[Deschler's Precedents, Volume 8, Chapter 26]
[Chapter 26. Unauthorized Appropriations; Legislation on Appropriation Bills]
[B. Appropriations for Unauthorized Purposes]
[Â§ 18. Justice]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[Page 5550-5554]
 
                               CHAPTER 26
 
    Unauthorized Appropriations; Legislation on Appropriation Bills
 
              B. APPROPRIATIONS FOR UNAUTHORIZED PURPOSES
 
Sec. 18. Justice

Training of United States Attorneys

Sec. 18.1 An appropriation for the training of United States attorneys 
    and other officials was held not authorized by a law empowering the 
    Attorney General to exercise supervision over United States 
    attorneys.

    On Apr. 3, 1936,(7) the Committee of the Whole was 
considering H.R. 12098, an appropriation bill for the State, Justice, 
Commerce, and Labor Departments. During consideration, a point of order 
was sustained against a paragraph in the bill as indicated below:
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 7. 80 Cong. Rec. 4926, 4927, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
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        Salaries and expenses: For salaries and expenses incident to 
    the special instruction and training of the United States attorneys 
    and United States marshals, their assistants and deputies, and 
    United States commissioners, including personal services, supplies, 
    and equipment in the District of Columbia, traveling expenses, 
    including expenses of attendance at meetings when specifically 
    authorized by the Attorney General, $35,000.
        Mr. [Thomas L.] Blanton [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, I make a 
    point of order against the paragraph beginning on page 38, line 17, 
    ending on line 26, embracing the proposed appropriation of $35,000, 
    because there is no law authorizing it and it is legislation upon 
    an appropriation bill, unauthorized by law.
        The Chairman: (8) the Chair will hear the gentleman 
    from South Carolina [Mr. McMillan] on the point of order.
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 8. Byron B. Harlan (Ohio).
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        Mr. [John L.] McMillan: Mr. Chairman, this item is carried in 
    the bill, I may say to the Committee, on the authority of law as we 
    find it in section 317 of title V of the Code of Laws of the United 
    States in force January 3, 1935, in which I find this language:

            The Attorney General shall exercise general superintendence 
        and direction over the attorneys and marshals in the districts 
        of the United States and Territories as to the manner of 
        discharging their respective duties--

        And so forth. We take it that, in view of the language I have 
    just read, the Attorney General would have discretion under this 
    substantive law to provide for these men, marshals and district 
    attorneys, and what not, to be brought to Washington for such a 
    course of instruction or training as they may need. The purpose of 
    this language is to make uniform a policy to apply to district 
    attorneys and marshals throughout the country.

[[Page 5551]]

        Mr. Blanton: Mr. Chairman, that language in the statute read by 
    the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. McMillan] in no way embraces 
    authority for ``special instruction and training of United States 
    attorneys and United States marshals, their assistants and 
    deputies, and United States commissioners'' and their trips to 
    Washington. There is nothing in that language read by my colleague 
    that embraces or authorizes anything like that. This is nothing in 
    the world but providing for junket trips, pure and simple, and such 
    junket trips to Washington have been turned down by the Comptroller 
    General in the past. I have some of the accounts in my office, 
    certified to by his office, showing where he has turned them down 
    because there is no authority of law. This $35,000 provision is an 
    attempt to get around the Comptroller General of the United States.
        Mr. [John W.] McCormack [of Massachusetts]: Mr. Chairman, will 
    the gentleman yield?
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule. Does the gentleman 
    from Massachusetts wish to address the Chair on the point of order?
        Mr. McCormack: Not necessarily on the point of order, but I 
    should like to ask the gentleman from Texas to yield, if he will.
        Mr. Blanton: Certainly I yield to my friend from Massachusetts.
        Mr. McCormack: I just wish to make this observation: I do not 
    think the gentleman means to let it remain in the Record that these 
    are junket trips. I think what the Attorney General has in mind is 
    something which is a very desirable objective, namely, to create 
    uniformity throughout the country in the offices of the United 
    States district attorneys. I know something about the objective of 
    the Attorney General in this respect. It seems to me that, 
    independent of the point of order, it should not be permitted to go 
    into the Record, without an expression of view to the contrary, 
    that this is nothing but a junket trip.
        Mr. Blanton: I will say to the gentleman that he has not given 
    the attention to this matter that I have. I have gotten some of 
    these accounts in the past from the Comptroller General's office, 
    because it was my duty to look into those things as a member of 
    this committee. I have found out where they have attempted to put 
    these junket trips over and they have been approved by the 
    Department of Justice, but when they reached Comptroller General 
    McCarl he turned them down, and they were not paid out of 
    Government funds.
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule on the point of order.
        The question to be decided is the interpretation of the phrase, 
    ``special instruction and training'', contained in this 
    appropriation bill, the question being whether that phrase comes 
    under the statutory authorization to the Attorney General in the 
    section referred to by the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. 
    McMillan], section 317 of title 5, in which the Attorney General is 
    authorized to exercise ``general superintendence and direction'' 
    over the attorneys.
        This section has been on the statute books certainly for more 
    than half a century. So far as the records disclose, up to the 
    present time there has been

[[Page 5552]]

    no attempt to organize or operate a school for instructing district 
    attorneys under that authorization. There is very little in the 
    decisions interpreting this phrase of the statute. In the case of 
    Fish v. U.S. (36 Federal Reporter, 680), however, in a decision by 
    the District Court for the Eastern District of New York, the court, 
    by way of obiter, spoke as follows:

            The section no doubt confers upon the Attorney General 
        power to superintend any criminal prosecution instituted by the 
        district attorney, and to direct the district attorney in 
        regard to the method of discharging his duties in any 
        particular prosecution instituted by him. But it does not, in 
        my opinion, authorize the attorney general to control the 
        action of the district attorney in criminal cases by general 
        regulations. The supervision and direction contemplated by 
        section 362 must, as I think, be a particular instruction, 
        given in a particular case, and based on the facts of the 
        particular case. To hold otherwise would in many instances 
        deprive the court of the aid of counsel, learned in the law, 
        which is contemplated by the statute, and substitute in place 
        of counsel a set of general regulations issued by the Attorney 
        General; and in some cases the ends of justice would be 
        defeated by such a practice. A general regulation of the 
        Department of Justice that all district attorneys should in all 
        cases refuse to consent to any postponement of a trial, should 
        never admit a fact, should always move for the infliction of 
        the extreme penalty of the law, would hardly be upheld. The 
        statute must have some limit; and one proper limitation, as it 
        seems to me, is to require, for the validity of any direction 
        by the Attorney General in criminal cases, that it be made in a 
        particular case, and with reference to the duties of the 
        district attorney in that particular case.

        If this decision is to be followed, there is no authority under 
    present statutes for the Attorney General to operate a school for 
    district attorneys.
        The point of order is sustained.

Civil Rights Commission

Sec. 18.2 A paragraph in a general appropriation bill containing funds 
    for the Civil Rights Commission for fiscal 1979 was conceded to be 
    unauthorized in violation of Rule XXI clause 2 where the law 
    extending the existence and authorizations for the Commission 
    beyond fiscal 1978 had not yet been enacted (42 USC Sec. 1975c, 
    1975e).

    On June 14, 1978,(9) during consideration in the 
Committee of the Whole of the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, 
and Judiciary appropriation bill (H.R. 12934), a point of order was 
sustained against the following provision:
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 9. 124 Cong. Rec. 17629, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
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        The Clerk read as follows:

                           Commission on Civil Rights

                             salaries and expenses

            For expenses necessary for the Commission on Civil Rights, 
        including hire of passenger motor vehicles, $10,752,000.

        Mr. [John H.] Rousselot [of California]: Mr. Chairman, on the 
    basis of

[[Page 5553]]

    clause 2, rule XXI, I make a point of order that this is an 
    unauthorized appropriation and has not been authorized by law.
        Mr. [John M.] Slack [of West Virginia]: I concede the point of 
    order, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: (10) the point of order is conceded, 
    sustained, and the paragraph is stricken.
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10. George E. Brown, Jr. (Calif.).
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    Parliamentarian's Note: The authorization extension had not passed 
either House as of June 14 (see Public Law No. 95-444).

Department of Justice--Annual Authorizations Required

Sec. 18.3 Appropriations in a general appropriation bill for fiscal 
    1979 for the Department of Justice and its related agencies were 
    conceded to be unauthorized (where the authorization bill had been 
    reported in the House but not enacted into law) and were ruled out 
    in violation of Rule XXI clause 2.

    Pursuant to law (Public Law No. 94-503, Sec. 204), all 
appropriations for the Department of Justice and related agencies and 
bureaus are deemed unauthorized for fiscal 1979 and subsequent fiscal 
years unless specifically authorized for each fiscal year, and the 
creation of any subdivision in that department or the authorization of 
any activity therein, absent language specifically authorizing 
appropriations for a fiscal year, is not deemed sufficient 
authorization. Accordingly, on June 14, 1978,(11) during 
consideration of H.R. 12934 (Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, 
and the Judiciary appropriations for fiscal 1979), points of order were 
made and conceded, as follows:
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11. 124 Cong. Rec. 17622-24, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
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        The Clerk read as follows:

            For expenses necessary for the administration of the 
        Department of Justice, including hire of passenger motor 
        vehicles; and miscellaneous and emergency expenses authorized 
        or approved by the Attorney General or the Assistant Attorney 
        General for Administration; $28,500,000, of which $4,837,000 is 
        for the United States Parole Commission and $2,000,000 is for 
        the Federal justice research program, the latter amount to 
        remain available until expended.

        Mr. [John H.] Rousselot [of California]: Mr. Chairman, on the 
    basis of clause 2, rule XXI, I make the point of order that this is 
    an unauthorized appropriation and has not been authorized by law.
        Mr. [John M.] Slack [of West Virginia]: Mr. Chairman, I concede 
    the point of order.
        The Chairman: (12) the point of order is conceded 
    and sustained. The paragraph is stricken.
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12. George E. Brown, Jr. (Calif.).

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[[Page 5554]]

        The Clerk will read.
        The Clerk read as follows:

                                Legal Activities

          salaries and expenses, general legal activities (including 
                               transfer of funds)

            For expenses necessary for the legal activities of the 
        Department of Justice, not otherwise provided for, including 
        miscellaneous and emergency expenses authorized or approved by 
        the Attorney General or the Assistant Attorney General for 
        Administration. . . .

        Mr. Rousselot: Mr. Chairman, on the basis of clause 2, rule 
    XXI, I make the point of order that this is an unauthorized 
    appropriation and has not been authorized by law.
        Mr. Slack: I concede the point of order, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The point of order is conceded and sustained The 
    paragraph is stricken. . . .
        The Clerk read as follows:

                   salaries and expenses, antitrust division

            For expenses necessary for the enforcement of antitrust, 
        consumer protection and kindred laws. . . .

        Mr. Rousselot: Mr. Chairman, on the basis of clause 2, rule 
    XXI, I make the point of order that this is an unauthorized 
    appropriation and has not been authorized by law.
        Mr. Slack: Mr. Chairman, I concede the point of order.
        The Chairman: The point of order is conceded and sustained. The 
    paragraph is stricken. . . .
        The Clerk read as follows:

            For necessary expenses of the Community Relations Service. 
        . . .

        Mr. Rousselot: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order on the 
    basis of clause 2, rule XXI, that this is an unauthorized 
    appropriation and has not been authorized by law.
        Mr. Slack: Mr. Chairman, I concede the point of order.
        The Chairman: The point of order is conceded and sustained. The 
    paragraph is stricken.