[Hinds' Precedents, Volume 1]
[Chapter 12 - Electorates in New States and Territories]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


               ELECTORATES IN NEW STATES AND TERRITORIES.

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   1. Admission of Members after passage of act admitting State. 
     Sections 396-399.
   2. Delegates from portions of the Northwest Territory. Sections 
     400-401.
   3. Delegates admitted after portion of Territory becomes a 
     State. Sections 402-404.
   4. Territory must be organized to justify admission of 
     Delegates. Sections 405-412.

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  396. The House declined to admit the Member-elect from Illinois until 
the State had been formally admitted to the ``Union.
  The Speaker asked the decision of the House when a Member-elect from 
a State not yet admitted to the Union presented himself to be sworn.
  On November 19, 1818,\1\ Mr. John McLean, Representative from 
Illinois, being in attendance, the Speaker stated to the House a 
difficulty which he felt in deciding whether or not to administer the 
oath to Mr. McLean, in the absence of action by Congress on the 
admission of the State.
  Objection was made, especially by Mr. Timothy Pitkin, of Connecticut, 
who thought that before admitting a Representative to a seat, the 
question whether the people who elected him were a State ought to be 
decided.
  The question being put, it was decided that the Speaker should not 
administer the oath. Then the House ordered the constitution of 
Illinois referred to a select committee.
  On the following day that committee reported a joint resolution 
declaring the admission of the State of Illinois into the Union, on an 
equal footing with the original States. This was passed by the Senate, 
and on December 4 a message was received from the President announcing 
his signature.
  Thereupon Mr. McLean produced his credentials, and the oath was 
administered to him.
  397. The House declined to admit the Member-elect from Michigan 
except as a spectator--until the act admitting Michigan to the Union 
had become a law.
  It is not necessary that a State be admitted to the Union before it 
may elect a Representative to Congress.
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  \1\ Second session, Fifteenth Congress, Journal, pp. 22, 25, 61, 
Annals, pp. 296, 297, 306-311, 342.
                                                             Sec. 397
  On December 16, 1835,\1\ the Speaker submitted to the House the 
following communication:

                                    Washington, December 15, 1885.
  Sir: Inclosed is a certificate of my election as a Representative of 
the State of Michigan in the Congress of the United States. It is my 
desire that the same may be presented to the consideration of the body 
over which you have the honor to preside.
  I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,
                                                   Isaac E. Crary.
  Hon. James K. Polk,
    Speaker of the House of Representatives.

  As the question of the admission of Michigan into the Union was still 
pending, a question was raised and the consideration of the subject 
went over until December 28, when Mr. Samuel Beardsley, of New York, 
under suspension of the rules, offered this resolution:

  Resolved, That Isaac E. Crary, who claims to have been duly elected a 
member of this House, be admitted as a spectator, within the hall, 
during the sittings of the House.

  Mr. Beardsley stated that this resolution was in accordance with the 
precedent at the time when the admission of the State of Tennessee was 
pending.
  The resolution was agreed to by the House.
  On January 27, 1837,\2\ the bill entitled ``An act to admit the State 
of Michigan into the Union on an equal footing with the original 
States,'' passed by the two Houses of Congress, having been approved 
and signed by the President of the United States, and the certificate 
of the election of Isaac E. Crary as Representative from the State of 
Michigan in this House having been communicated to the House at the 
last session of Congress, to wit, on the 17th of December, 1835, and 
the said Isaac E. Crary being in attendance. A motion was made by Mr. 
Francis Thomas, of Maryland, that the oath appointed by law to be taken 
by Members of the House of Representatives be administered to the said 
Isaac E. Crary; and that he thereupon take his seat as a Representative 
of the State of Michigan in this House.
  A motion was made by Mr. John Robertson, of Virginia, that this 
motion, together with the whole subject of the legality of the election 
of a Member of the House from the State of Michigan, be referred to the 
Committee of Elections.
  Mr. Robertson said that the election by which Mr. Crary claimed his 
seat took place in October, 1835. At that time Michigan was a 
Territory, and she continued to be such until yesterday, when she was 
admitted into the Union. In this matter subsequent recognition of 
Michigan as a State could not stand in the place of previous consent, 
because the boundaries of Michigan were uncertain until fixed by 
Congress. That was a preliminary act, necessary before Michigan could 
lawfully frame a State government. Under the ordinance of 1787, 
Michigan must of necessity remain a Territory until admitted as a 
State, therefore, remaining a Territory until admission as a State, 
there was no right to representation at the time of the election of Mr. 
Crary, and his election could not be valid.
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  \1\ First session, Twenty-fourth Congress, Journal, pp. 71, 120, 121; 
Debates, pp. 1964, 2102, 2103
  \2\ Second session Twenty-fourth Congress, Journal, pp. 290, 291; 
Debates, pp. 1504-1509.
Sec. 398
  The previous question being ordered, the amendment of Mr. Robertson 
fell,\1\ and Mr. Thomas's motion was agreed to, yeas 150, nays 32.
  Mr. Crary was thereupon sworn, and took his seat.
  398. The Senate declined to admit the persons bearing credentials as 
Senators-elect from Tennessee until that State had been admitted to the 
Union.--On June 1, 1796 \2\ the Senate declined to admit William Blount 
and William Cocke, who produced credentials as Senators from the State 
of Tennessee. That State had not yet been admitted to the Union.
  399. The Senate election case of James Shields, of Minnesota, in the 
Thirty-fifth Congress.
  The Senate declined to admit a Senator-elect from Minnesota until a 
formal act of admission had been passed by Congress.
  On February 25, 1858,\3\ in the Senate, Mr. John J. Crittenden, of 
Kentucky, presented the following letter:

                                    Washington, February 24, 1858.
  Sir: I beg leave to offer a few reasons to show that Minnesota is one 
of the sovereign States of this Union. My first proposition is that 
there are only two forms of political organization under which a 
community of American citizens can legitimately exist within the 
jurisdiction and under the Constitution of the United States. The one 
is the organization of a Territory of the Union; the other that of a 
State of the Union. These are the only determinate shapes into which 
political communities can be molded under our Constitution. Each has 
its appropriate place in our federal system. A community of American 
citizens living under a Territorial organization is in direct and 
legitimate connection with the Federal Government. That same community, 
transformed into a State, is also in direct legitimate connection with 
the Federal Government. In the transition from a Territory to a State, 
there is no point of time at which this connection can by any 
possibility be broken. The Territorial government continues in full 
force until it is superseded by a State government; and whenever the 
people constitute themselves lawfully into a State, it is, Io instanti, 
a State of the Union. There is no such political anomaly as a State out 
of the Union, or not yet in the Union. These erroneous terms have been 
applied so vaguely to communities whose condition is not easily 
determined that the public begin to think there must be some 
intermediate provisional, probationary state, in which communities are 
sometimes kept on their passage from the condition of Territories to 
that of sovereign States of the Union. California was denominated not 
many years ago a State out of the Union. Minnesota is, I suppose, at 
present considered by some a State not yet in the Union, or, perhaps, a 
provisional State. Certainly the Representatives of Minnesota are at 
present in a provisional dilemma, not knowing whether they represent a 
State in the Union or out of the Union.
  I now beg leave to refer you to the law of 1857 \4\ authorizing the 
people of Minnesota to form a State government. The first section 
contains the following language: ``The inhabitants of Minnesota are 
hereby authorized to form for themselves a constitution and State 
government by the name of Minnesota, and to come into the Union on an 
equal footing with the original States, according to the Federal 
Constitution.'' Here the authority is absolute and unconditional, 
first, to form a constitution and State government; secondly, to come 
into the Union on an equal footing with the original States--authority 
to make a State and authority to come into the Union. No language could 
be more positive; no authority could be more plenary; no act could be 
more determinate. The people have performed their engagements in good 
faith, and they have a right to expect a like compliance on the part of 
Congress. These engagements, too, affect the most sacred of all 
political rights--the constitutional rights of a sovereign State. The 
third section of the Minnesota enabling act strengthens and 
corroborates this position. It provides that a convention of delegates 
shall assemble at the capital of said Territory on the second Monday of 
July next (1857), and first determine by a vote whether it is the wish 
of the people of the proposed State
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  \1\ This was the effect of the previous question on a pending 
amendment at that time.
  \2\ First session Fourth Congress, Contested Elections in Congress, 
from 1789 to 1834, p. 868.
  \3\ First session Thirty-fifth Congress, Globe, pp. 861-867.
  \4\ Act approved February 26, 1857, 11 Stat. L., p. 166.
                                                             Sec. 399
to be admitted into the Union ``at that time.'' Mark the language--not 
thereafter; not upon the happening of any future contingency, but ``at 
that time,'' to wit, on the second Monday in July, 1857; ``and if 
so,''--that is, if they shall so determine--``shall proceed to form a 
constitution and to take all necessary steps for the establishment of a 
State government in conformity with the Federal Constitution, subject 
to the approval and ratification of the people of the proposed State.''
  Here two things are to be specially observed: First, the 
determination to become a State at that time; not the determination at 
that time to become a State, but a State at that time. Second, the 
submission to the approval and ratification of the people. When was 
Minnesota to become a State? At that time. How was her constitution to 
be ratified? By submission to the people. She has complied with every 
requirement. She entered the Union at the time prescribed; her 
constitution is ratified in the manner prescribed; and yet she is now 
as completely postponed and ignored as if she had disregarded all her 
obligations. Permit me to cite two precedents, which I hope will prove 
conclusive in this case. In 1802 an enabling act was passed for Ohio 
somewhat similar to, but not so decisive as, the Minnesota act. The 
authority given was to form a constitution and State government, and 
then follows this language: ``The State, when formed, shall be admitted 
into the Union on the same footing with the original States.'' This was 
then considered an authorized admission of the State, and the only act 
of admission that ever took place in the case of Ohio, and that State 
is now in the Union under and by virtue of the authority of that 
enabling act.
  The enabling act in the case of Indiana contains the following 
language: ``The State, when formed, shall be admitted into the Union.'' 
Mark the difference in the two acts. In the case of Minnesota authority 
is given to come in at the present time. In the case of Indiana a 
promise is given for her admission at some future time; under the law 
Indiana adopted a constitution and elected Representatives, as 
Minnesota has done.
  On the 2d December, 1816, Mr. Hendricks, Representative from the new 
State, presented his credentials in the House of Representatives, was 
sworn in, was appointed on a committee, and was allowed to vote and act 
as a Member of that body; and yet it was not until ten days afterwards 
(on the 12th of the same month) that a joint resolution was passed by 
both branches of Congress formally admitting Indiana. This kind of 
resolution was then considered form--nothing but mere form--something 
which Congress has the power to observe or omit at pleasure, but 
something with which the State has no concern, and which can not affect 
its right. This was then the opinion of John C. Calhoun, at that time a 
Member of the other House; and this, we may fairly presume, would be 
his opinion if he were a Member of the Senate now. When the precedent 
was established Daniel Webster was also a Member of the House, and gave 
it the weight of his authority. But Minnesota stands upon far stronger 
grounds than Ohio or Indiana the ground of Congressional authority. If 
this authority is good, Minnesota can not fail. This is a great 
question--a question of constitutional right, of national faith. 
Congressional faith, I sincerely hope, will be held sacred and 
inviolate in the case of Minnesota by the prompt admission of her 
Representatives. My sense of duty to my constituents compels me, 
through you, to make this appeal to the Senate.
  I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
                                                    James Shields,
                                           Senator from Minnesota.
    Hon. John J. Crittenden.

  Mr. Crittenden also presented credentials in due form, showing the 
election of Mr. Shields by the legislature of Minnesota on December 19, 
1857.
  A discussion arose as to whether or not Minnesota was a State in the 
Union by virtue of the enabling act, or whether an act of admission 
would be necessary. Mr. Crittenden, in arguing that there had been no 
act of admission, cited the case of Louisiana in addition to those of 
Ohio and Indiana quoted by Mr. Shields.
  A motion that the subject lie on the table was disagreed to--yeas 22, 
nays 26.
  Then, after lengthy debate, the Senate, on motion of Mr. Robert 
Toombs, of Georgia, agreed to the following:

  Resolved, That the question of the admission of James Shields to a 
seat in this body, as a Senator from the State of Minnesota, be 
referred to the Judiciary Committee, with instructions to inquire 
whether or not Minnesota is a State of the Union under the Constitution 
and laws.
Sec. 400
  The Judiciary Committee consisted of Messrs. James A. Bayard, of 
Delaware; Robert Toombs, of Georgia; George E. Pugh, of Ohio; Judah P. 
Benjamin, of Louisiana; James S. Green, of Missouri; Jacob Collamer, of 
Vermont; and Lyman Trumbull, of Illinois. On March 4, 1858,\1\ Mr. 
Bayard submitted the following report:

  Having considered the question as to which they were by the the 
foregoing resolution instructed to inquire, the committee have 
unanimously adopted the following resolution:
  Resolved, That Minnesota is not a State of the Union under the 
Constitution and laws.

  Minnesota was admitted into the Union by the act approved May 11, 
1858,\2\ and thereupon her Senators-elect were admitted.
  400. The election case of James White, Delegate from the Territory 
south of the Ohio, in the Third Congress.
  In 1794 the House admitted a Delegate on the theory that it might 
admit to the floor for debate merely anybody whom it might choose.
  The office of Delegate was established by an ordinance of the 
Continental Congress, confirmed by a law of Congress.
  The House decided in 1794 that the oath should not be administered to 
a Delegate.
  The legislation as to the privileges of the Delegate was enacted 
after the House had recognized the office.
  In 1794 the Delegate seated by the House was elected by the 
legislature of the Territory and not by the people.
  On November 11, 1794,\3\ the credentials of James White as a 
Representative of the Territory of the United States south of the river 
Ohio, were laid before the House and referred to a select committee, 
who, on November 14, made the following report:

  That, by the ordinance for the government of the Territory of the 
United States northwest of the river Ohio, section 9, it is provided 
``that, so soon as there shall be five thousand free male inhabitants 
of full age in the district, upon giving proof thereof to the governor, 
they shall receive authority to elect representatives to represent them 
in a general assembly,'' and by the twelfth section of the ordinance, 
``as soon as a legislature shall be formed in the district, the council 
and house, assembled in one room, shall have authority, by joint 
ballot, to elect a Delegate to Congress, who shall have a seat in 
Congress, with a right of debating, but not of voting, during this 
temporary government.'' Full effect is given to this ordinance by act 
of Congress August 7, 1789.
  That, by the deed of cession of the Territory south of the river Ohio 
to the United States, in the fourth article, it is also provided ``that 
the inhabitants of the said Territory shall enjoy all the privileges, 
benefits, and advantages set forth in the ordinance of the late 
Congress for the government of the Western Territory--that is to say, 
Congress shall assume the government of the said Territory, which they 
shall execute in a manner similar to that which they support in the 
Territory west of the Ohio, and shall never bar or deprive them of any 
privilege which the people in the Territory west of the Ohio enjoy.''
  The cession, on these conditions, was accepted by act of Congress on 
the 2d of April, 1790.
  By an act passed the 26th of May, 1790, for the government of the 
Territory of the United States south of the river Ohio, it is enacted 
``that the inhabitants shall enjoy all the privileges, benefits, and 
advantages set forth in the ordinance of the late Congress for the 
government of the Territory of the United States northwest of the river 
Ohio. And the government of the said Territory south of the Ohio shall 
be
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  \1\ Globe, p. 957, Senate Report No. 104.
  \2\ 11 Stat. L., p. 285.
  \3\ Second session Third Congress, contested elections in Congress 
from 1789 to 1834, p. 85.
                                                             Sec. 401
similar to that which is now exercised in the Territory northwest of 
the river Ohio, except so far as is otherwise provided in the 
conditions expressed in an act of Congress of the present session, 
entitled `An act to accept a cession of the claim of the State of North 
Carolina to a certain district of western territory.' ''
  The committee are of opinion that James White has been duly elected 
as Delegate from the Territory of the United States south of the Ohio, 
on the terms of the foregoing acts. They therefore submit the following 
resolution:
  Resolved, That James White be admitted to a seat in this House as a 
Delegate from the Territory of the United States south of the river 
Ohio, with a right of debating, but not of voting.

  This resolution gave rise to considerable debate, it being urged in 
opposition that the Constitution provided for no such admission to the 
House, and that it would be more proper to admit him to the Senate. It 
was said, also, that he should be admitted only in accordance with a 
law of Congress. In opposition it was maintained that the House might 
admit and give the right of debating to whomsoever it might please, as 
it might admit an advocate to plead in any particular case, and that a 
law was not necessary, since they need not and ought not to consult the 
Senate in such a matter.
  On November 18 the House agreed to the report of the committee.
  A question then arose as to whether or not the oath should be 
administered to Mr. Smith.
  The question being taken, it was decided--yeas 32, noes 42--that the 
Delegate should not take the oath, the argument that his inability to 
vote rendered the oath unnecessary.\1\
  During this session a bill was passed allowing the Delegate pay and 
the privilege of franking letters.\2\ This legislation was in the form 
of a bill extending the franking privilege specifically to James White 
and providing for the same compensation received by a Member.
  401. The election case of Narsworthy Hunter, Delegate for Mississippi 
Territory, in the Seventh Congress.
  In 1801 the oath was administered as a matter of course to a Delegate 
from a Territory.
  On December 21, 1801,\3\ the House, on report of the Committee on 
Elections, to whom had been referred the credentials of Narsworthy 
Hunter as Delegate from Mississippi Territory, decided that the 
Territory was entitled to a Delegate, with a right to debate, but not 
to vote, and that Mr. Hunter was elected such Delegate. As in the case 
of James White, the title of the territory to a Delegate was referred 
back to the ordinance of 1787, certain provisions of which were by acts 
of April 7, 1798, and May 10, 1800, applied to Mississippi Territory.
  Mr. Hunter had appeared on December 7, at the time of the 
organization of the House, and had taken the oath with the Members.\4\
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  \1\ The compiler of the election cases has inserted a footnote 
explaining that in practice it was usual (in 1834, when the work was 
published) for the Delegates to be sworn. See also Section 401.
  \2\ 1 Stat. L., p. 403.
  \3\ First session Seventh Congress, Contested Elections in Congress 
from 1789 to 1834, p. 120
  \4\ Journal, p. 5.
Sec. 402
  402. The election case of Paul Fearing, Delegate from the territory 
northwest of the river Ohio, in the Seventh Congress.
  A Delegate was not dispossessed of his seat because a portion, but 
not all, of his territory had been erected into a State.
  On January 31, 1803,\1\ the Committee on Elections reported on the 
following proposition, which had been referred to them previously:

  That inasmuch as the late territory of the United States northwest of 
the river Ohio have, by virtue of an act of Congress passed on the 1st 
day of May, 1802,\2\ formed a constitution and State government, and 
have thereby and by virtue of an act of Congress aforesaid become a 
separate and independent State, by the name of ``Ohio,'' that Paul 
Fearing, a Member of this House, who was elected by the late 
territorial government of the territory northwest of the river Ohio, is 
no longer entitled to a seat in this House.

  The committee reported the following:

  Resolved, That Paul Fearing, the Delegate from the territory 
northwest of the river Ohio, is still entitled to a seat in this House.

  The report was laid on the table.
  Mr. Fearing has taken his seat on the first day of the Congress.\3\ 
The Member from the State of Ohio did not appear until the next 
Congress.\4\
  403. The election case of Doty v. Jones, from Wisconsin Territory, in 
the Twenty-fifth Congress.
  The term of a Delegate need not necessarily begin and end with the 
term of Congress.\5\
  In 1839 the Committee on Elections held that the office of Delegate 
ceased when the Territory ceased to exist as a corporation by becoming 
a State.
  At the session of 1838-39 \6\ the Committee on Elections reported on 
the case of Doty v. Jones, from Wisconsin Territory. This case involved 
merely a question as to when Mr. Doty should take the seat.
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  \1\ Second session Seventh Congress Contested Elections in Congress, 
from 1789 to 1834, p. 127; Journal, pp. 297, 313, 314; Annals, pp. 413, 
448.
  \2\ This act, actually approved April 30, 1802 (2 Stat. L., p. 174), 
did not include in the new State of Ohio all the territory of the 
``late territory of the United State northwest of the river Ohio,'' but 
provided ``that all that part of the territory of the United States 
northwest of the river Ohio heretofore included in the eastern division 
of said territory and not included within the boundary herein 
prescribed for the said State is hereby attached to and made a part of 
the Indiana Territory from and after the formation of the said State.'' 
Indiana had been organized by act of May 7, 1800 (2 Stat. L., p. 58). 
Indiana was not allowed a Delegate until the act of February 27, 1809 
(second session Tenth Congress, 2 Stat. L., p. 525). So it is evident 
that Mr. Fearing would remain as the Delegate for an increment of 
population left out by the new boundaries of Ohio. The act of May 1, 
1802, provided that ``the said State, when formed, shall be admitted 
into the Union upon the same footing with the original States in all 
respects whatsoever.''
  \3\ Journal, p. 5.
  \4\ First session Eighth Congress, Journal, p. 403 (Gales and Seaton 
ed.).
  \5\ But since 1848 (9 Stat. L., p. 349) the acts admitting States 
have required that the term of the delegate should begin and end with a 
single Congress.
  \6\ Third session Twenty-fifth Congress, 1 Bartlett, p. 6; Rowell's 
Digest, p. 107; Report No. 7, Journal, p. 191.
                                                             Sec. 403
  In October, 1835, Mr. George W. Jones had been elected Delegate from 
the Territory of Michigan for a term extending, under the existing law 
for Michigan, for two years from the date of his certificate. He took 
his seat in December, 1835, and would naturally have served until about 
that time in 1837. But by act of June 15, 1836, Michigan was admitted 
to the Union on condition that she should by convention ratify certain 
boundaries, which was done December 15, 1836. The committee therefore 
considered that the Territory of Michigan ceased to be on June 15, 
1836, and that Mr. Jones ceased to be her Delegate on that day, which 
was about a year and a half before his term would naturally have 
expired.\1\
  In October, 1836, Mr. Jones was elected Delegate from the adjacent 
Territory of Wisconsin, which had just been organized. The act of 
organization provided that he should serve ``for a term of two years.'' 
Mr. Jones took his seat December 5, 1836, and the term of two years 
would, if computed from the time of election or qualification, expire 
in October or the 1st of December, 1838.
  And so, naturally, Mr. James D. Doty, elected on September 10, 1838, 
would take his seat at the December session of 1838, which was the last 
and not the first or long session of the Congress, and consequently 
would finish out the current Congress and sit for the first half of the 
next Congress.
  The natural objection then arose that this should not be, because the 
term of the Delegate, like the term of the Member from a State, should 
be for the term of the Congress, and should not comprise a portion of 
two Congresses. In support of this contention a clause of the act of 
March 3, 1817, was cited, wherein it was provided that Delegates 
``shall be elected every second year for the same term of two years for 
which Members of the House of Representatives of the United States are 
elected.'' Furthermore, there was a question as to when Mr. Jones's 
term as Delegate from Michigan expired, and so that term might work out 
the time of beginning for the term of Mr. Doty.
  The committee did not consider that the law of 1817, even supposing 
it not to have been modified by the subsequent act organizing Wisconsin 
and providing simply that the Delegate should ``serve for a term of two 
years,'' necessarily meant that Delegates should serve the same two 
years for which Members of the House were elected. The committee would 
construe it to mean that the duration of service should be the same, 
but not necessarily contemporaneous. Although not entirely confident of 
this construction, the committee found it fortified by the fact that 
previous to that law Delegates were elected annually. The Constitution 
was silent as to Delegates, which were mere creatures of law, whose 
terms of service might be long or short and commence and terminate at 
such periods as Congress might dictate. The law organizing Wisconsin, 
unlike the Michigan law, did not specify when the term should begin; 
but in cases where no time is specified for the performance of a duty 
it is common to construe that it is to be performed forthwith. Any 
other construction would, when Mr. Jones was elected Delegate from 
Wisconsin, have left the Territory unrepresented for part of a 
Congress, while he
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  \1\ Congress actually passed (on January 26, 1837) another act for 
admission of Michigan as a State, and Isaac E. Crary, elected 
Representative from the State, was not permitted to take his seat until 
January 27, 1837 (2d sess. 24th Cong., Journal, pp. 288, 290; Globe, p. 
134.)
Sec. 404
would have been awaiting the beginning of the term of the new Congress 
on March 4, 1837. So the committee decided that Mr. Jones's term did 
not last until March 4, 1839, and therefore reported the following 
resolution, which was agreed to by the House--yeas 165, nays 25:

  Resolved, That James Duane Doty is entitled to a seat in this House 
as a Delegate from Wisconsin Territory, and that George W. Jones is not 
so entitled.

  404. The election case of Henry H. Sibley, claiming a seat as 
Delegate from Wisconsin, in the Thirtieth Congress.
  The House admitted a Delegate from a county left under the old 
Territorial laws after the remainder of Wisconsin Territory had become 
a State.
  By the act of May 29,1848,\1\ Wisconsin, which had been a Territory, 
with a Territorial Delegate, was admitted to the Union as a State. But 
the boundaries of the new State left out a portion of the old Territory 
of Wisconsin lying beyond the St. Croix River, comprising a population 
of about 4,000 and constituting what had been a judicial district of 
the old Territory, organized as an entire county. The Delegate who had 
represented Wisconsin Territory had resigned when the State was formed. 
So the people in the portion left without the State boundaries had no 
representation in Congress.
  The governor of the Territory having become an United States Senator 
from the new State, the secretary of the Territory, upon whom under the 
law of the Territory the duties devolved, removed to the region beyond 
the St. Croix and assumed the duties of governor. He issued his 
proclamation as acting governor, ordering a special election to fill 
the vacancy caused by the resignation of the Delegate who had 
represented the whole Territory of Wisconsin. And in pursuance of that 
proclamation the people beyond the St. Croix elected Henry H. Sibley, 
who in due time presented his certificate of election, under the hand 
of the acting governor and with the seal of the ``Territory of 
Wisconsin'' attached.
  On December 4, 1848,\2\ at the beginning of the second session of the 
Congress, Mr. Sibley's credentials were presented to the House, but 
objection was made to swearing him in on his prima facie showing, and 
the credentials were referred to the Committee of Elections.
  The majority of the committee reported a resolution that Mr. Sibley 
be admitted to a seat as Delegate of the Territory of Wisconsin. They 
argued that these people as part of the old Territory of Wisconsin had 
once enjoyed the right of representation and that they were still 
entitled to it by natural right as well as by the usages of the 
Government. The act of Congress admitting the State of Wisconsin had 
left them outside its benefits, but had not abrogated any of the old 
law organizing the Territory, and they were therefore entitled to all 
their rights under the terms of the law organizing the original 
Territory of Wisconsin. Those rights had, moreover, been guaranteed by 
the ordinance of 1787, which had been reaffirmed by Congress. The 
omission of Congress to repeal the law organizing the Territory of 
Wisconsin, as well as the failure to make any other law for the 
government of
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  \1\ Second session Thirtieth Congress, House Report No. 10; 1 
Bartlett, p. 102; Rowell's Digest, p. 127.
  \2\ Globe, p. 2.
                                                             Sec. 405
the people beyond the St. Croix, were proof conclusive that the old 
Territorial law was intended to operate in the residuum of the 
Territory. Moreover, acting on the authority of the State Department, 
the officers of the present Territory were holding the offices under 
the original appointments made before the State of Wisconsin was 
formed. The committee cited the case of Delegate Paul Fearing, from the 
Territory of Ohio.
  The minority of the committee contended that the formation of the 
State of Wisconsin annulled by implication the whole political 
organization of the Territory of Wisconsin. A special repealing clause 
was not necessary and had not been inserted in the laws organizing 
other States. Neither had it been usual to grant Delegates to 
Territories in the first stages of their existence. When the people had 
become numerous enough to entitle them to legislative assemblies it had 
been usual to allow them Delegates in Congress. The authority of the 
precedent of Paul Fearing was denied. The fact that the people of the 
residuum county would be left without laws might be a matter to be 
remedied by law, but was not such as to require the interposition of 
the House in the manner proposed.
  On January 15, by a vote of 124 to 62, the House agreed to the 
resolution admitting Mr. Sibley as the Delegate of the Territory of 
Wisconsin.\1\
  405. The election cases of Hugh N. Smith and William S. Meservey, 
claiming seats as Delegates from New Mexico in the Thirty-first 
Congress.
  The House declined to admit a Delegate from New Mexico before the 
organization of the Territory had been authorized by law.
  The House declined to give prima facie effect to the credentials of a 
Delegate elected by a convention in an unorganized Territory.
  The House held that there should be prior legislation by Congress 
before the admission of a Delegate.
  On February 4, 1850,\2\ the credentials of Hugh N. Smith, as Delegate 
from the Territory of New Mexico, were presented to the House. The 
credentials were in the following form:

  Be it remembered that in the convention of delegates chosen from the 
seven different counties of New Mexico to assemble in the city of Santa 
Fe on the 24th day of September, A.D. 1849, for the purpose of forming 
and proposing the basis of a government which the people of New Mexico 
desire should be granted to them by the Congress of the United States, 
and for the purpose of choosing a Delegate to represent New Mexico in 
the House of Representatives of the Thirty-first Congress of the United 
States, Hugh N. Smith was chosen by a majority of all the convention, 
and declared duly elected said Delegate.
  Given under our hands, at Santa Fe, this twenty-sixth day of 
September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and 
forty-nine.
                                            Antonio Jose Martinez,
                                     Presidente de la Convensione.
  James H. Quinn, Secretary.

  The House did not swear in the Delegate on this prima facie showing, 
but referred the credentials to the Committee on Elections.
  This committee reported on April 4. It was ascertained that New 
Mexico was acquired by the treaty of GuadaloupeHidalgo; that previously 
it had been a
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Globe, p. 260.
  \2\ First session Thirty-first Congress, Journal, p. 463; Globe, pp. 
279, 412; 1 Bartlett, p. 109.
Sec. 405
department of Mexico, governed by its own legislature and having 
representation in the National Congress. But when acquired by the 
United States it came as territory only, not retaining its old 
political organization. An army officer was stationed there as military 
commander, but there was no political organization known to the laws. 
The convention which chose Mr. Smith Delegate was summoned by 
proclamation of the army officer in command.
  The further fact appeared that the larger portion of the Territory 
was claimed by the State of Texas and had been so claimed since 1836. 
This claim still existed although not admitted by the Executive of the 
United States. Mr. Smith, the Delegate-elect, was himself a resident of 
the portion claimed by Texas, as were the larger portion of his 
constituents.
  Without considering the claim of Texas, for the time being, the 
majority of the committee came to the conclusion that Delegates 
admitted by the House had in every case been chosen in accordance with 
laws enacted by Congress. The case of Mr. Sibley, of Wisconsin, was not 
an exception, since he was admitted on the theory that a Territory of 
Wisconsin still existed. The admission of Mr. Smith would be construed 
as a quasi recognition of New Mexico as an organized government, a 
proceeding not within the constitutional power of the House. To admit 
Mr. Smith simply as the representative of the inhabitants would be 
anomalous and unwise.
  The minority of the committee contended that the privilege of 
citizens of a Territory or portion of the Union not organized into a 
State to have a Delegate depended neither on the Constitution nor law, 
but on the pleasure of the House alone. The discretion of the House 
should be exercised in favor of the right of representation. New Mexico 
was a populous region, whose people had enjoyed an organized political 
existence under the former sovereignty. While her former condition 
could not be considered as establishing her claim to representation, 
yet it showed her capacity for self-government and constituted a strong 
argument to control the discretion of the House, so that she might not 
be kept in a worse situation than she was in before.
  As to the justness of the claim of Texas the majority passed no 
opinion. If it was just certainly the people were already represented, 
and might not be further represented. Whether just or not the claim 
existed, and it was not the part of the House to express judgment on it 
by admitting Mr. Smith. The minority held that the claim of Texas might 
be admitted as just, and yet Mr. Smith might be admitted properly as 
representing a residuum of people without the boundaries claimed by 
Texas. Furthermore, Texas had not enforced her claim and exercised no 
authority over the disputed territory; and New Mexico should not be 
neglected because of the mere claim of Texas.
  The majority of the committee recommended the following:

  Resolved, That it is inexpedient to admit Hugh N. Smith, esq., to a 
seat in this House as a Delegate from New Mexico.

  The minority proposed the following:

  Resolved, That the said Hugh N. Smith be admitted to a seat in the 
House of Representatives of the United States as a Delegate from New 
Mexico.
                                                             Sec. 406
  The report was debated at length on May 22 and July 15-18.\1\ Besides 
the merits of the case, there seems to have developed some 
considerations relating to the question of slavery and a disposition to 
resort to dilatory tactics. Finally, on July 19, the whole subject was 
laid on the table, by a vote of 105 yeas, 94 nays.
  406. On December 10, 1850,\2\ the credentials of William S. Meservey 
as Delegate from the Territory of New Mexico were presented and 
referred to the Committee on Territories, no motion being made to swear 
in Mr. Meservey. Later the reference was changed to the Committee on 
Elections, which reported on February 6, 1851.\3\ On May 25, 1850, 
before a decision had been reached by the House in the case of Mr. 
Smith, another convention had assembled at Santa Fe and established a 
constitution for a State government. On June 20, 1850, the voters of 
the Territory ratified the constitution and elected officers, including 
a Representative in Congress. Mr. Meservey was chosen to this office. 
The State officers issued a credential to Mr. Meservey as a 
``Representative,'' but he claimed a seat as a ``Delegate.'' The 
committee, after commenting on this fact, went on to argue that it 
would be a dangerous precedent to admit a Delegate not provided for by 
law of Congress and would overrule the usages of sixty years. Moreover, 
there was now in force an act of Congress providing for a Territorial 
Delegate from New Mexico. This act became a law on September 9, 1850, 
after the decision in Mr. Smith's case. So the committee reported 
against the admission of Mr. Meservey. The report was not acted on by 
the House.
  407. The election case of Almon W. Babbitt, claiming a seat as a 
Delegate from the so-called State of Deseret, in the Thirty-first 
Congress.
  The House decided it inexpedient to admit a Delegate chosen by a 
community not yet made a Territory by law.
  On April 4, 1850,\4\ the Committee on Elections reported on these 
credentials:
Provisional State of Deseret, ss:
  I hereby certify that, pursuant to a joint resolution passed by both 
houses of the general assembly of this State, Almon W. Babbitt, esq., 
was on the 5th day of July, 1849, elected by both branches of the 
general assembly a Delegate to the Congress of the United States, to 
present the memorial of said general assembly and otherwise represent 
the interests of the inhabitants of this State in Congress.
  Given under my hand and the great Seal of the State of Deseret, at 
the city of the Great Salt Lake, this twenty-fifth day of July, 1849.
 [Seal.]
                                                 Willard Richards,
                                               Secretary of State.
  Mr. Babbitt had not attempted to take a seat on these credentials in 
the first instance, and after examination the committee found that the 
memorial presented did not ask the admission of the Delegate until 
``some form of government'' had been adopted. Moreover, the so-called 
State of Deseret had been formed by an irregularly called convention of 
citizens representing a region not yet organized by law of Congress. To 
admit Mr. Babbitt would be for the House to give a quasi recognition of 
the legal existence of the State of Deseret and an implied ratification
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Journal, pp. 1142, 1150; Globe, pp. 1038, 1375, 1383, 1386, 1392, 
1399, 1411.
  \2\ Second session Thirty-first Congress, Globe, p. 22.
  \3\ 1 Bartlett, p. 148; Rowell's Digest, p. 135.
  \4\ First session Thirty-first Congress, 1 Bartlett, p. 116; Rowell's 
Digest, p. 130.
Sec. 408
of its constitution. Such recognition and ratification were within the 
power of Congress alone.
  So the committee recommended this resolution:

  Resolved, That it is inexpedient to admit Almon W. Babbitt, esq., to 
a seat in this body as a Delegate from the alleged State of Deseret.

  On July 18, 19, and 20 \1\ the resolution was debated in Committee of 
the Whole. There were arguments in favor of admitting a representative 
of the people of Deseret and the position of the committee as to the 
matter of recognition was combatted. The slavery question also had some 
bearing on the result.
  Finally, by a vote of yeas 104, nays 78, the resolution was laid on 
the table.
  408. The election case of Fuller v. Kingsbury, from the Dakota 
portion of the old Territory of Minnesota, in the Thirty-fifth 
Congress.
  Duty of the Speaker as to recognition of a Delegate after the 
Territory has been admitted as a State.
  On May 27, 1858,\2\ several days after the Representatives from the 
State of Minnesota had been qualified, one of them, Mr. James M. 
Cavanaugh, rising to a question of privilege, offered this resolution:

  Resolved, That the Committee on Elections be authorized to inquire 
into and report upon the right of W. W. Kingsbury to a seat upon this 
floor as Delegate from that part of the Territory of Minnesota outside 
the State limits.

  In the debate a question was raised as to recognition of Mr. 
Kingsbury, and the Speaker \3\ said he had continued to recognize him 
as Delegate in accordance with past precedents.
  Thereupon an amendment was adopted providing:

  And in the meantime no person shall be entitled to occupy a seat as a 
Delegate from said Territory.

  This amendment was adopted, and the resolution as amended was agreed 
to.
  On June 3,\4\ when the committee had reported in favor of allowing 
Mr. Kingsbury to retain his seat, a motion was proposed to lay the 
report on the table, and a question arose as to the effect of agreeing 
to the motion.
  The Speaker said:

  The resolution referring the subject to the Committee of Elections 
provided that the committee be authorized to inquire into and report 
upon the right of W. W. Kingsbury to his seat upon this floor as 
Delegate from that portion of the Territory of Minnesota outside of the 
State limits, and that in the meantime no person should be entitled to 
occupy a seat as Delegate from the said Territory. The Chair is of 
opinion that when the committee submitted a report to the House the 
proviso ceased to operate, and the Chair, following the precedents, 
without intimating whether the Chair thinks the precedents right or 
wrong, would recognize the Delegate from Minnesota.

  409. The election case of Fuller v. Kingsbury, continued.
  After the admission of Minnesota as a State, the House declared 
portions of the old Territory outside the limits of the State not 
entitled to a Delegate.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Journal, pp. 1153, 1155; Globe, pp. 1413, 1418, 1423.
  \2\ First session Thirty-fifth Congress, Journal, p. 932; Globe, p. 
2428.
  \3\ James L. Orr, of South Carolina, Speaker.
  \4\ Globe, pp. 2677, 2678.
                                                             Sec. 409
  The State of Minnesota being admitted, the House suspended the 
functions of the Delegate from the old Territory.
  On May 29, 1858,\1\ the Committee on Elections reported in the case 
of Fuller v. Kingsbury, of the portion of the former Territory of 
Minnesota not included within the limits of the new State. The 
committee, after quoting from the law establishing the Territory, and 
citing the fact that the Territory of Minnesota had been represented 
without interruption, by a Delegate elected in conformity with law, 
say:

  It further appears that William W. Kingsbury was regularly elected on 
the 13th day of October, 1857, as such Delegate, and, in that capacity, 
was, at the opening of the present session of Congress, admitted to, 
and has held, a seat in the House of Representatives until the passage 
of the act of May, 1858, for the admission of the State of Minnesota 
into the Union, when his right to retain it was brought in question. Of 
the legality of the election of Mr. Kingsbury as the Delegate from the 
Territory of Minnesota there seems to be no doubt. * * * The number of 
inhabitants in the Territory not included in the bounds of the State is 
not very clearly settled, but, as far as can be learned, it amounts to 
several thousands, and is said to be rapidly increasing. There were 
five counties established by law, and two of them fully organized, with 
the proper officers for regular municipal government. * * *
  Does the admission into the Union of a State formed out of a part of 
the original Territory of Minnesota annul the election of the Delegate, 
repeal or set aside the law creating the Territory, and all other laws; 
deprive the people inhabiting that part of the Territory not included 
in the limits of the new State of the right or privilege of being heard 
in the House of Representatives by an agent or Delegate; substitute 
anarchy for a government of law, and resolve society into its original 
elements? Such is not the opinion of your committee. There is nothing 
in the act authorizing the people of Minnesota to form a constitution 
and State government, nor in the act for the admission of the State of 
Minnesota into the Union, which repeals in anywise the law creating the 
Territory, or deprives the people inhabiting that part not included in 
the new State of any rights or privileges to which they were entitled 
under any laws existing at the time of the admission of that State. It 
matters not whether one State or half a dozen have been carved out of 
an organized Territory; if a portion remains, and, more especially, if 
inhabited, and counties and towns, with their corporate governments, 
exist, created by law, it would seem to be a most violent presumption 
to hold that they became eo instante upon the admission of the State a 
disfranchised people--a mere mob or rabble. The fact that the admitted 
State bears the same name as the Territory may lead to some confusion 
of ideas, but it does not alter the fact. The existence of the State of 
Minnesota does not destroy the existence of the Territory of Minnesota, 
nor deprive the inhabitants of such Territory of any of their rights. 
No such result can be by implication. The Territorial law must be 
repealed before such consequences could follow, and even then a grave 
question would arise here how far such repeal could operate upon the 
rights of the people.

  The committee then cite the cases of Delegates Fearing and Sibley in 
support of their view.
  As to the memorial of A. G. Fuller and his certificate of election 
under the hands of the county officers of Midway County, in the 
Territory of Dakota, the majority say that there is no Territory of 
Dakota authorized to elect a Delegate. The region named as Dakota is 
admitted to be the residue of the Territory of Minnesota, already 
represented by Mr. Kingsbury.
  Therefore the majority of the committee reported resolutions that Mr. 
Kingsbury be allowed to retain his seat ``as a Delegate from the 
Territory of Minnesota.''
  The minority of the committee base their argument on a question of 
fact which is disputed. The majority of the committee had said:

  The committee are informed, on what they consider good authority, 
that * * * at the election for Delegate to Congress, the people of this 
so-called Territory of Dakota, or a part of them, did vote for Mr. 
Kingsbury for their Delegate, and they so claim him to be, 
notwithstanding the admission of the State of Minnesota into the Union.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Thirty-fifth Congress, 1 Bartlett, p. 251; Rowell's 
Digest, p. 155.
Sec. 409
  The minority take issue on this point, saying:

  On the said 13th day of October, 1857, the people resident in the 
limits of the State voted entirely to themselves. They elected a 
Delegate (Mr. Kingsbury), who had opposition; also elected 
Representatives. On the same day the inhabitants outside said State 
limits held a separate election for themselves and elected A. G. Fuller 
their Delegate, said Fuller also having an opponent. The people outside 
the State limits acted and voted separately and independently; so did 
the inhabitants within the State.
  Section 14 of the act organizing the Territory of Minnesota, approved 
March 3, 1849, provides that a Delegate to the House of Representatives 
of the United States may be elected by the voters qualified to elect 
members of the legislative assembly. The election for governor, State 
officers, members of assembly, and Representatives, as well as 
Delegates, was confined to the voters within the limits of the proposed 
State. No polls were opened for these elections to the people outside 
the limits of the proposed State.

  When the reports were debated, on June 2 and 3,\1\ there was 
controversy over the point, and letters were presented from Territorial 
officers showing that votes were cast for Mr. Kingsbury in the portion 
of the Territory outside the limits of the proposed State. But this 
fact was not settled so conclusively that it could be said to be 
established.
  The minority alleged that Mr. Kingsbury was not a resident of the 
portion of Minnesota or Dakota which he sought to represent, but that 
he lived within the limits of the new State. In reply to this it was 
declared that there was no provision of law requiring a Delegate to be 
a resident of the Territory he represented.
  The minority further urged:

  We further find and report that the people residing out of the limits 
of the proposed State, after being separated, in anticipation of a 
separate Territorial organization for the remaining Territory, under 
the new name of Dakota, held an election for a Delegate on the 13th of 
October, A. D. 1857, as stated in the memorial of A. G. Fuller, when 
the said A. G. Fuller received a large majority of the legal voters 
resident in the said Territory, and he holds the best evidence thereof 
which the present imperfect legal provisions in the Territory will 
admit of; and, according to the precedent in the case of H. H. Sibley, 
from Wisconsin, would be entitled to his seat as a Delegate 
representing the resident citizens on the remaining Territory, who 
voted for him, and who were not by law allowed to vote for or against 
W. W. Kingsbury

  Therefore the minority recommended that Mr. Fuller be admitted in 
place of Mr. Kingsbury.
  On June 2 and 3 \2\ the question was debated at length, the doubt as 
to whether Mr. Kingsbury had been voted for by the people outside the 
limits assigned for the new State figuring prominently.
  Finally, by a vote of yeas 120, nays 80, the House amended the 
proposition of the majority of the committee by substituting the 
following: \3\

  Resolved, That the admission of the State of Minnesota into the Union 
with the boundaries prescribed in the act of admission operates as a 
dissolution of the Territorial organization of Minnesota; and that so 
much of the late Territory of Minnesota as lies without the limits of 
the present State of Minnesota is without any distinct legally 
organized government, and the people thereof are not entitled to a 
Delegate in Congress until that right is conferred on them by statute.

  The resolution as amended was then agreed to.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Globe, pp. 2660, 2679.
  \2\ Globe, pp. 2660, 2677-2679.
  \3\ Journal, p. 1007.
                                                             Sec. 410
  410.  The election case of J. S. Casement, claiming a seat as 
Delegate from Wyoming, in the Fortieth Congress.
  The House declined to give prima facie effect to credentials from a 
Territory not yet organized.
  After the passage of the act organizing the Territory of Wyoming, but 
before the actual organization, the House declined to admit a Delegate 
elected before the passage of the act.
  On January 12, 1869,\1\ Mr. Henry L. Dawes, of Massachusetts, 
claiming the floor for a question of privilege, presented the 
credentials of Mr. J. S. Casement, claiming to be Delegate-elect from 
the Territory of Wyoming, and asked that he be sworn in.
  A question being raised, it was admitted that the Territory had not 
been organized, and that Mr. Casement had not been regularly elected. 
Thereupon, after debate, the credentials were referred to the Committee 
on Elections, and Mr. Casement was not sworn in.
  On February 23 \2\ Mr. Burton C. Cook, of Illinois, presented the 
report of the committee, as follows:

  The Territory is not yet organized. Section 17 of the act to provide 
for the temporary government for the Territory of Wyoming, approved 
July 25, 1868, is as follows:
  ``This act shall take effect from and after the time when the 
executive and judicial officers herein provided for shall have been 
duly appointed and qualified: Provided, That all general Territorial 
laws of the Territory of Dakota in force in any portion of said 
Territory of Wyoming at the time this act shall take effect shall be 
and continue in force throughout the said Territory until repealed by 
the legislative authority of said Territory, except such laws as relate 
to the possession or occupation of mines or mining claims.''
  Section 13 of the same act provides as follows:
  ``A Delegate to the House of Representatives of the United States, to 
serve during each Congress of the United States, may be elected by the 
voters qualified to elect members of the legislative assembly. The 
first election shall be held at such times and places and be conducted 
in such manner as the governor shall appoint and direct, and at all 
subsequent elections the times, place, and manner of holding elections 
shall be prescribed by law. The person having the greatest number of 
votes of the qualified voters, as hereinbefore provided, shall be 
declared by the governor elected, and a certificate thereof shall be 
accordingly given.''
  The election at which J. S. Casement claims to have been elected was 
held on the 8th clay of October, A. D. 1867. The bill above referred to 
was passed July 25, 1868, and has not yet taken effect, for the reason 
that the executive and judicial officers provided for in said act have 
not been duly appointed and qualified. The election laws of Dakota are 
still in force in that Territory.
  The election held on the 8th day of October, A. D. 1867, was not held 
in pursuance of any law, but was held in pursuance of a call made by a 
mass meeting, at which certain commissioners were appointed to make 
arrangements for holding a general election. It is apparent that this 
election had none of the safeguards provided by law to secure the 
purity of elections; no one could be punished for illegal voting, or 
for receiving illegal votes, or for excluding legal votes, or for 
making false returns; no qualifications of voters had been prescribed 
by law; not even a residence in the Territory was required; no voting 
precincts had been established by law. Three persons, who sign their 
names as commissioners of elections, have made a certificate that the 
election was held, and that J. S. Casement was elected Delegate to 
Congress. A copy of this certificate is hereto annexed, marked ``A.''
  The only other evidence adduced before the committee in support of 
the claim was an affidavit of J. H. Hayfer, a copy of which is hereto 
annexed, marked ``B.''
  It is not contended that there is any law entitling the claimant to a 
seat as a Member of this House,
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Third session Fortieth Congress, Journal, p. 142; Globe, pp. 310, 
311.
  \2\ House Report No. 30; 2 Bartlett, p. 516. Rowell's Digest, p. 229; 
Globe, p. 1460.
Sec. 411
and it is apparent that, according to law, the first election must be 
holden in a very different manner and the certificate be given by the 
governor; but it is insisted that it is a matter within the discretion 
of the House, and that there are precedents which would justify the 
admission of the claimant to a seat; and the admission of Members of 
Congress from Arkansas who were elected before the State constitution 
was approved by Congress or the State admitted as one of the States, is 
cited.
  This precedent is not in point for the reason that Arkansas was a 
State in the Union at the time when the first Representatives from that 
State were admitted to seats in Congress, and the committee find no 
precedent for the admission of a Member from a State or a Delegate from 
a Territory which was not organized at the time the Member or Delegate 
was sworn and admitted to his seat. The Territory of Wyoming is not now 
organized, and no reason can be given for the admission of the claimant 
in this case which would not be equally good to sustain the claim of a 
Delegate from Alaska should a mass meeting be convened at Sitka and a 
Delegate be elected by such meeting.

  Therefore the committee recommended the adoption of a resolution 
declaring that Mr. Casement was not entitled to a seat.
  This report was not acted on by the House.
  411. The election case of Mottrom D. Ball, claiming a seat as 
Delegate from Alaska, in the Forty-seventh Congress.
  The House declined to admit a Delegate from an unorganized Territory, 
although by treaty the people were entitled to the rights of citizens.
  A proposition relating to the admission of a Delegate from an 
unorganized Territory was held not to be a question of privilege.
  On December 21, 1881,\1\ Mr. Horace F. Page, of California, by 
unanimous consent, presented the memorial of certain citizens of 
Alaska, together with a certificate of the election of Mottrom D. Ball 
as Delegate to the House of Representatives from the Territory of 
Alaska. These were referred to the Committee on Elections.
  On February 28,1882,\2\ Mr. William H. Calkins, of Indiana, reported 
\3\ from the committee this resolution, which was referred to the 
Committee on Territories:

  Resolved, That M. D. Ball be not admitted to a seat in the Forty-
seventh Congress as a Delegate from the Territory of Alaska until the 
Committee on Territories shall report thereon, and that the matter be 
continued until that time for further action.

  The minority of the committee proposed with their views this 
resolution:

  Resolved, That M. D. Ball be admitted to a seat in the Forty-seventh 
Congress as a duly elected Delegate from the Territory of Alaska, with 
all the rights and privileges of Delegates from other Territories of 
the United States.

  The majority did not make an argument, but the minority went at 
length into reasons for seating Mr. Ball. They recited that under the 
treaty by which Alaska had been ceded it had been stipulated that the 
inhabitants, except the uncivilized natives, should be ``admitted to 
the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens 
of the United States.''
  As Congress had passed no act in fulfillment of this obligation, the 
people of the district had met in election and chosen delegates, who in 
convention adopted a memorial and elected a Delegate. Reference was 
made to the case of James White, in 1794, who was seated as a Delegate 
from the territory south of the Ohio River. The minority summarized as 
follows the reasons for admitting Mr. Ball: (1) Representation is one 
of certain rights and advantages to which this people are
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Forty-seventh Congress, Journal, p. 193; Record, p. 
243.
  \2\ Journal, p. 685.
  \3\ House Report No. 560.
                                                             Sec. 412
entitled and were entitled at the time of their action; (2) having the 
vested title to the present enjoyment of this right, they were debarred 
from its possession through the failure of the party obligated to its 
accordance to furnish the means whereby they might attain it; (3) being 
so wrongfully debarred of an essential, a guaranteed, and an inherent 
right, by the fault of the authority that should have extended it, they 
set about its acquisition through the exercise of means recognized as 
authoritative under similar circumstances; (4) under such a condition 
of fact it is the duty of this House to ratify their act and make it 
legal and valid to the end desired; (5) not only is this duty plain, 
but the honor and good faith of our Government is involved in this 
recognition. And it is further shown to be advisable on the mere ground 
of expediency.
  On March 28, 1882,\1\ Mr. William H. Calkins, of Indiana, as a 
question of privilege, proposed to call up the report of the Committee 
on Elections in the case of the claim of M. D. Ball to a seat in this 
House as a Delegate from the Territory of Alaska.
  Mr. J. Proctor Knott, of Kentucky, made the point of order that the 
said report and subject was not a question of privilege, there being no 
law authorizing Alaska to send a Delegate to Congress or authorizing an 
election for that purpose to be held in said Territory.
  After debate on the point of order, the Speaker \2\ sustained the 
same, on the ground that said report, with an accompanying resolution, 
providing that M. D. Ball be not admitted to a seat in the Forty-
seventh Congress as a Delegate from the Territory of Alaska until the 
Committee on the Territories shall report thereon, was referred to the 
Committee on the Territories, which committee had not reported thereon.
  At the second session of this Congress an attempt was made, on 
February 19, 1883,\3\ to set a time for considering this report and 
also the bill and reports of the Committee on Territories, but it 
failed. The matter ended thus.
  412. The election case of Owen G. Chase, claiming a seat as Delegate 
from the Territory of Cimmaron, in the Fiftieth Congress.
  The House declined to admit a Delegate from a Territory not organized 
by law.
  On December 12, 1887,\4\ Mr. William M. Springer, of Illinois, 
presented the petition of Owen G. Chase, claiming to be elected a 
Delegate from the Territory of Cimmaron, and also a resolution 
referring the petition and certificate of election to the Committee on 
Territories and allowing Mr. Chase the privileges of the floor pending 
the consideration of the organization of a Territorial government.
  Mr. Springer urged, in behalf of his resolution, the precedent of 
California. On the other hand, it was urged that the more recent action 
of the House in the case of the proposed Delegate from Alaska was the 
better precedent.
  On motion of Mr. S. S. Cox, of New York, the resolution and petition 
were laid on the table, ayes 157, noes 53.
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  \1\ First session Forty-seventh Congress, Journal, pp. 923, 924; 
Record, pp. 2343-2345.
  \2\ J. Warren Keifer, of Ohio, Speaker.
  \3\ Second session Forty-seventh Congress, Journal, p. 444; Record, 
p. 2954.
  \4\ First session Fiftieth Congress, Journal, p. 42; Record, pp. 38-
40.