[Hinds' Precedents, Volume 3] [Chapter 63 - Nature of Impeachment] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov] NATURE OF IMPEACHMENT. ------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Provisions of the Constitution. Sections 2001-2003.\1\ 2. Rules of Jefferson's Manual. Sections 2004, 2005. 3. Trial proceeds only when House is in session. Section 2006.\2\ 4. Accused may be tried after resignation. Section 2007.\3\ 5. As to what are impeachable offenses. Sections 2008-2021.\4\ 6. General considerations. Sections 2022-2024.\5\ ------------------------------------------------------------------- 2001. ``Treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors'' require removal of President, Vice-President, or other civil officers from office on conviction by impeachment. The Constitution, in Article II, section 4, provides: The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Discussion as to right to demand jury trial. See. 2313 of this volume. Impeachment in relation to the courts. See. 2314 of this volume. A Senator is not a ``civil officer.'' Secs. 2316, 2318 of this volume. Argument that the power is remedial rather than punitive. Sec. 2510 of this volume. May a civil officer be impeached for offenses committed prior to his term of office? See. 2510 of this volume. As to the impeachment of territorial judges (secs. 2486, 2493) and officers removable by the Executive (secs. 2501, 2515). Is impeachment justified by ascertainment of probable cause? Sec. 2498. \2\ See also sec. 2462 of this volume. \3\ See also secs. 2317, 2444, 2459; but in other cases proceedings have ceased after resignation. Secs. 2489, 2500, 2509, 2512. \4\ As to the impeachment of citizens not holding an office. Secs. 2056, 2315. Nature of impeachment discussed. Sec. 2270; also in the Chase trial, secs. 2356-2362; in the Peck trial, secs. 2379-2382; in the Johnson trial, secs. 2405, 2406, 2410, 2418, 2433; in the case of Watrous,, sec. 2498. The argument that impeachment might be only for indictable offenses. Secs. 2356, 2379, 2405, 2406, 2410, 2418. Abuse and usurpation of power as grounds of. Secs. 2404, 2508, 2516, 2518. Authority of Congress to make nonresidence of a judge an impeachable offense. Sec. 2512. \5\ An officer threatened with impeachment may decline to testify. Sec. 1699. Impeachment and ordinary legislative investigations contrasted. Sec. 1700. Sec. 2002 2002. Impeachments are exempted from the constitutional requirement of trial by jury.--The Constitution, in Article III, section 2, provides: The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury. * * * 2003. Cases of impeachment are excluded by the Constitution from the offenses for which the President may grant reprieves and pardons.-- The Constitution in Article II, section 2, provides: The President * * * shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. 2004. The English precedents indicate that jury trial has not been permitted in impeachment cases. The Commons are considered, in English practice, as having in impeachment cases the function of a grand jury. In Chapter LIII of Jefferson's Manual the following is given in the ``sketch of some of the principles and practices of England'' on the subject of impeachments: Jury. In the case of Alice Pierce (I R., 2) a jury was impaneled for her trial before a committee. (Seld. Jud., 123.) But this was on a complaint, not on impeachment by the Commons. (Seld. Jud., 163.) It must also have been for a misdemeanor only, as the Lords spiritual sat in the case, which they do on misdemeanors, but not in capital cases. (Id., 148.) The judgment was a forfeiture of all her lands and goods. (Id., 188.) This, Selden says, is the only jury he finds recorded in Parliament for misdemeanors; but he makes no doubt if the delinquent doth put himself on the trial of his country, a jury ought to be impaneled, and he adds that it is not so on impeachment by the Commons; for they are in loco proprio, and there no jury ought to be impaneled. (Id., 124.) The Ld. Berkeley (6 E., 3) was arraigned for the murder of L. 2 on an information on the part of the King and not on impeachment of the Commons; for then they had been patria sua. He waived his peerage, and was tried by a jury of Gloucestershire and Warwickshire. (Id., 126.) In I H., 7, the Commons protest that they are not to be considered as parties to any judgment given, or thereafter to be given, in Parliament. (Id., 133.) They have been generally and more justly considered, as is before stated, as the grand jury, for the conceit of Selden is certainly not accurate that they are the patria sua of the accused, and that the Lords do only judge but not try. It is undeniable that they do try, for they examine witnesses as to the facts, and acquit or condemn according to their own belief of them. And Lord Hale says ``the peers are judges of law as well as of fact'' (2 Hale, P. C., 275), consequently of fact as well as of law. 2005. Under the parliamentary law an impeachment is not discontinued by the dissolution of Parliament.--In Chapter LIII of Jefferson's Manual the following is given in the ``sketch of some, of the principles and practices of England'' on the subject of impeachments: Continuance. An impeachment is not discontinued by the dissolution of Parliament, but may be resumed by the new Parliament. (T. Ray., 383; 4 Com. Journ., 23 Dec., 1790; Lords' Journ., May 15, 1791; 2 Wood., 618.) 2006. It was decided in 1876 that an impeachment trial could only proceed when Congress was in session. Instance during an impeachment trial wherein a Member of the Senate called on the managers for an opinion. On June 19, 1876,\1\ in the Senate sitting for the impeachment trial of William W. Belknap, late Secretary of War, the counsel for the respondent asked for a postponement of the trial until some time in the next November. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ First session Forty-fourth Congress, Record of Trial, p. 173. Sec. 2006 Thereupon a question arose as to whether or not the trial might proceed when the House of Representatives was not in session, and Mr. John J. Ingalls, a Senator from Kansas, asked for an opinion from the managers for the House of Representatives. Mr. Manager Scott Lord said: Perhaps, Mr. President, it will be sufficient for the managers to say in that regard that the managers are not agreed on that question. Some of us have a very fixed opinion one way, and other managers seem to have as fixed an opinion the other way; and not being agreed among ourselves we perhaps ought not to discuss the question until we can come to some agreement. I will say further, Mr. President and Senators, that the question which is presented by the Senator has not been fully considered by the managers; it has not been very much discussed by them, but it has been sufficiently discussed to enable us to see that there is this difference of opinion. I think myself that when the question is fully discussed by the managers they will come to a conclusion on the subject unanimously; but perhaps one differing with me might think we should come unanimously to a different conclusion from that which entertain. I will say for myself that I have no doubt of the power of this court to sit as a court of impeachment after the adjournment of the Congress. * * * * * * * I ought to say in regard to the opinion which I have expressed that I predicate that opinion upon the action of both the Houses. I think that in order to authorize the sitting of this court beyond all question either the House or the Congress should vote to empower the managers to appear before this court in the recess or absence of the House. * * * * * * * I ought to say in furtherance of the view which I have presented, that the question his been settled in the State of New York, the State in which I reside, and I, of course, would naturally be influenced somewhat by the decision. In the case of Judge Barnard the trial was had at Saratoga after the adjournment of the legislature, and in the recent impeachment trial in Virginia the same course was taken--the impeachment was not tried until after the adjournment of the legislature. I am also reminded that as far back as 1853 when Mr. Mather, a canal commissioner, was impeached in New York, he was tried after the legislature adjourned. In regard to the English authorities they seem on the whole to warrant the proposition that the House of Lords may proceed as a court of impeachment after the adjournment of the Parliament. Soon after,\1\ while an order was pending providing that the trial should proceed on July 6, Mr. Oliver P. Morton, of Indiana, proposed to add thereto as an amendment the following: Provided, That impeachment can only proceed in the presence of the House of Representatives. On motion of Mr. Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, of New Jersey, and without division, the words ``in the presence of the House of Representatives'' were stricken out and the words ``while Congress is in session'' were inserted. Thereupon Mr. Morton asked and obtained leave to withdraw his amendment. Thereupon Mr. Roscoe Conkling, of New York, offered the proviso again: Provided, That impeachment can only proceed while Congress is in session. This proviso was agreed to, yeas 21, nays 19. Thereupon Mr. Oliver P. Morton proposed to amend by adding the words, ``and in the presence of the House of Representatives.'' Mr. Eli Saulsbury, of Delaware, proposed to amend Mr. Morton's amendment by adding the words, ``or its managers.'' ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Senate Journal, pp. 957, 959. Sec. 2006 Mr. Saulsbury's amendment was disagreed to without division; and Mr. Morton's amendment was disagreed to by a vote of yeas 9, nays 28. So it was Provided, That the impeachment can only proceed while the Congress is in session. The reasons actuating the Senate in coming to this decision do not appear from Senate proceedings, as the debates were in secret; but in a verbal report made to the House of Representatives by the Chairman of the Managers, Mr. Scott Lord, of New York, this statement appears: \1\ The plan of the managers on the part of the House has been this: To induce the Senate, as a court of impeachment, to allow Congress to adjourn and then sit as a court to carry on the case. But there are two reasons against that which render it conclusive that the Senate will not do so. The first is that many Senators doubt the power of the Senate to sit as a court of impeachment after the adjournment of Congress. The second, and the really practicable reason, is that it will be found impossible to keep a quorum of the court together after the adjournment of Congress. 2007. The Senate decided, in 1876, that William W. Belknap was amenable to trial notwithstanding his resignation of the office before his impeachment for acts therein. In the Belknap trial the managers and counsel for respondent agreed that a private citizen, apart from offense in an office, might not be impeached. Discussion as to effect of an officer's resignation after the House has investigated his conduct, but before it has impeached. On May 4, 1876,\2\ in the Senate, sitting for the impeachment trial of William W. Belknap, late Secretary of War, the President pro tempore announced that the Senate had adopted the following: Ordered, That the Senate proceed first to hear and determine the question whether W. W. Belknap, the respondent, is amenable to trial by impeachment for acts done as Secretary of War, notwithstanding his resignation of said office; and that the managers and counsel in such argument discuss the question whether the issues of fact are material and whether the matters in support of the jurisdiction alleged by the House of Representatives in the pleadings subsequent to the articles of impeachment can be thus alleged if the same are not averred in said articles. On the first question, whether or not the respondent was amenable to trial for acts done as Secretary of War, notwithstanding his resignation, the argument naturally divided itself into three branches. 1. May a private citizen be impeached, irrespective of whether he has held office or not? 2. May a private citizen who formerly held an office be impeached for acts done as an incumbent of that office? 3. Assuming that a person may not be impeached after he is out of office for acts done in office, does a resignation, after proceedings for impeachment begin, confer immunity? ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Record, p. 3871. \2\ First session Forty-fourth Congress, Senate Journal, p. 928; record of trial, p. 27. Sec. 2007 As to the first question, may a private citizen be impeached, Mr. Montgomery Blair, of counsel for the respondent, said: \1\ Upon the first question I do not know how the managers are to maintain the jurisdiction of this court upon any other principle than that which was asserted in the Blount case, which was that ``all persons are liable to impeachment'' (Annals of Congress of 1797, vol. 2, p. 2251), because, as was alleged there all persons are liable in England, the country from which we borrow the proceeding, and to whose laws and usages we must therefore look for the extent of its application. But as the court on that occasion overruled this doctrine, and the decision has been acquiesced in for seventy-eight years, the managers ought not now to expect this court to overrule it. And Mr. Manager Scott Lord, speaking for the House of Representatives, said: \2\ The learned counsel, Mr. Blair, suggested that we should be driven to the position of asserting that a citizen who had never held office was impeachable. We claim no such thing. We claim first, and admit, that the authorities have settled that a mere citizen can not be impeached; and if the authorities had not settled it, the Constitution, not by express words, but by its intent, does exclude the idea of impeachment as against a mere private citizen. Mr. Matt H. Carpenter, of counsel for the respondent, after an exhaustive discussion of authorities, said: \3\ In Blount's case, where the question I am discussing was first presented to this court, Messrs. Bayard and Harper, managers, understanding the task before them, grappled with the subject, and maintained the broad ground that the power of impeachment under our Constitution reached to every inhabitant of the United States. Blount, not as a Senator, but while a Senator, had committed the acts charged in the articles of impeachment. He pleaded to the jurisdiction, first, that he was not an officer of the United States when he committed the acts complained of, and, secondly, that he was not even a Senator at the time of the impeachment. It appeared from the record that he was a Senator at the time the acts were committed. The managers argued that a Senator was a civil officer. But they also contended that whether a Senator was a civil officer or not was immaterial; because impeachment was not confined to civil officers. And there was no fault in their reasoning, upon their premises. If Impeachment lies against any private citizen of the United States, then Blount should have been convicted; because surely he could not interpose his senatorial character as a shield against an impeachment maintainable against any private citizen. And so the question was distinctly presented, whether or not impeachment lies against a private citizen. The court, as is well known, decided that there was no jurisdiction. And this decision is an authoritative declaration that impeachment can not be maintained against a private citizen. * * * * * * * We have been unable to find any case in which a private citizen has been held subject to impeachment for misconduct in an office formerly held by him. In the Barnard case, it is true, the court held that the accused might be convicted and removed from office on account of offenses committed in a former term of the same elective office which he was holding at the time of impeachment. In the State of Ohio, Messrs. Pease, Huntingdon, and Tod held a certain act of the legislature unconstitutional and void. At the session of the legislature 1807-8 steps were taken to impeach them therefor, but the resolution was not acted upon at that session; but at the next session steps were taken toward the impeachment of the offending judges, and articles of impeachment were reported against Pease and Tod, but not against Huntingdon, who in the meantime had been elected governor of the State, and of course had ceased to be a judge of the court. This discrimination is an authority in favor of the proposition that no man can be impeached after he is out of office. (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, p. 160, note 3.) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Record of trial, p. 28. \2\ Page 34. \3\ Pages 39-42. Sec. 2007 (2) The main force of the argument was expended on the second question, whether or not a private citizen who has formerly held an office may be impeached for acts done as an incumbent of that office. The question of the right to impeach private citizen was argued only for its relation to this second question. Mr. Montgomery Blair, of counsel for the respondent, began the argument with review of the nature of impeachment in America and England, and continued: \1\ This settles the principle upon which impeachment must be exercised. It is strictly confined to the cases expressly enumerated in the Constitution, as much so as any other court established by the Federal Constitution. And this brings me to the consideration of what are the cases enumerated by this Constitution as within the power of impeachment. There is no other enumeration except what is contained in the fourth section of the second article, as follows: ``The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' The enumerated cues of persons, therefore, against whom this court can entertain articles of impeachment are ``the President, Vice- President, and all civil officers of the United States;'' not persons who have been President, Vice President, or civil officers, but only persons who can be at the time truly described as President, Vice- President, or as civil officers, and who can ``be removed from office on impeachment and conviction of treason,'' etc. ``If there must be a judgment of removal,'' says Story, ``it would seem to follow that the party was still in office;'' but it is not necessary to rely upon this inference, plain and necessary as it is, because the only persons specified as subject to impeachment are officers, and it would be equally plain that only officers were amenable to impeachment if nothing was said in the section about removal, and it were simply ``that the President, Vice-President, and all civil officers shall be subject to impeachment for and conviction of treason, bribery,'' etc., because it is only by these descriptions as officers that they are made subject to impeachment. Hence the only question before the court is whether the term ``officer'' can be applied to a person not at the time in the holding of an office. And this has been the accepted construction. From the day when Blount was tried until now no attempt has been made to impeach a private citizen, and that not because there have not been plenty of proper subjects for impeachment if the law had authorized the proceeding against ex-officers. Within a few years past it is notorious that a number of officers who were under investigation and who were threatened with impeachment resigned to avoid it, and the proceedings against them were abandoned. Several judges were among the number, all whose names I do not now recall, and it is not necessary to do so, because the Senate knows to whom I refer, who resigned their places and thereby arrested the proceedings. So in New York, where the high court of impeachment is composed of the judges of the court of appeals and the senate, and the provisions of whose constitution, if not in identical words with those of the national Constitution, are substantially the same, an impeachment was dismissed against Judge Cardozo, within a few years, on the presentation of his resignation. The judiciary committee of the house of representatives of that State, composed of persons who will, I understand, be recognized by some of the managers as among the ablest lawyers of that State, reported against the power of impeachment of any person not actually in office. The language of the resolution in Fuller's case (the case referred to) is: ``That no person can be impeached who was not at the time of the commission of the alleged offense and at the time of the impeachment holding some office under the laws of the State.'' This resolution and the accompanying report form part of the report of the trial of George G. Barnard, page 158. I have examined all the constitutions of all the States with reference to the provisions therein contained on the subject of impeachment. With two exceptions, they correspond in substance with the national Constitution; and I have not learned that any impeachments against ex-officers have taken place under those constitutions. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Page 29. Sec. 2007 Mr. Blair next cited opinions of the framers of the Constitution, and the comments of Judge Story, saying: \1\ All the reasons upon which the proceeding was supposed to be necessary were applicable only to a man who wielded at the moment the power of the Government, when only it was necessary to put in motion the great power of the people, as organized in the House of Representatives, to bring him to justice. It is a shocking abuse of power to direct so overwhelming a force against a private man. It may be deemed by some of small moment, because it can only effect his disfranchisement; but the effect is to dishonor him, and it is simply tyranny to put this man's honor in peril by the application of that overwhelming force. The great authors of England, as well as the great commentator on our Constitution mentioned, hold that impeachment ought only to be brought into action to arrest the wrongdoing of another power in the Government. The arena of impeachment is in fact a place in which a controversy takes place between the high powers of the Government. The only theory upon which it can be justified is to enable the people, massed and organized in their representative houses, to assail their oppressors, armed with the power of the Executive and the patronage and prestige which that gives them. Do you seek to prostitute that power to the oppression of a private individual, wasting his means by an action that, as this author says, has invariably ruined every private man who has been the subject of it in Great Britain? Mr. Matt R. Carpenter held that there were two theories in regard to impeachment--one that the proceeding was so broad that private persons might fall within its reach, as in England, and the other that impeachment ``was only a proceeding to remove an unworthy public officer.'' And he declared that one of these theories must be accepted, and that there was no middle ground. He then proceeded at length to cite authorities \2\ to show that a private citizen might not be impeached, and then said: \3\ Bearing in mind this method, when we read that the ``House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment, and the Senate the sole power to try impeachments;'' and learn from the debates in the convention that impeachment was intended as a method of removal from office, we naturally look elsewhere in the Constitution for the extent of this power; in other words, for the officers who may be removed by this method, which we find in section 4 of article 2, as follows: ``The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment, etc.'' There is a strong implication arising from the provision that punishment in cases of impeachment shall extend no further than removal from office, or removal and disqualification, that impeachment only lies against those in office. But section 4 of article 2 is perfectly conclusive. Consider the language of this fourth section of the second article. The President shall be removed, etc. Suppose General Jackson still alive, and to be impeached to-day for removing the deposits from the Bank of the United States. Who would preside over the trial? Section 3 of article 1 provides: ``When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside.'' Suppose General Jackson living and impeached for removing the deposits. Would the Chief Justice preside? Manifestly not, because General Grant is President, and the case supposed would be an impeachment of a private citizen, and not of the President. And yet, upon the theory now maintained, that once a President is always a President for the purposes of impeachment, the Chief Justice would have to preside. This is as absurd as it would be to construe a statute giving Members of Congress the franking privilege, as giving that privilege to every one who had been a Member of Congress. The Constitution does not authorize the impeachment of certain crimes--that is, crimes committed in offices--but it authorizes an impeachment of certain persons, described by the class to which they belong; that is, civil officers of the United States. I may assume therefore that the purpose for which the power of impeachment was incorporated in the Constitution will be observed by this court, in exercising the jurisdiction which the Constitu- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Pages 30, 31. \2\ Pages 38, 39. \3\ Page 40. Sec. 2007 tion confers. And upon this subject the debates in the convention are not only satisfactory, but absolutely conclusive. Before passing from the subject of these debates let me say that considerable opposition was developed against embodying this power in the Constitution. Those who opposed it did so upon the ground that conferring the power would make the President a subservient tool of Congress and destroy the proper equilibrium of the three departments. On the other hand, it was urged that without the impeachment clause it would be in the power of the President, especially in time of war, when he would have large military and naval forces at command, and public moneys at his disposal, to overthrow the liberties of the people. Near the close of the debate Mr. Morris said his views had been changed by the discussion, and he expressed his opinion to the effect that-- ``The Executive ought to be impeached. He should be punished, not as a man, but as an officer, and punished only by degradation from his office.'' This was the only debate upon the general subject of impeachment. Thus it will be seen that those who favored and those who opposed incorporating the power in the Constitution, contemplated the impeachment of officers while holding office. Mr. Jeremiah S. Black, also of counsel for the respondent, said: \1\ We must then fall back on the one question whether an officer who has resigned is subject to the power of impeachment, or whether he is to be regarded as a private citizen after he goes out, and therefore amenable only to the courts. The words are ``the President, Vice-President, and all civil officers.'' Who is the President? If that means an ex-President, a person who has once held the office of President, but whose term has expired or who has resigned, then the same interpretation must be given to the other words, and the words ``the Vice-President and all civil officers'' may include all persons who have held office at any period of their lives. When we speak about the President, do we ever refer to anybody except the incumbent of that office? A half-grown boy reads in a newspaper that the President occupies the White House; if he would understand from that that all ex-Presidents are in it together he would be considered a very unpromising lad. The managers would not assign that absurd meaning to any other part of the Constitution. Where it is provided that the Vice-President shall preside in the Senate, they know very well that nobody is included but the actual incumbent. Statutes have been passed declaring that the Members of Congress shall have certain privileges, such as franking letters and receiving an annual compensation out of the Treasury. Did any body ever claim that this extended to old Members retired from public life? Any law which declares that public officers as a class shall be entitled to pay as privileges would be confined to those persons in office, and no sensible man would think of a Constitution extending it to former officers. When, therefore, the Constitution says that all civil officers may be impeached, it is a violation of common sense to hold that the power may be applied to a late Secretary of War or other person who does not at the time actually hold any office at all. The Constitution declares that when the President is impeached the Chief Justice shall preside. The question has been propounded repeatedly, and by several Senators, who would preside if an ex- President was impeached? I admit that that is a puzzle. The puzzle arises out of the absurdity of impeaching an ex-President. Our friends on the other side are so hampered by their own theory that they are obliged simply to decline answering. There is one answer and only one consistent with their logic, and that is this: That when an ex- President is impeached an ex-Chief Justice ought to preside at the trial. But then the reductio ad absurdum is furnished to their argument when they read on that the President, the Vice-President, and all other civil officers of the United States shall be removed upon conviction. The single sentence uttered by Governor Johnstone in the North Carolina convention puts this in a light so perfectly clear that it would be throwing words away to talk about it. How can a man be removed from office who holds no office? How turn him out if he is not in? The object and purpose of impeachment was removal--removal, mind you, not for a day, not for an hour, not a removal which might be rendered nugatory the next moment by his reappointment or reelection, but a permanent removal. You find an officer misbehaving himself, and you get hold of him while ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Page 71. Sec. 2007 he is still in the possession of power. When you get your grasp upon him, you hurl him down, and give him such a pernicious fall that he can never rise again. Removal is not only the object of impeachment, but it is the sole object. Removal and disqualification are so associated together that they can not be separated. You cannot pronounce a judgment of removal without disqualifying; and you can not pronounce a judgment of disqualification without removal, because the judgment which the Constitution requires you to pronounce is a judgment of removal and disqualification-not removal or disqualification; and this is made perfectly manifest to my mind from the experience we have had in Pennsylvania. It was thought by the convention that framed our Constitution desirable that the Senate, upon conviction of an offender of this kind, should have the discretion to say that he might be removed without being disqualified; and accordingly they changed the provision which had previously been copied from the Constitution of the United States, and instead of saying what is said here, that judgment shall extend to removal and disqualification, it says it shall extend to removal, or to removal and disqualification. The effect of that was to allow of a judgment of removal alone, but not of disqualification alone--removal alone, or removal and disqualification. On the other hand, the managers for the House of Representatives maintained, with careful citation of authorities, that impeachment was intended to reach a public officer while in office or after he had left office. Mr. Manager Scott Lord said: \1\ Therefore we claim that the limitation of the Constitution is not as to time; it simply relates to a class of persons, and the word ``officer'' is used as descriptive precisely as it is used in the very statute to which the counsel referred. If it be true because the word ``office'' or ``officer'' is used in the Constitution, without saying anything about a person after he is out of office, that the defendant is not impeachable, then he can not be indicted, because the statute relating to his indictment simply speaks of him as an officer. What is the real intent and meaning of the word ``officer'' in the Constitution? It is but a general description. An officer in one sense never loses his office. He gets his title and he wears it forever, and an officer is under this liability for life; if he once takes office under the United States, if while in office and as an officer he commits acts which demand impeachment, be may be impeached even down to the time to which the learned counsel, Mr. Carpenter, so eloquently referred the other day--down to the time that he takes his departure from this life. It is supposed by many that because an officer must be removed no judgment can be pronounced without pronouncing the judgment of removal. This, it seems to me, is a very great error. If he is in office, of course under the Constitution he must be removed; but if out of office, the sentence of disqualification or some inferior sentence may be passed upon him, for the obvious reason that the sentence is divisible. This was distinctly held in the Barnard case, to which reference has been made. In that case the court proceeded unanimously to vote that he should be removed from office; but when the question came up on the other point, shall he be disqualified? several members of the court voted in the negative. I do not see, then, any possible view in which there is difficulty; and the learned counsel on the other side will not be able to create any difficulty excepting under the claim that a person in office, having so conducted himself as to be worthy of impeachment, finding that it is impossible to escape the facts or pervert them, may, I repeat, defeat the Constitution for the purpose of preventing his punishment. Messrs. Managers George A. Jenks and George F. Hoar examined the English precedents and the history of the Constitution at length, the latter summarizing his conclusions \2\ thus: The history of the steps by which these constitutional provisions found their place, the few authorities which can be found on the subject, the narrower argument drawn from the language of the Constitution and the broader argument drawn from a consideration of the great public object to be accomplished all point the same way and bring us irresistibly to the conclusion that the power of the Senate of the ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Page 34. \2\ Page 57. Sec. 2007 United States over all grades of public official national wrongdoers, a power conferred for the highest reasons of state and on fullest deliberation, to interpose by its judgment a perpetual barrier against the return to power of great political offenders, does not depend upon the consent of the culprit, does not depend upon the accidental circumstance that the evidence of the crime is not discovered until after the official term has expired or toward the close of that term, but is a perpetual power, hanging over the guilty officer during his whole subsequent life, restricted in its exercise only by the discretion of the Senate itself and the necessity of the concurrence of both branches, the requirement of a two-thirds' vote for conviction, and the constitutional limitation of the punishment * * * * * * * But I think I can show to the Senate of the United States, from the history of the formation of this Constitution, that the jurisdiction conferred was complete, and that the unanimous purpose of the convention to confer the power of impeachment over everybody committing crime in office is to be found and proved by its debates, and that the clause saying that civil officers can be removed on conviction is put there as an exception to the clauses which previously had determined the tenure of those offices. In other words, the framers of the Constitution had given power of impeachment to the House, given the power of trial to the Senate, extended the power to all cases of national official wrongdoers, prescribed the mode of proceeding, the numbers necessary to convict, limited the judgment, and passed from that question. Mr. Aaron A. Sargent, a Senator from California, asked if Members of the Senate who had in times past been civil officers of the United States were, in Mr. Hoar's view, liable to impeachment. Mr. Hoar replied: \1\ They are, undoubtedly. The logic of my argument brings us to that result, and undoubtedly they are as safe from the operation of that process practically as the newly-born infant in his mother's arms. Does anybody suppose that there is to be a two-thirds vote of the American Senate which will rake up and try and punish for political offenses, when the public judgment of this people has demanded an amnesty? The whole power to punish, the whole judgment after the offender has left office is disqualification to hold office, and that judgment is a judgment in the discretion of the Senate. Hunt in Massachusetts, a justice of the peace--the language being exactly the same as this--was sentenced simply to suspension from his office and disqualification to hold any other for twelve months. That was the case of a justice of the peace in the town of Watertown, I think, early in this century. * * * * * * * Let me sum up the argument, drawn from the language of the Constitution. The power of impeachment is not defined in the grant in the Constitution. It is conferred as a general common-law power. The judgment is then limited to removal and disqualification, and two- thirds required for conviction. No limit of its application to persons is inserted in the grant. But a subsequent limitation on the tenure of office is inserted, namely, the case of a removal by impeachment, to guard against the argument that officers, whose term is fixed in the Constitution, can not be removed under the power of impeachment, just as impeachment is excepted in the clause securing the right of trial by jury and in the clause conferring the power to pardon. But suppose we grant the phrase, all civil officers, to be inserted as a definition of the persons who may be reached by this process. Is the definition to be taken to apply to them at the time of the commission of the offense or at the time of the punishment? Suppose a statute enact that all wrongdoers may be punished. Is it not clear that if they be wrongdoers when they commit the act the liability to punishment attaches? The very statute which punishes bribery would fail by this construction to reach anybody, because it is in this respect, as has already been said, almost identical with the provision of the Constitution in its description. The provision that the judgment shall extend no further than removal from office and perpetual disqualification authorizes any lesser penalty included within those limits to be imposed at the discretion of the Senate. In Hunt's case, in Massachusetts, the sentence was disqualification for a year under a like constitutional provision. * * * * * * * ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Page 60. Sec. 2007 The whole constitutional provision, so far as affects our present purpose, can be summed up in two sentences which are scarcely a paraphase or change of the existing text of the existing law, and these two sentences I think state precisely the contentions on the one side and on the other. We say that the Constitution in substance is this: ``The Senate shall have the sole power to try impeachments, and civil officers shall be removed on conviction.'' The counsel for the defendant would state it to be: ``Judgment in case of conviction shall be removal from office and disqualification if the defendant is willing.'' That is the summing up of the two propositions. But the meaning of these provisions of the Constitution must be ascertained after all by a broad consideration of the great public objects they were intended to accomplish.''Never forget,'' says Chief Justice Marshall, in McCulloch v. Maryland--and that sentence is the keynote to his whole judicial power--``Never forget that it is a constitution you are interpreting.'' (3) As to the third branch of the inquiry, assuming that an ex- officer may not be impeached, whether or not a resignation after proceedings begin confers immunity, there was not very extended debate. Mr. Manager Scott Lord said,\1\ I now propose to call the attention of the court to the other questions of this case referred to in the order of the Senate. The first question of the second replication is: ``Can the defendant escape by dividing the day into fractions?'' This question is also presented by the articles and plea. The allegation on page 5 is not denied. Therefore, as I propose to show this court by an unbroken series of decisions that the law does not permit a day to be divided into fractions in such a case as this, and if it be true that the defendant was Secretary of War on the 2d of March, on any part of that day, and there fore impeachable, then that question, perhaps, can be argued independent of this replication. I propose, now, to argue the question under the second replication. The authorities will bear upon both the plea and replication. First, I say a judicial act dates from the earliest minute of the day in which it is done. After citing authorities, he continued--\2\ The next question presented by their replication is, Did the impeachment relate back to the inception of the proceedings by an authorized committee of the House? Whether the committee was authorized or not is a question of fact. Therefore the comments of the learned counsel relating thereto were not in order, because it is affirmed on the part of the House of Representatives that this committee had authority. If it should appear that the committee had no authority, then another principle would be invoked, and that is the principle of adoption. But it is not necessary to discuss that now, because for the purposes of this argument the authority is conceded. In regard to the principle of relation it is this: That the House of Representatives before this resignation having instituted proceedings against Mr. Belknap for the purpose of investigating these crimes and for the purpose of impeaching the defendant, when the impeachment was made it related back to the original proceeding which was instituted, as is confessed, before this resignation. When divers acts concur to a result, the original act is to be preferred, and to this the other acts have relation. And after citing other authorities: In this case we claim that the House of Representatives, having obtained jurisdiction of the subject-matter by instituting these proceedings against the defendant, he could no more defeat them by resigning midway than he could defeat the Constitution itself. When the House of Representatives by its solemn act impeached him of high crimes and misdemeanors, that was a judicial act, the highest judicial act that can be performed in this nation save one, and that is the act to be performed by this tribunal when it pronounces ``guilty ``or ``not guilty'' upon the proofs before it. Therefore, we say the defendant in this case should not be allowed his dilatory plea, because these proceedings had been instituted against him long before he had resigned his office, long before he had attempted to escape the penalty due to his crime by this resignation. This impeachment is in furtherance of justice, not in furtherance of injustice. It is due to the defendant; it is due to the dead whom he claims to represent; it is due to all the associations that surround him, if he is an innocent man, that he establish his innocence in this tribunal. Therefore to hold jurisdiction in this case, to give him the ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Page 35. \2\ Page 36. Sec. 2007 opportunity to establish his innocence, or the House of Representatives to establish his guilt, is in furtherance of justice. To deny jurisdiction under these circumstances would be in furtherance of injustice. In this case before the court the doctrine of relation prevents injustice, for it changes no rule of evidence, and does not affect the merits. Mr. Carpenter, of counsel for respondent, argued,\1\ on the other hand: If I am right in saying that the only purpose of impeachment is to remove a man from office, when the man is out of office the object of impeachment ceases, and the proceedings must abate. There would be no further object to attain by the proceeding. Suppose the man committed suicide while his trial was progressing, would not that be good matter of abatement? Suppose he commits official suicide by resigning, why should this not have the same effect? I have attempted to show that the sole object for which the power of impeachment was given is removal from office. There is another proposition which I intended to argue in that connection. The disqualification clause of punishment was evidently put in for the purpose of making the power of removal by impeachment effectual. After providing that the officers of the United States might be removed on impeachment, although the President could not pardon the offender convicted and removed, yet if he could reinstate him the next morning he would have substantially the power of pardon. To prevent this was the object of the disqualifying clause; which Story says is not a necessary part of the judgment. You might impose it where you had removed an officer appointed by the President whom the President could reinstate. You could stop that by fixing disability upon the officer; and that I take to have been the sole purpose of this clause. If I am right in this position, if the man died in the middle of the trial, or if he died after finding against him, but before judgment had been pronounced, the suit would abate. Must this court go on and sentence a man after he is dead--either physically or officially dead? It is equally absurd to talk of removing a man from an office which he no longer fills, as to talk of removing a man from office after he is dead. So far as its effect upon the suit is concerned I see no difference between the case of his natural death and his official death. The suit abates because there is no further object to be attained by its prosecution. Let me remind the Senate that there is not a writer on this subject who does not maintain that the power of impeachment was never intended for punishment. This is conclusively shown by the fact that the party, after he is impeached, is to be indicted and punished for his crime. And it should be remarked that, if impeachment lies against one not in office, he must either not be punished at all, which would show the absurdity of the proceeding; or you must inflict the disqualification, which, Story says, you need not inflict on one removed from office. Returning from this digression to the line of my argument, let me say that Rawle's Commentaries and the report of the Blount case were considered by Judge Story in writing his Commentaries; and he quotes from them both, but evidently disagrees with Rawle's parenthetic suggestion, and the concessions made by the counsel of Blount. Mr. Roscoe Conkling, a Senator from New York, asked Mr. Carpenter this question: Is there no distinction on the point of jurisdiction to try an impeachment, between the case of a resignation before articles are found and the case of resignation not till after articles, have been found? Mr. Carpenter replied: \2\ The question put to me by the Senator from New York is very specific, and, in reply, I would say that a distinction exists between the case where a resignation precedes the exhibition of the articles and the case where a resignation comes between the exhibition of the articles and final judgment. And this court might hold that after jurisdiction had attached by exhibition of the articles, or even by the formal impeachment which precedes exhibition of articles, the jurisdiction had attached, and resignation would not prevent final judgment. Speaking, however, for myself, I still incline to the opinion that ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Page 42. \2\ Page 43. Sec. 2007 if the officer, who alone can be impeached, is out of the office before judgment of removal passes, this would abate a proceeding, which, I have endeavored to show, can only be had for the purpose of removal. It is said the law will not require a vain thing; from which I infer that the highest court in the Republic will not render a vain judgment. Mr. Carpenter also said,\1\ after citing authorities: But against this army of authorities, showing that a private citizen can not be impeached, the managers say that Belknap was in office at the time of the impeachment. It is not denied that Belknap resigned, and his resignation was accepted by the President, at 10 o'clock and 20 minutes a. m., March 2, 1876; nor is it denied that the first proceedings in the House in relation to him took place after 3 p. m. of that day. But the managers say that, in legal contemplation, he was in office at the time of impeachment, because the law will not notice fractions of a day; and, second, that he resigned to evade impeachment, and therefore was in office for the purpose of impeachment after his resignation was accepted. Fractions of a day! I did not suppose this case would be determined on a question of special pleading, or a fiction of law, until I heard the argument of the learned manager [Mr. Lord] yesterday. I supposed we could strike through the fog and place our feet upon the solid rock of jurisdiction. But the managers propose to hold us by a fiction. They maintain that, although the respondent had resigned, and his resignation had been accepted, nevertheless, this court must decide that he was in office all day, and until after his impeachment on the afternoon of that day, because this court can not distinguish between the forenoon and afternoon of a day. Suppose a man is sentenced by a criminal court to be hanged at 2 p. m. of a certain day; and suppose the President pardons him at 10 a. m. of that day. Must he be hanged at 2 p. m. because the law knows no fraction of a day? We have heard of men being hanged on the gallows; hanged at the yard-arm; but we never beard of a man being hanged on the fraction of a day. Suppose in time of war the colonel of a regiment is relieved from duty, or his resignation accepted at 9 o'clock in the morning, and at 4 p. m. of the same day the regiment is engaged in battle. Could the colonel be court-martialed because he was not at the head of his regiment at 4 o'clock? But having answered the managers on the substance of their claim of jurisdiction, we shall not yield to their fictions. Mr. Manager Jenks replied \2\ to Mr. Carpenter: Of the second portion of this proposition, which is concerning the collateral facts, I shall say but little, if anything, more than this: It has been considered by the chairman of the managers; he has advanced three or four propositions in support of the view that it is material to consider all the surrounding facts. One of those propositions is, that in law there is no fraction of a day. He has cited authorities to establish that; that was the general rule, that in law there is no fraction of a day. This being the general rule, an exception was introduced by the honorable counsel for the defendant, that is, that if it be necessary to subserve the purposes of justice, a court will consider the fractions of a day. Then the matter stands thus: As a rule, courts will not recognize the fractions of a day; but as an exception, if it be necessary to subserve the purposes of justice, they will recognize the fractions of a day. Hence, when the counsel cited those authorities to show that they would consider it as an exception, it was essential to show that it was necessary to subserve the purposes of justice to bring his case within the exception. He left off just where the real contest began: Is it necessary to subserve the purposes of justice that this court should recognize the fractions of a day? It seems to me that there is no necessity in subserving the purposes of justice that this court should recognize any fraction of a day. Put the question in this form: How can it subserve the interests of justice, when a defendant is charged with having surreptitiously filched from the pockets of from eight hundred to a thousand men from 10 to 25 cents every day for five years, that that defendant shall plead this as an excuse, that the ends of justice are subserved by recognizing the fractions of a day? If he had discussed this, and shown that this defendant would have been wronged did you not consider it, he would then have brought his case within the exception; but, having failed to do that, he leaves it as my colleague, the chairman, left it; that is, that the general ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Page 44. \2\ Page 48. Sec. 2007 rule, if the defendant have not brought himself within the exception, still exists, and the court will not recognize the fractions of a day. With reference to the question of relation, that was not considered at all by the counsel for the defendant, and we shall leave it, as our chairman has left it, with you. The Senate debated the question from the 15th to the 29th of May.\1\ The debates were behind closed doors and were not reported. On May 16 \2\ the following questions were submitted by Senators for consideration: By Mr. Oliver P. Morton, of Indiana: Is there power in Congress to impeach a person for crime committed while in office if such person had resigned the office and such resignation had been accepted before the finding of articles of impeachment by the House? By Mr. Justin S. Morrill, of Vermont: Has the Senate power to entertain jurisdiction in the pending case of the impeachment by the House of Representatives of William W. Belknap, late Secretary of War, notwithstanding the facts alleged in relation to his resignation? By Mr. John Sherman, of Ohio, on May 25: \3\ Resolved, That notwithstanding the resignation of William W. Belknap prior to his impeachment by the House of Representatives he is still liable to such impeachment for the misdemeanors charged in the articles presented by the House of Representatives, and his plea of such resignation is not sufficient in law to bar the trial upon such articles. On May 29 \4\ the Presiding Officer announced that the proposition pending was that offered by Mr. Morton on the 16th instant. Thereupon Mr. Morton modified his proposition to read as follows: Resolved, That the power of impeachment created by the Constitution does not extend to a person who is charged with the commission of a high crime while he was a civil officer of the United States and acting in his official character, but who had ceased to be such officer before the finding of articles of impeachment by the House of Representatives. Mr. Justin S. Morrill, of Vermont, moved to amend the resolution by striking out all after the word ``resolved,'' in the first line, and in lieu thereof inserting: That the demurrer of the respondent to the replication of the House of Representatives to the plea of the respondent be, and the same is hereby, overruled; and that the plea of the respondent to the jurisdiction of the Senate be, and the same is hereby, overruled; and that the articles of impeachment are sufficient to show that the Senate has jurisdiction of the case, and that the respondent answer to the merits of the accusation contained in the articles of impeachment. Mr. Isaac P. Christiancy, of Michigan, moved to amend the amendment of Mr. Morrill, of Vermont, by striking out all after the word ``that'' in the first line thereof, and inserting: W. W. Belknap, the respondent, is not amenable to trial by impeachment for acts done as Secretary of War, he having resigned said office before impeachment. Mr. George G. Wright, of Iowa, moved to lay the resolution of Mr. Morton on the table, and this motion was agreed to, yeas 36, nays 30. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Senate Journal, pp. 932-947; Record of trial, pp. 72-76. \2\ Senate Journal, p. 933; Record of trial, p. 73. \3\ Senate Journal, p. 939; Record of trial, p. 74. \4\ Senate Journal, pp. 942-947; Record of trial, p. 76. Sec. 2008 Thereupon Mr. Allen G. Thurman, of Ohio, proposed a resolution, which was in this form, after the words ``before he was impeached'' had been added on motion of Mr. Roscoe Conkling, of New York: Resolved, That in the opinion of the Senate William W. Belknap, the respondent, is amenable to trial by impeachment for acts done as Secretary of War, notwithstanding his resignation of said office before he was impeached. Mr. Algernon S. Paddock, of Nebraska, moved to amend the said resolution by striking out all after the word ``resolved'' and in lieu thereof inserting: That William W. Belknap, late Secretary of Wax, having ceased to be a civil officer of the United States by reason of his resignation before proceedings in impeachment were commenced against him by the House of Representatives, the Senate can not take jurisdiction in this case. This amendment was disagreed to, yeas 29, nays 37. Then the resolution was agreed to, yeas 37, nays 29. Mr. Thurman also presented a further resolution, which, after amendment at the suggestion of Mr. Thomas F. Bayard, of Delaware, was agreed to by a vote of 35 yeas, 22 nays: Resolved, That at the time specified in the foregoing resolution [June 1 was fixed by a separate resolution] the President of the Senate shall pronounce the judgment of the Senate as follows: ``It is ordered by the Senate sitting for the trial of the articles of impeachment preferred by the House of Representatives against William W. Belknap, late Secretary of War, that the demurrer of said William W. Belknap to the replication of the House of Representatives to the plea to the jurisdiction filed by said Belknap be, and the same hereby is, overruled; and, it being the opinion of the Senate that said plea is insufficient in law and that said articles of impeachment are sufficient in law, it is therefore further ordered and adjudged that said plea be, and the same hereby is, overruled and held for naught;'' which judgment thus pronounced shall be entered upon the Journal of the Senate sitting as aforesaid. In the final arguments Messrs. Montgomery Blair \1\ and Matthew H. Carpenter \2\ also argued this question. 2008. Reference to discussions as to what are impeachable offenses.-- In the course of the arguments during the impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, the question, ``What are impeachable offenses?'' was discussed at length and learnedly. Mr. Manager Benjamin F. Butler, of Massachusetts, argued \3\ learnedly in favor of this definition: We define therefore an impeachable high crime or misdemeanor to be one in its nature or consequences subversive of some fundamental or essential principle of government or highly prejudicial to the public interest, and this may consist of a violation of the Constitution, of law, of an official oath, or of duty, by an act committed or omitted, or, without violating a positive law, by the abuse of discretionary powers from improper motives or for any improper purpose. Mr. Butler also appended to his argument \4\ an exhaustive brief on the ``law of impeachable crimes and misdemeanors,'' prepared by Mr. William Lawrence, of Ohio.\5\ This view was also supported by Mr. Manager John A. Logan, of Illinois.\6\ Of the Senators who filed written opinions, Mr. Charles Sumner, of Massachusetts, argued at length that political offenses were impeachable offenses.\7\ So also argued Mr. Richard Yates, of Illinois.\8\ ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Record of trial, pp. 287-289. \2\ Pp. 330-334. \3\ Second session Fortieth Congress, Globe, Supplement, p. 29. \4\ Pages 41-50. \5\ Globe, p. 1559. \6\ Pages 252-254. \7\ Pages 464-466. \8\ Page 487. Sec. 2009 Mr. Benjamin R. Curtis, of Massachusetts, of counsel for the President, argued, on the other hand, that impeachable offenses could only be offenses against the laws of the United States.\1\ Mr. Thomas A. R. Nelson, of Tennessee, also of President's counsel, argued in the same line,\2\ and Mr. William M. Evarts, of New York, also of counsel for the President, argued at length against the definition given by Mr. Manager Butler.\3\ Of the Senators who filed written opinions on the case, this view was sustained by Mr. Garrett Davis, of Kentucky.\4\ 2009. Argument that the phrase ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' is a ``term of art,'' of fixed meaning in English parliamentary law, and transplanted to the Constitution in unchangeable significance.--On February 22, 1905,\5\ in the Senate sitting for the impeachment trial of Judge Charles Swayne, Messrs. Anthony Higgins and John M. Thurston, of counsel for the respondent, offered a brief in support of their plea of jurisdiction as to the first seven articles. This brief, which was signed by them as counsel, but which, as they said, had been prepared by another, covered many questions relating to impeachments, the following being among them: i. what are impeachable ``high crimes and misdemeanors,'' as defined in article 11, section 4, of the constitution of the united states? By a strange coincidence, the death of parliamentary impeachment, as a living and working organ of the English constitution, synchronizes with its birth in American constitutions, State and Federal. Leaving out of view the comparatively unimportant impeachment of Lord Melville (1805), really the last of that long series of accusations by the Commons and trials by the Lords, which began in the fiftieth year of the reign of Edward III (1376), was the case of Warren Hastings, who was impeached in the very year in which the Federal Convention of 1787 met at Philadelphia. Before that famous prosecution, with its failure and disappointment, drew to a close, the English people resolved that the ancient and cumbrous machinery of parliamentary impeachment was no longer adapted to the wants of a modern and progressive society. But before this ancient method of trial thus passed into desuetude in the land of its birth it was embodied, in a modified form, first in the several State constitutions and finally in the Constitution of the United States. Article II, section 4, of the Federal Constitution, provides that ``the President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' Article I, section 2, provides that ``the House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other officers; and shall have the sole power of impeachment.'' Article I, section 3, provides that ``the Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside; and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States; but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law.'' Article III, section 2, provides that ``the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury.'' ii. provisions borrowed from the english constitution. Mr. Bayard said in his argument in Blount's trial (Wharton's St. Tr., 264): ``On this subject, the Convention proceeded in the same manner it is manifest they did in many other cases. They considered the object of their legislation as a known thing, having a previous definite existence. Thus existing, ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Page 134. \2\ Pages 293, 294. \3\ Pages 343, 344. \4\ Pages 439, 440. \5\ Third session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, pp. 3026-3028. Sec. 2009 their work was solely to mold it into a suitable shape. They have given it to us, not as a thing of their creation, but merely of their modification. And therefore I shall insist that it remains as at common law, with the variance only of the positive provisions of the Constitution. * * * That law was familiar to all those who framed the Constitution. Its institutions furnished the principles of jurisprudence in most of the States. It was the only common language intelligible to the members of the Convention.'' A recent writer of note, speaking on the same subject, has said: ``If we examine the clauses of the Constitution, we perceive at once that the phraseology is applied to a method of procedure already existing. `Impeachment' is not defined, but is used precisely as `felony,' `larceny,' `burglary,' `grand jury,' `real actions,' or any other legal term used so long as to have acquired an accepted meaning, might be. The Constitution takes impeachment as an established procedure, and lodges the jurisdiction in a particular court, declaring how and by whom the process shall be put in motion, and how far it shall be carried. They have given to us a thing not of their creation, but of their modification. To ascertain, then, what this established procedure was, what were, at the time of the Constitutional Convention, impeachable offenses, we must look to England, where the legal notions contained in the clauses quoted had their origin.'' (American Law Review, vol. 16, p. 800. Article by G. Willett Van Nest.) Madison, in No. 65 of the Federalist, said: ``The model from which the idea of this institution has been borrowed pointed out the course to the Convention. In Great Britain it is the province of the House of Commons to prefer the impeachment and of the House of Lords to decide upon it. Several of the State constitutions have followed the example.'' iii. high crimes and misdemeanors as defined in english parliamentary law. The English Parliament as a whole has always been considered and styled ``The high court of Parliament,'' which is governed by a single body of law peculiarly its own. As Sir Thomas Erskine May (Parl. Prac., pp. 71 and 72) has well expressed it: ``Each house, as a constituent part of Parliament, exercises its own privileges independently of the other. They are enjoyed, however, not by a separate right peculiar to each, but solely by virtue of the law and custom of Parliament.'' In the words of Lord Coke (4 Inst., 15), ``As every court of justice hath laws and customs for its direction--some the civil and canon, some the common law, others their own peculiar laws and customs--so the high court of Parliament hath also its own peculiar law, called the lex et consuetudo parliamenti.'' Blackstone (Bk. I, 163) in commenting upon the statement of Coke, that the law of Parliament, unknown to many and known by few, should be sought by all observes that, ``It is much better to be learned out of the rolls of Parliament and other records and by precedents and continual experience than can be expressed by any one man.'' Chitty, in commenting upon the statement of Blackstone, has said: ``The law of Parliament is part of the general law of the land, and must be discovered and construed like all other laws. The members of the respective houses of Parliament are in most instances the judges of that law; and, like the judges of the realm, when they are deciding upon past laws, they are under the most sacred obligation to inquire and decide what the law actually is, and not what, in their will and pleasure, or even in their reason and wisdom, it ought to be. When they are declaring what is the law of Parliament, their character is totally different from that with which, as legislators, they are invested when they are framing new laws; and they ought never to forget the admonition of that great and patriotic chief justice, Lord Holt, viz, `that the authority of the Parliament is from the law, and as it is circumscribed by law, so it may be exceeded; and if they do exceed those legal bounds and authority their acts are wrongful, and can not be justified any more than the acts of private men.' (1 Salk, 505.)'' (Chitty's Blackstone, vol. 1, p. 119, note 21.) It has always been conceded that the phrase ``other high crimes and misdemeanors,'' embodied in Article II, section 4, of the Constitution of the United States, must be construed in the light of the definitions fixing its meaning in the parliamentary law of England as that law existed in 1787. The construction then given to the phrase in question was incorporated into our Federal Constitution as a part of the phrase itself, which is unintelligible and meaningless without such construction. The following elementary principles (as stated by Hon. William Lawrence, in the brief prepared by him for use in the trial of Andrew Johnson, Vol. I, pp. 125, 136), seem upon that occasion, to have passed unchallenged: ``As these words are copied by our Constitution from the British constitutional and parliamentary law, they are, so far as applicable to our institutions and condition, to be interpreted not by English municipal law but by the lex parliamentaria. * * * Whatever `crimes and misdemeanors' were Sec. 2009 the subject of impeachment in England prior to the adoption of our Constitution, and as understood by its framers, are therefore subjects of impeachment before the Senate of the United States, subject only to the limitations of the Constitution. * * * ` Treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors' are, of course, impeachable. Treason and bribery are specifically named, but `other high crimes and misdemeanors' are just as fully comprehended as though each was specified. The Senate is made the sole judge of what they are. There is no revising court. The Senate determines in the light of parliamentary law. Congress can not define or limit by law that which the Constitution defines in two cases by enumeration and in others by classification, and of which the Senate is sole judge. * * * Now, when the Constitution says that all civil officers shall be removable on impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors, and the Senate shall have the sole power of trial, the jurisdiction is conferred and its scope is defined by common parliamentary law.'' While the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment is the sole and final judge of what impeachable ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' are, no arbitrary discretion so to determine is vested. The Power of the court simply extends to the construction of the phrase in question as defined in English constitutional and parliamentary law as it existed in 1787. That is made plain by Story in his Commentary on the Constitution, section 797, when he says: ``Resort then must be had either to parliamentary practice, and the common law, in order to ascertain what high crimes and misdemeanors; or the whole subject must be left to the arbitrary discretion of the Senate for the time being. The latter is so incompatible with the genius of our institutions that no lawyer or statesman would be inclined to countenance so absolute a despotism of opinion and practice, which might make that a crime at one time or in one person which would be deemed innocent at another time or in another person. The only safe guide in such cases must be the common law.'' iv. a rule of constitutional construction as defined by the supreme court of the united states. The fundamental principles of English constitutional law were first reproduced in the constitutions of the several States. In the light of the construction put upon them there, they were embodied, so far as applicable and desirable, in the Constitution of the United States. Thus the Federal Supreme Court was called upon at an early day to interpret the immemorial formulas or ``terms of art'' through which the cardinal principles of English constitutional law were incorporated in our governmental systems, State and Federal. The uniform rule for construing such formulas or ``terms of art'' adopted at the outset has been continued in force until the present time. When, in the trial of Aaron Burr, Chief Justice Marshall was called upon to construe Article III, section 3, of the Constitution, which provides that ``treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort,'' he said, ``What is the natural import of the words `levying war?' and who may be said to levy it? * * * The term is not for the first time applied to treason by the Constitution of the United States. It is a technical term. It is used in a very old statute of that country whose language is our language and whose laws form the substratum of our laws. It is scarcely conceivable that the term was not employed by the framers of our Constitution in the sense which had been affixed to it by those from whom we borrowed it. So far as the meaning of any terms, particularly terms of art, is completely ascertained, those by whom they are employed must be considered as employing them in that ascertained meaning, unless the contrary be proved by the context. It is therefore reasonable to suppose, unless it be incompatible with other expressions of the Constitution, that the term `levying war' is used in that instrument in the same sense in which it was understood in England and in this country to have been used in the statute of twenty- fifth of Edward III, from which it was borrowed.'' (Burr's Trial, Vol. 2, pp. 401, 402.) When in the case of Murray v. The Hoboken Land Co. (18 How., 272) it became necessary for the Supreme Court to construe the formula ``due process of law,'' as embodied in the fifth amendment, Mr. Justice Curtis, speaking for the court, said: ``The words `due process of law' were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words `by the law of the land' in Magna Charta. Lord Coke, in his commentary on those words (2 Inst., 50), says they mean due process of law. The constitutions which had been adopted by the several States before the formation of the Federal Constitution, following the language of the Great Charter more closely, generally contained the words `but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.' The ordinance of Congress of July 13, 1787, for the government of the territory of the United State northwest of the river Ohio, used the words.'' Sec. 2009 When in the case of Davidson v. New Orleans (96 U. S., 97) it became necessary to again construe the same formula-- ``due process of law,'' as embodied in the fourteenth amendment-Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the court, said: ``The prohibition against depriving the citizen or subject of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law is not new in the constitutional history of the English race. It is not new in the constitutional history of this country, and it was not new in the Constitution of the United States when it became a part of the fourteenth amendment, in the year 1866. The equivalent of the phrase `due process of law,' according to Lord Coke, is found in the words `law of the land,' in the Great Charter, in connection with the writ of habeas corpus, the trial by jury, and other guarantees of the rights of the subject against the oppression of the Crown.'' In Smith v. Alabama (124 U. S., 465) it was held that ``the interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its history,'' a statement affirmed by the adoption in United States v. Wong Kim Ark (169 U. S. 649). v. immemorial formulas transplanted from the english constitution, unchangeable by subsequent congressional legislation. The foregoing authorities put the fact beyond all question that the immemorial formulas or ``terms of art'' transferred from the English constitution to our own were adopted, not as isolated or abstract phrases, but as epitomes or digests of the great principles which they embodied. That is to say, the term ``levying war'' carried with it the identical meaning given it as a part of the statute of Edward III; the term ``due process of law,'' the identical meaning given to it as a part of Magna Charta; the term ``high crimes and misdemeanors,'' the identical meaning given it as a part of the law of the High Court of Parliament. Or, in other words, when such formulas were embedded in the Constitution of 1787, their historical meaning and construction went along with them as completely as if such meaning and construction had been written out at length upon the face of the instrument itself. If that be true, the conclusion is self-evident that no subsequent Congressional legislation can change in any way, by addition or substraction, the definitions embodied in such formulas at the time of their adoption. If the contrary were true, Congress could any day give to the term ``levying war'' or ``due process of law'' a definition, conveying ideas of which the fathers never dreamed. Or if the term ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' could be subjected to a new Congressional definition, acts which were such in 1787 could be relieved of all criminality, and new acts not then criminal could be added to the list of impeachable offenses. So obvious is the fact that Congress can not legislate at all on the subject that Mr. Lawrence, whose brief has been heretofore quoted, frankly admitted, while striving to give to the powers of Congress the widest possible construction, that ``Congress can not define or limit by law that which the Constitution defines in two cases by enumeration, and in others by classification, and of which the Senate is sole judge.'' The last phrase is specially suggestive of the fact that if Congress could, by subsequent legislation, ``define or limit by law that which the Constitution defines,'' the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment could be entirely deprived by such legislation of the power to determine what were impeachable high crimes and misdemeanors as defined by the fathers in 1787. In other words, if Congress can add to or subtract from the constitutional definition in any particular, it can destroy it altogether. In the great case of Marbury v. Madison (1 Cranch, 137) the first in which an act of Congress was ever declared unconstitutional, the question of questions was this: Does the fact that the Constitution itself has defined the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court prohibit Congress from enlarging such original jurisdiction by subsequent legislation? The solemn answer was that the attempt of Congress to do so was void. Why? Because the dividing line between the original and appellate jurisdiction having been drawn by the Constitution itself, it is immovable by legislation. In the words of the great Chief Justice: ``If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution is form without substance.'' Thus it follows that any act of Congress which attempts to change the constitutional definition of impeachable high crimes and misdemeanors, by adding to the list some offense unknown to the parliamentary law of England as it existed in 1787, is simply void and of no effect. Sec. 2010 2010. Argument of Mr. John M. Thurston, counsel, that judges may be impeached only for judicial misconduct occurring in the actual administration of justice in connection with the court. Argument that an impeachment trial is a criminal proceeding. On February 25, 1905,\1\ in the Senate, sitting for the impeachment of Judge Charles Swayne, Mr. John M. Thurston, of counsel for the respondent, in final argument, said: In the printed brief originally filed in behalf of the respondent a demonstration, based upon the authorities, was made, to the effect that no clear light is to be derived as to the meaning of the phrase ``other high crimes and misdemeanors,'' so far as that phrase relates to the impeachment of English and American judges, except from the English and American judicial impeachment cases in which it has been applied to that subject. Instead of attempting to meet that reasonable and obvious contention upon its merits, the managers have evaded it by propounding a series of generalities, based upon principles drawn, in the main, from political impeachments which throw no real light upon the subject. In the course of that evasion the following remarkable statement has been made: Said the managers in their brief: ``For the first time in impeachment trials in this or any other country the claim is made that a judge can be impeached only for acts done in his official capacity.'' The fact that that statement does not fully relate the history of impeachment cases will appear by consideration of those cases. After the impeachments for bribery, pure and simple, of English judges are put aside, but two judicial impeachments remain in the entire history of the English people--that is, the impeachment of judges. Judges, like all others, can be impeached for treason not committed upon the bench or in judicial affairs. They can be impeached for bribery by the strict terms of the Constitution, bribery committed anywhere, without regard to whether they were sitting upon the bench at the time. But as to other causes of impeachment I challenge the honorable managers to show me any case in history, English or American, where a judge has been impeached for any other crime or high misdemeanor except one alleged to have been committed in connection with his exercise of judicial authority. In saying that, I do not refer to some impeachment cases that have happened in States and under State constitutions, for many of the constitutions of the several States have provisions largely at variance with those of the Constitution of the United States upon this subject. But four judicial impeachments have taken place under the Constitution of the United States. It was admitted by the House of Commons in England and by the House of Representatives in the United States by the form of the articles they presented in these judicial impeachment cases that, excepting treason or bribery, neither an English nor a Federal judge could be impeached except for judicial misconduct occurring in the actual administration of justice in connection with his court, either between private individuals or between the Government and the citizen. The statement of the honorable managers in their brief-- ``For the first time in impeachment trials in this or any other country the claim is made that a judge can be impeached only for acts done in his official capacity''-- is contradicted by the judicial history of every case of impeachment of a judge in Great Britain and the United States. Mr. Manager Olmsted was greatly mistaken when he said in his argument: ``One year later, the Senate having convicted John Pickering, Federal judge in a New Hampshire district, upon a charge of drunkenness''-- The article exhibited against John Pickering charged him with drunkenness upon the bench, and was limited to that charge, for the framers of that impeachment well knew that the drunkenness of the judge was no ground for impeachment under the Constitution of the United States unless he carried that drunkenness upon the bench. The articles against Pickering read: ``Being then judge of the district court in and for the district of New Hampshire, did appear on the bench of the said court for the purpose of administering justice in a state of total intoxication, pro ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Third session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, pp. 3365, 3366. Sec. 2010 duced by the free and intemperate use of inebriating liquors, and did then and there frequently in a most profane and indecent manner''-- That is, on the bench, while administering justice-- ``invoke the name of the Supreme Being, etc.'' It was perfectly understood by every constitutional lawyer then, as it should be understood now, that the personal misconduct of an English judge off the bench has never furnished the ground for impeachment, and for the well-understood reason that under the English constitution, as it has been called, they provided for two methods of removing judges from the bench--one by impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors and the other upon address to the sovereign by both houses of Parliament. When we came to frame our Constitution we adopted from the English constitution the term ``treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' The question was mooted in that convention as to whether or not we should also embody in our Constitution the English provision for the removal of Federal judges by address of the two Houses of Congress to the President. Understanding perfectly well, as the debates will show, that impeachment would only lie for a crime or offense committed in connection with the judicial office and the administration of justice, they rejected the proposed clause providing for removal by address. The framers of our Constitution did this because they were tenacious of the stability of the tenure of office of our Federal judges, and were fearful that if they enlarged the impeachment provision some of the States, by reason of local prejudice, might proceed criminally against them, and upon conviction of crime base articles of impeachment thereon. Mr. President, I state here and now that the contention made by one of the honorable managers that a judge can be impeached under the Constitution of the United States for a crime committed as an individual against a State law has no foundation in any case that has ever been known of on the earth, was not thought of as possible by the framers of our Constitution, and is not the law today. It would leave a Federal judge at the mercy of a local condition, inimical as it might be to the Federal Constitution. The case of Humphreys has been cited as a case where a Federal judge was impeached for other than judicial misconduct. Yes, Humphreys was impeached for treason. Any judge can be impeached for treason or for bribery, no matter where or how committed; but the only charge in his impeachment other than treason was the charge of judicial misconduct as the judge of the court, in the court, and acting in the administration of justice. Mr. President, that the framers of our Constitution well knew the limitations they were imposing upon the right of impeachment is further attested by the fact that in the original draft of that great document the language was ``for treason, bribery, or maladministration,'' and the word ``maladministration'' has crept into some of the constitutions of our several States. Upon the consideration of that question on the floor of the convention it was moved to strike out ``maladministration'' and insert ``other high crimes and misdemeanors,'' and for the very reason that the term ``maladministration'' was a loose term that might mean, under the decisions of the Senate in the future, much or little; that it might cover impeachments at one period of time by one party in power that it would not cover at another period of time with another party in power. They struck it out because it was too large a term, too loose a term, and they inserted in its place those definite words, ``high crimes and misdemeanors,'' taken from the English constitution with parliamentary construction already attached. We took that provision from the English constitution and with it we took the interpretation that was placed upon it by the lex parliamenti, the law of Parliament, established by the adjudications in the great tribunal. That provision meant then what it meant in England at the time. Mr. President, that provision meant then what it has meant ever since. It meant then what it always must mean. From the debates in that convention it does appear that those words were adopted with that construction upon them because it was claimed that it would be unwise to permit even the Congress of the United States, by ever making something a crime that was not then a crime, to enlarge the operation of that impeachment provision of the Constitution, or to repeal some of those things which then constituted crimes and thereby prevent the impeachment of those who committed them. Sir, that provision of the Constitution was embodied in that great instrument with a meaning that can never be changed by the Congress of the United States. It was embodied there with a meaning which will remain the same to the end of time. It furnishes the limitation with which the power of Congress can be exercised in impeachment cases. I insist that for the first time in this case is it even suggested by constitutional lawyers that that Sec. 2011 term permits the impeachment of a judge simply because he has been tried and convicted in a court of a State for a crime against the statutes of a State, or because in his private life he has been impure or improvident, or because of any other shortcomings or failures exhibited in his career except those which relate to the administration of justice in the court over which he presides. Mr. President, before proceeding to discuss the articles and the evidence, I call your attention to the fact that this is a criminal proceeding, and the respondent is charged with a crime. That question was settled by the Senate some days since upon the vote taken on the question of the admissibility of evidence. It is certain that this proposition is true, because the last portion of section 2 of article 3 of the Constitution of the United States provides that ``the trial of all crimes except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury,'' and thereby the framers of that great instrument declared that an offense to be impeachable must be a crime, or, what is equivalent to it, a high misdemeanor. Mr. President, this respondent, being on trial charged with crime, is entitled to every reasonable doubt that may arise upon the evidence in the case. I do not come here to claim that he needs the application of this rule, for I insist that the evidence in this case shows that he is guiltless beyond a reasonable doubt; but I invoke the attention of the Senate to that beneficent rule of law now because it is the outgrowth of the spirit of liberty and justice so strong in the Anglo-Saxon race. It is the common safeguard and heritage of every American citizen. It is the shield of the accused and is a bulwark for the protection of the liberty and life of every man, woman, and child in the land. 2011. Argument of Mr. Manager Perkins that a judge may be impeached for personal misconduct.--On February 24, 1905,\1\ in the Senate, sitting for the impeachment trial of Judge Charles Swayne, Mr. Manager James B. Perkins, of New York, in concluding argument, said in relation to the articles charging nonresidents in the district: The argument made in behalf of the respondent is this: That a judge, under the precedents of the English courts, can not be impeached for any act except one done in the course of his duty as a judge, and that the sixth and seventh articles do not charge an omission of duty as a judge, but an omission of duty as an individual. Mr. President, this can best be answered by an illustration of what is the logical and necessary result of the argument on the other side, that a judge of the United States court can not be impeached by the Senate of the United States unless for some strictly judicial act. Let us suppose that a judge commits a crime; that he forges a note; that he embezzles money. He is indicted and tried and convicted in the State courts of these crimes and sentenced to bear the punishment. Then it is sought to remove him from office by impeachment. The judge having committed these crimes is impeached. He employs my learned friends on the other side, and they claim before the Senate then, as they claim now, that the Senate has no power to impeach a judge except for acts done as a judge. They say, and say justly, that when this judge forged a note, or embezzled money, he was not acting as a judge, but as an individual. And if the argument be just, we have this extraordinary conclusion: A judge can not be removed except by impeachment. The judge, for the crime committed in his private capacity, is serving his term in State's prison. As he marches to perform hard labor, he will once a month receive the consolation of opening the envelope containing the check which will be monthly sent to him to pay him his salary as a judge of the United States court. Such a result shows the absurdity of the position. The English cases are cited, but in England, apart from the remedy by impeachment, a judge can be removed for any cause deemed sufficient by a bill of attainder. That is unknown in this country. Bills of attainder were not put in our Constitution, and the remedy by impeachment by the Senate is the sole remedy by which a judge can be removed. But a word more. What offense is Judge Swayne charged with? It is that he did not reside within his district. The law could not say that Judge Swayne as an individual should reside in the northern district of Florida or anywhere else, but the law says that when he is a judge he, because he is a judge, shall reside within his district; and when he failed so to do he omitted a judicial requirement made of him just as much as if he had sold justice or made unrighteous decisions. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Third session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 3246. Sec. 2012 I shall say no more on that point, but come at once to what is the important, the great question in this case--not whether the offense is impeachable, but whether the offense was committed. It has already been suggested that a judge of the United States court is the one officer in the land who holds his office by a life tenure. He can not be removed by the people. He can not be removed by the President. Nothing but the act of God or the vote of the Senate can remove a man who holds the office of United States judge. His dignity is great; his responsibility is correspondingly great. The people who complain, the people who lack confidence in their judges, can look to the Senate and can look here alone for relief. If they can not get it here they can not get it anywhere. 2012. Argument of Mr. Anthony Higgins, counsel, that impeachable offenses by a judge are confined to acts done on the bench in discharge of his duties.--On February 24, 1905,\1\ in the Senate, sitting for the impeachment trial of Judge Charles Swayne, Mr. Anthony Higgins, of counsel for the respondent, said in final argument: Mr. President, I conceive it is of no slight interest or importance to the Senate that of the four learned managers who have now taken part in the presentation of the prosecution of this case three of them have devoted as much time as they have to the question whether the offenses charged in the first seven articles constitute impeachable offenses the alleged offense or crime of the respondent of making a false claim, or obtaining money by false pretenses; of using a car belonging to a railroad company, contrary to good morals, and, third, in not obeying the statute to reside in his district. All three have united in presenting the argument of ab inconvenienti--one which seldom weighs much with courts, and one which, it seems to us, after the conclusive discussion of the subject in the argument which it has been our privilege to present to the Senate on the constitutional question, is not left in the case really for discussion. That argument shows beyond per adventure that the framers of the Constitution in leaving out of the Constitution any provision for the removal of an official subject to impeachment by address did it purposely and with a view of giving stability to those who hold the offices, and especially the judges. ``Mr. Dickinson,'' says Elliott in his Debates on the Constitution, ``moved, as an amendment to Article XI, section 2, after the words `good behavior,' the words `Provided, That they may be removed by the Executive on the application by the Senate and House of Representatives.''' This was in respect of the judges. Mr. Gerry seconded the motion. Mr. Gouverneur Morris thought it a contradiction in terms to say that the judges should hold their offices during good behavior and yet be removable without a trial. Besides, it was fundamentally wrong to subject judges to so arbitrary an authority. ``Mr. Randolph opposed the motion as weakening too much the independence of the judges. ``Delaware alone voted for Mr. Dickinson's motion.'' Says Judge Lawrence in a paper on this subject, which he filed in the Johnson impeachment case: ``Impeachment was deemed sufficiently comprehensive to cover every proper case for removal. ``The first proposition was to use the words `to be removable on impeachment and conviction for malpractice and neglect of duty.' It was agreed that these expressions were too general. They were therefore stricken out.'' Mr. Mason said: ``Treason, as defined in the Constitution, will not reach many great and dangerous offenses. Hastings is not guilty of treason. Attempts to subvert the Constitution may not be treason as above defined.'' * * * * * * He moved to insert after ``bribery'' the words ``or maladministration.'' Mr. Madison replied: ``So vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during the pleasure of the Senate.'' ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Third session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, pp. 3258-3259. Sec. 2013 Mr. Mason withdrew ``maladministration'' and substituted ``other high crimes and misdemeanors against the State.'' Mr. President, there are in the States of Pennsylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Texas provisions substantially the same as those contained in the constitutions of Pennsylvania and of Delaware. The constitution of the State of Pennsylvania of 1790 provides: ``Article V. ``Sec. 2. The judges of the supreme court and of the several courts of common pleas shall hold their offices during good behavior. But for any reasonable cause, which shall not be sufficient ground of impeachment, the governor may remove any of them on the address of two- thirds of each branch of the legislature.'' The clause of the constitution of Delaware is similar. The Pennsylvania constitution as amended in 1838 provides: ``Sec. 3. The governor and all other civil officers under this Commonwealth shall be liable to impeachment for any misdemeanor in office, but judgment in such cases shall not extend farther than to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Commonwealth. The party, whether convicted or acquitted, shall, nevertheless, be liable to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law.'' (Page 1561.) So that there are in those constitutions the direct provision that power of removal by address is given as punishment for cases which by the very words of the constitution are said not to be the subject of impeachment. An examination of the constitutions of the several States will show that there are not more than two or three State constitutions which do not contain the power of removal by address. That power was placed in the English constitution by a great and famous historic statute--the Act of Settlement--passed early in the reign of William and Mary, or of Anne, at the time when the present dynasty of the British throne was placed upon the authority of an act of Parliament. Then it was that the provision was placed in the statute that judges should be removable by address for causes that were not the subject of impeachment. Therefore, in the face of this state of the constitutional law and of the terms and provisions of the Constitution, where is there room for an argument that that construction shall not hold because there is no other way of getting rid of judges but by impeachment? Now, but one word more on this, and that is in respect to the case that was cited by the learned manager, Mr. Olmsted, of an impeachment in Massachusetts. I call attention to the fact that the constitution of Massachusetts of 1780 makes provision for the impeachment of judges broader than the other States, or at least most of them. ``Art. VIII, The Senate shall be a court with full authority to hear and determine all impeachments made by the house of representatives against any officer or officers of the Commonwealth for misconduct and maladministration in their offices.'' So in Massachusetts the judge who took illegal fees upon the ministerial side of his probate court was clearly impeachable under the provision of the Massachusetts constitution, which extended to ministerial functions. 2013. Argument from review of English impeachments that the phrase ``high crimes and misdemeanors,'' as applied to judicial conduct, must mean only acts of the judge while sitting on the bench. History of removal by address in England and the States as bearing on the nature of impeachable offenses on the part of a judge. On February 22, 1905,\1\ in the Senate sitting for the impeachment trial of Judge Charles Swayne, Messrs. Anthony Higgins and John M. Thurston, of counsel for the respondent, offered a brief in support of their plea of jurisdiction as to the first seven articles. This brief, which was signed by them as counsel, but which, as they said, ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Third session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, pp. 3028-3031. Sec. 2013 had been prepared by another, covered many questions relating to impeachments,, the following being among them: The only pertinent definitions of the term ``high crimes and misdemeanors,'' as contained in Article II, section 4, of the Federal Constitution, must be drawn (1) from the law of Parliament as it existed in 1787; (2) from the contemporaneous expositions of that law embodied in the constitutions of the several States. In order to present anything like an adequate statement of the English law of impeachment as it existed at the time in question, some account must be given of the process of growth through which it had passed prior to that time. The history of that growth is divided into two epochs, easily distinguishable from each other. The first begins with the proceedings against the Lords Latimer and Neville, which took place in the Good Parliament in the fiftieth of Edward 111 (1376). These proceedings are regarded by the constitutional historians as the earliest instances of a trial by lords upon a definite accusation made by the Commons. (Hallam, M. A., Vol. III, p. 56; Stubbs, Const. Hist., Vol. II, p. 431.) Not until early in the reign of Edward III was Parliament definitely and finally divided into two houses that deliberated apart; not until near the dose of that reign did the Commons, as the grand jury of the whole realm, attempt to present persons accused of grave offenses against the State to the Lords for trial. At the outset, the new method of accusation was rivaled by what were known as ``appeals,'' which have been thus defined: ``It was the regular course for private persons, even persons who were not members of Parliament, to bring accusations of a criminal nature in Parliament, upon which proceedings were had.'' (Stephen, Hist. of the Criminal Law of England, Vol. 1, 151.) The results of the private warfare thus instituted were so inconvenient that ``appeals'' were finally abolished by the statute of I Hen. 4, c. 14. Thus left without a rival, proceedings by impeachment were occasionally employed during the reigns of Richard II, Henry IV, Henry V, and Henry VI. In the reign last named Lord Stanley was impeached in 1459 for not sending his troops to the battle of Bloreheath. That trial terminates the first epoch in the history of the law of impeachment in England. It was not again employed during the period that divides 1459 from 1621, an interval of one hundred and sixty-two years. The primary cause for the suspension is to be found in the fact that during that interval it was that the decline in the prestige and influence of Parliament was such that the directing power in the state passed to the King in council, the judicial aspect of which was known as ``the star chamber.'' There it was that the great state trials took place during the reign of Edward IV and during the following reigns of the princes of the house of Tudor. Such impeachment trials as did take place during the first or formative epoch are not as distinctly defined as those that occurred during the later period, and have now only an antiquarian interest. vii. impeachments in england: second epoch. With the revival of the powers of Parliament in the reign of James 1, impeachment was resumed as a weapon of constitutional warfare. From that time its modern history, with which this discussion is concerned, really begins. The first impeachment case to occur during the second epoch was that of Sir Giles Mompesson in 1621, the last that of Lord Melville in 1805. Including the first and last the total is 54. [Here follows the list.] An examination of the foregoing list reveals the fact that many of the impeachments in question were directed against private individuals, it having always been the law of England that all subjects, as well out of office as in office, might be thus accused and tried. A good illustration may be found in the notable case of Doctor Sacheverell, rector of St. Savior's, Southwark, who was impeached by the Commons and convicted by the Lords for having preached two sermons inculcating the doctrine of unlimited passive obedience. (State Trials, XV, p. 1.) As that branch of the law of impeachment which authorized the accusation of private individuals out of office was never reproduced in this country, cases of that class may be dismissed from consideration. By far the greater number of the remaining cases are what are known as ``political impeachments,'' whereby one party in the State would attempt to crush its adversaries in office by impeaching them for high treason, which generally involved commitment to the Tower. As illustrations, reference may be made to the case of Portland, Halifax, and Somers, three Whig peers impeached of high treason by a Tory House of Commons for their share in promoting the Spanish Sec. 2013 partition treaties in 1700; and to that of Oxford, Bolingbroke, and Ormond, Tory ministers impeached by the triumphant Whigs in the Commons for their share in negotiating the peace of Utrecht in 1713. (State Trials, Vol. XIV, p. 233. Parl. Hist., Vol. VII, p. 105.) A well-known English writer has described the latter as ``the last instance of purely political impeachment.'' (Taswell-Langmead, English Const. Hist., p. 549, note.) Cases of that class shed but a dim light upon the definition of the term ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' as applied to those offenses for which English judges have been punished for misbehavior in office. No clear or authoritative definitions of the term in question can be found, as applied to that subject, outside of what are known as judicial impeachments as contradistinguished from political. As the purely judicial impeachment cases which have occurred in England are very few in number, their results may be stated within narrow limits. The earliest of the accusations which have been made against English judges have been for the crime of bribery, the crime for which Lord Bacon was impeached by the Commons in 1621. The changes against Bacon particularly set forth instances of judicial corruption by the acceptance of bribes, and in his ``confession and submission ``he said: ``I do plainly and ingeniously confess that I am guilty of corruption, and do renounce all defense.'' (State Trials, Vol. 11, 1106.) Such cases, though rare, had occurred before Bacon's time. In the words of Sir 1. F. Stephen, Coke ``gives two instances in which judges were punished for taking bribes, namely, Sir William Thorpe, in 1351, who took sums amounting in all to
90 for not awarding an exigent against five persons at Lincoln assizes, and certain commissioners (probably special commissioners) of over and terminer, who were fined 1,000 marks each for taking a bribe of 4. I have elsewhere referred to the impeachment of the Chancellor Michael de la Pole, by Cavendish, the fishmonger, for taking a bribe of 40, 3 yards of scarlet cloth, and a quantity of fish, in the time of Richard II. * * * ``Lord Macclesfield was also impeached and removed from his office for bribery in 1725.'' (Hist. of the Crim. Law of Eng., Vol. III, pp. 251-52, citing as to the case of Lord Macclesfield Sixteen State Trials, p. 767.) That Case was the last judicial impeachment in England. It is not, therefore, strange that bribery, as a distinct and substance offense, should have been named, side by side with treason, as an impeachable crime, in the Constitution of the United States. After the bribery cases of Lord Chancellor Bacon and Lord Chancellor Macclesfield have been subtracted from the foregoing list, but two judicial impeachments remain in the entire history of the English people. Only in those two cases have the Commons impeached and the Lords tried English judges upon charges of judicial misconduct other than bribery. ix. impeachment of sir robert berkley and other judges. In 1635 Charles I announced his attention to extend the exaction of ship money to the inland counties. When the writs of that year were resisted, the judges gave answers in favor of the prerogative. When in 1636 another set of ship writs were issued, Hampden made a test case by refusing to pay the assessment on his lands at Great Missenden, and the issue thus raised was argued in November and December, 1637, before a full bench. The contention made in favor of the Crown was sustained by seven of the judges--Finch, chief justice of the common pleas; Bramston, chief justice of the king's bench; Berkley, one of the justices of that court; Crawley, one of the judges of the common pleas; Davenport, lord chief baron of the exchequer; Weston and Trevor, barons of that court. When the day of reckoning came, Finch fled to Holland, and the remaining six were impeached by the Commons for their judgments rendered in favor of the royal contention, the charges being delivered to the Lords July 6,1641. As Berkley's opinion in favor of the legality of ship money was the most emphatic, he was made the special object of attack in articles which charged him not only with the ship-money opinion, but with other acts of judicial misconduct on the bench. The nature of the accusations against him can be best explained by extracts from the articles themselves, which open with the general statement ``that the said Sir Robert Berkley, then being one of the justices of the said court of king's bench, hath traitorously and wickedly endeavored to subvert the fundamental laws and established government of the realm of England, and instead thereof to introduce an arbitrary and tyrannical government against law, which he bath declared, by traitorous and wicked words, opinions, judgments, practices, and actions appearing in the several articles ensuing.'' The following are a fair sample of the special charges: ``4. That he, the said Robert Berkley, then being one of the justices of the king's bench, and having taken an oath for the due administration of justice, according to the laws and statutes of the realm, to His Majesty's liege people, on or about the Sec. 2013 last of December subscribed an opinion, in haec verba: ` I am of opinion, that where the benefit doth more particularly redound to the good of the ports,' etc. * * * 6. That he, the said Sir Robert Berkley, then being one of the justices of the court of king's bench, and duly sworn as aforesaid, did on------deliver his opinion in the exchequer chamber against John Hampden, esq., in the case of ship money. * * * 7. That he, the said Sir Robert Berkley, then being one of the justices of the court of king's bench, and one of the justices of the assize for the county of York, did, at the assizes held at York in Lent, 1636, deliver his charge to the grand jury, `that it was a lawful and inseparable flower of the Crown for the King to command, not only the maritime counties, but also those that were inland, to find ships for the defense of the kingdom.' * * * 8. The said Sir R. Berkley then being one of the justices of the court of king's bench, in Trinity term last, then sitting on the bench in said court, upon debate of the said case between the said chambers and Sir E. Bromfield, said openly in the court, `that there was a rule of law, and a rule of government;' and that `many things which might not be done by the rule of law might be done by the rule of government;' and would not suffer the point of legality of ship money to be argued by chambers' counsel. * * * 9. The said Sir R. Berkley, then and there sitting on the bench, did revile and threaten the grand jury returned to serve at the said session, for presenting the removal of the communion table in All Saints Church in Hertford aforesaid. * * * 11. He, the said Sir R. Berkeley, being one of the justices of the said court of king's bench, and sitting in said court, deferred to grant a prohibition to the said Court-Christian in said cause, although the counsel did move in the said court many several times and several times for a prohibition.'' (State Trials, vol. 3, pp. 1283-1291.) The impeachment against Berkley ended in his paying a fine of 10,000. x. impeachment of sir william scroggs, chief justice of the king's bench. In the reign of Charles II, Sir William Scroggs, chief justice of the king's bench, was impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors, the nature of which may be best explained by the following extracts from the articles themselves. The general accusation is ``that the said William Scroggs, then being chief justice of the court of king's bench, hath traitorously and wickedly endeavored to subvert the fundamental laws, and the established religion and government of this Kingdom of England; and instead thereof to introduce properly and arbitrary and tyranical government against law; which he has declared by divers traitorous and wicked words, opinions, judgments, practices, and actions.'' Chief among the special charges are the following: II. ``That he, the said Sir William Scroggs, in Trinity term last, being then chief justice of the said court, and having taken an oath duly to administer justice according to the laws and statutes of this realm, in pursuance of his said traitorous purposes, did, together with the rest of the justices of the said court, several days before the end of said term, in an arbitrary manner, discharge the grand jury which then served for the hundred of Oswaldston, in the county of Middlesex, before they had made their presentments, etc. * * * III. That, whereas one Henry Carr had, for some time before, published every week a certain book, entitled `The Weekly Pacquet of Advice from Rome, or The History of Popery,' wherein the superstitions and cheats of the Church of Rome were from time to time exposed, he, the said Sir William Scroggs, then chief justice of the court of king's bench, together with the other judges of the said court, before any legal conviction of the said Carr, of any crime did in the said Trinity term, in a most illegal and arbitrary manner, make and cause to be entered a certain rule of that court against the printing of said book, in haec verba. * * * IV. That the said Sir William Scroggs, since he was made chief justice of the king's bench, hath, together with the other judges of the said court, most notoriously departed from all rules of justice and equality in the imposition of fines upon persons convicted of misdemeanors in said court.'' The result was that the chief justice was removed from office and given a pension for life. (State Trials, Vol. VIII, pp. 195, 216.) xi. proceeding against lord chief justice keeling. Intervening between the case of Berkley and other judges (1640) and that of Sir William Scroggs (1680) are proceedings by the Commons against Lord Chief Justice Keeling, which occurred in 1667, notable for the reason that they clearly illustrate what kind of judicial acts were considered as impeachable high crimes and misdemeanors at that time.'' A copy of Judge Keeling's case, taken out of the Parliament Journal, December 11, 1667: `The House resumed the hearing of the rest of the report touching the matter of restraint upon juries; and that upon the examination of divers witnesses, in several causes of restraints put upon juries, by the Lord Chief Justice Keeling; whereupon the committee made their resolutions, which are as follows: 1. That the proceedings of the Lord Chief Justice, in the cases now Sec. 2013 reported, are innovations in the trial of men for their lives and liberties; and that he hath used an arbitrary and illegal power, which is of dangerous consequence to the lives and liberties of the people of England, and tends to the introducing of an arbitrary government. 2. That in the place of judicature, the Lord Chief Justice hath undervalued, vilified, and condemned Magna Charta, the great preserver of our lives, freedom, and property. 3. That he be brought to trial, in order to condign punishment in such manner as the House shall judge most fit and requisite.''' (State Trials, Vol. 6, p. 991, seq.) ``On the 16th of October, 1667, the House being informed `that there have been some innovations of late in trials of men for their lives and deaths, and in some particular cases restraints have been put upon juries in the inquiries,' this matter is referred to a committee. On the 18th of November this committee are empowered to receive information against the Lord Chief Justice Keeling for any other misdemeanors besides those concerning juries. And on the 11th of December, 1667, the committee report several resolutions against the Lord Chief Justice Keeling of illegal and arbitrary proceedings in his office. The chief justice desiring to be heard, he is admitted on the 13th of December and heard in his defense to the matters charged against him, and being withdrawn, the House resolve `that they will proceed no further in the matter against him.' '' (4 Hatsel Prec., pp. 123-4, cited in Chase's Trial, Vol. II, p. 461.) xii. removal by address provided by the act of settlement. By the foregoing analysis of the only English precedents to which we can look for expositions of the meaning of the phrase ``high crimes and misdemeanors,'' as applied to the conduct of English judges, the fact is put beyond all question that the only judicial acts which the House of Commons ever regarded as falling within that category are such acts as a judge performs while sitting upon the bench, administering the laws of the realm, either between private persons or between the Crown and the subject. In the case of Mr. Justice Berkley the gravamen of the charge was that he rendered a judgment in the matter of ship money in conflict with what his triers considered the law of the realm to be. In the case of Chief Justice Scroggs the gravamen of the charge was that he arbitrarily discharged grand juries; that in a libel case he rendered an illegal judgment, and that he imposed unjust fines upon those convicted of misdemeanors. In the proceedings against Chief Justice Keeling the gravamen of the charge was that he had put ``restraint'' upon juries by fining them for their verdicts.``Wagstaff and others of a jury were fined an hundred marks a piece by Lord Chief Justice Keeling.'' (4 Hatsell Prec., p. 124, note.) Excepting bribery there is no case in the parliamentary law of England which gives color to the idea that the personal misconduct of a judge, in matters outside of his administration of the law in a court of justice, was ever considered or charged to constitute a high crime and misdemeanor. When the question is asked, By what means is the personal misconduct of an English judge, not amounting to a high crime and misdemeanor, punished ? the answer is easy. Prior to the passage in 1701 of the famous Act of Settlement (12 and 13 Will. III, C. 2) neither the tenure nor the compensation of English judges rested upon a firm or definite foundation. Hallam (Const. Hist., Vol. III, p. 194) tells us that ``it had been the practice of the Stuarts, especially in the last years of their dynasty, to dismiss judges, without seeking any other pretense, who showed any disposition to thwart government in political prosecutions.'' As the hasty and imperfect Bill of Rights had failed to provide a. remedy for that condition of things, it became necessary for the authors of the Act of Settlement, ``the complement of the Revolution itself and the Bill of Rights,'' to provide that English judges should hold office during good behavior (quandiu se bene gesserint), and that they should receive ascertained and established salaries. But, while the judges were being thus entrenched in their offices, the fact was not forgotten that the remedy by impeachment extended only to high crimes and misdemeanors which did not embrace personal misconduct. Therefore a method of removal was provided by address, which was intended to embrace all misconduct not included in the term ``high crimes and misdemeanors.'' In the light of that statement it will be easier to understand the full purport of that section of the Act of Settlement which provides ``that after the said limitations shall take effect as aforesaid, judges'' commissions be made quandiu se bene gesserint, and their salaries ascertained and established; but upon the address of both Houses of Parliament it maybe lawful to remove them.'' Thus, for seventy-five years prior to the severance of the political tie which bound the English colonies in America to the parent State, the twofold method for the removal of English judges was clearly defined and perfectly understood on both sides of the Atlantic. The twofold method embraced (1) the removal by impeach- Sec. 2013 ment for all acts constituting ``high crimes and misdemeanors,'' a term then clearly defined in English parliamentary law; (2) the removal by address for all lesser acts of personal misconduct not embraced within that term. That such was the general and accepted view on this side of the Atlantic in 1776 of the English parliamentary law on impeachment and address will be put beyond all question by the following references to the several State constitutions in which that law reappeared. xiii. impeachment and address as defined in the constitutions of the several states. On May 10, 1776, the Continental Congress recommended to the several conventions and assemblies of the colonies the establishment of independent governments ``for the maintenance of internal peace and the defense of their lives, liberties, and properties.'' (Charters and Constitutions, vol. 1, p. 3.) Before the end of the year in which that recommendation was made the greater part of the colonies had adopted written constitutions, in which were restated, in a dogmatic form, all of the vital principles of the English constitutional system. Illustrations of the adoption of the English plan for the removal of judges by impeachment and address may be drawn from the following State constitutions: The constitution of Pennsylvania of 1776, Article V, section 2, provides that ``the judges of the supreme court and of the several courts of common pleas shall hold their offices during good behavior. But for any reasonable cause, which shall not be sufficient ground for impeachment, the governor may remove any of them, on the address of two-thirds of each branch of the legislature.'' The constitution of Delaware of 1792, Article VI, section 2, provides that ``the chancellor and the judges of the supreme court of common pleas shall hold their offices during good behavior; but for any reasonable cause, which shall not be sufficient ground for impeachment, the governor may in his discretion, remove any of them on the address of two-thirds of all the members of each branch of the legislature.'' The constitution of South Carolina of 1868, Article VII, section 4, provides that ``for any willful neglect of duty or other reasonable cause, which shall not be sufficient ground of impeachment, the governor shall remove any executive or judicial officer on the address of two-thirds of each house of the general assembly.'' Here are explicit and dogmatic statements of the settled rule of English parliamentary law that judges may be removed by impeachment for grave offenses of judicial misconduct, and by address for lesser offenses of personal misconduct. As this distinction was so well known, many of the State constitutions simply presuppose it without stating it in express terms. The constitution of Massachusetts of 1780, Chapter III, article 1, after providing for removal by impeachment, declares that ``all judicial officers duly appointed, commissioned, and sworn shall hold their offices during good behavior, excepting such concerning whom there is different provision made in this constitution: Provided, nevertheless, the governor, with consent of the council, may remove them upon the address of both houses of the legislature.'' The constitution of Georgia of 1798, Article III, section 1, provides that ``the judges of the superior court shall be elected for the term of three years, removable by the governor on the address of two-thirds of both houses for that purpose, or by impeachment and conviction thereon.'' The constitution of New Hampshire of 1784, Article I, part 2, provides that ``all judicial officers, duly appointed, commissioned, and sworn, shall hold their offices during good behavior, excepting those concerning whom there is a different provision made in this constitution: Provided, nevertheless, the president, with the consent of council, may remove them upon the address of both houses of the legislature.'' The constitution of Connecticut of 1818, Article V, section 3, provides that ``the judges of the supreme court and of the superior court shall hold their offices during good behavior; but may be removed by impeachment, and the governor shall also remove them on the address of two-thirds of the members of each house of the general assembly.'' It is said that the constitution of New York of 1777 was the model from which the impeachment clauses of the Constitution of the United States were copied. (6 Am. Law Reg., N. S., 277.) The New York constitution of that date expressly limited impeachment to persons in office, and omitted removal by address. Such an omission was, however, exceptional. The rule was to introduce into the State constitutions both processes of removal by impeachment and address. And if it were not for fear of wearying the court by reiteration, the list of instances could be greatly lengthened in which both methods were introduced into later State constitutions not here mentioned, together with the recognized distinction between impeachable offenses and the lesser acts of misconduct justifying only removal by address, expressed in the words ``not sufficient ground of impeachment.'' (See Appendix.) Sec. 2014 2014. Argument that Congress might not by law make nonresidence a high misdemeanor in a judge. Discussion of the intent of a judge as a primary condition needed to justify impeachment. On February 22, 1905,\1\ in the Senate sitting for the impeachment trial of Judge Charles Swayne, Messrs. Anthony Higgins and John M. Thurston, of counsel for the respondent, offered a brief in support of their plea of jurisdiction as to the first seven articles. This brief, which was signed by them as counsel, but which, as they said, had been prepared by another, covered many questions relating to impeachments, the following being among them: First. That the definition of the term ``high crimes and misdemeanors,'' as employed in Article II, section 4, of the Constitution, must be drawn from the parliamentary law of England as it existed in 1787, construed in the light of the contemporaneous expositions of that law embodied in the provisions of the constitutions of the several States as to impeachment and address. Second. That the definition of that term, as thus fixed at the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution, is organic and unchangeable by subsequent Congressional legislation; that no act not an impeachable offense when the Constitution was adopted can be made so by a subsequent act of Congress. Third. That the ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' for which English judges were impeachable in 1787 can only be clearly ascertained from an examination of what are known as the English judicial impeachment cases, as contradistinguished from the political. Fourth. That English judges have never been impeached except for bribery, or for judicial misconduct occurring in the actual administration of justice in court, either between private individuals or between the Crown and the subject. Fifth. That since the act of settlement (1701), when the tenure and compensation of English judges was first fixed on a definite basis, such judges have been removable for judicial misconduct not amounting to an impeachable high crime and misdemeanor, by address. Sixth. That the plain distinction between the acts for which a judge may be impeached and the acts for which he may be removed by address was clearly recognized and defined in the constitutions of many of the States. Seventh. That after careful consideration and debate the Federal Convention of 1787, with only one dissenting vote, rejected the proposition to embody the removal of Federal judges by address in the Constitution of the United States ``as weakening too much the independence of the judges.'' After rejecting the more ample provisions upon the subject of impeachment embodied in some of the State constitutions, it was resolved that Federal judges should only be removed by impeachment for and conviction of ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' in the limited sense in which that phrase was defined in the parliamentary law of England as it existed in 1787. Eighth. That in no one of the four judicial impeachments which have taken place since the adoption of our Federal Constitution has the House of Representatives ever attempted to impeach a Federal judge for ``high crimes and misdemeanors,'' except in those cases in which he would have been impeachable under the English parliamentary precedents. That is to say, the proceedings against Justice Berkley and other judges (1640), the proceedings against Chief Justice Keeling (1667), the proceedings against Chief Justice Scroggs (1680), the proceedings against Judge Pickering (1803), the proceedings against Judge Chase (1804), the proceedings against Judge Peck (1830), the proceedings against Judge Humphreys (1862), so far as they relate to judicial misconduct, rest upon a single proposition, which is this: In English and American parliamentary and constitutional law the judicial misconduct which rises to the dignity of a high crime and misdemeanor must consist of judicial acts, performed with an evil or wicked intent, by a judge while administering justice in a court, either between private persons or between a private person and the government of the State. All personal misconduct of a judge occurring during his tenure of office and not coming within that category must be classed among the offenses for which a judge may be removed by address, a method of removal which the framers of our Federal Constitution refused to embody therein. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Third session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, pp. 3033-3034. Sec. 2014 When the allegations contained in articles 1, 2, and 3, presented against this respondent, are examined, it appears that they set forth in three forms an identical charge, which is in substance that the respondent, in settling his accounts with certain United States marshals under a certain act of Congress providing for the reasonable expenses for travel and attendance of a district judge, when lawfully directed to hold court outside of his district, exacted and received in payment for such expenses from the said marshals sums in excess of the amounts contemplated in said act. It is charged that such acts constitute ``a high crime, to wit, the crime of obtaining money from the United States by a false pretense, and of a high misdemeanor in office.'' The short answer to such a charge is that no such offense was ever thought of or defined in the parliamentary law of England as a high crime and misdemeanor in 1787, or at any other time; that it bears no relation whatever to the acts known in English parliamentary law as an impeachable offense. If it be true, as alleged, that the respondent was guilty in making such settlements of ``obtaining money from the United States by a false pretense,'' then the remedy is by indictment by a grand jury and a trial by a petit jury, as in the case of any other citizen of the country. The Constitution expressly provides, Article I, section 3, that persons subject to impeachment ``shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law.'' While it is quite possible to understand how such personal misconduct upon the part of a judge, entirely disconnected with the conduct of judicial business on the bench, might subject him to removal by address in a State which had adopted that plan of removal for nonimpeachable offenses, it is hard to conceive how any effort of the imagination could reach the conclusion that such an act constitutes an impeachable high crime and misdemeanor as defined in English parliamentary law. The same comments are applicable to the charges made in articles 4 and 5 as to the use by the respondent of a certain car belonging to a certain railroad, ``the said railroad company being at the time in the possession of a receiver appointed by said Charles Swayne, judge as aforesaid, on the petition of creditors.'' Even if it could be established that the circumstances attending such a transaction would warrant removal by address, no advance would be made toward the conclusion that such acts constitute an impeachable high crime and misdemeanor as defined in English parliamentary law, because the further allegation that ``the said Charles Swayne, acting as judge, allowed the credit claimed by the said receiver for and on account of the said expenditure as part of the necessary expenses of operating said road'' falls far short of the English and American rule as to the evil or wicked intent which must accompany a judgment or opinion delivered on the bench in order to render it impeachable. Nothing is better settled than the fact that a judge is not impeachable even for a judgment, order, or opinion rendered contrary to law unless it is alleged and proved that it was rendered with an evil, wicked, or malicious intent. Justice Berkley was impeached not simply because he decided in favor of ship money, but because he ``traitorously and wickedly endeavored to subvert the fundamental laws'' of the realm thereby. Chief Justice Scroggs was impeached not simply for imposing ``fines upon persons convicted of misdemeanors in said court,'' but because he imposed them ``for the further accomplishing of his said traitorous and wicked purposes.'' Justice Chase was impeached because he, ``with intent to oppress and procure the conviction of the said Callender, did overrule the objection of John Bassett, one of the jury;'' ``that, with intent to oppress and procure the conviction of the prisoner, the evidence of John Taylor, a material witness on behalf of the aforesaid Callender, was not permitted by the said Samuel Chase to be given in.'' Judge Peck was impeached not because he punished Lawless for contempt, but because he did so ``with intention wrongfully and unjustly to oppress, imprison, and otherwise injure the said Luke Edward Lawless under color of law, * * * under the color and pretense aforesaid and with the intent aforesaid, in the said court then and there did unjustly, oppressively, and arbitrarily order and adjudge,'' etc. If further illustrations of the necessity for averments as to the wicked and malicious intent with which a judicial act must be performed need be given, they may be drawn from articles 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, presented against this respondent, in which impeachable offenses are properly charged under the rule which the Constitution prescribes--that is to say, the rule of English parliamentary law. It is charged in one article that the said Charles Swayne ``did maliciously and unlawfully adjudge guilty of contempt of court and impose a fine of $100 upon and commit to prison for a period of ten days E. T. Davis, an attorney at law, for an alleged contempt of the circuit court of the United States;'' and in another that he ``did maliciously and unlawfully adjudge guilty of a contempt of court and impose a Sec. 2015 fine of $100 upon and commit to prison for a period of ten days Simeon Belden, an attorney and counselor at law, for an alleged contempt of the circuit court of the United States.'' With the plain and settled rule thus recognized clearly in view, the draftsmen of articles 4 and 5 have not only failed to charge that the respondent ``allowed the credit claimed by said receiver for and on account of the said expenditure,'' etc., ``maliciously and unlawfully,'' but, what is more to the point, they have failed to charge that he did so ``knowingly.'' There is no reason to suppose, in the absence of such an allegation, that a judge, approving the mass of accounts presented to the court by a receiver of a railroad, would have personal knowledge of every trivial item which such accounts contain. The presumption is clearly to the contrary. In articles 4 and 5 there is no charge either that the respondent ever ``knowingly'' passed upon the items of expense in question or that he approved them ``maliciously and unlawfully.'' In the absence of such allegations articles 4 and 5 fall to the ground. The charge of nonresidence contained in article 6 presupposes the validity of section 551, Revised Statutes of the United States, which provides that ``a district judge shall be appointed for each district, except in cases hereinafter provided. Every judge shall reside in the district for which he is appointed, and for offending against this provision shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor.'' If the foregoing argument proves anything, it is the fact that when the phrase ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' was embodied in the Federal Constitution in 1787 it drew along with it, as an integral part of it, the definitions which fixed its meaning in English parliamentary law at that time. The phrase, coupled with the definitions of it, thus became organic and unchangeable by subsequent Congressional legislation, just as the definition of the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court became organic and unchangeable. The convention pointedly refused to make impeachable offenses an uncertain or changeable quantity. ``The first proposition was to use the words `to be removable on impeachment and conviction for malpractice and neglect of duty.' It was agreed that these expressions were too general. They were therefore stricken out. * * * Colonel Mason said: `Treason, as defined in the Constitution, will not reach many great and dangerous offenses. Hastings is not guilty of treason. Attempts to subvert the Constitution may not be treason as above defined.' He moved to insert after `bribery' the words `or maladministration.' Madison: `So vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during the pleasure of the Senate.' Mason withdrew `maladministration' and substituted `other high climes and misdemeanors against the State.' '' (American Law Review, vol. 16, p. 804.) The fathers knew exactly the limitations of the phrase adopted, and they repelled the idea that it was ever to be enlarged or diminished. If nonresidence of a judge in his district could be added by Congress to the list of impeachable offenses, that list could be thus indefinitely extended; or, by the same authority, every impeachable offense as understood in 1787 could be abolished. If it is admitted that Congress can change the organic definition, either by addition or subtraction, it follows as clearly as a mathematical demonstration that the scheme of impeachment provided in the Constitution can be entirely remodeled by legislation. The validity of the section in question, making nonresidence a high misdemeanor, can not be supported by serious argument. Even if it could be, the fact can not be lost sight of that its plain provision is that ``every such judge shall reside in the district for which he is appointed.'' It will not be disputed that Judge Swayne was so residing in the district for which he was appointed at the time that subsequent legislation excluded the place of his residence from such district. Certainly nothing more can be put forward by those who assert the validity of section 551 than the contention that it was respondent's duty to remove, within a reasonable time, from the district for which he was appointed into the new one for which he was not appointed. It follows, therefore, that the accusation now made amounts to nothing more than the charge that respondent did not act with sufficient alacrity; that he did not remove his residence into the new district with sufficient promptness. How could such laches possibly constitute an impeachable high crime and misdemeanor? 2015. Argument that an impeachable offense is any misbehavior that shows disqualification to hold and exercise the office, whether moral, intellectual or physical. Answer to the argument that a judge may be impeached only for acts done in his official capacity. Answer to the argument that Congress might not make nonresidence a high misdemeanor. Sec. 2015 By permission, before the final arguments in the Swayne trial, the managers filed a brief on the respondent's plea to jurisdiction. On February 23, 1905,\1\ in the Senate sitting for the impeachment trial of Judge Charles Swayne, Manager Henry W. Palmer, of Pennsylvania, filed, by permission the following brief: a brief of authorities on the laws of impeachment. The purpose of this brief is to show-- First. That the framers of the Constitution intended that the House of Representatives should have the right to impeach and the Senate the power to try a judicial officer for any misbehavior that showed disqualification to hold and exercise the office, whether moral, intellectual, or physical. The provisions of the Constitution relating to the subject of impeachment are as follows: ``The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other officers, and shall have the sole power of impeachment. (Art. I, see. 2.) ``Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States; but the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law. (Art. II, sec. 1.) ``The President * * * shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. (Art. II, sec. 2.) ``The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors. (Art. II, see. 4.) ``The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury.'' (Art. 3, sec. 2.) The convention that framed the Constitution did not define words, but used them in the sense in which they were understood at that time. The convention did not invent the remedy by impeachment, but adopted a well-known and frequently used method of getting rid of objectionable public officers, modifying it to suit the conditions of a new country. In England all the King's subjects were liable to impeachment for any offense against the sovereign or the law. Floyd was impeached for speaking lightly of the Elector Palatine and sentenced to ride on horseback for two successive days through certain public streets with his face to the horse's tail, with the tail in his hands; to stand each day two hours in pillory; to be pelted by the mob, then to be branded with the letter ``K'' and be imprisoned for life in the Tower. The character and extent of the punishment was in the discretion of the House of Lords. The Constitution modified the remedy by confining it to the President, Vice-President, and all civil officers, and the punishment to removal from office and disqualification to hold office in future. That it was not intended as a punishment of crime clearly appears when we read that a party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law. Said Mr. Bayard, in Blount's trial: ``Impeachment is a proceeding of a purely political nature. It is not so much designed to punish the offender as to secure the State. It touches neither his person nor his property, but simply divests him of his political capacity.'' (Wharton's State Trials, 263.) Subject to these modifications and adopting the recognized rule, the Constitution should be construed so as to be equal to every occasion which might call for its exercise and adequate to accomplish the purposes of its framers. Impeachment remains here as it was recognized in England at and prior to the adoption of the Constitution. These limitations were imposed in view of the abuses of the power of impeachment in English history. These abuses were not guarded against in our Constitution by limiting, defining, or reducing impeachable crimes, since the same necessity existed here as in England for the remedy of impeach ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Third session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, pp. 3179-3181. Sec. 2015 ment, but by other safeguards thrown around it in that instrument. It will be observed that the sole power of impeachment is conferred on the House and the sole power of trial on the Senate by Article I, sections 2 and 3. These are the only jurisdictional clauses, and they do not limit impeachment to crimes and misdemeanors. Nor is it elsewhere so limited. Section 4 of Article II makes it imperative when the President, Vice-President, and all civil officers are convicted of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors that they shall be removed from office. There may be cases appropriate for the exercise of the power of impeachment where no crime or misdemeanor has been committed. Whatever crimes and misdemeanors were the subjects of impeachment in England prior to the adoption of our Constitution, and as understood by its framers, are, therefore, subjects of impeachment before the Senate of the United States, subject only to the limitations of the Constitution. ``The framers of our Constitution, looking to the impeachment trials in England, and to the writers on parliamentary and common law, and to the constitutions and usages of our own States, saw that no act of Parliament or of any State legislature ever undertook to define an impeachable crime. They saw that the whole system of crimes, as defined in acts of Parliament and as recognized at common law, was prescribed for and adapted to the ordinary courts.'' (2 Hale, Pl. Crown, ch. 20, p. 150; 6 Howell State Trials, 313, note.) They saw that the high court of impeachment took jurisdiction of cases where no indictable crime had been committed, in many instances, and there was then, as there yet are, two parallel modes of reaching some, but not all offenders--one by impeachment, the other by indictment. With these landmarks to guide them, our fathers adopted a Constitution under which official malfeasance and nonfeasance, and, in some cases, misfeasance, may be the subject of impeachment, although not made criminal by act of Congress, or so recognized by the common law of England, or of any State of the Union. They adopted impeachment as a means of removing men from office whose misconduct imperils the public safety and renders them unfit to occupy official position. All American text writers support this view. [Story on the Constitution, p. 583.] ``Congress have unhesitatingly adopted the conclusion that no previous statute is necessary to authorize an impeachment for any official misconduct; and the rules of proceeding and the rules of evidence, as well as the principles of decision, have been uniformly regulated by the known doctrines of the common law and parliamentary usage. In the few cases of impeachment which have hitherto been tried no one of the charges has rested upon any statutable misdemeanors. It seems, then, to be the settled doctrine of the high court of impeachment that, though the common law can not be a foundation of a jurisdiction not given by the Constitution or laws, that jurisdiction, when given, attaches, and is to be exercised according to the rules of the common law, and that what are and what are not high crimes and misdemeanors is to be ascertained by a recurrence to that great basis of American jurisprudence. The reasoning by which the power of the House of Representatives to punish for contempts (which are breaches of privileges and offenses not defined by any positive laws) has been upheld by the Supreme Court stands upon similar grounds; for if the House had no jurisdiction to punish for contempts until the acts had been previously defined and ascertained by positive law it is clear that the process of arrest would be illegal. ``In examining the parliamentary history of impeachments it will be found that many offenses not easily definable by law, and many of a purely political character, have been deemed high crimes and misdemeanors worthy of this extraordinary remedy. Thus lord chancellors, and judges, and other magistrates have not only been impeached for bribery and acting grossly contrary to the duties of their offices, but for misleading their sovereign by unconstitutional opinions, and for attempts to subvert the fundamental laws and introduce arbitrary power. So where a lord chancellor has been thought to have put the great seal to an ignominious treaty, a lord admiral to have neglected the safeguard of the sea, an ambassador to have betrayed his trust, a privy councilor to have propounded or supported pernicious and dishonorable measures, or a confidential adviser of his sovereign to have obtained exorbitant grants or incompatible employments--these have been all deemed impeachable offenses. Some of these offenses, indeed, for which persons were impeached in the early ages of British jurisprudence would now seem harsh and severe; but perhaps they were rendered necessary by existing corruptions, and the importance of suppressing a spirit of favoritism and court intrigue. Sec. 2015 ``Thus persons have been impeached for giving bad counsel to the King, advising a prejudicia peace, enticing the King to act against the advice of Parliament, purchasing offices, giving medicine to the King without advice of physicians, preventing other persons from giving counsel to the King except in their presence, and procuring exorbitant personal grants from the King. But others, again, were founded in the most salutary public justice, such as impeachments for malversations and neglects in office, for encouraging pirates, for official oppression, extortions, and deceits, and especially for putting good magistrates out of office and advancing bad. One can not but be struck, in this slight enumeration, with the utter unfitness of the common tribunals of justice to take cognizance of such offenses, and with the entire propriety of confiding the jurisdiction over them to a tribunal capable of understanding and reforming and scrutinizing the policy of the state, and of sufficient dignity to maintain the independence and reputation of worthy public officers. [Page 587.] ``The other point is one of more difficulty. In the argument upon Blount's impeachment it was pressed with great earnestness, while there is not a syllable in the Constitution which confines impeachments to official acts, and it is against the plainest dictates of common sense that such restraint should be imposed upon it. Suppose a judge should countenance or aid insurgents in a meditated conspiracy or insurrection against the Government. This is not a judicial act, and yet it ought certainly to be impeachable. He maybe called upon to try the very persons whom he has aided. Suppose a judge or other officer to receive a bribe not connected with his judicial office, could he be entitled to any public confidence? Would not these reasons for his removal be just as strong as if it were a case of an official bribe? The argument on the other side was that the power of impeachment was strictly confined to civil officers of the United States, and this necessarily implied that it must be limited to malconduct in office.'' [American and English Encyclopedia of Law, Vol. XV, p. 1066.] ``In the United States.--The Constitution of the United States provides that the President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. If impeachment in England be regarded merely as a mode of trial for the punishment of common-law or statutory crimes, and if the Constitution has adopted it only as a mode of procedure, leaving the crimes to which it is to be applied to be settled by the general rules of criminal law, then, as it is well settled that in regard to the National Government there are no common-law crimes, it would seem necessarily to follow that impeachment can be instituted only for crimes specifically named in the Constitution or for offenses declared to be crimes by Federal statute. This view has been maintained by very eminent authority. But the cases of impeachment that have been brought under the Constitution would seem to give to the remedy a much wider scope than the above rule would indicate. ``In each of the only two cases of impeachment tried by the Senate in which a conviction resulted the defendant was found guilty of offenses not indictable either at common law or under any Federal statute, and in almost every case brought offenses were charged in the articles of impeachment which were not indictable under any Federal statute, and in several cases they were such as constituted neither a statutory nor a common-law crime. The impeachability of the offenses charged in the articles was, inmost of the cases, not denied. In one case, however, counsel for the defendant insisted that impeachment would not lie for any but an indictable offense, but after exhaustive argument on both sides this defense was practically abandoned. The cases, then, seem to establish that impeachment is not a mere mode of procedure for the punishment of indictable crimes-, that the phrase 'high crimes and misdemeanors' is to be taken, not in its common-law but in its broader parliamentary sense, and is to be interpreted in the light of parliamentary usage; that in this sense it includes not only crimes for which an indictment may be brought, but grave political offenses, corruptions, maladministration, or neglect of duty involving moral turpitude, arbitrary and oppressive conduct, and even gross improprieties, by judges and high officers of state, although such offenses be not of a character to render the offender liable to an indictment either at common law or under any statute. Additional weight is added to this interpretation of the Constitution by the opinions of eminent writers on constitutional and parliamentary law and by the fact that some of the most distinguished members of the convention that framed it have thus interpreted it.'' Sec. 2015 [Rawls on the Constitution, p. 210.] ``Impeachments are thus introduced as a known definite term, and we must have recourse to the common law of England for the definition of them.'' In England the practice of impeachments by the House of Commons before the House of Lords has existed from very ancient times. Its foundation is that a subject intrusted with the administration of public affairs may sometimes infringe the rights of the people and be guilty of such crimes as the ordinary magistrates either dare not or can not punish. Of these, the representatives of the people, or House of Commons, can not judge, because they and their constituents are the persons injured, and can therefore only accuse. But the ordinary tribunals would naturally be swayed by the authority of so powerful an accuser. That branch of the legislature which represents the people, therefore, brings the charge before the other branch, which consists of the nobility, who are said not to have the same interests or the same passions as the popular assembly. ``The delegation of important trusts, affecting the higher interests of society, is always from various causes liable to abuse. The fondness frequently felt for the inordinate extension of power, the influence of party and of prejudice, the reductions of foreign states, or the basest appetite for illegitimate emoluments are sometimes productive of what are not inaptly termed political offenses, which it would be difficult to take cognizance of in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.'' [Cushing's Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, p. 980, par. 2539.] ``The purpose of impeachment, in modem times, is the prosecution and punishment of high crimes and misdemeanors, chiefly of an official or political character, which are either beyond the reach of the law, or which no other authority in the State but the supreme legislative power is competent to prosecute, and, by the law of Parliament, all persons, whether peers or commoners. may be impeached for any crimes or offenses whatever.'' [Trial of Judge Peck, p. 427. Mr. Buchanan's argument.] ``What is an impeachable offense? This is a preliminary question which demands attention. It must be decided before the court can rightly understand what it is they have to try. The Constitution of the United States declares the tenure of the judicial office to be ``during good behavior.'' Official misbehavior, therefore, in a judge is a forfeiture of his office. But when we say this we have advanced only a small distance. Another question meets us. What is misbehavior in office? In answer to this question and without pretending to furnish a definition, I freely admit we are bound to prove that the respondent has violated the Constitution or some known law of the land. This, I think, was the principle fairly to be deduced from all the arguments on the trial of Judge Chase, and from the votes of the Senate in the articles of impeachment against him, in opposition to the principle for which his counsel in the first instance strenuously contended, that in order to render an offense impeachable it must be indictable. But this violation of law may consist in the abuse as well as in the usurpation of authority. ``The abuse of a power which has been given may be as criminal as the usurpation of a power which has not been granted. Can there be any doubt of this? Suppose a man to be indicted for an assault and battery. He is tried and found guilty, and the judge, without any circumstances of peculiar aggravation having been shown, fines him a thousand dollars and commits him to prison for one year. Now, although the judge may possess the power to fine and imprison for this offense, at his discretion, would not this punishment be such an abuse of judicial discretion and afford such evidence of the tyrannical and arbitrary exercises of power as would justify the House of Representatives in voting an impeachment? But why need I fancy cases? Can fancy imagine a stronger case than is now, in point of fact, before us? A member of the bar is brought before a court of the United States guilty, if you please, of having published a libel on the judge--a libel, however, perfectly decorous in its terms and imputing no criminal intention, and so difficult of construction that though the counsel of the respondent have labored for hours to prove it to be a libel still that question remains doubtful. If in this case the judge has degraded the author by imprisonment and deprived him of the means of earning bread for himself and his family by suspending him from the practice of his profession for eighteen months, would not this be a cruel and oppressive abuse of authority, even admitting the power to punish in such a case to be possessed by the judge? Sec. 2015 ``A gross abuse of granted power and an usurpation of power not granted are offenses equally worthy of and liable to impeachment. If, therefore, the gentleman could establish, on the firmest foundation, that the power to punish libels as contempts may be legally exercised by all the courts of the United States, still he would not have proceeded far toward the acquittal of his client. ``It has been contended that even supposing the judge to have transcended his power and violated the law, yet he can not be convicted unless the Senate should believe he did the act with a criminal intention. It has been said that crime consists in two things, a fact and an intention; and in support of this proposition the legal maxim has been quoted that `actus non fit reum, nisi mens rea.' This may be true as a general proposition, and yet it may have but a slight bearing upon the present cue. ``I admit that if the charge against a judge be merely an illegal decision on a question of property in a civil cause, his error ought to be gross and palpable, indeed, to justify the interference of a criminal intention and to convict him upon an impeachment. And yet one case of this character has occurred in our history. Judge Pickering was tried and condemned upon all the four articles exhibited against him, although the three first contained no other charge than that of making decisions contrary to law in a cause involving a mere question of property, and then refusing to grant the party injured an appeal from his decision, to which he was entitled. ``And yet am I to be told that if a judge shall do an act which is in itself criminal; if he shall, in an arbitrary and oppressive manner and without the authority of law, imprison a citizen of this country and thus consign him to infamy, you are not to infer his intention from the act? [Judge Spencer's argument, p. 290.] ``It is necessary to a right understanding of the impeachment to ascertain and define what offenses constitute judicial misdemeanors. A judicial misdemeanor consists, in my opinion, in doing an illegal act colore officii with bad motives, or in doing an act within the competency of the court or judge in some cases, but unwarranted in a particular case from the facts existing in that case, with bad motives. To illustrate the last proposition: The eighth article of the amendments of the Constitution forbids the requirement of excessive bail, the imposition of excessive fines, or the infliction of cruel or unusual punishment. If a judge should disregard these provisions, and from bad motives violate them, his offense would consist, not in the want of power, but in the manner of his executing an authority intrusted to him and for exceeding a just and lawful discretion.'' [Mr. Wickliffe's argument, p. 308.] ``By the third article of the Constitution of the United States it is declared that the judges of the supreme and inferior courts shall hold their office during good behavior. ``I maintain the proposition that any official act committed or omitted by the judge, which is a violation of the condition upon which he holds his office, is an impeachable offense under the Constitution. ``The word misdemeanor, used in its parliamentary sense as applied to offenses, means maladministration, misconduct not necessarily indictable, not only in England, but in the United States. ``'In the Senate, July 8, 1797, it was resolved that William Blount, esq., one of the Senators of the United States, having been guilty of a high misdemeanor, entirely inconsistent with his public trust and duty as a Senator, be, and he hereby is, expelled from the Senate of the United States.' (Wharton's State Trials, 202.) ``He was not guilty of an indictable crime. (Story on the Constitution, see. 799, note.) ``The offense charged, Judge Story remarks, was not defined by any statute of the United States. It was an attempt to Seduce a United States Indian interpreter from his duty, and to alienate the affections and conduct of the Indians from the public officers residing among them.'' Blackstone says: ``The fourth species of offense more immediately against the King and Government axe entitled `misprisions and contempts.' Misprisions are, in the acceptance of our law, generally understood to be all such high offenses as are under the degree of capital, but nearly bordering thereon. * * * Misprisions which are merely positive are generally denominated contempts or high misdemeanors, of which the first and principal is maladministration of such high offices as are in public trust and employment. This is usually punished by the method of parliamentary impeachment.'' (Vol. 4, p. 121. See Prescott's trial, Mass., 1821, pp. 79-N, 109,117-120, 172- 180,191.) Sec. 2015 On Chase's trial the defense conceded that to misbehave or to misdemean is precisely the same. (2 Chase's Trial, 145.) The Constitution declares that judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their commissions during good behavior. This tenure of office was introduced into the English law to enable a removal to be made for misbehavior. (Chase's Trial, 357.) At common law, an ordinary violation of a public statute, even by one not an officer, though the statute in terms provides no punishment, is an indictable misdemeanor. (Bishop, Constitutional Law, 3d ed., 187, 535.) The term ``misdemeanor'' covers every act of misbehavior in a popular sense. Misdemeanor in office and misbehavior in office mean the same things. (7 Dane Abgt., 365.) Misbehavior, therefore, which is a mere negative of good behavior, is an express limitation of the office of a judge. We may therefore conclude that the House has the right to impeach and the Senate the power to try a judicial officer for any misbehavior or misconduct which evidences his unfitness for the bench, without reference to its indictable quality. All history, all precedent, and all text writers agree upon this proposition. The direful consequences attendant upon any other theory are manifest. For the first time in impeachment trials in this or any other country the claim is made that a judge can be impeached only for acts done in his official capacity. If that position is well taken, a judge might be a common drunkard, an open frequenter of disreputable resorts; he might be a common thief, an embezzler of trust funds, a gambler, even a murderer. If he could manage to keep out of jail and attend to his judicial duties, the remedy by impeachment would not reach him. To state the proposition, is to argue it. Removal of a judge for misbehavior or lack of good behavior is impossible unless it can be done through the impeaching power. Otherwise the people are powerless to rid themselves of the most unworthy, disgraceful, and unfit official. But the exigencies of this case do not demand even a discussion of the proposition that a judge can be impeached only for acts done in his official capacity. The claim is in the nature of a demurrer to the first seven articles. It admits the truth of the averments contained in them. It admits that the respondent, as judge of the district court he held at Waco, Tex., that as judge he knowingly made a false certificate; that as judge he receipted for and received money to which he was not entitled as reimbursement for expenses incurred as judge which he never did incur. All these acts were done in his official capacity. If he had not been a judge, he could not have held the court, incurred any expense, or receipted for or received any money. The stamp of his official character is on every act. His official position enabled him to do what he did do; without it he could not have violated the law. In the case of the use of the property of the bankrupt corporation, which was in his hands for preservation, it was because he was judge that he had the opportunity to use the property. It was to bring him to hold court that the car was sent. An officer of his court sent it. He had the right and it was his duty to approve the account covering the expenses of the trip. If he had not been a judge, he could not have used the property of the railroad company. The article charges that Charles Swayne, judge, appropriated the property to his own use without making compensation under a claim of right, viz, that what he did was done in his official capacity. The articles that charge him with violation the residence law assert that he did it while exercising his office of judge. The act is directed against judges; a private person can not violate it. The act commands a judge to reside in his district--that is, the official must live there; it is to be his official residence, so that he will be where he is wanted to perform his official duty. The violation of the law is the violation of an official duty, which the law imposes on him in his official character. All this the demurrer confesses, and yet the argument is made that for a violation of the act a judge is not impeachable, because it is not an official act. But the proposition is seriously advanced that no act of Congress can create an impeachable offense or make a crime or misdemeanor the subject of impeachment for which impeachment would not lie in England before the adoption of the Constitution. Impeachable offenses were not defined in the English law by act of Parliament or otherwise; any offense was impeachable that Parliament chose to so consider. Therefore when Congress makes that a crime or misdemeanor which was not so denominated at the time of the adoption of the Constitution Sec. 2016 it does not follow that the acts made crimes were not the subject of impeachment before the adoption of the Constitution. For example, suppose no English law condemned the making of false certificates by a judge for the purpose of obtaining money from the Treasury. Can it be said that if an English judge had been guilty of such an offense that he would not have been subject to impeachment? If so, then neither can it be said that Congress created new impeachable offenses when the act was passed pertaining to false certificates. The power to impeach for misbehavior of civil officials is vested in the House and the power to try in the Senate as fully as it was exercised by the English Parliament before 1787. That power covered every offense from high treason to slander against a ruler. Subject only to the limitation that the remedy by impeachment is confined to civil officers--for high crimes and misdemeanors--the power was conferred and may be exercised as fully now as then. We have seen that according to the law of Parliament misdemeanor and misbehavior of public officers are synonymous terms. Another proposition advanced by counsel for respondent is that no judge was ever impeached in England for a misbehavior not committed in the discharge of his judicial functions. This is believed to be an error; judges were impeached for giving extrajudicial opinions. But suppose the fact to be as stated, the conclusion would not follow that because no English judge ever so misbehaved himself outside of his official duties as to make him a subject of impeachment that therefore he could not have been impeached if he had so misbehaved. But however interesting discussion of such question may be it is quite unimportant in this case. All the charges against this respondent grow out of his official acts. Nothing that he did of which complaint is made could have been done by a private person, or by anyone who did not hold a judicial office. Because the respondent was a judge he had the right to make a certificate upon which to draw money from the Treasury; because he was a judge a private car was sent to bring him from Guyencourt to hold court at Jacksonville; because he was a judge the law imposed upon him the duty of living in a certain district; because he violated the law in all these cases in his official capacity he is charged. The conclusion is therefore not to be resisted that even if the contention of the respondent's counsel is correct a judge can be impeached for nothing but official misconduct, these offenses are within the rule, and of them this court has jurisdiction. 2016. Argument of Mr. Manager Clayton that a judge may be impeached for misbehavior not necessarily connected with his judicial functions.--On February 24, 1905,\1\ in the Senate sitting for the impeachment trial of Judge Charles Swayne. Mr. Manager Henry D. Clayton, of Alabama, said in final argument: Mr. President, I desire to call attention to the fact that repeatedly in impeachment trials before the Senate it has been asserted that civil officers can not be impeached except for the commission of indictable offenses, but it was never before this time seriously contended that a judge can not be impeached except for wrongful conduct committed strictly in the performance of an act purely judicial. Therefore in this case we are brought to a consideration of what is an impeachable offense. The Constitution denounces impeachable offenses under the terms of ``treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' ``Other high crimes and misdemeanors'' are general terms, and for their import and meaning reference may be had to English jurisprudence and parliamentary law, to the provisions of the constitutions of the several States relating to impeachments in existence prior to and at the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution, and to the interpretation put upon the words in the debates in and by the action of the United States Senate in impeachment cases which have heretofore been tried. In the present case the House of Representatives has charged this judge with crimes and misdemeanors, and also contends that he has forfeited his tenure of office because he has not conformed to the good behavior required by Article III, section 3. upon which his right to hold office is predicated. The judge is entitled to hold his office during good behavior, but not otherwise. The provision of the Constitution conversely stated would be that he shall not hold office after having been guilty of mis- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Third session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, pp. 3249-3250. Sec. 2016 behavior. If I understand the contention of the counsel for the respondent here, they insist that high crimes and crimes and misdemeanors and the words ``the judges both of the Supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices during good behavior'' are limited or restricted to such acts as may be committed by a judge in his purely judicial capacity. In other words, however serious the crime, the misdemeanor, or misbehavior of tie judge may be, if it can be said to be extrajudicial he can not be impeached. To illustrate this contention, the judge may have committed murder or burglary and be confined under a sentence in a penitentiary for any period of time, however long, but because he has not committed the murder or burglary in his capacity as judge he can not be impeached. That contention, carried out logically, might lead to the very defeat of the performance of the function confided to the judicial branch of the Government. In the History of the Constitution of the United States. by George Ticknor Curtis, in volume 2, page 260, is found this language: ``The purposes of an impeachment lie wholly beyond the penalties of the statute or the customary law. The object of the proceeding is to ascertain whether cause exists for removing a public officer from office. Such a cause may be found in the fact that, either in the discharge of his office or aside from its functions, he has violated a law or committed what is technically denominated a crime. But a cause for removal from office may exist when no offense against positive law has been committed, as when the individual has from immorality or imbecility or maladministration become Unfit to exercise the office.'' In the Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, by Roger Foster, volume 1, page 569, this statement is made: ``The object of the grant of the power of impeachment was to free the Commonwealth from the danger caused by the retention of an unworthy public servant.'' Again, on page 586, this statement: ``The Constitution provides that `the judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their office during good behavior.' ``This necessarily implies that they may be removed in case of bad behavior. But no means, except impeachment, is provided for their removal, and judicial misconduct is not indictable by either a statute of the United States or the common law.'' Again, on page 591, this statement: ``An impeachable offense may consist of treason, bribery, or a breach of official duty by malfeasance or misfeasance, including conduct such as * * * an abuse or reckless exercise of a discretionary power. In Rawle on The Constitution, page 201, in speaking of the court of impeachment, it is said: ``The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust.'' In Story on The Constitution (5th edition), section 796, it is said: ``Is the silence of the statute book to be deemed conclusive in favor of the party until Congress have made a legislative declaration and enumeration of the offenses which shall be deemed high crimes and misdemeanors? If so, then, as has been truly remarked (citing Rawle on The Constitution), the power of impeachment, except as to the two expressed cases, is a complete nullity and the party is wholly dispunishable, however enormous may be his corruption or criminality. It will not be sufficient to say that, in the cases where any offense is punished by any statute of the United States, it may and ought to be deemed an impeachable offense. It is not every offense that by the Constitution is so impeachable. It must not only be an offense, but a high crime and misdemeanor.'' The further answer to this contention may be that it is repugnant to the Constitution, which especially provides for the impeachment of a civil officer for high crimes and misdemeanors, and especially provides that the judge shall hold his office during good behavior. Again, it is repugnant to the spirit and genius of our institutions; and, if it were correct, it would be to throw around the judge, as a civil officer, a protection not afforded any other officer under the Government. It is also repugnant to the precedents in impeachment trials before the Senate, to the precedents in impeachment trials in the different States that had similar provisions in their constitutions and had had impeachment trials before the adoption of the Federal Constitution. Any civil officer can be impeached. The President of the United States can be impeached. The removal from office can be had in respect to any officer under the Government, and it would be Sec. 2016 anomaly to say that in a free representative government the people are deprived of the power and the right to remove from office an unworthy officer. If it be true that a judge can not be impeached except for what he may have done strictly in his capacity as judge, then this extraordinary protection is afforded to him: He is put upon a pedestal by himself; he is raised above the military, because they can be tried and gotten rid of; he is raised above the Executive, for he can be tried by impeachment and removed from office; he is raised above the members of the Senate and the Members of the House of Representatives, for they may be expelled upon a two-thirds vote of the members of their respective bodies. I say it would be anomaly. So far as the power of getting rid of an unworthy official is concerned, if that contention be correct it would be a hiatus in the power of government. Did the fathers intend that it should ever come to pass that an unworthy officer, although a judge, guilty of murder or burglary or any other disgraceful crime which brings his high position into disrepute, can wrap a mantle of protection around him and say, ``Although I am guilty of an infamous crime, I did not commit it in my judicial capacity, and therefore, convicted felon though I am, I can continue to be judge and to draw the emoluments of that high office?'' I do not believe that this contention has ever been made in any of the cases heretofore presented to the Senate. In Judge Pickering's case it will be remembered that he was accused of drunkenness. He was also accused of releasing a ship which had been libeled without requiring bond. It might be argued that he did not get drunk in his official capacity; and yet the Senate in that case did impeach him and remove him from office, and that was one of the charges. In the case of Judge Humphreys, the other judge who was convicted and removed from office, the charge was that he had made secession speeches and that he had acted as a judge of a Confederate court. Certainly he did not make secession speeches in his capacity as a judge of the United States court; it was not done in the trial of any cause before him. He did that in his individual capacity, and yet the Senate did vote to convict him, and did remove him from office, because, among other things, he had made these speeches and had held and exercised the office of a Confederate judge during the civil war. I have here Foster on the Constitution. I will not tax the patience of the Senate by reading it; but, availing myself of the privilege heretofore referred to, I shall ask to have inserted in the Record that portion of the text which I have marked. The extract referred to is as follows: ``The only difficulty arises in the construction of the term, `other high crimes and misdemeanors.' As to this, four theories have been proposed: That, except treason or bribery, no offense is impeachable which is not declared by a statute of the United States to be a crime subject to indictment. That no offense is impeachable which is not subject to indictment by such a statute or by the common law. That all offenses are impeachable which were so by that branch of the common law known as the `law of Parliament.' And that the House and Senate have the discretionary power to remove and stigmatize by perpetual disqualification an officer subject to impeachment for any cause that to them seems fit. The position that, except treason or bribery, no offense is impeachable which is not indictable by law was maintained by the counsel for the respondents on the trials of Chase and Johnson. * * * ``The first two theories are impracticable in their operation, inconsistent with other language of the Constitution, and overruled by precedents. If no crime, save treason and bribery, not forbidden by a statute of the United States, will support an impeachment, then almost every kind of official corruption or oppression must go unpunished. Suppose the Chief Justice of the United States were convicted in a State court of a felony or misdemeanor, must he remain in office unimpeached and hold court in a State prison? ``The term `high crimes and misdemeanors' has no significance in the common law concerning crimes subject to indictment. It can be found only in the law of Parliament, and is the technical term which was used by the Commons at the bar of the Lords for centuries before the existence of the United States. ``The Constitution provides that-- `` `The judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior.' ``This necessarily implies that they may be removed in case of bad behavior. But no means except impeachment is provided for their removal, and judicial misconduct is not indictable by either a statute of the United States or the common law. ``In 1803 Pickering, a district judge of the United States, was convicted on impeachment for his Sec. 2017 official action in surrendering to the claimant, without requiring the statutory bond, a vessel libeled by the United States, for refusing to allow an appeal from this order, and for drunkenness and profane language on the bench. ``None of these offenses was indictable by the common law or by statute. ``Humphreys, a district judge of the United States, was convicted on impeachment, not only for treason, but also for refusing to hold court, for holding office under the Confederate States, and for imprisoning citizens for expressing their sympathy with the Union. The managers of the House of Representatives who opened the case admitted that none of these offenses except the treason was indictable. ``Some advocates have gone so far as to maintain by a misapplication of a term of the common law that the proceedings on an impeachment are not a trial, but a so-called `inquest of office,' and that the House and Senate may thus remove an officer for any reason that they approve. That Congress has the power to do so may be admitted. For it is not likely that any court would hold void collaterally a judgment on an impeachment where the Senate had jurisdiction over the person of the condemned. And undoubtedly a court of impeachment has the jurisdiction to determine what constitutes an impeachable offense. But the judgments of the Senate of the United States in the cases of Chase and Peck, as well as those of the State senates in the different cases which have been before them, have established the rule that no officer should be impeached for any act that does not have at least the characteristics of a crime. And public opinion must be irremediably debauched by party spirit before it will sanction any other course. ``Impeachable offenses are those which were the subject of impeachment by the practice in Parliament before the Declaration of Independence, except in so far as that practice is repugnant to the language of the Constitution and the spirit of American institutions. An examination of the English precedents will show that, although private citizens as well as public officers have been impeached, no article has been presented or sustained which did not charge either misconduct in office or some offense which was injurious to the welfare of the State at large. ``In this class of cases, which rests so much in the discretion of the Senate, the writer would be rash who were to attempt to prescribe the limits of its jurisdiction in this respect. ``An impeachable offense may consist of treason, bribery, or a breach of official duty by malfeasance, or misfeasance, including conduct such as drunkenness, when habitual or in the performance of official duties, gross indecency, and profanity, obscenity, or other language used in the discharge of an official function which tends to bring the office into disrepute, or an abuse or reckless exercise of a discretionary power, as well as a breach or omission of an official duty imposed by statute or common law; or a public speech when off duty which encourages insurrection. It does not consist in an error in judgment made in good faith in the decision of a doubtful question of law, except, perhaps, in the violation of the Constitution.'' 2017. Review of impeachments in Congress to show that judges have been impeached only for acts of judgment performed on the bench, as contradistinguished from personal acts performed while in office.--On February 22, 1905,\1\ in the Senate sitting for the impeachment trial of Judge Charles Swayne, Messrs. Anthony Higgins and John M. Thurston, of counsel for the respondent, offered a brief in support of their plea of jurisdiction as to the first seven articles. This brief, which was signed by them as counsel, but which, as they said, had been prepared by another, covered many questions relating to impeachments, the following being among them: Seven impeachment trials have taken place under the machinery provided for that purpose by the Constitution of the United States: That of William Blount (1798), that of John Pickering (1803), that of Samuel Chase (1804), that of James H. Peck (1830), that of West H. Humphreys (1862), that of Andrew Johnson (1868), and that of William W. Belknap (1876). Three of the foregoing were political impeachments and four judicial, as those terms are understood in English parliamentary law. The articles presented by the House of Representatives against the four judges--Pickering, Chase, Peck, and Humphreys--illustrate in the most emphatic manner possible that the popular branch of Congress has ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Third session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, pp. 3032, 3033. Sec. 2017 heretofore always perfectly understood the meaning of the term ``high crimes and misdemeanors,'' as applied to the misconduct for which a judge may be impeached. When placed side by side with the English precedents on that subject heretofore examined they agree in every particular. The House of Representatives, in the only four cases of the kind ever tried, limited its accusations, with the greatest strictness, to the acts of judgment performed by the judge on the bench, as contradistinguished from personal acts performed by the judge while in office, which might have been the ground of removal by address. Turning first to the case against John Pickering, judge of the district court of New Hampshire, for practical illustrations, we find that judge charged with misconduct while adjudicating a certain admiralty case pending in said district court: ``Yet the said John Pickering, being then judge of the said district court, and then in court sitting, with intent to defeat the just claims of the United States, did refuse to hear the testimony of the said witnesses so as aforesaid produced in behalf of the United States, and without hearing the said testimony so adduced in behalf of the United States in the trial of said cause did order and decree the ship Eliza, with her furniture, tackle, and apparel, to be restored to the said Eliphalett Ladd, the claimant, contrary to his trust and duty as judge of the said district court, in violation of the laws of the United States and to the manifest injury of their revenue.'' (Art. II.) Again (Art. III), when an appeal was prayed in open court in behalf of the United States, the charge is that ``the said John Pickering, judge of the said district court, disregarding the authority of the laws, and wickedly meaning and intending to injure the revenues of the United States, and thereby to impair their public credit, did absolutely and positively refuse to allow the said appeal as prayed for.'' And again (Art. IV), after the statement was made that said Pickering was ``a man of loose morals and intemperate habits,'' he was thus accused: ``On the eleventh and twelfth days of November, in the year one thousand eight hundred and two, being then judge of the district court in and for the district of New Hampshire, did appear upon the bench of said court, for the purpose of administering justice, in a state of total intoxication, produced by the free and intemperate use of inebriating liquors, and did then and there frequently, in a most profane and indecent manner, invoke the name of the Supreme Being, to the evil example of all good citizens of the United States, and was then and there guilty of other high misdemeanors, disgraceful to his own character as a judge and degrading to the honor and dignity of the United States.'' It should be specially noted here that no pretense was made that ``loose morals and intemperate habits'' or profanity constituted a high crime and misdemeanor. Upon the contrary, the accusation was strictly limited to acts done ``upon the bench of the said court'' while ``administering justice in a state of total intoxication.'' There was no attempt in Pickering's case to claim that personal misconduct, which might have been the ground of removal by address, was an impeachable offense. The articles of impeachment presented against Judge Samuel Chase contain equally pointed illustrations. In Article I he is charged with delivering an opinion in writing on the question of law, on the construction of which the defense of the accused materially depended, tending to prejudice the minds of the jury against the said John Fries, the prisoner, before the counsel had been heard in his defense; in Article II the charge is that'' the said Samuel Chase, with intent to oppress and procure the conviction of the said Callender, did overrule the objection of John Bassett, one of the jury, who wished to be excused from serving on said trial;'' in Article III the charge is that on the trial the judge refused to permit a witness to testify; in Article IV the charge is of various acts of judicial misconduct during a trial; and in the remaining articles the charges are of various acts of judicial misconduct on the bench in charging and refusing to discharge grand juries. The accusation against Judge James H. Peck was contained in a single article, based upon the judicial conduct of the judge while sitting upon the bench in a case of contempt against Luke E. Lawless, who had published a newspaper article criticizing a judgment rendered by Judge Peck in a case in which Lawless was plaintiff's counsel. The gravamen of the charge was this: ``The said James H. Peck, judge as aforesaid, did afterwards, on the same day, under the color and pretenses aforesaid, and with intent aforesaid, in the said court, then and there unjustly, oppressively, and arbitrarily order and adjudge that the said Luke Edward Lawless, for the cause aforesaid, should be committed to prison for the period of twenty-four hours, and that he should be suspended from practicing as an attorney or councellor at law in the said district court for the period of eighteen calendar months from that day; and did then and there further cause the said unjust and oppressive sentence to be carried into execution.'' The impeachment of Judge West E. Humphreys was begun and concluded during the civil war. He was tried and condemned in his absence and without a hearing. While such an anomalous proceed- Sec. 2018 ing can have but little weight as a precedent, what it does contain of matter relevant to a judicial impeachment supports the contention made herein. The first charge contained in the articles presented against Judge Humphreys was that he was guilty of treason, in that he ``then being district judge of the United States, as aforesaid, did then and there, to wit, within said State, unlawfully and in conjunction with other persons, organize armed rebellion against the United States and levy war against them.'' When the allegations incident to the accusation of treason are subtracted from the articles, all that remains is a charge of judicial misconduct upon the part of Judge Humphreys while sitting in a court of the Confederate States. The words of the accusation axe that the said Humphreys ``did unlawfully act as judge of an illegally constituted tribunal within said State, called the district court of the Confederate States of America, and as judge of said tribunal last named, said West H. Humphreys, with the intent aforesaid, then and there assumed and exercised powers unlawful and unjust to wit, in causing one Perez Dickinson, a citizen of said State, to be unlawfully arrested and brought before him, as judge of said alleged court of said Confederate States of America, and required him to swear allegiance to the pretended government of said Confederate States of America; * * * In decreeing within said State, and as judge of said illegal tribunal, the confiscation to the use of said Confederate States of America of property of citizens of the United States, and especially of property of one Andrew Johnson and one John Catron.'' Thus in this anomalous proceeding, carried on amid the passions of a great civil war, the idea was not for one moment lost sight of that the misconduct upon the part of a judge, which constitutes an impeachable high crime and misdemeanor, must occur while he is actually presiding in a judicial tribunal and abusing its powers. 2018. Review of the deliberation of the Constitutional Convention as bearing on the use of the words ``high crimes and misdemeanors.''--On February 22, 1905,\1\ in the Senate sitting for the impeachment trial of Judge Charles Swayne, Messrs. Anthony Higgins and John M. Thurston, of counsel for the respondent, offered a brief in support of their plea of jurisdiction as to the first seven articles. This brief which was signed by them as counsel but which as they said had been prepared by another, covered many questions relating to impeachments, the following being among them. After reviewing the accepted meaning of tile words ``high crimes and misdemeanors,'' as used in England and the colonies, the argument proceeds: Before the Federal Convention of 1787 met the original State constitutions had been in operation for at least ten years. As a general rule the framers looked to that source of light when the adoption of a principle of English constitutional law was concerned. The questions that constantly arose were: In what form has such a principle reappeared in the several States? Is its operation an effect satisfactory therein? Such examples were sometimes taken, however, not as guides but as warnings. It did not always follow that a principle adapted to the wants of a single State was to be ingrafted without modification upon the constitution of a Federal State. The debates touching the adoption of impeachment and address pointedly illustrate that fact, as the Convention resolved to adopt the one without the other. The record is specially clear and direct upon that point. In the Madison papers (pp. 481-482) the following appears: ``Article XI being taken up, Doctor Johnson suggested that the judicial power ought to extend to equity as well as law, and moved to insert the words `both in law and equity' after the words `United States' in the first line of the first section.'' Mr. Read objected to vesting these powers in the same court. On the question, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye--6; Delaware, Maryland, no--2; Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, absent. On the question to agree to Article XI, section 1, as amended, the States were the same as on the preceding question. Mr. Dickinson moved, as an amendment to Article XI, section 2, after the words ``good behavior,'' the words ``Provided that they may be removed by the Executive on the application by the Senate and ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Third session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, pp. 3031, 3032. Sec. 2018 House of Representatives.'' (The words of the act of settlement are, ``but upon the address of both Houses of Parliament it maybe lawful to remove them.'') Mr. Gerry seconded the motion. Mr. Gouverneur Morris thought it a contradiction, in terms, to say that the judges should hold their offices during good behavior, and yet be removable without a trial. Besides, it was fundamently wrong to subject judges to so arbitrary an authority. Mr. Sherman saw no contradiction or impropriety if this were made a part of the constitutional legislation of the judiciary establishment. He observed that a like provision was contained in the British statutes. Mr. Rutledge. If the Supreme Court is to judge between the United States and particular States, this alone is an insuperable objection to the motion. Mr. Wilson considers such a provision in the British Government as less dangerous than here; the House of Lords and House of Commons being less likely to concur on the same occasions. Chief Justice Holt, he remarked, had successively offended, by his independent conduct, both Houses of Parliament. Had this happened at the same time, he would have been ousted. The judges would be in a bad situation if made to depend on any gust of faction which might prevail in the two branches of our Government. Mr. Randolph opposed the motion as weakening too much the independence of the judges. Mr. Dickinson was not apprehensive that the legislature, composed of different branches, constructed on such different principles, would improperly unite for the purpose of displacing a judge. On the question for agreeing to Mr. Dickinson's motion, it was negatived. Connecticut, aye; all the other States present, no. Thus the proposition to ingraft upon our Federal Constitution that provision of the act of settlement, specially referred to in the debate by Mr. Sherman, was rejected with only one dissenting voice. When, at another time, Mr. Dickinson attempted to provide that the President should be removed by address, his proposal was rejected by the same majority. As Mr. William Lawrence (Impeachment of Andrew Johnson, Vol. I, p. 135) has stated it: ``Removal on the address of both Houses of Parliament is provided for in the act of settlement (3 Hallam, 262). In the convention which framed our Constitution, June 2, 1787, Mr. John Dickinson, of Delaware, moved `that the Executive be made removable by the National Legislature on the request of a majority of the legislatures of individual States.' Delaware alone voted for this and it was rejected. Impeachment was deemed sufficiently comprehensive to cover every proper case for removal.'' The last sentence states the essence of the whole matter. The Convention resolved that neither the executive nor judicial officers of the United States should be removed from office except ``on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' As a well-known authority has expressed it: ``The first proposition was to use the words, `to be removable on impeachment and conviction of malpractice and neglect of duty.' It was agreed that these expressions were too general. They were therefore stricken out. It was voted that the clause should be simply `removable on impeachment.' The debate shows that the Members did not wish the Senate to be able to remove a civil officer whenever he acted in a way detrimental to the public service, for such a power was expressly refused. (Citing Madison Papers, p. 481, heretofore quoted.) A general debate took place on a clause in one draft which made the President triable only for treason and bribery. It was urged that the jurisdiction was too limited. The following are extracts from the debate which ensued: Colonel Mason said: `Treason, as defined in the Constitution, will not reach many great and dangerous offenses. Hastings is not guilty of treason. Attempts to subvert the Constitution may not be treason as above defined.' He moved to insert after `bribery' the words `or maladministration.' Madison: `So vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during the pleasure of the Senate.' Mason withdrew `maladministration' and substituted `other high crimes and misdemeanors against the State.' In the final draft the words `against the State' were omitted, doubtless as surplusage, and the expressions finally adopted, `crimes' and `misdemeanors,' were words which had a well- defined signification in the courts of England and in her colonies as meaning criminal offenses at common (parliamentary) law.'' (American Law Review, vol. 16, p. 804, article on ``Impeachable offenses under the Constitution of the United States.'') The term ``common'' instead of ``parliamentary'' law is carelessly used in that excellent statement, as it often is elsewhere. After quoting Rawle on Constitution (200, Lawrence (Johnson's Imp., Vol. I, p. 125) remarks: ``This author says in reference to impeachments, `we must have recourse to the common law of England for the definition of them;' that is, to the common parliamentary law. (3 Wheaton, 610; 1 Wood and Minot, 448.)'' Sec. 2019 2019. Abandonment of the theory that impeachment may be only for indictable offenses. Discussion of the theory that an impeachable offense is one in its nature or consequence subversive of some fundamental or essential principle of government or highly prejudicial to the public interest. On February 22, 1905,\1\ in the Senate sitting for the impeachment trial of Judge Charles Swayne, Messrs. Anthony Higgins and John M. Thurston, of counsel for the respondent, offered a brief in support to their plea of jurisdiction as to the first seven of the articles. This brief, which was signed by them as counsel, but which, as they said, had been prepared by another, covered many questions relating to impeachments, the following being among them: When sitting as a high court of impeachment the Senate is the sole and final judge of the meaning of the phrase ``high crimes and misdemeanors.'' It has been well said that `` `Treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors' are of course impeachable. Treason and bribery are specifically named. But `other high crimes and misdemeanors' are just as fully comprehended as though each was specified. The Senate is made the sole judge of what they are. There is no revising court. The Senate determines in the light of parliamentary law. Congress can not define or limit by law that which the Constitution defines in two cases by enumeration and in others by classification, and of which the Senate is sole judge.'' (Lawrence, Johnson's Imp., Vol. I, p. 136.) And yet the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment has in no one of the seven cases tried before it ever attempted to define the momentous phrase in question, and probably never will. When a new case arises nothing can be learned except what may be gleaned from the individual utterances of Senators, and from the arguments of counsel made in preceding cases, too often under the temptation to bend the precedents to the necessities of the particular occasion. One good result has, however, been the outcome of such discussions, and that is the elimination of two propositions which have perished through their own inherent weakness. On the one hand, a grotesque attempt has been made to narrow unreasonably the jurisdiction of the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment by the claim that the power of impeachment is limited to offenses positively defined by the statutes of the United States as impeachable crimes and misdemeanors. Apart from its other infirmities, this contention loses sight of the fact that Congress has no power whatever to define a high crime and misdemeanor. On the other hand, an equally untenable attempt has been made to widen unreasonably the jurisdiction of the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment by the claim that, under the general principles of right, it can declare that an impeachable high crime or misdemeanor is one in its nature or consequence subversive of some fundamental or essential principle of government or highly prejudicial to the public interest, and this may consist of a violation of the Constitution, of law, of an official oath, or of duty, by an act committed or omitted, or, without violating a positive law, by the abuse of discretionary powers for improper motives or for an improper purpose. This expansive and nebulous definition embodies an attempt to clothe the Senate sitting as a court with such a jurisdiction as it would have possessed had the Federal Convention seen fit to extend impeachment ``to malpractice and neglect of duty,'' or to ``maladministration,'' a proposition rejected with a single dissent because, as Madison expressed it, ``So vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during the pleasure of the Senate.'' Even that school which gives the widest possible interpretation to the Federal Constitution will hardly be willing to go so far, even under the general-welfare clause, as to write into the Constitution phrases and meanings which the framers expressly rejected, in order to accomplish what may be considered by some a convenient end. Certainly that school which still respects the canons of strict construction can not listen to such an argument. Between the two extremes, those who have made a careful study of the subject find no difficulty in reaching the obvious conclusion that the term ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' embraces simply those offenses impeachable under the parliamentary law of England in 1787, subject to such modifications as that law suffered in the process of reproduction. When the objection is made that the phrase thus construed covers too narrow an area, the answer is ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Third session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, pp. 3034, 3035. Sec. 2020 that it was the expressly declared purpose of the framers so to restrict it within narrow limits perfectly understood at the time. In the first place, the proposition to adopt removal by address was rejected with only one dissent; in the second, the proposal to adopt such a comprehensive term as ``maladministration. was rejected and the limited phrase in question substituted. The declaration was clearly made at the time that there must be no undue weakening of the independence of the Federal judiciary. The necessity for such a precaution was soon justified by events. A leading authority upon the subject tells us that upon the destruction of the Federalist party on the election of Jefferson ``An assault upon the judiciary, State and Federal, was made all along the lines. In some States, as New Hampshire, old courts were abolished and new ones, with similar jurisdiction, created for the sole purpose of obtaining new judges. In Pennsylvania an obnoxious Federal judge was removed from the common pleas by impeachment; and an impeachment of all the Federal judges of the highest court was made, but failed through the uprising of the entire bar, irrespective of party lines, in defense of their official chiefs. A similar attack was made upon the Federal judiciary.'' (Foster on the Constitution, Vol. I, p. 531.) With the possibility of such an assault impending it is not strange that the makers of our Federal Constitution should have confined the power of removing judges by impeachment within the well-known limits which the English constitution had defined. 2020. Mr. Manager Olmsted's argument that impeachment is not restricted to offenses indictable under Federal law and that judges may be impeached for breaches of ``good behavior.'' Discussion of English and American precedents as bearing on the meaning of the phrase ``high crimes and misdemeanors.'' On February 23, 1905,\1\ in the Senate sitting for the impeachment trial of Judge Charles Swayne, Mr. Manager Marlin E. Olmsted, of Pennsylvania, in final argument, said: Although it would seem that the question must now be considered settled, nevertheless in nearly every impeachment trial the question is raised as to the character of and offenses for which impeachment will lie. In times past men of great learning and authority have contended that no officer can be impeached except for indictable offenses, and that as there are no common-law offenses against the United States, it follows that there can be no impeachment except for an offense expressly declared and made indictable by act of Congress. This view of the matter fades away in the bright light of reason and of precedent. Such a construction would render the constitutional provision practically a nullity. Congress has defined and made indictable by statute comparatively few offenses. It would be impossible in any statute to define or describe all the various ways in which a judge or other civil officer might so notably and conspicuously misbehave himself as to justify and require his removal. Even murder is not defined in any act of Congress. When it so appears, reference to some other source must be had to ascertain the meaning of the term. Murder is not made indictable by any act of Congress, nor has any Federal court jurisdiction of that crime unless committed upon the high seas. Suppose a judge to commit murder upon the dry land within the confines of a State. That would not be a high crime or misdemeanor within the provision of any act of Congress. Could it successfully be maintained that it was not a high crime and misdemeanor within the meaning of Article II, section 4, of the Constitution, or that it was not such a breach of good behavior as would justify removal from office? If that be the proper construction, then it is possible to imagine that as the respondent transacted official business at and dated his communications from ``United States district court, northern district of Florida, judge's chambers, Guyencourt, Del.,'' so a more violent and vicious man might conduct business at ``Judge's chambers, State penitentiary,'' and still be free from all danger of impeachment or removal from the judicial office. I have shown, Mr. President, that men have formerly argued that only indictable offenses are subjects for impeachment; that as there were no common-law offenses against the United States there can be no impeachment except for crimes declared and defined by act of Congress. But now, in the 48-page brief served upon us last evening, bearing the names of the honorable counsel for respondent, ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Third session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, pp. 3182-3194. Sec. 2020 but the authorship of which they distinctly disavowed--and I now know the reason why--we find the astounding doctrine that no man can be impeached for any offense declared by Congress. Therefore no officer can be impeached, no matter what he does, unless we can find that in England some judge had been impeached for the same specific offense prior to the adoption of our Constitution, which borrowed something from the mother country in this matter. Now, we admit, Mr. President, that the term ``impeachment'' is imported from the English law, and so is the constitutional phrase ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' used in relation thereto. They are both without definition, either in the Constitution or in any act of Congress. Where, then, shall their definition and construction be found? Our Supreme Court has declared that-- ``Where English statutes--such, for instance, as the statute of frauds and the statute of limitations--have been adopted into our legislation, the known and settled construction of those statutes by courts of law has been considered as silently incorporated into the acts or has been received with all the weight of authority.'' (Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Peters, 2-18.) That was an unanimous decision in which Chief Justice John Marshall participated and concurred, and the opinion was written by Mr. Justice Story. To the same effect is the case of United States v. Jones (3 Wash. C. C. R., 209), and many other authorities that might be cited. We may therefore look to the law of England for the meaning of the term ``impeachment'' and of the phrase ``high crimes and misdemeanors,'' as used in connection therewith--not so much to the statute law, nor to the common law, as generally understood, but to the common parliamentary law of England, as found in the precedents and reports of impeachment cases. The Senate has always been governed in impeachment cases by the lex et consuetudo parliamenti. It requires but a brief investigation to show that according to the English parliamentary practice in vogue at and prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the greatest possible variety of offenses, not indictable, were nevertheless held proper causes for impeachment. In II Wooddeson's Law Lectures, an acknowledged authority, the learned author, in his lecture upon ``Parliamentary Impeachment,'' says (p. 596): ``It is certain that magistrates and officers intrusted with the administration of public affairs may abuse their delegated powers to the extensive detriment of the community and at the same time in a manner not properly cognizable before the ordinary tribunals. The influence of such delinquents and the nature of such offenses may not unsuitably engage the authority of the highest court and the wisdom of the sagest assembly. The Commons, therefore, as the grand inquest of the nation, become suitors for penal justice, and they can not consistently, either with their own dignity or with safety to the accused, sue elsewhere but to those who share with them in the legislature. ``On this policy is founded the origin of impeachments, which began soon after the constitution assumed its present form.'' And again (p. 601): ``Such kind of misdeeds, however, as peculiarly injure the commonwealth by the abuse of high offices of trust, are most proper, and have been the most usual grounds for this kind of prosecution. Thus, if a lord chancellor be guilty of bribery, or of acting grossly contrary to the duty of his office; if the judges mislead their sovereign by unconstitutional opinions; if any other magistrate attempt to subvert the fundamental laws or introduce arbitrary power, these have been deemed cases adapted to parliamentary inquiry and decision. So where a lord chancellor has been thought to have put the seal to an ignominous treaty, a lord admiral to neglect the safeguard of the sea, an ambassador to betray his trust, a privy counselor to propound or support pernicious and dishonorable measures, or a confidential adviser of his sovereign to obtain exorbitant grants or incompatible employments, these imputations have properly occasioned impeachments, because it is apparent how little the ordinary tribunals are calculated to take cognizance of such offenses or to investigate and reform the general polity of the state.'' In several cases English judges were impeached for giving extrajudicial opinions and misinterpreting the law. (4 Hatsell, 76.) Such is the undoubted parliamentary law of England, from which our process and practice of impeachment and the very term itself are derived. That it has been adopted and followed here is equally certain. Judge Curtis, in his History of the Constitution (pp. 260-261), says: ``The purposes of an impeachment lie wholly beyond the penalties of the statute or the customary law. The object of the proceeding is to ascertain whether cause exists for removing a public officer from Sec. 2020 office. * * * Such a cause may be found in the fact that either in the discharge of his office or aside from its functions he has violated a law or committed what is technically denominated a crime, but a cause for removal from office may exist where no offense against positive law is committed, as where the individual has from immorality, imbecility, or maladministration become unfit to exercise the office.'' And Judge Story says, in section 799 of his work on the Constitution: ``Congress has unhesitatingly adopted the conclusion that no previous statute is necessary to authorize an impeachment for any official misconduct. * * * In the few cases of impeachment which have hitherto been tried no one of the charges has rested upon any statutable misdemeanor.'' (1 Story on Con., sec. 799.) Such writers as Cooley and Wharton and Rawle maintain the same position and support it not only by reason, but by authority and precedent. For a very able discussion of this subject I refer to the brief of Mr. Lawrence, adopted by the managers and published among the proceedings in the impeachment of Andrew Johnson and also in 6 American Law Register, new series, page 641. Every impeachment case ever presented to the United States Senate has been founded upon articles, some or all of which charged offenses not indictable; and Judge West, of Tennessee, as well as Judge Pickering, was convicted and removed for offenses not subject to indictment under either State or Federal laws. We agree with respondent's brief, the authorship of which his counsel disavow, that the general character of offenses impeachable may be studied to advantage by a consideration of the English precedent, but I can never agree that in order to convict an American judge we must first show that some English judge has been convicted of the same specific offense. No English judge has been impeached for murder, or perjury, or forgery, or larceny; and yet they were undoubtedly impeachable offenses in England as they are here to-day. They, or any of them, would certainly constitute a breach of that ``good behavior'' during which Federal judges hold their commissions. Surely an offense which would have been impeachable without a statute is none the less so because Congress has declared it a misdemeanor. Taking money out of the Treasury on a false certificate would have been impeachable in England before our Constitution. It is none the less so here, Statute or no statute. jurisdiction of first seven articles. Respondent denies that the offenses charged in the first seven articles are proper subjects of impeachment on the ground, as we understand it, that they were committed by him in his private and not in his official capacity; or, in other words, that the articles do not charge misbehaviors or misdemeanors in office. We labor under the impression that the respondent is ``in office,'' and that any misdemeanor committed by him, either in his private or official capacity, since he accepted the President's commission was a misdemeanor ``in office.'' He may have been out of his court room and out of his district, but he has never been out of office. The Constitution and his commission each defines his term as ``during good behavior,'' and provides for his removal from office for ``treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors,'' meaning thereby misbehavior, for misbehavior is misdemeanor, and misdemeanor is misbehavior. There is no limitation to offenses actually committed upon the bench, nor to those committed while in the performance of any judicial or official function, or in any way under color of office. The Century Dictionary gives this definition: ``During good behavior: As long as one remains blameless in the discharge of one's duties or the conduct of one's life; as, an office held during good behavior.'' Judge Curtis, in his History of the Constitution (pp. 260-261), says: ``The purposes of an impeachment lie wholly beyond the penalties of the statute or the customary law. The object of the proceeding is to ascertain whether cause exists for removing a public officer from office. * * * Such a cause maybe found in the fact that either in the discharge of his office or aside from its functions he has violated a law or committed what is technically denominated a crime, but a cause for removal from office may exist where no offense against positive law is committed, as where the individual has from immorality, imbecility, or maladministration become unfit to exercise the office.'' Such is manifestly the intention of the Constitution. That instrument says ``during good behavior.'' It does not, as some of the State constitutions do, add the words ``in office.'' It says ``high crimes Sec. 2020 and misdemeanors,'' but it does not add ``in office.'' In the brief of respondent's honorable counsel the authorship of which they disavow, they tell us, and it is entirely true, that at one stage of its formation the provision read ``misdemeanors against the State.'' But as the words ``against the State'' were stricken out they argue that it must be construed as if they had been left in. judge humphrey's case. Mr. President, there are plenty of authorities, both English and American, that in order to be the subject of impeachment it is not necessary that an offense shall be committed even under color of office, and just here I take issue in the most emphatic manner with the statements of that 48-page brief as to the causes for which convictions have been had in impeachment. It is full of historical inaccuracies. It declares, for instance, that Judge West H. Humphreys, of Tennessee, was convicted only for offenses committed in his judicial capacity. I say that he was convicted upon each one of the seven articles, only one of which--the fifth--had any relation at all to his duties as a Federal judge. The very first article charged him with advocating secession. Where? Upon the bench? No. In the court room? No. In a written opinion? No; but in a public speech in the city of Nashville. Five other of those counts were of the same character. How could a judge commit that offense upon the bench? He did not speak as a judge, but as a citizen at a public meeting. Mr. President, Andrew Johnson came within one vote of being impeached upon the eleventh article in his case, a portion of which I will read: ``That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the high duties of his office, and of his oath of office, and in disregard of the Constitution and laws of the United States, did, heretofore, to wit, on the 18th day of August, A. D. 1866, at the city of Washington and the District of Columbia, by public speech, declare and affirm, in substance, that the Thirty-ninth Congress of the United States was not a Congress of the United States.'' Upon that article the vote against him was 35 to 19. A change of one vote would have expelled him from the Presidency. Treason, removal for which is made compulsory, is specifically defined by the Constitution in these words: ``Treason against the United States shall consist only of levying war against them or adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort.'' It would hardly be possible for a judge, sitting upon the bench, or in any other way except entirely aside from any function of his office, to be guilty of this offense. But suppose that, disassociating himself as far as possible from his judicial position, he should in his individual capacity participate in ``levying war against them or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort.'' That would surely be treason, as constitutionally defined, and yet, upon the argument of the honorable counsel for respondent, he could not be impeached and removed from office for that offense. Think of that. A traitor to his country, sitting securely upon the bench, secure from removal by any power on earth, for in no way can he be removed except by the Senate, upon impeachment by the House of Representatives. A Federal judge, upon that reasoning, might commit murder upon the public highway, or be convicted of housebreaking, or forgery, or perjury, or in any other way bring into contempt his high office, and yet we are told that if the offense be not committed upon the bench, nor in the court room, nor in any way relating to his judicial duties, he can not be impeached and removed. It is hardly necessary to prolong this branch of the discussion, in view of the fact that the question has already been determined by the Senate itself. blount's case. In 1797 William Blount was expelled from the Senate for attempting to seduce a United States Indian interpreter from his duty and to alienate the affections and conduct of the Indians from the public officers residing among them. That was not a statutory offense, nor committed in the Senate Chamber, nor in the exercise or omission of any Senatorial function, nor under color of office; but the Senate, nevertheless, resolved that he ``having been guilty of a high misdemeanor entirely inconsistent with his public trust and duty as a Senator, be, and he is hereby, expelled from the United States Senate.'' That was not upon an impeachment proceeding, but the principle involved was precisely the same, and later it was sustained in the impeachment case of Judge Humphreys, as I have shown. Sec. 2021 THE ARTICLES DO CHARGE OFFENSES HAVING STRICT RELATION TO HIS OFFICIAL OFFICE. It is difficult in any event to see any force in respondent's plea to the jurisdiction. The offenses charged in the first seven as well as in all the other articles do relate entirely to his judicial office and not to his private conduct. 2021. Argument of Mr. Manager De Armond that Congress may make nonresidence of a judge a high misdemeanor. Argument that a judge may be impeached for misbehavior generally. On February 25, 1905,\1\ in the Senate, sitting for the impeachment trial of Judge Charles Swayne, Mr. Manager David A. De Armond, of Missouri, in final argument, said: Thirty years before Judge Swayne was born the Congress of the United States enacted a law, now embodied in section 551, Revised Statutes, requiring a district judge to reside in his district. The question of the enactment of such a law arose years earlier. The discussion was participated in by makers of the Constitution as well as by contemporaries of those illustrious men. In the body which passed the law were those who had gathered in the spirit of the Constitution, not merely from the lips of those who had made it, but through participation in the making of it. The law was passed in the full belief, unchallenged by anybody, that the power rested in the Congress to pass such a law, and it was declared that a violation or disregard of that law should constitute a high misdemeanor, employing the very language of the Constitution itself. And yet we find, thanks to the facile pen of some modern essayist whose product is embodied in the record in this case, some unknown great man, that it is impossible for Congress to add to or take from the category of ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' as embodied in the Constitution in the clause relating to impeachments. Those who lived in that early day, those who participated in the discussions that led up to that early legislation, and those who enacted that law did not think just as this modern writer and essayist does think. This graceful writer, but, as he has demonstrated, evidently poor lawyer, confesses that be can not define, and he says nobody can define, just what was meant by ``high crimes and misdemeanors;'' but he insists that there was such a fixed, settled, immovable, unchangeable, ever-enduring meaning and limitation attached to and embodied in it that nothing can be added to it or taken from it; and yet he does not know what it is; he does not tell us, and he says nobody else can tell, what it is. The doctrine, aside from this authority which the respondent's counsel quoted with so much approval and indorsed so fully, the doctrine of other essayists and other commentators upon the Constitution, the doctrine of men whose names have gone into our history as illustrating it in its best phases and as demonstrating the greatest capacity and the highest achievements of the human mind, was and is that Congress could add to what might be embraced in the term, and that the Senate of the United States, on the trial of an impeachment, was made by the Constitution itself, and ever must be, the final authorized judge of the meaning. Suppose that this Republic were to endure, as all of us most sincerely hope it will, for centuries and multiplied centuries, and suppose that a thousand years hence, or five thousand years hence, after agencies and forces undreamed of to-day, as those playing important parts in the drama of to-day were undreamed of a short time ago, were brought into requisition, and out of their use and development new and strange conditions, unthought of and unthinkable to-day, should arise, and that the Congress, in its enlightened wisdom, should conclude to declare this, that, or the other thing arising out of the development of these new conditions high crimes and misdemeanors. These wise commentators of the school of this essayist and their successors, if they are to have succession in a more enlightened age of the world and of the country, would say: ``You can not impeach for that. You must go back into the English parliamentary law for the chart of your powers. At the adoption of the Constitution you were confined within the Englishman's definition of high crimes and misdemeanors, and confined to his catalogue of them; but what his definition was or is and what was or is embraced within his catalogue we do not know, and nobody knows. Those who framed the Constitution meant to deny and did deny to the Congress all power whatsoever to declare anything a high crime or misdemeanor which was not such when the Constitution was made.'' ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Third session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, pp. 3376, 3377. Sec. 2022 Then if you or your successors should modestly say to these gentlemen, ``Pray tell us, then, what are the things for which an impeachment will lie? What is comprehended within the term `high crimes and misdemeanors?' What, within the meaning of the Constitution, made by those short-sighted men, so long, long ago in their graves, is embodied in these words?'' They would answer then, I suppose, as this wise commentator of to-day answers, ``I do not know; nobody ever has said, and nobody will ever be able to say.'' Drifting back to English history, counsel claim to have discovered-- and it is a discovery of something which does not exist, I think; but I pass that by--that no judge in English history ever was impeached or tried on impeachment except for an offense committed in the actual discharge of the duties of a judge, sitting on the bench itself. Well now, if that were true, what does it prove? It proves nothing-- absolutely nothing. Reflect upon it for a moment. Suppose all these trials had been with reference to some particular offense. It would be just as logical to contend that for no other offense committed upon the bench in the discharge of judicial duty would impeachment lie. How many cases must there be before this is settled? They say there have been but few, and that is true. How many are necessary to fix it that there can not be a trial by impeachment for any other offense? There again they can not answer. The truth of the matter is that this question of impeachment and the right and power to impeach, and the things for which people could be impeached in Great Britain, shifted and changed with the shifting and changing judgment and legislation of the times. At one time it was supposed to be legitimate and proper, and the supposed power was exercised, to impeach and convict and remove from office and imprison for the advocacy of religious views and the propagation of religious doctrines which, at another time, were held to be the correct views and the sound doctrines relating to the subject of religion in that great realm. So it has been and so it is and so it will be. These gentlemen ignore entirely the question as to good conduct-- ``during good behavior.'' They say that the provision for removing judges by address is not embodied in the Constitution. What do they say then? They say there is no way of removing them except in a few cases to which, they say, the constitutional provision respecting impeachment implies. As was said by Mr. Morris, when that matter was under discussion in the Constitutional Convention, the judges ought not to be removed on the ground of lacking in good behavior except upon a trial. What trial is provided? The kind of trial you have here now. The trial before the Senate of the United States, on impeachment by the House of Representatives. There has been embodied in that one method all the power that resides in the Government in all its branches--all the power of the people of this vast country, this great and mighty Republic--to remove from office an offending civil officer. And precisely the same provision that applies to the judges applies to all other civil officers. The gentlemen discriminate respecting the judges. Where do they get the ground for the discrimination? It is not in the Constitution. There is nothing in the Constitution suggesting that a judge can be removed from office only for offending on the bench, and that as to other civil officers they may be removed for offenses off duty, or not so narrowly official. The learned counsel for the respondent who closed the case on the other side seemed to take lightly the suggestion of Mr. Manager Palmer in the brief which he filed, and of my other colleagues who argued this case, that according to the commentators upon the Constitution, according to the spirit of the Constitution, according to the just principles of law governing impeachment, it is within the power of the House of Representatives to vote impeachment, and it is within the just and constitutional powers of the Senate to convict, for conduct in a judge off the beach and away even from his judicial transactions. The logical conclusion from the contention of respondent's counsel is that no matter how vile any civil officer of the Government may be, no matter how great the sum total of the individual items of his offending, so long as the offending is not on the bench or in the active technical conduct of his office the whole power of the Government is too weak, the arm of the House of Representatives too short, and the judgment of the Senate too puny to reach the offender and protect the public from the vile contamination of his continued presence in office. We do not take that view of the matter. 2022. Opinion of Attorney-General Felix Grundy that Territorial judges are not civil officers of the United States within the meaning of the impeachment clause of the Constitution.--On February 4, 1839,\1\ as perti- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Third session Twenty-fifth Congress, Journal, p. 452, House Ex. Doc. No. 154. Sec. 2023 nent to the consideration of a pending bill to amend the law establishing the Territorial government of Wisconsin, Mr. Isaac H. Bronson, of New York, chairman of the Committee on Territories, presented to the House a letter of the Attorney-General of the United States, Hon. Felix Grundy, giving an opinion on the subject of the removal of Territorial judges by impeachment: The provision of the Constitution which relates most directly to this subject is contained in the first section of the third article, which declares that ``the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish. The judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.'' The construction of this part of the Constitution has been settled, it seems to me, by the opinion of Congress, expressed by various acts, and also by the Supreme Court of the United States. By the article of the Constitution referred to the judges are to hold their offices during good behavior. Congress can not consistently with this provision provide any other or different tenure of office within the States. Congress has inmost cases limited the tenure of office of Territorial judges to four years. This Could not be done were they judges under or provided for by the Constitution, because by that instrument the tenure is during good behavior. It should be noticed that Congress has imposed this limitation of four years, not in a single instance only, but in many. It has been imposed in the Territories embraced within the limits of the original States, where the Territory has been ceded to the General Government, and Territorial governments have been created therein. It has also been done in the Territories purchased by the United States from foreign nations. I think these acts clearly prove the sense of Congress to be that Territorial judges are not judges under the Constitution, but are mere creatures of legislation. I have said that the Supreme Court of the United States have also decided upon this point. In the case of the American Insurance Company and others v. Canter, reported in first Peters, the court very distinctly recognized the opinion above expressed, and convey their views in the following strong language: ``These courts (meaning Territorial courts), then, are not constitutional courts, in which the judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the General Government can be deposited; they are incapable of receiving it; they are legislative courts, created in virtue of the general rights of sovereignty.'' The only remaining inquiry is as to the liability of Territorial judges to impeachment under the Constitution. The fourth section of the second article of the Constitution is in these words: ``The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' If the construction Of the Constitution be correct, as I suppose it is, that these judges are not constitutional but legislative judges, I can see nothing in the Constitution which would warrant their being embraced by the expression, ``and all civil officers of the United States.'' They are not civil officers of the United States in the constitutional meaning of the phrase. They are merely Territorial officers, and therefore, in my opinion, not subject to impeachment and trial before the Senate of the United States. 2023. Reference to a summary of provisions of State constitutions relating to impeachment and removal by address.--On February 22, 1905,\1\ in the Senate, sitting for the impeachment trial of Judge Charles Swayne, Messrs. John M. Thurston and Anthony Higgins, of counsel for respondent, filed as part of an argument on a plea as to jurisdiction a summary of provisions in the constitutions of the various States at various periods of their existence. It appears in full in the Congressional Record of that date. 2024. The question of reimbursement of respondent for his expenses in an impeachment trial.--On February 28, 1905.\2\ in the Senate, the President ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Third session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, pp. 3035-3041. \2\ Third session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 3601. Sec. 2024 pro tempore laid before the Senate the following communication from the counsel of Judge Charles Swayne; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary: To the President pro tempore of the United States Senate: The undersigned have the honor to request that, inasmuch as Judge Charles Swayne has been declared not guilty by the Senate of the impeachment charges preferred against him by the House of Representatives, an allowance may be made as a part of the expenses of the Senate in connection with the impeachment which shall enable him to defray the expenses of his counsel and the other expenses incurred by him in making his defense. The undersigned will submit a statement of such expenses whenever requested to do so by the Senate. Anthony Higgins. John M. Thurston. Washington, February 27, 1905. The joint resolution \1\ appropriating for the expenses of the Senate in the trial made no provision for granting this request. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ 33 Stat. L., p. 1280.