[Deschler's Precedents, Volume 6, Chapter 21]
[Chapter 21. Order of Business; Special Orders]
[C. Special Rules or Orders]
[Â§ 19. Interpretation and Effect]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[Page 4106-4118]
 
                               CHAPTER 21
 
                   Order of Business; Special Orders
 
                       C. SPECIAL RULES OR ORDERS
 
Sec. 19. Interpretation and Effect

    Since the interpretation and effect of special orders depends on 
their exact language and purpose, few general principles can be laid 
down in that regard.
    While the general effect of the adoption of a resolution making in 
order the consideration of a bill is to give to the bill a privileged 
status, the adoption of the resolution making in order the 
consideration of a bill does not make the consideration of the bill 
mandatory unless so stated therein, and the bill must still be called 
up by a Member designated in the resolution or authorize by the 
committee to do so.(19)
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19. See Sec. 19.9, infra.
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    The Speaker in the House and the Chairman in the Committee of the 
Whole are often requested to interpret the effect of a pending or 
adopted order of business resolution. In responding to such inquiries, 
the Chair may rely upon the legislative history of the resolution, 
including hearings on the resolution, statements as to purpose and 
intent made by members of the Committee on Rules, and debate on the 
resolution in the House.(1) But the actions of the Committee 
on Rules in construing the rules of the House and their application to 
factual situations are not binding on the Chair, who has the 
responsibility to interpret the rules when the question is properly 
presented.(2)
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 1. See Sec. Sec. 19.1-19.3, infra.
 2. See Sec. 19.3, infra.
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    The Speaker may decline to answer parliamentary inquiries, stated 
in the House, as to parliamentary situations which may arise in the 
Committee of the Whole when operating under a resolution affecting the 
order of business; such questions are properly presented, when they 
arise, to the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole.(3) The 
Speaker, moreover, will not entertain points of order against such 
resolutions on the ground that they
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 3. See Sec. Sec. 19.4, 19.5, infra.
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[[Page 4107]]

are inconsistent or that they abrogate the rules of the House, as it is 
for the House to pass on the efficacy of such resolutions by voting 
thereon.(4)
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 4. See Sec. 19.7, infra.
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    Similarly, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole will not 
question the validity of the provisions of such a resolution which has 
been adopted by the House.(5)
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 5. See Sec. 19.6, infra.                          -------------------
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Chair's Interpretation of Special Orders

Sec. 19.1 Notwithstanding the adoption by the House of a resolution 
    making in order the consideration of conference reports on the day 
    reported (on that day), the Speaker indicated, in response to a 
    parliamentary inquiry, that the legislative history which prompted 
    the Committee on Rules to meet and report that resolution 
    restricted his authority to recognize Members to call up three 
    designated reports.

    On Oct. 18, 1972,(6) Mr. William M. Colmer, of 
Mississippi, called up, by direction of the Committee on Rules, House 
Resolution 1168, providing for the consideration, on a certain day, of 
any reports from the Committee on Rules and any conference reports 
reported on that day. Mr. Colmer explained that the resolution was a 
product of an informal leadership agreement of the preceding day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 118 Cong. Rec. 37063, 37064, 92d Cong. 2d Sess.
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    Speaker Carl Albert, of Oklahoma, then answered parliamentary 
inquiries on his exercise of the power of recognition under the 
resolution:

        Mr. [Peter W.] Rodino [Jr., of New Jersey]: Mr. Speaker, under 
    the resolution just agreed to, would it be in order for the House 
    to consider the conference report when it is ready on S. 2087, 
    Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, benefits to 
    survivors of police officers killed in line of duty, which was 
    agreed upon and which was filed yesterday?
        The Speaker: The Chair must answer the gentleman in accordance 
    with the language which the Chair used when this matter was before 
    the House on yesterday. At that time the Chair stated, and no 
    specific reference was made to any bill because it had been 
    informally mentioned to the Members who were seeking the rule, that 
    this rule would not be used for any other bill except those dealing 
    with three items. Under that interpretation it would be in order to 
    bring those conference reports upon the day on which they were 
    filed. As the Chair understands his own language and his own 
    informal agreement, which was a part of the history, the Chair 
    would very much like to recognize the gentleman,

[[Page 4108]]

    but the Chair feels constrained to hold that the legislative 
    history restricts all action under House Resolution 1168 to three 
    measures, the highway bill, the debt ceiling bill, and the 
    continuing resolution.
        Mr. Rodino: Mr. Speaker a further parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Rodino: Mr. Speaker, referring again to the rule adopted, 
    was not the language strictly stated, and this is the language that 
    I heard stated, the language referred to in the course of debate 
    notwithstanding legislative history of yesterday, to consider 
    conference reports the same day reported, notwithstanding the 
    provisions of clause 2, rule XXVIII?
        The Speaker: The gentleman is referring to three conference 
    reports which precipitated the action which brought into existence 
    this resolution.
        The Chair would like to recognize the gentleman, but the Chair 
    feels that its own promise is at stake here.
        The Chair will try to find some other method of recognizing the 
    gentleman.
        The Chair does not feel that in good faith or in good 
    conscience it can recognize the gentleman under the circumstances. 
    . . .
        The Chair feels constrained to say--and the Chair hates to make 
    a statement from the chair on issues like this--it was suggested 
    these three bills which the Chair has mentioned be listed in the 
    resolution. The Chair said that was not necessary; that was the 
    understanding, and it would simply complicate the resolution by 
    naming the three bills. That is what happened.
        The Chair recognizes that had it not been for that 
    understanding and legislative history, which is in the Record, this 
    would have been eligible under the clear language of the 
    resolution.
        The Chair would gladly recognize the gentleman for a unanimous-
    consent request to bring it up now.

    Parliamentarian's Note: When called upon to interpret the 
provisions of a special rule adopted by the House, the Speaker may 
examine the legislative history of that resolution, including debate 
and statements of members of the Committee on Rules during its 
consideration in the House.

Sec. 19.2 In construing a resolution waiving points of order, the 
    Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may examine debate on the 
    resolution in the House in determining the scope of the waiver.

    On June 22, 1973,(7) Mr. Edward P. Boland, of 
Massachusetts, made a point of order against three amendments offered 
en bloc by Mr. Robert O. Tiernan, of Rhode Island, to H.R. 8825 (the 
HUD and independent agencies appropriation bill) on the ground that 
they violated Rule XXI clause 2, prohibiting legislation on an 
appropriations bill. Before reaching the question whether the 
amendments did in fact violate that rule,
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 7. 119 Cong. Rec. 20981-83, 93d Cong. 1st Sess.
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[[Page 4109]]

Chairman James G. O'Hara, of Michigan, heard argument on and ruled on 
the scope of the resolution providing for the consideration of the bill 
and waiving certain points of order:

        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The Chair feels that it will be necessary first to speak on the 
    contention raised by the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Tiernan) 
    and amplified upon by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Giaimo) 
    with respect to the provisions of the resolution under which the 
    bill is being considered, and whether or not the provisions of that 
    resolution have an effect on the point of order made by the 
    gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Boland).
        The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Giaimo) is correct in 
    asserting that if the amendment offered by the gentleman from Rhode 
    Island ( Mr. Tiernan) is out of order at all it is out of order 
    because of the second sentence of clause 2 of rule XXI, which 
    contains the provisions that ``nor shall any provision in any such 
    bill or amendment thereto changing existing law be in order,'' and 
    so forth, setting forth exceptions. But the gentleman from 
    Connecticut (Mr. Giaimo) contends, and the gentleman from Rhode 
    Island (Mr. Tiernan) concurs, that the resolution providing for the 
    consideration of the bill waives the provisions of that rule. The 
    Chair has again read the rule. It says:

            Resolved, That during the consideration of the bill (H.R. 
        8825) making appropriations for the Department of Housing and 
        Urban Development . . . the provisions of clause 2, rule XXI 
        are hereby waived.

        It does not say that points of order are waived only with 
    respect to matters contained in the bill. It says ``During the 
    consideration of the bill'' the provisions of clause 2 of rule XXI 
    are waived.
        The Chair was troubled by that language and has examined the 
    statements made by the members of the Committee on Rules who 
    presented the rule to see if their statements in any way amplified 
    or explained or limited that language. The Chair has found that 
    both the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Long) and the gentleman from 
    Ohio (Mr. Latta) in their explanations of the resolution did, 
    indeed, indicate that it was their intention, and the intention of 
    the committee, that the waiver should apply only to matters 
    contained in the bill and that it was not a blanket waiver.
        Therefore whatever ambiguity there may have been in the rule as 
    reported, the Chair is going to hold, was cured by the remarks and 
    legislative history made during the presentation of the rule, which 
    were not disputed in any way by the gentleman from Connecticut or 
    anyone else. However, the Chair, recognizes that it is a rather 
    imprecise was of achieving that result and would hope that in the 
    future such resolutions would be more precise in their application.

Sec. 19.3 In ruling on the germaneness of an amendment, the Chair 
    considers the purpose of the amendment with relation to the bill 
    under consideration, and is not

[[Page 4110]]

    bound by the fact that the Committee on Rules, in reporting the 
    resolution providing for the consideration of the bill, 
    specifically waived points of order against the consideration of a 
    similar amendment.

    On Mar. 15, 1960,(8) Mr. Howard W. Smith, of Virginia, 
made a point of order, on the grounds of germaneness, against an 
amendment offered by Mr. William M. McCulloch, of Ohio, to H.R. 8601, 
to enforce constitutional rights and for other purposes. In argument on 
the point of order, Mr. Smith stated in support of his contention that 
the amendment was not germane, that the Committee on Rules had reported 
a resolution for the consideration of the bill, which resolution waived 
points of order against a specified amendment containing similar 
language. Mr. Emanuel Celler, of New York, and Mr. Charles A. Halleck, 
of Indiana, argued that the action of the Committee on Rules in 
resolving any doubts about the nongermaneness of an amendment by 
waiving points of order should not indicate whether the amendment was 
in fact germane. Chairman Francis E. Walter, of Pennsylvania, ruled as 
follows:
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 8. 106 Cong. Rec. 5655-57, 86th Cong. 2d Sess.
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        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule.
        It is quite true that the rule House Resolution 359, under 
    which H.R. 8601 is being considered, contains the language that the 
    gentleman from Virginia mentioned a moment ago, concerning putting 
    in order H.R. 10035 in order to eliminate any question of 
    germaneness of that particular proposal.
        The Chair dislikes to substitute the judgment of the Chair for 
    that of the distinguished Committee on Rules, but, frankly, the 
    Chair does not believe that including this language necessarily 
    binds the present occupant of the Chair.
        It is quite true that the measure, H.R. 8601, deals with 
    Federal election records, and the Chair is quite certain that the 
    membership agrees with the Chair that the scope is rather narrow. 
    However, the Chair feels that the amendment offered by the 
    gentleman from Ohio has to do with the basic purpose of title 3 of 
    the bill H.R. 8601.
        The Chair overrules the point of order.

Interpretations Not Within the Chair's Province

Sec. 19.4 During consideration in the House of a resolution waiving 
    points of order against a designated amendment, the Speaker 
    declined to respond to a parliamentary inquiry concerning 
    amendments which might be

[[Page 4111]]

    offered to that amendment in Committee of the Whole, since the 
    Speaker does not construe parliamentary situations which might 
    arise in the Committee of the Whole.

    On June 29, 1973,(9) the House was considering House 
Resolution 479, providing for the consideration of H.R. 9055, a 
supplemental appropriations bill; the resolution waived points of order 
against a designated amendment which contained legislation. Mr. James 
J. Pickle, of Texas, inquired of Speaker Carl Albert, of Oklahoma, as 
to the process of amending the amendment designated in the resolution. 
The Speaker responded as follows:
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 9. 119 Cong. Rec. 22336, 22337, 93d Cong. 1st Sess.
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        The Chair will answer that this is a matter for the Chairman of 
    the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.
        The Chair is not able at this time to take over the 
    responsibility of making parliamentary rulings from the Chairman of 
    the Committee of the Whole House.
        Mr. [Delbert L.] Latta [of Ohio]: Mr. Speaker, the Speaker is 
    absolutely correct. This is something that can be taken up in the 
    Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union

Sec. 19.5 The Speaker declined, in response to a parliamentary inquiry, 
    to interpret the provisions of a resolution which would control the 
    consideration of amendments in the Committee of the Whole.

    On Apr. 16, 1973,(10) the House was considering a 
resolution making in order the consideration of a bill in the Committee 
of the Whole, where the resolution made in order a designated amendment 
as an amendment in the nature of a substitute, and if that amendment 
was rejected made in order the committee amendments printed in the 
bill. In response to a parliamentary inquiry as to the procedure in the 
consideration of such amendments in the Committee of the Whole, Speaker 
Carl Albert, of Oklahoma, stated that the question was properly for the 
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole and that the Speaker did not 
desire to ``get into the parliamentary situation which would properly 
be considered in the Committee of the Whole.''
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10. 119 Cong. Rec. 12501, 12503, 93d Cong. 1st Sess.
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Sec. 19.6 It is the duty of the Chair to determine whether language in 
    a pending bill conforms with the rules of the House, but where the 
    House has adopted a resolution waiving points of order

[[Page 4112]]

    against provisions in violation of the standing rules, the Chair 
    will not construe the constitutional validity of those provisions.

    On May 10, 1973,(11) the Committee of the Whole was 
considering for amendment under the five-minute rule the bill H.R. 
7447, making supplemental appropriations, where the House had 
previously adopted House Resolution 389 waiving points of order against 
unauthorized appropriations, legislation, and reappropriations of 
unexpended balances in the bill. Mr. Sidney R. Yates, of Illinois, made 
a point of order against language contained in the bill, appropriating 
moneys for the Department of Defense, on the grounds that such 
appropriation violated constitutional principles:
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11. 119 Cong. Rec. 15290, 15291, 93d Cong. 1st Sess.
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        Mr. Chairman. I make a point of order against the language set 
    forth in lines 10, 11, and 12, on page 6.
        Article I, section 8, of the Constitution of the United States 
    says:
        ``The Congress shall have the power to declare war.''
        Congress has not declared war against Cambodia or Laos or 
    against any other country in Southeast Asia for that matter. 
    Congress has not given the President any authority to use the 
    American Armed Forces in Cambodia and Laos. Nevertheless, on order 
    of President Nixon, American military planes are bombing in both 
    those countries. The appropriation contained in the transfer 
    authority includes funds to continue the bombing of Cambodia and 
    Laos. . . .
        Now, my argument, Mr. Chairman, will not relate to an 
    interpretation by the Chair of the Constitution. I want to make 
    that clear at this point.
        Rule XXI, paragraph 2, of the Rules of the House says:

            No appropriation shall be reported in any general 
        appropriation bill for any expenditure not previously 
        authorized by law.

        Mr. Chairman, under that rule it is not enough that there be 
    ordinary legislative authority which is required for other 
    appropriations. It is not enough that there be ordinary legislative 
    authority upon which to base an appropriation for American Armed 
    Forces to engage in war.
        There must be constitutional authority for that appropriation 
    as well, namely, there must be congressional approval for American 
    forces to engage in a war. Both authorizations are essential for 
    that kind of appropriation.
        Mr. Chairman, I am contending that there are two forms of 
    legislative authorization that are essential for military 
    appropriations which are to be used to carry on a war, as the 
    bombing is in Cambodia and Laos. One is the ordinary legislative 
    authorization, and the other, which is necessary, also, is a 
    following of the constitutional mandate as well.
        It will be argued, Mr. Chairman, what difference does that 
    make? Points of order have been waived by rule approved by the 
    House and granted by

[[Page 4113]]

    the Committee on Rules. That argument might be appropriate with 
    respect the need for ordinary legislation which would authorize the 
    use of that transfer of authority, but, as I pointed out, we have 
    two forms of legislation. While that waiver of points of order 
    might apply to ordinary legislation, it cannot apply to a waiver of 
    the constitutional provisions, because the Committee on Rules 
    cannot waive any constitutional provisions. The provisions of the 
    Constitution cannot be waived by the Committee on Rules, because to 
    hold otherwise would be to authorize any unconstitutional action by 
    the House. This House cannot pass any rule of procedure that would 
    vitiate or violate any provision of the Constitution. . . .
        I am asking the Chair for its ruling on two points. One, I ask 
    the Chair to rule with respect to military appropriations which 
    provide funds for American Armed Forces to engage in war under rule 
    XXI, section 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the House of 
    Representatives, which states there must be, as well as any other 
    legislation authorizing such action, compliance with article I, 
    section 8, of the U.S. Constitution, which requires the approval of 
    the Congress for American Armed Forces to engage in that war; and, 
    secondly, I am asking the Chair to rule that the requirements in 
    article I, section 8, cannot be waived by any rule of the Committee 
    on Rules.
        Mr. Chairman, with your ruling, if favorable, the language 
    authorizing the transfer authority should be stricken.

    After further argument, Chairman Jack B. Brooks, of Texas, ruled as 
follovs:

        The Chair is ready to rule.
        The Chair has read the resolution, and the resolution adopted 
    by the House under which this legislation is being considered says 
    that--

            All points of order against said bill for failure to comply 
        with the provisions of clause 2 and clause 5 of rule XXI are 
        hereby waived.

        Under clause 2, which the Chair has read, the pending paragraph 
    would be subject to a point of order, as legislation, were it not 
    for this rule.
        The Chair is not in a position, nor is it proper for the Chair 
    to rule on the constitutionality of the language, or on the 
    constitutionality or other effect of the action of the House in 
    adopting the resolution of the Committee on Rules. In the head 
    notes in the precedents of the House it very clearly states that it 
    is not the duty of a chairman to construe the Constitution as it 
    may affect proposed legislation, or to interpret the legality or 
    effect of language; and the Chair therefore overrules the point of 
    order raised by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Yates).

Sec. 19.7 A point of order does not lie against the consideration of a 
    resolution, reported by the Committee on Rules and properly before 
    the House as a privileged matter, on the ground that its adoption 
    will abrogate the provisions of a House rule, as it is for the 
    House and not the Chair to determine the order of its proceedings.

[[Page 4114]]

    On Nov. 28, 1967,(12) the previous question had been 
moved on House Resolution 985, called up by direction of the Committee 
on Rules, providing for concurring in a Senate amendment to a House 
bill; the resolution was necessary in order to waive the requirement of 
Rule XX clause 1, that Senate amendments be considered in Committee of 
the Whole if originating in the House they would be subject to that 
procedure. Speaker John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts, overruled a 
point of order against the resolution:
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12. 113 Cong. Rec. 34038, 34039, 90th Cong. 1st Sess.
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        Mr. [Paul C.] Jones of Missouri: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of 
    order against a vote on this resolution, and I make the point of 
    order based entirely on rule XX, which says that any amendment of 
    the Senate to any House bill shall be subject to a point of order 
    that it shall first be considered in the Committee of the Whole 
    House on the State of the Union. If it originated in the House it 
    would be subject to that point of order. I believe there is no 
    question about it being subject to a point of order should it 
    originate here in this House. Until that issue is debated in the 
    Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union I believe 
    that we are violating rule XX of the House rules.
        The Speaker: The Chair will state that the Chair has previously 
    ruled on the point of order raised by the gentleman, and the matter 
    is one that is now before the House for the consideration of the 
    House, and the will of the House.
        For the reasons heretofore stated and now stated, the Chair 
    overrules the point of order.
        Mr. Jones of Missouri: Respectfully, Mr. Speaker, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Jones of Missouri: Mr. Speaker, can the Chair tell me under 
    what authority the House can consider this in the House rather than 
    in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, in 
    view of rule XX which says it shall first be considered in the 
    Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union?
        The Speaker: The Chair will state that the House can change its 
    rules at any time upon a resolution that is properly before the 
    House reported by the Committee on Rules. The present resolution 
    has been put before the House by the Committee on Rules within the 
    authority of the Committee on Rules, therefore the matter presents 
    itself for the will of the House.
        Mr. Jones of Missouri: Mr. Speaker, a further parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The reason I am making this is that I want to get some record 
    on this for this reason: The Chair has said that the Committee on 
    Rules may make a resolution which has not been adopted by the House 
    which summarily amends the Rules of the House which the Members of 
    the House are supposed to rely upon.
        This rule has not been adopted as yet.
        The Speaker: The Chair will state that the Committee on Rules 
    has reported the rule under consideration--

[[Page 4115]]

        Mr. Jones of Missouri: But it has never been voted upon.
        The Speaker: The Chair will state that we are about to approach 
    that matter now.
        Mr. Jones of Missouri: And I am challenging that, and the point 
    of order is made that we cannot vote on that because it says in 
    rule XX that this first shall be considered in the Committee of the 
    Whole House on the State of the Union.
        The Speaker: The Chair cannot be any more specific or clear in 
    responding to the point of order or in answering the gentleman's 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The matter is properly before the House and it is a matter on 
    which the House may express its will.

Sec. 19.8 The question whether the House will consider a resolution 
    making in order the consideration of a bill which allegedly seeks 
    to amend a nonexisting law is a matter for the House and not the 
    Chair to decide.

    On May 13, 1953,(13) Mr. Leo E. Allen, of Illinois, 
called up, by direction of the Committee on Rules, a resolution 
providing for the consideration of a bill to amend the ``Submerged 
Lands Act,'' reported from the Committee on the Judiciary Speaker 
Joseph W. Martin, Jr., of Massachusetts, overruled a point of order 
against the consideration of the resolution:
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13. 99 Cong. Rec. 4877, 83d Cong. 1st Sess.
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        Mr. [Michael A.] Feighan [of Ohio]: Mr. Speaker, a point of 
    order.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Feighan: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order against the 
    consideration of this rule because it attempts to make in order the 
    consideration of the bill H.R. 5l34, which is a bill to amend a 
    nonexisting act.
        The Speaker: The Chair will state that the point of order that 
    has been raised by the gentleman from Ohio is not one within the 
    jurisdiction of the Chair, but is a question for the House to 
    decide, whether it wants to consider such legislation.
        The Chair overrules the point of order.

Effect of Adoption of Special Order

Sec. 19.9 The adoption of a resolution making in order the 
    consideration of a bill does not necessarily make the bill the 
    unfinished business the next day, and the bill can only be called 
    up by a Member designated by the committee to do so.

        On July 19, 1939,(14) the House adopted a resolution 
    from the Committee on Rules making in order the consideration of a 
    bill. Speaker William B. Bankhead, of Alabama, an
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14. 84 Cong. Rec. 9541, 76th Cong. 1st Sess.
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[[Page 4116]]

    swered a parliamentary inquiry on the status of the bill thereby 
    made in order as unfinished business:

        Mr. [Claude V.] Parsons [of Illinois]: Mr. Speaker, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Parsons: Mr. Speaker, the House having adopted the rule, is 
    not this bill the unfinished business of the House on tomorrow?
        The Speaker: Not necessarily. The rule adopted by the House 
    makes the bill in order for consideration, but it is not 
    necessarily the unfinished business. It can only come up, after the 
    adoption of the rule, by being called up by the gentleman in charge 
    of the bill.

Sec. 19.10 The effect of a special rule providing for the consideration 
    of a bill is to give to the bill the privileged status for 
    consideration that a revenue or appropriation bill has under Rule 
    XVI clause 9.

    On June 28, 1930,(15) Mr. Fred S. Purnell, of Indiana, 
called up by direction of the Committee on Rules, House Resolution 264, 
providing that upon the adoption of the resolution it be in order to 
move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole for 
the consideration of a particular bill, and providing for that bill's 
consideration. Speaker Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, overruled a point 
of order against the resolution and characterized the effect of such a 
resolution from the Committee on Rules:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 72 Cong. Rec. 11994, 11995, 71st Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Carl R.] Chindblom [of Illinois]: Mr. Speaker, if pressed, 
    I will make the point of order that the resolution from the 
    Committee on Rules is not in order because it relates to a bill 
    which is not now upon the calendar of the House under the 
    conditions and in the status which existed when this resolution was 
    adopted by the Committee on Rules.
        The calendar shows that H.R. 12549 was reported to the House on 
    June 24, 1930, Report No. 2016, and was placed on the House 
    Calendar. The resolution or rule now called up for consideration by 
    the Committee on Rules was presented to the House June 20, 1930, 
    and therefore before the bill on the calendar had been reported to 
    the House.
        Of course, we all know that this bill is now upon the calendar 
    for the third time. A previous rule was adopted for its 
    consideration on June 12, 1930, and at that time a point of order 
    was made, when it was sought to take up the bill in Committee of 
    the Whole House on the state of the Union, on the ground that the 
    report did not comply with the Ramseyer rule. Subsequently, after 
    the present rule was presented in the House on June 20, 1930, I 
    think it is well known that another irregularity in the adoption of 
    the report became known, so, on June 23, if my recollection is 
    correct, the chairman of the Committee on Patents obtained 
    unanimous consent to withdraw the bill and the report, and the bill 
    was thereupon

[[Page 4117]]

    reported the following day and placed upon the House Calendar.
        The situation is novel and arises, so far as I can learn, for 
    the first time, and it raises the question whether the Committee on 
    Rules has authority in advance of the report of a bill, and in 
    advance of the placing of a bill on any calendar of the House, to 
    bring in a rule for the consideration of the bill under the general 
    rules of the House, as this resolution does, because the rule 
    merely makes it in order to move that the House resolve itself into 
    the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the 
    consideration of the bill. As I construe the rule, it does not 
    suspend any of the rules of the House in reference to the 
    consideration of legislation. It does not suspend the rule which 
    requires bills to be upon the calendar of the House before they can 
    have consideration. . . .
        Mr. [John Q.] Tilson [of Connecticut]: Mr. Speaker, will the 
    gentleman yield?
        Mr. Chindblom: Yes.
        Mr. Tilson: Does not the effect of this resolution date from 
    the time it is adopted by the House, and not from the time it was 
    reported by the Committee on Rules? And if we today in the House 
    adopt the rule, is not the effect of the rule to be applied as of 
    today, and not three or four days ago, when the rule was reported?
        The Speaker: The Chair is prepared to rule. It is not necessary 
    to pass upon the question of whether the original rule for the 
    consideration of this bill is still alive or not. The Chair, when 
    the matter was originally submitted to him, informally expressed a 
    grave doubt as to whether it would be considered alive. But this 
    rule is an entirely different rule. It appears now for the first 
    time for consideration. The Chair is aware that this bill has had a 
    rather stormy passage. It has been twice rereferred to the 
    committee, but as the bill now appears, so far as the Chair is 
    advised, it is properly on the calendar as of June 24, 1930, and 
    this special rule is properly reported to consider that bill. The 
    Chair thinks that all that special rules of this sort do is to put 
    bills for which they are provided in the same status that a revenue 
    or appropriation bill has under the general rules of the House. 
    Clause 9 of Rule XVI provides:

            At any time after the reading of the Journal it shall be in 
        order, by direction of the appropriate committees, to move that 
        the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House 
        on the state of the Union for the purpose of considering bills 
        raising revenue, or general appropriation bills.

        Now all that this special rule does is to give the same status 
    to this particular bill at this particular time. The Chair has no 
    hesitation in saying that the Committee on Rules has acted with 
    authority, and that it will be in order to move that the House 
    resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state 
    of the Union for the consideration of this bill after the 
    resolution is passed.

Sec. 19.11 Where a special rule gives a highly privileged status to a 
    motion for a recess, such motion takes precedence over a motion to 
    adjourn.

[[Page 4118]]

    On June 4, 1934,(16) Speaker Henry T. Rainey, of 
Illinois, ruled that a motion to recess, given privilege by a special 
rule, took precedence over a motion to adjourn:
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16. 78 Cong. Rec. 10470, 10471, 73d Cong. 2d Sess.
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        Mr. [Joseph W.] Byrns [of Tennessee]: Mr. Speaker, under the 
    rules it is in order today to call up bills under suspension of the 
    rules and to call the Consent Calendar. We have been here since 11 
    o'clock. The entire day has been taken up in suspensions. There are 
    quite a number of bills on the Unanimous Consent Calendar. A number 
    of Members have come to me and said they were very anxious to have 
    those bills called. Perhaps this will be the last time the Consent 
    Calendar can be called during this session. I think it is only fair 
    that this legislative day shall go over until tomorrow.
        Mr. Speaker, I move that the House stand in recess until 11 
    o'clock tomorrow.

        Mr. [Gerald J.] Boileau [of Wisconsin]: Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    preferential motion.
        Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.
        Mr. Byrns: Mr. Speaker, under the rule adopted last week my 
    motion is highly privileged.
        The Speaker: The gentleman from Wisconsin cannot be recognized.

    The special rule referred to was reported from the Committee on 
Rules and adopted on June 1, 1934:

        Mr. [William B.] Bankhead [of Alabama]: Mr. Speaker, I call up 
    a privileged report (Rept. No. 1856) from the Committee on Rules 
    (H. Res. 410) and ask for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read as follows:

                              House Resolution 410

            Resolved, That during the remainder of the second session 
        of the Seventy-third Congress it shall be in order for the 
        Speaker at any time to entertain motions, to suspend the rules, 
        notwithstanding the provisions of clause 1, rule XXVII; it 
        shall also be in order at any time during the second session of 
        the Seventy-third Congress for the majority leader to move that 
        the House take a recess, and said motion is hereby made of the 
        highest privilege; and it shall also be in order at any time 
        during the second session of the Seventy-third Congress to 
        consider reports from the Committee on Rules, as provided in 
        clause 45, rule XI, except that the provision requiring a two-
        thirds vote to consider said reports is hereby suspended during 
        the remainder of this session of Congress.(17)
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17. Id. at p. 10239.

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