.
        The committee proof lies not in the facts it presents, but in 
    the conjecture and misstatements of events. The committee plays 
    upon what each Member knows to infer the events of almost a decade 
    ago. The committee is under the belief that its mandate requires an 
    accused Member to carry the burden of proof of his own innocence.
        With all of the time available to it, its investigative powers, 
    its access to funding, the committee has come up with allegations 
    of 7 and 8 years ago.
        This is a resolution based on someone's gut feeling, not on 
    facts. This resolution is based on the proposition where there was 
    one violation, there must be others. The committee feels it is 
    obligated to find other violations, regardless of the time that has 
    passed on or the changes made in the rules and standards.
        If you have read the materials I have sent to you, it is 
    apparent that the Ethics Committee has pushed this matter beyond 
    all bounds of realistic fairness. I have worked hard for my 
    constituents. I have never let them down. I would never have 
    knowingly violated their trust. Yet, in June I was defeated in my 
    own primary. That defeat was the most heartbreaking of all. It was 
    as if my whole career in this House was meant to be repudiated, but 
    it really could not be otherwise based upon the 5 and 6 months of 
    extensive press and media and open opposition pronouncements at 
    every turn of the committee process, even to the date before the 
    committee voted to start its proceedings. I was tried and convicted 
    time and again, four times I was tried and convicted. To this very 
    day I could pick up a paper and find the disproved charges of 
    bribery, perjury and payroll kickbacks in the articles.
        When will the record finally be set straight? To expect my 
    constituents to ignore such constant reinforcement of unethical 
    behavior and criminal conduct, though there never was, would be 
    disrespectful of their value and standards.
        The fact remains I have lost everything of value that I worked 
    so hard to achieve professionally. What is left is my self-respect 
    and my reputation.
        I suppose I could have walked away from this whole thing months 
    ago. I suppose I could have walked away from this whole thing 
    yesterday, but I cannot because the committee is wrong. These 18 
    years have given me enough insight to know when to fight or not to 
    fight for an issue.
        Practicalities bear a great deal on making those decisions. But 
    in this instance, practicalities have no bearing. This resolution 
    brands me as something I am not. I have not acted in any manner 
    that is disrespectful of this House. This institution has been my 
    life. I cannot let these years go by and end as the committee would 
    like.
        Every issue in this House is given a full and fair hearing. 
    Every issue in this House has its supporter and detractor. But 
    every issue that comes before this House is judged on its merits in 
    the way in which it came before this House.
        Sometimes personalities become more dominant than the facts and 
    the procedures, but the House, in its wisdom, always seems to make 
    the right decision. I believe that this last fight for me can be 
    judged on its merits.
        Oh, I recognize I am not a popular person in this House. I have 
    emotionally objected to unanimous-consent requests of people, Ms. 
    Holtzman, Mr. Gramm. I have even antagonized other people, some of 
    my colleagues on this side because I vote with the folks on this 
    side on some matters of international affairs, which mean so much 
    to me. But I do not think that how you vote on this matter today 
    should be based upon whether I am a popular Member of the House or 
    not. It should be based on what is right and what is wrong.
        Reading all that has been presented, listening to all that has 
    been spoken, this House must come to grips with this resolution. My 
    constituents have made their decision based upon what they know.
        I have fought this resolution based upon what I know, and what 
    I have been advised to do by my counsel. And let me tell you, I 
    take their advice. They are very expensive.
        You must evaluate all that has been presented to you, factually 
    and otherwise.
        Let me know, let each succeeding House know what this 
    institution considers to be the facts and the truth. Let each 
    succeeding Congress know what it expects of the Members as 
    individuals, and let each individual Member know what he can expect 
    from the institution as a whole.
        I thank my colleagues for their patience. . . .
        Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Speaker, we participate today in an 
    extremely important part of the legislative process. Under the 
    Constitution we are specifically granted the power to discipline a 
    Member by a majority vote, or to expel a Member under our rules and 
    our Code of Ethics by a two-third vote. We have guides under the 
    Constitution but no mandate as to what rules to apply as to guilt 
    or innocence.
        Clearly, a Member has a constitutional right against self-
    incrimination. He has the right to counsel. But whether we in the 
    House today are sitting as a jury, a trier of the fact, or an 
    appellate court is not clear. We vote as our consciences dictate.
        One thing is clear, however. We have adopted our own rules that 
    before we discipline a Member, we apply the test of clear and 
    convincing evidence. We do not apply a civil test of the weight of 
    the evidence on one side or the other, and we do not go so far as 
    to require, under the criminal rule, guilt beyond a reasonable 
    doubt. But we do require clear and convincing evidence, here we 
    recognize, that we as the House sit independent of the committee.
        The committee has served as an investigator. It has served as a 
    prosecutor. It has served as grand jury. That committee contains, I 
    think, some of our ablest Members, people that do a job for all of 
    us, and I thank them for the job that they have done in this case. 
    But I respectfully disagree that the quantum of evidence shown in 
    the record--and I have read that record three times now--meets the 
    clear and convincing test. I would not have been presumptuous 
    enough to make this argument on Mr. Wilson's behalf but for having 
    had the privilege of spending 14 years as a small-town lawyer, 
    serving as president of the Conference of Barristers of the State 
    Bar of California, and having edited the procedural handbook on 
    ethics that is used by the California Bar for disciplinary 
    proceedings. I think that as a bar, we attorneys apply to ourselves 
    a higher standard of guilt than we do to criminal defendants, and 
    that for that standard of guilt, in my judgment--were Mr. Wilson to 
    be tried for professional misconduct before the State Bar in 
    California--this evidence would not suffice to meet the clear and 
    convincing evidence test.
        Let me take up the eight specific counts and the proof in the 
    record. These eight counts essentially divide into two categories. 
    The first counts 1, 2, and 3 involve three checks that were given 
    to Mr. Wilson by a Mr. Lee Rogers in June of 1971, in June of 1972, 
    and in December of 1972. I think the committee concedes that if 
    those three checks were loans, Mr. Wilson is guilty of nothing. If 
    they were gifts, then he is guilty of the counts as charged.
        We as triers of the fact must look at the record, and I would 
    ask the committee to point to anything in the record which 
    furnishes clear and convincing evidence that the checks were not 
    loans. The sole evidence, the sole witness who appeared before the 
    committee, Mr. Lee Rogers himself who signed these three checks, 
    said that they were loans. Two of the checks bore the word ``loan'' 
    on the face of them. The committee went to that point and said, 
    well, there was no promissory note; there was no due date on the 
    loan; there was no rate of interest. Mr. Rogers never sued to get 
    the money back. All of those things are true, but Mr. Rogers was in 
    a peculiar relationship with Mr. Wilson. He was a member of his 
    staff.
        He was the chairman of his key committee to raise money for Mr. 
    Wilson in his campaigns. He was a multimillionaire. He was a man 
    who testified before the committee that he was not accustomed to 
    sue to get loans back, and that he rarely was repaid. He listed a 
    number of people to whom he had given loans, and only on one 
    occasion had the individual paid him back. So the evidence is in a 
    state of confusion, in my judgment, as to whether or not these 
    transactions were loans or gifts. You could go either way. In our 
    consciences as Members, it is perfectly appropriate for the members 
    of the committee to reach the conclusion that on the evidence that 
    they examined, they believed these were gifts and not loans. But I 
    would submit to you that applying a clear and convincing evidence 
    test to this evidence, you would have to give the benefit of the 
    doubt to Mr. Wilson.
        This was a peculiar relationship, to have a man on your staff 
    who was an expert in postal matters; ran three companies engaged in 
    the mail order business; obviously giving advice to Mr. Wilson on 
    his payroll at $1,000 a month, $12,000 a year between 1971 and 
    1974; taken off of the payroll in 1974; put back in 1976. This was 
    a transaction between a man and his employee, and while it is 
    peculiar and it is strange, it does not seem to me to qualify as 
    clear and convincing evidence that this was a gift of funds and not 
    a loan.
        Now take the second set of counts, the last five counts of 
    conversion. These were moneys, about $15,000 in counts 7 and 8 and 
    $9,900 in counts 9, 10, and 11, which were paid from Mr. Wilson's 
    campaign account to him. The first two checks, roughly, $15,000, 
    were repaying bank loans that he had taken out during the 1970 
    campaign.
        I pointed out in a letter to the committee before this matter 
    was heard on May 29 that there was no evidence in the record to 
    show that this $15,000 in debts, incurred during the campaign in 
    1970, were not taken out by Mr. Wilson to pay his campaign 
    expenses.
        The gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas), with documents that 
    were obtained just before the hearings, showed those documents to 
    me, and those documents conclusively show, in my judgment, that 
    these moneys were not spent for campaign expenses in 1970. There is 
    a statement by Mr. Wilson made to the California authorities, not 
    required by law to the Federal authorities, that he had incurred no 
    personal expenses for campaign purposes in 1970, and I advised Mr. 
    Wilson that if the record stayed in that condition, I would not 
    argue on his behalf that these moneys were used either for campaign 
    expenses or were used for personal expenses. But what were they 
    used for? Mr. Wilson brought forth, and it is in the record of the 
    committee hearings, that he held two fundraisers. The first was 
    held in March of 1969, and his campaign account shows deposits of 
    about $15,700 in that period of time from that fundraiser, and he 
    paid himself $15,500 to pay these two loans back.
        In November 1971, 7 or 8 months later, he held a second 
    fundraiser, and in that fundraiser he raised over $13,000. He then 
    wrote three checks, counts 9, 10, and 11, for $9,900 to himself. 
    But where in the record is there any indication or any fact or any 
    evidence to indicate that those were not reimbursement, say, for 
    newsletters, or travel expenses?
        We were accustomed, in 1967 when I was first elected to the 
    Congress, until 1977, 10 years later--in fact, I think most Members 
    did--to raise money from our supporters to pay those costs of 
    newsletters and travel which were not covered by the House expense 
    allowances. I can remember in 1967 coming back here as a freshman 
    when the House funded six trips a year back and forth to 
    California. We were accustomed to making 20 or 25 trips a year back 
    and forth to our districts. And there are Members from California 
    who go back every weekend. Until 1977 it was eminently proper, and 
    it was accepted as right, to raise money from your supporters to 
    pay for these business expenses, the additional expenses of 
    newsletters, and travel which were not funded by the House and were 
    not proper campaign expenses.
        There is no showing in the record that these funds were not 
    used for this purpose, so we are left with a situation dating back 
    to 1971 that Mr. Wilson applied $25,000 to his own use, but there 
    is no evidence to show that it was not for proper purposes, for 
    congressional expenses. The violation was to use them for personal 
    expenses.
        We are faced, then, as a trier of the fact with the question, 
    where should the burden of proof lie, the committee having come 
    forward with evidence of suspicious payments? Should the burden be 
    on the Member to produce records from 9 years ago showing that 
    these expenses were for a specific valid purpose?
        We in the Congress have applied a 5-year statute of limitation 
    on crimes to all other citizens. We are not bound by that statute 
    of limitation, but I think we should consider the reasoning behind 
    the statute of limitation. The reason for the statute of limitation 
    is that very few of us can reach back more than 5 years and produce 
    evidence of what we spent money for at any given time. That statute 
    of limitation is founded in a rule of reason that no person should 
    be charged with a crime that occurred so long ago that he cannot 
    easily produce evidence to refute the accusations. I think we 
    should apply in these proceedings the constitutional view that a 
    person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. We have adopted as 
    one of our rules that that proof be by clear and convincing 
    evidence.
        I have no disagreement with the gentleman of the committee 
    except on this one point. It seems to me that the clear and 
    convincing evidence of what happened 9 years ago should be on the 
    committee to produce, not on the part of the defendant to try to 
    refute. It is that reason and that reason alone that causes me to 
    urge that we should vote for an acquittal on all eight of the 
    counts with which Mr. Wilson is charged.
        It is not a disagreement with the fairness of the proceedings 
    that the committee has undertaken, but it seems to me that we make 
    a record here that is going to stand for 200 years. If we are going 
    to insist on proof that is clear and convincing, then we must do so 
    on the record before us and the record of this evidence is not 
    clear and convincing; it is evidence that raises a suspicion; it 
    may raise a possibility or even a probability of guilt, but it is 
    not evidence that if we were arguing this case before a jury, or we 
    were arguing this case before our peers in the Bar Association or 
    any other professional organization that we could say meets the 
    clear and convincing test. . . .
        Mr. [Wyche] FOWLER [of Georgia]. Mr. Speaker, I believe I speak 
    for all members of the committee when I say, that this is not a 
    pleasant task. Our charge was to proceed fairly, dispassionately, 
    and without any sense of moral righteousness. I think we did that, 
    and we acted in a nonpartisan manner in presenting the committee's 
    recommendations for discipline which we have given to all Members 
    of the House.
        I will proceed quickly because we have only 4 or 5 minutes 
    left, most of the time having been used last week.
        Let me try to summarize why the committee has recommended what 
    it has:
        First, there was no substantial rebuttal to the charges that 
    there were conversions from Mr. Wilson's campaign account--moneys 
    traced from his campaign funds to his office account to a 
    California bank account--to pay off personal debts. Why? Because 
    Mr. Wilson refused to testify.
        Second, today, for the first time, Mr. Wilson has spoken. He 
    says that what the committee found were ``gifts'' were in fact 
    ``loans.'' We do think that the evidence was clear and convincing 
    that these moneys were gifts, but Mr. Wilson cannot argue it both 
    ways.
        I ask all Members to read the testimony of Mr. Lee Rogers. Mr. 
    Rogers described himself as a multimillionaire engaged in the mail 
    order business. He testified he was made a congressional employee 
    of Mr. Wilson by Mr. Wilson for 3 years and paid $12,000 a year. 
    Mr. Rogers did claim that the moneys he gave to Mr. Wilson were 
    ``loans.'' The committee, however, found the evidence to belie this 
    interpretation, and dismissed the charges relating to ``loans.'' 
    However, Mr. Wilson now for the first time insists on the 
    interpretation of ``loans.'' I can say in rebuttal that there was 
    substantial evidence that Mr. Rogers was put on the congressional 
    payroll as a method of repaying the money that was ``loaned'' by 
    Mr. Rogers.
        Mr. FORD of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. FOWLER. I will not yield until I have finished my 
    statement. Now, all Members must determine whether it was a 
    ``gift'' or whether it was a ``loan.'' You have heard Mr. Wilson. 
    We did not. He refused to testify at any time before the committee.
        I am willing to accept what Mr. Wilson has said, but you must 
    determine the credibility of his testimony in light of that of Mr. 
    Rogers. There are only four pages of his testimony. Please read it.
        Finally, on the subject of the statute of limitations. The 
    statute of limitations, I say to my colleagues and fellow lawyers 
    at the bar, was put on the books in English and American 
    constitutional history to deal primarily with petty crimes_crimes 
    committed outside of the jurisdiction, crimes that had been 
    consciously concealed, as well as lesser infractions considered 
    ``stale'' by the passage of time.
        But there are some crimes that so shock the public conscience 
    that there is no statute of limitations.
        The committee dealt with this question of what happened in 1972 
    as soon as it came to light. We did not tarry out of a sense of 
    forgiveness to Mr. Wilson. All delays or postponements were at his 
    request.
        Your committee is not a court of law. What we tried to do was 
    pierce procedure to get at the substance while protecting Mr. 
    Wilson in his constitutional rights. Much of the outrage at the 
    judicial branch of our Government occurs when technical defenses, 
    properly presented, are allowed to shadow or obscure the real 
    issues, the issues of substance.
        Here, I submit, are the issues of substance which we must 
    decide after hearing and reading all the evidence:
        First, was there a conversion of campaign funds for personal 
    use? The committee, by an overwhelming majority, found that there 
    was.
        Second, was the congressional office of Mr. Wilson being used 
    for private rather than public purposes, or used so casually as to 
    violate the responsibilities of stewardship with which we are all 
    charged? The committee, by an overwhelming majority, thought it 
    was.
        Last, I must say that there was a duty, an absolute duty of Mr. 
    Wilson, to speak in defense of himself and in defense of the 
    institution of the Congress.
        Mr. Wilson does not stand questioned by the courts. He stands 
    questioned by his peers. And the question is direct and profound: 
    Did he violate his oath of office?
        This is different than an accusation against the butcher or the 
    baker or the candlestick maker. If a member of any of those 
    occupations are brought before any court of inquiry and found 
    guilty, it would not affect the institution of butchering or baking 
    or candlestick making. It would leave no taint on any other 
    practitioner of the profession. No other butcher or baker or 
    candlestick maker would be affected.
        The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. 
    Fowler) has expired.
        Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 additional minute to the 
    gentleman from Georgia.
        Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Speaker, but whenever we are accused, when any 
    one of our Members is accused, then we all stand accused. He does 
    stand alone, because the institution is therefore brought under 
    question. The institution of Congress is also the name which then 
    must be cleared. And that duty accrues to Mr. Wilson, as a sitting 
    Member of this Congress, to clear the name of this institution as 
    much as it is to clear himself.
        My colleagues, it is extremely unpleasant, after the defeat of 
    Mr. Wilson of California, to be here. The committee tried for 
    months to bring this matter for resolution. We have granted the 
    delays of Mr. Wilson, who has asked over and over to postpone it 
    beyond his primary. But all I can say to you, to answer the 
    gentleman from South Carolina, who quoted Sir Thomas More 
    accurately, though not completely, is that when asked, ``Who will 
    defend after the laws?'' the answer by Roper was, ``God will 
    defend.'' And the answer of Sir Thomas More was, ``Then let God 
    strike down the laws.''
        We have laws called ``rules'' for protection of the 
    institution. We must defend them. It is our duty, regardless of all 
    externalities like elections. The committee has found, in a strong 
    nonpartisan vote, after hearing the evidence, that the punishment 
    recommended, regretfully, should be accepted by this House. . . .
        Mr. [Louis] STOKES [of Ohio]. Mr. Speaker, I am a member of the 
    Committee on Standards of Official Conduct. As such, I am the only 
    member of the committee who voted against each and every count 
    which the committee found to be proved. I also voted against the 
    committee's recommendations that Charles H. Wilson be censured and 
    stripped of his chairmanships.
        Mr. Speaker, I did not seek membership on this committee. In 
    fact, as you know, I resisted this appointment for a considerable 
    amount of time. In agreeing to go on this committee, I did consider 
    that my background might enable me to bring a different perspective 
    to the committee. The background to which I refer is that of having 
    been a trial defense lawyer in criminal cases for 14 years. That 
    experience included trying hundreds of cases ranging from first 
    degree murder down to simple assault. It also included 
    participation in several cases in the U.S. Supreme Court.
        One of these cases which I argued in that Court, Terry against 
    Ohio, a landmark case, is still the law of the land in stop and 
    frisk, search and seizure law under the fourth amendment to the 
    Constitution. I mention this, Mr. Speaker, not out of braggadocio, 
    but to say that I think I bring to the committee some understanding 
    of our system of justice and more importantly a real understanding 
    of due process of law. I also understand that the Ethics Committee 
    is not a court of law and that in proceedings before it, ordinary 
    rules of evidence in a court of law do not apply. But, I say to my 
    colleagues that even disciplinary tribunals such as the Ethics 
    Committee cannot divest themselves of the requirement to afford a 
    respondent due process of law and fundamental fairness. As one who 
    has spent a great part of his life preserving the constitutional 
    rights of criminals in order that that constitutional right would 
    be available to America's best citizens if ever need be, I can only 
    say to you, that the due process and fundamental fairness denied to 
    Charles Wilson today may be denied to you or me tomorrow.
        It is for that reason that there is something fundamentally 
    wrong with a system where the same Members of the House who 
    initiate an investigation of a Member, charge him with violations, 
    investigate the charges, hear the evidence relating to the charges, 
    decide the guilt as to the charges, and then decide the punishment 
    for the charges. There is something fundamentally wrong with this 
    system, otherwise 9 of the 12 members sitting on this committee in 
    February 1979, would not have proposed to the House under House 
    Resolution 136 legislation to change the rules and initiate new 
    methods of disciplinary proceedings which would insure due process 
    and fairness.
        The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Clay) is correct. The members 
    of the committee were in and out of the room, in absentia, and 
    otherwise occupied during proceedings where witnesses were giving 
    testimony against the respondent for whom they now recommend this 
    severe punishment. One afternoon, while witnesses were testifying, 
    I had to spend over 2 hours in the Rules Committee. I did not want 
    to leave Charlie's hearing, but, I had to make a choice, 
    legislation affecting my congressional district won priority over 
    my obligation to my colleague. Sure I had the transcript to read, 
    but did you know that accompanying the transcript was a letter from 
    our staff director which said:

  The enclosed transcripts from the Wilson hearings are for your review. It 
is the opinion of the committee staff that the transcripts are not totally 
accurate, therefore the reporting company will be asked to review their 
tapes.

        This means then that not only did those of us who missed 
    hearing witnesses not only have no opportunity to observe the 
    witnesses on the stand, to observe their demeanor, to evaluate 
    their appearance of truthfulness or lack of thruthfulness, but we 
    made up for this by reading ``not totally accurate transcripts.'' 
    How would any of you today like to have your fate determined, be 
    censured, and stripped by some jurors who were running around 
    answering bells and taking care of regular congressional business 
    while deciding your fate?
        Now, let us talk about counts 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 which all 
    dealt with conversion of campaign funds to personal use 8 and 9 
    years ago. The House rule which the respondent is alleged to have 
    violated which was in effect in 1971 and 1972, and which is in 
    effect today, prohibits conversion to personal use of funds ``in 
    excess of reimbursement for legitimate and verifiable prior 
    campaign expenses.'' Thus, under the House rule in question, a 
    Member has the absolute right to be reimbursed from campaign funds 
    for campaign expenses he may have incurred and once reimbursed may 
    use the reimbursed amount for personal or any other use. Under the 
    rules of our committee, it was incumbent upon the staff to prove by 
    clear and convincing evidence that these transfers were not 
    reimbursements for prior campaign expenses.
        The key to the lack of clear and convincing proof that 
    Representative Wilson committed any offense can be found in the 
    statements of our distinguished chairman on the floor here last 
    week. With references to counts 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, the chairman 
    in his remarks used phases such as, ``the committee was offered no 
    evidence that this loan was for prior campaign expenses,'' or ``the 
    committee was offered no evidence that this loan was for legitimate 
    campaign expenses,'' or ``no evidence was offered to the 
    contrary.'' The fact, my colleagues, is that Representative Wilson 
    had no burden of proof as to his innocence. The committee was 
    required, but they did not offer one scintilla of evidence that the 
    transfers were ``in excess of reimbursement for legitimate and 
    verifiable campaign expenses.''
        They cannot absolve themselves of such burden of proof by 
    transferring the burden of proof to the respondent. Additionally 
    and more importantly, let us admit that the House has played around 
    a little bit with the same law Representative Wilson has been found 
    guilty of violating. Conversion of campaign funds to personal use 
    was not prohibited by law in 1971 and 1972. It also was not 
    prohibited by the Federal Election Campaign Act. Even the more 
    recent amendment does not prohibit conversion of campaign funds for 
    Members in office on January 8, 1980. The House rule relating to 
    conversion was adopted in 1968.
        In 1975 the rule was amended to prohibit conversion unless 
    ``otherwise specifically provided by law.'' This change in the law, 
    as we all know, was enacted to permit a special circumstance to 
    occur in the House. Once the circumstance was over, in 1977 we 
    removed the 1975 provision and went back to the previous law. Thus, 
    two points appear to be evident. First, there is no well-stated 
    policy in this area and second, we have alternately prohibited and 
    permitted under certain circumstances the same thing Representative 
    Wilson has been found guilty of. My conscience will not under these 
    circumstances permit me to find him guillty of these 8- and 9-year-
    old charges. And since the charges are not criminal in nature, and 
    since few of us would be able to reconstruct campaign records 8 or 
    9 years later, the absence of a statute of limitations would seem 
    to me to be denial of fundamental fairness.
        Lastly, I want to say that I do not condone wrongdoing, nor do 
    I oppose disciplinary proceedings against any Member of the House 
    under proper circumstances. As a member of this committee, I can 
    say to you without fear of refutation, that all members of the 
    committee acknowledged Representative Wilson's attorney, Mr. 
    Bonner's observation that at one time or another, each of us, with 
    the exception of the chairman and perhaps one other member had 
    missed some portion of the proceedings. Every member agreed that 
    before deliberating they wanted to read the transcripts so that 
    they could accurately and intelligently discuss the evidence. 
    Therein was the admission that the circumstances under which we 
    acted as jurors did not lend itself to our being able to act as 
    jurors. Here was an admission by the entire committee that they 
    were unable to deliberate and decide this case upon the evidence 
    they had seen and heard. Even in a court of law when jurors cannot 
    remember the evidence they are instructed that they must recall the 
    evidence as they saw and heard it in the courtroom.
        Mr. Speaker, my conscience will not let me find Representative 
    Wilson guilty of any of these charges. The question for you to ask 
    yourselves is this: Would you want yourself or anyone near and dear 
    to you to be found guilty based upon this kind of evidence? I urge 
    a no vote on this resolution. . . .
        Mr. [Lunsford] PREYER [of North Carolina]. Mr. Speaker, I will 
    just touch on two points very briefly: First, to respond to the 
    testimony of the gentleman from California (Mr. McCloskey) that was 
    offered a little earlier this afternoon. What Mr. McCloskey pointed 
    out was the source of the campaign funds in the campaign fund 
    account of Mr. Wilson. But the point we are concerned with is the 
    transfer from that campaign fund account to the office account then 
    to pay for his personal expenses. For example, the first of the 
    fundraisers occurred on February 26, 1971. On March 9, Mr. Wilson 
    withdrew $10,283.35 for deposit in his office account, and on the 
    day following drew the same amount of money, to the penny, and 
    repaid a loan at the Imperial Bank. That loan was characterized on 
    the loan approval and credit report as being for ``personal 
    expenses.'' Clearly, in the absence of even a single fragment of 
    evidence that these funds were used for any other purpose, the 
    committee is entitled to clearly and convincingly conclude that the 
    funds were used precisely for the purpose stated on the approval of 
    the credit report. I think the same rationale applies to the other 
    counts dealing with the conversion of funds.
        Let me finally just briefly mention the statements that have 
    been made about this being a ``mock trial,'' that we have ``leveled 
    all of the rules of constitutional procedure,'' and that we have 
    abolished protection for Members of the House here. I think as a 
    matter of policy we may want to change the way we have proceeded, 
    and I have cosponsored H.R. 136 because I think as a matter of 
    policy we ought to get Members of the House more involved in these 
    ethics procedures rather than leaving it up to the committee to 
    handle all aspects of these things. But I want to make it very 
    clear to you that by cosponsoring that bill does not mean I have 
    the slightest question about the constitutionality of the 
    procedures of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct.
        There can be no question under the law that our proceedings are 
    entirely constitutional. They are customary procedures that protect 
    all sorts of professional organizations, medical societies, bar 
    associations, and the rules which we follow offer every sort of 
    protection for a Member, including adequate notice, the right to 
    counsel, the right to challenge any member of the committee who he 
    believes cannot make an impartial decision, the right of discovery, 
    the right of cross-examination, the right to call witnesses and to 
    offer evidence in his own defense. Mr. Wilson's attorneys were 
    granted access to all of the committee's evidence in this case 
    before the hearing commenced, and every motion filed, whether it 
    was timely or not_and some were not timely_was heard by the 
    committee. The committee granted his subpenas for all the witnesses 
    that he requested. The committee granted every reasonable request 
    of the respondent in this case.
        These disciplinary procedures are not criminal cases. They are 
    not the same. If they were, the ability of any institution to 
    protect its own integrity would be in question. But the committee 
    rules as applied in this case have been fair and certainly are in 
    no way violative of due process. . . . 
        Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Speaker, the charges against Mr. Wilson are 
    contained in the original committee report, in the Record of May 
    29, 1980, and in the amended report.
        There is no need to dwell on the facts. The record is complete.
        Mr. Wilson is charged first with violating House rule 43, 
    clause 4, in three counts, to wit: receiving gifts of substantial 
    value from a person with direct interest in legislation.
        The committee found sufficient evidence to prove clearly and 
    convincingly that Mr. Wilson received three checks totaling $10,500 
    from Lee Rogers, and that Lee Rogers, whose principal business was 
    a mail order operation, had a direct interest in postal 
    legislation, over which Mr. Wilson, as a member of the Postal 
    Subcommittee, had direct jurisdiction.
        The question is whether the checks constituted ``loans'' or 
    ``gifts.'' The definitions of both were inserted by me into the 
    Record of May 29, 1980.
        The committee found that, although two checks were marked 
    ``loans,'' and Lee Rogers called them ``loans,'' there was--
        No written agreement;
        No maturity date;
        No interest:
        No repayment schedule;
        No attempt to repay; and
        No demand to repay.
        In fact, it was deemed totally unreasonable to believe them to 
    be anything other than ``gifts.''
        Hence, the committee found Mr. Wilson guilty of counts 1, 2, 
    and 3. In counts 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, Mr. Wilson was charged with 
    five instances of syphoning off campaign funds for his personal 
    use, in violation of House rule 43, clause 6. In fact, the 
    committee found Mr. Wilson violated rule 43, clause 6 by convert 
    $25,383.35 of campaign funds to his personal use.
        The checks show the transactions. The only question is this: 
    Were they reimbursements for prior loans to his campaign?
        Mr. Wilson did not testify, but he leaves the House with the 
    clear implication that he is claiming they were reimbursement for 
    prior loans.
        Lacking any evidence to prove such is true, the committee found 
    evidence to show clearly and convincingly that money was taken by 
    Mr. Wilson strictly for his personal use, and that these funds were 
    not campaign debts to him. There is no evidence at all to show they 
    were campaign obligations to Mr. Wilson.
        Moreover, documents introduced by Representative Bill Thomas, 
    show categorically, by Mr. Wilson's own hand, that in the only 
    campaign preceding these transactions, the candidate, Mr. Wilson, 
    contributed no money to the campaign. He loaned no money to the 
    campaign, and the campaign was completed in the black, without 
    debt. So there was no need for Mr. Wilson to loan the campaign 
    money.
        Now we hear that Mr. Wilson raised $15,727 in a fundraiser in 
    February 1971 and $13,880 in November 1971.
        Mr. Wilson would now have us believe that this money was raised 
    to reimburse himself for out-of-pocket campaign costs or office 
    expenses not reflected on his campaign documents--$25,383.35 to be 
    exact.
        This argument simply does not hold water, and is beyond belief 
    for an average reasonable man. There are simply no documents which 
    verify such out-of-pocket expenditures.
        The checks supporting counts 7 through 11 make it abundantly 
    clear that Mr. Wilson had personal obligations which had nothing to 
    do with his campaign, and that he took the money from his campaign 
    to pay them off.
        Thus, there is ample justification to support the committee's 
    finding that Mr. Wilson is guilty of counts 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11.
        He took the money;
        He converted it to his own use; and
        It was not for loans by him to a previous campaign.
        I urge the committee to find Mr. Wilson guilty as charged and 
    to censure him for his conduct.
        Mr. [Harold] HOLLENBECK [of New Jersey]. Mr. Speaker, I had not 
    intended to speak again in this matter but am constrained to by 
    certain further statements and allegations made by members and 
    counsel since the beginning portion of this hearing.
        Let me refer to statements by counsel at the June 5, 1980, 
    hearing (transcript p. 26, 1. 12; through p. 27, 1. 20). These 
    statements allude to his feelings that he was ``sandbagged'' by 
    members of the committee and the House who ``have taken the 
    position that Mr. Wilson did not have a full defense, because 
    certain documents, no evidence was put in, he only chose to call an 
    abbreviated number of witnesses.'' (p. 27, 1. 4-6). Counsel's 
    defensiveness surprises this Member since in reviewing the floor 
    statements and dear colleague letters I find no allegations that 
    Mr. Wilson ``did not have a full defense.''
        On the contrary, counsel provided an outstanding defense. But 
    simply put, on the basis of all the evidence adduced, the charges 
    were proven to the committee by the ``clear and convincing'' 
    standard and that proof is in the report of the committee.
        This Member, in his initial remarks, enunciated his firm belief 
    that the House should act on the record adduced at the hearings for 
    two reasons--he was afraid of the introduction of additional 
    evidence on the floor as was attempted by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Thomas 
    and, second, he felt that the dignity of the House might be 
    besmirched by additional allegations and statements made on the 
    floor under the immunity of the speech and debate clause but not 
    made under oath at the hearings. And after listening to the 
    gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Clay) use unfounded and 
    unsubstantiated statistics to attack the committee itself, I 
    realize I should have had a third fear.
        Let me say in closing that I respect the views of the gentleman 
    from California (Mr. McCloskey) who, I add parenthetically, I agree 
    with on several counts, and his basis for them. He, as I, and as I 
    hope this body will have based our conclusions on the facts, on the 
    record and not on extraneous material or on an unfounded attack on 
    the committee's basic fairness.
        Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the 
    resolution, as amended.
        The previous question was ordered.

                 motion to recommit offered by mr. mcloskey    

        Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
        The SPEAKER. Is the gentleman opposed to the resolution?
        Mr. McCLOSKEY. Yes I am, Mr. Speaker.
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman qualifies.
        The Clerk will report the motion to recommit.
        The Clerk read as follows:

  Mr. McCloskey moves to recommit the resolution (H. Res. 660) to the 
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct with instructions to report the 
same to the House forthwith with the following amendment:

  Strike out all after the resolving clause and insert in lieu thereof the 
following:

That Representative Charles H. Wilson be reprimanded.

        The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion to recommit offered 
    by the gentleman from California (Mr. McCloskey).
        The question was taken; and the Speaker being in doubt, the 
    House divided, and there were--ayes 67, noes 102.
        Mr. FORD of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas 
    and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    97, nays 308, answered ``present'' 4, not voting 24, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 307] . . . 

        So the motion to recommit was rejected.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        The SPEAKER. The question is on the resolution, as amended.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes 
    appeared to have it.
        Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were refused.
        So the resolution, as amended, was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the 
    table.                          -------------------

         CENSURE OF REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES H. WILSON OF CALIFORNIA    

        The SPEAKER. Will the gentleman from California (Mr. Charles H. 
    Wilson) kindly appear in the well?
        Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California presented himself at the 
    bar of the House.
        The SPEAKER read House Resolution 660, as amended, as follows:

H. Res. 660

  Resolved,

  (1) That Representative Charles H. Wilson be censured.

  (2) That upon adoption of this resolution, Representative Charles H. 
Wilson forthwith present himself in the well of the House of 
Representatives for the public reading of this resolution by the Speaker; 
and

  (3) That the House of Representatives adopt the report of the Committee 
on Standards of Official Conduct dated May 8, 1980, in the matter of 
Representative Charles H. Wilson.

        The SPEAKER. The matter is closed.
                        PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE
Ch. 8


                          INDEX TO PRECEDENTS

Apportionment
    Apportionment Act of 1911, Sec. 1
    constitutional provisions regarding, Sec. 1
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, relationship to, Sec. 1
    ``equal proportions'' method, Sec. 1
    historical development, Sec. 1
    jurisdiction, of House committees, Sec. 1
    methods of apportionment, history, Sec. 1
    Permanent Apportionment Act of 1929, Sec. 1
    privilege of legislation regarding, Sec. 1
    size of the House, relationship to, Sec. 1
Campaigns
    see Election Campaigns
Census
    African-Americans, historical treatment of, Sec. 1
    Committee on Oversight and Reform, jurisdiction, Sec. 1
    constitutional requirement to take, Sec. 1
    executive agencies with jurisdiction over, Sec. 1
    historical development, Sec. 1
    jurisdiction, of executive agencies, Sec. 1
    jurisdiction, of House committees, Sec. 1
    Native Americans, historical treatment of, Sec. 1
    presidential messages regarding, Sec. 1
    privilege of legislation regarding, Sec. 1
    proportional reduction of House seats, Sec. 1
Committee on Ethics
    see Ethics
Committee on House Administration
    campaign practices, jurisdiction over, Sec. 5
Committee on Oversight and Reform
    census, jurisdiction over, Sec. 1
Committee on the Judiciary
    apportionment, jurisdiction over, Sec. 1
Committees
    apportionment, jurisdiction over, Sec. 1
    campaign practices, jurisdiction over, Sec. 5
    campaign practices, special committee on, Sec. 5
    census, jurisdiction over, Sec. 1
    special committee on campaign practices, Sec. 5
Constitution
    apportionment, provisions regarding, Sec. 1
    campaign contribution limits, constitutionality of, Sec. 6
    census, provisions regarding, Sec. 1
    Federal Election Commission (FEC), constitutional defects in 
        original appointment structure, Sec. 6
    quorum requirements, Sec. 4
Contested Elections
    see Elections to the House
Continuity of Operations
    see Vacancies
Delegates and Resident Commissioners
    apportionment, relationship to, Sec. 1
    elections of, Sec. 3
Districting
    Baker v. Carr, Sec. 2
    compactness, Sec. 2
    congressional authority over, Sec. 2
    contiguity, Sec. 2
    equal population, requirements regarding, Sec. 2
    generally, Sec. 2
    gerrymandering, Sec. 2
    single-Member districts, use of, Sec. 2
    state authority over, Sec. 2
    Wesberry v. Sanders, Sec. 2
Election Campaigns
    campaign expenditures, regulation of, Sec. 5
    contribution limits, constitutionality of, Sec. 6
    disclosure requirements, Sec. 5
    Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, Sec. 5
    Federal Election Commission (FEC), Sec. 6
    National Publicity Act of 1910, Sec. 5
    Tillman Act of 1907, Sec. 5
Election Contests
    see Elections to the House
Elections to the House
    accessibility, Sec. 3
    campaigns, see Election Campaigns
    certificate of election, lack of, Sec. 4
    civil rights laws, effect of, Sec. 3
    congressional authority over, Sec. 3
    constitutional amendments, effect of, Sec. 3
    constitutional provisions regarding, Sec. 3
    Delegates and Resident Commissioners, elections of, Sec. 3
    election campaigns, see Election Campaigns
    election contests, Sec. 3
    Federal Contested Elections Act (FCEA), Sec. 3
    Federal Election Commission, see Federal Election Commission (FEC)
    oath of office, requirement to take, Sec. 4
    primary elections, Sec. 3
    qualifications for voting, Sec. 3
    registration of voters, Sec. 3
    special committee on campaign practices, Sec. 5
    special elections, Sec. 4
    state authority over, Sec. 3
    vacancies, see Vacancies
    voter qualifications, Sec. 3
    voter registration, Sec. 3
Ethics
    campaign finance violations, Sec. Sec. 5, 6, 7
    censure, Sec. Sec. 7, 7.4
    code of official conduct, campaign provisions in, Sec. 7
    Committee on Ethics, Sec. 7
    Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Sec. 7
    reprimand, Sec. Sec. 7, 7.1-7.3
Federal Election Commission (FEC)
    constitutional defects in original appointment structure, Sec. 6
    enforcement powers, Sec. 6
    Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), Sec. 6
    historical development, Sec. 6
    membership, Sec. 6
    regulations issued by, Sec. 6
Gerrymandering
    see Districting
Invesigations and Inquiries
    election contests, relationship to special committee on campaign 
        practices, Sec. 5
    special committee on campaign practices, Sec. 5
Oath of Office
    requirement to take, Sec. 4
    Speaker, administration of oath by, Sec. 4
    Speaker pro tempore, administration of oath by, Sec. 4
Presidential Messages
    census results transmitted via, Sec. 1
Privileged Questions
    census, former precedents regarding, Sec. 1
    statutory disapproval procedures under the Federal Election 
        Campaign Act (FECA), Sec. 6
Quorums
    constitutional requirements, Sec. 4
    continuity of operations, Sec. 4
    provisional quorums, Sec. 4
    whole number adjustment, Sec. 4
Redistricting
    see Districting
Resignation
    prospective resignations, Sec. 4
    vacancies caused by, Sec. 4
Rules of the House
    statutory rulemaking under the Federal Election Campaign Act 
        (FECA), Sec. 6
Speaker of the House
    oath of office, administration by, Sec. 4
    Speaker pro tempore, Sec. 4
Special Committees
    see Committees
Vacancies
    certificate of election, lack of, Sec. 4
    continuity of operations, Sec. 4
    death, Sec. 4
    declination, Sec. 4
    exclusion, Sec. 4
    expulsion, Sec. 4
    incapacitation, Sec. 4
    resignation, Sec. 4
    whole number adjustment, Sec. 4




                               CHAPTER 9

                           Election Contests
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commentary and editing by Max Spitzer, J.D., LL.M.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                A. Jurisdiction and Authority

                  Sec.  1. Constitutional Provisions; Historical 
                    Background

                  Sec.  2. Statutory Provisions; Former Statutory 
                    Provisions

                  Sec.  3. State and Local Election Procedures

                  Sec.  4. Jurisdiction: House, Committees, and Courts

                B. Grounds and Defenses

                  Sec.  5. Grounds for Initiating a Contest

                  Sec.  6. Defenses to a Contest

                C. Procedure

                  Sec.  7. Standing; Parties

                  Sec.  8. Notice of Contest

                  Sec.  9. Other Pleadings

                  Sec. 10. Taking Testimony; Depositions

                D. Committee and House Consideration

                  Sec. 11. Burden of Proof; Presumptions

                  Sec. 12. Ballot Issues; Recounts

                  Sec. 13. Disposition of Contests

                E. Summaries of Election Contests, 1973-2020

                  Sec. 14. Ninety-third Congress, 1973-1974

                  Sec. 15. Ninety-fourth Congress, 1975-1976

                  Sec. 16. Ninety-fifth Congress, 1977-1978

                  Sec. 17. Ninety-sixth Congress, 1979-1980

                  Sec. 18. Ninety-seventh Congress, 1981-1982

                  Sec. 19. Ninety-eighth Congress, 1983-1984

                  Sec. 20. Ninety-ninth Congress, 1985-1986

                  Sec. 21. One Hundredth Congress, 1987-1988

                  Sec. 22. One Hundred First Congress, 1989-1990

                  Sec. 23. One Hundred Second Congress, 1991-1992

                  Sec. 24. One Hundred Third Congress, 1993-1994

                  Sec. 25. One Hundred Fourth Congress, 1995-1996

                  Sec. 26. One Hundred Fifth Congress, 1997-1998

                  Sec. 27. One Hundred Sixth Congress, 1999-2000

                  Sec. 28. One Hundred Seventh Congress, 2001-2002

                  Sec. 29. One Hundred Eighth Congress, 2003-2004

                  Sec. 30. One Hundred Ninth Congress, 2005-2006

                  Sec. 31. One Hundred Tenth Congress, 2007-2008

                  Sec. 32. One Hundred Eleventh Congress, 2009-2010

                  Sec. 33. One Hundred Twelfth Congress, 2011-2012

                  Sec. 34. One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, 2013-2014

                  Sec. 35. One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, 2015-2016

                  Sec. 36. One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, 2017-2018

                  Sec. 37. One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, 2019-2020

                  Sec. 38. One Hundred Seventeenth Congress, 2021-2022



                     A. Jurisdiction and Authority



Sec. 1. Constitutional Provisions; Historical Background

    When the House first convenes at the outset of a Congress, Members-
elect arrive to be sworn in as full Members of the House. If there are 
no controversies or disputes with respect to the election of any 
individual, the states will have conveyed the required certificates of 
election to the Clerk of the House, and each Member-elect will be 
administered the oath of office.(1) However, the right of 
any individual to a seat in the House may be challenged by others who 
may formally ``contest'' the election. This chapter addresses the 
subject of election contests brought before the House of 
Representatives.(2)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. For more on the administration of the oath, see Precedents 
        (Wickham) Ch. 2. See also Deschler's Precedents Ch. 2.
 2. For earlier treatment of election contests generally, see 1 Hinds' 
        Precedents Sec. Sec. 528-755; 6 Cannon's Precedents 
        Sec. Sec. 88-120; and Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 1-
        45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The individual who initiates the election contest is known as the 
contestant. The individual responding to the contest (most often the 
Member-elect bearing a certificate of election) is known as the 
contestee. In contested election cases, the matter is styled similar to 
a court case: ``Contestant v Contestee'' (with the contestant's name 
given first).
    The format of this chapter will follow the arrangement used in the 
preceding Deschler's Precedents series. The various elements of an 
election contest will be analyzed separately in the initial sections, 
while the remaining sections will contain full summaries of each 
election contest considered by the House between the 93d and 117th 
Congresses.(3)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. For summaries of election contests brought during the First 
        Congress through the 59th Congress (1789-1906), see 1 Hinds' 
        Precedents Sec. Sec. 756-844; and 2 Hinds' Precedents 
        Sec. Sec. 845-1135. For summaries of election contests brought 
        during the 60th Congress through the 72d Congress (1907-1933), 
        see 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. Sec. 121-189; and the Appendix 
        to Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9. For summaries of election 
        contests brought during the 72d Congress through the 92d 
        Congress (1931-1972), see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 
        Sec. Sec. 46-64.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Issues surrounding the expulsion of Members from the House, or 
exclusion of individuals from its membership, are addressed in Chapter 
12 of this series.(4) Similarly, a more detailed discussion 
of election practices may be found in Chapter 8.(5) In 
addition, Chapter 2 concerns the administration of the oath of office 
and the certificates of election, while Chapter 7 contains material on 
the qualification of Members.(6)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. See also 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 1236-1289; 6 Cannon's 
        Precedents Sec. Sec. 236-239; and Deschler's Precedents Ch. 12 
        Sec. 13, 14.
 5. See also 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 507-527; 6 Cannon's 
        Precedents Sec. Sec. 66-87; and Deschler's Precedents Ch. 8.
 6. See also 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 127-185, 414-506; 2 Hinds' 
        Precedents Sec. 1136-1235; 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. Sec. 6-22 
        and 55-65; Deschler's Precedents Ch. 2; and Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Constitutional Provisions

    Article I, section 4, of the U.S. Constitution provides that the 
``Times, Places, and Manner'' of holding elections for Representatives 
to the House shall be vested in the legislatures of the individual 
states.(7) However, Congress may ``at any 
time''(8) enact laws to alter the regulations propounded by 
state legislatures. These constitutional provisions effectively create 
concurrent jurisdiction over the election of Representatives, and 
Congress has on many occasions exercised its authority to regulate 
state election procedures.(9)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. House Rules and Manual Sec. 42 (2021).
 8. Id.
 9. Voting and election laws have been codified in Title 52 of the U.S. 
        Code. Chapter 301 concerns the regulation of Federal election 
        campaigns and campaign financing. See 52 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 30101 
        et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Pursuant to article I, section 5, of the Constitution, the House 
``shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of 
its own Members.''(10) The Supreme Court has held that the 
question as to the right of an individual to a seat in the House is a 
``nonjusticiable political question.''(11) The House itself 
has asserted its right under the Constitution to be the final arbiter 
of who is entitled to membership.(12)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. House Rules and Manual Sec. 46 (2021). See also 1 Hinds' Precedents 
        Sec. 634.
11. Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 19 (1972).
12. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 1 (fn. 3) (The right to a seat 
        in the House ``is in the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the 
        House of Representatives.''). See generally, 1 Hinds' 
        Precedents Sec. Sec. 634-677; and 6 Cannon's Precedents 
        Sec. Sec. 90-96.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



Sec. 2. Statutory Provisions; Former Statutory Provisions

    When the House first convened in 1789, it had no statutory 
mechanism for resolving election contests. Instead, it established a 
standing Committee of Elections to handle any disputes that 
arose.(1) That committee promulgated rules for taking 
evidence and other procedures relating to election contests. These 
procedures were codified in statute in 1798, and remained in force 
until the mid-19th century.(2)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 1 Annals of Cong. 127, 1st Cong. 1st Sess. (Apr. 14, 1789).
 2. 1 Stat. 537. See also Staff of H. Comm. on Admin., 112th Cong. A 
        History of the Committee on House Administration 1947-2012, at 
        27-30 (Comm. Print 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 1851, a second statute addressing contested congressional 
elections was enacted into law.(3) This statute, the 
Contested Elections Act, was used to govern proceedings in election 
contests from the 32d Congress to the 91st Congress. In 1969, Congress 
passed the Federal Contested Elections Act (FCEA),(4) which 
has regulated the consideration of election contests from the 92d 
Congress to the present. The enactment of the modern statute 
affirmatively repealed the earlier contested elections law. All 
election contests discussed in this chapter were decided after 
enactment of the modern statute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 9 Stat. 568. Prior to its repeal, this statute (along with 
        subsequent amendments to the original act) had been codified at 
        2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 201-226.
 4. 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 381-396.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FCEA prescribes procedures for initiating an election 
contest,(5) taking testimony and evidence,(6) and 
filing pleadings.(7)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. See Sec. 8, infra.
 6. See Sec. 10, infra.
 7. See Sec. 9, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



Sec. 3. State and Local Election Procedures

    Although the Constitution confers on Congress the ability to alter 
any state or local regulations concerning the conduct of elections for 
Members to the House, Congress has typically deferred to state and 
local election boards to conduct elections in the manner of their 
choosing. The House has no authority to direct state or local officials 
to conduct a recount, or to otherwise intervene in those election 
procedures. If an election contest is pursued, the case is typically 
brought to the House after state and local officials have completed 
their work (i.e., the result has been officially certified by the 
relevant state authorities). State courts have often disclaimed 
jurisdiction over election contests, in deference to the constitutional 
provision giving the House sole authority to judge the elections of its 
Members.(1)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. See, e.g., McCuen v Dickey, Sec. 24.1, infra (Arkansas circuit 
        court dismissed case, citing lack of jurisdiction).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



Sec. 4. Jurisdiction: House, Committees, and Courts

    As noted earlier, constitutional provisions confer jurisdiction 
over the election of its Members to the House. Under the Federal 
Contested Elections Act (FCEA), the House attains jurisdiction over an 
individual election contest when the notice of contest is filed by the 
contestant with the Clerk of the House. The Clerk then transmits the 
notice and any accompanying papers or pleadings to the Committee on 
House Administration. No further action of the House is required for 
the Committee on House Administration to begin consideration of the 
case.
    An election contest may also be initiated by the House 
itself.(1) On opening day of a new Congress, prior to the 
swearing-in of Members-elect, any Member-elect may offer a challenge to 
the seating of any other Member-elect.(2) The House must 
then decide how to resolve the challenge, either by seating the Member-
elect despite the challenge, by seating the Member-elect conditionally 
but referring the issue to the Committee on House Administration, or by 
declining to seat the Member-elect and referring the case to committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. See Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 2 Sec. 4.
 2. Parliamentarian's Note: Since the advent of the modern statute 
        prescribing procedures for resolving election contests, 
        challenges on the floor of the House on opening day have been 
        extremely rare. Since the 93d Congress in 1973, there have only 
        been two instances of a Member-elect being challenged, both 
        occurring in 1985. See Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 2 
        Sec. Sec. 4.1, 4.2; McCloskey v McIntyre, Sec. 20.1; and Hansen 
        v Stallings, Sec. 20.3, infra. In the 117th Congress, a 
        challenge was made to the seating of all Members-elect from 
        certain states, and the House subsequently adopted a privileged 
        resolution authorizing the Speaker to administer the oath of 
        office to all Members-elect. See 167 Cong. Rec. H7-H8 [Daily 
        Ed.], 117th Cong. 1st Sess. (Jan. 3, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the FCEA, a notice of contest must first be filed before the 
House takes cognizance of the election contest. This requirement does 
not, however, affect the House's plenary authority under the 
Constitution to decide election cases. Where the House finds no merit 
in the contest (for example, the contestant is found to be incompetent 
under the statute to bring a claim), it may summarily dismiss the 
contest prior to committee consideration.(3) Similarly, 
where there is extrinsic evidence of irregularities in an election, the 
House may itself initiate a contest even where no notice of contest has 
been filed.(4) There have also been instances where the 
House has failed to take formal action on an election contest--most 
often where the contestee is determined to have the final right to the 
seat but is already a sworn Member.(5)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 4.4, 4.5.
 4. See, e.g., McCloskey v McIntyre, Sec. 20.1, infra.
 5. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 42.19, 42.20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On April 14, 1789, the House established a ``Committee of 
Elections,'' and chose seven Members by ballot to serve on such 
committee.(6) Members of this committee were charged with 
examining certificates of election, taking ``into their consideration 
all such matters as shall or may come in question . . . touching 
returns and elections,'' and to report their findings back to the 
House.(7) In 1794, the House adopted a resolution requiring 
that a Committee of Elections ``be appointed at the commencement of 
each session.''(8) This committee would have exclusive 
jurisdiction over election contests for the next century.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 1 Annals of Cong. 127-28, 1st Cong. 1st Sess. (Apr. 14, 1789).
 7. Id.
 8. 1 Annals of Cong. 879-80, 3d Cong. 2d Sess. (Nov. 13, 1794).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Toward the end of the 19th century, as the membership of the House 
grew larger, the workload of the committee correspondingly increased. 
In 1895, the Committee on Elections was split into three separate 
committees: Committee on Elections No. 1, Committee on Elections No. 2, 
and Committee on Elections No. 3.(9) These three committees 
handled election contests until the mid-20th century. As part of the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,(10) committee 
jurisdictions were streamlined, numerous committees were consolidated, 
and the jurisdiction of the three election committees was subsumed into 
the new Committee on House Administration.(11) The Committee 
on House Administration maintains a Subcommittee on Elections to 
address contested elections. It has also chosen to form ad hoc task 
forces and panels to address individual election contests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. See 4 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 4019.
10. P.L. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812.
11. Staff of H. Comm. on Admin., 112th Cong. A History of the Committee 
        on House Administration 1947-2012, at 21-22 (Comm. Print 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Pursuant to clause 1(k)(12) of rule X,(12) the Committee 
on House Administration has jurisdiction over the election of Members, 
as well as all election contests. Similarly, the FCEA contemplates 
actions by the relevant ``committee'' of the House, which is defined as 
the Committee on House Administration.(13)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. House Rules and Manual Sec. 724 (2021).
13. Parliamentarian's Note: As codified, the FCEA still refers to the 
        Committee on House Administration by its former name: the 
        Committee on House Oversight. The Committee on House 
        Administration was known by this name during the 104th and 
        105th Congresses. See House Rules and Manual Sec. 724 (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



                        B. Grounds and Defenses



Sec. 5. Grounds for Initiating a Contest

    The Federal Contested Elections Act (FCEA) does not specify the 
grounds on which an election contest may be based. Contestants are thus 
free to assert any basis for challenging the right of the contestee to 
the seat in question. However, it should be noted that the statute 
contemplates affirmative defenses that the contestee may utilize in 
responding to a notice of contest. One such defense directly addresses 
the claims made by the contestant in the notice of contest: the 
contestant must state grounds sufficient to change the result of the 
election.(1) Thus, whatever facts the contestant alleges as 
a basis for contesting the election must be sufficient to meet this 
burden.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 383(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The notice of contest must also state ``with particularity'' the 
grounds on which the contestant seeks to challenge the results of the 
election.(2) Vague or ambiguous allegations will not be 
sufficient for the contestant to succeed, and the Committee on House 
Administration has often recommended the dismissal of election contests 
on the basis that the grounds relied upon in the notice of contest were 
insufficiently specific to carry the burden of proof.(3)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 382(b).
 3. See, e.g., Sec. 5.1, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Voting and Balloting Irregularities

    By far the most common allegation proffered in a notice of contest 
is that there were substantial irregularities in election procedures or 
the tabulation of votes.(4) The specifics of such claims 
vary from contest to contest. For instance, the contestant may assert 
that voting machines or equipment failed to accurately record 
votes.(5) The contestant may claim that the ballots 
themselves (or the process of marking ballots) were confusing or 
ambiguous and that, as a result, the intent of the voter was not 
properly ascertained.(6) It may also be asserted that 
individuals not qualified to vote were nevertheless permitted to cast 
votes illegally.(7)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. For an earlier treatment of such issues, see Deschler's Precedents 
        Ch. 9 Sec. 12.
 5. See, e.g., Sec. 5.2, infra.
 6. See, e.g., Sec. 5.3, infra.
 7. See, e.g., Sec. 5.4, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The conduct of election officials is often raised as an issue in 
the contestant's notice of contest. The contestant may claim that 
election officials either intentionally breached their duties under 
state and local election laws,(8) or that the officials were 
negligent in carrying out such duties.(9)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. See, e.g., Sec. 5.5, infra.
 9. See, e.g., Hansen v Stallings, Sec. 20.3; and Curtis v Feeney, 
        Sec. 31.2, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Improper Attempts to Influence Voters

    Another common ground for initiating an election contest is the 
allegation that the contestee sought to improperly influence or confuse 
voters.(10) The specifics of this type of claim may involve: 
harassment or intimidation of voters;(11) ``vote-buying'' or 
other attempts to bribe voters;(12) or the dissemination of 
misleading information to voters.(13)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. For an earlier treatment of such issues, see Deschler's Precedents 
        Ch. 9 Sec. 11.
11. See, e.g., Sec. 5.6, infra.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Young v Mikva, Sec. 15.1, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Violations of Campaign Practices Laws

    Election campaigns are conducted pursuant to a variety of Federal, 
state, and local laws.(14) Such laws regulate how campaign 
contributions are collected and spent, what communications to voters 
are permitted, and other campaign practices. A contestant may base 
their challenge to the results of the election on allegations that the 
contestee violated these laws (and that, but for the election campaign 
violations, the contestant would have been elected 
instead).(15)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. See Precedents (Smith) Ch. 8. For earlier treatment of the 
        regulation of campaign practices, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 
        8 Sec. Sec. 10-14.
15. See, e.g., Sec. 5.7, infra. See also Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 
        Sec. 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Qualifications; Exclusion

    The contestant may assert that the contestee in an election contest 
is not entitled to a seat in the House on the grounds that the 
contestee does not meet the qualifications for office laid out in the 
Constitution (and thus was never a viable candidate for the 
seat).(16) However, the House has been reluctant to treat 
such claims as a legitimate basis for initiating an election contest, 
as the individual was still properly elected to the seat. Instead, the 
House had usually viewed such claims as more appropriately adjudicated 
in the context of exclusion from the House, rather than as an election 
contest.(17)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. Parliamentarian's Note: The differences in outcome between an 
        election contest and a case of exclusion can be summarized as 
        follows: an election contest in which the contestant is 
        successful results in the unseating of the contestee and the 
        seating of the contestant. However, the exclusion of an 
        individual from the House, on the basis that the individual is 
        not qualified to serve, results in a vacancy in the seat (which 
        must be filled via special election).
17. See Precedents (Smith) Ch. 7. See also Deschler's Precedents Ch. 7 
        Sec. Sec. 9-14 and Deschler's Precedents Ch. 12 Sec. 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, the Committee on House Administration has on occasion 
taken up cases where one of the bases for the election contest was the 
lack of proper qualifications by the contestee.(18) In no 
such cases since the advent of the FCEA did the committee find that the 
arguments by the contestant had merit; all were thus dismissed by the 
House.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. See, e.g., Sec. 5.8, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Other Grounds

    Since the advent of the FCEA, a variety of other arguments have 
been raised as possible grounds for challenging the outcome of an 
election. These have included: abuse or misuse of an official 
position;(19) intimidation of, or threats directed at, the 
contestant;(20) and refusal to debate the 
contestant.(21) Finally, a number of election contests have 
been brought under the FCEA based on alleged fraud or error in the 
primary election to select party candidates for the general 
election.(22) In general, the House has been reluctant to 
treat such grounds as valid, on the theory that losing primary 
candidates do not have standing to challenge the results of the general 
election.(23)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. See, e.g., Sec. 5.9, infra.
20. See, e.g., Sec. 5.10, infra.
21. See, e.g., Sec. 5.11, infra.
22. See, e.g., Sec. 5.12, infra.
23. See Sec. 7, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 5.1 Grounds for initiating an election contest must be based on 
    specific evidence, and the notice of contest must state ``with 
    particularity'' the basis for challenging the results of the 
    election.

    In the case of Wilson v Hinshaw (Sec. 15.3, infra), the committee 
report evinced the proposition that the contestant must provide enough 
evidence to allow the committee to determine whether ``contestant's 
claims are substantial and not frivolous''(24) Allegations 
of fraud in the notice of contest ``should disclose with particularity 
what, when, where, how much and by whom.''(25) The committee 
ultimately concluded that the allegations in that case were ``vague and 
uncertain as to the necessary particulars.''(26) In the case 
of Lowe v Fowler (Sec. 16.7, infra), the committee asserted that the 
contestant must meet the high burden of providing specific, substantial 
evidence, and, in dismissing the contest, concluded that this 
``standard has not been met by the contestant in his 
pleadings.''(27)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
24. H. Rept. 94-761, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3.
25. Id. at p. 4.
26. Id.
27. H. Rept. 95-724, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 5.2 A notice of contest may be based on allegations that voting 
    machines or equipment failed to accurately record votes.

    In the case of McCuen v Dickey (Sec. 24.1, infra), the contestant 
alleged that ``the position of the individual voting pointers, vis a 
vis the location of the names on the ballot inserts associated with 
these pointers, was misleading to voters.''(28) Contestant 
further alleged that certain voting machines were ``improperly 
programmed and were defective''(29) and that other machines 
were not properly secured against tampering.(30) In the case 
of Gonzalez v Diaz-Balart (Sec. 31.1, infra), the contestant alleged 
that voting machines ``were hacked or had their data tabulations 
altered by electronic means.''(31) In both of these cases, 
the committee found the claims of the contestants unpersuasive, and 
resolved the contests in favor of the contestees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
28. H. Rept. 103-109, 103d Cong. 1st Sess. p. 4.
29. Id. at p. 5.
30. Id. at p. 6.
31. H. Rept. 110-175, 110th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 5.3 A notice of contest may be based on the allegation that 
    ballots were inherently confusing or ambiguous, and thus the intent 
    of the voter was not properly ascertained.

    In the case of Dehr v Leggett (Sec. 16.5, infra), the election was 
conducted using IBM Votomatic machines, where a data card is inserted 
underneath a plastic ballot sheet and perforated when the voter makes a 
selection. The contestant argued that penciled-in notations regarding 
write-in candidates obscured the contestant's name and thus misled 
voters as to whom they were selecting (a claim ultimately rejected by 
the Committee on House Administration).(32) In the case of 
Archer v Packard (Sec. 19.1, infra), Votomatic machines were also used, 
and it was alleged by the contestant that voters attempting to vote for 
a write-in candidate defaced some machines--leading to possible 
confusion by subsequent voters using those machines.(33) 
However, the contestant could only provide one substantiated instance 
of a voter who claimed that his vote had been affected by a defaced 
machine,(34) and the case was dismissed. In the case of 
McCuen v Dickey (Sec. 24.1, infra), the contestant alleged that it was 
``difficult for voters to align the name of the person for whom they 
wished to vote, with the pointer designated for the person'' due to the 
ballot design.(35) The committee, however, was not persuaded 
by this argument and the case was ultimately dismissed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
32. H. Rept. 95-654, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. pp. 2, 3.
33. H. Rept. 98-452, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 4.
34. Id.
35. H. Rept. 103-109, 103d Cong. 1st Sess. p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 5.4 A notice of contest may be based on the allegation that 
    individuals ineligible to vote were nevertheless permitted to cast 
    ballots.

    In the case of Hansen v Stallings (Sec. 20.3, infra), the 
contestant claimed that ``illegal votes had been cast by persons not 
properly registered'' to vote, and that such votes ``if removed from 
the results, would change the outcome of the election.''(36) 
The Committee on House Administration in that case went on to analyze 
Idaho state law regarding proper registration procedures, and concluded 
that ``no facts have been produced from which it could be concluded 
that the voters involved were not qualified.''(37) In the 
Dornan v Sanchez (Sec. 26.1, infra) case, the contestant argued that 
illegal votes were cast by a variety of unqualified individuals, 
including ``under-age voters'' ``noncitizens,'' and ``convicted 
felons.'' The contestant ultimately narrowed his claims to the issue of 
voting by noncitizens. The committee investigation did find evidence 
that illegal votes were cast, but not enough to make a difference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
36. H. Rept. 99-290, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3.
37. Id. at p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 5.5 A notice of contest may allege intentional or negligent 
    improper conduct by state and local election officials.

    In the case of Freeman v Mitchell (Sec. 17.2, infra), the 
contestant argued that improper conduct by election officials was 
intentional, that ``contestee and associates conspired with election 
officials,'' and that the ``election was illegally and improperly 
certified.''(38) Ultimately, the committee concluded in that 
case that the contestant had ``failed to support'' such allegations 
``with documentary or other evidence.''(39) In the Archer v 
Packard (Sec. 19.1, infra) case, the contestant incorporated into his 
notice of contest the allegations contained in a petition filed in 
state court that claimed ``a variety of inadequacies in the . . . 
conduct of officials charged with overseeing the 
election.''(40) However, the committee ``found no evidence 
of criminal violations of the California Election Code by election 
officials'' and the case was dismissed.(41) The Anderson v 
Rose (Sec. 25.1, infra) case involved a ``long laundry list of 
allegations, principally directed at elections officials in Robeson 
County''(42) by the contestant. The contestant claimed both 
intentional and negligent conduct by election officials--that 
``[b]allots were improperly remarked by election 
officials,''(43) and that ``election officials were 
improperly advising and assisting voters.''(44) Ultimately, 
the committee concluded that the contestant did not provide the 
necessary evidence to support his claims, and the case was dismissed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
38. H. Rept. 96-226, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 4.
39. Id.
40. H. Rept. 98-452, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
41. Id. at p. 4.
42. H. Rept. 104-852, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 18.
43. Id. at p. 5.
44. Id. at p. 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 5.6 A notice of contest may be based on the allegation that the 
    contestee sought to improperly influence, intimidate, or confuse 
    voters.

    In the Anderson v Rose (Sec. 25.1, infra) case, contestant 
submitted affidavits and other evidence ``suggesting that voters were 
harassed at certain polling stations.''(45) The contestant 
also claimed that ``[b]ribes were offered to voters with funds 
contributed'' by the contestee.(46) Similarly, in the 
Hayward v Cuellar (Sec. 34.1, infra) case, the contestant argued that 
some voters were ``intimidated''(47) and that others ``were 
given free tacos, and were provided money in return for their 
vote.''(48) Accusations of bribery were also at the center 
of the Wilson v Leach (Sec. 17.4, infra) case, where contestant alleged 
that voters were ``paid to vote in the election for 
Contestee.''(49) In the Young v Mikva (Sec. 15.1, infra) 
case, contestant claimed that the election was marred by ``[w]idespread 
dissemination by Contestee to hundreds of thousands of voters of false 
and misleading information about Contestant.''(50) In all of 
these cases, the committee found that the contestant did not support 
the allegations with sufficient evidence, and the cases were dismissed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
45. H. Rept. 104-852, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 13.
46. Id. at p. 5.
47. H. Rept. 113-22, 113th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
48. Id. at p. 4.
49. H. Rept. 96-784, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 3.
50. H. Rept. 94-759, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 5.7 Allegations that the contestee violated laws regarding 
    permissible campaign practices have been used as the basis of a 
    notice of contest.

    Federal, state, and local laws govern what activities candidates 
for House seats may engage in during their campaigns. Contestants have 
sometimes based their contests on accusations that the contestee 
violated such laws. For example, one of the allegations contained in 
the notice of contest in the Young v Mikva (Sec. 15.1, infra) case was 
the ``acceptance by Contestee of political contributions in violation 
of the FECA of 1971, and the failure to report these contributions as 
required by law.''(51) In the Wilson v Hinshaw (Sec. 15.3, 
infra) case, a grand jury indicted contestee ``on one count of 
conspiracy to pay voters in order to secure his election and ten counts 
of paying voters''(52) but the contestee was acquitted by a 
Federal jury. Ultimately, ``Contestant withdrew any allegations of 
involvement by Contestee''(53) in the alleged fraud and 
irregularities surrounding the election. Both of these cases were 
decided by the committee in favor of the contestee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
51. Id.
52. H. Rept. 94-761, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
53. Id. at p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 5.8 The House has viewed claims that the contestee failed to meet 
    constitutional requirements for qualification as more properly 
    framed as a matter of exclusion to be decided by the House rather 
    than as a legitimate basis to contest an election.

    In the Mack v Stokes (Sec. 15.4, infra) case, the committee ``took 
note of the fact that this case is a qualifications case and as such 
would more appropriately be brought to the House of Representatives by 
a petition or memorial rather than by proceeding in the nature of a 
contest.''(54) In the case of Lyons v Gordon (Sec. 29.2, 
infra), contestant advanced the theory that the contestee was not 
qualified to serve in the House because certain actions of his rendered 
him an ``insurrectionist'' under clause 3 of the 14th 
Amendment.(55) In response, the committee found that, ``as a 
general matter, challenges to the qualifications of a member-elect to 
serve in the Congress fall outside the purview of the FCEA, which was 
designed to consider allegations relating to the actual conduct of the 
election.''(56) In the Cox v McCrery (Sec. 31.5, infra) 
case, the contestant argued that ``the Contestee was not, when elected 
on November 7, 2006, an inhabitant of the state of Louisiana within the 
meaning of the Qualification clause.''(57) The committee, 
however, found that, ``[u]nder the precedents, a challenge to the 
qualifications of a Member is not treated as an election 
contest''(58) and that ``challenges to the qualifications of 
a Member-elect to serve in the Congress are not a proper subject for a 
contest brought under the FCEA.''(59) Although in each of 
these cases the committee recommended dismissal based on a failure to 
adequately support their grounds for the contests, it nevertheless 
evinced a view that qualifications challenges should not be made in the 
context of an election contest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
54. H. Rept. 94-762, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
55. H. Rept. 108-208, 108th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
56. Id. at p. 4.
57. H. Rept. 110-177, 110th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
58. Id. at p. 3.
59. Id. at p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 5.9 A notice of contest has been based on the allegation that 
    contestee (or others) abused or misused an official position to 
    affect the outcome of the election.

    In the Wilson v Hinshaw (Sec. 15.3, infra) case, the contestant 
argued that ``misconduct by Contestee and abuse of his position as 
County Assessor''(60) resulted in an election that was not 
``fair, independent, and open.''(61) In the case of Saunders 
v Kelly (Sec. 16.1, infra), the contestant alleged that ``the chairman 
of the Florida Ethics Commission carried out an attack . . . against 
her candidacy''(62) and that the contestee ``conspired with 
the Chairman of the committee to attack her candidacy.''(63) 
In both of these cases, the accusations of misuse of official positions 
were deemed by the committee as not sufficiently supported with 
specific evidence, and the cases were dismissed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
60. See H. Rept. 94-761, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
61. Id.
62. H. Rept. 95-242, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
63. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 5.10 A notice of contest has been based on allegations that the 
    contestee made threats against the contestant or engaged in other 
    acts of intimidation.

    In the case of Freeman v Mitchell (Sec. 17.2, infra), the 
contestant ``alleged acts of violence and intimidation to herself, her 
husband, her campaign staff, and her supporters.''(64) Such 
acts allegedly included ``telephone death threats,'' ``attempts to 
extort money,'' and ``a threat to contestant's own life at 
gunpoint.''(65) However, the committee determined that the 
contestant did not sufficiently support such claims and ``failed to 
meet the burden placed on contestant by the act in order to overcome 
the motion to dismiss.''(66)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
64. H. Rept. 96-226, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 4.
65. Id.
66. Id. at p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 5.11 A notice of contest has been based in part on the allegation 
    that, but for contestee's failure to debate the contestant, the 
    outcome of the election would have been different.

    In the Tataii v Abercrombie (Sec. 32.1, infra) case, the committee 
report noted that ``Contestant's sole allegation supporting his contest 
is that, but for Contestee's refusal to debate him, Contestant would 
have won election to the First Congressional District'' of 
Hawaii.(67) However, the committee concluded that such 
accusations were ``no more than unsupported speculation'' and that 
contestant's ``claims do not cast sufficient doubt on the results of 
the election to merit further investigation.''(68) The case 
was subsequently dismissed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
67. H. Rept. 111-68, 111th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3.
68. Id. at p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 5.12 The House has rejected fraud or error in the primary election 
    as a valid basis for a notice of contest.

    In the Perkins v Byron (Sec. 17.1, infra) case, the contestant 
``claimed that the Maryland Democratic Central Committee failed to 
provide adequate notice of the meeting''(69) at which an 
alternative nominee was selected following the death of the prior 
nominee. The committee report stated that the contestant ``made no 
claim of any irregularity in the conduct of the general 
election.''(70) It concluded that the contestant ``failed to 
demonstrate that his allegations, if true, would have changed the 
election results.''(71) The case of Tataii v Case 
(Sec. 29.1, infra) also involved the death of one party's nominee prior 
to the general election. The deceased candidate won the general 
election posthumously, and a special election was held to fill the 
resulting vacancy. The committee report on the contest summarized the 
basis for contestant's claim as follows: ``. . . the contestant's claim 
to why he is entitled to the Second Congressional seat is based chiefly 
on his argument that Representative Mink should have been disqualified 
as a primary candidate, that he should have been declared the 
Democratic nominee by default, and that as the nominee, he would have 
been the inevitable general election winner.''(72) The 
committee was not persuaded by this argument, deciding that ``the basis 
for the contestant's Notice of Contest falls outside the scope of the 
FCEA.''(73) In its analysis, the committee stated 
unequivocally that, ``[b]y its very terms, the FCEA does not 
contemplate considering Notices of Contest that are based on the 
conduct of primary elections.''(74) Thus, the case was 
decided in favor of the contestee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
69. H. Rept. 96-78, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3.
70. Id.
71. Id. at p. 4.
72. H. Rept. 108-207, 108th Cong. 1st Sess. pp. 4, 5.
73. Id. at p. 5.
74. Id. at p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



Sec. 6. Defenses to a Contest

    The Federal Contested Elections Act (FCEA) provides four possible 
defenses that a contestee may assert in opposition to a notice of 
contest filed by the contestant. These are: (1) insufficiency of 
service; (2) lack of standing of the contestant; (3) failure of the 
notice of contest to state grounds sufficient to change the results of 
the election; and (4) failure of contestant to claim a right to 
contestee's seat.(1)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 383(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The notice of contest filed by the contestant must be properly 
served on the contestee in conformity with the statute's service 
requirements.(2) The statute requires that the notice of 
contest be filed within 30 days after the results of the election have 
been officially declared by the relevant state 
authorities.(3) Thus, the untimely filing of a notice of 
contest may be raised by the contestee as a possible 
defense.(4) Other deficiencies in service (such as lack of 
proof of service, or improper form of the notice) may similarly be 
raised by the contestee under this statutory defense.(5)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 382(c).
 3. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 382(a).
 4. See, e.g., Sec. 6.1, infra.
 5. See, e.g., Sec. 6.2, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The contestant must have proper standing to challenge the results 
of the election, and the contestee may allege lack of standing as a 
defense to a notice of contest.(6) The FCEA specifies that, 
to have proper standing, an individual must have been ``a candidate for 
election in the last preceding election.''(7) Thus, losing 
primary election candidates, campaign organizations, or other 
individuals who were not candidates in the general election, will not 
be able to meet the requirements for standing under the 
statute.(8)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 383(b)(2). For a discussion of standing generally, 
        see Sec. 7, infra. For examples of election contests where the 
        contestee raised the issue of standing, see, e.g., Lowe v 
        Fowler, Sec. 16.7; Thorsness v Daschle, Sec. 17.5; and Project 
        Hurt v Waters, Sec. 34.3, infra. See also Deschler's Precedents 
        Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 14.1, 14.2.
 7. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 382(a). Under the former Contested Elections Act, the 
        standing requirements were not as strict as under the FCEA, and 
        the statute theoretically permitted ``any person'' to challenge 
        the results of an election. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 
        Sec. 19. Nevertheless, even under the old statute, the House 
        considered individuals who were not candidates in the general 
        election as incompetent to pursue a claim. See Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 19.1.
 8. Parliamentarian's Note: Although the individual or entity filing a 
        notice of contest under the FCEA may lack proper standing, the 
        Committee on House Administration may nevertheless elect to 
        consider the merits of the case in order to dismiss the case on 
        substantive rather than merely procedural grounds. See, e.g., 
        Project Hurt v Cohen, Sec. 34.2, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To prevail in an elections contest case, the contestant must show 
not only that there were errors, fraud, or irregularities in the 
conduct of the election, but also that such factors were sufficient to 
change the result of the election.(9) In other words, but 
for such factors, the contestant (rather than the contestee) would have 
been declared the winner of the election. Since the advent of the FCEA, 
contestees have often asserted the defense that, even accepting the 
truth of the contestant's claims regarding the election, the contestant 
did not demonstrate that the result would have been 
different.(10)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 383(b)(3).
10. See, e.g., Sec. 6.3, infra. See also Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 
        Sec. 13.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final statutory defense under the FCEA is a failure by the 
contestant to claim a right to contestant's seat.(11) This 
defense has been asserted where, for example, the individual initiating 
the contest was only a candidate in the party primary election, but not 
a candidate in the general election.(12) In other cases, 
this defense has essentially merged with the third statutory defense 
(failure to demonstrate that the results of the election would have 
been different) because the inability to claim that the result would 
have changed necessarily precludes the contestant from claiming that 
they should be seated in place of the contestee.(13)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 383(b)(4).
12. See, e.g., Hill and Panlasigui v Clay, Sec. 16.6, infra.
13. See, e.g., Sec. 6.4, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to these defenses provided by the FCEA, House 
precedents delineate additional nonstatutory defenses that a contestee 
may assert to counter the allegations made in a notice of 
contest.(14) Some of these nonstatutory defenses are 
analytically similar to the defenses (or other requirements) provided 
in statute. For example, the House has recognized the failure on the 
part of the contestant to state the grounds for the contest with 
specificity as a valid defense for the contestee(15) 
(mirroring the statutory requirement that the contestant state grounds 
``with particularity'').(16) Contests that the House has 
determined were brought on mere ``conjecture'' have likewise been 
dismissed as lacking the required specificity.(17)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 13.
15. See, e.g., Sec. 6.5, infra. See also Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 
        Sec. 13.8.
16. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 382(a).
17. See, e.g., Freeman v Mitchell, Sec. 17.2, infra (contestee claimed 
        insufficient knowledge to response to vague allegations by 
        contestant). See also Jennings v Buchanan, Sec. 31.4, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Pursuant to the statute, contestants must also request proper 
relief in their notice of contest (i.e., claim a right to the 
contestee's seat). Where a contestant merely requests a recount of 
certain disputed ballots or precincts (without further claiming that 
the result of the recount would demonstrate that the contestant was the 
actual winner), the committee has recommended dismissal of the 
case.(18)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. See, e.g., Ziebarth v Smith, Sec. 15.5; and Hendon v Clarke, 
        Sec. 19.2, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The failure of the contestant to make a prima facie case has also 
been recognized by the House as a legitimate defense in an election 
contest.(19) Where the contestee asserts that the contestant 
has made no claim that there were any irregularities, fraud, or 
misconduct in the administration of the election, the House may choose 
to dismiss the case as lacking a proper foundation.(20)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 13.1.
20. See, e.g., Sec. 6.6, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The House has been reluctant to accord legitimacy to election 
contests where the contestant had opportunities at the state level to 
pursue claims related to the conduct of the election but chose to forgo 
those opportunities.(21) The defense of a ``failure to 
exhaust state remedies'' has been asserted in election contests since 
the advent of the FCEA, though the statute does not specifically 
require contestants to avail themselves of state processes prior to 
commencing an election contest.(22)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
21. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 13.4, 13.5.
22. See, e.g., Anderson v Rose, Sec. 25.1; and Dornan v Sanchez, 
        Sec. 26.1, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Where the contestant asserts that irregularities or misconduct 
occurred prior to the election (for example, errors in the production 
or distribution of absentee ballots), the contestee may offer the 
defense that such issues should have been addressed at the state level 
prior to the election. The House has accepted this defense in earlier 
cases,(23) noting that candidates should attempt to resolve 
known pre-election issues prior to the election (i.e., when there is 
still time to prevent those issues from affecting the outcome of the 
election).(24)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
23. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 13.6, 13.7.
24. See, e.g., Won Pat v Blaz, Sec. 20.2, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is important to note that the contestee is not required to 
assert any defense in an election contest in order to prevail. The 
burden at all times is on the contestant to prove the case. The FCEA 
provides that the ``failure of contestee to answer the notice of 
contest or to otherwise defend as provided by this chapter shall not be 
deemed an admission of the truth of the averments in the notice of 
contest.''(25) Since the enactment of the statute, several 
cases have proceeded to committee consideration despite the lack of any 
answer or defense offered by the contestee.(26) The 
contestant may respond to contestee's defenses by noting that they were 
not filed within the time period prescribed by the statute, and thus 
should be disregarded as untimely.(27) However, as even the 
lack of defense does not shift the burden of proof, an untimely defense 
presents no barrier to the success of the contestee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
25. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 385.
26. See, e.g., Sec. 6.7, infra; and Tataii v Abercrombie, Sec. 32.1, 
        infra. Withdrawal from the case by the contestant necessarily 
        moots any lack of defense on the part of the contestee. See 
        Kyros v Emery, Sec. 15.2, infra.
27. See, e.g., Hansen v Stallings, Sec. 20.3, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Abatement; Laches

    An election contest may become moot due to the failure of the 
contestant to continue the case to its conclusion.(28) 
Contestants may withdraw their notice of contest at any point, 
including during committee consideration of the claims, in which case 
the election contest is terminated. Furthermore, pursuant to the FCEA, 
the contested election ``shall abate'' in the event of the death of the 
contestant.(29) Where a notice of contest has been filed, 
but the contestant does not thereafter provide the House with any 
testimony or evidence in support of the claim, the House may dismiss 
the case on that basis.(30) The House may also choose to 
dismiss an election contest upon a finding that the contestant has 
unreasonably delayed the proceedings by failing to gather evidence, 
submit testimony, or file required briefs within the time periods 
established by law.(31)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
28. See, e.g., Hart v Miller-Meeks, Sec. 38.1, infra.
29. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 395.
30. See, e.g., Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 15.1-15.3.
31. See, e.g., Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 16.1, 16.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 6.1 Contestees may avail themselves of the defense that the 
    contestant failed to file the notice of contest within the required 
    time period.

    In the Rayner v Stewart (Sec. 17.3, infra) case, the contestee 
averred that the notice of contest was not timely filed--a claim that 
the ad hoc panel investigating the case concluded was 
true.(32) The committee also found no merit to contestant's 
substantive claims, and therefore recommend dismissal of the case, 
``based on procedural and substantive grounds.''(33) In the 
Gonzalez v Diaz-Balart (Sec. 31.1, infra) case, contestee sought ``to 
have this election contest dismissed based on Contestant's failure to 
timely file the Notice of Contest with the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives pursuant to the filing requirements under 
FCEA.''(34) Although the committee chose to dismiss the case 
on substantive grounds, the minority views accompanying the report 
agreed with contestee's assertion regarding the proper method of filing 
the notice of contest, and concluded that the case could have been 
dismissed on this procedural ground alone.(35) In the 
Project Hurt v Cohen (Sec. 34.2, infra) case, the committee report 
noted that ``Project Hurt filed the Notice of Contest with the Clerk of 
the House of Representatives on March 27, 2013, 112 days past the 
certification date. The notice of contest was not timely and therefore 
should not be considered.''(36) For this and other reasons, 
the case was dismissed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
32. H. Rept. 96-316, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3.
33. Id. at p. 5.
34. H. Rept. 110-175, 110th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3.
35. Id. at pp. 5, 6.
36. H. Rept. 113-132, 113th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 6.2 Contestees may base their defense on the lack of (or 
    deficiencies in) proper service of process.

    The FCEA provides that the contestant must properly serve the 
contestee with the notice of contest, and lays out the requirements for 
proper service.(37) Contestees may therefore offer a defense 
that the notice was not properly served. For instance, in the Rayner v 
Stewart (Sec. 17.3, infra) case, contestee countered contestant's 
notice of contest by claiming, in part, that there was no proof of 
service.(38) This alleged procedural defect, along with 
other procedural defects related to the notice contest, was accepted by 
the committee as accurate, and the case was dismissed ``based on both 
procedural and substantive grounds.''(39)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
37. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 382(c).
38. H. Rept. 96-316, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. pp. 2, 3.
39. Id. at p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 6.3 Contestees may offer the defense that, even accepting the 
    factual claims made by the contestant, contestant did not 
    demonstrate how the result of the election would have been 
    different.

    In the Pierce v Pursell (Sec. 16.4, infra) case, contestee ``filed 
a Motion to Dismiss and asserted that the contestant had failed to 
state grounds sufficient to change the result of the 
election.''(40) In assessing whether or not to grant 
contestant's request for a recount, the committee stated that ``some 
substantial allegations of fraud must be alleged, and the likelihood 
must exist that the result of the election would have been different 
were not for such irregularity or fraud.''(41) The committee 
ultimately concluded that the contestant had not met this burden. In 
the case of Anderson v Rose (Sec. 25.1, infra), contestee's motion to 
dismiss ``demanded dismissal on the grounds that Anderson's Notice 
failed to state sufficient grounds to change the result of the 
election.''(42) The committee report in this case evinced 
the following standard for evaluating whether contestant has shown that 
the outcome would have been different: credible allegations must be 
made which ``show either that: (1) more ballots mere improperly cast 
than the margin of victory; or (2) because of contaminating factors 
such as bribery, harassment of voters, corruption of officials, etc., 
in certain precinct(s), the credibility of the vote total is 
irreparably damaged.''(43) However, the committee concluded 
that the ``allegations did not meet the required standard to survive 
the Motion to Dismiss.''(44) The contestee in the Curtis v 
Feeney (Sec. 31.2, infra) case also filed a motion to dismiss based on 
the defense that the contestant ``failed to claim a right to the office 
and support that claim with specific credible allegations of 
irregularities or fraud that if proven true would be sufficient to 
change the result of the election.''(45) The committee 
reiterated this standard, stating that to ``survive a motion to 
dismiss, Contestant must proffer allegations that, if proven, would 
have altered the election outcome.''(46) In recommending 
dismissal, the committee concluded that ``Contestant's claims amount to 
no more than raw conjecture and speculation unsupported by specific and 
credible allegations of irregularity sufficient to put into doubt the 
outcome of the election.''(47)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
40. H. Rept. 95-245, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
41. Id. at p. 4.
42. H. Rept. 104-852, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 6.
43. Id. at p. 7.
44. Id. at p. 12.
45. H. Rept. 110-176, 110th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3.
46. Id.
47. Id. at p. 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 6.4 Contestees may offer a defense that the contestant's notice of 
    contest failed to include an affirmative claim of right to the seat 
    at issue.

    In the Hill and Panlasigui v Clay (Sec. 16.6, infra) case, a 
``Concerned Citizens Committee'' filed a notice of contest on behalf of 
two primary election candidates alleging that the election was tainted 
by illegal voting and other irregularities and seeking a new primary 
election.(48) The committee concluded that no claims were 
made regarding the general election and that therefore the contest 
should be dismissed on the ground that the ``notice of contest and 
subsequent pleadings did not sustain contestants' claim of a right to 
contestee's seat.''(49) In the Ziebarth v Smith (Sec. 15.5, 
infra) case, one defense offered by the contestee was the ``[f]ailure 
of contestant to claim right to contestee's seat.''(50) In 
that case, the contestant sought a recount in certain precincts, but 
after the committee's review of the pleadings it concluded that there 
was no ``indication as to the factual basis for contestant's opinion 
that a recount would change the result of the election and substantiate 
contestant's claim of a right to the seat in question.''(51) 
Similarly, the contestant in the Pierce v Pursell (Sec. 16.4, infra) 
case also claimed that a recount of ballots would demonstrate that he 
was the rightful winner of the election, and contestee filed a motion 
to dismiss based in part on the defense that contestant ``had failed to 
claim a right to contestee's seat.''(52) The committee 
agreed that the ``present case lacks all of the ingredients that our 
colleagues in earlier Congresses have found essential to ordering a 
recount'' and recommended dismissal of the case.(53) 
Finally, in the Project Hurt v Waters (Sec. 34.3, infra) and the 
Project Hurt v Cohen (Sec. 34.2, infra) cases, a not-for-profit 
organization attempted to challenge two different congressional 
elections, but in both cases the committee stated, ``Project Hurt does 
not claim a right to the office''(54) and both cases were 
resolved in favor of the contestee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
48. H. Rept. 95-723, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
49. Id. at p. 4.
50. H. Rept. 94-763, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 4.
51. Id.
52. H. Rept. 95-245, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
53. Id. at p. 4.
54. H. Rept. 113-133, 113th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3; and H. Rept. 113-132, 
        113th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 6.5 Contestees may offer a defense that the contestant has not 
    stated the grounds for the contest with sufficient specificity.

    In the Saunders v Kelly (Sec. 16.1, infra) case, the contestee 
claimed that the notice of contest ``was so vague and ambiguous'' that 
the contestee was ``unable to adequately respond 
thereto.''(55) The committee ultimately agreed that the 
contestant ``has not made the sort of specific allegations accompanied 
by supportive evidence that is required to overcome a motion to 
dismiss.''(56) Similarly, the contestee in the Freeman v 
Mitchell (Sec. 17.2, infra) case claimed that he was ``without 
sufficient knowledge or information to respond''(57) to 
contestant's allegations, and that contestant ``failed to support her 
allegations with documentary evidence.''(58) The committee 
reiterated the statutory requirement to state grounds for the contest 
with ``particularity''(59) and ultimately recommended 
dismissal of the case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
55. H. Rept. 95-242, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
56. Id. at p. 4.
57. H. Rept. 96-226, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
58. Id. at p. 3.
59. Id. at p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 6.6 Contestees may assert a defense that the contestant has not 
    made a prima facie showing that would overcome the presumption that 
    the election was properly conducted.

    To overcome the presumption that certified election results were 
correct and valid, a contestant must make out a prima facie case 
demonstrating how fraud, mistake, or other irregularities could 
successfully impeach those results.(60) Contestees may 
therefore assert a defense that the contestant has not made such a 
showing. For example, in the Thorsness v Daschle (Sec. 17.5, infra) 
case, contestee argued that ``Contestant made no showing of fraud, 
irregularities, or misconduct.''(61) The committee 
concurred, stating that, contestant's notice of contest was not 
initially supported by any documentary evidence establishing the 
allegations(62) and the case was dismissed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
60. See, e.g., Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 13.1.
61. H. Rept. 96-785, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 2.
62. Id. at p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 6.7 Pursuant to the FCEA, the burden of proof rests with the 
    contestant, and the lack of any timely defense or answer on the 
    part of the contestee is not to be construed as an admission of the 
    truth of claims made in the notice of contest.

    In the Lyons v Gordon (Sec. 29.2, infra) case, the committee report 
noted that the contestee submitted a one-page letter relating to the 
case but ``did not file a formal answer in response to the Notice of 
Contest.''(63) The committee went on to reiterate that the 
``burden remains upon the contestant to provide credible allegations to 
the House sufficient to support a claim under the 
FCEA.''(64) The case was ultimately dismissed. In the Hansen 
v Stallings (Sec. 20.3, infra) case, the contestant argued that 
contestee's motion to dismiss should not be granted because it was not 
timely filed.(65) However, the committee explained that a 
``Motion to Dismiss, whenever filed, is always in order for the 
Committee's consideration''(66) and that ``it is immaterial 
whether the Committee dismisses the contest on its own initiative, or 
upon the motion of the contestee, whenever such motion is 
filed.''(67)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
63. H. Rept. 108-208, 108th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3.
64. Id.
65. H. Rept. 99-290, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 8.
66. Id.
67. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



                              C. Procedure



Sec. 7. Standing; Parties

    Under the Federal Contested Elections Act (FCEA), an individual 
filing a notice of contest challenging the results of an election must 
have been a candidate in that election.(1) In other words, 
to have standing to file a notice of contest, the individual must be 
eligible to claim a right to the seat. However, as the House is (under 
the Constitution) the ultimate arbiter of any disputes with regard to 
its membership, the House is at liberty to decide election cases 
brought by those who were not candidates for the seat at 
issue.(2)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. In order to file a notice of contest under the FCEA, an individual 
        must have been ``a candidate for election in the last preceding 
        election.'' 2 U.S.C. Sec. 382(a).
 2. Parliamentarian's Note: Under the earlier act (the Contested 
        Elections Act, formerly codified at 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 201-
        226), ``any person'' could give notice of an intention to 
        contest an election. However, the House still considered 
        individuals who were not candidates in the general election as 
        incompetent to pursue a claim. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 
        Sec. 19.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Despite the statutory requirement that a contestant be a candidate 
in the general election for the seat, the House has taken up several 
election contests initiated by other individuals or 
organizations.(3) Individuals who lost primary elections, 
and were thus precluded from competing in the general election, have 
sometimes filed notices of contest.(4) In one case, the 
Committee on House Administration treated a losing primary candidate as 
competent to file a notice of contest under the statute on the theory 
that such an individual was eligible to win the seat as a write-in 
candidate.(5) The House has rejected contests initiated by 
the campaign manager for a losing general election 
candidate,(6) candidates in an unofficial ``shadow'' 
election,(7) and a citizen challenging multiple elections 
via petition.(8)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. For examples of organizations, rather than individuals, filing 
        notices of contest, see, e.g., Hill and Panlasigui v Clay, 
        Sec. 16.6; Project Hurt v Cohen, Sec. 34.2; and Project Hurt v 
        Waters, Sec. 34.3, infra.
 4. See, e.g., Tataii v Case, Sec. 29.1, infra. See also Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 19.1, 19.4, and 19.5.
 5. See, e.g., Haas v Bass, Sec. 25.2, infra (The committee report 
        states that the contestant ``would have apparent standing to 
        contest the election.'').
 6. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 19.2.
 7. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 19.3.
 8. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 19.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FCEA applies both to elections to the House as Members and to 
elections to the House as Delegates or Resident 
Commissioners.(9)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 381(1). See, e.g., Won Pat v Blaz, Sec. 20.2, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 7.1 In order to have standing to pursue a claim under the FCEA, a 
    contestant must be an individual who was a candidate in a general 
    election for a seat in the House.

    Under the statutory definition,(10) organizations (such 
as advocacy groups, citizens committees, etc.) are not competent to 
file claims under the FCEA. The cases of Project Hurt v Cohen 
(Sec. 34.2, infra) and Project Hurt v Waters (Sec. 34.3, infra) were 
both filed by the same not-for-profit organization. The committee 
report in both cases stated that ``Project Hurt does not meet the 
definition of Contestant under the FCEA and is not authorized to file a 
contest.''(11) These cases were ultimately dismissed by the 
House.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 382(a).
11. H. Rept. 113-133, 113th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2; and H. Rept. 113-132, 
        113th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 7.2 Although losing primary election candidates are not competent 
    to file claims under the FCEA, the House may nevertheless accept 
    such a filing under the theory that such individuals may have 
    qualified as write-in candidates in the general election.

    In the case of Tataii v Case (Sec. 29.1, infra), the contestant's 
substantive claims were aimed at irregularities in the primary 
election, and he was not a candidate in the general 
election.(12) The committee stated that it was ``unclear, 
however, whether a contestant may claim a right to a seat, and thus 
have standing, when the basis of his or her complaint relates to the 
conduct of the primary election, not the general 
election.''(13) The committee went on to dismiss the case on 
other grounds, without resolving the question of standing. In the Haas 
v Bass (Sec. 25.2, infra) case, the contestant was a losing primary 
candidate who nevertheless, under New Hampshire law, was permitted to 
solicit votes as a write-in candidate.(14) The committee 
concluded that the contestant ``would have apparent standing to contest 
the election.''(15)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. H. Rept. 108-207, 108th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3. Although the 
        contestant was not a candidate in the general election, he was 
        a candidate in the special election to fill the vacancy caused 
        by the death of the incumbent prior to the general election.
13. Id.
14. H. Rept. 104-853, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 2. The FCEA defines a 
        ``candidate'' for purposes of the act as someone whose name was 
        printed on the general election ballot, or who seeks the office 
        ``by write-in votes, provided that he is qualified for such 
        office'' and state law permits such write-in candidates. 2 
        U.S.C. Sec. 381(2).
15. H. Rept. 104-853, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. p.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



Sec. 8. Notice of Contest

    Pursuant to the Federal Contested Elections Act (FCEA), an election 
contest commences when the contestant files the required initial 
pleading: the notice of contest.(1) A defeated candidate in 
an election to the House has 30 days under the statute to submit this 
document to the Clerk of the House, and to serve upon the contestee 
written notice that the contest has been initiated.(2) The 
30-day period runs from the point at which the election is formally 
certified by the relevant state or local election 
officials.(3)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. For an example of the House summarily dismissing an election 
        contest due to the contestant having failed to file a notice of 
        contest, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 20.1. See also 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 18.1, 18.2.
 2. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 382(a).
 3. Id. See, e.g., Dornan v Sanchez, Sec. 26.1, infra. See also 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 20.4, 20.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The House may choose to dismiss an election contest on the 
procedural ground that the notice of contest was not timely 
filed.(4) However, the House may also choose to overlook an 
untimely submission, often to dismiss the case on substantive rather 
than merely procedural grounds.(5) In some cases, the House 
has treated the mailing of the required notice of contest within the 
statutory time period as sufficient to initiate a 
contest.(6) There is no prohibition on the same individual 
initiating contests with respect to the same seat in successive 
elections.(7)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. See, e.g., Sec. 8.1, infra.
 5. Id. See also Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 20.2, 20.3.
 6. See, e.g., Gonzalez v Diaz-Balart, Sec. 31.1; and Russell v Brown-
        Waite, Sec. 31.3, infra. The minority views in each of these 
        cases would have determined that the notice of contest was not 
        timely filed and would have dismissed the contest based on that 
        procedural ground.
 7. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 18.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The form of the notice of contest is provided by 
statute.(8) The notice of contest must state ``with 
particularity'' the grounds on which the contest is being pursued, and 
inform the contestee that an answer to the notice of contest must be 
filed within 30 days.(9) The notice of contest must be 
signed by the contestant and verified by ``oath or 
affirmation.''(10) The contestant may revise a notice of 
contest by filing an amended notice of contest.(11) The 
Committee on House Administration may recommend dismissal of a contest 
on the basis that the notice of contest was in improper 
form.(12) The lack of specificity with respect to the 
grounds for commencing the contest has often been used by the House as 
the basis for dismissing an election contest.(13) Similarly, 
the statute provides two affirmative defenses to an election contest 
that address the content of the notice of contest: (1) that the notice 
of contest did not state grounds sufficient to change the result of the 
election;(14) and (2) that the notice of contest did not 
claim a right to the contestee's seat.(15)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 382(b).
 9. Id.
10. Id. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 22.4.
11. See Sec. 9, infra.
12. See, e.g., Sec. 8.2, infra.
13. See, e.g., Saunders v Kelly, Sec. 16.1, infra. See Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 13.8, 22.1-22.3.
14. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 383(b)(3).
15. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 383(b)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The notice of contest must also be properly served upon the 
contestee.(16) The FCEA provides a variety of methods by 
which service of process may be executed and verified.(17) 
Lack of proper service may provide a basis for the Committee on House 
Administration to recommend dismissal of the election 
contest.(18) Lack of proper service is also provided as a 
possible defense by the contestee.(19)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 382(c).
17. Id. Under the prior statute, it was unclear whether substituted 
        service (rather than personal service) was sufficient to meet 
        statutory requirements. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 
        Sec. 21.1. However, under the current statute, substituted 
        service is permissible.
18. See, e.g., Sec. 8.3, infra. For minority views concluding that an 
        election contest should have been dismissed for lack of proper 
        service, see Oberweis v Underwood, Sec. 38.2, infra.
19. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 383(b)(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 8.1 The House may choose to dismiss an election contest based on 
    the untimely filing of the notice of contest, though the House has 
    also taken mitigating factors into account when deciding whether to 
    dismiss the case on procedural grounds.

    Under the FCEA, a contestant seeking to challenge the results of an 
election must file the notice of contest within 30 days of the final 
certification of results.(20) If the contestant fails to 
abide by this requirement, the House may dismiss the case for lack of 
timely filing. For example, in both the Project Hurt v Cohen 
(Sec. 34.2, infra) case and the Project Hurt v Waters (Sec. 34.3, 
infra) case, the committee report stated that the ``Notice of Contest 
was not timely filed and therefore should not be 
considered.''(21) In some cases, the House has chosen to 
accept an untimely filing and instead dismiss the case on substantive 
rather than procedural grounds. For example, in the Tataii v 
Abercrombie (Sec. 32.1, infra) case, the committee report concluded 
that ``the Contestant's Notice of Contest was filed untimely with the 
Clerk of the House of Representatives.''(22) However, the 
committee went on to state that ``it is acknowledged that the 
Contestant may have received inaccurate advice on exhausting his 
remedies and timely filing. Therefore the Committee will evaluate 
Contestant's claims on their merits.''(23) In the Gonzalez v 
Diaz-Balart (Sec. 31.1, infra) case and the Russell v Brown-Waite 
(Sec. 31.3, infra) case, the minority views accompanying the 
committee's report in each case took issue with the method of filing, 
stating that ``[w]hile mailing does suffice for service of other kinds 
of pleading, it does not suffice for the initial filing of the contest. 
We believe the proper interpretation of FCEA requires the document 
actually be in the possession of the Clerk within the prescribed 
period.''(24) The majority, however, accepted the date on 
the certificate of service as the date of submission and did not 
address the question of untimely filing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 382(a).
21. H. Rept. 113-133, 113th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3; and H. Rept. 113-132, 
        113th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3.
22. H. Rept. 111-68, 111th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3.
23. Id.
24. H. Rept. 110-175, 110th Cong. 1st Sess. pp. 5, 6; and H. Rept. 110-
        178, 110th Cong. 1st Sess. pp. 5, 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 8.2 The House may dismiss an election contest on the basis that 
    contestant's notice of contest was not in proper form.

    The FCEA provides that the notice of contest must abide by certain 
formal requirements, including a statement of the grounds for 
initiating the contest, a verified signature, etc.(25) The 
House may dismiss a contest on the basis that the notice of contest 
lacked these required elements. For example, in the Rayner v Stewart 
(Sec. 17.3, infra) case, the contestee's motion to dismiss noted 
several deficiencies in contestant's notice of contest, including: lack 
of timely filing; failure to name the proper party; and failure to 
state when contestee's answer would be due under the 
statute.(26) The committee accepted that these formal 
requirements were not met and dismissed the case ``based both on 
procedural and substantive grounds.''(27)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
25. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 382(b).
26. H. Rept. 96-316, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. pp. 2, 3.
27. Id. at p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 8.3 The House may dismiss an election contest on the basis that 
    the notice of contest was not properly served upon the contestee.

    The FCEA provides certain methods for properly notifying the 
contestee that an election contest has been initiated.(28) 
If the contestant fails to demonstrate proof of proper service, the 
House may dismiss the case. For example, the House in the Rayner v 
Stewart (Sec. 17.3, infra) case concluded that ``there was no proof of 
service'' by the contestant.(29) This omission was one of 
the procedural grounds on which the committee recommended dismissal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
28. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 382(c).
29. H. Rept. 96-316, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



Sec. 9. Other Pleadings

    As noted above,(1) the statutory method for commencing 
an election contest is the filing by the contestant of a notice of 
contest. This initial pleading is the required first step under the 
Federal Contested Elections Act (FCEA), and its filing confers 
jurisdiction over the election contest to the House (specifically, the 
Committee on House Administration). This pleading may be revised or 
supplemented, either by filing an amended notice of 
contest(2) or by submitting an addendum to the original 
notice of contest.(3)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. See Sec. 8, supra.
 2. See, e.g., Sec. 9.1, infra.
 3. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A variety of additional pleadings may also be filed in an election 
contest once the notice of contest has been filed. In response to a 
notice of contest, the contestee has three options available under the 
statute. In most cases that have arisen since the advent of the FCEA, 
the contestee has responded to the notice of contest with a motion to 
dismiss. The contestee may submit this motion prior to filing an answer 
to the notice of contest, and invoke one or more of the defenses 
described in the statute.(4) Alternatively, the contestee 
may take issue with the specificity of the complaint in the notice of 
contest, and file instead a motion for a more definite statement. 
Finally, the contestee may simply file an answer to the notice of 
contest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. The contestee may also raise one of the nonstatutory defenses 
        recognized under the precedents. See Sec. 6, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Answer

    After the notice of contest has been filed, the contestee has 30 
days under the statute to submit a reply, termed the 
``answer.''(5) The answer should admit or deny the charges 
made in the notice of contest, or state that the contestee has 
insufficient information to admit or deny such claims.(6) 
While the statute contemplates that an answer will be filed in response 
to any notice of contest, the failure on the part of the contestee to 
make such a pleading does not shift the burden of proof.(7) 
``The failure of contestee to answer the notice of contest or to 
otherwise defend as provided by this chapter shall not be deemed an 
admission of the truth of the averments in the notice of 
contest.''(8) In most election contests that have arisen 
under the FCEA, the contestee has foregone the opportunity to file an 
answer to the notice of contest.(9) If the contestee does 
file an answer, the contestant may choose to file a subsequent 
response.(10)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 383(a).
 6. Id.
 7. See Sec. 11, infra.
 8. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 385.
 9. See, e.g., Tataii v Abercrombie, Sec. 32.1, infra.
10. See, e.g., McCuen v Dickey, Sec. 24.1, infra. The statute does not 
        require a response to the answer, nor is such a response 
        specifically contemplated under the statutory procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Motion for a More Definite Statement

    In some cases, the contestee will aver that the allegations 
contained in the notice of contest are insufficiently specific, and 
that the contestee is therefore unable to formulate an appropriate 
answer. The FCEA thus permits the contestee to instead file a ``motion 
for a more definite statement.''(11) This pleading must 
identify the defects in the notice of contest, and what details are 
required to prepare a response.(12) If the committee grants 
this motion, the statute provides ten days for the contestant to submit 
a more detailed statement.(13) Failure to do so in the 
allotted time may be used by the committee as a basis for dismissing 
the case.(14)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 383(c). For examples of election contests where a 
        motion for a more definite statement was filed, see, e.g., 
        Ziebarth v Smith, Sec. 15.5; Saunders v Kelly, Sec. 16.1; 
        Perkins v Byron, Sec. 17.1; and Dornan v Sanchez, Sec. 26.1, 
        infra.
12. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 383(c).
13. Id. For an example of a response to a motion for a more definite 
        statement, see, e.g., Dornan v Sanchez, Sec. 26.1, infra.
14. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 383(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Motion to Dismiss

    Under the FCEA, the burden is on the contestant to present a prima 
facie case in the notice of contest.(15) The rationale for 
this requirement is that lengthy inquiries or investigations should be 
avoided if the contestant cannot show how such investigations would 
prove the allegations made in the notice of contest. Thus, the 
contestee is permitted to file a motion to dismiss (in lieu of an 
answer) before any testimony or evidence is gathered, in order to 
expedite the dismissal of cases that on their face fail to properly 
challenge the results of the election. In formulating the motion to 
dismiss, contestees may avail themselves of any of the four prescribed 
defenses provided in the FCEA.(16) In addition, the House 
has also recognized other nonstatutory defenses that may also be 
asserted in a motion to dismiss.(17)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 385.
16. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 383(b).
17. See Sec. 6, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The motion to dismiss may be accompanied by additional information, 
in the form of ``memoranda'' or ``appendices'' in support 
thereof.(18) Contestees may also file a supplemental motion 
to dismiss containing additional arguments or defenses.(19) 
A motion to dismiss that is initially postponed in order for conduct 
discovery may be renewed following the submission of testimony or 
evidence.(20)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. See, e.g., Anderson v Rose, Sec. 25.1; and Jennings v Buchanan, 
        Sec. 31.4, infra.
19. See, e.g., Perkins v Byron, Sec. 17.1, infra.
20. See, e.g., Dornan v Sanchez, Sec. 26.1, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to a motion to dismiss, the contestant may choose to 
file a pleading in opposition. Since the advent of the FCEA, these 
pleadings have been styled as: a ``memorandum in 
opposition;''(21) a ``reply;''(22) a 
``response;''(23) and an ``answer.''(24) 
Regardless of how the pleading is presented, its purpose is to counter 
the defenses raised in the motion to dismiss and raise arguments for 
the committee to consider in evaluating whether or not dismissal is 
warranted. In response to this pleading by the contestant, the 
contestee may in turn file a reply,(25) and the contestant 
may then submit a response to said reply.(26)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
21. See, e.g., Mack v Stokes, Sec. 15.4, infra.
22. See, e.g., Ziebarth v Smith, Sec. 15.5, infra.
23. See, e.g., Won Pat v Blaz, Sec. 20.2; McCuen v Dickey, Sec. 24.1; 
        and Anderson v Rose, Sec. 25.1, infra.
24. See, e.g., Thorsness v Daschle, Sec. 17.5; and Archer v Packard, 
        Sec. 19.1, infra.
25. See, e.g., Won Pat v Blaz, Sec. 20.2; and Anderson v Rose, 
        Sec. 25.1, infra.
26. See, e.g., Anderson v Rose, Sec. 25.1, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Discovery Motions

    Election contests may proceed to the discovery stage, wherein the 
parties may take depositions, issue subpoenas, and otherwise gather 
evidence to support their claims. Pleadings at the discovery stage may 
request that the time for conducting discovery be extended or 
enlarged.(27) They may also call for compliance with duly-
issued subpoenas,(28) or request that subpoenas issued by 
the other party be modified or quashed.(29) The committee 
itself may request that the parties supply pertinent information, and 
additional pleadings may be filed in response to such a 
request.(30) Should a witness refuse to sign the transcript 
of a deposition, the statute provides for a motion to suppress the 
deposition.(31)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
27. See, e.g., Paul v Gammage, Sec. 16.2; Freeman v Mitchell, 
        Sec. 17.2; and Dornan v Sanchez, Sec. 26.1, infra.
28. See, e.g., Dornan v Sanchez, Sec. 26.1, infra.
29. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 388(e). See Dornan v Sanchez, Sec. 26.1, infra.
30. See, e.g., Dornan v Sanchez, Sec. 26.1, infra.
31. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 386(h).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Other Motions

    In several election contests since the enactment of the FCEA, the 
contestant has filed a motion to stay the proceedings.(32) 
While not recognized under the statute, this motion has been used in 
cases where there is ongoing litigation related to the election 
contest, and the contestant desires the court proceedings to conclude 
prior to moving forward with the election contest in the House. The 
Committee on House Administration may grant such a motion on the theory 
that the court proceedings may render further inquiry by the committee 
moot.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
32. See, e.g., Sec. 9.2, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In one election contest, the committee task force evaluating the 
case had recommended dismissal, and the contestant thereafter filed 
with the committee a ``motion to reconsider'' the determination of the 
task force.(33) Ultimately, the committee chose not to 
reconsider that determination and the contest was dismissed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
33. See Anderson v Rose, Sec. 25.1, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 9.1 Contestants in election contests may be permitted to 
    supplement their initial notice of contest by filing an amended 
    notice of contest or an addendum to the original filing.

    In the McCuen v Dickey (Sec. 24.1, infra) case, the contestant 
``filed an Amended Notice of Election Contest with the Clerk, providing 
additional information and arguments in support of his two initial 
contentions, and providing documentary evidence and 
exhibits.''(34) In the Kyros v Emery (Sec. 15.2, infra) 
case, the contestant initially made claims regarding violations of 
campaign practices, but ``the Contestant, with the consent of the 
Contestee, withdrew these charges by filing an Amended Notice of 
Contest.''(35) In the Anderson v Rose (Sec. 25.1, infra) 
case, the contestant filed two addenda to the initial notice of contest 
containing new allegations relating to financial improprieties and 
residency requirements.(36)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
34. H. Rept. 103-109, 103d Cong. 1st Sess. p. 4.
35. H. Rept. 94-760, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
36. H. Rept. 104-852, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 4 (fn. 6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 9.2 In cases where an election contest was initiated while 
    litigation relating to the election remained ongoing, the 
    contestant has sometimes filed a motion to stay the proceedings 
    pending an outcome of the litigation.

    In the case of Paul v Gammage (Sec. 16.2, infra), the contestant 
filed a motion ``requesting that the House stay all proceedings pending 
the outcome of court proceedings in Texas.''(37) In the 
Freeman v Mitchell (Sec. 17.2, infra) case, the contestant filed a 
``Motion for stay of proceeding pending resolution of appeal to the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.''(38) In the Thorsness 
v Daschle (Sec. 17.5, infra) case, the contestant filed a ``Motion to 
Extend Time Until the South Dakota Supreme Court Acts Upon Disputed 
Ballots.''(39) The committee did ultimately render its 
decision after the South Dakota Supreme Court had ruled in favor of the 
contestee, and incorporated that ruling into its determination to grant 
contestee's motion to dismiss.(40)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
37. H. Rept. 95-243, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
38. H. Rept. 96-226, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3.
39. H. Rept. 96-785, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 2.
40. Id. at p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



Sec. 10. Taking Testimony; Depositions

    Either party in an election contest may take testimony from 
witnesses via deposition, to be used for discovery purposes or as 
evidence.(1) The opposing party, as well as third-party 
witnesses or any other person, may be subpoenaed to give 
testimony.(2) Under the statute, the contestant's period for 
taking testimony occurs first: after the contestee's answer is filed 
(or following the expiration of the time period for filing an answer), 
the contestant has 30 days in which to take testimony.(3) 
After that 30-day period for the contestant to take evidence expires, 
the contestee's 30-day period begins.(4) After that period 
is exhausted, the contestant has a further 10 days to take rebuttal 
testimony.(5) Depositions must be taken before an officer 
authorized to administer oaths.(6) The other party is to be 
notified two days in advance of any deposition.(7) The 
statute provides for penalties for witnesses who refuse to appear in 
response to a subpoena.(8) The committee may extend or 
enlarge the period for discovery at the request of either 
party.(9) Evidence submitted to the committee may be 
withdrawn by the parties.(10)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 386(a). It should be noted that a successful motion 
        to dismiss necessarily terminates the case, thus precluding 
        these statutory mechanisms for taking evidence. Since the 
        advent of the Federal Contested Elections Act, only one 
        election contest has proceeded to the discovery phase. See 
        Dornan v Sanchez, Sec. 26.1, infra.
 2. Id.
 3. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 386(c).
 4. Id.
 5. Id.
 6. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 386(d).
 7. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 387(a).
 8. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 390.
 9. See Sec. 9, supra. See also Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 
        Sec. Sec. 27.10-27.15. For an example of the time for taking 
        testimony being tolled while ballots were in the possession of 
        a court, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 27.8.
10. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 32.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Examination of Parties and Witnesses

    Pursuant to the Federal Contested Elections Act (FCEA), depositions 
in an election contest are taken before an ``officer authorized to 
administer oaths''.(11) Said officer puts the witness under 
oath, and the witness' testimony is recorded and 
transcribed.(12) The opposing party is permitted to cross-
examine any witness, which may be done in person or by the submission 
of written interrogatories.(13)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 386(d).
12. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 386(g).
13. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Following the completion of a deposition, the witness reviews the 
transcript of the proceedings to ensure its accuracy.(14) 
Review of the transcript may be waived by the witness and the 
parties.(15) The witness may make revisions in form or in 
substance, but must provide reasons for the proposed 
change.(16) After review, the deposition shall be signed by 
the witness. If the witness is unable to sign, or refuses to sign, the 
officer who conducted the deposition shall sign it, and note any 
reasons for the failure of the witness to sign the 
deposition.(17) Where the witness refuses to sign the 
deposition, the committee may entertain a motion to suppress the 
deposition.(18)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 386(h).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 28.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The officer before whom the deposition is taken is required by 
statute to certify the deposition, attesting to its accuracy and that 
the witness was properly sworn.(19) The officer then files 
the deposition with the Clerk of the House,(20) and notifies 
the parties of its filing.(21)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 391(a).
20. Id.
21. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 391(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Scope of Examination; Objections

    Witnesses may be examined with regard to any matter relevant to the 
election contest, whether it relates to claims made by the contestant 
or defenses proffered by the contestee.(22) Questions may 
pertain to records, documents, or other materials known to the witness 
that are relevant to the case.(23) Witnesses may also be 
questioned regarding the identity of persons with additional knowledge 
or relevant facts regarding the election contest.(24) The 
opposing party is entitled to cross-examine any witness.(25)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
22. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 386(b).
23. Id. On the issue of whether ballots are considered ``papers'' that 
        may be subpoenaed in an election contest, see Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 29.2, 29.3.
24. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 386(b).
25. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Either party may raise objections to the testimony presented, and 
the officer conducting the deposition notes all such 
objections.(26) Objections may also be raised with regard to 
manner of taking the deposition or the qualifications of the officer 
conducting the deposition.(27)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
26. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 386(g).
27. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Subpoenas; Affidavits

    The FCEA allows for the issuance of subpoenas to compel testimony 
from witnesses(28) or the production of documents or other 
materials.(29) The statute provides the form that the 
subpoena should take(30) and delineates the procedures for 
their issuance (including timing, method of service, and proof of 
service).(31) Subpoenas in election contests are to be 
issued by a judge or clerk located in the district, state, or county in 
which the examination is to take place, upon application by any 
party.(32) Witnesses are only required to attend 
examinations where the person resides or transacts business, or within 
40 miles of the place of service.(33) Failure to comply with 
a subpoena under the FCEA is punishable by fines, imprisonment, or 
both.(34) In the only election contest to proceed to the 
discovery phase since the FCEA's enactment, the House adopted a 
resolution demanding that the U.S. Attorney file criminal charges 
against an entity for failure to comply with validly-issued 
subpoenas.(35)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
28. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 388(a).
29. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 388(e).
30. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 388(d).
31. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 388(b).
32. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 388(a). For an example of a district court issuing a 
        subpoena in an election contest, but later recalling said 
        subpoena, see Dornan v Sanchez, Sec. 26.1, infra.
33. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 388(c).
34. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 390. Under the earlier statute, there were no 
        penalties prescribed for failure to comply with subpoenas. See 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 30.2.
35. See H. Res. 244, 143 Cong. Rec. 20876-85, 105th Cong. 1st Sess. 
        (Sept. 30, 1997). See also Dornan v Sanchez, Sec. 26.1, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Parties in the case, or recipients of subpoenas issued pursuant to 
the FCEA, may file with the committee motions to quash or modify the 
subpoenas.(36) In response to such motions, the committee 
has voted to modify and enforce the subpoenas,(37) quash the 
subpoenas,(38) or hold the subpoenas in abeyance pending a 
determination as to their relevancy.(39)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
36. See Sec. 9, supra.
37. See H. Rept. 105-416, 105th Cong. 2d Sess., p. 13.
38. Id.
39. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FCEA provides that testimony may be provided to the committee 
in the form of an affidavit.(40) The parties may also agree 
to written stipulations, confirming the mutual understanding of what a 
witness would have testified to had a deposition been 
taken.(41) The filing procedures (and timelines) are the 
same as those for taking testimony via deposition.(42) When 
filing the notice of contest, the contestant may choose to include 
affidavits or other testimony in support of the claims 
therein.(43)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
40. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 387(c).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Sec. 10.2, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Committee Investigations

    Independent of the statutory mechanisms for taking testimony and 
deposing witnesses, other procedures may be used by the Committee on 
House Administration to evaluate whether the election contest has 
merit. The committee has sometimes sent observers to the congressional 
district in dispute in order to monitor a state-ordered recount or 
other election proceeding.(44) The committee has also 
conducted a preliminary review of disputed ballots.(45) The 
committee may solicit the assistance of the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) in testing and analyzing electronic voting 
equipment(46) or tabulating ballots in a 
recount.(47)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
44. See, e.g., Sec. 10.3, infra.
45. See, e.g., Kyros v Emery, Sec. 15.2, infra.
46. See, e.g., Sec. 10.4, infra.
47. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Like the parties in the case, the committee itself may also issue 
subpoenas, interrogatories, or other requests for information in 
furtherance of the investigation.(48) In order to protect 
private or sensitive information, the committee may issue protective 
orders indicating how information is to be transmitted and 
safeguarded.(49) The committee may also instruct state or 
local election officials to safeguard ballots, voting machines, or 
other equipment and materials, so that the committee can conduct its 
own recount.(50)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
48. See, e.g., Sec. 10.5, infra.
49. Id.
50. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Effect of Motion to Dismiss

    As noted earlier,(51) the contestee in an election case 
may, prior to the taking of any testimony, offer a motion to dismiss 
the case. The motion to dismiss will be granted where the contestant 
has not made a prima facie case that the contestant, and not the 
contestee, is entitled to the seat. Because the motion to dismiss is 
available prior to the statutory periods for conducting discovery, the 
granting of the motion necessarily terminates the case before testimony 
under the statutory procedures is obtained. Subpoenas or notices of 
deposition issued while a motion to dismiss is pending may be rendered 
moot by the House's dismissal of the case.(52) Where 
consideration of a motion to dismiss is postponed by the committee, 
discovery under the statute may proceed.(53) Since the 
advent of the FCEA in 1969, there has only been one election contest 
that has proceeded to the stage of taking testimony under the 
statute.(54)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
51. See Sec. 9, supra.
52. See, e.g., Sec. 10.6, infra.
53. Id.
54. See Dornan v Sanchez, Sec. 26.1, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 10.1 During the discovery phase(55) of an election 
    contest, the parties are authorized to issue subpoenas through 
    judicial officials, and submit pleadings relating to the 
    enforcement of such subpoenas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
55. Parliamentarian's Note: The FCEA authorizes the parties in an 
        election contest to issue subpoenas and take depositions in 
        order to gather evidence if the case proceeds to discovery. 
        Since the advent of the FCEA, only the Dornan v Sanchez case 
        (Sec. 26.1, infra) has continued to this phase. The Paul v 
        Gammage case (Sec. 16.2, infra) and the Freeman v Mitchell case 
        (Sec. 17.2, infra) were both dismissed prior to the discovery 
        phase, but prior to dismissal, the contestants in both cases 
        filed pleadings seeking to enlarge the period of discovery by 
        30 days. See H. Rept. 95-243, 95th Cong. 1st Sess., p. 2, and 
        H. Rept. 96-266, 96th Cong. 1st Sess., p. 3. In Freeman v 
        Mitchell (Sec. 17.2, infra), the contestant also filed notices 
        of deposition and subpoenas duces tecum, but such motions were 
        temporarily quashed and ultimately mooted when the contestee's 
        motion to dismiss was granted. See H. Rept. 96-226, 96th Cong. 
        1st Sess., p. 3. Under the statute, deposition may be subject 
        to a motion to suppress if the deponent refuses to sign the 
        deposition (2 U.S.C. Sec. 386(h)) but no case thus far under 
        the FCEA has utilized this procedure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the case of Dornan v Sanchez (Sec. 26.1, infra), the contestant 
issued numerous subpoenas, and the Committee on House 
Oversight(56) itself issued interrogatories(57) 
and subpoenas in furtherance of its investigation.(58) These 
subpoenas became the subject of pleadings by both parties, seeking to 
have the subpoenas enforced, modified, quashed, or held in abeyance 
pending the submission of further evidence.(59)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
56. Parliamentarian's Note: During the 104th and 105th Congresses, the 
        Committee on House Administration was redesignated as the 
        Committee on House Oversight. House Rules and Manual Sec. 724 
        (2021).
57. Parliamentarian's Note: The committee, by unanimous consent, 
        delegated the authority to issue interrogatories to the chair 
        of the committee after consultation with the ranking minority 
        member. However, it should be noted that clause 2(m)(3)(A) of 
        rule XI, which permits committees to delegate certain 
        investigatory authorities to the chair, is textually limited to 
        ``the power to authorize and issue subpoenas'' and is silent 
        with respect to other forms of compulsory process. Although no 
        challenge was made to the committee's authorization here, the 
        ranking minority member of the committee did express concern 
        that he was not appropriately consulted with respect to the 
        issuance of the interrogatories. 143 Cong. Rec. 21828-29, 105th 
        Cong. 1st Sess. (Oct. 8, 1997).
58. H. Rept. 105-416, 105th Cong. 2d Sess. pp. 12, 13.
59. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 10.2 When initiating an election contest, a contestant may choose 
    to submit affidavits or other testimony in support of the notice of 
    contest.

    In the Jennings v Buchanan (Sec. 31.4, infra) case, the contestant 
submitted ``affidavits memorializing the eyewitness accounts'' of 
voters attesting to their difficulty in using the voting software used 
in the election.(60) In the Freeman v Mitchell (Sec. 17.2, 
infra) case, the contestant submitted four affidavits from ``campaign 
associates'' relating to claims of harassment and intimidation against 
the contestant.(61)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
60. H. Rept. 110-528, 110th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 7.
61. H. Rept. 96-226, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 10.3 In its investigation of an election contest, the Committee on 
    House Administration may send staff to the relevant district, in 
    order to gather information or monitor recounts or other state-
    level proceedings relating to the contest.

    In the Lowe v Fowler (Sec. 16.7, infra) case, ``the Committee 
dispatched staff . . . to meet with the Atlanta assistant city 
attorney'' and other election officials.(62) In the Hill and 
Panlasigui v Clay (Sec. 16.6, infra) case, ``committee dispatched staff 
to St. Louis to meet with the incumbent board of election 
commissioners, the commission secretary, and the commission 
counsel.''(63) In the Lehr v Deggett (Sec. 16.5, infra) 
case, the committee report noted that the contestant had ``filed for a 
recount of the returns in Sacramento County, which recount was duly 
conducted and observed by the parties in interest, their attorneys, and 
staff from the Committee on House Administration.''(64) 
Similarly, in the Paul v Gammage (Sec. 16.2, infra) case, a ``recount 
was conducted under the general observation of inspectors from the 
Secretary of State of Texas and by counsel from Elections Subcommittee 
of the House Administration Committee.''(65) The committee 
report in the Young v Mikva (Sec. 16.3, infra) case described a 
proceeding in a local court where contestant had petitioned to have 
certain absentee ballots counted, and noted that ``staff of this 
committee was present during this proceeding.''(66) Prior to 
the withdrawal of the contestant in the Kyros v Emery (Sec. 15.2, 
infra) case, the ``Subcommittee on Elections directed its staff to 
conduct a preliminary review of the disputed ballots in Portland, 
Maine.''(67) In the Wilson v Leach (Sec. 17.4, infra) case, 
a Member ``accompanied by Majority and Minority staff, made 
arrangements with the Department of Justice to visit the Department and 
individually review each of the FBI interviews of voters from the 
precinct in which specific violations were alleged to have 
occurred.''(68) Finally, in the Dornan v Sanchez (Sec. 26.1, 
infra) case, the task force investigating the case held a field hearing 
in Santa Ana, California, to hear testimony from state and local 
election officials.(69)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
62. H. Rept. 95-724, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
63. H. Rept. 95-723, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3.
64. H. Rept. 95-654, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 1.
65. H. Rept. 95-243, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
66. H. Rept. 95-244, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
67. H. Rept. 94-760, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
68. H. Rept. 96-784, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 2.
69. H. Rept. 105-416, 105th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 10.4 In investigating election contests, the Committee on House 
    Administration has availed itself of assistance from the Government 
    Accountability Office (GAO) in analyzing voting equipment and 
    tabulating ballots.

    In the Jennings v Buchanan (Sec. 31.4, infra) case, the task force 
investigating the contest ``unanimously voted to retain the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) to investigate whether the voting machines 
used in Sarasota County contributed to the unusually high number of 
undervotes.''(70) In the McCloskey v McIntyre (Sec. 20.1, 
infra) case, the committee undertook its own recount of the ballots 
used in the election, and ``arranged with the General Accounting 
Office(71) to provide two-person teams of auditors to 
actually count the ballots . . . under the overall direction of the 
Task Force.''(72)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
70. H. Rept. 110-528, 110th Cong. 2d Sess. pp. 1614, 1615.
71. The General Accounting Office was renamed the Government 
        Accountability Office in 2004. See P.L. 108-271, 118 Stat. 811.
72. H. Rept. 99-58, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 10.5 In furtherance of its investigation into election contests, 
    the Committee on House Administration may issue requests for 
    information, protective orders, or instructions to local officials 
    to safeguard ballots or other materials.

    In the Dornan v Sanchez (Sec. 26.1, infra) case, the committee 
``voted to authorize the issuance of interrogatories'' to the 
contestant, the contestee, and various state and local election 
officials.(73) In the same case, the committee deemed it 
necessary ``to issue its own subpoenas and undertake a larger role in 
the investigation'' when earlier requests for information were not 
complied with.(74) The committee also issued ``three 
protective orders that specify the term of production and custody of 
documents produced under subpoena'' in order to ``protect the 
legitimate privacy interests of those organizations and individuals 
subpoenaed by the Contestant.''(75) In the McCloskey v 
McIntyre (Sec. 20.1, infra) case, the committee instructed all county 
clerks in the district to ``protect and keep safe'' all relevant 
documents in the case ``including but not limited to all ballots, 
certifications, poll books, and tally sheets.''(76)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
73. H. Rept. 105-416, 105th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 13. For a discussion of 
        the committee's delegation of this authority to the chair of 
        the committee, see Sec. 10.1 (fn. 57), supra.
74. Id.
75. Id. at p. 12.
76. H. Rept. 99-58, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 10.6 If the contestee's motion to dismiss is granted, any pending 
    subpoenas or notices of deposition become moot due to the 
    termination of the case, but where a motion to dismiss is merely 
    postponed, discovery may proceed.

    In the Freeman v Mitchell (Sec. 17.2, infra) case, the ad hoc 
elections panel investigating the case temporarily quashed subpoenas 
filed by the contestant pending a decision on contestee's motion to 
dismiss.(77) These subpoenas were rendered moot when the 
motion to dismiss was granted and the House adopted a resolution 
dismissing the case. By contrast, in the Dornan v Sanchez (Sec. 26.1, 
infra) case, the task force investigating the case ``voted to postpone 
the disposition of Ms. Sanchez's Motion to Dismiss until a hearing on 
the merits.''(78) Ultimately that motion to dismiss was 
renewed (and granted) following the committee's investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
77. H. Rept. 96-226, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3.
78. H. Rept. 105-416, 105th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



                  D. Committee and House Consideration



Sec. 11. Burden of Proof; Presumptions

    When evidence is submitted in an election contest, the Committee on 
House Administration (often through a subcommittee or ad hoc task 
force) must evaluate said evidence and make judgments as to its 
relevance, credibility, etc. The House has articulated a ``fair 
preponderance of the evidence'' standard in evaluating claims made in 
election contests.(1) Hearsay evidence will not be 
admitted(2) and unsupported claims will generally lead to a 
dismissal of the case.(3) Evidence regarding elections to 
prior Congresses will not be considered relevant for an election 
contest brought in the current Congress.(4) In the past, 
evidence gathered by special committees investigating campaign 
practices has been submitted to the Committee on House Administration 
where relevant to an ongoing election contest.(5)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 35.2, 36.5, 47.9, 50.2; 
        and 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 91. It should be noted that, 
        although the fair preponderance standard has been used most 
        frequently, the House has also articulated different 
        evidentiary standards in different contexts. For example, in 
        the Dornan v Sanchez case (Sec. 26.1, infra), the committee 
        report stated that ``Only clear and convincing evidence can 
        provide the basis to overcome the presumption of legitimacy of 
        the electoral process.'' H. Rept. 105-416, 105th Cong. 2d Sess. 
        p. 15. An earlier case evinced the view that, where the 
        contestant requests that votes be rejected, evidence that they 
        were illegally cast must ``leave no doubt.'' Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 35.5, 56.5. In another case, the 
        committee accepted ``none but clear and convincing testimony'' 
        regarding the number and contents of disputed ballots. 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 App. Sec. 1.6. Similarly, in an 
        1890 case, the committee determined that a ``clear 
        preponderance of competent evidence'' must be demonstrated 
        before a vote could be ``thrown out for illegality.'' 1 Hinds' 
        Precedents Sec. 585.
 2. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 35.9.
 3. See, e.g., Sec. 11.1, infra.
 4. See, e.g., Sec. 11.2, infra.
 5. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 34.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The burden of proof in election contests is always on contestants 
to demonstrate that their claims are well-founded.(6) The 
contestee is not required to answer the notice of contest, and the 
failure to answer (pursuant to statute) is not to be considered an 
admission of the claims made by the contestant.(7) Evidence 
submitted with or as part of the notice of contest must be sufficient 
to survive a motion to dismiss, and a motion to dismiss may be granted 
before any evidence is gathered under the statutory 
procedures.(8) If the contestant argues that a recount of 
ballots by the committee is necessary, the contestant must demonstrate 
both that there were errors in the tabulation of votes and that ballots 
have been properly preserved for recount purposes.(9)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 35.
 7. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 385 (``The failure of contestee to answer the notice 
        of contest or to otherwise defend as provided by this chapter 
        shall not be deemed an admission of the truth of the averments 
        in the notice of contest.'').
 8. See Sec. Sec. 9, 10, supra.
 9. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 35.10, 37.19, 37.20, 
        40.5-40.8, and 41.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Contestants must also overcome the presumption of regularity that 
attaches to the official results of any election.(10) State 
and local election officials are presumed to have undertaken their 
duties competently and in good faith.(11) Fraud is never to 
be presumed but must be proven.(12) A valid certificate of 
election issued by state officials has been considered prima facie 
evidence of the regularity and correctness of the 
election.(13) The mere closeness of an election in no way 
creates a presumption that fraud or error has occurred.(14)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 36. See also Sec. 11.3, infra.
11. See, e.g., McCloskey v McIntyre, Sec. 20.1, infra (``election 
        officials are presumed to have operated in good faith'').
12. See, e.g., Young v Mikva, Sec. 15.1, infra.
13. See, e.g., McCloskey v McIntyre, Sec. 20.1, infra (``To prevent 
        election disputes from degenerating into partisan 
        confrontations, the House has created a general presumption in 
        favor of the candidate who is certified by the appropriate 
        state election official as a Member-elect. That certification 
        carries with it the presumption that the state election 
        procedures have been timely, regular, and fairly 
        implemented.''). See also Gonzalez v Diaz-Balart, Sec. 31.1, 
        infra (``Contestant's allegations are no more than unsupported 
        speculation and his claims do not cast sufficient doubt on the 
        results of the election to merit investigation. For the 
        committee to come to any other conclusion would be to remove 
        the presumption of regularity that attaches to the state 
        certification and would make all elections open to contest and 
        investigation based on mere conjecture or speculation.'').
14. See, e.g., Sec. 11.4 infra. See also Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 
        Sec. 36.11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 11.1 The burden of proof rests with the contestant in an election 
    contest, and claims that lack sufficient evidentiary support will 
    not be accepted.

    In the Mack v Stokes (Sec. 15.4, infra) case, the committee found 
that the contestant did not meet this burden of proof, stating that 
``only conclusions of law are alleged and no substantial offer of proof 
is made.''(15) The committee report in the Perkins v Byron 
(Sec. 17.1, infra) case reiterated the fact that the contestant ``must 
initially support his allegations and conclusions with documentary 
evidence, or provide some other showing that would change the result of 
the election.''(16) However, no such showing was made: 
``Contestant Perkins failed to present any documentary evidence 
supporting his allegations''(17) The House ultimately 
dismissed the case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. H. Rept. 94-762, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3.
16. H. Rept. 96-78, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3.
17. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 11.2 Evidence relating to actions or events in elections to prior 
    Congresses will not be considered relevant for purposes of 
    evaluating claims regarding an election to the current Congress.

    In the Wilson v Hinshaw (Sec. 15.3, infra) case, the contestant 
made ``allegations of violations of law, misconduct, and other actions 
both in the 1972 congressional election (in which contestee was a 
candidate) and the 1974 congressional election, on the part of 
contestee and other individuals.''(18) However, the 
committee stated that the ``allegations of wrongdoing by the Contestee 
in 1973 for a seat in the 93d Congress cannot be considered in this 
election contest for a seat in the 94th Congress.''(19) 
Similarly, in the Lowe v Fowler (Sec. 16.7, infra) case, one of the 
contestant's claims was that, because contestant had received 
substantially more votes in the 1970 primary election as compared to 
the 1977 special election at issue, ``a presumption of fraud or 
irregularity'' could be inferred.(20) The committee rejected 
this argument, stating that ``Disparity in the number of votes is not, 
in itself, sufficient to demonstrate fraud or 
irregularity.''(21)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. H. Rept. 94-761, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
19. Id. at p. 5.
20. H. Rept. 95-724, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
21. Id. at p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 11.3 The official returns and certification by state and local 
    election officials constitutes prima facie evidence that the 
    election was properly administered, and the contestant must provide 
    sufficient evidence to overcome that presumption.

    A presumption of regularity attaches to the official returns of an 
election, and contestants bear the burden of overcoming this 
presumption with substantial evidence. As stated in the Jennings v 
Buchanan (Sec. 31.4, infra) case, ``It is the Constitutional duty of 
the House of Representatives to investigate a valid election contest, 
yet only clear and convincing evidence can provide the basis to 
overcome the presumption of regularity accorded a State's certified 
results.''(22) The committee report in the Gonzalez v Diaz-
Balart (Sec. 31.1, infra) case similarly describes the presumption that 
contestants must overcome: ``Contestant's allegations are no more than 
unsupported speculation and his claims do not cast sufficient doubt on 
the results of the election to merit investigation. For the committee 
to come to any other conclusion would be to remove the presumption of 
regularity that attaches to the state certification and would make all 
elections open to contest and investigation based on mere conjecture or 
speculation.''(23) In the Haas v Bass (Sec. 25.2, infra) 
case, the committee stated in its conclusion that the ``official 
certification of election submitted to the Clerk of the House by the 
New Hampshire Secretary of State provides prima facie evidence of the 
regularity and correctness of state election returns and of Mr. Bass' 
presumption of entitlement to the seat''(24) and that the 
contestant failed ``to present any basis on which the Committee could 
overcome, rebut, or contradict this presumption.''(25)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
22. H. Rept. 110-528, 110th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 12.
23. H. Rept. 110-175, 110th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 4.
24. H. Rept. 104-853, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 3.
25. Id. at p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 11.4 The mere closeness of an election does not raise a 
    presumption or inference of fraud or irregularity, and the 
    contestant must prove any such fraud or irregularity by presenting 
    sufficient evidence.

    Contestants have sometimes argued that a close result in the 
election should lead to the presumption that fraud or other 
irregularities must have occurred. This type of argument has not been 
accepted by the House, which has required contestants to demonstrate 
(via substantial evidence) what fraud or irregularities occurred and 
what impact they had on the election. As stated in the Young v Mikva 
(Sec. 15.1, infra) case, ``fraud is never presumed but must be proven, 
and . . . the mere closeness of the result of an election raises no 
presumption of fraud, irregularities, or dishonesty.''(26) 
The committee report in the Ziebarth v Smith (Sec. 15.5, infra) case 
articulated the same principle in denying contestant's request for a 
recount based solely on the closeness of the election 
results.(27)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
26. H. Rept. 94-759, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. pp. 4, 5.
27. H. Rept. 94-763, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. pp. 15, 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



Sec. 12. Ballot Issues; Recounts

    The Committee on House Administration may find it necessary, in 
exceptional circumstances, to examine disputed ballots used in an 
election or conduct its own recount.(1) Most states have 
adopted their own recount procedures, often triggered automatically 
when the difference in votes between the winning and losing candidates 
is within a certain margin. In addition, some states have voluntary 
procedures by which unsuccessful candidates can request recounts of 
some or all precincts.(2) In general, the Committee on House 
Administration is highly deferential to state election procedures, and 
where state recount processes exist, the committee is unlikely to 
intervene to conduct its own count of the ballots.(3) On 
occasion, the committee has sent observers to supervise a recount 
conducted by state officials.(4) There have also been 
historical instances where the parties to an election contest have 
agreed to conduct their own recount.(5)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. Under modern statutory procedures, committee-conducted recounts 
        have become exceedingly rare. For earlier treatment of recounts 
        under the prior statute, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 
        Sec. 39-41.
 2. See, e.g., Illinois' ``discovery recount'' procedures described in 
        Young v Mikva, Sec. 15.1, and Idaho's partial recount 
        provisions described in Hansen v Stallings, Sec. 20.3, infra. 
        See also Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 41.2 (New Hampshire 
        state law permitted either candidate to request a recount).
 3. See Sec. 12.1, infra. See also Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 
        Sec. 41.1 (committee indicated that it would not conduct its 
        own recount where state recount procedures existed). But see 
        McCloskey v McIntyre, Sec. 20.1, infra.
 4. See, e.g., Young v Mikva, Sec. 15.1; Paul v Gammage, Sec. 16.2; 
        Dehr v Leggett, Sec. 16.5; and Dornan v Sanchez, Sec. 26.1, 
        infra. See also Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 39.4.
 5. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 39.1, 39.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Despite the House's reluctance to conduct its own recounts, it is 
also the case that states have long recognized the House's authority, 
under the Constitution, to determine which individuals have been 
properly elected to its membership.(6) Thus, states may have 
adopted procedures that do not permit recounts in elections to Federal 
office, preferring instead to defer to the House's jurisdiction over 
election contests.(7)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. See, e.g., Ziebarth v Smith, Sec. 15.5, infra (Nebraska court 
        determined that there was no method to contest an election to 
        the House under Nebraska law, and thus only the House could 
        conduct a recount of ballots); Rayner v Stewart, Sec. 17.3, 
        infra (U.S. district court held that the House has exclusive 
        jurisdiction over the final determination as to who was elected 
        to one of its seats); and McCuen v Dickey, Sec. 24.1, infra 
        (Arkansas state court dismissed complaint on the grounds that 
        it lacked jurisdiction over a contested House election).
 7. See, e.g., Sec. 12.2, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A request that the House conduct a recount of ballots used in the 
election is not a proper form of relief under the Federal Contested 
Elections Act. Instead, the contestant must affirmatively claim a right 
to contestee's seat. Merely requesting a recount, without offering 
supporting evidence demonstrating that the result of the election would 
have been different, is not sufficient under the statute.(8) 
This principle conforms to the House's overarching goal in election 
contests to balance the need to adjudicate valid, substantiated claims 
with the desire to avoid time-consuming and meritless investigations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. See, e.g., Ziebarth v Smith, Sec. 15.5; and Hendon v Clarke, 
        Sec. 19.2, infra. See also Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In evaluating ballots, the House weighs a variety of factors to 
reach a decision. Of paramount importance is determining the intent of 
the voter.(9) The focus on voter intent supports the goal of 
avoiding voter disenfranchisement wherever possible. A secondary factor 
is compliance with state and local election laws. The House has 
distinguished between ``mandatory'' provisions in state election 
statutes, and ``directory'' provisions. ``Mandatory'' provisions are 
those which are ``substantial,''(10) ``essential to the 
validity of the election,''(11) and ``confer rights of 
suffrage.''(12) ``Directory'' provisions, by contrast, are 
merely ``formal,''(13) ``relate to the mode of 
procedure,''(14) and constitute only ``administrative 
requirements.''(15) Provisions of state law that regulate 
the conduct of voters have been considered ``mandatory,'' while those 
regulating the conduct of election officials have been considered 
merely ``directory.''(16) As a result, the House will 
generally not invalidate ballots where the only issue is lack of 
compliance by election officials with ``directory'' provisions of 
election law.(17)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 38.1.
10. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 10.6.
11. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 10.11.
12. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 10.10.
13. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 10.6.
14. Id.
15. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 10.11.
16. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 10.7.
17. See, e.g., Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 10.14. However, 
        election results may be invalidated where there is ``evidence 
        of legal fraud or intentional corruptness'' on the part of 
        election officials. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 10.13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In determining voter intent, the House examines the format of the 
ballot, the markings of the voter, and the requirements of state law. 
The House has distinguished ambiguous or misleading ballots (where 
recourse to extrinsic evidence may clarify voter intent) and 
conflicting voter marks (where the intent of the voter is a ``matter of 
conjecture.'').(18) State laws (and the interpretation of 
those laws by state courts), are accorded some deference in evaluating 
the validity of ballots, but are not considered binding.(19) 
Ambiguities in state law will generally be resolved in favor of 
validating ballots where the intent of the voter is 
clear.(20)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 37.1, 38.3.
19. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 38.4.
20. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 38.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On occasion, the House has had to make determinations as to voter 
intent in the context of straight-ticket voting. In general, where the 
clear intent of the voter is to vote for all candidates of a single 
party, the House candidate of that party is entitled to such straight-
ticket votes.(21) However, an intent to vote straight-ticket 
will not be presumed based on selections for other 
candidates.(22)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
21. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 37.7.
22. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 37.6, 37.8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The House has also addressed ambiguities in ballots that allow for 
write-in candidates. The misspelling of a candidate's name, where the 
intent of the voter is otherwise clear, will not be sufficient to 
invalidate a ballot.(23) Where a voter writes in a 
candidate's name, but fails to properly mark the ballot next to the 
name, the vote may still be accepted.(24)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
23. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 37.12.
24. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 37.9, 37.16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The voter's markings on the ballot are obviously the best evidence 
of voter intent, but such markings may be ambiguous or conflicting. 
Stray marks or an improperly formed ``check'' or ``X'' will generally 
be accepted as a valid marking if the intent of the voter is 
clear.(25) Ballots with conflicting marks for both 
candidates, however, will be rejected.(26) State election 
law requirements regarding the type of marking device (e.g., 
pencil,(27) sticker,(28) etc.) or other 
formalities (e.g., detaching a ballot stub)(29) may be taken 
into account in evaluating ballots, and have been subject to the 
``mandatory'' versus ``directory'' analysis described above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
25. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 37.10, 37.11.
26. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 37.15.
27. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 37.18.
28. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 37.14.
29. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 37.17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Where there is evidence that some number of votes in the election 
were cast illegally, but it is impossible to determine for which 
candidate the illegal votes were cast, the House has used a 
``proportionate deduction'' rule to invalidate such 
votes.(30) This method deducts the illegal votes from both 
candidates in the proportion of each candidate's share of the overall 
vote.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
30. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 37.3-37.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Since the advent of the Federal Contested Elections Act, the 
Committee on House Administration has only conducted one full recount 
of an election to the House.(31) In the case of McCloskey v 
McIntyre (Sec. 20.1, infra), the committee had concluded that many 
valid ballots had been rejected by state and local officials for 
technical errors and that the standards for invalidating ballots were 
not uniform.(32) It thus authorized a task force to obtain 
the ballots used in the election, and conduct a new recount. The task 
force developed protocols for how to evaluate problematic 
ballots,(33) and conducted a full recount(34) 
utilizing the resources of the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO).(35)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
31. See Sec. 12.3, infra. In one other election contest, the committee 
        began an investigation into disputed ballots, but the 
        contestant ultimately withdrew the case, rendering the 
        committee investigation moot. See Kyros v Emery, Sec. 15.2, 
        infra.
32. See H. Rept. 99-58, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. pp. 15-32.
33. Id. at pp. 3, 4.
34. But see H. Rept. 99-58, 99th Cong. 1st Sess., pp. 55-57 (dissenting 
        views questioned why certain ballots were not included in the 
        recount).
35. At the time of this election contest, GAO was known as the General 
        Accounting Office. For an earlier example of the House 
        utilizing the services of GAO in an election contest, see 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 41.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 12.1 Where state recount procedures are available to the parties, 
    the Committee on House Administration has been reluctant to 
    authorize its own review of disputed ballots.

    In the Thorsness v Daschle (Sec. 17.5, infra) case, the ad hoc 
election panel investigating the case noted that the South Dakota 
Supreme Court had already conducted a review of the disputed ballots, 
and concluded, ``In light of this exhaustive de novo recount by South 
Dakota's highest Court, it would seem both redundant and presumptuous 
for this panel to recount the ballots ourselves and substitute our 
judgement for the courts.''(36) In the case of Hendon v 
Clarke (Sec. 19.2, infra), the contestant's request for a recount was 
denied by both state election officials and Federal 
courts.(37) In considering whether to conduct its own 
recount, the Committee on House Administration noted that, ``In 
previous contests the Committee has held that before it will conduct a 
recount, a Contestant must meet his evidentiary burden, i.e., 
demonstrate that the recount would change the result of the 
election.''(38) The committee determined that this burden 
had not been met and the case was ultimately dismissed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
36. H. Rept. 96-785, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 3.
37. H. Rept. 98-453, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
38. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 12.2 State recount procedures may not provide for state-level 
    review of disputed ballots in Federal elections.

    The case of Kyros v Emery (Sec. 15.2, infra) involved a Maine law 
that allowed for state officials to make determinations as to disputed 
ballots except for elections governed by the Federal 
Constitution.(39) Thus, the parties agreed that only the 
House of Representatives had the authority to review disputed ballots. 
The Subcommittee on Elections began a preliminary review before the 
contestant terminated the case by withdrawing.(40)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
39. H. Rept. 94-760, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 5.
40. Id. at pp. 2-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 12.3 The House has the authority to conduct its own review and 
    recount of disputed ballots in a House election.

    In the case of McCloskey v McIntyre (Sec. 20.1, infra), the 
Committee on House Administration (following state-level recounts) 
chose to conduct a full recount of the ballots cast in the 
election.(41) However the committee stressed that ``The 
House has consistently extended considerable deference to state 
election procedure''(42) and that it was only the 
``manifest''(43) irregularities and inconsistencies in state 
election processes that compelled the committee to authorize a 
recount.(44)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
41. H. Rept. 99-58, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 33.
42. Id. at p. 3.
43. Id.
44. For dissenting views in this case, arguing that a recount was not 
        justified, see H. Rept. 99-58, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. pp. 53, 54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



Sec. 13. Disposition of Contests

    As noted above,(1) under the Federal Contested Elections 
Act (FCEA), the House obtains jurisdiction over an election when a 
notice of contest is filed with the Clerk of the House. The Clerk then 
forwards this pleading, along with any accompanying documentation, to 
the Committee on House Administration, which has jurisdiction over 
election contests pursuant to clause 1(k)(12) of rule X.(2) 
The committee then assigns the matter to either a subcommittee, or an 
ad hoc task force (most often composed of three Members--two from the 
majority party and one from the minority party).(3) The task 
force or subcommittee will generally review the matter, and make a 
recommendation to the full committee. The full committee then meets to 
compose a committee report on the matter, and make a recommendation to 
the full House.(4) As with most committee reports in the 
House, members of the committee who do not wish to associate themselves 
entirely with the report may instead file separate views to accompany 
the report.(5) The filing of a committee report on an 
election contest is a privileged matter under clause 5(a)(3) of rule 
XIII.(6)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. See Sec. 8, supra.
 2. House Rules and Manual Sec. 724 (2021). The FCEA also defines the 
        relevant committee for purposes of the act as the Committee on 
        House Administration. See 2 U.S.C. Sec. 381(7).
 3. Parliamentarian's Note: The Committee on House Administration has 
        maintained a Subcommittee on Elections since the consolidation 
        of the three elections committees in the Legislative 
        Reorganization Act of 1946.
 4. Parliamentarian's Note: Until the 94th Congress, House rules 
        mandated that the Committee on House Administration file a 
        final report on every election contest. See House Rules and 
        Manual Sec. 733 (1973). Deadlines were imposed by rule on the 
        committee to complete its action. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 
        9 Sec. Sec. 43.5, 43.6. Although these requirements are no 
        longer in House rules, the committee generally does file a 
        report for every contest (even those deemed more properly 
        brought as an issue exclusion rather than an election contest). 
        See, e.g., Cox v McCrery, Sec. 31.5, infra. See also Deschler's 
        Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 43.3. Committee reports have typically 
        been filed even where the contestant withdraws from the case 
        (see, e.g., Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 43.10, 43.12; 
        and Kyros v Emery, Sec. 15.2, infra.), but there have been 
        instances where no committee report was filed. See, e.g., 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 43.11; and Hart v Miller-
        Meeks, Sec. 38.1, infra. For other historical examples of the 
        committee failing to take action on election contests, see 
        Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 43.13, 43.14.
 5. Rule XI, clause 2(l); House Rules and Manual Sec. 804 (2021). For 
        examples of committee reports on election contests with 
        dissenting or minority views, see, e.g., Paul v Gammage, 
        Sec. 16.2; Hendon v Clarke, Sec. 19.2; McCloskey v McIntyre, 
        Sec. 20.1; Anderson v Rose, Sec. 25.1; Dornan v Sanchez, 
        Sec. 26.1; Gonzalez v Diaz-Balart, Sec. 31.1; and Russell v 
        Brown-Waite, Sec. 31.3, infra. See also Deschler's Precedents 
        Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 43.7-43.9.
 6. House Rules and Manual Sec. Sec. 853-855 (2021). For an example of 
        a committee report on an election contest filed with the Clerk 
        rather than on the floor as a privileged matter, see Jennings v 
        Buchanan, Sec. 31.4, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    No contestant has been successful in an election contest pursued 
under the FCEA, and thus no contestant has been seated in place of the 
contestee.(7) In the vast majority of cases, the contestee 
filed a motion to dismiss the case, which the committee (after 
consideration of the case) recommended be granted. In other cases, the 
contestee chose not to file any pleadings in the case, and the 
committee, on its own authority, recommended that the case be 
dismissed. In prior years, election contests were occasionally resolved 
by adopting a resolution seating neither the contestant nor the 
contestee, but instead declaring the seat vacant.(8)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. Parliamentarian's Note: The election contest of McCloskey v 
        McIntyre (Sec. 20.1, infra) did involve an ultimately 
        successful challenge to the seating of the contestee in favor 
        of the contestant, but that contest proceeded under the House's 
        own constitutional authority and not pursuant to statutory 
        procedures.
 8. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 42.11, 42.12, and 42.15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under modern practice, the committee report accompanies a simple 
House resolution formally resolving the contest. There is no prescribed 
form that such resolutions must take.(9) It is possible for 
a single resolution to resolve multiple election 
contests,(10) but under modern procedures a separate 
resolution is used for each individual contest.(11) Issues 
relating to the seating of Members have long been recognized as 
constituting questions of the privileges of the House,(12) 
and thus the 72-hour layover period for committee reports does not 
apply.(13)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. Parliamentarian's Note: As all contests brought under the FCEA to 
        date have been unsuccessful, the resolutions resolving such 
        contests have typically consisted of a single sentence 
        dismissing the case.
10. See, e.g., Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 44.3.
11. For an example of two election contests being dismissed in serial 
        fashion via individual resolutions, see Project Hurt v Cohen, 
        Sec. 34.2; and Project Hurt v Waters, Sec. 34.3, infra.
12. See 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 322; and 3 Hinds' Precedents 
        Sec. Sec. 2579-2587. For questions of privilege raised during 
        the pendency of an election contest (either to resolve the 
        contest or address collateral issues), see McCloskey v 
        McIntyre, Sec. 20.1; and Dornan v Sanchez, Sec. 26.1, infra. 
        For questions of privilege generally, see Precedents (____) Ch. 
        11; and Deschler's Precedents Ch. 11.
13. See House Rules and Manual Sec. 850 (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A resolution to resolve an election contest may be offered as a 
privileged question,(14) but in recent years the committee 
member filing the report usually requests unanimous consent for the 
immediate consideration of the resolution.(15) In one 
instance, such a unanimous-consent request also specified other aspects 
of the resolution's consideration, such as debate time.(16) 
Absent such types of provisions, a resolution resolving an election 
contest is considered under the hour rule. The time for debate on a 
resolution resolving an election contest may be extended by unanimous 
consent.(17) Under the precedents, the side supporting the 
seating of the contestant is entitled to close debate.(18) 
Contestants in election contests are entitled to floor privileges 
``during the pendency of their cases'' under clause 2(a)(2) of rule 
IV,(19) but may not participate in debate.(20) 
Contestees who are seated Members may participate in debate on the 
resolution disposing of the contest.(21) A resolution 
resolving an election contest is subject to the regular parliamentary 
motions recognized by the House, such as amendment,(22) a 
motion to recommit the resolution to committee,(23) and a 
demand for a division of the question.(24)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. See, e.g., Hansen v Stallings, Sec. 20.3, infra.
15. See, e.g., Hayward v Cuellar, Sec. 34.1, infra.
16. See, e.g., Jennings v Buchanan, Sec. 31.4, infra. In that instance, 
        the unanimous-consent request allowed ten minutes of debate 
        time (equally divided between the chair and ranking member of 
        the Committee on House Administration) and ordered the previous 
        question to final adoption of the resolution without 
        intervening motion.
17. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 42.9.
18. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 42.8.
19. House Rules and Manual Sec. 678 (2021).
20. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 42.6.
21. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 42.7.
22. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 42.17, 42.18.
23. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 42.16.
24. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 42.13, 42.14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Expenses; Compensation

    Witnesses who give depositions in election contests are, pursuant 
to statute,(25) entitled to fees and travel expenses. 
Parties may also apply to the committee for reimbursement for certain 
funds.(26) Under the earlier statute, there was a cap for 
such expenses, but the modern FCEA only requires that the expenses be 
``reasonable.''(27) In prior years, the House would 
occasionally authorize payments from the ``contingent 
fund''(28) of the House to cover costs associated with the 
contest.(29) In the McCloskey v McIntyre (Sec. 20.1, infra) 
election contest, neither the contestee nor the contestant were seated 
on opening day, but both were paid (pursuant to the resolution 
transferring jurisdiction of the case to the Committee on House 
Administration) ``an amount equal to the daily equivalent of the annual 
rate of basic pay payable to a Member of the House'' for the period 
commencing with the adoption of the resolution and ending upon 
resolution of the contest.(30)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
25. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 389(b).
26. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 396.
27. Id.
28. Parliamentarian's Note: References to the ``contingent fund'' were 
        eliminated in the 104th Congress and replaced with ``applicable 
        accounts of the House.'' See rule X, clause 1(k)(1); House 
        Rules and Manual Sec. 724 (2021).
29. See, e.g., Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 45.1, 45.2. For an 
        unusual example of a joint resolution authorizing payment from 
        the Treasury of the United States to compensate parties in an 
        election contest, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. 45.3.
30. See McCloskey v McIntyre, Sec. 20.1, infra. For similar past 
        instances, see Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 Sec. Sec. 45.4, 
        45.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 13.1 A contestant may withdraw the election contest at any point, 
    resulting in a termination of the case.

    An election contest may end upon a withdrawal by the contestant, 
and there have been several instances of contestants choosing not to 
pursue their cases to a final decision by the House. In the Kyros v 
Emery (Sec. 15.2, infra) case, the committee begin an investigation 
into certain contested ballots, but the contestant concluded that 
continuing the review would not overturn sufficient ballots to reverse 
the outcome of the election, and he stated an intention to 
withdraw.(31) The committee report noted that the 
``withdrawal of Contestant Kyros terminated this case.''(32) 
The Hart v Miller-Meeks (Sec. 38.1, infra) case was also terminated by 
the withdrawal of the contestant, and in that case no committee report 
was filed.(33)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
31. H. Rept. 94-760, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 4.
32. Id.
33. For a letter regarding the case from the chair of the committee to 
        the Speaker that was submitted to the Congressional Record, see 
        167 Cong. Rec. E464-E465 [Daily Ed.], 117th Cong. 1st Sess. 
        (Apr. 28, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



              E. Summaries of Election Contests, 1973-2020



Sec. 14. Ninety-third Congress, 1973-1974

    There were no election contests considered by the House during the 
93d Congress.



Sec. 15. Ninety-fourth Congress, 1975-1976

Sec. 15.1 Young v Mikva

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the Tenth District of Illinois was conducted on November 5, 
1974.(1) The general election candidates were Abner J. Mikva 
(the Democratic candidate) and Samuel H. Young (the Republican 
candidate). The official canvass of votes indicated that 164,054 total 
votes were cast, of which 83,457 were cast for Mr. Mikva and 80,597 
were cast for Mr. Young. Mr. Mikva's margin of victory was therefore 
2,860 votes. Mr. Mikva was thereafter certified as the winner of the 
election. His credentials were presented to the House of 
Representatives, and on January 14, 1975, he was duly administered the 
oath of office without objection or challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 94-759, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Clerk of the House, on December 23, 1974, received a notice of 
contest filed by Mr. Young (hereafter ``contestant'') under the Federal 
Contested Elections Act. This initial pleading was forwarded to the 
Committee on House Administration for its consideration. The pleading 
was accompanied by the requisite proof of service.
    Contestant's notice of contest requested that he be declared by the 
House to have won the general election and that he was entitled to the 
seat at issue. Alternatively, the contestant requested that the House 
declare a vacancy in the office of Member of the House of 
Representatives for the Tenth District of Illinois.
    Contestant advanced three categories of allegations to support his 
requested relief. First, the contestant alleged dissemination by Mr. 
Mikva (hereafter ``contestee'') of false or misleading information 
about the contestant to voters. Second, the contestant alleged that the 
contestee violated the Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971 by 
receiving certain kinds of campaign contributions and failing to report 
such contributions. Third, the contestant alleged that a recount of all 
ballots in the contest would show that a sufficient number had been 
improperly cast for the contestee to reduce the number he received 
below that of the contestant. Contestee moved to dismiss the contest on 
the basis that contestant had not stated grounds sufficient to change 
the result of the election (one of the four possible statutory 
defenses).(2)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. See 2 U.S.C. Sec. 383(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its committee report, the Committee on House Administration 
concluded that the contestant's claim was without merit and that the 
motion to dismiss should be granted. The committee concluded that the 
contestant failed to demonstrate how the allegations would have changed 
votes sufficient to reverse the outcome of the election. The committee 
reiterated that a presumption of regularity must be overcome by the 
production of sufficient proof of fraud or error. In the view of the 
committee, the contestant did not present sufficient evidence to 
overcome this presumption.
    The committee further concluded that the contestant's request for a 
recount should not be granted, as the contestant failed to provide 
evidence justifying such recount. The committee noted that state 
election procedures allowed losing candidates who attained certain vote 
thresholds to request a partial recount of certain precincts (a 
``discovery recount'').(3) The contestant availed himself of 
this procedure, and alleged that, as a result of this process, a number 
of absentee ballots should be invalidated for technical errors. 
However, the committee expressed ``considerable doubt''(4) 
that Illinois law required the invalidation of such ballots, and 
further determined that the contestant had not presented any evidence 
that votes were either willfully or fraudulently miscounted. The 
committee reiterated that the burden is on the contestant to show 
sufficient evidence to justify a committee-conducted recount, which, in 
the committee's estimation, the contestant failed to do.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. H. Rept. 94-759, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 5.
 4. Id. at p. 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On December 18, 1975, the committee's report was filed with the 
House with the recommendation that the election contest be dismissed. 
On December 19, 1975,(5) the House by unanimous consent 
adopted House Resolution 894, dismissing the contest:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 121 Cong. Rec. 41868-69, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              DISMISSAL OF ELECTION CONTEST OF SAMUEL H. YOUNG    

        Mr. [Wayne] HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the 
    Committee on House Administration, I call up a privileged 
    resolution (H. Res. 894), and ask unanimous consent for its 
    immediate consideration.

H. Res. 894

  Resolved, That the election contest of Samuel H. Young, contestant, 
against Abner J. Mikva, contestee, Tenth Congressional District of the 
State of Illinois, be dismissed.

        The SPEAKER.(6) Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Ohio?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. Carl Albert (OK).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 15.2 Kyros v Emery

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the First District of Maine was conducted on November 5, 
1974.(7) The general election candidates were Peter N. Kyros 
(the Democratic candidate) and David F. Emery (the Republican 
candidate). The official canvass of votes indicated that 187,727 total 
votes were cast, of which Mr. Emery obtained a margin of victory of 679 
votes. Mr. Emery was thereafter certified as the winner of the election 
on December 23, 1974. His credentials were presented to the House of 
Representatives, and on January 14, 1975, he was duly administered the 
oath of office without objection or challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 94-760, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Due to the closeness of the result, Mr. Kyros requested that a 
recount be conducted pursuant to state law. The recount commenced on 
November 25, 1974, supervised by the Maine Secretary of State. On 
December 19, 1974, a review of disputed ballots was begun. The parties 
agreed that, under state law and the Constitution, only the House of 
Representatives has the authority to determine the winner of elections 
to House seats, and thus only the House had jurisdiction over the 
disputed ballots.
    On December 27, 1974, Mr. Kyros (hereafter ``contestant'') filed a 
notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was then forwarded 
to the Committee on House Administration. On December 30, 1974, the 
Maine Secretary of State executed an affidavit correcting the vote 
totals, and bringing Mr. Emery's margin of victory down to 421 votes.
    The contestant offered two arguments in support of his claim to be 
seated as the Member from the First District of Maine. First, the 
contestant argued that proper application of the law to the disputed 
ballots would show a plurality in favor of the contestant. Second, the 
contestant alleged that Mr. Emery (hereafter ``contestee'') engaged in 
unfair and fraudulent campaign practices. This second category of 
allegations was withdrawn by the contestant via an amended notice of 
contest filed on March 17, 1975, and the committee did not consider 
those claims.
    The Subcommittee on Elections heard oral arguments in the case on 
March 25, 1975, focusing on the proper standard for evaluating the 
disputed ballots. Counsel for the parties were instructed to file 
briefs relating to that issue. For the duration of five days in May 
1975, staff for the subcommittee conducted a preliminary review in 
Portland, Maine, in order to resolve challenges and reduce the number 
of ballots in dispute. The remaining disputed ballots were counted and 
sealed by a United States Marshal, and delivered to the Committee on 
House Administration in Washington, D.C.
    During July 1975, the Subcommittee on Elections met to discuss the 
types of ballots in dispute and the proper standard for evaluating how 
such ballots should be counted. On July 15, 1975, the subcommittee made 
several rulings with regard to the disputed ballots. On July 16, 1975, 
the subcommittee met again, but before continuing its review, the 
contestant announced that he was withdrawing his notice of contest. In 
doing so, the contestant stated that he did not believe a further 
review of disputed ballots would demonstrate that the contestee had 
received fewer votes.
    In its committee report, the Committee on House Administration 
included a lengthy analysis of how challenges to the disputed ballots 
should be received. The committee reviewed the relevant state laws, 
discussed the extent to which the House should be bound by such laws, 
and articulated the standard for evaluating voter intent.(8) 
The committee also reiterated the House's constitutional authority to 
judge the elections of its Members, and the extent to which it has in 
the past deferred to state law and the interpretations of that law by 
state courts. The committee report reaffirmed the distinction between 
``directory'' and ``mandatory'' laws--the latter viewed as being ``of 
the very essence of the thing done'' and essential to the ``vital 
purpose'' of the statute,(9) while the former regarded as 
merely formal or technical requirements. The overarching consideration 
is to prevent the disenfranchisement of voters for innocent errors 
committed by election officials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. H. Rept. 94-760, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 5.
 9. Id. at p. 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As the contestant ultimately withdrew his case, the committee did 
not make a formal recommendation to the House as to which side should 
prevail. Instead, it simply noted in its report that ``The withdrawal 
of Contestant Kyros terminated this case.''(10) On December 
19, 1975,(11) the House by unanimous consent adopted House 
Resolution 895, dismissing the contest:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Id. at p. 5.
11. 121 Cong. Rec. 41869, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              DISMISSAL OF ELECTION CONTEST OF PETER N. KYROS    

        Mr. [Wayne] HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the 
    Committee on House Administration, I call up a privileged 
    resolution (H. Res. 895), and ask unanimous consent for its 
    immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

H. Res. 895

  Resolved, That the election contest of Peter N. Kyros, contestant, 
against David F. Emery, contestee, First Congressional District of the 
State of Maine, be dismissed.

        The SPEAKER.(12) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Ohio?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. Carl Albert (OK).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 15.3 Wilson v Hinshaw

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the 40th District of California was conducted on November 5, 
1974.(13) The general election candidates were Roderick J. 
Wilson (the Democratic candidate) and Andrew J. Hinshaw (the Republican 
candidate). The official canvass of votes indicated that 173,299 total 
votes were cast, of which Mr. Hinshaw received 116,499 votes and Mr. 
Wilson received 56,850. Mr. Hinshaw's margin of victory was therefore 
59,599 votes. Mr. Hinshaw was thereafter certified as the winner of the 
election on December 10, 1974, by the Secretary of State of California. 
His credentials to the House of Representatives, and on January 14, 
1975, he was duly administered the oath of office without objection or 
challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 94-761, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Wilson (hereafter ``contestant'') served a notice of contest on 
Mr. Hinshaw (hereafter ``contestee'') by mail on January 3, 1975. The 
notice of contest was received by the Clerk of the House on January 6, 
1975, and forwarded to the Committee on House Administration for its 
consideration.
    The contestant alleged that the contestee engaged in numerous 
violations of law, including both Federal campaign laws and civil 
rights laws. In particular, the contestant alleged that the contestee 
abused his position as county tax assessor to both interfere with the 
contestant's campaign and distribute illegal favors to contestee's 
supporters. In sum, contestant's allegations described a wide-ranging 
conspiracy by the contestee and others to deprive voters of a ``free, 
independent, and open election.''(14)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. H. Rept. 94-761, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response, the contestee filed a motion to dismiss the contest, 
based on the statutory defense that the contestant had failed to state 
grounds sufficient to change the result of the election.(15) 
The Subcommittee on Elections held a hearing on March 25, 1975, to 
consider this motion. In its committee report, the committee noted that 
to prevail, a contestant must show with particularity how the 
allegations contained in the notice of contest would support a 
conclusion that the results of the election would have been different. 
General assertions and vague or uncertain allegations are insufficient 
to carry the contestant's burden. The committee concluded that the 
contestant had presented ``no concrete evidence''(16) 
demonstrating how votes would have been different had the alleged 
violations of law not occurred.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. Id. at p. 3. See also 2 U.S.C. Sec. 383(b)(3).
16. Id. at p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The committee reiterated that alleged criminal violations are not 
grounds for determining an election contest if such violations cannot 
be connected by substantial evidence to the conduct of the election. 
The committee also noted that some of the allegations involved conduct 
in the preceding election in 1972, and that the House (as a ``separate 
constitutional entity'' each Congress)(17) thus does not 
have jurisdiction over prior claims of misconduct or criminal activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. Id. at p. 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For these reasons, the committee adopted its report recommending 
dismissal of the case. On December 19, 1975,(18) the House 
by unanimous consent adopted House Resolution 896, dismissing the 
contest:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 121 Cong. Rec. 41869, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            DISMISSAL OF ELECTION CONTEST OF RODERICK J. WILSON    

        Mr. [Wayne] HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the 
    Committee on House Administration, I call up a privileged 
    resolution (H. Res. 896), and ask unanimous consent for its 
    immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

H. Res. 896

  Resolved, That the election contest of Roderick J. Wilson, contestant, 
against Andrew J. Hinshaw, contestee, Fortieth Congressional District of 
the State of California, be dismissed.

        The SPEAKER.(19) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Ohio?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. Carl Albert (OK).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 15.4 Mack v Stokes

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the 21st District of Ohio was conducted on November 5, 
1974.(20) The general election candidates were William Mack 
(the Republican candidate) and Louis A. Stokes (the Democratic 
candidate). Mr. Stokes was certified by the Secretary of State of Ohio 
as the winner of the election on December 10, 1974. His credentials 
were presented to the House of Representatives, and on January 14, 
1975, he was duly administered the oath of office without objection or 
challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 94-762, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Mack (hereafter ``contestant'') filed a notice of contest with 
the Clerk of the House on the same day that Mr. Stokes (hereafter 
``contestee'') was certified as having won the election. The Clerk 
referred the notice to the Committee on House Administration for its 
consideration. On January 8, 1975, the Clerk received a motion to 
dismiss (as well as briefs and exhibits in support thereof) from the 
contestee, which was also referred to the Committee on House 
Administration. In response, the contestant, on January 13, 1975, filed 
a memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss, along with related 
documents.
    Contestant's only argument in the case was that contestee lacked 
essential qualifications for the office; specifically, that the 
contestee was not an inhabitant of the state, as required by the 
Constitution.(21)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
21. U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 2, cl. 2; and House Rules and Manual 
        Sec. 11 (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The committee's report noted that, as essentially a qualifications 
case rather than an election contest, it ``would more appropriately be 
brought to the House of Representatives by a petition or memorial 
rather than by proceeding in the nature of a contest.''(22) 
It further noted the ``inappropriateness of the 
procedure''(23) but nevertheless chose not to recommend 
dismissal on mere procedural grounds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
22. H. Rept. 94-762, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
23. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Turning to the merits of contestant's argument, the committee found 
that the contestant had only advanced conclusions of law, and did not 
provide any specific evidence to support those conclusions. The 
committee briefly summarized the legal issues surrounding 
qualifications cases, such as the definitions of ``inhabitancy'' and 
``legal residence'' (citing both House precedents and Federal and state 
case law). In recommending dismissal of the case, the committee 
reiterated that the contestant must carry the burden of proof and 
substantiate their claims with something more than ``unsupported 
generalities.''(24)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
24. Id. at p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On December 19, 1975,(25) the House by unanimous consent 
adopted House Resolution 897, dismissing the contest:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
25. 121 Cong. Rec. 41869, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            DISMISSAL OF ELECTION CONTEST OF WILLIAM (BILL) MACK    

        Mr. [Wayne] HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the 
    Committee on House Administration, I call up a privileged 
    resolution (H. Res. 897) and ask unanimous consent for its 
    immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

H. Res. 897

  Resolved, That the election contest of William (Bill) Mack, contestant, 
against Louis A. Stokes, contestee, Twenty-first Congressional District of 
the State of Ohio, be dismissed.

        The SPEAKER.(26) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Ohio?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
26. Carl Albert (OK).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 15.5 Ziebarth v Smith

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the Third District of Nebraska was conducted on November 5, 
1974.(27) The general election candidates were Virginia H. 
Smith (the Republican candidate) and Wayne Ziebarth (the Democratic 
candidate). The Nebraska State Canvassing Board reported that 80,992 
votes had been cast for Mrs. Smith, and that 80,225 votes had been cast 
for Mr. Ziebarth. Mrs. Smith was certified by the Nebraska State 
Canvassing Board as the winner of the election on December 3, 1974. Her 
credentials were presented to the House of Representatives, and on 
January 14, 1975, she was duly administered the oath of office without 
objection or challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
27. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 94-763, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Ziebarth (hereafter ``contestant'') filed a notice of contest 
with the Clerk of the House on December 30, 1974, which was referred to 
the Committee on House Administration for its consideration. On January 
7, 1975, contestant filed additional documents, including a copy of a 
petition for a recount filed with the Nebraska state 
courts.(28) On January 24, 1975, Mrs. Smith (hereafter 
``contestee'') filed a motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, a 
motion for a more definite statement (as provided by the Federal 
Contested Elections Act)(29) along with supporting 
documentation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
28. The contestant's request for a recount had been denied by the 
        Nebraska Secretary of State. See H. Rept. 94-763, 94th Cong. 
        1st Sess. p. 3. On May 15, 1975, a Nebraska district court held 
        that there was no method of contesting a congressional election 
        under Nebraska law. Thus, the only entity with jurisdiction to 
        conduct a recount, as requested by the contestant, was the 
        House of Representatives.
29. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 383(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Contestant claimed that the reported vote totals from various 
precincts contained errors, and that statistical evidence showed that a 
recount would confirm that contestant had in fact received more votes 
than the contestee. Contestant relied heavily on a statistical analysis 
conducted by a statistician with experience in election cases.
    Contestee availed herself of two of the defenses to the contest 
provided under the statute: (1) that by merely requesting a recount, 
the contestant had failed to properly claim a right to the seat at 
issue;(30) and (2) that the contestant failed to state 
grounds sufficient to change the result of the election.(31) 
Contestee also filed, as an alternative to the motion to dismiss, a 
motion for a more definite statement. In that pleading, contestee 
requested more specific information about the precincts at issue, the 
nature of the statistical analysis supporting contestant's claims, and 
how precisely a new canvass of the votes would demonstrate a reversal 
of the certified results.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
30. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 383(b)(4).
31. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 383(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On March 11, 1975, the Subcommittee on Elections held the motion to 
dismiss in abeyance while granting the motion for a more definite 
statement. The committee report noted the lack of any state recount 
procedures, and that it was in the interest of justice to allow the 
contestant the opportunity to add specificity to his claims. In 
response, the contestant filed an amended notice of contest on April 8, 
1975. However, the committee concluded that the contestant failed to 
supply the needed particularization to cure the defects in the initial 
pleading.
    On April 17, 1975, the contestee filed an answer to the amended 
notice of contest. This pleading contained an affidavit from the 
Nebraska Secretary of State rebutting the allegations of overcounts and 
undercounts in precincts identified by the contestant. The committee 
report stated that during the next two months, the contestant failed to 
utilize the discovery processes under the statute to substantiate any 
of the general assertions made in prior pleadings. The committee 
concluded that the contestant was only seeking a recount under the 
auspices of the House because no such relief was available at the state 
level.
    The committee report analyzed the circumstances under which the 
Committee on House Administration should undertake a recount in order 
to resolve an election contest. In summarizing the issues, the 
committee cited ``traditional requirements of pleading and proof'' 
drawn from earlier contests.(32) In essence, a committee-
ordered recount should only be granted where the contestant has made 
specific claims and offers preliminary proof of fraud or irregularity 
sufficient to change the result of the election. Absent the offering of 
such evidence, the committee would likely be inundated with requests 
for ``fruitless, time-consuming fishing expeditions,''(33) 
based on little more than the closeness of the election results. The 
committee reiterated the presumption of regularity that attaches to any 
election properly certified by the relevant state officials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
32. H. Rept. 94-763, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 11.
33. Id. at p. 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The committee thus concluded that the contestant had failed to meet 
the burden of proof required under the statute, and that therefore 
contestee's motion to dismiss should be granted. On December 19, 
1975,(34) the House by unanimous consent adopted House 
Resolution 898, dismissing the contest:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
34. 121 Cong. Rec. 41869, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                DISMISSAL OF ELECTION CONTEST OF WAYNE ZIEBARTH

        Mr. [Wayne] HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the 
    Committee on House Administration, I call up a privileged 
    resolution (H. Res. 898) and ask unanimous consent for its 
    immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

H. Res. 898

  Resolved, That the election contest of Wayne Ziebarth, contestant, 
against Virginia H. Smith, contestee, Third Congressional District of the 
State of Nebraska, be dismissed.

        The SPEAKER.(35) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Ohio?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
35. Carl Albert (OK).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.



Sec. 16. Ninety-fifth Congress, 1977-1978

Sec. 16.1 Saunders v Kelly

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the Fifth District of Florida was conducted on November 2, 
1976.(1) The general election candidates were Richard Kelly 
(the Republican candidate) and JoAnn Saunders (the Democratic 
candidate). The Elections Canvassing Commission of Florida reported 
that 138,371 votes had been cast for Mr. Kelly, and that 96,260 votes 
had been cast for Ms. Saunders. Mr. Kelly was certified as the winner 
of the election on November 10, 1976. His credentials were presented to 
the House of Representatives, and on January 4, 1977, he was duly 
administered the oath of office without objection or challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 95-242, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On December 10, 1976, Ms. Saunders (hereafter ``contestant'') filed 
a notice of contest with the Clerk of the House of Representatives, 
which was forwarded to the Committee on House Administration for its 
consideration. On January 13, 1977, Mr. Kelly (hereafter ``contestee'') 
filed both a motion to dismiss the case, and a motion for a more 
definite statement. On March 2, 1977, the Committee on House 
Administration appointed an ad hoc panel of three Members to review the 
case and make recommendations on the motions before it. The panel met 
on March 10, 1977, and again on March 30, 1977, to hear oral arguments 
and review the evidence presented.
    Contestant argued that contestee conspired with the Florida Ethics 
Commission to circulate negative information about the contestant and 
her financial disclosure statements. Contestant also argued that 
Florida's requirement for candidates to file such disclosures was 
unconstitutional, in that it added new qualifications to those required 
under the Constitution.
    Contestee, in reply briefs, argued that the contestant's notice of 
contest was too vague and ambiguous to allow an adequate response. 
Contestee also noted the decision of a Federal district court, which 
had held that the Florida ethics requirements were not 
unconstitutional. Finally, contestee asserted the statutory defense 
that the contestant had not stated grounds sufficient to change the 
outcome of the election.(2)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 383(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The panel and the full committee agreed that the contestant had not 
met her burden in this case. Rather than support her claims with 
specific evidence of fraud, misconduct, or irregularities, the 
contestant asserted merely generalized allegations and uncertain 
accusations of wrongdoing. The committee therefore recommended 
dismissal of the case in its committee report. On May 9, 
1977,(3) the committee offered House Resolution 525 
(dismissing the contest) as a privileged matter, which the House 
adopted by voice vote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 123 Cong. Rec. 13953-54, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

             DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST AGAINST RICHARD KELLY

        Mr. [Frank] THOMPSON [of New Jersey]. Mr. Speaker, by direction 
    of the Committee on House Administration, I call up a privileged 
    resolution (H. Res. 525), and ask for its immediate consideration.
        The CLERK read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 525

  Resolved, That the election contest of JoAnn Saunders, contestant, 
against Richard Kelly, contestee, Fifth Congressional District of the State 
of Florida, be dismissed.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(4) The Chair recognizes the 
    gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Thompson) for 1 hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. William Natcher (KY).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
    consume.
        Mr. Speaker, I intend to call up three additional privileged 
    resolutions dealing with contested election cases--House 
    Resolutions 526, 527, and 528.
        I intend further, Mr. Speaker, to defer in each instance to the 
    member of the Committee on House Administration who chaired the 
    respective contested election panel.
        Before proceeding, however, I should like to note several 
    matters briefly for the Record.
        The U.S. Constitution gives the House plenary power to judge 
    its own elections.
        Under the rules of the House, jurisdiction over election 
    contests lies with the Committee on House Administration.
        Eight election contests, a nearly unprecedented number, have 
    arisen from elections to the 95th Congress.
        In order to expedite the processing and resolution of these 
    eight cases, I assigned each one to a three-member contested 
    election panel.
        Four of these contested election panels have concluded their 
    hearings and deliberations, and have reported to the full House 
    Administration Committee.
        These four matters are before the House this afternoon; because 
    of the serious import of a contest for a Member's seat in Congress, 
    I urge my colleagues to pay particular attention.
        In each of the four election cases before us today I want to 
    commend the superb work done by the panel chairman and members. The 
    investigation and resolution of a cloud to a Member's seat is 
    always a heavy responsibility. In each instance our colleagues met 
    that responsibility with distinction.
        Mr. Speaker, the instant resolution, House Resolution 525, 
    deals with the contested election matters of Saunders against 
    Kelly. The ad hoc panel assigned to this case was chaired by the 
    Honorable Joseph Minish and consisted of our colleagues Robert 
    Mollohan and Samuel Devine.
        Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
    gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Minish) for debate only.
        Mr. [Joseph] MINISH [of New Jersey]. Mr. Speaker, this 
    resolution pertains to the election contest brought against the 
    Honorable Richard Kelly.
        Congressman Kelly was certified on November 10, 1976, as the 
    duly elected U.S. Representative from Florida's Fifth District; the 
    official canvass of that race showed that Mr. Kelly had defeated 
    his opponent in the general election, Ms. JoAnn Saunders by 42,111 
    votes. His credentials were presented to the House and he took the 
    oath and was seated without objection on January 4, 1977.
        On December 10, 1976, Ms. Saunders filed a notice of contest 
    pursuant to the Federal Contested Elections Act.
        The contestant alleged that during the campaign she had been 
    involved in a controversy with the Florida Ethics Commission 
    concerning her filing of a personal financial disclosure statement 
    which is required by State law. She asserted that the requirement 
    that a candidate file a statement of financial interest at the time 
    qualifying papers are filed is unconstitutional. The contestant 
    further alleged that the chairman of the Florida Ethics Commission 
    carried on ``an attack--against'' her candidacy and that the 
    contestee ``conspired with the chairman'' of the Commission to 
    attack her candidacy. She stated that prior to the controversy 
    surrounding her difficulties with the Ethics Commission she was 
    leading in the campaign, and that her subsequent loss to Mr. Kelly 
    was ``solely as a result of the unconstitutional action'' of the 
    Ethics Commission. She cited unfavorable press publicity because of 
    this matter.
        On January 13, 1977, the contestee filed two motions pursuant 
    to the act. One was a motion for a more definite statement which 
    asserted that the contestant's notice of contest was so vague and 
    ambiguous that he was unable to respond adequately to it.
        The other was a motion to dismiss. It cited a Federal district 
    court order which held that Florida's personal financial disclosure 
    statute was not unconstitutional and asserted that the contestant 
    had failed in his notice of contest to state grounds sufficient to 
    change the results of the election.
        On March 2, 1977, the Committee on House Administration adopted 
    a resolution which assigned the consideration of the case to an ad 
    hoc panel consisting of myself as chairman and the Honorable Robert 
    L. Mollohan and the Honorable Samuel L. Devine as members. The 
    panel was charged in the resolution ``to report findings and to 
    make recommendations on this matter to the Committee on House 
    Administration.''
        On March 10, 1977, the panel met in open session and heard oral 
    argument by counsel for contestant and contestee on contestee's 
    motion to dismiss. The panel then took the matter under advisement. 
    The record was held open for postsubmission filings.
        On March 30, 1977, the panel met again in an open hearing to 
    discuss the evidence presented in this case relevant to the pending 
    motion. Pursuant to a motion made by Mr. Devine, the panel voted 
    unanimously to recommend to the Committee on House Administration 
    that the contestee's motion to dismiss should be granted.
        On April 28 the Committee on House Administration approved that 
    recommendation and reported the resolution.
        The Commission is of the opinion after careful consideration of 
    the record that the case should be dismissed. We reached this 
    conclusion only after a thorough review of the oral argument by 
    counsel and the written submissions on behalf of the contestant and 
    the contestee.
        The contest should be dismissed because the contestant has 
    failed to meet the burden placed by the act on all contestants if 
    such a motion to dismiss is to be denied.
        The statute, together with its legislative history and the 
    precedents construing it, indicate that more than mere notice 
    pleading and generalized allegations are required if a motion to 
    dismiss is to be denied. This was made clear in the case of Tunno 
    against Veysey, the first case to arise under the present statute, 
    where the Committee noted that--

  Under the new law then the present contestant and any further contestant, 
when challenged by motion to dismiss, must have presented in the first 
instance, sufficient allegations and evidence to justify his claim to the 
seat in order to overcome the motion to dismiss.

        The contestant in the case has not made the sort of specific 
    allegations accompanied by supportive evidence that is required to 
    overcome a motion to dismiss. Indeed, she has offered no specific 
    evidence in support of her claim.
        Accordingly, the committee recommends to the House that the 
    resolution be adopted dismissing this contested election case.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, does the gentleman from California 
    (Mr. Wiggins) seek recognition for debate?
        Mr. [Charles] WIGGINS [of California]. I do, Mr. Speaker.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman 
    from California (Mr. Wiggins), for debate only.
        Mr. WIGGINS. Mr. Speaker, the contest of Saunders against Kelly 
    is ripe for disposition on the merits. The decision of the House 
    committee to dismiss the Saunders contest is correct. But I do not 
    agree with the reasons for that action which are stated in the 
    majority report and I will take just a moment to tell the Members 
    why.
        It is clear from the notice of contest filed by Ms. Saunders 
    that she has not alleged a legal basis entitling her to any relief 
    and it is clear that she cannot do so. Accordingly it is wholly 
    appropriate to entertain a motion to dismiss.
        Now why is it that she has not alleged a legal basis for 
    relief? The contestant Ms. Saunders complains that election 
    officials in the State of Florida called to the attention of the 
    electorate the fact that she had failed to comply with certain 
    procedural requirements of the Florida statute. If that is her only 
    complaint, it does not justify overturning an election. It is not a 
    legal basis for doing so since it does not challenge the propriety 
    of the election process itself. Accordingly I join in the 
    majority's view that this contest should be dismissed.
        But please do not understand my support to be agreement with 
    the reasons stated by the majority that there is a duty on the part 
    of the respondent faced with a motion to dismiss to go forward and 
    instantly prove all elements of his or her case. That is a 
    misplaced burden of proof as we shall explain later in connection 
    with other contests.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the 
    resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 16.2 Paul v Gammage

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the 22nd District of Texas was conducted on November 2, 
1976.(5) The general election candidates were Ron Paul (the 
Republican candidate) and Bob Gammage (the Democratic candidate). The 
initial vote totals indicated that Mr. Gammage received 96,433 votes, 
while Mr. Paul received 96,197 votes. Because of the closeness of the 
result, a recount was conducted by the Secretary of State of Texas, 
with observers from the Committee on House Administration. The final 
count showed 96,535 votes cast for Mr. Gammage and 96,267 votes cast 
for Mr. Paul. Mr. Gammage's margin of victory was therefore 268 votes. 
On November 22, 1976, Mr. Gammage was certified as the winner of the 
election by the Texas Secretary of State. His credentials were 
presented to the House of Representatives, and on January 4, 1977, he 
was duly administered the oath of office without objection or 
challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 95-243, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On December 19, 1976, Mr. Paul (hereafter ``contestant'') filed a 
notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was forwarded to 
the Committee on House Administration for its consideration. On January 
19, 1977, Mr. Gammage (hereafter ``contestee'') filed both an answer to 
the notice of contest, and a motion to dismiss the case. On February 8, 
1977, the contestant filed a motion to extend the time for discovery, 
requesting an additional 30 days to take depositions.
    On February 23, 1977, an ad hoc panel of the Committee on House 
Administration met to hear arguments regarding the above pleadings, and 
an additional filing from the contestant (a motion to stay all 
proceedings pending the resolution of a Texas state court case). On 
March 2, 1977, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that state proceedings 
contesting the election of this Federal office were invalid under the 
Constitution, and state court proceedings where therefore terminated. 
On March 9, 1977, the ad hoc panel met and voted to recommend that the 
motion to dismiss be granted.
    In its committee report, the Committee on House Administration 
reiterated the ``weighty'' burden placed on contestants by the Federal 
Contested Elections Act (FCEA) to overcome a motion to 
dismiss.(6) The committee also reiterated the presumption of 
regularity that attaches to official returns and actions of election 
officials. Not only must the contestant overcome those presumptions, 
but in doing so, the contestant must also demonstrate how the outcome 
of the election would have been changed absent the alleged 
irregularities. Contestant ``alleged instances of improper and perhaps 
even illegal voting''(7) but did not support such 
allegations with specific evidence. The committee report concluded by 
noting the time and expense involved in pursuing meritless claims, and 
recommended that the House grant contestee's motion to dismiss.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. H. Rept. 95-243, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 4.
 7. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its dissenting views accompanying the committee report, Members 
from the minority party evinced disagreement with the majority party's 
analysis. The primary issue in dispute was the extent to which a 
contestant must ``prove''(8) the allegations contained in 
the notice of contest in order to prevail on a motion to dismiss. 
Because the statute provided for the possibility of an extensive 
discovery process, the dissent argued for a lower threshold for the 
contestant to reach at the initial pleading stages. In essence, the 
dissent argued that the committee impermissibly reversed the burden of 
proof under the statute, and that contestant should have been allowed 
to proceed to the discovery stage in order to gather additional 
evidence to support his allegations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. Id. at p. 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On May 9, 1977,(9) the committee offered House 
Resolution 526 (dismissing the contest) as a privileged matter, which 
the House adopted by voice vote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 123 Cong. Rec. 13954-57, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST AGAINST BOB GAMMAGE

        Mr. [Frank] THOMPSON [of New Jersey]. Mr. Speaker, by direction 
    of the Committee on House Administration, I call up a privileged 
    resolution (H. Res. 526) and ask for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

H. Res. 526

  Resolved, That the election contest of Ron Paul, contestant, against Bob 
Gammage, contestee, Twenty-second Congressional District of the State or 
Texas, be dismissed.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(10) The gentleman from New 
    Jersey (Mr. Thompson) is recognized for 1 hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. William Natcher (KY).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, this resolution deals with the 
    contested election case of Paul against Gammage. The ad hoc 
    committee investigating this case was chaired by the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania (Mr. Ammerman) and consisted of the gentleman from 
    Michigan (Mr. Nedzi) and the gentleman from California (Mr. 
    Wiggins).
        Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume, for debate 
    only, to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Ammerman), the panel 
    chairman.
        Mr. [Joseph] AMMERMAN [of Pennsylvania]. Mr. Speaker, the 
    subject of House Resolution 526, for which I now rise, is the 
    contested election case of Paul against Gammage arising out of the 
    general election of November 2, 1976, for a seat in the 59th 
    Congress from the 22d district of Texas. I will briefly summarize 
    events which have taken place from the date of the general 
    election, November 2, 1976, up to this moment.
        The result of the November 2, 1976, general election involving 
    Mr. Gammage and Mr. Paul showed a difference of 236 votes in Mr. 
    Gammage's favor.
        Mr. Paul requested and obtained a full recount pursuant to 
    Texas law which resulted in a difference of 268 votes in Mr. 
    Gammage's favor.
        The recount was conducted under the general observation of 
    inspectors from the secretary of state of Texas and by counsel from 
    the House Administration Committee. Accordingly, on November 22, 
    1976, Bob Gammage received a certificate of election from the 
    secretary of state of Texas. Mr. Gammage was duly sworn, without 
    objection, as a Member of the 95th Congress on January 4, 1977.
        Mr. Paul filed an election contest in the State district court 
    of Harris County, Tex., pursuant to Texas law. Mr. Gammage 
    responded with a motion to dismiss and State court litigation was 
    joined.
        On December 19, 1976, contestant Paul filed a notice of contest 
    with the U.S. House of Representatives pursuant to the Federal 
    Contested Election [sic](11) Act. The matter was 
    referred to the Committee on House Administration and on January 
    19, 1977, contestee Gammage filed an answer and motion to dismiss.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. As in the original. Text should read: Elections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        During this period, Chairman Frank Thompson, Jr., appointed me 
    to chair a contested election panel to deal with this matter. Also 
    serving on that panel are Lucien Nedzi and Charles Wiggins.
        On February 23, 1977, the panel conducted an open hearing for 
    the purpose of hearing oral arguments from both sides pertaining to 
    three motions:
        First. A motion by contestant Paul requesting that the House 
    stay all proceedings pending the outcome of court proceedings in 
    Texas.
        Second. A motion by contestant Paul requesting 30 additional 
    days for taking depositions.
        Third. A motion by contestee Gammage for a dismissal of the 
    case. Arguments were heard and taken under advisement. The record 
    was held open for postsubmission briefs.
        One week after the panel hearing, on March 2, 1977, the Supreme 
    Court of Texas ruled that the provisions of Texas law under which 
    contestant Paul had brought his State court contest, as it applied 
    to Federal offices ``is in diametrical conflict with and contrary 
    to article I, section 5 of the U.S. Constitution.''
        The State court cases were thereby terminated and the question 
    of staying House proceedings was moot.
        On March 9, 1977, again 1 week later, the panel met in an open 
    hearing for the purpose of discussing the evidence presented. 
    Pursuant to a motion made by Chairman Ammerman, the panel voted 2 
    to 1 to recommend to the full Committee on House Administration 
    that contestee Gammage's motion to dismiss be granted.
        On April 28, 1977, at a full committee meeting, the Committee 
    on House Administration voted 16 to 6 to adopt House Resolution 
    526:

  Resolved, That the election contest on Ron Paul, contestant, against Bob 
Gammage, contestee, 22d Congressional District of the State of Texas, be 
dismissed.

        That is the resolution before the House this afternoon.
        Mr. Speaker, a contest for a seat in the House is a matter of 
    the most serious import. The House underlined its concern when it 
    passed, in 1969, the Contested Election Act.
        The thrust of the legislative history and first House cases 
    interpreting the contested election law can be summarized simply:

  The contestant must, at the outset, make allegations with sufficient 
supportive evidence to justify his claim to the seat. In other words, Mr. 
Speaker, the contestant must come forward with sufficient evidence, which 
if substantiated, would show he would have won the election.

        Mere allegations or statements by one's campaign workers do not 
    meet the high standard of supportive evidence that must be offered 
    before a contestant is entitled to go forward.
        The dissenting views object because an evidentiary burden is 
    placed on contestant Paul. However, Mr. Speaker and my fellow 
    colleagues, that is only proper: The contested election law does 
    not purport to allow losing candidates to go on fishing 
    expeditions. Indeed, had the committee permitted, Mr. Paul might 
    have attempted to depose every voter in the 22d district.
        Mr. Speaker, Ron Paul had his ``days in court.'' This committee 
    allowed him ample opportunity to argue his case and present 
    supportive and credible evidence that would show his entitlement to 
    this seat in Congress.
        He argued at length, but failed to present evidence to support 
    his claim to this seat.
        Mr. Speaker, I urge the adoption of House Resolution 526.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, before yielding to the distinguished 
    gentleman from California, I am constrained to say with 
    considerable pride that in this instance and in the preceding one, 
    the wisdom of setting up bipartisan panels, including bipartisan 
    staff and bipartisan investigators, is vindicated by the splendid 
    work done by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Ammerman) and the 
    gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Minish), as well as the two panel 
    chairmen to follow. The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Ammerman) 
    has been a U.S. attorney for western Pennsylvania, and has had 
    extensive experience as a prosecutor, as a lawyer, and certainly 
    has given evidence of a splendid knowledge of law in this instance.
        Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield 5 minutes to 
    the gentleman from California (Mr. Wiggins), a distinguished 
    constitutional lawyer second only to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
    Eckhardt).
        Mr. [Charles] WIGGINS [of California]. Mr. Speaker, I thank the 
    gentleman for yielding to me. I object to the resolution, and will 
    urge my colleagues to vote against it, but I assure the gentleman 
    that my objections are not based upon any constitutional argument.
        Ladies and gentlemen, we are in the process of adopting a 
    totally improper procedure for the consideration of election 
    contests, and it is important that we correct it now. It has 
    nothing to do with the merits of Mr. Paul's case or the case that 
    will follow. It is important, however, that whatever the merits may 
    be, we adopt a procedure providing for the orderly, fair 
    disposition of election contests.
        Let me explain very briefly, ladies and gentlemen, what our 
    statute provides. The new contested election statute enacted by 
    this House provides that a contest will be commenced by the filing 
    of a document known as a notice of contest. This is something akin 
    to a complaint. It is a pleading which initiates the process.
        That pleading, the notice of contest, must be filed within 30 
    days following the certification of the results of an election by 
    the appropriate State election officers. In this case, there is no 
    challenge at all to the fact that Mr. Paul filed an appropriate 
    notice of contest within the time provided by law.
        The next section of our election contest statute says what the 
    contestee must do when served with a notice of contest. The statute 
    says that the contestee may do one of two things: He may either 
    file an answer within 30 days of service of the notice of contest, 
    in which answer the contestee admits, denies or otherwise answers 
    the complaint: or, alternatively, the contestee may raise certain 
    motions by way of defense.
        Those motions include a statement that the complaint, that is, 
    the notice, is so ambiguous that it is impossible to frame an 
    answer to it. We understand such a motion. It is addressed to the 
    sufficiency of the pleading. The statute also provides that a 
    contestee may, by way of motion, complain that the notice of 
    contest fails to state with particularity the grounds upon which 
    the contest is founded or that it would change the result of the 
    election. Such a motion is also addressed to the pleadings.
        Bear in mind that the burden on the maker of that motion is to 
    ``state,'' only to allege, the basis of the contest.
        The statute goes on to provide a method of collecting evidence 
    in support of a well-pleaded notice of contest. The statute says 
    that 30 days after this answer comes in, the contestant may start 
    collecting his evidence by way of noticing depositions, obtaining 
    affidavits, or entering into stipulations.
        That is the technique envisioned in the law for the proof of 
    allegations contained in a notice of contest.
        That is the process, I say to the Members. Let me tell the 
    Members what is wrong with our treatment of that process.
        We are authorizing the contestee to file a motion to dismiss 
    any time after the filing of the notice of contest. When that 
    motion to dismiss is filed, the majority says that there is a 
    burden cast upon the contestant. He is a respondent to the motion. 
    The immediate burden is cast on the respondent of the motion to 
    come forward and prove the case at that time, even though the time 
    for taking depositions and the collection of evidence has not yet 
    run.
        There is an analogy in Federal civil practice.
        It is clear that the maker of a motion to dismiss is asking for 
    a disposition of the case on the merits. He is not challenging the 
    pleadings. It is not in the nature of a demurrer.
        In that respect, the motion to dismiss is very much like a 
    motion for summary judgment.
        There are enough attorneys in this Chamber right now to know 
    that the maker of a motion for summary judgment carries a very 
    heavy burden of proof.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from 
    California (Mr. Wiggins) has expired.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 additional minutes for the 
    purpose of debate only to the gentleman from California (Mr. 
    Wiggins).
        Mr. WIGGINS. Mr. Speaker, as I just said, this motion to 
    dismiss is very much like a motion for summary judgment. When 
    confronted with a motion for summary judgment in civil litigation, 
    the responding party does not carry the burden, nor should he. The 
    maker of the motion carries the burden. And he must show that there 
    are no issues of fact justifying going to the jury, and he must 
    show that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The 
    responding party need not prove his case to defeat the motion.
        He must merely show credible questions of fact which justify 
    going forward.
        Mr. Speaker, we are now abandoning all those lessons, and we 
    are saying that the making of motion to dismiss immediately after a 
    notice of contest casts upon the respondent the duty of proving his 
    case right then in response to the motion, even though the effect 
    of granting the motion, as in this case, is to cut off the 
    opportunity of taking depositions, which is the technique 
    envisioned in the statute for collecting the evidence.
        Let me suggest a proper disposition of this matter. Clearly 
    this resolution ought to go back to the committee so that the 
    contestant can go forward with his attempt to prove his case, as 
    envisioned by the statute. I have no idea whether he is going to 
    prove it or not. He has undertaken a pretty tough case to prove, 
    and it may be that he cannot prove it. But surely he should have 
    the chance to do so, and he should not be cut off.
        The proper disposition of the pending resolution is to recommit 
    that resolution to the Committee on House Administration so that 
    the contestant will have a chance to prove his case. If in fact he 
    cannot do so, of course, we will dispose of his contest quickly, 
    but under no circumstances should we right now on this floor ratify 
    a procedure which denies to a contestant the opportunity of proving 
    his case.
        In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, it might be alleged that Mr. Paul 
    had that chance. After all, the statute gives him 30 days within 
    which to take depositions. But the statute also says that he may 
    extend that time for good cause, and within 30 days Mr. Paul 
    through his attorney came forward and made a formal request to 
    extend time.
        Our committee did not even reach that motion. It elected to 
    dismiss it on the merits and with prejudice because the contestee 
    filed a notice to dismiss.
        We cannot tolerate this procedure. We cannot tolerate it in the 
    future. There are going to be other contests by Republicans and 
    Democrats, so let us not look at this as a partisan issue. This 
    question will come up again in the future. If we do anything today, 
    let us establish a precedent, a precedent that will provide for the 
    fair disposition of all election contests according to the election 
    contest statute. Let us not emasculate that statute as is suggested 
    by the majority.
        Mr. Speaker, I urge a ``no'' vote on the resolution. I urge an 
    ``aye'' vote on the motion to recommit which will be made.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman 
    from Michigan (Mr. Nedzi).
        Mr. [Lucien] NEDZI [of Michigan]. Mr. Speaker, I thank the 
    gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Thompson) for yielding me this time.
        Mr. Speaker, I was very pleased to hear the gentleman from 
    California (Mr. Wiggins) say that this is not a partisan issue. I 
    think the Members on our side have demonstrated that it is not a 
    partisan issue because we voted across the board in all four of 
    these contests. We disallowed them basically because evidence was 
    not presented to our committee which warranted that kind of 
    response upholding any of the contests.
        Mr. Speaker, the issue is a pretty simple one which I think 
    each of us is going to have to resolve in his own mind. The 
    gentleman from California (Mr. Wiggins) has taken one approach to 
    the statute. I, along with my colleagues on this side of the aisle, 
    have taken another approach which I think is the more reasonable 
    one.
        The question is whether we are going to insist upon all of the 
    fine legalisms of procedure that exist in a court of law in these 
    election contests which are, as all of us know, fraught with 
    political pitfalls and political temptations.
        This is the problem, Mr. Speaker. It is not a partisan issue.
        I think that in many cases if we go the route of allowing these 
    legal procedures to tie up the Committee on House Administration 
    and the House of Representatives to a point where we cannot resolve 
    these election contests expeditiously, we are going to find that in 
    each of the congressional districts anyone who thinks that he has a 
    good shot at whoever is pronounced the winner of an election, 
    during the next election will engage in an election contest. He 
    will come in and have a forum which will enable him to get a leg up 
    as far as the next election is concerned. The issue will not be 
    resolved within that period of time.
        Therefore, Mr. Speaker, the question is whether we are going to 
    seek to resolve these issues expeditiously where evidence has not 
    been presented to the panel with any degree of sufficiency, or 
    whether we are going to insist on permitting these people to go on 
    fishing expeditions.
        There is an historical presumption that the certificate of 
    election is valid; and unless that is refuted with adequate 
    evidence, we certainly should stick to that presumption.
        Mr. [George] MAHON [of Texas]. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman 
    yield?
        Mr. NEDZI. I yield to the gentleman from Texas
        Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I concur in the remarks of the 
    gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Nedzi). The Committee on House 
    Administration has now investigated this matter and is satisfied 
    that Mr. Gammage received the majority of the votes in the election 
    and that in the recount he continued to receive a majority of the 
    votes. He was certified by the secretary of state of Texas as 
    having been elected to the Congress from the 22d District. Any 
    close election always raises questions, but it seems to me this now 
    should not be a partisan matter and that the proper action of the 
    House is to approve the recommendation of the Committee on House 
    Administration so that the people of the 22d District of Texas can 
    be represented.
        I urge the House to defeat the motion to recommit and to 
    approve the recommendation of the committee.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
    from Texas (Mr. Archer), for purposes of debate only.
        Mr. [William] ARCHER [of Texas]. Mr. Speaker, last November 
    voters of the 22d Congressional District of Texas went to the polls 
    to elect their Congressman.
        The true outcome of that election is still very much in doubt, 
    and it now appears quite probable from the proceedings today that 
    it will be forever in doubt.
        Mr. Speaker, I must question the action taken by the Committee 
    on House Administration. The committee has denied the right to 
    pursue justice, which is sacred to our American principles, and 
    denied it to one of the staunchest defenders of justice and liberty 
    who has ever served in the Congress.
        Certainly the time is now to put to rest any doubts whatsoever 
    about the outcome of last November's election. However, that does 
    not mean that we have a right to unfairly limit a fellow American's 
    right to present evidence to prove his case; and that is what the 
    majority will be doing today if it votes to dismiss Congressman Ron 
    Paul's contest.
        Mr. Speaker, as my colleague, the gentleman from California has 
    stated so eloquently, Congressman Ron Paul has procedurally been 
    denied the opportunity to present evidence substantiating his claim 
    that the election should be invalidated.
        For the second time now, Congressman Ron Paul has been told 
    that he has no right to present evidence to prove his case.
        The Texas Supreme Court ruled in effect that the people of the 
    State of Texas do not have any right to use their court system to 
    settle questions involving Federal elections. But I might point out 
    that that was a 5 to 4 decision of a 9-judge panel, all of whom are 
    Democrats.
        Is this body going to rule that the people of the State of 
    Texas also cannot depend upon the U.S. House of Representatives to 
    seek out the truth in such disputes? If so, that is really quite a 
    frightening comment on our system of justice in this country.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
    consume.
        Mr. Speaker, I cannot leave unanswered the remarks of the 
    gentleman from Texas (Mr. Archer). To say that there is still doubt 
    may be a valid claim in his mind. It is not in the judgment of the 
    committee.
        To say that there has been a denial of justice by the Committee 
    on House Administration is an absolute and complete untruth and is 
    deeply resented.
        I refuse to yield.
        To say that we should yield this matter to the Supreme Court of 
    Texas is to say to the Supreme Court of Texas, notwithstanding the 
    5-to-4 vote that, no, you are wrong, we throw it back to you.
        To say that we have not considered motives, to say that we have 
    been unfair, is an absolute insult to the members of the Committee 
    on House Administration and I do not intend to let it go 
    unanswered.
        I deeply regret having to say this to the gentleman.
        The gentleman from California (Mr. Wiggins) has not accused us 
    of evil motives. He bases his case on legal theory. The gentleman 
    from Texas may make such judgments as he wants on the Americanism 
    of anybody--whatever that is, whether it be love of mother, or 
    apple pie, or Texas, or whatever. He can have his definition. I 
    have wondered for years at the definition of a great American. I 
    have heard a great many described as great Americans whom I would 
    not describe as such, but I have not taken their definition.
        Mr. Speaker, I yield briefly to the gentleman from California 
    (Mr. Wiggins) for the purpose of debate only.
        Mr. WIGGINS. Mr. Speaker, I did not at all understand the 
    gentleman from Texas (Mr. Archer) to impugn in any way the motives 
    and the integrity of the members of the committee on which we both 
    serve but, nevertheless, I fully share the views of the gentleman 
    from Texas that justice has been denied in this case because the 
    committee is approving a procedure which prevents one of the 
    parties from going forward to prove his case. That is a fair 
    observation and I hope the gentleman from New Jersey does not take 
    it personally.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, we have 
    adhered strictly to the standards set forth in the statute. I 
    concede to the gentleman that it can be bad but I deny that there 
    was any justice denied in this case.
        Mr. WIGGINS. Indeed, the words ``motion to dismiss'' do not 
    appear anywhere in this statute. This is not a statutory motion. 
    Rather is calls upon the inherent authority of the committee to 
    dismiss a frivolous petition on a good showing. Strangely, we 
    require the respondent to prove his case in order to resist the 
    motion. That is not right, my colleagues, and I do not believe that 
    that is what justice is all about. This emasculates the statute. I 
    urge the Members to read it, it is all in title 2, section 382.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes, for debate only, 
    to the gentleman from California (Mr. John L. Burton).
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON [of California]. Mr. Speaker, later on there 
    is another contest Pierce against Pursell that is a very close 
    election that will forever be in doubt in the minds of many people, 
    including the member of the Democratic Party whose motion was 
    dismissed by majority members of the House Administrative 
    Committee. He was denied any means of pursuing his action, which 
    was merely a recount, because there is no provision available. We 
    did it consistent with the laws and the procedures of this House 
    and the Committee on House Administration. That election will also 
    forever be in doubt in the mind of the Democrat who ran for office.
        I would say to my colleagues on this side of the aisle I will 
    wonder if we did the right thing if this all becomes a partisan 
    basis in the view that elections will forever be in doubt, because 
    we do not have a procedure--and I would like to see one--for 
    recount. But we were struck with the fact that under the laws and 
    under our precedents there is no procedure except to call them as 
    we see them, and that is how we did it, fairly and squarely. I do 
    not see anybody raising that issue on the Pierce against Pursell 
    matter.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume 
    to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Ammerman).
        Mr. AMMERMAN. Mr. Speaker, we, the panel, notified the 
    contestant of the hearings and for him to come forward with 
    whatever he had. We heard the argument and questions were put by 
    the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Nedzi) directly to his counsel--
    which the transcript will show--such as, ``Do you have anything? 
    Why do you not present it?''
        It boils down simply to this: Do the Certificate of Election 
    and the results of the election that it certifies mean anything, or 
    does the person who was certified have to go in and show that the 
    contestant was wrong? It is strictly a technicality. He had an 
    opportunity to present everything he had. He had taken depositions 
    over a period of almost 89 days, and he did not even present them. 
    There was an opportunity not only that day but in the ensuing week, 
    which we gave him, to present anything, and it was not done.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the 
    resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.

                   motion to recommit offered by mr. wiggins

        Mr. WIGGINS. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the 
    resolution?
        Mr. WIGGINS. I am, Mr. Speaker.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
    recommit.
        The Clerk reads as follows:

  Mr. Wiggins moves to recommit the resolution, H. Res. 526, to the 
Committee on House Administration.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous 
    question is ordered on the motion to recommit.
        There was no objection.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to 
    recommit.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the noes appeared to have it.
        Mr. WIGGINS. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground 
    that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a 
    quorum is not present.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
        The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    126, nays 260, answered ``present'' 2, not voting 44, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 211] . . . 

        Mr. FINDLEY changed his vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
        Mr. WIRTH changed his vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
        So the motion to recommit was rejected.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution.
        The question was taken; and the SPEAKER pro tempore announced 
    that they ayes appeared to have it.
        Mr. WIGGINS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were refused.
        So the resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 16.3 Young v Mikva

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the Tenth District of Illinois was conducted on November 2, 
1976.(12) The general election candidates were Samuel H. 
Young (the Republican candidate) and Abner J. Mikva (the Democratic 
candidate). The initial vote totals indicated that Mr. Mikva received 
106,804 votes, while Mr. Young received 106,603 votes. Mr. Mikva's 
margin of victory was therefore 201 votes. On November 5, 1976, a 
county clerk filed a petition in an Illinois state court to have 
certain absentee ballots counted, despite their having not been 
delivered to their required precincts in time to be counted. The court, 
however, dismissed the action. A similar action filed on November 12, 
1976, was also dismissed. Mr. Mikva was declared the winner of the 
election by the Governor on November 22, 1977.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 95-244, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On November 24, 1976, Mr. Young took advantage of the state's 
``discovery recount'' procedures to request a partial recount of 
certain precincts. This recount, supervised by state officials and 
observers from the Committee on House Administration, began on December 
6, 1976, and was concluded on December 7, 1976.
    On December 16, 1976, Mr. Young filed a petition for a court-
ordered recount of certain precincts. Mr. Mikva opposed this motion on 
January 6, 1977, and the court granted Mr. Mikva's motion to dismiss on 
January 18, 1977, finding that the state's recount provisions were 
inapplicable to Federal elections, and that there were no state 
procedures for contesting such elections. Mr. Young appealed to the 
Illinois Supreme Court, but at the time of the filing of the 
committee's report in this election contest, the Illinois Supreme Court 
had not issued a decision.
    On December 20, 1976, Mr. Young (hereafter ``contestant'') filed a 
notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was referred to 
the Committee on House Administration for its consideration. On January 
20, 1977, Mr. Mikva (hereafter ``contestee'') filed a motion to 
dismiss, and on March 8, 1977, an ad hoc panel from the Committee on 
House Administration met to consider oral arguments and written 
testimony. The panel gave the parties an additional ten days to submit 
further information. Action on the motion to dismiss was deferred until 
April 20, 1977. At that time, the ad hoc panel recommended granting 
contestee's motion to dismiss.
    In its report recommending dismissal of the contest, the Committee 
on House Administration reiterated previously-articulated standards for 
evaluating motions to dismiss. The report noted the presumptions of 
regularity that accompany official state election documents (such as 
certificates of election), as well as actions by election officials. 
The burden is thus placed on the contestant to overcome these 
presumptions of regularity by substantial evidence. Not only must the 
contestant show that there existed fraud, mistake, or other 
irregularities in the election process, but that such factors were 
determinative of the outcome. Ultimately, the committee found that the 
contestant had failed ``to sustain the necessary burden to 
overcome''(13) the motion to dismiss.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. H. Rept. 95-244, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One minority party Member (Rep. Dave Stockman of Michigan) filed 
minority views to accompany the committee's report. In his statement, 
Rep. Stockman claimed that it was ``premature'' and 
``improper''(14) for the House to dismiss the contest. He 
described the contestant as facing a ``Catch-22''(15) 
dilemma, where state recount procedures denied him the ability to 
inspect ballots and, lacking such supporting evidence, contestant could 
not proceed to the discovery phase under the FCEA. In Rep. Stockman's 
view, the motion to dismiss should not be granted, in order to afford 
contestant the opportunity to gather additional evidence. In additional 
dissenting views submitted by all minority party members of the 
committee, the argument was made that ``the majority elevates a 
certificate of election to a conclusive presumption of the validity of 
an election by denying to the contestant any means of challenging 
it.''(16)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Id. at p. 9.
15. Id. at p. 8.
16. Id. at p. 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On May 9, 1977,(17) the committee offered House 
Resolution 527 (dismissing the contest) as a privileged matter, which 
the House adopted by voice vote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 123 Cong. Rec. 13957-60, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

             DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST AGAINST ABNER J. MIKVA

        Mr. [Frank] THOMPSON [of New Jersey]. Mr. Speaker, by direction 
    of the Committee on House Administration, I call up a privileged 
    resolution (H. Res. 527), and ask for its immediate consideration.
        The CLERK read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 527

  Resolved, That the election contest of Samuel H. Young, contestant, 
against Abner J. Mikva, contestee, Tenth Congressional District of the 
State of Illinois, be dismissed.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(18) The gentleman from New 
    Jersey (Mr. Thompson) is recognized for 1 hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. William Natcher (KY).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
    consume.
        Mr. Speaker, this resolution deals with the contested election 
    case of Young against Mikva. The ad hoc panel investigating this 
    case was chaired by the gentleman from California, the Honorable 
    Leon Panetta, and consisted of the gentleman from California, the 
    Honorable Augustus Hawkins, and the gentleman from Michigan, the 
    Honorable Dave Stockman.
        Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California 
    (Mr. Panetta), the panel chairman.
        Mr. [Leon] PANETTA [of California]. Mr. Speaker, we deal now 
    with House Resolution 527, which involves the election contest 
    between Samuel Young, the contestant, and Abner Mikva, the 
    contestee, in the 10th Congressional District of Illinois.
        The Committee on House Administration recommends adoption of 
    the resolution for dismissal. The history of this case is rather 
    complicated. I will try to present a brief summary to the House.
        The general election was held on November 2, 1976, at which 
    time Mr. Mikva won over Mr. Young by 201 votes. On November 22 Mr. 
    Mikva was certified and declared by the Governor of Illinois as 
    having been duly elected.
        On November 24, Mr. Young filed a petition for discovery 
    recount with the clerk of Cook County. On December 6 and 7, a 
    recount was held before representatives of Mr. Young and Mr. Mikva, 
    the clerk of Cook County, and staff members of the Committee on 
    House Administration. A retabulation was made of approximately 
    53,000 votes, and it was indicated at that time that there was only 
    a difference of four votes in the election result.
        On December 16, 1976, a petition for a recount was filed by Mr. 
    Young in the circuit court, and on December 20, 1976, Mr. Young 
    filed a notice of intention to contest the election with the House 
    of Representatives.
        Mr. Speaker, the notice of intention to contest was based on 
    approximately five grounds, alleging malfunction of voting 
    machines, ballots with various identifying marks, ballots not 
    initialed by election judges, ballots cast by nonresidents, and 
    others.
        On January 4, 1977, Mr. Mikva was sworn in as the 
    Representative from the 10th Congressional District. On January 6, 
    1977, he filed a motion to dismiss the petition for recount in the 
    courts, and the courts upheld Mr. Mikva and dismissed the case. 
    That case is still under appeal to the supreme court in Illinois.
        On January 20, 1977, Mr. Mikva filed a motion to dismiss with 
    the committee under section b(3), which states that the contestant 
    must state grounds that are sufficient to change the result of the 
    election, and the position by Mr. Mikva was that the motion did not 
    state grounds sufficient to change the result of the election.
        Hearings were held on March 8, by the ad hoc subcommittee 
    chaired by myself, with the distinguished gentleman from California 
    (Mr. Hawkins) and also the distinguished gentleman from Michigan 
    (Mr. Stockman). On April 5 an additional hearing was held, and on 
    April 20 a final hearing was held on the motion to dismiss. And a 
    vote was taken of 2 to 1 recommending dismissal.
        The basic issue that faces the House is whether the notice of 
    contest filed by Mr. Young states grounds sufficient to change the 
    result of the election. The law in this case is very clear. In an 
    amendment adopted by the House in 1969 makes it clear that an 
    individual can file a motion for dismissal in order to challenge 
    notices of contest that do not meet the burden of presenting 
    sufficient facts and evidence.
        In Tunno against Veysey, which is one of the cases handled by 
    the House, the point was made that there is a substantial burden on 
    the contestant not only to come forward with allegations, but also 
    to present evidence and facts supporting those allegations. This is 
    a heavy burden placed on the contestant.
        Indeed, in one case, Gormley against Goss, it was held that 
    there were three prerequisites, one, that the official returns 
    themselves are prima facie evidence that the conduct of the 
    election officials was legal; second, that there is also a 
    presumption that the officials performed their duty honestly.
        Therefore, the burden to resist these presumptions is a heavy 
    one and falls on the contestant.
        Mr. Speaker, this is not just a motion for summary judgment. It 
    should not be compared to other civil proceedings. This is not just 
    simple notice pleadings. There is a substantial burden on the 
    contestant to come forward not only with allegations; but with 
    facts.
        In this case, Mr. Speaker, the initial allegations were based 
    not on fact but on information and belief. The affidavits filed by 
    the contestant showed, at most, a difference of 4 to 10 votes out 
    of 53,000 votes.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from 
    California (Mr. Panetta) has expired.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 additional minutes to the 
    gentleman from California (Mr. Panetta), for purposes of debate 
    only.
        Mr. PANETTA. To continue what I was saying, Mr. Speaker, the 
    contestant showed a difference of 4 to 10 votes out of the 53,000 
    vote recount and out of the 200,000 vote election result.
        The question is, Are 4 to 10 votes enough of a difference to 
    warrant this House proceeding with a full investigation and a full 
    recount of that election?
        Mr. Speaker, it was the decision of the panel, which has the 
    right to exercise its discretion in these matters, based on the 
    facts presented to it, that the contestant had not met his burden. 
    We are not in the business of helping the contestant to make out 
    his case. We may argue with procedure. We may not like the process 
    established, but the fact is that we must adhere to the procedures 
    that we have before the House. The fact is that the contestant did 
    not meet or comply with those procedures.
        Mr. Speaker, it could well be said that any argument with 
    procedures should be dealt with legislatively; but it should not be 
    dealt with in the context of a quasijudicial proceeding. Therefore, 
    Mr. Speaker, based on the time and effort that would be involved in 
    further investigating this case and based on the dangerous 
    precedent that could be established, it was the decision of the 
    panel that we recommend dismissal of the case.
        I, too, Mr. Speaker, as chairman of that panel, recommend 
    dismissal of this case and that the Members agree to House 
    Resolution 527.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the 
    distinguished gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Stockman), for the 
    purposes of debate only.
        Mr. [David] STOCKMAN [of Michigan]. Mr. Speaker, I rise in 
    opposition to the resolution before us.
        I just want to make clear before I proceed into the argument 
    that we do not take this position in this case for the purpose of 
    merely overturning the result of a certified election. We are not 
    taking this position, because we wish to deny the seat to a sitting 
    Member of this body, because we want to see a seat switched from 
    one side of the aisle to the other, and certainly not because we 
    think the proceedings which took place before our panel and our 
    full committee were unfair.
        Mr. Speaker, our purpose, really, in raising these questions on 
    these resolutions is to prevent the accumulation of precedents 
    which, in our judgment, will render our whole contested elections 
    procedure null and void and will make it, for all practical 
    purposes, a useful instrument to resolve election contests.
        I think it is important for the House to understand that the 
    resolution before the House today is not the product of a hearing 
    on the merits of this case. No evidence was gathered by the 
    committee. Neither of the parties involved in this contest took 
    depositions or other steps to gather evidence. No examination or 
    cross examination occurred.
        All of the procedures that are provided by U.S.C. 386 to 389 
    were not used, because we did not get that far. This motion to 
    dismiss was interposed; and as a result, the basic procedures of 
    the Contested Elections Act were not used.
        The fact is that the motion to dismiss must clearly rest on a 
    showing by the contestee that grounds sufficient to change the 
    result of the election were not presented.
        Mr. Speaker, the majority of the panel and the majority of the 
    committee have concluded that such grounds were not presented.
        I would like to take just about 2 minutes to lay before the 
    House some of the information that was contained in the notice of 
    contest, in the pleadings of the contestant in this case, and then 
    I would ask the Members, on the basis of this evidence, whether or 
    not they think sufficient grounds were presented.
        The following pieces of information were presented to us in the 
    original notice of the contestant, first, it showed that there were 
    10 votes that were counted for the contestee which actually 
    belonged to the contestant, as a result of a discovery recount that 
    was made, and those have not been questioned by the contestee.
        Second, it showed in this same discovery recount which was 
    carried out pursuant to State procedure, that there were 230 
    ballots which were uninitialed by the election judges and, 
    nevertheless, they were counted, even though that is a violation of 
    the State law in Illinois.
        The third thing that the notice showed, or contended, or 
    alleged, was that there were 611 ballots containing distinguishing 
    marks, numbers, some of them in sequential order; these ballots 
    also contained lines, checks, and all of these marks, again, are 
    prohibited by the election act in Illinois.
        These ballots were counted, therefore, in violation of the 
    basic election act in this State under which the election was 
    carried out.
        Then, finally, the notice of contest filed by the contestant 
    contained the names and addresses of 20 individuals who voted in 
    that election despite the fact that they had been stricken from the 
    registration rolls previous to the election. Nevertheless, those 
    ballots cast by unregistered voters were counted.
        What does this add up to? It adds up to a showing, a clear, 
    concrete, material showing, that 871 ballots were counted in that 
    contest which were either--No. 1, erroneously tabulated; No. 2, 
    counted in violation of the State law; or, No. 3, illegally cast.
        We were dealing with an election involving a difference of only 
    201 votes and we have a showing in the pleadings, in the notice of 
    contest, that there were 871 ballots which are subject to question.
        The only thing that the notice of contest does not show is 
    whether or not each of those 871, or even 500 of them, would have 
    gone to the contestee or the declared winner in that election, Mr. 
    Mikva and, therefore, would not change the outcome.
        But I would suggest to the House that proving which way each 
    one of those ballots would have gone is not something that has to 
    be done in the initial notice; that is something that should be 
    done during hearings on the merits.
        This case is far different from some of those we have had in 
    the past, because I think the notice is sufficient and demonstrates 
    that the outcome could have been different.
        I would urge that the House recommit this matter to the 
    committee.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, before yielding to the gentleman 
    from California (Mr. John L. Burton) following which I presume the 
    gentleman from California (Mr. Wiggins) would want to be heard--I 
    might point out that, in substance, the legal groundwork for this 
    and the other three contests today is essentially the same. I would 
    think that it is a matter which will come up later, and which 
    deserves some further in depth discussion, probably in the 
    Committee on House Administration which has the substantive 
    legislative jurisdiction.
        Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman 
    from California (Mr. John L. Burton) for debate only.
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON [of California]. Mr. Speaker, I thank the 
    gentleman from New Jersey for yielding to me.
        This case, again, is not unlike the next matter that will be 
    before us and it is not unlike a matter that was before us 2 years 
    ago out in the State of Nebraska, Ziebarth versus Smith, where 
    there was a close election and where the loser petitioned on the 
    basis of statistical information and probabilities that the 
    counting of the ballots had to be erroneous and, therefore, the 
    winning candidate, Mrs. Smith of Nebraska, should not have been 
    seated.
        At that time the Committee on House Administration, with a 
    majority joined by the minority and only myself voting in the 
    negative, dismissed the contest. The matter went to the floor and 
    again the contest was dismissed. I voted in the negative, because I 
    thought there should be some procedure in a close election whereby 
    there should be an avenue of recourse. I found out, chairing the 
    Pierce-Pursell matter that in fact there was not. Based on that I 
    would hope to introduce later this year legislation to provide for 
    a recount procedure for the House of Representatives and that does 
    not exist at the present time in many of the States. But again here 
    we are faced with a close election.
        The minority members felt somehow that the burden of proof was 
    met by the losing candidate and voted not to dismiss--the same 
    facts. The numbers are a little bit different. I think there is 
    maybe a 100-vote difference in the margin in the Michigan contest. 
    We on the majority--including myself who voted against dismissing a 
    similar matter 2 years ago because I thought there had to be 
    recourse--voted to dismiss, because there was just no way in the 
    world that we could go in and start ordering local governments to 
    pay for some kind of a recount.
        So I would hope that the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Stockman) 
    --and we have discussed this--would join with me in coming up with 
    a procedure to deal with close elections.
        Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. Mr. Speaker, will the 
    gentleman yield?
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. I yield to the gentleman from California.
        Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. I thank the gentleman for 
    yielding.
        I wonder if the gentleman will agree with me that perhaps we 
    should have a rollcall vote when the next resolution comes up.
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. Possibly on the next one.
        Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California. Apparently these are all 
    going on a party-line vote.
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. We did not operate on a party-line basis 
    when we dismissed Smith and Ziebarth 2 years ago, Kyros and Emery 2 
    years ago, and the Pierce-Pursell matter this year. I am kind of 
    distressed that some of these things become partisan, because the 
    facts are the same.
        We are dealing with a close election. Unfortunately, there is 
    no procedure under the laws we can address ourselves to, and I hope 
    we can deal with these in fairness as with the others.
        I thank the gentleman for yielding.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, for debate only, I yield 3 minutes 
    to the gentleman from California (Mr. Wiggins).
        Mr. [Charles] WIGGINS [of California]. Mr. Speaker, I should 
    like to paint a little picture here which demonstrates how utterly 
    preposterous this procedure is. Let us suppose you are a plaintiff 
    and you file a complaint, and you allege in the complaint a cause 
    of action entitling you to relief. Let us suppose that the 
    defendant instead of answering immediately files a motion to 
    dismiss your well-pleaded complaint and sets it down for hearing on 
    his motion to dismiss. You go into court, and the judge says to 
    you, the plaintiff:

  Well, what have you got to say for yourself? Why shouldn't we dismiss 
your complaint? Prove it. Prove it now. Prove up your allegations.

        Your answer is:

  Well, Your Honor, this is not my motion. It is not my burden to establish 
a motion to dismiss. Moreover, I am entitled to take depositions to find 
out what the evidence is to support my well-pleaded allegations.

        We have that procedure in civil litigation, because it is fair, 
    and doing it in this context is unfair.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. WIGGINS. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.
        Mr. THOMPSON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
        We are in an entirely different situation here, I respectfully 
    say. We are not in court. There is a presumption to which a Member 
    is entitled when his secretary of state or Governor certifies to 
    his election.
        Mr. WIGGINS. I stipulate that presumption, but it is not a 
    constructive presumption which prohibits someone from offering 
    evidence that it is improper. To maintain this position is to do 
    away with our election contest statute.
        Mr. THOMPSON. If the gentleman will yield further--and if 
    necessary I will yield him additional time for debate--in the 
    matter of the case just disposed of, the contestee was given an 
    opportunity of in excess of 10 days to submit additional evidence.
        The rules of discovery are not applicable here as they are or 
    perhaps should be. The legal situation, as the gentleman knows, is 
    different.
        Mr. WIGGINS. But surely the rules of discovery in our own 
    election contests statute are applicable; are they not?
        Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, and with respect to existing standards the 
    gentleman is quite right, and the rules have been strictly adhered 
    to.
        Mr. WIGGINS. It provides that those depositions be made after 
    answer and the answer was never filed in this case.
        Mr. THOMPSON. But those procedures were not utilized by Dr. 
    Paul.
        Mr. WIGGINS. If the gentleman wishes to go back and reargue 
    that case, I will if the gentleman will extend the time.
        In this case there is a stronger answer. There was not any 
    answer at all filed. In this case the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. 
    Mikva), for whom I have the greatest respect, filed an immediate 
    motion to dismiss, cutting off any opportunity.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
    from California (Mr. Panetta).
        Mr. PANETTA. Mr. Speaker, I would say very briefly if we get 
    into the game of trying to take outside legal procedures and try to 
    apply them here, it is a very dangerous game. Those procedures are 
    just not the same.
        As a matter of fact, in standard civil proceedings, if a person 
    comes forward with a motion and the respondent on the motion does 
    not present anything, he is going to get thrown out of court.
        In 2 U.S.C. section 385, default of contestee, the language 
    says:

  The failure of contestee to answer the notice of contest or to otherwise 
defend as provided by this chapter shall not be deemed an admission of the 
truth of the averments in the notice of contest. Notwithstanding such 
failure, the burden is upon contestant to prove that the election results 
entitle him to contestee's seat. (P.L. 91-138, Sec. 6, Dec. 5, 1969, 83 
Stat. 286.)

        If the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Mikva) did not do anything, 
    file a motion to dismiss, or whatever, and he did nothing, 
    according to this statute the burden would still be on the 
    contestant, Mr. Young, to prove his case.
        Mr. WIGGINS. Mr. Chairman. if the gentleman will yield, I agree 
    totally with the gentleman. Of course the burden rests on the 
    contestant to prove his case, but the time to prove that case is 
    when the case is submitted on the record, not before one has had an 
    opportunity to develop that record.
        Mr. PANETTA. I understand the gentleman's argument and I have 
    the greatest respect for his expertise. I respectfully disagree 
    with him. I think it extremely important that we do not come into 
    these cases as advocates and that we do not take the position of 
    simply supporting one side or the other because of party. We must 
    deal with the facts as they are presented to the committee.
        The second point I would like to make is that it is extremely 
    dangerous for this House if we permit free and open notices to be 
    filed by everyone everywhere to contest elections. They must be 
    based on fact.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the 
    resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.

                   motion to recommit offered by mr. wiggins

        Mr. WIGGINS. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the 
    resolution?
        Mr. WIGGINS. I am, Mr. Speaker.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
    recommit.
        The Clerk read as follows:

  Mr. Wiggins to recommit the resolution (H. Res. 527) to the Committee on 
House Administration.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous 
    question is ordered on the motion to recommit.
        There was no objection.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to 
    recommit.
        The motion to recommit was rejected.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes 
    appeared to have it.
        Mr. WIGGINS. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground 
    that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a 
    quorum is not present.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
        The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    272, nays 107, answered ``present'' 3, not voting 50, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 212] . . . 

        Mr. ST GERMAIN changed his vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
        Mr. HAGEDORN changed his vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
        So the resolution was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 16.4 Pierce v Pursell

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the Second District of Michigan was conducted on November 2, 
1976.(19) The general election candidates were Carl D. 
Pursell (the Republican candidate) and Edward C. Pierce (the Democratic 
candidate). The official canvass of votes indicated that Mr. Pursell 
received 95,397 votes, while Dr. Pierce received 95,053 votes. Mr. 
Pursell's margin of victory was therefore 344 votes. On November 23, 
1976, Mr. Pursell was certified as the winner of the election by the 
Michigan Board of Canvassers. His credential were presented to the 
House of Representatives, and on January 4, 1977, he was duly 
administered the oath of office without objection or challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 95-245, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On November 8, 1976, Dr. Pierce filed suit in state court to obtain 
a review of tally sheets and vote totals, but the initial order 
granting this request was reversed on appeal. Dr. Pierce next filed a 
petition for a recount with the Board of Canvassers, but this request 
was also denied, on the basis that state law did not provide for a 
recount of elections for Federal office.
    On December 2, 1976, Dr. Pierce (hereafter ``contestant'') filed a 
notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was forwarded to 
the Committee on House Administration for its consideration. The notice 
of contest claimed that certain mistakes had been made in the 
tabulation of votes, and that certain precincts should be recounted. In 
reply, Mr. Pursell (hereafter ``contestee'') filed a motion to dismiss, 
asserting the statutory defenses that the contestant had not properly 
claimed a right to the seat, and that contestant had not stated that, 
but for the alleged errors, the result of the election would have been 
different.
    The Committee on House Administration established an ad hoc panel 
of three Members on March 2, 1977, to investigate the matter. The panel 
met on March 7, 1977, to hear oral arguments on contestee's motion to 
dismiss. On March 16, 1977, the ad hoc panel voted unanimously to 
recommend that the committee grant the motion to dismiss.
    In its committee report, the Committee on House Administration 
reviewed prior precedents regarding the circumstances under which the 
committee would undertake a recount after the initiation of an election 
contest. The committee concluded that the case ``lacks all of the 
ingredients that our colleagues in earlier Congresses have found 
essential to ordering a recount.''(20) To prevail on a 
request for a recount, ``substantial allegations of fraud must be 
alleged''(21) and ``the likelihood must exist that the 
result of the election would have been different.''(22) The 
committee recommended that the House adopt a resolution to dismiss the 
contest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. H. Rept. 95-245, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 4.
21. Id.
22. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Members of the minority party filed supplemental views to accompany 
the committee report. In those views, the minority desired to 
distinguish this case from a similar case in the same 
Congress.(23) There, the minority felt that the contestant 
had affirmatively alleged specific ballots errors sufficient to change 
the result of the election. Here, however, the contestant had advanced 
merely a suspicion of error without any supporting evidence. Thus, 
while the minority agreed that the motion to dismiss should be granted, 
it disagreed with the standard used by the majority in evaluating such 
cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
23. See Young v Mikva, Sec. 16.3, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On May 9, 1977,(24) the committee offered House 
Resolution 528 (dismissing the contest) as a privileged matter, which 
the House adopted by voice vote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
24. 123 Cong. Rec. 13960-61, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST AGAINST CARL D. PURSELL    

        Mr. [Frank] THOMPSON [of New Jersey]. Mr. Speaker, by direction 
    of the Committee on House Administration, I call up a privileged 
    resolution (H. Res. 528) and ask for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 528

  Resolved, That the election contest of Edward C. Pierce, contestant, 
against Carl D. Pursell, contestee, Second Congressional District of the 
State of Michigan, be dismissed.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(25) The gentleman from New 
    Jersey (Mr. Thompson) is recognized for 1 hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
25. William Natcher (KY).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
    consume.
        Mr. Speaker, this resolution deals with the contested election 
    case of Pierce against Pursell. The ad hoc panel investigating this 
    case was chaired by the gentleman from California, the Honorable 
    John L. Burton, and consisted of the gentleman from Illinois, the 
    Honorable Frank Annunzio, and the gentleman from New Hampshire, the 
    Honorable James Cleveland.
        Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
    gentleman from California (Mr. John L. Burton), the chairman of the 
    panel, for purposes of debate only.
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON [of California]. Mr. Speaker, I thank the 
    chairman of the committee for yielding this time to me.
        This is the election contest matter to which I referred in 
    debate on the other two resolutions in which the margin of victory, 
    out of more than 190,000 votes, was 344 votes.
        In this matter I will listen, I am sure, very closely to the 
    motion to recommit offered by the gentleman from California, and I 
    will see if he raises any arguments that would cause me to change 
    my mind from my original intention.
        Mr. Speaker, we found ourselves in this situation with the same 
    problems as did the other election panels. This was a close 
    election that will forever be in doubt. There is a contest in which 
    the losing candidate raised some probabilities of error in the 
    tabulation of votes that could lead one to believe that the outcome 
    of the election might have been changed.
        After listening to testimony, we found that whatever we did 
    would be second-guessing the results of this election, with no real 
    information brought to us, other than some statistical 
    probabilities, that could guide us to do anything but dismiss the 
    contest.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.
        Mr. THOMPSON. May I ask the gentleman this question, Mr. 
    Speaker:
        Am I correct that in this matter, following the canvass showing 
    the difference of 344 votes and the presentation of the credentials 
    of Mr. Pursell to the House, on November 8 the contestant, Dr. 
    Pierce, filed a suit in the State court seeking an order permitting 
    an inspection and review of tally sheets containing the vote totals 
    and that the initial court granted the requested order, but that 
    decision was reversed on appeal; is that correct?
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. By the Supreme Court: yes, it was.
        Mr. THOMPSON. By the Supreme Court of the State?
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. By the Supreme Court of the State of 
    Michigan.
        Mr. THOMPSON. In other words, it is a situation analogous to 
    the Supreme Court decision in the Paul case; is that correct?
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. I believe that the State Supreme Court of 
    Michigan and the State Supreme Court of Texas are the highest 
    judicial branches in those States.
        Mr. Speaker, it is interesting to point out that if this were a 
    primary election, a recount could have been granted, under State of 
    Michigan law. If it were an election for a judgeship in the State 
    or for the State legislature, there could have been a recount under 
    the State law.
        The only place where there cannot be a recount is in the 
    general election for a Member of Congress or the U.S. Senate.
        There was a feeling on my part, as I expressed earlier, that 
    there should be a procedure whereby, especially in a State that 
    provides for recounts all the way up the line, with this one 
    exception, a recount might be in order. However, we have no 
    guidelines for a recount. We really have no policy with respect to 
    a recount.
        Therefore, based on that information, I felt that it was my 
    duty, in fairness and in equity, notwithstanding the fact that this 
    Member very strongly wanted the losing party, Dr. Pierce, to win 
    the general election, to decide that the only thing I could do, in 
    fairness and in equity, and that the members of committee, the 
    gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Annunzio) and the gentleman from New 
    Hampshire (Mr. Cleveland) could do was to dismiss this contest, not 
    on a party-line basis, not on an ideological basis, but in fairness 
    and in honesty.
        Mr. Speaker, I do feel, based on my experience with this 
    contest and with the others, that there should be a procedure 
    whereby recount procedures are available in congressional 
    elections; and I would hope that our committee would move on such a 
    matter.
        As I say, I think this is really pretty well on all fours with 
    the Gammage matter, and with the Mikva matter.
        Mr. Speaker, somebody wants to vote. I do not know whether the 
    motion to recommit will come now or later. I certainly believe that 
    consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds, but I would still vote 
    against the motion to recommit this matter, as I did on the others.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman 
    from California (Mr. Wiggins), for purposes of debate only.
        Mr. [Charles] WIGGINS [of California]. Mr. Speaker, some of the 
    Members of this body believe that this contest is fairly analogous 
    to the previous ones, the Paul and Mikva contests.
        It is not. There are some important legal distinctions between 
    them, and I will take just a moment to explain them.
        In this case the notice of contest alleges only as follows:

  Contestant Pierce bases this contest on information and belief that 
certain mistakes were committed and corrections thereof should be made. 
Contestant Pierce considers himself to be aggrieved by such mistakes.

        Mr. Speaker, that is the pleading we have in this case. In both 
    the Mikva case and the Paul case the complaint specified with great 
    particularity the precise nature of the irregularities.
        They were sufficiently numerous to change the result of an 
    election. The case before us now is indeed on all fours with the 
    case we decided 2 years ago, Zeibarth versus Smith. In that case 
    Mr. Zeibarth could not point to any specific irregularities, he 
    merely had a close election on his hands and he was disappointed in 
    the result and said,

  It is so close there must be some irregularity, I ought to have a 
recount.

        The decision in Zeibarth versus Smith was that a close election 
    standing alone was not a sufficient basis to overturn an election.
        The gentleman from California thought there should be a 
    procedure for a recount and I would not resist amending the code to 
    provide an automatic recount in close elections, even with no 
    specific allegation of irregularity.
        But in Zeibarth versus Smith 2 years ago we said that closeness 
    alone is not enough and that you must allege with specificity the 
    particular irregularities which occurred in the election. Clearly 
    Mr. Pierce has not done so. All that was shown is what I have read 
    to the Members, that certain unspecified mistakes were committed 
    and the contestant conceives himself to have been aggrieved. 
    Therefore the proper disposition in this case, in light of those 
    pleadings, and no offer to amend it on his part, is to approve the 
    resolution before the committee.
        It is not my intention to offer a motion to recommit, but if 
    the majority would wish to do so, I would not resist it.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
    consume.
        Mr. Speaker, I gather there is sort of an element of throwing 
    the gauntlet by the gentleman from California (Mr. Wiggins). I do 
    not anticipate any motion to recommit unless it is made by the 
    gentleman from California.
        I would like to point out a few things. First of all, the 
    notice of contest in the Mikva case, was based on information and 
    belief and not on particularities and not until the committee 
    granted an extension were there any affidavits presented.
        For those Members who subscribe and have subscribed to the 
    argument presented by the gentleman from California (Mr. Wiggins) 
    in the earlier cases today, it would seem that the same standard 
    should apply in this case. For those Members who desire different 
    standards and who voted earlier to recommit House Resolution 526, 
    perhaps they should consider turning this matter down, in order to 
    be consistent because they are analogous.
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. THOMPSON. I yield to the gentleman from California.
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to say there was 
    a showing which I would consider, there was one precinct where 
    there seemed to be a disproportionate falloff, or a possible loss 
    in which the losing party or the moving party claimed 90 votes. I 
    think the winning party stipulated it could not have been more than 
    40 or 50. There were further showings made, but we did not consider 
    them in any way sufficient enough to go in and order an election. 
    There was a partial recount that showed a switch of four votes.
        I really believe this is on all fours with the others.
        I might say that I believe as the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. 
    Stockman) does, that we should have a procedure setting forth how 
    we could deal with this type of matter because it is not an easy 
    thing to deal with, especially when you are in the majority and 
    calling them as you see them and then you find out that other 
    people appear to see things differently depending on how you look 
    at it from one side to the other.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the 
    resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it.
        Mr. [Elliott] LEVITAS [of Georgia]. Mr. Speaker, I object to 
    the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the 
    point of order that a quorum is not present.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
        The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    371, nays 8, answered ``present'' 2, not voting 51, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 213] . . . 

        Mr. MILLER of California changed his vote from ``nay'' to 
    ``yea.''
        So the resolution was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 16.5 Dehr v Leggett

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the Fourth District of California was conducted on November 2, 
1976.(26) The general election candidates were Robert L. 
Leggett (the Democratic candidate) and Albert Dehr (the Republican 
candidate). The official returns indicated that Mr. Leggett received 
75,866 votes, while Mr. Dehr received 75,202 votes. Mr. Leggett's 
margin of victory was therefore 664 votes. Following the canvass, Mr. 
Dehr filed for a recount in Sacramento County, which was observed by 
staff from the Committee on House Administration. Following the 
recount, Mr. Leggett's margin of victory was reduced to 651 votes. On 
December 3, 1976, Mr. Leggett was certified as the winner of the 
election by the California Secretary of State. His credentials were 
presented to the House of Representatives, and on January 4, 1977, he 
was duly administered the oath of office without objection or 
challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
26. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 95-654, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On December 31, 1976, Mr. Dehr (hereafter ``contestant'') filed a 
notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was referred to 
the Committee on House Administration for its consideration.
    In his notice of contest, contestant argued that the IBM Votomatic 
system used in the election did not reliably record voters' choices. 
Specifically, contestant alleged that the ballot and punch-card system 
made it difficult for voters to correctly distinguish between votes for 
write-in candidates and votes for Mr. Leggett (hereafter 
``contestee'').
    On March 2, 1977, the Committee on House Administration formed an 
ad hoc panel of three Members to review the case. On July 15, 1977, the 
panel met to hear oral arguments from the parties. On July 29, 1977, 
the panel voted to recommend that the contest be dismissed.
    In its committee report, the Committee on House Administration 
rejected the contention that the voters were confused by the Votomatic 
system used in the election. The committee noted the consistent manner 
in which candidates were listed on the master ballot, and considered it 
unlikely that voters would be confused as to how to vote for the 
contestee or for a write-in candidate. The contestant had presented no 
direct evidence as to how specifically votes would have been changed as 
a result of these ostensibly ambiguous ballots.
    On October 27, 1977,(27) the committee offered House 
Resolution 770 (dismissing the contest) as a privileged matter, which 
the House adopted by voice vote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
27. 123 Cong. Rec. 35407-408, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST OF ALBERT DEHR AGAINST ROBERT 
                                 L. LEGGETT    

        Mr. [Frank] THOMPSON [of New Jersey]. Mr. Speaker, by direction 
    of the Committee on House Administration I call up a privileged 
    resolution (H. Res. 770), and ask for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 770

  Resolved, That the election contest of Albert Dehr, contestant, against 
Robert L. Leggett, contestee, Fourth Congressional District of the State of 
California, be dismissed.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(28) The gentleman from New 
    Jersey (Mr. Thompson) is recognized for 1 hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
28. James Wright (TX).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume 
    to my distinguished colleague, the chairman of the ad hoc election 
    panel, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Pattison).
        Mr. [Edward] PATTISON of New York. Mr. Speaker, before getting 
    into this contest, allow me to go into some background. Eight cases 
    were filed before the Committee on House Administration arising out 
    of elections for seats in the 95th Congress, five from the general 
    election of November 2, 1976, two from primary elections, and one 
    from a subsequent special election.
        The U.S. Constitution provides Congress with plenary power over 
    its own elections and the rules of the House give the Committee on 
    House Administration authority and jurisdiction to process these 
    matters.
        In order to provide for both an efficient and expeditious 
    handling of these eight cases, the Honorable Frank Thompson, Jr., 
    chairman of the full Committee on House Administration, pursuant to 
    the rules of the House and the rules adopted for the Committee on 
    House Administration, designated this and seven other three-member 
    ad hoc panels to deal with these eight separate cases to the point 
    of disposition, subject to the approval of the full committee and 
    ultimately the full House.
        This ad hoc panel consists of Mr. Jones of Tennessee, Mr. Burke 
    of Florida, and myself, as chairman.
        A formal notice of contest was filed by Albert Dehr, 
    unsuccessful candidate for a seat in the 95th Congress in the 
    November 1976 general election. Mr. Dehr filed his notice of 
    contest in this case on January 3, 1977. Pursuant to the rules of 
    the House, the case was referred to the committee on House 
    Administration.
        Congressman Leggett responded on February 8, 1977, and the 
    matter was brought before the ad hoc election panel.
        On July 15, the panel heard oral argument, both sides being 
    represented by able counsel. The contestant claimed that 
    Congressman Leggett received votes allegedly cast for a write-in 
    candidate.
        On July 29, 1977, the panel met again to consider this matter. 
    After carefully considering the legal arguments, examining copies 
    of the ballot inserts and receiving a staff report from committee 
    general counsel, the panel voted unanimously to dismiss the 
    election contest.
        I might say, Mr. Speaker, it was clear to the panel that the 
    likelihood of any votes being erroneously cast for Congressman 
    Leggett was extremely remote. The contestant was given every 
    opportunity to demonstrate otherwise, but failed to do so.
        Finally, on September 21, 1977, the full Committee on House 
    Administration met and voted, again unanimously, to dismiss this 
    contest.
        Mr. Speaker, this matter was fully investigated and fairly 
    heard. I urge my colleagues to vote with the committee to dismiss 
    this contest.
        Mr. THOMPSON. I yield for the purpose of debate only to the 
    ranking minority member of the panel, the gentleman from Florida 
    (Mr. Burke).
        Mr. [Herbert] BURKE of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I thank the 
    gentleman from New York for yielding.
        As the ranking minority member of this ad hoc committee, I 
    would like to concur with a statement my colleague from New York 
    has just given. This matter has been examined fully by the 
    committee. My opinion is that the committee was fair with the 
    attorneys on both sides, and after hearing all the testimony and 
    the probable evidence the committee found no reason that the 
    outcome of this election should be reversed. I agree with the 
    recommendations of the committee.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the 
    resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 16.6 Hill and Panlasigui v Clay

    The primary election to nominate a Democratic candidate for the 
office of Representative to Congress from the First District of 
Missouri took place on August 3, 1976.(29) Of the seven 
candidates, William L. Clay received the most votes (by a margin of 
26,526 votes compared to the next highest vote-getter). A ``Concerned 
Citizens Committee'' on behalf of two losing primary candidates (Felix 
J. Panlasigui and Elsa D. Hill), filed a petition with election 
officials, alleging that the candidates' names were left off of certain 
ballots, that candidates' names were not in the correct position on 
other ballots, that illegal votes had been cast, and that voting 
machines had been tampered with. The St. Louis Board of Election 
Commissioners investigated the allegations, and concluded that there 
was ``no merit''(30) to the complaints. Thereafter, suits 
were filed in both state and Federal courts, both of which were 
dismissed on lack of jurisdiction grounds. On October 14, 1976, the 
``Concerned Citizens Committee'' requested that the FBI conduct an 
investigation into the matter. In December, the Justice Department 
concluded the matter, stating that it was ``lacking 
foundation.''(31)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
29. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 95-723, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
30. H. Rept. 95-723, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
31. Id. at p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On August 30, 1976, the ``Concerned Citizens Committee,'' on behalf 
of Mr. Panlasigui and Ms. Hill (hereafter ``contestants'') filed a 
notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was forwarded to 
the Committee on House Administration for its consideration. The notice 
of contest reiterated the claims made to state officials and the FBI. 
On March 2, 1977, the Committee on House Administration formed an ad 
hoc panel of three Members to review the allegations. On August 18, 
1977, committee staff traveled to St. Louis to meet with state and 
local election officials and review documents related to the case. On 
September 29, 1977, the ad hoc panel recommended dismissal of the case.
    In its committee report, the Committee on House Administration 
concluded that contestants' ``allegations were not well 
founded.''(32) The contestants failed to demonstrate 
sufficient grounds to change the result of the election, and their 
pleadings did not sustain a claim of a right to the seat. The committee 
thus recommended that the case be dismissed. On October 27, 
1977,(33) the committee offered House Resolution 822 
(dismissing the contest) as a privileged matter, which the House 
adopted by voice vote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
32. Id. at p. 4.
33. 123 Cong. Rec. 35408, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST OF ELSA DEBRA HILL AND FELIX J. 
            PANASIGUI [sic](34) AGAINST WILLIAM CLAY    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
34. As in the original. Text should read: Panlasigui.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Frank] THOMPSON [of New Jersey]. Mr. Speaker, by direction 
    of the Committee on House Administration, I call up a privileged 
    resolution (H. Res. 822), and ask for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 822

  Resolved, That the election contest of Elsa Debra Hill and Felix J. 
Panasigui, contestants, against William Clay, contestee, First 
Congressional District of the State of Missouri, be dismissed.

        The CHAIRMAN.(35) The gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. 
    Thompson) is recognized for 1 hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
35. James Wright (TX).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume 
    to my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. 
    Van Deerlin), chairman of the ad hoc election panel.
        Mr. [Lionel] VAN DEERLIN [of California]. Mr. Speaker, this 
    contested election involves the Democratic primary in the First 
    Congressional District of Missouri.
        Ned Pattison and Bill Frenzel also served the ad hoc panel 
    hearing the case.
        The Democratic primary for the First Congressional District of 
    Missouri was held on August 3, 1976. There were seven candidates.
        Congressman William L. Clay received 29,094 votes. I will skip 
    over the second, third, and fourth finishers, all of whom accepted 
    the official tally.
        The fifth highest number of votes cast were for one of the 
    contestants in this action, Felix J. Panasigui. He received 957 
    votes.
        The sixth highest number of votes were for the other 
    contestant, Elsa D. Hill, who received 574.
        On August 30, 1976, the contestants Panasigui and Hill filed 
    their notice of contest with the Clerk of the House.
        Since that time the contestants have filed numerous documents 
    and pleading with our committee. The allegations contained in those 
    documents raise substantially the same charges that the contestants 
    filed with the St. Louis Board of Election commissioners. They are:
        First. That Ms. Hill's and Mr. Panlasigui's names were left off 
    the primary ballot in at least 17 different polling places;
        Second. That in a number of instances, the name of Ms. Hill 
    appeared on the ballot in a place other than its designated 
    position;
        Third. That illegal votes were cast under the names of 
    registered voters who did not appear at the polls; and
        Fourth. That some votes were cast on the machines after the 
    closing of the polls.
        A staff report prepared by committee general counsel indicates 
    that the St. Louis board of election commissioners thoroughly 
    investigated the described charges, and found that: ``There is no 
    merit in the complaints filed by Mrs. Hill.''
        The staff report also indicates that the contestants requested 
    that the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of the 
    Justice Department conduct an investigation, and that subsequently 
    an investigation was conducted by the Federal Bureau of 
    Investigation. Attached to the staff report was a letter from 
    Justice stating that: ``The matter was closed in the Criminal 
    Division as lacking foundation.''
        Additionally, committee staff went to St. Louis and met with 
    the board of election commissioners and their counsel. At that 
    meeting the board's investigation was discussed, and supporting 
    documents were provided to staff.
        On September 29, 1977, the ad hoc election panel voted, 
    unanimously, to dismiss the election contest.
        Finally, on October 20, 1977, the full Committee on House 
    Administration voted, again unanimously, to dismiss this matter.
        Mr. Speaker, over the past several weeks, members of the 
    committee and staff have been harassed--even threatened--in 
    connection with this case. Enough of the taxpayers money has been 
    expended on the matter, which clearly has no basis in fact or law.
        Mr. Speaker, I urge colleagues to join in supporting the 
    recommendations of the panel and committee, and dismissing this 
    election contest.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from 
    California.
        Mr. Speaker, I yield, for purposes of debate only, such time as 
    he may consume to our distinguished colleague, the gentleman from 
    Minnesota (Mr. Frenzel).
        Mr. [William] FRENZEL [of Minnesota]. Mr. Speaker, I thank the 
    chairman for yielding.
        I subscribe to the statement of the gentleman from California 
    and hope this resolution will be speedily adopted.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the 
    resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 16.7 Lowe v Fowler

    On January 30, 1977, Andrew Young (Representative from the Fifth 
District of Georgia) resigned from the House in order to serve as 
Ambassador to the United Nations.(36) A special election to 
fill his vacant seat was conducted on March 15, 1977. Twelve candidates 
took part in the election, and no candidate received a majority of 
votes cast. A runoff election was then held on April 5, 1977, with 
Wyche Fowler receiving 54,378 votes and John Lewis receiving 32,732 
votes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
36. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 95-724, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On April 15, 1977, one of the 12 initial candidates, Wyman C. Lowe 
(hereafter ``contestant'') filed a notice of contest with the Clerk of 
the House, which was referred to the Committee on House Administration 
for its consideration. The contestant alleged that Mr. Fowler 
(hereafter ``contestee'') was ineligible to run for the seat because he 
had not resigned from the Atlanta City Council. The notice of contest 
also stated that the low vote totals for contestant (as compared to 
vote totals in a prior election) gave the presumption of fraud or 
irregularity. Contestant also claimed that a large number of unused 
extra ballots supported the claims of fraud or error. Contestee filed a 
motion to dismiss the contest, based on lack of standing by the 
contestant, and a failure to state grounds sufficient to change the 
result of the election.
    On March 2, 1977, the Committee on House Administration established 
an ad hoc panel of three Members to review the matter. On September 16, 
1977, staff of the committee met with state and local officials in 
Georgia. They obtained from the Atlanta City attorney an opinion that 
state law did not require resignation from the Atlanta City Council in 
order to run for another office. Committee staff also met with election 
officials to review documents relating to the claim of unused extra 
ballots. The committee concluded that the ``apparent discrepancies were 
either explicable or normal.''(37)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
37. H. Rept. 95-724, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the claims regarding low vote totals compared to 
prior elections, the committee's report cited earlier 
precedents(38) for the proposition that a mere disparity in 
the number of votes from one election to the next does not raise the 
presumption of irregularity. Vague or uncertain allegations will not be 
sufficient for a contestant to prevail in an election contest. The 
committee thus recommended granting contestee's motion to dismiss.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
38. See 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 942; and Deschler's Precedents Ch. 9 
        Sec. 47.9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On October 27, 1977,(39) the committee offered House 
Resolution 825 (dismissing the contest) as a privileged matter, which 
the House adopted by voice vote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
39. 123 Cong. Rec. 35408-409, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST AGAINST W. WYCHE FOWLER, JR.

        Mr. [Frank] THOMPSON [of New Jersey]. Mr. Speaker, by direction 
    of the Committee on House Administration, I call up a privileged 
    resolution (H. Res. 825), and ask for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 825

  Resolved, That the election contest of Wyman C. Lowe, contestant, against 
W. Wyche Fowler, Junior, contestee, Fifth Congressional District or the 
state of Georgia, be dismissed.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(40) The gentleman from New 
    Jersey is recognized for 1 hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
40. James Wright (TX).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, before yielding to the chairman of 
    the ad hoc panel, I would like to express my appreciation not only 
    to the three panel chairmen who are presenting these election 
    contest matters today, but to all the other members, majority and 
    minority, of the Committee on House Administration who served on 
    these panels.
        We think that we have saved a tremendous lot of time, money, 
    and that each and every one of the panel chairmen have done a 
    really outstanding job, as have their colleagues from the minority.
        In this case, the panel chairman to whom I yield, is the 
    gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Ammerman).
        Mr. [Joseph] AMMERMAN [of Pennsylvania]. Mr. Speaker, I have 
    been designated by the Honorable Frank Thompson, chairman of the 
    Committee on House Administration, to chair the ad hoc panel 
    investigating the contested election involving the Fifth 
    Congressional District of Georgia.
        Also serving with me are the Honorable Lucien Nedzi of 
    Michigan, and the Honorable Bill Frenzel of Minnesota.
        By way of background, a special election was held in Atlanta, 
    Ga., on March 15, 1977, to fill the seat vacated by U.N. 
    Ambassador, Andy Young. There were 12 candidates in that election. 
    Wyche Fowler ran first with 29,898 votes; John Lewis ran second 
    with 21,531. The contestant in today's case, Wyman Lowe, came in 
    eighth, with 276 votes.
        As Mr. Fowler did not receive a majority, a runoff election was 
    held on April 5, 1977. In that election, Mr. Fowler defeated Mr. 
    Lewis by 54,378 to 32,732 votes.
        On April 15, 1977, Mr. Lowe filed this election contest with 
    the House of Representatives. Since that time, Mr. Lowe has filed 
    numerous documents and pleadings with this committee. Generally, 
    Mr. Lowe alleges three grounds in support of his election contest:
        First. That since Mr. Fowler, who was president of the Atlanta 
    City Council did not resign that seat, he was ineligible to run for 
    Congress;
        Second. Mr. Lowe asserts that since he received 36,000 votes in 
    the 1970 Democratic primary against Andy Young and only 276 votes 
    in his 1977 race, there must exist fraud because of the disparity 
    in vote totals; and
        Third. That the vote tallys did not properly total and that 
    there were shortages in unused, extra ballots.
        The members of the panel have been provided with a staff report 
    prepared by committee general counsel.
        In summary, that report indicates that the office of the 
    Atlanta city attorney had ruled on February 16, 1976, that members 
    of the Atlanta City Council did not have to resign to run for other 
    office.
        The staff report also concluded that the precedents of the 
    House require a higher degree of proof than a showing that a 
    candidate received substantially fewer votes in a subsequent 
    election.
        Additionally, committee staff went to Atlanta and met with the 
    city attorney's office and Fulton County election officials. It was 
    determined that the allegations of the voting irregularities made 
    by Mr. Lowe were not substantiated. In many instances Mr. Lowe 
    apparently misread the tally sheets and used the congressional vote 
    rather than the total vote cast for Congress and the county 
    commissioner race. The staff was satisfied that the alleged 
    discrepancies were either explained away by examination or normal 
    to the election process.
        On October 6, 1977, the ad hoc election panel met and 
    unanimously voted to dismiss the election contest.
        Finally, on October 13, the full Committee on House 
    Administration met and voted, again unanimously, to dismiss this 
    case.
        Mr. Speaker, I might point to my colleagues that this is the 
    third election contest Mr. Lowe has filed with the House. This 
    contest has no claim to legitimacy--in either fact or law--and I 
    strongly urge my colleagues to promptly dismiss this matter.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume 
    to the distinguished minority member of the panel, the gentleman 
    from Minnesota (Mr. Frenzel), for debate only.
        Mr. [William] FRENZEL [of Minnesota]. Mr. Speaker, I thank the 
    distinguished gentleman from New Jersey for yielding to me.
        I support the statement of the distinguished gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania, the task force chairman, and hope that the resolution 
    will be promptly adopted.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the 
    resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 16.8 Moreau v Tonry

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the First District of Louisiana was conducted on November 2, 
1976.(41) Richard A. Tonry (the Democratic candidate) was 
certified as the winner of that election. Another Democratic candidate, 
James A. Moreau, who had lost to Mr. Tonry in the Democratic primary, 
petitioned the Committee on House Administration to investigate the 
circumstances of the primary election.(42) In addition, Mr. 
Moreau pursued his claim in state courts, and the Louisiana Supreme 
Court ultimately dismissed the case and refused the invalidate the 
election.(43)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
41. For more details on this case, see Contested Election Cases in the 
        House of Representatives: 1933 to 2011, CRS Report 98-194 (Dec. 
        12, 2011).
42. Parliamentarian's Note: As Mr. Moreau was not a candidate in the 
        general election, he would not have had standing to pursue his 
        election contest under the FCEA.
43. See Moreau v. Tonry, 339 So. 2d 3, 5 (La. 1976), rev'g 338 So. 2d 
        791 (La. 1976).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On February 11, 1977, several Louisiana election officials pleaded 
guilty to casting fraudulent votes for Mr. Tonry. As the Committee on 
House Administration continued its investigation, Mr. Tonry decided to 
resign his seat, thus mooting the election contest.(44) No 
committee report was therefore filed in this case. Mr. Tonry's letter 
of resignation was laid before the House on May 4, 1977:(45)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
44. Parliamentarian's Note: Following his resignation, Mr. Tonry was 
        charged with taking illegal campaign contributions. He pleaded 
        guilty and served a six-month prison term.
45. 123 Cong. Rec. 13391, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

               RESIGNATION AS MEMBER OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

        The SPEAKER laid before the House the following communications, 
    which were read:

Washington, DC., May 4, 1977.
Hon. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.,
Speaker of the House, Washington, DC.

        Dear Mr. Speaker: Enclosed please find my letter of resignation 
    addressed this day to the Honorable Edwin W. Edwards, the Governor 
    of the State of Louisiana.
        My short stay in the House has been the most rewarding 
    experience of my life. I am tremendously impressed by the integrity 
    and industry of its members. I have made friends whom I will never 
    forget.
        Keep my seat warm and tell my colleagues not to forget me 
    because I am running again and will win again.
        With kindest personal regards, I am.

            Sincerely,
                                                 Richard A. Tonry.




                                         House of Representatives,
                                     Washington, DC., May 4, 1977.
Hon. Edwin W. Edwards,
Governor, State Capitol,
Baton Rouge, La.

        Dear Governor Edwards: This is perhaps the hardest letter I 
    have ever had to write.
        I am sure you are familiar with the continuing controversy that 
    has surrounded my election to Congress. My own personal 
    investigation and that of the House Committee has convinced me that 
    there were fraudulent and illegal votes cast in my favor and in 
    favor of my opponent. I sincerely believe and have always felt that 
    if all the fraudulent and illegal votes were subtracted from the 
    total I would still be declared the winner.
        However, what I believe is not important. What must be 
    protected is our beloved Louisiana and this Nation. That fraudulent 
    votes were cast at all is deplorable. This democracy must be 
    protected and the people of the First Congressional District must 
    rest with the assurance that their Congressman has been elected by 
    a majority of the people.
        I have enjoyed nothing as much as serving my people in 
    Congress. I know I have been a good Congressman.
        But the divisiveness must be cured and the will of the people 
    in the First Congressional District must be definitively 
    recognized.
        For these reasons, I hereby tender my resignation as the United 
    States Representative for the First Congressional District.
        I respectfully request that you call a new election as soon as 
    possible so that the people of my district will not be without 
    representation for any significant length of time.

            Sincerely,
                                                 Richard A. Tonry.



Sec. 17. Ninety-sixth Congress, 1979-1980

Sec. 17.1 Perkins v Byron

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the Sixth District of Maryland was conducted on November 7, 
1978.(1) The general election candidates were Beverly Byron 
(the Democratic candidate) and Melvin Perkins (the Republican 
candidate). The official returns indicated that Mrs. Byron had received 
122,374 votes, while Mr. Perkins had received 14,276 votes. On November 
30, 1978, Mrs. Byron was certified as the winner of the election by the 
Maryland State Board of Canvassers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 96-78, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On November 28, 1978, Mr. Perkins (hereafter the ``contestant'') 
filed a notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was 
forwarded to the Committee on House Administration for its review. The 
notice of contest asserted that Mrs. Byron (hereafter the 
``contestee'') had been improperly selected by the state Democratic 
party to stand in the election in place of her husband, who had died 
prior to the general election. The contestant argued that a special 
election should have been held to fill the vacancy.
    On December 28, 1978, contestee filed both a motion to dismiss 
(based on lack of proper service) and a motion for a more definite 
statement. A supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by contestee on 
February 23, 1979, on the basis that contestant had not properly 
claimed a right to the seat, and that contestant had failed to state 
grounds sufficient to change the result of the election.
    The Committee on House Administration formed an ad hoc panel of 
three Members to review the case. On February 28, 1979, the panel met 
to hear oral arguments, and, after executive session deliberation, 
voted to recommend that the contestee's motion to dismiss be granted. 
On March 1, 1979, the full committee voted to recommend dismissal of 
the case.
    In its committee report, the Committee on House Administration 
found that the statutory requirement that contestee be properly served 
with the notice of contest had not been met. It further concluded that 
contestant had not stated grounds sufficient to change the result of 
the election. Contestant ``failed to present any documentary evidence 
supporting his allegations,''(2) nor did contestant attempt 
to demonstrate how the allegations, if true, would have changed the 
outcome of the election. The committee report noted provisions of state 
law regarding the death of candidates and the circumstances under which 
special elections are to be held, and concluded that there was no 
requirement to hold a special election in this case. The committee 
therefore recommended that the contestee's motion to dismiss be 
granted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. H. Rept. 96-78, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On March 29, 1979,(3) the committee filed its privileged 
report, and the House (by unanimous consent) adopted House Resolution 
189 to dismiss the contest:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 125 Cong. Rec. 6832-33, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

             DISMISSING ELECTION CONTEST AGAINST BEVERLY BYRON    

        Mr. NEDZI, from the Committee on House Administration, 
    submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 96-78) on the resolution 
    (H. Res. 189) dismissing the election contest against Beverly 
    Byron, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 
    printed.
        Mr. [Lucien] NEDZI [of Michigan]. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous 
    consent for immediate consideration of the resolution.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 189

  Resolved, That the election contest of Melvin Perkins, contestant, 
against Beverly B. Byron, contestee, Sixth Congressional District of the 
State of Maryland, be dismissed.

        The SPEAKER.(4) Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Michigan?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. Thomas O'Neill (MA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Nedzi) is 
    recognized for 1 hour.
        Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Speaker, the rules of the House and title 2 of 
    the United States Code place contested elections under the 
    jurisdiction of the Committee on House Administration. This year 
    five contested elections were filed with the committee.
        In order to insure the timely and responsive handling of these 
    election contests, so that all five might go forward 
    simultaneously, the committee has established five three-member 
    panels, consisting of two members of the majority and one member of 
    the minority, with majority and minority legal staff assigned to 
    support the panels.
        Each panel examines the record of the particular case assigned 
    to it, and then conducts hearings and factfinding as may be 
    necessary. After considering the information presented by the 
    parties, and after due deliberation, the election panel then 
    recommends to the full committee what it considers to be the 
    appropriate disposition of the contest. The committee then reviews 
    the recommendation, makes a final determination, and refers its 
    final action to the House. This procedure has been extremely 
    successful in insuring that both the contestant and contestee have 
    a timely and responsive forum for consideration of each contest.
        The election contest before the House this afternoon is Perkins 
    against Byron. It is the first of five which the House will 
    consider under the elections panel procedure this Congress. Each of 
    these contested elections is being considered under the provisions 
    of 2 U.S.C. 381 et seq., which was enacted in 1969. The first 
    contest decided under the 1960 act was Tunno against Vesey. 
    [sic](5) There the contestant alleged various 
    irregularities, and contestee moved to dismiss the contest. The 
    committee examined the contestant's arguments, and his showing that 
    the allegations, if true, would change the result of the election. 
    However, notwithstanding contestant's allegations, he failed to 
    demonstrate to the satisfaction of the committee that further 
    proceedings would be fruitful. The committee then recommended, and 
    the House adopted, a resolution dismissing the case, without a full 
    presentation of the evidence, because contestant had failed to 
    demonstrate that his allegations, if true, would have changed the 
    results of the election. Such a failure is statutory defense to a 
    contest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. As in the original. Text should read: Veysey.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The legislative branch is a policy-making body with a 
    constitutional responsibility to determine its own proceedings, 
    such as elections contests, impeachment matters and other similar 
    pronouncements. The standards and procedures must, of course, be 
    fair to all sides. However, the legislative branch is not the 
    judicial branch, either in its constitutional duties or its 
    procedures. In that regard, the House has determined by statute 
    that it need not proceed to full presentation of evidence on the 
    merits, when it is evident on the face of the allegations and 
    supporting materials, that an elections contest is frivolous, or 
    that the results of the election will not be changed. Thus the 
    burden, on a motion to dismiss, properly rests on the contestant, 
    who must demonstrate, by more than mere allegation, that there is 
    some documentable basis for his allegations.
        To quote the House report in Tunno against Veysey,

  It has been the experience of Congress that exhaustive hearings and 
investigations have, in the past, been conducted only to find that if the 
contestant has been required at the outset to make proper allegations, with 
sufficient supportive evidence that could most readily have been garnered 
at the time of the election, such further investigation would have been 
unnecessary and unwarranted.

  Under the new law, then, the present contestant, and any future 
contestant, must have presented, in the first instance, sufficient 
allegations and evidence to justify his claim to the seat in order to 
overcome the motion to dismiss.

        Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 minutes, for the purposes of debate 
    only, to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Peyser), the 
    distinguished chairman of the Ad Hoc Elections Panel which reviewed 
    the contest.
        Mr. [Peter] PEYSER [of New York]. Mr. Speaker, I thank the 
    gentleman from Michigan, the ranking member of the Committee on 
    House Administration, for his clarification of the act.
        This elections contest was filed by Mr. Melvin Perkins against 
    Mrs. Beverly Byron for the seat in the Sixth Congressional District 
    of Maryland. In the election held November 7, 1978, Beverly Byron 
    received 122,374 votes to Mr. Perkins' 14,276 votes, a margin of 
    108,098 votes. The election results were certified by the Maryland 
    State Board of Canvassers on November 30, 1978. Beverly Byron was 
    sworn in and took office on January 15, 1979, after presenting her 
    credentials to the House.
        On November 28, 1978, Melvin Perkins filed a handwritten notice 
    of contest with the Clerk of the House. The notice of contest was 
    somewhat ambiguous, and portions were illegible. But the general 
    allegation was that Mrs. Byron was improperly selected by the 
    Democratic State Central Committee of Maryland to replace her 
    husband, the late honorable Goodloe Byron, who was selected by 
    primary election as the Democratic nominee for reelection, but who 
    died before the date of the general election. The notice of contest 
    asserted that a special election should be held to fill the vacancy 
    during the unexpired term.
        On December 28, 1978, Mrs. Byron filed a motion to dismiss the 
    contest and subsequently filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. 
    The grounds for the motion were: First, improper service of the 
    notice of contest; second, failure of the contestant to allege 
    grounds sufficient to change the result of the election; and third, 
    failure of the contestant to claim a right to contestee's seat--all 
    statutory grounds for dismissing an election contest under the 
    provisions of 2 U.S.C. 383.
        On February 28, 1979, the ad hoc elections panel, consisting of 
    myself as chairman, the honorable Ed Jones, and the honorable 
    Carroll A. Campbell, Jr., held an open hearing for the purpose of 
    receiving oral argument on the motion to dismiss. Contestant 
    Perkins and his counsel were present, and counsel for Mrs. Byron 
    was present. Each side was provided 20 minutes to argue on the 
    motion. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the election panel reviewed 
    the record before it, and considered the oral arguments. After due 
    deliberation, the panel adopted a motion, by a vote of 3 ayes and 0 
    nays, to recommend to the full committee that contestee's motion to 
    dismiss be granted. On March 1, 1979, the full committee reviewed 
    the panel's recommendation and by a rollcall vote of 23 ayes and 0 
    nays, adopted a resolution recommending dismissal of the contest to 
    the House. That recommendation is before you now.
        In assessing the record of the contest, the panel noted that 
    contestant Perkins failed to provide documented proof of service of 
    the notice of contest on Mrs. Byron in accordance with the 
    provisions of section 282 of title 2, United States Code, and that 
    Mr. Perkins failed to state grounds sufficient to change the result 
    of the election. The panel did not deem it necessary to reach the 
    question of whether contestant failed to claim a right to Mrs. 
    Byron's seat.
        Although contestant is not required to prove his case on a 
    motion to dismiss, contestant must initially support his 
    allegations and conclusions with documentary evidence, or provide 
    some other showing which would change the result or the election.
        Contestant Perkins failed to present any documentary evidence 
    supporting his allegations, which claimed that the Maryland 
    Democratic Central Committee failed to provide adequate notice of 
    the meeting at which the successor to the late Honorable Goodloe 
    Byron was nominated. Furthermore, Perkins failed to demonstrate 
    that his allegations, if true, would have changed the results of 
    the election.
        The panel concluded that the case should be dismissed, because 
    contestant Perkins failed to provide service of the notice of 
    contest on Mrs. Byron in accordance with the requirements of the 
    act, and failed to support his allegations with evidence sufficient 
    to meet contestant's burden in overcoming a motion to dismiss, and 
    failed to demonstrate that his allegations, if true, would have 
    changed the election results.
        The decision is, therefore, based both on the procedural defect 
    of lack of proper service, and on the substantive defect of failure 
    to allege grounds, and to support such grounds with documentary 
    evidence sufficient to change the election results.
        Mr. Speaker, I want the House to know that the ad hoc committee 
    gave every opportunity to Mr. Perkins to present his case and to 
    listen to him beyond the time normally allotted, and that the 
    questioning was very careful and thoughtful. I particularly want to 
    thank my colleague who served with me on that committee, the 
    gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Campbell) who pursued a line of 
    questioning that was very important in reaching a decision.
        Mr. Speaker, I would be glad to yield at this time to the 
    gentleman from South Carolina.
        Mr. [Carroll] CAMPBELL [of South Carolina]. I thank the 
    gentleman for yielding, and I thank him for his comments. As the 
    gentleman has stated, the line of questioning was pursued, and 
    there was no substantiation of the allegations that were made. The 
    findings were that Mrs. Byron was not properly served. We found 
    that we did not have to go into the further motion for dismissal by 
    Mrs. Byron which alleged that a dismissal at that time should be 
    made because of the failure to claim a right to the seat. That was 
    not a matter that we had to bring up. It might also be pointed out, 
    as the gentleman from New York (Mr. Peyser) has so eloquently 
    stated here, that there were no irregularities in the election vote 
    whatsoever. Because of the hearings and because of the work of the 
    chairman of the subcommittee who did such an outstanding job, I 
    rise to support the resolution, and, as he has pointed out, it was 
    a unanimous recommendation.
        Mr. PEYSER. I thank the gentleman for his comments.
        Mr. Speaker, I yield back the remainder of my time.
        Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the 
    resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 17.2 Freeman v Mitchell

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the Seventh District of Maryland was conducted on November 7, 
1978.(6) The general election candidates were Parren J. 
Mitchell (the Democratic candidate) and Debra Freeman (an Independent 
candidate). The official canvass indicated that Mr. Mitchell received 
51,996 votes, while Mrs. Freeman received 6,626 votes. On November 30, 
1978, Mr. Mitchell was certified as the winner by the Maryland State 
Administrative Board of Election Laws. His credentials were presented 
to the House of Representatives, and on January 15, 1979, he was duly 
administered the oath of office without objection or challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 96-226, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On November 17, 1978, Mrs. Freeman filed a petition in state court 
seeking authorization to inspect voting machines and an injunction 
against certifying the election. This petition was denied and an appeal 
was subsequently filed.
    On December 29, 1978, Mrs. Freeman (hereafter the ``contestant'') 
filed a notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was 
forwarded to the Committee on House Administration for its 
consideration. On January 26, 1979, Mr. Mitchell (hereafter the 
``contestee'') filed a motion to dismiss and an answer to the notice of 
contest. On January 30, 1979, the Committee on House Administration 
established an ad hoc panel of three Members to evaluate the pleadings.
    In her notice of contest, contestant alleged that both contestee 
and election officials engaged in a variety of illegal acts to win the 
election, including tampering with voting machines, intimidating 
voters, fraud, extortion, and other ``dirty tricks.''(7) 
Contestee's motion to dismiss asserted that the contestant had not 
stated ground sufficient to change the result of the election, and 
further alleged that the notice of contest had not been filed in a 
timely manner under the statute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. H. Rept. 96-226, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On February 26, 1979, contestant filed several additional 
pleadings: (1) a motion to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of 
the state litigation then on appeal; (2) a motion to enlarge the time 
for discovery; and (3) notices for depositions and subpoenas duces 
tecum for election officials. The ad hoc panel temporarily quashed the 
subpoenas pending a determination on the contestee's motion to dismiss. 
On March 14, 1979, the panel met to hear oral arguments on the motion 
to dismiss.
    On April 3, 1979, the panel deliberated and recommended that 
contestee's motion to dismiss be granted. The panel concluded that the 
contestant had not shown ``by documentary evidence or 
otherwise''(8) that the alleged illegal behavior had the 
effect of reversing the outcome of the election.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its committee report, the Committee on House Administration 
agreed with the conclusions of the ad hoc panel. The entirety of the 
contestant's evidence consisted of unsupported allegations in the 
notice of contest and ``four affidavits from campaign 
associates.''(9) These documents were insufficient to carry 
the burden under the statute, and therefore the committee recommended 
dismissal of the case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. Id. at p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On June 12, 1979,(10) the committee offered House 
Resolution 198 (dismissing the contest) as a privileged matter, and the 
House adopted the resolution by voice vote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 125 Cong. Rec. 14457-58, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST AGAINST PARREN J. MITCHELL

        Mr. [Frank] THOMPSON [of New Jersey]. Mr. Speaker, I call up a 
    privileged resolution (H. Res. 198) dismissing the election contest 
    against Parren J. Mitchell, and ask for its immediate 
    consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 198

  Resolved, That the election contest of Debra Hannania Freeman, 
contestant, against Parren J. Mitchell, contestee, Seventh Congressional 
District of the State of Maryland, be dismissed.

        The SPEAKER.(11) The gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. 
    Thompson) is recognized for 1 hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. Thomas O'Neill (MA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
    consume.
        Mr. Speaker, under the Constitution and the Rules of the House, 
    the Committee on House Administration is charged with the 
    responsibility for investigating contested elections. In this 
    Congress five election contests were filed. In each case I, as 
    chairman of the committee, appointed an ad hoc panel to conduct the 
    investigation.
        In the contest before the House today, Freeman against 
    Mitchell, the panel was chaired by our colleague, the gentleman 
    from Connecticut, Mr. William Ratchford. Also serving with Chairman 
    Ratchford were the committee members, the gentleman from North 
    Carolina, Mr. Charles Rose, and the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. 
    Newt Gingrich.
        Mr. Speaker, I now yield such time as he may consume to the 
    gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Ratchford).
        Mr. [William] RATCHFORD [of Connecticut]. Mr. Speaker, I thank 
    the gentleman from New Jersey, the chairman of the Committee on 
    House Administration.
        This election contest was filed by Mrs. Debra Hannania-Freeman 
    against Parren J. Mitchell for the seat in the Seventh 
    Congressional District of Maryland. In the election held on 
    November 7, 1978, Parren J. Mitchell received 51,996 votes to Mrs. 
    Freeman's 6,626 votes, a margin of 45,370 votes. The election 
    results were certified by the Maryland State Board of Election Laws 
    on November 30, 1978. Parren J. Mitchell was sworn in and took 
    office on January 15, 1979, after presenting his credentials to the 
    House.
        On December 29, 1978, Mrs. Freeman filed a notice of intention 
    to contest against Mr. Mitchell with the Clerk of the House. The 
    notice of contest alleged inadequate and insufficient police 
    protection of voting machines, conspiracy between Mr. Mitchell and 
    election officials, malfunction of voting machines due to 
    tampering, improper and illegal certification of Mr. Mitchell and 
    various acts of fraud, violence, intimidation, assault, theft, 
    extortion, and ``dirty tricks.''
        On January 26, 1979, Mr. Mitchell filed a motion to dismiss and 
    answer to the notice of intention to contest. The grounds for the 
    motion and answer were: First, The notice of intention to contest 
    was not timely filed within the required statutory period: second, 
    The notice of intention to contest failed to state grounds 
    sufficient to change the results of the election; and third, The 
    contestee was without sufficient knowledge or information to 
    respond to the remaining allegations.
        Counsel for the contestant made his appearance on February 26, 
    1979, and subsequently filed the following papers with the 
    committee:
        First. Motion for stay of proceeding pending resolution of 
    appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland;
        Second. Motion to enlarge time for discovery by 30 days;
        Third. Two notices of depositions, and
        Fourth. A motion to strike and answer to motion to dismiss.
        On March 5, 1979, the attorney general of Maryland filed a 
    motion to quash subpenas, and I issued an order on March 6, 1979, 
    which temporarily quashed subpenas without prejudice to the 
    contestant.
        The ad hoc election panel consisting of the Honorable Charles 
    Rose, the Honorable Newt Gingrich and me as chairman held an open 
    hearing on March 14, 1979, for the purpose of receiving oral 
    argument on the motion to dismiss. Contestant Freeman and her 
    counsel were present, counsel for the contestee was present, and 
    the assistant attorney general for the State of Maryland was 
    present. All sides were provided 20 minutes each to argue on the 
    motion.
        All parties were heard and upon conclusion of the hearing, the 
    election panel took the case under advisement.
        On April 3, 1979, the panel, on my motion, voted unanimously to 
    go into executive session to discuss the oral argument, pleadings 
    and motions on the case. After due deliberation the panel adopted a 
    motion, by a vote of 3 ayes and 0 nays, to recommend to the full 
    committee that the contestee's motion to dismiss be granted. On 
    April 4, 1978, the full committee reviewed the panel's 
    recommendation and by voice vote unanimously adopted a resolution 
    recommending dismissal of the contest to the House. That 
    recommendation is now before the House.
        In assessing the record, the panel noted that contestant 
    Freeman failed to provide sufficient record to support the 
    allegations contained in her notice of contest in accordance with 
    the provisions of 2 U.S.C. 383, and that Mrs. Freeman failed to 
    state grounds sufficient to change the result of the election. The 
    panel did not deem it necessary to rule on the remaining motions.
        Although contestant is not required to prove her case on a 
    motion to dismiss, contestant must initially support her 
    allegations and conclusions with documentary evidence, or provide 
    some other showing which would change the result of the election.
        Contestant Freeman failed to present documentary evidence 
    sufficient to support her allegations of inadequate and 
    insufficient police protection of voting machines, conspiracy, 
    malfunction of voting machines, improper and illegal certification, 
    fraud, intimidation, extortion or ``dirty tricks.'' Furthermore, 
    contestant failed to demonstrate that her allegations, if true, 
    would have changed the results of the election.
        The panel concluded that the case should be dismissed because 
    contestant Freeman failed to support her allegations with evidence 
    sufficient to meet the contestant's burden in overcoming a motion 
    to dismiss.
        The decision is therefore based on the substantive defect of 
    failure to allege grounds, and to support such grounds with 
    documentary evidence, sufficient to change the election results.
        Mr. Speaker, at this point I yield to the gentleman from 
    Georgia (Mr. Gingrich).
        Mr. [Newt] GINGRICH [of Georgia]. I thank the gentleman for 
    yielding.
        Mr. Speaker, I just want to commend the gentleman from 
    Connecticut (Mr. Ratchford). The hearings made it very clear that 
    there was no evidence that was substantial enough to warrant any 
    question about who won the election. I think it was very clear 
    there were a number of allegations with no proof. I would hope that 
    the House would vote to dismiss the charges and to vote for passage 
    of House Resolution 198.
        Mr. RATCHFORD. Mr. Speaker, we have no further requests for 
    time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The SPEAKER. The question is on the resolution.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes 
    appeared to have it.
        Mr. [John] ERLENBORN [of Illinois]. Mr. Speaker, I object to 
    the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the 
    point of order that a quorum is not present.
        The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.
        The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    378, nays 0, not voting 56, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 208] . . . 

        So the resolution was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 17.3 Rayner v Stewart

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the First District of Illinois was conducted on November 7, 
1978.(12) The general election candidates were A. A. Sammy 
Rayner (the Republican candidate) and Bennett M. Stewart, Jr. (the 
Democratic candidate). The official canvass indicated that Mr. Stewart 
received 47,581 votes, while Mr. Rayner received 33,540 votes. The 
Board of Canvassers declared the result on November 19, 1978, and 
certifying credentials were signed by the Secretary of State and 
Governor of Illinois on November 30, 1978. Mr. Stewart's credentials 
were presented to the House of Representatives, and on January 15, 
1979, to he was duly administered the oath of office without objection 
or challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 96-316, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Rayner filed suit in a U.S. district court, but the case was 
dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction. In the court's memorandum 
opinion of March 14, 1979, the judge held that the House of 
Representatives had exclusive jurisdiction over the final determination 
as to the outcome of an election to one of its seats.
    On December 27, 1978, Mr. Rayner (hereafter the ``contestant'') 
filed a notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was 
referred to the Committee on House Administration for its 
consideration. On January 22, 1979, Mr. Stewart (hereafter the 
``contestee'') file a motion to dismiss the contest. In contestant's 
notice of contest, he alleged ``massive errors, irregularities, fraud 
and mistake in the conduct of said election.''(13) 
Contestant further alleged illegal assistance to voters in casting 
ballots, irregularities in voting displays, removal of poll-watchers, 
and other errors. Contestee's motion to dismiss asserted that the 
notice of contest had numerous procedural deficiencies (lack of proper 
service, failure to name the proper party, untimely filing, etc.) and 
further, that contestant had failed to state grounds sufficient to 
change the result of the election.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. H. Rept. 96-316, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Committee on House Administration formed an ad hoc panel of 
three Members to review the pleadings. The panel met on March 6, 1979, 
to hear oral arguments. On April 25, 1979, it met again and recommended 
that contestee's motion to dismiss be granted.
    In its committee report, the Committee on House Administration 
agreed with the conclusions of the ad hoc panel. To prevail against a 
motion to dismiss, the contestant ``must initially support his 
allegations and conclusions with documentary or other 
evidence.''(14) The committee found that the contestant had 
not produced such evidence, and the documents that were provided were 
insufficient to support the allegations. The committee also took issue 
with technical deficiencies in contestant's pleadings, and thus 
rendered its decision ``based both on procedural and substantive 
grounds.''(15)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Id. p. 3.
15. Id. p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On June 28, 1979,(16) the committee filed its privileged 
report with the House. By unanimous consent, the House took up House 
Resolution 344 (dismissing the contest), and adopted the resolution by 
a division vote of 63 to 0:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 125 Cong. Rec. 17225-26, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST AGAINST BENNETT M. STEWART    

        Mr. NEDZI, from the Committee on House Administration, 
    submitted a privileged report to accompany a resolution (H. Res. 
    344) on the election contest of A.A. Sammy Rayner, Jr., contestant, 
    against Bennett M. Stewart, contestee, First Congressional District 
    of the State of Illinois, which was referred to the House Calendar 
    and ordered to be printed.
        Mr. [Lucien] NEDZI [of Michigan]. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous 
    consent for immediate consideration of the resolution.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 344

  Resolved, That the election contest of A.A. Sammy Rayner, Jr., 
contestant, against Bennett M. Stewart, contestee, First Congressional 
District of the State of Illinois, be dismissed.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Michigan?
        There was no objection.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. 
    Nedzi) is recognized for 1 hour.
        Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Speaker, the Rules of the House and title 2 of 
    the United States Code, place uncontested elections under the 
    jurisdiction of the Committee on House Administration. This year 
    five contested elections were filed with the committee.
        The election contest before the House this afternoon is Rayner 
    against Stewart. It is the fourth of the five contests which the 
    House will consider under the elections panel procedure.
        This election contest was filed by Mr. A. A. Sammy Rayner, Jr., 
    against Mr. Bennett M. Stewart for the seat in the First 
    Congressional District of Illinois. In the election held on 
    November 7, 1978, Bennett Stewart received 47,581 votes to Mr. 
    Rayner's 33,540, a margin of 14,041 votes. The election results 
    were certified by the Board of Canvassers on November 19, 1978. The 
    results were filed with the Cook County Circuit Court on November 
    20, 1978. Certifying credentials were signed by the Secretary of 
    State and the Governor, and were issued to Mr. Stewart on November 
    30, 1978. Bennett Stewart was sworn in and took the oath of office 
    on January 15, 1979, after presenting his credentials to the House.
        On December 27, 1978, Mr. Rayner filed with the Clerk of the 
    House a ``petition under the Federal Contested Elections Act'' 
    against the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners and the Clerk 
    of Cook County. Nowhere in his pleadings did Mr. Rayner mention Mr. 
    Stewart as a party to the proceeding. The petition went on to 
    allege ``massive errors, irregularities, fraud, and mistakes in the 
    conduct of said election which impaired the plaintiff's right to 
    vote and the right to have his vote counted.'' The petition further 
    alleged illegal vote totals on the backs of voting machines, 
    illegal assistance to voters in casting their votes, prohibition of 
    Rayner vote watchers from polling places, numerous counting errors 
    and electioneering at or near the polls.
        On January 22, 1979, Mr. Stewart filed a motion to dismiss the 
    contest. The grounds for the motion were as follows:
        First. The notice of contest failed to state grounds sufficient 
    to change the result of the election.
        Second. The notice of contest was not filed within the 
    statutory 30-day period in accordance with the provisions of 2 
    United States Code 282(a);
        Third. The notice of contest failed to name a proper party--
    Bennett M. Stewart, in accordance with the provisions of 2 United 
    States Code 381(d).
        Fourth. The notice of contest failed to State that Mr. Stewart 
    had 30 days in which to answer pleadings, in accordance with the 
    provisions of 2 United States Code 382(b); and
        Fifth. The notice of contest was insufficient for failure of 
    Mr. Rayner to show proof of service upon Mr. Stewart, as required 
    by 2 United States Code 382(c).
        On March 6, 1979, the Ad Hoc Elections Panel, consisting of 
    myself as chairman, the Honorable Robert H. Mollohan, and the 
    Honorable Jerry Lewis, held an open hearing for the purpose of 
    receiving oral argument on the motion to dismiss. Contestant Rayner 
    and his counsel were present, and counsel for contestee Stewart was 
    present. Each side was provided 20 minutes to argue the motion. 
    Upon conclusion of the arguments, the panel took the matter under 
    advisement.
        After a thorough review of the record, and after due 
    deliberation, on April 25, 1979, the Panel adopted a motion by a 
    vote of three ``ayes'' and no ``nays,'' to recommend to the full 
    committee that the contestee's motion to dismiss be granted.
        On April 25, 1979, by a unanimous voice vote, the Committee on 
    House Administration adopted the panel's resolution to recommend 
    dismissal of the contest to the House. That recommendation is 
    before you now.
        In assessing the record of the contest, the panel noted that 
    contestant Rayner failed to overcome any of the contestee's 
    procedural defenses in his motion to dismiss. However, the 
    principal deficiency in contestant's pleading and upon which the 
    committee primarily relied, was contestant's failure to state 
    grounds sufficient to change the result of the election.
        Although contestant is not required to prove his case on a 
    motion to dismiss, contestant must initially support his 
    allegations and conclusions with documentary or other evidence, and 
    must provide some showing that his allegations, if true, would 
    change the result of the election.
        Contestant Rayner failed to present sufficient documentary or 
    other evidence supporting his allegations of massive errors, 
    irregularities, fraud, and mistake. For example, contestant alleged 
    the ``possibility of 10,449 (vote) forgeries'', but did not 
    demonstrate by affidavit or other showing, a single convincing 
    instance of forgery. Contestant alleged an ``8,000 vote 
    discrepancy'', but failed to explain how that discrepancy, if true, 
    would change the results of the election. Contestant filed 12 
    affidavits which alleged questionable circumstances at polling 
    places. But even if such circumstances were assumed to be true, 
    contestant was unable to demonstrate that the circumstances would 
    change the result of the election.
        The panel concluded that the case should be dismissed because 
    of the contestant's numerous technical errors, and because 
    contestant failed to support his allegations with documentary or 
    other evidence, sufficient to meet the contestant's burden in 
    overcoming a motion to dismiss. Contestant further failed to 
    demonstrate that his allegations, if true, would have changed the 
    election result.
        The decision is therefore based both on procedural 
    deficiencies, and on the substantive defect of failure to allege 
    grounds sufficient to change the election results and to support 
    such grounds with documentary or other evidence.
        Mr. Speaker, I yield to our colleague and member of the panel, 
    the gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis).
        Mr. [Jerry] LEWIS [of California]. Mr. Speaker, I thank the 
    gentleman from Michigan for yielding. It was my responsibility to 
    serve with my chairman of the subcommittee and to share his 
    responsibility. It was very apparent that the chairman was more 
    than willing to take testimony, respond to questions, and ask 
    questions. There was a 15,000 vote spread in this election. There 
    was no evidence presented whatsoever for a change of the vote.
        Mr. Speaker, I personally would recommend an ``aye'' vote on 
    this motion, and support the position of the committee.
        Mr. NEDZI. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution.
        The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. 
    Symms) there were ayes 63; noes 0.
        So the resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 17.4 Wilson v Leach

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the Fourth District of Louisiana was conducted on November 7, 
1978.(17) The general election candidates were Jimmy Wilson 
(the Republican candidate) and Anthony C. Leach, Jr. (the Democratic 
candidate). The official canvass indicated that Mr. Leach received 
65,583 votes, while Mr. Wilson received 65,317 votes. Mr. Leach's 
margin of victory was therefore 266 votes. The Louisiana Secretary of 
State and Governor certified Mr. Leach as the winner of the election on 
November 21, 1978. Mr. Leach's credentials were presented to the House 
of Representatives, and on January 15, 1979, he was duly administered 
the oath of office without objection or challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 96-784, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On December 20, 1978, Mr. Wilson (hereafter the ``contestant'') 
filed a notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was 
referred to the Committee on House Administration for its 
consideration. On January 11, 1979, the contestant filed an amended 
notice of contest. On January 22, 1979, Mr. Leach (hereafter the 
``contestee'') filed a motion to dismiss, on the basis that contestant 
had failed to state grounds sufficient to change the result of the 
election.
    Shortly after the election, a Federal investigation began regarding 
allegations of vote-buying by the contestee. On July 20, 1979, 
contestee was indicted on 11 counts relating to payments to individuals 
to secure his election. The committee deferred action on contestee's 
motion to dismiss until after court proceedings had concluded. On 
November 3, 1979, contestee was acquitted on all 11 counts.
    Thereafter, the Committee on House Administration formed an ad hoc 
panel of three Members to review the case. On November 28, 1979, the 
panel met to hear oral arguments from the parties. The panel also 
agreed to extend its investigation to include the Department of 
Justice's criminal case against contestee. A member of the panel 
reviewed FBI interviews of voters conducted during its investigation. 
On December 20, 1979, the panel voted to recommend that the contestee's 
motion to dismiss be granted.
    In its committee report, the Committee on House Administration 
reiterated the high burden that must be overcome if a contestant is to 
prevail against a motion to dismiss. The contestant must show with 
specific evidence not only that irregularities occurred, but that ``but 
for''(18) the irregularities, the result of the election 
would have been different.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. H. Rept. 96-784, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The committee acknowledged that evidence of fraud and 
irregularities did exist in this case, but further noted that such 
irregularities were not connected to the contestee, that contestee had 
been acquitted of involvement in those activities by a Federal jury, 
and that the contestant had withdrawn claims of alleged involvement by 
the contestee. The committee report discussed the FBI's investigation 
of vote-buying, and concluded that while some accounts were 
substantiated, they were insufficient to cause a reversal of the 
election's outcome. The committee thus recommended dismissal of the 
case.
    Members of the minority party filed separate minority views to 
accompany the committee's report. In those views, the minority party 
Members recognized the need to quickly dispose of frivolous contests, 
but asserted that the committee must fully investigate situations where 
there is substantiated evidence of fraud and illegal conduct. The 
minority would have denied the motion to dismiss in order to proceed to 
the discovery stage under the Federal Contested Elections Act and 
gather additional evidence. Only after such a process could a 
determination be made as to which individual is entitled to the seat in 
question. In short, the minority believed that the contestant had 
carried his burden under the statute.
    On March 4, 1980,(19) the committee called up House 
Resolution 575 (dismissing the contest) as a privileged matter. The 
House adopted the resolution by a vote of 241 to 153 (with three 
Members voting ``present'' and 36 Members not voting):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 126 Cong. Rec. 4491-98, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST AGAINST ANTHONY CLAUDE LEACH, 
                                      JR.

        Mr. [Frank] THOMPSON [of New Jersey]. Mr. Speaker, I call up a 
    privileged resolution (H. Res. 575) dismissing the election contest 
    against Anthony Claude Leach, Jr., and ask for its immediate 
    consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

H. Res. 575

  Resolved, That the election contest of Jimmy H. Wilson, contestant, 
against Anthony Claude Leach, Junior, contestee, Fourth Congressional 
District of the State of Louisiana, be dismissed.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(20) The gentleman from New 
    Jersey (Mr. Thompson) is recognized for 1 hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. Carroll Hubbard, Jr. (KY).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
    consume.
        Mr. Speaker, in this case I also appointed an ad hoc panel of 
    House Administration Committee members to conduct the investigation 
    of the Wilson against Leach matter. The panel was chaired by our 
    colleague John Burton. Also serving with Chairman Burton were 
    Joseph G. Minish and Robert E. Badham.
        Mr. Speaker, at this point I yield for purposes of debate only 
    such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. 
    John L. Burton).
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON [of California]. Mr. Speaker, the election 
    contest before the House today was filed by Mr. Jimmy H. Wilson 
    against Mr. Anthony Claude Leach, Jr., for the seat in the Fourth 
    Congressional District of Louisiana. The official canvass of the 
    Fourth District of Louisiana showed that in the November 7, 1978, 
    election Mr. Leach received 65,583 votes and Mr. Wilson received 
    65,317 votes, a difference of 266 votes. Mr. Leach was certified by 
    the State of Louisiana as the elected representative from the 
    Fourth District and he presented his credentials and was sworn in 
    and took office on January 15, 1979.
        On December 20, 1978, Mr. Wilson filed with the House of 
    Representatives a notice of contest. The matter was referred under 
    the rules of the House to the Committee on House Administration. 
    The chairman of the committee appointed an ad hoc panel which I 
    chaired and on which I was joined by Mr. Joseph Minish and Mr. 
    Robert Badham of the committee. The panel reviewed the evidence and 
    held hearings on the matter, reporting its findings to the full 
    committee. After careful deliberation the committee voted to 
    recommend to the House that the contest be dismissed.
        This is not an instance where the incumbent's involvement in 
    the alleged vote fraud is at issue. He has been acquitted of all 
    such charges by a Federal district court jury, and just as 
    important, the contestant has withdrawn any allegation of his 
    involvement. As is clear from the case of Evans against Turner, 
    which is reprinted as appendix A in the committee's report, it 
    would be inappropriate to ascribe to Mr. Leach any fraud or 
    irregularities involving third parties.
        So it is clear that the question before the House today is not 
    his guilt or innocence; that has already been decided. The question 
    today is simply the sufficiency of the contestant's evidence.
        It is clear under the governing statute and House precedent 
    that a contestant has a substantial burden to carry. A contestant 
    must provide the House with evidence not only that fraud or 
    irregularity existed but that the fraud or irregularity was 
    sufficiently widespread to have changed the outcome of the 
    election.
        In the present contest, the contestant, Mr. Wilson, 
    consequently, was required to allege and support with specific 
    evidence that at least 266 votes, the margin of the incumbent's 
    victory, were illegally cast for the incumbent. It is the judgment 
    of the majority of the committee that the contestant has not met 
    this burden.
        The record fails to substantiate the claim that more than 266 
    votes were fraudulently cast for the incumbent. In fact the 
    evidence falls short of this mark. The evidence offered 
    specifically identified only 32 potentially illegal votes. And even 
    going outside the record, as the committee has done, to review the 
    evidence generated by the FBI in its investigation of vote buying 
    in the election, at most only an additional 34 votes become 
    suspect.
        The contestant relies on a notebook which was offered in 
    evidence at the trial of Mr. Leach to support his claim that the 
    outcome of the election was affected. He claimed that the notebook 
    contained the names of 440 voters who were paid to vote in the 
    election for the incumbent.
        The FBI, however, interviewed 283 of the 440 voters named in 
    the notebook. The vast majority of those interviewed, 225 of the 
    283, stated that they were not paid to vote. Only 58 admitted 
    receiving payment and of those 17 were not instructed on how to 
    vote and only 14 were instructed to vote for Mr. Leach.
        A thorough investigation by the U.S. attorney's office and the 
    FBI revealed only 14 votes illegally cast for the incumbent. The 
    contestant has provided the House with no reason to believe a 
    further investigation by the House would be more successful.
        That an election contestant feels that he may, some day and in 
    some unspecified way, show sufficient fraud is not the point; he 
    must demonstrate to the House a likelihood that further 
    investigation will bear fruit. The contestant has not done so. 
    Given the substantial burden of proof imposed, the contestant has 
    been unable to demonstrate that the result of the election would be 
    changed by whatever deplorable illegal activity might have occurred 
    in the election.
        Given the choice between dismissing the contest or embarking on 
    a fishing expedition, House precedent and reason call for the 
    dismissal of the contest. In that recommendation, a majority of the 
    committee concurred.
        I would, before yielding for purposes of debate only, like to 
    say that the committee's report was delayed for some time because, 
    after allegations were brought and indictments were brought by a 
    Federal grand jury, our discussions with the Department of Justice 
    indicated their very strong desire that we not proceed further 
    until the legal proceedings had come to an end. It is for that 
    reason we were forced into a delayed time.
        I would also like to commend my colleague, the ranking minority 
    member of the subcommittee task force for the time and effort that 
    he has put into this matter. I would like to further commend him, 
    for in this matter he rose above the position of partisanship and 
    press conferences and addressed himself to the issues as best he 
    could, and to some questions that were in his mind. Although we 
    disagree on the final disposition of this matter, I know he does 
    this from a point of view that he just feels another disposition 
    other than dismissal would be in order. We feel also, as a matter 
    of conscience, given the statutes and the precedents of the House, 
    that the dismissal is the only course of conduct that the committee 
    or the House could take.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield for purposes of debate only 
    10 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Badham).
        Mr. [Robert] BADHAM [of California]. I thank the distinguished 
    chairman. I hope I will have the opportunity to thank him more as 
    time progresses.
        Mr. THOMPSON. I would say to my distinguished colleague, the 
    gentleman from California, that I hope so, too. Let us see how we 
    do with the first third.
        Mr. BADHAM. That is certainly agreeable to me, I will say to my 
    distinguished chairman.
        Mr. Speaker, we are confronted here today with a most trying 
    and difficult situation that involves a Member of this House, the 
    integrity of this House, and the situation that we might be facing 
    in the future when allegations are brought against Members of this 
    House, as have been brought recently in the so-called Abscam, and 
    about how we proceed as a body that is responsible for its own 
    membership, and the terms of membership as opposed to court 
    proceedings that are for the purpose of uncovering criminal 
    matters.
        First of all, let me state as a member of the panel in the 
    matter of the contested election of the gentleman from Louisiana 
    (Mr. Leach) that I and my colleagues on the committee can find no 
    fault with the actions of Mr. Leach because Mr. Leach is not on 
    trial in these proceedings, or in the panel, or in the resolution 
    before the House, because, as my distinguished friend and 
    colleague, the gentleman from California, Mr. Burton, has so aptly 
    pointed out, Mr. Leach has been acquitted by a Federal jury in 
    Louisiana of 12 men tried and true by a vote of 12 to 0. So, again, 
    this is not a criminal proceedings in any stretch of the 
    imagination.
        What we have before us, on the contrary, is a contest of 
    election which, as in previous contests that have been brought 
    before this body. We understand this procedure prescribes very 
    difficult hurdles for a contestant to surmount. First of all, the 
    contestant must demonstrate in a specific allegation that a 
    sufficient number of votes were illegally cast so as to change the 
    outcome of the election. In this case when specific allegations 
    were brought by Mr. Jimmie Wilson of the 4th District in Louisiana, 
    he surmounted the hurdles and established a prima facie case.
        In the particular election contest at hand, we have specific 
    allegations made by the contestant that over 400 votes were 
    illegally cast and the election was fraught with fraud. There is 
    nothing in the brief of the contestee, Mr. Leach, that would tend 
    to deny this. In sworn testimony by over 20 people who were 
    convicted in court or entered guilty pleas in Federal court trial 
    in the State of Louisiana, that these votes were, indeed, illegally 
    cast. The majority and, indeed, my good friend, the chairman of the 
    panel, the gentleman from California, Mr. Burton, has made the 
    statement that it is true that the guilty pleas add up to 
    approximately 33 illegally cast votes. The prosecution allowed each 
    of the defendants to plead guilty to only one count of vote-buying. 
    Sworn testimony in the Federal court in Louisiana indicates 
    otherwise, but these guilty were allowed to plead on one count 
    alone and that added up to about 33 votes.
        I would now like to read into the Record a portion of the 
    transcript of sworn testimony by the former mayor of the town in 
    which all of this went on. The gentleman who was the mayor was a 
    fellow named Ralph D. McRae, Jr., who served as mayor of the town 
    of Leesville. Mr. McRae testified to the following:

  Mr. Ralph D. McRae, Jr., called as a witness by counsel for the 
government for the purpose of giving evidence, being first duly sworn, 
testified as follows:

Direct Examination

  By Mr. Lydick:

  Q. Would you tell us your name, please?

  A. My name is Ralph D. McRae, Jr.

  Q. And how do you spell the last?

  A. M-c capital R-A-E.

  Q. Where do you live, Mr. McRae?

  A. I live in Leesville.

  Q. Were you raised in the Leesville area?

  A. Yes, sir.

  Q. How long have you lived in Leesville?

  A. All my life except for the time spent in the Service and at college.

  Q. How old are you?

  A. I am thirty-five.

  Q. Are you married?

  A. Yes, sir.

  Q. Do you have any children?

  A. Yes, sir.

  Q. How many?

  A. I have three.

  Q. Have you ever served in the Armed Forces?

  A. Yes, sir.

  Q. In what capacity and during what period of time?

  A. I was an infantry officer and a pilot from June, 1966 until August, 
1972.

  Q. Were you decorated while in the Service?

  A. Some, yes, sir.

  Q. What decorations did you receive?

  A. Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star, Vietnamese Cross of 
Gallantry. I have at over twenty-eight Oak Leaf Clusters, Army 
Accommodation Medal, numerous campaign and service ribbons.

        Now, this is not your ordinary, run-of-the-mill, vote buyer; 
    and he said in sworn testimony, unrefuted, unchallenged the 
    following:

  Question. Did you talk with other people about the term commercial 
voters?

  Answer. Yes, sir.

  Question. What did that term commercial voters mean between the people 
that you talked with?

  Answer. Sir, the term refers to a person who has, in the past, or expects 
to be paid to vote.

  Question. Do you recall where it was?

  Answer. Yes, sir. It was in an automobile.

  Question. What was said on that occasion?

  Answer. On that occasion Mr. Leach told me that he had reconsidered and 
he would like for me to help him in the commercial area in District Two. I 
told him I thought five thousand dollars would do it.

  Question. Did you have any additional discussions at that time concerning 
that money?

  Answer. Yes, sir. I told him that the way I arrived at the five thousand 
dollars was I felt that we could get by with paying five dollars a vote, 
and we would need about twenty-five hundred dollars to pay the voters and 
twenty-five hundred dollars to pay the drivers.

  Question. What occurred during that meeting, Mr. McRae?

  Answer. Well, that meeting was kind of a repeat of the first. Mr. Leach 
was in a hurry. He was on his way someplace. Shreveport, I guess. And he 
asked me how it was going. I told him I thought things were in pretty good 
shape. And he gave me a thousand dollars at that time.

        Again I want to stress that Mr. Leach is not on trial. What is 
    on trial are two things here: The integrity of the U.S. House of 
    Representatives and the integrity of the election held in the 
    Fourth District of Louisiana on November 7, 1978. While Mr. Leach 
    is not on trial; the election process of this country is; and it 
    was found to be faulty; admittedly fraudulent by the majority of 
    the panel. This puts us in a terrible dilemma. First of all, from a 
    question of timeliness, the House of Representatives Committee on 
    House Administration's panel on this contested election had to 
    delay any sort of investigation until the case was prosecuted fully 
    in the Federal courts, and only then on resolution of that could we 
    then legitimately, without obstructing prosecution in the Federal 
    courts, conduct our own investigation if one was to be held. Now we 
    are in the 2d session of the 96th Congress. The case almost a year 
    and a half old, and the question comes out, then, Could we at this 
    point investigate? That is the question that should be answered by 
    the House of Representatives because the panel could not and did 
    not. Neither did the full committee.
        But, Mr. Speaker, I say that we have a situation where fraud 
    was conducted in an election for membership to this body. Such 
    being the case, it falls squarely upon us to investigate fully and 
    to determine whether or not a person was beneficiary of a 
    fraudulent election. The people of that district have the right to 
    be represented in a true election.
        Mr. Speaker, I feel that this resolution to dismiss must be 
    opposed because not only has the matter not been investigated from 
    the standpoint of the integrity of the House of Representatives, 
    but I might add that the criminal prosecution and the criminal 
    investigation of this same election on November 7, 1978, is not 
    only still under investigation, but the grand jury, a Federal grand 
    jury in Louisiana, has within the past week accepted another guilty 
    plea to another count of vote buying in that election race of 1978, 
    and two others indicted on February 29 in Shreveport on multiple 
    counts of vote buying in Sabine Parish. The indictment named names 
    of people who were given money to vote for candidates in that 
    congressional race in the primary and in the general election.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from 
    California (Mr. Badham) an additional 20 minutes for purposes of 
    debate only.
        Mr. BADHAM. I thank the distinguished gentleman.
        Mr. Speaker, both in the primary and in the general election--
    and a Mrs. Lorraina Sepulveda was indicted by that same grand jury 
    on nine counts of vote buying in that same election. It is to be 
    noted that both grand juries above mentioned are still in session. 
    The Shreveport one announced it had heard 52 witnesses and it would 
    reconvene this matter on March 17, 1978.
        Mr. Speaker, I cannot believe, in all conscience, that the 
    Members of the body in which we are privileged to serve can condone 
    this and call it just a little bit of fraud, as was the gist of the 
    Kentucky case.
        For purposes of debate I now yield of my time 3 minutes to the 
    gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Frenzel).
        Mr. [William] FRENZEL [of Minnesota]. Mr. Speaker, I thank the 
    gentleman for yielding.
        Mr. Speaker, I think this is an important vote for the House of 
    Representatives. I have the feeling some of the Members may want to 
    look on this as something very routine--a normal dismissal of a 
    contest for election.
        It is a good deal more than that because of the widespread 
    fraud which did occur in this particular district. I believe that 
    fraud cast a kind of a shadow over the whole House of 
    Representatives.
        This matter is one that should not be dismissed without a great 
    deal of thought, a great deal more investigation, and, certainly, 
    until the completion of the legal actions that are going forward in 
    the State of Louisiana.
        Mr. Speaker, I look upon this resolution as not being 
    pernicious but certainly being very premature under the 
    circumstances.
        In the Committee on House Administration there is a precedent 
    that we are very careful about accepting election contests. We try 
    to make sure that we do not overturn the opponent will of the 
    people unless we have very strong evidence that the will of the 
    people was somehow controverted by fraud, miscount or some other 
    reason. That is a good precedent. We should stick to it.
        However, Mr. Speaker, we have a case where there was widespread 
    fraud. There were 22 guilty pleas. Not one or two or an isolated 
    one. Not disadvantaged, uneducated people. The exmayor of the town 
    is involved in this election fraud.
        Mr. Speaker, I would like to repeat the words of my 
    distinguished colleague from California (Mr. Badham). We are not 
    talking here about our colleague, Buddy Leach. The gentleman's 
    innocence has been determined by a jury of his peers and of that we 
    are glad. However, we are talking about the process that brought 
    Mr. Leach into this body.
        Mr. Speaker, if we compare the Daschle case which has just been 
    dispatched by this House, we will recall that there we let the 
    State supreme court make the decision. We deferred action until all 
    the local dust had settled.
        In this case, as was pointed out by gentleman from California 
    (Mr. Badham), grand juries are still in operation. There were two 
    guilty pleas accepted last week. Obviously grand juries are still 
    sitting on this matter. The matter has not been completed in 
    Louisiana and there is no reason for this House to dismiss the 
    complaint.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
        Mr. BADHAM. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 additional minutes to the 
    gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Frenzel).
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, the contestee has submitted 
    documentation showing 440 allegedly bought votes. That contest was 
    won by our colleague, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Leach) by 
    266 votes. The 22 people who pleaded guilty are certainly not going 
    to plead guilty for any more than they have to, so we have a very 
    small number of votes that have been admittedly bought.
        However, Mr. Speaker, I think, when we have 22 guilty pleas 
    previously, a couple of more now and a grand jury still sitting, 
    there is a strong presumption that more than 266 votes may have 
    been involved.
        Mr. Speaker, because the election process is so fundamental and 
    our representativeness is so fundamental, I think it would be a 
    terrible mistake, and a terrible precedent, for this House to 
    dismiss this case at this time.
        Obviously, the House should retain jurisdiction of this contest 
    until all of us are absolutely certain that there is no pall, no 
    shadow hanging over the election of our colleague.
        Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I recommend very strongly, as strongly 
    as I can to this body, do not take this measure lightly. It is not 
    some kind of indictment of the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. 
    Leach). It is simply an earnest desire on our part to find out what 
    indeed happened in that election district. We have not yet found 
    out.
        Mr. BADHAM. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
    Alabama (Mr. Dickinson).
        Mr. [William] DICKINSON [of Alabama]. Mr. Speaker, at this time 
    I rise to express my strong opposition to the pending motion in the 
    House to dismiss the election contest from the Fourth Congressional 
    District of Louisiana.
        I am certain that many of my colleagues have shared my shock 
    and outrage at the various revelations which have been made through 
    court testimony and FBI reports as to how improper influences were 
    exerted to affect the outcome of this race for a seat here in the 
    U.S. House of Representatives. One could easily come to the 
    conclusion that this was one of the most sordid election contests 
    in modern times--and, yet, the majority on the Committee on House 
    Administration would have us believe that there was not enough 
    wrongdoing to question the 266-vote margin in this election.
        On the basis of information obtained to date, it would, of 
    course, be impossible to say how many fraudulent votes were cast in 
    favor of the alleged winner in this race. We do know that 24 
    individuals have been convicted of vote-buying activities and a 
    notebook was offered in evidence at one of the trials in this case 
    containing the names of 440 voters who were purportedly paid to 
    vote for the contestee in the general election. Various 
    investigations and court proceedings are still underway in this 
    matter.
        Under these circumstances, I must disagree with the conclusion 
    of the majority of the Committee on House Administration that the 
    ``contestee Leach received the majority of the votes cast and was 
    duly elected by the voters of the Fourth Congressional District.'' 
    I do not think that the House should give its stamp of approval to 
    the outcome of a race which is so shrouded in uncertainty and 
    chicanery.
        Therefore, I urge the House to reject this motion dismissing 
    the election contest against Mr. Leach and I further urge that the 
    Committee on House Administration then examine the case on its 
    merits by conducting a full inquiry into all available evidence--
    something which the committee has not done to date.
        Mr. BADHAM. Mr. Speaker, I now yield 3 minutes to the gentleman 
    from South Carolina (Mr. Campbell).
        Mr. [Carroll] CAMPBELL [of South Carolina]. Mr. Speaker, the 
    House is today taking up House Resolution 575, dismissing without 
    full investigation the election contest against our colleague from 
    Louisiana. As a small step toward restoring public confidence in 
    this institution, this resolution should be defeated.
        The House Administration Committee majority sees its 
    responsibility in election disputes as one of separating challenges 
    which ``merit a full investigation from those where further 
    investigation appears to be unwarranted,'' and I concur.
        In this case, the record is clear that further investigation is 
    in fact warranted. The committee report states that:

  It is apparent that fraud and irregularities were involved in the 
election in question.

        And bases its recommendation for dismissal on the grounds that 
    there is no hard evidence that the contestee himself was directly 
    involved with the vote buying that evidently went on. Nothing in 
    the statute, however, suggests that a fraudulent election is any 
    less so whether or not the beneficiary of that fraud actively 
    participates.
        The majority contends that since there are only 58 proven cases 
    of vote buying and the margin of the contestee's victory was 266 
    votes, there is no reason for further investigation. Again, 
    however, the record suggests strongly that the votes still in 
    question may well have changed the outcome of the election.
        Mr. Speaker, I make no accusation against any Member of this 
    House, but I believe we owe it to the American people--and to 
    ourselves--to avoid even the appearance of coverup where the 
    integrity of this body is at stake.
        Mr. BADHAM. Mr. Speaker, I would just like to say that the 
    remarks made by the Members who have served on the Committee on 
    House Administration with me are remarks that are proper. I would 
    again recite the facts that the House of Representatives has never 
    taken an investigative posture or role in this case; that 
    indictments are still coming down from the Federal grand juries at 
    work in the State of Louisiana; that the FBI did only a very 
    cursory examination and did not even inquire of people under oath 
    as to the reasons for and matters surrounding their activities and 
    their presence in various notebooks.
        I think it would be a shame for the House of Representatives at 
    this juncture to give up the jurisdiction of this case.
        I would like to thank the distinguished chairman of the panel, 
    the gentleman from California, for his understanding in this 
    matter, and the committee chairman for allowing the minority to 
    have this time, because I think it is serious and I think the 
    integrity of this House is further cast in a light that is not 
    altogether good for this House with the people of the United 
    States, whom we represent.
        Mr. [John] ROUSSELOT [of California]. Mr. Speaker, will the 
    gentleman yield?
        Mr. BADHAM. I yield to my colleague from California.
        Mr. ROUSSELOT. Mr. Speaker, could the gentleman tell us, did 
    the committee have any kind of hearing of fact on this?
        Mr. BADHAM. I can respond to the gentleman by saying, yes, we 
    did have a hearing in that the representatives of the contestant 
    and the representatives of the contestee were both allowed time 
    before the committee to make statements and plead their case, as it 
    were, but as far as investigation or hearings into the actual fact, 
    I will have to say ``no.''
        Mr. ROUSSELOT. So, as the gentleman has already stated then, 
    there really was not an adequate investigation on our part?
        Mr. BADHAM. That is correct.
        Mr. ROUSSELOT. Well, it is certainly unfortunate because we 
    have enough problems as it is with credibility these days, and that 
    is certainly too bad. I am sorry to hear that.
        Mr. BADHAM. I thank the gentleman.
        May I inquire of the Speaker as to how much time I have 
    remaining?
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman has 8 minutes remaining.
        Mr. [Elliott] LEVITAS [of Georgia]. Mr. Speaker, will the 
    gentleman yield for a question?
        Mr. BADHAM. I will be happy to yield to the gentleman from 
    Georgia.
        Mr. LEVITAS. Mr. Speaker, along with other Members of the House 
    I have been sitting through this debate, trying to read the 
    committee report and form a judgment. There were two points that I 
    am still not clear about, and certainly I want to make a judgment 
    based on the facts and not some partisan consideration. I am sure 
    the gentleman from California feels likewise.
        In the opening statement of the gentleman from California he 
    read or referred to testimony from a Mayor McRae of Leesville, I 
    believe it is, Louisiana. Does the gentleman from California know 
    whether Mayor McRae's testimony was given at the trial of 
    Congressman Leach, which resulted in his acquittal?
        Mr. BADHAM. Yes. The record will show that the testimony that I 
    referred to was given by former Mayor McRae of Leesville in the 
    trial of Congressman Leach.
        Mr. LEVITAS. The reason I asked the question is, if that 
    testimony were to be believed by myself or by a jury, then it was 
    pretty clear that Congressman Leach was guilty of the crime 
    alleged; and since the jury acquitted him, it must have been based 
    on some judgment by that jury that Mr. McRae's testimony was not 
    credible.
        Mr. BADHAM. I find the gentleman's analysis striking. I find 
    the gentleman's analysis extremely logical, and I have a hard time 
    believing the whole thing, too.
        Mr. LEVITAS. May I ask another question?
        Mr. BADHAM. I would be delighted to yield.
        Mr. LEVITAS. The other question is this, and it was a point 
    which both the gentleman from South Carolina and the gentleman from 
    California made; that is, there was another reason that perhaps the 
    committee should retain jurisdiction. That relates to the fact that 
    there are ongoing investigations by other grand juries involving 
    this same matter.
        I wonder if the gentleman from California (Mr. Badham) or the 
    gentleman from California (Mr. John L. Burton) would care to give 
    some guidance to those of us who are not on the committee as to the 
    significance of the ongoing grand jury investigations?
        Mr. BADHAM. Well, I think it is somewhat clear that the Federal 
    Justice Department is not satisfied that all the wrongdoing 
    pertinent to that particular election has been uncovered and 
    brought to the Federal court.
        I would be happy to yield to the gentleman from South Carolina 
    for further response.
        Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, the point being that in the 
    committee report we state that there was--paraphrasing--there were 
    not enough votes that were proved to have been bought to overturn 
    the result of the election. Now, in the process of pleading, plea 
    bargaining, many of the people involved plead to one instance of 
    vote buying when in fact there had been a number of instances under 
    question. The fact that now there are other instances coming to 
    light strengthens the argument that there were in fact enough votes 
    in question, and that in fact if the investigation were to continue 
    and we were to consider all of the numbers that were in question as 
    fraudulent votes, that it would probably be enough to change the 
    result of an election. Not knowing that fact at this time, we are 
    making the argument that this committee should retain jurisdiction 
    until such time as it is closed out, and that we are satisfied 
    completely that there are enough votes.
        I am not condoning a little sin in the process, but that is the 
    way the committee has operated on this, and we have tried to look 
    at all elections along those lines.
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. BADHAM. I yield to the gentleman from California.
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
    yielding. I have got my own time. I was just standing.
        Mr. BADHAM. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, how much time does my colleague, Mr. 
    Badham, have remaining?
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. 
    Badham) has 2 minutes remaining.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Could it be agreed that the gentleman reserve the 
    balance of his time, but that the last 2 minutes be given to the 
    chairman of the panel, the gentleman from California (Mr. John L. 
    Burton)?
        Mr. BADHAM. I have no objection to that.
        Mr. THOMPSON. We want to be fair in this debate.
        Mr. BADHAM. If the gentleman will yield, I have always agreed 
    that the gentleman, the distinguished chairman, is eminently fair.
        Mr. THOMPSON. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. BADHAM. And the distinguished gentleman, the chairman of 
    the panel, also.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman 
    from California (Mr. John L. Burton).
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. Mr. Speaker, I would ask the distinguished 
    chairman of the full committee if I may be yielded such time as I 
    may consume.
        Mr. THOMPSON. The chairman yields such time as he may consume 
    to the gentleman from California, with the request that the 
    chairman be informed as to when we approach the last 3 minutes.
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. Mr. Speaker, the precedents of the House 
    must be followed. We have a duty to ourselves. I think we also have 
    a duty to the contestants, we have a duty to the voters of that 
    congressional district, and certainly, in the words of our great 
    friend and colleague, the chairman of the Republican Policy 
    Committee, Representative Shuster of Pennsylvania, who said:

  The position is that the people of the Fourth District of Louisiana have 
a right to a final determination of this question, or this matter.

        Mr. Speaker, I submit that is what we are doing.
        Unsupported allegations of fraud or irregularity are 
    insufficient to overturn an election. This is in the matter of Mr. 
    Pierce, who was a contestant, versus Mr. Pursell, a member of the 
    minority party, an incumbent. I was on that panel. I chaired that 
    panel, and we held in favor of a member of the opposition that 
    unsupported allegations of fraud or irregularity were insufficient, 
    that there must be specificity, and that we cannot just go on a 
    fishing expedition.
        I think my good friend, the gentleman from California (Mr. 
    Badham), will admit that he is not sure what we would do if we did 
    not dismiss today, but we probably should go somewhere and look at 
    something. Notwithstanding the fact the FBI investigation was 
    alleged to be cursory, however, I submit it is a crime to lie to a 
    law enforcement official in his official capacity, whether one is 
    under oath or not.
        We were asked to take the testimony of an admitted felon, 
    former Mayor McRae, but the jury listened to it and did not agree 
    to it at the time they acquitted Mr. Leach of any wrongdoing.
        Allegations of fraud or irregularity absent a showing of the 
    contestee's involvement must be supported by evidence sufficiently 
    specific--and I underline that--to support a finding that final and 
    further investigation will likely bear fruit.
        Nobody is saying this is likely to bear fruit. They are saying 
    we should go on a fishing expedition in order to find out whether 
    it bears fruit.
        Mr. [Daniel] LUNGREN [of California]. Mr. Speaker, will the 
    gentleman yield?
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. Mr. Speaker, if I could finish this first, 
    I will be happy to yield. Let me finish this reference to Evans 
    against Turner, and then I will be happy to yield to my friend, the 
    gentleman from California.
        The case of Evans against Turner in the 56th Congress was very 
    persuasive at least on this Member as we were trying to determine 
    what the facts are and if there were any irregularity in election, 
    and yet the person thought to be penalized, if you will, was not a 
    participant in those irregular activities.
        In this case, Mr. Speaker, there was a circulation of a general 
    circular proposing bribery, of which the contestee was not 
    cognizant, and it did not vitiate the election although it was 
    accompanied by acts of bribery.
        On February 5, 1900, Mr. Romulus R. Linney, of North Carolina, 
    from the Committee on Elections No. 1, submitted a report in the 
    Kentucky case of Evans against Turner. The grounds of the contest 
    alleged by the contestant were fraud and bribery, the 
    specifications of which were denied by the sitting Member.
        Again, Mr. Speaker, it seems to be right on all fours with this 
    matter.
        The opinion states that the sitting Member had been returned by 
    a plurality of 568 votes, a close election. The committee decided 
    the contestant had not successfully attacked that vote, and enough 
    votes were not vitiated.
        Again, Mr. Speaker, that is the finding the majority panel 
    made.

  The evidence offered by the contestant tends to prove the allegations of 
fraud and bribery, and much of it discloses the resort to methods which 
were disreputable--

        As was the case here with whatever actions other people were 
    taking.
        To continue, Mr. Speaker:

it is in evidence that on the morning of the election a circular was issued 
and generally distributed in the city of Louisville among the political 
workers of the contestant, printed on the paper of the Congressional 
Campaign Committee, on that date, and containing a proposition to place 
$100 in each precinct, and requesting Captains of each ward, if they did 
not get the money by 6:30 on the morning of the election, to come to 
headquarters. The circular was issued by enemies of the contestant. This is 
a novel method in the history of political struggles in the United States, 
and in the opinion of the committee demands the unqualified condemnation of 
the committee.

        And, Mr. Speaker, I would say the activities that were engaged 
    in by persons were admitted felons, including one whose testimony 
    was read to the House or to those who are persons unknown at this 
    time, are equally reprehensible to this Member of Congress and, I 
    am sure, to the entire House.
        Returning to the finding, Mr. Speaker:

  This evidence tends strongly to establish the contention of the 
contestant but does not show the contestee was a party to the fraud.

  There is no evidence tending to show that the contestee had anything to 
do with the fake circular, and there is much evidence offered by the 
contestee showing the propositions of bribery came from persons who were 
organized for the purpose of obtaining money from someone--anyone from whom 
they could obtain it. Upon a careful consideration, the committee was 
unable to determine the exact number of votes tainted and vitiated by fraud 
and bribery.

        Then, Mr. Speaker, without debate or division, I might add, the 
    House agreed to the resolutions confirming title on the sitting 
    Member.
        Mr. Speaker, I would also like to point out that the 
    allegations concerned a certain area in Vernon Parish, ward 1, 
    precinct 11, called the ``Crossing.'' Historically, in 1971 
    Representative Leach got 71.6 percent of the vote against two 
    candidates. In 1975 that total was raised when he was a State 
    senator by 15 percentage points, and he received 86.7 percent of 
    the vote. In this election it was increased by less than 7 percent, 
    by 6.3 percent or half of the increase over the prior 4 years, and 
    he received 93 percent of the vote.
        I mention this just to indicate that the historical support 
    here was predominantly, if not totally, black. It was a black 
    constituency that the incumbent had, and it is highly unlikely that 
    he would have to buy allegiance at this time. It was evident in 
    fact that he was so popular in the community that a variety of 
    candidates--I think, including the school board and the county 
    sheriff or parish sheriff, who parenthetically received 15 percent 
    of all Federal revenue sharing right off the top in the State of 
    Louisiana, and in fact including the distinguished senior Senator--
    were attaching themselves to his coattails, and he was leading 
    several slates.
        Mr. Speaker, I believe that the people do, as our good friend, 
    the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Shuster), said, have a right 
    to a resolution of this matter. It is our opinion that the only 
    resolution can be dismissal, and to go on a fishing expedition, I 
    think, is unfair and does not resolve the matter for them nor for 
    the incumbent.
        Again the testimony of an admitted felon who was relied upon 
    here was listened to by a jury of 12 men and women, good and true, 
    and it is a fact in judicial law that they were there watching the 
    demeanor of and were able to assess the credibility of that person 
    and chose to believe that person was not in fact telling the truth. 
    I think we are in a situation where we cannot gainsay that.
        Mr. BADHAM. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from 
    California.
        Mr. BADHAM. Mr. Speaker, I would like to inquire of the Chair 
    if it is not true that we are to use our remaining 2 minutes after 
    the time the gentleman speaks?
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire, how much time 
    do I have remaining.
        Mr. [Carroll] HUBBARD [of Kentucky]. The Chair will state that 
    the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Thompson) has 12 minutes 
    remaining.
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. Mr. Speaker, I would be happy to yield 1 
    minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Lungren).
        Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Speaker, may I begin by saying that the 
    gentleman from California (Mr. Badham) made a good point.
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. Mr. Speaker, if I may interrupt, I will ask 
    the Chair to remind me when I have 5 minutes remaining. I yield 1 
    minute now to the gentleman from California (Mr. Lungren).
        Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Speaker, as the Members know, I am not a 
    member of this committee, but I have been trying to listen to find 
    out what the criteria is that was used for this resolution.
        I heard the gentleman from California tell us that unless there 
    is sufficient evidence that shows there is in fact a true contest 
    of an election, the resolution before us would be appropriate, and 
    I would like to ask two questions of the gentleman from California.
        First, do we have in this House in past experience a situation 
    which parallels this, that is, one in which 24 people have already 
    been convicted either by a plea or by a conviction of a court of 
    vote fraud?
        Second, I would like to ask the gentleman, is it not true that 
    most of us who have been involved with legal proceedings know that 
    plea bargaining usually amounts to a lessening of the charges that 
    were originally brought and may in fact not really limit themselves 
    to all of the charges that were brought?
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. If the gentleman will yield, I will be 
    happy to answer the question.
        Mr. LUNGREN. I yield to the gentleman.
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. The 34 was the number that totaled those in 
    the indictment, not the plea bargaining. So the 34 was what they 
    were indicted for. They plea-bargained that down to a lesser 
    number. The number 34 was the number of illegal votes that were 
    named or alleged in the indictments. So that answers that question.
        Mr. LUNGREN. There were 24, I understand, who have been 
    convicted to this point, although 2 more are in the process.
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. Thirty-four was the total number of tainted 
    votes that were alleged in the indictments and, as the gentleman 
    knows, an indictment is an accusation and not a fact.
        Mr. LUNGREN. My question then is this: Is the gentleman 
    suggesting that the 24 who have been convicted is the total sum and 
    substance of all of the possible fraud? And I mean by ``possible,'' 
    for which there is some credible evidence that existed in that 
    election. Is that what we are to believe and, therefore, are 
    consistent in saying that in no way could there have been 266 
    falsehoods?
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. I think we would be consistent in saying 
    that in no way do we know in any election in the Nation there may 
    or may not have been a fraudulent vote cast.
        I would just respond by saying--and then I will yield to the 
    gentleman from Louisiana for debate only--that under the rules of 
    the House, and as the chairman of the task force involving a member 
    of your party, a member of this party over here, we ruled at that 
    time that there would have to be specific allegations that lead you 
    somewhere and you cannot just say there has been some fraud and to 
    go about it. Even our good friend, the gentleman from California 
    (Mr. Badham), was at a specific loss to tell us what to do except 
    that our committee somehow could have done a better job than the 
    FBI. I do not believe that we could have. I believe, with the 
    precedents of the House, with the allegations that were made, 
    specific allegations that were made by Mr. Wilson, that the numbers 
    do not add up to a total. That in no way says a little fraud is not 
    a bad thing. A little fraud, like a little bit of learning, is a 
    dangerous thing.
        Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. 
    Breaux) for purposes of debate only.
        Mr. [John] BREAUX [of Louisiana]. I thank the gentleman for 
    yielding.
        Mr. Speaker, I take this time, although I did not plan to, just 
    to make a couple of observations.
        I think, somehow, that the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Leach) 
    really becomes a victim of the political climate, and I think, in 
    making him the victim of the political climate, we really make the 
    House a victim of the political climate. I say that because I think 
    that our minds are really made up on this issue and it is basically 
    being made up because of which party we happen to belong to. This 
    election contest is not being decided based on how we should 
    interpret the law that we passed in this area, but it is being 
    decided based on how many press releases we can issue on 
    Congressman Leach's election.
        I think we do ourselves a disservice in this area. We passed a 
    law which should govern what action we should take in this regard, 
    and it says that the person who is challenging must show grounds 
    sufficient to change the result of the election, not the fact that 
    there was fraud, or that there were votes bought in the election. 
    That is admitted. A trial has cleared Congressman Leach of any 
    wrongdoing in that regard completely. In fact, the challenger does 
    not even contest Leach's involvement any more.
        But if you accept as fact all of the votes that the challenger 
    says were bought were in fact bought, it does not affect the 
    outcome of the election. And the law that we in this House passed 
    clearly states that the challenger must show that enough votes were 
    fraudulently cast to change the outcome of the election. That 
    clearly has not been done.
        We have been looking at this election for over a year; the U.S. 
    attorney has; the FBI has; and you can book it that the challenger 
    has. And despite all of that, despite all of those interviews, they 
    still have not come up with a standard that we ourselves have 
    placed on the challenger, that he has to show that there were votes 
    bought and that it would in fact change the result of the election.
        So are we interested in doing a service to this House and to 
    this body and not just to our party? I think we have to look at 
    those facts, forget the press releases, and do justice to the 
    gentleman whose career, really, is at stake and indeed the 
    integrity of this House is at stake.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield such further time as he may 
    consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. John L. Burton).
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
    gentlewoman from Louisiana (Mrs. Boggs).
        Mrs. [Corinne] BOGGS [of Louisiana]. I thank the gentleman from 
    California and the gentleman from New Jersey.
        Mr. Speaker, I would like to address myself to the climate that 
    we have indeed created here or have simply reflected here, and 
    there is another climate that we have to think about aside from the 
    integrity of this House, and that is the integrity of the people of 
    Louisiana and the integrity of all of the people who have worked 
    for so many years in trying to make certain that all of the chores 
    of democracy have been properly done, that the voters are properly 
    registered, that the voters know what the issues are, that the 
    voters know where the polling places are, that they have easy 
    access to the vote, that the vote will be administered over by 
    honest and efficient commissioners, that the vote will be properly 
    counted, honestly counted and promptly promulgated.
        There have been groups in Louisiana which have been working in 
    these regards for over 40 years. We were one of the first States to 
    having voting machines, we were one of the first States to have 
    permanent registration since 1941. We worked diligently to enlarge 
    the franchise, particularly to blacks and other minorities, and 
    many of the people who have worked in this regard also worked very 
    diligently in the campaign of the gentleman whose contest is before 
    us today.
        So I do think we have to remember these elements as well.
        I have been a member of the Elections Subcommittee of House 
    Administration, and I have worked with many of the Members who have 
    spoken previously today. I think I have agreed on that committee 
    very, very often with the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Frenzel). I 
    have also agreed with the gentleman from California (Mr. John L. 
    Burton). And I do think that we all know that in other contests 
    that we have looked at, we agreed that it was not worth the time 
    and the effort and the moneys that would have to be expended to 
    attorneys and other investigators to look into cases where not 
    sufficient amounts of evidence had been shown that the election 
    could be overturned by the number of votes that were in contest.
        I hope that my colleagues will join me in voting to dismiss 
    this contest.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. 
    Thompson) has 4 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from 
    California (Mr. Badham) has 2 minutes remaining.
        Mr. BADHAM. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman 
    from South Carolina (Mr. Campbell).
        Mr. CAMPBELL. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
        Mr. Speaker, one point should be made. There was a statement 
    made concerning partisanship of this nature, and I think that the 
    majority side would agree that we have heard many contested 
    elections this year and that we on the minority side have in every 
    instance agreed with the majority in all cases in dismissing 
    challenges by, in all cases, the minority candidates. And, this 
    happens to be one that we stand on the merits of the case, and I do 
    not think that it should be inferred that this is strictly 
    partisanship on the part of the minority. Rather, it is a stand 
    against fraud in the election process.
        Mr. BADHAM. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I 
    may consume.
        Mr. Speaker, I would just like to respond that the members of 
    the committee have never raised this on a partisan level, and I 
    commended the gentleman from California (Mr. Badham) for it. The 
    gentleman from California (Mr. Badham) was out of the country on 
    official business at the time that your leadership held a press 
    conference before our first meeting on it, to let us know what they 
    were going to do. So any remarks certainly would not go to any of 
    the minority members of either the task force or the committee. So 
    the gentleman is to be commended for approaching this with an open 
    mind. It was the Republican leadership which chose to make this a 
    partisan issue and practically decide what the votes were going to 
    be before we had our hearing on it. I wanted to make that straight, 
    to differentiate the gentleman from the position of the leadership. 
    I think the gentleman did approach it, as we did, with as open a 
    mind as possible, but it was their leadership press conference that 
    sought to put this in a somewhat partisan light. I do not think the 
    members of the committee did, because it was not an easy situation 
    for them.
        Mr. BADHAM. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.
        Mr. Speaker, I would like to just mention a couple of comments 
    that were made by the Members from Louisiana, that really one of 
    the basic items here at question is the book of 440 people, 
    allegedly the commercial vote, were they taken to the polls as just 
    innocent black folks being driven to the polls, or were they 
    actually paid? That is where the whole thing turns. We have had no 
    investigation of that.
        Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman 
    from Pennsylvania (Mr. Shuster).
        Mr. [E.G.] SHUSTER [of Pennsylvania]. I thank the gentleman for 
    yielding.
        Mr. Speaker, we are not questioning the integrity of the 
    gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Leach). We are not even asking for a 
    final disposition here today. We are simply saying that this should 
    not be swept under the rug. We are simply saying that there is 
    evidence of fraud. After all, several people have already been 
    convicted. There is an ongoing, continuing FBI investigation. Eight 
    people are still under investigation. So there is evidence of 
    fraud; the question of how many votes were bought is still at 
    issue. We have no issue over whether or not some votes were bought, 
    that is agreed upon.
        The issue is how many votes were bought, and we think that not 
    only Republicans but Democrats, as well, should join in not 
    permitting this to be swept under the rug. The issue is not Mr. 
    Leach's integrity.
        The issue is the integrity of the electoral process.
        Let us vote down this resolution so that the committee can 
    proceed with a full hearing into this contested election.
        Mr. THOMPSON. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
    California (Mr. John L. Burton).
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. I thank the chairman of the Republican 
    policy committee of the House for his nonpartisan statement.
        I also thank him for the bipartisan statements that were made 
    before we even had our first hearings. I would refer him to his own 
    statement:

  The position is that the people of the Fourth District have a right to a 
final resolution of this matter.

        This is what we are trying to do. We differ as to whether or 
    not a House committee could do a better investigatory job than the 
    FBI. We do not think we could.
        Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania (Mr. Shuster).
        Mr. SHUSTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
        I would ask the gentleman is it not true that Republicans on 
    the committee vigorously supported dismissing the election contest 
    brought by a Republican, Leo Thorsness? So our position is not 
    simply a partisan decision.
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. I will not talk about the Republicans on 
    the committee. I commended them. It was the leadership on the 
    gentleman's side that chose to put this in partisan perspective 
    before we had our first committee hearing, assuming we were going 
    to give them 5 minutes and not let them talk. The gentleman from 
    California (Mr. Badham) was told--well, he was out of the country 
    on official business--like his vote had already been counted at a 
    certain place. I do not think that was proper.
        We voted to dismiss counts. In fact, we are following 
    precedents laid down in the matter of Pierce against Pursell where 
    I, as a Democrat, chaired the subcommittee and ruled against the 
    Democrat contestee.
        So these matters have been nonpartisan, but it was the 
    leadership of the other side that sought to put this here.
        The people of the State of Louisiana, who have to be as 
    outraged and shocked as anybody that there could be a tainted 
    election in that State, need a resolution of this problem. They 
    have never seen the likes of this in any election prior to this, 
    and hope they never see any tainted elections again.
        I just believe that the motion to dismiss is the right thing 
    for the integrity of the House and the right thing for the 
    integrity of Mr. Leach. I think it is very important that this has 
    been cast by some Members under a partisan pall.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I think enough has been said on the 
    question, and I move the previous question on the resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the noes appeared to have it.
        Mr. JOHN L. BURTON. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the 
    ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order 
    that a quorum is not present.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
        The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    241, nays 153, answered ``present'' 3, not voting 36, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 114] . . . 

        Mr. BENNETT changed his vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
        Mr. OBEY changed his vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
        So the resolution was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 17.5 Thorsness v Daschle

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the First District of South Dakota was conducted on November 7, 
1978.(21) The general election candidates were Thomas 
Daschle (the Democratic candidate) and Leo K. Thorsness (the Republican 
candidate). The official results indicated that Mr. Daschle received 
64,661 votes, while Mr. Thorsness received 64,647 votes. Mr. Daschle's 
margin of victory was therefore 14 votes. After a state recount, Mr. 
Daschle's margin of victory grew to 105 votes. The South Dakota 
Secretary of State certified Mr. Daschle as the winner of the election 
on November 27, 1978. Mr. Daschle's credentials were presented to the 
House of Representatives, and on January 15, 1979, he was duly 
administered the oath of office without objection or challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
21. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 96-785, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under South Dakota state law, candidates may appeal recount 
decisions to the state Supreme Court. Mr. Thorsness filed a writ of 
certiorari with the court, and on August 27 and August 28, 1979, the 
court conducted its own recount and review of disputed ballots. The 
court determined that Mr. Daschle had won the election.
    On December 26, 1979, Mr. Thorsness (hereafter the ``contestant'') 
filed a notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was 
forwarded to the Committee on House Administration for its review. 
Contestant alleged that a fair review of disputed ballots would show 
that contestant received a plurality. Contestant further alleged that 
Mr. Daschle's representatives conducted illegal and fraudulent training 
sessions for the state's recount boards.
    On January 25, 1979, Mr. Daschle (hereafter the ``contestee'') 
filed an answer and a motion to dismiss, arguing that contestant: (1) 
had failed to state grounds sufficient to change the results of the 
election; (2) had failed to show any fraud, irregularities, or 
misconduct on the part of election officials; (3) did not have standing 
to file a contest; and (4) had waived his right to contest the election 
by proceeding in state courts.
    The Committee on House Administration formed an ad hoc election 
panel of three Members to review the case. The panel met on March 1, 
1979, to hear oral arguments from the parties. The parties stipulated 
that the allegation regarding improper training sessions would be 
withdrawn. On December 13, 1979, the panel met again, noted the results 
of the South Dakota Supreme Court proceeding (which had concluded that 
contestee had won the election) and thereafter voted to recommend that 
contestee's motion to dismiss be granted.
    In its committee report, the Committee on House Administration 
agreed with the ad hoc panel that the motion to dismiss should be 
granted. The committee found that the contestant had not supported his 
allegations with sufficient documentary evidence to show that the 
election result would have been different. The report relied heavily on 
the fact that the South Dakota Supreme Court had reviewed disputed 
ballots and had declared contestee the winner of the election. In the 
words of the ad hoc election panel, it would be ``redundant and 
presumptuous for this panel to recount the ballots ourselves and 
substitute our judgement for the courts.''(22) The committee 
agreed that any committee-conducted recount would not be advisable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
22. H. Rept. 96-785, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On March 4, 1980,(23) the committee called up House 
Resolution 576 (dismissing the contest) as a privileged matter. The 
House adopted the resolution by voice vote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
23. 126 Cong. Rec. 4490-91, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

             DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST AGAINST THOMAS DASCHLE

        Mr. [Frank] THOMPSON [of New Jersey]. Mr. Speaker, I call up a 
    privileged resolution (H. Res. 576), dismissing the election 
    contest against Thomas Daschle, and ask for its immediate 
    consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 576

  Resolved, That the election contest of Leo K. Thorsness, contestant, 
against Thomas Daschle, contestee, First Congressional District of the 
State of South Dakota, be dismissed.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(24) The gentleman from New 
    Jersey (Mr. Thompson) is recognized for 1 hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
24. Carroll Hubbard, Jr. (KY).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
    consume.
        Mr. Speaker, under the U.S. Constitution and the rules of the 
    House, the Committee on House Administration is charged with the 
    responsibility for investigating contested elections. In this 
    Congress, five contested elections were filed. In each case I 
    appointed as chairman an ad hoc panel to conduct the investigation.
        In the contest before the House today, Thorsness against 
    Daschle, the panel was chaired by our distinguished colleague, the 
    gentleman from California (Mr. Fazio). Also serving with the 
    gentleman from California (Mr. Fazio) were committee members, the 
    gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Davis) and the gentleman from 
    Minnesota (Mr. Frenzel).
        Mr. Speaker, I now yield such time as he may consume to the 
    gentleman from California, the chairman of the panel (Mr. Fazio).
        Mr. [Victor] FAZIO [of California]. Mr. Speaker, I thank the 
    gentleman from New Jersey, the chairman of the Committee on House 
    Administration.
        This election contest was filed by Mr. Leo K. Thorsness against 
    Thomas A. Daschle for the seat in the First Congressional District 
    of South Dakota. In the election held on November 7, 1978, Thomas 
    Daschle received 64,661 votes to Mr. Thorsness' 64,647 votes, a 
    margin of 14 votes.
        Acting under provisions of the laws of the State of South 
    Dakota, Mr. Thorsness requested a recount for certain selected 
    districts, at which time the margin of votes grew larger in Mr. 
    Daschle's favor. Thereupon, a complete district-wide recount was 
    made and Mr. Daschle's margin of victory grew to a total of 105 
    votes.
        The election results were subsequently certified on November 
    27, 1978, by the secretary of state and the Governor, and 
    credentials were issued to Thomas Daschle. Mr. Daschle was sworn in 
    and took office on January 15, 1979, after presenting his 
    credentials to the House.
        On December 26, 1978, Mr. Thorsness filed a ``notice of 
    contest'' against Mr. Daschle with the Clerk of the House. The 
    notice of contest alleged that a fair and impartial review of more 
    than 2,000 ballots still in dispute would show that the contestant, 
    Mr. Thorsness, did in fact receive a plurality.
        At the same time, the contestant appealed the determination of 
    the recount board to the supreme court of South Dakota.
        On January 25, 1979, the contestee, Mr. Daschle, filed a motion 
    to dismiss the contest alleging, among other things, a failure to 
    make a showing of grounds sufficient to change the results of the 
    election.
        On March 1, 1979, the ad hoc election panel, consisting of 
    myself as chairman, the Honorable Mendel Davis and the Honorable 
    Bill Frenzel, held an open hearing for the purpose of receiving 
    oral arguments on the motion to dismiss. Both contestee and 
    contestant were represented by counsel. The contest centered on the 
    issue of whether ``a fair and impartial review'' of the disputed 
    ballots would result in a plurality for the contestant.
        The ad hoc election panel again met, on December 13, 1979, with 
    all members present, to consider the motion to dismiss. After a 
    thorough review of the record and after due deliberation and 
    notification from the South Dakota supreme court that it had 
    determined Daschle to be the winner, the panel voted 3 to 0 to 
    recommend to the full committee that the contestee's motion to 
    dismiss be granted.
        On February 12, 1980, a quorum being present, by unanimous 
    voice vote, the Committee on House Administration adopted the 
    panel's resolution to recommend dismissal of the contest to the 
    House.
        In assessing the record of the contest the panel noted that 
    contestant Thorsness' case hinged on the allegation that ``a fair 
    and impartial review'' of the contested ballots would prove him the 
    winner. The panel held that in light of the exhaustive de novo 
    recount by South Dakota's highest court, it would seem both 
    redundant and presumptuous for the panel to recount the ballots and 
    substitute its judgment for that of the courts. While we certainly 
    have that authority, we found no reason to use it.
        The contestant was unable to produce any documentary or other 
    evidence of sufficient weight to demonstrate to the satisfaction of 
    the committee that the allegations, if true, would have changed the 
    election result. It was the committee's unanimous opinion that the 
    case should therefore be dismissed.
        Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. 
    Frenzel) for any comments the gentleman wishes to make.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished chairman of 
    the elections panel for yielding.
        Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the privileged resolution. 
    The contestant and the contestee have had their day in court. The 
    supreme court of the State of South Dakota has ruled in favor of 
    our colleague, the gentleman from South Dakota (Mr. Daschle).
        The panel has made a good decision. The committee has made a 
    good decision. The minority believes that the House should ratify 
    that decision by passing the privileged resolution today.
        Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
        Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker. I move the previous question on the 
    resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.



Sec. 18. Ninety-seventh Congress, 1981-1982

    There were no election contests considered by the House during the 
97th Congress.



Sec. 19. Ninety-eighth Congress, 1983-1984

Sec. 19.1 Archer v Packard

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the 43rd District of California was conducted on November 2, 
1982.(1) The general election candidates were Roy Archer 
(the Democratic candidate), Johnnie R. Crean (the Republican 
candidate), and Ron Packard (a write-in candidate). The official 
results indicated that Mr. Packard won a plurality with 66,444 votes, 
as compared to 57,995 for Mr. Archer and 56,297 for Mr. Crean. On 
December 3, 1982, the California Secretary of State certified the 
results of the election, and credentials were issued to Mr. Packard. 
Mr. Packard's credentials were presented to the House of 
Representatives, and on January 3, 1983, he was duly administered the 
oath of office without objection or challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 98-452, 98th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On December 16, 1982, Mr. Archer filed a petition with a state 
court seeking to contest the election. On January 13, 1983, the judge 
dismissed the complaint, stating that ``[t]he evidence in this case 
falls far short of that required to set aside the results of this 
election.''(2)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. H. Rept. 98-452, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On December 29, 1982, Mr. Archer (hereafter ``contestant'') filed a 
notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was referred to 
the Committee on House Administration for its consideration. In the 
notice of contest, contestant alleged that election officials had 
engaged in a variety of improper and illegal behavior. On January 21, 
1983, Mr. Packard (hereafter ``contestee'') filed a motion to dismiss.
    The committee designated a task force to review the matter. On June 
30, 1983, the task force met to hear oral arguments from the parties. 
On August 3, 1983, the task force voted to recommend that contestee's 
motion to dismiss be granted.
    In its committee report, the Committee on House Administration 
agreed with the conclusion reached by its task force. It reiterated 
prior precedents regarding the need for contestant to show that, but 
for the alleged acts of election officials, the result of the election 
would have been different. The committee relied on the conclusion 
reached by the state court that ``exonerated contestee and all election 
officials.''(3) It also relied on the determination by a 
county district attorney that no prosecutions connected to the election 
were warranted. The committee acknowledged that California's process 
for voting for write-in candidates using the Votomatic machines caused 
the defacement of certain machines, but concluded that there was no 
evidence to support the idea that confusion about how to vote properly 
was sufficient to change the outcome of the election.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. Id. at p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On November 15, 1983,(4) the committee called up House 
Resolution 305 (dismissing the contest) as a privileged matter. The 
House adopted the resolution by voice vote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 129 Cong. Rec. 32704-705, 98th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST AGAINST RON PACKARD

        Ms. [Mary Rose] OAKAR [of Ohio]. Mr. Speaker, by direction of 
    the Committee on House Administration, I call up a privileged 
    resolution (H. Res. 305) dismissing the election contest against 
    Ron Packard, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 305

  Resolved, That the election contest of Roy ``Pat'' Archer, contestant, 
against Ron Packard, contestee, Forty-third Congressional District of the 
State of California, be dismissed.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(5) The gentlewoman from 
    Ohio (Ms. Oakar) is recognized for 1 hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. Ronald Coleman (TX).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Ms. OAKAR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes, for purposes of 
    debate only, to the gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas) and 
    pending that I yield myself such time as I may consume.
        Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 305 is a resolution to dismiss 
    the election contest filed in the 43d Congressional District of 
    California.
        In the contest before the House, Archer against Packard, I 
    chaired the investigating task force and I was joined by committee 
    members Al Swift and William Thomas.
        This election contest was filed by Pat Archer against Ron 
    Packard for the seat in the 43d Congressional District of 
    California. In the election held on November 2, 1982, the 
    Republican candidate, Johnnie Crean, received 56,297 votes, the 
    Democratic candidate, Pat Archer, received 57,995 votes, and the 
    write-in candidate, Ron Packard, received 66,444 votes for an 8,449 
    vote margin of victory. On December 3, 1982, certifying credentials 
    were signed by the Secretary of State and were issued to Mr. 
    Packard. The credentials of Mr. Packard were presented to the House 
    of Representatives on January 3, 1983. He took the oath of office 
    and was seated on the same day.
        Mr. Archer contested the results of the election charging that 
    irregularities took place during the election. Mr. Archer 
    challenged the results in California court and his case was 
    dismissed for lack of evidence.
        On June 30, 1983, the task force held an open hearing for 
    receiving oral argument on the motion to dismiss. On August 3, 
    1983, the task force again met and voted by a rollcall vote of 
    three ayes and zero nays to recommend to the committee that the 
    motion to dismiss be granted and that contest be dismissed.
        On October 25, 1983, by a unanimous vote, a quorum being 
    present, the committee adopted the task force's resolution to 
    recommend dismissal of the contest to the House.
        The recommendation for dismissal is based upon the fact that 
    the contestant failed to establish, as required by the Contested 
    Election Act, that the outcome of the election was affected by the 
    alleged irregularities.
        I would note that a contestant has a substantial burden to 
    carry and the contestant in this matter has fallen far short of 
    doing so. The contestant lost by over 8,000 votes, and has not 
    presented any evidence that puts the outcome in doubt. However, I 
    would note that the election system employed did have inherent 
    weaknesses when it comes to write-in efforts, such as that 
    successfully mounted by Mr. Packard. Therefore, the report included 
    a recommendation that election officials in California explore 
    alternative means for handling write-in candidacies.
        Mr. [William] THOMAS of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 
    such time as I may consume.
        Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of House Resolution 305, the 
    resolution dismissing the election contest filed by Mr. Roy Pat 
    Archer against Congressman Ron Packard.
        The election of Congressman Packard was the fourth time in U.S. 
    history that a Member was elected to Congress through the write-in 
    process. Viable write-in candidacies are rare, and pretty 
    obviously, elected write-in candidates are rarer yet. It is unique 
    in the history of the House that we currently have two write-in 
    candidates sitting.
        Although the county election officials did provide the poll 
    inspectors in the 43d District with extra training on write-in 
    voting, the importance of frequent checks of the voting booths, and 
    inspection of the voting devices, they did not anticipate the 
    volume of problems encountered by the confusion created by the 
    write-in procedures and the mechanical devices used in voting. The 
    committee's recommendation to improve the write-in procedures is, I 
    think, a good one.
        Mr. Archer presented his case for himself, and the committee 
    rejected his conclusions, as did the District Attorney and the 
    superior court in California previously, and I would strongly urge 
    the House to do likewise.
        Mr. [William] FRENZEL [of Minnesota]. Mr. Speaker, will the 
    gentleman yield?
        Mr. THOMAS of California. I yield to the gentleman from 
    Minnesota.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, I take this time only to compliment 
    the six members of these two election task forces who have worked 
    over nearly a year on these particular cases.
        I think these two cases illustrate some of the behind-the-
    scenes work that is done in this Congress of which the outside 
    world is not aware and in fact some of our own Members are not 
    aware.
        I would further state that in each of these cases the task 
    forces and the committee uncovered defective State systems. In the 
    case of North Carolina, there was the problem of not allowing a 
    candidate a recount and the problem of counting votes in different 
    ways. In the case of California, there was the difficulty of 
    administering a write-in system.
        Our committee has no jurisdiction over State election systems, 
    and all we can do is make recommendations. But I hope that the 
    Members of the House are aware of the extra effort being put in by 
    members of this committee and of their untiring efforts to see that 
    the will of the people is maintained in election contests.
        Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
        Mr. THOMAS of California. Mr. Speaker, I have no further 
    requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.
        Ms. OAKAR. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, 
    and I move the previous question on the resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 19.2 Hendon v Clarke

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the 11th District of North Carolina was conducted on November 2, 
1982.(6) The general election candidates were James M. 
Clarke (the Democratic candidate), and William Hendon (the Republican 
candidate). The official vote count indicated that Mr. Clarke had 
received 85,410 votes, and that Mr. Hendon had received 84,085 votes. 
On December 6, 1982, the North Carolina Secretary of State and Governor 
certified the results of the election. Mr. Clarke's credentials were 
presented to the House of Representatives, and on January 3, 1983, he 
was duly administered the oath of office without objection or 
challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 98-453, 98th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The election contest centered on ballots used in five of the 17 
counties in the 11th District of North Carolina. In those countries, 
the computer punch-card system used allowed voters to cast ambiguous 
ballots by selecting both individual names and a straight-party ticket. 
Under North Carolina law, such ambiguous ballots would be counted as 
straight-party tickets and the additional markings for individual 
candidates ignored. Mr. Hendon challenged the constitutionality of this 
North Carolina law in Federal court.
    The U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina 
ruled against Mr. Hendon's request for a recount and his request to 
enjoin the certification of Mr. Clarke. The court held that the North 
Carolina statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because 
all voters in the affected precincts were treated the same. The case 
was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The 
appellate court did accept Mr. Hendon's claim that parts of the North 
Carolina law were unconstitutional, but decided that the relief 
requested should not be granted. The court held that known pre-election 
issues should be resolved prior to the election. Allowing parties to 
challenge election laws after the fact ``would encourage parties to 
gamble on the favorable outcome of the election, and then, having lost, 
to seek to overturn the results in court by challenging'' the election 
procedures.(7) The court thus refused to invalidate the 
election.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. H. Rept. 98-453, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On December 3, 1982, Mr. Hendon (hereafter ``contestant'') filed a 
notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was forwarded to 
the Committee on House Administration for its review. The notice 
alleged that because of the ballot system used, the true intent of the 
voter was not reflected in the vote totals. On December 17, 1982, Mr. 
Clarke (hereafter ``contestee'') filed a motion to dismiss the case.
    The Committee on House Administration formed a task force composed 
of three Members to investigate the contest. On July 25, 1983, the task 
force met to hear oral arguments from the parties. On August 3, 1983, 
the task force voted to recommend that contestee's motion to dismiss be 
granted.
    In its committee report, the Committee on House Administration 
reiterated the substantial burden that a contestant must overcome to 
prevail against a motion to dismiss. In the view of the committee, the 
``evidence submitted by Contestant amounted to mere 
speculation''(8) and that the contestant had not shown with 
specificity how the result of the election would have been different 
had different balloting procedures been used. The committee also took 
issue with the relief sought, i.e., a recount of the votes cast in the 
five affected counties. The report evinced great reluctance for the 
committee to conduct its own recount, which would necessarily involve 
making judgments as to disputed ballots and potentially 
disenfranchising some voters. Such a process ``would not guarantee that 
the voters' intent would be carried out.''(9) The committee 
report concluded that contestee's motion to dismiss should be granted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. Id. at p. 5.
 9. Id. at p. 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Members of the minority party filed dissenting views to accompany 
the committee report. They argued the North Carolina law, which had 
been declared unconstitutional, had the effect of favoring Democratic 
candidates and ignoring voters' attempts to make split-ticket voting 
choices. In their view, the committee should have made the decision to 
review disputed ballots and attempt to discern voter intent (consistent 
with prior occasions where the committee took these steps). Because the 
House is the sole judge of its elections under the Constitution, the 
minority party Members, in their dissent, felt that this 
``constitutional mandate compels that we act.''(10)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Id. at p. 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On November 15, 1983,(11) the committee called up House 
Resolution 304 (dismissing the contest) as a privileged matter. The 
House adopted the resolution by voice vote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 129 Cong. Rec. 32702-704, 98th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST AGAINST JAMES McCLURE CLARKE    


        Mr. [Jim] BATES [of California]. Mr. Speaker, by direction of 
    the Committee on House Administration, I call up a privileged 
    resolution (H. Res. 304) dismissing the election contest against 
    James McClure Clarke, and ask for its immediate consideration in 
    the House.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 304

  Resolved, That the election contest of William M. Hendon, contestant, 
against James McClure Clarke, contestee, Eleventh Congressional District of 
the State of North Carolina, be dismissed.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. [Ronald] Coleman of Texas). The 
    gentleman from California (Mr. Bates) is recognized for 1 hour.
        Mr. BATES. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes, for the purpose of 
    debate only, to the gentleman from California (Mr. Badham), pending 
    which I yield myself such time as I may consume.
        Mr. Speaker, under the U.S. Constitution and the rules of the 
    House, the Committee on House Administration is charged with the 
    responsibility for investigating contested elections.
        In this Congress, two election contests were filed. In both 
    contests, the chairman of the Committee on House Administration, 
    Augustus Hawkins, established a task force to conduct the 
    investigation.
        In the contest before the House today, Hendon against Clarke, I 
    chaired the investigating task force and I was joined by committee 
    members Ed Jones and Robert Badham.
        This election contest was filed by William Hendon against James 
    McClure Clarke for the seat in the 11th Congressional District of 
    North Carolina. In the election held on November 2, 1982, Mr. 
    Clarke received 85,410 votes while Mr. Hendon received 84,085 
    votes. On December 6, 1982, certifying credentials were signed by 
    the secretary of state and Governor and were issued to Mr. Clarke. 
    The credentials of Mr. Clarke were presented to the House of 
    Representatives, and he appeared, took the oath of office, and was 
    seated without objection on January 3, 1983.
        Mr. Hendon contested the results of the election and requested 
    a recount of the ballots cast. Specifically, Mr. Hendon challenged 
    the vote counting procedures used in 5 of the 17 counties in the 
    district. In these five counties, ballots which had markings for 
    both a straight party ticket and for an individual candidate of 
    another party were counted as a straight party vote. This procedure 
    was consistent with North Carolina election law and the ballots had 
    clear instructions that ambiguously marked ballots would be counted 
    in this way.
        Mr. Hendon challenged the constitutionality of the North 
    Carolina election law in Federal court and requested a recount of 
    ballots cast in the five counties. A district court rejected Mr. 
    Hendon's case. However, the appeals court found the North Carolina 
    law unconstitutional, but denied Mr. Hendon's request for a 
    recount, holding that it is the duty of parties having grievances 
    with election laws to challenge the laws prior to the election in 
    question.
        On July 25, 1983, the task force held an open hearing and 
    received oral argument on a motion to dismiss the contest. On 
    August 3, 1983, the task force again met and heard additional 
    arguments. The concerns of this task force centered on whether the 
    outcome of the election had been affected by the vote counting 
    procedures used in the election, and whether the committee should 
    conduct a recount of the ballots. At the conclusion of the oral 
    presentation, the task force recommended to the committee, by a 
    rollcall vote of 2 ayes and 1 nay that the motion to dismiss be 
    granted, and that the contest be dismissed.
        On October 25, 1983, by voice vote, a quorum being present, the 
    committee adopted the task force's resolution to recommend 
    dismissal of the contest to the House.
        These are two bases for the recommendation of dismissal. First 
    the contestant failed to demonstrate with sufficient evidence, as 
    required by the Contested Election Act, that the outcome of the 
    election was affected. The committee found no evidence indicating 
    that the election was affected by the vote counting procedures used 
    in the election. Mr. Hendon presented only unsubstantiated 
    speculation, and the committee felt that the will of the people as 
    expressed at the ballot box should not be thwarted by mere 
    speculation.
        The second basis for dismissal is that a contestant, wishing to 
    challenge an election on the basis of known preelection 
    irregularities, must challenge the irregularities prior to the 
    election in question. This was the ruling of the U.S. Court of 
    Appeals, and it is entirely consistent with House precedent. I 
    would like to point out that the law which the contestant 
    challenged has been on the books since 1955, and it is the same law 
    under which the contestant won election to Congress in 1980, at 
    which time he did not challenge the validity of the statute. To 
    quote the appeals court:

  Failure to require preelection adjudication would permit, if not 
encourage, parties who could raise a claim to lay by and gamble upon 
receiving a favorable decision of the electorate and then, upon losing, 
seek to undo the ballot results in court action.

        For these reasons, the committee recommends that the contest of 
    Hendon against Clarke be dismissed. The House has before it House 
    Resolution 304 and I urge its adoption.
        Mr. [Robert] BADHAM [of California]. Mr. Speaker, I yield 
    myself such time as I may consume.
        Mr. Speaker, this case is case is before us because of the 
    responsibilities the U.S. Constitution entrusts to the House of 
    Representatives. Article I, section 5, clause 1 states specifically 
    that it is the obligation of the House to ``be the Judge of the 
    Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members,'' We are 
    fortunate in having in this case more than the evidence collected 
    through the Federal Contested Election Act (FCEA) (2 U.S.C. 381-96 
    (1981)). We also have the benefit of a U.S. Court of Appeals 
    decision. Hendon v. North Carolina Board of Elections, No. 82-2122 
    (4th Cir. June 23, 1983). The ruling provides a fair and impartial 
    analysis that we cannot ignore. The court found unconstitutional 
    the law under which the Hendon-Clarke ballots were counted.
        In addition to the ruling on the methods of vote tabulation, 
    Mr. Hendon presented this task force with sufficient evidence to 
    show that he would have won the election if the ballots had been 
    counted in a constitutional manner. The precedents of the House 
    allow us to examine the ballots. Equity and our duties under the 
    Constitution require that we recount those ballots, or, at the very 
    least, set aside the election, declare the seat vacant, and hold a 
    new election.
        Mr. Hendon brought this contest under the FCEA on the grounds 
    that the counting and casting of ballots in his congressional race 
    denied voters equal protection of the law. He also filed suit in 
    U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. The 
    accuracy of the tabulation is crucial because Democrat Clarke 
    defeated incumbent Hendon by 1,325 votes out of 171,047 cast. The 
    15 counties in the 11th Congressional District employed 4 voting 
    methods: a hand-counted paper ballot listing only the congressional 
    race; a mechanical lever voting machine; an electronic punch card 
    system (CES); and an optically scanned paper ballot system 
    (Airmac). Hendon protested the tabulation of votes on the CES, 
    where voters punched a hole beside the name of a party or candidate 
    and the ballots were counted electronically by machine, and on the 
    Airmac system, where voters used a special pen to mark ballots 
    counted by an optical scanning device. Five counties used these 
    methods.
        Hendon's complaint and the fourth circuit's opinion both center 
    on the North Carolina statute permitting a person to vote a 
    straight party ballot by marking a circle above that party's 
    column. More than 50 contests faced 11th Congressional District 
    voters last November. Democrats had candidates for all the races 
    while Republicans fielded less than 10 in some counties. Therefore, 
    a voter wanting to split his ballot and vote for candidates of 
    different parties had to mark a square by each candidate's name. A 
    voter wanting to vote a straight party ticket had to make only one 
    mark.
        The court found the application of these statutes 
    unconstitutional because of the way a CES or Airmac ballot with a 
    mark in the straight party circle, but also in the square of an 
    individual candidate, was counted. Such ballots registered as a 
    straight party vote, with the vote for the individual of the other 
    party not counted. But voters using paper ballots or mechanical 
    lever voting machines could split their tickets, even if they 
    marked the straight party circle, by just marking Hendon's name.
        Mr. Hendon provided the task force with convincing evidence 
    that this system of counting votes deprived him of enough votes to 
    change the result of the election. Examining the system, the fourth 
    circuit rules:

  The imposition of a legislative preference for the straight party 
candidate, when the voter has indicated no such preference, is an arbitrary 
subversion of the electoral process that serves no compelling State 
interest.

        Mr. Hendon provided the task force with specific evidence that 
    a constitutional tabulation would have given him enough votes to 
    change the outcome through affidavits from disenfranchised voters 
    and through evidence that a manual count necessitated by an 
    election night breakdown of some CES and Airmac machines showed 
    Hendon votes not being counted.
        While the fourth circuit found the method of vote counting in 
    the Hendon-Clarke election unconstitutional, it did not order a 
    recount as had been requested and arrayed for by the Hendon forces. 
    Although Mr. Clarke and his supporters have tried to make much of 
    this, the Constitution makes the House the sole judge of the 
    elections of its Members. See Brit v. Board of Canvassers (172 N.C. 
    797, 90 S.E. 1005, 1007 (1916)); see also, Roudebush v. Hartke (405 
    U.S. 15, 25-26 (1972)); Keough v. Homer (8 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Ill. 
    1933)). The court knew during its deliberations that Mr. Hendon had 
    filed an election contest with the House of Representatives. The 
    court's decision avoids any interference with the constitutional 
    prerogative of a coequal branch of government.
        The precedents of the House of Representatives clearly allow us 
    to examine contested ballots to insure the integrity of an 
    election. See Roush v. Chambers (H.R. Rep. No. 513, 87th Cong., 1st 
    Sess. (1961)); Moreland v. Scharetz (H.R. Rep. No. 1158, 78th 
    Cong., 1st Sess. (1944)). Faced, as we are, with an election 
    conducted in a manner a U.S. Court of Appeals has found 
    unconstitutional, such is our obligation. As this committee said:

  The power to examine the ballots and to correct both deliberate and 
inadvertent mistakes and errors shall always remain in the House.

        Kyros v. Emery (H.R. Rep. No. 760, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 
    (1975)); (quoting Brown v. Hicks (H.R. Rep. No. 1328, 64th Cong., 
    1st Sess. (1916)); see also Mikva v. Young (H.R. Rep. No. 244, 95th 
    Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)); Ziebart v. Smith (H.R. Rep. No. 763, 94th 
    Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)); L. Deschler, ``Deschler's Precedents of 
    the House of Representatives'' (Ch. 8, Sec. 8.4-8.5 (1978)). In 
    previous contests, such recounts have been conducted by bipartisan 
    teams supervised by this committee. See, for example, Kyros against 
    Emery, supra. Mr. Hendon has estimated that 64,000 votes are being 
    contested and that the recount would take only 5 days.
        The precedents of this House further state that disputed 
    ballots, such as the split ticket ballots in this case, ``should be 
    counted on the basis of obvious voter intent.'' Mikva v. Young 
    (H.R. Rep. No. 759, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1975)). The North 
    Carolina statute holds:

  No official ballot shall be rejected because of technical errors in 
marking it, unless it is impossible to determine the voter's choice under 
the rules for counting ballots. (N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 163-170.)

        Indeed, the fourth circuit rules that no compelling State 
    interest existed for the method used to count split tickets on CES 
    and Airmac systems as was done in the 11th Congressional District. 
    Equity and fairness demand that these ballots be recounted so that 
    this election can truly reflect the voters intent.
        Our constitutional mandate compels that we act. The role of the 
    judge that this House must assume is not an easy one. But it 
    entails getting the full facts of this case by conducting a recount 
    or, alternatively, declaring this seat vacant and ordering a new 
    election. I strongly urge the House to examine the facts of this 
    case objectively and to reject House Resolution 304.
        Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I reserve 
    the balance of my time.
        Mr. BATES. Mr. Speaker, I would just like to commend the 
    gentleman from California (Mr. Badham) on the fine way that he has 
    handled this issue. I think certainly his position is not without 
    merit, but I think on balance the committee and the task force have 
    made the right decision.
        Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I move 
    the previous question on the resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.



Sec. 20. Ninety-ninth Congress, 1985-1986

Sec. 20.1 McCloskey v McIntyre

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the Eighth District of Indiana was conducted on November 6, 
1984.(1) The general election candidates were Frank 
McCloskey (the Democratic candidate), Richard D. McIntyre (the 
Republican candidate), and Michael J. Fallahay (the Libertarian 
candidate). The initial vote count indicated that Mr. McCloskey had 
received 116,841 votes, Mr. McIntyre had received 116,769 votes, and 
Mr. Fallahay had received 769 votes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 99-58, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under Indiana law, the county clerk from each country certifies the 
results from that county to the Indiana Secretary of State. Initial 
certifications from all counties were received on November 13, 1984. On 
November 19 and November 26, two counties submitted corrected returns. 
Mr. McIntyre, however, alleged that one additional county (Gibson 
County) had incorrect initial vote totals, and that a new count would 
show a swing of 111 votes in favor of Mr. McIntyre, thus reversing the 
outcome of the election. The county clerk disagreed with this 
assessment and did not certify new totals to the Indiana Secretary of 
State. The Secretary of State, however, declined to certify a winner 
until new vote totals had been produced by Gibson County.
    Mr. McIntyre filed suit with the Indiana Supreme Court seeking to 
compel Gibson County to submit corrected vote totals to the Secretary 
of State. The Indiana Supreme Court ordered all precincts in Gibson 
County recounted, and instructed the county clerk to certify new totals 
to the Indiana Secretary of State. The recount was conducted between 
December 3 and December 7, 1984. Under the new totals, Mr. McIntyre 
obtained a margin of victory of 34 votes. On December 14, 1984, the 
Indiana Secretary of State certified Mr. McIntyre as the winner of the 
election.
    Prior to this certification, both candidates had requested recounts 
of other counties and precincts pursuant to state law. This state 
recount ultimately reached all precincts in 14 of the 15 counties, and 
53 of the 157 precincts in the remaining county.
    On November 27, 1984, Mr. McCloskey filed suit in the U.S. District 
Court in the Southern District of Indiana (Evansville Division), 
seeking to direct the Indiana Secretary of State to certify Mr. 
McCloskey as the winner of the election. The suit also attempted to 
enjoin the ongoing state recounts. On December 7, 1984, the court 
denied Mr. McCloskey's requests, stating that the Federal Contested 
Elections Act (FCEA) did not pre-empt recounts pursued under state law.
    Recounts were thus continued throughout December 1984, and into 
January 1985. Under state law, a county circuit judge appointed three-
member commissions to conduct the recounts in each county. Following 
the recount, the new vote totals showed that Mr. McIntyre's lead had 
increased to 418 votes. On February 6, 1985, the Indiana Secretary of 
State then informed the Clerk of the House of the new vote totals and 
reaffirmed the original certification of Mr. McIntyre as the winner.
    As the state recount continued, Mr. McIntyre appeared on opening 
day of the 99th Congress with his credentials and prepared to take the 
oath of office with other Members-elect. However, a challenge was made 
to the seating of Mr. McIntyre by the Majority Leader (Rep. Jim Wright 
of Texas).(2) Following the swearing-in of other Members, 
Rep. Wright then offered a privileged resolution to address the issue 
of the election to the Eighth District of Indiana. That resolution 
provided that neither Mr. McIntyre nor Mr. McCloskey would be seated at 
that time, and the question of the final right to the seat would be 
referred to the Committee on House Administration. The resolution also 
authorized salary expenditures from the contingent fund of the House to 
both candidates during the period of the contest. The House adopted the 
resolution by a recorded vote of 238 yeas, 177 nays, and 11 not 
voting.(3)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. See Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 2 Sec. 4.1.
 3. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Neither candidate in this contest attempted to file a notice of 
contest under the FCEA. Thus, the proceedings of this election contest 
did not take place under the rubric of the statute.
    On February 6, 1985,(4) the Minority Leader addressed 
the House, and read the letter from the Indiana Secretary of State to 
the Clerk of the House, indicating that Mr. McIntyre had been elected 
by a vote of 114,278 for McIntyre to 113,860 for Mr. McCloskey. The 
original certificate of election was thus reaffirmed. The next 
day,(5) the Minority Leader offered a resolution raised as a 
question of the privileges of the House to permit the Speaker to 
administer the oath of office to Mr. McIntyre and to refer the final 
right to the seat to the Committee on House Administration. The House 
did not adopt the resolution, but instead referred it to the Committee 
on House Administration by a vote of 221 yeas, 180 nays, one answering 
``present,'' and 30 not voting:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 131 Cong. Rec. 1844, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.
 5. 131 Cong. Rec. 2220-31, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. (Feb. 7, 1985). The 
        minority party made two similar attempts to seat Mr. McIntyre. 
        See H. Res. 97, 131 Cong. Rec. 4277-89, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 
        (Mar. 4, 1985); and H. Res. 121, 131 Cong. Rec. 7118-28, 99th 
        Cong. 1st Sess. (Apr. 2, 1985).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        PRIVILEGES OF THE HOUSE--RESOLUTION TO SEAT RICHARD D. McINTYRE 
                          AS A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE    

        Mr. [Robert] MICHEL [of Illinois]. Mr. Speaker, I rise to a 
    question of the privileges of the House, and I offer a privileged 
    resolution (H. Res. 52) and ask for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

H. Res. 52

  Whereas, Richard D. McIntyre won the November 6, 1984, election in the 
Eighth Congressional District of Indiana by 34 votes according to the 
certificates of election filed by the county clerks from the District's 15 
counties; and

  Whereas, the Indiana Secretary of State, Edwin J. Simcox, acting in 
accordance with his duties as set forth in the Indiana Code (Ann. Sec. 3-1-
26-9), certified Richard D. McIntyre as the Representative from Indiana's 
Eighth Congressional District; and

  Whereas the Clerk of the House stated on January 3, 1985 in opening the 
99th Congress that he had ``prepared the official roll of the 
Representatives-elect'' which included McIntyre's name. The Clerk stated: 
``Certificates of election covering the 435 seats in the 99th Congress have 
been received by the Clerk of the House of Representatives, and the names 
of these persons whose credentials show that they were regularly elected as 
Representatives in accordance with the laws of their respective States and 
of the United States will be called.'' McIntyre's name was called and he 
cast his vote for Robert H. Michel as Speaker of the House of 
Representatives; and

  Whereas the majority of the House of Representatives on January 3, 1985 
voted in House Resolution 1 not to seat Richard D. McIntyre as 
Representative from Indiana's Eighth Congressional District despite has 
certificate of election issued pursuant to the laws of Indiana; and

  Whereas House Resolution 1 is contrary to the precedents of the House of 
Representatives in that the holder of a certificate of election not tainted 
by fraud or irregularities has previously been granted a prima facie right 
to a seat with the final right being referred to the Committee on House 
Administration; and

  Whereas Richard D. McIntyre received 418 votes more than Francis X. 
McCloskey in a recount of the ballots cast in Indiana's Eighth 
Congressional District pursuant to Indiana Code (Ann. Sec. 3-1-27 et seq.); 
Now, therefore be it

  Resolved, That the Speaker is hereby authorized and directed to 
administer the oath of office to the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Richard D. 
McIntyre.

  Resolved, That the question of the final right of Mr. McIntyre to a seat 
in the 99th Congress is referred to the Committee on House Administration.

        The SPEAKER.(6) The Chair has examined the 
    resolution offered by the gentleman from Illinois. In the opinion 
    of the Chair, the resolution constitutes a question of the 
    privileges of the House under article I, section 5 of the 
    Constitution and under rule IX.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. Thomas O'Neill (MA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          motion offered by mr. wright

        Mr. [James] WRIGHT [of Texas]. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to 
    refer.
        The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the motion.
        The Clerk read as follows:

  Mr. Wright moves to refer the resolution to the Committee on House 
Administration.

        The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Wright] is 
    recognized for 1 hour.
        Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only I yield 30 
    minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Frenzel] or his 
    designees, and pending that I yield myself such time as I may 
    consume.
        Mr. Speaker, this motion involves a disputed election between 
    Mr. McCloskey, the Democratic candidate, and Mr. McIntyre, the 
    Republican candidate in the Eighth District of Indiana.
        On January 3, exercising its constitutional responsibility to 
    be the judge of elections, returns, and qualifications of its own 
    Members, the House voted to seat neither of the contested 
    candidates and to refer the matter to the Committee on House 
    Administration, in order that an entire, thorough, complete inquiry 
    might be made.
        Attempt now is being made to overturn that action of the House. 
    My motion would simply refer this motion of the gentleman from 
    Illinois to that committee which already is moving to act in a 
    responsible way on this contest.
        To do otherwise would be to express a lack of confidence in the 
    duly constituted committees of this House. There is no reason 
    whatsoever, Mr. Speaker, for any Member of this House to question 
    the integrity or the intentions of the Committee on House 
    Administration.
        That committee, exercising its jurisdiction, has on numerous 
    occasions undertaken careful and exhaustive inquiries into 
    elections that were contested. Never once so far as I know, 
    certainly not in my memory, has that committee been accused of 
    having acted in a partisan way or in any way contrary to the facts.
        As a matter of fact, in the last Congress a subcommittee 
    chaired by the gentlewoman from Ohio [Ms. Oakar] heard the case 
    involving the gentleman from California [Mr. Packard] and ruled in 
    favor of the gentleman from California [Mr. Packard] a Republican 
    Member of the House.
        The committee ruled on the basis of fact, and that is how the 
    committee will rule this year, if given that privilege. The House 
    has referred this matter to its own House committee. To take it 
    away from the committee now would be to express disfavor of the 
    committee, to express our lack of confidence in the integrity of 
    the committee and in the integrity of the House procedures.
        For those reasons and for reasons which will be further 
    elucidated, I believe this matter should be returned to that 
    committee, this motion referred to the committee, and the committee 
    given the opportunity to act.
        The chairman of that committee has given public assurances that 
    the committee will act expeditiously. There is no intention to 
    delay; the intention is precisely the opposite. We intend to act 
    soon but not sooner than the facts are in, the votes are counted, 
    and qualified voters are given the privilege of having their votes 
    taken into account.
        Mr. [Frank] ANNUNZIO [of Illinois]. Mr. Speaker, will the 
    majority leader yield?
        Mr. WRIGHT. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
        Mr. ANNUNZIO. I appreciate the distinguished majority leader 
    yielding to me.
        Mr. Speaker, the Committee on House Administration is well 
    aware of its heavy responsibility in this matter. As chairman, I 
    have absolutely no preconceived judgments about the issues that 
    have been raised in this contested election, or about its likely 
    outcome.
        I want to assure the Members I feel confident that I speak for 
    the other members of the committee, as well as myself, in saying 
    that our minds are open and will remain so until all the facts are 
    in.
        To gather these facts, I am informing the House that I have 
    already appointed a task force, with Mr. Panetta, of California, as 
    chairman; Bill Clay, of Missouri, a member; and Bill Thomas 
    representing the minority side on this task force.
        They are prepared to move as quickly as possible toward a 
    resolution of this unfortunate situation. For my part, I want to 
    completely assure all of my colleagues, both sides of the aisle, 
    the citizens of the Eighth Congressional District in Indiana, that 
    the Committee on House Administration will conduct its 
    investigation in a manner that is thorough, complete, fair and 
    impartial like we have done all of these years when election 
    matters have been referred to the House Administration Committee.
        I again want to pledge to you our best efforts to uphold the 
    trust that has been placed upon us.
        Mr. WRIGHT. I defer at this time to the gentleman from 
    Minnesota [Mr. Frenzel] for purposes of debate only.
        Mr. [William] FRENZEL [of Minnesota]. Mr. Speaker, I yield such 
    time as he many consume to the distinguished minority leader, the 
    gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Michel].
        Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker and my colleagues, I am offering this 
    resolution to seat Rick McIntyre, the duly certified Congressman 
    from the Eighth District of Indiana.
        The resolution is conditional, pending a final outcome of the 
    House Administration Committee's involvement in this matter.
        Before I get to the specifics of the case, allow me to dwell 
    for just a moment on some facts that put it in historic context. 
    Our Library of Congress found that from 1920 to 1974, there were 11 
    occasions when a House race was won by fewer than 100 votes. Oddly 
    enough, this is not the first time that the Eighth District of 
    Indiana has been involved in a close race.
        In a curious, historic irony, in 1930 incumbent Albert Vestall 
    of the Indiana Eighth District, beat challenger Claude Bell by nine 
    votes.
        That is right. Nine votes out of 88,397 cast. Do you know what 
    happened when Congressman Vestall won by such a tiny margin? Why 
    his election was not even contested. But, my, how times have 
    changed.
        In the election of 1984, the people of the Eighth District of 
    Indiana voted in another close House election. A certificate of 
    election, based on final election night results, and the correction 
    of two tabulating errors, was issued to Mr. McIntyre. He has since 
    won a recount all in conformance with Indiana law, not by 9 votes, 
    not by a count less than 100, but by 418 votes.
        Mr. McIntyre is, in the eyes of the people of Indiana, a duly 
    elected and certified representative to this House. But he is not 
    representing the people of Indiana because this House has barred 
    him from doing so in an unprecedented display of raw legislative 
    power.
        The people of the Eighth District of Indiana have been 
    summarily disenfranchised.
        I am therefore introducing this resolution for two reasons: 
    First, because what is happening to the people of the Eighth 
    District of Indiana is wrong. It is unprecedented, it is 
    unconstitutional and it is unjust.
        Second, if the majority persists in this course, the reputation 
    of this institution will be severely damaged,
        Representative Rick McIntyre, with the certificate of election 
    given to him by the people of Indiana, has a prima facie right to 
    take this seat.
        The House Administration Committee can pursue any line of 
    inquiries it so desires. And I do not question the integrity of 
    that committee or any member thereof. But while this is going on 
    Rick McIntyre is entitled to be seated by tradition, by precedent 
    and by law. The facts dictate that Representative Rick McIntyre 
    should be seated. Justice demands that Representative Rick McIntyre 
    be seated.
        Mr. Speaker, we cannot content ourselves, nor can the people 
    out in the Eighth District of Indiana be content or satisfied with 
    the caliber of their representation, simply because House 
    Resolution No. 1 on opening day provided for a staffed office in 
    Washington. So what. Roughly 500,000 people have no voice or vote 
    in the 99th Congress. They have no one to speak for them like I am 
    speaking today. Instead they have two men clamoring to speak for 
    them. This is not representation. It is a tragedy.
        I have no quarrel with that provision of House Resolution No. 1 
    which directed the House Administration Committee to examine this 
    election and report its findings to the House. That is consistent 
    with the precedents of this great body. In fact, my resolution 
    would defer to the Committee on House Administration to make a 
    final determination.
        Specifically, the last paragraph reads:

  Resolved, That the question of the final right of Mr. McIntyre to a seat 
in the 99th Congress is referred to the Committee on House Administration.

        The language is totally consistent with section 5 of the 
    Constitution and all of our precedents. It sets out clearly that 
    this body can decide the final right to representation based on 
    election results.
        We also have a law--the contested elections law--which provides 
    the mechanism by which a candidate can question the results of an 
    election. If there is cause for questioning an election--I mean 
    real cause, not closeness, we have had close elections, but real 
    cause--then Mr. McCloskey could have filed a grievance under this 
    law.
        Mr. McCloskey did not file. One has to ask why?
        One final point. The same law has another purpose: To ensure 
    that the citizens of Indiana or any other State are represented in 
    this body while a contested election is being resolved by the House 
    Administration Committee. Here again, the law is being ignored. You 
    cannot get away from that fact. There is a void here, a vacuum, no 
    representation.
        We always have provided heretofore that there is representation 
    here while the House Administration Committee follows its course.
        We have had an official recount. Are we now going to be told 
    this afternoon that that recount is invalid? When will this ever 
    cease to happen? When will we go back to Judging these issues by 
    procedures rather than by politics?
        Back in my hometown of Peoria, a former Member of this body, 
    Abe Lincoln, once said:

  No man is good enough to govern another man without the other's consent.

        And it can be applied to the case before us.
        The majority is, in effect, seeking to govern the people of the 
    Eight District of Indiana and of the State of Indiana without their 
    consent.
        I would ask Members of the majority to reconsider while there 
    is still time and while the reputation of this House can still 
    recover.
        Mr. Speaker, I would ask that Members cast a ``no'' vote on the 
    motion offered by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Wright].
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the 
    distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. Sam B. Hall, Jr.].
        Mr. SAM B. HALL, JR. [of Texas]. Mr. Speaker, let me say at the 
    outset I do not like at all to be placed in the position that I am 
    today with my party. I am doing this because I think what we are 
    being asked to do today is not right. I have no feeling against 
    either one of these gentlemen. I do not know them. I know that the 
    House Administration Committee will do a fine job in what it is 
    constitutionally appointed to do.
        My only thought Is this. I wish my colleagues to listen to me 
    for just a moment on some dates.
        This election was held on November 6. Between November 8 and 
    November 21, Mr. McIntyre filed a petition to recount votes in 
    eight counties. On November 27, Mr. McCloskey filed a suit to 
    enjoin Mr. McIntyre from having a recount on the basis that the 
    House of Representatives had the exclusive right to determine its 
    membership and that the State of Indiana did not have the right to 
    declare an election contest. Also, the second count in that 
    petition was that the secretary of state be ordered to certify him, 
    Mr. McCloskey, as a winner.
        Now, this was a Federal court case. It was filed in November 
    1984. Judge Brooks wrote an opinion on December 7, 1984. Here is 
    what he said. He refused to grant the relief sought by Mr. 
    McCloskey against Mr. McIntyre. He said that he could not find any 
    reading in the statute which gave the right of the Congress to take 
    over the right of a contested election contest in a State. He said 
    it in this opinion.
        He also stated that he was not going to mandate that the 
    secretary of state certify a winner. Although he did say rightfully 
    so, that the secretary of state had a continuing obligation.
        He says:

  In my reading of the Statute, it says that he has a continuing duty to 
recertify at any time the totals that are given to him, I think, he has a 
duty to recertify those totals, whatever the outcome may be.

        Now, no one is questioning--certainly I am not--we are not 
    questioning the right of the House Administration Committee to do 
    what it is constitutionally mandated to do.
        The only position I am taking here today is that we, in my 
    opinion, do not have the right to refuse to seat Mr. McIntyre. He 
    has been certified. He has been certified twice by the secretary of 
    state as the winner. I do not know whether he is the winner or 
    whether he is not. That is not the point.
        We had the same type of situation, Adam Clayton Powell. Many of 
    you are familiar with that case. The Supreme Court of the United 
    States reversed a lower court and a circuit court, which held that 
    we had the right to eliminate or expunge him from the membership in 
    this body. The Supreme Court held we did not have that right and 
    mandated that we put him back, which we did.
        Mr. [Andrew] JACOBS [of Indiana]. Mr. Speaker, will the 
    gentleman yield on that point?
        Mr. SAM B. HALL, JR. Let me finish, please.
        Mr. JACOBS. The gentleman is misstating the case. Will the 
    gentleman yield on that point?
        Mr. SAM B. HALL, JR. No, sir; I am not misstating. You read it.
        Mr. JACOBS. I wrote a book about it. The gentleman is 
    misstating the case.
        Mr. SAM B. HALL, JR. Mr. Speaker, in the case that we have here 
    today, we have language by this judge dealing with this specific 
    point, and I read it. I am reading on page 3 of his opinion:

  So, they updated that. They mention specifically--

        Talking about the Federal Contested Election Act, which was 
    passed in 1969--

  That it completely overhauls and modernizes election contest procedures 
in the House. But nowhere does it refer to any change in the intent to 
preempt the States from holding their own recounts.

        That has been decided.
        I think the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Abbitt, It was his 
    testimony, and he is the one who introduced it, said that it is:

  Pure and simple, they are prescribing a procedural framework for the 
prosecution, defense, and disposition of contested election cases patterned 
upon the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

        Now, listen to this next sentence:

  One of the other Congressmen says that a question occurs to me as to 
whether the Committee has dealt with the question of whether or not the 
certified winner of a general election would be seated pending the outcome 
of the contest.

        That is the question we have got here today.
        Here is what the judge said:

  I think Mr. Abbitt says, ``We did not intend to change any basic rule of 
law. This is purely and simply a procedural matter * * *

        The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman from Texas has expired.
        Mr. SAM B. HALL, JR. May I have an additional 1 minute?
        Mr. FRENZEL. I yield the gentleman 30 seconds.
        Mr. SAM B. HALL, JR. Now, when you go back to the basic rule of 
    law, that is that this Congress has a mandate to seat a person if 
    he has been certified as the winner.
        It is up to the House Administration Committee to make a 
    determination as to whether or not in the future that he is or is 
    not the winner.
        I would say that if this were reversed, if Mr. McCloskey were 
    in the same shape that Mr. McIntyre is in, he would have the same 
    right to be seated while the House Administration Committee works 
    its will.
        I certainly think that this gentleman should be seated.
        Mr. WRIGHT. May I have a statement of the time, Mr. Speaker?
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Wright] has 24 
    minutes remaining; the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Frenzel] has 
    17 1/2 minutes remaining.
        Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman 
    from Ohio [Ms. Oakar] the chairman of a subcommittee of the 
    Committee on House Administration.
        Ms. [Mary Rose] OAKAR [of Ohio]. I thank the majority leader 
    for yielding.
        Mr. Speaker, I subscribe to the fact that this is an issue that 
    transcends this election. This is an issue that, in my judgment, 
    directly points to whether or not the House Administration 
    Committee has the integrity to be fair. We voted to send the 
    results of this election to the House Administration Committee, and 
    our chairman is very distinguished.
        Now, in the last session I had the dubious task, believe me--it 
    is not the kind of task one seeks--to chair a task force on a 
    contested election. It was already mentioned. The gentleman from 
    California, a Republican Member, was being challenged in terms of 
    whether or not the election was fair. On the committee we had the 
    gentleman from Washington, who is a Democrat, and we had the 
    gentleman from California [Mr. Thomas] who was also from California 
    and Republican. No one challenged the makeup of the committee, no 
    one challenged whether or not we would be fair. And this election 
    was called the most serious election violation--in southern 
    California--in the history of that area of the State.
        Mr. [Robert] WALKER [of Pennsylvania]. Mr. Speaker, will the 
    gentlewoman yield?
        Ms. OAKAR. I only have 3 minutes. If the gentleman would like 
    to give me some time, I would be happy to extend to him that 
    courtesy.
        We had very, very serious allegations. There was the allegation 
    that there was a mass conspiracy to deface voting booklets because 
    one of the candidates was a write-in candidate. Fraud, theft were 
    also alleged.
        Now, we worked on this election for many, many hours. We sent 
    our legal staff to California directly to look at the evidence, In 
    fact. They came back with massive amounts of reading material that 
    I personally read, and, believe me, I had better things to do with 
    my time. And I personally, after having an extensive hearing, made 
    the recommendation--and I am as partisan as anybody in this House--
    that the Republican Member continued to be certified. And that was 
    the recommendation I initiated to my committee members.
        Now, there was not one Democrat on that House Administration 
    Committee--and, by the way, the chairman at the time was a Democrat 
    from California, who voted against our recommendation. The House 
    Administration has been distinguished by its fairness.
        Now, I want to say to my colleagues that we are not only 
    dealing with a contested election here.
        The SPEAKER. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
        Ms. OAKAR. We are dealing with the view that----
        May I have 30 seconds, Mr. Majority Leader?
        Mr. WRIGHT. I yield 30 seconds additionally.
        Ms. OAKAR. What we are dealing with is the integrity of a 
    committee that is objective. And that also should be counted in 
    your vote. Do you trust the House Administration Committee to be 
    fair?
        And I suggest to you that it has always been fair and will 
    continue to remain so and can be objective in this election, in 
    discussing and deciding the results of the McCloskey/McIntyre 
    contested election.
        Mr. [James] PICKLE [of Texas]. Mr. Speaker, will the 
    gentlewoman yield to me?
        Ms. OAKAR. I do not know if I have further time.
        Mr. PICKLE. Would the gentleman yield the gentlewoman 1 extra 
    minute?
        Mr. WRIGHT. I yield the gentlewoman an extra minute for the 
    purpose of yielding to the gentleman from Texas.
        Ms. OAKAR. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
        Mr. PICKLE. I see nothing wrong about referring this to the 
    House Administration Committee. It is a serious question. And most 
    of us are not familiar with all of the facts and have difficulty in 
    passing judgment with some finality.
        I am concerned, though, that if you refer this to the House 
    Administration that it might be interpreted as a final act and a 
    final delay, and the people, then, of Indiana, it would seem to me, 
    from the district would be entitled to some representation.
        Would the gentlewoman tell me, the chairman of the 
    subcommittee, would she promise the House that that subcommittee 
    would have a report back to us within 30 days, within 40 days, 
    within some specific time? If we could have that assurance, I would 
    say that it is perfectly proper for us to look into it. But without 
    that assurance, I have grave doubts that we are proceeding in the 
    right channel.
        Can the gentlewoman tell us she would report to the House?
        Ms. OAKAR. I am not on the task force at this time. I think 
    that is a question for the chairman of the Committee on House 
    Administration. But I can tell you this, that the individuals on 
    that task force will proceed as expeditiously as possible, knowing 
    how important it is to the House.
        Mr. PICKLE. From this Member's standpoint, I see nothing would 
    keep us from giving a report of finality within 30 or 40 days, and 
    I would expect that if some motion were made at that time, we ought 
    to look at it again.
        Ms. OAKAR. That might be possible.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the 
    distinguished gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Myers].
        Mr. [John] MYERS of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, the more I read the 
    more I understand why the opponents of self-government don't like 
    us to bring up the case of Adam Clayton Powell.
        The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Powell versus McCormack that 
    ``he House is without power to exclude any Member-elect who meets 
    the Constitution's requirements for membership.'' How did the Court 
    arrive at this landmark decision? By studying the history that made 
    this rule an essential part of the Constitution.
        First, the Court studied John Wilkes, the Englishman who kept 
    getting elected by his constituents to the House of Commons, even 
    though the House would not seat him.
        As it turns out Wilkes had quite an impact on the American 
    colonists, who sought his advice and took as one of their slogans, 
    ``Wilkes and Liberty.'' Their critics called them Wilkites; they 
    called themselves Sons of Liberty.
        In fact, Wilkes and his exclusion from Parliament symbolized to 
    colonial America, King George III's attitude about the thing the 
    colonists craved most: self-government.
        What a coincidence, then, that on the same day, John Wilkes 
    argued against the blockade of Boston Harbor, he argued to expunge 
    the record of his exclusion. On the exclusion issue he said:

  If . . . his constituents should differ in opinion from the majority of 
this House, if they should think him fit to be reelected, he ought to be 
admitted, because he claims his seat under the same authority by which 
every member holds the privilege of sitting and voting here, a delegation 
from the people, their free choice.

   . . . They are the fountain of this power. We exercise their right. By 
their representation only we are a House of Parliament. They have a right 
of choosing for themselves, not a majority here for them.

  If you can reject those disagreeable to a majority, the House of Commons 
will be self-created and self-existing. . . . The consequences of such a 
principle are dangerous in the extreme. A more forcible engine of despotism 
cannot be put into the hands of a minister.

        Convinced that the Wilkes case influenced the framing of our 
    Constitution, the Court turned next to the drafting debates, where 
    James Madison argued strongly against giving Congress any power to 
    exclude Representatives chosen by the people. He warned that 
    ``artificial distinctions may be devised by the stronger in order 
    to keep out partisans of the weaker faction.''
        What were those artificial distinctions on January 3 that were 
    devised to keep out Rick McIntyre while the gentleman from Idaho, 
    whose election was formally contested, was seated?
        The time of day that McIntyre election certificate was issued;
        A Member's opinion that Indiana's ballot validation laws are 
    too complicated; and
        The false statement--and we all know it to be false--that the 
    McIntyre certificate was based upon a partially completed recount.
        Why weren't you told on January 3, Mr. Speaker, that Mr. 
    McIntyre's certificate was issued when--and not until--the 
    secretary of state had received all 15 original and correct county 
    election certificates, and that the McIntyre certificate had 
    nothing to do with the recount?
        Why weren't you told on January 3, Mr. Speaker, that a Federal 
    court in Indiana--with a judge appointed by President Carter--had 
    already ruled that there had never been a basis to declare Mr. 
    McCloskey the winner, and that the secretary of state of Indiana 
    had acted lawfully and properly in withholding a certificate until 
    Gibson County corrected its own arithmetic?
        Why weren't you reminded on January 3, Mr. Speaker, about the 
    debate right here in this House on the FCEA? Did you remember the 
    assurance given us--and all Americans--by the manager of the bill? 
    Here it is, Mr. Speaker:

  Mr. Blackburn. This action would not be construed as changing the present 
precedents, which are to the effect that the certified winner will take his 
seat pending the outcome of the contest?

  Mr. Abbitt. It does not affect the basic law one iota. It is merely 
intended to expedite the hearings so that the matter can be brought to a 
resolution as quickly as possible.

        Is this why former Congressman McCloskey did not file a contest 
    in compliance with the FCEA? Or was it because he had no basis to 
    file?
        Speaking of floor debates, a lot of history was made right here 
    in this body relating to Adam Powell on the question of who 
    composes this body, the voters at home or Congress itself. In fact, 
    one of our colleagues thought it was historic enough to write a 
    book about it. It is called ``The Powell Affair, Freedom Minus 
    One.''
        In the opening pages, the author takes us back to the debate on 
    the original resolution to exclude Mr. Powell.
        Where can we Americans who still crave self-Government and 
    liberty find protection today, Mr. Speaker? Can we find it in this 
    body?
        Mr. Speaker, I ask you and the gentleman from Indiana who wrote 
    this beautiful book to listen to what the author himself said so 
    persuasively in that same debate:

  Mr. Speaker, those who do not study history are ill-equipped to make it. 
One lesson of history is that those of authority who have made historic 
decisions on the basis of the emotions of the moment, quite often were the 
ones who hindered our heritage of freedom . . . 

  Mr. Speaker, we of this Select Committee . . . found jealous regard in 
the Constitution for the fundamental right of the people of a congressional 
district to choose their own representative without permission from the 
people of any other congressional district; and we found that in this case 
the better part of wisdom is to preserve a fundamental right of freedom by 
not setting aside the choice, wise or unwise, of the people of Mr. Powell's 
district . . . 

  Mr. Speaker, we concluded that Mr. Powell is not entitled to the things 
this House has to give . . . 

  But, Mr. Speaker, there is one thing that the House cannot give, and that 
is an appointment to represent the people of the 18th district of New York. 
This is the one office for which no Congress, no governor, only the 
governed can make a choice.

  In my judgment, the better part of wisdom cries out against tinkering 
with the fundamental right of the people to choose their representative . . 
 

  Finally, Mr. Speaker, we are not holding a popularity contest.

        Mr. Jacobs own reflection on article 1, section 5 appears on 
    page 10:

  Any high school civics student knows that Article 1 of the United States 
Constitution provides, ``Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, 
Returns, and Qualifications of its own members.'' But surely in a 
constitutional democracy such a provision could not be interpreted . . . to 
confer upon a legislative body unlimited power to abrogate a decision by 
the electorate. Or could it?''

        He quotes our beloved colleague, the gentleman from Arizona 
    [Mr. Udall]:

  Mr. Powell appears before us today with a certificate of election which 
is just as good as yours or mine . . . His people said that they wanted him 
to be their Congressman . . . 

  I say that this [issue] is about fair play to the people Adam Powell 
represents. There are 450,000 people--American citizens--in Manhattan who 
are represented by this man. They have said that they want him to be their 
Congressman. You might not have made that choice, and I might not have made 
it. But they want him . . . 

  I am prepared to let him sit and vote for them until we have a fair 
hearing . . . 

        Our colleague author tells us in his book that he was 
    confronted by a young black who asked him, ``Do you believe the 
    Congress of the United States is going to apply a double standard * 
    * * with regard to Adam Clayton Powell?'' ``I hope not,'' our 
    author answered. ``And I must say, I disagree sharply with the 
    action taken on January 10.''
        Does the gentleman from Indiana disagree then with the action 
    taken on January 3, 1985? Did the Congress of the United States 
    apply a double standard with regard to Rick McIntyre? Will people--
    American citizens--from the author's own State be denied a voice in 
    Government because of it?
        Toward the end of his book, our author quoted extensively from 
    the debate on a later vote to continue excluding Powell. Hear what 
    he wrote about the speech by a member of Madison's ``weaker 
    faction,'' Mr. Wiggins of California:

  That every American could find protection in the precedent that we 
recommended [i.e., seating Powell], was underscored by what Chuck Wiggins 
said next:

  ``I might add, Mr. Speaker, that as a member of the minority party, I 
have good reason to reject the notion that my seat is subject to the whim 
of the majority of seated members.''

        Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished 
    dean of the Indiana delegation, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. 
    Hamilton].
        Mr. [Lee] HAMILTON [of Indiana]. I thank the gentleman for 
    yielding me this time.
        Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Michel resolution.
        The question before us is of the highest significance: Who will 
    represent the people of Indiana's Eighth District in Congress? The 
    answer to that question ought not to be decided on partisan 
    grounds.
        On January 3, 1985, the House of Representatives voted to seat 
    neither Mr. McIntyre nor Mr. McCloskey until the Committee on House 
    Administration exercised the House's constitutional power and 
    conducted its own review of the eighth district congressional race.
        That was not a radical decision, nor was it unprecedented. We 
    did the fair and reasonable thing to protect the voters of the 
    eighth district, and to preserve the integrity of the House and its 
    constitutional prerogatives.
        Let me summarize briefly the reasons for our action on January 
    3:
        First, it was impossible on that date to tell who was the 
    winner of the election. The race was simply too close to call. We 
    could have seated one man or the other, only to unseat him later if 
    the final results showed a new winner.
        That action indeed would have been radical, and would have 
    served neither the interests of the eighth district residents nor 
    the ideals of regularity and continuity in the electoral process.
        Second, it seemed likely on January 3, that the recounts then 
    in progress would do little to help us determine who actually 
    received more votes. The regrettable fact is that the recounts were 
    being conducted under haphazard and inconsistent rules.
        Third, article I, section 5 of the U.S. Constitution says that 
    ``Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and 
    Qualifications of its own Members.'' This was not an election for a 
    State or county position. We were not bound by rules adopted by 
    State or local recount commissions. This was a Federal election, 
    and the Constitution imposed on us the responsibility to conduct 
    our own investigation and reach our own conclusion.
        Fourth, our action on January 3 was based squarely on House 
    precedent. I refer to the Roush-Chambers case, which is a clear and 
    controlling precedent. There have been statements that Roush-
    Chambers is distinguishable and should not apply. Those statements 
    are simply not correct. The record of the Roush-Chambers debate 
    plainly reveals a strikingly similar set of facts. Mr. Chambers was 
    the only claimant to the seat who had a certificate from the 
    Indiana secretary of state. There are repeated references in the 
    debate to the ``duly certified Member from Indiana.'' Yet, because 
    the outcome of the election was still in doubt, the House refused 
    to seat Mr. Chambers notwithstanding his due certification. The 
    precedent of that case is that the House may scrutinize the 
    certificate of election and, under unusual and compelling 
    circumstances, reject it.
        Now we are asked to reverse our decision of January 3. But 
    there is no good reason to do so. In fact, the reasons for waiting 
    until the committee has inquired and reported are more compelling 
    than they were a month ago. Consider them briefly:
        We still cannot honestly say whether it was Mr. McIntyre of Mr. 
    McCloskey who received more votes on November 6. Even though they 
    have been completed, recounts conducted under 15 different sets of 
    rules under an Indiana statute that the Republican leadership of 
    the Indiana Senate says is ``obsolete'' and which the Indiana 
    Legislature is now reforming, should not satisfy us. We do not yet 
    know the winner in this chaotic process which led eventually to the 
    disqualification of nearly 5,000 ballots. And we should not guess.
        Some ballots were invalidated in some counties because they did 
    not carry the handwritten initials of poll clerks. In other 
    counties such ballots were counted. Other ballots were thrown out 
    in some counties because they did not have precinct numbers written 
    on them. In other counties such ballots were counted. Still other 
    ballots were canceled merely because of the masking tape on the 
    envelopes in which they were stored. A disproportionate number of 
    all disqualified ballots--about 20 percent--were cast in three 
    predominantly black precincts in the Evansville area.
        Ballots were disqualified in nearly every county on the basis 
    of some technical deficiency. There was not even a semblance of 
    uniformity in the application of the disqualifying rules. In case 
    after case after case, ballots were not counted even though they 
    would have been perfectly good had they been cast a few miles away 
    in another county. Such an extraordinary, haphazard, and 
    inconsistent procedure for judging close elections should not be 
    the manner of election to this House, and should not be accepted by 
    this House.
        Most of us are not comfortable with any procedure that 
    disenfranchises large numbers of citizens. We are especially 
    uncomfortable when we think that the disenfranchisement may change 
    the outcome of an election. We should not favor election procedures 
    that ignore the clear intent of the voter or otherwise compromise 
    the electoral process.
        In my view, there are four guidelines for action that should be 
    recommended to the Committee on House Administration:
        First, fair and reasonable recount rules should parallel 
    Indiana law and practice as closely as possible. We should not 
    attempt to get around Indiana law or practice, though we must 
    acknowledge that they are not always clear enough to be 
    determinative.
        Second, the rules must be designed to protect against electoral 
    fraud. The authenticity of ballots is basic to the fairness of any 
    election. We must be assured that each ballot was cast properly.
        Third, we should do our best to safe-guard the voting franchise 
    and respect, whenever reasonably possible, the participation of 
    voters. The recount rules should include every ballot from which 
    the intent of the voter can reasonably be discerned. The House has 
    traditionally applied principles which serve to give effect to the 
    reasonably discernible intentions of the voters. That precedent 
    should be followed here.
        Fourth, the rules must be applied uniformly throughout the 
    counties of the eighth district.
        I really do not know how the application of such a set of 
    recount rules would affect the outcome of the eighth district race. 
    Partisanship should be no concern of ours in this case. We ought to 
    be worried about the will of the eighth district voters and the 
    integrity of our own actions.
        We should permit the Committee on House Administration to 
    discharge its constitutionally mandated function using fair and 
    reasonable rules of uniform application. Accordingly, I urge you to 
    vote against the Michel resolution.
        Mr. Michel makes three basic arguments to support his 
    resolution to seat Mr. McIntyre. These arguments are:
        First, Mr. McIntyre won the election on election night and was 
    properly certified at that time by the secretary of state;
        Second, Mr. McIntyre won the election based on the now-
    completed recounts, and as a result now holds a valid certificate 
    from Indiana;
        Third, there is no House precedent for our refusal to seat Mr. 
    McIntyre.
        Let me respond briefly to these arguments:
        First, Mr. McIntyre did not win the election on election night. 
    The 15 original certificates, submitted by the 15 county clerks to 
    the Indiana secretary of state, gave Mr. McCloskey a 72-vote margin 
    of victory. The Indiana secretary of state, in violation of Indiana 
    statute, refused to certify Mr. McCloskey. His refusal was based on 
    rumors of error in the returns from one county, Gibson. However, 
    there is nothing improper on the face of that return, and there is 
    nothing legally improper in the return. Indiana law (I.C. 3-1-26-9) 
    gives the secretary of state no discretion to reject returns from 
    the county clerks. He is not empowered to act on rumors, but is 
    required to certify the election based on the face of the returns. 
    Those fifteen original documents show McCloskey to be the winner.
        Several days after the election, Mr. McIntyre requested that 
    the ballots from Gibson be sealed until they could be examined to 
    determine the source of the discrepancy in the vote totals. The 
    ballots were opened and examined by the Gibson County recount 
    commission. Based upon that recount, the Gibson County clerk issued 
    an amended certification. The secretary of state immediately 
    certified Mr. McIntyre the winner on the basis of the recount in 
    Gibson County alone. The secretary of state subsequently refused to 
    change that certification each time new vote totals produced by 
    recounts in other counties showed Mr. McCloskey to be the winner.
        Mr. Michel states that a Federal district court judge upheld 
    the secretary of state's action. In fact, the judge stated that the 
    secretary of state frustrated the processes for resolving the 
    election by failing to certify anyone based on the original 
    returns.
        Second, The House should not accept the results produced by the 
    county recounts. The regrettable fact is that 15 different county 
    recount commissions adopted and applied their own sets of rules. 
    There is not the slightest semblance of uniformity from county to 
    county in the way these rules were applied. Ballots disqualified in 
    one county would have been perfectly good had they been cast in 
    another county. The effect of this haphazard application of rules 
    is that nearly 5,000 ballots were disqualified districtwide. Such a 
    procedure is improper for judging elections, and we should not 
    accept it.
        Mr. Michel and Mr. Frenzel erroneously contend that Indiana law 
    requires such a hodgepodge of rules. But rules relating to 
    punchcard ballots were applied inconsistently in counties which 
    used punchcards, just as the rules were applied inconsistently in 
    the counties which used paper ballots. Indiana law regarding the 
    distinction between punchcard and paper ballots is confusing in any 
    case. As an example of this confusion, the Indiana General Assembly 
    refused to recognize a distinction between the two types of ballots 
    when it recently judged an election to the Indiana House of 
    Representatives.
        Mr. Michel himself lists instances in which inconsistent rules 
    were applied. He attributes these inconsistencies to partisan 
    actions designed to disqualify votes for Mr. McIntyre. Inconsistent 
    rules were applied to disqualify votes for both Mr. McIntyre and 
    Mr. McCloskey. The House should not be concerned for whom a 
    disqualified ballot was cast. The House should be concerned with 
    protecting voters. We should attempt to give equal worth to the 
    legitimately cast ballots disqualified to Mr. McIntyre's detriment 
    as we do to the legitimately cast ballots disqualified to Mr. 
    McCloskey's detriment.
        Third, our action on January 3 was based squarely on House 
    precedent. There is no meaningful distinction between this case and 
    the Roush-Chambers case. The record of debate in Roush-Chambers 
    plainly reveals a strikingly similar set of facts. The important 
    fact from that case is that Mr. Chambers was the only candidate for 
    the seat who was ever certified by Indiana. There is no mention in 
    the debate of any certificate for Mr. Roush, but there are repeated 
    references to the ``duly certified Member of Indiana''(Mr. 
    Chambers). Both Mr. Chambers and Mr. McIntyre were the only 
    claimants who held certificates. Yet the House refused to seat both 
    men until the Committee on House Administration has exercised the 
    House's constitutional power to judge the election, no withstanding 
    their certificates. In compelling situations, the House may refuse 
    to accept a certification from the State. The haphazard 
    disenfranchisement of 5,000 voters is compelling justification.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
    distinguished gentlewoman from Maryland [Mrs. Bentley].
        Mrs. [Helen] BENTLEY [of Maryland]. Mr. Speaker, as the 
    representative of the Republican freshman class of 1984, I am here 
    to point out that appearances are deceiving in the election contest 
    in Indiana's Eighth Congressional District. A member of our class 
    has been certified twice by his State and yet he is being denied 
    his right to join us as a voting Member on the floor of the House 
    of Representatives.
        What may appear to be just a case of a contested seat, with 
    both sides putting forth arguments to support the seating of their 
    candidate, goes much deeper than that. Whatever the momentary 
    advantages to the majority, seating the loser on the cynical basis 
    of sheer force will open a Pandora's box of evils on both the 
    Nation and on the entire Congress.
        In recent years, individual Members of the Congress have 
    brought disrepute on this body by their private actions. By seating 
    the candidate who got the few votes, the House will now bring 
    itself into disrepute as an institution for a base political 
    motive.
        The other party sheds crocodile tears about fairness until they 
    see an advantage in being unfair. For years they have claimed to be 
    the party of electoral reform, except in this body. What the 
    majority party in this House is attempting here is both to play in 
    the game and to referee it.
        Can this be the view of the judicial function to serious 
    people? To judge a matter does not involve being a witness. It does 
    not allow creating facts. It certainly does not imply the creation 
    of rules after the game is over.
        The majority cannot base its position on the contested election 
    statute. It cannot base its position on the facts. It cannot base 
    its position on the law in Indiana, and of prime importance, it 
    cannot base its position on the vote results in the Eighth District 
    of Indiana. Its sole recourse is to its presumed power in having 
    the votes to force an also-ran into a seat he had not been given by 
    the voters of his district.
        Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman 
    from Maryland [Mr. Mitchell].
        Mr. [George] MITCHELL [of Maine]. I thank the gentleman for 
    yielding this time to me.
        Mr. Speaker, I listened very carefully to the arguments 
    advanced by the minority leader and they were persuasive. I also 
    listened very carefully to Sam Hall. I have a great deal of respect 
    for both of those gentlemen. However, both failed to mention 
    another dimension in this problem which clearly makes it a 
    compelling issue and, therefore, forces the House to do what it 
    must do. It is because of that compelling dimension, I must vote 
    against your motion Mr. Michel, and I would urge my other 
    colleagues to do so.
        The compelling dimension for me is what appears to be a 
    flagrant, venal violation of civil rights. Now, argue all you want, 
    but that is an issue for me and it ought to be an issue for you if 
    you care about this country.
        The reason I raise this issue is that in Vanderburgh County we 
    have seen some strange rules apply. Some of the ballots were 
    rejected because the poll worker initialed them instead of a judge. 
    Some of them were rejected because the poll worker initialed them 
    at one point and later the judge initialed them before taking them 
    to the election board. But the interesting thing is that of the 
    counties involved, of the five precincts involved, two were 
    concentrated in the black areas in the fourth ward. That is where 
    the area of concentration was.
        I would assume that there must be action taken by those local 
    black citizens to protect their right to vote. It strains credulity 
    to assume that these different standards were applied in those 
    areas in Vanderburgh County as opposed to other counties where 
    there are not concentrations of black voters.
        That is the compelling reason why I think the House must act as 
    it will act. That is the compelling reason why I cannot support Mr. 
    Michel's or Mr. Hall's position. We are talking about the most 
    fundamental right in this country, the thing that every President 
    and every Congress and every elected official has urged us to do: 
    Get people to get out and exercise their right to vote.
        I suggest to you that anything that trammels or diminishes the 
    right to vote for a given category of people is grossly violative 
    of the principles for which we should stand. So I would urge my 
    colleagues, if for no other issue, to vote for the majority 
    leader's motion on the issue of the compelling problem of civil 
    rights violations.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the 
    distinguished gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Vander Jagt].
        Mr. [Adrian] VANDER JAGT [of Michigan]. I thank the gentleman 
    for yielding this time to me.
        Mr. Speaker, the essential facts in this case are very simple, 
    straightforward, and undisputed. Complexity and confusion serve the 
    purpose only of those who would obscure the truth, because I 
    honestly believe that when the truth is known and understood, you 
    will vote to seat Rick McIntyre this afternoon, as we should have 
    January 3.
        Of course you are partisan Democrats, even as we are partisan 
    Republicans. Of course you would like to protect one of your own 
    and would reach as far as you reasonably can to do so, even as we 
    would.
        But I believe--no, I know that you are Americans first, and I 
    believe when the crunch comes and the facts are known, you will 
    subordinate partisanship to two centuries of precedents in this, 
    the greatest deliberative body that the world has ever seen, noted 
    even more for its fairness than its partisanship. I believe that 
    when the crunch comes, you will vote not to sacrifice truth, 
    justice, and fairness on the altar of partisanship, even though you 
    have the votes to do it once the facts are known, because once the 
    facts were known and understood by a county Democratic judge, by a 
    Democratic Federal district judge, and by a bipartisan Indiana 
    Supreme Court, the judges ruled unanimously in favor of Rick 
    McIntyre, rejecting the arguments that have been raised so 
    eloquently here today, and the ruling was upheld that Rick McIntyre 
    was the duly certified winner In the Eighth Congressional District.
        Once the facts were known to recount commissioners on the 
    county level, three-fourths of whom were Democrats, Rick McIntyre 
    was the winner of that recount by 415 votes. In fact, in 
    Vanderburgh County there were 2,500 votes disallowed in 
    predominantly blue-collar white precincts, to which McCloskey made 
    no objection before on the same basis there were 1,000 votes 
    disallowed in the black precincts. As a matter of fact, if you put 
    back in every vote that was disallowed in the recount by counties, 
    11 out of 15 which were Democratic, McIntyre wins by 34 votes.
        No matter how partisan you are, you cannot escape four 
    undisputed simple facts. First, on election night results, Rick 
    McIntyre was the winner.
        Fact No. 2: On the basis of completed and corrected totals from 
    the counties, all of them certified to the secretary of state as 
    complete and correct, McIntyre was the winner and was so certified.
        Fact No. 3: On the basis of the recount, McIntyre is the winner 
    by 450 votes.
        And fact No. 4: For two centuries, in 82 out of 82 cases, when 
    there was a disputed election, the individual who had the due 
    certificate of election from that State was seated pending the 
    resolution of the controversy or of the recount.
        Now, the case has been made that there is one exception, and in 
    that exception from Indiana there were two people who showed up, 
    each of them had a certificate of election, and the House wisely 
    said, ``You both stand aside until we can figure out which has the 
    valid certificate of election from that State.''
        It is a little bit like an umpire in a baseball game calling 
    ``Strike three, you're out.'' No matter how much you might disagree 
    with the call on that pitch, it stands because the umpire is duly 
    authorized to make that call. Now, in elections, unlike in baseball 
    game, there is an appeals process called recount or referral to the 
    House Administration Committee, and that is fine. But the original 
    call by the duly authorized umpire or official of that State stands 
    until such time as there is an overwhelming case to reverse that 
    original decision, a case beyond on testimony, not press releases, 
    on evidence taken under oath, not on charges and claims.
        It seems to me that we have a clear-cut case here of whether or 
    not we are going to undo a mistake that was made on January 3 when, 
    for the first time in two centuries, we refused to seat a duly 
    authorized winner.
        The majority made the case on January 3 that ``We can't seat 
    him because there is a recount that is in process, and it would be 
    premature,'' and the argument was made very persuasively that we 
    ought to wait until the recount is over. The recount is over, the 
    final count is in, and McIntyre is an even bigger winner. That 
    excuse is gone.
        Mr. Speaker, let us seat him as we should do under the 
    Constitution.
        Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
    from Indiana [Mr. Jacobs].
        Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Speaker, first I would like to correct the 
    first fact of my friend, the gentleman from Michigan, that on 
    election night the Republican candidate was declared the winner. 
    The fact----
        Mr. VANDER JAGT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. JACOBS. Of course not. I only have 2 minutes.
        Mr. VANDER JAGT. You just made a misstatement of fact as to 
    what I said. Could I correct it?
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Jacobs] controls 
    the time.
        Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Speaker, is this the same gentleman who was 
    calling for fairness? I only have 2 minutes.
        The fact is that 15 counties certified their votes and Mr. 
    McCloskey was the winner by 72 votes. The fact is that the 
    Republican secretary of state-
        Mr. VANDER JAGT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Speaker, could I have regular order, please? I 
    did not badger the gentleman from Michigan when he was stating his 
    facts.
        The fact is that the secretary of state waited until a 
    correction was made in one county before certifying. The fact 
    further is that he certified before the recount was done.
        Another fact, is that in the Indiana State Legislature right 
    now there is a contested election, and in that contested election 
    the House of Representatives has thrown out the very rules on which 
    this recount relied and counted all the votes and seated the 
    Republican by a majority of Republican votes in the State house of 
    representatives.
        The other fact is about Powell versus McCormack. I have great 
    affection for the gentleman from Texas, and I am sure the error was 
    unintentional, but Powell versus McCormack turned on whether the 
    House of Representatives, by a simple majority vote, could refuse 
    to seat a person whose votes were not in contest, whose citizenship 
    of the State from which he was elected was not in contest, and 
    whose citizenship of the United States for 7 years, as provided by 
    the Constitution, was not in controversy. The controversy was 
    whether he was a good guy or a bad guy, and the U.S. Supreme Court 
    held that the House of Representatives by a simple majority vote 
    could not make that judgment, they would have to do it by a two-
    thirds vote. The only judgment they could make by a simple majority 
    vote would be who got the most votes and whether the person was 
    qualified in the other two respects I mentioned.
        Let me finally say this, Mr. Speaker: I have been disillusioned 
    today. I have always had a profound respect for my Republican 
    friends and their cold efficiency, if nothing else, and to think 
    that they would have to disenfranchise 5,000 of my fellow Hoosiers 
    in order for their man to win by only 400 votes Is disillusioning.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the 
    distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Thomas].
        Mr. [William] THOMAS of California. Mr. Speaker, I feel 
    compelled to take the well as a member of the task force charged 
    under House Resolution 1 to get to the bottom of this election 
    question in Indiana's Eighth District.
        On January 3, a prudent person could well have taken a wait-
    and-see attitude and said, ``Give Indiana the benefit of the doubt, 
    let them recount, don't seat anyone for the time being.'' Today 
    that process is behind us. Indiana has recounted. Today the prudent 
    choice Is to seat Mr. McIntyre conditionally pending the outcome of 
    the task force's investigation, which for me will be guided by a 
    requirement that the political chips will fall where they may.
        Mr. Speaker, for me, my personal integrity, this institution's 
    integrity and my oath of office are at stake. If we seat Mr. 
    McIntyre conditionally, this House loses nothing. Our power is 
    absolute in this area. But when you exercise absolute power, you 
    should be absolutely sure.
        By voting not to seat today, you repudiate Indiana's recount 
    statutes; you repudiate the citizens of Indiana, white and black, 
    Republican and Democrat, who participated in that recount 
    procedure; you condemn them without a hearing; you reject Indiana's 
    efforts as unfair, corrupt, biased, or prejudiced without letting 
    them present their case.
        This is what the task force is supposed to do and will do. Let 
    us examine the facts in an orderly forum under an orderly process. 
    Would you want anything less for your State and your people?
        If you know that the election and the recount in Indiana's 
    Eighth Congressional District was so flawed by design or accident 
    as to be repudiated now on this floor, then vote no to seat. But if 
    you do not know with absolute certainty, if you think that an 
    orderly investigation of the facts, at no risk to this institution 
    and its powers, is the very minimum that you would want for your 
    State and your people, then you must vote to seat Mr. McIntyre.
        Seat Mr. McIntyre conditionally and let those of us narrowly 
    charged with the awesome duty of protecting our free and fair vote 
    do so in a forum where everyone's rights can be fully exercised. A 
    vote to seat protects all of us. A vote not to seat puts us all at 
    risk individually, institutionally and constitutionally. When you 
    vote, ask yourself, are you absolutely sure.
        Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume 
    to the gentlewoman from Illinois [Mrs. Collins].
        Mrs. [Cardiss] COLLINS [of Illinois]. Mr. Speaker, I am 
    outraged by the disenfranchisement of 5,000 black voters in Indiana 
    during the Indiana election under discussion today. These uncounted 
    votes came from three to four election precincts which were 
    predominantly black. It is obvious which candidate would have 
    gained these votes. Thus, it is equally obvious which party was 
    responsible for not counting them.
        I believe that this act of disenfranchisement is more important 
    than even the final disposition of the House seat in question. For 
    it does not matter who serves in Congress if all the people are not 
    permitted their constitutional right to vote.
        I am particularly angered by the fact that black votes were 
    singled out as the ones that did not count. This has happened so 
    many times in our history-yet I refuse to accept this injustice.
        At best, the inconsistent and contradictory standards applied 
    by some of the 15 counties in the recount were the result of 
    inadvertent mistakes on the part of election officials. At worst, 
    they are a blatant attempt on the part of the Republicans to steal 
    the election.
        If House Democrats wanted to be partisan, they could have 
    seated Frank McCloskey on January 3 on the basis of his winning 
    margin on election night. We did not do that. Instead, we referred 
    the matter to the House Administration Committee.
        In doing so, the House has simply fulfilled its constitutional 
    responsibility to judge the elections, returns, and qualifications 
    of its own Members. The House is not imposing any additional 
    qualifications on its Members, and is therefore in compliance with 
    the Supreme Court's rulings on this matter.
        Instead by referring this matter to committee, the House is 
    attempting to make certain that the election procedures were fair 
    and that the candidate receiving the most votes is seated. I have 
    complete faith that the House Administration Committee will act 
    with speed and integrity to decide which candidate in this 
    contested election actually received the most votes.
        Have we returned to the days of poll taxes, property 
    requirements for voting, and other ruses to keep the black 
    community's voice from being heard? Are we back again at the days 
    of Jim Crow?
        No, we are not returning to the methods of the past but, just 
    the same, I fear we are going back to the discrimination that has 
    so colored voting rights in this Nation.
        Haven't we learned that we cannot take away any citizen's vote 
    without threatening every citizen's vote? If Indiana throws out 
    black votes today who can predict what State will throw out the 
    votes of another group in the next election.
        This is truly a frightening precedent that the vote counters in 
    Indiana set back on November 6, 1984. It will not go unnoticed or 
    unchallenged. Black and all other voters will not be 
    disenfranchised for anybody's political advantage.
        Listening to this debate, I am greatly disturbed by this unjust 
    attempt to deny Representative McCloskey his seat in Congress. It 
    is the Republicans, not the Democrats, who are distorting the 
    election results and recount process for partisan advantage.
        Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
    New York [Mr. LaFalce].
        Mr. [Joseph] LaFALCE [of New York]. Mr. Speaker, we must act as 
    judges rather than as partisans in this case. That is why I called 
    up Bob Michel's office and said, ``Send me every piece of 
    information you have on this case so I can sit as a judge rather 
    than as a partisan.''
        There is one issue, and it is not whether we should seat Mr. 
    McIntyre permanently, but whether we should seat him temporarily, 
    and I understand that.
        It is my judgment we ought not to. There are precedents going 
    each way, precedents where we have seated individuals temporarily 
    and where we have not.
        What are the deciding factors in this case which should lead us 
    not to seat him? I think two.
        First of all, the certification in question that we are dealing 
    with, except that Mr. McIntyre won by about 400 votes or so, came 
    after this House voted to give jurisdiction on the issue to the 
    House Administration Committee, and I do not think we should be 
    backtracking.
        Second, it is the nature of Indiana's law and practices. The 
    fact of the matter is that they do have approximately 15 different 
    standards. Given the conjunction of those two circumstances that we 
    already assumed jurisdiction prior to this certification and the 
    fact that they used 15 different sets of standards in determining 
    the merit of the various ballots chosen, we ought not to seat 
    temporarily. We ought to wait until the House Administration 
    Committee judiciously renders Its final nonpartisan decision.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, the minority in this House is 
    accustomed to being kicked around by majority Democrats. In the 
    more than 14 years I've been here, that's been the rule in 
    everything we do.
        Republicans who make up 42 percent of the House get only about 
    20 percent of its committee staff. The majority Democrat caucus has 
    demanded extraordinary majorities on all committees. At one time 
    they required a 2-to-l-plus-1 ratio on conference committees. That 
    meant Republicans who never had less than 35 percent of the House 
    frequently had less than 25 percent representation on conference 
    committees.
        This session, the committee ratios have been improved, but the 
    most important committees, Ways and Means, Appropriations, and 
    Rules still have indefensible, distorted committee ratios designed 
    to cheat Republicans out of whatever modest victories they have won 
    in the last election. Yesterday the minority on Judiciary Committee 
    had to walk out of committee to dramatize the spiteful 2-to-1-plus-
    1 ratio on subcommittees.
        Our House procedures are slanted to keep the minority 
    suppressed. Probably alone among parliamentary bodies, the House 
    allows its committees to do business with less than a 50-percent 
    quorum. The minority's right to demand a quorum on the floor has 
    been substantially reduced.
        When minority amendments to appropriations bills were 
    occasionally being passed, majority Democrats made such amendments 
    out of order. When other Republican amendments looked attractive, 
    the majority used its 2-to-1-plus-1 majority on the Rules Committee 
    to pass rules foreclosing debate and limiting amendments.
        These abuses of majority control are just the way things are 
    here. Most Democrats don't even think about it. They think the 
    minority was created to be abused by the majority. They don't think 
    of their conduct as abusive. They think it is the natural order.
        Against this historical background of suppression comes the 
    McIntyre case. I suspect most Members don't know much about it. 
    Democrats who don't understand the facts and fundamentals did, and 
    may again, simply blindly follow their leadership in the mistaken 
    notion that this is just another opportunity to slap down the 
    minority.
        But this isn't just another case. It is the ultimate abuse of 
    representative government in our Republic. A member-elect of this 
    House, duly elected and certified under State laws of Indiana-then 
    duly recertified and reaffirmed by a careful recount process under 
    a recent State law-has been denied his seat.
        His constituents have been abused and insulted. The State of 
    Indiana has been abused and insulted. This House has been degraded. 
    The Constitution has been defiled.
        And to what purpose? Plain and simple, it is to steal an 
    election. The purpose is to take unlawfully a seat in Congress from 
    a Republican who won it, so that the seat can be given to a 
    Democrat who lost the election.
        On January 3, I called this a naked abuse of power by an 
    arrogant, ruthless majority. After the completion of the recount, 
    the majority leader's motion seems to make that description a timid 
    one.
        Make no mistake about it. That was no procedural vote on 
    January 3. This is no simple procedural vote today, nor is it a 
    little partisan kick at the minority to keep it from acting uppity. 
    It's a supervote, a blockbuster.
        It's a vote where each of you can sustain, or overturn, an 
    atrocity, a rape of our fundamental theory of elective government. 
    The vote on January 3 was unprecedented. The new precedent the 
    House set then puts every seat in every State where the election 
    was close in jeopardy.
        That vote pitted the House majority Democrats against the 
    people of Indiana, the State of Indiana, and against the very 
    foundations of this Republic. The people, the State, and the 
    Republic lost.
        When historians write about this case, it will probably be 
    subtitled, ``The House versus the State of Indiana.'' But, after 
    this precedent, it could be any State, mine or yours. In my 
    judgment, this case should be titled, ``House Democrats versus 
    Elective Government.''
        On January 3, I gave some examples why this case differed 
    markedly from the Roush case. I repeat them now for the record: 
    First, there is a clear certificated winner here; second, there is 
    no question about who won; third, there are no allegations of 
    fraud; fourth, there has been no contest filed under our FCEA; 
    fifth, there is a modern recount law and it has affirmed the 
    McIntyre victory; sixth, the House now has a FCEA.
        Derchler's precedents clearly identifies the Roush case (ch. 8-
    16.2) as one where a certificate of election was contradicted. If 
    anyone believes the Roush case is a reasonable precedent, it can 
    only mean they have not studied either case, or the events which 
    occurred in between.
        No amount of partisan sophistry can erode the fact that 
    Congressman-elect McIntyre was elected on November 6--that he 
    received an election certificated from the State of Indiana--and 
    that he should be seated. No other Member of this House has been 
    denied a seat when the certification process has been clear and 
    unchallenged.
        Then came the clincher. On February 5, this House was 
    officially notified that a recount, under the laws of the State of 
    Indiana, supervised by judges in each of the 15 counties, conducted 
    by recount commissioners chosen by the courts, has been completed. 
    The secretary of state writes that the recount reaffirms the 
    earlier certification of Congressman-elect McIntyre.
        During the debate on January 3, proponents of the resolution to 
    deny McIntyre his seat, said the situation was confused because a 
    recount was in process. I wasn't a bit confused. But, if any other 
    Member was, there ought to be no need for confusion now after the 
    recount.
        Having lost the election, having lost the attempt to confuse 
    the election result by claiming victory before corrected county 
    returns were filed, and having lost the recount, election stealers 
    are, of course, still trying to spread more confusion.
        They say Republicans controlled and subverted the recount in 
    nefarious ways. That doesn't wash because the county judges appoint 
    recount commissioners. In Vanderburgh County, in which most changes 
    were made in the recount, and in which McCloskey forces allege 
    shenanigans, the Democrat county judge selected 2 Democrats and 1 
    Republican as recount commissioners.
        The most aggressive Democrat commissioner there insisted on 
    strict compliance with Indiana law. Hundreds of ballots, 
    particularly absentee ballots for McIntyre, were declared invalid 
    without a peep out of the McCloskey forces. Later, when several 
    hundred ballots in black precincts were Invalidated because the law 
    requires punch card ballots to carry precinct numbers, the 
    McCloskey forces wailed that Republicans had done something wrong.
        The problem here is that every time the McCloskey crowd cries 
    foul, its allegations are promptly refuted, but it then promptly 
    raises another specious complaint, That's ridiculous. The burden of 
    proof is not on McIntyre. He was elected. He was certified.
        The burden of proof Is on the loser. The loser has only blown 
    smoke. He has not put forward convincing proof that the McIntyre 
    certificate and reaffirmation is flawed. He lost first in the 
    election, then in court, and then in the recount. The only place he 
    can win is in this House, and only then if the House majority 
    Democrats are shameless enough to declare a loser the winner.
        The district court's response to McCloskey is instructive here. 
    The court said if it looked at all the county reports, McCloskey 
    loses. If it looked at the Gibson recount, he loses. His remedy 
    lies in the Federal Contested Elections Act.
        Despite what the court told him, McCloskey did not file a 
    contest under that act. He did not do it because he had no case. 
    Instead, he is now trying to frustrate that act by appealing to his 
    friends in the House majority. The only way he can succeed-through 
    confusion.
        It's hard to be unemotional, dispassionate, and calm while 
    being mugged. If I sound emotional, It is because I am. This is not 
    garden variety, minor league suppression of the minority. This is 
    not run-of-the-mill partisan game playing. This is murder.
        If you don't understand this vote, please find someone who can 
    explain it to you. Some of you are going to be terribly 
    embarrassed, and not just by the lawsuits that will inevitably 
    follow a vote to deny again the seat legally won by Richard 
    McIntyre.
        Please think about what representative government means. Then 
    vote to seat this lawfully elected Congressman.
        Mr. [Trent] LOTT [of Mississippi]. Mr. Speaker, in reviewing 
    House precedents, I went back to volume one of Hinds' Precedents 
    which was published in 1907. There you will find in chapter 18 case 
    after case after case in which the precedent is upheld, and I 
    quote, that ``The House admits on his prima facie showing and 
    without regard to final right, a Member-elect from a recognized 
    constituency whose credentials are in due form and whose 
    qualifications are unquestioned.''
        But in reading over those earlier cases, the more human and 
    institutional aspect of this precedent was brought home in the 
    debates of those who have preceded us in this Chamber. Perhaps the 
    most compelling case was an 1871 challenge in which someone 
    objected to the seating of a minority party Member, even though his 
    credentials were in order. A Member of the majority party, 
    Congressman Dawes of Massachusetts, who served on the elections 
    committee, rose in the well to defend the temporary right of his 
    challenged minority party Member to a seat. To quote from 
    Congressman Dawes' remarks:

  Sir, I, as the organ of the Committee on Elections for twelve years, have 
time and again so stated . . . that the certificate of a Member, where 
there was no allegation against his eligibility, of his lack of loyalty, or 
other ineligibility, entitled him to be sworn in.

        Mr. Dawes went on, and again I quote:

  It has been the struggle during all these disturbed times of that 
Committee on Elections to hold to the precedents and to the law against 
passion and against prejudice, so that if the party should ever fall into a 
minority, they should have no precedent of their own making to be brought 
up against them to their own great injury.

        My colleagues, what are we doing here? What about the 
    constitutional right of the people of the Eighth District of 
    Indiana, to have a representative in the body? Where will it end? 
    Will winners of close elections summarily not be seated if he or 
    she is of the wrong party? Will it eventually extend to positions 
    taken in campaigns, or primary results? Mr. Speaker, it is wrong 
    not to seat Congressman-elect McIntyre.
        And Mr. Dawes concluded his remarks by beseeching his majority 
    party colleagues, and I quote:

  Now, with nothing to be gained, but with everything to be lost, by the 
precedent now sought to be established, I entreat the House to adhere to 
the ancient rule.

        Mr. Dawes prevailed in that instance as the House voted 42-147 
    against the motion not to seat the challenged Member.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have?
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman has 2 1/2 minutes remaining.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remaining time.

                                 general leave

        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all 
    Members may be allowed 5 legislative days in which to revise and 
    extend their remarks on the item of business presently under 
    consideration.
        The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
    from Minnesota?
        There was no objection.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Now, Mr. Speaker, there is not time to do 
    everything. First let us talk about the 5,000 invalidated votes 
    that Republicans stole; 96 percent of the invalidated votes in the 
    recount were done by a recount commission appointed with 2-to-1 
    Democrats, by a Democrat judge, hardly a Republican shenanigan.
        With respect to the allegation of the gentleman from Indiana 
    [Mr. Hamilton] that there are different rules, of course there are 
    different rules. If the gentleman knew his own State law he would 
    know they have rules for paper ballots, punchcards, and machines. 
    Six counties were on punchcards, six were on machines, and three on 
    paper ballots. Of course they were different.
        With respect to the disenfranchisement of black voters, the 
    judge, the Democrat judge, instructed the 2-to-1 recount 
    commissioners on Indiana law and on the Supreme Court decisions 
    which related to it.
        Punchcards, when they do not have anything on them other than a 
    punch in Indiana have got to be thrown out. That law was followed 
    scrupulously.
        Finally let me say that all these items are smoke being blown 
    over the problem by the McCloskey forces. McIntyre has no burden of 
    proof. He won. McCloskey has the burden of proof. He lost the 
    election. He lost in district court and he lost the recount. The 
    only way McCloskey can win is if he confuses his cronies so that 
    they violate the laws of the United States and the State of Indiana 
    and vote him into the Congress.
        This is not a procedural vote. It is not a vote on the 
    integrity of any committee. It Is not the usual political squabble. 
    It is not just Democrats picking on Republicans so the suppressed 
    minority will not get uppity.
        This is a blockbuster vote. This is murder. This is a rape of a 
    system. The issue is the ultimate abuse of representative 
    government. We have an elected, certified Member.
        Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker----
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, I did not yield to the gentleman. Was 
    he making a point of order?
        The SPEAKER. The Chair would probably understand, as does the 
    gentleman, what the gentleman from Texas was doing. He was 
    questioning whether the words should be taken down or not. But no 
    point of order was made.
        The gentleman from Minnesota will continue.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, may I ask the Speaker If I might get 
    an appropriate amount of time extra, as the gentleman from Texas 
    did?
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman will continue.
        Mr. FRENZEL. I thank the Speaker. If I may continue.
        The SPEAKER. The remarks of the gentleman from Texas are not 
    taken out of the time of the gentleman from Minnesota.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, an elected certified Member of 
    Congress whose certification has been reaffirmed by a recount under 
    the appropriate State law has been voted once in an atrocity 
    perpetrated by this House not to take the seat which he himself 
    won. If we reaffirm that outrage today we are bringing further 
    shame upon the House.
        I would ask, I would beg, I would implore every Member of the 
    House to look at the facts. Forget about your partisan 
    inclinations. Think about what representative government means to 
    you. Think about what your constituents think when they cast a vote 
    for you or for your opponent in an election.
        Having completed that meditation, I would respectfully request 
    and suggest that every Member of this House vote down the motion to 
    refer and to vote to seat Rick McIntyre, the rightful winner in 
    Indiana's Eighth District election.
        The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. 
    Frenzel] has expired.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Wright].
        Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, there has been a veritable rhetorical 
    orgy attempting to portray what is being done here today and what 
    was done on January 3 as the theft of an election or as some 
    surreptitious attempt to seat a Democrat because he is a Democrat. 
    Let us get it real clear.
        We are not trying to seat anybody today. We are trying to allow 
    the orderly procedures of the House to be followed. This House 
    voted on January 3 that the matter should be referred to the House 
    Committee on Administration. It was so referred.
        Now, lest anybody think that committee, which has an 
    unblemished record for nonpartisanship, plans any delays in its 
    findings, I want to yield to the chairman of that committee or to 
    the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Foley] who is a member of that 
    committee to give us assurances that it intends to act and report 
    back if possible within 45 days.
        Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. WRIGHT. I yield for that purpose, I do.
        Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, as the gentleman knows, in an 
    earlier statement I have instructed this task force to move as 
    quickly as possible toward a resolution of this unfortunate 
    situation. As chairman of the full committee, I have already 
    consulted with the gentleman from California [Mr. Panetta], our 
    colleague, who is chairman of the task force, and I have asked him 
    not only to move as quickly as possible toward a resolution of this 
    problem, but to complete its work within 45 days on or before April 
    30.
        Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for that 
    assurance.
        Mr. [Leon] PANETTA [of California]. Mr. Speaker, will the 
    gentleman yield?
        Mr. WRIGHT. I will yield to the gentleman who is the chairman 
    of the subcommittee.
        Mr. PANETTA. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. SPEAKER. For what purpose does the gentleman from Indiana 
    rise?
        Mr. MYERS of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I ask for a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The SPEAKER. Will the gentleman yield for that purpose?
        Mr. WRIGHT. I do not yield for that purpose. Mr. Speaker. I 
    have already yielded to the gentleman from California who is 
    chairman of the task force investigating this election contest.
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman from California will kindly stand at 
    the microphone and be on his feet.
        Mr. PANETTA. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I had not 
    intended to speak on this issue because I have the responsibility 
    on the task force to look at this issue. I consider this one of the 
    most serious responsibilities that I have assumed since becoming a 
    Member of this institution.
        It is my approach that this matter will be handled 
    expeditiously and on a bipartisan basis because we do have to set 
    common procedures and determine the vote.
        I am in concurrence with the chairman and have indicated to the 
    chairman that it is our intent that within 45 days to attempt to 
    report back to the House, assuming that we have cooperation within 
    the task force.
        Mr. WRIGHT. I thank the gentleman for that statement.
        Mr. Speaker, I want to address myself in the few remaining 
    moments to the questions that have been raised.
        First is a statement on the part of the minority that somehow 
    we are breaking precedent. That, of course, is not true. It is not 
    the first time we have refused to seat either claimant, 
    notwithstanding the possession by one of a certificate.
        In 1961, in the contest between Roush and Chambers, it was 
    stated clearly on the House floor by the then minority leader, Mr. 
    Halleck from Indiana, that Mr. Chambers has a certificate of 
    election from the State of Indiana and should be seated. In that 
    case the House wisely chose to seat neither Mr. Chambers and Mr. 
    Roush, and pursuant to the inquiry and the counting of all of the 
    votes, Mr. Roush was declared the due winner.
        Citing Deschler's Precedents:

  Thus the adoption of House Resolution 1 automatically nullified the 
certificate of election which had been issued by the Governor of Indiana.

        Further citing Deschler's Precedents, and I think this is 
    vital:

  Although the House of Representatives generally follows State law and the 
rulings of State courts in resolving election contests, this is not 
necessarily so with respect to the validity of ballots where the intention 
of the voter is clear and there is no evidence of fraud.

        What is at issue here today is the insistence of the House 
    Administration Committee that all ballots of all qualified voters--
    Republican, Democrat, or what have you--shall be counted. That is a 
    sacred right.
        This is an unusual case. More than 5,000 voters were 
    systematically disenfranchised upon often flimsy technicalities. 
    Now, is it not important that those 5,000 voters shall have their 
    ballots counted? I do not know who the winner will be. I do not 
    think members of the committee know who the winner will be.
        The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Vander Jagt] has asserted that 
    if all of the ballots are counted then Mr. McIntyre will be the 
    winner. If that is the case, so be it. But let us have the ballots 
    counted. That is the most sacred thing available in this democracy 
    of ours.
        Let me cite some more precedents from law, the very State of 
    Indiana itself. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that a precinct 
    clerk's initials do not need to be inscribed on a ballot; yet many 
    of these uncounted ballots were disallowed on that ground. The 
    Indiana State Legislature, acting very recently, overruled an 
    earlier local election commission ruling in another contest. The 
    legislature held that strict adherence to this requirement was 
    unfair to the voters.
        These people have been disenfranchised through no fault of 
    their own, Mr. Speaker. I should like to recite the precedent in 
    Moss versus Rhea, which held in another case that the failure of 
    the clerks to initial the ballots was a mistake of which the voter 
    himself was not a participant, and that the ballots should be 
    counted.
        Further, from McCrary, a Treatise on the Law of Elections, 
    1897:

  Acts of election officials are merely directory and the voter will not be 
disenfranchised for failure of these officials to perform their duty.

        Further, in the case of Taylor versus England, 6 Cannon's 
    Precedents, and this is a critical case:

  The House of Representatives should not consider itself obligated to 
follow the drastic statute of the State of West Virginia.

        Another instance of another State.

  Under the provisions of which all ballots not personally signed by the 
clerks of election in strict compliance with the manner prescribed had been 
rejected, but should retain the discretionary right to follow the rules of 
endeavoring to discover the clear intention of the voter.

        That is what is sacred. That is what is at issue. The intent of 
    the voter, and his or her right to be counted.
        If we declare a winner today before those votes have been 
    counted, then we will be ratifying decisions which disenfranchised 
    more the 5,000 Indiana voters.
        No question has been raised so far as I am able to discern, but 
    that those voters were qualified voters. No question has arisen 
    alleging fraud. The voters came to the polls. They voted. Thousands 
    of their votes were disallowed. That Is the question which requires 
    B, committee investigation and finding.
        The SPEAKER. All time has expired.
        Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the 
    motion to refer.

                             parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, my inquiry is will the Speaker 
    protect my request to strike the intrusion into my discussion by 
    the distinguished majority leader, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. 
    Wright], under Deschler's Precedents, and this is volume 8, section 
    24.65, which says that----

  A Member desiring to interrupt another in debate should address the Chair 
for permission. If the Member having the floor declines to yield, he may 
strike from the record.

        The SPEAKER. As to the remarks of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. 
    Wright], which were not a point of order in view of the fact that 
    the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Frenzel] had the time and did not 
    yield to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Wright], the remarks of the 
    gentleman from Texas [Mr. Wright] will not be printed in the 
    Record.
        Mr. FRENZEL. I thank the Speaker.
        The SPEAKER. The question is on ordering the previous question.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The Clerk will report the motion to refer.
        The Clerk read as follows:

  Mr. Wright moves to refer the resolution to the Committee on House 
Administration.

        The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion to refer offered by 
    the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Wright].
        The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes 
    appeared to have it.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    221, nays 180, answered ``present'' 1, not voting 30, as follows:

                              [Roll No. 9] . . . 

        Mr. REGULA changed his vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
        So the motion to refer was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

    On February 6, 1985, the Committee on House Administration 
appointed a task force of three Members to investigate the 
circumstances of the election. The committee did not impound or 
subpoena the ballots at issue, but relied on state procedures that 
ensured the security of the ballots. The task force informed all county 
clerks that the committee was investigating the matter, and that all 
documents relating to the election should be safeguarded.
    On February 21, 1985, the task force adopted an organizational 
memorandum outlining the procedures that it would abide by in 
determining the final right to the seat for the Eighth District of 
Indiana. Included in this memorandum were ballot counting rules for 
recounting ballots and resolving issues surrounding disputed ballots. 
The task force was mindful of two alleged deficiencies with the state 
recount procedures: (1) that overly-stringent application of ballot 
counting rules invalidated many legal ballots; and (2) that ballot 
counting rules varied considerably from county to county.(7)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. H. Rept. 99-58, 99th Cong. Sess. p. 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The committee identified 22 different categories of problematic 
ballots that, under state law, could be subject to invalidation. The 
committee studied Indiana's election statutes, the decisions of its 
courts in election cases, and the official instruction manuals provided 
to election officials. After reviewing these sources, the committee 
concluded that a strict adherence to Indiana law could provide the 
necessary uniformity across counties and precincts, but at the expense 
of disenfranchising thousands of Indiana voters for mere technical 
errors. Rather than cause this potential disenfranchisement, the 
committee instead opted to ``count all the votes where election 
official error rather than voter error resulted in 
disenfranchisement.''(8)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. Id. at p. 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The committee also reviewed House precedents on election contests 
to determine their applicability to the case before it. The committee 
reiterated that state election law may be persuasive to the House (and, 
indeed, the House has generally shown much deference to state statutes 
and court decisions) but it is not dispositive. Further, while the 
House ``is not legally bound to follow state law, there are instances 
where it is in fact bound by justice and equity to deviate from 
it.''(9) The committee also noted that the House has 
traditionally been reluctant to disenfranchise voters based on 
technical errors made by election officials. Where the intent of the 
voter could be ascertained, the general rule has been that the ballot 
should be counted.(10)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. Id. at p. 23.
10. See Sec. 12, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    From these considerations, the task force was able to devise a set 
of counting rules to evaluate each of the 22 different categories of 
ballots subject to invalidation under Indiana law. The committee 
determined that ``these rules come as close as possible  . . .  to 
establishing a fair standard for determining the will of the majority 
of voters'' in this election.(11) The committee then 
commenced a full recount of all ballots cast in the election.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. H. Rept. 99-58, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The majority and minority parties both agreed that James Shumway, 
an independent election official and future Secretary of State for 
Arizona, should supervise the recount, assisted by auditors from the 
General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office). 
The recount began on March 26, 1985.(12)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. For an announcement by the chair of the task force (Rep. Leon 
        Panetta of California) regarding the status of the recount, see 
        131 Cong. Rec. 6346, 99th Cong. 1st Sess (Mar. 26, 1985).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    During the course of the recount, the auditors discovered 
tabulation errors in five counties--enough to overcome the vote margin 
from the state certified results and give Mr. McCloskey a plurality. 
Nevertheless, the recount continued until all ballots had been 
examined.
    The task force further noted three additional categories of ballots 
discovered during the recount process that had not been anticipated 
under the task force's recount procedure rules. The report filed by the 
committee included a detailed examination of each category, with an 
explanation of how the standard used in each case advanced the goal of 
counting all valid ballots.
    When the task force had completed its recount, the final tally 
indicated that Mr. McCloskey had received 116,645 votes and Mr. 
McIntyre had received 116,641 votes--a margin of victory of four votes.
    Members of the minority party filed a strenuous dissent to 
accompany the committee's report, calling the recount process a 
``shameful exercise  . . .  of partisan political 
power.''(13) The dissent argued that it was contrary to 
precedent not to seat a Member-elect who appeared with a validly-issued 
certificate of election, as Mr. McIntyre had done. They cited earlier 
cases standing for the proposition that the mere closeness of an 
election does not raise the presumption of fraud or irregularity. They 
further argued that the House should at least have seated Mr. McIntyre 
when the results of the state recount were known on February 7, 1985.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. H. Rept. 99-58, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The dissent also took issue with Mr. McCloskey's failure to proceed 
under the FCEA, thus avoiding the need to meet burdens of proof 
established by the statute. It also argued that the majority had not 
shown proper deference to state laws, but instead substituted its own 
procedures for evaluating disputed ballots. The fact that the committee 
chose to conduct a recount itself was criticized, citing prior cases 
where the committee demonstrated great reluctance in examining ballots 
where state recount procedures were already in place.
    Finally, the dissent criticized the recount process itself, 
accusing it of exhibiting the same inconsistencies and potential for 
disenfranchisement as the state election procedures. It was 
particularly critical of the categories of ballots that were not 
initially anticipated by the task force's counting rules, and thus 
required establishing procedures for evaluating them during the recount 
itself. The dissent concluded by urging rejection of any resolution to 
seat Mr. McCloskey.
    The committee filed its report on April 29, 1985. On April 30, 
1985,(14) a minority party Member (Rep. William Frenzel of 
Minnesota) offered a resolution as a question of the privileges of the 
House to declare the seat for the Eighth District of Indiana vacant. 
The House rejected the resolution, with 200 Members voting yea, 229 
voting nay, and four Members not voting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. H. Res. 148, 131 Cong. Rec. 9801-21, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On May 1, 1985, the chair of the committee's task force (Rep. Leon 
Panetta of California) offered a privileged resolution to resolve the 
election contest.(15) The resolution declared that Mr. 
McCloskey had been duly elected and was entitled to a seat in the 99th 
Congress. The minority raised the question of consideration against the 
resolution, which was decided in the affirmative--242 yeas, 185 nays, 
and six not voting. After debate, the minority offered a motion to 
recommit the resolution to the Committee on House Administration, with 
instructions to count ``otherwise valid unnotarized absentee ballots'' 
in certain identified counties. The motion to recommit was not adopted. 
Thereafter, the resolution seating Mr. McCloskey was agreed to by a 
vote of 236 yeas, 190 nays, two answering ``present,'' and five Members 
not voting. Mr. McCloskey was then sworn in as a Member of the 99th 
Congress by the Speaker.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. H. Res. 146, 131 Cong. Rec. 9998-10020, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proceedings of May 1, 1985, are as follows:

           RELATING TO ELECTION OF A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE EIGHTH 
                     CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF INDIANA    

        Mr. [Leon] PANETTA [of California]. Mr. Speaker, by direction 
    of the Committee on House Administration, I call up a privileged 
    resolution (H. Res. 146) relating to election of a Representative 
    from the Eighth Congressional District of Indiana, and ask for its 
    immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 146

  Resolved, That, based on a recount of votes in the election of November 
6, 1984, conducted pursuant to House Resolution 1, Ninety-ninth Congress, 
agreed to January 3, 1985, the House of Representatives determines that 
Frank McCloskey was duly elected to the office of Representative from the 
Eighth Congressional District of Indiana and is entitled to a seat in the 
Ninety-ninth Congress.

        Mr. [Joe] BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I raise a question of 
    consideration and demand that the Chair put the question.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore [Mr. (James) Wright (of Texas)]. The 
    question is, Will the House now consider House Resolution 146?
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it.
        Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and 
    nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    242, nays 185, not voting 6, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 89]  . . . 

        So the House agreed to consider House Resolution 146.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman 
    from California [Mr. Panetta] for 1 hour.
        Mr. PANETTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman 
    from Minnesota [Mr. Frenzel] for purposes of debate only, and I 
    yield myself 8 minutes.
        Mr. Speaker, the privileged resolution that is before you is 
    for seating and it is made pursuant to the action of the House 
    taken on House Resolution 1. It is based on actions of the task 
    force as well as the recommendation of the full House 
    Administration Committee.
        House Resolution 1 was adopted by the House by a vote of 238 to 
    177. It referred the question of who had the right to the seat in 
    the Eighth District in Indiana to the Committee on House 
    Administration.
        Pursuant to that vote, the committee organized and appointed 
    the task force, made up of three Members.
        Between February 6 and April 18 the task force adopted a series 
    of procedures, rules and other memoranda to conduct a recount of 
    the election in the Eighth District. That recount was conducted by 
    GAO auditors. The official tally of that recount was presented to 
    the task force on Monday, April 22, by the director of elections.
        The full House committee received the official tally on 
    Tuesday, April 23.
        The official tally that was presented by the director of 
    elections gave Mr. McCloskey 116,645 votes and Mr. McIntyre 116,641 
    votes.
        Pursuant to the responsibility that was placed on the task 
    force and the House Administration Committee to determine who 
    received the most votes based on the official tally provided by the 
    GAO auditors and the director of elections, it is the 
    recommendation that Mr. McCloskey, therefore, be seated. That was 
    approved by the task force and approved by the full House 
    Administration Committee on April 23.
        As you know, a full report based on the actions of the task 
    force, the views of the task force both on the majority and the 
    minority side was prepared and that has been provided now to all 
    Members.
        My colleagues, the arguments on this issue are well presented 
    in the report and the backup material. The issue was fully debated 
    yesterday on the House floor, based on the motion to vacate the 
    seat and call for a special election.
        I would again ask the Members to please look at the facts that 
    are presented in that report.
        There is a great deal of rhetoric and a great deal of charge 
    and countercharge that has been presented here, but what I ask the 
    Members in implementing a very serious responsibility under the 
    Constitution is please look at the facts that are presented in the 
    report. I think the conclusion from that report is that the 
    procedures were indeed fair, that they were developed largely in 
    cooperation with the minority, that the rules were justified by 
    House precedent and they were implemented in line with House 
    precedent all the way down the road, that the GAO auditors and the 
    director of elections conducted a fair and credible recount of all 
    the votes that were presented in the Eighth District, all of the 
    ballots that had been cast, and that the legitimate winner of that 
    election should now be seated.
        In summary, let me also personally thank the individuals that 
    were involved in this recount. This was difficult responsibility 
    for all who have been involved. I want to thank in particular the 
    chairman of the full committee for his cooperation and support 
    during this entire effort. I want to thank the ranking minority 
    member, the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Frenzel] for his support 
    during the operations of the task force.
        I also want to pay tribute to the members of that task force, 
    both the gentleman from California [Mr. Thomas] and the gentleman 
    from Missouri [Mr. Clay], who were always diligent in attending all 
    the task force hearings, both here and in Evansville, IN, and 
    although there were disagreements, they continued to work to see 
    that the process was completed.
        I also want to thank all the staff involved on both sides who 
    worked so hard and diligently in trying to complete this very 
    difficult process.
        Let me say in conclusion that the House was given a very 
    difficult and uncomfortable responsibility. It is not pleasant to 
    make judgments on issues like this, but under the Constitution, we 
    are to be the final judge of election returns and qualifications of 
    our own Members. That is a very serious responsibility that we have 
    and one that must be exercised carefully.
        The task force and the House Administration Committee in 
    implementing that responsibility implemented it fairly, 
    impartially, and honestly. We now present to you the results of the 
    recount that were accomplished by the task force and the auditors.
        No one-no one regrets more deeply than I that the final result 
    of counting the votes in the Eighth District in Indiana were am 
    close as they were, no one regrets that more. It would have been 
    far easier had either candidate won by 100 or more votes, but that 
    is not the way it turned out according to the recount.
        Should the closeness of that vote, as close as it was, lead to 
    the rejection of all the results, be a justification for rejecting 
    those results, or more importantly, be a basis to reject the voters 
    who cast their votes on election night in the Eighth District? Are 
    they not due some respect by virtue of going to the polls, those 
    that cast valid ballots, are they not to be respected for the votes 
    that they cast on election night?
        It seems to me that those votes should be counted, that those 
    votes were cast and that as a result of that, Mr. McCloskey won. We 
    know very well that if Mr. McIntyre won, he would be seated.
        I ask us to do the same for Mr. McCloskey.
        Mr. [William] FRENZEL [of Minnesota]. Mr. Speaker, I yield such 
    time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Nevada [Mrs. 
    Vucanovich], a member of the committee.
        Mrs. [Barbara] VUCANOVICH [of Nevada]. Mr. Speaker, I just 
    simply say that I rise in opposition to this resolution.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume 
    to the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Thomas], the 
    sole Republican member of the 2-to-1 task force.
        Mr. [William] THOMAS [of California]. Mr. Speaker, I ask 
    unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks and to read out 
    of printed material, waiving rule XXX.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from California?
        There was no objection.
        Mr. THOMAS of California. Mr. Speaker, I think it is important 
    for us to note we are here today because of the big lie. And that 
    is that there was a question over who the people had chosen in 
    Indiana's Eighth Congressional District election night.
        Now, Mr. Speaker, there is no question about who won. Just as I 
    do not believe there is a plot or a conspiracy going on, I think 
    there has just been an amazing series of unintended errors, of 
    inadvertent comments.
        From day one in this Congress the Democrats' comments have 
    referred to recount night, not to election night. Just yesterday on 
    this floor the majority leader, in speaking out about what 
    happened, indicated that:

  So the question is, did the House do the right thing in having a recount? 
Someone said yesterday in debate that the only reason for the 
constitutional provision that we be the judge of our own elections is to 
guard against extraordinary circumstances, and this gentleman concluded 
there had been no extraordinary circumstances in the Indiana case.

        The majority leader went on to say:

  Well, I suggest that there was truly and extraordinary circumstance when 
almost 5,000 American citizens were disenfranchised on technicalities and 
their votes were not counted.

        Mr. Majority Leader, that was the recount, not the election. 
    The certificate was based upon the election, not the recount.
        Of the 22 task force rules, every one of them counted ballots 
    that were invalid under Indiana law. When you compare the number of 
    votes election night with the number of votes in the committee 
    report under the task force, and subtract the tabulation errors, 
    the difference is 91 votes. And everyone to the 22 rules of the 
    task force admitted ballots that were illegal under Indiana law. 
    And the difference between election night and the task force's 
    recount after correction for tabulation errors: 191 votes.
        Two hundred thirty-three thousand votes were counted election 
    night, 233,000 votes were counted by the task force. Your error has 
    been corrected.
        From day one of this Congress there has been a systematic 
    although unintended and inadvertent stream of comments to create 
    the impression that Republicans played games in Indiana. I thought 
    for a few days that the secretary of state's name in Indiana was 
    Mr. Republican, it was so important to underscore the fact that the 
    secretary of state was a Republican and that the Governor was a 
    Republican.
        Just yesterday the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Clay], said on 
    the floor of this House, and I quote:

  I assume, Mr. Speaker, that those black voters, and that was 20 percent 
of the total black vote in that District, that were disenfranchised under 
the recount, the Republican-controlled recount * * *.

        Vanderburgh County had a recount commission made up of three 
    individuals, two of them Democrat, one Republican. Nine of the 
    fifteen counties were controlled by Democrats. Error corrected.
        There were errors made election night, yes. The county clerk 
    from Gibson County, Mr. Lutz, double counted a precinct. I asked 
    him, ``You said you saw the sheet and there were two 20th precincts 
    out of the 37 precincts shown on election night?''
        ``Mr. Lutz. That is when I knew something--it wasn't perfect. I 
    noticed it.''
        I said, ``Why did you sign your name to a certificate when you 
    knew the count wasn't perfect?''
        Mr. Lutz said, ``I done just like all the other clerks. You 
    take the summary sheet--that is what the purpose was for. We are in 
    a hurry. We want to find out what people are getting to these 
    votes. You understand what I am saying? The total.''
        I said, ``Does Indiana law require you to submit the very next 
    day a total?
        Mr. Lutz said, ``No, not the very next day.''
        That is at page 297 of the transcript. Mr. Lutz admitted that 
    he transmitted an imperfect total. Mr. Lutz is a Democrat.
        When it was discovered that that total was incorrect the county 
    judge was asked to order the Democrat county clerk to correct it. 
    The judge refused. The county judge was a Democrat. It was not 
    until the State Supreme Court of Indiana ordered, exhibit in the 
    minority report, the Supreme Court of Indiana determine that an 
    error had occurred in the counting of the votes. ``The clerk of 
    Gibson County is ordered within 48 hours of receipt of this order 
    to proceed pursuant to statute to certify the proper results of the 
    election in question of the secretary of state of the State of 
    Indiana.'' The supreme court had to order the Democrat judge in 
    Gibson County, and the Democrat county clerk to correct the error.
        At the same time the State supreme court was ordering Democrats 
    to correct an error Mr. McCloskey was in State court demanding that 
    that court rule that the only way to correct the error was to have 
    a complete recount. While at the same time he was in Federal court 
    arguing that he should be certified as the proper winner in 
    Indiana's Eighth Congressional District based upon the erroneous 
    total of election night.
        There were errors election night. Were they corrected? Yes. 
    There was a full accounting of the votes election night! Was there 
    a winner election night? Yes. Was the winner McIntyre? Yes. Did 
    this House honor his valid certificate? No.
        We are here today through a series of amazing coincidences. A 
    Democrat clerk forwards the wrong total and refuses to correct it. 
    A Democrat county judge refuses to order the Democrat clerk to 
    correct his total.
        Even though the Indiana State Supreme Court orders the error 
    corrected and a true total is forwarded to the secretary of state, 
    and then to the House Clerk, the Democrat leadership is apparently 
    confused, does not understand the difference between election night 
    and the recount and it asks the House not to honor Mr. McIntyre's 
    valid certificate.
        And this House, on a straight party vote, 238 Democrats vote to 
    send it to House Administration. A task force is created with a 2-
    to-1 Democrat majority. Democrats on the task force vote 2-to-1 to 
    quit counting when McCloskey is ahead.
        House Administration, by a straight Democrat vote, sends this 
    resolution to the floor.
        And soon, with only Democrats voting in favor of seating, Mr. 
    McCloskey will become a Member of the House of Representatives.
        That is quite a streak of coincidences, even for you folks.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California [Mr. 
    Thomas] has consumed 8 minutes.
        Mr. PANETTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 1/2 minutes to the chairman 
    of the House Administration Committee, the gentleman from Illinois 
    [Mr. Annunzio].
        Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, throughout the public debate over 
    deciding the winner in Indiana's Eighth Congressional District, I 
    have not spoken. Certainly as a Democrat, I would hope that Mr. 
    McCloskey would win the seat. But as chairman of the House 
    Administration Committee, my first and only goal was to make 
    certain that the House Administration Committee, your committee, 
    operated in as fair a manner as possible.
        During the hearings on the task force report, I made no 
    statements. On the floor yesterday I made no statements. And my 
    statement today is not a partisan one designed to advocate the 
    seating of any candidate.
        In January, the House Administration Committee was assigned the 
    task by this body of preparing a report with recommendations on the 
    outcome of Indiana's Eighth Congressional District, it was not a 
    job that I welcomed, but one that you assigned to my committee. 
    That night in reflecting on the assignment, I decided that because 
    of the closeness of the race and the supercharged emotions 
    surrounding it, the committee must operate on the highest ethical 
    plane. When I appointed the task force I gave them no special 
    partisan instructions but rather gave the task force and its 
    chairman, the gentleman from California [Mr. Panetta], a free rein. 
    I made available to the task force whatever funds and personnel 
    were necessary to conduct the recount.
        Some may feel that the task force did not reach the proper 
    conclusion. I am not here to debate that point. I do feel that the 
    task force, dealing with one of the closest political races in our 
    history, operated in an honorable manner. I commend the three 
    members of the task force-the gentleman from California [Mr. 
    Panetta], the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Clay], and the gentleman 
    from California [Mr. Thomas], as well as the recount director, Mr. 
    Shumway.
        While others of us were performing our political duties here in 
    Washington and our constituent duties in our districts, these three 
    gentlemen were forced to spend hundreds of hours of their own time 
    working on the task force report.
        Members of Congress have so little free time, and I know the 
    most common complaint in this body is the limited amount of time we 
    have to spend with our families and loved ones. Yet these three 
    gentlemen gave up hundreds of hours of their time to complete a 
    task that I am certain not a single Member of this House would 
    want.
        The many staff people who assisted the task force also are due 
    our praise, as are the representatives of the General Accounting 
    Office who assisted the task force. These people worked many hours 
    that they could have spent with their families or in other more 
    enjoyable springtime activities.
        Mr. Speaker, I am proud of the job that the Committee on House 
    Administration did on its assignment, and I am particularly proud 
    of the task force.
        Before the final vote is taken on the Eighth District 
    Congressional seat, I want to let the members of the task force 
    know that they have performed a valuable service.
        It is easy for Members of both sides to criticize specific 
    actions of the task force, but I do not know of a single Member of 
    this body who would have wanted to trade places with a member of 
    the task force. It is a lot harder to go out and do the work and be 
    faced with tough decisions hour after hour. I cannot let this 
    contested election episode draw to a close without letting the 
    members of the task force know of my appreciation for their 
    efforts.
        In closing let me make this request. No matter what your 
    feelings are about the Eighth Congressional District's seat, please 
    join me in expressing appreciation of this body for the hard work, 
    long hours, and devotion to duty put forth by Mr. Panetta, Mr. 
    Clay, and Mr. Thomas.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
    distinguished gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Coble].
        Mr. [Howard] COBLE [of North Carolina]. I thank the Speaker.
        The 34 votes were enlarged to 418 votes; the secretary of state 
    of Indiana certified the Republican candidate, Mr. McIntyre, as the 
    winner; Mr. McCloskey, the Democrat candidate, did not allege fraud 
    or other illegal activity surrounding the election.
        Yet Mr. McIntyre's 418 margin of victory was not enough. 
    Perhaps 500 votes will be insufficient 2 years from now. Perhaps 
    5,000 will be insufficient 5 years from now.
        Some have said, ``Why all the fuss over one seat.'' One seat 
    will not emasculate the Republicans nor appreciably strengthen the 
    Democrats. The one seat, however, Mr. Speaker, is not the main 
    point. The main point is the course that was charted and pursued in 
    the name of fair play and equity. Fair play and equity, indeed; the 
    words fair play and equity were severely tarnished by this Chamber. 
    A dark cloud hangs heavy over this House. And if Mr. Rick McIntyre 
    is denied his seat that cloud will not disappear.
        In Biblical times some martyrs who suffered, had to endure pain 
    inflicted by thorns and thistles. Some have proclaimed that Rick 
    McIntyre is plagued by thorns and thistles.
        Horns and whistles might be more appropriate. Horns and 
    whistles that are indigenous to the atmosphere of a carnival 
    because I fear those who were the architects of this Indiana fiasco 
    more readily resemble carnival barkers rather than Biblical 
    martyrs.
        The ship of fairness is bound for the shoals and reefs to 
    destruction. This disaster can be avoided by not denying Rick 
    McIntyre the seat he won.
        I thank the Speaker.
        Mr. PANETTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman 
    from Indiana [Mr. Jacobs].
        Mr. [Andrew] JACOBS [of Indiana]. Mr. Speaker, in a Bill 
    Mauldin cartoon in 1945, a little boy was giving a report in school 
    and he said, ``And so my conclusion is that wars is impossible 
    unless both sides is right.''
        When you have a very close election as we seldom have in the 
    history of our Republic you are right at the ragged edge of 
    democracy. A great deal of discipline, a great deal of self-
    restraint is required.
        I would like to say a couple of words about the disputed 
    ballots in the Eighth District of Indiana. As I see it, Mr. 
    Speaker, they fall into two categories. The first category of 
    disputed votes are those which were cast by citizens who in every 
    respect met their obligations, did their duties and cast their 
    ballots, but ballots which were thrown out because of errors made 
    by election officials.
        Under the Indiana ancient, and, I think, somewhat crazy 
    statute, such errors by election officials, even though they do not 
    call into question the validity of the votes cast by the citizens, 
    under that ancient Indiana law the entire votes of a precinct can 
    be vitiated by a technical error upon the part of the precinct 
    official in that precinct.
        Imagine what the literal translation of that law could lead to, 
    if anybody even knew about it. Hardly anybody in Indiana even knew 
    it was still on the books. And, by the way, the Indiana House of 
    Representatives just voted 94 to 6 to repeal it and overruled it, 
    having a similar power as that of the Constitution in the U.S. 
    House, in judging an election contest this very year.
        Imagine what the literal application of that law could lead to. 
    Let us take an overwhelmingly Republican precinct where most of the 
    folks vote Republican. Here is a Democratic official at that 
    precinct who would just as soon not have that precinct counted in 
    the final tally. So he or she makes an accidental technical error. 
    Under the literal interpretation of that law all the votes of that 
    precinct could be thrown out.
        It could be worked exactly the same way the other way around.
        As I understand It, that question is not paramount in this 
    debate today. I think most people do agree that that statute is 
    very bad and that the Indiana Republican majority in the house of 
    representatives there and the Democratic majority in the House of 
    Representatives here did the proper thing in exercising the plenary 
    authority awarded by the constitutions to those respective bodies.
        The other category of contested votes, the ones being discussed 
    here today, are absentee ballots. That category of controversy has 
    to do with the duty of the individual citizen. When you go to a 
    precinct to cast your vote you are required, No. 1, to be there on 
    time. If you get there 1 hour late or 5 minutes late you are not 
    permitted to cast the vote. You have not met your duty to be there 
    on time.
        No. 2, you are required to sign the polling book in the 
    presence of election officials.
        In the case of absentee ballots theoretically the same thing 
    applies. You must be there on time with your ballot, not postmarked 
    but it must be there on election day. That is your responsibility 
    to get it there.
        No. 3, you must have signed the equivalent of the polling book 
    in the presence of an official known as a notary public.
        In the cases of 32 disputed ballots that was not done. They are 
    intrinsically, not malum prohibitum but malum, in se, they are 
    intrinsically illegal ballots. But were not 10 of those illegal 
    ballots counted? Yes, they were. I tell my friend from California 
    [Mr. Panetta] I think he was mistaken in supporting the counting of 
    those 10 ballots.
        Next question: Once you have counted those 10 illegal ballots, 
    why not count the other 32 illegal ballots? I cannot tell you, 
    during my days as a police officer, how many times I heard that 
    same argument when I was on traffic. ``There went three guys going 
    40 miles an hour. Why are you stopping me?''
        ``I wasn't able to stop the others,'' or whatever the reason, 
    it is not Justification for further illegality.
        Now, I hear it said that the task force was happy enough to 
    overrule Indiana law in one instance but not in another, and I 
    point out to you that the task force only overruled Indiana law in 
    one instance. It supported Indiana law in a variety of instances, 
    including the law requiring registration of voters, the law 
    requiring presence at the polling place on time, and so on.
        Now finally, Mr. Speaker, in all affection for my colleagues, 
    my fellow citizens of the United States, I think history tells us 
    that there is a faction among our Republican friends; I think it 
    could be described best by a faction that hates the word 
    conservative because it sounds too liberal.
        A faction which, somehow or another, seems to assert its 
    rightness inevitably, and it may be right; maybe it is right by 
    far, but the remarkable thing about that faction, Mr. Speaker, is 
    that in the entire history of the Republic, it has never lost an 
    election. It has had a few stolen from it, but it has never lost an 
    election-not to the Democrats, not even to other Republicans.
        In 1952, that faction lost the Texas primary to Dwight 
    Eisenhower, but it said no, we didn't lose it; Ike stole the 
    election, leading Edward R. Murrow to say to this reporter, ``It 
    would seem as traditional a part of the proceedings as for a fight 
    manager to yell `We was robbed.' ''
        Now, I want you listen to these words: In our campaigns, no 
    matter how hard fought they may be, no matter how close the 
    election may turn out to be, those who lose accept the verdict and 
    support those who win. Who said that? Richard M. Nixon on January 
    6, 1961, standing at that podium, announcing that he had lost the 
    election to John F. Kennedy.
        However, the faction in 1961 said that Mr. Nixon did not lose 
    the election to John F. Kennedy; they concluded that John F. 
    Kennedy stole it.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume 
    to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Crane].

                      removal of name member as cosponsor

                           of h.r. 75, and h.r. 1345

        Mr. [Philip] CRANE [of Illinois]. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous 
    consent that the name of the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. Robert F. 
    Smith] be removed from the list of cosponsors of H.R. 75, H.R. 76, 
    and H.R. 1345 and replaced as of today with Mr. Robert C. Smith of 
    New Hampshire. Mr. Robert F. Smith of Oregon was inadvertently 
    added to that bill instead of the Robert C. Smith of the State of 
    New Hampshire.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Illinois?
        There was no objection.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minutes to the gentleman 
    from Indiana [Mr. Myers] and following that I yield 1 1/2 minutes 
    to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hillis].
        Mr. [John] MYERS of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, it has Just been 
    conceded by my colleague from Indiana that there was an error in 
    counting 10 ballots in Indiana. Because of that, I think it is good 
    basis to say that the margin of error of only four votes is good 
    reason that this should not happen today.
        The precedents for the counting of those ballots has been used 
    by the House, the task force. In Roush versus Chambers in 1961, the 
    House Administration Committee went out and counted the ballots.
        There is one difference. When they came back with their count, 
    there was never a criticism or question about how they counted the 
    ballots in Indiana. It was not questioned. You certainly cannot say 
    that this time.
        It is unfair, I think; it is a tragedy, really, to the House of 
    Representatives. It is a sorry day today, but most importantly it 
    is a sorry day for a friend of ours, Frank McCloskey, taking his 
    seat today under this cloud. Because unfortunately, Mr. McCloskey, 
    who is a friend of mine, I have known him longer than any of the 
    rest of you I am sure, but he will be remembered as one Member who 
    was not elected by his constituency but selected by the House, and 
    that is too bad for a fine gentleman like Mr. McCloskey.
        I am not going to vote today on this issue. It is a vote that 
    should not be taking place in this House. I have not been a party 
    to illegal acts in the past, and I am not going to be today.
        Mr. [Elwood] HILLIS [of Indiana]. Mr. Speaker, we've discussed 
    at length the constitutional implications inherent in this debate 
    over the Eighth District of Indiana. We've also spent considerable 
    time talking about the mechanics of the recount, the ballots which 
    should or should not be counted, and the partisanship which has 
    overshadowed clear and reasoned debate.
        I want to speak for a moment on behalf of my home State and 
    more than a half million Hoosiers who have yet to be represented in 
    the 99th Congress.
        Mr. Speaker, they are, in a world, disillusioned. They wonder 
    what kind of people's House this is that its Members can vote to 
    deny them their right to elect a Member of Congress who can serve 
    in this body without suspicion.
        They wonder why the House insists they be represented by a man 
    who many in this Chamber believe lost the election. They wonder how 
    effective any Representative can be with this sword hanging over 
    his head.
        I know I would have great reservations about taking my seat in 
    this House under these conditions. I think many of you would too.
        Mr. Speaker, the people of the Eighth District want to make 
    this right. They want another chance to elect their Representative 
    on the same terms by which all of us were elected. I think they 
    deserve that opportunity just as their Representative deserves the 
    right, as we have, to sit in this Chamber as the unchallenged 
    choice of our constituents.
        I have always tried, in my 15 years here, to vote my 
    conscience. Sometimes that has meant differing with my party's 
    position on some tough issues. But I have done that and I will do 
    it again if I think it's right.
        I turn to my friends on the other side of the aisle and say to 
    them: Here is a clear vote of conscience. Here is a chance to do 
    what all great Democrats have advocated throughout our history. Let 
    the people decide.
        It is not too late. Our actions of yesterday can be reversed by 
    defeating the motion on the floor today. But it is our last chance 
    to do what is right.
        Please, let us not fail.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
    distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. Boulter].
        Mr. [Eldon] BOULTER [of Texas]. Mr. Speaker, I want to express 
    my appreciation to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Frenzel] for 
    the inspiration you have been to us who believe in this cause so 
    much.
        There have been a lot of words exchanged in the House the past 
    few months. Many Members on the Democrat side of the aisle have 
    spent time lamenting and regretting what they call our strident 
    partisanship on this side of the aisle.
        Just to those Members who have spoken in that way, let me say 
    that on our side of the aisle, we view your words as purposefully 
    confusing and intent on avoiding the facts.
        Yesterday, the chairman of the task force, the gentleman from 
    California [Mr. Panetta], said that the test which should be 
    applied to the work of the task force is one of reasonableness. I 
    agree, but is the result reasonable? Why, of course, it is not.
        Why do I say that? Because when all of the ballots that were 
    cast on election night are counted, McIntyre won by 34 votes. He 
    won a State-supervised recount by 418 votes. Yet, on those 
    occasions you said that it was too close; Indiana law is too 
    confusing; and you said most of all, count all the ballots.
        We have Just heard today where 10 ballots were counted and yet 
    32 more, similarly situated, ballots were not counted; and Mr. 
    Shumway himself said those ballots should have been counted.
        Then yesterday, one of the members of the task force on the 
    majority side said that our call for a special election--the 
    Republican call for a special election--could be considered by some 
    as ``racist.'' That is a quote from Mr. Clay ``could be considered 
    by some as racist.''
        That is sheer, sheer demagoguery. It is untrue, it is 
    dishonest. And you ask how our side can get emotional on this 
    issue.
        I think history is going to judge this, and I look forward to 
    history's verdict on this issue.
        The mere statement that we are racist shows that you are not 
    really being reasonable. History will judge that the task force 
    recount was not proper; the outcome was not reasonable, and that 
    the majority action was a subterfuge and a deliberate denial of 
    democracy.

                          point of personal privilege

        Mr. [William] CLAY [of Missouri]. Mr. Speaker, I rise to a 
    point of personal privilege.
        The gentleman accused me of accusing him of being a racist.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman cannot----
        Mr. CLAY. The gentleman called my name and accused me of 
    calling him a racist.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman cannot----
        Mr. CLAY. The gentleman cannot rise to a point of personal 
    privilege while the House is considering a question of privilege of 
    the House.
        Mr. PANETTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman 
    from Indiana [Mr. Sharp].
        Mr. CLAY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. [Philip] SHARP [of Indiana]. I yield to the gentleman from 
    Missouri.
        Mr. CLAY. Mr. Speaker, a colleague from the other side of the 
    aisle misrepresented my remarks of yesterday when he accused me of 
    calling Republican members ``racist.'' I did not make that 
    statement and the Congressional Record of April 30, 1985, will 
    confirm my position.
        Apparently the gentleman is very sensitive to such criticism. I 
    am told that most racists are unable to admit their racism and 
    sometimes even imagine being attacked for their views.
        I know not what category, if either, my accuser falls into, but 
    I suggest his conscience should be his guide.
        Mr. Speaker, I suffered the thankless ordeal of serving on the 
    election task force to decide the winner in Indiana Eighth 
    Congressional District. I knew from the outset that the eventual 
    outcome would leave some disgruntled, some dissatisfied, some as 
    confused as ever. But respect, concern, appreciation for this 
    institution moved me to join with two other colleagues in this 
    endeavor to determine which candidate received the most votes in 
    the November general election. I wish to commend the other two 
    members of the task force, Mr. Panetta and Mr. Thomas, for their 
    diligent, sincere, professional pursuit of the facts in this time-
    consuming effort. In particular, I wish to compliment our chairman, 
    Mr. Panetta, for his impartial and fair handling of this very 
    sensitive matter. There were times when partisan, intemperate 
    attacks questioning his integrity would have made lesser men and 
    women retaliate in kind. Mr. Panetta did not.
        Mr. Speaker, after more than 200 hours of debate on the floor 
    of this House, after 100 hours of deliberations and travel by the 
    special task force on elections, after 4 months of partisan 
    wrangling, the moment of truth has arrived. There is no further 
    time for posturing, procrastinating or politicking. In a matter of 
    minutes a vote will be taken to seat the winner of the election in 
    the Eighth District of Indiana. Mr. McCloskey won that election in 
    a fair but close contest by the slim margin of four votes. When all 
    of the more than 233,000 legitimate votes were counted, as slim as 
    the margin was, he emerged the victor.
        Some truly believed that a special election should have been 
    declared because of the closeness of the outcome. Some are not 
    inclined to accept any verdict other than one favoring their 
    candidate. Some wish the entire matter had never developed and look 
    forward to an expeditious resolution of the problem.
        To those who still have doubts about the wisdom of seating a 
    person who only won by four votes, I say that happens to be the 
    nature of the Democratic process. Our majority leader, Jim Wright 
    on yesterday, in a brilliant presentation pointed to several Earth 
    shaking incidents in history that have been decided by one vote.
        I would like to expand on his discourse to show that even a 
    one-vote margin is justification for seating a Member of this 
    House. The eagle is our national bird, instead of the turkey, 
    because of a one-vote margin in the Continental Congress. I'm sure 
    that some turkeys then also argued that a new vote should be taken. 
    But turkeys, no matter how persuasive their oratory, have never 
    been able to persuade logical thinking eagles or reasonable, 
    intelligent people that a one-vote margin is not credible. If they 
    had, we would be eating eagles on Thanksgiving and those of us who 
    spent so much time and effort in conducting an honest, fair recount 
    might be eating crow today.
        Mr. Speaker, a President of the United States, Andrew Johnson, 
    in 1868 was faced with impeachment by an emotionally charged 
    Congress-similar to the present situation. But a one-vote margin in 
    the Senate found him not guilty of the charges. Certainly if this 
    Congress can retain a President by the slim margin of one vote, 
    this House can seat Mr. McCloskey by the landslide margin of four.
        Mr. Speaker, even more related to the point, a President of the 
    United States was seated by one vote. In the Hayes-Tilden election, 
    Mr. Samuel Tilden--a Democrat--received the majority of the popular 
    votes, a majority of the electoral votes on election night and was 
    announced the winner by every newspaper in the country. But 
    disputes arose in several of the States challenging the electors. A 
    law was passed establishing a 15-member commission to decide the 
    validity of the challenges. Five Members of the Senate; three 
    Republicans and two Democrats were chosen; Five Members of the 
    House, three Democrats and two Republicans; five from the Supreme 
    Court, three Republicans and two Democrats. In a straight party 
    line vote, eight Republicans to seven Democrats, all Republican 
    challenges were upheld. The final count of electoral votes was 185 
    for the Republican, Mr. Hayes, and 184 for the Democrat, Mr. 
    Tilden. If a President of the United States can be seated by the 
    margin of one vote, it's ludicrous to argue that four votes 
    disqualifies Mr. McCloskey from sitting in this Chamber.
        Mr. Speaker, I recommend that Mr. McCloskey be seated so that 
    we can get on with the business of the Nation.
        On the second and third pages of the minority views of the 
    report filed by House Administration concerning McCloskey-McIntyre 
    election, the Republicans have listed in abbreviated fashion the 
    sins they feel have been perpetrated upon them and their candidate 
    by the majority. I would like to take a moment to respond to those 
    charges.
        The first charge is in fact, two assertions. In the interest of 
    understanding I will deal with each assertion separately.
        First, ``the majority refused on January 3, 1985, to seat the 
    duly certified winner of the election, Richard D. McIntyre, 
    charging inconsistencies in the election.''
        On behalf of myself I plead guilty, but offer the following by 
    way of mitigating circumstances: Under Indiana law, the secretary 
    of state is not permitted to reject the return of any county which 
    has come into his hands and which has been duly authenticated by 
    the clerk of the circuit court of that county under seal. Yet, 
    believing tabulation errors to have occurred effecting the outcome 
    of the election, the secretary of state refused to certify Prank 
    McCloskey based on official election night returns which showed Mr. 
    McCloskey to have been the winner by 72 votes. Then, after only a 
    partial recount of the district had been done, without waiting for 
    the correction of other tabulation errors, the secretary of state 
    certified the candidate of his party as the winner at the earliest 
    moment that candidate appeared to have a lead. At later points in 
    the recount, when Mr. McCloskey was again ahead, the secretary of 
    state was either absent and his deputy sick or was enjoined by a 
    Republican judge and therefore unable to certify Mr. McCloskey. By 
    January 3, it was evident that the secretary of state was inclined 
    to certify only one candidate regardless of the facts.
        On January 3, the recount of five counties--Monroe, Orange, 
    Posey, Vanderburgh, and Warrick--had not been completed. These five 
    counties include more than half of the voters who participated in 
    the election. Further, if one cumulatively figures the margin 
    between Mr. McCloskey and Mr. McIntyre and subtracts those counties 
    where the recount was not completed as of January 3, Mr. McCloskey 
    had a 2-vote margin on Mr. McIntyre. Finally, in an election 
    involving over a quarter million voters, where the election night 
    margin has been reported variously at 72, 39, or 34 votes, and the 
    recount has yet to be completed, the better course of wisdom would 
    seem to be to await a definitive recount of the district.
        Second, ``as a result, McIntyre is the only person with an 
    unchallenged certificate of election not seated in the last 50 
    years.''
        This statement is simply factually inaccurate. I would refer my 
    colleagues on the other side of the aisle to the hearing 
    transcripts of the task force and to Roush or Chambers (H. Rept. 
    No. 513, 87th Cong., 1961). As Mr. Roush testified before the task 
    force, the only candidate to receive a certificate of election in 
    that contest was Mr. Chambers. Despite this fact, Mr. Chambers was 
    not sworn in on opening day, nor, as events work out, was he ever 
    sworn in. Finally, to make sure the record is correct, there were 
    no allegations of fraud in that election prior to the House's 
    decision to investigate.
        Third, ``the majority refused on February 7, 1985, to seat the 
    winner of the State of Indiana's recount, McIntyre, charging 
    inconsistencies in the recount.''
        The recount conducted by the State of Indiana treated the 
    ballots of some voters differently than identical ballots cast by 
    other voters. Yes, I would certainly call that an inconsistency.
        Additionally, the recount disenfranchised 4,800 voters on the 
    basis of errors made by election officials, not the voter; and, as 
    indicated earlier, the likelihood of being disenfranchised was as 
    much a matter of geography and race as anything else. Finally, the 
    Indiana recount clearly had a disproportionate impact on black 
    voters, 20 percent of whom were disenfranchised as a result of the 
    recount.
        For any one of these reasons it would have been appropriate for 
    this body to investigate that recount. Given all of these reasons, 
    this body would have seriously failed in its duty had it not 
    discounted the results of that recount.
        Fourth, ``the majority refused to require McCloskey to adhere 
    to the procedures of the Federal Contested Elections Act.''
        In point of fact, the procedures of the House do not 
    necessarily adhere a candidate to the procedures of the Federal 
    Contested Elections Act. The Federal Contested Elections Act is but 
    one way to bring an election contest before the House. If the 
    minority feels it should be the only way, then legislation to 
    accomplish that end should be pursued. While the method utilized in 
    this instance is unusual, it is neither unprecedented nor illegal. 
    Given what has transpired in Indiana, it is also warranted. 
    Finally, in case there may be a misunderstanding, it was not Mr. 
    McCloskey who brought this case to us in this manner. Only a member 
    of this body may bring a case in such a manner and Mr. McCloskey is 
    not yet a member.
        Fifth, ``the majority refused to hold hearings for State 
    officials and the candidates before supplanting the State's laws 
    with custom--made rules of its own--a shocking preliminary 
    indication that the conclusion was predetermined.''
        If the House is indeed bound by State law, it is bound by those 
    laws in their entirety. Not even the minority member of the task 
    force supported that proposition. Had we sought to implement State 
    law we would have disenfranchised thousands of voters.
        A conclusion was predetermined. Going in we were determined to 
    adhere to the principles of democracy and determine the will of the 
    citizens of that district as indicated by their votes. 
    Unfortunately, adherence to democratic principles required the 
    supplanting of State law and frankly, little would have been served 
    by having State officials come before us to explain why voters 
    should be disenfranchised. Further, as the minority made plain at 
    the time, the task force was under instructions to proceed as 
    quickly as due diligence would allow.
        Finally, our rules were indeed custom made. That is, the 
    proposition that errors or mistakes on the part of election 
    officials should not be allow, to disenfranchise voters is fully 
    supported by the precedents of the House as established by both 
    Republican and Democratic majorities.
        Sixth, ``the majority voted to vitiate Indiana election laws 
    after McCloskey lost twice and replaced such laws with rules of its 
    own which have no basis in Indiana law.''
        Since the Eighth District was never recounted in accordance 
    with Indiana law, it is impossible to say whether McCloskey would 
    have lost under that law. For instance, because polling machines in 
    Spencer County were never properly sealed, Indiana law would 
    require that virtually all the votes cast in that county be 
    disallowed. In such circumstance, it is entirely likely that 
    McCloskey would have won the election.
        And more importantly, where strict adherence to the law would 
    require that so many voters be disenfranchised that it is no longer 
    possible to determine what the will of the voter, is, this House 
    has both a moral and constitutional duty to ``vitiate'' that law.
        Seventh, ``the majority insisted on a House recount after 
    McCloskey lost the State election, his Federal court suit demanding 
    certification and the State recount.''
        I do not dispute that Mr. McCloskey lost his Federal court suit 
    demanding certification. As the judge un that case noted, this body 
    is fully able to correct an erroneous certification. Nor do I 
    dispute that Mr. McCloskey lost the Indiana recount, by a margin of 
    one-tenth of the number of voters who were disenfranchised in that 
    recount. I am even willing to stipulate that, based upon a partial 
    recount of the district, Mr. McCloskey did not win. However, as the 
    only fair and uniform recount of that election has proved, it was 
    Mr. McCloskey, not Mr. McIntyre who won the election.
        Eighth, ``the majority suspended its insistence that the House 
    ``count all the votes'' in the name of enfranchising the voters as 
    soon as McCloskey had a lead of four votes. The majority's change 
    in position disenfranchised 32 voters whose unnotarized absentee 
    ballots were identical to those the task force counted a week 
    earlier.''
        I appreciate the minority acknowledging It was not until it 
    became apparent that Mr. McIntyre would lose that anyone ever 
    suggested that those unnotarized absentee ballots retained properly 
    by the county clerks should be counted. To correct the record, 
    though at no point did the majority anticipate or expect to count 
    invalid ballots that were retained by the county clerk. Unnotarized 
    absentee ballots are invalid under Indiana law, they are invalid 
    under House precedent, and they are invalid under the rules of the 
    task force. Nevertheless, because some of these ballots had been 
    counted on election night and were not longer distinguishable from 
    valid ballots it would otherwise have rejected. It should be noted 
    that it was Mr. McIntyre, not Mr. McCloskey, who benefited from 
    this exception. Despite the 11th hour insistence of the minority, 
    the task sought to minimize those instances, not to compound the 
    error.
        Even granting the minority's view that, because invalid ballots 
    have been treated with a degree of security, they may now be 
    considered countable, presumably no one has ever examined those 
    ballots. Unless the minority happens to know otherwise, there may 
    still be other faults with the ballots.
        The record needs to be corrected on another point as well. As 
    the minority member of the task force has himself made clear in the 
    Congressional Record, it was never the intent of the task force to 
    ``count all the votes.'' It was not the task force who 
    disenfranchised those 32 voters. Where the ability to ensure the 
    validity of the ballot lies with the voter, the voter must be held 
    accountable for his actions. It is the voter, not anyone else, who 
    is responsible for the fact that those ballots have not been 
    notarized as required by law. In this case, it is the voter who has 
    disenfranchised himself.
        Mr. Speaker, the House of Representatives is being asked to 
    seat Frank McCloskey as the Representative of the Eighth 
    Congressional District of Indiana. Because of the partisan nature 
    of the dispute, there are a number of questions which each Member 
    of this body must be able to answer with assurance if they are to 
    vote to seat Mr. McCloskey. As a member of the task force which 
    conducted the recount In Indiana, I have, of necessity, become 
    intimately familiar with the issues involved. In my view, Mr. 
    McCloskey should be seated as a Member of this body. I will review 
    for the Members the history of this dispute and my reasons for 
    concluding that it was Mr. McCloskey who was chosen by the greatest 
    number of citizens of the Eighth District of Indiana to be their 
    Representative.

                            makeup of the task force

        Much has been made of the fact that the task force consists of 
    two Democrats and only one Republican. While an evenly divided task 
    force may sound nice as an ideal, it is obviously unworkable as a 
    practical matter. We are elected to Congress to make judgments on 
    the issues before the country, in the case of the task force, we 
    were told to investigate the election in the Eighth Congressional 
    District of Indiana, determine if and how to conduct a recount of 
    that election, and ensure that that recount was conducted. If the 
    task force had an even number of members, evenly divided between 
    the parties, it is very conceivable that on those issues on which 
    the task force divided it would have split evenly. In that 
    circumstances we may still be waiting even to begin the recount. If 
    we are to ensure that the task force is to be able to make those 
    difficult decisions necessary to fulfill its obligations, it is 
    necessary that the task force have an odd number of members. 
    Because the citizens of the county have elected a majority of 
    Democrats to this body, the task force also has a majority of 
    Democrats. To attempt to make an issue of this demonstrates either 
    incredible naivety or, in the worst light, demagoguery.

                              certification issue

        The election returns as originally certified by the county 
    clerks of each of the 15 counties which constitute the Eighth 
    District were as follows: 116,841 for Frank McCloskey and 116,769 
    for Rick McIntyre. Of 233,610 votes cast, Mr. McCloskey was shown 
    to have won by 72 votes. Under Indiana law, the secretary of state 
    is not permitted to reject the return from any county which has 
    come into his hands and which has been duly authenticated by the 
    Clerk of the Circuit Court of that county under seal. Nevertheless, 
    believing tabulations errors to have occurred which would affect 
    the outcome of the race, Indiana's secretary of state declined to 
    certify Mr. McCloskey as the winner of the congressional election 
    in the Eighth District.
        Mr. McIntyre, as permitted by Indiana law and as I would have 
    done, filed to have a recount conducted in various areas of the 
    district of his choosing. Mr. McCloskey consequently cross-
    petitioned to have recounts conducted. After the completion of the 
    recount in only 1 of the 15 counties the secretary of state 
    certified Mr. McIntyre to be the winner by 34 votes.
        There should be no question in anyone's mind that a recount of 
    the results of this election was both appropriate and desirable. 
    Where election night returns show that, in an election in which 
    more than 233,600 voters participated, the difference between the 
    two candidates with the largest numbers of votes is only 72, it is 
    entirely proper that a recount be conducted. Further, prudent 
    observers may wish for the recount to be concluded before saying 
    definitively who won the election.
        If this is true, what then are we to make of the actions of the 
    secretary of state? Without provision in law, he refused to certify 
    the winner based upon election night results because of his concern 
    for tabulation errors. Then, after only one county had been 
    recounted, without waiting for the corrections of other tabulation 
    errors in other counties, he certifies one candidate, who 
    coincidentally is a member of his political party, as the winner, 
    this time by the even closer margin of 34 votes. Given these facts, 
    and given the fact that at the time the outcome of the election in 
    the Eighth District was, indeed, in doubt, the actions of this body 
    of the opening day of the 99th Congress were entirely appropriate.

                                indiana recount

        Now, let us examine the recount conducted by the State of 
    Indiana. In Indiana there is no provision for conducting a single 
    recount according to uniform rules on a district-wide basis. 
    Rather, in each county a recount commission determines its own 
    responsibilities pursuant to instructions from the judge of the 
    circuit court in that county. Each judge is elected in a partisan 
    political campaign. As we have witnessed, the consequence in this 
    case was that 15 different bodies developed 15 different sets of 
    criteria for determining the validity of ballots. In one county, 
    Posey, the recount commission was instructed by the judge to only 
    recount the votes. As a result, that commission did not examine 
    ballots to see if they met the requirements of Indiana law, but 
    limited itself to the correction of election night tabulation 
    errors.
        In another county, Vanderburgh, the recount commission was 
    instructed to recount the votes pursuant to Indiana law. That 
    commission determined for itself what the requirements of Indiana 
    law were, based upon interpretations of that law by the Indiana 
    Supreme Court. In Vanderburgh County over 3,000 ballots were 
    disallowed because of errors and omissions committed not by the 
    voter, but by election officials of the State of Indiana. Three 
    thousand votes were disallowed in Vanderburgh County, but had those 
    voters lived in Posey County, their votes would have been counted.
        Indiana law allows the candidate requesting the recount to 
    choose those precincts he wishes recounted without substantiating 
    the need for the recount. In the Eighth District, black voters are 
    heavily concentrated in Vanderburgh County. Not surprisingly, Mr. 
    McIntyre requested recounts in those precincts in which minority 
    voters were concentrated. As a result, 20 percent of the black 
    voters of the entire district were disenfranchised in the recount. 
    Further, despite the fact that both candidates had requested 
    recounts in parts of Vanderburgh, other parts of that county, where 
    neither candidate requested a recount, were never recounted by the 
    State of Indiana. Though probably unintended, Indiana law governing 
    recounts may result in subjecting blacks to stricter voting 
    standards than other voters and disproportionately impacting them 
    as a result. Clearly, this was the consequence in the Eighth 
    District of Indiana.
        The recount conducted by the State of Indiana treated the 
    ballots of some voters differently in identical ballots of other 
    voters within the district. The result was the disenfranchisement 
    of 4,800 voters. Errors and negligence on the part of election 
    officials were the major causes of voter disenfranchisement. This 
    process disproportionately impacted the minority population of the 
    Eighth District of Indiana. For any one of these reasons, it would 
    have been appropriate for the body to look into that recount. Given 
    all of these reasons, this body would have seriously failed in its 
    duty had it not discounted the results of that recount and 
    determined to conduct its own recount. Finally, there should be no 
    question as to the authority of this body to conduct a recount. 
    That authority is found in the Constitution, itself, in article I, 
    section 5.

                         house not bound by indiana law

        Having reviewed why it was necessary for us to conduct a 
    recount, I will review the manner in which our recount was 
    conducted. Let me say at the outset that no member of the task 
    force ever suggested that the recount be conducted strictly 
    according to Indiana law. State law either controls or it does not. 
    If the House felt itself bound by those laws, we are bound by them 
    in their entirety. If the House has the authority to pick and 
    choose among those aspects of the law it approves of, there is no 
    ``States right'' issue because clearly the House has chosen not to 
    be bound by that law. Assuming Indiana law to be sacrosanct, we 
    would have been bound by the language of those statutes as 
    interpreted by the Supreme Court of Indiana. One of the county 
    recount commissions felt itself so bound and as a result 
    disenfranchised 3,000 voters. Had we applied similar standards, 
    thousands of additional voters would also have been 
    disenfranchised. Such a consequence was unacceptable to the members 
    of the task force and would have been unacceptable to this body. 
    Finally, the constitutional authority of this House to judge for 
    itself the elections of its Members clearly takes precedence over 
    State law.

                 ballots lacking initials and precinct numbers

        Being forced to rely upon the precedents of the House and those 
    aspects of Indiana law which commended themselves to us, there was 
    still remarkable unanimity in determining the rules by which votes 
    would be determined to be valid. In developing the counting rules 
    there was only one issue of disagreement, whether to count those 
    nonabsentee paper and punchcard ballots that lacked poll clerks' 
    initials and precinct numbers. When the voter entered the polling 
    area he was to be presented a ballot on the back of which were to 
    be written by the poll clerks the precinct number or designation 
    and the initials of each poll clerk. In addition, the poll clerks 
    were to inform the voter to look for the initials and warn the 
    voter that the ballot would not be counted if both sets of initials 
    were not present. One member of the task force argued that it was 
    essential to ballot security that at least one set of initials or 
    the precinct number appear on the ballot.
        First, since the same individuals are responsible for ensuring 
    that both the initials and the precinct number are on the ballot 
    and are also responsible for asking the voter to check for them, it 
    is likely that all three requirements would not be met in the event 
    poll clerks were ignorant of or negligent in their duties. Those 
    requirements do not act as a check on each other. Second, a ballot 
    with only one set of initials and without those of the poll clerk 
    of the opposite party would on its face seem no more secure than a 
    ballot without any initials. Third, poll clerk Initials are but one 
    method of ensuring ballot security. In Indiana, ballots are cast in 
    the presence of two poll clerks representing the two major parties, 
    an election inspector, an election judge, and observers from the 
    political parties. To stuff the ballot box requires not only the 
    possession of the ballots and the secrecy envelopes but the 
    complicity of all the aforementioned individuals. Such a conspiracy 
    would be very difficult to conceal completely and, despite the 
    extreme, partisan emotions this election has raised, there have 
    been no allegations of fraud. Finally, investigation revealed that 
    in many cases poll clerks did not receive instructions before the 
    election and either through Ignorance or negligence ignored the 
    initialing requirement.
        Based upon these facts, the task force by a 2-to-1 margin voted 
    to count otherwise valid nonabsentee punchcard and paper ballots 
    lacking poll clerk initials. The task force also voted to count 
    otherwise valid ballots lacking precinct numbers. The reasoning 
    behind this decision was that in the absence of allegations of 
    fraud or irregularity the enfranchisement of the voter would not be 
    forfeited due to the failure of an election official to fulfill his 
    responsibilities under Indiana law. This decision conforms with the 
    precedents of the House as established by both Republican and 
    Democratic majorities and, in my view, gives proper weight to the 
    right of the voter to have his vote counted.

                  task force never decided to count all votes

        The task force did not conclude that it would count all the 
    ballots. In fact, the task force voted not to count ballots which 
    were mutilated, on which there was an overvote in the congressional 
    race, or on which the voter had placed a distinguishing mark. 
    Finally, all of the task force's counting rules providing 
    exceptions to Indiana law are conditioned by the phrase ``an 
    otherwise valid ballot.'' My own position regarding this issue has 
    been very clear. I feel strongly and have stated that where the 
    intention of the voter is not in doubt, and the honesty of that 
    intention is not in question, the failure of election officials to 
    fulfill their obligations should not be allowed to disenfranchise a 
    voter who has met all of his obligations. If the intent of the 
    voter is not clear, if there is good reason to suspect fraud, or if 
    the voter has failed to fulfill his obligations under law, then we 
    are obligated to apply a stricter standard to that ballot than 
    would otherwise have been the case.

                    actual counting of votes above reproach

        The recount itself was conducted by GAO auditors under the 
    supervision of James H. Shumway, the Arizona State elections 
    officer. Mr. Shumway was recommended by the Republicans and 
    concurred in by the Democrats. The entire recount was conducted in 
    the presence of staff from both sides of the aisles, 
    representatives from each candidate, the press, and the public. I 
    do not believe it is possible to conduct a more open recount. I 
    have heard nothing but praise for the GAO auditors and for Mr. 
    Shumway. It is very definitely my view that the job they did was 
    truly exceptional and beyond reproach.

                          unnotarized absentee ballots

        In Indiana there are three classes of absentee ballots. There 
    are military absentees, absentee ballots delivered to confined 
    voters by election officials, and what I will call regular absentee 
    ballots issued to nonmilitary, unconfirmed, registered voters who 
    will be unable to be present at the polls on election day.
        Under Indiana law those absentee ballots delivered by election 
    officials to those who are confined are witnessed by two election 
    officials after they are voted. In the event the ballot has been 
    improperly witnessed, that is the initials of two election 
    officials are not on the ballot envelope, then the ballot is deemed 
    invalid and not counted. When the ballot is returned to the county 
    clerk the ballot envelope is checked to ensure it is properly 
    witnessed. If so the ballot is forwarded to the precinct on 
    election day, removed from the ballot envelope, and counted with 
    all the other valid ballots. If the ballot has been improperly 
    witnessed it is retained by the county clerk, not sent to the 
    precinct, and is never counted.
        During the course of the recount several improperly initialed, 
    confined absentee ballot envelopes were found at the precinct 
    level, indicating that invalid, confined absentee ballots had been 
    counted on election night. Since it is impossible to distinguish 
    those ballots from other ballots and therefore impossible to know 
    which candidate received those votes no adjustment was made to the 
    vote totals.
        In addition, two confined absentee ballot envelopes containing 
    ballots (that is ballots that had never been counted) were found in 
    two precincts. It was determined that these envelopes would be 
    opened and the ballots counted. There are two underlying reasons 
    for this decision. First, the ballots had been sent to the 
    precincts and therefore, with the exception of not having been 
    counted, had been treated in a fashion identical to other valid 
    ballots. Second, each ballot was defective because the envelope 
    contained only one set of initials instead of two. Pursuant to the 
    view that failures of election officials should not disenfranchise 
    voters where the intent of the voter is clear and not questioned, I 
    felt these ballots should be counted. However, since our counting 
    rules provided only for counting ``otherwise valid ballots'' there 
    was a rationale for not counting those ballots. Both ballots were 
    counted for Rick McIntyre.
        Besides the confined absentee envelopes that were found to have 
    been incorrectly sent to the precincts, opened unnotarized regular 
    absentee ballot envelopes were also found at the precincts. Under 
    Indiana law, after indicating his preferences on a regular absentee 
    ballot the voter is required to obtain notarization of the ballot 
    envelope to help insure that the person who applied to vote 
    absentee is also the person who voted. When the ballot is returned 
    to the county clerk the ballot envelope is checked for 
    notarization. If the envelope has been notarized it is sent to the 
    precinct where the voter is registered on election day and it is 
    counted with all other valid ballots. If the ballot envelope has 
    not been notarized the ballot is to be retained by the county 
    clerk, never forwarded to the precincts, and never counted. The 
    presence of the opened unnotarized ballot envelopes indicated that 
    regular absentee ballots, which should not have been counted, had 
    been counted on election night. However, since it was impossible to 
    distinguish those ballots from legitimate ballots and therefore 
    impossible to know who those ballots were counted for, no 
    adjustment was made to the vote totals.
        Besides finding opened unnotarized absentee envelopes at the 
    precincts, nine unopened, unnotarized absentee ballot envelopes and 
    one opened but uncounted, unnotarized ballot envelope were found. 
    It was argued by one member of the task force that, since we had 
    counted improperly witnessed confined absentee ballots, we should 
    also count unnotarized regular absentee ballots. My view was that 
    we should not count those ballots. Whereas an improperly witnessed 
    ballot is due to failure on the part of election officials, it is 
    the responsibility of the voter to ensure that regular absentee 
    ballots are notarized. In my view it is entirely appropriate to 
    apply a stricter standard where the action of the voter has placed 
    the ballot in question than where the action of a second party has 
    jeopardized the ballot. Where the ability to ensure the ballot 
    would be valid lies wholly with the voter, the voter should be held 
    accountable for his actions. Those illegal ballots counted on 
    election night should never have been counted in the first 
    instance. I did not feel we should compound that error by counting 
    additional ballots of this kind. In addition, our counting rules 
    only provided for counting otherwise valid ballots.
        On this issue I was overruled. It was evident that other 
    unnotarized absentee ballots sent to the precincts had been 
    counted. While the unnotarized, unopened absentee ballots had not 
    been counted, they had in every other way been treated in an 
    identical fashion to other valid ballots. It was decided by a 
    majority of the task force that the 10 uncounted, unnotarized 
    absentee ballots that had been found at the precincts would be 
    counted. As a result of counting those ballots Rick McIntyre 
    received six votes, Frank McCloskey received three votes and one 
    was a ``no'' vote.
        It was then proposed that we count unnotarized absentee ballots 
    that had been retained by the county clerks. Having been against 
    counting the uncounted, unnotarized absentee ballots found at the 
    precincts, I opposed counting those unnotarized absentee ballots 
    retained by the county clerks. These ballots had never been counted 
    before, either on election night or during the recount. No one had 
    previously contended that these ballots should be counted. While I 
    do not feel that mistakes made by an election official should 
    disenfranchise the voter, mistakes made by the voter are another 
    matter. It was unfortunate that any unnotarized absentee ballots 
    had been counted. To count more of them merely compounded the 
    problem. Finally, and most importantly, never having been sent to 
    the precincts, these ballots had not been treated in a fashion 
    similar to other valid ballots. They most certainly were not 
    subjected to the same ballot security. On that basis, it was 
    decided by a 2-to-1 margin that unnotarized absentee ballots 
    retained by the county clerks would not be counted.

                                military ballots

        At the last task force hearing held in Indiana it was proposed 
    that those absentee military ballots that had been received after 
    election day should be counted. The subject had not been raised 
    before. By a 2-to-1-margin the task force voted not to count those 
    ballots. While the debate for counting these ballots was not very 
    extensive, the argument for counting them rested on the premise 
    that through no fault of their own, military personnel stationed 
    overseas could have their ballots unduly delayed in the mails and 
    thereby be disenfranchised. If this is true it is even more true of 
    other Americans abroad as they must rely upon foreign mail systems 
    as their point of entry into our mail system. No one, however, has 
    suggested that an exception be made for these ballots. All absentee 
    voters are informed that ballots that have not been received in 
    time to transfer the ballot to the precinct on election day will 
    not be counted. When one registers to vote absentee one assumes the 
    obligation of ensuring that one's ballot is mailed early enough to 
    ensure it arrives in time to be counted. Elections must have a 
    conclusion. It would be unreasonable for an elected official to 
    have to give up an office because 4 months later three more 
    military ballots finally come in which change the outcome of the 
    election. For these reasons I voted to not count absentee military 
    ballots received after election day.

                                 reconciliation

        As a part of their duty of counting the votes the GAO auditors 
    were asked to track and compare the number of voters who signed the 
    poll books with the number of votes registered in the precinct. 
    Where these numbers did not agree, Mr. Shumway, the recount 
    supervisor, was asked to try to ascertain why this was the case. In 
    a perfect world the number of voters registered as having voted 
    would correspond exactly with the number of votes counted. In some 
    precincts in the Eighth District this actually occurred. However, 
    this is not a perfect world. In some precincts the number of voters 
    registered as having voted was greater than the number of votes 
    that were registered. This can be explained by the fact that not 
    every voter voted in every race. In rare cases a voter may have 
    signed the poll books, received a ballot, and then, deciding not to 
    vote, walked off with the ballot. In any case, I know of no methods 
    for adding votes to a total where one can find no evidence of the 
    actual vote ever having been cast.
        In other precincts there were more votes counted than the 
    number of voters registered as having voted. In fact, in a total of 
    50 precincts there was a total of 103 more votes than voters 
    registered as having voted. Thirty-three of those precincts were 
    off by one vote, nine precincts were off by only two votes, and two 
    precincts were off by only three votes. In other words, in 44 
    precincts there was a discrepancy of three votes or less. While 
    there are many possible explanations for such discrepancies, by far 
    the most likely is human error. In two precincts there was a 
    discrepancy of four votes. Again, I think the error is very 
    probably the result of less than divine diligence on the part of 
    the poll clerks.
        However, I would note that Mr. McIntyre carried both precincts 
    by margins of 55 and 56 percent. In one precinct there was a 
    discrepancy of five votes. Mr. McIntyre won 59 percent of the votes 
    in that precinct. In another precinct the discrepancy is six votes. 
    Mr. McIntyre also won that precinct by 59 percent. In two other 
    precincts, both in Spencer County, there were discrepancies of 12 
    and 15 votes. In these precincts it may be possible that the voting 
    machines malfunctioned. If that is the case, it is impossible to 
    know who those votes were counted for. It is known that Mr. 
    McIntyre carried both of those precincts by margins of 60 and 56 
    percent, respectively. One can imagine the cries of injustice if we 
    had sought to proportionately reduce the vote in those precincts. 
    Seventy percent of the overvotes occurred in precincts carried by 
    Mr. McIntyre.
        We did not disallow votes based on discrepancies between votes 
    cast and voters registered as having voted. This is an imperfect 
    world and in every election of this size these kinds of errors will 
    occur. By far the most probable explanation for these discrepancies 
    is carelessness on the part of poll workers. Some voters apparently 
    were given ballots without signing the poll book. I do not believe 
    that such discrepancies discredit the vote totals. However, had we 
    sought to adjust the vote totals on the basis of these 
    discrepancies Mr. McCloskey would have a larger margin of victory 
    than we, in fact, reported.

                                 seat mccloskey

        Mr. Speaker, your task force has conducted its recount in the 
    open and on the record. Based upon that record, I do not believe 
    that it can be said that the rules we adopted sought to provide 
    undue advantage to either candidate. For myself, while I do not 
    pretend to be disappointed by the results of the recount, my 
    decisions on the issues which arose during the course of the 
    recount were not motivated by a desire to reach that end. My single 
    guiding principle was to ascertain as accurately as possible the 
    will of the citizens of the Eighth Congressional District of 
    Indiana as expressed by their votes. In my opinion the task force 
    has achieved that end.
        There are those who from the beginning have indicated they 
    would not accept any decision that did not result in the seating of 
    their candidate. These individuals have largely ignored factual 
    issues surrounding this election. Instead they have contented 
    themselves with dogmatic assertions and bald-faced accusations that 
    the election was being stolen. I believe that if the College of 
    Cardinals had conducted the recount and found for someone not to 
    their liking, they would accuse God of stealing the election. 
    Partisan politics taken to such extremes serves neither Mr. 
    McIntyre nor Mr. McCloskey, the Republican Party nor the Democratic 
    Party, this body nor the country. If there is to be dispute, let it 
    be based on the facts.
        A close election night result is a good reason to conduct a 
    recount. A close result in a recount is not justification for a new 
    election. Our recount rules were reasonable and were applied 
    uniformly. Mr. McCloskey won this election by four votes. In my 
    opinion, Mr. McCloskey deserves to be seated.
        Mr. SHARP. Mr. Speaker, the problem arises of course, because 
    we have one of the closest elections n the history of this country, 
    but it is also no coincidence that the last major election dispute 
    in this country arose in Indiana in 1960.
        The reason for that is because, unfortunately, in my State, we 
    have a very arcane and archaic election law, as virtually everyone 
    who has observed this election independently, and without a 
    partisan eye, has come to the conclusion.
        Editorial writers in my own district and throughout the State 
    in the past have called for election reform and they are calling 
    for it with renewed intensity.
        Indeed, a Republican newspaper in my own district not only on 
    April 26 called for the seating of Frank McCloskey, the Democrat, 
    it also called on April 30, using the words Congressman Tom Foley 
    here, for dramatic election reform in the State of Indiana.
        Mr. Speaker, the House sent to Indiana a task force which 
    operated in the open, through great difficulty to all three members 
    of the task force. They went to Indiana to make sure ballots were 
    opened, counted, discussed in front of the public and the news 
    media of that State, and I appreciate that effort that they made.
        I think that independent observers in Indiana and outside of 
    Indiana know that an honest and an honorable job was done in what 
    was an extremely difficult situation. Basically, the principle 
    followed was that they sought to count every ballot that was at the 
    polling place on election night last fall. So long as they could 
    consider the intent of that ballot, they counted it. And the only 
    ballots that are in question and being raised here that were not 
    counted were those that ever reached the polling places on election 
    night in Indiana because they were illegal from the outset and they 
    are illegal now, and everyone basically knows that who is willing 
    to examine the facts.
        My colleague from Indiana [Mr. Jacobs] raised the question: But 
    weren't 10 ballots that went to the polling places that were not 
    counted on election night in Indiana but subsequently counted 
    because of the task force, weren't they illegal and wasn't that an 
    error?
        I think possibly that was an error to have counted those in. 
    But, again, we all know the outcome that those 10 ballots had. 
    Those 10 ballots, if counted in error, inured to the benefit of Mr. 
    McIntyre, not Mr. McCloskey.
        Had they been excluded, had that error that some of us believe 
    was made not been made, Mr. McCloskey's return in the end would not 
    have been just four votes, it would have been seven votes.
        So if you believe that an error was made, then you can feel 
    more comfortable with the outcome that this task force engaged in, 
    because the return was actually higher than four votes.
        Let us proceed to a conclusion and let Indiana fight this out 
    in the next election.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
    distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. Barton].
        Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, we began on January 3 by 
    refusing to seat the certified winner in the Indiana Eighth 
    Congressional District election race. Instead, we decided to 
    appoint a task force to investigate that election because the 
    original election was neither timely nor regular and there were 
    serious doubts about its fairness. Since that time we have been 
    engaged in a debate, in some semblance of a procedure to determine 
    the true outcome in the Eighth Congressional District race. The 
    task force that was appointed, instead of investigating the 
    original election, decided to hold its own recount. The guiding 
    principle of that task force, as it was enunciated at the time, was 
    to count all the ballots. Now, when they said ``Count all the 
    ballots,'' that is a little bit different than counting the ballots 
    that were counted in either the recount or the original election 
    results; in other words, count every ballot. In doing that, it 
    resulted in 345 ballots being counted that had never been counted 
    before. By definition, under Indiana election law, those were 
    illegal ballots. They had not been counted on election day, they 
    had not been counted in the State-certified recount. But 345 
    ballots were counted, 345 additional ballots were counted by the 
    task force.
        Now, of those 345 ballots, all but 78 of them were counted by 
    the GAO auditors, but 78 had to be counted by Mr. Panetta, Mr. 
    Clay, and Mr. Thomas, of those 78, 54 were agreed upon by the 3 
    members of the task force, but 19 Mr. Thomas refused to vote on and 
    they were determined by Mr. Panetta and Mr. Clay.
        Now, we have got an election outcome of four votes. There are 
    345 additional, 78 determined by the task force, of which at least 
    19 were determined on a straight party line vote. I ask the 
    question: Is this the result that can be considered reasonable and 
    fair? I think not. I think we should vote not to seat Mr. McCloskey 
    and let the people of Indiana determine who the true winner is.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the 
    distinguished gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Roberts], a member of the 
    Committee on House Administration.
        Mr. [Charles] ROBERTS [of Kansas]. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to 
    speak not about the issue at hand; that is already a foregone 
    conclusion; you have won the Eighth District of Indiana. Rather, I 
    wish to share with my colleagues a keen sadness I feel regarding 
    the effect of this business upon this House as an institution--more 
    important, what we want it to be both as individual Members and as 
    Democrat and Republican partisans.
        We all ran through partisan gauntlets of sorts to gain the 
    privilege of being here. You cannot find a more Republican Member 
    than this one from the standpoint of personal heritage and 
    commitment.
        Yet the special fabric that binds this institution in purpose 
    and achievement is bipartisan. I am the first to admit that no 
    political party has an exclusive patent on common sense or can lay 
    claim to what is right. And, personally, I try very hard to work 
    with my good Democrat friends. We on the Agriculture Committee are 
    bound together with a special kind of commitment in behalf of our 
    farmers and ranchers. That's just the way it is in farm country. To 
    be sure we have our differences, but for the most part we work 
    together and try on the other fellow's boots--they pinch but we get 
    the foot to fit.
        So, I try to be the best Member I know how to be--tempered by 
    18 years as a staff member and Member of this body. That, I say to 
    my friends in the majority, is the rub. Part of what we are is what 
    you allow us to be. And you folks have had us on short rein this 
    session.
        Each time around the track we get nicked--a piece of flesh on 
    committee assignments, on funding, on what legislation is 
    considered, and how, and when, and who gets the credit--or blame.
        But I knew that when I climbed into the ring. As a Member of 
    the minority in this House, I am accustomed to being treated 
    unfairly by some of you in the majority. That's part of the 
    penance. The other half of that is that others in the majority do 
    allow me the privilege of being a full partner in my duties--so the 
    privilege is worth the penance.
        But I know this: On this issue you have torn that special 
    fabric that holds us together as a House of Representatives. Let me 
    make it clear I do not point the finger of blame or place the 
    charge of conspiracy at the doorstep of Mr. Panetta and Mr. Clay. I 
    stood yesterday and applauded when the majority leader said Leon 
    Panetta was a man of integrity. He is you in the leadership put him 
    in that box. And when the command is column left and you are the 
    lieutenant, you march--as best you can.
        We ought to stand today, Mr. Speaker, and give the same due 
    credit to my friend and colleague, Mr. Thomas, whose aggressive 
    defense of what we think is right, and factual, and correct was 
    both fair and tough. It is one thing to climb between the ropes and 
    do battle against great odds but yet another to suffer the 
    subsequent agony of defeat when you enter into the fray knowing the 
    fight has been fixed.
        What we are talking about is the kind of majority rule that has 
    led to resentment, frustration, anger, and retirement. We will lose 
    good Members because of this issue.
        But, never mind--on to business as usual. After all, what 
    alternative do we have. This next vote is a fait accomplished; just 
    a little formal salt in the wound. What am I to do as an individual 
    Member? Disrupt the House? Abdicate my responsibilities to my 
    people? No; I will continue to work with my Democrat friends. After 
    all, it was just moments after the vote yesterday and after 
    personally watching the press conference by Rick McIntyre that one 
    of my Democrat colleagues, with a big smile on his face, said: 
    ``When are you guys going to get us a farm bill?'' I guess I am a 
    ``you guys'' Member. One of the back--rail troops, a committee 
    person if you will, not a floor expert in virtually every policy 
    area according to the Republican or Democrat holy grail.
        But I can tell you this. This wound will not heal without a 
    terrible price and a scar that will be with this House for many 
    years. It would appear, Mr. Speaker, there are two kinds of Members 
    within your majority. We have those who listen and work with the 
    minority and those who do not believe we are full--fledged partners 
    in this House. In baseball terms, they are the ones who call for 
    their pitcher to stick it in the batter's ear. The unmitigated gall 
    occurs when once you make us hit the dirt, you take offense when we 
    come up swinging.
        Yesterday I stood to underscore my belief that Leon Panetta is 
    an honorable man, only to be lectured by the majority leader that 
    somehow my additional expression of frustration, and anger, and 
    outrage was beneath the dignity of this body. I say this to the 
    majority leader--you folks dish it out daily, but you sure can't 
    take it. Oh, I know the majority leader and those that make up the 
    cabal that is responsible for this whole business will respond that 
    we shouldn't feel that way. They have argued their version of the 
    facts. But regardless of that attitude, we feel this case was 
    handled unfairly for the reasons so eloquently stated in the House 
    debate.
        And, it is that sense of unfairness that will live long after 
    this dispute is over. Yes; Mr. Speaker, I will take off my ``Thou 
    shall not steal'' button. A slogan too harsh? I think not. I am 
    going back to work.
        But for me and for my colleagues, this House is not the same. 
    The collective sense of unfairness symbolized by this button 
    remains in our hearts.
        The sad, sad thing is that we did not have to go down this 
    road.
        Mr. [Robert] MICHEL [of Illinois]. Mr. Speaker, yesterday, my 
    good friend, the distinguished majority leader, gave one of his 
    eloquent and articulate speeches on this controversial topic.
        While I admire his gift of oratory, I must say I disagree with 
    much of his emphasis.
        He devoted a great deal of his remarks to real or alleged 
    breaches of House etiquette on the part of certain Members of the 
    minority.
        This is what is known as blaming the victim.
        The issue here is not whether Members on our side have lost 
    their temper. It is whether Rick McIntyre has lost his seat.
        The issue isn't whether during heated debate Members on both 
    sides have said things that Miss Manners would blush at hearing. 
    The issue is that Republicans and concerned Democrats feel, in the 
    words of a Democrat, that this race is tainted and has a cloud over 
    it.
        So let's not play the old game of blame the victim. If there is 
    any indignation on our side, it arises from a universal sense of 
    frustration, anger, and yes, bitterness over the way this has been 
    handled by the majority from beginning to end.
        The distinguished majority leader also said that the Republican 
    leadership, in a meeting in the Speaker's office, said we wouldn't 
    be asking for a reelection if McIntyre had won by four votes.
        Yes, if Rick had won by four votes or one vote, we wouldn't be 
    asking for a rerun and we'd do the same with McCloskey--if we 
    thought the vote count was fair.
        But we don't think it was fair. That's the central point of the 
    controversy.
        So it is not accurate to come here and tell people we wouldn't 
    call for a rerun if McIntyre had won by four votes.
        If the evidence showed--that he won by the device of having 
    cast aside legitimate ballots, I would give the other side a fair 
    shot at it with a rerun.
        There is one ironic aspect to all this and I have to comment on 
    it.
        Mr. Speaker, I mentioned yesterday that the issue here was not 
    one seat in Congress. It was one of fairness. It remains one of 
    fairness.
        It is also an issue that strikes at the heart of the balance 
    between those powers given to the States and those given to the 
    Federal Government. The balance has been tipped--in the wrong 
    direction.
        It is an issue of representative government and the difference 
    between democratic and autocratic rule in this House. We are 
    fighting for the rights of the minority and millions of Americans 
    whose rights have been entrusted to us. That is why this fight will 
    go on. That is why this cause will not die. That is why we will not 
    return to business as usual. The Rick McIntyre issue is more than 
    an election. It is unfair rules, unfair ratios, unfair staffing, 
    excessive spending and a hundred other abuses of this House and our 
    democratic processes.
        The majority leadership seems incapable of understanding--the 
    deep feelings on this side. We are not angry because we lost.
        We are angry because of the way we lost. We are not sore 
    losers.
        Yes, we are sore. But we are sore winners. We won this thing 
    and it's been taken away.
        The distinguished majority leader said that his side is not so 
    hard up that they would deprive Republicans of an extra seat by 
    devious means.
        I say to the majority leader--we are not so hard up that we 
    will take any bone you choose to throw us.
        We can't take this thing lying down, nor can we surrender 
    because we've just begun to fight.
        Mr. [William] GOODLING [of Pennsylvania]. Mr. Speaker, we know 
    the facts, January 3, 1985, the Democrats in the House of 
    Representatives exercised their power of majority and refused to 
    sit a duly authorized winner of the race for Congress in Indiana's 
    Eighth District. We now know that the creation of a task force to 
    decide the winner was another exercise of their majority party 
    status, the task force reversed the nearly quarter--million voters 
    decision in Indiana and declared Democrat, Frank McCloskey the 
    winner.
        Since Mr. McCloskey does not appear to be embarrassed to win in 
    this manner and speak out against such political maneuvering, the 
    fight for the rights of these voters must continue. If we do not 
    stand firm at this point, the Democrats sensing the public mood 
    toward the Republican Party will surely turn around many more seats 
    after the election in 1986.
        It is a shame that this power play is not looked at by the 
    media, who are always seeking to fight for right, seem to be 
    unaware of the corrupt methods being used to determine the winner 
    of this election. Is that indicative of their distinctive bias?
        I also find it puzzling as to why the more junior members of 
    the Democrat Party, who obviously understand the dangerous road 
    being taken by the Speaker and other leaders of their party, do not 
    stand up against what they know to be wrong. They have come here in 
    all probability to represent a newer attitude within the voters of 
    America, and they are hiding behind the party demagogy with fear. 
    In the long run, the people will vindicate the winner, Mr. Rick 
    McIntyre, but what the Democrats are doing to the Constitution of 
    the United States cannot be vindicated, excused, or condoned. I 
    believe the people will seek more honest Representatives in the 
    future. If Mr. McCloskey accepts the, title Representative of the 
    Eighth District of Indiana he does so without honor.
        Mr. [Norman] SHUMWAY [of California]. Mr. Speaker, I am 
    vehemently opposed to this resolution, just as I have been opposed 
    to and appalled by the outrageous circumstances which have led up 
    to it. By its actions, the House has abrogated the States rights of 
    Indiana; it has trampled the voters' right in Indiana's Eighth 
    District, and, today, it is literally stealing a congressional seat 
    away from the duly elected choice of the people. Worst of all, we 
    are establishing a dangerous precedent--what is to prevent the 
    majority party in the House from stepping in and seizing every 
    close race in the future?
        It is true that the race between Messrs. McIntyre and McCloskey 
    last November was a close one--but it is also true that McCloskey 
    lost. He was not the individual certified by the Indiana secretary 
    of state as the winner of the election. The House majority chose to 
    ignore that validation, a slap in the face to Indiana. It chose to 
    allow Mr. McCloskey to claim a congressional seat without using the 
    avenues of recourse available to him within his State. It chose to 
    leave the people of Indiana's Eighth District without 
    representation for months, and it chose to ignore two separate vote 
    counts, both of which made it clear that McIntyre had won.
        We do not tolerate this type of election charade when it takes 
    place in emerging nations, nor should we. For us to sit by and 
    allow an election to be manipulated by our own membership is a 
    travesty. If the House majority leadership is to be permitted to 
    wield this arrogant and unresponsive abuse of power, what is the 
    point of having elections at all?
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield my remaining time to myself.
        Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. 
    Pashayan].
        Mr. [Charles] PASHAYAN [of California]. Mr. Speaker, what the 
    task force did in Indiana stabs the very heart of the Constitution. 
    Article I, section 2, says: ``The House of Representatives shall be 
    composed of Members chosen * * * by the People * * * and the 
    Electors of each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for 
    Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature,'' 
    and in article I, section 4, the Constitution says, ``The Times, 
    Places and Manner of holding Elections for * * * Representatives, 
    shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof * * 
    *,'' unless Congress shall by law regulate elections.
        When the task force refused to count 32 absentee ballots that 
    were the same as other absentee ballots which they did count, it 
    acted in a manner repugnant and obnoxious to article I. It 
    certainly acted contrary to what the Supreme Court in a whole 
    series of cases has held, of which there is perhaps no more a clear 
    and brilliant articulation by the Court than its pronouncement in 
    1941 in U.S. versus Classic:

  Obviously included within the right to choose, secured by the 
Constitution, is the right of qualified voters within a state to cast their 
ballots and have them counted at congressional elections. This court has 
consistently held that this is a right secured by the Constitution * * *. 
And since the constitutional command is without restriction or limitation 
the right * * * is secured against the action of individuals as well as of 
states.

        The task force acted under its own rules, not under Federal law 
    passed under article I, section 4. What is worse, they applied 
    their own rules inconsistently. In the task force's counting rules, 
    No. 9, the task force provides that it will count ballots that * * 
    * a may not have been properly sealed election night.'' Likewise, 
    rule 21 provides for the counting of ballots that ``* * * may have 
    been improperly sealed election night.'' In other words, rules 9 
    and 21 contemplate counting votes that were not necessarily 
    perfectly secured.
        Why then, but for latent political reasons, did the majority of 
    the task force refuse to count 32 absentee ballots that 4 Indiana 
    county clerks swore under perjury had been secured? There is no 
    consistency in the proceedings of a task force whose written rule 
    proclaims counting unsecured ballots and whose later ad hoc rule 
    proclaims not counting secured ballots.
        Even worse, there is every likelihood that the task force acted 
    in violation of the tenets of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 
    Perhaps section 11(a) of the act meant to echo the lofty 
    articulation of Classic in providing: ``No person acting under 
    color of law shall fail or refuse to permit any person to vote who 
    * * * is * * * qualified to vote, or willfully fail to refuse to 
    tabulate, count and report such person's vote.'' I find a cruel 
    irony indeed that the majority of the task force composed of the 
    majority party of this Chamber refused to follow the dictates and 
    spirit of the law that its party fought so hard for so many years 
    to realize. I find it a cruel irony that the very party that was 
    responsible for passing this legislation is responsible for 
    violating its most precious tenants: that of denying the right to 
    vote of people equally situated as the same class of voters.
        I wonder how grievously disappointed that the people in America 
    whom the Voting Rights Act was designed to protect will be when 
    they shall come to understand that it was members of the Democratic 
    Party who violated the very tenet of the Voting Rights Act: ``Equal 
    people, equal votes.''
        Article I, section 5, says, ``Each House shall be the judge of 
    the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members * * 
    *,'' but is the power absolute? In Powell versus MacCormack, the 
    case of Adam Clayton Powell, the Supreme Court in 1969 said that 
    the House's power to be the judge the qualification of its Members 
    was not absolute but rather qualified by other provisions of the 
    Constitution, and I agree. I think it unconstitutional for a 
    committee or for even the House itself sitting as a judge of the 
    election not to be bound by other provisions of the Constitution. 
    Should the House have the power to judge elections unchecked by the 
    broad principles incorporated in the due process clause, the equal 
    protection clause, the privileges and immunities clause, and 
    especially article I, section 2, of the Constitution? Should the 
    House have the power to ignore these great constitutional 
    principles? The Democratic Party claims it does, and so it claims 
    an absolutist doctrine: that the ultimate power to elect the 
    Members of the House lies not in the people, but in the majority 
    party's caucus.
        As a constitutional doctrine, the Democratic Party's claim 
    would absolutely permit the majority party, on January 3, 1987, 
    absolutely to determine the results of any House election. It would 
    absolutely permit them to refuse to accept the certification of the 
    secretary of state of any State, to order another task force to 
    recount the ballots, to have the task force issue written rules, 
    within the proceedings to have the task force issue ad hoc rules 
    inconsistent with the written, and then to unseat a properly 
    elected Member of the minority party by recounting only arbitrarily 
    selected ballots. Surely our Constitution cannot mean: ``The House 
    of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen by the 
    majority party.''
        The grand principle of the Constitution is that the people 
    shall choose. Once the task force decided to supplant Indiana law 
    by counting votes that would not be counted under Indiana law, it 
    was bound to do so evenly. To preclude 32 absentee ballots from 
    being counted while actually counting other absentee ballots 
    exactly alike but for a supposedly lesser degree of security is 
    fatuous in face of rules 9 and 21 that contemplates counting 
    ballots not necessarily secured.
        The refusal to count all like ballots of the same substantive 
    class is arbitrary and unreasoned.
        If this House shall act to seat McCloskey, then this House will 
    endorse a dark absolute power to determine elections, and the 
    entire Constitution will fall under a despotic shadow. Let us take 
    the only enlightened course: Let us order another election, open, 
    clean, and unbloodied by politics.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, I wish that the gentleman from Kansas 
    [Mr. Roberts] could have closed the debate for our side, because I 
    think he speaks eloquently for every Republican in the House of 
    Representatives. We, who have been the ground beneath the tyrant's 
    heel, have become used to that kind of treatment. Perhaps our 
    spirit has been broken too much; I think perhaps we have spoiled 
    our friends in the majority by not being outraged nearly enough. I 
    hope that you will forgive us if we raise our voices once in a 
    century, when the peoples' right to determine who will represent 
    them has been taken away from them by a willful caucus, willing to 
    exercise ruthlessly whatever power it has by its sheer numbers.
        Before I get overcome with the bitterness of past defeats, Mr. 
    Speaker, I do want to call particular attention to the service of 
    the committee chairman, our good friend, the gentleman from 
    Illinois [Mr. Frank Annunzio]. I believe he has handled himself and 
    his committee in the best traditions of the House and has been very 
    helpful in moving this process along in the best way that the House 
    can possibly move on any question this difficult.
        Mr. Speaker, when the time has run its course for this debate, 
    I shall move to recommit House Resolution 146 to the Committee on 
    House Administration with instructions to that committee to count 
    the otherwise valid, unauthorized absentee ballots in the four 
    counties often discussed on the floor here so that we will have 
    some measure of rough justice.
        As you will recall, the Democrat task force, by party line 
    votes, refused to count the remainder of the ballots after it had 
    counted 52 ballots that had been counted during the general 
    election, and 10 which have not. It refused to count 32 which could 
    be identified as having been carried under the same security as the 
    ballots which have been counted.
        The task force, which is the real thrust of the Republican 
    attack here, simply found enough votes to elect its man, McCloskey, 
    and then stopped counting, leaving those 32 voters disenfranchised. 
    We heard tons of speeches on this floor that, by golly, we were 
    going to save those disenfranchised voters. Those bad, bad Indiana 
    clerks, and that bad Indiana law kept people from voting. This task 
    force is going to let those people vote.
        Well, it did. It let 10 of the 42 we know of, but would not let 
    the other 32. Why not? Because they were afraid to risk losing the 
    four-vote advantage. Now, remember: McIntyre won the election. The 
    only way that McCloskey could win it was under a new set of rules. 
    When the new set of rules were drawn, we stopped counting under 
    those new rules. We abandoned them and we said: ``Oh, my goodness, 
    we are going to go back to Indiana law; those 32 ballots are 
    uncountable.''
        Well, we could not find Indiana law because the task force 
    threw it in the trash can when it established its counting rules.
        Now, I want to talk about the count a little bit. I hope that 
    the motion to recommit will be supported. The district court in 
    southern Indiana has granted a temporary injunction to protect the 
    ballots, so you need not worry whether they will be there or not. 
    They did that yesterday in response to a request.
        Let me talk about the ballots. I have been led, or I think many 
    people have been led, to believe that for some reason mistabs have 
    decided who got elected here. Let me first tell you that mistabs 
    gave candidate McIntyre 75 more votes and candidate McCloskey 79 
    more votes. That is a four-vote increase for McCloskey. He did not 
    gain back 34 votes that he had on election night by mistabs.
        Where he gained back his votes were on ballots not counted; 
    those 142 ballots that our valiant committee has saved to 
    enfranchised otherwise disenfranchised voters, even though their 
    ballots did not satisfy Indiana law. There his friends on the task 
    force found 22 more votes for McCloskey than they did for McIntyre. 
    Actually, McCloskey won the whole election by picking up 12 extra 
    votes on hanging chads.
        Do you know what hanging chads are? When you have a punchcard 
    that does not go through, you get the little punch out and it is 
    hanging there. Nobody knows who they voted for. You have to be 
    Harry Houdini or the Almighty to know what the score is, but 
    somehow our task force was able to determine that 12 more of those 
    went for McCloskey and they found out who won.
        I believe that McIntyre was beaten clearly and unmistakably by 
    the rules. He was beaten by subjective judgments of his Democrat 
    cronies. I did not say McCloskey won; I said McIntyre was defeated.
        When the press asked me when I came in here today what the 
    House was going to do, I said: ``I think the Democrat Caucus is 
    going to seat the loser.'' And the basis for the seating is that 
    the king can do no wrong; king caucus decided on January 3 that it 
    was going to impose its will. King Democrat caucus was going to 
    impose its will on the people of Indiana. I do not think that any 
    other description can disguise the shame that our whole 
    representative process feels because this decision was made 
    unilaterally in that caucus, throwing aside the votes of more than 
    230,000 Indianans.
        We have heard a lot about honor in the last couple of days, and 
    I am all for honor. I believe everyone here is just dripping with 
    honor. I remember William Shakespeare spoke through Mark Anthony to 
    say that Brutus was an honorable man, but he was not above sticking 
    a broadsword between the ribs of Julius Caesar into some of his 
    more tender parts. I feel a little bit like Julius Caesar today 
    too. I have felt the sting of the Democrat broadsword.
        I remember, too, a couple of lines from Tennyson, which go like 
    this:

  His honor rooted in dishonor stood,

  And faith unfaithful held him falsely true.

        Now, if there is anyone being held falsely true because he 
    believes that to be a good Democrat you have to disenfranchise 
    Indianans, I beg you, you have only two more chances. You have a 
    chance to give the election process back to the people of Indiana. 
    You have a chance to go with the certification process. You have a 
    chance to prove that king caucus is not a ruthless wielder of 
    brutal political power that overwhelms the votes of the people of 
    Indiana.
        You have a chance to prove that you really believe in the 
    Constitution and the election processes of the United States of 
    America. If you do not, you will simply exacerbate the difficulties 
    that we have gone through in the last few weeks. You will have 
    proved to the United States of America that it does not make any 
    difference who the people elect if king caucus, king Democrat 
    caucus decides that it wants to elect one of its cronies.
        Your best way to prove that this House means something, that 
    your love of the institution and the processes are more improtant 
    than your love of the party, is to vote to recommit House 
    Resolution 146.
        Mr. PANETTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my 
    time.
        Mr. [Ronald] COLEMAN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman 
    yield?
        Mr. PANETTA. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
        Mr. COLEMAN of Texas. I thank the gentleman for yielding. As 
    one of those Members who has read every page of this document, I 
    rise in support of this resolution.
        Mr. Speaker, today, the House of Representatives will be voting 
    to seat Frank McCloskey as the duly elected Representative of the 
    Eighth Congressional District of Indiana. The resolution before 
    this body is premised upon the recount sponsored by the House which 
    shows Mr. McCloskey with a four-vote margin over his Republican 
    challenger, Mr. McIntyre.
        I believe that all of us present today understand the 
    seriousness of the task force before us in deciding what our 
    respective position will be relative to the resolution now before 
    this body. While there has been a swirl of partisan feelings and 
    emotions surrounding this issue which have, on some occasions, 
    obscured rational thought on the part of some Members, I feel 
    confident that the information now available from proponents of 
    both sides of this issue adequately provide a basis from which an 
    informed decision can be made.
        I am going to vote in favor of accepting the recommendation of 
    the Committee on House Administration to seat Frank McCloskey, not 
    on the basis of my political affiliation, but upon a reasoned and 
    indepth analysis of the premises advanced by the committee in 
    support of its recommendation to this Chamber.
        To begin with, let us not lose sight of the fact that the House 
    has the ultimate responsibility as well as primary jurisdiction, 
    under article I, section 5 of the U.S. Constitution, to judge 
    elections. Pursuant to this power, the House adopted a resolution, 
    on January 3, 1985, to investigate the McCloskey-McIntyre election. 
    While I will not review the unfolding of events from election 
    night, 1984, through the present, I believe that all of us can 
    agree that the many irregularities and inconsistencies in the 
    Eighth Congressional District of Indiana's election process 
    certainly justified this action by the House.
        Given the inconsistencies which characterized the counting of 
    the ballots in Indiana that evening within the Eighth Congressional 
    District, the goals of the task force were to follow counting rules 
    which disenfranchised the smallest possible number of voters and to 
    apply uniform standards which would cover all counties and 
    precincts. These counting rules were adopted so that technical 
    errors made by election officials, as opposed to those made by 
    voters, would not invalidate a ballot.
        What I will attempt to do is to isolate for my colleagues what 
    I have come to view as the crucial issues upon which I have made my 
    decision to support the committee's recommendation.
        One point which I find critical in determining the ``winner'' 
    is that the key difference between the State's certified election 
    result of 34 votes and the House recount process is directly 
    related to tabulation errors discovered by the task force auditors 
    on the part of election clerks in Indiana. It is important to note 
    that these changes in vote tabulations resulted not from the 
    counting rules adopted by the task force, but from this discovery 
    of tabulation errors in the initial counting which took place 
    election night.
        The true crux of this controversy surrounds the nebulous nature 
    of the unnotarized absentee ballots. Under Indiana law, absentee 
    ballots must be signed by the voter, notarized, and returned to the 
    appropriate county clerk by election day. On election day, the 
    clerk then forward the absentee ballots for each precinct out to 
    the appropriate precinct, where the absentees are opened and 
    counted along with the ballots cast in a normal manner that day. 
    Also under Indiana law, any absentee ballots that are not signed 
    and notarized are supposed to be immediately rejected and not 
    forwarded to the precinct--these ballots are per se invalid.
        The unfortunate fact discovered by the GAO auditors hired by 
    the task force to count the ballots was that some of these 
    unnotarized ballots had been sent out to the precincts. Of these 
    absentees sent to the precincts through clerical error, some were 
    recognized by precinct workers as invalid and were not opened up or 
    counted while others were opened as well as counted. The task force 
    was then confronted with absentee ballots, clearly invalid, which 
    were inadvertently forwarded to precinct workers and counted; 
    absentee ballots, clearly invalid, which were sent to the precincts 
    but not counted; and, absentee ballots, clearly invalid, which were 
    recognized as such and retained by the various county clerks and 
    not forwarded to the precincts. Of those invalid absentee ballots 
    which were erroneously sent to the precincts, counted, and then 
    mixed in with the other ballots, there was no way for the task 
    force to be able to distinguish them and thus not count them. Of 
    the second category, those absentee ballots which were 
    inadvertently sent to the precincts and not counted, these were 
    clearly able to be segregated by the task force. Of the third 
    category, those absentees which were retained by the county clerks, 
    it was easy for the task force to be able to identify and 
    segregate.
        Since it was not possible for the task force to identify and 
    segregate those invalid absentee ballots counted erroneously, the 
    question became how to treat these ballots in an equitable manner. 
    In the House, there is no precedent for counting unnotarized and 
    unwitnessed absentee ballots. What precedent there is provides that 
    when it is possible to differentiate between valid absentee ballots 
    and invalid absentee ballots, the preferred method is to 
    proportionately reduce the vote totals for each candidate. In this 
    instance--and given the tabulation errors uncovered by the GAO 
    auditors which benefited Mr. McCloskey--had this proportional 
    reduction formula been followed, Mr. McIntyre would lose more votes 
    than Mr. McCloskey.
        Despite the existence of this precedent, and at the request of 
    the Republican member of the task force, it was agreed that those 
    ballots already counted should remain in the active count. 
    Regarding those absentee ballots which, while clearly invalid, were 
    forwarded to the precincts yet not counted or integrated with the 
    other ballots, task force Chairman Panetta agree with the 
    Republican member to count this group as well which increase Mr. 
    McIntyre's vote total. Relative to the third group of absentee 
    ballots--those recognized as invalid by the county clerks and 
    withheld from the precincts--the task force, along party lines, 
    decided not to count them.
        Despite my personal misgivings about the decision of the task 
    force chairman to count the second category of ballots, or to count 
    the first category and not proportionately reduce each candidate's 
    totals, neither decision would have changed the result of who 
    actually won this election.
        I believe it significant to note that not one member of the 
    task force ever suggested that unnotarized or unwitnessed absentee 
    ballots ever be counted. It was not until the last meeting of the 
    task force, on April 18, after it was apparent that Mr. McIntyre 
    was losing by four votes, that the Republican task force member 
    first suggested that those invalid ballots retained by the county 
    clerks should be treated in a manner similar to valid ballots.
        In another desperate attempt to erase Mr. McIntyre's four-vote 
    deficit, and in direct contravention of Indiana law, the Republican 
    task force member also requested that military absentee ballots 
    that had arrived after election day be counted. The task force 
    voted not to count late-arriving military or other absentee ballots 
    received after the election.
        Mr. Speaker, Frank McCloskey, albeit narrowly, won this 
    election based upon what I sincerely believe was a credible 
    counting of the ballots by GAO auditors under the supervision of 
    the task force. While I disagree with the decision made by the task 
    force to count those invalid absentee ballots which were not 
    comingled with other valid ballots--a total of 10 ballots in all 
    which gave McIntyre the majority--it is apparent that either 
    through the means adopted by the task force or the concept of 
    proportional reduction or both, McCloskey would still be the 
    victor.
        On the matter of a special election, several things disturb me 
    about the recent momentum for such an event. First of all, it is 
    the Republicans, after realizing that they had possibly lost the 
    election on the recount, who are demanding a special election. This 
    is a new claim raised by them at the 11th hour and lacks a sound 
    premise. Moreover, and despite Mr. McCloskey's small margin of 
    victory, closeness alone while it could justify a recount, does not 
    now, nor has it ever, constituted an adequate legal basis to call 
    for a special election. Absent a showing of irregularities which go 
    to the heart of the final result, there is no precedent for 
    demanding such a special election.
        For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Speaker, I believe it legal and 
    proper to now seat Mr. McCloskey as the representative from the 
    Eighth Congressional District of Indiana and I would hope that the 
    House can now return its attention to the national issues pending 
    before it.
        Mr. [William] FORD of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman 
    yield?
        Mr. PANETTA. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
        Mr. FORD of Michigan. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
        Mr. Speaker, after an exhaustive and painstaking recount of 
    last November's election in Indiana's Eighth Congressional 
    District, I don't believe that any fair-minded person can deny that 
    incumbent Frank McCloskey is the winner.
        The recount was federally supervised under a careful procedure 
    that ensured the utmost integrity and fairness. The results are now 
    before us. And they are conclusive.
        There is little doubt that this was the closest congressional 
    election of this century, with the final outcome decided by only a 
    handful of votes.
        The narrowness of Mr. McCloskey's victory, however, is not the 
    issue before us. Rather, it is whether, after one of the most 
    careful and diligent recount procedures in our history, he emerges 
    as the undisputed winner. On this score the record is now clear. 
    And it matters not whether he won by 4 or 400 votes.
        While the central issue is indeed who won that photo-finish 
    race, it is not, in my mind, the most important consideration 
    before us. That, instead, is whether the recount procedure 
    established by the House to resolve this prickly dilemma can stand 
    the test of harsh scrutiny for openness, honesty, and fairness. I 
    am convinced it can.
        It was a far more valid recount than the one ordered by the 
    State of Indiana. Why? Because it examined all the ballots and did 
    not selectively throw some out for minor technical reasons. If the 
    intent of the voter was clear--and it mattered not for whom the 
    ballot was cast--the vote was counted. Indiana, on the other hand, 
    excluded nearly 5,000 ballots because of technical, not 
    substantive, reasons, thereby willy-nilly disenfranchising 
    thousands of voters.
        The federally supervised recount was conducted by teams of 
    independent auditors from the General Accounting Office whose 
    integrity and professionalism is beyond reproach. These teams of 
    auditors laboriously counted the ballots on site by hand, leaving 
    nothing to chance.
        Moreover, the task force appointed by the House bent over 
    backward to ensure fairness to both sides and fidelity to the 
    Constitution and the people of Indiana's Eighth District.
        It has been charged, unfairly, that the composition of the task 
    force guaranteed an outcome favorable to Mr. McCloskey. Nothing 
    could be further from the truth. First of all, as I said earlier, 
    it established a procedure for counting all the ballots, which were 
    not disqualified through voter error, the only democratic way to 
    determine the winner.
        I would like to remind my colleagues that, under the 
    Constitution, Congress is the sole judge when it comes to deciding 
    the outcome of the election of its Members.
        To have relied on the results of the Indiana recount would have 
    been a patent abdication of our constitutional duty as elected 
    Members of this body. There were more than 15 separate recount 
    commissions in Indiana evaluating the results with 15 separate and 
    irregular procedures. One group, for example, accepted ballots that 
    another group operating only a few miles away threw out for 
    technical reasons. The task force, on the other hand, applied 
    uniform rules to bring order out of chaos. To charge now, as some 
    of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle have done, that we 
    have attempted to ``steal'' this election is to ignore the facts 
    for political gain.
        From the very outset of this case the House has acted in a 
    prudent and cautious manner to protect the parties involved and the 
    integrity of the system. Quite properly it refused to seat either 
    Mr. McCloskey or his challenger, Mr. McIntyre, until all the facts 
    were known. To have done otherwise would have flown in the face of 
    electoral justice and constitutional responsibility.
        It was only fitting and proper for us to withhold a final 
    judgment pending the results of this thorough and eminently open 
    recount process--a procedure open to both sides and the media every 
    step of the way. For us to have acted hastily before all the facts 
    were on the table would have demeaned the process and created 
    distrust in the public mind.
        But now we are in possession of all the facts. Nothing remains 
    hidden from public view. And now that we do have the facts, it is 
    our duty to act upon them fairly and decisively. And the only fair 
    and honest way to do that is by seating Mr. McCloskey according to 
    the will of the majority of the voters of Indiana's Eighth 
    District.
        Mr. [William] ALEXANDER [of Arkansas]. Mr. Speaker, will the 
    gentleman yield?
        Mr. PANETTA. I yield to the gentleman from Arkansas.
        Mr. ALEXANDER. I thank the gentleman for yielding and I will 
    not take any time, although I would like to. I would like to 
    compliment the chairman and the task force for an excellent job and 
    an excellent report.
        Mr. Speaker, the rhetoric and parliamentary antics of the other 
    side have reached an absurd, juvenile level in the past few weeks. 
    Obviously, this reflects the increasing role of the extremist 
    element in Republican policymaking.
        Sadly, many senior Members on the Republican side have recently 
    been quoted publicly and privately as saying that they are planning 
    to leave this body--either through early retirement or seeking 
    other offices--because of the frustrations and embarrassment caused 
    by this extremist element which paralyzes those Republicans who 
    legitimately seek constructive solutions to our Nation's problems.
        Mr. Speaker, today the Republican side plans to walk out of the 
    Chamber to protest the seating of the rightful winner of Eighth 
    Congressional District of Indiana. Judging from the assembling of 
    the media around the capitol, I can only conclude this planned walk 
    out is more for the purposes of good press, than good government. I 
    suppose they will use this opportunity to once again attack the 
    leaders of the Democratic Party as slime and thieves, and repeat 
    their threats of civil disobedience and, indeed, physical assaults 
    to prevent the House from swearing in the rightful Congressman from 
    the Eighth District.
        Mr. Speaker, I know at this point the extremists on the 
    Republican side are not interested in substance. That quality was 
    abandoned in their speeches weeks ago. However, I would suggest to 
    them that they take a look at the position of the Reagan 
    administration on this matter. I think they will discover the shaky 
    legal ground upon which they have been making their allegations of 
    criminal and immoral behavior. Frankly, it seems to me that the 
    brief filed in the Supreme Court by the Reagan administration on 
    the Indiana question actually justifies the action of the House in 
    how it has proceeded on this matter.
        On the Republican allegation that the House does not have the 
    right to assume jurisdiction over the Indiana race, the Reagan 
    administration argues--and I quote:

  This cannot be right * * *. The House should be left to continue its 
recount and judge the elections and returns of its own Members.

        On the Republican allegation that there is no evidence of 
    fraud, the Administration said the absence of specific allegations 
    of election fraud or irregularity--and I again:

  That * * * is beside the point. The election was extremely close and the 
question the House must determine is, what was the vote?

        On the charge by the Republican side that the House should have 
    honored the dubious certificate of election, the administration 
    argues that the validity of the certificate is ``really up to each 
    House as the judge of its election returns.''
        And on the allegation by the Republican side that the House is 
    unfairly and illegally denying the people of Indiana their 
    constitutional right to representation, the Reagan administration 
    quoted the case of Barry versus the United States which said:

  (There is no) merit In the suggestion that the effect of the refusal * * 
* to seat (a member) pending investigation was to deprive the State of its 
equal representation. The temporary deprivation of equal representation 
which results from the refusal * * * to seat a member pending inquiry as to 
his election or qualifications is the necessary consequence of the exercise 
of a constitutional power, and no more deprives the State of its ``equal 
suffrage'' in the constitutional sense than would a vote  * * * vacating 
the seat of a sitting member or a vote of expulsion.

        Mr. Speaker, there are many issues in this case upon which 
    reasonable people might disagree. However, the other side has 
    repeatedly taken the issues of this case pounded and pounded again 
    their own interpretation of them to the point that they are no 
    longer willing to listen to reason.
        While I know they will not listen to my arguments or those of 
    the Members who have so professionally and astutely guided this 
    procedure, I urge them to look at the arguments or President 
    Reagan's own Justice Department on this matter.

        [In the Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 1984, 
                               No. 102, Original]

         State of Indiana, Plaintiff v.United States of America, et al.

            (On Motion for Leave To File Original Bill of Complaint)

                   brief for the united states in opposition

Jurisdiction

  The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Article III, Sec. 12, Cl. 
2, of the Constitution of the United States and 28 U.S.C. 1251(b)(2). The 
question of jurisdiction is further dicussed in the Argument, infra.

Statement

  1. The State of Indiana--in its own right and as parens patriae--has 
filed a motion for leave to file an original complaint in this Court, 
seeking an order requiring the seating (at least provisionally) of Richard 
McIntyre as Representative for the Eighth Congressional District of 
Indiana. The claim is that refusal to seat McIntyre in the Ninety-Ninth 
Congress deprives Indiana and its citizens of constitutional rights 
relating to representation and control over the election of Representatives 
from the State. Named as defendants are the United States, the House of 
Representatives, the Speaker, and various officers of the House. The House 
and its officers are represented by the Counsel to the Clerk of the House 
of Representatives, who is filing a separate response to Indiana's Motion 
for Leave. The present brief is submitted on behalf of the United States 
only.

  2. In the general election of November 6, 1984, the seat for 
Representative from Indiana's Eighth Congressional District was closely 
contested between Richard D. McIntyre and Francis X. McCloskey. For some 
five weeks, state officials withheld certification of either candidate. 
Then, on December 13, the Indiana Secretary of State and the Governor 
certified McIntyre as the winner. Nevertheless, when the House of 
Representatives convened on January 3, 1985, it passed a resolution 
declining to seat either candidate and referring the question to its 
Committee on House Administration. That Committee is conducting a recount 
and has not yet reported, though it appears to be close to doing so; the 
result, whoever wins, will be extremely narrow. In the meantime, both 
claimants have been tendered the salary of Representative.

  3. Some weeks before Indiana filed the present Motion in this Court, 
Richard McIntyre and a voter from his District commenced an action against 
the Speaker of the House in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia. McIntyre v. O'Neill, Civ. No. 85-0528. The relief 
sought there was essentially the same as in this original action. On March 
1, the suit was dismissed on grounds of non-justiciability, and an appeal 
from that ruling is now pending on an expedited basis in the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, No. 85-5212, where briefing 
has been completed.

Argument

  There are perhaps special objections to the joinder of the United States 
as a defendant to this action.1

------------

    1 It is arguable, first, that the United States--as 
distinguished from the House of Representatives and its officers--is not a 
``proper'' party, having no separate interest in the case. Presumably, 
Powell v. McCormack 395 U.S. 486 (1969), establishes that the United States 
is not an indispensable party, without whose joinder the suit could not 
proceed. On the other hand, it is difficult to assert that the United 
States is ever an improper party where any federal governmental matter is 
in controversy. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 2322 (review of I.C.C. orders); 28 
U.S.C. 2344 (orders of Hobbs Act agencies); 28 U.S.C. 2403 
(constitutionality of Act of Congress drawn into question); 25 U.S.C. 201 
(qui tam action for penalties in Indian cases); 40 U.S.C. 270b(b) (suit on 
behalf of laborers or materialmen on public works contracts); 42 U.S.C. 
1973h(b) (challenge to state poll taxes). There is, indeed, much to be said 
for affording the Department of Justice an opportunity to participate in 
such litigation. In sum, we see no ground for objecting to the joinder of 
the United States as improper.

    It is perhaps a more serious question whether sovereign immunity 
prevents the suit against the United States. The basic rule, of course, is 
that absent congressional consent, a suit for injunctive relief can be 
maintained only against its officers if they are charged with acting ultra 
vires or unconstitutionally. See Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 280-
282 (1983). Here, the only arguably relevant statutory provision effecting 
the requisite waiver for joining the sovereign itself is 5 U.S.C. 702, 
which permits joinder of the United States whenever ``agency'' action is 
subject to judicial review and nonmonetary relief is sought. However, 
assuming that it applies to original actions in this Court (cf. California 
v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59 (1979)), the provision expressly excludes 
``Congress'' as an ``agency.'' Accordingly, the question is whether the 
officers of one House are nevertheless covered. It is not apparent why 
Congress should have wished to bar joinder of the United States in such a 
case if the suit otherwise can be prosecuted against the officials.

------------

  We do not stop to examine any such obstacles, however, because, given 
that the United States is not an indispensable party, its dismissal would 
not prevent continuation of the suit against some or all of the other 
defendants. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 and 21. For like reasons, there is no 
need to determine whether the joinder of the Speaker is barred by the 
Speech and Debate Clauses: that would not affect prosecution of the action 
against the other officers of the House. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 
486, 501-506 (1969). And, finally, we accept without quibble that the case, 
if justiciable in any federal court, falls within this Court's nonexclusive 
original jurisdiction as a controversy to which a state is a proper 
party.2

------------

    2 Notwithstanding the failure of the Judicial Code to so 
provide (28 U.S.C. 1251) and contrary indications in some of the Court's 
opinions (e.g., California v. Southern Pacific Co., 157 U.S. 229, 261-262 
(1895); New Mexico v. Lane, 243 U.S. 82, 58 (1917); Texas v. Interstate 
Commerce Commission, 258 U.S. 158. 163 (1922)), we deem it clear that this 
Court enjoys concurrent original jurisdiction of all cases within the 
federal judicial power, not barred by sovereign immunity, where a state is 
a party, including a suit founded on federal law by a state against its own 
citizens. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 642-645 (1892); Monaco 
v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 321, 329-330 (1934). An independent basis for 
invoking the original jurisdiction of this Court is that the suit is 
brought by a state against citizens of other states. 28 U.S.C. 1251(b)(3). 
See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 307 (1966); Oregon v. 
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117 n.1, 152-153 n.1, 230-231 (1970). And if the 
United States is permissibly joined, original jurisdiction also lies on the 
ground that the suit is between a state and the United States. 28 U.S.C. 
1251(b)(2). See California ex rel. State Lands Commission v. United States, 
457 U.S. 273, 277 n.6 (1982). Whichever of the three bases is invoked, this 
Court's original jurisdiction is only concurrent--given that a federal 
question is presented. Compare Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 
493, 498 n.3 (1971). Accordingly, it would not affect this Court's 
jurisdiction if the United States were dismissed as a party.

    It may be questioned whether Indiana, acting merely as parens patriae, 
can maintain an original action against the United States or its officers. 
See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-486 (1923); South Carolina 
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324. But the Court's precedents indicate that 
Indiana here has sufficiently alleged injury to the State in its sovereign 
capacity. South Carolina v. Kazenbach, supra; Oregon v. Mitchell, supra; 
South Carolina v. Regan, No. 94, Orig. (Feb. 22, 1984). See also Hodel v. 
Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).

------------

  We confine ourselves here to two submissions: (1) The case presents only 
a nonjusticiable ``political question'' which no federal court can 
entertain; and (2) in any event, this Court ought not exercise its original 
jurisdiction, but should deny leave to file as a matter of discretion.

  1. This matter is nonjusticiable, because it presents a political 
question. There is no exception for cases otherwise within the Court's 
original jurisdiction. ``The effect of [Art. III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3] is not to 
confer jurisdiction upon the Court merely because the State is a party, but 
only where it is a party to a proceeding of judicial cognizance. 
Proceedings not of a justiciable character are outside the contemplation of 
the constitutional grant.'' Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 
(1923). It would be difficult to overstate the degree to which this 
controversy presents the defining instance of a political question. The 
classic characteristics of textual commitment to another branch and 
conspicuous separation of powers problems are present and pronounced. 
Unsurprisingly, the Court's opinions in this area strongly suggest that 
this precise controversy would be held nonjusticiable on political question 
grounds.

  a. There is, in the present context, ``a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department 
* * *.'' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). See Gilligan v. Morgan, 
413 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1973). Article I, Sec. 15 of the Constitution begins: 
``Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and 
Qualifications of its own Members * * *.'' This is specific and more 
directed to the matter at hand than Article I, Sec. 4, on which plaintiff 
relies. See Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1972). The House of 
Commons and the legislatures of the colonies judged their own elections, 
and jealously protected their right to do so against other governmental 
entities. H. Remick, The Powers of Congress in Respect to Membership and 
Elections 1-62 (1929); M. Clarke, Parliamentary Privilege in the American 
Colonies 9-10, 132-172 (1971). So, also, the American Senate and House have 
been deciding election questions involving their members for nearly 200 
years--sometimes responsibly, sometimes not, but never with judicial 
review, despite repeated requests. In light of this history and the express 
provision of Article I, Sec. 5, it seems obvious the political question 
doctrine applies here--all the more so given that judicial review has been 
deemed barred where the commitment of the issue's resolution to another 
entity is only implicit, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1938); 
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1003 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring, 
joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart and Stevens, JJ.).

  It is no answer that courts regularly review other exercises of power 
``textually committed'' to Congress. The commitment made by Article I, 
Sec. 5, is different not only in degrees, but in kind. The Commerce Clause, 
for example, makes a grant of lawmaking power, and it is entirely 
unremarkable that there should be judicial review of the exercise of that 
authority. Here, however, the grant is itself of an adjudicative sort, and 
review by the judiciary is redundant and intrusive. Article I, Sec. 5 
entails making specific decisions about particular disputes--not setting 
broad, prospective policy. The Constitution charges the legislature in this 
special instance with doing what courts usually do--and, logically, 
excluding courts from that process.3

------------

    3 See Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 
597, 613 (1029): ``Generally, the Senate is a legislative body, exercising 
in connection with the House only the power to make laws. But is has had 
conferred on it by the Constitution certain powers which are not 
legislative but judicial in character. Among these is the power to judge of 
the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members. Art. I, 
Sec. 5, cl. 1.'' See also 279 U.S. at 616: ``In exercising the power to 
judge the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, the Senate 
acts as a judicial tribunal * * *.''

    The Court again alluded to this special function in Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1. 133 (1976): ``[Article I,] Section 5 confers * * * a power 
`judicial in character' upon each House of the Congress [citation to Barry 
v. Cunningham omitted].''

    Finally, in Reed v. County Comm'rs, 277 U.S. 376, 388 (1928), the Court 
concluded that, given the Senate's own established powers to compel 
production of evidence in election disputes, it was unlikely that the 
statute in question allowed the Senators there to ask the courts to do so: 
``[The Senate] is the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications 
of its members. Art. I, Sec. 5. It is fully empowered, and may determine 
such matters without the aid of the House of Representatives or the 
Executive or Judicial Department.''

------------

  b. This underscores some of the other criteria for political questions 
set out in Baker v. Carr. Judicial review in this case would repeat 
precisely the job which has been committed to the House of Representatives 
in the first instance, thereby ``expressing lack of respect due coordinate 
branches of government * * *'' 369 U.S. at 217. For the same reason, 
judicial review here necessarily contains ``the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on 
one question.'' Ibid. As the Court in Baker v. Carr pointed out, the 
earmark of a classic political question is the presence of pronounced 
separation of powers problems. 369 U.S. at 210.

  Those separation of powers concerns are further dramatized here by the 
remedies plaintiff seeks. They include forcing the Speaker of the House to 
administer an oath of office, compelling the House of Representatives to 
seat Mr. McIntyre, and requiring the officers of the House to provide him 
all the ``rights, privileges, powers, emoluments, and services'' of a 
Member. To say that the enforcement of such a decree would express ``lack 
of respect'' for the House and create a ``potentiality for embarrassment'' 
is a gross understatement. The extent to which judicial relief would 
necessitate unseemly judicial interference in the business of the political 
branches is of course a valid consideration in justiciability matters 
generally. Cf. Allen v. Wright, No. 81-757 (July 3, 1984), slip op. 22-23.

  c. Plaintiff relies heavily on Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), 
for the general proposition that the political question doctrine is 
inapplicable here. But the fact is that the Court there expressly reserved 
the question whether a complaint seeking the sort of coercive relief now 
sought would be justiciable. Id. At 517-518, 550. Moreover, the Court also 
observed; ``[F]ederal courts might still be barred by the political 
question doctrine from reviewing the House's factual determination that a 
member did not meet one of the standing qualifications. This is an issue 
not presented in this case and we express no view as to its resolution.'' 
Id. at 521 n.42. The same plainly applies to the House's review of 
``Elections'' and ``Returns'' as well, listed together with 
``Qualifications'' in Article I, Sec. 5.4

------------

    4 In this concurrence in Powell, Justice Douglas wrote that 
had the dispute there been over whether an elected candidate met one of the 
qualifications set out in the Constitution, then ``the House is the sole 
judge.'' 395 U.S. at 552, citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 242 n.2 Again, 
presumably the same would be true for ``Elections'' and ``Returns.''

------------

  What Powell did deal with was whether the Court could define what the 
Constitution meant in Article I, Sec. 5, when it said ``Qualifications.'' 
There is no like question in this case about the meaning of ``Elections'' 
and ``Returns.''

  The other case relied upon by plaintiffs is Barry v. United States ex 
rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929). There again, however, it was not 
ruled that scrutiny by a house of Congress of election returns was 
judicially reviewable, On the contrary: the Court indicated repeatedly in 
dicta that it would not be. In ruling that the Senate could subpoena 
witnesses in the course of investigating an election, the Court said that 
the judiciary could intervene in such cases only upon a clear showing that 
due process was being denied--and stated that the Senate's ultimate 
judgment on elections was ``beyond the authority of any other tribunal to 
review.'' Id. at 613. Similarly, the Court wrote that, when a member-elect 
to the Senate presented himself there (Id. At 614): ``the jurisdiction of 
the Senate to determine the rightfulness of the claim was invoked and its 
power to adjudicate such right attached by virtue of section 5 of Article I 
of the Constitution. Whether, pending this adjudication, the credentials 
should be accepted, the oath administered, and the full right accorded to 
participate in the business of the Senate, was a matter within the 
discretion of the Senate.''

  The Court went on to give one example, ``[a]mong the typical cases in the 
House, where that body refused to seat members in advance of the 
investigation although presenting credentials unimpeachable in form * * *'' 
Id. at 615 n.*. Finally, the Court stated that ``the Senate [has] sole 
authority under the Constitution to judge of the elections, returns, and 
qualifications of its members  * * *.'' Id. at 619 (emphasis added).

  The Court made a similar statement, although again in dicta, in Roudebush 
v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 19 (1972) (citation omitted): ``Which candidate [of 
the two in the disputed election] is entitled to be seated in the Senate 
is, to be sure, a nonjusticiable political question--a question that would 
not have been the business of this Court even before the Senate voted. 
[Citation to Powell v. McCormack omitted.]'' Hartke presented the mirror 
image of this case: the apparently victorious candidate was seeking to 
prevent a recount by invoking the Senate's Article I, Sec. 5 power, and 
arguing that a recount by the State would undercut the Senate's authority. 
In allowing the recount, the Court acknowledged that the ``State's 
verification of the accuracy of election results pursuant to its Art. I, 
Sec. 4 powers is not totally separate from the Senate's power to judge 
elections and returns,'' but made clear that the Senate could review those 
returns, as the House is doing in the instant matter: ``The Senate is free 
to accept or reject the apparent winner * * *, and, if it chooses, to 
conduct its own recount'' (405 U.S. at 25-26) (footnote omitted). The Court 
pointed out that ``[t]he Senate itself has recounted the votes in close 
elections in States where there was not recount. Procedure'' (Id. at 26 
n.24) (citation omitted).5

------------

    5 Justices Douglas and Brennan dissented in part, on the 
ground that the Court should have enjoined the state's recount so that the 
Senate could be sure that the ballots were reviewed in pristine form. The 
partial dissent stated (405 U.S. at 30), that `[t]he parties before the 
Court are apparently in agreement that * * * there has been a ``textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment'' (Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217; 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-549) to the Senate of the decision 
[who] * * * I received more votes. Our case law agrees.'' The dissent then 
went on to discuss Barry v. Cunningham, supra, and Reed v. County Comm'rs, 
277 U.S. 376 (1928), concluding that ``where all that is at stake is a 
determination of which candidates attracted the greater number of ballots, 
each [house] has supreme authority to resolve such controversies'' (Id. at 
32) (citation omitted).

------------

  d. Indiana is asking more than that the House's determination of the 
election be overturned; it seems to be praying that the House be precluded 
even from reviewing the State of Indiana's determination of that election. 
The assertion is apparently that the House must accept the State's 
certification of the election returns, or it will violate Indiana's 
constitutional right to determine the ``Times, Places, and Manner of 
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives * * *.'' Art. I, Sec. 4, 
Cl. 1. This cannot be right, for it would contradict the more specific 
constitutional provision that ``[e]ach House shall be the Judge of the 
Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members * * *.'' See 
Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. at 25-26. The Court said in Barry v. United 
States, 279 U.S. at 613, that in ``exercising this power [of reviewing 
elections], the Senate may, of course, devolve upon a committee of its 
members the authority to investigate and report; and this is the general, 
if not the uniform, practice.6

------------

        6 With regard to plaintiff's claim that it is being 
deprived of Its right to representation, Barry is also relevant (279 U.S. 
at 615-616): ``Not is there merit in the suggestion that the effect of the 
refusal of the Senate to seat (a member) pending investigation was to 
deprive the state of its equal representation in the Senate * * * The 
temporary deprivation of equal representation which results from the 
refusal of the Senate to seat a member pending inquiry as to his election 
or qualifications is the necessary consequence of the exercise of a 
constitutional power, and no more deprives the state of its ``equal 
suffrage'' in the constitutional sense than would a vote of the Senate 
vacating the seat of a sitting member or a vote of expulsion.''

------------

  Plaintiff insists that the state certification be afforded a 
``presumption of validity,'' But that is really up to each house, as the 
judge of its election returns. In any event, the House may well be 
affording just such a presumption, albeit it is unwilling to risk seating 
and then unseating the Representative from the Eighth Congressional 
District of Indiana. Plaintiff also stresses that there have been no 
allegations of election fraud or irregularity. That, however, is beside the 
point: everyone agrees that the election was extremely close, and the 
question which the House must determine is, what was the vote? It is 
implicit that there is a chance for honest or dishonest error. Such 
presumptions, in any event, are two-edged; as the Court said in Barry v. 
United States, supra, ``[T]he presumption in favor of regularity, which 
applies to the proceedings of courts, cannot be denied to the proceedings 
of the Houses of Congress, when acting upon matters within their 
constitutional authority.'' 279 U.S. at 619.

  The clarity with which this controversy presents a political question is 
remarkable. The House should be left to continue its recount and judge the 
elections and returns of its own Members.

  2. The political question issue aside, the Court should exercise its 
discretion in favor of declining to hear the case. The Court's jurisdiction 
here is neither exclusive, 28 U.S.C. 1251(b)(2), nor mandatory. It has 
consistently been the Court's philosophy that its original jurisdiction 
should be exercised ``sparingly.'' See, e.g., Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 
U.S. 794, 796 (1976); United States v. Nevada, 412 U.S. 534, 538 (1973); 
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972); Ohio v. Wyandotte 
Chemical Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 501 (1971); Utah v. United States, 394 U.S. 
89, 95 (1969); and Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1939). The 
Court exercises this discretion in the light of Its increasing appellate 
docket--Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 93-94; Washington v. 
General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 113 (1972); Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 
U.S. at 797 and, more generally, ``with an eye to promoting the most 
effective functioning of this Court within the overall federal system.'' 
Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 570 (1983).

  The Court noted in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 93, that 
what is ``appropriate'' for the Court to hear in the exercise of its 
original jurisdiction involves both ``the seriousness and dignity of the 
claim'' and ``the availability of another forum where there is jurisdiction 
over the named parties, where the issues may be litigated, and where 
appropriate relief may be had.'' See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 
739-740 (1981); Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. at 796-797. This case fails 
to meet either criterion. The immediacy of the claim--an important part of 
its ``seriousness''--is undermined by the fact that the House is now in the 
process of recounting the ballots, and it is very much in doubt what the 
outcome will be. The Court cited similar ripeness problems in declining to 
assert its original jurisdiction in United States v. Nevada, 412 U.S. at 
540.

  There are available, moreover, other judicial forums for this dispute. It 
is, in fact, already being litigated in the District of Columbia Circuit, 
where it has been heard by the District Court on an expedited basis, and 
has now been briefed for the appellate court on an expedited schedule. 
McIntyre v. O'Neill, dismissed, Civ. No. 85-0528 (D.D.C. Mar. 1, 1985), 
appeal docketed, No. 85-5212 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 1, 1985). One plaintiff in 
that case is suing as a voter from the Eighth District. Also, relief 
against the House essentially identical to that sought here is asked for. 
Indiana itself is not precluded from bringing an action in another forum; 
nor does it appear to have been prevented from joining the action now in 
progress in the District of Columbia Circuit. This Court could properly 
decline to exercise its jurisdiction, in any event, so long as the 
``issues'' are being litigated in another forum and Indiana's ``interests'' 
will be ``represented'' there. See Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. at 797; 
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 743. Given the relief sought and the 
parties represented, that is the situation here.

  As the Court said in United States v. Nevada, 412 U.S. at 538, ``We seek 
to exercise our original jurisdiction sparingly and are particularly 
reluctant to take jurisdiction of a suit where the plaintiff has another 
adequate forum in which to settle his claim.'' See Maryland v. Louisiana, 
451 U.S. at 744; Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 93; Washington 
v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. at 114; Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 
U.S. at 19-20. In sum, the State of Indiana has wholly failed to establish 
the ``practical necessity'' required for invoking this Court's original 
jurisdiction. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 570 (1983).

Conclusion

  The motion for leave to file an original complaint in this Court should 
be denied.

  Respectfully submitted.

                                              Rex E. Lee,

                                              Solicitor General.

                                              Richard K. Willard,

                                              Acting Assistant Attorney 
General.

                                              Louis F. Claiborne,

                                              Deputy Solicitor General.

                                              Roger Clegg,

                                              Attorney.

  April 1985.

        Mr. PANETTA. Mr. Speaker, I regret that there are obviously 
    larger issues that go beyond the Eighth District that are involved 
    here that relate to abuse of the minority and the feeling that that 
    is the case. Unfortunately, I think that poisons the atmosphere in 
    terms of being able to weigh the facts that are presented here in a 
    fair and objective way. I regret that, but that is the case.
        Nevertheless, I urge Members to please look at the report and 
    please look at the facts that are involved here.
        The issue that is raised on the recommittal will relate to the 
    ballot issue, the illegal ballots that were not counted. Let me 
    speak to that.
        At no time--at no time--did the task force intend to count 
    illegal votes. At no time, under House precedent or under any other 
    rule. Our basic approach was not to count illegal votes. Absentee 
    ballots that are not authorized and not signed are illegal votes. 
    We never intended to count those votes.
        What happened was, we found a mistake, an error, not by the 
    task force, not by the majority, but by the election officials in 
    Indiana who, by mistake, sent some 62 of those illegal ballots out 
    to the precincts. Fifty-two of those were counted. That was a 
    mistake. It should not have happened. Once those 52 were counted, 
    they were intermingled with other valid ballots. There was no way 
    to go back and correct that mistake. Ten were out there that were 
    also at the precinct level. One of those was open and not counted.
        It was our feeling and, frankly, the gentleman from California 
    [Mr. Thomas], agreed with us, that there is the potential for 
    mischief when a precinct worker can look at the name on that 
    absentee ballot and decide whether or not that individual will be 
    counted. In particular, when an envelope is opened and that 
    particular vote has not been counted.
        Mr. [Charles] PASHAYAN [of California]. Mr. Speaker, will the 
    gentleman yield?
        Mr. PANETTA. Please let me finish my statement.
        Mr. Speaker, as a result of that, it was our feeling that a 
    mistake had been made. Unfortunately, there were additional ballots 
    at the precinct level that were subject to mischief and, therefore, 
    that those votes ought to also be counted, and as you know, they 
    counted six, three, and one in favor of Mr. McIntyre.
        The role of the task force, it seems to me, is to limit 
    mistakes, not compound mistakes. Those clerks were to serve--
        Mr. THOMAS of California. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield 
    on a point of error? On a point of error?
        Mr. PANETTA. Allow me to complete my statement, please.
        The clerks were supposed to act as a dam to prevent those 
    illegal ballots from going out to the precincts. A few of those 
    ballots seeped through the dam, and now what the Republicans argue 
    is that we ought to blow up the dam and let the rest of the illegal 
    ballots that were retained by the clerks be counted.
        It is my view that we ought to respect the performance of those 
    clerks who held those illegal ballots and did not forward them on 
    to the precincts.
        Yes, there were judgments made here. Let us make no question 
    about it. Every time you deal with an election, there are judgments 
    that have to be made on a variety of issues and we did that over 9 
    weeks. The GAO auditors went to 233,000 ballots. They had to make 
    judgments. The teams had to make judgments. We on the task force 
    had to make judgments.
        Some of the ballots were counted, some were not, based on those 
    judgments. The question you have to ask as Members of this House 
    is: Were those judgments justified, reasonable, and supported by 
    House precedent? The House precedent, when it comes to counting 
    illegal votes, is that you do a proportional reduction on the ones 
    that are counted. That is what the House precedent is, if you want 
    to know what the law is with regard to those ballots. And if we did 
    a proportional reduction or took those 10 votes out, who would be 
    the winner? McCloskey would be the winner, because those ballots 
    inured to the benefit of Mr. McIntyre.
        So for that reason, my view was that we do not do a 
    proportional reduction because I know what the attack would have 
    been. ``That is a very inexact tool, and you hurt our candidate.'' 
    So we did not use that tool. In terms of the proportional 
    reduction, we counted the 10 and drew the line at that class with 
    regard to the ballots that were at the precinct, and that is 
    supported by House precedent and, incidentally, it is supported by 
    Mr. Shumway. There have been comments here that Mr. Shumway would 
    support a recount. Let me read to you from a letter that he sent to 
    me yesterday stating:

  There have been remarks that I would have counted those absentee ballots. 
I would like to have the record accurately reflect my position. I would say 
invalid ballots, whether absentee or otherwise, should not be counted.

        That is Mr. Shumway's position with regard to this issue.
        One final reflection: If Mr. McIntyre had won this race, none 
    of this would have been an issue. Make no mistake about it. This 
    would not be an issue that would have been raised at this time. Had 
    we counted these illegal votes and McIntyre was not ahead, do you 
    think they would have stopped there? They would have argued that we 
    continue to count illegal votes, the deceased votes, the late-
    arriving ballots, until Mr. McIntyre had somehow won.
        The fact is that in looking at this election, the argument that 
    now we ought to count these illegal ballots, do we want this 
    election to turn on counting illegal votes? Would Mr. McCloskey or 
    Mr. McIntyre want this election to count based on counting illegal 
    votes? Is that something we want to justify? I do not think so.
        The 10 votes made no difference. As I said, McCloskey, if we 
    took those 10 votes out, would still be the winner. Please look at 
    the facts. That is all I ask as chairman of this task force.
        The decisions were justified. They were supported, and they 
    were right, and Mr. McCloskey ought to be seated.
        Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
        Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the 
    resolution.                          -------------------

                   MOTION TO RECOMMIT OFFERED BY MR. FRENZEL

        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit with 
    instructions.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the 
    resolution?
        Mr. FRENZEL. I am, Mr. Speaker.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion.
        The Clerk read as follows:

  Mr. Frenzel moves to recommit H. Res. 146 to the Committee on House 
Administration with instructions that the Committee be directed to count 
the otherwise valid unnotorized absentee ballots identified by the Task 
Force on the Indiana Eighth Congressional District in Orange, Lawrence, 
Daviess and Greene Counties and when that count is completed the Committee 
will certify the winner and report their findings immediately to the House.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous 
    question is ordered on the motion to recommit.
        There was no objection.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to 
    recommit.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the noes appeared to have it.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    183, nays 246, not voting 4, as follows:

                              [Roll No. 90] . . . 

        Mr. MURPHY and Mr. MICA changed their votes from ``yea'' to 
    ``nay.''
        Mr. SCHAEFER changed his vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
        So the motion to recommit was rejected.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        The SPEAKER. The question is on the resolution.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes 
    appeared to have it.
        Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    236, nays 190, answered ``present'' 2, not voting 5, as follows:

                              [Roll No. 91] . . . 

        So the resolution was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the 
    table.                          -------------------

                               MOTION TO ADJOURN

        The SPEAKER.(16) For what purpose does the gentleman 
    from Illinois [Mr. Michel] rise?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. Thomas O'Neill (MA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, in view of that vote, the last vote, I 
    move that we adjourn.
        The SPEAKER. Would the gentleman withhold until the Chair has 
    had an opportunity to swear in Mr. McCloskey?
        Mr. MICHEL. No, Mr. Speaker. Our purpose is to adjourn 
    immediately in keeping with the precedent of the Democratic Party 
    back in 1890.
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman appreciates the fact that the motion 
    is not debatable.
        Mr. MICHEL. I understand, Mr. Speaker.
        The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion to adjourn offered 
    by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Michel].
        The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the noes 
    appeared to have it.
        Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    179, nays 248, not voting 6, as follows:

                              [Roll No. 92] . . . 

        Mr. CONTE changed his vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
        Mr. SMITH of Iowa and Mr. Breaux changed their votes from 
    ``yea'' to ``nay.''
        So the motion to adjourn was rejected.
        The result of the vote was announced as above 
    recorded.                          -------------------

         SWEARING IN OF THE HONORABLE FRANK McCLOSKEY OF INDIANA AS A 
                            MEMBER OF THE HOUSE    

        The SPEAKER. It is the intention at this particular time to 
    have the Indiana delegation present to the House the elected 
    candidate.
        Mr. McCLOSKEY appeared at the bar of the House and took the 
    oath of office.
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman is a Member of the Congress of the 
    United States.

Sec. 20.2 Won Pat v Blaz

    The general election for the office of Delegate to the House of 
Representatives from Guam was conducted on November 6, 
1984.(17) The general election candidates were Antonio B. 
Won Pat (the Democratic candidate), and Ben Blaz (the Republican 
candidate). The initial vote count by the Guam Election Commission 
(GEC) indicated that Mr. Blaz had received 15,725 votes, and that Mr. 
Won Pat had received 15,402 votes--a margin of 323 votes. After the GEC 
ordered a computer recount, and then a hand count of paper ballots, the 
margin had increased to 355 votes. The GEC certified Mr. Blaz as the 
winner of the election on November 21, 1984.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 99-220, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On December 21, 1984, Mr. Won Pat (hereafter ``contestant'') 
submitted a notice of contest to the Clerk of the House, which was 
referred to the Committee on House Administration for disposition. The 
contestant argued that Mr. Blaz (hereafter ``contestee'') did not 
receive a majority of votes cast, as required by 
statute.(18) Further, contestant argued that the GEC had 
failed to issue absentee ballots in a timely manner, thus 
constructively disenfranchising eligible voters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 48 U.S.C. Sec. 1712.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On January 21, 1985, contestee filed a motion to dismiss the case. 
Thereafter, on March 29, 1985, contestant filed a response in 
opposition to the motion to dismiss, and contestee, on June 5, 1985, 
filed a reply to the response.
    The Committee on House Administration formed a task force of three 
Members to review the various pleadings in the case. On June 5, 1985, 
the task force met to hear oral arguments on the motion to dismiss. On 
June 27, 1985, the task force voted to recommend that the contestee's 
motion to dismiss be granted.
    In its committee report, the Committee on House Administration 
noted that a Federal statute provides that the Delegate to the House of 
Representatives from Guam must be elected ``by a majority of the votes 
cast.''(19) Contestant argued that ``overvotes'' (i.e., 
ballots cast for more than one candidate) and blank ballots (in which 
no candidate was selected) should be included in the denominator for 
determining ``a majority'' of the total number of votes cast. The 
committee, however, found that the GEC's decision not to count such 
ballots in the vote total was consistent with both prior practice and 
House precedents, and was thus ``reasonable and 
proper.''(20)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. Id.
20. H. Rept. 99-220, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The committee was also not persuaded by the contestant's second 
claim that the late issuance of absentee ballots disenfranchised 
voters. The committee argued that the late issuance of absentee ballots 
was a known pre-election issue, and thus should have been addressed 
before the election took place. The committee further noted that most 
absentee ballots were returned on time to be counted, and that there 
was no evidence presented that counting late ballots would have changed 
the result of the election. Further, contestant's remedy that late-
arriving ballots be counted as part of the total votes cast, but not 
for any candidate, was considered by the committee to be 
``illogical.''(21) On this basis, the committee recommended 
dismissal of the contest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
21. Id. at p. 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On July 24, 1985,(22) the committee called up House 
Resolution 229 (dismissing the contest) as a privileged matter, and the 
House agreed to the resolution by voice vote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
22. 131 Cong. Rec. 20180-81, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST AGAINST BEN BLAZ    

        Mr. [Ed] JONES of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the 
    Committee on House Administration, I call up a privileged 
    resolution (H. Res. 229) dismissing the election contest against 
    Ben Blaz, and ask for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 229

  Resolved, That the election contest of Antonio Borja Won Pat, contestant, 
against Ben Blaz, contestee, relating to the office of Delegate from Guam, 
is dismissed.

        The SPEAKER.(23) The gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. 
    Jones] is recognized for 1 hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
23. Thomas O'Neill (MA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. JONES of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes, for 
    the purpose of debate only, to the gentlewoman from Nevada 
    [Mrs.Vucanovich], and pending that, I yield myself such time as I 
    may consume.
        Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 229 is a resolution to dismiss 
    the election contest regarding the position of Delegate from the 
    Territory of Guam.
        Under the U.S. Constitution and the rules of the House, the 
    Committee on House Administration is charged with the 
    responsibility for investigating contested elections.
        On July 10 the Committee on House Administration, by unanimous 
    voice vote, directed me to bring to the floor this resolution 
    dismissing the election contest of Antonio Won Pat against Ben 
    Blaz.
        Pursuant to the Rules of the committee, Chairman Annunzio 
    established a task force to examine the documentary record, and to 
    receive oral arguments from contestant and contestee. I chaired the 
    task force, serving with me were Mr. Gejdenson and Mr. Badham.
        After presentation of oral arguments, and examination of the 
    record, the task force determined that the contestant did not meet 
    his burden of presenting sufficient documentary and other evidence 
    to warrant further proceedings. The task force then unanimously 
    recommended dismissal of the contest, and the committee also by 
    unanimous vote, ordered this dismissal resolution reported to the 
    House.
        Although contestant Won Pat raised a number of issues regarding 
    the administration of the election, which the committee hopes will 
    be addressed by the Guam Election Commission before the next 
    election, the committee concluded that the issues raised were not 
    sufficient to overturn the outcome of the election. The initial 
    count of ballots, and two subsequent recounts, provided 
    contesteeBlaz with a winning margin of approximately 350 votes out 
    of 31,000 cast.
        The two principal issues raised by contestant were the late 
    mailing of absentee ballots, and an interpretation by the Guam 
    Election Commission of the election statute. Let me first address 
    the absentee ballot question.
        The task force found that no absentee ballots were sent out 
    until October 16, 1984. Thereafter they were sent out as 
    applications were received, right up to the week before the 
    election.
        The voters were instructed to return the absentee ballots as 
    soon as possible, and were also instructed that absentee ballots 
    received after election day would not be counted. Nearly two-thirds 
    of the ballots sent out were returned by election day, and were 
    included in the final tally. Late arriving ballots were not 
    counted.
        Given the late date on which absentee ballots were sent out, 21 
    days before the election compared to the 45 days recommended by the 
    Voting Assistance Office of the Pentagon, some voters may not have 
    been able to timely return their ballots. The committee hopes that 
    the Guam Election Commission will establish procedures for future 
    elections which allow substantially more transit time than was 
    provided in the last general election, so as to avoid the possible 
    disenfranchisement of overseas voters. Nevertheless, the committee 
    does not believe contestant's claim requires that the election be 
    invalidated. Invalidating an election is a radical step. There is 
    no reason for believing that delay in sending out the absentee 
    ballots had an impact on the result of the election. If there were 
    a problem the contestant should have sought relief before the 
    election.
        The contestant's second contention is that blank ballots and 
    over votes should be included in the total number of ``votes 
    cast.'' That would deprive contestee of the absolute majority, 
    required by the Guam statute.
        In interpreting a similar statutory provision governing 
    elections in the Virgin Islands, a Federal court of appeals 
    rejected the argument that such ballots should be included in the 
    total of votes cast. The committee found the court's reasoning to 
    be persuasive and affirmed the decision of the Guam Election 
    Commission.
        The committee reviewed the other arguments put forth by 
    contestant, but found that the various issues raised were not, 
    individually or collectively, sufficient to change the result of 
    the election.
        Consequently the committee recommends that the House adopt the 
    resolution dismissing the election contest.
        Mr. [Robert] BADHAM [of California]. Mr. Speaker, I yield 
    myself such time as I may consume.
        Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution. As was stated 
    by the gentleman from Tennessee, the task force met and heard oral 
    arguments from the counsels for both parties and in a later meeting 
    voted unanimously to dismiss the contest.
        Briefly, Mr. Speaker, the contestant's allegations were that 
    the rights of absentee voters were deprived by acts of election 
    officials and that the contestee did not receive a majority of the 
    votes cast in this election. Additionally, the contestant raised 
    certain other allegations of irregularities in the Guam election 
    process.
        First, the allegation was made that the low rate of return of 
    the ballots was because the first ballots were not mailed to the 
    absentee voters until October 16 and that the mailing of the 
    absentee ballots were not completed until October 31. Therefore, 
    there was not enough time to complete and return the ballots in a 
    timely manner. Counsel for the contestee presented the task force 
    with an affidavit from the employee of the Guam Election Commission 
    who spoke with the Postal Service representative who had advised 
    her that if the absentee ballots were sent out by October 21 and if 
    they were expeditiously returned by the voter the ballots should be 
    back in time to be counted in the general election. In addition, 
    Mr. Speaker, the absentee voter was advised several times within 
    the absentee mailing to return the ballot immediately.
        The contestant's second allegation that the contestee did not 
    receive a majority of the votes cast. They contend that the 
    ``majority'' must be computed to include ballots cast that were 
    marked for both candidates--over-votes--or neither candidate--blank 
    ballots. Further, the contestant believes that the absentee ballots 
    which were postmarked prior to November 6, but received after the 
    close of the polls are ``votes cast.''
        Mr. Speaker, there was a similar case decided in 1982 in an 
    election for Governor and Lieutenant Governor of the Virgin 
    Islands. The court was faced with the issue of whether blank and 
    spoiled ballots should be counted in determining the majority of 
    the votes cast. In the Totman versus Boschulte opinion, the Court 
    quoted an earlier decision (Euwema v. Todman, 8 V.I.224 (D.V.I. 
    1971)) which stated that ``The proper basis for computing a 
    majority'' was that ``voters not attending the election or not 
    voting on the matter submitted are presumed to assent to the 
    expressed will of those attending and voting and are not to be 
    taken into consideration in determining the result.'' Additionally, 
    the Guam Election Commission legal counsel advised the commission 
    of a legal opinion written 2 years ago that blank ballots and those 
    with voted too many should not be counted.
        Mr. Speaker, I don't believe it is necessary to take any more 
    of the House's time on the resolution and would urge its adoption.
        Mr. JONES of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests 
    for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

                                 general leave

        Mr. JONES of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent 
    that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and 
    extend their remarks on the resolution just agreed to.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. [Kenneth] GRAY of Illinois). Is 
    there objection to the request of the gentleman from Tennessee?
        There was no objection.
        Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 20.3 Hansen v Stallings

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the Second District of Idaho was conducted on November 6, 
1984.(24) The general election candidates were Richard H. 
Stallings (the Democratic candidate), and George V. Hansen (the 
Republican candidate). The official canvass of votes by the State Board 
of Governors showed that Mr. Stallings had received 101,266 votes, and 
that Mr. Hansen had received 101,133 votes--a margin of 133 votes. On 
November 21, 1984, a certificate of election was issued by the State 
Board of Governors to Mr. Stallings. Mr. Stallings' credentials were 
presented to the House of Representatives, and he appeared on January 
3, 1985, to be administered the oath of office. Another Member-elect 
(Rep. John Myers of Indiana) objected to the seating of Mr. Stallings, 
and Mr. Stallings did not take the oath of office with other Members-
elect en masse. However, the Majority Leader (Rep. Jim Wright of Texas) 
offered a privileged resolution authorizing the Speaker to administer 
the oath of office to Mr. Stallings. That resolution was agreed to 
unanimously (407 yeas, zero nays, one voting ``present,'' and 18 
Members not voting). Mr. Stallings was then administered the oath of 
office by the Speaker.(25)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
24. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 99-290, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.
25. For the Congressional Record depiction of the challenge to the 
        seating of Mr. Stallings, and the subsequent offering of the 
        resolution authorizing the administration of the oath of 
        office, see Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 2 Sec. Sec. 4.1, 4.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A partial recount was conducted by state election officials 
pursuant to a request by Mr. Hansen under state law. The results of the 
partial recount showed an increase in Mr. Stallings' margin of victory 
to 170 votes. Mr. Hansen requested that the Attorney General of Idaho 
conduct a full recount at state expense, but the Attorney General 
declined, citing Idaho law that required ``sufficient material 
differences''(26) between the initial count and the partial 
recount. This decision was affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
26. H. Rept. 99-290, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On December 21, 1984, Mr. Hansen (hereafter ``contestant'') filed a 
notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was forwarded to 
the Committee on House Administration for its review. In response, Mr. 
Stallings (hereafter ``contestee'') filed a motion to dismiss the case. 
The committee established a task force of three Members to review the 
pleadings in the case. On June 7, 1985, the task force met to hear oral 
arguments from the parties.
    Contestant argued that illegal votes had been cast by individuals 
who were not eligible to vote. Contestant further contended that state 
officials had misrepresented the results of the recount. With regard to 
the first claim, the task force examined Idaho election laws, and 
concluded that state voter registration requirements were complied 
with. Contestant produced no evidence to suggest that improperly 
registered voters had voted in the election. The committee also cited 
House and Idaho precedents for the proposition that mere technical 
errors by local election officials (e.g., negligently accepting 
incomplete voter registration cards) should not be the basis for 
invalidating votes or overturning the results of an election.
    With regard to the second claim, the committee relied on the 
decisions of state officials and courts in making the decision not to 
conduct a full recount under its own auspices. The committee noted that 
the contestant had failed to avail himself of opportunities under state 
law to expand the partial recount to include more precincts. Given that 
the FCEA was designed, in part, to exclude ``[w]asteful investigations 
of meritless claims,''(27) the committee concluded that the 
contestant had not undertaken the required effort to develop the 
necessary evidentiary record that would allow him to prevail against a 
motion to dismiss. Absent such a record, there was no basis on which 
the committee could conclude that any irregularities had occurred--
either with the election itself or the partial recount.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
27. Id. at p. 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Contestant also argued (subsequent to the filing of the notice of 
contest) that an impoundment order issued by the Idaho Secretary of 
State prevented local election administrators from properly verifying 
vote totals. The committee, however, found that claim to be ``without 
merit'' and that the ``claimed impact on the election is merely 
speculative.''(28)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
28. Id. at p. 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the committee affirmed the House's inherent authority to 
dismiss cases even where the contestee fails to file a motion to 
dismiss, or where contestee's motion to dismiss is untimely. Whether or 
not the contestee's motion to dismiss was timely under the statute is 
immaterial to the issue of whether the contestant met his burdens under 
the statute. The committee concluded that the contestant had not met 
the substantial burden imposed by the FCEA, and therefore recommended 
that the House dismiss the case.
    On October 2, 1985,(29) the committee called up House 
Resolution 272 (dismissing the contest) as a privileged matter, and the 
House agreed to the resolution by voice vote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
29. 131 Cong. Rec. 25664-70, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST AGAINST RICHARD HOWARD 
                                 STALLINGS    

        Mr. [Jim] BATES [of California]. Mr. Speaker, by direction of 
    the Committee on House Administration, I call up a privileged 
    resolution (H. Res. 272) dismissing the election contest against 
    Richard Howard Stallings, and ask for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 272

  Resolved, That the election contest of George Vernon Hansen, contestant, 
against Richard Howard Stallings, contestee, relating to the office of 
Representative from the Second Congressional District of Idaho, is 
dismissed.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(30) The gentleman from 
    California [Mr. Bates] is recognized for 1 hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
30. Chester Atkins (MA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. BATES. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes, for the purpose of 
    debate only, to the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Roberts], and 
    pending that, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
        Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 272 is a resolution to dismiss 
    the election contest regarding the seat of the Representative from 
    the Second Congressional District of Idaho.
        Under the U.S. Constitution, title 2 of the United States Code, 
    and the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee on 
    House Administration is charged with the responsibility of hearing 
    contested election cases and recommending disposition of such cases 
    to the House.
        Pursuant to the rules of the Committee on House Administration, 
    Chairman Frank Annunzio established a task force to examine the 
    documentary record, and to receive oral arguments from contestant 
    and contestee. I chaired the task force. Serving with me were Mr. 
    Swift and Mr. Roberts.

                             summary of proceedings

        After presentation of oral arguments, and examination of the 
    record, the task force determined that the contestant did not meet 
    his burden of presenting sufficient documentary and other evidence 
    to warrant further proceedings. The task force then recommended 
    dismissal of the contest to the Committee on House Administration. 
    On July 24, the Committee on House Administration, by a vote of 12 
    ayes and 1 nay, directed me to bring to the floor this resolution 
    dismissing the election contest of George Hansen against Richard 
    Stallings.
        Although contestant Hansen raised a number of issues regarding 
    the administration of the election, which the State of Idaho has 
    addressed for future elections, the committee concluded that the 
    issues raised were not adequately supported by documentary or other 
    materials as required by House precedent, and were in any case 
    insufficient to overturn the outcome of the election. The election 
    night canvass of the ballots, and a subsequent partial recount at 
    contestant Hansen's request, gave Stallings an initial winning 
    margin of 133 votes, which was increased to 170 votes after the 
    recount.

                           summary of primary grounds

        There were two primary grounds upon which the contest was 
    based. First, Hansen claimed that a number of illegal votes were 
    cast for Mr. Stallings which, if removed, would change the outcome 
    of the election. The essence of this claim is that these allegedly 
    illegal votes were cast by voters who were not properly registered.
        The second ground for the contest was that the results of a 
    partial recount, which was conducted at contestant Hansen's 
    request, required the House of Representatives to conduct a full 
    recount. Contestant Hansen also raised during oral argument, 
    various ancillary claims of irregularity, which I will address 
    later, even though they were not a part of contestant's original 
    notice of contest. For example, after filing the notice of contest, 
    contestant Hansen suggested that the canvass of votes by the State 
    on election night was not conducted in accordance with Idaho law, 
    and that an impoundment order, protecting the balloting materials, 
    was not properly issued by the secretary of state.
        The committee reviewed these and other arguments put forth by 
    contestant, but found that the various issues raised were not, 
    individually, or collectively, sufficient to change the result of 
    the election, and were not supported by an evidentiary showing.
        Consequently the task force, and the committee recommend that 
    the House adopt the resolution dismissing the election contest.

                                 illegal votes

        Mr. Hansen's first claim was that a number of illegal votes 
    were cast for Mr. Stallings, which, if invalidated, would change 
    the outcome of the election. The task force found that the claim 
    was without foundation.
        Contestant Hansen claimed that approximately 2,500 voters were 
    illegally registered. Contestant based his claim on an 
    interpretation of an Idaho statute which specifies the information 
    to be gathered by State registrars in registering voters. In Idaho, 
    the State election official completes a voter registration form 
    based upon information provided to the election official by the 
    prospective voter. Based on that information, and any additional 
    information provided by the prospective voter, the election 
    official then makes a determination as to whether or not the 
    applicant is qualified to register and to vote.
        In some instances, State election officials registered voters 
    whose addresses were listed as post office boxes, or were 
    incomplete or missing. Contestant Hansen argued that since these 
    registration forms, filled out by State election officials, lacked 
    some or all of the elements of a conventional address; for example, 
    street numbers and street names, that these citizens should be 
    declared ineligible to vote.
        Election officials from urban and suburban areas can, by and 
    large, specifically locate eligible voters by street name and 
    street address. However citizens living in remote or rural areas 
    seldom live on a block or in a subdivision, and may live where 
    there are no streets, or where rural access roads are unpaved, 
    unnamed and unnumbered. These voters may receive their mail through 
    a post box, or by rural free delivery. The lack of a street address 
    is not a basis for depriving an otherwise eligible citizen of the 
    State of Idaho his or her opportunity and right to vote.
        In this instance, contestant Hansen's complaint relates largely 
    to the rural areas of Blaine County, where many people live in 
    areas remote from any town. The election officials registering 
    these voters made determinations about their eligibility, even in 
    the absence of a street name or number. In making that 
    determination, that the applicants were residents and citizens 
    qualified to vote in the election, the election officials satisfied 
    themselves as to the fact. But notwithstanding the determinations 
    made by the State election officials, contestant Hansen complained 
    that these 2,500 voters should be disenfranchised, and their votes 
    thrown out.
        Contestant Hansen did not challenge these voters on election 
    day as Idaho law provides. Rather he raised this complaint only 
    after the election result was announced. He sought investigations 
    by the county prosecutor, the State attorney general, the Justice 
    Department and the FBI. He also asked the State court to rule that 
    the results of the election were invalid, because of the 
    registration practices complained about.
        The State attorney general's office, and the Blaine County 
    magistrate conducted independent investigations. At the conclusion 
    of the investigations, public reports were issued. The results were 
    that not a single voter was found to have been unqualified to vote. 
    These investigations fully supported the declared result of the 
    election.
        Based on the results of these investigations, the task force 
    found that contestant's claim of a right to the seat, due to 
    registration irregularities, was without merit.

                               results of partial

        Contestant Hansen's second ground for contesting the election 
    was based upon a partial recount. Contestant availed himself of an 
    Idaho statute which allows a disappointed candidate to obtain a 
    full or partial recount. The disappointed candidate posts a $100 
    bond for each precinct he chooses to have recounted. Obviously he 
    has multiple incentives to pick those precincts which he believes 
    will best support his position or claim. If the results of the 
    candidate-initiated recount demonstrate to the State officials that 
    a full recount is justified, then the State takes over and conducts 
    a district-wide recount at State expense, and refunds to the 
    disappointed candidate the entire bond posted in support of the 
    partial recount.
        In this instance, contestant Hansen picked 45 precincts, posted 
    the necessary bond, and a partial recount was conducted. As a 
    result, contestant lost ground to contestee Stallings by an 
    additional 37 votes. Although this unfavorable trend did not 
    support contestant Hansen's position that he was entitled to the 
    seat, at the conclusion of the recount of the 45 precincts, 
    contestant Hansen petitioned the State attorney general for a full 
    State-paid recount, citing the results of the partial recount. The 
    State attorney general concluded that a full State-paid recount was 
    not justified by the results, and rejected Hansen's request for a 
    full State-paid recount, whereupon contestant Hansen appealed the 
    decision of the attorney general to the Idaho Supreme Court. The 
    Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the arguments of contestant Hansen and 
    the Idaho Attorney General, and rejected contestant Hansen's 
    argument that the results of the partial recount justified a full 
    recount at State expense. After a review of the written and oral 
    arguments presented by contestant Hansen, both the task force and 
    the Committee on House Administration came to the same conclusion. 
    Contestant Hansen's second claim was determined to be without 
    merit, and the committee, like the Idaho Attorney General and the 
    Idaho Supreme Court, rejected it.

                      conclusion regarding primary grounds

        Hence, contestant's two principal claims, raised in his notice 
    of contest, were determined to be inadequate to change the result 
    of the election, or to justify a full recount by the State of Idaho 
    or the House of Representatives.

                               ancillary grounds

        During the course of oral arguments, contestant raised some 
    additional issues which he suggested might serve as a basis for 
    throwing out the results of the election. For example, contestant 
    Hansen suggested that an impoundment order, issued after the 
    election night canvass, was not proper or in accordance with State 
    law, and that the proceedings prevented local election officials 
    from performing their duties in verifying the election totals. 
    Contestant made this claim unsuccessfully in the State court. 
    However, he did not make this claim in his notice of contest. He 
    raised it only after his claim of illegal voting had been 
    investigated and found to be without merit. Contestant's claim 
    identifies no errors, nor did contestant identify the types of 
    errors he believed may have occurred. He merely alleges 
    irregularity, and speculates as to the impact. Under House 
    precedent, bare allegations of irregularity do not overcome the 
    presumption that State election officials have acted in accordance 
    with law, nor do such allegations serve as a basis for imputing 
    errors. Contestant was unable to convince the courts of Idaho that 
    the election night canvass was in any sense defective, and the task 
    force and the committee found contestant Hansen's arguments 
    similarly unpersuasive.
        Contestant raised various other matters which were not 
    contained in the notice of contest. But the task force and the 
    committee found that, both individually and collectively, these 
    claims were not sufficient nor specific enough to put into serious 
    question the propriety or accuracy of the canvass. This committee 
    found no reason to believe that there was anything illegal or 
    improper in the conduct of the canvass, and that these ancillary 
    claims do not provide a basis for changing the result of the 
    election.

                            dismissal recommendation

        For the reasons given and upon recommendation of the task 
    force, the Committee on House Administration, by a vote of 12 ayes 
    and 1 nay, recommended to the House that the election contest be 
    dismissed.
        Mr. [Charles] ROBERTS [of Kansas]. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 
    such time as I may consume.
        Mr. Speaker, we are here today to perform a most solemn 
    responsibility-judging the qualifications, returns and election of 
    one of our colleagues. The questions presented by this case are not 
    easy ones--especially in light of the precedent set in this House 
    earlier this year and in light of recent events.
        The task force to determine the outcome of this election was 
    made up of myself, Mr. Bates and Mr. Swift. I While I do not agree 
    with the conclusion of the task force, I do wish to thank both 
    gentlemen for their demeanor during the proceedings.
        As I stated, the questions presented by this case are not easy 
    ones and I would like to call to the attention of my colleagues the 
    four basic issues that we feel are both primary and pertinent to 
    this case.
        First, there is the canvassing issue. The impoundment order 
    issued by the Secretary of State of Idaho resulted in the ballots 
    being impounded but it also resulted in an inconsistent and 
    defective canvass of the votes. The board of canvassers in the 
    largest county in Idaho, Bonneville County, was unable to verify 
    the accuracy of the count. They have so certified by means of an 
    affidavit filed with the notice of contest. In addition to having 
    no access to the ballots, the county commissioners in 14 of the 26 
    counties in the congressional district had a best limited access, 
    and in many cases, no access to the precinct poll books and tally 
    books when they conducted their canvass of the vote.
        Now, under Idaho law, the impoundment of the ballot boxes is 
    authorized only upon a request for a recount. And, such a request 
    may only be made after the completion of the canvass by the county 
    commissioners. There was no complete canvass. There was no recount. 
    The Secretary of State's impoundment order was premature. It 
    interfered with the ordinary and necessary access to all election 
    materials.
        Second, there was a recount of 10 percent of the precincts. 
    Yes, Mr. Hansen lost ground. That recount demonstrated a rate of 
    error in the total count of more than 3 1/2 times the margin of 
    victory. Mr. Hansen was denied a State-sponsored recount of the 
    remaining 90 percent of the precincts. And, I want to stress that 
    now, after the election and the partial recount and the impoundment 
    of ballots, Idaho's law has been changed. After the fact, State law 
    now provides for automatic State-conducted recounts in races as 
    close as this race.
        Third, the address of the voters issue. Idaho law requires that 
    in order to be a qualified voter, an individual must include in his 
    or her voter registration application information which definitely 
    locates his or her residence. But, in Blaine County, some 5,400 
    voters failed to provide this information and approximately 1,000 
    voters listed only their post office boxes.
        More to the point, this requirement was inconsistently applied 
    throughout the election district-13 counties accepted post office 
    box registrations to identify residences and the remaining 13 did 
    not.
        Fourth, we do have an important precedent in this case and all 
    election disputes from this date forward.
        Mr. Speaker, as I said during that debate earlier this year for 
    me and for my Republican colleagues, this House is not the same. 
    The collective sense of unfairness symbolized by the McIntyre 
    precedent remains in our hearts. There is in fact, a pall hanging 
    over contested election deliberations by the House.
        You, in the majority changed the precedents we must follow by 
    your actions in McIntyre. As majority leader, Mr. Wright, stated on 
    the floor of this House on January 3, 1985, the results of an 
    election are called into question when ``the very ability of the 
    State election procedures to determine the outcome accurately is 
    put into serious question.''
        The majority in the McIntyre election dispute decided to ignore 
    State law and adopt House mandated rules. But, in this case you 
    have decided to rely on State law and the doctrine of the 
    exhaustion of State remedies.
        This is an inconsistent application of House precedents and 
    underscores the abuses served on this House and the American people 
    when you seated Mr. McCloskey. Inconsistent application of Indiana 
    law from county to county was alleged to be intolerable in 
    McIntyre-McCloskey while in Hansen-Stallings it is merely viewed as 
    the vagaries of the State system and is considered a virtue. I 
    suggest the record will clearly show you cannot have it both ways. 
    Mr. Hansen desires a recount to determine if the inconsistent 
    application of Idaho law denied him the election. On a similar 
    basis Mr. McCloskey was granted such a recount.
        It appears as if the majority in this House once again is 
    willing to yield to State law, to continue the high threshold of 
    proof heretofore used in election disputes prior to the McIntyre 
    case. It appears as if like Halley's Comet, the McIntyre precedent 
    was no precedent at all. It has apparently gone. I can assure my 
    colleagues it has not been forgotten. Under the precedent set by 
    the majority in McIntyre, Mr. Hansen should be granted a recount.
        Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
        Mr. BATES. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may require to 
    the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Swift].
        Mr. [Allan] SWIFT [of Washington]. Mr. Speaker, the issue is 
    whether this contest should be dismissed. I believe it should, and 
    for the same reason this House has regularly recommended dismissing 
    contests, including most recently the Guam contest. Under our 
    precedents a contestant has a substantial burden. A contestant must 
    allege with specificity irregularities that, if proven, would 
    likely change the result of the election. This is the standard the 
    House has consistently applied. To my mind, the contestant, Mr. 
    Hansen, did not satisfy this test.
        A contest is subject to dismissal at any time if the 
    contestant's claims are not sufficiently specific to put into 
    serious question the outcome of the election.
        Are contestant's claims sufficiently specific in light of the 
    evidence presented to meet this test? In my opinion they are not. 
    Contestant's primary claim is that substantial illegal voting 
    marred and likely changed the result of the election. Allegedly, 
    nonresidents were allowed to vote. After a full investigation of 
    these charges, Idaho's attorney general found them meritless. Not a 
    single instance in which an unqualified person was permitted to 
    vote was discovered. The attorney general's findings stand 
    unrefuted by contestant. Consequently, I find no merit in 
    contestant's claim of illegal voting.
        Do the results of the partial State recount justify, as 
    contestant claims that they do, a full House recount? Again, under 
    our precedents, I believe not. The State recount revealed no 
    material difference in the count. Although the recount was 
    conducted only in those precincts where the contestant felt a 
    mistake favorable to him was most likely, the recount only 
    increased Mr. Stallings' margin. Again Mr. Hansen does not dispute 
    the result of the State recount. Nor does he identify specific 
    problems in the count or the recount. His claim rests on no more 
    than mere speculation. If contestant had evidence of significant 
    irregularity, he was obliged to produce it. Without such evidence 
    his claim is to be dismissed.
        Lastly, contestant claims that the canvass of votes was not 
    conducted in accordance with State law. Mr. Hansen made this claim 
    unsuccessfully in State court. This claim was not made in Mr. 
    Hansen's notice of contest. I suspect it is only now being raised 
    because all the other claims have proven to be unsupportable. There 
    is no reason to believe that there was anything illegal or improper 
    in the manner that the votes were canvassed.
        For these reasons I would recommend that the contest be 
    dismissed.
        Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 minutes to my 
    distinguished colleague and friend, the gentleman from California 
    [Mr. Thomas].
        Mr. [Williams] THOMAS of California. Mr. Speaker, on election 
    day in November of 1984, there was a very close election, but there 
    was a winner and the State certified that winner. Oh, there was a 
    State official involved in some questionable procedure. It was 
    challenged by county officials. There were election materials that 
    were handled differently in different counties. State election law 
    was not followed precisely in some counties in that congressional 
    district.
        Are we back home again in Indiana? No; we are in Idaho's Second 
    District.
        But the similarities between those two contests does not end 
    there. This House decided to send to the House Administration 
    Committee and a task force dominated 2 to 1 by Democrats the 
    question of how to resolve those elections.
        And so, were there hearings in Idaho's Second District, as 
    there were in Indiana's Eighth District? No. Were there witnesses 
    brought forth to examine the information of individuals who 
    participated in the election, as was done in Indiana? No.
        In fact, the motion filed by the Democrat to dismiss under the 
    laws by which he certainly has that privilege was not even filed in 
    a timely fashion. How was that handled? By a 2-to-1 vote.
        I recall in the debate on Indiana's Eighth, a number of 
    Democrats pointing out that there was a bill in the Indiana 
    Legislature. It had been introduced, and the contents of that bill 
    that had been introduced has some change suggested in Indiana law 
    which was supportive of the Democrats' position, and on this floor 
    they touted how significant the fact was that the Indiana 
    Legislature was considering a possible change in Indiana State law. 
    It was evidence for them of a clear direction, not just of the 
    voters but of the State government of Indiana. What happened to the 
    bill? It did not even get out of one House.
        In Idaho a bill was introduced, passed by the legislature, and 
    signed by the Governor. It is now the law of the State of Idaho, 
    repudiating the action that was taken by State election officials. 
    It is the law of the State of Idaho based upon what occurred in 
    this contest.
        Did this task force consider what occurred in Idaho? No.
        In Indiana the people elected a candidate in the Eighth 
    Congressional District. His name was Rick McIntyre. The State of 
    Indiana certified him as the winner, once during the election and a 
    second time after the recount. He came to this floor on January 3, 
    like any other Member-elect. He held a valid certificate from the 
    State of Indiana. Was that good enough for the Democratic majority 
    in this House? No.
        Did we get to an investigation of Indiana's Eighth 
    Congressional District based upon a motion filed by the loser, 
    Frank McCloskey? No. That contest, that motion that was filed has 
    not been handled by the House Administration Committee. Perhaps it 
    is for the reason that the gentleman from Washington gave as to why 
    he believes we should now support the task force and the 
    committee's position, and that the motion is without merit. But 
    that did not stop the majority of Democrats in this House. They 
    sent it to the committee, and as a matter of fact, by a series of 
    2-to-1 votes, the choice of the people of Indiana was overturned, 
    the Indiana State election laws were trashed, and by a majority of 
    Democrats on the floor of the House Frank McCloskey was selected as 
    the Representative from the Eighth District of Indiana.
        Now, in Idaho's Second District, we may have an individual who 
    was elected by the people. He was certified by the State. But 
    Idaho's election law was not followed in terms of a canvassing of 
    those votes to determine in fact if the initial count was an 
    accurate count. Idaho State law requires that. It was not done. The 
    presumption is that Mr. Stallings holds a valid State certificate.
        But did the task force look behind the certificate, as they did 
    in Indiana? Did they examine the irregularities of Idaho law as 
    they did in Indiana? No.
        By a series of 2-to-1 votes, they dismissed all of the 
    discrepancies and the inaccuracies and the inadvertent errors in 
    Idaho's Second District.
        Now, Mr. and Mrs. America may be a little bit confused by what 
    has gone on over a span of 6 months. Why in the world would we 
    spend the time in Indiana to go behind the State certificate and 
    attempt to overturn and in fact, by a straight Democratic vote on 
    the floor of the House, overturn that certificate when in Idaho we 
    will not even hold one hearing to question any violation of State 
    law in Idaho? Well Mr. and Mrs. America, let me clarify it for you. 
    In Indiana the holder of the State certificate was a Republican; in 
    Idaho the holder of the State certificate is a Democrat.
        So, Mr. and Mrs. America, if the wind shifts westward and you 
    notice a bit of a putrid smell on the wind, let me tell you what 
    that is. That is the House of Representatives writing chapter 2 in 
    their book of political arrogance.
        I would ask the Members of this House to simply not participate 
    any longer in these kinds of charades unless and until the 
    Committee on House Administration and this House decide that 
    election contests are at least equal to ethics questions against 
    the Members and we treat election contests as we treat questions of 
    ethics, and that is that there be an equal number of Democrats and 
    an equal number of Republicans deciding what the truth is.
        Unless and until that structural procedure is changed, I think 
    we can understand what every case coming to this floor from House 
    Administration and any task force formed by that committee is going 
    to be, and that will be by a series of 2-to-1 votes making sure 
    that the outcome is exactly as the majority wishes.
        In Indiana's Eighth, it was to overturn the valid State 
    certificate, deny the election to the Republican and seat the 
    Democrat.
        In Idaho, since the Democrat won, the Democratic majority 
    upholds State law, does not examine the changes taken place, and 
    somehow within a period of 6 months, the Democrats are attempting 
    to convince everyone that black is white and then white is black.
        You do not believe it and I do not believe it, but it is going 
    to happen. It is going to happen when the majority, through sheer 
    arrogance, exercises the tyranny of the majority. Mr. Speaker, I 
    yield back the balance of my time.
        Mr. BATES. Mr. Speaker, I have some final remarks that I would 
    make, and I now reserve the balance of my time.
        Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to my friend and 
    colleague, the gentleman from Idaho [Mr. Craig].
        Mr. [Larry] CRAIG [of Idaho]. Mr. Speaker, I would like to 
    associate myself with the remarks of my colleague from Nebraska and 
    my colleague from California as it relates to this issue.
        In January when we convened to seat Members, I took the floor 
    hoping to convince my colleagues here in the House to uphold State 
    law, both in the instance of Indiana and in the instance of Idaho. 
    I stood and encouraged this House to seat Richard Stallings. 
    Although there was a question and a cloud in Idaho as to whether he 
    was officially elected, the State had certified as they had in 
    Indiana.
        I am not sure yet whether I erred, but at least I was very 
    ignorant as to what would follow the proceedings in this House. Now 
    we know. The story has unraveled. There is no question as to how 
    the House planned to proceed at that time and then proceeded.
        My ignorance was this: What I failed to recognize was that the 
    incumbent in the Indiana race, Mr. McCloskey, was a Democrat, and 
    the incumbent in the Idaho race, Mr. Hansen, was a Republican. In 
    that rests the whole question and, of course, in that is the result 
    of the outcome.
        Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to my friend and 
    colleague, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Myers].
        Mr. [John] MYERS of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I rise for 
    clarification. I thought I understood what was happening until I 
    came to the floor today. I have looked for the committee hearings. 
    Were the committee hearings printed, I ask the gentleman from 
    California [Mr. Bates] I have a committee print, but I mean the 
    hearings where they investigated the facts that I have heard 
    discussed here today.
        I yield to the gentleman for his response.
        Mr. BATES. As the House Administration Committee has done on 
    all contested elections, we have several this year. The task force 
    holds a hearing. If the gentleman is referring to field hearings, 
    there were none held in this case because the evidence was not 
    overwhelming to warrant such hearings.
        Mr. MYERS of Indiana. No hearings held in Washington?
        Mr. BATES. There were hearings in Washington.
        Mr. MYERS of Indiana. Were there any hearings held in Idaho to 
    investigate the allegations and the facts as has been presented 
    here today?
        Mr. BATES. Hearings held in Washington, none held in Idaho.
        Mr. MYERS of Indiana. There were none held in Idaho?
        Mr. BATES. None.
        Mr. MYERS of Indiana. Were there any witnesses from Idaho that 
    appeared here to substantiate or to raise any further questions 
    about what happened in Idaho?
        Mr. BATES. No. In order to go to the expense and hold those 
    hearings, we handled this the same as all the other contested 
    elections similar to the one in Guam. We did not go to Guam. We did 
    not go to Idaho. We did not go to all these other places. In fact, 
    the McCloskey-McIntyre is the only one in which the additional 
    effort and expense of holding the hearings in the District of 
    Columbia occurred, to my knowledge.
        Mr. MYERS of Indiana. Well, the statement was made by the 
    gentleman from California, as I recall, today that the questionable 
    ballots of 2,500, or whatever they were, that they were valid 
    ballots. How does the gentleman know that?
        Mr. BATES. How do we know that any-
        Mr. MYERS of Indiana. How do we know that people exist who cast 
    those ballots? The gentleman said they lived on rural routes way 
    out so they got their mail at a post office box. How does the 
    gentleman know that without any hearings?
        Mr. BATES. An investigation was conducted.
        Mr. MYERS of Indiana. By whom?
        Mr. BATES. The district attorney in Idaho.
        Mr. MYERS of Indiana. Idaho's officials were accepted? 
    Indiana's officials were not valid? Why is Idaho acceptable and 
    Indiana was not?
        Mr. BATES. I did not chair the task force.
        Mr. MYERS of Indiana. I am asking the gentleman, the gentleman 
    chaired this one.
        I yield to the gentleman for the response as to why Idaho's 
    officials were valid and Indiana's were not, the officials of that 
    State.
        Mr. BATES. As the gentleman maybe aware, the contested election 
    procedure is under a different statute than the one which the 
    Indiana is under.
        Mr. MYERS of Indiana. Indiana, action by this House, had no 
    contested election. There was not one.
        Mr. BATES. There were two separate procedures.
        Mr. MYERS of Indiana. As it has already been drawn out, the 
    Indiana case was instigated by this House.
        Why was it not similar? Why was it handled entirely different? 
    There was a very close examination, in Indiana ballot by ballot, 
    which ignored Indiana law entirely, and yet we have not examined 
    Idaho law. As has been said, Idaho law has been changed because 
    they recognized it was wrong. Indiana examined theirs and said, 
    ``We have a valid law. We did not change it.''
        I am shocked today. I did not agree with what happened in the 
    Indiana case. I did not think the House had the right to come into 
    Indiana and rewrite the election laws. But if that was going to be 
    the precedent, if that was going to be the new rule that this House 
    decided for its membership, so be it.
        But today we have gone back and said, ``Oh, we're going to 
    abolish all of that.''
        Inconsistency, and I am shocked at this House and am very 
    disappointed in this task force and the House Administration 
    Committee and the leadership of this House.
        Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. Speaker, to close debate on our side, I yield 
    such time as he may consume to my friend and colleague, the 
    gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Frenzel].
        Mr. [William] FRENZEL [of Minnesota]. Mr. Speaker, there is in 
    this specific case before us no bitterness, no allegation of 
    misconduct by either contestee or contestant or by the people who 
    are promoting either person.
        The bitterness that has infected our debate today is a residual 
    of discussions and decisions made with respect to Indiana's Eighth 
    District earlier in the year. The reason that that bitterness 
    floods over, spreads over this whole Chamber today, is that the 
    cases are so similar.
        As has already been pointed out, in the case of the Indiana 
    Eighth, the House decided that it had to upset the laws of the 
    State of Indiana. It said that the Indiana laws were no good, that 
    Indiana State officials were incompetent and that the election was 
    therefore invalid. We literally caused another election under rules 
    invented by the elections task force as it went along. Then, those 
    rules were changed on the last day of that subcommittee's work so 
    that it could declare the person it wanted as the winner, even 
    though he had not won the election.
        In the Idaho case which is now before us, we have a very 
    similar situation. I recall our distinguished majority leader 
    saying that the laws of Indiana were not carried out in a timely, 
    regular, and fair manner.
        What do we have in Idaho? Exactly the same kind of problem. The 
    gentleman from Kansas outlined the difficulty with canvassing, the 
    address problem, the error rate. But did the task force and the 
    committee make a similar decision? No. In this case the committee 
    decided by a 2-to-1 vote that the contestee's complaint was without 
    merit. In a similar case, the committee will back up Idaho law, but 
    it trashed Indiana law.
        I submit that the difference between these actions was simply 
    the difference in the way it was handled; that is, the McIntyre-
    McCloskey matter was not handled under the Federal Contested 
    Elections Act. It was handled under an exercise in pure cronyism.
        The Hansen-Stallings matter was handled under the Federal 
    Contested Elections Act. It follows, in my judgment, the precedents 
    of the House; that is, the elections task force said that the State 
    did the best it could under the circumstances. The State ought to 
    be upheld.
        The problem is not with Hansen-Stallings. The problem is the 
    atrocity wrought in the case of McIntyre versus McCloskey, the 
    egregious exercise in cronyism that I have already discussed.
        The bottom line after all the exclusions, deductions, tax 
    credits, and carry-forwards, the net, net, net in that case, is 
    that we overturned Indiana. We discredited the State, its law and 
    its officials. Here we are going to uphold Idaho, its State law and 
    its officials.
        There is clearly something wrong in this House of 
    Representatives. It is not with the matter before us today. It is 
    the matter which was stuffed down the throats of the minority by 
    the Democratic majority in our previous Indiana decision.
        Now, my judgment is that the best way that the Republican 
    minority can express its absolute disgust with the previous 
    McIntyre-McCloskey matter and not befoul the matter that is before 
    us is to vote ``present'' on the rollcall which I expect will 
    follow.
        If we are to follow the precedents of the House and good 
    procedures and the Federal Contested Elections Act, many Members 
    would be inclined, as I am inclined, to vote ``yes'' on the 
    recommendation of the House Administration Committee. It is pretty 
    straightforward. A ``yes'' vote means that we agree with the State 
    of Idaho.
        If we are to follow the McIntyre precedent that you gave us, 
    that our friends in the Democrat majority inflicted on us, we would 
    have to vote ``no''. A ``no'' vote would say the State has not done 
    a good job, that it has not done its Job in a timely manner. I do 
    not believe that is the way Republicans should vote, either.
        I think our only choice is to vote ``present'' and leave the 
    Democrat majority with its own mess, the mess of conflict of 
    precedent, and counter-precedent, which they have awarded to 
    themselves. Let them remain hoisted on their own petards, swinging 
    in the wind. They have justly earned that position of 
    embarrassment.
        I will remind my Republican friends that we have already voted 
    to seat Congressman Stallings. On the previous January 3 vote to 
    seat him, no Republican voted against Mr. Stallings. He presented a 
    valid certificate presented to him by his State. We accepted it and 
    we voted to make him a Congressman, like all the rest of us.
        It is only Mr. McIntyre who is the victim of partisan cronyism 
    in this House.
        I think the good news in this matter is the information that I 
    started with. That is, whatever irregularities we have found in the 
    committee and in the task force, there was no allegation of fraud, 
    no intentional wrong doing. We do not know, as stated before, 
    whether the State did right or not. But, as should have been our 
    precedent in the McIntyre case, the committee decided that the 
    State's laws and its certificate should be upheld.
        Mr. Speaker, I urge on my Republican colleagues a ``present'' 
    vote and on my Democrat colleagues examination of their 
    consciences.
        Mr. [Frank] ANNUNZIO [of Illinois]. Mr. Speaker, I want to take 
    this opportunity to compliment the members of the task force for 
    their thorough examination and review of this contested election.
        Both majority and minority have expressed differing views as to 
    the conclusion of this contest. However, the hearing and the 
    meeting of the committee at which the matter was considered was 
    conspicuously without the rancor which has characterized 
    deliberations on earlier contests. Icongratulate Mr. Bates who 
    chaired the task force as well as Mr. Swift and Mr. Roberts who 
    served ably thereon. I congratulate Mr. Frenzel, the ranking 
    minority of the committee, for his objectivity and candor.
        I look forward to a continued constructive relationship with 
    the minority and I believe that we are working in the right 
    direction.
        Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, 
    and I yield back the balance of my time.
        Mr. BATES. Mr. Speaker, just a few final remarks.
        I would for the record want to clarify that there is no 
    similarity between this contested election and the McIntyre-
    McCloskey issue which was under House Resolution 1 and was under a 
    different set of rules.
        This particular resolution is brought up under Federal statute 
    of contested elections, quite similar to the one for the Territory 
    of Guam in which a Republican Delegate from Guam did have his 
    election challenged. He was seated unanimously by the task force, 
    dominated by Democrats and by the full committee which also has a 
    Democratic majority and by the full House.
        So I think to make a comparison of the cases requires a 
    comparison of these two cases where we did without incident, 
    without bitterness, without hostility, seat the Member and followed 
    through with the recommendations, as I think we should do on this 
    one.
        I might say that the members on the task force and the full 
    committee have conducted themselves quite properly in voting out a 
    12-to-1 bipartisan vote for approval; so I think we should not add 
    to the hostility and bitterness that has been brought about by 
    previous actions.
        I call on the House of Representatives to support this 
    recommendation, House Resolution 272, and vote ``aye.''
        Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution.
        The question was taken, and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it.
        Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    247, nays 4, answered ``present'' 169, not voting 14, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 326] . . . 

        Mr. McDADE changed his vote from ``yea'' to ``present.''
        Mr. SWINDALL changed his vote from ``present'' to ``nay.''
        So the resolution was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table. . .  
    -------------------

                              PERSONAL EXPLANATION

        Mr. [Richard] STALLINGS [of Idaho]. Mr. Speaker, a few moments 
    ago, on rollcall No. 326, relating to the contested-election 
    contest in Idaho, I intended to vote ``present.'' As circumstances 
    developed on the floor, it became apparent that a present vote was 
    developing as a protest vote, one disapproving of the process 
    carried out by the Committee on House Administration. Thus, I voted 
    ``aye,'' not wanting to have my vote thus construed. I reiterate 
    that I intended to vote ``present'' and that was my desire.



Sec. 21. One Hundredth Congress, 1987-1988

    There were no election contests considered by the House during the 
100th Congress.



Sec. 22. One Hundred First Congress, 1989-1990

    There were no election contests considered by the House during the 
101st Congress.



Sec. 23. One Hundred Second Congress, 1991-1992

    There were no election contests considered by the House during the 
102d Congress.



Sec. 24. One Hundred Third Congress, 1993-1994

Sec. 24.1 McCuen v Dickey

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the Fourth District of Arkansas was conducted on November 3, 
1992.(1) The general election candidates were Jay Dickey 
(the Republican candidate), and Bill McCuen (the Democratic candidate). 
Mr. McCuen was also the Arkansas Secretary of State, and therefore the 
state official with the responsibility to issue a certificate of 
election to the winner of the election. An unofficial canvass of votes 
on December 5, 1992, showed that Mr. Dickey had received 113,004 votes, 
and that Mr. McCuen had received 102,911 votes. A state circuit court, 
following a petition by Mr. McCuen, instructed him to issue the 
requisite certificate of election. On December 23, 1992, such 
certificate was issued, with the final vote tallies indicating that Mr. 
Dickey had received 113,009 votes and Mr. McCuen had received 102,918 
votes. Mr. Dickey appeared on January 5, 1993, at the opening of the 
103d Congress, and was administered the oath of office without 
objection or challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 103-109, 103d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted, Mr. McCuen initially went to state court alleging 
irregularities with the voting machines used in the election. The court 
ordered the machines impounded, and the machines were then inspected, 
with representatives of all parties in attendance. Following the 
inspection, the court dismissed the complaint, citing lack of 
jurisdiction over a contested House election.
    On December 4, 1992, Mr. McCuen (hereafter ``contestant'') filed a 
notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was referred to 
the Committee on House Administration for its consideration. An amended 
notice of contest was filed the following day, with additional 
arguments and documents to support the claims made in the initial 
notice of contest. Contestant alleged that voting machines and ballots 
had misled voters, and that defective machines failed to properly 
record or count votes. On January 4, 1993, Mr. Dickey (hereafter 
``contestee'') filed an answer and a motion to dismiss the case. On 
January 20, 1993, contestant filed a response to the answer and in 
opposition to the motion to dismiss.
    The Committee on House Administration established a task force of 
three Members to review the pleadings in this case. On February 4, 
1993, the task force met to hear oral arguments from the parties. 
Contestant made four specific allegations: (1) that the form of certain 
ballots was not in compliance with state law; (2) that the form of 
certain ballots misaligned candidates' names, making it difficult for 
voters to select the correct candidate; (3) that programming errors 
caused incorrect tabulation of votes in some machines; and (4) that 
voting machines were not properly secured.
    The task force rejected each of these arguments as insufficient to 
overcome the motion to dismiss. The task force considered it ``merely 
conjectural''(2) that the lack of strict compliance with 
state law affected any votes. Similarly, ``no irregularity, sufficient 
to change the result of the election, could be reasonable 
inferred''(3) from the form of the ballots used. An expert 
witness testified that programming errors discovered during the 
inspection did not affect the congressional races. The lack of proper 
security for the voting machines was ``entirely speculative and without 
any evidentiary basis.''(4) Ultimately, the committee agreed 
with the assessment of its task force, and concluded that ``no credible 
evidence of irregularities sufficient to change the result of the 
election''(5) was presented. The committee thus recommended 
granting contestee's motion to dismiss.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. H. Rept. 103-109, 103d Cong. 1st Sess. p. 4.
 3. Id. at p. 5.
 4. Id. at p. 6.
 5. Id. at p. 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On May 25, 1993,(6) the committee filed its privileged 
report. By unanimous consent, the House agreed to take up House 
Resolution 182 (dismissing the contest), which was agreed to by voice 
vote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 139 Cong. Rec. 11046-47, 103d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

               DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST AGAINST JAY DICKEY

        Mr. KLECZKA, from the Committee on House Administration, 
    reported the following privileged resolution (H. Res. 182, Rept. 
    No. 103-109) dismissing the election contest against Jay Dickey, 
    which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed:

H. Res. 182

  Resolved, That the election contest of Bill McCuen, contestant, against 
Jay Dickey, contestee, relating to the office of Representative from the 
Fourth Congressional District of Arkansas, is dismissed.

        Mr. [Gerald] KLECZKA [of Wisconsin]. Mr. Speaker, I ask 
    unanimous consent for the immediate consideration in the House of 
    the resolution (H. Res. 182) dismissing the election contest 
    against Jay Dickey.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(7) The Clerk will report 
    the resolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. Michael McNulty (NY).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read the resolution.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. McNulty). Is there objection to 
    the request of the gentleman from Wisconsin?
        There was no objection.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. 
    Kleczka] is recognized for 1 hour.
        Mr. KLECZKA. Mr. Speaker, I yield the customary half hour, for 
    the purpose of debate only, to the ranking member of the contested 
    election task force and the full Committee on House Administration, 
    the gentleman from California [Mr.Thomas], pending which I yield 
    myself such time as I may consume.
        Mr. Speaker, to provide the House with a little background, on 
    Tuesday, November 3, 1992, the general election for the Fourth 
    Congressional District in the State of Arkansas was held. This is a 
    largely rural district consisting of 26 counties in the southern 
    half of the State.
        The initial results of this election had Jay Dickey, the 
    Republican candidate, leading Bill McCuen, the Democrat, by 10,093 
    votes.
        On December 4, 1992, Mr. McCuen filed a notice of election 
    contest with the Clerk of the House, based on two contentions: 
    First, that the ballot and voting machines misled voters, and, 
    second, that defective voting machines produced inaccurate totals.
        On December 5, 1992, Mr. McCuen filed an amended notice of 
    election contest with the Clerk, providing additional information 
    and arguments in support of his two initial contentions, and 
    providing documentary evidence and exhibits.
        Mr. Speaker, on January 27, 1993, pursuant to House 
    Administration Committee rule 16, the chairman of the committee, 
    Mr. Rose, created a task force to review the election contest. This 
    task force was charged with reviewing the documentary record, 
    receiving oral arguments, and recommending to the committee the 
    disposition of an election contest filed pursuant to 2 U.S.C. 381 
    through 396, by Mr. McCuen.
        The House is given its authority to judge election returns, 
    primarily from article I, section 5 of the Constitution which 
    provides that: ``Each House shall be the judge of the elections, 
    returns, and qualifications of its own members * * *.'' This 
    provision, taken with section 4 or article I, invest in Congress 
    near complete authority to establish procedures and render final 
    decisions relating to the election of its Members.
        Although the House could assume complete responsibility for 
    resolving election contests, to date it has declined to do so. 
    Instead, both Chambers have recognized and relied upon State 
    contest and recount procedures to clarify and resolve issues 
    relating to election contests. The State of Arkansas, in this case, 
    however, has chosen not to assert its jurisdiction.
        In fact, the Governor of Arkansas, in his letter to the Clerk 
    of the House, certifying the results of the Fourth Congressional 
    District race, stated:

  The enclosed certification should not be interpreted as my position on 
the merits of the contest. In fact, I am greatly disturbed by the apparent 
defects in the voting machines in Garland County and by the finding of the 
Garland County Circuit Court that the voting machines have errors and 
faults.

        Thus, it became the House's obligation to resolve this matter.
        I was appointed to chair this task force, which also consisted 
    of Mr. Thomas of California and the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. 
    Kildee.
        On Thursday, February 4, the task force met and heard testimony 
    on Mr. Dickey's motion to dismiss the contest. Upon review of the 
    arguments presented by contestant and the contestee, the task force 
    unanimously agreed to recommend dismissal, thus reaffirming Jay 
    Dickey as the duly elected Member of Congress from the Fourth 
    Congressional District of Arkansas.
        Mr. Speaker, the members of the task force unanimously agreed 
    that the contestant's allegations were not sufficiently specific to 
    put into serious question either the results of the election, or 
    the propriety of the actions of election and other State and local 
    officials in the conduct of the election, so as to justify 
    proceeding further with an election contest.
        It should be noted that in contested election proceedings in 
    the House, the contestant always has the burden of specifically 
    alleging, and supporting with documentation, irregularities 
    sufficient to change the outcome of the election. The contestant 
    must also demonstrate that he is entitled to the seat. If the 
    contestant fails to meet this burden, the Committee on House 
    Administration may suggest dismissal of the contest.
        On Wednesday, March 17, the full Committee on House 
    Administration concurred in the task force's decision that the 
    contestant failed to sustain his burden with evidence sufficient to 
    overcome a motion to dismiss. It accordingly moved to favorably 
    report an original resolution dismissing this election contest.
        It is therefore the finding of the committee that contestee Jay 
    Dickey received the highest number of votes cast in the election 
    and was duly elected by the voters of the Fourth Congressional 
    District of the State of Arkansas.
        Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
        Mr. [Williams] THOMAS of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 
    myself such time as I may consume.
        Mr. Speaker, about a decade ago I addressed the floor of the 
    House on another contested election. I think it is significant to 
    note the differences between the one we have before us today and 
    that one of a decade ago.
        The gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Kleczka] correctly pointed 
    out that this was brought to the floor under the Contested Election 
    Act and that we examined the contention of irregularities in the 
    race according to Arkansas law. Over a decade ago, Mr. Speaker, we 
    did not do that. We examined a contest in Indiana brought to the 
    task force by resolution in which a set of rules that existed 
    nowhere in the world, in any State, and especially in the State of 
    Indiana, was used to examine a series of ballots, and that through 
    sheer force of partisan majority an election that had been 
    certified by the secretary of state of Indiana was overturned. I am 
    pleased to say that today we have an election in front of us that 
    was certified by the secretary of state of Arkansas who, by 
    coincidence, happened to be the opponent in this case, Mr. McCuen. 
    And we examined his contentions about whether or not there were 
    irregularities in the ballots, in the voting machines, and in the 
    manner in which people voted in those voting machines in particular 
    areas.
        Mr. Speaker, there was an extensive hearing. Evidence was 
    presented. Numerous questions were asked. Followup information was 
    presented. And the chairman, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. 
    Kleczka], the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Kildee], and myself 
    exhausted our questions, and to our satisfaction none of the 
    allegations about irregularities in the election were proved. Under 
    the law of the State of Arkansas our colleague, Mr. Dickey, was 
    duly elected.
        So, Mr. Speaker, it is with extreme pleasure that I come before 
    the Members today and support the majority in asking unanimous 
    consent to move forward House Resolution 182 which finally puts the 
    election contest against Mr. Dickey to rest, a contest that never 
    should have been presented, that never had credible evidence to 
    carry it forward, and that put a taint on his election by the 
    people in Arkansas.
        The answer is: Mr. Dickey won the election day, he won on the 
    recount, he won on the challenge in the court, and he won in front 
    of the task force. It seems to me the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. 
    Dickey] has been certified more than any other Member of the House, 
    that he truly won that election, and it is about time we move 
    forward with saying so formally, and so I am pleased to ask my 
    colleagues to support House Resolution 182.
        Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
        Mr. KLECZKA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
    consume.
        Mr. Speaker, after the last comments by the gentleman from 
    California [Mr. Thomas] I am thinking of withdrawing the 
    resolution. Let us keep the hype up for the gentleman from Arkansas 
    [Mr. Dickey]. But I will not do so, Mr. Speaker.
        Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move 
    the previous question on the resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.



Sec. 25. One Hundred Fourth Congress, 1995-1996

Sec. 25.1 Anderson v Rose

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the Seventh District of North Carolina was conducted on November 
8, 1994.(1) The general election candidates were Charlie 
Rose (the Democratic candidate), and Robert Anderson (the Republican 
candidate). The official election returns showed that Mr. Rose had 
received 62,670 votes, and that Mr. Anderson had received 58,849 votes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Oversight relating to this election contest. See H. Rept. 
        104-852, 104th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On November 28, 1994, Mr. Anderson filed a complaint against 
certain county election officials, alleging violations of election laws 
and other irregularities. The State Board of Elections initially voted 
to delay certification of the results, but later reversed that 
decision. The State Bureau of Investigation began an investigation of 
the alleged violations on November 18, 1994.
    On December 28, 1994, Mr. Anderson (hereafter ``contestant'') filed 
a notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was referred to 
the Committee on House Oversight(2) for its consideration. 
The committee appointed a task force of three Members to review the 
matter. On February 8, 1995, Mr. Rose (hereafter ``contestee'') filed a 
motion to dismiss and a memorandum in support thereof. The task force 
met on June 9, 1995, and August 3, 1995, to hear testimony from the 
parties. On August 3, the task force voted both to grant contestee's 
motion to dismiss, and to refer allegations of Federal law violations 
to the Department of Justice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. Parliamentarian's Note: During the 104th and 105th Congresses, the 
        Committee on House Administration was redesignated as the 
        Committee on House Oversight. House Rules and Manual Sec. 724 
        (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In his notice of contest, the contestant alleged a variety of 
irregularities in the election, including: illegal voting by those 
ineligible to vote; tampering with voting machines; illegal conduct by 
election officials; bribery of voters; harassment of poll workers; and 
voter intimidation. Contestant also based his claim on the fact that 
one county increased its turnout from the 1992 election while all other 
counties saw a decrease in turnout (concluding that only fraud or error 
explained the difference). Finally, contestant questioned whether 
contestee fulfilled North Carolina's residency requirements, alleging 
that contestee was actually an inhabitant of Virginia and therefore 
ineligible to be elected to a North Carolina seat.
    Contestee's motion to dismiss denied the allegations of the 
contestant, stating that the claims were based on mere conjecture, and 
that he had not met his burden under the statute to show how the 
election results would have been changed. Alternatively, contestee 
argued that contestant failed to take advantage of state remedies for 
the alleged violations, and should therefore be precluded from 
advancing those claims with the House.
    In its committee report, the Committee on House Oversight 
articulated a standard for determining whether or not a motion to 
dismiss should be granted. The committee's standard focused on 
``credibility,'' i.e., did the contestant provide ``specific, credible 
allegations''(3) that either showed how the outcome of the 
election would have been reversed, or that the election as a whole was 
so tainted by fraud or error as to be inherently unreliable. The 
committee report attempted to distinguish prior cases (decided when the 
other party was in the majority) where the motion to dismiss presented 
``an insurmountable barrier to election contestants.''(4) In 
their report, the majority cited their own prior dissents, from when 
they were in the minority, that took issue with standards used by the 
previous majority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. H. Rept. 104-852, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 7.
 4. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Despite these expressed differences in the standard for evaluating 
motions to dismiss, the committee nevertheless concluded that the 
contestant had not met his burden under the statute. The committee 
report discussed each allegation, and dismissed each as either not 
credible, insufficiently specific, or as having an uncertain effect on 
the outcome of the election. The committee also relied heavily on the 
state investigation and the conclusions of state authorities with 
respect to the alleged irregularities. Ultimately, the committee agreed 
that contestant's claims were insufficient to overcome the burdens 
imposed by the statute, and thus recommended to the House dismissal of 
the contest.
    Minority party Members filed supplemental views to accompany the 
majority's report. The minority criticized the majority's conduct in 
all election contests during the 104th Congress, arguing that the 
majority's standard for evaluating pre-answer motions under the statute 
was flawed, and inevitably led to ``unnecessary and wasteful 
proceedings.''(5) The supplemental views cited earlier 
precedents that set the bar for contestants to prevail against motions 
to dismiss very high, so as to deter meritless claims and avoid 
unnecessary investigations. Ultimately, the disagreement centered on 
the extent to which contestants must be able to support claims of 
alleged irregularities in the election with substantive evidence in 
order to proceed to the discovery stage under the statute. The 
supplemental views argued that the committee report failed to strike 
the correct balance between allowing credible claims to move forward 
and turning aside claims that are unlikely to be substantiated. 
Nevertheless, the minority ultimately agreed with the majority's 
conclusion that the contestant in this case did not meet his burden 
under the statute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. Id. at p. 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On September 26, 1996,(6) the committee filed its 
privileged report. By unanimous consent, the House agreed to take up 
House Resolution 538 (dismissing the contest), which was agreed to by 
voice vote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 142 Cong. Rec. 25242, 104th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST AGAINST CHARLIE ROSE

        Mr. THOMAS, from the Committee on House Oversight, submitted a 
    privileged report (Rept. No. 104-852) on the resolution (H. Res. 
    538) dismissing the election contest against Charlie Rose, which 
    was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.
        Mr. [William] THOMAS [of California]. Mr. Speaker, I ask 
    unanimous consent for immediate consideration of the resolution 
    (House Resolution 538) dismissing the election contest against 
    Charlie Rose.
        The Clerk read the title of the resolution.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(7) Is there objection to 
    the request of the gentleman from California?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. Mark Foley (FL).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Victor] FAZIO of California. Reserving the right to 
    object, Mr. Speaker, and I obviously do not intend to object, but I 
    would like my colleague, the gentleman from California, to explain 
    the purpose of this resolution.
        Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. FAZIO of California. I yield to the gentleman from 
    California.
        Mr. THOMAS. I thank the gentleman for yielding, Mr. Speaker.
        As was announced, this was a resolution dismissing the election 
    contest filed by Mr. Robert Anderson against the gentleman from 
    North Carolina, Mr. Charlie Rose, for the seat in the Seventh 
    Congressional District in North Carolina.
        As chairman of the Committee on House Oversight, I appointed a 
    task force from the committee, comprised of the gentleman from 
    Ohio, John Boehner, as chairman, the gentleman from Louisiana, 
    William Jefferson, and the gentleman from Michigan, Vern Ehlers, to 
    hear the matter.
        The task force heard allegations of election irregularities and 
    fraud but concluded that there were not sufficient credible 
    allegations that, if proven, would change the outcome of the 
    election.
        The task force met on August 3, 1995, and voted unanimously to 
    dismiss the contest. I believe the House clearly should so indicate 
    to the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Rose], since October 25, 
    1995, the full committee agreed unanimously to recommend dismissal.
        I do want to thank the minority for lifting the hold on 
    unanimous consents so we could present this resolution this 
    evening.
        Mr. FAZIO of California. Further reserving the right to object, 
    Mr. Speaker, I simply want to join with the gentleman from 
    California [Mr. Thomas] in removing our colleague, the gentleman 
    from North Carolina [Mr. Rose], from his 2-year term in purgatory.
        With that, Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from California?
        There was no objection.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 538

  Resolved, That the election contest of Robert Anderson, contestant, 
against Charlie Rose, contestee, relating to the office of Representative 
from the Seventh Congressional District of North Carolina, is dismissed.

        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 25.2 Haas v Bass

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the Second District of New Hampshire was conducted on November 8, 
1994.(8) This election contest, however, involved candidates 
for the Republican primary rather than the general election. Joseph S. 
Haas, Jr. (hereafter ``contestant'') lost to Charles F. Bass (hereafter 
``contestee'') in that primary election. The contestee went on to win 
the general election, and was seated by the House on opening day of the 
104th Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Oversight relating to this election contest. See H. Rept. 
        104-853, 104th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On December 6, 1994, contestant filed a notice of contest with the 
Clerk of the House, which was forwarded to the Committee on House 
Oversight(9) for its consideration. The committee formed a 
task force of three Members to review the case. The only allegation 
made by contestant was that New Hampshire law required all candidates 
to file an affidavit attesting to the fact that they are not a 
``subversive person,''(10) and that contestee had failed to 
abide by this requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. Parliamentarian's Note: During the 104th and 105th Congresses, the 
        Committee on House Administration was redesignated as the 
        Committee on House Oversight. House Rules and Manual Sec. 724 
        (2021).
10. H. Rept. 104-853, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given that the contestant was only a candidate in the primary 
election and not the general election, the task force first addressed 
the question of whether contestant had standing to bring an election 
contest under the Federal Contested Elections Act. The task force 
concluded that New Hampshire law allows write-in candidates, and thus 
the contestant was an eligible write-in candidate in the general 
election.
    The task force then turned to the specific allegation of the 
violation of New Hampshire law. After investigating New Hampshire law, 
the task force found both that this provision of law had not been 
enforced in many decades (due to its apparent unconstitutionality), and 
that it had in fact been formally repealed prior to the 1994 elections.
    In its committee report, the committee agreed with the conclusions 
of its task force that the contestant was unable to offer ``any 
basis''(11) to contradict the presumption that contestee's 
valid certificate of election entitled him to his seat. The committee 
thus recommended dismissal of the contest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. Id. at p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On September 26, 1996,(12) the committee filed its 
privileged report. By unanimous consent, the House agreed to take up 
House Resolution 539 (dismissing the contest), which was agreed to by 
voice vote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 142 Cong. Rec. 25243, 104th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST AGAINST CHARLES BASS

        Mr. THOMAS, from the Committee on House Oversight, submitted a 
    privileged report (Rept. No. 104-853) on the resolution (H. Res. 
    539) dismissing the election contest against Charles F. Bass, which 
    was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.
        Mr. [William] THOMAS [of California]. Mr. Speaker, I ask 
    unanimous consent for immediate consideration in the House of the 
    resolution (H. Res. 539) dismissing the election contest against 
    Charles F. Bass.
        The Clerk read the title of the resolution.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(13) Is there objection to 
    the request of the gentleman from California?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. Mark Foley (FL).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Victor] FAZIO of California. Reserving the right to 
    object, Mr. Speaker, I ask my friend, the gentleman from 
    California, to kindly explain the purpose of this resolution.
        Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. FAZIO of California. I yield to the gentleman from 
    California.
        Mr. THOMAS. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me, Mr. 
    Speaker.
        This is, as the last was, a contested election. A task force 
    was appointed, as matter of fact, the identical task force to the 
    one that investigated the North Carolina allegations, the gentleman 
    from Ohio, John Boehner, as chairman, the gentleman from Louisiana, 
    William Jefferson, and the gentleman from Michigan, Vern Ehlers, as 
    members. It was in the State of New Hampshire, in the Second 
    District.
        Mr. Haas's claim was based on the application of a New 
    Hampshire statute which required that a candidate file an oath 
    stating that they were not ``a subversive person.'' This statute 
    had not been applied to candidates in New Hampshire elections since 
    1966, when the State Attorney General notified the Secretary of 
    State that the United States Supreme Court had ruled such oaths 
    unconstitutional.
        Therefore, on March 15, the task force voted unanimously to 
    dismiss the contest, and on May 10 the full committee agreed 
    unanimously to recommend dismissal.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from California?
        There was no objection.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 539

  Resolved, That the election contest of Joseph Haas, contestant, against 
Charles F. Bass, contestee, relating to the office of Representative from 
the Second Congressional District of New Hampshire, is dismissed.

        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 25.3 Munster v Gejdenson

    The election contest of Munster v Gejdenson (Second District of 
Connecticut) was withdrawn by the contestant before the House could 
complete its review of the case.(14) The Committee on House 
Oversight did not issue a report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. See Contested Election Cases in the House of Representatives: 1933 
        to 2011, CRS Report 98-194 (Dec. 12, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 25.4 Brooks v Harman

    The election contest of Brooks v Harman (36th District of 
California) was withdrawn by the contestant before the House could 
complete its review of the case.(15) The Committee on House 
Oversight did not issue a report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------



Sec. 26. One Hundred Fifth Congress, 1997-1998

Sec. 26.1 Dornan v Sanchez

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the 46th District of California was conducted on November 5, 
1996.(1) The general election candidates were Robert K. 
Dornan (the Republican candidate), and Loretta Sanchez (the Democratic 
candidate). The Orange County Registrar of voters certified the 
election on November 22, 1996, declaring Ms. Sanchez the winner by 984 
votes. Following a state recount requested by Mr. Dornan, Ms. Sanchez's 
margin of victory was reduced to 979 votes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Oversight relating to this election contest. See H. Rept. 
        105-416, 105th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On December 4, 1997, state authorities (including the California 
Secretary of State and the Orange County District Attorney) began 
investigating alleged instances of vote fraud occurring in the 
election.
    On December 26, 1997, Mr. Dornan (hereafter ``contestant'') filed a 
notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was forwarded to 
the Committee on House Oversight(2) for its consideration. 
On January 7, 1997, Ms. Sanchez (hereafter ``contestee'') appeared on 
opening day of the new Congress and was administered the oath of office 
without objection or challenge.(3)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. Parliamentarian's Note: During the 104th and 105th Congresses, the 
        Committee on House Administration was redesignated as the 
        Committee on House Oversight. House Rules and Manual Sec. 724 
        (2021).
 3. Parliamentarian's Note: Although no challenge was made to the 
        seating of Ms. Sanchez on opening day, parliamentary inquiries 
        were propounded by both majority party and minority party 
        Members, which established that an election contest was being 
        pursued under the Federal Contested Elections Act, that Ms. 
        Sanchez had appeared with valid credentials from the state of 
        California, and that her seating was without prejudice to the 
        final right to the seat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On January 8, 1997, the committee formed a task force of three 
Members to review the matter. On January 31, 1997, contestee filed a 
motion to dismiss the case or, in the alternative, a motion for a more 
definite statement. On February 10, 1997, the contestant filed an 
opposition to the motion to dismiss and a response to the motion for a 
more definite statement. On February 26, 1997, the task force agreed to 
a request from the contestee to postpone consideration of the motion to 
dismiss until a field hearing in Orange County could be conducted. The 
field hearing was conducted on April 19, 1997.
    Contestant's notice of contest identified a variety of grounds on 
which the contest was based, including allegations that more total 
votes were cast than could be accounted for in county records, that 
illegal votes had been cast by those not eligible to vote, and that 
election officials had made tabulation and other errors sufficient to 
change the result of the election. At the April 19, 1997, hearing, 
contestant narrowed this claims to: (1) alleged voting by noncitizens; 
and (2) voting irregularities, including improper delivery of absentee 
ballots, double voting, and phantom voting.
    Contestee's motion to dismiss argued that contestant's notice of 
contest was defective on a number of procedural grounds: that it was 
not timely filed; that it failed to affirmatively claim a right to 
contestee's seat; that it was insufficiently specific with regard to 
its claims; and that contestant had failed to exhaust available state 
remedies. Contestee's substantive arguments alleged that contestant had 
failed to make credible allegations of fraud or irregularity sufficient 
to change the result of the election, and that, with no indication for 
which candidate illegal votes might have been cast, such illegal votes 
would be deducted proportionally(4) from both candidates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. For more on the concept of proportional deduction of improper votes 
        in election contests, see Sec. 12, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    By postponing a decision on contestee's motion to dismiss, the task 
force triggered the discovery process under the Federal Contested 
Elections Act. On March 10, 1997, contestant's period of discovery 
commenced, and on March 18, 1997, he issued 24 subpoenas signed by a 
U.S. district court judge. Ultimately, 20 more subpoenas were issued 
before May 20, 1997. Contestee's period for discovery commenced on 
April 9, 1997, but she did not issue any subpoenas.
    On April 16, 1997, the committee met to resolve motions to quash or 
modify the subpoenas issued by contestant. The committee chose to hold 
in abeyance some subpoenas, to enforce other subpoenas, and also to 
issue protective orders to protect the privacy interests of 
organizations or individuals who were issued subpoenas. On May 21, 
1997, the committee again met and voted to hold certain subpoenas in 
abeyance, while denying motions to quash other subpoenas. On September 
24, 1997, the committee voted to quash certain subpoenas, modify and 
enforce other subpoenas, and issue its own 
interrogatories.(5) The committee also voted to recommend a 
House resolution urging the U.S. Attorney for the Central District of 
California to file criminal charges against an organization for failure 
to comply with a subpoena.(6)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. Parliamentarian's Note: Pursuant to a committee resolution, such 
        interrogatories would be issued by the chair of the committee 
        after consultation with the ranking minority member. For a one-
        minute speech by the ranking minority member complaining that 
        such consultation did not take place, see 143 Cong. Rec. 21828-
        29, 105th Cong. 1st Sess. (Oct. 8, 1997).
 6. Parliamentarian's Note: Contestant had filed a criminal complaint 
        against the organization with the District Attorney in Los 
        Angeles. The committee wrote to the U.S. Attorney's office 
        twice in an attempt to spur action on the matter. Ultimately, 
        the House adopted the resolution recommended by the committee 
        on September 30, 1997. See H. Res. 244, 143 Cong. Rec. 20876-
        85, 105th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The committee also took an active role in the investigation by 
issuing its own subpoenas to the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS). The committee requested that the INS match its data on 
undocumented aliens to eligible voters lists from Orange County. The 
committee also requested access to relevant INS databases. These 
subpoenas were in addition to the interrogatories and protective orders 
described above.
    Using the data received from INS, the task force ``found clear and 
convincing evidence that 748 invalid votes were cast'' in the 
election.(7) The task force was unable to substantiate other 
allegations of illegal voting by undocumented aliens. Because the 
number of confirmed cases of illegal voting was ``substantially less 
than the 979 vote margin''(8) the committee concluded that 
contest should be dismissed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. H. Rept. 105-416, 105th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 15.
 8. Id. at p. 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Members of the minority filed three separate ``minority'' or 
``additional'' views to accompany the majority's report. These 
additional views found fault with the majority's application of the 
statute, and argued that contestee's motion to dismiss should have been 
granted at the outset because contestant had failed to show 
``credible'' evidence that the outcome of the election would have been 
different.(9) The minority party Members also alleged that 
committee procedures were not followed, that the majority failed to 
provide documents to the minority, and that the majority failed to 
consult with the minority as required. Finally, the minority views took 
issue with the process for determining whether illegal votes had been 
cast by noncitizens. Ultimately, the minority felt that the majority 
had misconstrued the applicable burdens of proof under the statute and 
House precedents, and would have reached the same conclusion (i.e., 
dismissal of the contest) prior to the extensive discovery that was 
conducted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. Id. at p. 1026.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    During the course of this election contest, some Members took issue 
with the conduct of the contestant on the House floor.(10) 
Ultimately, a resolution, offered as a question of the privileges of 
the House under rule IX, was adopted barring the contestant from the 
floor until the election contest was resolved.(11)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Parliamentarian's Note: Under clause 2(a)(2) of rule IV, 
        contestants in election cases are entitled to floor privileges 
        during the pendency of their cases. In this case, the 
        contestant was a former Member, and as such, he separately had 
        floor privileges pursuant to clause 2(a)(15) of rule IV. House 
        Rules and Manual Sec. 678 (2021). For parliamentary inquiries 
        regarding the behavior of the contestant in this case, and 
        whether he should be prohibited from the floor pursuant to 
        clause 4(a)(2) of rule IV, see 143 Cong. Rec. 19026, 105th 
        Cong. 1st Sess. (Sept. 17, 1997). For more on floor privileges 
        generally, see Precedents (Wickham) Ch. 4 Sec. 5.
11. H. Res. 233, 143 Cong. Rec. 19340-45, 105th Cong. 1st Sess. (Sept. 
        18, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As the contest proceeded further into the first session of the 
105th Congress, and ultimately into the second session, the minority 
party began to offer resolutions to dismiss the contest, raised as 
questions of the privileges of the House. The first such resolution was 
offered by the Minority Leader and tabled on October 23, 
1997.(12) Additional resolutions were offered and laid on 
the table on October 29, 1997,(13) October 30, 
1997,(14) and November 5, 1997.(15) Members also 
gave notice to offer additional resolutions that were never formally 
called up for consideration.(16) On November 6, 1997, the 
House adopted a resolution restricting the noticing and offering of 
questions of privilege to the Majority Leader and the Minority Leader, 
and eliminating the requirement that the Speaker designate a time 
within the two-day period set forth in clause 2(a)(1) of rule IX for 
consideration of existing resolutions noticed pursuant to rule 
IX.(17) Before the contest was ultimately resolved, the 
Minority Leader offered three additional resolutions to dismiss the 
contest (on November 8, 1997,(18) November 9, 
1997,(19) and January 28, 1998).(20)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. H. Res. 276, 143 Cong. Rec. 23231-41, 105th Cong. 1st Sess.
13. H. Res. 287, 143 Cong. Rec. 23695-96, 105th Cong. 1st Sess.
14. Eight separate resolutions were offered on this day: H. Res. 290, 
        H. Res. 291, H. Res. 292, H. Res. 293, H. Res. 294, H. Res. 
        295, H. Res. 296, and H. Res. 297. See 143 Cong. Rec. 23959-67, 
        105th Cong. 1st Sess.
15. H. Res. 307, 143 Cong. Rec. 24645-53, 105th Cong. 1st Sess.
16. See 143 Cong. Rec. 24017-48, 105th Cong. 1st Sess. (Oct. 31, 1997); 
        143 Cong. Rec. 24410-13, 105th Cong. 1st Sess. (Nov. 4, 1997); 
        and 143 Cong. Rec. 24596-603, 105th Cong. 1st Sess. (Nov. 5, 
        1997).
17. H. Res. 305, 143 Cong. Rec. 24776-87, 105th Cong. 1st Sess.
18. H. Res. 315, 143 Cong. Rec. 25294-96, 105th Cong. 1st Sess.
19. H. Res. 318, 143 Cong. Rec. 25721-22, 105th Cong. 1st Sess.
20. H. Res. 341, 144 Cong. Rec. 175-76, 105th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Committee on House Oversight filed its privileged report to 
dismiss the contest on February 11, 1998.(21) On February 
12, 1998, House Resolution 355 (dismissing the contest) was offered as 
a privileged matter by the direction of the committee. A motion to 
recommit the resolution back to committee with instructions to strike 
the preamble was rejected. The resolution was adopted by the House, by 
a vote of 378 yeas, 33 nays, and 19 Members not voting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
21. 144 Cong. Rec. 1263, 105th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proceedings of February 12, 1998,(22) are as 
follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
22. 144 Cong. Rec. 1323-24, 1334, 105th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST AGAINST LORETTA SANCHEZ

        Mr. [William] THOMAS [of California]. Mr. Speaker, by direction 
    of the Committee on House Oversight, I call up a privileged 
    resolution (H. Res. 355) and ask for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 355

  Whereas credible allegations by contestant Robert Dornan of election 
fraud in the 46th Congressional District of California were received by the 
House of Representatives and an investigation has been conducted under the 
authority of the Federal Contested Election Act;

  Whereas that investigation was repeatedly hindered and delayed by the 
lack of cooperation by the Department of Justice, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, and key witnesses;

  Whereas the delay and lack of cooperation included the following:

  (1) The refusal of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to provide 
any information to the Committee on House Oversight until the Service was 
subpoenaed and the failure 8 months after the subpoenas to provide the 
accurate information needed by the Committee.

  (2) The refusal of key witnesses to provide evidence under the provisions 
of the Federal Contested Election Act.

  (3) The refusal of the Department of Justice, in complete disregard of a 
resolution passed by the House of Representatives, to enforce the Federal 
Contested Election Act by prosecuting any of the 11 witnesses who refused 
to comply with the provisions of such Act which require production of 
evidence on a timely basis;

  Whereas despite the lack of full cooperation from witnesses and 
government agencies, the investigation of the election contest in the 46th 
Congressional District of California has resulted in evidence that over 700 
illegal votes were cast in that election, including votes cast by persons 
who were not citizens of the United States;

  Whereas the evidence of illegal voting comes from the following sources:

  (1) The Registrar of Voters of Orange County has indicated that 124 
absentee ballots were cast illegally in the November 1996 General Election.

  (2) The Committee on House Oversight's comparison of Immigration and 
Naturalization Service records and Orange County voter registration records 
provide evidence that more than 600 additional votes were illegally cast in 
that election;

  Whereas the number of votes shown to be illegal by clear and convincing 
evidence is less than the post-recount 979 vote margin by which the 
election was decided;

  Whereas it is critical that the incidence of illegal voting be reduced 
and eliminated in future elections and that the ability of investigators in 
future election contests to detect and punish voter fraud be enhanced;

  Whereas the Committee on House Oversight should continue its 
investigation of illegal voting practices and recommend to the House of 
Representatives legislative measures to reduce voter fraud and improve the 
integrity of the voting process; and

  Whereas the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on 
Appropriations should closely examine the operations of the Department of 
Justice and the Immigration and Naturalization Service to ensure that 
proper steps are being taken to enforce the laws of the United States and 
accurately provide information on the citizenship status of individuals, as 
required by Federal law: Now, therefore, be it

  Resolved, That the election contest of Robert Dornan, contestant, against 
Loretta Sanchez, contestee, relating to the office of Representative from 
the 46th Congressional District of California, is dismissed.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. [David] Camp [of Michigan]). The 
    reported resolution constitutes a question of the privileges of the 
    House and may be called up at any time.
        The gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas) is recognized for 1 
    hour.
        Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield 
    the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. 
    Hoyer), pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.
        Mr. Speaker, the resolution before us dismisses the contested 
    election in California's 46th District. That is clearly the 
    substance. The real story is that in the process of examining this 
    particular contested election, it is clear that voter rolls across 
    the country are suspect.
        We all know that elections are fundamental to our democracy. 
    Free and fair elections are essential in selecting our 
    Representatives in this Republic. The belief on the part of people 
    who cast their ballot that their ballot may be negated by someone 
    who should not have been able to vote in an election erodes the 
    fundamental basis of our democracy and our Republic.
        There have been attempts in this process to argue that our 
    concern about making sure that only those people who are eligible 
    to be registered and, therefore, eligible to vote, was not the 
    focus of our concern. Their arguments have been that, quite 
    frankly, what we are doing is ``racist;'' that we are on a ``witch 
    hunt.''
        It is extremely difficult to understand why someone would not 
    want to make sure that voter rolls are accurate. It is without 
    contention, Mr. Speaker, that in those areas involving people who 
    wish to become naturalized citizens that there are enormous 
    problems today. We discovered just this week that the Immigration 
    and Naturalization Service has hired one of the big five accounting 
    firms to examine the way in which their process operates.
        We have been accused of racism because we thought we needed 
    some firmer identification than is currently available from the 
    INS. The INS now admits that they are going to look at a proposal 
    which requires digitized photographs and fingerprints at the 
    beginning of the process, in the middle of the process, and at the 
    end of the process.
        It just seems to me that if that system is admittedly flawed, 
    and that people have become citizens who should not have become 
    citizens, or, even more regrettably, those private organizations 
    who participated, ostensibly, in bringing this citizenship about, 
    utilized the opportunity to interact with these nascent citizens in 
    a way that put them on voter rolls illegally, has got to be 
    investigated until it is resolved.
        Included in the Coopers & Lybrand report is the suggestion that 
    these private operations should be shut down. In the particular 
    contested election in front of us, one of those private 
    organizations, Hermandad Nacional, had 60 percent of the people it 
    registered flawed. That kind of a ratio either indicates sloppiness 
    or an unwillingness to follow the rules. Which clearly indicates we 
    should not use these private organizations. Now, whichever instance 
    it is, it simply means voter rolls are flawed.
        Mr. Speaker, I yield 8 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan, 
    (Mr. Vern Ehlers), the chairman of the task force, to give my 
    colleagues an understanding of the details of this particular 
    examination of an election beyond the normal examination of 
    contested elections historically. And thank goodness we are finally 
    looking at the problems behind the surface.
        Mr. [Vernon] EHLERS [of Michigan]. Mr. Speaker, I thank the 
    chairman of the committee for yielding me this time. I am pleased 
    to come to the House and report on the results of a very thorough 
    investigation of the Dornan-Sanchez contested election race.
        I was given the following charge by the chairman of the 
    committee, when I took this task: I was asked to chair this task 
    force because of my reputation for integrity and honesty, and he 
    emphasized in the initial assignment that he wanted me to be fair, 
    honest, factual and thorough. This charge was reinforced by the 
    Republican leadership of the House several times during the course 
    of this investigation when certain issues came up, and once again I 
    was always encouraged to be fair, honest, factual and thorough in 
    the investigation. And I have certainly attempted to do that 
    because that is the way I want it to be.
        It is regrettable that many false charges were made by the 
    minority party, even on the floor of the House, during the course 
    of this investigation. Because I felt it improper for anyone 
    involved in the investigation to comment, I restrained my comments 
    at that time.
        Initially, there were several charges made in the contest 
    documents filed by former Representative Dornan. As we examined 
    these, we found that many of them simply could not be 
    substantiated. But what we did find was that charges of illegal 
    voting, specifically of fraudulent voting by noncitizens, could be 
    substantiated and, in fact, were true.
        The initial examination by the registrar of voters of Orange 
    County discovered 124 absentee ballots which were invalid, and so 
    that reduced the 979 vote margin by 124. The California Secretary 
    of State did an independent investigation of the election, along 
    with the Los Angeles office of the Immigration and Naturalization 
    Service, and identified in their first pass 305 noncitizens who had 
    registered to vote and had voted.
        Mr. [Steny] HOYER [of Maryland]. Mr. Speaker, will the 
    gentleman yield?
        Mr. EHLERS. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.
        Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I do not want to interrupt the 
    gentleman's statement, but I want to ask him a question to clarify 
    what he just said.
        When the gentleman indicated that reduced the margin by 124, am 
    I correct that in order to do that, we would have to assume that 
    all of those votes were cast for the gentlewoman from California 
    (Ms. Sanchez)?
        Mr. EHLERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for calling that 
    to my attention. I did not mean to imply that. Reducing the margin 
    gets into another issue, but my point is that the reports from the 
    Registrar of Voters and the Secretary of State certainly indicated 
    substantial problems with the election.
        Unfortunately, the national headquarters of the INS stopped the 
    process by telling the Los Angeles office they were no longer 
    allowed to cooperate with the California Secretary of State. At 
    that point, the House Oversight Committee asked the INS to 
    cooperate, and again we were told no. All this resulted in 
    approximately a 3-month delay, until the committee issued subpoenas 
    and the INS then responded to the subpoenas. The delay was most 
    unfortunate because we wanted to wrap up the investigation quickly.
        Another delay occurred with the subpoenas issued by former 
    Congressman Dornan in an attempt to engage in the discovery process 
    and get more information. All of those subpoenas were ignored by 
    the recipients and no progress was made on that point.
        Furthermore, the request by the House to the Department of 
    Justice to enforce the subpoenas resulted in no action and, again, 
    we incurred approximately a 3-month delay.
        Finally, the Congress itself issued subpoenas to a few crucial 
    witnesses and organizations, and after considerable work on our 
    part and their part, they responded and we did get some 
    information, although it is still in question as to how thorough 
    that was.
        I give this only by background to illustrate some of the 
    difficulties encountered by the task force in attempting to 
    ascertain the truth and, as I said, to be fair, honest, factual, 
    and thorough.
        Let me give a very brief report of the process and of the 
    discoveries we made. This chart looks very complex because it is, 
    and it is very hard to read because there is a lot of information 
    on one sheet. I will not go through it in detail; I simply want to 
    illustrate that the process started by getting a computer tape of 
    the Orange County voter registration list, computer tapes of the 
    INS database, and running comparisons. And that is what we started 
    from.
        The rest of the work primarily was going through the results of 
    the computer match because we wanted to determine to the maximum 
    extent possible what names had to be eliminated because they had 
    proof of citizenship at time of registration to vote. So most of 
    the work, contrary to what one might expect from a Republican 
    majority task force, was not devoted to finding additional 
    noncitizen voters but rather to prove that we could verify and 
    document the results presented here.
        Let me report now on what we discovered in terms of number of 
    votes. After doing the computer check, eliminating obvious 
    mismatches, we had an original number of 7,841 suspect votes. Upon 
    further examination, going through not just the INS computer tapes 
    but also through the INS written records and trying to clear up the 
    many discrepancies we encountered, we discovered that 5,303 of the 
    7,841 actually were citizens and were legitimate registrants. So we 
    subtracted that from the 7,841 and that indicated we still had 
    2,538 suspect registrants. Then, checking the voter records 
    carefully, we determined that 1,718 of them, even though they had 
    registered illegally, did not vote and so, therefore, had no impact 
    on the election.
        But it does illustrate the point that the chairman of the 
    committee made a moment ago, this is definitely a matter of 
    concern. Altogether, we have approximately 2,500 illegal 
    registrants discovered in our process; and that has to be taken 
    care of as a separate issue, through further legislation. That 
    indicated that there were still 820 suspect registrants who did 
    vote in the November 1996 election.
        At that point we went into extensive examination of the data to 
    try to document in the best possible way those that we could be 
    certain were illegal noncitizens who voted, and the number that 
    emerged was 624. We had circumstantial evidence that an additional 
    196 had voted but were unable to document it to my and our 
    satisfaction; and, therefore, we decided not to include those in 
    the total of questionable votes.
        If we add to the 624 illegal noncitizen voters that we have 
    identified the 124 absentee ballots that had previously been 
    disallowed by the Orange County Registrar of Voters, then we 
    discover 748 illegal votes. And that is the total that we had 
    emerge as the number of illegal votes cast in that election. If one 
    were to include those votes with circumstantial evidence of 
    illegality, there would be 944.
        Let me remind my colleagues again, the margin of victory was 
    979. Let me also remind my colleagues, the three options open to 
    the committee and the task force were, number one, to dismiss the 
    election, simply saying there is not sufficient proof to change the 
    result of the election; number two, to say the evidence was so 
    overwhelming in favor of the contestant that we had to overthrow 
    the election and seat Mr. Dornan; and number three, to simply say, 
    we cannot tell the result of the election, no one can tell the 
    result of the election, and we vacate the seat and the State must 
    call a new election.
        It is our recommendation to the committee, and its recommended 
    to the Congress, that we dismiss the election in view of the fact 
    that the number of illegal votes we identified is less than the 
    margin of victory that was previously determined . . . 
        The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Camp). The question is on the 
    resolution.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it.
        Mr, HOYER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    378, nays 33, not voting 19, as follows:

                              [Roll No. 16] . . . 

        Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma changed the vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
        So the resolution was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.



Sec. 27. One Hundred Sixth Congress, 1999-2000

    There were no election contests considered by the House during the 
106th Congress.



Sec. 28. One Hundred Seventh Congress, 2001-2002

    There were no election contests considered by the House during the 
107th Congress.



Sec. 29. One Hundred Eighth Congress, 2003-2004

Sec. 29.1 Tataii v Case

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the Second District of Hawaii was conducted on November 2, 
2002.(1) On September 21, 2002, the Hawaii Democratic party 
held a primary election to choose a candidate for the general election. 
Rep. Patsy Mink won the primary over Mr. Steve Tataii by over 50,000 
votes. On September 27, 2002, Mr. Tataii filed a state election contest 
with the Hawaii Supreme Court, arguing that Rep. Mink's poor health 
required either that she withdraw from the contest or that she be 
disqualified by state election officials or party officials. The Hawaii 
Supreme Court ruled against Mr. Tataii, noting that the statute 
``allows, but does not mandate''(2) a candidate's 
disqualification under such circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 108-207, 108th Cong. 1st Sess.
 2. H. Rept. 108-207, 108th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On September 28, 2002, prior to the general election, Rep. Mink 
died.(3) Nevertheless, her name remained on the ballot, and 
she received 56 percent of the votes cast. Her death thus caused a 
vacancy in the Second District of Hawaii, both for the remainder of her 
term for the 107th Congress, and for the seat in the 108th Congress. 
Mr. Tataii was a candidate in the special election to fill the seat for 
the remainder of 107th Congress, but received only 28 votes as compared 
to Mr. Ed Case, who received over 23,000 votes. Mr. Tataii was also a 
candidate in the special election to fill the vacancy for the 108th 
Congress. In that election, Mr. Tataii received only nine votes, as 
compared to Mr. Case, who received over 33,000 votes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. See Deschler's Precedents Ch. 38 Sec. 2.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On January 31, 2003, Mr. Tataii (hereafter ``contestant'') filed a 
notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was forwarded to 
the Committee on House Administration for its consideration. Mr. Case 
(hereafter ``contestee'') did not file an answer to the notice of 
contest nor any other pleadings.
    The committee first addressed the issue of standing, noting that 
the Federal Contested Elections Act applies to general or special 
elections, but not partisan primary elections. Nevertheless, the 
committee chose not to recommend dismissal of the case based on this 
procedural consideration. Instead, the committee addressed the merits 
of the contestant's argument, which was centered on the activities of 
the Democratic party in conducting its primary election. Contestant 
presented no evidence of any kind regarding the primary election, 
claiming only that a victory in the primary would have assured victory 
in any subsequent general election because of ``Hawaii's traditional 
Democratic voting for this seat.''(4) The committee did not 
find this reasoning persuasive, reiterating that the burden for 
contestants under the Federal Contested Elections Act is high, as they 
must show with substantial evidence that the results of the election 
would have been different absent any irregularities. The committee 
concluded that contestant had not met this burden, and thus recommended 
that the House dismiss the case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. H. Rept. 108-207, 108th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On July 15, 2003,(5) the committee filed its privileged 
report. By unanimous consent, the House agreed to take up House 
Resolution 317 (dismissing the contest), which was agreed to by voice 
vote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 149 Cong. Rec. 18031, 108th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           RESOLUTION DISMISSING ELECTION CONTEST AGAINST ED CASE OF 
                                     HAWAII

        Mr. NEY, from the Committee on House Administration, submitted 
    a privileged report (H. Rept. 108-207) on the resolution (H. Res. 
    317) dismissing the election contest against Ed Case, which was 
    referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.
        Mr. [Robert] NEY [of Ohio]. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous 
    consent for the immediate consideration of the resolution (H. Res. 
    317) dismissing the election contest relating to the office of 
    Representative from the Second Congressional District of Hawaii.
        The Clerk read the title of the resolution.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(6) The Clerk will report 
    the resolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. Eugene Shaw, Jr. (FL).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

H. Res. 317

  Resolved, That the election contest relating to the office of 
Representative from the Second Congressional District of Hawaii is 
dismissed.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Ohio?
        Mr. [John] LARSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, reserving my 
    right to object, I yield to the distinguished chairman to explain 
    the purpose of this resolution.
        Mr. NEY. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from 
    Connecticut, our ranking member, for yielding.
        I rise in support of House Resolution 317, a bill to dismiss an 
    election contest filed against Representative Ed Case of Hawaii's 
    Second Congressional District. There is bipartisan and complete 
    agreement that the contest fails to state grounds sufficient to 
    change the result of the election and therefore should be 
    dismissed.
        The contestant challenged the late Representative Patsy Mink in 
    the 2002 Democrat primary, where he received 15 percent of the 
    vote. The contestant argues that Representative Mink, who was 
    seriously ill at the time of the primary and passed away 1 week 
    later, should have been disqualified as a primary candidate, that 
    he should have been declared the Democrat nominee by default and 
    that as the nominee he therefore would have been the inevitable 
    general election winner.
        The Federal Contested Elections Act does not contemplate 
    considering Notices of Contest that are based on the conduct of 
    primary elections. Consequently, the committee concludes that the 
    basis for the contestant's Notice of Contest falls outside the 
    scope of the FCEA, and it was totally agreed to without any 
    dissension.
        Mr. LARSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, further reserving my 
    right to object, I rise in support of the resolution reported 
    unanimously by the Committee on House Administration to dismiss 
    this frivolous election contest against our colleague from Hawaii 
    Ed Case.
        Representative Case won a special election with 44 candidates 
    on the ballot on January 4, 2003, by an overwhelming margin; and I 
    want to commend the gentleman from Ohio (Chairman Ney) for the 
    bipartisan cooperation that has been demonstrated throughout this 
    process.
        Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Ohio?
        There was no objection.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 29.2 Lyons v Gordon

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the Sixth District of Tennessee was conducted on November 5, 
2002.(7) The general election candidates were Bart J. Gordon 
(the Democratic candidate), Robert L. Garrison (the Republican 
candidate), and J. Patrick Lyons (an Independent candidate). The 
results provided by the Tennessee Secretary of State indicated that Mr. 
Gordon had received 117,034 votes, Mr. Garrison had received 57,401 
votes, and Mr. Lyons had received 3,065 votes. On December 2, 2002, the 
Tennessee Secretary of State certified the results of the election, and 
credentials were issued to Mr. Gordon. Mr. Gordon's credentials were 
presented to the House of Representatives, and on January 7, 2003, he 
was duly administered the oath of office without objection or 
challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 108-208, 108th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On December 5, 2002, Mr. Lyons (hereafter ``contestant'') filed a 
notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was referred to 
the Committee on House Administration for its review. Mr. Gordon 
(hereafter ``contestee'') did not submit formal pleadings in this case, 
but did submit a letter to the committee relating to the matter.
    Contestant's basis for contesting the election centered on two 
constitutional claims. The first is that incumbent Members of Congress 
are ineligible to be elected to the following Congress without first 
resigning their seats. The second is that retaining membership in the 
Tennessee Bar made contestee a ``judicial officer of the courts of 
Tennessee''(8) and thus his election to a legislative seat 
would violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers. The 
latter violation, in contestant's view, rendered contestee an 
``insurrectionist'' under the 14th Amendment.(9)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. H. Rept. 108-208, 108th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
 9. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its committee report, the Committee on House Administration did 
not find contestant's claims persuasive. The contestant ``does not 
advance a single allegation of irregularity or fraud in the conduct of 
the election.''(10) Instead, contestant's constitutional 
arguments only addressed the issue of contestee's ineligibility and 
provided no ``nexus''(11) between this allegation and 
contestant's right to the seat in question. Ultimately, the committee 
concluded that the alleged controversy should be viewed more properly 
as a qualifications case rather than an election 
contest.(12) The committee thus recommended dismissal of the 
case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Id. at p. 4.
11. Id. at p. 3.
12. For similar cases, see Mack v Stokes, Sec. 15.4, supra; Lyons v 
        Gordon, Sec. 30.1, infra.; and Cox v McCrery, Sec. 31.5, infra. 
        See also Sec. 5, supra. For qualifications generally, see 
        Precedents (Smith) Ch. 7 Sec. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On July 15, 2003,(13) the committee filed its privileged 
report. By unanimous consent, the House adopted House Resolution 318 
(dismissing the contest):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 149 Cong. Rec. 18032, 108th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         RESOLUTION DISMISSING ELECTION CONTEST AGAINST BART GORDON OF 
                                 TENNESSEE    

        Mr. Ney, from the Committee on House Administration, submitted 
    a privileged report (H. Rept. 108-208) on the resolution (H. Res. 
    318) dismissing the election contest against Bart Gordon, which was 
    referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.
        Mr. [Robert] NEY [of Ohio]. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous 
    consent for the immediate consideration of the resolution (H. Res. 
    318) dismissing the election contest relating to the office of 
    Representative from the Sixth Congressional District of Tennessee.
        The Clerk read the title of the resolution.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(14) The Clerk will report 
    the resolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Eugene Shaw, Jr. (FL).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

H. Res. 318

  Resolved, That the election contest relating to the office of 
Representative from the Sixth Congressional District of Tennessee is 
dismissed.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Shaw). Is there objection to the 
    request of the gentleman from Ohio?
        Mr. [John] LARSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, reserving the 
    right to object, I yield to the distinguished chairman, the 
    gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Ney), to explain the purpose of this 
    resolution.
        Mr. NEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member for yielding.
        In keeping with the tradition of the dismissal of ``Election 
    Contest Day'' here in the U.S. House, I rise in support of House 
    Resolution 318, a bill to dismiss an election contest filed against 
    the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Gordon) in Tennessee's Sixth 
    District.
        The contestant, a candidate on the November 2002 ballot against 
    the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Gordon), filed a notice of 
    contest under the Federal Contested Elections Act contending that 
    the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Gordon) is unqualified for the 
    office because the Constitution bars an incumbent from running for 
    reelection without first resigning his or her seat and being an 
    inactive member of the State Bar Association. The contestant makes 
    no allegations of irregularities, fraud, or wrongdoing in respect 
    to the election of the sixth congressional seat.
        The committee finds that challenges to the qualifications of a 
    Member-elect to serve in the Congress fall outside the purview of 
    the FCEA, which was designed to consider allegations relating to 
    the actual conduct of an election. Consequently, the committee 
    concludes that the contestant's arguments regarding the 
    qualifications of the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Gordon) to 
    serve in Congress do not constitute grounds sufficient to change 
    the results of the election and, therefore, recommends that this 
    election contest be dismissed.
        Again, in the frame of the other resolution, we had full 
    support on this and deem it to be frivolous.
        Mr. LARSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, further reserving my 
    right to object, I rise in support of this resolution reported 
    unanimously by the Committee on House Administration, dismissed as 
    a frivolous election contest against our colleague, the gentleman 
    from Tennessee (Mr. Gordon). The gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. 
    Gordon) was reelected with 66 percent of the vote.
        Again, I would like to commend the gentleman from Ohio 
    (Chairman Ney) for his fair-handed and fair-minded bipartisan 
    cooperation that has been demonstrated throughout this process.
        Mr. NEY. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield again briefly 
    under his reservation, I would like to thank our ranking member, 
    the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Larson), and members of the 
    committee for their work on these two issues.
        Mr. LARSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my 
    reservation of objection.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Ohio?
        There was no objection.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.



Sec. 30. One Hundred Ninth Congress, 2005-2006

Sec. 30.1 Lyons v Gordon

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the Sixth District of Tennessee was conducted on November 2, 
2004.(1) The general election candidates were Bart J. Gordon 
(the Democratic candidate), Nick Demas (the Republican candidate), and 
Norman R. Saliba (an Independent candidate). Another Independent 
candidate, J. Patrick Lyons, was also on the ballot. The results 
provided by the Tennessee Secretary of State indicated that Mr. Gordon 
had received 167,448 votes, Mr. Demas had received 87,523 votes, Mr. 
Saliba had received 1,802 votes, and Mr. Lyons had received 3,869 
votes. On December 7, 2004, the Tennessee Secretary of State certified 
the results of the election, and credentials were issued to Mr. Gordon. 
Mr. Gordon's credentials were presented to the House of 
Representatives, and on January 4, 2005, he was duly administered the 
oath of office without objection or challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 109-57, 109th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On December 28, 2004, Mr. Lyons (hereafter ``contestant'') filed a 
notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was forwarded to 
the Committee on House Administration for its consideration. The 
arguments made by contestant in this case were identical to those 
raised by the same individual, with respect to the same seat, in the 
prior Congress.(2) In both cases, contestant argued that Mr. 
Gordon (hereafter ``contestee'') was not qualified to take a seat in 
the House of Representatives. In neither case did the contestant allege 
any fraud or irregularities in the election, nor did the contestant 
dispute the vote totals as reported by state and local officials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. See Lyons v Gordon, Sec. 29.2, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its committee report, the Committee on House Administration 
concluded that ``as a general matter, challenges to the qualifications 
of a member-elect to serve in the Congress fall outside the purview of 
the Federal Contested Elections Act, which was designed to consider 
allegations relating to the actual conduct of an 
election.''(3) As a result, the contestant had not presented 
any evidence that would show that the result of the election would have 
been different. Accordingly, the committee recommended dismissal of the 
case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. H. Rept. 109-57, 109th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On April 27, 2005,(4) the committee filed its privileged 
report:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 151 Cong. Rec. 7990, 109th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         REPORT ON RESOLUTION DISMISSING ELECTION CONTEST RELATING TO 
         OFFICE OF REPRESENTATIVE FROM TENNESSEE'S SIXTH CONGRESSIONAL 
                                  DISTRICT    

        Mr.Ney, from the Committee on House Administration, submitted a 
    privileged report (Rept. No. 109-57) on the resolution (H. Res. 
    239) dismissing the election contest relating to the office of 
    Representative from the Sixth Congressional District of Tennessee, 
    which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

    The same day,(5) by unanimous consent, the House adopted 
House Resolution 239 (dismissing the contest):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 151 Cong. Rec. 7994, 109th Cong. 1st Sess. (Apr. 27, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF 
            REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE SIXTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF 
                                 TENNESSEE    

        Mr. [Robert] NEY [of Ohio]. Mr. Speaker, I offer a resolution 
    (H. Res. 239) dismissing the election relating to the office of 
    Representative from the Sixth Congressional District of Tennessee, 
    and ask unanimous consent for its immediate consideration in the 
    House.
        The Clerk read the title of the resolution.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(6) Is there objection to 
    the request of the gentleman from Ohio?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. Michael Simpson (ID).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 239

  Resolved, That the election contest relating to the office of 
Representative from the Sixth Congressional District of Tennessee is 
dismissed.

        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.



Sec. 31. One Hundred Tenth Congress, 2007-2008

Sec. 31.1 Gonzalez v Diaz-Balart

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the 21st District of Florida was conducted on November 7, 
2006.(1) The general election candidates were Frank J. 
Gonzalez (the Democratic candidate), and Lincoln Diaz-Balart (the 
Republican candidate). On November 20, 2006, the Florida Elections 
Canvassing Commission certified the following results: 66,784 votes for 
Mr. Diaz-Balart, and 45,522 votes for Mr. Gonzalez. On November 22, 
2006, the Florida Secretary of State issued credentials to Mr. Diaz-
Balart. Mr. Diaz-Balart's credentials were presented to the House of 
Representatives, and on January 4, 2007, he was duly administered the 
oath of office without objection or challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 110-175, 110th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On December 20, 2006, Mr. Gonzalez (hereafter ``contestant'') filed 
a notice of contest, which was received in the House on December 28 and 
officially delivered to the Clerk on January 3, 2007. In the notice of 
contest, contestant alleged that the voting machines used in the 
elections had been ``hacked or had their data tabulations altered by 
electronic means.''(2) Contestant further argued that the 
lack of a verified paper trail made any recount based on the original 
electronic totals inherently inaccurate. On January 17, 2007, Mr. Diaz-
Balart (hereafter ``contestee'') filed a motion to dismiss the contest 
based on the failure to file a timely notice of contest pursuant to the 
Federal Contested Elections Act (FCEA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. H. Rept. 110-175, 110th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its committee report, the Committee on House Administration 
noted that the primary argument advanced by the contestant was that 
voting machines in a neighboring congressional district registered 
inaccurate totals, and the same type of voting machines were used in 
the 21st District. The committee viewed this evidence as irrelevant, as 
it presented no direct evidence that the machines in the 21st District 
were affected. The committee also concluded that contestant's 
allegation of misconduct and insufficient testing of voting equipment 
by election officials was not persuasive, absent some evidence that 
such irregularities affected the outcome of the election. ``For the 
Committee to come to any other conclusion would be to remove the 
presumption of regularity that attaches to the state certification and 
would make all elections open to contest and investigation based on 
mere conjecture or speculation.''(3) The committee thus 
recommended dismissal of the case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. H. Rept. 110-175, 110th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the minority view filed with the committee's report, Members 
from the minority party agreed with the ultimate conclusion, but would 
have dismissed the case on procedural grounds. The minority views 
focused on the temporal requirements of the FCEA. Specifically, they 
argued that the notice of contest, though dated December 20, 2006 
(i.e., within the 30-day time frame laid out by the statute), was not 
actually received by the Clerk until January 3, 2007. Thus, the 
minority would have found the filing of that initial pleading untimely, 
and would have dismissed the case on that basis.
    On June 6, 2007,(4) the committee filed its privileged 
report:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 153 Cong. Rec. 14661, 110th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          REPORT ON HOUSE RESOLUTION 459, DISMISSING ELECTION CONTEST 
         RELATING TO OFFICE OF REPRESENTATIVE FROM 21ST CONGRESSIONAL 
                            DISTRICT OF FLORIDA    

        Mr. BRADY of Pennsylvania, from the Committee on House 
    Administration, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 110-175) 
    on the resolution (H. Res. 459) dismissing the election contest 
    relating to the office of Representative from the Twenty-first 
    Congressional District of Florida, which was referred to the House 
    Calendar and ordered to be printed.

    On June 12, 2007,(5) by unanimous consent, the House 
adopted House Resolution 459 (dismissing the contest):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 153 Cong. Rec. 15453, 110th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF 
        REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE TWENTY-FIRST CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF 
                                  FLORIDA    

        Mr. [Robert] BRADY of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I ask 
    unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of House 
    Resolution 459 in the House.
        The Clerk read the title of the resolution.
        The text of the resolution is as follows:

H. Res. 459

  Resolved, That the election contest relating to the office of 
Representative from the Twenty-first Congressional District of Florida is 
dismissed.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(6) Is there objection to 
    the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. John Salazar (CO).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 31.2 Curtis v Feeney

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the 24th District of Florida was conducted on November 7, 
2006.(7) The general election candidates were Clint Curtis 
(the Democratic candidate), and Tom Feeney (the Republican candidate). 
On November 20, 2006, the Florida Elections Canvassing Commission 
certified the following results: 123,795 votes for Mr. Feeney, and 
89,863 votes for Mr. Curtis. Consequently, the Florida Secretary of 
State issued credentials to Mr. Feeney. Mr. Feeney's credentials were 
presented to the House of Representatives, and on January 4, 2007, he 
was duly administered the oath of office without objection or 
challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 110-176, 110th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On December 20, 2006, Mr. Curtis (hereafter ``contestant'') filed a 
notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was forwarded to 
the Committee on House Administration for its consideration. In his 
notice of contest, contestant alleged that voting machines did not 
record accurate vote totals, and that they had been ``hacked and the 
software manipulated.''(8) Contestant also alleged that 
election officials did not take ``necessary procedural 
safeguards''(9) to ensure that voting machines were not 
tampered with.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. H. Rept. 110-176, 110th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
 9. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On January 19, 2007, Mr. Feeney (hereafter ``contestee'') filed a 
motion to dismiss the contest. The motion to dismiss argued that 
contestant had not claimed a right to the seat in question, and had not 
supported his allegations with evidence sufficient to change the result 
of the election.
    In its committee report, the Committee on House Administration 
addressed five separate categories of alleged errors, fraud, or voting 
machine irregularities. The committee found that the contestant did not 
provide substantial evidence to support his claims, relying instead on 
historical trends, polls, and other data to conclude that the election 
must have been poorly administered. Even if the contestant's claims of 
errors and irregularities were taken as true, no direct evidence was 
presented that would have shown how the outcome of the election would 
have been reversed. The committee concluded that contestant's claims 
were ``built on shifting sands of speculation and 
conjecture.''(10) It therefore recommended dismissal of the 
contest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Id. at p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On June 6, 2007,(11) the committee filed its privileged 
report:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 153 Cong. Rec. 14661, 110th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          REPORT ON HOUSE RESOLUTION 461, DISMISSING ELECTION CONTEST 
         RELATING TO OFFICE OF REPRESENTATIVE FROM 24TH CONGRESSIONAL 
                            DISTRICT OF FLORIDA    

        Mr. BRADY of Pennsylvania, from the Committee on House 
    Administration, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 110-176) 
    on the resolution (H. Res. 461) dismissing the election contest 
    relating to the office of Representative from the Twenty-fourth 
    Congressional District of Florida, which was referred to the House 
    Calendar and ordered to be printed.

    On June 12, 2007,(12) by unanimous consent, the House 
adopted House Resolution 461 (dismissing the contest):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 153 Cong. Rec. 15453, 110th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF 
        REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF 
                                  FLORIDA    

        Mr. [Robert] BRADY of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I ask 
    unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of House 
    Resolution 461 in the House.
        The Clerk read the title of the resolution.
        The text of the resolution is as follows:

H. Res. 461

  Resolved, That the election contest relating to the office of 
Representative from the Twenty-fourth Congressional District of Florida is 
dismissed.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(13) Is there objection to 
    the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. John Salazar (CO).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 31.3 Russell v Brown-Waite

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the Fifth District of Florida was conducted on November 7, 
2006.(14) The general election candidates were Virginia 
Brown-Waite (the Republican candidate), and John Russell (the 
Democratic candidate). On November 20, 2006, the Florida Elections 
Canvassing Commission certified the following results: 162,421 votes 
for Mrs. Brown-Waite, and 108,959 votes for Mr. Russell. On November 
22, 2006, the Florida Secretary of State issued credentials to Mrs. 
Brown-Waite. Mrs. Brown-Waite's credentials were presented to the House 
of Representatives, and on January 4, 2007, she was duly administered 
the oath of office without objection or challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 110-178, 110th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On January 3, 2007, Mr. Russell (hereafter ``contestant'') filed a 
notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was referred to 
the Committee on House Administration for its review. Contestant argued 
that votes were not accurately recorded by the voting machines used in 
the election because ``their data tabulations [had been] altered by 
electronic means.''(15) Because the voting machines did not 
provide a verified paper trail, contestant alleged that no accurate 
recount could be conducted. On January 17, 2007, Mrs. Brown-Waite 
(hereafter ``contestee'') filed a motion to dismiss the contest. 
Contestee argued that contestant's notice of contest was not timely 
filed pursuant to statutory requirements, and should be rejected on 
that basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. H. Rept. 110-178, 110th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its committee report, the Committee on House Administration 
noted that the only direct evidence of discrepancies in the voting 
process were affidavits submitted by the contestant alleging that six 
votes in one precinct were different than those recorded. Given that 
the margin of victory in the election was over 50,000 votes, the 
committee concluded that the contestant had not demonstrated how the 
alleged irregularities would have changed the result of the election. 
The committee further found that ``contestant's musing'' about the 
possibility of software error or manipulation of the electronic voting 
machines ``does not form the basis for a cognizable 
claim.''(16)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. Id. at p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Members of the minority party submitted minority views to accompany 
the committee's report. Those views agreed with the decision to dismiss 
the case, but would have done so for procedural reasons. Specifically, 
the minority would have considered the contestant's notice of contest 
as not timely filed under the statute, and would have thus dismissed 
the case on that basis.
    On June 6, 2007,(17) the committee filed its privileged 
report:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 153 Cong. Rec. 14661, 110th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          REPORT ON HOUSE RESOLUTION 463, DISMISSING ELECTION CONTEST 
         RELATING TO OFFICE OF REPRESENTATIVE FROM FIFTH CONGRESSIONAL 
                            DISTRICT OF FLORIDA    

        Mr. BRADY of Pennsylvania, from the Committee on House 
    Administration, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 110-178) 
    on the resolution (H. Res. 463) dismissing the election contest 
    relating to the office of Representative from the Fifth 
    Congressional District of Florida, which was referred to the House 
    Calendar and ordered to be printed.

    On June 12, 2007,(18) by unanimous consent, the House 
adopted House Resolution 463 (dismissing the contest):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 153 Cong. Rec. 15453, 110th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF 
        REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE FIFTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF FLORIDA  
                                         

        Mr. [Robert] BRADY of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I ask 
    unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of House 
    Resolution 463 in the House.
        The Clerk read the title of the resolution.
        The text of the resolution is as follows:

H. Res. 463

  Resolved, That the election contest relating to the office of 
Representative from the Fifth Congressional District of Florida is 
dismissed.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(19) Is there objection to 
    the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. John Salazar (CO).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 31.4 Jennings v Buchanan

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the 13th District of Florida was conducted on November 7, 
2006.(20) The general election candidates were Christine 
Jennings (the Democratic candidate), and Vern Buchanan (the Republican 
candidate). In that election, Mr. Buchanan received 119,105 votes and 
Mrs. Jennings received 118,737 votes, giving Mr. Buchanan a margin of 
victory of 368 votes. A recount ordered by the Florida Elections 
Canvassing Commission pursuant to state law increased the margin of 
victory by one vote. On November 20, 2006, the Florida Elections 
Canvassing Commission certified these results as final. Mr. Buchanan's 
credentials were presented to the House of Representatives and on 
January 4, 2007, he was duly administered the oath of office without 
objection or challenge.(21)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 110-528, 110th Cong. 2d Sess.
21. Parliamentarian's Note: Although no challenge was made to the 
        seating of Mr. Buchanan on opening day, parliamentary inquiries 
        were propounded by both majority party and minority party 
        Members, which established that an election contest was being 
        pursued under the FCEA, that Mr. Buchanan had appeared with 
        valid credentials from the state of Florida, and that his 
        seating was without prejudice to the final right to the seat. 
        See 153 Cong. Rec. 5, 110th Cong. 1st Sess. (Jan. 4, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Florida officials discovered a potential undercount in the vote in 
Sarasota County, and on November 9, 2006, an audit was conducted at the 
behest of the Florida Secretary of State. The final audit report, 
released on February 23, 2007, concluded that there was no evidence to 
suggest that the electronic voting machines used in the election failed 
to properly record votes.
    Mrs. Jennings filed a contested election suit in state court, 
arguing that votes cast in Sarasota County were not properly recorded 
due to malfunctioning voting machines. Mrs. Jennings sought access to 
the machines and their software in order to test their accuracy. On 
December 29, 2006, a state judge denied this request. This decision was 
upheld at the appellate level on June 18, 2007, and no further state 
court proceedings occurred before Mrs. Jennings ultimately withdrew her 
challenge in the courts on November 26, 2007.
    On December 20, 2006, Mrs. Jennings (hereafter ``contestant'') 
filed a notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was 
forwarded to the Committee on House Administration for its 
consideration. Contestant took issue with the state recount, calling it 
a ``meaningless exercise''(22) because there was no separate 
paper trail to verify the results. Contestant also presented 
statistical evidence of the undervote in Sarasota County, and provided 
affidavits from individuals who claimed to have had difficulty 
registering votes for the congressional seat at issue. On January 19, 
2007, Mr. Buchanan (hereafter ``contestee'') filed a motion to dismiss 
the contest, citing the findings of the state audit of the voting 
machines.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
22. H. Rept. 110-528, 110th Cong. 2d Sess. p. 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On February 7, 2007, the chair of the committee (Rep. Millender-
McDonald of California) reached an agreement with Sarasota County 
officials to safeguard half of the voting machines for further testing. 
On March 23, 2007, the committee established a task force to review the 
matter. The task force first met on May 2, 2007, and voted to retain 
the services of the Government Accountability Office to conduct an 
inspection of the machines. The final Government Accountability Office 
report, delivered to the task force on February 8, 2008, determined 
that ``the voting systems used in Sarasota County did not contribute to 
the undervote.''(23) The task force thus voted to recommend 
dismissal of the case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
23. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its committee report, the Committee on House Administration 
agreed with the conclusions of the task force, noting that ``only clear 
and convincing evidence can provide the basis to overcome the 
presumption of the regularity accorded a State's certified 
results.''(24) The committee thus concluded that the contest 
should be dismissed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
24. Id. at p. 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On February 25, 2008,(25) the House adopted a special 
order of business by unanimous consent and immediately considered House 
Resolution 989 (dismissing the contest) pursuant to such order. The 
resolution was agreed to by voice vote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
25. 154 Cong. Rec. 2426-28, 110th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF 
        REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE 13TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF FLORIDA  
                                         

        Mr. [Charles] GONZALEZ [of Texas]. Madam Speaker, I ask 
    unanimous consent that it shall be in order at any time to consider 
    in the House, House Resolution 989; that the resolution shall be 
    considered as read; and that the previous question shall be 
    considered as ordered on the resolution to its adoption without 
    intervening motion except 10 minutes of debate equally divided and 
    controlled by the chairman and the ranking minority member of the 
    Committee on House Administration, or their designees.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(26) Is there objection to 
    the request of the gentleman from Texas?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
26. Tammy Baldwin (WI).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        Mr. GONZALEZ. Madam Speaker, pursuant to the previous order, I 
    call up House Resolution 989 and ask for its immediate 
    consideration in the House.
        The Clerk read the title of the resolution.
        The text of the resolution is as follows:

H. Res. 989

  Resolved, That the election contest relating to the office of 
Representative from the Thirteenth Congressional District of Florida is 
dismissed.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the order of the House of 
    today, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Gonzalez) and the gentleman 
    from California (Mr. McCarthy) each will control 5 minutes.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.

                                 general leave

        Mr. GONZALEZ. Madam Speaker, I would ask unanimous consent that 
    all Members have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their 
    remarks in the Record on this resolution.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Texas?
        There was no objection.
        Mr. GONZALEZ. Madam Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I 
    may consume.
        On February 12, the Committee on House Administration 
    unanimously recommended dismissal of the election contest relating 
    to the 13th Congressional District of Florida.
        The late chairwoman, Juanita Millender-McDonald, established a 
    task force to investigate this contested election in which over 
    18,000 ballots did not show a vote cast in the United States 
    congressional race in Sarasota County, Florida. The task force 
    consisted of Representative Zoe Lofgren and Representative Kevin 
    McCarthy of California, and I had the honor of serving as the Chair 
    of the task force.
        After the task force established the need to conduct an 
    investigation, every vote by the task force to determine the scope 
    and direction in the investigation was, in fact, unanimous.
        I want to thank the members of the task force for their 
    dedication to the investigation and the Government Accountability 
    Office for a systematic investigation of the voting equipment. I 
    would also like to thank both the majority and the minority staffs, 
    along with the House recording studio.
        The task force authorized the GAO to investigate whether the 
    voting machines used in Sarasota County contributed to the 
    unusually high number of undervotes. The task force also directed 
    the GAO to evaluate whether additional testing was needed. After 
    the GAO recommended further testing in October, the task force 
    directed the GAO to design and execute testing to determine the 
    reliability of the Sarasota voting equipment.
        The GAO presented its final findings to the task force on 
    February 8, 2008, when the GAO reported the Sarasota County voting 
    machines did not contribute to the large undervote in the 
    congressional race for the 13th District of Florida.
        The GAO acknowledged that the undervote could have been caused 
    by other elements, such as voters who intentionally did not vote in 
    the race or voters who unintentionally did not cast their ballots 
    because of poor ballot design.
        However, because the contestant's central argument claimed 
    voting machine malfunction caused the abnormal undervote, the GAO's 
    analysis was limited to the voting machine malfunction issue. Due 
    to the GAO's determination with a high degree of certainty that the 
    voting machines did not cause the undervote, the task force 
    unanimously recommended to the full committee, and the full 
    committee has unanimously recommended to the House, that the 
    contest be dismissed.
        I urge Members to vote in favor of this resolution.
        Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
        Mr. [Kevin] McCARTHY of California. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 
    minutes to the ranking Republican on the full committee, the 
    gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Ehlers).
        Mr. [Vernon] EHLERS [of Michigan]. I thank the gentleman for 
    yielding.
        Madam Speaker, this is the third time I have served or been 
    involved with a task force dealing with contested elections, and I 
    believe this is by far the best procedure that has been developed 
    and can help serve as a model for future decisions of this sort.
        I congratulate the two gentlemen before you, who, representing 
    the majority and the minority, did the yeoman's work on 
    investigating the issue, deciding to pull in the Government 
    Accountability Office, which I think was a good addition to the 
    entire process. A careful examination has made it very clear that 
    there was nothing wrong with the voting machines in this particular 
    election; and, therefore, the contestant's claims that the 
    undervote was caused by faulty machines is just not valid.
        What the real reasons were, we will never know. It could have 
    been ballot design. It could be several other factors that we have 
    considered.
        But the simple fact is that Mr. Buchanan did win the election, 
    and the results of our vote tonight will demonstrate that. He did, 
    in fact, win the election and will remain as a Member of the 
    Congress.
        I want to once again compliment the individuals here. Chairman 
    Gonzalez of the task force was eminently fair, thorough, and 
    complete in all his evaluations and discussions. Mr. McCarthy, in 
    his first time on an assignment of this sort, has carried it out 
    very carefully, very thoroughly and contributed a great deal to the 
    discussions and the decisions.
        I am just very proud that the House Administration Committee 
    has completed this task which can be, I can assure you, a very 
    onerous and difficult task; but the committee has completed it very 
    competently, thoroughly and fairly; and the result, I believe, is 
    beyond question.
        This will serve as a model for future situations of this sort.
        Mr. GONZALEZ. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
        Mr. McCARTHY of California. Madam Speaker, I rise today in 
    support of this resolution to dismiss the election contest related 
    to the results of the 13th Congressional District of Florida race 
    in 2006.
        Madam Speaker, I want to congratulate the chairman of this task 
    force, Mr. Gonzalez.  It was a three-member task force with 
    Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren and myself. Every bit of this contest, as 
    we went through studying it and spent the hours on it, was a 
    unanimous decision. This was a bipartisan movement, a bipartisan 
    investigation; and I just want to thank the chairman for his 
    professionalism, his respect and the ethics in which he carried 
    this out.
        In my former life, I was actually a staff member to a former 
    chairman of House Administration, and I was an individual that 
    investigated some contestant elections. I will tell you this is 
    probably the most thorough investigation we have seen.
        We knew after the last election that there were races in this 
    body that were even closer, within 100 votes; and we did not 
    contest those as they went. But we wanted to make sure, as 
    Christine Jennings moved this debate and this argument, as we were 
    going through, that we looked at every single one.
        I want to thank the State of Florida. Before we even went to 
    study it, they went through analyzing all the machines. We had the 
    GAO look at every ability of the machines, even miscalculating the 
    machines as they came forward to make sure they were still correct.
        The American public can be very proud to know that every vote 
    in the 13th District was counted. The outcome was correct, and 
    Congressman Vern Buchanan was elected on that day and still elected 
    today. I want to congratulate the work that was done by the task 
    force.
        Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
        Mr. GONZALEZ. Madam Speaker, I just do want to have some 
    parting words to the members of the task force, Congresswoman Zoe 
    Lofgren, and, of course, my colleague from California, Congressman 
    McCarthy, because they really worked very hard. As indicated, all 
    decisions were unanimous, which made the process go smoothly.
        I also want to recognize Congressman Dan Lungren from 
    California, who is not an official member of the task force but was 
    present during some of the briefings and was very instructive.
        The last thought is, of course, that the task force and the 
    full committee simply were acknowledging the responsibility that is 
    laid before this body, and that is to determine the qualifications 
    and who actually will sit and take the oath and have the great 
    privilege of joining us here in what is often referred to as the 
    people's House.

        Mr. BRADY of Pennsylvania. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of 
    House Resolution 989.
        Madam Speaker, on February 12th the Committee on House 
    Administration unanimously recommended dismissal of the election 
    contest relating to the 13th Congressional district of Florida. The 
    late Chairwoman Juanita Millender-McDonald had established a task 
    force to investigative this contest election in which over 18,000 
    ballots did not show a vote cast for the U.S. Congressional race in 
    Sarasota County, Florida. Former judge, and our colleague, 
    Representative Charles Gonzalez was appointed Chair, along with 
    Representatives Lofgren and McCarthy as members of the task force. 
    After the task force established the need to investigate, every 
    vote to determine the scope and direction of the investigation was 
    unanimous.
        The task force engaged the Government Accountability Office 
    (GAO) to explore whether the voting machines used in Sarasota 
    County contributed to the unusually high number of undervotes. GAO 
    also was instructed to assess whether additional voting machines 
    testing was needed. When GAO recommended further testing in October 
    2007, the task force directed the GAO to design and execute testing 
    protocols to determine the reliability of the Sarasota County 
    voting equipment.
        Last week, the GAO presented its findings and conclusions to 
    the task force. They found that the Sarasota County voting machines 
    did not contribute to the large undervote in the Congressional race 
    for the 13th District of Florida. The GAO acknowledged that the 
    undervote could have been caused by voters who chose not vote for 
    that race, or by voters who did not properly cast their ballots 
    because of poor ballot design. In any case, the machines were not 
    the culprits. Since that time, some groups have attacked the GAO 
    study as imprecise for a host of speculative reasons. However, the 
    Contestant's central argument in the election contest before the 
    committee was that voting machine malfunction caused the abnormal 
    undervote, and GAO's focus of analysis was directed solely to the 
    voting machine malfunction issue.
        Under the Federal Contested Election Act, a Contestant must 
    submit allegations that, if proven, would have altered the election 
    outcome. The task force and the Committee on House Administration 
    have conducted a thorough investigation and believe that the 
    findings of the GAO are compelling. Therefore, the Contestant's 
    argument that malfunctioning electronic voting machines caused the 
    18,000 undervote in Sarasota County was not supported. For this 
    reason, I urge members to support to passage of House Resolution 
    989 to dismiss this election contest.

        Mr. GONZALEZ. Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my 
    time.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
        Pursuant to the order of the House of today, the resolution is 
    considered read and the previous question is ordered.
        The question is on the resolution.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 31.5 Cox v McCrery

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the Fourth District of Louisiana was conducted on November 7, 
2006.(27) The general election candidates were Jim McCrery 
(a Republican candidate), Artis R. Cash (a Democratic candidate), Patti 
Cox (a Democratic candidate), and Chester T. Kelley (a Republican 
candidate). In that election, Mr. McCrery received 77,078 votes, Mr. 
Cash received 22,757 votes, Mrs. Cox received 17,788 votes, and Mr. 
Kelley received 16,649 votes. Based on these results, Mr. McCrery was 
certified as the winner of the election on November 20, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
27. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 110-177, 110th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On December 20, 2006, Mrs. Cox (hereafter ``contestant'') filed a 
notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was referred to 
the Committee on House Administration for its consideration. Contestant 
did not allege any fraud or mistake in the election itself, but claimed 
that Mr. McCrery was not an inhabitant of the state of Louisiana (as 
required by the Constitution) and was therefore not qualified to serve 
as a Member of Congress from the Fourth District. On January 18, 2007, 
Mr. McCrery (hereafter ``contestee'') filed an answer and a motion to 
dismiss the case. Contestee's response included an affidavit from the 
property owner of his Louisiana residence indicating that he had 
maintained that residence during the requisite period.
    In its committee report, the Committee on House Administration 
stated unequivocally that ``this contest should not have been brought 
before the House under the FCEA'' and that ``a challenge to the 
qualifications of a Member is not treated as an election 
contest.''(28) It therefore concluded that the contestant 
had not made a proper claim of a right to the seat in question, and 
that the contest should therefore be dismissed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
28. H. Rept. 110-177, 110th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On June 6, 2007,(29) the committee filed its privileged 
report:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
29. 153 Cong. Rec. 14661, 110th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          REPORT ON HOUSE RESOLUTION 462, DISMISSING ELECTION CONTEST 
        RELATING TO OFFICE OF REPRESENTATIVE FROM FOURTH CONGRESSIONAL 
                           DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA    

        Mr. BRADY of Pennsylvania, from the Committee on House 
    Administration, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 110-177) 
    on the resolution (H. Res. 462) dismissing the election contest 
    relating to the office of Representative from the Fourth 
    Congressional District of Louisiana, which was referred to the 
    House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

    On June 12, 2007,(30) by unanimous consent, the House 
adopted House Resolution 462 (dismissing the contest):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
30. 153 Cong. Rec. 15453, 110th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF 
           REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE FOURTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF 
                                 LOUISIANA    

        Mr. [Robert] BRADY of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I ask 
    unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of House 
    Resolution 462 in the House.
        The Clerk read the title of the resolution.
        The text of the resolution is as follows:

H. Res. 462

  Resolved, That the election contest relating to the office of 
Representative from the Fourth Congressional District of Louisiana is 
dismissed.

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(31) Is there objection to 
    the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
31. John Salazar (CO).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.



Sec. 32. One Hundred Eleventh Congress, 2009-2010

Sec. 32.1 Tataii v Abercrombie

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the First District of Hawaii was conducted on November 4, 
2008.(1) (The general election candidates were Neil 
Abercrombie (the Democratic candidate), and Steve Tataii (the 
Republican candidate). In that election, Mr. Abercrombie received 
154,208 votes and Mr. Tataii received 38,115 votes. Mr. Abercrombie was 
certified by the Office of Elections for the State of Hawaii as the 
winner on November 24, 2008, though the certification was not received 
by the Clerk of the House until December 16, 2008. Mr. Abercrombie's 
credentials were presented to the House of Representatives, and on 
January 6, 2009, he was duly administered the oath of office without 
objection or challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 111-68, 111th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On January 16, 2009, Mr. Tataii (hereafter ``contestant'') filed a 
notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was forwarded to 
the Committee on House Administration for its review. Contestant also 
filed an election contest with the Supreme Court of Hawaii. Mr. 
Abercrombie (hereafter ``contestee'') did not file any pleadings in 
this case.
    The sole basis for contestant's challenge was that contestee 
refused to engage in a televised debate with the contestant. Had voters 
been given the opportunity to see the candidates debate one another, 
contestant argued, the result of the election would have been 
different.
    In its committee report, the Committee on House Administration 
noted, as a threshold matter, that contestant's notice of contest 
appeared to have been untimely filed. However, given that ``contestant 
may have been given inaccurate advice on exhausting state remedies and 
timely filing''(2) the committee chose to review the case on 
its merits rather than dismiss the case solely on procedural grounds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. H. Rept. 111-68, 111th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to contestant's claims, the committee was not 
persuaded that contestant had carried his burden under the statute. 
Contestant offered no direct evidence that votes would have been 
changed had the public debate occurred. Contestant provided only 
``unsupported speculation''(3) and nothing that would 
``remove the presumption of regularity that attached to the state 
certification of the election.''(4) Thus, the committee 
recommended dismissal of the case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. Id. at p. 4.
 4. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On March 31, 2009,(5) the committee filed its privileged 
report, and by unanimous consent, the House adopted House Resolution 
303 (dismissing the contest):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 155 Cong. Rec. 9207, 111th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF 
        REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF HAWAII  
                                         

        Mr. BRADY of Pennsylvania, from the Committee on House 
    Administration, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 111-68) on 
    the resolution (H. Res. 303) dismissing the election contest 
    relating to the office of Representative from the First 
    Congressional District of Hawaii, which was referred to the House 
    Calendar and ordered to be printed.
        Mr. [Robert] BRADY of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I call up 
    House Resolution 303 and ask unanimous consent for its immediate 
    consideration in the House.

        The Clerk read the title of the resolution.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(6) Is there objection to 
    the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. Elijah Cummings (MD).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        The text of the resolution is as follows:

H. Res. 303

  Resolved, That the election contest relating to the office of 
Representative from the First Congressional District of Hawaii is 
dismissed.

        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.



Sec. 33. One Hundred Twelfth Congress, 2011-2012

    There were no election contests considered by the House during the 
112th Congress.



Sec. 34. One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, 2013-2014

Sec. 34.1 Hayward v Cuellar

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the 28th District of Texas was conducted on November 6, 
2012.(1) The general election candidates were William 
Hayward (the Republican candidate), and Henry Cuellar (the Democratic 
candidate). In that election, Mr. Cuellar received 112,456 votes and 
Mr. Hayward received 49,309 votes. The Texas Secretary of State 
certified Mr. Cuellar as the winner of the election on December 6, 
2012, and credentials were issued on December 7, 2012. Mr. Cuellar's 
credentials were presented were presented to the House of 
Representatives, and on January 3, 2013, he was duly administered the 
oath of office without objection or challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 113-22, 113th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On December 11, 2012, Mr. Hayward (hereafter ``contestant'') filed 
a notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was referred to 
the Committee on House Administration for its review. On January 15, 
2013, Mr. Cuellar (hereafter ``contestee'') filed a motion to dismiss 
the contest. Contestant argued that fraud and vote tampering marred the 
election, and that voters who supported the contestant were intimidated 
from going to the polls. Contestee's motion to dismiss argued that the 
contestant did not support his claims with evidence that the result of 
the election would have been changed.
    In its committee report, the Committee on House Administration 
first addressed the threshold question of whether contestant's notice 
of contest conformed to the statutory requirements. In particular, the 
committee questioned whether contestant had properly claimed a right to 
contestee's seat. The notice of contest requested that a new election 
be held so that the will of the voters (absent the alleged fraud and 
intimidation) could be ascertained. The committee ultimately chose to 
assume that contestant had proper standing to pursue the case, and 
turned to the merits of contestant's argument.
    With respect to contestant's allegations of voter fraud, machine 
tampering, voter intimidation, vote-buying, and other irregularities, 
the committee found that contestant offered only ``hearsay of unnamed 
sources and his own testimony.''(2) Absent specific, 
credible evidence of fraud or irregularity, the committee felt bound to 
recommend granting contestee's motion to dismiss.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. H. Rept. 113-22, 113th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On March 19, 2013,(3) the committee filed its privileged 
report, and by unanimous consent, the House adopted House Resolution 
127 (dismissing the contest):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 159 Cong. Rec. 3946, 113th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF 
        REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE TWENTY EIGHTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF 
                                   TEXAS    

        Mrs. MILLER of Michigan, from the Committee on House 
    Administration, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 113-22) on 
    the resolution (H. Res. 127) dismissing the election contest 
    relating to the office of Representative from the Twenty Eighth 
    Congressional District of Texas, which was referred to the House 
    Calendar and ordered to be printed.
        Mrs. [Candice] MILLER of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I call up House 
    Resolution 127 and ask unanimous consent for its immediate 
    consideration in the House.
        The Clerk read the title of the resolution.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. [Rob] Woodall [of Georgia]). Is 
    there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Michigan?
        There was no objection.
        The text of the resolution is as follows:

H. Res. 127

  Resolved, That the election contest relating to the office of 
Representative from the Twenty Eighth Congressional District of Texas is 
dismissed.

        Mr. [Robert] BRADY of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I agree with 
    the majority that this election contest should be dismissed and 
    that it stands before us without merit. The Contestant notified the 
    House that he should be the winner of the election not based on the 
    finding of any solid evidence but based on rumors, conjecture and 
    hearsay.
        Contestant also raises accusations of misconduct by law 
    enforcement and election officials without proof. The Contestant 
    does not support any of his arguments with specific creditable 
    evidence. Based on this, I am voting to grant the Contestee relief 
    by disposing of this contest.
        My only regret is that the House was not able to dismiss this 
    frivolous contest earlier in the 113th Congress.

        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 34.2 Project Hurt v Cohen

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the Ninth District of Tennessee was conducted on November 6, 
2012.(4) Project Hurt (hereafter 
``contestant'')(5) was not a candidate in the election, and 
did not dispute the election results, in which Steve Cohen (hereafter 
``contestee'') was certified as the winner. No claims of fraud or other 
election irregularities were made by the contestant. Instead, in its 
notice of contest (filed on March 27, 2013), contestant argued that 
contestee had failed to respond to contestant's allegations of 
impeachable offenses committed by the President, and that therefore 
contestee was ``complicit in those massive criminal 
activities.''(6) Absent such activities, contestant alleges 
that it would have been able to recruit a candidate to successfully 
challenge contestee in the election.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 113-132, 113th Cong. 1st Sess.
 5. Parliamentarian's Note: Project Hurt was a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit 
        organization.
 6. H. Rept. 113-132, 113th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2 (internal quotations 
        omitted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its committee report, the Committee on House Administration 
noted that Project Hurt is not an individual, and therefore does not 
meet the definition of a contestant under the Federal Contested 
Elections Act. Even assuming that Project Hurt was qualified to file a 
notice of contest, the committee further noted that it was not a 
candidate in the election, and had not formally claimed a right to the 
seat in question. For these reasons, the committee concluded that 
``Project Hurt does not have standing to pursue a 
contest.''(7) The committee report also concluded that 
contestant's notice of contest was not timely filed under the statute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. Id. at p. 3. The committee reiterated that its analysis would have 
        been the same had the organization's founder, Dwayne Anderson, 
        filed the contest in his individual capacity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For these various procedural defects, the committee was persuaded 
that contestee's motion to dismiss should be granted. It concluded that 
contestant's claims ``do not in any way speak to whether or not 
[contestee] was validly elected.''(8)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. Id. at p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On June 26, 2013,(9) the committee filed its privileged 
report, and by unanimous consent, the House adopted House Resolution 
277 (dismissing the contest):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 159 Cong. Rec. 10425, 113th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF 
            REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE NINTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF 
                                 TENNESSEE    

        Mrs. MILLER of Michigan, from the Committee on House 
    Administration, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 113-132) 
    on the resolution (H. Res. 277) dismissing the election contest 
    relating to the office of Representative from the Ninth 
    Congressional District of Tennessee, which was referred to the 
    House Calendar and ordered to be printed.
        Mrs. [Candice] MILLER of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I call up 
    House Resolution 277 and ask unanimous consent for its immediate 
    consideration in the House.
        The Clerk read the title of the resolution.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(10) Is there objection to 
    the request of the gentlewoman from Michigan?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Virginia Foxx (NC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        The text of the resolution is as follows:

H. Res. 277

  Resolved, That the election contest relating to the office of 
Representative from the Ninth Congressional District of Tennessee is 
dismissed.

        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 34.3 Project Hurt v Waters

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the 43rd District of California was conducted on November 6, 
2012.(11) Project Hurt (hereafter 
``contestant'')(12) was not a candidate in the election, and 
did not dispute the election results, in which Maxine Waters (hereafter 
``contestee'') was certified as the winner. In its notice of contest 
filed on March 27, 2013, contestant made similar accusations against 
contestee as it made in another election contest in the 113th 
Congress.(13) Specifically, contestant claimed that Ms. 
Waters was complicit in ``massive criminal activities''(14) 
engaged in by the President, and that such activities negatively 
affected the recruitment of other candidates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 113-133, 113th Cong. 1st Sess.
12. Parliamentarian's Note: Project Hurt was a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit 
        organization.
13. See Project Hurt v Cohen, Sec. 34.2, supra.
14. H. Rept. 113-133, 113th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As with the earlier case,(15) the Committee on House 
Administration found that Project Hurt: (1) was not a legitimate 
contestant under the Federal Contested Election Act; (2) was not a 
candidate in the preceding election (and thus did not have standing to 
pursue an election contest under the statute); (3) had failed to claim 
a right to the seat in question; and (4) had failed to file the notice 
of contest before the deadline imposed by the statute. It therefore 
recommended dismissal of the case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. See Project Hurt v Cohen, Sec. 34.2, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On June 26, 2013,(16) the committee filed its privileged 
report, and by unanimous consent, the House adopted House Resolution 
278 (dismissing the contest):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 159 Cong. Rec. 10426, 113th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF 
         REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE FORTY THIRD CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF 
                                 CALIFORNIA    

        Mrs. MILLER of Michigan, from the Committee on House 
    Administration, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 113-133) 
    on the resolution (H. Res. 278) dismissing the election contest 
    relating to the office of Representative from the Forty Third 
    Congressional District of California, which was referred to the 
    House Calendar and ordered to be printed.
        Mrs. [Candice] MILLER of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I call up 
    House Resolution 278 and ask unanimous consent for its immediate 
    consideration in the House.
        The Clerk read the title of the resolution.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(17) Is there objection to 
    the request of the gentlewoman from Michigan?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. Virginia Foxx (NC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        The text of the resolution is as follows:

H. Res. 278

  Resolved, That the election contest relating to the office of 
Representative from the Forty Third Congressional District of California is 
dismissed.

        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.



Sec. 35. One Hundred Fourteen Congress, 2015-2016

    There were no election contests considered by the House during the 
114th Congress.



Sec. 36. One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, 2017-2018

    There were no election contests considered by the House during the 
115th Congress.



Sec. 37. One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, 2019-2020

    There were no election contests considered by the House during the 
116th Congress.



Sec. 38. One Hundred Seventeenth Congress, 2021-2022

Sec. 38.1. Hart v Miller-Meeks

    The election contest of Hart v. Miller-Meeks (Second District of 
Iowa) was withdrawn by the contestant before the House could complete 
its review of the case. The Committee on House Administration did not 
issue a report, but the chair of the committee submitted a letter to 
the Speaker describing the case for inclusion in the Congressional 
Record. That letter of April 28, 2021,(1) is as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 167 Cong. Rec. E464-E465 [Daily Ed.], 117th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           LETTER FROM CHAIRPERSON LOFGREN TO SPEAKER PELOSI ON THE 
             DISPOSITION OF THE ELECTION CONTEST IN IOWA'S SECOND 
                             CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT



                                HON. ZOE LOFGREN

                                 OF CALIFORNIA

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES    

                         Wednesday, April 28, 2021    

        Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I include the following letter in 
    the Record:

                                         House of Representatives,
                                Committee on House Administration,
                                   Washington, DC, April 28, 2021.
  Hon. Nancy Pelosi,
  Speaker of the House,
  Washington, DC.

        Dear Speaker Pelosi: I hereby report to the House the 
    disposition of the election contest in Iowa's Second Congressional 
    District. Contestant Rita Hart properly filed a notice of contest 
    under the Federal Contested Election Act (FCEA) on December 22, 
    2020. Contestee Mariannette Miller-Meeks filed motion to dismiss on 
    January 21, 2021. On February 19, 2021, the Committee adopted a 
    resolution to establish procedures in contested election cases 
    properly filed under the FCEA in the 117th Congress. After 
    reviewing additional filings from the parties, including a response 
    to the Contestee's motion filed by the Contestant and a reply filed 
    by the Contestee, the Committee on House Administration voted on 
    March 10, 2021, to postpone disposition of the motion to dismiss. 
    On March 31, 2021,Contestant Hart announced she would withdraw her 
    contest. A letter of withdrawal from Contestant Rita Hart, mailed 
    on March 31, 2021, was transmitted to the Committee on House 
    Administration by the Clerk of the House on April 8, 2021.
        After a review of House and Committee precedent in contested 
    elections cases in which the contestant withdraws, I have 
    determined no further House or Committee action is required to 
    dismiss the contest. The contestant's letter of withdrawal was 
    entered into the record of the Committee on House Administration's 
    Markup on April 28, 2021, and the Committee will take no further 
    action on this contest.

            Sincerely,
                                                      Zoe Lofgren,
                                                      Chairperson.

Sec. 38.2. Oberweis v Underwood

    The general election for the office of Representative to Congress 
from the 14th District of Illinois was conducted on November 3, 
2020.(2) The general election candidates were Lauren 
Underwood (the Democratic candidate) and James Oberweis (the Republican 
candidate). In that election, Ms. Underwood received 203,209 votes and 
Mr. Oberweis received 197,835 votes (a difference of 5,347 votes). On 
December 4, 2020, the Illinois State Board of Elections certified the 
vote totals. Ms. Underwood's credentials were presented to the House of 
Representatives, she appeared on January 3, 2021, and was administered 
the oath of office without objection or challenge.(3)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. This summary is derived from the report filed by the Committee on 
        House Administration relating to this election contest. See H. 
        Rept. 117-28, 117th Cong. 1st Sess.
 3. Parliamentarian's Note: On January 3, 2021, when the seating of 
        Members-elect from six different states was challenged by 
        another Member-elect, the House subsequently adopted a 
        privileged resolution to authorize the Speaker to administer 
        the oath of office to all Members-elect (including Ms. 
        Underwood). Due to social distancing protocols adopting in 
        light of the COVID-19 pandemic, Members-elect were administered 
        the oath in groups. See 167 Cong. Rec. H7-H8 [Daily Ed.], 117th 
        Cong. 1st Sess. (Jan. 3, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On January 4, 2021, Mr. Oberweis (hereafter the ``contestant'') 
filed a notice of contest with the Clerk of the House, which was 
referred to the committee on House Administration for its review. On 
February 3, 2021, Ms. Underwood (hereafter the ``contestee'') filed a 
motion to dismiss the contest.(4) Contestant argued that the 
election was marred by fraud and irregularities (particularly in the 
use of mail-in ballots), violations of Illinois election law, and 
inconsistent administration of the election by local authorities. The 
contestee maintained that contestant did not provide evidence 
sufficient to change the outcome of the election, as required by the 
Federal Contested Elections Act (FECA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. Pursuant to a committee resolution, both parties were permitted to 
        file additional briefs in support of and in opposition to the 
        motion to dismiss. See H. Rept. 117-28, 117th Cong. 1st Sess., 
        p. 3 (fn. 6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its committee report on the case, the Committee on House 
Administration concluded that contestant had ``failed to make a 
credible and specific claim that he is entitled to 
office.''(5) Contestant claimed that certain county clerks 
had mailed vote-by-mail applications to registered voters in those 
counties--something not provided to voters in other counties. 
Contestant further argued that this disparate treatment violated the 
14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and thus all mailed in 
ballots from the affected counties should be invalidated. The committee 
did not consider the invalidation of votes a ``constitutionally 
appropriate remedy,'' even if the factual and legal claims made by the 
contestant were accepted.(6) Relying on prior election 
contests, the committee noted the ``longstanding practice of counting 
all ballots validly cast by eligible voters where the voters' intent is 
clear.''(7) Regarding contestant's additional claims, it was 
conceded by the contestant that the ``number of votes in contention . . 
. are insufficient, by themselves, to change the outcome of the 
election.''(8) The committee concluded its report by 
recommending dismissal of the contest for failure to allege facts 
sufficient to alter the outcome of the election.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. H. Rept. 117-28, 117th Cong. 1st Sess., p. 4.
 6. Id.
 7. H. Rept. 117-28, 117th Cong. 1st Sess., p. 5.
 8. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Members of the minority party on the committee filed separate views 
in this case that came to the same conclusion as the majority. However, 
in the minority's view, the case should have dismissed on procedural 
grounds alone. The minority concluded that the contestant ``failed to 
effect proper and timely service of process''(9) as required 
under the Federal Contested Elections Act (FECA). This constituted a 
``fatal procedural error''(10) and thus the analysis of 
contestant's substantive claims was unnecessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. H. Rept. 117-28, 117th Cong. 1st Sess., p. 8.
10. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On May 11, 2021,(11) the Committee on House 
Administration filed its report in the House recommending dismissal of 
the case:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 167 Cong. Rec. H2192 [Daily Ed.], 117th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS    

        Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were 
    delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper 
    calendar, as follows:

  Ms. LOFGREN: Committee on House Administration. House Resolution 379. 
Resolution dismissing the election contest relating to the office of 
Representative from the Fourteenth Congressional District of Illinois 
(Rept. 117-28). Referred to the House Calendar.

    On May 12, 2021,(12) the House adopted a special order 
of business resolution providing, inter alia, that House Resolution 379 
(dismissing the contest) be adopted:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. H. Res. 380, 167 Cong. Rec. H2235 [Daily Ed.], 117th Cong. 1st 
        Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF 
         REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF 
                                  ILLINOIS    

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(13) Pursuant to section 7 
    of House Resolution 380, House Resolution 379 is hereby adopted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. Henry Cuellar (TX).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The text of the resolution is as follows:

H. Res. 379

  Resolved, That the election contest relating to the office of 
Representative from the Fourteenth Congressional District of Illinois is 
dismissed.
                        PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE
Ch. 9


                          INDEX TO PRECEDENTS

Ad Hoc Task Forces
    see Committee Investigations
Affidavits
    use of, Sec. Sec. 10, 10.2, 17.2
Amended Notice of Contest
    see Notice of Contest
Anderson v Rose, Sec. 25.1
Answer
    failure by contestee to file, Sec. Sec. 9, 11
    response by contestant, Sec. 9
    statutory requirements regarding, Sec. 9
Archer v Packard, Sec. 19.1
Ballots
    absentee ballots, Sec. 20.2
    instructions to election officials to safeguard, Sec. Sec. 10.5, 
        20.1
    irregularities in offered as grounds, Sec. Sec. 16.5, 19.1, 19.2, 
        24.1
    proportionate reduction, Sec. Sec. 12, 26.1
    review of, Sec. Sec. 10, 10.4, 12, 12.1-12.3, 15.1, 15.2
    voter intent, standards for evaluating, Sec. Sec. 12, 20.1
Brooks v Harman, Sec. 25.4
Burden of Proof
    generally, Sec. Sec. 9, 11, 11.1, 16.2, 20.3, 26.1
    standards of proof, Sec. 11
Certificates of Election
    presentation to Clerk, Sec. 1
    presumption of regularity attaches to, Sec. Sec. 11, 11.3, 15.1, 
        15.5, 16.2, 16.3, 31.1, 32.1
Clerk of the House
    deposition transcription filed with, Sec. 10
    notice of contest received by, Sec. 4, 13
Committee Investigations
    ad hoc task forces, use of, Sec. 13
    ballots, instructions to safeguard, Sec. Sec. 10.5, 20.1
    ballots, review of by committee, Sec. Sec. 10, 10.4, 12, 12.3, 
        15.2, 20.1
    committee reports, see Committee Reports
    funding, Sec. 13
    generally, Sec. 10
    interrogatories, use of, Sec. Sec. 10, 10.1, 10.5, 26.1
    observers, use of, Sec. Sec. 10, 10.3, 12, 16.5, 16.6, 16.7, 26.1
    protective orders, use of, Sec. Sec. 10, 10.5, 26.1
    recounts conducted by committee, Sec. Sec. 10, 12, 20.1
    reports, see Committee Reports
    subcommittees, use of, Sec. 13
    subpoenas, use of Sec. Sec. 10, 26.1
Committee Reports
    additional or supplemental views, Sec. Sec. 13, 16.2, 16.3, 16.4, 
        17.4, 19.2, 20.1, 25.1, 26.1, 31.1, 31.3, 38.2
    generally, Sec. 13
    lack of, Sec. Sec. 16.8, 25.3, 25.4, 38.1
    minority or dissenting views, Sec. Sec. 13, 16.2, 16.3, 16.4, 17.4, 
        19.2, 20.1, 25.1, 26.1, 31.1, 31.3, 38.2
    privilege, Sec. 13
Committee on Elections
    see Former Committee on Elections
Committee on House Administration
    ad hoc task forces, use of, Sec. 13
    election contests, jurisdiction over, Sec. Sec. 4, 13
    history, Sec. 4
    investigations by, see Committee Investigations
    jurisdiction over election contests, Sec. Sec. 4, 13
    referrals to, Sec. 4
    reports, see Committee Reports
    subcommittees on elections, Sec. Sec. 4, 13
Congress
    authority regarding election of Members, Sec. Sec. 1, 3, 4
Congressional Record
    insertion regarding disposition of case, Sec. 38.1
Consideration of Resolution Resolving Contest
    amendment, Sec. 13
    debate, right to close, Sec. 13
    debate time, Sec. 13
    division of the question for voting, applicability, Sec. 13
    hour rule, Sec. 13
    question of consideration, Sec. 20.1
    reconsideration, see Motion to Reconsider
    right to close debate, Sec. 13
    unanimous consent, Sec. 13
Constitution
    election of Members, provisions regarding, Sec. 1
Contestant
    definition, Sec. 1
    floor privileges, Sec. Sec. 13, 26.1
    salary payment pending resolution of case, Sec. Sec. 13, 20.1
Contested Elections
    see Election Contests
Contestee
    definition, Sec. 1
    salary payment pending resolution of case, Sec. Sec. 13, 20.1
Cox v McCrery, Sec. 31.5
Curtis v Feeney, Sec. 31.2
Defenses
    change the result, failure to state grounds sufficient to, 
        Sec. Sec. 6, 6.3
    death of contestant, effect on contest, Sec. 6
    failure to claim right to seat, Sec. Sec. 6, 6.4
    lack of, Sec. Sec. 6, 6.7
    motion to dismiss, relation to, Sec. 9
    notice of contest, defects in, Sec. 8
    notice of contest not properly served, Sec. Sec. 6, 6.2, 17.1, 
        17.3, 38.2
    notice of contest untimely filed, Sec. Sec. 6, 6.1, 17.3, 26.1, 
        31.1, 31.3, 32.1, 34.2, 34.3
    particularity, failure to state grounds with, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.1, 6, 
        6.5, 8, 15.3, 15.4, 16.1, 16.7, 19.2, 26.1
    pre-election issues not timely addressed, Sec. Sec. 6, 19.2, 20.2
    prima facie case, failure to make, Sec. Sec. 6, 6.6
    recount as improper relief, Sec. Sec. 6, 6.4, 12, 15.1, 15.5
    service of process, deficiencies in, Sec. Sec. 6, 6.2, 17.1, 17.3, 
        38.2
    standing, lack of, Sec. 6
    state remedies, failure to exhaust, Sec. Sec. 6, 32.1
    statutory defenses, Sec. 6
    timeliness, Sec. 6
    withdrawal by contestant, effect on contest, Sec. Sec. 6, 13.1, 
        25.3, 25.4, 38.1
Dehr v Leggett, Sec. 16.5
Delegates and Resident Commissioners
    election contests involving, Sec. Sec. 7, 20.2
Depositions
    Clerk of the House, transcripts filed with, Sec. 10
    cross-examination of witnesses, Sec. 10
    evidence obtained by, Sec. 10
    motion to suppress, Sec. Sec. 9, 10
    oath requirements, Sec. 10
    objections raised during, Sec. 10
    signature requirement, Sec. Sec. 9, 10
    statutory authority to take, Sec. 9
    testimony gathered by, Sec. 10
    transcripts filed with Clerk, Sec. 10
    transcripts generally, Sec. 10
    transcripts, right to review, Sec. 10
    waiver of right to review transcript, Sec. 10
Discovery
    committee-initiated motions and requests, Sec. Sec. 9, 26.1
    depositions, statutory authority to take, Sec. Sec. 9, 10
    enlarge time for, requests to, Sec. Sec. 9, 10, 16.2, 17.2
    evidence, determinations as to relevancy, Sec. 11
    evidence obtained by special committee, Sec. 11
    evidence, procedures to obtain, Sec. Sec. 9, 11, 26.1
    evidence regarding prior congresses, Sec. Sec. 11, 11.2, 15.3, 16.7
    generally, Sec. Sec. 9, 10
    interrogatories issued by committee, Sec. Sec. 9, 10, 10.1, 26.1
    interrogatories issued by parties, Sec. 10
    motion to dismiss, effect of, Sec. Sec. 10, 11, 26.1
    motions regarding, Sec. Sec. 9, 10, 26.1
    subpoenas, statutory authority to issue, Sec. Sec. 9, 10
    timeliness of motions, Sec. 10
Disposition of Contests
    committee report, lack of, Sec. Sec. 16.8, 25.3, 25.4, 38.1
    Congressional Record insertion in lieu of committee report, 
        Sec. 38.1
    generally, Sec. 13
    resolution, contests resolved by, Sec. 13
    withdrawal of notice of contest, Sec. Sec. 13.1, 15.2, 25.3, 25.4, 
        38.1
Division of the Question for Voting
    applicability to resolution resolving election contests, Sec. 13
Dornan v Sanchez, Sec. 26.1
Election Contests
    committee jurisdiction over, Sec. 4
    referrals, Sec. 4
    statutory provisions regarding, Sec. 2
    style, Sec. 1
Election of Members
    Congress, authority regarding, Sec. Sec. 1, 3, 4
    constitutional provisions regarding, Sec. 1
    states, authority regarding, Sec. Sec. 1, 3, 4
Election Officials
    misconduct by used as grounds, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.5, 17.3, 19.1, 20.1, 
        20.3, 31.1, 31.2, 38.2
    presumption of good faith, Sec. Sec. 11, 11.3
Electronic Voting Machines
    see Voting Equipment
Evidence
    see Discovery
Exclusion
    election contests, relationship to, Sec. 5
Federal Contested Elections Act (FCEA)
    burden of proof under, Sec. Sec. 9, 11
    former Contested Elections Act, Sec. 2
    generally, Sec. 2
    history, Sec. 2
    jurisdiction pursuant to, Sec. 13
    pleadings under, Sec. 9
    recounts not proper relief under, Sec. Sec. 6, 6.4, 12, 15.1, 15.5
Floor Privileges
    contestant prohibited from exercising, Sec. 26.1
    contestants, privileges extended to, Sec. Sec. 13, 26.1
Former Committee on Elections
    history, Sec. 4
Fraud
    presumptions regarding, Sec. Sec. 11, 11.2, 11.4, 16.7
Freeman v Mitchell, Sec. 17.2
Gonzalez v Diaz-Balart, Sec. 31.1
Government Accountability Office (GAO)
    recounts, use of during, Sec. Sec. 10, 12, 20.1
    voting equipment, analysis of by, Sec. Sec. 10, 10.4
Grounds
    ballot irregularities offered as, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.3, 16.5, 19.1, 
        19.2
    campaign law, violations offered as, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.7, 15.1, 15.2, 
        15.3
    generally, Sec. 5
    illegal voting offered as, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.4, 12, 16.2, 16.6, 16.8, 
        20.3, 25.1, 26.1
    improper conduct by contestee offered as, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.6
    intimidation of contestant offered as, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.10
    misconduct by election officials offered as, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.5, 
        17.3, 19.1, 20.1, 20.3, 31.1, 31.2, 38.2
    misuse of official position offered as, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.9, 15.3
    particularity, requirement to state with, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.1, 6, 6.5, 
        15.3, 15.4, 16.1, 16.7, 19.2, 26.1
    primary election, fraud or error in offered as, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.11, 
        16.5, 25.2, 29.1
    qualifications, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.8, 15.4, 16.1, 16.7, 25.1, 25.2, 
        29.2, 30.1, 31.5
    refusal to debate offered as, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.11
    vote buying or bribery offered as, Sec. Sec. 17.4, 25.1
    voter confusion offered as, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.3, 16.5, 19.1
    voter intimidation offered as, Sec. Sec. 5, 25.1, 34.1
    voting equipment malfunction offered as, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.2, 16.5, 
        16.6, 17.2, 19.1, 19.2, 24.1, 25.1, 31.1, 31.2, 31.3, 31.4, 
        34.1
Haas v Bass, Sec. 25.2
Hansen v Stallings, Sec. 20.3
Hart v Miller-Meeks, Sec. 38.1
Hayward v Cuellar, Sec. 34.1
Hendon v Clarke, Sec. 19.2
Hill and Panlasigui v Clay, Sec. 16.6
Hour Rule
    resolution resolving election contest considered under, Sec. 13
House Administration
    see Committee on House Administration
Interrogatories
    committee-issued, Sec. Sec. 9, 10, 10.1, 10.5, 26.1
    parties may issue, Sec. 10
Investigations and Inquiries
    see Committee Investigations
Jennings v Buchanan, Sec. 31.4
Kyros v Emery, Sec. 15.2
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946
    election contest provisions, Sec. 4
Lowe v Fowler, Sec. 16.7
Lyons v Gordon (108th Congress), Sec. 29.2
Lyons v Gordon (109th Congress), Sec. 30.1
Mack v Stokes, Sec. 15.4
McCloskey v McIntyre, Sec. 20.1
McCuen v Dickey, Sec. 24.1
Moreau v Tonry, Sec. 16.8
Motion for a More Definite Statement
    statutory requirements regarding, Sec. 9
    timeliness, Sec. 9
    use of, Sec. Sec. 9, 15.5, 16.1, 26.1
Motion to Dismiss
    defenses raised in opposition to, Sec. 9
    discovery, effect on, Sec. Sec. 10, 10.5, 11
    generally, Sec. 9
    memoranda or appendices to, Sec. 9
    pleadings in opposition to, Sec. 9
    postponement, Sec. Sec. 9, 10, 10.5, 26.1
    supplemental filings, Sec. 9
    timeliness, Sec. Sec. 9, 20.3
Motion to Quash Subpoenas
    statutory procedures, Sec. Sec. 9, 10
    use of, Sec. Sec. 10.1, 17.2, 26.1
Motion to Recommit
    resolution resolving election contests, applicability to, 
        Sec. Sec. 13, 20.1, 26.1
Motion to Reconsider
    use of, Sec. 9
Motion to Stay Proceedings
    use of, Sec. Sec. 9, 9.2, 16.2, 17.2
Motion to Suppress a Deposition
    statutory authority, Sec. Sec. 9, 10
Munster v Gejdenson, Sec. 25.3
Notice of Contest
    addenda, Sec. Sec. 9, 9.1
    amended notice of contest, Sec. Sec. 8, 9, 9.1, 15.2, 15.5, 24.1
    Clerk, received by, Sec. Sec. 4, 13
    deadline for filing, Sec. Sec. 8, 8.1, 17.3, 26.1, 31.1, 31.3, 
        32.1, 34.2, 34.3
    defects in used as defense, Sec. 8
    form, Sec. Sec. 8, 8.2
    particularity, grounds must be stated with, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.1, 6, 
        6.5, 8, 15.3, 15.4, 16.1, 16.7, 19.2, 26.1
    service of process requirements, Sec. Sec. 8, 8.3, 17.1, 17.3, 38.2
    signature requirement, Sec. 8
    timeliness, Sec. Sec. 8, 8.1, 17.3, 26.1, 31.1, 31.3, 32.1, 34.2, 
        34.3
    withdrawal of claims contained in, Sec. Sec. 9.1, 15.2
Oaths
    administration to Members-elect, Sec. 1
    challenging the right to be sworn, Sec. Sec. 4, 20.1, 20.3
    depositions, requirement to take, Sec. 10
Oberweis v Underwood, Sec. 38.2
Organizations
    election contests initiated by, Sec. Sec. 7, 34.2, 34.3
Particularity
    grounds must be stated with, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.1, 6, 6.5, 8, 15.3, 
        15.4, 16.1, 16.7, 19.2, 26.1
    notice of contest must state grounds with, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.1, 6, 
        6.5, 8, 15.3, 15.4, 16.1, 16.7, 19.2, 26.1
Paul v Gammage, Sec. 16.2
Perkins v Byron, Sec. 17.1
Pierce v Pursell, Sec. 16.4
Postponement
    motion to dismiss, effect of, Sec. Sec. 9, 10, 10.5, 26.1
Primary Candidates
    election contests initiated by, Sec. Sec. 7, 7.2, 16.5, 25.2, 29.1
Privileged Reports
    see Committee Reports
Project Hurt v Cohen, Sec. 34.2
Project Hurt v Waters, Sec. 34.3
Qualifications
    grounds for initiating a contest, Sec. Sec. 5, 5.8, 15.4, 16.1, 
        16.7, 25.1, 25.2, 29.2, 30.1, 31.5
Question of Consideration
    applicability, Sec. 20.1
Questions of Privilege
    floor privileges of contestant address via, Sec. 26.1
    resolution regarding election contests constitutes, Sec. Sec. 13, 
        20.1
Rayner v Stewart, Sec. 17.3
Reconsideration
    see Motion to Reconsider
Recounts
    committee-conducted, Sec. Sec. 10, 12, 20.1
    Government Accountability Office (GAO), use of during, 
        Sec. Sec. 10, 12, 20.1
    improper relief under FCEA, Sec. Sec. 6, 6.5, 12, 15.1
    observers from committee sent to monitor, Sec. Sec. 10, 10.3, 12, 
        16.5
    standard for requesting, Sec. Sec. 11, 11.4, 15.5, 16.4, 17.5, 
        19.2, 20.1, 20.3
    state authority and procedures, Sec. Sec. 2, 12, 12.1, 12.2, 15.1, 
        15.2, 15.5, 16.3, 16.4, 16.5, 17.5, 20.1, 20.3
Referrals
    election contests, referrals to committee, Sec. 4
Resident Commissioners
    see Delegates and Resident Commissioners
Resignation
    effect on case, Sec. 16.8
Russell v Brown-Waite, Sec. 31.3
Saunders v Kelly, Sec. 16.1
Service of Process
    notice of contest, Sec. Sec. 8, 8.3, 17.1, 17.3, 38.2
    subpoenas, Sec. 10
Specificity
    see Particularity
Standing
    general or special election candidates, Sec. Sec. 7, 7.1, 29.1
    generally, Sec. 7
    organizations, Sec. Sec. 7, 34.2, 34.3,
    primary election candidates, Sec. Sec. 7, 7.2, 16.5, 25.2, 29.1
    write-in candidates, Sec. Sec. 7, 7.2, 16.5, 25.2
State and Local Election Procedures
    authority regarding election of Members, Sec. Sec. 1, 3, 4
    deference accorded, Sec. Sec. 12, 12.1, 15.2, 20.1, 20.3
    directory laws distinguished from mandatory laws, Sec. Sec. 12, 
        15.2
    generally, Sec. Sec. 12, 12.1, 12.2
    mandatory laws distinguished from directory laws, Sec. Sec. 12, 
        15.2
    recounts under, Sec. Sec. 12, 12.1, 12.2, 15.1, 15.2, 15.5, 16.3, 
        16.4, 16.5, 17.5, 20.1, 20.3
    straight-ticket voting, Sec. Sec. 12, 19.2
Subcommittee on Elections
    see Committee on House Administration
Subpoenas
    committee, issued by, Sec. Sec. 10, 26.1
    evidence obtained by, Sec. Sec. 10, 26.1
    held in abeyance, Sec. Sec. 10, 10.1, 26.1
    modification of, Sec. Sec. 9, 10, 10.1, 26.1
    parties, issued by, Sec. Sec. 10, 10.1, 17.2, 26.1
    penalties for failure to respond, Sec. Sec. 10, 26.1
    quash, motions to, Sec. Sec. 9, 10, 10.1, 17.2, 26.1
    service of process, Sec. 10
    statutory authority to issue, Sec. 9
Tataii v Abercrombie, Sec. 32.1
Tataii v Case, Sec. 29.1
Testimony
    affidavits, Sec. Sec. 10, 10.2, 17.2
    depositions to obtain, Sec. 10
    stipulations, Sec. 10
    witnesses, Sec. Sec. 10, 13
Thorsness v Daschle, Sec. 17.5
Timeliness
    discovery motions, statutory deadlines regarding, Sec. 10
    motion for a more definite statement, statutory deadlines 
        regarding, Sec. 9
    motion to dismiss, statutory deadlines regarding, Sec. Sec. 9, 20.3
    notice of contest, statutory deadlines regarding, Sec. Sec. 8, 8.1, 
        31.1, 31.3, 32.1, 34.2, 34.3
Unanimous Consent
    resolution resolving election contest considered by, Sec. 13
Voting Equipment
    Government Accountability Office (GAO), analysis by, Sec. Sec. 10, 
        10.4
    malfunction of offered as grounds, Sec. Sec. 16.5, 16.6, 17.2, 
        19.1, 19.2, 24.1, 25.1, 31.1, 31.2, 31.3, 31.4, 34.1
Waiver
    deposition transcript, waiver of right to review, Sec. 10
Wilson v Hinshaw, Sec. 15.3
Wilson v Leach, Sec. 17.4
Withdrawal
    claims in a notice of contest, Sec. Sec. 9, 15.2
    evidence, Sec. 10
    notice of contest, Sec. Sec. 13.1, 15.2, 25.3, 25.4, 38.1
Witnesses
    cross-examination, Sec. 10
    depositions issued to, Sec. 10
    fees and travel expenses of, Sec. 13
    testimony gathered from, Sec. 10
Won Pat v Blaz, Sec. 20.2
Write-in Candidates
    standing to initiate election contest, Sec. Sec. 7, 7.2, 25.2
    voter intent regarding, Sec. Sec. 12, 16.5, 19.1
Young v Mikva (94th Congress), Sec. 15.1
Young v Mikva (95th Congress), Sec. 16.3
Ziebarth v Smith, Sec. 15.5