[Deschler's Precedents, Volume 8, Chapter 26]
[Chapter 26. Unauthorized Appropriations; Legislation on Appropriation Bills]
[F. Permissible Limitations on Use of Funds]
[Â§ 74. Federal Employment]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[Page 6442-6454]
 
                               CHAPTER 26
 
    Unauthorized Appropriations; Legislation on Appropriation Bills
 
               F. PERMISSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON USE OF FUNDS
 
Sec. 74. Federal Employment

Maximum Age

Sec. 74.1 To an appropriation bill, an amendment to provide that no 
    part of the funds thereby appropriated shall be used to pay 
    compensation of persons who allocate positions in the classified 
    civil service with a requirement of maximum age for such positions 
    was held to be a proper limitation and in order.

    On Mar. 30, 1955,(11) the Committee of the Whole was 
considering H.R. 5240, an independent offices appropriation bill. The 
following proceedings took place:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 101 Cong. Rec. 4077, 84th Cong. 1st Sess.
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        Amendment offered by Mr. [Sidney R.] Yates [of Illinois]: On 
    page 37, after line 25, insert a new section to be designated as 
    section 108, as follows:
        ``No part of any appropriation contained in this title shall be 
    used to pay the compensation of any officers and employees who 
    allocate positions in the

[[Page 6443]]

    classified civil service with a requirement of maximum age for such 
    positions.''

        Mr. [Albert] Thomas [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of 
    order against the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois 
    [Mr. Yates] on the ground that it is legislation and placing a duty 
    upon the agency to determine the age of each applicant. . . .
        Mr. Yates: Mr. Chairman, this is negative restriction directed 
    solely to funds sought to be appropriated by this bill. It is not 
    legislation on an appropriation bill.
        The Chairman: (12) The Chair is ready to rule. It 
    appears to the Chair that this is a proper limitation. Therefore, 
    the point of order is overruled.
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12. Albert Rains (Ala.).
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Limiting Number of Employees in Executive Office of President

Sec. 74.2 An amendment to a general appropriation bill restricting the 
    total amount of funds used to pay certain salaries and for certain 
    positions constitutes a valid limitation if it is confined to 
    appropriations made by that bill and does not affect funds 
    appropriated in other acts.

    On June 22, 1972,(13) During consideration in the 
Committee of the Whole of a general appropriation bill (H.R. 15585), a 
point of order was raised against the following amendment:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 118 Cong. Rec. 22098, 22099, 92d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Morris K.] Udall [of Arizona]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Udall: On page 38, line 18, add a 
        new section 611, as follows:
            Sec. 611. No part of the appropriation made by this Act 
        shall be expended for the compensation of more than 1647 
        employees in the Executive Office of the President, including 
        not more than 50 employees of any Department or agency detailed 
        to serve in the Executive Offices;
            Nor shall the total amount appropriated to the Executive 
        Office of the President for personnel compensation exceed 
        $29,737,760;
            Nor shall any part of the appropriations be expended for 
        the compensation of more than 95 ungraded employees in the 
        Executive Office of the President, whose individual salaries 
        are in excess of the maximum rates of pay established at the 
        pay level of GS-10 of the General Schedule (5 USC 5332);
            Nor shall any part of the appropriation be expended for the 
        compensation of more than 549 employees in the Executive Office 
        of the President whose annual rates of pay are more than the 
        minimum rate in effect for GS-13 of the General Schedule (5 USC 
        5332) but less than the annual rate of pay for Level II of the 
        Executive Schedule (5 USC 5313);
            Except that no part of this section shall apply to the 
        compensation of any employees of the White House Office, or the 
        compensation of the President. . . .

        Mr. [Howard W.] Robison of New York: Mr. Chairman, I make a 
    point of order against the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
    Arizona.

[[Page 6444]]

        The Chairman: (14) The Chair will hear the 
    gentleman.
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14. John S. Monagan (Conn.).
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        Mr. Robison of New York: Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding 
    that in order to be qualified under the rules and the precedents of 
    the House, a limitation on an appropriation bill must limit the 
    funds appropriated under that act and that act only.
        I think the chairman of the subcommittee has already pointed 
    out to the Chair that there are other Executive Office agencies 
    under the heading of the Executive Office of the President to which 
    the amendment seeks to add a limitation. I would say to the Chair 
    that those agencies are, among others, the Council on Environmental 
    Quality, the National Aeronautics and Space Council, the National 
    Commission on Productivity, the National Council on Marine 
    Resources and Engineering, the Office of Consumer Affairs, the 
    Office of Science and Technology, the Special Representative for 
    Trade Negotiations, and finally, Mr. Chairman, the Office of 
    Economic Opportunity, for none of which agencies is money provided 
    under this appropriation bill.
        Mr. Udall: Mr. Chairman, I wish to be heard on a point of 
    order; in the first place, my esteemed friend from New York (Mr. 
    Robison) did not reserve a point of order. He is either making the 
    same one my friend from Oklahoma made, or he is making a different 
    one, and the gentleman from Oklahoma's point of order has been 
    ruled upon.
        He has no right to make a point of order, since he did not 
    reserve one, and debate had intervened.
        On the second ground, I think the Chairman has already covered 
    in his earlier ruling the precise point the gentleman has raised.
        Mr. [Thomas J.] Steed [of Oklahoma]: Mr. Chairman, may I be 
    heard further?
        The Chairman: Yes, the gentleman is recognized.
        Mr. Steed: Mr. Chairman, if the Chair will direct his attention 
    to the first paragraph, he will see a specific reference to the 
    number 1,647 employees in the Executive Office of the President. It 
    does not say, in this act. It says, in the entire office. It says:

            Nor shall the total amount appropriated--

        Not in this act, but in all acts--

            To the Executive Office of the President for personnel 
        compensation exceed $29,737,760.

        Mr. Chairman, there is no way from the record here or any other 
    available record that we can show where the 1,647 limitation does 
    increase or decrease the people available in the Executive Office 
    of the President.
        In the rules of the House it is very specific under the Holman 
    rule, that unless a definite reduction can be shown this language 
    would be legislation and would not be appropriate to this bill.
        The Chairman: The point made by the gentleman from New York is 
    essentially that already made by the gentleman from Oklahoma. This 
    bill does contain appropriations for the Executive Office of the 
    President and the Chair reads the amendment as being a limitation 
    upon those appropriations. And, as pointed out before, the specific 
    provision is that no part of the appropriations made by this act 
    shall be ex

[[Page 6445]]

    pended for certain purposes--detailed in the first four paragraphs 
    of the amendment. The Chair is constrained, therefore, to overrule 
    the point of order.

Hatch Act Application

Sec. 74.3 To an appropriation bill an amendment providing that no part 
    of any appropriation in the bill be used for compensation of any 
    officer or employee of a designated bureau who for the purposes of 
    the Hatch Act, ``shall not be included within the construction of 
    the term `officer' or `employee' '' was held in order as a 
    limitation where the determinations of employment status were 
    already required by law.

    On Mar. 4, 1954,(15) the Committee of the Whole was 
considering H.R. 8067, a State, Justice, and Commerce Departments 
appropriation bill. The Clerk read as follows, and proceedings ensued 
as indicated below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 100 Cong. Rec. 2697, 2698, 83d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Amendment offered by Mr. [Louis C.] Rabaut [of Michigan]: At 
    page 52, after line 19, add the following new section:
        ``Sec. 604. No part of any appropriation contained in this act 
    shall be used to pay the salary or wages of any officer or employee 
    of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs of the Department of 
    State who, for the purposes of the act of August 2, 1939, as 
    amended (5 U.S.C. 118i), shall not be included within the 
    construction of the term `officer' or `employee'.''
        Mr. [John] Taber [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, I make the point 
    of order against the amendment that it is legislation on an 
    appropriation bill; that it changes existing law and requires new 
    and additional duties.
        The Chairman: (16) Does the gentleman from Michigan 
    desire to be heard?
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16. Leroy Johnson (Calif.).
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        Mr. Rabaut: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I cite volume VII, Cannon's 
    Precedents, section 1663 and section 1670:

            1. Denial of use of an appropriation for payment of 
        salaries of employees of the Department of Agriculture who 
        forecast the price of agricultural products was construed as a 
        proper limitation and in order on an appropriation bill.
            The Chairman at that time, March 2, 1928, Allen T. 
        Treadway, of Massachusetts, relied on prior decisions of 
        Chairmen of the Committee of the Whole, Mr. Graham, of 
        Illinois, in 1924, and Mr. Longworth, of Ohio, in 1923, and 
        held such a limitation proper and not subject to a point of 
        order.
            2. An amendment forbidding payment of salary authorized by 
        law from any part of an appropriation to a designated 
        individual was held to be a limitation and in order on an 
        appropriation bill. . . .

        Mr. Taber: . . . This amendment, Mr. Chairman, refers to the 
    so-called Hatch Act, section 118i, of title V of the Code. It reads 
    as follows:

            For the purposes of this section the term ``officer'' or 
        ``employee'' shall

[[Page 6446]]

        not be construed to include (1) the President and Vice 
        President of the United States; (2) persons whose compensation 
        is paid from the appropriation for the Office of the President 
        (3) heads and assistant heads of executive departments; (4) 
        officers who are appointed by the President, by and with the 
        advice and consent of the Senate, and who determine policies to 
        be pursued by the United States in its relations with foreign 
        powers or in the nationwide administration of Federal laws. The 
        provisions of the second sentence of this subsection shall not 
        apply to the employees of the Alaska Railroad.

        This provision in effect brings about the prohibition of 
    payments to these employees who are not determined to be officers 
    or employees within the provisions of this paragraph of section 
    118. It requires a determination on the part of some officer before 
    the thing can be effective. For that reason, it requires additional 
    duties to be performed by some officer before it can be effective. 
    Therefore, it is subject to the rule that it requires additional 
    duties, and it is an attempt on the part of the amendment to change 
    and enlarge the provisions of that section. . . .
        Mr. Rabaut: Mr. Chairman, in House Report No. 1365, 82d 
    Congress, relative to H.R. 5678, the McCarran-Walter bill, it is 
    stated on page 36:

            The Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, section 104, 
        creates a new organizational setup within the Department of 
        State to administer the issuance of passports and visas. There 
        will be a responsible authority in the Department of State of 
        rank and power corresponding to the Commissioner of Immigration 
        and Naturalization and to the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation--

        Mr. J. Edgar Hoover--

            and the Central Intelligence Agency--

        Mr. Dulles--

            All of whom are to collaborate in the interests of national 
        security.

        Is it the contention of anybody here that we would want, for 
    instance, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover going around the country making 
    political speeches? . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule. . . .
        It appears to the Chair that the contention of those who make 
    the point of order is answered by this provision in Hinds' 
    Precedents, volume IV, section 3954:

            A provision that no part of an appropriation for pay of 
        retired Army officers should go to one receiving pay for 
        services as a civil employee was held to be a limitation.

        Likewise we have a similar expression in Cannon's Precedents, 
    volume VII, section 1651, which contains the provision that no part 
    of an appropriation shall be allotted to a beneficiary failing to 
    comply with certain requirements. That provision was held in order 
    as a proper limitation on an appropriation bill. With those two 
    precedents the Chair is constrained to overrule the point of order, 
    and the Chair so rules.
        The point of order is overruled.

Past Employment of Heads of Departments

Sec. 74.4 An amendment providing that no part of an appropriation shall 
    be paid to

[[Page 6447]]

    the head of any executive department who, within a specified period 
    was a partner in a firm which derived any income from representing 
    a foreign government, was held to be a proper limitation on an 
    appropriation bill and in order.

    On July 26, 1951,(17) the Committee of the Whole was 
considering H.R. 4740, a State, Justice, Commerce Departments and 
Judiciary appropriation bill. The Clerk read as follows:
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17. 97 Cong. Rec. 8963, 8965, 82d Cong. 1st Sess.
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        Amendment offered by Mr. [John] Phillips [of California]: On 
    page 58, following line 14, add a new section to be numbered 
    section 602:
        ``None of the money appropriated in this act shall be paid to 
    the head of any executive department who, within a period of 5 
    years preceding his appointment, was a partner in, or a member of, 
    a professional firm which derived any part of its income from 
    representing, or acting for, a foreign government, or who, acting 
    as an individual, derived income from such representation.''

    Mr. John J. Rooney, of New York, made a point of order on which 
debate occurred as follows:

        Mr. [John W.] McCormack [of Massachusetts]: Mr. Chairman, the 
    proposed amendment starts out under the guise of a limitation, ``No 
    money in this appropriation shall be paid,'' and so forth. A 
    limitation, as I understand it, cannot impose any more duties upon 
    an official, any affirmative duties, any additional duties, that do 
    not presently exist by law.

        Let us see what additional duties this amendment imposes upon 
    someone. It does not state here, but someone has to carry out the 
    provisions of this amendment if it were held to be in order and it 
    was adopted. ``Who in a period of 5 years preceding his 
    appointment.'' Who is going to determine the 5-year period? 
    Somebody has got to say. That is an additional duty and 
    responsibility resting upon somebody. This is legislation. ``Was a 
    partner in.'' Somebody has to pass on that. That imposes additional 
    duties upon somebody. ``Or a member of a professional firm which 
    derived any part of its income from representing, or acting for a 
    foreign government.'' That imposes additional duties upon some one, 
    and that duty is not imposed upon anybody by law now. There is no 
    organic law now relating to it. ``Or who, acting as an individual, 
    derived income from such representation.'' There are many firms 
    where men may be partners in one thing and in one case, and not 
    partners in another. Somebody has to determine all of these 
    factors.
        Mr. Chairman, under the guise of a limitation I respectfully 
    submit that the proposed amendment constitutes pure legislation. . 
    . .
        Mr. Phillips: . . . I am sure that all the information 
    necessary was necessarily obtained before the appointment was made. 
    It all appears, I will say to the gentleman from Massachusetts, in 
    the Senate hearings. . . .
        Mr. [Clare E.] Hoffman of Michigan: . . . If [Mr. McCormack's] 
    argu

[[Page 6448]]

    ment is logically followed through it would not be possible for the 
    Congress to make any appropriation, because every appropriation 
    that we make requires that someone take some action to determine 
    that a condition or situation exists before the money appropriated 
    can be had or used. For example, if we make an appropriation for 
    the armed services, someone has to certify the individuals who are 
    entitled to receive it. Someone must take action to create the 
    obligation which justifies the expenditure. What I say with 
    reference to this appropriation is true with reference to every 
    appropriation bill. Every appropriation requires something be done 
    before the money becomes available, an action which is incidental 
    rather than legislative. . . .
        The Chairman: (18) . . . The Chair is prepared to 
    rule.
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18. Jere Cooper (Tenn.).
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        The gentleman from California has offered an amendment which 
    has been reported by the Clerk. The gentleman from New York has 
    made a point of order against the amendment on the ground that it 
    is not a proper limitation on an appropriation bill.
        The Chair has examined the amendment with some degree of care. 
    . . .
        It should be clear that almost any limitation must necessarily 
    require some action on the part of somebody. One of the classic 
    illustrations given on many occasions by the distinguished 
    parliamentarian to whom the Chair made reference a few moments ago, 
    Hon. James R. Mann, of Illinois, was that if a provision states 
    that ``no part of this appropriation shall be paid to a red-headed 
    man,'' somebody will have to find that red-headed man and determine 
    whether his hair is red; therefore, it would appear that in any 
    instance where a limitation is sought to be imposed there must be 
    some activity contemplated or some effort exerted by someone to 
    carry out the provisions of the limitation.
        The Chair would invite attention to section 1593 of Cannon's 
    Precedents. . . .
        The Chair is of the opinion that that decision is applicable to 
    the pending question raised by the point of order made by the 
    gentleman from New York. It would appear that the over-all and 
    controlling element of the pending amendment is a limitation on an 
    appropriation bill. It is entirely negative in character, and does 
    not affirmatively impose any additional duties upon anybody.
        Therefore the Chair overrules the point of order.

    Parliamentarian's Note: As a general rule, it is in order in a 
general appropriation bill to describe the qualifications of the 
recipients of funds provided therein and to deny the availability of 
those funds to persons or purposes not meeting those criteria, so long 
as the restriction is confined to the fiscal year covered by the bill. 
See Sec. 54, supra, discussing qualifications of recipients of funds. 
Of course, a determination must be made by the administrator of the 
funds as to whether prospective recipients have the qualifications 
described as a condition to receiving funds, and in some instances

[[Page 6449]]

that determination may entail the performance of new and substantial 
duties on the part of the administrator. In such cases, as has been 
seen (Sec. 52, supra), the express or implied requirement that such 
duties be performed would amount to legislation prohibited by Rule XXI. 
The question of whether the new duties are in fact of such a 
substantial nature is sometimes a difficult one, especially where those 
duties are merely implicit in the proposed limitation. The application 
of any limitation on an appropriation bill places some minimal extra 
duties on federal officials, who, if nothing else, must determine 
whether a particular use of funds falls within that prohibited by the 
limitation. But when an amendment, while curtailing certain uses of 
funds carried in the bill, explicitly places new duties on officers of 
the government or implicitly requires them to make investigations, 
compile evidence, or make judgments and determinations not otherwise 
required of them by law, then it assumes the character of legislation 
and is subject to a point of order. See 115 Cong. Rec. 21653, 21675, 
91st Cong. 1st Sess., July 31, 1969 (discussed in Sec. 61.6, supra), 
ruling that the words ``in order to overcome racial imbalance'' in an 
amendment to an appropriation bill would impose additional duties on 
school officials. If language such as that involved in the 1951 ruling 
above were to be ruled on today, the issue of whether it constitutes 
prohibited ``legislation'' might depend on whether the applicability of 
the provision could be determined on the basis of information that was 
already required to be disclosed under existing law, or whether the 
administrator of the funds in question would have to undertake new 
duties of an investigative nature.

Abortion; Prohibition Against Federal Funds for Insurance Coverage

Sec. 74.5 An amendment to a general appropriation bill denying the use 
    of funds therein to pay for an abortion, or administrative expenses 
    in connection with any federal employees health benefits plan which 
    provides any benefits or coverage for abortions after the last day 
    of contracts currently in force, was held not to constitute 
    legislation, since the amendment did not directly interfere with 
    executive discretion (in contracting to establish such plans); it 
    is permissible by limitation to negatively deny

[[Page 6450]]

    the availability of funds although discretionary authority may be 
    indirectly curtailed and contracts may be left unsatisfied.

    On Aug. 20, 1980,(19) during consideration of the 
Department of Treasury and Postal Service appropriation bill (H.R. 
7593), an amendment was ruled in order as follows:
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19. 126 Cong. Rec. 22171, 22172, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
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        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. [John M.] Ashbrook [of Ohio]: Page 
        43, after line 5, insert the following:
            ``Sec. 614. No funds appropriated by this Act shall be 
        available to pay for an abortion or the administrative expenses 
        in connection with any health plan under the Federal Employees 
        Health Benefit Program which provides any benefits or coverage 
        for abortions under such negotiated plans after the last day of 
        the contracts currently in force.''. . .

        Mrs. [Patricia] Schroeder [of Colorado]: Mr. Chairman, I make a 
    point of order that this amendment constitutes legislation in an 
    appropriation bill. This limitation changes existing law, and 
    imposes new duties on administrative officials.
        This amendment changes current law in a variety of ways. 
    Section 8904 of title 5, United States Code, lists the authorized 
    content of a Federal employee health plan. This amendment, in 
    effect, amends this section to add an exclusion. By doing so, the 
    amendment changes the benefits provided to Federal employees. 
    Directly on point is the precedent found in section 9.8 of chapter 
    26 of Deschler's Procedure, holding that language in a general 
    appropriation bill changing the allowances and benefits due 
    overseas employees of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission was 
    held to be legislation and not in order (106 Congressional Record 
    17899, 86th Congress, 2d session, August 26, 1960).
        There are other ways in which this amendment changes the basic 
    law. Throughout the development of Federal labor-relations law 
    culminating in passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, a 
    careful balance was worked out on labor organization rights. 
    Congress did not go along with providing an agency shop in which 
    dues would be required from bargaining unit members, but did allow 
    labor organizations to offer health plans exclusively to their 
    members as a membership and fund-raising device. This amendment 
    would strip one of the attractive features out of these plans and 
    would thereby deny labor organizations one of the rights which they 
    fought hard for during civil service reform. . . .
        This amendment imposes considerable new duties on the Office of 
    Personnel Management. The general rule on this is well stated in 
    section 11.3 of chapter 26 of Deschler's Procedure:

            It is not in order, in an appropriation bill, to impose 
        additional duties on an executive officer or to make the 
        appropriation contingent upon the performance of such duties.

        Currently, virtually all the health plan contracts for 1981 are 
    written, signed and sealed. Most provide abortion health services 
    or indemnification

[[Page 6451]]

    for abortions. The adoption of this amendment would force the 
    renegotiation of these contracts in the very limited time prior to 
    the beginning of the open session in October. The administrative 
    burdens are so high, in fact, that I am not certain they can be 
    discharged in time. . . .
        Another side of this question of administrative duties has to 
    do with changing the authority of a Federal official. . . .
        . . . [S]ections 20.6 and 13.3 of chapter 26 of Deschler's 
    Procedure stand for the proposition that changing the authority of 
    a Federal official renders an amendment out of order. Here, the 
    plenary authority of the Director of the Office of Personnel 
    Management to negotiate health plans is limited by a requirement 
    that he negotiate plans having a certain type of coverage. By tying 
    the Director's hands in this way, the amendment is seriously 
    changing the contracting authority of an executive official. . . .
        Mr. Ashbrook: Mr. Chairman, if we read the amendment, the 
    amendment very clearly is a limitation on expenditures, it is a 
    limitation consistent with previous limitations that have been 
    upheld by this Chair.
        As I say, it does not require any affirmative actions.
        My colleague, the gentlewoman from Colorado, refers to 
    abortions that are in current health benefits programs. I know of 
    no federally protected right that anyone would have for an abortion 
    that comes under a Federal employees' health benefit program.
        The truth of the matter is that since June 30, the Supreme 
    Court upheld the right of this Congress to withhold funds. This has 
    been the stated purpose. The Hyde amendment originally withheld 
    funds for activities that up to that time had been legal. There is 
    nothing new about that. . . .
        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: . . . If the Chair will 
    examine the specific limitations that are embodied in the language, 
    he will find that it would require nothing more than incidental 
    determinations which have been held in the past to be perfectly 
    adequate and within the rule allowing limitations on expenditures.
        I would cite to the Chair chapter 25, section 10.4, Deschler's 
    Procedure, where it was ruled in the 86th Congress that:

            Where the manifest intent of a proposed amendment is to 
        impose a limitation on the use of funds appropriated in the 
        bill, the fact that the administration of the limitation will 
        impose certain incidental but additional burdens on executive 
        officers does not destroy the character of the limitation.

        In this case, the amendment forbids the use of Federal funds to 
    pay for an abortion or the administrative expenses in connection 
    with any health plan under the Federal employee's health benefit 
    program providing abortions. Those health plans at the present time 
    are well known, are available, their contents are fully known, and 
    no new determinations must be made. . . .
        The Chairman: (20) The Chair is prepared to rule on 
    the point of order.
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20. Richardson Preyer (N.C.).
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        The gentlewoman from Colorado makes the point of order that the 
    amendment offered by the gentleman

[[Page 6452]]

    from Ohio (Mr. Ashbrook), is legislation on an appropriation bill 
    in violation of clause 2, rule XXI. The gentlewoman cites statutory 
    provisions relating to the discretionary authority conferred upon 
    the Office of Personnel Management in contracting with health 
    insurance carriers to establish health benefit plans for Federal 
    employees, and also to administer the health benefits fund. The 
    gentlewoman then cites precedents to the effect that it is not in 
    order on a general appropriation bill to directly limit executive 
    discretionary authority, to directly change entitlement benefits or 
    to directly change contracts entered into pursuant to law, or 
    otherwise impose new duties not required by existing law by 
    requiring new investigations or judgments to be made. All of the 
    precedents examined by the Chair standing for the proposition 
    asserted by the gentlewoman from Colorado involve situations where 
    the Chair was able to discern from the language of the amendment 
    itself, rather than from resulting circumstances which might derive 
    from the enactment of the amendment, that a change in law would 
    necessarily result from the amendment.
        On the other hand, the great weight of precedent in the House, 
    not only with respect to the denial of availability of funds in a 
    general appropriation bill for abortions but also for any other 
    purpose otherwise authorized by law, indicates that it is 
    permissible as a limitation to negatively deny the availability of 
    funds although discretionary authority may be indirectly curtailed 
    or although contracts may remain unsatisfied thereby. And, while 
    new determinations, which the gentlewoman suggests would 
    necessarily have to be made in order to properly administer the 
    funded program within the terms of the amendment cannot be 
    foreclosed as possibilities, the Chair sees no language in the 
    amendment itself which would require those new findings to be made. 
    Such was the essence of the decision of the Chair on July 17, 1979, 
    where to the D.C. appropriation bill a substitute amendment 
    providing that none of the funds in the bill provided by the 
    Federal payment to the District shall be used to perform abortions 
    was held not to constitute legislation.
        The Chair rules therefore that the amendment is in order, and 
    the point of order is overruled.

Striking Employees Not To Be Rehired

Sec. 74.6 Where existing law (5 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 7311, 3333; 18 USC 
    Sec. 1918) provided civil and criminal sanctions against strikes by 
    federal employees, and where a federal court order had enjoined a 
    particular strike by a union representing a group of federal 
    employees, it was held in order as a limitation on a general 
    appropriation bill to deny funds for the rehiring of those 
    employees engaged in a strike, where federal officials 
    administering those funds would know which of the employees in 
    question were ``on strike''.

[[Page 6453]]

    On Sept. 10, 1981,(1) an amendment to a general 
appropriation bill prohibiting the use of funds therein to rehire 
certain federal employees engaged in a strike in violation of federal 
law (5 U.S.C. Sec. 7311; 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1918) was held in order as a 
limitation not requiring new determinations on the part of federal 
officials administering those funds, since existing law (5 USC 
Sec. 3333) requiring an affidavit undertaking not to strike to be 
signed by federal employees, and a court order enjoining the strike in 
question, already imposed an obligation on the administering officials 
to enforce the law. The proceedings were as indicated below:
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 1. 127 Cong. Rec. 20109, 20110, 97th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of 
        Pennsylvania]: On page 38, after line 15, insert the following 
        new section:
            ``Sec. 322. None of the funds provided in this Act shall be 
        used to rehire Federal air traffic controllers engaged in a 
        strike in violation of Federal law.'' . . .

        Mr. [Lawrence] Coughlin [of Pennsylvania]: . . .  Mr. Chairman, 
    I make a point of order that the amendment offered by the gentleman 
    from Pennsylvania is legislation on an appropriation bill, contrary 
    to clause 2 of rule XXI.
        I make the further point of order that it places additional 
    duties on officers of the Government or implicitly requires them to 
    make investigations, compile data or otherwise make determinations 
    not otherwise required by law.
        Mr. Chairman, chapter 26 of the Deschler's procedure, section 
    11.2 states:

            Where an amendment, in the guise of a limitation, imposes 
        additional determinations and duties on an executive, it may be 
        ruled out as legislation on a general appropriation bill. . . .

        Mr. [Dennis E.] Eckart [of Ohio]: . . . I would like to draw to 
    the Chair's attention that, in fact, other duties may be incumbent 
    as a result of this point of order in the amendment raised by 
    virtue of the fact that it would require a self-standing judicial 
    determination to be made if, in fact, the strike was a violation of 
    Federal laws, separate judicial determination that has not been 
    made. Therefore, there is a contingency contained in this amendment 
    which I believe would place it within the grounds of the point of 
    order. . . .
        The Chairman: (2) [T]he determination required of 
    the Federal Government by the amendment involves a set of facts 
    that is within the knowledge of the Federal Government in that the 
    Federal Government is under an obligation to know which of its 
    employees have been engaged in a strike in violation of Federal 
    laws.
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 2. Richard A. Gephardt (Mo.).
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        The Chair would cite the precedent in Deschler's procedure, 
    chapter 5, section 12.7, which states:

            While an amendment under the guise of a limitation may not 
        require

[[Page 6454]]

        affirmative action or additional duties on the part of federal 
        officials, it is in order on a general appropriation bill to 
        deny funds to a nonfederal recipient of a federal grant program 
        unless he is in compliance with a provision of federal law; for 
        such a requirement places no new duties on a federal official 
        (who is already charged with responsibility for enforcing the 
        law) but only on the non-federal grantee.

        The Chair would also cite the related precedents appearing in 
    Cannon's precedents, volume 7, sections 1661 and 1662.
        For these reasons the Chair overrules the point of order.