[Deschler's Precedents, Volume 8, Chapter 26]
[Chapter 26. Unauthorized Appropriations; Legislation on Appropriation Bills]
[F. Permissible Limitations on Use of Funds]
[Â§ 64. Generally]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[Page 6269-6311]
 
                               CHAPTER 26
 
    Unauthorized Appropriations; Legislation on Appropriation Bills
 
               F. PERMISSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON USE OF FUNDS
 
Sec. 64. Generally

    When points of order are made under the rule prohibiting 
legislation on appropriation bills, rulings thereon will frequently 
turn on whether the proposition in question is in fact one of 
legislation, or whether it is merely a permissible ``limitation'' on 
the funds sought to be appropriated. The basic theory of limitations is 
that, just as the House may decline to appropriate for a purpose 
authorized by law, it may by limitation prohibit the use of the money 
for part of the purpose while appropriating for the remainder of it. 
The limitation cannot change existing law, but may negatively restrict 
the use of funds for an authorized purpose or project. A limitation may 
furthermore serve the purpose of foreclosing possible interpretations 
of language in an appropriation bill that otherwise might be 
administratively construed to include matters other than those actually 
contemplated by the bill.(10)
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10. See the statement of the Chair at 83 Cong. Rec. 2655, 75th Cong. 3d 
        Sess., Mar. 1, 1938, in the course of ruling on a point of 
        order against language contained in H.R. 9621, an Interior 
        Department appropriation bill.
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    A useful discussion and a list of tests to be applied in 
determining whether language in an appropriation bill or amendment 
thereto constitutes a permissible limitation can be found in a ruling 
made on Jan. 8, 1923.(11) The Chairman,(12) in 
the course of rul

[[Page 6270]]

ing on a point of order against provisions of a District of Columbia 
appropriation bill, set forth a series of tests for determining the 
validity of a purported limitation under the rules. The checklist is 
reproduced here for quick reference:
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11. 64 Cong. Rec. 1422, 67th Cong. 4th Sess.
12. Frederick C. Hicks (N.Y.).
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    1. Does the limitation apply solely to the appropriation under 
consideration?
    2. Does it operate beyond the fiscal year for which the 
appropriation is made?
    3. Is the limitation accompanied or coupled with a phrase applying 
to official functions, and if so, does the phrase give affirmative 
directions in fact or in effect, although not in form?
    4. Is it accompanied by a phrase which might be construed to impose 
additional duties or permit an official to assume an intent to change 
existing law?
    5. Does the limitation curtail or extend, modify, or alter existing 
powers or duties, or terminate old or confer new ones? If it does, then 
it must be conceded that legislation is involved, for without 
legislation these results could not be accomplished.
    The statement of the Chair was as follows:

        The Chair is cognizant of confusion in the rulings in cases 
    somewhat akin to this one, and realizes that in considering 
    questions of limitations as in determining questions of germaneness 
    there is considerable latitude between what is clearly permissible 
    and what is as clearly repugnant to the rule. The Chair feels that 
    in traversing this twilight zone he is justified in leaning toward 
    the side of conservatism in regard to admission of legislation on 
    appropriation bills. In the last few years there has been a very 
    perceptible increase in the amount of legislative provisions 
    incorporated in bills reported by the Appropriations Committee. The 
    growth of this practice, in the opinion of the Chair, is unwise and 
    is not warranted by the rules or procedure of the House. It is 
    probably due to the fact that, as formerly many of the standing 
    committees had jurisdiction over both appropriations and 
    legislation, a clear distinction of these separate functions was 
    not made in the bills reported, which left the Appropriations 
    Committee in the position of finding that many of the items for 
    which it desired to appropriate were unauthorized. This made it 
    incumbent upon the Appropriations Committee, in order to carry on 
    its work, to devise these legislative limitations.
        Under our rules the Committee on Appropriations can consider 
    only questions of appropriations, the subjects of legislation and 
    authorization being confined to the jurisdiction of standing 
    committees constituted for that very purpose and equipped with 
    facilities to conduct investigations. Feeling that each committee 
    should be held strictly to the consideration of its own particular 
    work, the Chair is of the opinion that too much latitude has been 
    given in the employment of limitations, and that the practice of 
    resorting to

[[Page 6271]]

    this method of securing, in an indirect way, legislation on 
    appropriation bills has been abused, and extended beyond the 
    intention of the rule. . . .
        Since Congress has the right to appropriate, Congress has the 
    right to refuse to appropriate, even though the appropriation is 
    authorized, and this may be done in two ways: First, by not 
    appropriating for a certain purpose at all, and second, by denying 
    the use of a part of an appropriation for a certain purpose. This 
    is the principle on which the theory of limitations is grounded and 
    should always be kept in mind in construing a limitation.
        To use the illustration of the late James R. Mann, of honored 
    memory, Congress, having the right to appropriate for red-headed 
    men, may specifically deny the use of an appropriation for the 
    payment of red-headed men. Therefore, while it is not in order to 
    require the employment of red-headed men or even the payment of 
    red-headed men, it is in order to deny the use of an appropriation 
    for the payment of red-headed men, even though existing law permits 
    the employment and payment of red-headed men.
        But the misapplication and the difficulty in construing the 
    rule has occurred when a limitation is accompanied by something 
    additional in the nature of a further limitation or restriction.
        For example, there is no difficulty in the following provision: 
    ``No part of this appropriation may be expended in the payment of 
    red-headed men.''
        But take the following proposition: ``No part of this 
    appropriation may be used for the payment of any persons except 
    red-headed men.''
        In construing the last example it is necessary for the Chair to 
    look to the effect rather than to the form. Does the language 
    merely deny the use of the appropriation or does it go further and 
    require the employment of red-headed men? If existing law does not 
    authorize the employment of red-headed men, or expressly prohibits 
    the employment of red-headed men, the language clearly becomes not 
    a limitation but becomes legislation making an appropriation for an 
    unauthorized purpose and in addition proposes legislation 
    permitting the employment of red-headed men contrary to existing 
    law. But if the law authorizes the employment of red-headed men the 
    language merely becomes explanatory of the recipient of the 
    appropriation, and is in fact merely an appropriation for a certain 
    purpose. Therefore, as a test in determining the legality of such 
    language, the Chair may properly ask himself this question: ``Would 
    it be in order to make a direct appropriation for this purpose 
    instead of denying the use of this appropriation except for the 
    specified purpose? '' If the question could be answered in the 
    affirmative this particular class of limitations would be in order.
        Approaching the point of order now before us, in the 
    consideration of which the merits of the proposition are not under 
    review, the Chair will cite a number of precedents that bear on the 
    subject of limitations, quoting from Hinds' Precedents:
        ``No. 3931. Legislation may not be proposed under the form of a 
    limitation.
        ``No. 3976. The language of limitation prescribing the 
    conditions under which the appropriation may be used

[[Page 6272]]

    may not be such as, when fairly construed, would change existing 
    law.
        ``No. 3812. The enactment of positive law where none exists is 
    constructed as a ``provision changing existing law,'' such as is 
    forbidden in an appropriation bill.
        ``No. 3967. A limitation is negative in its nature and may not 
    include positive enactments establishing rules for executive 
    officers.
        ``No. 3854. A proposition to establish affirmative directions 
    for an executive officer constitutes legislation and is not in 
    order on a general appropriation bill. Also a ruling of Chairman 
    Towner, April 15, 1920.
        ``Chairman Crisp, March 11, 1916: Limitations must not impose 
    new duties upon an executive officer.
        ``No. 3984. Where a proposition might be construed by the 
    executive officer as a modification of a statute, it may not be 
    held as such a limitation of appropriation as is permissible on a 
    general appropriation bill.

        ``No. 3927. A limitation may be attached only to the money of 
    the appropriation under consideration and may not be made 
    applicable to moneys appropriated in other acts.
        ``No. 3957. The limitation must be upon the appropriation and 
    not an affirmative limitation of official functions.
        ``No. 3966. Limitations which directly, or indirectly, vest in 
    any executive officer any discretion, or impose any duty upon the 
    officer, directly or indirectly, in the expenditure of money, would 
    be obnoxious. But (No. 3968) the House may provide that no part of 
    an appropriation shall be used in a certain way even though 
    executive discretion be thereby negatively restricted.
        ``No. 3936. A provision proposing to construe existing law is 
    in itself a proposition of legislation and, therefore, not in order 
    on an appropriation bill as a limitation.
        ``No. 3936. The fact that a paragraph on an appropriation bill 
    would constitute legislation for only a year does not make it 
    admissible as a limitation.
        ``No. 3936. As an appropriation bill may deny an appropriation 
    for a purpose authorized by law, so it may by limitation prohibit 
    the use of money for part of the purpose while appropriating for 
    the remainder of it.
        ``No. 3929. A limitation must apply solely to the present 
    appropriation and may not be made as a permanent provision of law.
        ``No. 3942. While it is not in order to legislate as to 
    qualifications of the recipients of an appropriation, the House may 
    specify that no part of the appropriation shall go to recipients 
    lacking certain qualifications.''
        In section 3935 of Hinds' Precedents is a ruling by Speaker 
    Cannon, which has been referred to and which the Chair feels covers 
    the point under consideration. The language is clear and specific, 
    and in view of Mr. Cannon's approaching retirement from Congress 
    after a long and distinguished career, the Chair is glad to refer 
    to it in this instance:
        ``The merits of the proposition are not involved in the point 
    of order. What is the object of the motion and of the instruction? 
    If it does not change existing law, then it is not necessary. If it 
    does change existing law, then it is subject to the point of order. 
    Much has been said about limitation; and the doctrine of limitation 
    is sustained upon

[[Page 6273]]

    the proposition under the rule that, as Congress has the power to 
    withhold every appropriation, it may withhold the appropriation 
    upon limitation. Now, that is correct. But there is another rule, 
    another phase of that question. If the limitation, whether it be 
    affirmative or negative, operates to change the law or to enact new 
    law in effect, then it is subject to the rule that prohibits 
    legislation upon a general appropriation bill; and the Chair, in 
    view of the fact that the amendment would impose upon officials new 
    duties as to purchasing canal supplies, has no difficulty in 
    arriving at the conclusion that the instructions are subject to the 
    point of order for the reasons stated.''
        In viewing propositions of a legislative character the Chair 
    feels we should look to the substance and not to the form in which 
    it is presented. In the case before us what does the proviso 
    propose? Does it impose a simple restriction on the expenditure of 
    funds? No. Does it stipulate that the use of the funds is 
    conditional upon the possession by the recipients of certain 
    qualifications or distinctions? No. It goes much further, for by 
    the use of the words ``until'' and ``unless,'' in connection with 
    certain things to be done, it implies--yes, asserts--that these 
    activities must be undertaken before the appropriation becomes 
    available. This is a direction to officers and imposes new duties 
    upon them which is repugnant to our practice. By requiring the 
    court to perform functions which are not now required, it clearly 
    implies a change of law, otherwise it would be futile to suggest 
    it. This is legislation under the guise of a limitation which is 
    contrary to our procedure.
        As a general proposition the Chair feels that whenever a 
    limitation is accompanied by the words ``unless,'' ``except,'' 
    ``until,'' ``if,'' ``however,'' there is ground to view the so-
    called limitation with suspicion, and in case of doubt as to its 
    ultimate effect the doubt should be resolved on the conservative 
    side. By doing so appropriation bills will be relieved of much of 
    the legislation which is being constantly grafted upon them and a 
    check given a practice which seems to the Chair both unwise and in 
    violation of the spirit, as well as the substance, of our rules. 
    Without endeavoring to lay down any hard and fast rule, the Chair 
    feels that the following tests may be helpful in deciding a 
    question of order directed against a limitation, first having 
    determined the powers granted or the duties imposed by existing 
    laws:
        Does the limitation apply solely to the appropriation under 
    consideration?
        Does it operate beyond the fiscal year for which the 
    appropriation is made?
        Is the limitation accompanied or coupled with a phrase applying 
    to official functions, and if so, does the phrase give affirmative 
    directions in fact or in effect, although not in form?
        Is it accompanied by a phrase which might be construed to 
    impose additional duties or permit an official to assume an intent 
    to change existing law?
        Does the limitation curtail or extend, modify, or alter 
    existing powers or duties, or terminate old or confer new ones? If 
    it does, then it must be conceded that legislation is involved, for 
    without legislation these results could not be accomplished.
        If the limitation will not fairly stand these tests then in my 
    opinion the point of order should be sustained.

[[Page 6274]]

        The following sections contain illustrations of limitations 
    deemed by the Chair to be permissible under the rule.
    The rule prohibiting unauthorized appropriations and legislation on 
general appropriation bills, and the broad qualifications on the 
application of the rule, are discussed in more detail at the beginning 
of the chapter.(13)
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13. See Sec. 1, supra.                          -------------------
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General Rule

Sec. 64.1 An amendment prohibiting the use of funds in a general 
    appropriation bill for a certain purpose is in order, although the 
    availability of funds for that purpose is authorized by law.

    On June 22, 1973,(14) uring consideration in the 
Committee of the Whole of a general appropriation bill (H.R. 8825), a 
point of order was raised against the following amendment:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 119 Cong. Rec. 20998, 20999, 93d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Ms. [Bella S.] Abzug [of New York]: 
        Page 9, lines 2 and 3, strike out ``$2,194,000,000, to remain 
        available until expended.'' and insert in lieu thereof 
        ``$1,719,000,000, to remain available until expended: Provided, 
        That none of the funds appropriated in this Act shall be used 
        to further in any way the research, development or construction 
        of any reusable space transportation system or space shuttle or 
        facilities therefor.''
            And on page 10, lines 2 through 19, strike out all of 
        subparagraph (12) and redesignate the succeeding subparagraphs 
        accordingly.

        Mr. [Burt L.] Talcott [of California]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve 
    a point of order against the amendment. . . .
        The Chairman: (15) The Chair will hear the gentleman 
    from California.
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15. James G. O'Hara (Mich.).
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        Mr. Talcott: Mr. Chairman, my point of order is quick and 
    clean. This is more than just a reduction of funds. It is 
    legislation on an appropriation bill when it says:
        none of the funds appropriated in this act shall be used to 
        further in any way the research, development or construction of 
        any reusable space transportation system or space shuttle or 
        facilities therefor.

        This is completely changing the authorization by the Committee 
    on Science and Astronautics.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule on the point of 
    order.
        It seems to the Chair that the provision in the gentlewoman's 
    amendment is pretty clearly a limitation on an appropriation. It 
    does not impose any affirmative obligation on the administration, 
    nor does it provide any legislative direction. It is simply a 
    limitation on the use of the funds to be appropriated.
        The Chair therefore overrules the point of order.

Sec. 64.2 An amendment denying use of funds for purposes otherwise 
    authorized by law may be in order as a limitation.

[[Page 6275]]

    On May 19, 1964,(16) during consideration in the 
Committee of the Whole of the Department of Agriculture appropriation 
bill for fiscal 1965 (H.R. 11202), a point of order was raised against 
the following amendment:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 110 Cong. Rec. 11391, 11392, 88th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Paul] Findley [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Findley: On page 14, line 12, 
        after the figure ``$39,389,000'' strike the period, insert a 
        colon and the following: ``Provided, That no part of the funds 
        appropriated by this Act shall be used for any expenses 
        incident to the assembly or preparation of information for 
        transmission over Government-leased wires directly serving 
        privately-owned radio or television stations or newspapers of 
        general circulation, or for transmission over Government-leased 
        wires which are subject to direct interconnection with wires 
        leased by nongovernmental persons, firms or associations.''. . 
        .

        The Chairman: (17) The gentleman from Mississippi 
    will state his point of order.
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17. Eugene J. Keogh (N.Y.).
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        Mr. [Jamie L.] Whitten [of Mississippi]: The law requires, in 
    subsection k of section 1622 of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 
    1946, 7 U.S.C. 1621-27, as follows:

            To collect, tabulate, and disseminate statistics of 
        marketing agricultural products, including, but not restricted 
        to statistics on market supplies, storage stocks, quantity, 
        quality, and condition of such products in various positions in 
        the marketing channel, utilization of such products, and 
        shipments and unloads thereof.

        That statute is absolutely mandatory and requires the 
    Department to bring together that information. The gentleman's 
    amendment does not limit funds for the discharge of the duties 
    under that section. It attempts to deprive the Secretary of 
    authority conferred by law which was determined in an earlier 
    ruling (IV, 3846) to be legislation. Further, I respectfully submit 
    it will require additional duties of folks in the Department of 
    Agriculture, which is also legislation.
        May I point out again, Mr. Chairman, in the last part of it, it 
    says the information cannot be collected for the purpose of being 
    disseminated. I respectfully submit it is legislation on an 
    appropriation bill calling for new duties and responsibilities on 
    the one hand, and limiting executive authority on the other. . . .
        The Chairman: . . . The Chairman would call the attention of 
    the Committee to the fact that the existence of substantive law and 
    the provisions thereof are quite obviously not necessarily binding 
    on the Appropriations Committee. The Chair feels, therefore, that 
    where that committee seeks to appropriate funds and an amendment is 
    offered that seeks to deny the use of those funds even for 
    functions otherwise required by law, that that amendment is in the 
    nature of a limitation of appropriations and therefore overrules 
    the point of order.

Must Apply Only to Funds in Bill

Sec. 64.3 To qualify as a limitation, restrictive language in

[[Page 6276]]

    a general appropriation bill must apply solely to the funds carried 
    in the bill and not to all funds which might otherwise be available 
    for that purpose.

    On Apr. 26, 1972,(18) during consideration in the 
Committee of the Whole of a supplemental appropriation bill (H.R. 
14582), a point of order was raised against the following provision of 
the bill:
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18. 118 Cong. Rec. 14456, 14457, 92d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          Federal Home Loan Bank Board

            Increases of $177,000 in the limitation on the amount 
        available for administrative expenses and of $351,000 in the 
        limitation on the amount available for nonadministrative 
        expenses: Provided, That none of the funds available for 
        administrative or nonadministrative expenses of the Federal 
        Home Loan Bank Board shall be used to finance the relocation of 
        all or any part of the Federal Home Loan Bank from Greensboro, 
        North Carolina, nor for the supervision, direction or operation 
        of any district bank for the fourth district other than at such 
        location;

        Mr. (John J.) Flynt (Jr., of Georgia): Mr. Chairman, I make a 
    point of order against the language in the bill beginning after the 
    colon on line 25 of page 42, and which continues through line 6 on 
    page 43, which reads as follows:

            ``Provided--''
            And so forth, down through ``at such location.''

        I make the point of order on the ground that the language goes 
    beyond the scope of the time frame covered by this appropriation 
    bill, by the pending legislation. . . .
        The Chairman: (19) The gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
    Mahon) is recognized.
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19. Jack B. Brooks (Tex.).
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        Mr. [George H.] Mahon: Mr. Chairman, under the government 
    corporation control law, we are entitled to enact an annual budget 
    involving the handling of corporate funds. That is what this goes 
    to, and it is a limit on those funds.
        It would appear to be clearly in order. So I trust, Mr. 
    Chairman, that the point of order will not be sustained.
        Mr. [Edward P.] Boland [of Massachusetts]: Mr. Chairman, may I 
    be heard on the point of order?
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized.
        Mr. Boland: Mr. Chairman, I am reading from page 8455, United 
    States Code, under title 31.
        Paragraph 849 reads as follows:

            Sec. 849. Consideration of programs by Congress; enactment 
        of necessary legislation; effect of section on certain existing 
        authority of corporations.
            The Budget programs transmitted by the President to the 
        Congress shall be considered and legislation shall be enacted 
        making necessary appropriations as may be authorized by law, 
        making available for expenditure for operating and 
        administrative expenses such corporate funds or other financial 
        resources or limiting the use thereof as the Congress may 
        determine. . . .

        Mr. Chairman, that is precisely what the language of the bill 
    does. It limits the funds of the corporation, and it is

[[Page 6277]]

    my contention that the point of order is out of order.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Flynt) makes a point of order 
    against the language in the bill on page 42, line 25 to page 43, 
    line 6.
        The proviso in this paragraph goes to all of the expense funds 
    that might be available to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. It 
    does not merely restrict the funds in this bill.

        The Chair finds the restriction is not limited to funds in the 
    bill and must be construed as legislation.
        The Chair therefore sustains the point of order made by the 
    gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Flynt).

Sec. 64.4 To qualify as a ``limitation,'' the restrictive language must 
    apply to the appropriations carried in the bill and not to all 
    funds which may have been provided under the authorizing 
    legislation or to the provisions of the authorization itself.

    On June 4, 1970,(20) during consideration in the 
Committee of the Whole of the foreign assistance appropriation bill for 
fiscal 1971 (H.R. 17867), a point of order was raised against the 
following provision of the bill:
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20. 116 Cong. Rec. 18404, 18405, 91st Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        (b) No economic assistance shall be furnished under the Foreign 
    Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, to any country which sells, 
    furnishes, or permits any ships under its registry to carry items 
    of economic assistance to Cuba, so long as it is governed by the 
    Castro regime, or to North Vietnam.
        Mr. [Peter H. B.] Frelinghuysen [of New Jersey]: Mr. Chairman, 
    I make a point of order that the language on lines 13 through 17, 
    page 9, section 107(b) constitutes legislation on an appropriation 
    bill and therefore should be stricken.
        I should like to point out, also, there is comparable language, 
    but stronger language, already in the Foreign Assistance Act. I 
    refer to section 620(a)(3) with respect to the prohibition against 
    trade with Cuba, and section 620(n), the language with respect to 
    North Vietnam.
        The Chairman: (1) Does the gentleman from Louisiana 
    desire to be heard on the point of order?
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 1. Hale Boggs (La.).
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        Mr. [Otto E.] Passman [of Louisiana]: Mr. Chairman, the 
    committee believes now, as we have believed for many years, that 
    this was a limitation on expenditures. It says:

            No economic assistance--

        Referring first to U.S. dollars--
        shall be furnished under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 
        amended, to any country which sells, furnishes, or permits any 
        ships under its registry to carry items of economic assistance 
        to Cuba, so long as it is governed by the Castro regime, or to 
        North Vietnam.

        According to the committee's interpretation, this is a 
    limitation, and I ask for a ruling.

[[Page 6278]]

        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The first two lines read:

            No economic assistance shall be furnished under the Foreign 
        Assistance Act of 1961--

        It is entirely possible that there is a variety of programs 
    under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Therefore, this is 
    clearly a limitation upon the Act and not on the bill and comes 
    within the prohibition of rule XXI, clause 2, and the point of 
    order is sustained.

Sec. 64.5 A limitation to be in order must relate specifically to the 
    appropriation to which it is offered and not contain language so 
    broad as to cover other appropriations.

    On Mar. 28, 1939,(2) the Committee of the Whole was 
considering H.R. 5269, an Agriculture Department appropriation bill. 
The Clerk read as follows:
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 2. 84 Cong. Rec. 3446, 76th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Amendment offered by Mr. [Edward H.] Rees of Kansas to the 
    amendment offered by Mr. Cannon of Missouri: At the end of Mr. 
    Cannon's amendment add the following: ``Provided, That total 
    payments to any person, firm, or corporation under soil 
    conservation and parity payments shall not exceed $2,500.''
        Mr. [Clarence] Cannon of Missouri: Mr. Chairman, I make the 
    point of order against the amendment that it is legislation on an 
    appropriation bill.
        The Chairman: (3) Does the gentleman from Kansas 
    desire to be heard on the point of order?
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 3. Wright Patman (Tex.).
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        Mr. Rees of Kansas: No, I do not believe I do, Mr. Chairman, 
    although I do not believe it is legislation.
        Mr. [John] Taber [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, this is a pure 
    limitation, as I understand it, limiting the amount that can be 
    paid out under the bill to any one person and therefore is clearly 
    in order.
        The Chairman: The Chair is of the opinion that the amendment is 
    entirely too broad in that it would not only include this 
    appropriation but other appropriations as well and the point of 
    order is therefore sustained.

Restricting Funds for Purpose Not Funded in Bill

Sec. 64.6 To a bill appropriating funds for defense procurement, an 
    amendment providing that none of the funds therein shall be 
    available for paying the cost of a conventional powerplant for a 
    designated ship was held to be a proper limitation and in order 
    even though it was apparent that there were no funds in the bill 
    for the ship in question.

    On Apr. 22, 1964,(4) the Committee of the Whole was 
considering H.R. 10939, a Department of

[[Page 6279]]

Defense appropriation bill. The Clerk read as follows, and proceedings 
ensued as indicated below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 110 Cong. Rec. 8802, 88th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Amendment offered by Mr. [Craig] Hosmer [of California]: On 
    page 42, line 18, after line 18 insert a new section 540--and 
    renumber the following sections--to read as follows:
        ``None of the funds appropriated herein shall be available for 
    paying the cost of a conventional powerplant for CVA-67.''
        Mr. [George H.] Mahon [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, I make the 
    point of order that there are no funds in this bill for an aircraft 
    carrier.
        The Chairman: (5) Does the gentleman desire to be 
    heard on the point of order?
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 5. Eugene J. Keogh (N.Y.).
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        Mr. Hosmer: Yes, I do.
        The Chairman: The Chair will be pleased to hear him.
        Mr. Hosmer: My point is, it is irrelevant whether or not there 
    are any funds in this bill. An amendment of this nature will lie 
    irrespective.
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule. . . .
        . . . Apparently the only basis for that point of order is that 
    there are no funds in the pending bill to accomplish that which is 
    sought to be accomplished by the amendment. As futile, therefore, 
    as the amendment might be, it is in fact a limitation of the funds 
    herein appropriated and the Chair therefore overrules the point of 
    order.

Sec. 64.7 To a section of the legislative branch appropriation bill 
    making appropriations for the Government Printing Office, an 
    amendment providing that no part of the appropriation shall be used 
    to pay the salary of any person who shall perform any service or 
    authorize any expenditure in connection with the printing and 
    binding of the Yearbook of Agriculture was held as a valid 
    limitation and in order.

    On Mar. 18, 1942,(6) the Committee of the Whole was 
considering H.R. 6802. The Clerk read as follows:
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 6. 88 Cong. Rec. 2681, 77th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Amendment offered by Mr. [Everett M.] Dirksen [of Illinois]: On 
    page 45, line 3, after ``1942'', insert ``Provided further, That no 
    part of this appropriation shall be used to pay the salary of any 
    person who shall perform any service or authorize any expenditure 
    in connection with the printing and binding of part 2 of the annual 
    report of the Secretary of Agriculture (known as the Year Book of 
    Agriculture) for 1942.''
        Mr. [Malcolm C.] Tarver [of Georgia]: Mr. Chairman, I make a 
    point of order against the amendment. There are no funds carried in 
    this bill for the purposes which are inhibited by the gentleman's 
    amendment. It would be nugatory and of no effect, and I can 
    conceive of no rule under which it might be in order.

[[Page 6280]]

        Mr. Dirksen: I think the amendment will speak for itself. I 
    think it is a limitation and would be germane and in order, 
    irrespective of whether any funds are carried, but the fact of the 
    matter is that the yearbook is not printed ordinarily until after 
    the first of the year. Consequently the personnel and salaries for 
    clerical work and mechanical work in the Government Printing Office 
    is done after the beginning of the fiscal year 1943. I therefore 
    regard it as a proper limitation and in order. . . .
        The Chairman: (7) The Chair thinks that the 
    limitation is a valid one, and, therefore, the point of order is 
    overruled.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. William R. Thom (Ohio).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 64.8 To a section of a supplemental appropriation bill making 
    appropriations for the Air Force, an amendment providing that none 
    of the funds appropriated therein shall be used in the branches of 
    the Department of the Air Force in which there exists racial 
    segregation was held germane and a proper limitation.

    On Apr. 15, 1948,(8) the Committee of the Whole was 
considering H.R. 6226, a supplemental appropriation bill. The Clerk 
read as follows, and proceedings ensued as indicated below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 94 Cong. Rec. 4543, 89th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Amendment offered by Mr. [Adam C.] Powell [Jr., of New York]: 
    On page 2, line 25, insert ``Provided further, That none of the 
    funds herein appropriated shall be used in the branches of the 
    Department of the Air Force in which there exists racial 
    segregation.''
        Mr. [John E.] Rankin [of Mississippi]: Mr. Chairman, a point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: (9) The gentleman will state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. James G. O'Hara (Mich.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Rankin: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that this 
    amendment is not germane and it is, therefore, not in order on this 
    bill; that it is legislation on an appropriation bill; that imposes 
    additional burdens and restrictions that are entirely out of place.
        This is an aircraft procurement bill. This is not a labor bill. 
    I submit that the amendment is out of order from practically every 
    standpoint.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from New York desire to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Powell: Yes, Mr. Chairman. This is an amendment which has 
    limitations; it is negative; it is the type that has been ruled in 
    order on previous appropriation bills.
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule. The gentleman from 
    New York has offered an amendment against which the gentleman from 
    Mississippi has made a point of order. The Chair is constrained to 
    rule that the amendment is germane and is in order and consequently 
    overrules the point of order.

Committee Report as Containing Limitations

Sec. 64.9 The Chair does not pass on the question as to wheth

[[Page 6281]]

    er ``limitations'' written in a committee report on an 
    appropriation bill but not written into the wording of the bill are 
    binding; that is a matter for the Committee of the Whole to 
    consider during its deliberation on the bill.

    On Apr. 14, 1955,(10) the Committee of the Whole was 
considering H.R. 5502, a bill making appropriations for the Departments 
of State, Justice, the Judiciary, and related agencies. The following 
occurred:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 101 Cong. Rec. 4463, 4464, 84th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Robert C.] Wilson of California: I have a question 
    relative to the United States Information Agency as it affects the 
    report of the committee. As printed I notice there are several 
    limitations written into the report. For instance, not to exceed 
    $300,000 is provided for the ``presentation'' program; not to 
    exceed $200,000 is provided for exhibits for which $334,000 was 
    requested, and other limitations of that type.
        I am wondering if the fact that these limitations appear in the 
    report make them actual limitations in law. I notice they are not 
    mentioned in the bill itself, and I wonder if the committee regards 
    them as binding on the agency, because there are many serious 
    limitations, particularly in regard to exhibits, for example. I 
    would just like to hear the opinion of the chairman.
        Mr. [John J.] Rooney [of New York]: I may say to the gentleman 
    from California that it is expected that they will be the law; and 
    that they are binding. The fact that they have not been inserted in 
    the bill is not important. They represent the considered judgment 
    of the committee and we expect the language of the report to be 
    followed.
        Mr. Wilson of California: Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Chairman: (11) The gentleman will state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. Jere Cooper [Tenn.].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Wilson of California: Are limitations written in a 
    committee report such as this, but not written into the wording of 
    the legislation, binding?
        The Chairman: That is not a parliamentary inquiry. That is a 
    matter to be settled by the members of the Committee of the Whole.
        Mr. Wilson of California: I merely wanted it for my own 
    understanding and information, for I am fairly new here. It seems 
    to me rather unusual to consider matter written into a report of 
    the same binding effect on an administrator as though written into 
    the law itself.
        The Chairman: It is not the prerogative of the Chair to pass 
    upon the sufficiency or insufficiency of a committee report.

Condition Subsequent--Obligation Terminated on Occurrence of Future 
    Event

Sec. 64.10 An amendment to an appropriation bill, terminating the use 
    of funds therein after the passage of

[[Page 6282]]

    certain legislation pending before the Congress, is a valid 
    limitation and in order.

    On May 19, 1964,(12) during consideration in the 
Committee of the Whole of the Department of Agriculture appropriation 
bill (H.R. 11202), a point of order was raised against the following 
amendment:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 110 Cong. Rec. 11388, 11389, 88th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Paul] Findley [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Findley: On page 12, line 24, 
        after the word ``consumer'' change the colon to a comma and 
        insert the following: ``except that no part of the funds 
        appropriated herein may be obligated for this special study 
        subsequent to the enactment of legislation establishing a 
        National Commission on Food Marketing:''.

        Mr. [Jamie L.] Whitten [of Mississippi]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    reserve a point of order. . . .
        The Chairman: (13) The gentleman from Mississippi 
    will state his point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. Eugene J. Keogh (N.Y.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Whitten: The language provides:

            Except that no part of the funds appropriated herein may be 
        obligated for this special study subsequent to the enactment of 
        legislation establishing a national commission.

        The point of order I make is that this is not a limitation on 
    an appropriation bill as such but is entirely dependent on a 
    contingency that may never occur. For that reason the point of 
    order should be sustained.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Illinois desire to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Findley: Yes. My amendment shows retrenchment on the face 
    of it, and in my opinion is within the rules.
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule.
        The gentleman from Illinois offers an amendment, which has been 
    fully reported, and provides that no part of the funds appropriated 
    in the pending section may be obligated for the special study 
    provided therein subsequent to the enactment of legislation 
    establishing a National Commission on Food Marketing, to which 
    amendment the gentleman from Mississippi made his point of order 
    that it was, in effect, legislation on an appropriation bill. The 
    Chair, however, is of the opinion that this amendment constitutes a 
    limitation on the funds herein appropriated even though that 
    limitation may be conditioned upon a condition subsequent which may 
    never come into existence and, therefore, overrules the point of 
    order.

Obligation Triggered by Future Event

Sec. 64.11 To a bill appropriating funds for NASA [which had, under its 
    authorizing legislation, authority to use appropriations for 
    capital expenditures providing that the Committee on Science and 
    Astronautics of the House

[[Page 6283]]

    was notified of the proposed expenditure], an amendment specifying 
    that no funds therein appropriated could be used for capital items 
    until 14 days after the notification required by law, was held to 
    be a limitation upon the expenditure of funds and in order.

    On June 29, 1959,(14) during consideration in the 
Committee of the Whole of a supplemental appropriation bill (H.R. 
7978), a point of order was raised against the following amendment:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 105 Cong. Rec. 12125, 12126, 86th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Albert] Thomas [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Thomas: On page 4, line 16, after 
        ``expended'' insert: ``Provided, That no part of the foregoing 
        appropriation shall be available for other items of a capital 
        nature which exceed $250,000 until 14 days have elapsed after 
        notification as required by law to the Committee on Science and 
        Astronautics of the House of Representatives and the Committee 
        on Aeronautical and Space Sciences of the Senate.''

        Mr. [John] Taber [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        The Chairman: (15) The gentleman will state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. Paul J. Kilday (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Taber: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order against the 
    amendment on the ground that it changes existing law and requires 
    additional duties on the part of the Space Agency. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Thomas] has offered an amendment 
    which has been reported. The gentleman from New York [Mr. Taber] 
    has made a point of order that it is legislation on an 
    appropriation bill.
        The Chair calls attention to that portion of subsection (b) of 
    Public Law 86-45 approved June 15, 1959, with reference to 
    expenditures in excess of $250,000 and notice to the legislative 
    committees. In addition thereto, the amendment contains a period of 
    notice of 14 days. However, this does not impose a new duty, 
    because it is a limitation upon the expenditure of the funds within 
    a period of 14 days.
        The Chair therefore overrules the point of order.

Exception From Limitation Carried in Same Bill

Sec. 64.12 Where an appropriation bill carried a provision limiting 
    certain administrative expenses in various accounts therein, a 
    paragraph subsequently reached in the reading was held in order 
    where it carried a provision excepting an authorized appropriation 
    project from those limitations.

    On May 17, 1937,(16) the Committee of the Whole was 
consid

[[Page 6284]]

ering H.R. 6958, an Interior Department appropriation bill. The Clerk 
read as follows, and proceedings ensued as indicated below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 16. 81 Cong. Rec. 4685, 4686, 75th Cong. 1st Sess.
            See 83 Cong. Rec. 2707, 75th Cong. 3d Sess., Mar. 2, 1938, 
        for a similar ruling.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Boulder Canyon project: For the continuation of construction of 
    the Boulder Canyon Dam and incidental works in the main stream of 
    the Colorado River at Black Canyon, to create a storage reservoir, 
    and of a complete plant and incidental structures suitable for the 
    fullest economic development of electrical energy from the water 
    discharged from such reservoir $2,550,000, to be immediately 
    available and there shall also be available from power and other 
    revenues not to exceed $500,000 for operation and maintenance of 
    the Boulder Canyon Dam, power plant, and other facilities; which 
    amounts of $2,550,000 and $500,000 shall be available for personal 
    services in the District of Columbia . . . and for all other 
    objects of expenditure that are specified for projects hereinbefore 
    included in this act, under the caption ``Bureau of Reclamation, 
    Administrative provisions and limitations'', without regard to the 
    amounts of the limitations therein set forth.
        Mr. [Richard B.] Wigglesworth [of Massachusetts]: Mr. Chairman, 
    I reserve a point of order for the purpose of asking the chairman 
    of the subcommittee the effect of the language in lines 19 and 20 
    of the paragraph under consideration, ``without regard to the 
    amounts of the limitations therein set forth.'' . . .
        Mr. [James G.] Scrugham [of Nevada]: Mr. Chairman, the 
    paragraph applies to limitations on appropriations, and I hold it 
    to be clearly in order.

        The Chairman: (17) The Chair is prepared to rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. Jere Cooper (Tenn.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The gentleman from Massachusetts makes the point of order 
    against the language appearing in lines 19 and 20.
        There is no point made here that the provisions referred to are 
    not covered by authorization of law. It is apparent from examining 
    this provision, and referring back to the provisions contained on 
    page 68, that the purpose here is to remove certain limitations 
    imposed by the language on page 68 under the heading 
    ``Administrative provisions and limitations.'' Therefore the Chair 
    is of the opinion that this language is not subject to a point of 
    order and overrules the point of order.

Exceptions From Limitations

Sec. 64.13 To an amendment prohibiting the expenditure of any 
    government funds during fiscal 1971 for American ground forces in 
    Cambodia, offered to a legislative provision in a general 
    appropriation bill prescribing an overall limitation on budget 
    outlays for that fiscal year, an amendment excepting from such 
    prohibition those expenditures which protect the lives of American 
    troops re

[[Page 6285]]

    maining within South Vietnam was held in order as a germane 
    exception to the prohibition merely descriptive of a Presidential 
    duty as Commander in Chief to protect U.S. troops, and as not 
    adding legislation to the provision permitted to remain in the 
    bill.

    On May 7, 1970,(18) the Committee of the Whole was 
considering H.R. 17399, a supplemental appropriation bill. A point of 
order against an amendment to an amendment was overruled as indicated 
below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 116 Cong. Rec. 14569-71, 91st Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

                                    Title V

                 Limitation on Fiscal Year 1971 Budget Outlays

            Sec. 501. (a) Expenditures and net lending (budget outlays) 
        of the Federal Government during the fiscal year ending June 
        30, 1971, shall not exceed $200,771,000,000: Provided, That 
        whenever action, or inaction, by the Congress on requests for 
        appropriations and other budgetary proposals varies from the 
        President's recommendations reflected in the Budget for 1971 
        (H. Doc. 91-240, part 1), the Director of the Bureau of the 
        Budget shall report to the President and to the Congress his 
        estimate of the effect of such action or inaction on budget 
        outlays, and the limitation set forth herein shall be 
        correspondingly adjusted: Provided further, That the Director 
        of the Bureau of the Budget shall report to the President and 
        to the Congress his estimate of the effect on budget outlays of 
        other actions by the Congress (whether initiated by the 
        President or the Congress) and the limitation set forth herein 
        shall be correspondingly adjusted, and reports, so far as 
        practicable, shall indicate whether such other actions were 
        initiated by the President or by the Congress.

        Mr. [Edward P.] Boland [of Massachusetts]: Mr. Chairman I offer 
    an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Boland: On page 53 on line 25 
        after the amount [$200,771,000,000], insert the following: ``, 
        of which expenditures none shall be available for use for 
        American ground combat forces in Cambodia.''. . .

        Mr. [Paul] Findley [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment to the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
    Massachusetts (Mr. Boland).
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Findley to the amendment offered 
        by Mr. Boland: In front of the period insert the following: 
        ``except those which protect the lives of American troops 
        remaining within South Vietnam.''

        Mr. [George H.] Mahon [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, I make a point 
    of order against the amendment. . . .
        I make a point of order on the ground that the amendment 
    requires particular and special duties. . . .
        Mr. [Sidney R.] Yates [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, I make the 
    further point of order that it is legislation on an appropriation 
    bill.
        The Chairman: (19) The Chair has examined the 
    proposed amendment to

[[Page 6286]]

    the amendment. In the opinion of the Chair the proposed amendment 
    to the amendment constitutes an exception to the limitation that 
    was offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts, does not 
    constitute additional legislation, and is germane. Therefore the 
    Chair overrules the point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. James G. O'Hara (Mich.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    During ensuing debate, Mr. Findley stated:

        Mr. Chairman, I would hope that no Member of this body would 
    wish to leave the impression, by supporting any amendment today, 
    that subsequent to July 1 he would wish the President of the United 
    States as Commander in Chief to fail to do what he feels is 
    necessary to protect the lives of American troops remaining in 
    South Vietnam.
        That is why I propose this amendment.

Sec. 64.14 An exception to a valid limitation in a general 
    appropriation bill is in order, providing the exception does not 
    add language legislative in effect. Thus, an amendment inserting 
    ``Except as required by the Constitution'' in provisions in a 
    general appropriation bill prohibiting the use of funds therein to 
    force a school district to take action involving the busing of 
    students, was held in order as providing an exception from valid 
    limitations in the bill.

    On Feb. 19, 1970,(20) during consideration in the 
Committee of the Whole of the Departments of Labor, and Health, 
Education, and Welfare appropriation bill for fiscal 1970 (H.R. 15931), 
a point of order was raised against the following amendments:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 116 Cong. Rec. 4019, 91st Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Jeffery] Cohelan [of California]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Cohelan: On page 60, strike out 
        line 19 and all that follows through line 25, and substitute in 
        lieu thereof the following:
            ``Sec. 408. Except as required by the Constitution no part 
        of the funds contained in the Act may be used to force any 
        school district to take any actions involving the busing of 
        students, the abolishment of any school or the assignment of 
        any student attending any elementary or secondary school to a 
        particular school against the choice of his or her parent or 
        parents.''

        Mr. Cohelan: Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my 
    amendments on sections 408 and 409 be considered en bloc.
        The Chairman: (1) The Clerk will report the 
    amendment to section 409.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. Chet Holifield (Calif.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Cohelan: On page 61, strike out 
        line 1 and all that follows through line 6 and substitute in 
        lieu thereof the following:
            ``Sec. 409. Except as required by the Constitution no part 
        of the funds

[[Page 6287]]

        contained in this Act shall be used to force any school 
        district to take any actions involving the busing of students, 
        the abolishment of any school or the assignment of students to 
        a particular school as a condition precedent to obtaining 
        Federal funds otherwise available to any State, school district 
        or school.''

        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from California (Mr. Cohelan) that the amendments be 
    considered en bloc?
        There was no objection.
        Mr. [Frank T.] Bow [of Ohio]: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of 
    order against the amendments.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Bow: Mr. Chairman, the point of order is that the language 
    puts additional duties upon the Secretary of Health, Education, and 
    Welfare to make a determination of the constitutionality of the 
    provisions.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from California (Mr. Cohelan) 
    desire to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Cohelan: Mr. Chairman, obviously all that my amendments 
    will do is to restore the language of the original bill.
        Prior to my presenting these amendments I checked with the 
    parliamentarian. It is my understanding that they are perfectly 
    proper amendments. I ask that they be considered so.
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule.
        The gentleman from California (Mr. Cohelan) has offered 
    amendments en bloc to insert the provision ``Except as required by 
    the Constitution'' at the beginning of sections 408 and 409 of the 
    bill. The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Bow) has raised a point of order 
    against the amendments on the ground that they constitute 
    legislation on an appropriation bill in violation of clause 2, rule 
    XXI.
        The precedents of the House establish that it is in order in a 
    general appropriation bill to include, along with a valid 
    limitation, an exception therefrom. On April 27, 1950, a provision 
    limiting the use of an appropriation and specifying certain 
    exceptions to the limitation was held in order--Chairman Cooper, 
    Tennessee, 81st Congress, Record, page 5910.
        For the reason stated the Chair overrules the point of order.

Sec. 64.15 An exception from a valid limitation may be included in an 
    amendment to an appropriation bill so long as it does not contain 
    provisions which are legislative in effect; in an amendment 
    prohibiting the use of funds for food stamp assistance for 
    households that need such assistance solely because a member 
    therein is a member of a striking union, language stating that such 
    limitation shall not apply to a household eligible for general 
    assistance directly payable by a local government was held to 
    constitute a valid exception not imposing additional duties on 
    federal administrators.

[[Page 6288]]

    On June 29, 1972,(2) during consideration in the 
Committee of the Whole of a general appropriation bill (H.R. 15690), a 
point of order was raised against the following amendment:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 118 Cong. Rec. 23378, 23379, 92d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Garry E.] Brown of Michigan: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Brown of Michigan: On page 43, 
        line 9, delete the period after the figure ``$2,341,146,000'' 
        and insert the following: ``Provided that no part of the funds 
        appropriated by this Act shall be used during the fiscal year 
        ending June 30, 1973 to make food stamps available to a 
        household where the necessity and eligibility of such household 
        for assistance stems solely from the unemployment of a member 
        of such household who is a member of an employee unit which has 
        voluntarily terminated employment due to a labor dispute or 
        controversy, except that such limitation shall not apply to a 
        household eligible for general assistance directly payable by 
        such household's local union of government.''

        Mr. [Jamie L.] Whitten [of Mississippi]: Mr. Chairman, I make a 
    point of order against the amendment. It is legislation on an 
    appropriation bill and, for all practical purposes, it is a 
    perfecting amendment and identical to the one we have already voted 
    on. . . .
        The Chairman: (3) Does the gentleman from Michigan 
    desire to be heard on the point of order?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. James C. Wright, Jr. (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Brown of Michigan: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        In the first place, it is not legislation on an appropriation 
    bill because it only further limits the thrust of the 
    appropriation, and establishes a further standard, that standard to 
    be applied for the eligibility, to be determined by the State and 
    local agencies, and under various appropriations to the food stamp 
    program, eligibility standards which are determined by these State 
    and local agencies.
        Second, it is not the same amendment as the Michel amendment 
    because it is not an absolute prohibition on food stamps to 
    strikers, so called. It says that eligibility for food stamps shall 
    be based upon eligibility for general assistance, not the food 
    stamp program itself.
        Mr. Whitten: Mr. Chairman, in view of the statement made by the 
    gentleman from Michigan, and having seen the amendment and having 
    read it and understood it, I state that it calls for new duties to 
    determine new regulations for eligibility, therefore it is 
    definitely legislation on an appropriation bill.
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule.
        The Chair has carefully read the amendment.
        In the first place, it is not identical to the amendment 
    previously offered, nor is it subject to the interpretation that it 
    would simply do exactly the same thing as the amendment previously 
    offered and rejected. It is clearly distinguishable in its 
    provisions.
        As to the second question, that of its being rendered out of 
    order because it supposedly requires affirmative actions on the 
    part of an administrator, the Chair believes that the latter part 
    of

[[Page 6289]]

    the amendment--to which the gentleman from Mississippi has 
    referred--simply provides an exception to the application of the 
    limitation imposed by the first part of the amendment. It does not 
    impose additional duties. The Chair holds that the amendment 
    offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Brown), is in order and 
    overrules the point of order.

Prohibiting Funds for Salaries for Carrying out Certain Programs

Sec. 64.16 An amendment to a general appropriation bill which is 
    negative in character and which prohibits the use of funds therein 
    for salaries of persons carrying out certain programs which extend 
    in duration beyond that fiscal year is in order as a limitation on 
    the funds in that bill.

    On June 15, 1973,(4) during consideration in the 
Committee of the Whole of a general appropriation bill (H.R. 8619), the 
following occurred:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 119 Cong. Rec. 19836, 19837, 93d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Silvio O.] Conte [of Massachusetts]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Conte: Page 3 after line 12, 
        insert the following: ``: Provided further, That none of the 
        funds appropriated by this Act shall be used during the fiscal 
        year ending June 30, 1974, to formulate or carry out any single 
        1974 crop year price support program (other than for sugar and 
        wool) under which the total amount of payments to any person or 
        State government would be more than $20,000''. . . .

        Mr. [Paul] Findley [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, I offer a 
    substitute amendment for the amendment offered by the gentleman 
    from Massachusetts (Mr. Conte).
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Substitute amendment offered by Mr. Findley for the 
        amendment offered by Mr. Conte: None of the funds provided by 
        this Act shall be used to pay the salaries of personnel who 
        formulate or carry out:
            (1) programs for the 1974 crop year under which the 
        aggregate payments for the wheat, feed grains and upland cotton 
        programs for price support, set-aside, diversion and resource 
        adjustment to one person exceed $20,000, or
            (2) a program effective after December 31, 1973 which 
        sanctions the sale or lease of cotton acreage allotments.

        Mr. [Jamie L.] Whitten [of Mississippi]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    reserve a point of order.
        The Chairman: (5) The gentleman reserves a point of 
    order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. James C. Wright, Jr. (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Whitten: Mr. Chairman, the Commodity Credit Corporation of 
    the Department of Agriculture has some $3 or $4 billion; it has 
    certain obligations and authority under its charter, and that money 
    they now have is not in this bill.

[[Page 6290]]

        This amendment, if passed, would in no way affect the 
    Corporation. It has 3 or 4 billions of dollars which in turn it 
    already had with obligations under the charter under which it is 
    formulated.

        The amendment at this point would not reach funds already 
    available with existing authority and under a charter.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Mississippi make a point 
    of order against the substitute?
        Mr. Whitten: Yes, I will make the point of order at this point, 
    that if it be held that this goes to the action of a corporation 
    that presently has $3 to $4 billion, that presently has a charter 
    which directs it to carry out what is prohibited by this provision; 
    that if this amendment attempts to reach that corporation which has 
    a corporation charter, it is legislation on an appropriations bill 
    and, therefore, subject to a point of order. . . .
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Illinois desire to be 
    heard?
        Mr. Findley: Yes. . . .
        The amendment which I have offered as a substitute to the Conte 
    amendment is a limitation of salaries of personnel. Personnel, of 
    course, includes the Secretary of Agriculture, all of his 
    lieutenants right down to the CCC level. Even if, as the gentleman 
    argues, the limitation could not apply to the salaries of CCC 
    personnel, which I do not concede, nevertheless this amendment 
    would be effective in establishing the limitation it seeks to 
    effect, because it would go to the salary of the Secretary. All of 
    the authority that is in the draft bill now before the Committee on 
    Agriculture dealing with continuing farm legislation goes to the 
    Secretary as a person.
        This is a limitation on the expenditure of funds, a limitation 
    that goes to the expenditure of salaries, and therefore entirely 
    within the rules of the House as being germane. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Conte) has offered an 
    amendment, for which the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Findley) has 
    offered a substitute.
        The gentleman from Mississippi has raised a point of order 
    against the substitute amendment offered by the gentleman from 
    Illinois on the ground that it constitutes legislation in an 
    appropriation bill.
        The Chair has listened to the arguments and has carefully read 
    the text of the proposed substitute. The Chair notes that the 
    substitute would restrict funds provided by this act, providing 
    that none of such funds should be used to pay salaries of personnel 
    to carry out certain programs. As such, insofar as it applies to 
    the funds provided in this act, the substitute would be a 
    limitation on the appropriation bill and would not be legislation, 
    and is therefore in order.
        The Chair would point out that nothing in such substitute could 
    act officially or affirmatively to inhibit payment of funds that 
    are not provided in this act. As the Chair reads the proposed 
    substitute, there is no language which would affect, limit, or 
    inhibit funds other than those provided in this act.
        Therefore, the Chair overrules the point of order.

Limiting Funds ``In Any Fiscal Year''

Sec. 64.17 Where a limitation seeks to provide that ``funds

[[Page 6291]]

    appropriated by this Act'' shall not be used ``in any fiscal year'' 
    for a certain purpose, the addition of the phrase ``in any fiscal 
    year'' has no effect, because the measure can apply only to the 
    fiscal year for which funds are being appropriated; thus the phrase 
    does not destroy the character of the limitation.

    On May 26, 1965,(6) during consideration of an 
Agriculture Department appropriation bill (H.R. 8370), it was held that 
an amendment, specifying that no part of the funds therein shall be 
used ``in any fiscal year'' for farm program payments aggregating more 
than $50,000 to any person or corporation, was a proper limitation. The 
proceedings were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 111 Cong. Rec. 11660-62, 89th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Sec. 506. Not less than $1,500,000 of the appropriations of the 
    Department for research and service work authorized by the Acts of 
    August 14, 1946, July 28, 1954, and September 6, 1958 (7 U.S.C. 
    427, 1621-1629; 42 U.S.C. 1891-1893), shall be available for 
    contracting in accordance with said Acts.
        Mr. [John D.] Dingell [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Dingell: Page 37, after line 2, 
        insert the following section:
            ``Sec. 507. No part of any funds appropriated by this Act 
        may, in any fiscal year, be used, directly or indirectly, to 
        make payments to any person, partnership, or corporation in an 
        aggregate amount in excess of $50,000 in connection with any 
        price-support program or combination of programs for price 
        support or stabilization, irrespective of whether such payments 
        are on account of loans, purchases, or subsidies or are 
        otherwise authorized.''. . .

        [A point of order was made, as follows:]
        Mr. [Jamie L.] Whitten [of Mississippi]: This amendment would 
    require the keeping of books, it would require substantive 
    additional duties on many people because many producers produce 
    many different crops. This would be legislation on an appropriation 
    bill.
        The Chairman: (7) The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. 
    Dingell] offered an amendment to page 37, line 2, which is a new 
    section. . . .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. Eugene J. Keogh (N.Y.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        To which amendment the gentleman from Mississippi makes the 
    point of order that it is legislation on an appropriation bill.
        The Chair is of the opinion that since the amendment is 
    directed to funds appropriated by the pending act, the phrase ``in 
    any fiscal year'' is not applicable, nor in fact is it necessary. 
    But the Chair is further of the opinion that this is an express 
    limitation on the funds appropriated by the pending bill, and holds 
    that the amendment is in order, and overrules the point of order.

[[Page 6292]]

When Amendment May Be Offered

Sec. 64.18 To an appropriation bill, an amendment in the form of a new 
    section limiting the use of all appropriations in the bill may be 
    offered after sufficiently diverse parts of the bill have been read 
    and is not required to come at the end of the bill.

    On June 28, 1952,(8) the Committee of the Whole was 
considering H.R. 8370, a supplemental appropriation bill. The Clerk 
read as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 98 Cong. Rec. 8502, 8503, 82d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Amendment offered by Mr. [Ben F.] Jensen [of Iowa]: Page 37, 
    after line 2 insert a new section as follows:
        ``Sec.--. (a) No part of any appropriation made by this act for 
    any purpose shall be used for the payment of personal services in 
    excess of an amount equal to 85 percent of the amount requested for 
    personal services for such purpose in budget estimates heretofore 
    submitted to the Congress for the fiscal year 1953; and the total 
    amount of each appropriation, any part of which is available for 
    the payment of personal services for any purpose, is hereby reduced 
    by an amount equal to 15 percent of the amount requested in such 
    budget estimates for personal services for such purpose less an 
    amount representing the reduction, if any, between the amount 
    requested for personal services in the budget estimates and the 
    amount appropriated herein for such services.
        ``(b) This section shall not apply to--
        ``(1) not to exceed 25 percent of all vacancies;
        ``(2) positions filled from within the Mutual Security Agency 
    and related Government functions provided for in this act;
        ``(3) offices or positions required by law to be filled by 
    appointment of the President by and with the advice and consent of 
    the Senate;
    Provided further, That subsection (1) of paragraph (b) shall 
    operate to accomplish the provisions of paragraph (a), and the said 
    85 percent shall not be exceeded at any time during fiscal year 
    1953; and Provided further, each agency shall impound and deposit 
    in the general fund of the Treasury as soon as practicable, but not 
    less frequently than quarterly an amount equivalent to the savings 
    resulting from the vacant positions which are prohibited from being 
    filled by this section, based on the salaries of the prior 
    incumbents of the positions.''

        Mr. [J. Vaughan] Gary of Virginia: Mr. Chairman, I make a point 
    of order against the amendment. The amendment applies to the act 
    and should be placed at the end of the act, rather than at the end 
    of the chapter which we are now considering. I wonder if the 
    gentleman will not withdraw the amendment at this time, and offer 
    it at the conclusion of the act.
        The Chairman: (9) The Chair is ready to rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. Francis E. Walter (Pa.).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 6293]]

        The language contained in this amendment might well appear at 
    any part of the act. It is not of such a nature that it must come 
    at the conclusion of the measure now under consideration. The Chair 
    overrules the point of order.

Legislation Permitted by Special Rule

Sec. 64.19 The House, by resolution, has given the Committee on 
    Appropriations authority to incorporate in any appropriation 
    measure legislative recommendations emanating from the 
    investigation authorized to be conducted by that committee in that 
    resolution, as, for example, a prohibition of expenditures in other 
    acts for salary or compensation to certain persons found by the 
    committee to be subversive, notwithstanding Rule XXI clause 2.

    On May 17, 1943,(10) H.R. 2714, an urgent deficiency 
appropriation, was being considered in the Committee of the Whole. At 
one point the Clerk read as follows, and proceedings ensued as 
indicated below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 89 Cong. Rec. 4558, 78th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Amendment offered by Mr. (John H.) Kerr (of North Carolina): On 
    page 36, after line 23, insert as a new section the following:
        ``Sec. 304. No part of any appropriation, allocation, or fund 
    (1) which is made available under or pursuant to this act, or (2) 
    which is now, or which is hereafter made, available under or 
    pursuant to any other act, to any department, agency, or 
    instrumentality of the United States, shall be used to pay any part 
    of the salary, or other compensation for the personal services, of 
    Goodwin B. Watson, William E. Dodd, Jr., and Robert Morss Lovett: 
    Provided, That this section shall not operate to deprive any such 
    person of payment for leaves of absence or salary, or of any refund 
    or reimbursement, which have accrued prior to the date of the 
    enactment of this act.''
        Mr. [Vito] Marcantonio [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, a point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: (11) The gentleman will state the 
    point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. Wright Patman (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Marcantonio: I make a point of order against the language 
    in line 3 of the amendment just offered, as follows:

            Which is now, or which is hereafter made, available under 
        or pursuant to any other act, to any department, agency, or 
        instrumentality of the United States--

        And so forth. This amendment seeks to limit an appropriation in 
    some other appropriation bill. It goes beyond this bill.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Missouri desire to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [Clarence] Cannon of Missouri: Mr. Chairman, this amendment 
    is made in order by House Resolution 105, authorizing the 
    investigation, providing--as shown on page 2 of the re

[[Page 6294]]

    port, House Report No. 448--as follows:

            Any legislation approved by the committee as a result of 
        this resolution may be incorporated in any general or special 
        appropriation measure emanating from such committee or may be 
        offered as a committee amendment to any such measure 
        notwithstanding the provisions of clause 2 of rule XXI.

        Under that provision, the amendment is in order.
        Mr. Marcantonio: May I say in reply, Mr. Chairman, that would 
    be true if the amendment offered were limited to this 
    appropriation, but the amendment offered extends to appropriations 
    not made by this bill.
        The Chairman: The language appears to be rather plain and 
    specific to the Chair, ``any legislation approved by the Committee 
    as a result of this resolution may be incorporated in any general 
    or special appropriation measure.''
        Therefore the point of order is overruled.

    Note: The text of House Resolution 105 was as follows: 
(12)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 89 Cong. Rec. 734, 78th Cong. 1st Sess., Feb. 9, 1943.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Resolved, That the Committee on Appropriations, acting through 
    a special subcommittee thereof appointed by the chairman of such 
    committee for the purposes of this resolution, is authorized and 
    directed to examine into any and all allegations or charges that 
    certain persons in the employ of the several executive departments 
    and other executive agencies are unfit to continue in such 
    employment by reason of their present association or membership or 
    past association or membership in or with organizations whose aims 
    or purposes are or have been subversive to the Government of the 
    United States. Such examination shall be pursued with the view of 
    obtaining all available evidence bearing upon each particular case 
    and reporting to the House the conclusions of the committee with 
    respect to each such case in the light of the factual evidence 
    obtained. Any legislation approved by the committee as a result of 
    this resolution may be incorporated in any general or special 
    appropriation measure emanating from such committee or may be 
    offered as a committee amendment to any such measure 
    notwithstanding the provisions of clause 2 of rule XXI.
        For the purposes of this resolution, such committee or any 
    subcommittee thereof is hereby authorized to sit and act during the 
    present Congress at such times and places within the United States, 
    whether the House is in session, has recessed, or has adjourned, to 
    hold such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses, 
    and the production of such books or papers or documents or vouchers 
    by subpena or otherwise, and to take such testimony and records as 
    it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued over the signature of 
    the chairman of the committee or subcommittee, or by any person 
    designated by him, and shall be served by such person or persons as 
    the chairman of the committee or subcommittee may designate. The 
    chairman of the committee or subcommittee, or any member thereof, 
    may administer oaths to witnesses.

Restriction on Transfer of Funds to Activities Funded in Paragraph

Sec. 64.20 A provision in a paragraph of a general appro

[[Page 6295]]

    priation bill prohibiting the transfer of funds therein to any 
    other account or activity unless specifically authorized was held 
    to be a proper limitation on the use of funds in the paragraph.

    On Aug. 1, 1973,(13) during consideration in the 
Committee of the Whole of a general appropriation bill (H.R. 9590), the 
following occurred:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 119 Cong. Rec. 27289, 93d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Tom] Steed [of Oklahoma]: Mr. Chairman, the points of 
    order made against the language are conceded down to line 7, page 
    23, but the language of that ``Provided further,'' is a simple 
    limitation on an appropriation bill and is not subject to a point 
    of order.
        The Chairman: (14) The Chair agrees with the 
    gentleman from Oklahoma.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Richard Bolling (Mo.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The various points of order that are conceded are sustained, 
    and that language is stricken. The language:
        Provided further, That none of the funds available under this 
        heading shall be available for transfer to any other account 
        nor for the funding of any activities other than those 
        specifically authorized under this heading.

        Which is a proper limitation and appears beginning in line 7, 
    page 23, through line 10, remains in the bill, since the point of 
    order has not been made against the entire paragraph.

Permanent Legislation; Use of ``Hereafter''

Sec. 64.21 An amendment to an appropriation bill in the form of a 
    limitation but containing the word ``hereafter'' was held to be 
    legislation and not in order.

    On Jan. 31, 1936,(15) during consideration in the 
Committee of the Whole of the Department of the Interior appropriation 
bill (H.R. 10630), a point of order was raised against the following 
amendment:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 80 Cong. Rec. 1300, 1305, 1306, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Amendment offered by Mr. (Byron N.) Scott (of California): On 
    page 48, line 13, after the word ``Interior'', add: ``Provided, 
    That hereafter no part of any appropriation for these Indian 
    schools shall be available for the salary of any person teaching or 
    advocating the legislative program of the American Liberty 
    League.''
        Mr. [Edward T.] Taylor of Colorado: Mr. Chairman, I make a 
    point of order against the amendment. It is legislation on an 
    appropriation bill. . . .
        The Chairman: (16) The Chair is ready to rule. The 
    word ``hereafter'' in the amendment makes the provision permanent 
    legislation. Permanent legislation on an appropriation bill would 
    not be in order. The language of the amendment here offered not 
    only applies to the appropriations of this bill but it would apply 
    to subsequent ap

[[Page 6296]]

    propriations. Therefore, the amendment contains legislation; and 
    the point of order is sustained.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. Robert L. Doughton (N.C.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Change in Administrative Policy by Negative Restriction on Use of Funds

Sec. 64.22 While a limitation may not involve a permanent change of 
    existing law, the allegation that it may result in a change of 
    administrative policy would not itself render it subject to a point 
    of order if only a negative limitation on use of funds.

    On May 11, 1960,(17) during consideration in the 
Committee of the Whole of the Agriculture Department appropriation bill 
(H.R. 12117), a point of order was raised against the following 
section:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 106 Cong. Rec. 10053, 10054, 86th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Sec. 408. No part of the funds appropriated by this Act shall 
    be used to pay the compensation of any employee or officer of the 
    Department, except the Secretary of Agriculture, who, in addition 
    to other regularly assigned responsibilities, serves as a member of 
    the Board of Directors or as an officer of the Commodity Credit 
    Corporation after February 1, 1961.
        Mr. [Paul] Brown of Georgia: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        The Chairman: (18) The gentleman will state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. Paul J. Kilday (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Brown of Georgia: Mr. Chairman, section 408 provides that 
    none of the funds appropriated by H.R. 12117, making appropriations 
    for the Department of Agriculture and Farm Credit Administration, 
    shall be used to pay the salary of any officer or employee of the 
    Department--except the Secretary--who serves as a member of the 
    Board of Directors of CCC, or as an officer of CCC, in addition to 
    other regular duties with the Department.
        This reverses a decision made by the Banking and Currency 
    Committee and the Congress in 1949, when the CCC Charter Act was 
    amended to strike out a similar restriction which had been enacted 
    in 1948. It is, therefore, legislation, and the mere fact it is put 
    in the form of a limitation on the use of funds appropriated by the 
    bill does not save it. As paragraph 1691, volume 7, of Cannon's 
    Precedents of the House of Representatives puts it:

            The purpose rather than the form of a proposed limitation 
        is the proper criterion by which its admissibility should be 
        judged, and if its purpose appears to be a restriction of 
        executive discretion to a degree that may be fairly termed a 
        change of policy rather than a matter of administrative detail 
        it is not in order.

        Again in paragraph 1606 of the same volume, the following is 
    found:

            Whenever a purported limitation makes unlawful that which 
        before was lawful or makes lawful that which before was 
        unlawful it changes existing law and is not in order on an 
        appropriation bill.
            A proper limitation is negative and in the nature of a 
        veto, and when it assumes affirmative form by direction to an 
        executive in the discharge of his duties under existing law it

[[Page 6297]]

        ceases to be a limitation and becomes legislation.

        Section 408 in effect requires the Secretary to take 
    affirmative action. To carry out the farm programs financed by CCC, 
    the Secretary would have to appoint new Board members, recruited 
    from private life, to replace the six Department officers other 
    than himself who now serve on the Board. He would also have to 
    recruit and appoint new personnel to serve as officers of the 
    Corporation. This not only means the section constitutes 
    legislation, but also means it is not entitled to the protection of 
    the Holman rule, because it would not save the Government money. On 
    the contrary, it would require hiring new employees at additional 
    expense to the Government.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Whitten] 
    desire to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [Jamie L.] Whitten: Mr. Chairman, the section clearly 
    provides a limitation on the use of funds that are appropriated in 
    this bill. It does not change the Commodity Credit Corporation 
    charter. It does not change any basic law. It just simply limits 
    what the money in this bill can be used for. It has been my 
    experience and observation during the years here that the Chair has 
    many times said that it is a negative limitation on the use of 
    money and that it is clearly in order, and on that I rest the 
    committee's position.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Brown] makes a point of order 
    against the language in section 408 of the bill on the ground that 
    it constitutes legislation on an appropriation bill.
        The Chair has had an opportunity to examine the precedents in 
    this connection, including the precedents to which the gentleman 
    from Georgia has referred and from which he has read. The Chair 
    would also refer to paragraph 1694 of Cannon's Precedents, volume 
    7, the language being:

            While a limitation may not involve change of existing law 
        or affirmatively restrict executive direction, it may properly 
        effect a change of administrative policy and still be in order.

        The Chair has examined additional precedents bearing on this 
    question. The Chair is constrained to hold that section 408 is a 
    restriction on a manner in which the funds can be used, and 
    constitutes a negative limitation, and, therefore, overrules the 
    point of order.

    Parliamentarian's Note: There are other recent rulings in which the 
Chair has chosen to rely on 7 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 1694 rather than 
on Sec. 1691 in permitting limitations on use of funds. See 118 Cong. 
Rec. 30749, 30750, 92d Cong. 2d Sess., Sept. 14, 1972; 120 Cong. Rec. 
20601, 20602, 93d Cong. 2d Sess., June 21, 1974; 120 Cong. Rec. 34716, 
93d Cong. 2d Sess., Oct. 9, 1974. The two rulings noted above, found at 
7 Cannon's Precedents Sec. Sec. 1691 and 1694, are discussed in more 
detail in Sec. 5s1, supra.

Burden of Proof as to Whether Language ``Changes Existing Law''

Sec. 64.23 The Chair strictly interprets the provisions of

[[Page 6298]]

    Rule XXI clause 2 prohibiting amendments to general appropriation 
    bills which change existing law; and if a proposed limitation on 
    the use of funds goes beyond the traditionally permissible objects 
    of a limitation, as for example restricting discretion in the 
    timing of expenditure of funds rather than restricting their use 
    for a specific object or purpose, the Chair is constrained to rule 
    that the amendment is legislation failing a convincing argument by 
    the proponent showing that the amendment does not change existing 
    law.

    On July 28, 1980,(19) the Committee of the Whole having 
under consideration the Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
and independent agencies appropriation bill (H.R. 7631), an amendment 
was offered and ruled upon as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 126 Cong. Rec. 19924, 19925, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Herbert E.] Harris [II, of Virginia): Mr. Chairman, I 
    offer an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Harris: Page 45, after line 23, 
        insert the following:
            Sec. 413. No more than an amount equal to 20 percent of the 
        total funds appropriated under this Act for any agency for any 
        fiscal year and apportioned to such agency pursuant to section 
        3679 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (31 U.S.C. 
        665) may be obligated during the last two months of such fiscal 
        year. . . .

        The Chairman: (20) Does the gentleman from Indiana 
    (Mr. Myers) insist on his point of order?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. Elliott H. Levitas (Ga.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John T.] Myers of Indiana: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, the gentleman has offered an amendment to limit 
    the appropriations to a specific time; but I respectfully suggest 
    that the fact the gentleman has added the words, ``No more than'' 
    is still not, in fact, a limitation. . . .
        Mr. Chairman, the fact that you are limiting here, not 
    directing, but limiting the authority to the last 2 months how much 
    may be spent takes away the discretionary authority of the 
    Executive which might be needed in this case. It clearly is more 
    than an administrative detail when you limit and you take away the 
    right of the Executive to use the funds prudently, to take 
    advantage of saving money for the Executive, which we all should be 
    interested in, and I certainly am, too; but Mr. Chairman, rule 843 
    provides that you cannot take away that discretionary authority of 
    the Executive.
        This attempt in this amendment does take that discretionary 
    authority to save money, to wisely allocate money prudently and it 
    takes away, I think, authority that we rightfully should keep with 
    the Executive, that you can accumulate funds and spend them in the 
    last quarter if it is to the advantage of the taxpayer and the 
    Executive. . . .

[[Page 6299]]

        Mr. Harris: . . . Mr. Chairman, let me first address the last 
    point, probably because it is the weakest that the gentleman has 
    made with respect to his point of order.
        With respect to the discretion that we are in any way limiting 
    the President, we cannot limit the discretion which we have not 
    given the President directly through legislation. There is no 
    discretion with regard to legislation that we have overtly 
    legislated and given to the President.
        Mr. Chairman, section 665(c)(3) of title 31 of the United 
    States Code, which states the following:

            Any appropriation subject to apportionment shall be 
        distributed as may be deemed appropriate by the officers 
        designated in subsection (d) of this section to make 
        apportionments and reapportionments.

        Clearly grants agency budget officers the discretionary 
    authority to apportion the funds in a manner they deem appropriate. 
    My amendment would not interfere with this authority to apportion 
    funds. On the contrary, my amendment reaffirms this section of the 
    United States Code, as Deschler's Procedures, in the U.S. House of 
    Representatives, chapter 26, section 1.8, states:

            The provision of the rule forbidding in any general 
        appropriation bill a ``provision changing existing law'' is 
        construed to mean the enactment of law where none exists, or a 
        proposition for repeal of existing law. Existing law may be 
        repeated verbatim in an appropriation bill, but the slightest 
        change of the text causes it to be ruled out.

        My amendment, Mr. Chairman, as the Chair will note, 
    specifically restates by reference the existing law, which in no 
    way gives discretion as to spending, but gives discretion as to 
    apportionment.
        Mr. Chairman, as the Chair knows, the budget execution cycle 
    has many steps. Whereas the Chair's earlier ruling related to the 
    executive branch authority to apportion, my amendment addresses the 
    obligation rate of funds appropriated under the fact. As OMB 
    circular No. A-34 (July 15, 1976) titled ``Budget Execution'' 
    explains:

            Apportionment is a distribution made by OMB.
            Obligations are amounts of orders placed, contracts 
        awarded, services received, and similar transactions.

        Mr. Chairman, my amendment proposes some additional duties, but 
    only a very minimal additional duty upon the executive branch.
        Deschler's chapter 26, section 11.1 says:

            The application of any limitation on an appropriation bill 
        places some minimal extra duties on Federal officials, who, if 
        nothing else, must determine whether a particular use of funds 
        falls within that prohibited by the limitation. . . .

        The Chairman: . . . In the first instance, the Chair would 
    observe that it is not the duty of the Chair or the authority of 
    the Chair to rule on the wisdom or the legislative effect of 
    amendments.
        Second, the Chair will observe that the gentleman from 
    Virginia, in the way in which his amendment has been drafted, 
    satisfies the requirements of the Apportionment Act, which was the 
    subject of a prior ruling of the Chair in connection with another 
    piece of legislation.

[[Page 6300]]

        The Chair agrees with the basic characterization made by the 
    gentleman from Indiana that the precedents of the House relating to 
    limitations on general appropriation bills stand for the 
    proposition that a limitation to be in order must apply to a 
    specific purpose, or object, or amount of appropriation. The 
    doctrine of limitations on a general appropriation bill has emerged 
    over the years from rulings of Chairmen of the Committee of the 
    Whole, and is not stated in clause 2, rule XXI itself as an 
    exception from the prohibition against inclusion of provisions 
    which ``change existing law.'' Thus the Chair must be guided by the 
    most persuasive body of precedent made known to him in determining 
    whether the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. 
    Harris) ``changes existing law.'' Under the precedents in 
    Deschler's Procedure, chapter 26, section 1.12, the proponent of an 
    amendment has the burden of proving that the amendment does not 
    change existing law.
        The Chair feels that the basic question addressed by the point 
    of order is as follows: Does the absence in the precedents of the 
    House of any ruling holding in order an amendment which attempts to 
    restrict not the purpose or object or amount of appropriation, but 
    to limit the timing of the availability of funds within the period 
    otherwise covered by the bill, require the Chair to conclude that 
    such an amendment is not within the permissible class of amendments 
    held in order as limitations? The precedents require the Chair to 
    strictly interpret clause 2, rule XXI, and where language is 
    susceptible to more than one interpretation, it is incumbent upon 
    proponent of the language to show that it is not in violation of 
    the rule (Deschler's chapter 25, section 6.3).

        In essence, the Chair is reluctant, based upon arguments 
    submitted to him, to expand the doctrine of limitations on general 
    appropriation bills to permit negative restrictions on the use of 
    funds which go beyond the amount, purpose, or object of an 
    appropriation, and the Chair therefore and accordingly sustains the 
    point of order.

Limiting Commingled Funds

Sec. 64.24 As long as a limitation on the use of funds in a general 
    appropriation bill restricts the expenditure of federal funds 
    carried in the bill without changing existing law, the limitation 
    is in order, even if those federal funds are under the program in 
    question commingled with nonfederal funds which would have to be 
    accounted for separately in carrying out the limitation.

    On Aug. 20, 1980,(1) the Chair ruled that an amendment 
to a general appropriation bill denying the use of funds therein to pay 
for an abortion, or administrative expenses in connection with any 
federal employees' health benefits plan which provides any benefits or 
coverage for abortions after the

[[Page 6301]]

last day of contracts currently in force, did not constitute 
legislation, since the amendment did not directly interfere with 
executive discretion (in contracting to establish such plans). (It is 
permissible by limitation to negatively deny the availability of funds 
although discretionary authority may be indirectly curtailed and 
contracts may be left unsatisfied.) The proceedings are discussed in 
Sec. 74.5, infra. See Sec. 51, supra, for discussion of provisions 
affecting the discretionary authority of officials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 126 Cong. Rec. 22171, 22172, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Limitation Resulting in Unsatisfied Contracts

Sec. 64.25 An appropriation may be withheld from a designated object by 
    a negative limitation on the use of funds in a general 
    appropriation bill, although contracts may be left unsatisfied 
    thereby.

    On July 10, 1975,(2) an amendment to a general 
appropriation bill prohibiting the use of Interstate Highway System 
funds in the bill by any state which permits the Interstate System to 
be used by vehicles in excess of certain sizes and weights but not 
interfering with contractual obligations entered into prior to 
enactment was held in order as a negative limitation on the use of 
funds in the bill which did not impose new duties on federal officials 
(who were already under an obligation to determine vehicle weights and 
widths in each state) and which did not directly change an allocation 
formula in existing law. The proceedings are discussed in detail in 
Sec. 69.8, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 121 Cong. Rec. 22006, 22007, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Limitation Interfering With Discretion

Sec. 64.26 A negative restriction on the availability of funds in a 
    general appropriation bill may be a proper limitation, although it 
    indirectly interferes with an executive official's discretionary 
    authority by denying the use of funds, as long as it does not 
    directly amend existing law and is merely descriptive of functions 
    and findings already required to be undertaken by existing law.

    On June 24, 1976,(3) it was held that, where existing 
law prohibited the implementation by any court, department, or agency 
of a plan to transport students to a school other than the school 
nearest or next nearest their homes

[[Page 6302]]

which offers the appropriate grade level and type of education for each 
student (thus requiring determinations of school proximity and 
curriculum to be made by federal officials), a paragraph in a general 
appropriation bill prohibiting the use of funds therein for the 
transportation of students to a school other than the school nearest 
their homes and offering the courses of study pursued by such students 
was in order as a negative limitation on the use of funds in that bill 
which did not directly amend existing law and which did not impose new 
determinations on federal officials which they were not already 
required by law to make. The proceedings were as indicated below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 122 Cong. Rec. 20408-10, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Sec. 208. None of the funds contained in this Act shall be 
        used to require, directly or indirectly, the transportation of 
        any student to a school other than the school which is nearest 
        the student's home, and which offers the courses of study 
        pursued by such student, in order to comply with title VI of 
        the Civil Rights Act of 1964. . . .

        Mr. [Louis] Stokes [of Ohio]: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of 
    order that the language set forth in section 208 of this bill 
    constitutes legislation in an appropriation bill, in clear 
    violation of rule XXI, section 2. . . .
        Under existing law, that is, section 215(a) of the Equal 
    Educational Opportunity Act of 1974 (title II of P.L. 93-380, 
    enacted August 21, 1974), the transportation of students as part of 
    a school desegregation plan or effort under mandate of Federal 
    authorities is permitted or authorized, but only within prescribed 
    distances from a student's home.
        Section 215(a) prescribes that:

            No court, department, or agency of the United States shall, 
        pursuant to Section 214, order the implementation of a plan 
        that would require the transportation of any student to a 
        school other than the school closest or next closest to his 
        place of residence which provides the appropriate grade level 
        and type of education for such student.

        Mr. Chairman, this is the standard of existing law, governing 
    the ordering of transportation of a student for purposes of school 
    desegregation, that is, not beyond the school closest or next 
    closest to his place of residence. . . .
        On its face, section 208, the so-called Byrd amendment, changes 
    existing law (section 215(a) cited above) in the following 
    particulars:
        First: Whereas existing law permits the transportation of a 
    student to the closest or ``next closest'' school, section 208 
    restricts such transportation to the ``nearest'' school, only, 
    thereby changing existing law;
        Secondly: Whereas existing law is silent on the point, section 
    208 forbids student transportation ``directly or indirectly'' 
    beyond the ``closest'' school, thereby creating new law on that 
    point;
        Third: Whereas existing law only forbids HEW's implementation 
    of a school desegregation plan requiring transportation beyond the 
    ``next closest'' school, section 208 forbids transportation be

[[Page 6303]]

    yond the ``closest'' school, plan or no plan, thereby changing 
    existing law; and
        Fourth: Whereas existing law prohibits transportation to a 
    school other than one ``which provides the appropriate grade level 
    and type of education for such student'', section 208 of this 
    appropriation bill changes existing law by restricting such 
    transportation to a school ``which offers the courses of study 
    pursued by such student'', only. While section 208 would be in 
    order if it merely repeated, verbatim, the provisions of existing 
    law (that is, section 215(a) described above), it clearly differs 
    from, goes beyond, and changes section 215(a) in the several ways 
    that I have indicated.
        That, Mr. Chairman, is a fatal defect, for subsection 842 of 
    rule XXI declares existing law may be repeated verbatim in an 
    appropriation bill (IV Hinds' precedents, 3814, 3815) but the 
    slightest change of the text causes it to be ruled out (IV Hinds' 
    precedents 3817; Cannon's precedents 1391, 1394; Cong. Record, June 
    4, 1970, p. 18405). . . .
        Mr. [Daniel J.] Flood [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, very 
    simply, and very clearly, and the legal minds will understand the 
    terminology, this provision is in the form of a limitation, period. 
    It is strictly limited to the funds appropriated in this bill. The 
    clear intent here is to impose what is known as a negative 
    prohibition--a negative prohibition--of the use of the funds 
    contained in this bill. It would not under any circumstances impose 
    any additional duties or any additional burdens on the executive 
    branch other than those already required in the enforcement of 
    existing law. . . .
        The Chairman: (4) May the Chair inquire of the 
    chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee with respect to whether 
    or not the terms of section 208 would require additional 
    determinations by the administrator. The Chair would ask the 
    gentleman from Pennsylvania for his response as to whether the 
    standard of an appropriate grade level and type of education for 
    such students, which is stipulated in the Equal Educational 
    Opportunity Act of 1974, is a different standard from that set 
    forth in section 208 of the bill pending before us--that is, 
    courses of study pursued by such student.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. James C. Wright, Jr. (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The question that the Chair is attempting to arrive at 
    basically is whether or not the requirement of a determination with 
    respect to courses of study pursued by such student would in any 
    substantial way differ from the requirement in the statute of a 
    determination of the appropriate grade level and type of education 
    offered by the schools.
        Mr. Flood: No, Mr. Chairman, the direct answer is this does not 
    require different standards. It is merely an expression in a 
    different way. It is not a requirement of any different standards. 
    It is an expression in a different way.
        The Chairman: The Chair thanks the gentleman from Pennsylvania. 
    The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Stokes) makes the point of order 
    against section 208 of the present bill and supports his point of 
    order with a well documented brief and very persuasive verbal 
    argument on the subject.

[[Page 6304]]

        Basically, three questions seem to be involved. The first 
    question is whether or not section 208 repeals or changes existing 
    law.
        It seems to the Chair that that question is answered 
    satisfactorily by the chairman of the subcommittee when he declares 
    that it does not directly amend existing law, but rather imposes a 
    negative restriction only with respect to moneys contained in this 
    present appropriation bill and that it is written as a limitation 
    upon funds in this bill.
        The second question occurs, of course, as to whether or not it 
    imposes additional duties upon a Federal official.
        That divides itself into two basic subquestions in the opinion 
    of the Chair.
        The first is whether the requirement in section 208 referring 
    only to the school nearest the student's residence requires an 
    additional duty over and above that required under the Equal 
    Education Opportunity Act of 1974. That law proscribes a court or 
    department or agency from ordering the transportation of students 
    to schools other than those either closest or next closest to their 
    homes. The Chair believes that no additional duties would be 
    imposed upon the Administrator by section 208 of the bill since the 
    Administrator already is required under existing law to make 
    determinations to ascertain the existence and location of the 
    comparable schools nearest and next nearest to the students' homes. 
    Therefore the Chair feels that the determination of the existence 
    of the school nearest the student's home would not be an additional 
    burden in that the law already compels the Administrator to make 
    that finding.
        The second subquestion involved is that of whether or not an 
    additional burden would be imposed by reason of the reference under 
    section 208 to ``the courses of study pursued by such student'' in 
    the schools involved. And the Chair, relying primarily upon the 
    information provided in response to its inquiry by the gentleman 
    from Pennsylvania and relying upon his own impression as well 
    believes that ``the courses of study pursued by such student'' are 
    essentially the same tests as that required in the Equal Education 
    Opportunity Act, the appropriate grade level and type of education.
        Now only one other question was addressed, it seems to the 
    Chair, and that was the question bearing upon a fairly well 
    established rule to the effect that existing law may be repeated 
    verbatim in an appropriation bill but the slightest change of the 
    text causes it to be ruled out. The Chair does not believe that 
    section 208 purports to be a statement of existing law. For each of 
    these reasons, and based upon the precedent cited by the gentleman 
    from Pennsylvania and recognizing that the committee could have 
    refused to appropriate any funds for implementation of 
    transportation plans, the Chair believes that section 208 is 
    properly in order as a limitation on an appropriation bill and 
    overrules the point of order.

Prohibiting Use of Funds to Enforce Particular Internal Revenue Service 
    Ruling

Sec. 64.27 An amendment to a general appropriation bill

[[Page 6305]]

    prohibiting the use of funds therein to carry out any ruling of the 
    Internal Revenue Service which rules that taxpayers are not 
    entitled to certain charitable deductions was held in order as a 
    limitation, since the amendment was merely descriptive of an 
    existing ruling already promulgated by that agency and did not 
    require new determinations as to the applicability of the 
    limitation to other categories of taxpayers.

    On July 16, 1979,(5) during consideration in the 
Committee of the Whole of H.R. 4393 (Treasury Department, Postal 
Service, and general government appropriation bill), a point of order 
against an amendment was overruled, as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 125 Cong. Rec. 18808-10, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. [Robert K.] Dornan [of 
        California]: Page 39, after line 18, add the following new 
        section:
            Sec. 613. None of the funds available under this Act may be 
        used to carry out any revenue ruling of the Internal Revenue 
        Service which rules that a taxpayer is not entitled to a 
        charitable deduction for general purpose contributions which 
        are used for educational purposes by a religious organization 
        which is an exempt organization as described in section 
        170(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. . . .

        Mr. [Tom] Steed [of Oklahoma]: Mr. Chairman, I want to insist 
    upon my point of order.
        Regardless of the merit of the subject matter here, this 
    obviously is not a limitation on an appropriation. It is evident by 
    the author's own statement that many things will be involved if 
    this amendment is adopted, that would be forced upon the agency, 
    that are not otherwise involved. It is in direct violation of 
    clause 2, rule XXI, because it does create legislative action.
        This is obviously a matter that only the legislative committee 
    can cope with, and so because it is a violation of that rule I 
    insist that the point of order be sustained. . . .
        Mr. Dornan: . . . I can assure the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. 
    Steed) that I checked out this amendment with the Parliamentarian's 
    Office, and I was told that the amendment was in order as a 
    limitation on an appropriations bill. There is no additional burden 
    imposed on Federal executive offices. IRS officials already perform 
    the simple ministerial requirement of analyzing our tax returns. 
    The amendment is negative in nature. It shows retrenchment on its 
    face. It is germane. Nevertheless, for the benefit of the 
    gentleman, if he desires, I will read some relevant excerpts from 
    Cannon's Precedents which demonstrate that the amendment is in 
    order. . . .
        [I]n section 1515:

            An amendment prohibiting payment of fees to officials under 
        certain contingencies was held to retrench expenditures and to 
        come within the exception to the rule against admis

[[Page 6306]]

        sion of legislation on appropriation bills. . . .

        Section 1491:

            If the obvious effect of an amendment is to reduce 
        expenditures, it is not necessary that it provide for such 
        reduction in definite terms and amount in order to come within 
        the exception.

        Section 1493, and I will conclude with this one--

            A cessation of Government activities was held to involve a 
        retrenchment of expenditures. . . .

        Mr. [Robert C.] Eckhardt [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, this 
    amendment obviously adds a burden to the IRS to establish a 
    different standard from that which would be applicable under 
    existing law. If it did not, the amendment would be of no effect. 
    What is attempted to be done here is to provide a different rule of 
    law and impose that on the IRS by what is called a retrenchment in 
    an appropriations bill. If this may be done in the name of 
    retrenchment of expenditures, then any law of this Nation may be 
    changed. Funds may not be permitted to go to any agency which makes 
    a determination of an administrative sort unless that determination 
    is different from that which the law would permit to apply under 
    the circumstances. . . .
        The Chairman: (6) The Chair is prepared to rule on 
    the point of order. The Chair is of the opinion that retrenchment 
    precedents under the Holman rule, do not apply in this situation 
    since no certain reduction in funds is involved. The Chair is of 
    the opinion that there are no precedents directly in point and the 
    Chair is not aware that the gentleman has sought the advice of the 
    Chair's advisers on this particular amendment but on a somewhat 
    similar amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. Richardson Preyer (N.C.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chair is of the opinion that what is involved in the 
    amendment is a particular ruling which applied to a single case and 
    that, therefore, no new determination has to be made by the IRS. It 
    does not require the IRS to make new rulings or determinations. The 
    amendment does not describe a situation where the IRS must look at 
    every religious contribution to determine if it applies. The 
    amendment is somewhat analogous to that in Deschler's [Procedure], 
    chapter 25, section 10.16, which was held in order.
        Therefore, the Chair thinks the amendment is in order, and the 
    point of order is overruled.

    Parliamentarian's Note: A different result might now be required 
under clause 5(b) of the present Rule XXI, which provides: 
(7)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. House Rules and Manual Sec. 846b, 99th Cong. (1985).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        No bill or joint resolution carrying a tax or tariff measure 
    shall be reported by any committee not having jurisdiction to 
    report tax and tariff measures, nor shall an amendment in the House 
    or proposed by the Senate carrying a tax or tariff measure be in 
    order during the consideration of a bill or joint resolution 
    reported by a committee not having that jurisdiction. A question of 
    order on a tax or tariff measure in any such bill, joint 
    resolution, or amendment thereto may be raised at any time.

[[Page 6307]]

    In a ruling under this provision on Sept. 12, 1984,(8) a 
Senate amendment to a general appropriation bill prohibiting the use of 
funds in that or any other act by the Internal Revenue Service to 
impose or assess any tax due under a designated provision of the 
Internal Revenue Code was held to be a tax measure within the meaning 
of Rule XXI clause 5(b), as it had the effect of repealing a tax by 
rendering it uncollectable through the use of all funds available to 
the collecting agency. Of course, the amendment in question in the 1984 
ruling was not a proper limitation. The extent to which any and all 
proper limitations on Internal Revenue Service funds are to be 
construed as tax or tariff measures under Rule XXI clause 5(b) is a 
matter to be spelled out in subsequent rulings. For example, on Aug. 1, 
1986, during consideration of H.R. 5294 (Treasury Department and Postal 
Service appropriation bill for fiscal 1987), it was held that a 
proposed limitation on the use of funds may violate Rule XXI clause 
5(b) where it is shown that the imposition of the restriction on 
Internal Revenue Service funding for the fiscal year would effectively 
and inevitably preclude the IRS from collecting revenues otherwise due 
and owing by law, or require collection of revenue not legally due or 
owing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 130 Cong. Rec. ----, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 5798, Treasury Department and Postal Service 
        appropriations for fiscal 1985.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Restricting Use of Funds--to Carry Out Particular Regulation

Sec. 64.28 It is in order on a general appropriation bill to deny the 
    use of funds to carry out an existing regulation, and the fact that 
    the regulation for which funds are denied may have been promulgated 
    pursuant to court order and pursuant to constitutional provisions 
    is an argument on the merits of the amendment and does not render 
    it legislative in nature.

    On Aug. 19, 1980,(9) the Chair held that an amendment to 
a general appropriation bill denying the use of funds therein for the 
Internal Revenue Service to carry out certain published tax procedures 
did not impose new duties or determinations on the executive branch and 
did not constitute leg

[[Page 6308]]

islation. The proceedings were as indicated below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 126 Cong. Rec. 21981, 21983, 21984, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. [Robert K.] Dornan [of 
        California]: Page 8, after line 22, insert the following new 
        sections:
            Sec. 104. None of the funds appropriated by this title may 
        be used to carry out the proposed revenue procedure 4830-01-M 
        of the Internal Revenue Service entitled ``Proposed Revenue 
        Procedure on Private Tax-Exempt Schools'' (44 F.R. 9451 through 
        9455, February 13, 1979, F.R. Document 79-4801), or the 
        proposed revenue procedure 4830-01 of the Internal Revenue 
        Service entitled ``Proposed Revenue Procedure on Private Tax-
        Exempt Schools'' (43 F.R. 37296 through 37298, August 22, 1978, 
        F.R. Document 78-23515); or parts thereof. . . .

        Mr. [Charles B.] Rangel [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, I join in 
    a reservation of a point of order. . . .
        Mr. Chairman, I think what we are doing is that we are 
    attempting again to legislate on an appropriation bill. It is clear 
    that the proponents of this type of amendment on previous occasions 
    were saying that the IRS has attempted to legislate and to go 
    beyond the scope that the Congress wanted to go and that they were 
    waiting for a court to review the jurisdiction of the IRS to make 
    certain that they would not be doing acts which this Congress has 
    the responsibility to perform.
        Now we find that the courts have responded, and they responded 
    specifically not only to the proposed regulations but to the 
    constitutional obligations that we not fund schools that involved 
    themselves in racial discrimination; and certainly no Member of the 
    House, including the proponents of this amendment, would support 
    that. But they have specifically given guidelines. They have 
    directed what the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue would have 
    to do, and the Commissioner would indeed be guilty of contempt if 
    he did not follow those court directions.
        It would seem to me that that is one argument as to why my 
    point of order should be sustained; but my second argument would be 
    that certainly it would not be equal protection under the law if 
    what the proponent of this amendment is really saying that if, 
    indeed, a teaching institution found itself losing its tax 
    exemption in Mississippi because of the Green case and then right 
    across the Mississippi River we found a different standard that had 
    been enacted by the IRS, I do not believe that this is what our 
    constitutional fathers really thought was equal protection under 
    the law. . . .
        Mr. Dornan: . . . I refer again to Deschler's Procedure, 
    chapter 25, section 10.16:

            Sec. 10.16 To a paragraph of a general appropriation bill 
        containing funds for expenses of the Internal Revenue Service, 
        an amendment prohibiting the use of any funds in the bill for 
        financing revenue rulings, letters, or advice not made 
        available to the general public was held in order as a negative 
        limitation which did not affirmatively impose new duties on 
        that agency. 120 Cong. Rec. 21029, 21030, 93d Cong. 2d Sess., 
        June 25, 1974 [H.R. 15544].

        Under section 10.18:

            Sec. 10.18 While language in a general appropriation bill 
        may not by its terms directly curtail a discretionary authority 
        conferred by law, the Committee on Appropriations may, by re

[[Page 6309]]

        fusing to recommend funds for all or part of an authorized 
        executive function, thereby effect a change in policy to the 
        extent of its denial of availability of funds. 120 Cong. Rec. 
        34716, 34717, 93d Cong. 2d Sess., Oct. 8, 1974 [H.R. 16901], 
        where a section in a general appropriation bill prohibiting the 
        use of any funds therein by the Environmental Protection 
        Agency--

        As a case example--
        ``to administer any program to tax, limit or otherwise regulate 
        parking facilities'' was held in order as a negative limitation 
        on the use of funds in the bill.

        Also, I think section 10.19 supports my amendment:

            Sec. 10.19 It is in order on a general appropriation bill 
        to provide that no part, or only a specified amount, of an 
        appropriation shall be used in a certain way, even though 
        executive discretion be thereby negatively restricted. 118 
        Cong. Rec. 30749, 92d Cong. 2d Sess., Sept. 14, 1972 [H.R. 
        16593]--

        They gave as an example:
        where an amendment to a defense appropriation bill providing 
        that not more than a certain amount of funds therein for 
        alteration, overhaul, and repair of naval vessels shall be 
        available for such work in Navy shipyards was held in order as 
        a limitation on the use of funds in the bill. . . .

        Mr. [Louis] Stokes [of Ohio]: Mr. Chairman, the word 
    ``charitable'' is used in its common law sense in the Internal 
    Revenue Code. . . .
        In the case of education, the . . . public policy of 
    nondiscrimination in both public and private schools [is well 
    established, being] derived from the 14th amendment to the 
    Constitution and its application in the case of Brown versus Board 
    of Education, subsequent judicial decisions and certain provisions 
    of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Thus, schools which follow 
    discriminatory admission policies fail to qualify as charitable 
    and, therefore, are not tax exempt.
        Under the amendment proposed by the gentleman from California, 
    Mr. Chairman, new duties are imposed upon the Internal Revenue 
    Service. Obviously, we are then legislating upon an appropriations 
    bill. . . .
        Obviously, once again we are referring back to the previous law 
    of 1978, while in the interim period we have now had new Federal 
    judicial determinations relative to 501(C).
        As the gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel) made a very salient 
    point, is the fact that you cannot have Internal Revenue in the 
    posture where they must apply one set of rules and regulations to 
    the State of Mississippi and another set of rules and regulations 
    to the other 49 States.
        Obviously, the amendment proposed by the gentleman would create 
    confusion and also would impose new duties and regulations upon the 
    Internal Revenue Service not previously imposed upon them, either 
    by the law or their own regulations. . . .
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: (10) . . . [T]he Chair is 
    prepared to rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Richardson Preyer (N.C.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        In a similar instance on July 16, 1979, an amendment to this 
    general appropriations bill last year prohibiting the use of funds 
    therein to carry out any ruling of the Internal Revenue Service, 
    which rules that taxpayers are

[[Page 6310]]

    not entitled to certain charitable deductions, was held in order as 
    a limitation, since the amendment was merely descriptive of an 
    existing ruling already promulgated by that agency and did not 
    require a new determination as to the applicability of the 
    limitation to other categories of taxpayers.
        In essence, the wording of this amendment is similar to the 
    wording of the amendment which was found in order. The Chair does 
    not see any new duties in any way imposed by the amendment.
        With reference to the court order issue, the language of the 
    amendment does not in any way speak to the question of court orders 
    or address the viability of court orders with regard to the 
    agency's actions.
        Lastly, with regard to the equal protection clause argument, 
    although those may be constitutional arguments which go to the 
    substance of the amendment, they do not go to the merits of the 
    parliamentary argument.
        Therefore, the point of order is overruled.

--For Changing an Existing Regulation

Sec. 64.29 While an agency may have authority to promulgate new 
    regulations which would change existing regulations, it is in order 
    in a general appropriation bill to deny the use of funds therein 
    for agency proceedings relating to changes in regulations.

    The ruling of the Chair on June 27, 1984,(11) was that 
language in a general appropriation bill prohibiting the use of funds 
therein to eliminate an existing legal requirement for sureties on 
customs bonds was in order as a valid limitation merely denying funds 
to change existing law and regulations. The point of order was as 
follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 130 Cong. Rec. ----, 98th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Bill] Frenzel [of Minnesota]: Mr. Chairman, I make a point 
    of order against section 513 on page 38.
        The portion of the bill to which the point of order relates is 
    as follows:

            Sec. 513. None of the funds made available by this Act for 
        the Department of Treasury may be used for the purpose of 
        eliminating any existing requirement for sureties on customs 
        bonds. . . .

        [This provision] violates rule XXI, clause 2. The section 
    prohibits the use of funds for the continuation of customs 
    rulemaking with respect to existing requirements for sureties on 
    customs bonds.
        The Customs Service has broad administrative authority to 
    establish guidelines for posting bonds for the payment of customs 
    duties.
        The rulemaking process is now underway to determine whether 
    existing requirements for sureties on customs bonds should be 
    modified or replaced altogether.
        Section 513 goes beyond the limitations of funds which are the 
    subject of this appropriation and constitutes an effort to change 
    existing law under the guise of a limitation. . . .
        The Chairman: (12) The Chair is ready to rule. . . .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. Anthony C. Beilenson (Calif.).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 6311]]

        The Chair would rule that in fact this section does constitute 
    a proper limitation consistent with the existing law and overrules 
    the gentleman's point of order.

New Duties Required to Invalidate Limitation

Sec. 64.30 While all limitations on funds on appropriation bills 
    require federal officials to construe the language of that law in 
    administering those funds, that duty of statutory construction, 
    absent a further imposition of an affirmative direction not 
    required by law, does not destroy the validity of the limitation.

    On June 27, 1974,(13) an amendment restricting the use 
of funds in an appropriation bill for abortions or abortion referral 
services, abortifacient drugs or devices, and the promotion or 
encouragement of abortion, was held to be a negative limitation on 
funds in the bill imposing no new duties on federal officials other 
than to construe the language of the limitation in administering the 
funds. The proceedings are discussed in Sec. 73.8, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 120 Cong. Rec. 21687, 93d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------